UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

COLLEGE OF NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF

AND
NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE

**********

THE JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE

FOR THE

JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS

RAYMOND A. SPRUANCE WARFIGHTERS COURSE

FEBRUARY 2016
**********

FOREWORD

This syllabus provides a comprehensive overview of the Naval War College Joint
Military Operations Department course on Joint Maritime Operations. Prepared for the
College of Naval Command and Staff and the Naval Staff College, this syllabus, along with
the JMO Blackboard website and iPad, provides session-by-session material to assist the
student in daily seminar preparation and development of a personal plan of study.
Administrative information is also included.

Richard A. LaBranche, CAPT, USN

Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

Approved:

Phil Haun, Dean of Academics

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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 JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT
SPRUANCE COURSE

FOREWARD ............................................................................................................................ i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... iii

COURSE STUDY GUIDES .................................................................................................. iv

1. Mission................................................................................................................. vii
2. Course Objectives ................................................................................................ vii
3. Course Overview ................................................................................................. vii
4. CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy ....................................... viii
5. Course Organization ............................................................................................. xi
6. Syllabus Organization ......................................................................................... xiv
7. Methods of Instruction ......................................................................................... xv
8. Readings .............................................................................................................. xvi
9. JMO Research Paper ......................................................................................... xviii
10. Plagiarism, Misrepresentation, and Cheating ................................................... xviii
11. Requirements ...................................................................................................... xix
12. JMO Department Grading Criteria ..................................................................... xxi
13. Seminar Assignments....................................................................................... xxvii
14. Schedule ........................................................................................................... xxvii
15. Key Personnel ................................................................................................. xxviii
16. Faculty Assistance ............................................................................................ xxix
17. Student Critiques............................................................................................... xxix
18. Lectures by Senior Military Leaders ................................................................. xxix
19. Non-Attribution Policy ..................................................................................... xxix
20. Course Calendar ................................................................................................. xxx
21. Faculty Biographies ........................................................................................... xxx
.

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 COURSE STUDY GUIDES

INTRODUCTORY SESSIONS

JMO-01 Introductory Lecture (Lecture) 1

JMO-02 Introductory Seminar (Seminar) 3
JMO-03 JMO Research Paper (Seminar) 5

NAVAL TACTICS AND CAPABILITIES

JMO-04 Introduction to Naval Tactics (Seminar) 11

JMO-05 The Tactical Employment of Naval Forces: 15
Objectives and Methods (Seminar)
JMO-06 Naval Platforms, Weapons, and Sensors (Seminar) 19
JMO-07 Fundamentals of Surface Warfare (Seminar) 23
JMO-08 Fundamentals of Submarine Warfare (Seminar) 27
JMO-09 Fundamentals of Naval Air Warfare (Seminar) 29
JMO-10 Tabletop Exercise #1: Organizing Naval Assets in the 33
Open Ocean (Seminar and Exercise)

JOINT OPERATIONAL WARFARE

JMO-11 Introduction to Operational Art (Seminar) 36

JMO-12 The War in the Pacific (Lecture) 39
JMO-13 Military Objectives and the Levels of War (Seminar) 43
JMO-14 The Theater: Its Structure and Geometry (Seminar) 47
JMO-15 Operational Factors (Seminar) 51
JMO-16 Operational Functions (Seminar) 55
JMO-17 Major Operations/Campaigns and their Elements (Seminar) 59
JMO-18 Operational Design (Seminar) 65
JMO-19 Operational Thinking and Leadership (Seminar) 69
JMO-20 A Critique of Doctrine: U. S. Doctrine and Operational 75
Art (Seminar)

NAVAL WARFARE THEORY

JMO-21 Introduction to Naval Warfare Theory (Seminar) 79

JMO-22 The Maritime Environment (Seminar) 83
JMO-23 The Objectives of Naval Warfare: Control and Denial of 89
the Sea (Seminar)
JMO-24 Combined Arms: Fundamentals of Anti-Surface Warfare 95
(Seminar)
JMO-25 Combined Arms: Fundamentals of Anti-Submarine 99
Warfare (Seminar)

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JMO-26 Combined Arms: Fundamentals of Naval Counter-Air 105
Warfare (Seminar)
JMO-27 Combined Arms: Fundamentals of Amphibious Warfare 109
(Seminar)
JMO-28 Combined Arms: Fundamentals of Mine Warfare (Seminar) 113
JMO-29 Combined Arms: Maritime Trade Warfare (Seminar) 117
JMO-30 Designing Major Naval/Joint Operations (Seminar) 121
JMO-31 Tabletop Exercise #2: Analysis of the Struggle for 125
Guadalcanal (Exercise)
JMO-32 The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict (Lecture and Practical Exercise) 129
JMO-33 Examination #1 (Individual Effort) 133

MARITIME OPERATIONAL LAW

JMO-34 Maritime Operational Law (Lecture) 135

JMO-35 Legal Basis for the Use of Force and Law of Armed Conflict 139
(Lecture)
JMO-36 Rules of Engagement Case Studies (Seminar) 145
JMO-37 Operational Law Case Study (Seminar) 149

THE SERVICES, THEIR DOCTRINE, AND FUNCTIONS

JMO-38 U. S. Navy Organization and Employment (Seminar) 153

JMO-39 U. S. Marine Corps Organization and Employment (Seminar) 155
JMO-40 U. S. Coast Guard Organization and Employment (Seminar) 159
JMO-41 U. S. Army Organization and Employment (Seminar) 161
JMO-42 U. S. Air Force Organization and Employment (Seminar) 163
JMO-43 U. S. Special Operations Forces Organization and Employment 167
(Seminar)
JMO-44 Naval Command and Control (Seminar) 171
JMO-45 Logistics and Deployment (Seminar) 175
JMO-46 Operational Intelligence for the Maritime Commander (Seminar) 181
JMO-47 Information Operations and Cyberspace (Seminar) 187
JMO-48 Conflict Termination: Criteria and Defeat Mechanisms (Seminar) 193
JMO-49 Stability Operations (Seminar) 197
JMO-50 Tabletop Exercise #3: PRC-Taiwan Case Study (Exercise) 203

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 OPERATIONAL DECISION MAKING
AND MILITARY PLANNING

JMO-51 Problem Solving and Complexity (Seminar) 207

JMO-52 The Logic of the Commanders Estimate and Decision (Seminar) 213
JMO-53 Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX) (Seminar) 219
JMO-54 Orders and Orders Development (Seminar) 221
JMO-55 Tabletop Exercise #4: An Analysis of VADM Kinkaids 225
Operations Order (Leyte Invasion) (Exercise)
JMO-56 Introduction to the Navy Planning Process (Seminar) 229
JMO-57 The Struggle for Sea Control (Exercise) 233
JMO-58 Tabletop Exercise #5: Critiquing the Operations Order (Seminar) 235

NAVAL OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR

JMO-59 Naval Operations Short of War (Lecture) 239

JMO-60 Naval Support of Foreign Policy (Seminar) 243
JMO-61 Homeland Security (Seminar) 249
JMO-62 Combating Piracy (Seminar) 253
JMO-63 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (Seminar) 259
JMO-64 Insurgency (Seminar) 263
JMO-65 Counterinsurgency (Seminar) 267
JMO-66 Hybrid and Unconventional Warfare, Irregular Warfare, 271
and Civil-Military Operations (Seminar)
JMO-67 Peace Operations (Seminar) 275
JMO-68 JMO Examination #2 (Individual Effort) 281

JOINT PLANNING: EXPLOITING CONTROL OF THE SEA

JMO-69 The War at Sea Exercise (Wargame) 283

ADDENDUM

Course Calendar285

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 THE ADMIRAL RAYMOND A. SPRUANCE COURSE

It cannot be too often repeated that in modern war, especially in

modern naval war, the chief factor in achieving triumph is what has
been done in way of thorough preparation and training before the
beginning of war.

President Theodore Roosevelt,

U. S. Naval Academy Address, 1902
1. Mission:

Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) Mission

The Intermediate Level Course (CNC&S/NSC) mission is to expand student

understanding of Joint Matters from a Service component perspective at the operational and
tactical levels of war.

Joint Maritime Operations Department Spruance Course Mission

During the Joint Maritime Operations trimester of the College of Naval Command
and Staff/Naval Staff College, students will become skilled at employing maritime power
across the range of military operations in order to achieve tactical and operational objectives
in support of a joint force.

2. Course Objectives

The objectives below are derived from the Department mission statement and detail
the expectations for those who successfully complete the Joint Maritime Operations
trimester. Each seminar or lecture has tailored objectives that support these course
objectives:

Expand critical and creative thinking and develop problem solving skills as they pertain
to decision making and leadership in the maritime domain.
Develop students grounded in Operational Art and Naval Warfare Theory including
practical application across the spectrum of conflict.
Apply the Joint/Navy Planning Process to volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous
problems and develop written orders designed to resolve them.
Understand how to employ maritime power in the attainment of assigned joint and
service objectives.

3. Course Overview

The Spruance Course presented by the Joint Military Operations Department is an in-
depth study of the upper tactical and lower operational levels of war throughout the full
spectrum of military operations.
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 It is first and foremost a warfighters course that recognizes the
inherent difficulties associated with planning for and executing major
combat operations at sea.

As such, it will prepare students to excel in the operational arena through an

understanding of the effective employment of naval power involving joint forces to achieve
military objectives. A focus will be put on refining your analytical skills as well as both
critical and creative thinking abilities. The emphasis in this Department is on developing
your warfighting and leadership skills through the lens of operational art and the theory of
naval warfare to develop creative solutions to ill-structured problems. Although maritime
operations and sea service contributions are emphasized, the capabilities of all services are
studied with the ultimate focus on planning and execution of joint operations at the fleet and
joint maritime component commander levelsin the maritime environment.
The trimester will flow from the simple to the more complex, culminating in a final
planning exercise intended to allow students to display their comprehension of the rational
employment of joint power and to demonstrate critical and creative thinking skills. There are
themes that permeate the course: the theoretical themes include operational art and naval
warfare theory while the practical themes include naval tactics and operations planning,
operational leadership, naval operations short of war, maritime operational law, and joint
operation planning. Through extensive study of multiple historical case studies, the JMO
student is challenged with four enduring questions from the perspective of maritime and Joint
Force Commanders (JFC) and their staff planners:

What are the objectives and desired end state? (Ends)

What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and end state? (Ways)
What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
What is the likely chance of failure or unacceptable results in performing that sequence of
actions? (Risk)

The ability to answer these questions is the essence of the Joint Maritime Operations course.

4. CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy

The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act revises the definition of joint matters
to include the integrated use of military forces that may be conducted under unified action on
land, sea, or in air or space, or in the information environment with participants from
multiple armed forces, U. S. Armed Forces and other U. S. departments and agencies, U. S.
Armed Forces and the military forces or agencies of other countries, U. S. Armed Forces and
non-governmental persons or entities, or any combination thereof. Accordingly, for purposes
of clarity, the term joint includes multinational and interagency partners.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction CJCSI 1800.01_ sets the
policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for both officer Professional Military
Education (PME) and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). It directs the services
and service colleges to comply with the Officer Professional Military Education Policy
(OPMEP) by meeting Joint Learning Area objectives defined in the OPMEP. This syllabus
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lists the CNC&S and NSC Syllabus for 2016 lists the Naval War College (NWC) objectives
to be addressed in each session.
The Intermediate-Level College (ILC) Joint Learning Area objectives below are
presented to highlight the linkage between the syllabus and joint learning areas prescribed by
the CJCS. The Professional Military Education (PME) outcomes for the College of Naval
Command and Staff and the Naval Staff College are designed to produce officers fully
capable of serving as leaders or staff officers at the upper tactical and operational level of
war. The following Intermediate-Level College (ILC) Joint Learning Area (JLA) objectives
are presented to highlight the linkage between the syllabus and the Joint Learning Areas
prescribed by the CJCS.

Learning Area 1 - National Military Capabilities Strategy

a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U. S. military forces to conduct the full
range of military operations in pursuit of national interests.
b. Comprehend the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the President and the
Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders,
Joint Force Commanders (JFCs), Service component commanders, and combat
support organizations or agencies.
c. Comprehend how the U .S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for
joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.
d. Comprehend strategic guidance contained in documents such as the National Security
Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Military Strategy, Global Force
Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), and the Guidance for the
Employment of the Force (GEF).

Learning Area 2 - Joint Doctrine and Concepts

a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.

b. Comprehend the interrelationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine.
c. Apply solutions to operational problems in a volatile, uncertain, complex, or
ambiguous environment using critical thinking, operational art, and joint doctrine.

Learning Area 3 - Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War

a. Comprehend the security environment within which Joint Forces are created,
employed, and sustained in support of JFCs and component commanders.
b. Comprehend joint force command relationships.
c. Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels of war.
d. Comprehend how theory and principles of joint operations pertain to the operational
level of war across the range of military operations to include traditional and irregular
warfare that impact the strategic environment.

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 e. Comprehend the relationships between all elements of national power and the
importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole of government response,
multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security
interests.
f. Analyze a plan critically for employment of joint and multinational forces at the
operational level of war
g. Comprehend the relationship between national security objectives, military
objectives, conflict termination, and post conflict transition to enabling civil
authorities.

Learning Area 4 - Joint Planning and Execution Processes

a. Comprehend the relationship among national objectives and means available through
the framework provided by the national level systems.
b. Comprehend the fundamentals of joint operation planning across all phases of a joint
operation.
c. Comprehend the integration of joint functions (command and control, intelligence,
fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment) to operational planning
problems across the range of military operations.
d. Comprehend how planning for OCS (Operational Contracting Support) across the joint
functions supports managing the effects contracting and contracted support have on
the operational environment.
e. Comprehend the integration of IO and cyberspace operations with other lines of
operation at the operational level.
f. Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, society, region,
culture / diversity, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint force
operations across the range of military operations, to include traditional and irregular
warfare.
g. Comprehend the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in
developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans.
h. Comprehend the requirements across the joint force, Services, inter-organizational
partners and the host nation in planning and execution of joint operations across the
range of military operations.

Learning Area 5 Joint Command and Control

a. Comprehend the organizational options, structures and requirements available to joint

force commanders.
b. Comprehend the factors of intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding
(Mission Command), mission objectives, forces, and capabilities that support the
selection of a specific C2 option.
c. Comprehend the effects of networks and cyberspace on the ability to conduct Joint
Operational Command and Control.

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Learning Area 6 Joint Operational Leadership and the Profession of Arms

a. Comprehend the role of the profession of arms in the contemporary environment.

b. Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and
recognize change, lead transitions, and anticipate/adapt to surprise and uncertainty.
c. Comprehend the ethical dimension of operational leadership and the challenges that it
may present when considering the Profession of Arms.
d. Analyze the application of mission command (intent through trust, empowerment, and
understanding) in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM)
environment.
e. Communicate with clarity and precision.
f. Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and
operations.

Additional Qualification Designation (AQD) Code Qualification. Since 16 May 2007,

the United States Navy awards an Additional Qualifying Designator (AQD) code of Joint
Operational Planner (JPN) for all U. S. Navy (11XX, 12XX, 13XX, 16XX and 31XX
designators) who graduate from the resident College of Naval Command and Staff Joint
Professional Military Education (JPME I) course.

5. Course Organization

After the introductory lecture and seminar and the research paper discussion, the
syllabus begins building the intellectual foundation necessary for success at the upper tactical
and lower operational levels of war. The introductory sessions focus on the opportunities and
challenges ahead and introduce students to the themes, outcomes, and general requirements
of the JMO trimester. Students next examine the building blocks of a navysurface,
subsurface, and airin order to begin to understand how navies fight. In this block, entitled
Naval Tactics and Capabilities, students will be exposed to basic tactical considerations and
the capabilities and roles of various naval platforms, weapons, and sensors in order to have a
general idea of what we are addressing in the following sections. This portion of the syllabus
ends with an open-ended tabletop exercise that allows the students to (a) demonstrate
understanding of the material presented thus far and (b) to organize naval forces creatively.
The objectives of the Naval Tactics and Capabilities sessions include:

Recognizing the general capabilities of naval forces.

Understanding the differences between single arm and combined arms naval operations.
Describing single arm naval tactics for surface, submarine, and naval air assets.
Demonstrating an understanding of tactics and capabilities of naval forces through an
aggregation/disaggregation of forces in a fictional scenario.

Next, a study of Joint Operational Warfare embodied in operational art prepares

students to examine the entire spectrum of joint warfighting by introducing a theoretical
framework and then applying that framework at the upper tactical and operational levels of
war. Operational Art and Naval Warfare, both examined as theory, present the best practices
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of the past and serve as a milepost in understanding military problems of today. Our Joint
Operational Warfare and the following Naval Warfare Theory sessions therefore, do not
follow what many are accustomed to vis--vis scientific theoryidea, test, replicate, and
then create law. Students will discover that there are very few, if any, laws in the art of war.
The final session of this block presents students with an in-depth look at current and service
doctrine. Armed with the theory that provides the foundation for modern doctrine, students
will critically analyze that doctrine given their understanding of operational art. The
Objectives for the Joint Operational Warfare sessions include:

Comprehending operational art as a body of theory, including its historical roots.

Applying operational art in the analysis of historical case studies involving ill-structured
problems.

In the Spruance Courses unique Naval Warfare Theory sessions that follow, students are
introduced to the maritime domain in the context of proven theory, and discussions will focus
on the theory and practice of mid- to high-intensity warfare at sea. By theory we mean the
experiencesboth successful and unsuccessfulof those practitioners who have gone
before. The Naval Warfare Theory seminars expand on the theoretical foundations we
explored in Joint Operational Warfare and prepare students for the practical sessions that
follow. These sessions conclude with another Tabletop exercise in which students will study
a historical case study and evaluate the employment of combined naval arms. This study of
theory as a whole culminates with an examination that covers selected aspects of the theory
we have discussed thus far and is an opportunity for the student to (a) demonstrate mastery of
the theoretical underpinnings of warfare, and (b) serve as a vehicle to demonstrate higher
order thinking skills. The objectives for these seminars include:

Reinforcing theoretical concepts through an appreciation of maritime warfare.

Understanding the theory and practice of tactical and operational warfare at sea.

Following the first written examination, an introduction to International Operational Law

will emphasize familiarity with specific aspects of the law with an eye toward using it to
assist planners in meeting assigned objectives. These sessions are intended to address the
following objectives:

Comprehending and applying operational law concepts in order to understand

international law as it relates to maritime operations.
Identifying operational law-related constraints and restraints on potential courses of
action.

Once students have grasped the fundamental theoretical underpinnings of military

actions and the nexus of operational law and warfighting theory, we will investigate how
each of the services is employed in combat, with emphasis on the naval services. The
Services, Their Doctrine, and Functions sessions signify the cognitive transition from the
theoretical to the practical. As discerned during our critique of modern doctrine in an earlier
session, one may only truly understand doctrine after an in-depth examination of the theory
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that informs it. Building on this foundation, students will examine the critical areas of naval
command and control, logistics and deployment, intelligence, information operations and
cyberspace, how conflicts are terminated, and lastly a brief look at stability operations.
Completion of these sessions provides the doctrinal and practical foundation necessary to
address U. S. military considerations for operations in the contemporary environment and to
support detailed Joint and Service planning events. The final session is a two-day open-ended
table top exercise involving a fictional clash between the United States and a near-peer
competitor. Students will be required to display an understanding of the theoretical concepts
discussed thus far as well as present creative solutions to potentially real-world problems
against that near-peer competitor. These sessions are expected to satisfy the following
objectives:

Describe the organization and employment considerations of Fleet assets.

Broadly describe other service capabilities and recognize the differences in service
doctrine.
Explain operational functions in practice as opposed to theory.
Identify the relationship between conflict termination and stability operations.
Consider an operational idea to resolve a fictional scenario against a near-peer
competitor.

Successfully prosecuting a modern war requires more than technical competence in

the military domain and effective operational concepts. In the seminars that make up the
Operational Decision Making and Military Planning portion of the course, we move deeper
into the practical and discuss the Logic of the Commanders Estimate and the language of
problem solving. Using the knowledge gained in previous sessions, students are next
introduced to additional skills that develop a broader understanding of the complexity of
military operations. Orders development provides an overview of how we convert the
critical and creative thinking in a planning group into tangible products for others to execute.
The development of an operations order, stressing the detailed requirements associated with
writing the order, will be accomplished during our first major exercise. The first exercise is a
multi-day, detailed planning exercise in which students will craft an operations order
intended to gain and maintain sea control against a fictional Anti-Access, Area Denied
(A2AD) environment in and around Borneo. Students will apply the Navy Planning Process
(NPP) to develop that operations order. The objectives for this first exercise include:

Understanding the difference between complex and complicated problems and the
approaches needed to resolve them.
Using the Navy Planning Process (NPP) to create orders that demonstrate mastery of
JMO subject matter thus far.
Creating an operations order that integrates the maritime force in time, space, and
purpose to obtain naval objectives in support of the joint force.

This exercise is followed by an investigation of those things that a navy does when it is
not involved in mid- to high-intensity combatNaval Operations Short of War.
Humanitarian assistance, combating piracy, peace operations, homeland security, and a
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multi-day session on Small Wars will round out the operations short of war seminars and set
the stage for the Final Planning Exercise. Objectives for these sessions include:

Describing the roles of a navy when not engaged in mid-to high intensity combat.
Discussing how a navy can support operations short of war.
Distinguishing the unique requirements of naval forces in operations short of war.

At the conclusion of these sessions, the final multi-day planning exercise using the Joint
Operation Planning Process (JOPP) and the previously developed Operations Order will
exercise our order against a thinking enemy. The War at Sea, a joint planning exercise, will
utilize the previously developed Operations Order for the struggle for sea control and will be
supported by the Colleges War Gaming Department. The War gaming Department will
adjudicate the order, requiring students to quickly reassess and plan accordingly. This
school-house reset allows students to refine their operational designs without the cost of
losing service members and machines to enemy action and is an essential element in an
active educational process. Students will note that the exercise pits the United States against
an exceptionally robust enemy force requiring not only a theoretically sound approach, but
also a creative approach. Simple use of force is insufficient to defeat the threat. We will
combine two seminars into an Operational Planning Team (OPT) and using the JOPES Crisis
Action Planning process, coupled with critical and creative thought; resolve a scenario that
involves the projection of joint power. The final scenario provides all students the
opportunity to interact with the media and to develop and present briefings to senior
leadership. The final exercise will reinforce many of the concepts studied throughout the
trimester. The objectives of the War at Sea exercise are to:

Apply the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) to develop a military solution to an
ill-structured problem.
Explain the challenges and responsibilities of members of an Operational Planning Team.
Synthesize the concepts of operational art, service and joint doctrine, operational law,
and operational planning by developing an operations order that accomplishes an
assigned mission.
Brief joint orders to senior decision makers.

6. Syllabus Organization

The syllabus establishes the basis for required course work and serves as an
intellectual roadmap for the trimester. In each session, the Focus specifies the general
context of the topic. Next, the Objectives section cites the specific session goals and provides
an intellectual line of departure for the readings. The Background section provides assistance
in framing the individual session and how it fits into the course flow. The Discussion Topics
section is designed to generate critical thinking and is the foundation for seminar discussion.
The questions serve to focus the student as he or she reads through the assigned readings.
They also provide a review at the completion of the readings to insure the student
comprehends the essence of the session. Prior understanding of the questions is critical for
effective reading. The Products section identifies those items that may be produced in
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fulfillment of the session objectives. The Readings section provides a foundation for student
preparation and enhances understanding of the topic.
The Joint Maritime Operations Trimester fulfills the majority of the Joint Professional
Military Education (JPME) Phase I requirements established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff in the OPMEP guidance. The objectives identified in each session reflect these
requirements. The remaining JPME Phase I requirements are fulfilled in the National
Security Affairs (NSA) and Strategy and Policy (S&P) Departments courses (TSDM and
S&W) and selected electives.

7. Methods of Instruction

The Socratic Method. The seminar is the fundamental learning forum for this course
with student expertise being a significant part of the learning process. For a seminar to
succeed there must be open and candid sharing of ideas and experiences, tempered with
necessary military decorum. Students will find that even the most unconventional idea may
have some merit. Successful seminarsthat is, seminars whose members leave with the
greatest knowledge and personal satisfactionare those made up of students who come to
each session equipped with questions based on thorough preparation. These questions build
upon the assigned questions and are generated through a combination of reading, experience,
and thinking through the material. Most students leave the seminar with new insights or even
more thought-provoking questions. Student preparation, free and open discussion, and the
open-minded consideration of other students ideas, all contribute to a valuable seminar
experience. The one-third rule is the keystone of the seminar approach. The first third is a
well-constructed, relevant curriculum. The second third is a quality JMO faculty to present
the material and guide the discussion, and the most important third is the participation of the
individual students. At the College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College,
students are responsible for their own education. Only by thoroughly preparing for seminar
sessions can students become active catalysts who generate positive and proactive seminar
interaction and refine critical and creative thinking skills.

The Case Study Method. This method of instruction is used to provide intellectual
stimulation for students and is designed to develop student abilities to analyze and solve
problems using the knowledge, concepts, and skills honed during the trimester. A
concomitant benefit of the case study is to deepen the experiential pool in students through
analysis of past great captains of war or to expand the knowledge of a specific geographic
area. Some of the cases and problems stress individual effort and planning, while others
require a team or staff approach. Cases may consist of historical events, analyzed for tactical
or operational purposes, or fictional crisis situations that demonstrate the application of
concepts such as presence, deterrence, international law, rules of engagement, and self-
defense. Case studies sometimes will be narrowly focused to illustrate a specific point and
potential force capabilities and limitations or to highlight explicit concepts involving an
aspect of tactical or operational warfare. Seminars are often split into smaller groups or
teams to prepare solutions and responses. The Case study method is active learning, meaning
that it allows students to achieve a higher level of learning while providing students with
many more data points relevant to problem solving in the volatile, uncertain, complex, and

xv
ambiguous environment in which they will operate. Students will be tasked with analyzing
the case study material, synthesizing information, and evaluating recommended courses of
action that they create.

The Lecture-Seminar Method. To share equally the vast experience of some of our
faculty members and guest speakers, lectures are often followed by seminar discussion.
Students are encouraged to analyze critically the information presented by speakers and
engage actively in post-speaker seminar discussions. JMO lectures are intended to generate
questions that the students may discuss in seminar and are not intended as merely the
transmission of knowledge.

The Practical Exercise Method. The opportunity for students to apply information
presented in the various sessions is important. Practical exercises allow students time to
analyze information critically in order to develop viable solutions to ill-structured problems.
Students may be assigned to practical exercise as individuals, small groups, seminar, or even
multiple seminars. This active learning method reinforces multiple concepts and should be
fully embraced.

8. Readings

All JMO course sessions are supported by various readings. The purpose of these
readings is to assist in understanding the many aspects of the topics being presented and
often, to provide divergent points of view on the same topic. For the most part, the readings
are intended to convey to the student basic information, the mastery of which will facilitate
in-class discussions. Many of the readings provide point-counterpoint and are intended to
foster discussion. The readings serve as a line of departure for seminar discussion and are
not intended solely as drivers of discussion. They are the raw material from which we will
build our understanding of various topics. Students are reminded, however, that as critical
thinkers, all readings should be questioned concerning their relationship to the topic, to other
readings, and to the personal experience of the student. While the vast majority of assigned
readings have been digitized and loaded on student iPads, some readings, due to their value
as reference material, are issued. A thorough understanding of the following information
will significantly assist the student in using the course readings to best advantage:

(a) Categories of Readings. Each syllabus session lists categories of readings.

(1) Required readings are those that must be read prior to the session. Often seminar
moderators will offer additional guidance on the priority of the readings, based on the special
needs of the individual seminar or recommend scanning a particular reading for broad
content or as a refresher. The required readings include video presentations of selected
lectures that students are expected to critically consume and come prepared to discuss in the
following days seminar.

(2) Supplementary readings are those relevant to a session topic that may be useful to a
student seeking more information in order to gain insight beyond that provided by the

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Required Readings; this includes additional background material on case studies and
exercises. On occasion, faculty moderators may assign Supplementary Readings to individual
students to read and provide oral synopses to the seminar in support of topic discussion.
Supplementary readings also provide additional sources for student research in support of the
JMO Research paper requirement.

(b) Reading Identifiers. Each reading that is not a complete book or publication is identified
through a four-digit reading identifier (e.g., NWC 1002). This number is often used instead
of the title, but in either event, the readings are located on the JMO Blackboard website and
have been uploaded on your iPad under the specific session.

(c) Finding Specific Readings. Readings for any specific session may be located as follows:

(1) Required Readings are provided electronically or annotated as (Issued). Issued means
that the readings may be found in the JMO reading material issued in hard copy

(2) Supplementary readings and Library Reserve readings, are not issued. These readings
are frequently available in the Henry E. Eccles Library and may assist students in
further research on a topic that interests them and often forms an embryonic
bibliography of the research paper

IMPORTANT NOTE: Students are cautioned that classified readings and documents must
be read on the premises of the Naval War College. Ensure such materials are properly
safeguarded at all times. Do not leave the materials unattended. Students are not provided
with classified material storage containers (safes); it is therefore necessary to check out and
return classified material on a daily basis. Faculty moderators will provide additional
information as required during the JMO trimester. Ensure that for any classified sessions or
lectures you do not bring your iPads, cell phones, or other wireless devices to class.

(d) Management of Reading Load. The amount of preparatory reading required for each
session depends on a variety of factors, including topic complexity, session objectives, and
the course schedule. The typical weekly reading requirements are on the order of 300 to 400
pages. This syllabus is a powerful tool in that it allows students to develop a personal plan of
study that leads to better time management and a deeper understanding of the syllabus
material.

It is recommended that students review session reading requirements at

least a week ahead of time in order to plan preparation time regressively
and accurately and ensure that all necessary readings are on hand.

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9. JMO Research Paper

The JMO Research Paper presents the opportunity to study an upper tactical,
operational, or in some cases, theater-strategic level issue, conduct research and analysis, and
prepare a paper that advances the literature and expands the body of knowledge. Purely
strategic or lower tactical level research papers are not appropriate for this research
requirement. The research paper is a chance for students to address a real-world topic that
they personally feel is of value. This assignment requires independent thought and graduate-
level writing; the final product must be a 14-17 page paper suitable for publication in a
professional journal. The amount and depth of research should be adequate to support the
students thesis, and sufficiently justify the conclusions and recommendations. Another use
of the paper may be to provide a source of innovative thinking to the Service and Joint staffs
involved with the many issues bearing on employment of forces.

Numerous combatant and headquarters commands actively solicit papers and

monographs on topics of current interest to them. The Naval War College is frequently
canvassed for papers on particular subjects, and requested to generate interest in specific
areas for research and writing to support requesting commands. Students are encouraged to
submit their research papers for the Naval War College Prize Competition as described in the
Naval War College Student Handbook and posted on the JMO Blackboard Website.
Amplifying information and guidance on the selection and execution of a successful JMO
Research Paper project is provided in NWC 2062. Your moderators will answer questions
and otherwise assist you in this most important intellectual undertaking during the
introductory seminars and student tutorials in February and March.

10. Plagiarism, Misrepresentation, and Cheating

Student attention is directed to the Naval War College 2013 Faculty Handbook which
discusses the academic honor code and specifically prohibits plagiarism, cheating, and
misrepresentation. The Naval War College diligently enforces a strict academic code
requiring authors to credit properly the source of materials directly cited to any written work
submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is
prohibited. Likewise, this academic code prohibits cheating, and the misrepresentation of a
paper as an authors original thought. Plagiarism, cheating and misrepresentation are
inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and
government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U. S. military officers, such conduct
clearly violates the Exemplary Conduct Standards delineated in Title 10, U. S. Code,
Sections 3583 (U. S. Army), 5947 (U. S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U. S. Air Force).

Plagiarism is the use of someone elses work without giving proper credit to the
author or creator of the work. It is passing off as ones own anothers words, ideas, analysis,
or other products. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of
academic integrity and will be treated as such by the command. Plagiarism includes but is not
limited to the following actions.

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 a. The verbatim use of others words without both quotation marks (or block
quotation) and citation.
b. The paraphrasing of others words or ideas without citation.
c. Any use of others work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common
knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews,
government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, and so forth without
giving credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when using
anothers words or ideas. Such use, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code.
However, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of
graduate-level work; submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not
plagiarism.

Cheating is defined as the giving, receiving, or using of unauthorized aid in support

of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. (Note: NWC Reference Librarians are
an authorized source of aid in the preparation of class assignments but not on exams).
Cheating includes the following:

a. Gaining unauthorized access to exams.

b. Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the
preparation of written assignments or during tests (unless specifically permitted).
c. Using unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or
electronic form) during tests.

Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose
without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes the following:

a. Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course
at the NWC without permission of the instructors.
b. Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some
other purpose outside the NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

11. Requirements

Students are expected to prepare fully for each seminar and to participate in
classroom discussions and exercises.

Your principal duty during this academic year is to read, to study, to

reflect, and to sharpen your critical and creative thinking skills.

A tough-minded, questioning attitude and a willingness to enter into rigorous but

disciplined discourse are central to the success of the course. An officers ability to engage
positively and productively in deliberations and formulate advice is integral to sound
operational decision making. Moderators evaluate seminar contributions with regard to ones

xix
skills in persuading peers and seniors because persuasive leadership is critical to an officers
continued success. Moderators evaluate written products because they represent ones ability
to synthesize and organize information in a coherent manner, applying analytical frameworks
and critical thinking. Seminar work and written products are also used to demonstrate the
level of subject mastery achieved by individual students and indirectly the effectiveness of
the faculty and course material. Students are expected to improve both their written and
verbal skills throughout their NWC experience.

(a) Workload. Some peaks in the workload will occur. Advance planning and careful
allocation of time will help mitigate these peaks. This is particularly true of the JMO
Research Paper.

This is a Masters Degree awarding course of study that confers

that degree after only one year of exceptionally rigorous study. Expect,
therefore, to commit significant time to reading and as importantly, to
reflection. Student experience indicates that the total course requirements
will involve a weekly average workload of about 12-18 hours of in-class
and 25-30 hours of out-of-class work. Additionally, students should expect
to dedicate 80-100 hours in researching, drafting, and producing an
acceptable graduate level research paper.

Time management is a critical aspect of a students success in mastering the multiple

requirements of the Joint Maritime Operations course. This syllabus is a powerful tool in that
it allows students to develop a personal plan of study that leads to better time management
and a deeper understanding of the course material.

(b) Oral and Written Requirements. The JMO Department has oral and written requirements
that provide the opportunity for the student to demonstrate synthesis and progress. In
addition, these requirements serve as a means for feedback and interaction between the
faculty and members of the seminar. Not all requirements are graded, but each provides the
student with some measure of how the student is doing at that point in the course. To
accomplish the JMO curriculum successfully, students must complete the below
requirements. The following is a composite listing of these course requirements, type of
activity, relative weights, and the key dates of graded events:

Requirement Type Effort Weight Date

Exam #1 Written/Individual 20% 28-29 March

Exam #2 Written/Individual 20% 25-27 May
JMO Research Paper Written/Individual 35% 13 May
Seminar Contribution Daily Assessment 25% 19 Feb 10 June

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12. JMO Department Grading Criteria

A course average grade of B- or higher is required for successful completion of

Masters degree requirements. A minimum grade of C- is required for successful completion
of the JMO course and receipt of JPME Phase I certification. Any assigned grade may be
appealed in writing within seven calendar days after receiving the grade. Grades will be
appealed first to the students seminar senior moderator and then to the Department
Chairman. If deemed necessary, the Chairman may assign an additional grader who will
review the assignment and provide an independent grade. Grade appeals may ultimately be
taken to the Dean of Academic Affairs, whose decision will be final. Note that the review
may sustain, lower, or raise the grade. The Academic Coordinator (Room C-417) can assist
in preparing an appeal.

Late or Incomplete Work. Per the current version of Naval War College Instruction 1520.2,
Examination and Grading Policy, student work that is not completed will receive a numeric
grade of zero. Unexcused tardy student work, that is work turned in past the deadline
without previous permission by the moderator, will receive a grade not to exceed C+,
depending on the quality of the work. This means that if a student submits work that if
turned in on time would have earned a grade of A+, it will receive a grade of C+. Likewise,
if the late work would have earned a grade of B+, the grade will be a D+.

Student work determined to be in violation of the honor code will receive a grade of
F. The College's Academic Integrity Committee will assign an accompanying numeric grade
to the F. Although it may not be applicable to all cases, a grade of zero will be assigned as a
matter of practice. Three sets of general grading criteria help in the determination of the
grades that will be assigned during the JMO trimester. The criteria below offer the student
the standards and requirements by which faculty assess performance. Using current Naval
War College guidance, the procedures below amplify the criteria as established within the
Joint Military Operations Department.

a. Grading criteria for the JMO Research Paper:

The JMO Research Paper must have a valid thesis, provide sufficient background
research to analyze the thesis, present a strong argument for the thesis, reflect consideration
of conflicting points of view present logical conclusions drawn from the material presented,
and provide recommendations or lessons learned based on the conclusions. Certain research
papers, because of the nature of the assigned research question, may follow a slightly
different flow. Students are reminded that their moderators serve as their research paper
advisors and different methodologies will be approved by the moderator team. In addition to
the examples of substantive criteria specified below, the paper must be editorially correct
(spelling, punctuation, grammar, syntax, format, and so forth). The research paper represents
the physical manifestation of your thinking. As such, all research papers are evaluated on
how well the student presents his or her ideas.

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A+ (97-100): Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Especially deserving of
distribution to appropriate authorities and submission for prize competition. Thesis is
definitive, research is extensive, subject is treated completely, and the conclusions and
recommendations are logical and justified.

A (94-<97): Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original thought.
Suitable for distribution and submission for prize competition. Should be retained in the
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). Thesis is clearly articulated and focused,
research is significant and arguments are comprehensive, and conclusions and
recommendations are supported.

A- (90-<94): Above the average expected of graduate work. Contains original thought.
Thesis is clearly defined, research is purposeful, arguments are presented, conclusions and
recommendations are valid.

B+ (87-<90): A solid paper. Above the average of graduate work. Thesis is articulated,
research has strong points, subject is well-presented and constructed, and conclusions and
recommendations are substantiated by the material.

B (84-<87): Average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, research is

appropriate for the majority of the subject, analysis of the subject is valid with minor
omissions and conclusions and recommendations are presented with few inconsistencies.

B- (80-<84): Below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the
research does not fully support it; the analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are not
fully developed. The paper may not be balanced and the logic may be flawed.

C+ (77-<80): Below the standards required of graduate work. Portions of the criteria are
lacking or missing, the thesis may be unclear, research may be inadequate, analysis may be
incomplete, and the conclusions and recommendations may be lacking or not supported by
the material.

C (74-<77): Fails to meet the standards of graduate work. Thesis is present, but support,
analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are either missing or illogically presented.
Paper has significant flaws in construction and development.

C- (70-<74): Well below standards. Thesis poorly stated with minimal evidence of
research and/or several missing requirements. Subject is presented in an incoherent manner
that does not warrant serious consideration.

D+ (67-<70) Considerably below graduate-level performance and lacking in any evidence

D (64-<67) of effort or understanding of the subject matter. In some measures, fails to
D- (60-<64) address the thesis, argument or counter-argument.

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F (0<60): Fails to meet graduate-level standards. Unsatisfactory work. Paper has no
thesis. Paper has significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic. Paper displays
an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction
and development detract from readability of the paper. Paper displays evidence of plagiarism
or misrepresentation.

b. Grading criteria for Examinations:

Spruance Course examinations usually focus on an historic case study (ies). Moderators will
provide read ahead material in advance of the exam date. Expect the examination questions
to be sourced from any of the course material presented to date in seminar. Response to the
examination will be in essay format. Grading will be assessed using the following criteria:

A+ (97-100): Organized, coherent and well-written response. Completely addresses the

question. Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total grasp and
comprehension of the topic.

A (94-<97): Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and
key minor points. Organized, coherent, and well-written.

A- (90-<94): Above the average expected of graduate work. Demonstrates a very good
grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and at least some minor points in a clear, coherent
manner.

B+ (87-<90): Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with
supporting rationale for analysis.

B (84-<87): Average graduate performance. A successful consideration of the topic

overall, but either lacking depth or containing statements for which the supporting rationale
is not sufficiently argued.

B- (80-<84): Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic, but
does not address all key concepts and is weak in rationale and clarity.

C+ (77-<80): Demonstrates some grasp of topic, but provides insufficient rationale for
response and misses major elements or concepts. Does not merit graduate credit.

C (74-<77): Demonstrates poor understanding of the topic. Provides marginal support for
response. Misses major elements or concepts.

C- (70-<72): Addresses the question, but does not provide sufficient discussion to
demonstrate adequate understanding of the topic.

D+ (67-<70) Considerably below graduate-level performance and lacking in any evidence

D (64-<67) of effort or understanding of the subject matter. In some measures, fails to

xxiii
D- (60-<64) address the entire question.

F (0<60): Unsatisfactory work. Fails to address the questions or paper displays

evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

c. Grading criteria for Seminar Contribution:

The Seminar Contribution grade is determined by the moderators evaluation of the

quality of a students contributions to seminar discussions, projects, and exercises and the
demonstration of critical and creative thought. It is recognized that throughout the course
many students will participate in areas for which they have no prior expertise. Additionally,
some positions may have greater visibility. Consequently, each student will be evaluated on
his/her preparation and contribution in each given role, taking into consideration the above
factors. All students are expected to contribute to each seminar session, and to listen and
respond respectfully when seminar-mates or moderators offer their ideas. This overall
expectation underlies all criteria described below. While rare, interruptive, discourteous,
disrespectful, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning
experience and will negatively affect the contribution grade.

A (90-100) Level Contribution

A-level contribution demonstrates real achievement by a student in grasping what

critical thinking is, along with the clear development of a range of specific critical thinking
skills or abilities. The contributions during the course were, on the whole, clear, precise, and
well-reasoned. Critical thinking terms and distinctions are used effectively. The work
demonstrates a mind in charge of its own ideas, assumptions, biases, inferences, and
intellectual processes. Often analyzed issues clearly and precisely, often formulated
information clearly, usually distinguished the relevant from the irrelevant, often recognized
key questionable assumptions, usually clarified key concepts effectively, typically used
language in keeping with educated usage, frequently identified relevant competing points of
view, and shows a general tendency to reason carefully from clearly stated premises, as well
as noticeable sensitivity to important implications and consequences. Generally displayed
excellent reasoning and problem-solving skills. The A students work is consistently at a high
level of intellectual excellence.

A+ (97-100): Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for individual seminar

sessions. Consistently contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team
player and leader.

A (94-<97): Superior demonstration of complete preparation for individual sessions.

Frequently offers original and well thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to
accomplish team projects.

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A- (90-<94): Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Contributes
original, well-developed insights in the majority of seminar sessions. Often takes the lead to
accomplish team projects.

B (80-89) Level Contribution

B-level work represents demonstrable achievement in grasping what critical thinking

is, along with the clear demonstration of a range of specific critical thinking skills or abilities.
Demonstrates, on the whole, clear, precise, and well-reasoned thought. Critical thinking
terms and distinctions are used frequently. The contributions demonstrate a mind beginning
to take charge of its own ideas, assumptions, inferences, biases, and intellectual processes.
Generally, analyzed issues clearly and precisely, often formulated information clearly,
usually distinguished the relevant from the irrelevant, often recognized key questionable
assumptions, usually clarified key concepts effectively, typically used language in keeping
with educated usage, frequently identified relevant competing points of view, and showed a
general tendency to reason carefully from clearly stated premises, as well as noticeable
sensitivity to important implications and consequences. B-level work displays good
reasoning and problem-solving skills.

B+ (87-<90): Above-average graduate level preparation for seminar sessions. Occasionally

contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes
the lead for team projects.

B (84-<87): Average graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Occasionally

contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player; takes effective lead on
team projects when assigned.

B- (80-<84): Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for individual sessions.

Infrequently contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having
thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take lead on team projects.

C (70-79) Level Contribution

C-level work illustrates some but inconsistent achievement in grasping what critical
thinking is, along with the development of modest critical thinking skills or abilities.
C-level contributions show some emerging critical thinking skills, but also pronounced
weaknesses as well. Though some contributions are reasonably well considered, others are
poorly done, or at best are mediocre. There are more than occasional lapses in reasoning.
Though critical thinking terms and distinctions are sometimes used effectively, sometimes
they are used quite ineffectively. Only on occasion does C-level work display a mind taking
charge of its own ideas, assumptions, inferences, and intellectual processes. Only
occasionally does C-level work display intellectual discipline and clarity. The C-level
student only occasionally analyzes issues clearly and precisely, formulates information
clearly, distinguishes the relevant from the irrelevant, recognizes key questionable
assumptions, clarifies key concepts effectively, uses language in keeping with educated

xxv
usage, identifies relevant competing points of view, and reasons carefully from clearly stated
premises, or recognizes important implications and consequences. Sometimes the C-level
student seems to be simply going through the motions of the assignment, carrying out the
form without getting into the spirit of it. On the whole, C-level work shows only modest and
inconsistent reasoning and problem-solving skills and sometimes displays weak reasoning
and problem-solving skills.

C+ (77-<80): Generally prepared, but not to minimum acceptable graduate level. Requires
encouragement to contribute to discussions; contributions do not include original thinking or
insights. Routinely allows others to take the lead in team projects.

C (74-<77): Preparation for individual sessions is only displayed when student is called
upon to contribute. Elicited contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session
material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on fair share of team
project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers and moderators.

C- (70-<74): Barely acceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely

voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in
contributing to team projects.

D (60-69) Level Contribution

D-level work shows only a minimal level of understanding of what critical thinking
is, along with the development of some, but very little, critical thinking skills or abilities.
D level contribution at the end of the trimester, on the whole, shows only occasional critical
thinking skills, but frequent uncritical thinking. Most contributions are poorly presented and
not supported logically. There is little evidence that the student is "reasoning" through the
discussion. Often the student seems to be merely going through the motions of the
assignment, carrying out the form without getting into the spirit of it. D-level work rarely
shows any effort to take charge of ideas, assumptions, inferences, and intellectual processes.
In D-level work, the student rarely analyzes issues clearly and precisely, almost never
formulates information clearly, rarely distinguishes the relevant from the irrelevant, rarely
recognizes key questionable assumptions, almost never clarifies key concepts effectively,
frequently fails to use language in keeping with educated usage, only rarely identifies
relevant competing points of view, and almost never reasons carefully from clearly stated
premises, or recognizes important implications and consequences. D-level work does not
show good reasoning and problem-solving skills and frequently displays poor reasoning and
problem-solving skills. In general, D-level thinking lacks discipline and clarity.

D+ (67-<70) Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are uncommon and reflect

D (64-<67) below-minimum acceptable understanding of lesson material. Engages in
D- (60-<64) frequent fact-free conversation. (Unsubstantiated claims and fallacious
reasoning).

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 F (Below 59) Level Contribution

While exceptionally rare at the Naval War College, for that student who receives an
F, the student does not understand the basic nature of critical thinking, and in any case does
not display the critical thinking skills and abilities which are at the heart of this course. The
contributions made during the course are vague, imprecise, and unreasoned. There is little
evidence that the student is genuinely engaged in the task of taking charge of his or her
thinking. Many contributions appear to have been done pro forma, with the student simply
going through the motions without really putting any significant effort into thinking his or
her way through them. Consequently, the student is not analyzing issues clearly, not
formulating information clearly, not accurately distinguishing the relevant from the
irrelevant, not identifying key questionable assumptions, not clarifying key concepts, not
identifying relevant competing points of view, not reasoning carefully from clearly stated
premises, or tracing implications and consequences. The students work does not display
discernable reasoning and problem-solving skills and did not take corrective actions as
recommended by his or her moderator.

F (060): Unacceptable preparation. Displays no interest in contributing to team projects;

cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work. At times may be seen by peers as
disruptive.

13. Seminar Assignments

The principal criteria in assigning students to a seminar is a balanced distribution

among services and agencies, as well as student and moderator specialties and operational
expertise. Typically, two faculty members are assigned to each seminar. Student seminar,
classroom, and faculty assignments are published separately.

14. Schedule

Seminars usually meet in the morning; there are, however, several afternoon seminars
scheduled. Depending on the work assigned, you may meet for scheduled periods in seminar
as a group, in smaller teams depending on tasking, or individually to conduct study and
research. Please pay close attention to the start times for each event since they vary
throughout the trimester. Classes normally are scheduled for 08301145. If class is
scheduled in the afternoon, the normal timeframe is 13001630. Moderators may adjust
these times to facilitate the learning objectives for each segment of instruction. A course-
planning schedule containing meeting dates and times is provided in the addenda to this
syllabus. A course planning schedule containing meeting dates and times is provided on the
JMO Blackboard Website. Changes from this schedule will be captured in the weekly
schedules available electronically to students.

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15. Key Personnel

If you require additional information on the course, or if problems develop that

cannot be resolved with your moderators, you may contact the Departmental Chairman via
his executive assistant. The key departmental personnel are:

Chairman .............................................................................. CAPT Richard LaBranche, USN

.............................................................................................. Room C-421, 841-3556

Executive Assistant .............................................................. PROF F. B. Horne, (USN (Ret))

.............................................................................................. Room C-420A, 841-6458

Academic Coordinator ......................................................... Ms. Susan Soderlund

.............................................................................................. Room C-417, 841-4120

Joint Maritime Operations Course Coordinator ................... PROF Bill Hartig, (USMC (Ret))
.............................................................................................. Room C-428, 841-6470

Naval Tactics and Capabilities............................................. CAPT Fred Turner, (USN)

...Room C-402, 841-6419

Joint Operational Warfare .................................................... PROF Doug Hime, (USAF (Ret))

.............................................................................................. Room C-423, 841-6463

Naval Warfare Theory ......................................................... PROF S. Forand, (USMC (Ret))

.............................................................................................. Room C-407, 841-6570

Maritime Operational Law ................................................... CAPT Rob Sanders, (USN)

.............................................................................................. Room C-424, 841-4644

The Services, Doctrine, and Functions ................................ COL Greg Bell, (USA)
.............................................................................................. Room C-408, 841-6475

Operational Decision Making and Planning ....................... PROF Michael McGauvran,

.............................................................................................. (USAF (Ret)) Room C-414, 841-
.............................................................................................. 6564

Naval Operations Short of WarPROF E. J. Shaw, (USCG (Ret))

.............................................................................................. Room C-425, 841-6467

Final Planning Exercise ....................................................... PROF J. Gannon, (USMC (Ret))

.............................................................................................. Room, C-421, 841-6480

xxviii
16. Faculty Assistance

Faculty members are your mentors and are available to assist students with course
material, to review a students progress, and to provide counseling as required. Accordingly,
students are expected to utilize this resource to the maximum extent that moderators can
support. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as
possible so that moderators can render assistance in a timely manner. Students are strongly
urged to make use of this non-classroom time with the faculty. During tutorials, scheduled in
conjunction with JMO Research Paper proposal review, moderators may take the opportunity
to discuss student progress as well as to solicit student input on the course to date. The bulk
of the JMO faculty is located on the fourth deck of Connolly Hall and is available to assist as
needed.

17. Student Critiques

The Joint Military Operations Department strives continually to improve this course.
To assist in this goal, students are required to complete a confidential end-of-course
questionnaire that is submitted electronically. Students are strongly encouraged to suggest
improvements immediately and not to wait until the end-of-course questionnaire. The course
questionnaire is designed to allow students to comment constructively on the trimesters
content, pacing, reading loads, and so forth. It is not intended as a gripe sheet but rather
seeks student input to improve the course for the following years students. As such, students
are strongly encouraged to maintain this questionnaire as if it were a diary. It is much easier
capturing your thoughts when they are fresh rather than to try to recreate them at the end of
the trimester. Your constructive comments will help ensure that the course remains relevant
and vital in the years to come. The release of student grades is contingent on completion of
the critique.

18. Lectures by Senior Military Leaders

Enrichment lectures by senior military leaders occur periodically during the course.
Most of these presentations feature the chiefs of service or regional and functional combatant
commanders. These speakers are invited to discuss views and ideas from their perspective as
operational commanders, service chiefs, or as senior staff officers. The weekly academic
schedule (CNC&S or NSC, as applicable) will specify the final date and time of each
enrichment lecture. Last minute changes will be disseminated by the Dean of Students and/or
seminar moderators. In order to gain the most benefit from these sessions, it is critical that
students be prepared to ask penetrating questions of the guest lecturer.

19. Non-attribution policy

The Colleges educational mission requires a climate conducive to the free and open
exchange of ideas and opinions by students, faculty and guest speakers. To this end and
unless otherwise announced by the College or someone with authority to speak for the
College, all lectures, seminars and similar academic or policy discussions (to include

xxix
conferences, workshops, roundtables, etc.) at the College are subject to the Chatham House
Rule (CHR). The CHR states: When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham
House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor
the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.
To support this policy, no student, faculty, staff member, or guest of the College may,
without express permission of the College, use any electronic device or other method to
record any lecture, seminar or similar event at the College, whether live, streamed, stored on
any NWC network or any removable storage device, or in any other manner.
The effect of the CHR is to separate statements from their source. For example, a
student may not publically ask a guest lecturer a question prefaced by, Last week General
Clausewitz stated that . . . Similarly, statements made by faculty or students in a seminar
cannot be reported and attributed outside of the seminar. Thus students, faculty, or guests
cannot claim orally, on a blog, or any other way, Admiral Mahan is being hypocritical in
advocating the use of mines, because in seminar he argued that they were inhumane.
Specific quotations are also to be avoided if they are likely to be traceable to specific
individuals. A professor should not say, for example, one of my [students from a
demographic category in which we have a few] students said that while deployed.
The CHR is relaxed in settings such as classroom discussions that are themselves
subject to the Rule. Also, the use of quotations in academic papers, professional articles or
other works is allowed when the author has secured the explicit permission of the source
individual. These policies apply to all students, faculty, staff and visitors. They apply not
only to events on the grounds of the College but also to the College of Distance Education,
remote classrooms, seminar off-sites, and other meetings run by the College. The policies are
designed to support the free exchange of ideas and opinion without fear of retaliation and to
encourage visiting dignitaries to speak freely. They should encourage the discussion in both
formal and informal settings of ideas and concepts central to an education in JPME at the
Masters Degree level. The policies do not protect and individual against improper speech,
discussion or behavior.

20. Course Calendar

A course calendar is included at the end of the syllabus. Be forewarned that this
calendar is subject to change. Changes will be announced by the Dean of Students and
accessed through your Google email calendar function.

21. Faculty Biographies

Faculty Biographies are available in the digital version of this syllabus.

xxx
 JMO-1

CHAIRMANS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS (Lecture)

Extraordinary as it may appear, the naval officer whose principal

business is to fight is not taught the higher branches of his profession. The
United States is not singular in this respect. The defect is common to
nearly all navies and is an inheritance of a past and less enlightened age.
But with the recent revolution in naval warfare comes a demand for a
higher order of talent in the conduct of naval operations.

Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, USN

First President of the U. S. Naval War College

A. Focus:

The Chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department, Captain Richard A.

LaBranche, USN, will provide an overview of the objectives and requirements of the
Raymond A. Spruance Course.

B. Objective:

Understand the requirements and objectives of the upcoming trimester.

C. Background:

For the foreseeable future, the use of military power, together with the diplomatic,
economic, and informational instruments of national power, will be essential in achieving
national strategic objectives. During this trimester, you will study how to wield the military
instrument of power effectively, in concert with the above mentioned instruments, to achieve
operational and theater-strategic objectives. The emphasis, quite naturally, will be on the
maritime domain. While many students arrive at the Naval War College flush with tactical
knowledge and expertise, we will now open the intellectual aperture and examine higher
levels of war, in this case, the operational level of war. Our focus will be on both naval
operations at the Fleet level and joint operations at the Joint Force Commander level;
however, the relationship between our national strategies and the actualization of the
objectives enunciated in those various national strategies by Combatant Commanders will
also be explored.
Most Masters Degree granting institutions require a significant amount of time
invested by students in preparation, research, study, and reflection outside of the formal
classroom. In these institutions, students are generally expected to devote between two and
three hours in outside preparation time for each hour in seminar. The JMO Department has
developed its curriculum in a manner in which, on average, students will devote between one
1
to two hours of outside preparation for every hour in seminar. Accordingly, for a ninety
minute seminar, expect to budget up to three hours for reading, preparing, and reflecting on
the material prior to discussion in seminar. The reason for this difference between purely
academic institutions and the War College is that unlike most civilian institutions of higher
learning, students attending the College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff
College are more mature and more experienced and have already demonstrated expertise in a
given field. You will note that there are days blocked off as student reading and reflection
time specifically to allow you to reflect on what you have learned thus far and to prepare for
what is scheduled in the following week. The faculty recognizes that in order for the student
to prepare himself/herself fully for the challenge of seminar participation, time must be
dedicated to preparation. As we enter into our initial theoretical studies of Joint Maritime
Operations, students are presented its purpose; to fully prepare U. S. and international
military officers and civilian professionals to serve at the upper tactical and operational levels
of war.

The point of contact for this session is Captain Richard LaBranche USN, C-421.

D. Discussion Topics:
None.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

LaBranche, Richard A. Captain, USN. U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations
Department. Expectations and Design, 2016. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016.
(NWC 4154).

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Joint Maritime Operations
(JMO) Syllabus and Study Guide, 2016. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2015.
Read pages viixxx. (Issued).

__________. Student Guide AY 2015. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2011. Review.
(Issued).

G. Supplementary Reading:
None.

2
 JMO-2

INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR (Seminar)

Always keep in mind the product which the country desperately needs
is military leaders with the capability of solving complex problems and of
executing their decisions. . . . You must keep your sights on problem
solving as your objective.

VADM Stansfield Turner, USN

President, U. S. Naval War College, 1972-1974

A. Focus:

This session is devoted to the introduction of seminar moderators and students, a

review of the administrative requirements and procedures for the trimester, and the general
ground rules of seminar conduct.

B. Objectives:

Discover seminar member backgrounds and areas of expertise.

Summarize seminar guidelines, expectations, and outcomes.
Discuss the JMO syllabus, grading policy, reading requirements, schedule, critique, and
student and faculty expectations.
Discuss social and administrative matters and assign seminar responsibilities.

C. Background:

The introductory session provides the opportunity to meet your moderators and
fellow seminar members. In preparation for the seminar, you will complete a short
questionnaire that was provided by e-mail or put in your school mailbox. Completed
questionnaires will be collected at the beginning of the introductory session.

1. Course Requirements. In addition to contribution to daily seminar discussions and

practical exercises, written course requirements include the Operational Art essay exam, the
Operations Research paper, and numerous other orders related tasks.

2. Grading. Grades will be based on the criteria specified in the JMO syllabus.

3. Honor Code. The academic honor code is discussed in the Naval War College Student
Handbook and Academic Policy Statements; cheating, plagiarism, and misrepresentation are
specifically prohibited.

3
The point of contact for this session is Professor Bill Hartig, C-428.

D. Discussion Topics:
None.

E. Products:

A completed student recall roster and a student billet assignment sheet.

F. Required Reading:

Familiarize yourself with: The Blackboard web site at:

http://navalwarcollege.blackboard.com/

Darlington, Roger. How to Think Critically. Roger Darlingtons World. April 2010.
(NWC 1059).

Richardson, John M. ADM. A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority. Washington,

D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Navy. January 2016. Read.

Turner, VADM Stansfield. Convocation Address (Edited), U. S. Naval War College,

Newport, RI. 24 August 1972. (NWC 1121).

G. Supplementary Readings:
None.

4
 JMO-3

THE JMO RESEARCH PAPER (Seminar)

A nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors
will have its laws made by cowards and its wars fought by fools.

Thucydides

A. Focus:

This session addresses JMO research paper requirements, to include guidance on paper
topics, research and writing, paper due dates, and grading criteria.

B. Objectives:

Discuss JMO research paper requirements, guidelines, expectations, and outcomes.

Understand how to submit papers for competitive prizes and awards offered by the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Naval War College, and other agencies.

C. Background:

The JMO research paper is an objective way for students to demonstrate competence at
the Masters degree level. The research paper provides each student with the opportunity to
focus on a theater or operational level issue, conduct research and analysis of the issue, and
prepare a paper that advances the literature on that issue. Consequently, it enables students to
concentrate on topics of significant value and interest to them as long as the topics are
relevant to any of the individual sessions found in the JMO syllabus.
The research paper requires independent thought and competent writing because the
final product should be suitable for publication in a professional journal. The range and depth
of research should be adequate to support the students approach and justify sufficiently the
conclusions and recommendations or lessons learned. Another use of the paper is to stimulate
innovative thinking in Service component and joint force staffs involved with the many
complex issues of military force employment.
Combatant commanders, operating forces, and headquarters staffs solicit papers and
monographs on topics of current interest to support initiatives, develop concepts, provide
depth to existing analytical efforts, and provide fresh looks at the methods of accomplishing
missions. The Naval War Colleges College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff
College is canvassed frequently for papers on particular subjects and is requested to stimulate
interest in specific areas for research and writing.
A recent example is consideration of innovation in the application of naval force
how to accomplish the goal of fighting smarter rather than fighting with more. While some
aspects of this project fall outside the parameters of the JMO research paper requirement,
5
many of the issues therein are applicable. These especially include doing the right things and
doing them rightthe result of integrating effectiveness and efficiency. In any case, open
dialogue with your moderator team is essential in ensuring an appropriate topic is selected.

1. Requirements. The JMO research paper requires the following:

a. A thesis: A definitive position that the paper will aim to defend, support, or justify.
b. Sufficient research to analyze the thesis properly.
c. Logical conclusions drawn from the material presented within the paper.
d. Recommendations or lessons learned, as appropriate, demonstrating the papers
relevance to the modern operational commander.

2. Topics. Topics should be taken from one of the following areas:

a. A current issue at the upper tactical or operational level of war.

b. Operational art or the use of operational art to analyze a case.
c. An option in support of a military strategy, operational concept, or a new doctrinal
concept.
d. An issue dealing with joint, interagency, multinational planning, execution, tasks, or
functions at the operational level of war.
e. Force employment innovation, such as the application of naval force at the operational
level of war.
f. A topic that applies to current, near-term, or future major operations or campaigns.
g. A topic of value to an operational level commander.

Note: The JMO research paper should not be an examination of simple tactics, technology,
force structure, or future force planning concepts. Also, it should not be a library search and
recitation of published material, nor should it contain proposals or recommendations
regarding numbers and types of weapons platforms, modifications to said platforms,
weapons, sensors, or force structure. Moderators will answer any questions on specific issues
relating to topic selection.

NWC 2062Y, Operations Paper: Guidance for Students contains the JMO
Chairmans guidance for selecting a suitable topic and crafting a research question. It also
contains detailed guidance on developing the paper from topic selection to final draft,
candidate topical areas from requesting commands, a list of topics dealing with the
operational level of war, extracts on the awards program, and instructions for submission of
papers to professional journals. NWC 2062Y is an excellent resource for developing ideas
and selecting a topic. Be aware, however, that some topics listed in 2062Y are more
applicable to other core courses and thus require transformation into JMO-worthy topics.

3. Paper Proposal. Students shall submit paper proposals to their moderators; the format of
the proposal can be found in enclosure (1) to NWC 2062Y. Moderator acceptance of a
proposal constitutes an understanding between the student and the moderator grading team.
An accepted proposal means that the student and the moderators understand in common the

6
depth of research, extent of analysis, and quality of writing expected of the student, in
addition to the requirements discussed above in paragraph 1.

4. Research and Writing. Research and writing shall meet graduate-level standards.

5. Format. Hacker and Sommers A Writers Reference and the Naval War College Pocket
Writing and Style Guide is the standard for unclassified written work. Students should use the
Chicago Manual of Style (CMS) format for notes and bibliography. Guidance for classified
papers is available from the moderators. Additionally, the 2015 JMO Research Paper
Template will be posted on Blackboard. Students may save this template as a file on their
own computers and either compose in the file directly, or paste their work into the file. Use
of the template is intended to aid in formatting of page numbers and section breaks.

6. Report Document Page. The final version of the paper submitted to the faculty requires a
Standard Form (SF) 298 as the report document page. This page will be used as a coversheet
for all other pages.

7. Length. The text of the JMO research paper will be 14 to 17 double-spaced pages in
Times New Roman font size 12 with a one and a quarter left margin and one inch top,
bottom, and right. (See the JMO Paper Template). Your moderators may accept longer
papers depending on paper purpose and topic, but this acceptance must be obtained prior to
paper submission.

8. Faculty Advisor. The paper advisor helps the students move from topic selection to
research question to thesis statement; define the scope of the research effort; keep research,
analysis, and writing on track; and develop effective outlines and drafts. Each student will
have a paper advisor; seminar moderators will serve as paper advisors for the students in
their seminars. A minimum of two tutorials will be scheduled with your moderators. Subject
matter expertise in a broad range of topics is resident in the War College faculty. Your
moderator will assist you, if required or desired, in coordinating a meeting with a SME in
your area of interest.

9. Grading. The JMO research paper represents a substantial portion of the overall Course
grade. The paper will be evaluated for both substance and writing quality. Grades will be
based on the criteria specified in the JMO syllabus.

10. Prizes and Awards. JMO research papers may compete for the prizes and awards
bestowed annually during the June graduation ceremony. Students are encouraged to prepare
their papers with the additional purpose of competing for one or more of these honors.
Details are included in reading NWC 2062Y.

7
11. Submission Schedule:

9-12 March: Conduct initial tutorial regarding potential paper topic.

19 March: Submit paper proposal to moderators.
30 March-2 April: Conduct follow-up tutorial; moderators and student agree on
thesis and course of action.
24 April: Suggested date to terminate research, commence analysis and
writing.
4 May: Suggested date to submit drafts to paper advisors for review.
13 May: Operations research paper due to moderators NLT 0830.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Carol Prather, C-408.

D. Discussion Topics:
None.

E. Products:

A quality 14-17 page research paper that demonstrates the ability to coherently
present a well-constructed argument and to demonstrate critical thought.

F. Required Reading:

Turabian, Kate L. A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations. 8th
ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013. Scan. (Issued).

U. S. Naval War College. Naval War College Pocket Writing and Style Guide. Newport, RI:
Naval War College, August 2012. Scan. (Issued).

__________. Joint Military Operations Department. Operations Paper: Guidance for

Students. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2012. Scan. (NWC 2062Y).

__________. JMO Paper Template, 2015. Scan.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Barzun, Jacques and Henry F. Graff. The Modern Researcher. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing, 2003.

Booth, Wayne C., Gregory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams. The Craft of Research. 3d
ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

Hacker, Diana and Nancy Sommers. A Writers Reference. 7th ed. Boston, MA: Bedford /
St. Martins, 2011.

8
Johns, Sylvia and Sarah Keller. Cite it Right: the SourceAid LLC guide to citation, research,
and avoiding plagiarism. Osterville, MA: SourceAid, LLC, 2005.

University of Chicago Press. The Chicago Manual of Style. 16th ed. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2010.

9
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

10
 JMO-4

INTRODUCTION TO NAVAL TACTICS (Seminar)

Naval tactics are based upon conditions the chief causes of which,
namely, the arms may change; which in turn causes necessarily a change
in the construction of ships, in the manner of handling them, and so finally
in the disposition and handling of fleets.

Sebastien-Francois Bigot de Morogoues,

Tactique Navale, 1763

A. Focus:

The principal purpose of this session is to explain the importance of naval tactics, its
relationship with strategy, and provide an overview of the key components of naval tactics.
This session will set the stage for all the subsequent sessions on tactics of single naval
combat arms.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the meaning and importance of naval tactics.

Know and comprehend the mutual relationship between naval tactics, maritime strategy
and tactics, and naval operational art.
Describe the effect of technological advances on the evolution of naval tactics.
Recognize the distinctions between minor and major naval tactical objectives and the
linkage among tactical objectives, tasks, and targets.
Summarize key aspects of tactics of weapons/sensors, individual platforms, naval combat
arms, and combined naval combat arms.
Explain the fundamentals of the theory of naval tactics (e.g. tactical factors of space-
time-force, tactical functions, tactical decision-making and planning, tactical leadership,
tactical thinking v tactical vision, tactical training).

C. Background:

In generic terms, naval tactics can be defined as the theory and practice of planning and
employing naval tactical actions aimed to accomplish a tactical objective. Naval tactics is
one of three components of naval art. All three components of naval art are closely related.
Their mutual relationships are highly dynamic. There is no clear-cut line separating these
three components of naval art. Actions and events at the tactical level often affect strategy
and policy in the most profound way. Operational art considerably influences both strategy
and policy on the one hand and tactics on the other. The strategy and policy framework
dominates operational art, and the latter, in turn, dominates tactics.
11
 The foundations of the theory of naval tactics are naval history and the current/future
naval technological advances. In developing the theory of naval tactics, one should study a
large number of historical examples in great detail. The greater the number of examples
studied, the more likely a theorist is to derive commonalties that could be of value today and
for some time in the future. Naval tactical combat is usually an integral part of a major
naval/joint operation or maritime campaigns. Hence, the study of the historical examples
must always take into account that broader operational framework. A sound theory of tactics
must fully explain and analyze the current and pending naval technological advances and
their effect on tactical employment of naval forces. Because of the frequent and sometimes
unpredictable changes in naval technologies, the durability of these influences is, of course,
relatively short. The sound theory of naval tactics should avoid being either exclusively
based on history or on new technologies. The importance of new technologies should not be
either overrated or underrated. The reality of war at the tactical level should always
dominate theory. Expressed differently, the theory of naval tactics will not be sound if it
conflicts with the practice of war.
The theory of naval tactics can be arbitrarily grouped into two categories: general
theory and tactics of naval forces. General naval tactics explain and analyze mutual
relationships and patterns of both tangible and intangible elements of tactics common to
tactics of platforms and forces as a whole. In contrast, tactics of naval forces deal with the
tactical employment of naval weapons/sensors/gear/equipment, individual naval platforms
and their groups, naval combat arms, and combined naval combat arms.
In generic terms, general naval tactics consist of the following mutually related
elements: tactical objectives, tactical factors of space-time-force, methods and elements of
combat forces' tactical employment, tactical functions, tactical decision-making and
planning, tactical leadership, tactical education, and tactical training.
Tactics of naval forces consist of tactics of naval weapons/sensors and
gear/equipment; naval platforms and their groups, single naval combat arms, and combined
naval combat arms tactics, respectively. Each of these types of tactics consists of theory and
practice. Various aspects of general naval tactics are also part of the tactics of naval forces as
a whole and their individual parts.
Tactics of naval weapons/sensors deal with the employment of each type of missiles
(e.g. ASMs, ASCMs, LACMs, SAMs), shipboard/coastal guns, torpedoes, Antisubmarine
Rockets (ASROC), depth charges (DCs), and mines. Specific types of tactics are developed
for the use of mine counter measures (MCM) gear and sensors. In recent years, tactics for
unmanned vehicles (unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); unmanned surface vehicles (USVs);
and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs)) are also being developed.
Tactics of naval platforms and their groups consist of tactics for the employment of
various types of surface combatants (e.g. cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, missile
craft, gunboats, patrol craft, combat craft, minelayers, MCM ships/craft), submarines
(ballistic-missiles armed submarines, attack submarines, midget submarines); fixed-wing
aircraft (e.g. attack aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft) and rotary wing
aircraft (e.g. multi-purpose helicopters, ASW helicopters, transport helicopters).
Tactics of naval combat arms deal with the methods and procedures in the tactical
employment of single combat arms (surface forces, submarine forces, naval aviation, naval
special forces, and coastal defense) in obtaining/maintaining or denying sea control, and

12
exercising control. It also deals with the tactics in their employment in operations short of
war (e.g. combating piracy, combating terrorism, support of counter insurgency).
Tactics of combined naval combat arms deal with the employment of two or more
naval combat arms, and they also often include the combat arms/branches of other services.
This requires synchronized employment of diverse forces in terms of the objective, place,
and time. The most complex of all, and extremely difficult to execute in practice, is the three
way employment of surface combatants-submarines-aircraft. Cooperation among these
combat arms is extremely difficult to plan and execute. This problem is even more difficult
when large combatants, submarines and aircraft have to cooperate with small surface
combatants and coastal defense forces plus land-based air defenses deployed in the littorals.
Combined naval combat arms tactics is the key requirement for success in anti-surface
warfare (ASUW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), amphibious warfare, maritime trade
warfare, and mine warfare (MIW). In each of these warfare areas, the combat arms/branches
of other services and air forces in particular, are also employed in cooperation with naval
forces.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Milan Vego, C-427.

D. Discussion Topics:

Describe the meaning and importance of naval tactics.

Discuss the mutual relationship between naval tactics and maritime strategy and tactics and
naval operational art.

How do new naval technologies affect naval tactics?

Discuss and analyze the distinctions between minor and major naval tactical objectives. What
is the linkage among tactical objectives, tasks, and targets?

Explain the key aspects and differences in tactics of weapons/sensors, individual platforms,
naval combat arms, and combined naval combat arms.

Discuss and analyze the fundamentals of the theory of naval tactics (e.g. tactical factors of
space-time-force, tactical functions, tactical decision-making and planning, tactical
leadership, tactical thinking vs. tactical vision, tactical training).

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Hone, Trent, "U. S. Navy Surface Battle Doctrine and Victory in the Pacific," Naval War
College Review, Vol. 62, No. 1 (2008) pp. 67-105. (NWC 1200).

13
Vego, Milan, "On Naval Tactics" Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department, U. S.
Naval War College, September 2015. (NWC 2148).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Bernotti, Romeo, The Fundamentals of Naval Tactics (Annapolis, MD: The United States
Naval Institute, 1912).

Brodie, Bernard, "New Tactics in Naval Warfare," Foreign Affairs, Vo. 24, No. 2 (January
1946), pp. 210-223.

Fioravanzo, Giuseppe, A History of Naval Tactical Thought (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1979).

Fiske, Bradley, A., "Naval Principles," The North American Review, Vol. 102, No. 720
(November 1915), pp. 693-701.

Hone, Trent, "The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U. S. Navy, 1922-1941," The
Journal of Military History, vol. 67, no. 4 (October 2003), pp. 1107-1148.

Hughes, Wayne, P. Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1986).

Hughes, Wayne, P. Jr., editor, The U. S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2015).

Lautenschlaeger, Karl, "Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare," International

Security, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall 1983), pp. 3-51.

Robison, Samuel S., and Robison, Mary, A History of Naval Tactics From 1530 to 1930. The
Evolution of Tactical Maxims (Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute,
1942).

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, "A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive
Battle, 1912-1916," The Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 1 (January 2003),
pp. 85-136.

Tunstall, Brian, edited by Dr. Tracy, Nicholas, Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail. The
Evolution of Fighting Tactics 1650-1815 (Edison, NJ: Wellfleet Press, 2001).

14
 JMO-5

THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES:

OBJECTIVES AND METHODS (Seminar)

Take, sink, burn, or destroy the enemy fleet.

Lord St. Vincent:

Orders to Nelson off Toulon, 21 May 1798

A. Focus:

This session will explain and analyze the principal methods of employing maritime forces
to accomplish minor or major tactical objectives.

B. Objectives:

Identify the main methods of tactical employment of naval forces without the use of
weapons.
Explain the terms naval attack, naval strike, and naval raid and their variants.
Understand the meaning of the term naval engagement and its importance in a naval
battle.
Comprehend the role and importance of naval battle and the various types of naval
battles.

C. Background:

The accomplishment of any military objective requires a specific method in the

employment of naval/maritime forces. In generic terms, the method of combat employment
can be described as the combat disposition, deployment, and maneuver, sectors of effort,
sequence and timing of the combat employment of the main and supporting forces, and their
disengagement and withdrawal. Technological advances had in the past, and will continue to
have in the future, the single largest effect on the development of new methods for combat
employment of naval forces. Methods of combat employment also depend on the type of
platforms/forces and characteristics of the physical environment in which they operate. There
is also a great difference between methods used for accomplishing an offensive vice
defensive objective.
In general, the larger the scale of an objective, the more complex the method for its
accomplishment, the larger and more diverse the forces required, and the greater the needed
area for their deployment/redeployment and combat employment. In the employment of
maritime forces, a distinction is made among naval tactical actions and major naval/joint
operations and maritime campaigns. As the title suggest, naval tactical actions are aimed at
accomplishing tactical objectives. Hence, the theory and practice of naval tactical actions
15
belongs to the field of naval tactics. In contrast, the theory and practice of major naval/joint
operations and maritime campaigns is the domain of operational art.
Naval tactical actions are conducted with and without the use of weapons. They can
be planned or unplanned. They can be conducted at any time and regardless of the ratio of
forces in a given theater. Naval tactical actions are much simpler to plan and execute than
major naval/joint operations or maritime campaigns. They are conducted in a sea/ocean area
varying in size from a combat zone/sector to a maritime area of operations.
The principal methods of tactical employment of naval forces without the use of
weapons are reconnaissance/surveillance, search, tracking, and patrolling. In generic terms
the main methods of tactical actions with the use of weapons are attacks, strikes, raids,
engagements, and battles. These terms are not necessarily identical to those used in the
employment of ground forces. For example, in land warfare the term "attack" is used to
describe actions ranging from those aimed at accomplishing minor tactical objectives to those
intended to accomplish operational or even strategic objectives. The terms "attack" and
"defense" are also used to describe the overall posture of the ground troops along the entire
or major part of the front. This problem is compounded by the fact that very often these
terms are not precisely defined, even in various doctrinal documents.
The oldest and simplest tactical action of naval forces is a naval attack a
combination of maneuver and decisive use of weapons/sensors aimed at accomplishing a
minor tactical objective. It is normally a part of a strike or an engagement/naval battle. It can
also be conducted independently.
A naval strike is the most important method in the tactical employment of naval
forces. It gradually emerged after the introduction of anti-ship missiles (ASMs), advanced
torpedoes, and smart bombs. Today, strike is a dominant method of combat employment
for combat aircraft and missile armed submarines and surface combatants. A naval strike can
be defined as a series of successive or simultaneous attacks coordinated in time and place, to
accomplish a major tactical (or in some case partial operational) objective. It is
characterized by the rapidity of action (often measured in minutes), swift maneuvering of
platforms, and quick firing of weapons.
A naval raid can be described as a clandestine and swift penetration of the enemy-
held coast, destruction of neutralization of the assigned objective, followed by a planned and
swift withdrawal. It is a broader variant of naval strike. It can be conducted independently or
as integral part of a major operation. A naval raid is usually conducted when the enemy has
general sea control but not local control.
The term naval engagement is widely used, but usually its meaning is not well
defined or understood. In U. S. military parlance, it is used interchangeably with the terms
encounter and attack. However, a naval engagement is a clash of opposing forces that is
larger than an attack/strike and smaller than a battle. It consists of a series of related
strikes/counterstrikes and attacks/counterattacks by a single or several naval combat arms,
intended to accomplish the main objective in a naval battle. Offensive and defensive, air,
anti-air, naval, and combined arms engagements are differentiated A naval engagement
consists of the entirety of attacks, counter attacks, strikes, counter strikes and diverse
defensive measures all intended to achieve a single operational objective.

16
 A naval battle is the highest and most complex method of tactical combat
employment of naval forces. Until the advent of submarines and aircraft, it was fought only
on the sea surface. Since then, a naval battle encompassed all three physical mediums or
dimensions. A naval battle can be defined as a series of mutually related attacks/
counterattacks, strikes/counterstrikes, and defensive measures, coordinated in time and place
to accomplish a major tactical objective. It can be fought exclusively on the surface, or it can
encompass subsurface and airspace. It can be conducted on the open sea/ocean or in the
littoral waters. A naval battle can be fought when one's forces possess local sea control, the
enemy has sea control, or in a situation where the state of un-commanded sea prevails.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Milan Vego, C-427.

D. Discussion Topics:

Describe the main methods of tactical employment of naval forces without the use of
weapons.

Define "naval attack." Discuss types of naval attack with regard to platforms, weapons used,
and attack sectors.

Discuss the role and importance of naval strikes in the past and today. What are the main
types of naval strikes today?

What is the meaning and what are the main purposes of naval raids? Are they viable today?

Describe the key difference between a naval engagement and a naval attack or strike?

Describe the role and importance of naval battles and their main types? Is this method of
tactical employment still viable today?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan, Naval Tactical Actions. Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department,
U. S. Naval War College. August 2015. (NWC 2155).

__________. Objectives of Naval Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2015.
(NWC 1102).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David. Swarming & The Future of Conflict. Santa Monica, CA:
RAND/National Defense Research Institute, 2000.

17
Baudry, A. The Naval Battle. Studies of the Tactical Factors (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd,
1914).

Haghshenass, Fariborz, Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare. (Washington, D.C.: Washington

Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus no. 87, September 2008).

Kirkpatrick, C.W., The Naval Night Battles in the Solomons (Pompano Beach, FL:
Exposition Press of Florida, 1987).

Lambert, Nicholas A., "Our Bloody Ships" or "Our Bloody System'? Jutland and the Loss of
The Battle Cruisers, 1916," The Journal of Military History, Vol. 62, No. 1 (January
1998): 29-55.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, "The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912-1916," The
Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 1 (January 2003): 85-136.

Sweetman, Jack, Great American Naval Battles. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1998).

18
 JMO-6

NAVAL PLATFORMS, WEAPONS,

AND SENSORS (Seminar)

A sword never kills anybody; it is a tool in the killer's hand.

Seneca

A. Focus:

This session will provide an overview of the standard platforms, weapons, and sensors
commonly found in navies today. Its intent is to begin to develop an understanding of naval
force capabilities.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of naval forces to conduct the full range of
military operations in pursuit of national interests.
Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and
operations.

C. Background:

The rapid advance in both sensor and weapon technology during the Second World War
had an inestimable effect on naval tactics, the kind of platforms navies procured and warship
design itself. In the years following the close of World War II, technologies with a direct
impact on naval warfare continued to evolve and improve. Both surface and air search radar,
which were in their nascent stage at the beginning of the war, became commonplace among
the major naval powers shortly thereafter. Such was also the case with sonar systems
designed to locate, identify and track much more capable submarines. With the advent of the
nuclear powered submarine, the surface to air guided missile, the anti-ship cruise missile, and
the super-carrier; the tactical considerations of naval commanders underwent a considerable
change.
As weapon and sensor capabilities changed, so did warship design. The advent of the
guided missile, along with the increased range and capability of naval aviation and modern
submarines, meant the heavy naval rifle (and the tactics to most effectively employ it) was
supplanted in importance. Heavily armored warships were likewise replaced with much
lighter designs with an emphasis on increased sensor capability. As new weapon systems
are developed and capabilities evolve, so do the tactics. Increases in the range and lethality
of offensive weapons coupled with increases in detection capabilities shortened the decision
cycle of commanders in both the defensive and offensive aspects of naval combat.

19
 With only the U. S. Navy and the Russian Navy maintaining a number of cruisers, the
multi-role destroyer has now become the most prolific and capable surface combatant. Even
smaller platforms such as frigates, corvettes and fast missile craft may have significant
offensive capabilities that must be mitigated by maritime planners.
Leaps in non-nuclear propulsion technology, such as air-independent propulsion (AIP),
have made the diesel submarine into an extremely capable platform which in some
environments is more desirable than its larger nuclear powered cousin. Modern subsonic as
well as supersonic long range anti-ship cruise missiles continue to proliferate with ever
increasing levels of accuracy and lethality. These weapons, which may be launched from
surface, subsurface and air platforms, put surface forces increasingly at risk. Likewise,
improvements in the performance of undersea mines as well as modern torpedoes further
threaten naval forces.
The proper synchronization of sensors, platforms, and weapon systems is a critical
component in massing effective naval firepower on a desired target. By overwhelming a
targets defensive capabilities with coordinated strikes a naval force may gain significant
tactical and operational advantage. As naval forces cannot be regenerated as quickly as ground
forces such an event may prove decisive.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Daniel Caldwell, C-414.

D. Discussion Topics:

How has the proliferation of long range Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) impacted naval
warfare tactics?

Describe the relationship between sensor and weapon system capability to naval strategy.

What type of sensors/weapon systems are commonly found on most surface combatants?

What are some common vulnerabilities/limitations of modern sensor/weapon systems?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Forces/Capabilities

Handbook. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2014. (NWC 3153P). Read pp. 11-12.
(Issued).

_________. Selected U. S. Navy and The People Republic of China Army (Navy) (PLA(N))
Tactical Capability Handbook Slide Pack. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016.
Scan. (NWC 2164).

20
G. Supplementary Readings:

Friedman, Norman. The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems, Fifth
Edition. Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute Press, 2006.

Jane's Weapons Systems Naval 2012-2013. London, UK; Janes Information Group. 2012.

Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015 116th Revised Edition. London, UK; Janes Information
Group. 2014.

Wertheim, Eric. The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, 16th Edition:
Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems. Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute
Press, 2013.

21
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

22
 JMO-7

FUNDAMENTALS OF SURFACE WARFARE (Seminar)

No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy.

Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson,

21 October 1805, Battle of Trafalgar

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the objectives and methods of employing Surface Warfare
(SUW) forces in combat operations.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the objectives of surface warfare and the distinctions between its conduct in
the open ocean and the littorals.
Understand the influence of the physical environment on the employment of ones
surface forces.
Comprehend the main methods of combat employment of surface forces.

C. Background:

As defined by the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms (Joint Publication1-02), Surface Warfare is that portion of maritime warfare in which
operations are conducted to destroy or neutralize enemy naval surface forces and merchant
vessels. It also may be referred to as SUW.
The history of surface warfare is as old as naval warfare itself. From the Battle of
Salamis in 480 BCE, through the age of sail and down to today, surface warfare remains a
critical component of attaining and maintaining sea control. Until the 20th Century, the
history of naval warfare was primarily the history of the surface combatant. From the
triremes of the classical age to the ships of the line during the Napoleonic Wars and into the
early 1900s, the power of a fleet was defined by the design and armament of surface ships
along with the fighting characteristics of the men who served on them.
The primacy of the surface combatant in naval warfare was not challenged until well
into the 20th century with the development of the airplane and the submarine as legitimate
components of a battle fleet. Despite the introduction of those platforms, the surface
combatant and surface warfare itself remains a cornerstone of naval power.
As technology has progressed throughout the centuries so have the types of platforms
from which surface warfare is conducted. The oar powered triremes of the classical age
with their rams and crews that fought ship to ship as soldiers eventually developed into the
23
wooden warship propelled by sail and mounting an ever increasing number of guns. These
vessels, which began to proliferate in the 15th Century and reached their zenith in the early
19th Century, gave way in turn to the steam powered, iron armored warships of the mid to
late 1800s.
With the launching of the HMS DREADNAUGHT in 1906, the British Royal Navy
introduced the age of the battleship which was to remain the primary naval combatant until
being displaced by the aircraft carrier during the Second World War. Designed primarily for
ship to ship combat through the use of ever larger guns with increasing range, the anti-
surface role of the battleship was eventually overtaken by a number of ship types armed with
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Originally developed as a radio controlled, air launched
weapon by Germany in WWII, the proliferation of ship launched ASCMs enabled relatively
small surface combatants to engage surface targets at much longer ranges with devastating
effect. First used successfully by the Egyptians against the Israeli destroyer EILAT in the
Six-Day War of 1967, the ASCM can now be found on numerous surface combatants around
the world.
Today, surface warfare and anti-surface warfare is carried out both in the open ocean
and in the littorals from a number of platforms ranging in size from large cruisers to much
smaller corvettes and missile patrol craft. The primary surface combatant of todays blue
water navies is the destroyer which is a multi-role platform capable of engaging surface, air,
and sub-surface targets with a mixture of guns, missiles and torpedoes.
Although technology has caused a number of revolutionary changes in the design of
warships and their tactical means of employment, the operational objectives of surface
warfare and anti-surface warfare have remained relatively constant. Surface forces play a
critical role in obtaining and maintaining sea control and remain essential for the protection
of sea lines of communications (SLOCs), denial of enemy SLOCs, support to amphibious
operations, maritime surveillance, coastal security, convoy protection and the destruction
and/or neutralization of an enemy fleet.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Daniel Caldwell, C-414.

D. Discussion Topics:

Explain the objectives of Surface Warfare.

What are the differences between conducting surface warfare in the open ocean and in the
littorals?

What are the effects of the physical environment (weather/climate) on surface forces as they
attempt to obtain/maintain control of the surface/subsurface/air and exercise that control?

E. Products:
None.

24
F. Required Reading:

Gurtcheff, John H. The Battle of Jutland. Air Command and Staff College, Montgomery,
Alabama, 1984. (NWC 4007).

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Selected U. S. Navy and
The People Republic of China Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) Tactical Capability Handbook
Slide Pack. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016. Scan. (NWC 2164).

Vego, Milan Fundamentals of Surface Warfare. Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations
Department, U. S. Naval War College. 2013. (NWC 1164).

Yaari, Yedida. The Littoral Arena, A Word of Caution. Naval War College Review, 48, No.
2 (Spring 1995): 7-21. (NWC 4110).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Adkins, Roy. Nelsons Trafalgar: The Battle That Changed the World. New York, NY:
Penguin. 2006.

Bennett, Geoffrey. Naval Battles of the First World War. NY: Penguin. 2002.

Bulkley, Robert. At Close Quarters, PT Boats in the United States Navy. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press. 2004.

Cross, Robert F. Shepherds of the Sea: Destroyer Escorts in World War II. Annapolis MD:
Naval Institute Press. 2013.

Gordon, Andrew. The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command. Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press. 2013.

Grace, James. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Night Action 13 November 1942. Annapolis
MD, Naval Institute Press. 1999.

Hornfischer, James D. The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War
II Story of the U. S. Navys Finest Hour. London: Bantam Press, 2004.

__________. Neptunes Inferno: The U. S. Navy at Guadalcanal. London: Bantam Press,

2012.

Muir, Malcolm. Black Shoes and Blue Water: Surface Warfare in the United States Navy,
1945-1975. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1996.

OHara, Vincent P. The U. S. Navy Against the Axis, Surface Combat 1941-1945. Annapolis
MD, Naval Institute Press. 2007.

25
Pope, Dudley. The Battle of the River Plate: The Hunt for the German Pocket Battleship
Graf Spee. Ithaca, NY: McBooks Press 2005.

__________. Flag 4: The Battle of Coastal Forces in the Mediterranean. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2006.

Roscoe, Theodore. United States Destroyer Operations in World War II. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1953.

Sauer, Howard. The Last Big-Gun Naval Battle: The Battle of Surigao Strait. Palo Alto, CA:
Glencannon Press, 1999.

Schull, Joseph. Far Distant Ships: An Official Account of Canadian Naval Operations in
World War II. Ontario, CA: Stoddart Publishing, 1953.

Strauss, Barry. The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter that Saved Greece- and Western
Civilization. New York, Simon and Schuster 2005.

Sumida, Tesuro, Jon. The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912-1916, The
Journal of Military History, 67, No. 1 (January 2003): 85-136.

Toll, Ian. Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U. S. Navy. New York, NY:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2007.

Willmott, H.P. The Battle of Leyte Gulf. The Last Fleet Action. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 2005

Yates, Keith. Graf Spees Raiders: Challenge to the Royal Navy 1914-1915. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1994.

26
 JMO-8

FUNDAMENTALS OF SUBMARINE WARFARE (Seminar)

Tenacity, Dick. Stay with the bastard till hes on the bottom.

CDR Mush Morton, USN,

Commanding Officer, USS Wahoo (SS-238)

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the objectives and methods of employing submarine forces
in the struggle for sea control and in sea denial.

B. Objectives:

Describe the range of missions performed by submarines.

Comprehend the main objectives and methods of combat employment of submarine
forces.
Explain the unique challenges of submarine operations in the littorals and the Arctic.
Understand the importance of the human factor in the art of submarine warfare.
Comprehend the unclassified capabilities of submarines.

C. Background:

Technological innovations have continued to expand submarine roles and missions.

At the start of the First World War, senior officers of all of the Great Powers were unsure as
to the role of the submarine. Submarines were originally employed for coastal defense and
as an arm of the battle fleet operating in close proximity with battleships. In 1917 during
World War I, German U-boats adopted unrestricted warfare sinking thousands of tons of
merchant shipping. The British effectively countered this tactic with convoys. During
World War II, Germans U-boats employed Wolf pack tactics that concentrated firepower
permitting simultaneous attacks that often overwhelmed convoy escorts. Even after over one
hundred years of submarine operations, there still remains some ambiguity in the
employment of submarines.
Submarines provide the operational commander with a diverse mission set that
includes Undersea Warfare (Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Mine Warfare (MIW)),
Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW), Strike,
Strategic Deterrence, Naval Special Warfare (NSW), Strike Group Support, and other
operations such as maritime interdiction and counter narcotics. The inherent stealth and
independence associated with the employment of submarines continues to perplex an enemy
and provide a unique ability to control the subsurface and surface domains.

27
The point of contact for this session is Captain Eric Irwin, USN, C-423.

D. Discussion Topics:

Discuss the historic role of submarines and their roles today. Have these roles changed
significantly over the last 100 years?

Describe the challenges of conducting submarine operations in various operating

environments.

Discuss the human factor as it applies to the art of submarine warfare.

Describe the unclassified capabilities of the various classes of submarines and the weapons
they employ.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Lautenschlager, Karl. The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001. International Security

11, No. 3 (Winter 1986-1987). Read pp. 94-111. (NWC 4077).

Richardson, John VADM, USN, Commander Submarine Forces. Undersea Warfighting.

(July 2011). Read pp. 1-23. (NWC 3168).

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Forces/Capabilities

Handbook. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2014. (NWC 3153N). Scan pp. 14-27.
(Issued).

_________. Selected U. S. Navy and The People Republic of China Army (Navy) (PLA(N))
Tactical Capability Handbook Slide Pack. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016.
Scan. (NWC 2164).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Blair, Clay. Hitlers U-Boat War: The Hunters, 1939-1942. New York, Random House,
1996.

Doenitz, Karl. Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1958.

28
 JMO-9

FUNDAMENTALS OF NAVAL AIR WARFARE (Seminar)

I-uh-have the utmost respect for Yamamoto-san. If it had not been for him,
there would be no naval aviation. However, the most brilliant man can
occasionally make a mistake.

Admiral Chuichi Nagumo

Imperial Japanese Navy

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is to describe and to analyze the main characteristics and the
importance of naval air forces in the struggle for sea control and in sea denial and to
differentiate them from land based aviation assets.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the fundamental differences between land based air power and sea based air
power.
Understand advantages/disadvantages in the employment of naval aviation in obtaining/
maintaining and exercising or denying sea control.
Comprehend the influence of the physical environment on the employment of ones naval
aircraft on the open ocean and in the littorals.

C. Background:

Navies have shown interest in aviation and the possibilities of its use since the
introduction of Samuel P. Langleys flying machine in the late 19th Century. It was not until
the early 20th Century that navies organized and funded aviation programs specifically
intended to develop airplanes for use in the maritime domain. These early aircraft were
initially used as naval gunfire spotters, intended to improve the accuracy of, and extend the
effective range of their main warship, the battleship. By 1914, testing of air delivered
ordnance was accomplished and within a few short years, forward firing ordnance for the
purpose of countering aircraft attack was introduced. From there, Naval Aviation has
developed to support operations across the air, surface and subsurface domains.
For gaining and maintaining sea control, Naval Air greatly extends the range and
increases the speed at which a Commander may either attack enemy forces in the air, land,
sea or undersea domains or defend his own forces in a maritime environment. Naval Air also
has the capacity to significantly enhance situational awareness in the maritime environment
by enabling the Commander to dispatch sensors (including wetware) well beyond surface
sensor ranges. In these ways, Naval Air offers significant enhancement to the Commanders
29
ability to gain and maintain sea control, as well as the ability to deny the enemy control of
the sea.
Naval Air, while a significant aid to warfare in the maritime environment, due to its
speed, range and lethality, has certain challenges associated with its efficacy. Naval Air
should arrive on-station with sufficient assets and strength to project power and defend the
fleet it is attached to (naval counter-air will be the subject of a separate seminar). Projecting
naval air-power generally requires air superiority in the operational environment in which the
Fleet is operating such that an opposing air force can be detected and neutralized before it
becomes a threat to the Fleet. Naval Air should also direct its capabilities in detecting and
neutralizing the opposing surface and undersurface force threat to the Fleet. Sustainment and
persistence can become challenging if circumstances require 24/7 coverage for more than 96
hours if only one aircraft carrier is assigned to a particular Naval Force. Meteorological
conditions can also threaten effective Naval Air operations (for example, heavy sea states
that do not permit launch and recovery of aircraft). Aircrew and flight deck personnel
fatigue, as well as aircraft reliability can also reduce sustainment and persistence with only
one aircraft carrier assigned to the Naval Forces in a specific AOR. Naval Air assets are
relatively cheap, fast and effective with respect to achieving positive identification of threats
with multiple sensors for weapons employment, but if a commander desires to maintain a
continuous air presence in the maritime environment, the costs associated with putting Naval
Air Strike assets on station for continuous coverage could be prodigious and could require
multiple carriers and the associated additional logistical support in the form of fuel and parts,
etc. (although with the advent and future incorporation of Unmanned Combat Ariel Vehicles
(UCAVs), to the Fleet Force, persistent surveillance and possibly limited force protection
may be possible). For these reasons, it is important for Naval Air to be viewed as an integral
and integrated part of the overall Naval Force and not viewed in isolation.
With respect to other services ability to support Naval Air operations, as with surface
ships and submarines, Naval Air Forces ultimately require sustainment from land. Ground
and other land air forces may be used to secure and maintain friendly force lodgments and
access to vital sustainment bases. Additionally, in a littoral environment, ground and air
forces could be used to attrite the enemys ability to threaten friendly Naval Forces with land
based air and missile systems. Further, destruction or seizure of enemy bases by friendly air
and ground forces could deny the enemy basing and sustainment of assets that could be used
to threaten friendly naval assets. Forward ground and non-naval air assets can also provide
situational awareness in areas where Naval Air might be used for power projection ashore.
Additionally, as technology advances, there appears to be potential for increased
reliance upon Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in maritime operations. A survey of
reports of ongoing discussions in defense establishments across the world indicates that many
countries recognize the potential strengths of maritime UAVs. It may be useful to consider
how the development and employment UAVs in a maritime role will affect sea control and
sea denial operations in the future.

The point of contact for this session is Captain Richard LaBranche, USN, C-420.

30
D. Discussion Topics:

Discuss the principal advantages and disadvantages in the combat employment of ones naval
air forces; i.e., sea control, sea denial, and power projection.

Discuss how the effects of the physical environment affect the employment of ones naval
aircraft on the open ocean.

Explain how the physical environment affects employment of fixed-wing and rotary-wing
aircraft in the littorals, and enclosed/semi enclosed seas in particular.

Discuss how/when other services (air forces and ground forces) might be employed in
support of naval air to obtain/maintain and exercise control or denial of the sea?

Discuss how the increasing prevalence of UAVs may affect Naval Air operations.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Bussert, James C. Chinese Navy Employs UAV Assets. Signal Magazine, April 2012.
(accessed 15 January 2015) http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/2918. (NWC 4046).

Dugan, Michael J. Air Power Concentration, Responsiveness and the Operational Art.
Military Review LXIX, no. 7 (July 1989): Read pp. 12-21. (NWC 4133).

Knott, Richard S. Attack From the Sky, Naval Air Operations in the Korean War.
Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 2004. Read pp.
11-17. (NWC 4061).

Leighton, Bruce G. The Relation of Aircraft to Sea-Power. U. S. Naval Institute

Proceedings (September 1928): Read pp. 728-745. (NWC 4109).

Manazir, Michael C. RADM. Responsive and Relevant. U. S. Naval Institute

Proceedings. 140, no. 2, (February 2014). (NWC 4155).

Reynolds, C. "The U. S. Fleet-in-Being Strategy of 1942." Journal of Military History

58, no. 1 (1994). (NWC 4068).

U. S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC).
Washington, D.C.: CJCS, January 2012. Scan.

31
U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Selected U. S. Navy and
The People Republic of China Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) Tactical Capability Handbook
Slide Pack. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016. Scan. (NWC 2164).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Caravaggio, A. The Attack at Taranto." Naval War College Review 59, no. 3 (2006): 103-
127.

Douglas, A. H., Captain, USN. Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare. Newport, RI:
U. S. Naval War College, 14 December 1939. Read Chapter II, pp. 15-32.

Hallion, Richard P. Air Power and the Changing Nature of Warfare. Joint Force Quarterly,
Autumn/Winter 1997-98

Lambeth, Benjamin S. American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century. Santa
Monica: RAND, 2005.

Moffett, William A., RADM, USN. Some Aviation Fundamentals. U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, October 1925.

Ramsey, Logan C. The Influence of Aircraft on the Exercise of Sea Command. U. S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, October 1938.

Trimble, William F. Admiral William A. Moffett Architect of Naval Aviation. Washington,

D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press. 1994.

Willmott, H. P. The Battle of the Philippine Sea. in Great American Naval Battles, ed. Jack
Sweetman. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Read pp. 324-341.
(NWC 4073).

32
 JMO-10

TABLETOP EXERCISE #1: ORGANIZING NAVAL

ASSETS IN THE OPEN OCEAN (Exercise)

Show me a good loser, and Ill show you a loser.

Vince Lombardi

A. Focus:

Students will be presented a tactical problem in the form of a brief scenario and using
the information learned in the previous seminars on surface, submarine, and naval air power,
will aggregate (task organize) their forces based on objective, friendly and threat capabilities,
and the environment. Moderators will serve as the opposing force. The purpose of this
simple exercise is to allow students to demonstrate an understanding of the capabilities of
various naval platforms, weapons, and sensors.

B. Objectives:

Apply critical and creative thinking skills and knowledge of naval power in task
organizing a naval force based on objective, threat, environment, and capabilities.
Demonstrate a general understanding of the broad capabilities of the United States
Navys principal weapons, platforms, and sensors.

C. Background:

Tabletop exercises, sand table exercises, and all manner of educational tools have
been in use since the Indians devised the game of chaturangamodern day chess to teach
military strategy and maneuver to their officers. From a cursory scan of the readings, we
discover that map exercises, staff exercises or Command Post Exercises (CPX), training
trips, tactical talks, and sand-table exercises are the more common form of these war
games. The purpose of this specific exercise presented here is to allow students to come
together to solve a real-world problem using a fictional scenario.
You are expected to concisely present your decision(s) and to argue (support) them
based on what we know of capabilities of the various platforms. Leveraging the very basic
information discovered thus far, students will apply critical thought and rudimentary problem
solving skills to first disaggregate the assigned forces and then, based on objectives, threat,
capabilities, and the environment, aggregate their forces to maximize likelihood of tactical
success.
This is not a war fighting exercise, merely the first in a series of exercises that will
expand in scope, complexity, and ambiguityall intended to sharpen your critical thinking
and decision making skills. It is, in the language of critical thinking, a logic exercise in
33
which students are p[resented an opportunity to demonstrate understanding of materials
discussed thus far. Your moderator will provide input/feedback on the various decisions
considered. Students are forewarned, however, that future exercises are designed to increase
in complexity, depth, and ambiguity.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Bill Hartig, C-428.

D. Discussion Topics:

Describe the utility of war gaming as a training and educational tool.

Develop, propose, and support your potential solution(s) to the given problem regarding the
aggregation of naval power.

E. Products:

An in-seminar discussion regarding potential task organizations for U. S. naval forces

in a fictional scenario.

F. Required Readings:

Hoffman, Rudolf M. General, with Generals Franz Halder, Friedrich Fangor, and Field
Marshal Wilhelm List. A Synopsis of War Games. U. S. Army Historical Division,
1952. (NWC 4143).

United States Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Tabletop Exercise
#1 Scenario and Forces Assigned. U. S. Naval War College, Newport, RI. 2015. (NWC
4144).

__________. Selected U. S. Navy and The People Republic of China Army (Navy) (PLA(N))
Tactical Capability Handbook Slide Pack. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016.
Scan. (NWC 2164).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Cheatham Ernest C. Major USMC. The Educational War Game. A Command and Staff
College Research paper. Marine Corps Command and Staff College: Quantico, VA,
1967.

Creveld, Martin van. Wargames: From Gladiators to Gigabytes. Cambridge University

Press: NY, 2013.

Nofi, Albert A. To Train the Fleet for War: The U. S. Navy Fleet Problems: 1923-1940.
Naval War College Press: Newport, RI. 2010.

34
 JMO-11

INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL ART (Seminar)

Successful strategy achieves national and alliance political aims at the

lowest possible cost in lives and treasure. Operational Art translates those
aims into effective military operations and campaigns.

Colonel Harry G. Summers, U. S. Army (Ret),

On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 1992

A. Focus:

Furthering your understanding of classic military thinkers and theory, this session focuses
on the historical roots of operational art. This session also introduces the linkages between
operational art, strategy, and tactics. The study of the theory known as operational art is
presented here using mid- to high-intensity combat scenarios as that is the most direct
manner in which to discern the nature of the art. That is not to say, however, that operational
art does not apply to lower intensity combat scenarios as we shall see later in the trimester.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the meaning of the term Operational Art.

Understand the historical emergence of Operational Art.
Comprehend how Operational Art links strategy to tactics.
Understand why it is important to understand and apply Operational Art.

C. Background:

In Strategy and War you discussed, and in some cases will discuss Clausewitz,
Mahan, and Douhet, military theorists who looked to the past to better predict how wars
could be fought in the future. These theorists lived a turbulent time, highlighted by technical
advancement. As both the size, speed, and diversity of military forces grewas well as the
space they occupied and fought in, these men understood that a good strategy alone could not
guarantee a victory; conversely, one could win every tactical engagement and still lose the
war. To achieve victory, they understood that one must effectively link strategy and tactics
to ensure that tactical actions support strategic objectives. In modern warfare, the strategic
perspective is often too broad to ensure the decisive employment of ones sources of power;
likewise, the tactical framework is often too narrow.
Another field of study and practice exists to synchronize multiple sources of power
properly in order to accomplish the ultimate strategic or operational objective. This third
component of military art, Operational Art, occupies an intermediate position between the
realm of policy and strategy and that of tacticsand is inextricably linked to both. Without
35
operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the
only measure of success or failure.
Operational art, as defined by Dr. Milan Vego in Joint Operational Warfare: Theory
and Practice, is the component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of
planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining campaigns and major operations aimed at
accomplishing strategic or operational objectives in a given theater. Operational art emerged
in the nexus of societal change and advancements in embodied by industrialization and
technology. As the size of military forces and the resultant complexity of their movement
and sustainment grew, military leaders and theoreticians, both on land and at sea, sought
effective methods for conducting war on a greater scale. The interaction among study,
theory, and practice continues today.
The application of operational art is a cognitive process; the conduct of warfare at the
operational level preceded the emergence of formal operational art. Operational Art is not
strategy; strategy is developed and implemented at the national and theater level.
Operational Art helps commanders make sound decisionsand to use resources efficiently
and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It requires broad vision, the ability to
anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Finally, operational art is
practiced not only by Joint Force Commanders, but also by their senior staff officers and
subordinate commanders.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Doug Hime, C-423.

D. Discussion Topics:

How does theory contribute to our understanding of operational art?

How does operational art link strategy and tactics?

Discuss how technology has influenced operational art and how practitioners and
theoreticians view the conduct of war.

How does operational art assist commanders in making sound military decisions?

Discuss how an understanding of operational art assists commanders in non-traditional

warfare.

How does operational art relate to the operational level of war?

Explain why operational art begins with the objective.

E. Products:
None.

36
F. Required Readings:

Mattelaer, Alexander. The Crisis in Operational Art. A paper presented at the European
Security and Defence Forum, London, UK, November 2009. (NWC 1118).

Menning, Bruce W. Operational Art's Origins. Military Review 77 (1997). Reprint. Read,
pp. 1-15. (NWC 1110).

Vego, Milan. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice. Newport, RI: Naval War
College, reprint 2009. (Issued). Read pp. I-3I-29.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Adams, Dwight L. and Clayton R. Newell. Operational Art in the Joint and Combined
Arenas. Parameters 18 (June 1988): 33-39.

Greer, James K. Operational Art for the Objective Force. Military Review 82 no.5
(Sep-Oct 2002): 22-29.

Hope, Ian. Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The Canadian Armys Failure to Define an
Operational Doctrine. The Army Bulletin 4 no. 4 (Winter, 2001). Also available at
http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_04/iss_4/CAJ_vol4.4_07_e.pdf.

Krause, Michael D., and Cody R. Phillips, eds. Historical Perspectives of the Operational
Art. Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, Department of the Army, 2006.

Matheny, Michael R. The Roots of Modern American Operational Art. United States Army
War College Paper, Carlisle, PA, n.d. Also available at http://www.au.af.mil
/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/modern_operations.pdf.

Naveh, Shimon. In Pursuit of Excellence: Evolution of Operational Theory. London: Frank

Cass, 1997.

Record, Jeffrey. Operational Brilliance, Strategic Incompetence: The Military Reformers

and the German Model. Parameters 16 (Autumn 1986): 2-8.

Schneider, James J. Theoretical Implications of Operational Art. Military Review

(September 1990): 19-27.

Schuurman, Bart. Clausewitz and the New Wars Scholars. Parameters 40 no. 1 (Spring
2010): 89-99.

Vego, Milan. Glossary of Operational Terms. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and
Practice. Newport, RI: Naval War College, reprint 2009.

37
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38
 JMO-12

THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC (Lecture)

The fate of the Empire rests on this enterprise and every man must devote
himself totally to the task in hand.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto

Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy,
7 December 1941

A. Focus:

This lecture briefly introduces the historical case study for operational art. It provides
students with the general origins of the War in the Pacific, the principal actors on each side,
and some of the major operations and campaigns that led to the series of battles known as the
Battle of Leyte Gulf. This presentation is intended to provide historical context for the
Philippines Campaign in general and not be a rehash of the previously-studied (for some)
Strategy and War sessions on World War II. It provides the strategic and operational
background for the October 1944 Allied invasion of the Republic of the Philippines and the
subsequent campaign to wrest the control of the Philippines from the Imperial Japanese. The
campaigns that preceded as well as selected succeeding U. S. campaigns later in the Pacific
War will set the conditions for a deeper understanding of the supporting naval operations that
occurred in and around Leyte Gulf in 1944 during the campaign to retake the Philippines.

B. Objectives:

Understand the historical setting for the U. S. entry into WWII.

Comprehend the major operations and campaigns in the Pacific in WWII.
Understand the concept and sequence of events associated with the combat actions in the
invasion of the Philippines from both the Allied and Japanese perspectives.

C. Background:

Students often ask, why study a war that happened so long ago? Or, why study a pre-
precision guided munitions era war? What utility is there in it for a modern maritime war
fighter? The answer to this lies in the timelessness of the theory of war. While we know that
the character of war changes with technological evolution and so forth, it is the nature of war
that is immutable; thus, the lessons we glean from an understanding of the battles for Leyte
Gulf vis--vis operational art remain valid today.
The 1944 Philippines Campaign does in fact have all the aspects of a modern, twenty-
first century campaign: a maritime component that fought to establish local sea control to
facilitate Sixth Armys decisive effort ashore; three numbered Air Forces isolating the
39
archipelago and providing operational fires to support the campaign objectives; a special
operations component coordinating an effective insurgency against the Japanese occupiers;
and finally, decisive combat operations ashore. General Douglas MacArthur skillfully
orchestrated these componentsin time, space, and purposeto achieve a theater strategic
objective.
As students at the U. S. College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff
College, you will consider the maritime aspects of this campaign, specifically Operation
KING IIthe largest and most complex sea-air conflict (four separate battles over two days)
in history. As the final showdown between the U. S. and Japanese fleets, this one major
joint/combined operation involved enormous naval and air forces in huge areas and over vast
distances (the operation spanned over one hundred thousand square miles). As such, the
operation provides superior illustrations of virtually all aspects of operational art and remains
directly relevant to joint operations in the littorals today.

The point of contact for this lecture is Professor Bill Hartig, C-428.

D. Discussion Topics:
None.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Hime, Douglas N. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department. The
Leyte Gulf Case Study. Newport, RI: Naval War College, December 2013. Read
pp. 1-22. (NWC 1196).

Hone, Thomas. The U. S. Navys 1942-1945 Pacific War as One Coherent Campaign.
Newport, RI: U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2010.
(NWC 1186).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Barbey, Daniel E. MacArthurs Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations,

19431945. Annapolis, MD: U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1977.

Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. COMINCH P-008, Amphibious Operations:

Invasion of the Philippines, October 1944 to January 1945. Washington, D.C.: Navy
Department, 1945.

Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 2326 October 1944. New York: Harper Collins,
1994.

40
Potter, E. B. The Battle of Leyte Gulf. Sea Power. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1960.

Smith, Robert Ross. Luzon versus Formosa in Command Decisions by the Office of the
Chief of Military History. Washington, D.C.: United States Army, 1960.

41
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42
 JMO-13

MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND

THE LEVELS OF WAR (Seminar)

Pursue one great decisive aim with force and determinationa maxim
which should take first place among all causes of victory.

Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, 1812

A. Focus:

The foci of this session are on understanding the distinctions between aims/goals and
objectives, the importance of the objective in operational warfare, the process of determining
and articulating objectives, the scale of military objectives, the linkage between the objective
and its constituent tasks, and the relationships between the military objectives and
corresponding levels of war.

B. Objectives:

Understand the relationship among and between the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels of war and their corresponding objectives.
Understand the interrelationships among/between the four elements of national power
(diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and how the strategic objective
relates to the desired end state.
Identify the concepts of regressive planning and operational-level planning that are the
focus of the course.
Analyze how the Four Questions of operational warfare can help operational-level
commanders employ assets in the pursuit of strategic objectives.

C. Background:

A clearly stated and attainable objective is essential to the theory and practice of war;
without one, any military effort expended is literally aimless. This is particularly true at the
operational and strategic levels of war because the stakes are higher than at the tactical level.
Almost all aspects of operational warfare are related, either directly or indirectly, to the
objective to be accomplished.
Tactical, operational, and strategic objectives are differentiated according to their
scale. Among other things, the objective determines the method of ones combat force
employment, the size of the physical space for accomplishing it, the level of war, and also the
level of command, type of planning, and major phases and elements of ones combat force
employment. The scale of the objective determines the method of ones combat force

43
employment and the size of the physical space in which ones forces are to be employed, not
vice versa.
The selection of an objective is the first and most critical step in undertaking any
military enterprise. Once the objective is determined, the entire problem becomes greatly
simplified (but not necessarily easy to resolve). Determining a military objective, however, is
often the most difficult aspect of operational planning, requiring a careful analysis of the
enemys factors of space, time, and force. In general, the larger the scale of the objective, the
more important the factors of space, time, and force to be considered become.
It is not sufficient to specify the objective alone; one must also clearly articulate what
type of action must be carried out to accomplish the specific objective or the staff will be
unable to plan the pending operation effectively. The operational commander and planners
must also try to anticipate the possible effects (consequences or results) of the
accomplishment of the military objective. This is more an art than a science. Much depends
on the commanders knowledge and understanding of the enemy and all aspects of the
military and nonmilitary situation. There are, however, many pitfalls in the process, which, in
turn, can make predictions tenuous at best.
The scale and complexity of the military objective to be accomplished determine the
level of war to be conducted. It is generally recognized that the larger the military objective,
the higher the level of war. Thus, as discussed in Introduction to Operational Art, three basic
levels of war exist: strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic level of war can be
divided into two sublevels: national-strategic and theater-strategic. In JMO, we will focus on
the operational level of war.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Darren Houston, Royal Navy, C-407.

D. Discussion Topics:

Discuss the differences in the meaning of the terms aim, goal, and objective.

What is the relationship between the military objective and its constituent tasks?

How do U. S. military commanders derive military objectives from higher strategic

direction?

Discuss the differences between and components of military art (strategy, operational art, and
tactics) and the levels of war.

E. Products:
None.

44
F. Required Readings:

Hime, Douglas N. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department. The
Leyte Gulf Case Study. Newport, RI: Naval War College, December 2013. Review
pp. 1-22. (NWC 1196).

Liddell-Hart, Sir Basil Henry. The Objective in War: National Object and Military Aim.
Naval War College Review 5, no. 4 (December 1952). (NWC 2046).

Vego, Milan. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice. Newport, RI: Naval War
College, reprint 2009. Policy-Strategy-Operational Art Nexus. Read pp. I-35 to I-50
and pp. II-3 to II-20. Military Objectives and the Levels of War. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

MacGregor, Douglas A. Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War. Parameters 22, no.4
(Winter 199293): 3347.

Vego, Milan. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice. Newport, RI: Naval War
College, reprint 2009. Objectives of Land Warfare.

45
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46
 JMO-14

THE THEATER: STRUCTURE

AND GEOMETRY (Seminar)

War is the business of positions.

Napoleon I

A. Focus:

This session aims to explore the meaning of the term theater, its structure, and its
elements or geometry. The inextricable linkages among and between the objective(s), theater,
and levels of war and command will be discussed, and the Leyte case study will be
introduced to illustrate and enable a critical analysis of the theater structure and selected parts
of the theater geometry in seminar.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the relationship between the military objective(s) and the physical structure
of a theater.
Understand the considerations that may inform and influence theater structure.
Understand the meaning and importance of the key terms pertaining to theater geometry
(positions, bases of operation, lines of operation, decisive points, lines of communication,
and objectives).

C. Background:

Modern theory holds that a theater of war should be militarily organized to ensure the
most favorable conditions for the employment of ones forces across the entire spectrum of
conflict, from peacetime competition to high-intensity conventional war. The larger the
assigned military objective(s), the greater the force required and, therefore, the larger the
physical environment required to deploy, concentrate, and maneuver the force, and the larger
the infrastructure needed to support the employment of ones forces. Hence, the theater has to
be divided into a number of geographically-based areas to ensure the most effective
employment of ones military and nonmilitary sources of power. The structure of a three-
dimensional theater, overlaid with the information environment, can include one or more
theaters of operations, areas of operations, and combat zones (or sectors). The size of each
subdivision should be primarily based on the scale of the military objective to be
accomplished and the selected method of combat force employment. The latter, in turn,
dictates the size and mix of ones forces required to accomplish a given objective. The
theater and its subdivisions are the very basis for establishing and maintaining tactical,
operational, and strategic levels of command or command echelons.
47
 Any theater contains a variety of natural and artificial features called theater
elements or theater geometry that significantly affect the planning and execution of
military action at any level of war. These theater elements include: positions, distances, bases
of operation, physical objectives, decisive points, lines of operation (LOO), and lines of
communication (LOC)any of which may have tactical, operational, or even strategic
significance. The key to evaluating the military importance of these features involves not
only their number and characteristics, but also their relative position and distance from each
otherthe geometry of the situation. Operational commanders and their staffs must,
therefore, know and understand the advantages and disadvantages of these elements to ensure
the most effective employment of their forces against the enemy, but also to protect friendly
forces from reciprocal actions by the enemy.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Darren Houston, Royal Navy, C-407.

D. Questions:

In building an appreciation of the operational environment, what physical and abstract factors
bear on theater structure and how are they balanced?

Explain the advantages and disadvantages of central and exterior positions.

What is the original meaning and importance of the Jominian concept of a decisive point?
Has the information age changed that concept? If so, how?

To what extent are there differences in using lines of operations on land, in the air, or at sea?
Explain.

Leyte Case Study:

Within the context of the Pacific Theater, what was the declared (or undeclared) theater
structure for the Japanese and Allies during the Leyte operation?

Identify and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the positions, and the respective
lines of operations, in the employment of the Japanese and Allied naval forces. How did the
Japanese and/or Allied commanders maximize the advantages and minimize the
disadvantages of position and corresponding lines of operation?

What were the advantages and disadvantages of the positions and lines of operation in the
employment of the Japanese and Allied ground forces and land-based aircraft?

Identify the principal decisive points from the Japanese and Allied perspectives. How well
did the Japanese and Allied naval commanders recognize the importance of decisive points?
What mistakes in selecting or omitting decisive points were made, if any?

48
E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Hime, Douglas N. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department. The
Leyte Gulf Case Study. Newport, RI: Naval War College, December 2013. Review
pp. 9-22, read pp. 23-32. (NWC 1196).

Vego, Milan. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice. Newport, RI: Naval War
College, reprint 2009. (Issued). Read Appendix A, pp. APP-5 to APP10, Levels of
Command, Chapter IV, IV-3 to IV-10, The Theater and its Structure, and IV-49 to
IV-74, Theater Geometry.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Collins, John M. Military Geography for Professionals and the Public. Washington, D.C.:
Brasseys, 1988.

49
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50
 JMO-15

OPERATIONAL FACTORS (Seminar)

Armies do not burst from one theater of war into another; rather a
projected strategic envelopment may easily take weeks and months to
carry out. Besides, distances are so great that the chances of even the best
measures finally achieving the desired result remain slight.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 1832

A. Focus:

This session addresses another foundational aspect of operational artthe analysis of

operational factors of space, time, and force and the interrelationship of these factors in
achieving operational objectives. As we have already discovered, all aspects of operational
art are linked to objectives. The concept of using information obtained from the analysis of
operational factors in order to better understand the operating environment and to make
sound operational decisions is examined in this session. This session builds on the theories
introduced in earlier sessions, Military Objectives and the Levels of War, and the Theater: Its
Structure and Geometry. Additionally, the assigned Leyte Gulf case study reading along
with the historic information presented in the War in the Pacific lecture provides context for
illustrating applications of operational factors in planning and conducting tactical actions and
operations.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the operational factors of space, time, and force.

Comprehend the interrelationship between the operational factors.
Analyze the process by which an operational commander balances the operational factors
against each other in order to achieve tactical and operational objectives.

C. Background:

The theoretical aspects of operational factors presented in this session enhance a

commanders ability to make sound decisions. Knowledge gained in analyzing the factors of
space, time, and force allow commanders greater mental freedom of action. In analyzing
operational factors, the size, shape, and nature of a space will affect the quantity and type of
force employed, as well as the time required to conduct a successful military operation. The
necessity of commanders having a full understanding of the factors of space, time, and force
and the ability to balance them toward achieving the objective are critical aspects of warfare.
Analysis of operational factors must begin with the objective. Without consideration
of the objective, the analysis has no focus. Critical aspects of information from both the
51
enemy and friendly sides are included in this analysis. Although operational commanders
may not be able to choose their space, they do have the ability to manage the characteristics
of time and force. The size, shape, and nature of a space will affect the quantity and type of
forces employed, as well as the time required to conduct a successful military operation.
Managing aspects of all three of these factors allows the commander to shape the operational
environment.
Operational factors must be considered early in the operational planning process. For
an experienced practitioner of operational art, they become intuitive considerations. During
the JMO trimester, operational factors will be considered explicitly to ensure that we, as
planners, identify enemy strengths to avoid and weaknesses to attack while at the same time
protecting friendly weaknesses and exploiting our strengths.

The point of contact for this session is Professor James P. Butler, C-429.

D. Discussion Topics:

Describe the key features of factor space. How do factor space and factor force relate?

Explain the main aspects of factor time. Describe the relationship between factor time and
the factors of space and force.

Why is a precise assessment of factor force so difficult? Describe the theoretical difference
between combat potential and combat power.

Explain the theoretical relationships between the operational factors space/time, space/force,
and time/force. How might an operational commander balance these relationships to achieve
objectives?

Leyte Case Study:

What were the Allied and Japanese objectives at Leyte?

Discuss the factors of time, space, and force from the Japanese and Allied perspectives.

How did factor force affect Japanese plans for the Philippines?

Assess the Allies and Japanese balancing of the operational factors of space, time, and force
at Leyte Gulf. Provide potentials for improving their likelihood of success vis--vis the
operational factors.

E. Products.
None.

52
F. Required Readings:

Hime, Douglas N. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department. The
Leyte Gulf Case Study. Newport, RI: Naval War College, December 2013. Review
pp. 1-32. (NWC 1196).

Vego, Milan. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice. 2006. Reprint, Newport, RI:
Naval War College Press, 2009. Read: pp. III-3 to III-63, Operational Factors.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Anderson, Charles Robert. Leyte in U. S. Army Campaigns of World War II, Washington,
D.C.: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1994.

Cannon, M. Hamlin. The Strategic Plan, The Nature of the Target, Plans Are Made and
Forces Are Readied, and Appendix A. In Leyte: The Return to the Philippines,
United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific. Washington, D.C.:
Center for Military History, United States Army, 1954.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. Leyte, June 1944-January 1945: History of the United States Naval
Operations in World War II, Volume 12. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1958.

Vego, Milan. The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and
Execution. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

53
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54
 JMO-16

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS (Seminar)

I dont know what the hell this logistics is that Marshall is always
talking about, but I want some of it.

Admiral Ernest King,

Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 1942-1945

A. Focus:

This session continues defining key aspects of operational art. After striving to
understand the importance of analyzing the operational factors of space, time, and force,
operational level commanders need to consider how other supporting structures and activities
may affect objectives or outcomes. To maximize effectiveness in the employment of forces
at the operational level of war, a number of supporting structures and activities, arbitrarily
called operational functions, need to be fully organized and developed. This session will
first discuss the operational functions as defined by Milan Vegoand then the joint
functions described in Joint Doctrine. The six operational functions identified in Dr. Vegos
analysis of operational warfare are slightly different from the six functions identified in joint
publications. For example, Vego identifies logistics (planning and executing the movement
and support of forces) as an operational function while Joint Publication 3-0, Joint
Operations refers to sustainment (a provision composed of both logistics and the personnel
services necessary to conduct operations) as one of the six joint functions. The
synchronization of these operational and joint functions ensures and enhances the ability of
operational commanders and their subordinate elements to carry out their missions in both
peace and war.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the role and importance of operational and joint functions in operational
planning and execution.
Understand how operational and joint functions support major operations and campaigns.

C. Background:

In Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice, Milan Vego identifies six
operational functions which he argues are supporting structures and activities that should be
fully organized and developed by the operational commander for maximum effectiveness in
employing ones combat forces. These operational functions include: command organization
(or command structure), intelligence, command and control warfare (C2W), fires, logistics,
55
and protection, and their integration ensures efficiency and effectiveness. The sequencing
and synchronization of operational functions ensures and enhances the ability of operational
commanders and their subordinate elements to carry out their assigned responsibilities
throughout a campaign or major operation. Similarly, joint doctrine states that joint
functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help the Joint Force
Commander (JFC) integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. In accordance with
Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, joint functions are common to joint operations at all
levels of war, and fall into six basic groupscommand and control, intelligence, fires,
movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some operational functions, such as
command and control and intelligence, apply to all operations. Others, such as fires, may not
apply, depending on the mission. For example, operational fires may not be necessary when
conducting a humanitarian operation.
In a mature theater, operational and joint functions will normally be established
nearly in their entirety. However, in an immature theater, they may exist in a rudimentary
form, or not at all. Understanding the impact and interaction of these functions at the
operational level of war is critically important for proper planning, preparation, employment,
and sustainment of ones own forces in the achievement of assigned objectives.
Operational and joint functions shape actions prior to and throughout a major
operation. Operational level practitioners will come to appreciate that at this level of war it is
the enemy functions which are most vigorously attacked/degraded in order to set the
conditions for component success at the tactical level. A superior force can be degraded by
an indirect attack upon its functions. As war is a reciprocal act, joint force commanders will
expend great effort and resources protecting friendly functions from enemy actions.

The point of contact for this session is Professor James Butler, C-429.

D. Discussion Topics:

Combatant commanders establish, maintain, and protect operational functions for routine
peacetime activities as well as for war. What risks does the commander assume in an
immature theater in which the functions have not yet been (fully) established?

As our armed forces become ever more information-based, what is the impact of information
on each operational function and the relationship between the functions?

What is the relationship between operational factors and operational functions?

What is the role and importance of command and control warfare in providing support to a
campaign or major operation?

Leyte Case Study:

Command Organizationhow did command structures affect operations at Leyte?

56
Command and Control Warfareto what extent did both sides employ operational security,
military deception, or psychological operations during the Leyte Gulf operation?

Operational Intelligencewhat advantages did operational intelligence provide to the Allied

Commanders at Leyte? How were the Japanese commanders disadvantaged by operational
intelligence at Leyte?

Operational Fireshow were Allied operational fires used to support the Leyte Gulf
operation? To what extent were they effective? Why?

Operational Protectionto what extent did either of the opposing forces at Leyte consider
and plan for the use of operational protection?

Operational Logisticshow did the Allied commanders address operational logistics in the
Leyte operation? What impact did operational logistics have on Japanese forces?

Sustainmenthow did the Japanese commanders sustain forces on the island of Leyte? How
did the Allied forces sustain forces as part of the major operation at Leyte?

Movement and Maneuverdescribe how Allied commanders employed maneuver to achieve

positional advantage over the enemy at Leyte.

E. Products.
None.

F. Required Readings:

Hime, Douglas N. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department. The
Leyte Gulf Case Study. Newport, RI: Naval War College, December 2013. Review
pp. 1-32. (NWC 1196).

U. S. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP)
3-0. Washington, D.C.: CJCS August 11, 2011. Read: pp. III-1 to III-39

Vego, Milan. Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge,
2009. Read: pp. 69-98. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Bolick, Joseph A. The Influence and Reasons for Acceptance or Rejection of Operational
Intelligence during the 1914 and 1943 Kursk Campaigns. Fort Leavenworth, KS:
School of Advanced Military Studies, U. S. Army Command and General Staff
College, 26 April 1988.

57
Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 2326 October 1944. New York: Harper Collins,
1994.

Goodrich, David M. Forgotten Mission: Land Based Air Operational Fires in Support of the
Leyte Gulf Invasion. Joint Military Operations Department. Newport, RI: Naval War
College, 2000.

Handel, Michael I. Intelligence and Military Operations. In Intelligence and Military

Operations. London: Frank Cass, 1990.

Hutcherson, Norman B. Command and Control Warfare: Putting another Tool in the War-
Fighters Data Base. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1994.

Porter, Laning M. Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experiences: Problems for Operational

Level Intelligence and Decision Making. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of
Advanced Military Studies, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 12
May 1986.

Rockwell, Christopher A. Operational Sustainment: Lines of Communication and the

Conduct of Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military
Studies, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 3 May 1987.

Vego, Milan. The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and
Execution. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

__________. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice. 2006. Reprint, Newport, RI:
Naval War College Press, 2009.

58
 JMO-17

MAJOR OPERATIONS / CAMPAIGNS

AND THEIR ELEMENTS (Seminar)

What the theorist has to say here is this: one must keep the dominant
characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a
certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on
which everything depends. That is the point at which all our energies should
be directed.

Carl von Clausewitz On War, 1832

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is to explain and analyze the principal methods of combat force
employment to accomplish operational or strategic objectives in a theater. The second part
of this session explains the main elements of major operations and campaigns with a focus on
the concept of the center of gravity, the point of culmination, and on operational/strategic
deception.
.
B. Objectives:

Know and understand the principal methods of combat force employment in general.
Describe the differences between/among tactical actions, major operations, and
campaigns, and how they relate to the levels of war.
Identify and examine the principal elements of warfare as applied to the operational level
of war.
Know and understand the meaning and concept of the terms critical factors,
culminating point and center of gravity.
Understand a process for deducing enemy centers of gravity and the subsequent
deconstruction of the center of gravity.
Explain the utility of the concept of center of gravity in analyzing military problems.
Describe the concept of culmination and identify potential indications of friendly and
enemy culmination.

C. Background:

Methods of combat force employment are an important component of operational art.

While battles and campaigns have received inordinately greater attention in U. S. doctrinal
publications, the same cannot be said about major operations. This lack of interest has been
compounded by differences in terminology. Each Service, although using the same or similar
terms, defines methods of combat force employment differently (even differently than joint
59
doctrine). The full extent of Service differences is such that some of the terms used are not
recognized by other Services, while other terms have no generally accepted definition or are
not defined at all. More often than not, terms are used loosely and without regard to their real
meaning or commonly accepted definitions.
Modern methods of combat force employment are the result of a long evolution of
warfare. In the nineteenth century, decisive battles were the area of study and practice of
tactics, while strategy was concerned with the conduct of campaigns. In that era, primarily a
single Service conducted campaigns, although there are examples where navies took part as
well (the American War of Independence, the Peninsular War, the Crimean War, the
American Civil War, and so forth).
The principal methods of combat force employment today are tactical actions, major
operations, and campaigns. The terms are differentiated by the military objectives they are
intended to accomplish and the corresponding command echelon responsible for their
planning, preparation, and execution. Tactical actions are normally conducted to accomplish
tactical objectives, while the principal methods for accomplishing strategic or operational
objectives are major operations and campaigns.
Tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes, attacks, etc.) are aimed at
accomplishing major or minor tactical objectives in a given combat zone or sectors and, in
some cases, can encompass an area of operations. They are usually an integral part of major
operations. When conducted over time and in a certain sea or ocean area or airspace, tactical
actions can cumulatively accomplish operational objective(s). Tactical actions can be either
defensive or offensive in nature and are differentiated by the physical environment (land, sea,
or airspace) in which they occur.
In generic terms, a major operation consists of series of related battles, engagements,
and strikes and other tactical actions sequenced and synchronized in terms of time and space
to accomplish an operational objective. Major operations are normally an integral part of a
campaign. Sometimes, a major operation could be planned to accomplish a strategic
objective in a situation short of war, and usually in an undeveloped theater. The examples of
such major operations are U. S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 (Operation URGENT
FURY), U. S. invasion of Panama in December 1989 (Operation JUST CAUSE), and
NATOs actions in the Kosovo Conflict of 1999 (Operation ALLIED FORCE).
Again, in generic terms, a campaign consists of a series of related major operations
(land, air/space, naval, special forces) sequenced and synchronized in terms of time and
space and aimed to accomplish a military strategic or theater-strategic objective in a given
(declared or undeclared) theater of operations. These operations are executed simultaneously
or sequentially and are conducted according to a common plan controlled by a theater
commander. The main purpose of a campaign may be either offensive or defensive. Land
campaigns and maritime campaigns are differentiated according to the physical environment
in which major operations predominantly take place. Because airspace is an inseparable part
of a maritime or land theater, air forces are always employed jointly with other Services.

60
 There is possibly no theoretical concept of operational art that generates as much
debate as that of center of gravity (COG). Originally coined by Carl von Clausewitz in his
magnum opus On War, it has become an integral part of how U. S. planners and commanders
analyze an enemys threat systems. There exists in service and joint doctrine many
definitions of the concept, but what is important to modern students of war is that they
develop in their minds eye their own understanding of the concept and not simply a pedantic
rendition of doctrine.
The COG often serves as the focal point for operations that naturally employ all
levers of national power and therefore permits a rational, analytical approach to operations
planning. As we will come to discover, however, the concept of the center of gravity, while
generally appropriate in the analysis of a rational force-on-force conflict, becomes much
more arcane as we encounter irregular and hybrid war, especially at the operational level we
will study this trimester.
Operational and Theater Strategic Commanders and their staffs are required to deduce
appropriate centers of gravity for a given operation/campaign. Accordingly, there must be a
method for accomplishing this task. Milan Vego presents to both the practitioner and student
of war the concept of critical factors. This includes a listing of enemy critical strengths and
weaknesses from which a potential COG is selected. COG selection is therefore
accomplishedtheoreticallythrough the analysis of enemy critical factors. Selection of a
potential COG in the absence of a solid understanding of likely enemy objectives, however,
is effort wasted. It is therefore incumbent upon planners that COG analysis follows the
deduction of enemy objectives, both operational and (theater) strategic. Likewise, a sound
understanding of the environment in which we will operate is essential. This initial
understanding of the environment begins with a detailed analysis of the operational factors
and operational functions, which are viewed through the lens of these deduced (enemy) and
assigned (friendly) objectives. These are, along with an analysis of the theater and its
structure, essential prerequisites to COG selection.
Closely linked to the concept of the COG is that of culmination. Another
Clausewitzian concept, culmination is the ultimate goal for the military practitioner for it is at
this point that we may, in theory, impose our will upon the enemy and theoretically achieve
our designated objective. Once we destroy or significantly degrade an enemy COG, the
enemys ability to prevent us from achieving our objective is hypothetically taken away and
we may impose our will on the enemy. In the harsh light of practice, however, the
degradation of an enemys COG is not always the coup dgrace that theory purports.
Referring back to our foundational theorist Clausewitz, we discover that in war, the result is
never final. It is therefore a mandate that planners and commanders alike continuously
assess the operating environment to ensure that actions taken against a COG, either directly
or indirectly, are having the expected outcomes.
Selection of the (a) COG is a complex process requiring a deep understanding of the
enemy and the operating environment. The subsequent decomposition of the center of gravity
leads to a general idea or scheme for defeating the enemy to include potential defeat
mechanisms, objectives, timing, and so forth. It leverages many of the facets of operational
art: principles of war, doctrine, factors, functions, and theater structure. Planners and
commanders are required to balance the factors and determine relative advantages to use and
weaknesses to exploit. The same critical analysis is required of both friendly and enemy

61
functions since operational level planners and commanders generally degrade/attack
functions in order to set the conditions for the tactical success of their components. For
example, one should consider the operational fires employed by Admiral Nimitz in Formosa
and the guerre de course by employed by U. S. submarines against Japanese merchant
shipping in order to degrade Japanese maneuver means prior to Kruegers troops arriving in
the amphibious objective area. Each operational or theater strategic action was intended to set
the stage for Sixth Armys tactical successes ashore, which led to the securing of Leyte.
Operational/strategic deception is one of the principal force multipliers in a given
major operation or campaign. The operational/strategic level of command allows the
commander to employ multi-service and often multi-national forces and assets in planning
and executing operational/strategic deception. When properly conceived and executed,
operational/strategic deception can significantly enhance the effectiveness of ones forces,
prevent surprise, and reduce the effectiveness of the enemy forces. To realize possible
benefits, operational commanders must not only understand the concept, but also must be
willing to dedicate the time and forces required for operational deception to be successful.
During this session, students will develop a working definition of a COG, identify
Japanese and Allied theater strategic and operational objectives and deduce enemy and
friendly COGs. Once the COGs have been deduced, a moderator-led deconstruction of one of
the COGs will be completed. This deconstruction, along with an understanding of friendly
and likely enemy objectives, and an analysis of the theaters geometry, friendly and enemy
operational factors, and operational functions, all set the stage for the following session,
Operational Design.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Al Bergstrom, C-430.

D. Discussion Topics:

Why is it important to know and understand the true meanings of the key terms dealing with
the methods of combat force employment?

Explain the principal methods for accomplishing major and minor tactical objectives. What is
the true meaning of the term major operation?

Explain what constitutes a campaign. Is there such a thing as an air campaign? Why or
why not?

How does a planner or commander deduce an enemy center of gravity? Can you describe
another method for deducing a center of gravity?

Explain the linkage between the objective and the center of gravity.

To what extent is the center of gravity concept valid across the spectrum of conflict? If not,
what analytical tool may planners use to develop an operational idea?

62
How are the concepts of center of gravity and culmination related? Explain factors that may
determine whether an indirect or direct approach to the center of gravity is appropriate.

What is the purpose of operational/strategic deception? Explain the relationship between

tactical and operational/strategic deception.

Leyte Case Study

To what extent was the Allied amphibious landing at Leyte aimed to accomplish an
operational or strategic objective?

Identify the type of major naval, ground, and air operation in terms of its main purpose
(offensive v defensive; fleet v fleet, fleet v shore, air v ground; main or supporting, etc.) and
timing (main, supporting, preliminary, initial, etc.) conducted by the Allied and Japanese
forces in the Philippines and the adjacent sea/airspace between 17 and 26 October 1944.

What naval battles and engagements constitute what is popularly known as the Battle of
Leyte Gulf? Were all battles or engagements planned or are they seen in retrospect as being
planned?

Identify the key elements of the major naval and air operations conducted by the Japanese
forces in defense of the Philippines in October 1944.

Identify the critical strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese and Allied sides in the
operation.

Describe the operational centers of gravity for both the Japanese and the Allied side. Justify
your analysis.

Which commander(s) do you believe demonstrated a deeper understanding of the concept of

center of gravity? Justify your argument.

Describe the indications of culmination on the Japanese side during the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

Which commander(s) do you believe demonstrated a deeper understanding of the concept of

center of gravity? Justify your argument.

Describe the indications of culmination on the Japanese side during the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

How does operational art relate to the defeat of an enemy and to attaining assigned
objective(s)?

63
E. Products:

An in-seminar analysis of Japanese and U. S. objectives, critical factors, and centers of

gravity for the Battle of Leyte Gulf and seizure of Leyte will be conducted during this
session.

F. Required Readings:

Butler, James P. Godzilla Methodology. Joint Force Quarterly 72. (1st Qtr, 2014): 26-30.
(NWC 1097).

Hime, Douglas N. U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. The
Leyte Gulf Case Study. Newport, RI: Naval War College, December 2013. Read:
Appendices A through F. (NWC 1196).

Strange, Joseph L., and Richard Iron. Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical
Vulnerabilities: Part 2: The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand
and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and Their Critical
Vulnerabilities. Air University Website, Last modified July 1 2014,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf. (NWC 1098).

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, The Joint Operations
Planning Process Workbook, Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1 July 2013.
Read Appendix C. (NWC 4111J w/Chg 1). (Issued).

U. S. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Operation Planning, Joint
Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 11 August 2011. Read pp. III-30.

Vego, Milan. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice. Newport, RI: Naval War
College, reprint 2009. Read pp. VII-13VII-33, Concept of Critical Factors and
Center of Gravity, pp. VII-73VII-91, Concept of Culminating Point, and pp. VII-
97VII-118, Operational/Strategic Deception. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Hartig, William. U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department.

Complexity and the Center of Gravity. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2010.

Mendel, William W. and Lamar Tooke. Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of
Gravity. Military Review (June 1993): 3-11.

__________. Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian

Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language. Perspectives on
Warfighting, No. 4, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Foundation, 1996.

64
 JMO-18

OPERATIONAL DESIGN (Seminar)

No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter

with the enemys main strength. Only the layman sees in the course of a
campaign a consistent execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original
concept pursued consistently to the end.

Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, 1871

A. Focus:

Following a selection of friendly and the deduction of our enemies objectives, a

function and factor analysis, a review of the theater and its geometry, a discussion and
deconstruction of the operational center(s) of gravity(COG(s)), coupled with an
understanding of our own and the enemys operating environment, students (and planners)
are ready to begin to seek out a rudimentary understanding of an operational design. This
seminar presents students with the general concept of an operational design or scheme for a
major operation as part of a campaign.

B. Objectives:

Distinguish the various elements that should comprise an operational idea/scheme.

Summarize the relationship between operational and (theater) strategic objectives and
operational and (theater) strategic centers of gravity.
Understand the relationship between objectives, factors, functions, and COGs in an
operational design.
Using the Leyte Gulf case study, evaluate the performance of opposing commanders with
respect to the concepts of critical factors and the center of gravity.

C. Background:

Military planning is a continuous process in preparation for assigned or future

objectives/tasks. It involves a detailed and methodical evaluation of all aspects of
contemplated military action. Planning makes future actions easier by allowing for quick,
subsequent, and coordinated actions by the staff and other elements of the command. Proper
planning allows for detailed and systematic examination of all factors involved in a
forthcoming military action.
A major operation or campaign contains a number of elements that collectively
ensure the accomplishment of the selected or assigned military objective(s). Thus, an overall
operational design or operational idea should exist to ensure that ones forces are employed
in a coherent manner and focused on the assigned operational or strategic objectives in the
65
theater. The principal elements of an operational idea for a major operation include: end
state, phases, factor and function analysis, deduced enemy objectives, timing, ultimate
operational (and sometimes strategic) objectives, theater structure, identification of the
enemys and friendly critical factors and center(s) of gravity, operational direction/axis,
selected principles of war, operational maneuver and fires, methods of defeating the enemys
center of gravity (defeat mechanism), application of ones military/non-military sources of
power, point of main attack (defense), operational deception, operational sequencing, concept
of deception, operational synchronization, branches and sequels, operational pause,
anticipating ones own operational/ strategic point of culmination, protection of ones own
operational/ strategic center of gravity, operational momentum, operational reserves,
regeneration of combat power, and operational sustainment.
An operational idea (sometimes referred to as an operational scheme) represents the
very heart of the design for a major operation or campaign. In its essence, it is very similar to
what is commonly known today as concept of operations (CONOPS) or at the tactical level
of war, scheme of maneuver. An operational idea should describe in broad terms the intended
sequence for the employment of service or functionally based forces (in a campaign) or
combat arms (in a major operation) necessary to accomplish the assigned strategic or
operational objectives. Optimally, an operational idea should be novel, avoid stereotyped
employment of ones forces, present the enemy with a multi-dimensional threat, provide for
surprise and deception, and ensure the speed of execution. It should clearly focus on the
destruction or neutralization of the enemys strategic (in a campaign) or operational (in a
major operation) center of gravity.
The rudimentary framework for the operational idea springs from the factor/function,
and center of gravity analysis and subsequent deconstruction. Many of the items cited above
become evident in the deconstruction of the COG or in analysis of the factors and functions.
In theory, a basic operation plan (OPLAN) normally contains only the most important
elements of an operational idea; however, many aspects of the idea are then elaborated in
detail in a subsequent Operations Order (OPORD) and its annexes, as well as in the
supporting plans of subordinate commanders.
The rational, analytical deduction and subsequent deconstruction of a COG seems
fairly straightforward in theory. In practice, however, it becomes far less linear and much
more rugged. In fact, in metaphorical terms, the landscape can be said to dance. Consider
the case of the problem that manifests itself as a complex adaptive system (CAS) (an
insurgency, for example); by its very nature, a CAS cannot have a single hub of all power
and movement. Does this render the concept of the COG moot? Far from it, as the analysis
of a CAS will reveal linkages and nodes, and soon the planner will begin to develop a holistic
understanding of the environment and forge a way ahead. And of course, the analysis of the
friendly COG remains an essential task for planners, if for nothing more than to generate a
deeper understanding of potential risks.
Facets of operational art will be considered in the analysis of the Leyte Gulf case
study from both the Japanese and American commanders perspectives. Additionally, a
discussion of the impact of the U. S. seizure of Leyte and subsequent Japanese defeat and the
concomitant destruction / degradation of the enemys operational center of gravity on the

66
overall U. S. campaign objective (the seizure of the Philippine archipelago) will highlight the
depth of understanding of operational art competent planners and commanders must possess
in order to succeed.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Al Bergstrom, C-430.

D. Discussion Topics:

Describe the general components of an operational design. How do commanders and staffs
generate an understanding of a given situation well enough to conceive an operational
design?

Discuss the purpose and elements of the operational idea (scheme).

Discuss methods that can be used in destroying/neutralizing (the stronger side) or

degrading/deceiving (the weaker side) enemy COG.

Explain the concept of operational sequencing and synchronization.

Explain the concept of branches and sequels.

How does a military professional arrive at a point where he or she can deduce an operational
design in a grossly complex and ambiguous environment under the aegis of policy changes or
ambiguous or unstated policy, coalition concerns, and close, real-time media scrutiny?

Leyte Case Study:

How would you assess the operational objectives determined by Admiral Toyoda? To what
extent did the operational idea (scheme) employed by the Japanese provide an opportunity
for success? How could they have made it more effective?

How are sequencing and synchronization different? Give examples of each from the Japanese
plans. Did Admiral Toyoda have a better option to apply operational sequencing in his plans
for naval defense of the Philippines?

What indications of culmination for both the U. S. and Japanese forces were present and how
did the operational commanders and staffs assess them?

Through the lens of operational art, critique the operational design developed by the Japanese
and U. S. Naval Commanders. What would you have done differently?

E. Products:
None.

67
F. Required Readings:

Hime, Douglas N. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department. The
Leyte Gulf Case Study. Newport, RI: Naval War College, December 2013. Review.
(NWC 1196).

Vego, Milan. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice. Newport, RI: Naval War
College, reprint 2009. Read: pp. IX-83 to IX-153. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Reading:

Boyd, John. Destruction and Creation. A Discourse on Winning and Losing. Unpublished
manuscript. August 1987.

Duggan, William. Coup dOeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning. Strategic Studies
Institute monograph. Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army War College, November 2005.

Klein, Gary. Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1998.

Schmitt, John F. Command and (Out of) Control: The Military Implications of Complexity
Theory, in David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., Complexity, Global
Politics, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University,
1997.

Schon, Donald A. The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. New
York: Basic Books, 1983.

Simon, Herbert A. The Sciences of the Artificial. 3rd Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1996.

68
 JMO-19

OPERATIONAL THINKING
AND LEADERSHIP (Seminar)

I am not afraid of an army of lions led by a sheep; I am afraid of an

army of sheep led by a lion.

Alexander the Great

A. Focus:

This session explores both the characteristics and elements of military thinking and
leadership at the operational level of command and assesses the impact of decisions on the
outcome of military operations. It also introduces students to the concepts of mission
command and of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Desired Leader Attributes
(DLAs) for Joint Force 2020.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the concepts of operational thinking and operational vision.

Understand why operational commanders need an operational perspective and how this
perspective is achieved.
Comprehend the tenets of mission command and the Desired Leader Attributes for Joint
Force 2020.
Examine common military leadership characteristics and attributes of successful
commanders at the operational level of command.
Assess the impact of leadership style and command decisions at the operational level of
war.

C. Background:

Leadership is one of the most critical aspects of warfare and has had an immeasurable
effect on military operations throughout history. Commanders throughout history have
shaped the course of operations, campaigns, and conflicts, leaving behind legacies for others
to emulate or reject. At the operational level of war, effective commanders require a broad
perspective of all the elements of national power influencing their areas of operations in
order to understand how their actions may impact the achievement of strategic objectives.
This broader operational level perspective, which requires an understanding of operational art
and the challenges of joint operations, renders decision-making processes more complex and
challenging than at the tactical level.
In contrast to their subordinate counterparts, operational commanders must focus on
military objectives beyond immediate tactical actions. Instead of concentrating on fighting
69
battles and engagements, the operational commander plans and conducts major operations
and campaigns. In doing so, the operational commander must place trust in subordinate
commanders and resist the temptation to become pre-occupied with the tactical level of war.
Successful operational commanders possess certain characteristics that, when coupled
with professional knowledge and experience, set them apart from their peers. Integrity,
intellectual capacity, creativity, and boldness allow them to make critical decisions that shape
the outcomes of operations, campaigns, and conflicts. Operational thinking, or the ability to
have a broad vision beyond the tactical perspective, can be developed through a synthesis of
practical experience in war, exercises and maneuvers during peace, operational and strategic
war gaming, professional education, and the systematic self-study of history, geography,
international relations, economics, nationalism, society, culture, and so forth. The study of
past wars, and their major operations, and campaigns in particular, can help a commander
acquire an operational perspective. It is the practical application of operational thinking in
planning, preparing, and executing a major operation or campaign that allows the commander
to anticipate and foresee the effects of his actions on the enemy and then take timely and
proper counteractions.
Operational vision is the commanders ability to visualize the military conditions that
will exist after the mission is accomplished. In essence, operational vision is the combination
of a commanders personal traits, professional education, and experience that together are
applied to ambiguous and uncertain situations. Imagination, anticipation, intuition, coupd
oeil (the innate ability to evaluate a situation quickly), introspective thought, and historical
perspective are critical leadership elements necessary to envision all phases of an operation
(or campaign) in support of the political leaderships decision to terminate hostilities, or to be
able to operate effectively in the absence of perfect information. Without proper operational
vision, the commander cannot translate the strategic objective assigned by political and
military leadership into a military-strategic or theater-strategic objective.
On 3 April 2012, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey
released a White Paper entitled Mission Command in which he outlined the requirement to
pursue, instill, and foster mission command throughout the U. S. military. This concept, a
notion based on decentralization of effort and speed of execution based on a commanders
intent, will also be discussed in seminar. The commanders intent (one of the principal
elements of the Commanders Estimate of the Situation) is a key link between operational
vision and the successful employment of mission command.
The Chairman issued a second memorandum on 28 June 2013 entitled Desired Leader
Attributes for Joint Force 2020, in which he approved a set of Desired Leader Attributes
(DLAs) as guideposts for joint officer leader development to aid in efforts to
institutionalize the essential knowledge, skills, attributes, and behaviors that define our
profession. How they relate to mission command and to the characteristics of operational
commanders will be discussed in seminar.

The point of contact for this session is LTC Anthony New, USA, C-411.

70
D. Discussion Topics:

Describe some of the differences between operational thinking and operational vision.

At any level of command, commanders intent is the commanders vision. Describe some of
the similarities and differences between the commanders vision and operational vision.

How does the study and application of operational art aid in developing a leaders ability to
think operationally?

To what extent is mission command new? Explain the role and reciprocal nature of trust in
the concept of mission command.

How can the services best develop ethical leaders comfortable and effective both in
establishing and operating in this environment of trust in light of myriad challenges the
services face today (i.e., Fiscal reality, force reductions, efficiency vis--vis effectiveness and
so forth)?

What common characteristics and attributes do successful and unsuccessful operational

commanders exhibit? Which, in your assessment, are the most important? How are they
different than those of successful tactical level commanders?

How can the Services best apply experience, education, and training to develop leaders who
possess the abilities outlined in the Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020 and who
are capable of thriving in an increasingly complex and uncertain operating environment?

Case Study Discussion Topics:

What set of leader attributes did operational leaders demonstrate during the War in the
Pacific? How are they different from or similar to the Desired Leader Attributes (DLA) for
Joint Force 2020?

Describe the leadership characteristics exhibited by the commanders in the case studies and
how did they affect their exercise of command?

How did professional knowledge, education, and experience affect the decisions of the
commanders?

What lessons can be derived from the leadership attributes of the commanders?

To what extent did the commanders exhibit characteristics associated with mission
command? If not, what could they have done differently?

How would you assess the effectiveness of these commanders at the operational level?

71
E. Products:

Student led discussions of six historical case studies.

F. Required Readings:

U. S. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mission Command. White Paper.
Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 2012. Read. (TSDM Students read this in Leadership
Concepts 01). (NWC 1193).

__________. Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020. CJCS Memorandum, CM-
0166-13, June 28, 2013. Review. (NWC 1194).

Vego, Milan. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice. Newport, RI: U. S. Naval
War College, 2009. Read Operational Leadership, pp. X-5 to X-13; Tenets of
Operational Leadership, pp. X-47 to X-48; The Decisions, pp. X-61 to X-71;
What Is Operational Thinking? pp. XI-4 to XI-5; and Operational Vision, pp. XI-
35 to XI-39. (Issued).

Case Studies:

Tomoyuki Yamashita:

Hoyt, Edwin P. Three Military Leaders: Heihachiro Togo, Isoroku Yamamoto, Tomoyuki
Yamashita. 1st ed. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1993. Tomoyuki Yamashita and
the Army Militarists, Read pp. 119-127, The End of a National Hero, pp. 153-157.
(NWC 4105).

Reel, A. Frank. The Case of General Yamashita. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1949. The War through the Enemys Eyes, Read pp. 12-13, 16-26. (NWC
4108A).

Walter Krueger:

McDonald, Major John H. (USA) General Walter Krueger: A Case Study in Operational
Command. Research paper, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military
Studies, 1989. General Walter KruegerThe Case Study (excerpt). Read. (NWC
4146B).

Taaffe, Stephen R. Marshall and His Generals: U. S. Army Commanders in World War II.
Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2011. Read pp. 33-36, 212-220. (NWC
4103).

72
Takeo Kurita:

Thomas, Evan. Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign,
1941-1945. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006. Read pp. 74-80 and pp. 173-187.
(NWC 4136).

William Halsey, Jr.:

Reynolds, Clark G. William F. Halsey, Jr.The Bull (1882-1959). In The Great Admirals:
Command at Sea, 1587-1945, ed. by Jack Sweetman. Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1997. Read pp. 482-505. (NWC 4137).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Blumenson, Martin and James L. Stokesbury. Masters of the Art of Command. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1975.

Bradley, General Omar N. On Leadership. Parameters XI (September 1981): 2-7.

Czege, Huba Wass de. A Comprehensive View of Leadership. Military Review (August
1992): 2129.

Gardner, Gregory C. Generalship in War: The Principles of Operational Command.

Research paper, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U. S.
Army Command and General Staff College, 4 May 1987.

Gerner, Mark, H. Leadership at the Operational Level. Military Review (June 1987):
26-35.

Meigs, Montgomery C. Generalship: Qualities, Instincts, and Character. Parameters,

31, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 4-17.

Slim, Sir William. Higher Command in War. U. S. Army Command and General Staff
College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 1970, 110.

Summers, Harry G., Jr. Leadership in Adversity: From Vietnam to Victory in the Gulf.
Military Review (May 1991): 29.

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74
 JMO-20

A CRITIQUE OF DOCTRINE:
U. S. DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL ART (Seminar)

Thus it has come about that our theoretical and critical literature, instead
of giving plain, straightforward arguments in which the author at least always
knows what he is saying and the reader what he is reading, is crammed with
jargon, ending at obscure crossroads where the author loses his readers.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War 1832

A. Focus:

The focus of this seminar is on the employment of our critical thinking skills in a well-
reasoned critique of select U. S. joint and services doctrines. This critique will be viewed
through the lens of theory, specifically the operational art theory that we have discussed thus
far. As Clausewitz said so eloquently in Book Two, Chapter 5 of, On War: Critical
analysis being the application of theoretical truths to actual events, it not only reduces the gap
between the two but also accustoms the mind to these truths through their repeated
application. We have established a criterion for theory, and must now establish one for
critical analysis as well. This seminar is our opportunity to do so.

B. Objectives:

Using critical thinking skills, critique selected service and joint doctrine using your
knowledge of operational art.
Value the role of military theory in doctrine development and employment of forces in
combat.

C. Background:

In the military use of the term, doctrine is understood as a set of commonly held,
concisely stated, and authoritatively expressed beliefs, fundamental principles, organizational
tenets, and methods of combat force employment intended to guide the planning, preparation,
and execution of ones forces to accomplish given military objectives. Its main purpose is to
provide a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common
purpose, and unity of effort. Doctrine is a bridge between military theory and practice. It
translates theoretical ideas into doctrinal principles. These principles are then used to devise
tactics, techniques, and procedures. Doctrine codifies the services or joint communitys latest
thoughts on warfare.
In general, a service doctrine should provide broad guidelines for the employment of
ones service forces to accomplish operational objectives through the planning, preparation,
75
and conduct of major operations. A properly written service doctrine should explain in some
detail the employment of the numbered or theater forces at the operational level of war as
part of a joint or combined force. It should provide a clear linkage between the operational
and tactical levels on one hand and the strategic level of war on the other.
A sound doctrine should be based on military theory. At the same time it should also
take current and projected technological advances fully into account. However, it should
never be predominantly or, even worse, exclusively based either on theory or on the new
technologies. The theoretical concepts should be based on certain principles derived from the
multitude of examples from military history. Afterward, doctrine should be developed in
consonance with theory. If a doctrine neglects the available historical experience, it may
become disconnected from realitythat is, those universal truths that Carl von Clausewitz
considered the bedrock of theory. A sound doctrine needs always to be grounded on
historical realities.
Based on the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of September 1986, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for the development, review,
approval, and maintenance of joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
(JTTP). The Director, Joint Force Development Directorate, Joint Staff (J-7) is responsible to
CJCS for the joint doctrine development process. Joint doctrine is coordinated with the
Services, Combatant Commands, and the Joint Staff. All joint doctrinal publications must be
approved by CJCS. Each Service must ensure that its doctrine and procedures are in
consonance with joint doctrine. Service headquarters (including the U. S. Coast Guard) are
responsible for the development of their doctrine.
The process of developing and writing U. S. joint and service doctrine involves large
numbers of people and organizations. It also requires a considerable amount of time for
completion of this process. The final version of a given doctrinal document represents a
compromise among competing individuals and their organizations/institutions. Hence, a joint
or Service doctrine may or may not represent the best ideas on a given subject.
U. S. joint and service doctrine contains numerous terms and their definitions
referring to aspects of operational art. However, there are sometimes considerable differences
between Joint and Service doctrinal documents. The principal joint doctrinal publications
pertaining to the operational level of war are JP 3-0 Unified Land Operations and JP 5-0
Joint Operation Planning. Both of them and the U. S. Armys ADRP 3-0 Operations
properly define what constitutes a major operation; while the U. S. Air Force and the U. S.
Navys doctrinal equivalents do not. Although the effects-based approach to operations
(EBAO) was officially abandoned by the USJFCOM some years ago, a systems approach to
situation assessment was for some reason retained. This, in turn, led the authors of JP 3-0/JP
5-0 to explain the concept of center of gravity partly in generic and partly in systems-centric
terms. Students are forewarned that in reading joint and service doctrine a critical eye is
necessary to discern the subtle, yet significant differences between what is doctrine and what
is theory.

The point of contact for this session is Lt Col Mike LePage USAF, C-403.

76
D. Discussion Topics:

Describe the differences between the way U. S. joint/service doctrine and operational warfare
theory explains the theater structure and geometry.

Discuss the differences and omissions in how U. S. joint and Army/Marine Corps doctrine
describe methods of combat forces employment. Do the U. S. Navy and the U. S. Air Force
recognize major operations as a method of combat forces employment?

What are the differences between the concept of center of gravity in U. S. joint doctrine and
service doctrines? Are the key nodes centers of gravity? Why or why not?

To what extent does U. S. joint doctrine address the Clausewitzian concept of point of
culmination? How do service doctrines describe the point of culmination?

What are the key differences between the operational functions described in operational
warfare theory and those listed in JP 3-0, Operations?

What are the differences in describing the elements of operational design between
operational warfare theory and the U. S. joint doctrine, specifically JP 3-0 and JP 5-0?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings (these readings will be assigned with specific page numbers by
your moderator team):

Department of the Air Force. Annex 3-0: Operations and Planning. Government Printing
Office: Washington, D.C. 9 November 2012.

Headquarters, Department of the Army. ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations. Government
Printing Office: Washington, D.C. May 2012.

Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. MCDP 1: Warfighting. Government Printing

Office: Quantico VA. 20 June 1997.

Headquarters, United States Navy. Naval Doctrinal Publication 1: Naval Warfare.

Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C. March 2010

U. S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed
Forces of the United States. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C. 25
March 2013.

__________. Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations. Government Printing Office:

Washington, D.C. 11 August 2011.

77
__________. Joint Publication 3-13.4: Military Deception. Government Printing Office:
Washington, D.C. 26 January 2012.

__________. Joint Publication 4-0: Joint Logistics. Government Printing Office:

Washington, D.C. 16 October 2013.

__________. Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning. Government Printing Office:
Washington, D.C. 11 August 2011.

G. Supplementary Readings:

U. S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1-01: Joint Doctrine
Development System. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C. 5 July 2000.

__________. Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence. Government Printing Office:

Washington, D.C. 22 October 2013.

__________. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms (amended through November 2015). Government Printing Office:
Washington, D.C. 8 November 2015.

__________. Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations. Government Printing Office:

Washington, D.C. 17 November 2012.
.
__________. Joint Publication 3-13.2: Military Information Support Operations.
Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C. 7 January 2010.

78
 JMO-21

INTRODUCTION TO NAVAL
WARFARE THEORY (Seminar)

Knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other and not to be

attended to at idle times and on the by . . .

Pericles, 460 BC

A. Focus:

The foci of this session are on explaining the nature and character of naval warfare,
the differences between wars at sea and those on land, and warfare conducted on the Open
Ocean and war in the littorals. It will also present in broad terms the principal objectives of
naval warfare, which we will discuss in greater detail in subsequent seminars.

B. Objectives:

Understand the character of naval warfare.

Comprehend in broad terms the principal objectives of naval warfare.
Comprehend the effect of new technologies on the character of war at sea.
Discern the key differences between wars at sea and wars on land and a war on the open
ocean and in the littorals.
Comprehend mutual relationship between war on land and at sea.
Understand the key aspects of the offense and the defense in a war at sea.
Know the importance of close cooperation (joint warfare) between a navy and other
services of the armed forces.

C. Background:

Students have come to appreciate the manner in which theoretical terms are often
misused in U. S. joint doctrine, in service manuals, and in the conversations among
professionals. As we have come to appreciate in our journey through the theory of
operational art that words do matter. They are the glue that binds a profession together and in
combat, a misunderstood term can, and as we have seen in our study of the Battle of Leyte
Gulf, lead to potential disaster. It is essential that as graduates of the Naval War College,
students speak the unique language of maritime warfare.
Like warfare in general, naval warfare is shaped by human nature, the complexities of
human behavior, and the limitations of human and physical conditions. The material and
psychological aspects of a war form an organic whole. In contrast to war on land, war at sea
(and war in the air) is directed to a greater extent against the enemys materiel. Nevertheless,
to paraphrase Clausewitz, war at sea cannot be considered in purely material terms. The
79
employment of ones naval forces is never directed against material force alone but is always
aimed simultaneously at moral forces.
The character of naval warfare in general is primarily determined by the prevailing
international relations, domestic politics, economic, social, demographic, religious, legal, and
other conditions in a certain era and also, last but not least, the influence of new
technological advances. War at sea is generally influenced to a much greater extent than war
on land with technological advances. Law of the sea also greatly affects character of naval
warfare. In addition, war at sea is also influenced with the changes in the character of war on
land and in the air.
Like war on land, naval warfare can be conducted using offensive, defensive, or a
combination of these methods. However, the overall posture and progress of the war on land
will determine whether ones naval forces would be on the strategic offensive or defensive.
A side on the strategic offensive on land and having a stronger navy would try to obtain and
maintain sea control at the strategic level. At the same time, the weaker side on land would
be forced on the strategic defensive at sea.
Clausewitz insisted that defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack. Among its
weaknesses, the offensive requires a large superiority of ones forces over the defender. He
wrote that the weaker the motives for action, the more will they be overlaid and neutralized
by the disparity between attack and defense. The superiority of strategic defense is based on
the fact that the attack itself cannot exist without some measure of defense. However, his
dictum that attack [is] the weaker and defense the stronger form of war is not fully
applicable to naval warfare (and war in the air too). For one thing, the stronger navy has to be
on the offensive if it aims to obtain and then maintain sea control in a given part of a theater.
Naval warfare in the littorals has many commonalties with, but also differences from,
war conducted on the open ocean. Among other things, waters and airspace in the littorals,
and enclosed and semi-enclosed seas (collectively called narrow seas), are often confined.
In a typical narrow sea, many offshore islands, shoals, and reefs, combined with strong
currents and high tides, make navigation in the littoral waters extremely difficult and
dangerous. In many littorals, it is commonplace to operate in the presence of multilayered,
possibly sophisticated, defenses. The weaker opponent at sea may not operate in the way one
expects and he may use asymmetric responses to neutralize or even nullify the advantages
normally enjoyed by a blue-water navy. Waters in a typical narrow sea are cluttered because
of the presence not only of the enemys and friendly forces but also those of the neutrals. In
a typical narrow sea, density of maritime traffic is generally high, especially in the
straits/narrows and the proximity of large ports. It is difficult to differentiate between friend
and foe, because of the presence of a large number of commercial vessels, ferries, and fishing
boats.
In generic terms, the principal objectives of war at sea are sea control, sea denial,
chokepoint control/denial, basing/deployment area control, and destroying/weakening the
enemys and defending/protecting friendly military-economic potential at sea. A stronger
side would generally try to obtain/maintain and exercise sea control, while the weaker side
would attempt to dispute or contest that control.
In the modern era, success in war requires the closest cooperation among the services.
The political objective determines the role and relative importance of each service in a war.
The navies and air forces play a supporting role because the outcome in a war is ultimately

80
decided on land. Yet a high-intensity conventional conflict cannot be ultimately won without
control of the sea and the air. Hence, the success of each service in war is critically
dependent on the support of the other, sister services.
The sessions that follow will investigate the concept of sea control and how gaining
and exploiting it provides the stronger side with significant advantage. We will understand
how the weaker side contests sea control and the relationship between actions at sea and
actions on land. We will study how maritime force commanders employ sea power in
attaining objectives. This study will include selected aspects of anti-surface warfare, anti-
submarine warfare, naval counter-air warfare, amphibious warfare, mine warfare and
maritime trade warfare. We will examine the requirements in designing major naval / joint
operations. Additionally, we will conduct a tabletop exercise analyzing a series of naval
struggles in the battle for Guadalcanal and complete a practical exercise on the
Falklands/Malvinas conflict.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Milan Vego, C-427.

D. Discussion Topics:

Discuss the key elements of nature and character of warfare at sea. Describe the role of the
human factor in naval warfare.

Explain the main differences in the conduct of war on land and at sea.

Describe the mutual relationship between war on land and at sea.

What are the main differences in conducting a war on the open ocean and in the littorals?

Discuss in generic terms the main objectives of naval warfare.

How do new technologies affect the theory and practice of war at sea?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

Till, Geoffrey. Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century. 3d ed. New York:
Routledge, 2013. Read pp. 79-86. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. On Naval Theory. Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2015. (NWC
1101).

81
G. Supplementary Readings:

Wegener, Wolfgang. The Naval Strategy of the World War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1989.

82
 JMO-22

THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT (Seminar)

The first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the
political and social viewpoint is that of great highway; or better, perhaps, of a
wide common, over which all men may pass in all directions.

Captain Alfred T. Mahan, USN

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1890

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is to describe the components of the maritime environment
and their effect on the planning and execution of major naval/joint operations. Emphasis is
placed on the physical differences between open-ocean and littoral environments.

B. Objectives:

Understand the main effects of physical environment and weather/climate on the

employment of maritime forces.
Comprehend the fundamental physical oceanographic properties and differences between
the Open Ocean and littoral environments.
Understand the threats unique to littoral environments, and how these influence joint
planning and operations.

C. Background:

The maritime environment is influenced by, indeed it drives, the earths climate.
Unlike weather that concerns daily and weekly conditions of more tactical relevance, climate
deals with long-term averages. The differential heating of the earth causes seasonally
predictable patterns of weather and oceanographic conditions that, at the operational and
strategic level, are of use to the planner or commander.
The maritime environment is an extraordinarily complex environment in which to
operate. First, the distances can be vast. The oceans cover more than 70% of the earth, with
the Pacific Ocean covering nearly a third of the area. Second, the oceans experience very
diverse undersea conditions analogous to the earths climate regimes. As all military sensors
are dependent upon the physical properties of the environment in which they work,
understanding these properties is critical to determining their effectiveness. Finally, the sea
surface is dramatically influenced by the local weather as well as storms thousands of miles
away.

83
 Physical oceanography is the science of understanding the processes that govern the
seas and help us to characterize the environment. Water is virtually opaque to light and radio
waves so sound is the primary means of sensing the undersea environment. Sound does not
travel in straight lines underwater, but is instead bent in predictable ways depending on the
properties of the water through which it travels. Knowledge of the physical properties to
include temperature, pressure, and salinity, allow us to model how sound will propagate and
determine optimum placement of sensors, and to estimate the range at which we will detect
an acoustic signal. On the surface, waves can be created by local winds or storms thousands
of miles away, and will travel with little loss of energy over extraordinary distances until
reaching land. Understanding the combination of environmental factors: sea heights,
bathymetry, thermal structure of the water column, salinity, currents, etc., enable us to
determine where and when it is safe to operate, where our adversary may operate and how
our military sensors will perform. Environmental conditions will determine the feasibility to
launch aircraft, stream a towed array, direct an amphibious landing, and conduct anti-
submarine warfare. Conditions will further determine the effectiveness of masking forces
from submarines as well as conducting anti-submarine warfare.
As low-lying and mountainous areas in the same geographic region on land have
different physical characteristics, so do coastal/littoral and open ocean areas have different
characteristics. Obviously coastal/littoral areas are generally shallow while open ocean areas
are deep. But what does this mean for navy planners? An eight foot swell in the open ocean
is no concern for most modern naval vessels, but if coming ashore, an eight foot swell could
preclude amphibious and small boat operations. In deep ocean waters, poor charts are of
relatively little concern for surface vessels, but in shallow littoral waters, uncharted reefs,
rocks, and shoals provide significant dangers to naval forces. Additionally, the structure of
open ocean water and littoral water columns are different. Open ocean deep water generally
provides good, long-range acoustic conditions; littoral waters are highly variable with poor
acoustics, eddies, and varying bathymetry. A smart submarine commander operating in the
environment with intimate knowledge of his water conditions can hide within an eddy or
behind a submerged ridge and lie in ambush of enemy forces. Deep water provides a relative
haven from mines whereas littoral waters provide opportunities to seed bottom-moored
minefields capable of sinking very large warships.
Finally, 40 percent of all the worlds cities with populations of 500,000 or more are
on the coast, while more than two-thirds of the worlds population lives within 250 miles of
the coast. These built-up coastal areas and accompanying civilian infrastructure can also
harbor coastal defenses. Small boats that cannot operate effectively on the open ocean can be
formidable in shallow littoral waters, operating close to home ports from which they can
rapidly sortie and retreat. Coastal guns and surface-to-surface missiles also provide
significant dangers, as clearly demonstrated in 2006 when the Israeli vessel Hanit, while
operating more than 30 nm off shore, was struck by a ground launched C-802 anti-ship cruise
missile fired from the back of a truck. Coastal infrastructure and efforts to minimize civilian
casualties may preclude many of the offensive and defensive tools of the naval commander.
Operational planners and commanders must consider these factors when transitioning from
open-ocean to littoral activities.

84
 The environment influences nearly all aspects of naval operations. The ability to
operate safely, the enhancement or degradation of combatant sensors, and the relatively
mundane task of locating forces operating in the maritime domain are all driven by
environmental conditions. With this in mind, a fundamental understanding of what
conditions can be expected, and how they will impact both friendly and adversary
performance, is critical to the joint force and naval commanders.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Mike Loomis, C-408.

D. Discussion Topics:

Discuss the main characteristics of the physical environment and their effect on the
employment of maritime forces.

Discuss the difficulties of detecting and identifying forces in the maritime domain.

What are the main differences between the combat employment of naval forces on the open
ocean and in the littorals?

Discuss the principal influences of weather/climate on the employment of naval forces.

How can the operational commander incorporate climate in his/her planning?

Discuss the effect of growing urbanization in the littorals on the employment of maritime
forces in combat.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Atkinson, Rick. Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1993. Read pp. 169-173, 237-240. (NWC 4151).

Freedman, Lawrence. The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Vol. II. New York:
Routledge, 2005. Read pp. 75-80, 206-207. (NWC 4150).

Woodward, Admiral Sir John and Patrick Robinson. One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of
the Falklands Battle Group Commander. London: Harper Collins, 1992. Read
pp. 63-68, 104-106, 184-194. (NWC 4148).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Angove, Michael, Owning the Weather in the Maritime Environment. Newport, RI: Naval
War College, 2005.

85
Barker, Jeffrey. U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. The
Environmental Influences upon Naval Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College,
November 2008.

__________. U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department.

Meteorological Factors at the Operational Level of War. Newport, RI: U. S.
Naval War College, Nov 2008.

Boraz, Steven C., Maritime Domain Awareness. Myth and Realities, Naval War College
Review 62, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 137-146.

Branch, Alan, E. Elements of Shipping. London: Routledge, 8th ed., 2007.

Collins, John. Military Geography for Professionals and the Public. Washington, D.C.:
Brasseys Ltd., 1998.

Cronin, Patrick M., editor, Cooperation from Strength. The United States, China and the
South China Sea. Washington, D.C.: Center for New American Security, 2012.

Grech, Michelle Rita, Horberry, Tim J., and Koster Thomas, Human Factors in the Maritime
Domain. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2008.

Huebert, Rob, Exner-Pirot, Heather, Lajeunesse, Adam, and Gulledge, Jay, Climate Change
& International Security: The Arctic as a Bellwether. Calgary, Alberta: Center for
Climate and Energy Solutions, University of Saskatchewan, May 2012.

Kraska, James, Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea. Expeditionary Operations in World
Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2011.

Maritime Knowledge Centre, International Maritime Organization (IMO), International

Shipping Facts and FiguresInformation Resources on Trade, Safety, Security,
Environment, 5 March 2012.

Michael, David and Sticklor, Russell, Indian Ocean Rising. Maritime Security and Policy
Challenges. Washington, D.C.: The Stimson Center, July 2012.

Pandya, Amit A. and Rupert Herbert-Burns, with Junko Kobayashi, Maritime Commerce and
Security. The Indian Ocean. Washington, D.C.: The Stimson Center, February 2011.

Rodriguez, Jean-Paul, Claude Comtois, and Brian Slack, The Geography of Transport
Systems. London/New York: Taylor & Francis Group, Routledge, 2nd ed., 2010.

Till, Geoffrey. Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century. 3d ed. London and New
York: Routledge, 2014.

86
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime
Transport 2013.

Vego, Milan. Physical Environment in the Littorals, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory
and Practice. Newport, RI: Naval War College, reprint, 2009. (Issued).
Read pp. IV-35IV-48.

Winters, Harold A. Battling the Elements, Weather, and Terrain in the Conduct of War.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Yuan, Jingdong. Emerging Maritime Rivalry in the South China Sea. Territorial Disputes,
Sea-Lane Security, and the Pursuit of Power. Sydney: International Security
Research Programme, University of Sydney, September 2012.

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88
 JMO-23

THE OBJECTIVES OF NAVAL WARFARE:

CONTROL AND DENIAL OF THE SEA (Seminar)

[My operations] must depend absolutely upon the naval force which is
employed in these sea . . . No land force can act decisively unless
accompanied by a maritime superiority.

General George Washington to the

Marquis de Lafayette, 15 November 1781

A. Focus:

This session considers the objectives of naval warfareboth on the open ocean and
in the littoralsat the operational level of war. Sea control is the necessary condition that
allows naval forces freedom of action to achieve military objectives in the face of an
opposing force. This session will examine sea control and sea denial as a theoretical
construct as well as the methods used by the stronger and weaker sides to obtain or deny sea
control in a maritime theater.

B. Objective:

Understand sea control and sea denial from a theoretical perspective.

Analyze the theoretical and practical implications of sea control and denial in regard to
operational factors and functions.
Differentiate between the various degrees of sea control.
Examine the main methods of obtaining, maintaining, and exploiting sea control.
Understand the conditions for denying and disputing sea control.
Comprehend the role and importance of other services in sea control and in denying it.
Understand distinctions between denying control on the open ocean and in the littorals.

C. Background:

Strategic objectives determine the part to be played by each service in war; however
achievement of strategic objectives normally requires employment of all the components of a
countrys armed forces. Therefore, war at sea should be considered not in isolation from but
as intrinsically related to war on land and in the air. Wars can no longer be won by the efforts
of a single service, requiring close service cooperation. In particular, the highest degree of
cooperation among the services is necessary in conducting war at sea.
Historically, the principal objective of a fleet was to obtain and maintain what was
called command of the sea (or maritime supremacy in modern joint terms). The meaning of
this term has undergone significant changes owing to the advent of the submarine, aircraft,
89
and guided missiles. The term used today, sea control (or sea superiority in modern joint
terms), more accurately conveys the true state of affairs in a war at sea. It requires some level
of control in all three domains (air, surface, sub-surface) to assure ones own unfettered use
or to deny such use to a strong and resourceful opponent. Sea control is the ability of ones
fleet to operate with a high degree of freedom in a sea or ocean area for a limited period of
time. The objective for a weaker opponent at sea would normally be that of sea denial. That
is to challenge the unfettered access of a more powerful opponent, increasing their risk to
operate in one or all of the domains.
Sea control, and the original concept of command of the sea, has been a fundamental
maritime objective for hundreds of years. By maintaining control of strategically important
areas of a maritime theater, the stronger fleet could secure the uninterrupted flow of friendly
shipping, cut off enemy maritime trade, and project power onto the enemy shore. The real
value of controlling the sea has not been the actual possession of a particular body of water
but its subsequent exploitation toward the achievement of other objectives. The stronger
maritime force leverages operational factors at sea to achieve its objectives while preventing
the weaker maritime force from doing the same. Sea control can be expressed in various
degreessuch as general, local, and temporarythat are relative to the operational factors of
time, space, and force. As such, it is often incomplete and imperfect.
Sea control, considered the essence of sea power, is often a prerequisite for joint
operations. Historically, sea control has been gained through various methods: destroying the
enemy fleet at sea, destroying the enemy fleet in ports or bases, attrition, blockades, offensive
mining, seizing choke points, blockading choke points, and seizing enemy bases. In the past,
the most common method used to destroy the enemy fleet was by seeking a decisive battle at
sea. After obtaining sea control, maritime forces consolidate operational or strategic success
by maintaining and then exploiting sea control by projecting power ashore, destroying enemy
coastal defenses and facilities, and degrading the enemys military, political, and economic
sources of power.
A weaker fleet is usually not able to go on the offensive but is forced to stay on a
strategic defensive until the balance of forces shifts in its favor. Consequently, sea denial is
normally the operational objective, in the maritime domain, for the weaker side during a war
at sea. A weaker side may also try to dispute control in certain sea or ocean areas. Because no
navy has unlimited resources and because a belligerents near term objectives may not
require significant use of the sea in a particular area, even a strong navy might opt or be
forced to conduct sea denial. In the former case, once conflict in a primary theater has abated,
sufficient forces may be brought into the secondary theater to enable a more offensive
posture. If, at this point, the stronger navy has been sufficiently attrited or the weaker side
has been sufficiently fortified, the objective for what had been the relatively weaker fleet
might shift to obtaining and maintaining sea control in a certain part of the theater.

The point of contact for this session is Professors Steve Forand, C-407, Richard Shuster C-
422, and Bill Hartig, C-428.

90
D. Discussion Topics:

What is sea control and why does one obtain it?

Does sea control exist in peacetime?

How are the terms sea control and sea denial related?

What tasks are associated with exercising sea control?

How can other services (air forces and ground forces) be employed in support of naval air to
obtain/maintain and exercise control of the air/surface or deny that control?

Case Study Discussion Topics for Sea Control:

What were the U. S. operational objective(s) for Midway?

How would you evaluate the effectiveness of U. S. planning and execution in the struggle for
sea control?

How much risk were the commanders willing to accept in order to obtain sea control?

Did any of the commanders use mission command or mission type orders?

What lessons learned can be derived from the case study?

Case Study Discussion Topics for Sea Denial:

Identify the U. S. and Japanese operational objectives.

Evaluate the effectiveness of U. S. and Japanese planning and execution in the struggle for
local sea control.

How much risk were the commanders willing to accept in order to obtain sea control?

What lessons learned can be derived from the case study for modern commanders?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

Vego, Milan. Objectives of Naval Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2015.
Scan. (NWC 1102).

91
__________. Obtaining and Maintaining Sea Control. Newport, RI: Naval War College,
August 2015. (NWC 1108).

__________. Exercising Sea Control. Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2015.
(NWC 1131).

__________. Disputing Sea Control. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2011. (NWC
1139).

Case Study:

Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center. The Battle of Midway 4-7 June 1942.
Extracted from: U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific): The Campaigns of the
Pacific War. Read: Chapters 1, Japanese Naval Planning and V, The Battle of
Midway. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center. 27 April 2005. (NWC 4153).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Barnett, Roger. Technology and Naval Blockade. Naval War College Review 58, no. 3
(Summer 2005): 87-98.

Brodie, Bernard. A Guide to Naval Strategy. 5th ed. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.

Caravaggio, Angelo N. The Attack at Taranto. Naval War College Review 59, no. 3
(Summer 2006): 103-127

Castex, Raoul. Strategic Theories. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1992.

Elleman, Bruce A. and S.C.M Paine, eds. Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and
Counter-strategies, 1805-2005. London and New York: Routledge, 2006.

Hill, J. R. Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1986.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 16601783. New York:
Dover, 1987, reprint of 1890 edition.

Moineville, Hubert. Naval Warfare Today and Tomorrow. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell,
1983.

Moore, S. Long Night of the Dreadnoughts. Military History 24, no. 2 (April 2007):
60-65.

92
Rosinski, Herbert. The Development of Naval Thought. Ed. B. Mitchell Simpson III.
Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977.
.
Scheina, Robert L. The Malvinas Crisis, Latin America: A Naval History 18101987.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003.

U. S. Navy. Naval Operating Concept 2010 (NOC). Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office. 2010.

Vego, Milan. On Naval Warfare. U. S Naval War College, Joint Military Operations
Department: Newport, RI. 2009.

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 JMO-24

COMBINED ARMS: FUNDAMENTALS

OF ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE (Seminar)

There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today.

Vice Admiral David Beatty,

31 May 1916, Battle of Jutland

A. Focus:

The following six sessions are intended to introduce the student to the concept of
naval combined arms, the synergistic combination of fires from different domains and
platforms intended to put an enemy on the horns of a dilemma. This session will focus on
the objectives and methods of employing Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) forces in the
struggle for sea control and in sea denial.

B. Objectives:

Understand the role and importance of ASUW in obtaining, maintaining, and exercising
or disputing sea control.
Explain the main objectives and methods of combat employment of ASUW forces.
Summarize the range of missions performed by ASUW forces at the operational level of
war.

C. Background:

Anti-Surface Warfare is that segment of naval warfare that involves sensors,

weapons, platforms, and targets in the surface environment. It also may be referred to as ASUW.
If surface forces are the spine of a fleet then anti-surface warfare must play a pivotal role in
the conduct of war at sea. With the proliferation of long range, supersonic anti-ship cruise
missiles (ASCMs) capable of deployment from land, air and sea as well as the relatively
recent development of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) the threat to surface forces has
never been greater. These developments are in addition to the historical threat from
submarines, aircraft, and mines. Small craft, ranging from traditional fast missile and torpedo
platforms to explosive laden boats operating in the littoral environment further complicate
surface ship operations.
ASUW is practiced not only by naval forces as significant capabilities reside in the air
and ground forces of several nations. Furthermore, targeting of surface forces may be
accomplished by a number of means including, but not limited to, land based maritime patrol
aircraft, long range land based sensors and the proliferation of maritime unmanned aerial and
underwater vehicles.
95
 As threats to surface forces have increased, ship survivability has not. Modern naval
warship design predicated on mission requirements has made surface ships more vulnerable
to damage from a variety of diverse weapons than their predecessors. Although the defensive
capability of the surface combatant has been extended with the advent of the surface to air
missile, current naval construction techniques have not increased the survivability of the
ships themselves once damage has occurred. The day of the heavily armored surface
combatant is over as these platforms have been replaced by lightly protected ships heavily
reliant on their electronic capabilities (and the power sources that support them) for both
defensive and offensive operations. In many cases a single hit by an ASCM or other weapon
would be enough to disrupt such capabilities resulting in a mission kill if not the outright
sinking of a surface vessel.
In response to this threat many navies have relied on a multi-faceted approach to
defending surface forces. By using effective emission control techniques, counter-targeting
and layered defense (utilizing both soft and hard kill systems) they have attempted to
mitigate challenges associated with ASUW threats. Techniques and capabilities required to
defeat air and subsurface threats are discussed in separate modules.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Dan Caldwell, C-414.

D. Discussion Topics:

Discuss the objectives and main methods of employment of ASUW forces in obtaining,
maintaining, and exercising or disputing sea control.

How do joint forces increase the effectiveness of ASUW efforts?

How is the ASUW threat increased in the littorals?

How does the operational commander accept risk in the ASUW area to balance his objectives
and force constraints to achieve success?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

Erickson, Andrew S. and David D. Yang. Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese
Analysts Consider the Anti-ship Ballistic Missile. Naval War College Review,
Autumn 2009. (NWC 4145).

Mahnken, Thomas G. The Cruise Missile Challenge. Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments. March 2005. Read: pp. 1-19 and 31-39. (NWC 1135).

96
United States Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Selected U. S.
Navy and The People Republic of China Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) Tactical Capability
Handbook Slide Pack. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016. Scan. (NWC 2164).

Winnefeld, James A. Surface Ships Survivability: An Enduring Issue. Naval War College
Review. MayJune 1983. (NWC 1136).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Bollinger, Martin J. Warriors and Wizards: Development and Defeat of Radio-Controlled

Glide Bombs of the Third Reich, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2010.

Dyke, David H. Four Weeks in May: The Loss of HMS Coventry. Atlantic Books 2007.

Levinson, Jeffrey L. Missile Inbound: The Attack on the USS Stark in the Persian Gulf.
Naval Institute Press May 1997.

Tangreti, Samuel J. Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies. Naval Institute Press
October 2013.

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 JMO-25

COMBINED ARMS: FUNDAMENTALS

OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (Seminar)

My Navy has been definitely slack in preparing for this submarine

war off our coast. As I need not tell you, most naval officers have declined
in the past to think in terms of any vessel of less than two thousand tons.
You learned the lesson two years ago. We still have to learn it.

President Franklin Roosevelt in a letter to

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
during the Battle of the Atlantic, 1942

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the objectives and methods of employing Anti-Submarine

Warfare (ASW) forces in the struggle for control of the sea or in sea denial operations.

B. Objectives:

Understand the role and importance of ASW in obtaining, maintaining and exercising or
disputing sea control.
Comprehend the main objectives and methods of combat employment of ASW forces.
Comprehend the range of missions performed by ASW forces at the operational level of
war.
Comprehend the capabilities of joint services in obtaining, maintaining and exercising or
disputing sea control.

C. Background:

Technological innovations have continued to expand submarine capabilities and

therefore complicated how to counter the undersea threat. At the start of the First World
War, efforts to counteract enemy submarines were obscure. One hundred years later, much
of this uncertainty remains, yet the objectives of ASW have been remarkably consistent over
time. Navies have attempted to destroy enemy submarines, limit their effectiveness or
contain their deployment. By mitigating the offensive powers of the enemy, friendly forces
were able to accomplish sea control in specific areas and achieve their objectives.
Conversely, by using powerful ASW forces navies could prevent enemy subsurface forces
from operating in an area. ASW will continue to be a vital component in any maritime
forces attempts to obtain, maintain and exercise or dispute sea control.
ASW can be characterized as a race between submarine warfare capabilities and
tactics to counter such capabilities. Many of the tactical methods of neutralizing submarines
99
have varied as naval forces have attempted to use advanced technology to deal with the
subsurface threat. Navies have employed hunter-killer groups to actively seek out
submarines, sent disguised merchant ships to attack unwary surfaced submarines, mined
submarine harbors and operating areas to restrict access, and used patrolling aircraft and
blimps to search for and attack patrolling submarines. During World War II, convoying
vessels proved to be the most effective way to diminish the effectiveness of submarines and
allow friendly forces to achieve their objectives.
Modern ASW has progressed well beyond dropping depth charges on German U-
Boats and must be viewed as a systematic approach to defeating a very difficult threat. The
tension between submarine capabilities and ASW has driven innovation in the undersea
domain. The Cold War battle between the United States and the Soviet Union saw many
innovations in submarine warfare and ASW. Between 1945 and 1950, the Soviets adapted
the German Type XXI dieselelectric submarine with features such as increased battery
capacity, a hydrodynamic hull design for a higher underwater speed and a snorkel mast
permitting the intake of air to operate the diesel engine while submerged at periscope depth.
These innovations effectively countered the ASW techniques during that period and drove
the development of new radar and underwater detection capabilities. The passive acoustic
array and fixed seabed array were developed as well as improved sonar performance. From
1950 to 1960, the first nuclear submarines were launched introducing speed and endurance.
Nuclear weapons were also developed and the submarine became a survivable nuclear
weapon launch platform. These developments greatly complicated the ASW problem and
increased the importance of passive detection and ocean surveillance. The first high
performance nuclear submarines were launched between 1960 and 1980. During this period
the United States submarine force enjoyed a substantial acoustic advantage over the Soviets
and exploited the effective use of fixed arrays such as Sounding and Surveillance Systems
(SOSUS) along with the significant U. S. submarine detection ranges of enemy submarines.
High performance nuclear submarines drove the innovation of Advanced Capability
(ADCAP) Heavy Weight Torpedoes (HWTs) that had much higher speeds and post-launch
wire guidance control. The final phase of Cold War ASW was the development of very quiet
nuclear submarines from 1980 to the end of the Cold War. This trend has continued and
resulted in near acoustic parity that Admiral Kinnard McKee predicted while he was the
Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion in 1986.

"Eventually, U. S. and Soviet submarine capabilities will converge.

Then we will have to think about different applications for submarines
because ASW is only going to become a defensive business for
submarines in my judgment. It will be blind man's bluff with other
submarinesMany of the other roles for submarines will become more
predominant as we go further into the future, because at some point,
nobody will be able to find a submarine with anything."

-Admiral Kinnard McKee, USN

Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
U. S. House of Representatives,
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1987, April 1986.

100
 The submarine is very effective in the detection and destruction of enemy submarines
simply because it operates in the same environment as the threat. However, as Admiral
McKee predicted, we are at a point where even modern submarines are not be able to
adequately detect a comparable threat submarine. Countering innovations such as nuclear
propulsion, cruise missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and quiet diesel-electric
and nuclear submarines requires a broad, operationally based joint ASW effort to be
successful. The integration of non-navy assets is an important part of joint and coalition
ASW operations. ASW is one of the most difficult and complex problems in naval warfare.
In addition to large areas, complex and variable environments and an immense demand on
time and resources, the increased emphasis on operations in the littorals further complicates
this already difficult problem. Commanders must not limit their perspectives to a single
avenue of approach. Otherwise, attempts to obtain, maintain, and exercise or disrupt sea
control will take much longer and require more resources.
At the operational level of war, maritime commanders have undertaken various
courses of action to degrade the enemy submarine threat. Attempting to defeat the submarine
threat in the submarine construction sites or training areas, the transit routes to their patrol
areas, or while on station require different methods and decisions for the joint commander.
Commanders who concentrated on only one of these methods, or focused only on the use of
maritime forces to degrade enemy capabilities, limited the effectiveness of their joint effort.
Land based air, ground, and cyber forces also play an important role in defeating the enemy,
or at least minimizing the enemys potential and allowing friendly forces to achieve their
objectives.
Exercising control over the subsurface allows the exploitation of the operating area by
other maritime forces to accomplish vital objectives. Essential maritime trade could be
conducted, amphibious forces could travel to their landing sites, or nuclear missile launching
submarines could be protected in bastions. Denying that same capability to the enemy allows
one force to prosecute the conflict more rapidly, maintaining the initiative in the maritime
and consequently terrestrial realm.
Concurrently, the use of other elements of national powerparticularly the security
of friendly information sources or the exploitation of enemy oneshave been crucial in
obtaining success; allied success in both World Wars in defeating German U-boat offensives
in the Atlantic was due in no small part to the sheer size of available ASW forces and the
massive numbers of merchant ships produced, as well as the exploitation of German signal
traffic. There are no panaceas in ASW, but focusing on the required operational objectives
and using all elements of the joint force provide a greater opportunity to achieve success.

The point of contact for this session is Captain Eric Irwin, USN, C-423.

D. Discussion Topics:

Discuss the objectives and main methods of employment of ASW forces in obtaining,
maintaining, and exercising or disputing sea control.

How do joint forces increase the effectiveness of ASW efforts?

101
How can operational functions be utilized to counter the submarine threat? Discuss the best
ways to synchronize and sequence these functions to produce a viable ASW scheme?

What are the challenges of conducting ASW in the littorals?

Discuss the human factor as it applies to the art of ASW.

How does the presence of an adversarys submarine force influence operational factors?

How does the relationship between these factors affect ASW?

How does the operational commander accept risk in the ASW area to balance his objectives
and force constraints to achieve success?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Breemer, Jan S. Chasing U-Boats and Hunting Insurgents. Joint Force Quarterly, 40 (1st
Quarter 2006): 60-66. (NWC 4080)

Gordon, John J. and Chester Helms. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations
Department. Operational ASW. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2011. (NWC
4030).

United States Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Selected U. S.
Navy and The People Republic of China Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) Tactical Capability
Handbook Slide Pack. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016. Scan. (NWC 2164).

Vego, Milan. Fundamentals of Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) U. S. Naval War College:

Newport, RI, 2012. Read pp. 1- 16, scan pp. 17-33. (NWC 1081).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Blair, Clay. Hitlers U-Boat War: The Hunters, 1939-1942. New York, Random House,
1996.

Burgess, Richard R. Awfully Slow Warfare. Seapower 48, no. 4 (April 2005): 12-14.

Cote, Owen R. Jr. The Third Battle: Innovation in the U. S. Navys Silent Cold War
Struggle with Soviet Submarines. Newport Papers no. 16. Newport, RI: Naval War
College Press, 2003.

102
Haydon, Peter. Is Anti-Submarine Warfare Dead? Canadian Defense Quarterly (May
1993): 15-23.

Oi, Atsushi. Why Japans Antisubmarine Warfare Failed. United States Naval Institute
Proceedings 78, no. 6 (June 1952): 587601.
Polmar, Norman and Kenneth J. Moore. Cold War Strategic ASW. Undersea Warfare.
(Summer 2005): 20-24.

Vego, Milan. Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) in the Littorals. U. S. Naval War College.
Joint Military Operations Department. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2010.

__________. A Short History of Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW), 1914-1945. U. S. Naval

War College. Joint Military Operations Department. Newport, RI: Naval War
College, December 2013.

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 JMO-26

COMBINED ARMS: FUNDAMENTALS OF

NAVAL COUNTER-AIR WARFARE (Seminar)

We can arrive at a true picture of the role of aircraft carriers in naval

operations only if we consider the airplane to be a fighting tool of fighting
men on fighting ships, only if we clearly recognize at the onset that the
aircraft carrier is just as surely a fighting ship as is a gun carrier or a
torpedo carrier.

LCDR Bruce G Leighton USN, 1928

A. Focus:

This session is designed to introduce the US Navys range of capabilities and fleet
tactics as they relate to Counter-air Warfare. The focus is on the Carrier Air Wing
contribution; however, Counter-Air Warfare is a team sport. As such, the Carrier Air Wing
must be understood as one of several tools that include the Carrier Strike Group surface ships
as well as sister service capabilities. As the range and lethality of our potential enemies
increases, the combat employment of naval forces in the littorals is the most valid framework
for the naval Counter-air Warfare discussion.

B. Objectives:

Understand the doctrinal definitions and relationships of Counter-Air Warfare, Air and
Missile Defense, Offensive Counter-Air warfare, and Defensive Counter-\Air Warfare.
Understand the theoretical framework for Counter-Air Warfare.
Understand the relationship between Air Superiority and Sea Control.
Appreciate the impact of threat capabilities.
Understand the implications of achieving Sea Control with and without Air Superiority.
Comprehend the influence of the littoral environment on Naval Counter-Air Warfare.
Understand the combined arms platforms and coordination necessary to effectively
execute Naval Counter-Air.

C. Background:

The threats to modern navies are numerous and diverse. Of all the domains in which
to fight and win on the oceans, modern navies must be prepared to defend itself from a mix
of sea and shore based anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, fighter/attack
aircraft and armed unmanned aerial vehicles. The proliferation and lethality of modern naval
weapons pose a growing threat to maritime operations.

105
 Counter-air warfare is conducted not as an end in itself. Rather, it is a concept
designed to protect naval forces from air attack, in order for friendly forces to execute
missions to include, but not limited to: the support of ground operations (either directly or by
independent strike warfare), defense of friendly territory from maritime attack, or protection
of maritime trade. Capital ships of a naval force, historically the aircraft carrier, are likely the
main targets of enemy air attacks. The naval commander must balance the inherent tension
between utilizing assets to protect the carrier and using the offensive punch of the carrier air
wing. A carrier strike group that is focused on self-protection alone adds little to achieving
military objectives. Furthermore, the strike group commander may have additional
requirements to protect other forces, as in detached surface forces or maritime shipping,
further complicating the balance between offense and defense.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Charles Broomfield, MLH-136.

D. Discussion Topics

Discuss counter-air warfare tactics at the theoretical level. Remove specific weapons
systems from the discussion. Consider the Objective, Purpose, and Methods vis--vis
counter-air warfare.

Explain the difference between Offensive Counter-air and Defensive Counter-Air.

Discuss the broad threats that counter-air acts against.

Discuss the counter-air capabilities resident in a Carrier Strike Group (CSG).

Discuss the operations area geography impact on the employment of CSG counter-air
capabilities.

Consider Vegos concepts associated with gaining, maintaining, and exploiting sea control
and the implications to counter-air warfare.

Discuss the integration of joint force capabilities in support of CSG counter-air warfare.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Holmes, James M. The Counter-air Companion, A Short Guide to Air Superiority for the
JFC. Air University Press, April 1995. Read pp. 35-40, 60-61, scan the rest. (NWC
4149).

ONeil, William D. Naval Antiair Warfare. National Defense LXV, no. 365 (February
1981). (NWC 1137).

106
United States Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Selected U. S.
Navy and The People Republic of China Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) Tactical Capability
Handbook Slide Pack. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016. Scan. (NWC 2164).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-01,
Countering Air and Missile Threats. Washington, D.C.: CJCS. March 2012. Scan
Chapters 4 and 5.

__________. Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). Washington, D.C.: CJCS. January
2012. Scan.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Caravaggio, A. The Attack at Taranto." Naval War College Review 59, no. 3 (2006): 103-
127.

Douglas, A. H., CAPT, USN. Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare. Newport, RI:
U. S. Naval War College, 14 December 1939.

Hallion, Richard P. Air Power and the Changing Nature of Warfare. Joint Force Quarterly,
(Autumn/Winter 1997-98): 39-46.

Lambeth, Benjamin S. American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century. Santa
Monica: RAND, 2005.

Ramsey, Logan C. The Influence of Aircraft on the Exercise of Sea Command. U. S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, October 1938.

Rosendahl, Charles E. "Some Aviation Fundamentals," United States Naval Institute

Proceedings 51, no. 272 (1925): 1871-1881.

Trimble, William F. Admiral William A. Moffett Architect of Naval Aviation. Washington,

D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1994.

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 JMO-27

COMBINED ARMS: FUNDAMENTALS OF

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE (Seminar)

You are Athenians, who know by experience the difficulty of

disembarking in the presence of the enemy.

Demosthenes to Athenian troops, 425 BC

A. Focus:

This session examines the theory of amphibious warfare broadly and the ability of
maritime nations to project power through the employment of this type of warfare.
Amphibious warfare provides an excellent example of naval combined arms and as students
will discover, is inherently a joint effort. We will explore the fundamental concepts of
amphibious warfare and the options provided by amphibious forces to operational
commanders.

B. Objectives

Comprehend the fundamental concepts of amphibious warfare.

Comprehend the potential effects that amphibious forces can generate on an enemy.
Understand the vulnerabilities that amphibious forces, and other elements of the
amphibious task force, are exposed to during landing operations.
Value the unique considerations for employing amphibious forces, in support of
operational objectives.

C. Background:

The theoretical underpinnings of amphibious warfare have been established through

trial and error over thousands of years. For readers of classic literature, it was the poet Homer
who 3,000 years ago wrote in the Iliad of the ancient Greeks employing amphibious
operations when attacking the city of Troy in Asia Minor, near modern-day Turkey. Greek
soldiers crossed the Aegean Sea and stormed ashore on the beaches near Troy during the ten-
year struggle to destroy the city. In amphibious operations, therefore, one sees a clear
example of a nation exploiting local sea control, for without local sea control and in modern
times, local air superiority, amphibious operations are an exceptionally risky course of action
to pursue.
The concept is simple, but like many simple military concepts it frequently has
proven difficult to realize in practice. At its foundation, command of the sea (sea control) is
the critical enabler; it allows the use of the sea as a means of transportation, in this case for
military purposes. As stated earlier, certain prerequisites are necessary before even
109
attempting amphibious operations. A very high level of at least localized sea control and air
superiority is a prerequisite for attempting an amphibious operation. The failure of
Napoleons and Hitlers intended invasions of England are examples of the inability of
obtaining localized sea control for amphibious operations. Even with control of the sea,
however, the difficulties in executing a successful amphibious operation are considerable,
and must be weighed against potential results. Geoffrey Till mentions the British siege and
capture of Havana in 1762, Wolfes capture of Louisburg in 1757 and Quebec in 1759 in the
Seven Years War (1757-1764), Wellingtons Peninsular Campaign 1807-1814, the
operations in the Crimean War of 1854-1856, and MacArthurs amphibious envelopment at
Inchon of the North Korean Peoples Army in 1950 as proof that amphibious operations can
have a significanteven decisiveimpact on the success of land campaigns.
Amphibious operations generally consist of the assault, withdrawal, raid,
demonstration, and other type operations (humanitarian assistance and noncombatant
evacuation operations, for example). Regardless of the type of operations, the theory holds
true; establish local sea control and air superiority, designate a landing beach or beaches,
develop a ship-to-shore movement plan, develop an amphibious fires plan, develop an afloat
sustainment plan, and execute. Once the landing force is on shore, and command and control
has been phased ashore to the Landing Force Commander, the amphibious operation is
terminated and a land operation or campaign begins.
Sea control enables the use of the sea as a conduit for amphibious operations and the
sea is, therefore, generally viewed by amphibious forces (the so-called Gator Navy and
Marines) as maneuver space. Amphibious operations are extremely complex requiring
detailed planning and combined arms cooperation to ensure success. Based on the
circumstances, the risks to the amphibious forces can be high, but the potential reward for
successful amphibious operations, as history demonstrates, can be immense and alter the
course of the conflict. Students should depart the seminar with a firm grasp of the inherent
value of amphibious warfare and the utility that amphibious forces provide an operational
commander.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Bill Hartig, C-428.

D. Discussion Topics:

What types of operational effects can be generated by amphibious forces?

Command and control challenges are exceptionally complex in amphibious operations. Why
is this so? Can anything be done to simplify C2?

What are the differences between conducting amphibious landings on the beaches fronting
the open ocean or a peripheral sea and enclosed or semi-enclosed sea?

E. Products:
None.

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F. Required Readings:

An Amphibious Warfare Compendium. Excerpted from: Hough, Frank, Verle Ludwig, and
Henry Shaw Jr. "Origins of a Mission and the Evolution of Modern Amphibious
Warfare." History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in WWII Pearl Harbor to
Guadalcanal. Vol. One. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957. (NWC
1099).

Till, Geoffrey. Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century. 3d ed. London:
Routledge, 2013. Read pp. 186-201, 252-280. (Issued).

United States Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Selected U. S.
Navy and The People Republic of China Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) Tactical Capability
Handbook Slide Pack. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016. Scan. (NWC 2164).

Vego, Milan. Operational Warfare at Sea, Theory and Practice. London & New York:
Routledge, 2009. Read pp. 57-60. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Gatchel, Theodore L. At the Waters Edge: Defending Against the Modern Amphibious
Assault. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996.

Heinl, Robert D. The Inchon Landing: A Case Study in Amphibious Planning. Naval War
College Review (March 2006): 117-135.

Kennedy, Michael R. Expeditionary Strike Group Concepts and Recommendations.

Marine Corps Gazette (March 2006): 1625.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 16601783. New York:
Dover, 1987, reprint of 1890 edition.

United States Marine Corps. Marine Corps Operating Concepts Assuring Littoral Access. . .
.Winning Small Wars (MOC), Quantico VA: Government Printing Office, Third
Edition, June 2010, Chapter 2, Mission Command, Chapter 6, Power Projection.

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 JMO-28

COMBINED ARMS: FUNDAMENTALS

OF MINE WARFARE (Seminar)

We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a Navy, using pre-
World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth
of Christ.

Rear Admiral Allan Smith, USN,

Advance Force Commander, Wonsan, Korea 1950

A. Focus:

This session will addresses offensive and defensive Mine Warfare (MIW) which
consists of offensive and defensive mine laying and Mine Countermeasures (MCM). It will
discuss how the offensive and defensive employment of mines can assist naval forces in
acquiring sea control or in executing sea denial. Additionally it will examine the complexity
faced by a naval component commander when having to deal with mined waters in an
operating area, and the methods to clear mined waters (MCM). Finally it also introduces the
Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) concept of mine warfare and several possible future
scenarios for student consideration regarding the impact of sea mining.

B. Objectives:

Understand how sea mines influence both sea control and sea denial.
Understand the types of sea mines and their operational impacts.
Comprehend the current and future offensive and defensive components of MIW.
Understand the conditions required to conduct MCM operations.
Comprehend the contributions of combined and joint operations in MCM planning and
operations.
Understand the legal constraints and restraints in regards to MIW.

C. Background:

Mine warfare (MIW) is an important tool for the operational commander. The
physical and psychological impact that mines can have on naval operations and maritime
trade should not be underestimated. Properly deployed and maintained mine fields can
contribute to establishing and maintaining sea control, denying the enemy access to the
littorals and open seas, and protecting critical lines of operation and communication.
Employing mines, however, is a double edged sword for the naval component
commander, and can deny the use of waterways by the force employing them. In a rapidly
changing scenario, the employment of mines may not be the most effective means in
113
controlling or denying access to the sea. For the naval component commander, mined waters
present time/space/force challenges for acquiring freedom of action on the seas. The threat
of mines may require adjustments in plans and timelines, or require the execution of branch
plans. Mine countermeasures (MCM) operations remain a tedious and time consuming
evolution. Consideration of the operational functions, especially intelligence, protection, and
movement and maneuver are essential in executing MCM operations. As MCM assets are
primarily slow moving surface ships, MCM operations may require establishing local air
superiority and sea control as prerequisites for success. Setting these conditions will
undoubtedly require a joint/combined effort of naval, air, and ground forces.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Keith Dowling, USN, C-413.

D. Discussion Topics:

Explain the main advantages and disadvantages of the offensive and defensive use of sea
mines.

How does the physical environment effect the employment of mines and the conduct of mine
countermeasures?

Explain the role and importance of mine warfare in obtaining and maintaining sea control or
establishing sea denial in the air, surface, and subsurface environment.

What are the unique implications in space, time, and force that must be considered when
conducting mine warfare?

Discuss the main methods of passive and active MCM.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

Dowling, Keith. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department. The
Future of Mine Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2015. (NWC 5061).

United States Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Selected U. S.
Navy and The People Republic of China Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) Tactical Capability
Handbook Slide Pack. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016. Scan. (NWC 2164).

Vego, Milan. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department.

Fundamentals of Mine Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2012. (NWC
1009A).

114
G. Supplementary Readings:

Bernitt, Thomas R. and Sam J. Tangredi. Mine Warfare and Globalization: Low-Tech
Warfare in a High-Tech World. In Tangredi, ed. Globalization and Maritime
Power. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2002.

Chilstrom, John S. Mines Away! The Significance of U. S. Army Air Forces Minelaying in
World War II. Research paper, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, May 1992.

Goulda, Michael E. The Dardanelles Campaign: A Historical Analogy for Littoral Mine
Warfare. Naval War College Review 51, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 82-96.

Luckow, Ulrich. Victory over Ignorance and Fear: The U. S. Mine Laying Attack on North
Vietnam Naval War College Review 35 (Jan-Feb 1982).

Till, Geoffrey. Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century. 3d ed. London: Frank
Cass, 2013.

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 JMO-29

MARITIME TRADE WARFARE (Seminar)

In the military, over 90 percent of our DOD requirements travel by the

sea. Its quite important to us. We are a nation that relies on the maritime
industry as a critical component of our countrys economy as well as our
national securityIt is American ships and American seafarers who have
always come through for us in times of peace, war or national emergency

Vice Admiral William Brown,

Deputy Commander, USTRANSCOM, 2014

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the objectives, methods, and tenets employed in attacking
the enemys maritime trade and defense and protection of friendly maritime trade (maritime
trade warfare) at the operational and theater-strategic levels of war. Both the theory and
practice of maritime trade warfare will be examined, with particular attention given to its
conduct in the littorals, its direct, indirect, and secondary effects, and considerations for the
Combatant Commander with respect to commerce warfare in a modern threat environment.
The roles of submarine, mine, and air warfare in attacking and defending trade, and the
importance of intermodal transport to sustaining wartime economies will also be explored.

B. Objectives:

Understand the importance of the theory and practice of maritime trade warfare at the
operational level of war.
Comprehend the objectives, main methods, and tenets of attacking the enemys maritime
trade and defense and protection of friendly maritime trade.
Understand the elements of maritime trade and the direct and indirect effects of maritime
trade warfare on an enemys ability to project combat power and sustain its war-fighting
capacity.
Comprehend that maritime trade warfare is inherently a joint, interagency action.

C. Background:

In the era prior to the advent of aircraft, a principal task of any navy was to attack
enemy shipping at sea while, at the same time, defending and protecting friendly shipping.
This situation changed drastically in World War II and afterward, when land and carrier-
based aircraft were used to attack not only shipping but also other elements of maritime
trade: ships in port and port facilities, shipyards/ship repair facilities, storage areas, and
intermodal rail, road, and waterborne transport systems. Yet these considerable changes were
117
often not recognized by naval theoreticians and practitioners. The importance of commercial
shipping is reflected in the use of terms such as anti-SLOC, pro-SLOC, and naval
control of shipping. The arbitrarily selected term here, maritime trade warfare, is more
accurate because it encompasses both attack and defense/protection of maritime trade, not
just of merchant shipping.
Today, there are some maritime and naval experts who apparently believe that in the
era of globalization, there will be no attacks on the enemys maritime trade. According to this
reasoning, no belligerent would take such an action due to business related interdependency,
and/or because his own trade would suffer considerable losses. However, experience shows
that, in any significant war, all belligerents will engage in a struggle to destroy/neutralize and
defend/protect merchant shipping or maritime trade to the greatest degree possible. Hence, in
any future high-intensity conventional war at sea, both the stronger and the weaker side can
be expected to conduct extensive maritime trade warfare. The focus of a weaker side, at sea,
is often on attacking the enemys maritime trade, while the stronger side will focus on
defense and protection of friendly maritime trade.
The size of the sea area short distances versus long and the peculiar features of the
physical environment, often necessitate considerable differences between maritime trade
warfare conducted on the open ocean versus in enclosed or semi-enclosed seas (popularly
called narrow seas). In the broader context, ones attack on enemy maritime trade is
conducted in support of a strategic objective to weaken the enemys military-economic
potential; a classic attack on a nations economy. Operationally, the objective is to destroy or
neutralize the flow of maritime trade in a given part of a maritime theater. This is
accomplished by the employment of ones naval forces and those of other services to
interfere, interdict, curtail, or cut-off the enemys maritime trade. The main methods of
employment of ones combat forces consist of a series of major and minor tactical actions
conducted over a relatively long period of time. From time to time, major naval/joint
operations are conducted as well.
Defense of maritime trade is one of the most important responsibilities of a
government and its armed forces. It pertains to both defensive and offensive employment of
ones combat forces, while protection refers to organizational, technical, and other
measures aimed at ensuring the safety of ones maritime trade without the use of weapons. If
ones forces are relatively limited, focus should be on the selected elements of ones
maritime trade in conducting defense and protection. A country that fails to safeguard its
seaborne trade may find that it not only suffers significant economic harm but also that its
entire war effort has been crippled. Consequently, defense and protection of maritime trade is
among a navys principal operational tasks in a high-intensity conventional war.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Christopher McMahon (RADM, USMS),
C-411.

D. Discussion Topics:

What are some of the lessons learned in World War II with regard to maritime trade warfare?

118
Describe the elements of maritime trade. How might the differences between maritime trade
conducted on the open ocean and in enclosed/semi-enclosed seas affect the commanders
operational planning?

Discuss the main methods of combat employment of naval forces and aviation in attacking an
enemys maritime trade, including the conduct of submarine, surface, and mine warfare.

What are the principal methods traditionally employed in the defense and protection of
friendly maritime trade? How should a Joint Force Commander plan to protect maritime
trade, both military and/or commercial, in a modern threat environment?

Describe some key prerequisites for success in attacking an enemys maritime trade and for
defending/protecting ones own.

Is unrestricted commerce warfare, such as occurred in WWII, possible in the 21st Century?

What are some of the legal, environmental, and economic issues in attacking commercial
vessels?

Is commerce warfare possible through the employment of business practices such as marine
insurance?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Project Gutenberg E-book. Scan all
then read the summary of pp. 269-270. (NWC 4011).

Poirer, Michael T. Results of the German and American Submarine Campaigns of World
War II. U. S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Submarine Warfare
Division, 1999. (All less the Appendix). (NWC 3175).

Till, Geoffrey. A Changing Focus for the Protection of Shipping in The Strategic
Importance of Seaborne Trade and Shipping: A Common Interest of Asia Pacific, ed.
Forbes, Andrew. Canberra, Australia: Sea Power CentreAustralia, 2002. (NWC
4032).

Vego, Milan. Maritime Trade Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2015. Scan
all, then read pp. 1-21, 32-34, and 48-50. (NWC 1135).

119
G. Supplementary Readings:

Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, The Navy Records Society, 1997. James, Jonathan T. Countering
Naval Guerrilla Warfare: Are Convoys Obsolete? Fort Leavenworth, KS.: School of
Advanced Military Studies, U. S. Command and General Staff College, 1991.

Goulter, Christina, J. M. A Forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Commands

Anti-shipping Campaign, 19401945. London: Frank Cass, 1995.

Grove, Eric, J. The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 19391945. A revised edition of
the Naval Staff History Volumes 1A (Text and Appendices) and 1B (Plans and
Tables).

Kemp, Paul. The Russian Convoys, 19411945. Poole, Dorset, U.K.: Arms and Armour
Press, 1987.

Lewis, Archibald. R. The Northern Seas: Shipping and Commerce in Northern Europe A.D.
3001100. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958.

Navias, Martin S., and E. R. Hooton. Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping
during the Iran-Iraq Conflict, 19801988. London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1996.

Schoefield, B. B. The Russian Convoys. Philadelphia, PA: Dufour Editions, 1964.

Tracy, Nicholas. Attack on Maritime Trade. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.

________. Sea Power and the Control of Trade: Belligerent Rights from the Russian War to
the Beira Patrol, 18541970. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate for the Navy Records Society,
2005.

Woodman, Richard. Malta Convoys 19401943. London: J. Murray, 2000.

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 JMO-30

DESIGNING MAJOR NAVAL/

JOINT OPERATIONS (Seminar)

Is the proposed operation likely to succeed? What might be the

consequences of failure? Is it in the realm of practicability in terms of
materials and supplies?

Posted on the bulkhead in

Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz office

A. Focus:

Using our understanding of naval capabilities and war fighting theory, in this session
students will examine how the previously discussed general concept of an operational design
for a major operation specifically applies to the design of major naval operations. This
session sets the conditions for our tactical analysis of five major surface battles in the waters
around Guadalcanal during the opening stages of World War II.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend how the key elements of operational design apply to the design of major
naval operations.
Using the Guadalcanal case study, analyze and critique the Japanese and U. S.
commanders operational designs.

C. Background:

Previous sessions have explored how major operations or campaigns contain a number
of elements that collectively ensure the accomplishment of the selected or assigned military
objective(s). For this to happen, an overall operational design or operational idea should
exist to ensure that ones forces are employed in a coherent manner and focused on the
assigned operational or strategic objectives in the theater. This session allows the student to
consider how the previously discussed concept of the operational idea applies to the design
of a major naval operation.
In generic terms, a major naval operation consists of a series of related major and
minor naval tactical actions conducted by diverse naval forces and combat arms of other
services, in terms of time and place, to accomplish an operational (and sometimes strategic)
objective in a given maritime theater of operations. Major naval operations are planned and
conducted in accordance with an operational idea (scheme) and common plan. They are
normally an integral part of a maritime or land campaign, but they can sometimes be
conducted outside of the framework of a campaign.
121
 An analysis and critique of the Japanese and U. S. operational design and its
underlying operational idea (scheme) for (the Guadalcanal case study) will be conducted to
highlight those aspects of the operational art unique to operational warfare in a maritime
context. In the near future, we will complete Tabletop Exercise (#3, The PRC-Taiwan Case
Study), in which students will be tasked with coming up with the rudimentary elements of
an operational design against a near-peer competitor.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Ivan Luke, C-431.

D. Discussion Topics:

Describe the general components of an operational design for a major naval operation.

Does the operational design for major naval operations differ from design of major
operations in the land domain? If so, how?

Guadalcanal Case Study:

What were the planned Japanese and U. S. objectives for the Guadalcanal case study? To
what degree were they nested? Were they appropriate?

Deduce and restate the Japanese and U. S. operational ideas (scheme) for the Guadalcanal
case study. What, with the advantage of hindsight, might they have done differently to better
achieve their ultimate objective?

Analyze and critique the Japanese and U. S. balance of operational factors and functions.

What elements of the Japanese and U. S. operational design contributed significantly to the
outcome?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

Hornfischer, James D. Neptunes Inferno The U. S. Navy at Guadalcanal. New York;

Bantam 2012. Read: Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7. (Issued).

Stille, Mark. The Naval Battles for Guadalcanal 1942. Oxford; Osprey Publishing 2013.
Read pp. 5-93. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. Operational Warfare at Sea. London and New York: Routledge, 2009. Review
pp. 119-171. (Issued).

122
G. Supplementary Readings:

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and
Practice of Military Operations on Land. Lecture series, Naval War College. S.
Lowe Marston and Co.: Boston, MA, 1911.

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 JMO-31

TABLETOP EXERCISE #2: ANALYSIS OF THE

STRUGGLE FOR GUADALCANAL

My God, what are we going to do about this?

Vice Admiral Robert L Ghormley

Nouma, September 1942

A. Focus:

This tabletop exercise, a natural segue from the prior analysis of the operational
design, is designed to assist students in comprehending, through the naval battles for
Guadalcanal, how both the U. S. and Japanese commanders attempted to leverage combined
arms in the struggle for sea control. The exercise uses three of the five night surface naval
battles around Guadalcanal: Savo Island, The Battle of Cape Esperance, the First Naval
Battle of Guadalcanal, the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, and the Battle of
Tassafaronga. The battles operating conditions, exportable to the modern operating
environment, should serve as an intellectual line of departure in developing an operational
idea in the next tabletop exercise.

B. Objectives:

Understand the organization of naval forces based on threat and objective.

Reinforce an understanding of naval capabilities in a combined arms arena.

C. Background:

During the beginning of the Second World War in the Pacific, most battles were
fought according to the manner the Japanese desired. They held the initiative and had the
advantage of better trained, organized and focused forces. The Allies had to react to the
Japanese attacks and were typically outfought and defeated as the Japanese seized outposts
across Southeast Asia and the Central Pacific. Japanese defeats at the Battles of Coral Sea
and Midway affected their ability to maintain the initiative in the war. With the loss of five
Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carriers in these battles, they no longer held the force
advantage to assure victory in any operation. The latter stage of the Pacific War, from the
Battle of Tarawa in November 1943 to the end of the war saw both the strength and quality
of U. S. naval forces expand to such a level that the Japanese Navy was unable to compete.
While Japanese ground forces could inflict significant casualties on American ground forces
attacking their defenses on a coral atoll, at sea and in the air, U. S. forces dominated the
conflict. The U. S. war economy out produced the Japanese to the extent that the Japanese
could not keep up regardless of their fearless devotion to the Emperors cause. During this
125
segment of the war the U. S. Navy could fight the way of war it desired, using the industrial
output of the American factories to destroy the Japanese on, over, and below the sea.
It is only in the middle portion of the war, from after Midway to roughly the
beginning of 1944, where neither side was fighting the type of war they envisioned. This
required both sides had to make do as best they could. The U. S. Navy at Guadalcanal, the
first U. S. offensive operation of the war, was past the nadir of its wartime performance, but
not by much. The Japanese, still shrugging off the shock of the Midway defeat, were not far
from their zenith. The Imperial Japanese Navy was a combat force with experienced tactical
commanders, well trained crews and, in several areas, better armed ships than their U. S.
opponent in 1942. Over the course of the six month battle, both sides fortunes ebbed and
flowed and the side that made the best use of the resources at hand took the lead.
The naval battles of Guadalcanal resulted in alarming losses to the U. S. Navy surface
fleet. Many of the naval battles during the six month struggle for the island were fought not
at the weapons optimum ranges envisioned by either side, but in close quarters in highly
restricted seas. The casualties suffered by the U. S. Navy included 4,900 killed and nearly
3,000 wounded. In fact, the number of U. S. sailors killed in the battles off Guadalcanal
exceeded the number of Marines and Soldiers killed in ground fighting (1,769 killed).
Losses to the Japanese at sea were also significant. In many ways this is the story of the
prewar navies fighting it out for sea control in the Solomon Islands. This might also suggest
that a peacetime navy requires a long time to develop the tactics, techniques and mindset to
excel at warfare, a time that future navies and their sailors may not have.
The purpose of this second table top exercise is to critically analyze the naval battles
through the lens of operational art and naval warfare theory. To avoid making this exercise
one of hindsight, students should avoid focusing on what happened and instead analyze the
leadership decisions within an operational art framework to answer why those decisions were
made. This exercise will include moderator led discussion and student group work. Seminar
teams will analyze each of the naval battles providing commentary on U. S. and Japanese
leadership decisions using an operational art framework.

The point of contact for this session is Professor S. L. Forand, C-407.

D. Discussion Topics:

From the Japanese Commanders viewpoint, what were his challenges with respect to Time,
Space, and Force? From the U. S. Commanders viewpoint?

How well did both commanders offset deficiencies in factors with their available operational
functions?

Were there any opportunities for either side to better utilize combined arms during the
struggle for Guadalcanal?

It has been said that the U. S. Navy was a learning organization during the early years of
World War II. What adjustments did the U. S. Navy make after each battle? Were they
successful in their implementation?

126
What did the Imperial Japanese Navy learn from their experiences in fighting the U. S. fleet
in the waters off Guadalcanal? How did this influence their decision to evacuate
Guadalcanal?

E. Products:

Student teams will prepare and brief an assigned battle, answering assigned questions.

F. Required Readings:

Hornfischer, James D. Neptunes Inferno The U. S. Navy at Guadalcanal. New York;

Bantam 2012. Review: Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7. (Issued).

Stille, Mark. The Naval Battles for Guadalcanal 1942. Oxford; Osprey Publishing 2013
Review: pp. 5-93. (Issued).

President, United States Naval War College to Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet. Comments
on the Battle of Guadalcanal, Nov. 11-15, 1942. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 5
June 1943. (NWC 1167).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Cook, Charles. The Battle of Cape Esperance, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 1992.

Crenshaw, Russell Sydnor. South Pacific Destroyer: The Battle for the Solomons from Savo
Island to Vella Gulf. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

__________. The Battle of Tassafaronga, Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing
Company of America, 1995.

Fuller, Richard. Japanese Admirals 1926-1945. Schiffer, Atglen 2011.

Grace, James W. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 1999.

Hara, Tameichi. Japanese Destroyer Captain. New York: Ballantine Books, 1961.

Loxton, Bruce and Coulthard-Clark, The Shame of Savo, Naval Institute Press 1994

Newcomb, Richard F. The Battle of Savo Island, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York
1981.

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 JMO-32

THE FALKLANDS / MALVINAS

CONFLICT (Lecture and Exercise)

A senior officer said after the war that it had proved that the things
we did on the basis of well-tried and proven formations worked, and
the ad-hoc arrangements turned out much less happily. Joint-service
liaison and staff work left much to be desired.

Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands

A. Focus:

This session serves as the synthesis event for the components of operational art and
maritime warfare theory discussed in preceding sessions and serves as a collective
preparation for the upcoming examination. The emphasis is placed on the decisions and
actions of operational-level commanders on both sides of the conflict and how they could
have been different with a better understanding of operational art.

B. Objectives:

Synthesize and apply the components of operational art and maritime warfare theory
studied to date.
Analyze and evaluate how commanders and their staffs applied operational art in a
historical case study.
Apply concepts from international and maritime operational law in order to evaluate the
legal issues in a historical case study.
Analyze the operational lessons valid for the employment of modern, multinational and
joint forces.

C. Background:

This case study is conducted over four sessions, starting with a presentation of the
historical/strategic background to the conflict by the JMO Royal Navy exchange officer. A
60-minute film drawing out key elements should be viewed via BlackBoard prior to the
commencement of this session. Students will have seminar time available to study the case
materials and develop student-led discussions of the assigned questions. The final session is
devoted to student-led discussions of the case study.
This session is designed to reinforce the aspects of operational art and maritime warfare
theory studied and discussed in preceding sessions. Historical examples provide an excellent
opportunity for illustrating the complexities of planning, preparing, conducting, and
sustaining major operations and the reasons why particular military actions either succeeded
129
or failed. This particular case is used because it is rich with examples of the application, lack
of application, misapplication, or inability to apply the concepts associated with operational
art.
The goal of this session is to provide in-depth discussion and analysis of major aspects
of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas Conflict from an operational perspective. As the major
synthesis event for this portion of the syllabus, the motivations, planning, and actions of both
sides in the conflict will be examined in some detail. Seminar moderators will assign specific
responsibilities for student discussion of the case.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Darren Houston, Royal Navy, C-407.

D. Discussion Topics:

Applying the principles elements of operational design, analyze the Falklands/Malvinas

conflict. How did each side use the concepts of operational design in developing its plan?

To what extent were the objectives for each side appropriate? Why?

How well did each side employ forces relative to theater geometry to achieve its objectives?

Critique the British and Argentinian operational theater organization and the relevant
command structures. What would you have done differently?

How well did each side apply the aspects of operational and maritime law?

What major operational lessons learned can the United States derive from this conflict?

E. Products:

To synthesize operational art concepts, students will use an analytical framework in

order to discuss and answer moderator assigned questions.

F. Required Readings:

Hime, Douglas N. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department. The
1982 Falklands-Malvinas Case Study. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2010.
(NWC 1036).

Vego, Milan. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice. 2006. Reprint, Newport, RI:
Naval War College Press, 2009. (Issued). Read: APP 91-93 and 97-101.

130
G. Supplementary Readings:

Selected extracts from Conflicto Malvinas, Official Report of the Argentine Army, Vol. II.
Clapp, Michael. Amphibious Assault Falkland Islands: The Battle of San Carlos
Water. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996.

Freedman, Lawrence. The Official History of the Falklands CampaignVol 2.

London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005.

Freedman, Lawrence, and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. Signals of War: The Falklands

Conflict of 1982. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.

Hastings, Max, and Simon Jenkins. The Battle for the Falklands. New York: Norton, 1983.

Middlebrook, Martin. Task Force: The Falklands War, 1982. Rev. ed. London: Penguin,
1987.

Scheina, Robert L. The Malvinas Crisis, MarchApril 1982 and The Malvinas War,
MayJune 1982. Chapters 14 and 15 in Latin America: A Naval History 1810
1987. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987.

Summers, Harry G., Jr. Strategic Lessons Learned: The Falkland Islands Campaign. The
Art of War Quarterly, (Sept. 1983): 91-112.

Thompson, Julian. Amphibious LogisticsFalklands 1982. Extract from Chapter 8 in

The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflicts. London: Brasseys, 1994.

__________. No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic: 1982. New York:
Hippocrene, 1985.

Woodward, Sandy. One Hundred DaysThe Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group
Commander. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.

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 JMO-33

EXAMINATION ONE (Individual Effort)

No wonder then, that war, though it may appear to be uncomplicated,

cannot be waged with distinction except by men of outstanding intellect.

Carl von Clausewitz,

On War, 1832

A. Focus:

This session is intended to permit the Raymond A. Spruance student to demonstrate a

synthesis of the material presented to date and to demonstrate higher order thinking skills.

B. Objectives:

Synthesize operational art and maritime warfare theory concepts through the analysis of a
historical, real-world case study.
Create a coherent response to the examination questions that demonstrate an
internalization of various concepts of operational art.

C. Background:

Written examinations serve three fundamental purposes: to evaluate student

understanding of a given subject, to evaluate the students ability to think critically and
respond to a complex question, and last, to evaluate the facultys ability to convey
information and to create new knowledge. This session presents the student with the
opportunity to demonstrate mastery of the first two purposes stated above and further allows
the moderators to ensure that no intellectual gaps exist in student learning to this point.
Students will be provided with a case study that contains sufficient information to
address the questions presented. This case study will be issued in sufficient time to allow
students to prepare as individuals and as a group. Time is dedicated on 28 March 2016
(0830-1145) for student preparation as a group. (Students are strongly encouraged to prepare
as a seminar.) The examination will be issued at 1200 on 28 March 2016 and is due to the
moderators not later than 1200 on 29 March 2016. Grading criteria for the operational art
examination may be found in the front matter of this Syllabus.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Doug Hime, C-423.

133
D. Discussion Topics:

See examination question sheet.

E. Products:

A written response to assigned questions that demonstrates student mastery of the

various concepts studied thus far. This effort should not exceed 10 double spaced typed
pages in Times New Roman font 12 point with one inch margins top, bottom, and right, and
one and a quarter inches left. (Use the mirrored option under page layout in Microsoft
Word.)

F. Required Reading:

A case study will be issued prior to the examination with sufficient time for students
to conduct a thorough analysis and prepare for the examination.

G. Supplementary Readings:
None.

134
 JMO-34

MARITIME OPERATIONAL LAW (Lecture)

The sea, in contrast to [land] cannot be held or captured. . . No one

possesses the sea or an ocean permanently.

The Nature of Naval Warfare,

Naval War College Staff, 1938

A. Focus:

This lecture focuses on the law of the sea and the law affecting military operations in
the maritime environment. When planning and conducting military operations, commanders
and their subordinates must comply with the international law that governs (1) the legal basis
for nations to use force and lethality and (2) the law that governs the conduct of hostilities
extraterritorially. We now add an aquatic tributary flowing from these two streams into the
maritime environment (conflict and non-conflict). The general features of the maritime
environment, what is called The Maritime Domain will be discussed from a legal perspective.
Legal classifications or regimes of the ocean and airspace directly affect maritime operations
by determining the degree of control a coastal nation may exercise over the conduct and
activities of foreign merchant ships, warships, and aircraft operating in those areas. This
lecture discusses not only constraints maritime operational law might have on military
operations but, also how the operational commander can use the law, what some now call
lawfare, to achieve success in both conflict and non-conflict missions.

B. Objectives:

Value the maritime operational considerations resulting from the sovereign right of
nations to limit the entry and movement of foreign forces within their territorial seas.
Analyze the operational challenges in asserting freedom of navigation and protection of
commerce on the maritime commons.
Analyze emerging legal issues surrounding freedom of navigation in disputed maritime
areas such as the Arctic, the Arabian Gulf, and the South China Sea.

C. Background:

For the operational planner, Factor Space is heavily influenced by international law
governing establishment of land, sea, and air boundaries. These boundaries directly impact
a military forces freedom of movement. For example, during the deterrent or pre-hostilities
phase of an operation, military forces typically respect the sovereign rights of nations
regarding their land territory, national waters, and national airspace.

135
 During the hostilities phase of an operation, when the Law of Armed Conflict governs
the situation, the movement of military forces may be conducted without regard to the
sovereign territorial rights of the enemy belligerent nation. However, the traditional
sovereign rights of other states (e.g., neighboring/neutral states) must, as a matter of law,
continue to be respected. Limitations on freedom of movement of forces within land, sea,
and air boundaries of such neighboring/neutral states must be factored into operational
planning. For instance, when navigation and over flight rights within another nations air and
sea space prove insufficient, operational planners must consider alternative routes or consider
notifying the State Department of the need to obtain access and transit agreements in order to
facilitate planned operations.
Freedom of movement in international waters and airspace is fundamental to
implementing U. S. national and military strategies. The legal basis for these navigational
freedoms is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This freedom
allows access to strategic areas of the world, facilitates support and reinforcement of
forward-deployed forces, enables U. S. and coalition forces to operate worldwide, and
ensures uninterrupted global commerce. During this lecture and associated readings the
rights of all nations in international waters and international airspace, as well as the limited
rights of coastal nations to exercise jurisdiction over some portions of the sea and airspace
adjacent to their coastline will be discussed.
Although UNCLOS has not been ratified by the U. S. Senate, all U. S. military
operations are, by Executive Order (EO), conducted in accordance with UNCLOS
delineation of rights and responsibilities. The EO, in place since 1983, is recognized as
depicting customary international law and reflects UNCLOS descriptions of various
maritime zones and boundaries and such areas associated states rights and responsibilities.
Since the EOs enactment, the United States has actively exercised and asserted U. S.
navigation and over flight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis. The U. S. does so in a
manner consistent with the balance of sovereignty and interests reflected in UNCLOS
through the Freedom of Navigation Program (FONOPS). Moreover, pursuant to the EO, the
United States under President Ronald Reagan (Statement on United States Ocean Policy, 10
March 1983) asserted it will not acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to
restrict the lawful rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation, over
flight, and other related high seas uses.

The point of contact for this session is Captain Robert A. Sanders, LP.D, JAGC, USN, C-
424.

D. Discussion Topics:

What sovereign rights does a nation have regarding its land territory, territorial sea and
national airspace, and how does this affect the movement or operation of foreign military
forces in these zones?

What are the distinctions between innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea-lane
passage, and high seas freedoms of navigation? How, if at all, are military planning and
operations affected by the various legal regimes of oceans and airspace?

136
How can operational planners use the concepts of belligerent control of the immediate area of
operations, maritime / air warning zones, and blockade to assist mission accomplishment?

To what extent may the military operations of a belligerent nation be conducted within the
land territory, national airspace and national waters of a neutral or non-belligerent nations?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

Guangqian, Major General (Ret) Peng, Peoples Liberation Army, Chinas Maritime Rights
and Interests, in Military Activities in the EEZ, A U. S.-China Dialogue on Security
and International Law in the Maritime Commons, Vol. 7 Naval War College, China
Maritime Studies Institute (December 2010), 15-22. (NWC 1150).

Pedrozo, Raul Pete, The Bull in the China Shop and Rising Tensions in the Asia Pacific
Region. Naval War College, International Law Studies, 90 66. (2014). (NWC 1205).

U. S. Department of Defense, General Counsel. DoD Law of Warfare Manual, 2015. Scan
Chapter XIII, Naval Warfare. (NWC 1208).

U. S. Department of the Navy. Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, The Commanders

Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. July, 2007. Scan Chapters 1-5. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Reading:

Garamone, George. [CJCS General] Dempsey Urges Ratification of Law of the Sea
Convention. Armed Forces Press Service. May 9, 2012.
Available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116265.

Kraska, James and Brian Wilson, Combating Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Djibouti
Code and the Somali Coast Guard, Ocean & Coastal Management (2009).

Migdalovitz, Carol, Israels Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its
Aftermath, Congressional Research Service, (June 23, 2010).

United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea. 1983. Articles 1-25, 29-54, 86-111 and 121.

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138
 JMO-35

OPERATIONAL LAWUSE OF FORCE (Lecture)

Nothing in the present Chapter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.

UN Charter, Article 51

A. Focus:

This lecture continues the operational law portion of the Spruance Course curriculum.
Operational law is a broad term encompassing those facets of international law, U. S.
domestic law, U. S. military regulations and the domestic law of other nations impacting
military planning and operations. When planning and conducting military operations,
commanders and their subordinates must comply with the international law that governs (1)
the location of hostilities/extraterritoriality, (2) the legal basis for nations to use force and (3)
levels of lethality. This lecture is discussing both the jus ad bellum (a nations right to use
forceor go to war) and the jus in bello (the law of armed conflict during land, air, and naval
warfare); however it focuses on the former (the later receives direct attention in the follow-on
Rules of Engagement Seminar). Additionally, this lecture touches on legal issues arising
from modern use of force against non-state actors, during detainee operations, in
drone/UAV/RPV strikes, and in cyber operations among others. Session objectives are
considered in relationship and application to planning and executing U. S. military operations
and within the Department of Defenses mandate (DoDD 2311.1E) that all Members of the
DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such
conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations, especially those holding the
potential for use of force.

B. Objectives:

Describe the effect of international law on the planning and execution of military
operations.
Summarize the basic principles of the law of armed conflict for land, air, and naval
warfare.
Analyze emerging legal issues surrounding the law of armed conflict at the strategic and
operational levels of war.

139
C. Background:

International relations, both military and civilian, involve the application of

international law - senior military officers may encounter international law in both contexts.
For example, international law regulates such diverse activities as aviation safety,
communications, financial transactions, nautical rules of the road, and environmental
protection. Paramount in the military context is that along with domestic law derived from a
nations constitution, International law is the standard measurement for the legality of a
nations resort to use of force and application of the law of war under the rule of law during
conflict or operations short of war.
There are two primary sources of international law: state practice and international
agreements. When state practice attains a degree of regularity and is accompanied by the
general conviction among nations that such behavior in conformity with that practice is
obligatory; that practice it is said has risen to become a rule of customary law or customary
international law. Customary international law is binding upon all nations and exists without
a signed agreement (e.g., treaties or conventions).
Bilateral or multilateral formal agreements between and among nations are the
primary sources of international law, and many often restate customary international law
norms while adding additional material and considerations. Signed, formal agreements,
treaties or conventions come in multiple forms related and unrelated to the conduct of
hostilities. Significant conventions and treaties related to the conduct of hostilities include,
the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949; the UN Charter; the 1975
Declaration protecting persons from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment; the 1977 Additional Protocols (AP I and AP II) to the 1949
Geneva Conventions (I, II, III and IV); and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, and the
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of
Anti-personnel Mines (Ottawa Treaty), among others. Secondary sources of international
law include general principles of law, judicial decisions, and the writings of legal experts.
The UN Charter is the keystone publication for understanding the post-WWII
construct for a nations resort to use of force whether in accordance with the Charters
Article 51 (self-defense) or as authorized by a formal Resolution of the UN Security Council.
Other legal bases for use of force may include, but are not limited to, humanitarian
intervention to stop a genocide (R2P- responsibility to protect), protection of own nationals
abroad through non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) or the rescue of hostages taken
by terrorists or pirates.
The two legal regimes that may apply to a use of force are (1) International Human
Rights Law (IHRL) or (2) the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). LOAC (which is the current
preferred U. S. terminology) has been historically referred to as the Law of War; and today it
is often referenced by the international community as International Humanitarian Law or
IHL. Unlike the general body of IHRL, which the USG generally considers a peacetime
regime; IHL/LOAC is the specialized body of law directed at military members involved in
international armed conflict (IAC), non-international armed conflict (NIACs), and during all
U. S. military-executed counter-terrorism (CT) operations. The U. S. military generally uses
the terms IHL and LOAC consistent with guidance under the DoD Law of War (LOW)
Instruction and the 2015 DoD Law of War Manual.

140
 Additional and slightly different language on the same subject is found under the
International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (ICRC) definition. The
DoD instruction on LOW definition says,

Law of War. That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed
hostilities. It is often called the law of armed conflict. The law of war
encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the
United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international
agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary
international law.

The ICRC definition states, International humanitarian law is a set of rules which
seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict [it] protects persons
who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and [it] restricts the means and
methods of warfare unless stated otherwise. This set of laws is represented, among other
places, in Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The U. S. militarys Law of War Doctrine does not consider most human rights law
extraterritorial, i.e., these laws are within a legal regime that generally does not apply across
nation state borders. The U. S. view on the application of human rights in armed conflict is:
in international armed conflict, only the customary law of human rights applies; in NIAC,
both customary and treaty law (to which the U. S. is a party) apply, but this application is
subject to the doctrine of lex specialis (law governing a specific subject matter). Under lex
specialis, when there is a conflict between the two sources of law (IHL/LOAC and IHRL),
the LOAC rule (the specialized law) is followed. Likewise, things in the conflict zone, not
germane to the fight (the right to marry or to vote, for example) would generally by governed
by IHRL.
In contrast, the U. S. does consider LOAC to have extraterritorial application, i.e., it
applies globally at all times to military forces during armed conflict and is the law primarily
applicable during international military combat operations. Definitely, it is that part of
international and domestic law regulating the conduct of armed hostilities under the jus in
bello construct. LOACs extraterritorial application is based on domestic policy, international
custom and practice, and international agreements or conventions and shows up in execution
as the rules of engagement followed by forces in the field.
There are three general principles of LOAC: military necessity, proportionality, and
humanity. Military necessity allows a belligerent to apply force to achieve legitimate military
objectives. Proportionality means the degree of force used must be no greater than necessary
(i.e., minimally necessary) and required (i.e., proportional) to the prompt realization of those
legitimate military objectives sought to be obtained. Humanity forbids the infliction of
suffering, injury, or destruction not actually necessary to accomplish legitimate military
purposes (i.e., not militarily necessary and/or not proportional). LOAC also requires, for
example, that belligerents distinguish as much as reasonably possible between combatants
and noncombatants when targeting the enemy; and for combatants to do the same and
separate from non-combatants when in a position to be engaged by opposing forcesthis is
known as the principle of distinction.

141
 Finally, LOAC is consistent with Principles of War, such as objective, mass, and
economy of force. LOAC and the previously discussed Principles of War stress the
importance of directing force against critical military targets, while avoiding the waste of
resources against objectives that are militarily unimportant. LOAC also enhances legitimacy
and facilitates restraint; both of which are principles of Joint Operations.

The point of contact for this session is Captain Robert A. Sanders, LP.D, JAGC, USN, C-
424.

D. Discussion Topics:

Why do nations care about international law when deciding whether or not to use force?
What motivates them to comply with its provisions?

Describe the role of the UN Security Council (UNSC) regarding the use of force against a
nation or non-state actors.

What are the requirements to be a lawful combatant; to be a non-combatant/civilian? What is

an unlawful (or unprivileged) combatant?

To what extent does the law of armed conflict apply across the spectrum of conflict?
Across this spectrum of conflict are criminals, unlawful combatants, or violent extremist
organizations (VEOs) subject to the same or different treatment?

How has the law of armed conflict changed, if at all, during the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan? Is it different for combating ISIL?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

Schmitt, Michael N. Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of

International Law, Volume 52, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Read pp.
77- 112. (NWC 1206).

United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations. June 26,1945. Scan (Relevant articles:
pp. 12, 23 [1963 text], 2425, 27 [1963 text], 3334, 3643, 4546, 4849, 5153).
(Contained within the Law of War Documentary Supplement, pp. v-vi; 1-8).
(NWC 1008A).

United States Congress, Joint Resolution, Authorization for Use of Military Force [AUMF]
Public Law. 107-40 [S.J. RES. 23], September 18, 2001. (NWC 1198).

142
U. S. Department of the Navy. Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, The Commanders
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. July 2007. Scan Chapter 5 and Chapters, 8
12. (Issued).

White House Fact Sheet: U. S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in
Counterterrorism Operations outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,
May 23, 2013. (NWC 1085).

G. Supplementary Reading:

OPLAW Overview

General Counsel, U. S. Department of Defense. DoD Law of Warfare Manual. June 12,
2015. Table of Contents. (NWC 1208).

Protection and Treatment of Combatants/Non-combatants

Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection
of Victims of War. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, August 12, 1949, Articles 13-26 and 47-88. (Contained within the Law of War
Documentary Supplement 238-240 and 244-251).

__________. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949,
Articles 1-42. (Contained within the Law of War Documentary Supplement 199-208),
111.

United States Congress, Joint Resolution. Affirmation of Authority of the Armed Forces of the
United States to Detain Covered Persons Pursuant to the [AUMF], NDAA FY2012,
Public Law. 112-81, 1021, December 31, 2011.

Emerging Legal Issues

Dunlap, Major General (Ret) Charles J., Jr. Lawfare Today . . . and Tomorrow, in
International Law and the Changing Character of War 87, Naval War College. (2011).

Hsu, Kimberly and Craig Murray. The U. S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, China and International Law in Cyberspace, 6 May 2014.
http://www.uscc.gov/Research/china-and-international-law-cyberspace.

Koh, Harold Hongju. International Law in Cyberspace USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency

Legal Conference, Ft. George G. Meade, MD (September 18, 2012).
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm

143
 Use of Force

Koh, Harold Hongju. State Department Legal Advisor. The Obama Administration and
International Law Annual Meeting American Society of International Law (ASIL),
(March 25, 2010), Read Subsection III. B., The Law of 9/11
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.

__________. Statement Regarding Use of Force in Libya Annual Meeting ASIL, (March
26, 2011), http://www.asil.org/am11/pdfs/haroldkoh/2011_Libya_Harold
_Koh_ASIL_Remarks.pdf.

War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. 1541-1548.

144
 JMO-36

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES (Seminar)

Don't Fire Till You See the Whites of Their Eyes.

General Israel Putnam or

Colonel William Prescott, Bunker Hill, 1775

A. Focus:

This seminar provides the opportunity to apply the fundamental concepts introduced
in previous operational law sessions to multiple real-world, Rules of Engagement (ROE)
scenarios. The 2015 U. S. National Military Strategy says, We now face multiple,
simultaneous security challenges from traditional state actors and transregional networks of
sub-state groups all taking advantage of rapid technological change. Future conflicts will
come more rapidly, last longer, and take place on a much more technically challenging
battlefield the application of the military instrument of power against state threats is very
different than the application of military power against non-state threats. This ROE section
is designed to enhance understanding of how legal, political, and military considerations
factor into ROE development as well as ROE-related issues that might arise during coalition
operations. Finally, this session focuses on the commanders role in promulgating and
reviewing ROE and responding to apparent ROE/LOAC violations.

B. Objectives:

Understand the basic principles underlying the use of force in self-defense.

Understand the principles behind the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and the
distinction between conduct-based ROE and status-based ROE.
Understand the distinction between SROE and the Standing Rules for the Use of Force
(SRUF).
Examine ROE development in the planning process and understand the process by which
modifications to ROE are obtained from higher authority.
Understand the role of political, legal, and military personnel in the formulation of ROE.
Discuss the role of the commander upon learning of an apparent ROE violation.
Understand the implications of working with coalition forces and their likely different
ROE.

C. Background:

J. Fred Buzhardt, then DoD General Counsel wrote a letter to Senator Edward
Kennedy dated 22 September 1972 (and reprinted in American Journal of International Law
145
(AJIL) 124 (1973) stated: With reference to your inquiry concerning the rules of
engagement governing American military activity in Indochina, you are advised that rules of
engagement are directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States Forces will initiate and/or continue
combat engagement with the enemy. These rules are the subject of constant review and
command emphasis. They are changed from time to time to conform to changing situations
and the demands of military necessity. One critical and unchanging factor is their conformity
to existing international law as reflected in the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, as well as with the principles of customary international law of which
UNGA [United Nations General Assembly] Resolution 2444 (XXIII) is deemed to be a
correct restatement.
Students will be work through various situations using short factual scenarios, videos
and other media depicting real world events and dramatic presentations, during which
mission specific ROE and the SROE have been applied. Students will be asked to identify
ROE issues and critique the efficacy of the ROE as well how the military forces involved
interpreted and applied the ROE/SROE.

The point of contact for this session is Captain Robert A. Sanders, LP.D, JAGC, USN; C-
424.

D. Discussion Topics:

Who has a role in crafting ROE for a particular mission and why?

How does a joint force and/or a coalition force draft and apply ROE for given operations?
What unique ROE issues arise in coalition operations? What methods to resolve?

What is Positive Identification (PID) and what ramification does the requirement for PID
have on US forces/ coalition forces?

Describe methods a planning staff can employ to obtain mission specific ROE. How do you
draft and seek supplemental ROE?

Who in the chain of command should have/does have the authority to determine hostile
intent? Who has the authority to take lethal measures when faced with hostile intent?

In asymmetric warfare what, if any, proactive measures can forces take to assist in
determining hostile intent at sea and on the ground?

What considerations impact a commanders actions when he/she becomes aware of potential
violations of the ROE and/or the Law of Armed Conflict?

What role do tactical Directives play vis--vis ROE? Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) examples?

146
E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

CFLCC Operation Iraqi Freedom ROE Card, 31 Jan 03. (NWC 5011).

Department of Defense DOD Directive 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program,

May 9, 2006 Incorporating Change 1, November 15, 2010 Certified Current as of
February 22, 2011, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101e.pdf
(NWC 1185).

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Direct Participation in Hostilities:

Questions and Answers, (June 2 2009), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/direct-participation-ihl-faq-
020609.htm. (NWC 3072).

McNeal, Gregory S. "The bin Laden Aftermath: Why Obama Chose SEALs, not Drones,"
Foreign Policy (May 5, 2011), available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/
2011/05/05/the_bin_laden_aftermath_why_obama_chose_seals_not_drones.
(NWC 3160).

U. S. Naval War College. CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement and Rules for the Use of
Force. Extracts from CJCS Instruction 3121.01B. Review as required. (NWC
1062A).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (2015). National Military Strategy of the United States of
America. .

International Institute of Humanitarian Law. Rules of Engagement Handbook November

2009. (NWC 3091). (Scan examples of mission specific supplemental ROE.)

International Security Assistance Force. News Release (2010) General Petraeus Issues
Updated Tactical Directive. (NWC 1073).

__________. CDR ISAF [General Allen] Tactical Directive (November 30, 2011). (NWC
1090).

Joint Publication 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations, 17 August 2011, Chapters II
(Legal Support to Joint Operational Planning) and III (Legal Support to JTF),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_04.pdf.

147
Rules of Engagement movie (1) courtroom scene; (2) combat scene:
(1) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BcBJbgJf69A
(2) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fp7ihY2aAaY

U. S. Department of Defense, General Counsel, DoD Law of Warfare Manual. June 12,
2015. Scan. Table of Contents. (NWC 1208)

148
 JMO-37

OPERATIONAL LAW CASE STUDY (Seminar)

You will usually find that the enemy has three courses open to him, and of
these he will adopt the fourth.

Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, the Elder

A. Focus:

This seminar provides the opportunity to apply operational law from the courses prior
OPLAW sessions and readings to a real world maritime conflict and to discuss how
operational commanders derive authorities for action and force employment within the
context of specific military operations.

B. Objectives:

Analyze the Law of the Sea and Laws of Armed Conflict as pillars upholding and
restraints binding a Commanders development of an operational idea into an operational
design that is executed across the range of military operations.
Apply the CJCS SROE and The Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations in a factual context involving employment of military forces.
Evaluate the evolution of the operational authorities for employment of force during the
Iran-Iraq Tanker Wars (1980-1988).

C. Background:

See JMO Sessions 34, 35, and 36.

The point of contact for this session is Captain Robert A. Sanders, JAGC, USN, C-424.

D. Discussion Topics:

Students will work individually to prepare short answers to assigned scenario

questions and then lead seminar discussion on their assigned questions.

E. Products:

An in-seminar discussion using a real-world case study and selected questions intended to
synthesize the concepts of operational law.

149
F. Required Reading:

U. S. Department of the Navy. Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, The Commanders

Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. July 2007. Review as required. (Issued).

U. S. Naval War College. CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement and Rules for the Use of
Force. Newport, RI: Extracts from CJCS 3121.01B. Review as required. (NWC
1062A).

Walker, George K. Selected Readings from The Tanker War, 198088, Law and Policy.
U. S. Naval War College International Law Studies, Volume 74 (2000), Edited by
CDR Dan Crouch. (NWC 3004B).

G. Supplementary Reading:

BBC video, Shooting down of Iran Air 655

Part 1 of 3: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Onk_Wi3ZVME
Part 2 of 3: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=50sYFs6p7lk
Part 3 of 3: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rgu5FNtpBzM

Cordesman, Anthony H. Iran, Oil, and the Strait of Hormuz, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) (March 26, 2007), available at
http://csis.org/publication/iran-oil-and-strait-hormuz (accessed June 24, 2015).

Council on Foreign Relations. Crisis Guide: Iran, CFR Website,

http://www.cfr.org/interactives/CG_Iran/embed.html (accessed June 24, 2015).

Grunawalt, Richard J. USS Vincennes (CG 49) and the shoot-down of Iranian Airbus Flt
655, NWC Internal Memorandum. (1992).

Islamic Republic of Iran Mission to the UN. Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran before the United Nations General
Assembly. (September 23, 2011), available at http://gadebate.un.org
/sites/default/files/gastatements/66/IR_en.pdf . (accessed June 24, 2015)

ONeil, William and Caitlin Talmadge. Costs and Difficulties of Blocking the Strait of
Hormuz. International Security 33, no. 3. (Winter 2008/09): 190198.

Talmadge, Caitlin. Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,
International Security 33, No. 1. (Summer 2008): 82117.

150
The President. Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General
Assembly (September 21, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/21/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-
assembly.

U. S. Department of Defense, General Counsel, DoD Law of Warfare Manual, 12 June 2015.
Chapter XIII-Naval Warfare. (NWC 1208).

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152
 JMO-38

U. S. NAVY ORGANIZATION
AND EMPLOYMENT (Seminar)

Tell the men to fire faster and not to give up the ship; fight her til she sinks!

Captain James Lawrence, USS Chesapeake,

1 June 1813 (War of 1812)

A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the United States Navy fights todays enemies while
preserving the operational agility necessary to respond to uncertain future crisis. As such,
this seminar will focus on the organization and employment of naval forces at the high-
tactical and operational levels of war. Highlights include roles, missions, core competencies,
operational concepts, doctrine, and considerations for employing Navy forces in a joint
environment. This session, in conjunction with other Service specific seminars, will broaden
the students comprehension of joint force employment across the range of military
operations in pursuit of national interests.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the roles and missions of the U. S. Navy and its contribution to the Joint
Force.
Understand how the U. S. Navy is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for
maritime and joint expeditionary operations in support of the Joint Force Commander
(JFC).
Know broad doctrinal service concepts guiding the employment of naval forces at the
high-tactical and operational levels of war.
Comprehend the Navys commitment to the Profession of Arms and the principal means
by which it achieves decentralized command and control; mission tactics.

C. Background:

This seminar is another opportunity for some students to critically examine specific U. S.
military capabilities. This session provides a foundational understanding of USN
organization and employment that students will use throughout the Spruance course.
Discussions of capabilities and employment considerations will support the Contemporary
Operations sessions by providing baseline knowledge of capabilities and doctrine to inform
future planners of potential contributions of the naval services for future operational
contingencies

153
The point of contact for this session Commander Daniel Caldwell, USN, C-414.

D. Discussion Topics:

What is the role for the U. S. Navy in todays strategic environment? Has it changed?

Describe how Navy forces organize Command and Control (C2) and how this construct fits
within the larger Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) and Joint Task Force (JTF)
constructs.

How are deployed Navy forces used to support geographic combatant commander theater
objectives?

Discuss how Mission Command works within the USN? How Desired Leadership Attributes
(DLAs) are applied within the USN?

Do the present capabilities of the Navy meet the requirements stated in its own strategic
guidance and doctrine?

E. Products:
None

F. Required Readings:

McManus, Mark. United States Navy Command and Control Organization. Newport, RI:
Naval War College, October, 2011. Scan. (NWC 5050).

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Forces/Capabilities

HandbookRead: Appendix C, Navy Composite Warfare
Commander (CWC) Concept. . (NWC 3153P). (Issued).

U. S. Navy, U. S. Marine Corps, U. S. Coast Guard. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U. S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
Guard. March 2015. Read pp. 1-2, 9-26. (NWC 2134).

United States Navy. Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 1: Naval Warfare. Government
Printing Office: Washington, D.C. March 2010. Read: pp. 33-35.

__________. Naval Operating Concept 2010 (NOC). Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office. 2010.

G. Supplementary Readings:
None.

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 JMO-39

U. S. MARINE CORPS ORGANIZATION

AND EMPLOYMENT (Seminar)

Every Marine has an individual responsibility to study the

profession of arms. A leader without either interest in or knowledge of the
history and theory of warfarethe intellectual content of the military
professionis a leader in appearance only. Self-directed study in the art
and science of war is at least equal in importance to maintaining physical
condition and should receive at least equal time. This is particularly true
among officers; after all, the mind is an officer's principal weapon.

Warfighting, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1

A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the Marine Corps fights todays enemies while
preserving the operational agility necessary to respond to uncertain future crisis. As such,
this seminar will focus on the organization and employment of Marine forces at the high-
tactical and operational levels of war. Highlights include roles, missions, core competencies,
operational concepts, doctrine, and considerations for employing the Marine Air Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) in a joint environment. This session, in conjunction with other Service
specific seminars, will broaden the students comprehension of joint force employment
across the range of military operations in pursuit of national interests.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the roles and missions of the U. S. Marine Corps and its contribution to the
Joint Force.
Comprehend how the U. S. Marine Corps is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train
for maritime and joint expeditionary operations in support of the Joint Force Commander
(JFC).
Comprehend broad doctrinal service concepts guiding the employment of Marine forces
at the high-tactical and operational levels of war.
Comprehend the Marine Corps commitment to the Profession of Arms and the principal
means by which the Corps achieves decentralized command and control; mission tactics.

155
C. Background:

Since its founding in 1775, the roles and missions of the Marine Corps have evolved
to meet the changing needs of the nation. Originally charged with security for naval stations
and ships-of-the-line, the Marine Corps grew to contribute major land formations during The
Great War (WWI). Throughout World War II, Marine aviators leveraging lessons from the
Banana Wars operated from Navy ships and provided close air support to Marine ground
units conducting amphibious operations in the Pacific. Today, the Marine Corps contributes
to the nations defense by providing an expeditionary force in readiness.
The Marine Corps organizes to provide rapidly deployable forces capable of
conducting expeditionary operations in any environment. In addition to maintaining the
Marine Corps unique amphibious capability, the operating forces maintain the capability to
deploy by whatever means is appropriate to the situation. Marine forces are organized
around a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), a scalable task-organized unit consisting
of ground, aviation, combat service support, and command elements. Although MAGTFs are
organized around base structures, for example the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB),
these organizations provide a combined arms force that a single commander can easily tailor
to most emerging situations.
Marine operating forces offer the JFC various options for employment. From forward
deployed ship-borne MAGTFs to self-sustaining units capable of operating hundreds of miles
inland. The Marine Corps provides unique capabilities for a variety of missions. The Marine
Corps ethos, heritage, and warfighting philosophy influence how the Marine Corps
organizes, trains, equips, and employs its operating forces. Concepts such as maneuver
warfare, decentralized command and control, and a bias for decision making at the lowest
level permeate the Marine mindset. Even well-known watchwords such as innovate, adapt,
and win are more than simple slogans, and they underpin the Marine Corps approach to
crisis, conflict, and war.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel Jason P. Brown, USMC, C-403.

D. Discussion Topics:

Describe the roles and mission of the United States Marine Corps.

Discuss the versatility, flexibility, scalability, combined arms capability, types, deployment/
employment considerations, and limitations of MAGTFs.

Describe how Marine forces are used to support the Joint Force Commander and functional
components (Joint Force Maritime Component, Joint Force Land Component, and so forth).

Discuss the enduring principles that define the identity of Marines and the Marine Corps.

Discuss how the Desired Leadership Attributes (DLAs) are applied within the Marine Corps.

156
Describe how Mission Command, commonly referred to by Marines as mission tactics or
mission orders, works within the Marine Corps.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Service Brief (USMC) Video on USNWC Blackboard. View.

United States Marine Corps. 36th Commandants Planning Guidance. Washington, D.C.:
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 23 January 2015. Read pp. 4-12. (NWC 1147).

__________. Expeditionary Force 21. Forward and Ready: Now and in the Future.
Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 4 March 2014. Read pp. 4-15.
(NWC 4048).

__________. Warfighting. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1. Washington,

D.C.: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1997. Read: pp. 53-58, 71-90, 93-96.

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Forces/Capabilities

Handbook. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2014. Scan pp. 69-84. (NWC
3153P). (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Benes, Thomas A. The Corps Return to the Sea, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 139,
no. 11, (November 2013): 42-46.

Clancy, Tom, Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit. New York, Scribner,
1996.

Gatchel, Theodore L. At the Waters Edge: Defending Against the Modern Amphibious
Assault. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996.

Krulak, Lieutenant General Victor H. First to Fight. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1999.

Lejeune, Major General John A., Commandant of the Marine Corps. Relations between
Officers and Men. Marine Corps Order No. 29. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters
U. S. Marine Corps, 14 August 1920.

OConnell, Aaron B. Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps. Boston, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2012.

157
Ricks, Thomas E. Making the Corps. New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 2007.

U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Expeditionary Operations. Marine Corps Operations.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters
U. S. Marine Corps, 2011. Read 1-1 1-5, 1-13 1-17, 2-1 2-23.

__________. Command and Control. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 6.

Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1997.

U. S. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Desired Leader Attributes for Joint
Force 2020. CJCS Memorandum, CM-0166-13, June 28, 2013.

Vandergrift, General Alexander A., Commandant of the Marine Corps. Bended Knee.
Speech. Presented to the U. S. Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, Washington,
D.C. 6 August 1946.

158
 JMO-40

U. S. COAST GUARD ORGANIZATION

AND EMPLOYMENT (Seminar)

The U. S. Coast Guard is a shining example of how well a Federal

agency can perform with its flexibility, speed, and expertise.

Representative Russ Carnahan, (D-Missouri)

A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the USCG operates in today joint environment while
preserving the operational agility necessary to respond to uncertain future crisis. As such,
this seminar will focus on the organization and employment of USCG forces both within the
joint community and domestic security and support. Highlights include roles, missions, core
competencies, operational concepts, and considerations for employing the USCG forces in a
joint environment. This session, in conjunction with other Service specific seminars, will
broaden the students comprehension of joint force employment across the range of military
operations in pursuit of national interests.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the roles and missions of the USCG and its contribution to the Joint Force.
Comprehend how the USCG is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for maritime
and joint expeditionary operations.
Comprehend broad doctrinal service concepts guiding the employment of USCG forces
at the high-tactical and operational levels of war.
Comprehend the USCGs commitment to the Profession of Arms and the principal means
by which it achieves decentralized command and control; mission tactics.

C. Background:

This session provides a foundational understanding of U. S. Coast Guard capabilities that

students will use throughout the Spruance course. A discussion of mission and capabilities
provides baseline knowledge of capabilities and doctrine to inform future planners of potential
contributions of these services for future operational contingencies. The Coast Guard is an
armed service that has participated in every American war since its inception. Although
multi-mission in nature and charged with significant responsibilities in such diverse areas as
maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, pollution response and maintaining an aids to
navigation system, Coast Guard forces provide military capabilities in support of the national
military strategy. In recent combat operations, Coast Guard forces provided to Joint Force
Commanders maritime interception operations, port operations and security, coastal sea
159
control and other mission sets where the smallest U. S. services expertise can add value. As
part of the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard functions as the lead federal
agency for maritime homeland security and plays a supporting role for maritime homeland
defense. While this new emphasis on homeland security has placed increasing demands on
an already over-extended service, the Coast Guard has garnered increasing political support
from involvement in 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina.

The point of contact for this session Captain Andy Norris, USCG, SP-214.

D. Discussion Topics:

Discuss the roles of the USCG in todays strategic environment. What are the Services
strengths and weaknesses in the joint operations arena? How is it organized?

Describe/discuss how deployed forces from the USCG are used to support geographic
combatant commander (GCC) theater objectives.

How might the Coast Guard's unique authorities and capabilities be leveraged in support of
joint military or interagency operations?

Discuss how Desired Leadership Attributes (DLAs) are applied within the USCG.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

U. S. Department of Homeland Security. White Paper on the U. S. Coast Guard, Safety,

Security and Stewardship Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 2013.
Read pp. 1-9. (NWC 4104).

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Forces/Capabilities

Handbook. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2014. Scan pp. 125-141. (NWC
3153P). (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:
None.

160
 JMO-41

U. S. ARMY ORGANIZATION
AND EMPLOYMENT (Seminar)

[Y]ou may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize
it and wipe it clean of lifebut if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep
it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions
did, by putting your young men into the mud.

T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War

A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the Army contributes to the Joint Force while preserving
the operational agility necessary to respond to future crisis. This session focuses on the
organization and employment of Army forces at the high-tactical and operational levels of
war. Highlights include roles, missions, core competencies, operational concepts, doctrine,
and considerations for employing Army forces in a joint environment. This session, in
conjunction with other Service specific sessions, will broaden the students comprehension of
joint force employment across the range of military operations in support of national
interests.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the roles and missions of the U. S. Army and its contribution to the Joint
Force.
Comprehend how the U. S. Army is organized to plan, execute, and sustain, operations in
support of the Joint Force Commander (JFC).
Comprehend broad doctrinal service concepts guiding the employment of Army forces at
the high-tactical and operational levels of war.
Comprehend the Armys principal means by which it achieves decentralized command
and control; mission tactics.

C. Background:

This seminar is the first formal opportunity for the students to examine critical
capabilities and employment considerations for of the U. S. Army. The session will serve as a
foundation for understanding how the Army thinks and operates, as well as how it arranges
and provides forces and capabilities to a joint commander.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel Anthony New, USA, C-411.

161
D. Discussion Topics:

What is the role of the Army in todays Joint Force? What does Army doctrine say it is?

Describe the operating concept for the Army.

What are the Armys primary formations at the operational and tactical levels of war? Are
these formations still relevant to todays operational environment? Why or why not?

How does the Army integrate and leverage joint force capabilities to support and sustain
Army operations?

Discuss how Mission Command works within the Army.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

U. S. Army. The Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1. Washington, D.C.:

Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 2012. Read pp. 1-1 thru 1-8.

__________. Unified Land Operations, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0.

Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2011. Read pp.
1-6.

__________. U. S. Army Operating Concept. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters

Department of the Army, October 2014. Read pp. 7-10, 16-25. (NWC 4107).

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Reference Guide, Forces/
Capabilities Handbook. Newport, RI: Naval War College, June 2014. Scan pp. 32-68.
(NWC 3153P). (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Blackboard Video on Army Capabilities.

162
 JMO-42

U. S. AIR FORCE ORGANIZATION

AND EMPLOYMENT (Seminar)

If we are not able to gain and maintain air superiority which is

not a given and its not easy if we were unable to do that in a future
conflict . . . then everything about the way the United States Army and the
United States Marine Corps fight on the ground would have to change.
What they buy, how they train, maybe even who they recruit. This is a
foundational element of the use of airpower and of joint warfighting.

General Mark A. Welsh III,

Air Force Chief of Staff

A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the United States Air Force (USAF) fights todays enemies
while preserving the operational agility necessary to respond to uncertain future crises. As
such, this seminar will focus on the organization and employment of United States Air Force
forces at the high-tactical and at the operational levels of war. Highlights include roles,
missions, core competencies, operational concepts, doctrine, and considerations for
employing U. S. Air Force forces in a joint environment. This session, in conjunction with
other Service specific seminars, is intended to broaden the students comprehension of joint
force employment across the range of military operations in pursuit of national interests.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the roles and missions of the USAF and its contribution to the Joint Force.
Comprehend how the USAF is organized to plan, execute, and sustain joint expeditionary
operations in support of the Joint Force Commander (JFC).
Comprehend broad doctrinal service concepts guiding the employment of USAF forces at
the high-tactical and operational levels of war.
Comprehend the USAFs commitment to the Profession of Arms and the principal means
by which it achieves decentralized command and control.

163
C. Background:

This seminar is an opportunity for the students to examine specific capabilities and
organization of the U. S. Air Force. This session will support the Spruance Course
curriculum by providing baseline knowledge of Air Force capabilities and doctrine,
informing students about what the USAF contribute, to operations throughout the spectrum
of conflict.

The point of contact for this session Colonel Adrian Schuettke, USAF, C-412.

D. Discussion Topics:

What are some of the core capabilities of the USAF?

Discuss the role of the USAF in todays strategic environment. How is the Air Force
organized?

Describe how deployed USAF forces are used to support geographic combatant commander
(GCC) theater objectives.

What deployment model does the Air Force use to provide air and space forces to combatant
commanders or subordinate joint force commanders for employment?

What are the roles and responsibilities of a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)
and the Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE)?

Discuss how Desired Leadership Attributes (DLAs) and Mission Command are applied
within the USAF.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

U. S. Air Force Doctrine Center. Air Force Doctrine Volume 1 Basic Doctrine (Extract).
Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, AL. 27 February 2015. Read pp. 1-23.

__________. Air Force Doctrine Volume 3 Command (Extract). Air Force Doctrine
Center, Maxwell AFB, AL. 5 June 2013. Read pp. 1-28.

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Forces/Capabilities

Handbook. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2014. Scan. pp. 85- 124.
(NWC 3153P). (Issued).

164
Welsh, Mark A. General. Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power for America, Air &
Space Power Journal, April 2014. Read p 4-10. (NWC 4102).

G. Supplementary Readings:

U. S. Air Force. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-0, Operations and Planning. Air Force
Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, AL. 5 August 2015.

__________.Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-04, Counter sea Operations. Air Force Doctrine
Center, Maxwell AFB, AL. 7 November 2014.

_________. Air Force Pamphlet 11-403, Air Mobility Planning Factors. Headquarters, Air
Mobility Command (AMC/A3XP), Scott AFB, IL. 12 December 2011.

U. S. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Desired Leader Attributes for Joint
Force 2020. CJCS Memorandum, CM-0166-13, June 28, 2013.

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 JMO-43

U. S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT (Seminar)

The environment in which we find ourselves has changed. Instead of

traditional nation-state conflict, both USSOCOMs and USSOFs assigned
missions are predominantly focused on addressing the non-state or
transnational violent extremist threat.

Admiral Eric Olson, USN,

Former Commander, USSOCOM

A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the Special Operations Forces (SOF) contribute to the Joint
Force while preserving the operational agility necessary to respond to uncertain future crisis.
As such, this seminar will focus on the organization and employment of SOF forces at the
high-tactical and operational levels of war. Highlights include roles, missions, core
competencies, operational concepts, and considerations for employing SOF in a joint
environment. This session, in conjunction with the Service specific seminars, will broaden
the students comprehension of joint force employment across the range of military
operations in pursuit of national interests.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the roles and missions of the SOF and its contribution to the Joint Force.
Comprehend how the SOF/U. S. Special Operations Command organized to plan,
execute, and sustain operations in support of the Joint Force Commander (JFC).
Comprehend broad doctrinal service concepts guiding the employment of SOF at the
high-tactical and operational levels of war.
Comprehend the SOFs commitment to the Profession of Arms and the principal means
by which it achieves decentralized command and control; mission tactics.

C. Background:

This session provides a foundational understanding of U. S. Special Operations Forces

capabilities that students will use throughout the JMO course. Discussions of capabilities will
support the Contemporary Operations sessions by providing baseline knowledge of capabilities
and doctrine to inform future planners of potential contributions of these services for future
operational contingencies. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small, specially organized
units manned by people carefully selected and trained to operate under physically demanding
and psychologically stressful conditions to accomplish missions using modified equipment
167
and unconventional applications of tactics against strategic and operational objectives in
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic,
informational and or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is
not broad conventional force requirement. Since the establishment of the U. S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987, SOF have been under the combatant command
of one unified commander and have been trained and equipped to conduct unilateral, joint
and combined special operations across the Range of Military Operations. SOF support the
geographic combatant commanders, U. S. ambassadors and their country teams, and other
government agencies. Additionally, USSOCOM is designated as the lead to synchronize
GWOT efforts across DoD. Each military service has established a major command to serve
as the service component of USSOCOM.

The point of contact for this session Captain Carl Tiska, USN, C-426.

D. Discussion Topics:

Describe the role of SOF. How is SOF organized? What are some of the future challenges
that SOF faces?

What capabilities does SOF provide national decision makers? What are some limitations of
SOF? In what ways can operational planners employ SOF to achieve GCC objectives?

U. S. Special Operations Command propounds five SOF Truths:

Humans are more important than hardware.

Quality is better than quantity.
Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced.
Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.
Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance

Discuss the relevance and applicability of these truths, particularly the fifth SOF Truth.

What are the advantages and disadvantages to employing SOF as compared to conventional
forces?

Discuss how Desired Leadership Attributes (DLAs) and Mission Command are applied
within SOF.

E. Products:
None.

168
F. Required Readings

Malvesti, Michele, To Serve the Nation-U. S. Special Operations Forces in an Era of

Persistent Conflict, Center for a New American Security, June 2010. Read pp. 4,
7-11. (NWC 1127).

__________. Policy Considerations in Combating Terrorism: Decision Making Under

Conditions of Risk and Uncertainty, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,
January 2012. (NWC 1129).

Thomas, Jim and Chris Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts-The Future of U. S. Special
Operations Forces, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013. Read
pp. 52-77. (NWC 1134).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special Operations. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-05. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 16 July 2014. Read pp. ix xv.

U. S. Special Operations Command. SOCOM Fact Book 2016. MacDill AFB: Tampa FL.
Scan pp. 1-60. (NWC 2120A).

G. Supplementary Readings:
None.

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170
 JMO-44

NAVY COMMAND AND CONTROL (Seminar)

We can never forget that organization, no less than a bayonet or an

aircraft carrier, is a weapon of war.

Congressman Bill Nichols, Hearings for the

Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, 1986

A. Focus:

This session addresses the Navys management of the Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander (JFMCC) organization, responsibilities, and command relationships.
It will provide an overview of the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) concept and construct.
Finally, it examines the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept and how this model
is organized to coordinates multiple warfare functions.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the factors of centralized and decentralized command and control to include
intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding that support the selection of a
specific command and control (C2) option.
Comprehend the organizational options, structures, and requirements available to the
JFMCC.
Comprehend the basic MOC structure and purpose.
Comprehend Navy Composite Warfare Doctrine, including the role of the Officer in
Tactical Command (OTC) and the OTC relationship to the CWC.

C. Background:

Command and control of maritime forces is shaped by the characteristics and

complexity of the maritime domain as well as the traditions and independent culture of the
naval service. In centralized command and control, all authority is concentrated in a single
commander and a single headquarters. Decentralized command and control relies on
subordinate commanders to execute operations independently but in accordance with a
thorough understanding of the commanders intent, and command by negation or mission
command. The selection of either a centralized or decentralized command and control option
depends upon the objective to be accomplished.
Naval command relationships are based on a philosophy of mission command
involving centralized guidance, collaborative planning, and decentralized control and
execution. With a long-standing practice of using mission-type orders, naval command and
control practices are intended to achieve relative advantage by leveraging Boyds OODA
171
Loop of observe, orient, decide, and act rapidly. Mission-type orders enable continued
operations in environments where communications are restricted, compromised, or denied,
allowing subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative, consistent with the higher
commanders intent.
The Joint Force Commander (JFC) will often designate a JFMCC to coordinate the
activities of maritime forces. In cases where the JFC does not designate a JFMCC, the JFC
may elect to directly task maritime forces. The JFC normally designates the forces made
available for tasking by the JFMCC, and delegates the appropriate command authority the
JFMCC will exercise over assigned and attached forces and maritime assets. Forward
deployed maritime force packages are normally comprised of units that train together prior to
deploying. These tailored force packages may include Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and
Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
The JFMCC will normally exercise operational control (OPCON) over assigned service
component maritime forces and either OPCON or tactical control (TACON) over attached
forces.
The JFMCCs staff is typically built from an existing service component, numbered
fleet, Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), or subordinate service force staff and then
augmented as required. If a Navy component or numbered fleet commander is designated as
the JFMCC, his or her existing staff or MOC will normally form the nucleus of the JFMCC
staff. In a maritime headquarters, two complementary methods of organizing people and
processes exist. The first is the doctrinal Napoleonic J-code structure, which organizes people
by the function they perform (i.e., intelligence, logistics). The second is a cross-functional
approach that organizes the staff into boards, centers, cell, and working groups. These
organizations manage specific processes or tasks that do not fit well under the J-code
structure and are best suited to those tasks that require cross-functional participation, such as
targeting, assessment, and information operations. The formalized addition of this cross-
functional network to the doctrinal J-code organizational structure is what constitutes the
MOC. The MOC can be thought of as a loosely-bound network of staff entities overlaying
the J-code structure. The MOCs focus is on operational tasks and activities rather than fleet
management or support and provides an organizational framework through which maritime
commanders may exercise operational level command and control. The MOC was
established to address shortfalls in the U. S. Navys ability to command and control at the
operational level of war. This MOC initiative focused on defining and developing operational
level headquarters with some degree of baseline commonality around the globe. The MOC
provides the framework from which Navy commanders at the operational level (Navy
Component Command, Numbered Fleet, and Joint/Combined Force Maritime Component
Command) exercise their command and control.
At the tactical level, command and control transitions to the Composite Warfare
Commander concept where the OTC is responsible for the tactical force deployment and
action. The OTC is the senior officer present eligible to assume command, or the officer to
whom the senior officer has delegated tactical command. The commander of a task
organization is its OTC when the organization is operating independently. The OTC also
designates a CWC to coordinate overall operations. Joint community understanding of these
command and control constructs is important when coordinating or working with maritime
forces. The OTC controls CWC and subordinate warfare commanders actions through

172
command by negation. Command by negation acknowledges that in many aspects of often
distributed and dispersed maritime warfare, it is necessary to pre-plan the actions of a force
to an assessed threat and delegate some warfare functions to subordinate commanders. Once
such functions are delegated, the subordinate commander is to take the required action
without delay, always keeping the OTC informed of the situation. The CWC orchestrates
operations to counter threats to the force, while the OTC retains close control of power
projection and specific sea control operations.

The point of contact for this session is Captain Edmund Hernandez, USN, C-402.

D. Discussion Topics:

Why is Mission Command a preferred method of Command and Control for Joint Maritime
Operations?

How is a JFMCC staff organized and what are its responsibilities?

Describe the MOC concept, its organization, and how the MOC construct differs from
traditional naval structures.

How does the CWC concept seek to minimize seams between various functional areas?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

McManus, Mark. United States Navy Command and Control Organization. Newport, RI:
Naval War College, October 2011. (NWC 5050). Read p. 1-13.

U. S. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Naval Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(NTTP) 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center. Washington, D.C.: GPO, April 2013.
Read p. 1-1 through 1-11 and p. C-1 through C-5.

__________. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-32, Maritime Operations at the

Operational Level of War. October 2008 (with Ch/1). Washington, D.C.: GPO,
August 2010). Scan sections 7-1 through 7-17.

__________. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56, Composite Warfare Doctrine.

Washington D.C.: September 2010. Read Ch. 1 and 6, Scan Ch. 2.

U. S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0,
Washington, D.C.: CSJS, 20 August 2011. Read p. III-1 through III-19.

173
__________. Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations. Joint Publication (JP)
3-32, Washington D.C.: CJCS, 7 August 2013. Read p. II-1 through II-13.

Vego, Milan. Joint Operational Warfare, Theory and Practice. Newport, RI: U.S. Naval
War College, 2009. Read Operational Command and Control p. X-19 through X-
28. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Vego, Milan. Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge,
2009.

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Forces/Capabilities

Handbook. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2014. (NWC 3153P). (Issued).

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 JMO-45

LOGISTICS AND DEPLOYMENT (Seminar)

The war has been variously termed a war of production and a war of
machines Whatever else it is, so far as the United States is concerned, it is a
war of logistics. The ways and means to supply and support our forces in all
parts of the world including the Army of course have presented problems
nothing short of colossal and have required the most careful and intricate
planning.

Admiral Ernest King,

Operation WATCHTOWER, 1942

A. Focus:

This session provides an overview of the operational function logistics, combined with an
introduction to the deployment process, which are critical for success in operational art.
This seminar session will include analysis and discussion of the imperatives of logistics, and
examine the Navys fleet and Joint Force Maritime Component Commanders role in
planning, coordinating, and synchronizing joint and maritime logistics and strategic
deployment. This session follows a discussion of Naval Command and Control with
discussion of options for controlling logistics and deployment at the tactical and operational
levels of war, and includes consideration of logistics within the context of the operational
functions, particularly operational maneuver and fires. An overview of joint logistics
doctrine, concepts and principles will be included. This session will introduce the national
deployment system (strategic triad) through an examination of the organization and mission
of U. S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and its subordinate component
commands and their role in deploying joint forces in support of global contingencies.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend and describe the relationship among the elements of strategic, operational,
and tactical logistics functions, and understand the relationship of logistics relative to the
other operational functions and factors.
Comprehend and describe the definitions, authorities, and responsibilities for intra-theater
and inter-theater logistics support and sustainment.
Describe the elements of the strategic deployment triad, which focuses on transportation
and sustainment by land, sea and air.

175
 Analyze the role and perspective of the joint force and Maritime Component
Commanders in the importance of the logistics estimate in the planning process. Identify
and analyze specific logistics issues that must be addressed when conducting a logistics
estimate and how to apply them in the planning process for a strategic deployment and an
operation.
Evaluate and assess the commanders operational concept in its feasibility, sustainability
and responsiveness to achieve operational objectives.

C. Background:

Sustainment is one of the six joint functions and is the provision of logistics and
personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until mission
accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Deployment and distribution are combined
as one of the seven core joint logistics functions that also include supply, maintenance,
logistics services, operational contract support, engineering, and health services.
Note that as discussed in the seminar on Operational Functions (JMO-16), there are slight
differences in the terminology described by Professor Vego regarding his description of the
operational functions and the name of the operational functions described in Joint Doctrine.
For the purposes of this seminar, we will discuss logistics and sustainment within the same
broad category as those essential functions required to equip, sustain, support and deploy
joint and naval forces.
Logistics include all those supporting activities required to sustain a deployed force.
Strategic deployment includes the transportation of people, equipment, supplies, and other
commodities by land, sea, and air, to enable military force projection. Logistics concern the
integration of strategic, operational and tactical support efforts within the theater, while
scheduling the mobilization and movement of forces and material to support the joint force
commanders operational concept.
In setting the conditions for operational success, several component and joint force
commanders have said that the most important things to get right in their commanders intent
must include command & control, basing and sustainment (logistics). These concepts must
be feasible, sustainable, integrated and synchronized within the other operational functions,
and with respect to factors time, space and force. Further, they must consider strategic
deployment and distribution early and throughout the joint planning process, particularly due
to lead times required to source, prepare and deploy forces globally.
The ability of the U. S. military to successfully carry out its assigned tasks in support of
the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy depends greatly on its logistics
and deployment capabilities to deploy forces, equip, and sustain them in a theater of
operations in a timely manner. The operational commander must have a clear understanding
of the capabilities and limitations of the strategic deployment and distribution processes to
execute a major operation or campaign successfully. Force selection, phasing of operations,
and risk assessment are directly tied to the ability to project forces and logistics to the area of
responsibility, area of operation, or theater of war and, once deployed, sustain them over
time.

176
 Even though logistics are normally a service responsibility, the combatant
commander retains Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL) and must decide if and when
it is appropriate to exercise that authority. The Logistics portion of this session provides an
overview of the fundamentals of operational logistics to include the core logistics functions
and principles. It identifies logistics tools that enable the geographic combatant commander
to execute logistics responsibilities in the operational area. These tools include Directive
Authority for Logistics, Executive Agency (EA), lead service, Common User Logistics
(CUL), joint logistics boards, Acquisition Cross Service Agreements (ACSA), and
(multinational) coalition/contract logistics.
The strategic deployment portion of this session focuses on the move the force
functional capability. While the Joint Staff J3 serves as the DOD joint deployment process
owner, USTRANSCOM serves as DODs Mobility Joint Force Provider, Single Manager for
Defense Transportation and Single Manager for Patient Movement. Their charter is to
maintain and operate a deployment system for orchestrating the transportation aspects of
worldwide mobility planning, integrating deployment-related information management
systems, and providing centralized wartime traffic management. Actual movement is
executed by USTRANSCOMs component commands: Military Surface Deployment &
Distribution Command (SDDCArmy), Military Sealift Command (MSCNavy), and Air
Mobility Command (AMCAir Force). The Department of Transportations Maritime
Administration (MARAD) bridges MSC, U. S. flag commercial carriers for sealift
procurement and operations.
In the initial steps of the deliberate planning process, the JTF staff develops CONOPs
along with task organization (Annex A) and a prioritized movement plan, communicated in
Annex A, Appendix 1, Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL). As the planning
process continues, the TPFDL is substantiated and codified as the TPFDD or Time Phased
Force Deployment Data. The TPFDD serves as the JTF commanders primary tool for
managing the flow of forces/ capability into the area of operations. The supported CCDR
reviews and validates the lift requirements within the specific TPFDD window and notifies
USTRANSCOM that the movement requirements are ready for lift scheduling. USTRANSCOM
uses the TPFDD to employ each leg of the Strategic Mobility Triad to project power. The
Strategic Mobility Triad consists of pre-positioned material, sealift and airlift.

Point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel Troy Rittenhouse, USA, C-404.

D. Discussion Topics:

Are logistics and sustainment the same/different? Where do logistics (sustainment) rank
against the other operational functions/joint functions? When should logistics be considered
during the planning process and why?

What are the Joint Force Commander or Naval Component Commanders options for
organizing and controlling operational logistics?

What tools are available to the combatant commander to balance joint logistics efficiency
and effectiveness? What are the advantages and disadvantages associated with those options?

177
What critical logistics issues must be properly addressed when planning joint operations and
why? How does the logistics estimate serve as a tool to facilitate critical logistics planning?

What are the major planning considerations of each leg of the strategic deployment triad?

How does the combatant commander or the JTF interface with USTRANSCOM? What is the
supported/supporting command relationship?

What are the major planning considerations facing operational planners in deploying a Force
to the theater of operations?

How does the JTF use the TPFDD to manage the movement of forces into the area of
operations?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. Operational Logistics Planning. Fort
Leavenworth, KS: March 2009. Read pp. 4-16 to 4-27. (NWC 3166).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Logistic Support of
Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 4-0. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 16 October,
2013. Read Executive Summary (ixxvi); Chapter I (all); Chapter II (II-1 to II-12);
Chapter III (III-1 to III-3; Scan remainder of chapter); Read Appendix B. Scan:
Appendices C, D, and E.

__________. Deployment and Redeployment Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-35.

Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 31 January 2013. Read Chapters I and III, Scan:
Appendices A & B.

__________. Joint Task Force Headquarters, Joint Publication (JP) 3-33. Washington, D.C.:
CJCS, 30 July 2012. Scan Executive Summary (xvi-xvii). Read Annex F to Appendix
A (A-F-1 through A-F-6), Checklist for Joint Task Force J-4.

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Reference Guide, Forces/
Capabilities Handbook. Newport, RI: Naval War College, June 2014. Read pp. 155-
170. (NWC 3153P). (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Akin, Mark W. and George L. Topic. Transforming Joint Operational-Level Logistics

Joint Force Quarterly Issue 47 (4th quarter 2007).

178
Creveld, Martin Van. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge,
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Eccles, Henry E. Logistics in the National Defense. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press,
1997.

Lynn, John A., ed. Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the
Present. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.

Mordente, Patrick, Paul Needham, Theodore Ogren, Logistics for the 21st Century
Deployment Distribution Center, Quick Fix or Long-Term Solution? Air Force
Journal of Logistics 3 No. 4 and 31 No. 1 (Winter 2006/Spring 2007).

Morgan, John. War Feeding War? The Impact of Logistics on the Napoleonic Occupation of
Catalonia. Journal of Military History No. 73 (January 2009): 83-116.

OHanlon, Michael E., The Science of War, Defense Budgeting, Military Technology,
Logistics and Combat Outcomes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Peterson, Mike W. Rapid Port Opening Elements - SDDCs newest units are logistics first
responders, TRANSLOG, The Journal of Surface and Deployment Distribution, (Fall
2009).

U. S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Naval Logistics. Naval Doctrine
Publication (NDP) 4. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, CNO, 20 February
2001.

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Deployment and Redeployment
Operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-35. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 7 May 2007.

__________. Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System. Joint Publication (JP) 4-
01, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 19 March 2003.

__________. Sealift Support to Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 4-01.2. Washington,
D.C.: CJCS, 22 June 2012. Read Chapter I. Scan Chapters III and IV.

U. S. Transportation Command. Understanding the Defense Transportation System.

Handbook 24-2. 6th ed. Scott AFB, IL: 30 January 2009.

Wade, Norman M., ed. The Sustainment and Multifunctional Logisticians Smartbook. 2d
Revised Edition. Lakeland, FL: The Lightning Press, 2009.

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180
 JMO-46

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR THE

MARITIME COMMANDER (Seminar)

By intelligence we mean every sort of information about the enemy and

his country the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.

Carl von Clausewitz,

On War, 1832

A. Focus:

Intelligence, as a discipline and an operational function, is essential to the successful

conduct of military operations in both peacetime and war. Intelligence operations are often
described as a high-demand/low-density enterprise, meaning requirements routinely outstrip
available resources. It is therefore imperative intelligence resources be utilized as efficiently
as possible and be driven by a clear set of priorities informed by commanders intent and
guidance. This will ensure limited resources are applied against the commanders most
pressing concerns.
This seminar focuses on the nature and principles of intelligence, the responsibilities
of both the joint force and maritime commander and the duties of the staff intelligence
officer/J2/N2, primarily at the operational level. In particular, this seminar will explore the
critical nature of the commanders relationship with the intelligence officer, and how
commanders priorities and Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) drive the intelligence
process to support operational decision-making. Additionally, the class will examine the
importance of the Intelligence Estimate and Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
(JIPOE), and how they support the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) and, in turn,
the Navy Planning Process (NPP).

B. Objectives:

Understand joint doctrinal terminology relating to intelligence, including the intelligence

process and associated intelligence functions.
Understand how the intelligence process is synchronized to support decision-making and
operational planning, specifically towards a more comprehensive understanding of the
adversary and the operational environment.
Examine intelligence organizations and operational-level integration.
Comprehend the roles and responsibilities of the commander and the intelligence officer
in the intelligence process at the operational level.
Assess how intelligence has been utilized - optimally or less so in historical context, to
determine enduring lessons and consider implications for future joint military and navy
planning and operations.
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C. Background:

History provides numerous examples of military and political leaders quests for
detailed information regarding their enemies. From Sun Tzu and Alexander the Great to the
present day, leaders thirst for information to help make informed decisions has only
increased with the progress of information technology. To this end, the United States has
developed, over time, an intelligence community of considerable scale and budget.
Beginning with personnel dedicated to intelligence duties in the Continental Army, to the
establishment of the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1882, military intelligence led the way to
more expansive national intelligence operations, namely the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS) during World War II. The OSS evolved into the first permanent peacetimeand
largely civilianintelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), following the
war. Since that time, dedicated intelligence departments and operations have proliferated
throughout the U. S. government. Currently there are 17 federal agencies with significant
intelligence sections that comprise the overall U. S. Intelligence Community (IC). As one of
the recommendations from the 9/11 Commission, and in an attempt to manage and
coordinate these intelligence operations optimally, Congress and President George W. Bush
established a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in 2004.
The IC covers a broad waterfront, from providing intelligence on a daily basis to the
President and key personnel in the National Security Council and cabinet, to informing the
theater-wide plans and operations of geographic combatant commanders, all the way down to
providing actionable intelligence at the tactical level. While agencies of the IC, guided by the
DNI, principally provide intelligence to national-level decision-makers, it is the Joint
Intelligence Officer (J2) who is responsible for providing intelligence to the Joint Force and
the N2 who is responsible for providing intelligence to naval forces. From the Joint Staff J2
at the national level, through Combatant Command J2s and Joint Task Force J2s at the
theater-strategic and operational level, to N2s at the operational and tactical levels,
operational intelligence plays a key role within the U. S. military. Operational intelligence
supports military strategy, theater-wide campaign plans, joint operations, maritime operations
and tactical actions in all domains.
To this end, operational intelligence has the key role of providing the commander and
staff a deep understanding of the operational environment and enemy (or potential enemy)
threat. This includes detailed predictive assessments of the enemy military forces, including
capabilities and intent, but extends further to include a wide range of environmental, cultural
and political factors that affect maritime, joint and multi-national operations. This process is
termed the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE). The
requirement for this wide-ranging assessment of the enemy and the operational environment
existed since the earliest days of intelligence.
Despite the considerable capabilities the U. S. Intelligence Community brings to the
joint force and maritime operations, they remain imperfect, and the conduct of intelligence
remains as much an art as a science. Intelligence has had its share of failures, both through
inaccuracy or even absence, which has had detrimental effects on some national policy
decisions and military operations. Even when intelligence is accurate, timely and predictive,
it has sometimes been poorly appreciated, or even disregarded, by both military and civilian
leaders, with corresponding ill effects on operations. It is therefore critical senior decision-

182
makers and staff planners alike be critical consumers of intelligence, partnering closely with
intelligence professionals and organizations to ensure the adversary and the operational
environment are as well analyzed and comprehended as possible before committing forces
and people to combat.

The point of contact for this session is Captain Fred Turner, USN, C-430.

D. Discussion Topics:

What is operational intelligence? How does it differ from strategic and tactical intelligence?

How is the intelligence process synchronized to support operational decision-making, as well

as joint and navy planning? What specific intelligence products does the J2/N2 bring to bear?

How does the intelligence officer at the operational level leverage the capabilities of the
intelligence community for military operations and tactical actions?

Intelligence must be driven by a clearly defined set of priorities to ensure limited resources
are applied against the most critical intelligence needs. What is the military decision-makers
role in defining these priorities? What are the characteristics of a critical consumer of
intelligence?

What are some of the intelligence challenges associated with multinational operations?

What is the relationship between intelligence officer and commander/decision maker?

What is the future of joint and maritime intelligence? What does the commander need to
make decisions in the likely operational environment of the future?

E. Products:

Students will lead a seminar discussion and critique optimal and sub-optimal uses of
intelligence through several case studies that present historical events from a variety of
perspectives and will determine potential commanders priority intelligence requirements for
U. S. naval forces in a fictional scenario.

F. Required Readings:

Flynn, Michael T. Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in

Afghanistan. Washington, D.C.: Center for New American Study. January 2010.
(NWC 2081).

Ford, Christopher A., and David A. Rosenberg. The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of
Reagans Maritime Strategy. Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (Apr 2005): 379-
409. (NWC 4141).

183
Jacoby, L. E. Operational Intelligence: Lessons from the Cold War. United States Naval
Institute, Proceedings 125, no. 9 (Sep 1999): 102-104. (NWC 4139).

Shuster, Richard. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department.

Intelligence, Leadership, and Decisive Victory at Midway. Newport, RI: Naval War
College, 2011. (NWC 2080).

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Table Top Exercise #3
PRC / Taiwan Vignette. Newport, RI: Naval War College. 2015. Read pp. 1-3. (NWC
4027E).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Intelligence, Joint Publication
(JP) 2-0. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 22 October 2013. Read Executive Summary and
Chapter III. Scan Chapters I, IV and V.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Hooker, Gregory. Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of Military
Assessments. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005.

Ilardi, Gaetano Joe. al Qaedas Operational Intelligence A Key Prerequisite to Action.

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31 (2008): 1072-1102. (NWC 2078).

Jones, Garrett. Working with the CIA, Parameters (Winter 200102): 22839.

Layton, RADM Edwin T. And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway Breaking the
Secrets. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

Mansoor, Colonel Peter R. and Major Mark S. Ulrich. Linking Doctrine to Action: A New
COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis, Military Review (September-October 2007): 21-
27.

Metz, Thomas F. OIF II: Intelligence Leads Successful Counterinsurgency Operations.

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 31, no. 3 (Jul-Sep 2005): 10-15.

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint and National Intelligence
Support to Military Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01. Washington, D.C.: CJCS,
7 October 2004.

________. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, Joint Publication

(JP) 2-01.3. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 21 May 2014.

________. Joint Task Force Headquarters, Joint Publication (JP) 3-33. Washington, D.C.:
CJCS, 30 July 2012.

184
Vego, Milan. Operational Intelligence. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice.
Newport, RI: Naval War College, reprint 2009.

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186
 JMO-47

INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND

CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS (Seminar)

The profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually

decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not the bodies of their men.

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart,

British Army

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is to develop an understanding of how Information and

Cyberspace may be used in the pursuit of military objectives and political ends in
contemporary conflict. Broadly speaking, all operations are in the end influence
operations. In other words, short of unconditional surrender military operations are
undertaken to influence an adversary to make a decision favorable to larger U. S. objectives.
As such, the integrated employment of informationrelated capabilities (IRCs) and
cyberspace operations is central to achieving the commanders objectives at every level of
warfare.
With the emergence of information as key terrain in modern warfare, how we use the
Information Environment (IE) and its contemporary subset cyberspace to inform, persuade,
and influence decision makers can be a key element of modern warfare. What moves
through cyberspace is information in the form of code (software) that is displayed as content
on graphic user interfaces of the electronics we use daily. Effectively using information
operations (IO) and cyberspace operations (CO) in support of objectives and ends will be
crucial enablers in future conflict; many of our current and potential adversaries clearly
understand this maxim.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the principles, strengths, and limitations of integrating information

operations and cyberspace operations into service and joint planning.
Comprehend how IO and CO are used to inform, persuade, and influence decision
makers across the spectrum of conflict.
Comprehend the relationships between lethal and non-lethal fires in developing IO and
CO objectives and tasks that support the Joint Force Commanders mission and
objectives.
Examine the use of cyber warfare in the pursuit of military objectives and political ends.
Comprehend the ability of cyberspace operations to achieve mass destruction and effects.

187
C. Background:

Understanding Information as an element of national and military power; how it is

moved, prioritized, analyzed and synthesized to support decision makers has been vital to
warfare throughout history. The confluence of information connectivity, content and
cognition combine to form the Information Environment (IE) a term of art in U. S. joint
doctrine. The IE is not new and is used by decision makers as data is collected and prioritized
to create information. That information is synthesized into knowledge that decision makers
leverage to make decisions. Information is also manipulated to influence friend and foe to
act in specific ways.
Cyberspace (much like the sea) is a domain in which humans maneuver in and
through to achieve objectives in the physical spaces where they live. What has changed in
the information age are the speed at which information moves around the world, its range,
and depth of penetration into society, and the continuous invention and adaptation of
electronics, software, and content for human and automated use. The speed, range, and depth
of the movement of information are made possible by the largely manmade domain of
cyberspace.
In what can be seen as the intertwining of cyberspace and human activity, the number
of humans utilizing cyberspace for commonplace activities (communication, navigation,
news, shopping, banking, entertainment, etc.) is rapidly accelerating. Examples of the scope
of global activity in cyberspace in the early 21st century include approximately 2.5 billion
internet users (or 33 percent of people on Earth); six billion mobile cellular subscriptions;
and more than 1 billion Facebook users. In fact the U. S. Department of Defense (DoD)
operates over 15,000 networks and more than seven millions edge devices (electronic
computing devices that provide entry points to move code and content around the internet).
Cyberspace is defined in US joint doctrine as a global domain within the information
environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology
infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks,
computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Joint Publication 3-13
Information Operations, characterizes IO as The integrated employment, during military
operations, of informationrelated capabilities (IRCs) in concert with other lines of
operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and
potential adversaries while protecting our own.
In an effort to bring together the concepts of cyberspace operations, information
operations, and warfare in the physical domains, the DoD has moved the lexicon of
cyberspace operations towards terminology that is recognizable to war fighters in all
domains. The constructs of Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO) and Defensive
Cyberspace Operations (DCO) were developed to standardize the terminology and allow war
fighters to better communicate across domains.
Code and content are clearly reshaping the operating environment as we continue to
intertwine cyberspace with nearly all aspects of life. Understanding how they move through
cyberspace and are used as force to inform, persuade, and influence decisionmakers and to
make electronics act independent of the owners intent will be fundamental to success in
twentyfirst century conflict. This session is intended as a foundation for understanding of
how IO and CO can be leveraged to achieve success across the spectrum of operations.

188
The point of contact for this session is Professor Dick Crowell, C-421.

D. Discussion Topics:

Can modern conflicts be won by the use of lethal operations alone? Explain your answer.

Why is information considered an element of national power?

Identify how joint force commanders can use information-related capabilities to inform,
persuade, and influence decision makers across the spectrum of conflict.

Can cyberspace be controlled? If so, what impact does that control have on operations in the
traditional domains of war? Can cyber control be disputed or denied? If so, provide some
examples.

What lessons for future operations can be drawn from both the Libyan government and the
opposition forces use of cyber technologies and information-related capabilities in the 2011
revolution?

Explain how potential adversaries might use cyber warfare against the United States or our
allies.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Crowell, Richard M. Some Principles of Cyber Warfare. Newport, RI: U. S. Naval War
College, Joint Military Operations Department, January 2014. Scan pp. 1-21; Read
pp. 22-39. (NWC 2160).

__________. War in the Information Age: A Primer for Information Operations and
Cyberspace Operations in 21st Century Warfare Newport: Naval War College,
January 2015 (NWC 2021D).

Fahrenkrug, David T. Countering the Offensive Advantage in Cyberspace: An Integrated

Defensive Strategy. NATO Center for Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, Tallinn,
2012. (NWC 2161).

Reilly, Robert R. Information Operations: Successes and Failures. Westminster Institute,

2013. (NWC 2163).

189
Scott-Railton, John. Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and Threats in the 2011
Libyan Revolution. CIWAG case study series 2013, eds. Richard Crowell, Marc
Genest, and Andrea Dew. Newport, RI: U. S. Naval War College, Center on Irregular
Warfare and Armed Groups, 2013. (NWC 3176).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-12R,
Cyberspace Operations. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 2013. Scan.

__________. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations. Washington, D.C.:

CJCS, Incorporating Change 1 November 20, 2014. Scan Executive Summary,
Chapters 1, and 2. Read Chapter 4.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Chisholm, Donald. The Risk of Optimism in the Conduct of War. Parameters 33, no. 4
(Winter 2003): 114131.

Crowell, Richard M. Analyzing Hybrid Warfare. Newport RI: Naval War College,
November 2014. (NWC 3084C).

__________. Hung on the Old Bridge like Slaughtered Sheep. Newport RI: Naval War
College, August 2009. (NWC 2074).

Darley, William M. Clausewitzs Theory of War and Information Operations. Joint Force
Quarterly. No. 40 (1st Quarter 2006): 7379.

Deibert, Ronald. Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace. Toronto: McClelland &
Stewart, 2013.

Dombrowski, Peter and Chris C. Demchak. Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime
Domain. Naval War College Review (Spring 2014).

Lamb, Christopher J. Information Operations as a Core Competency. Joint Force

Quarterly No. 36, (1st Quarter 2005): 8896.

Mullen, Michael G. Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics. Joint Force

Quarterly No. 55 (4th Quarter 2009): 2-4.

Olson, Parmy. We are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World of LulzSec, Anonymous, and the
Global Cyber Insurgency. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012.

Payne, Kenneth. The Media as an Instrument of War. Parameters 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005):
8193.

190
Schmitt, Michael N. Ed. The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Steele, Robert D. Information Operations: Putting the I Back in DIME. Strategic Studies
Institute. Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, February 2006.

U. S. Army. Bullets & Blogs New Media and the Warfighter. Center for Strategic
Leadership, U. S. Army War College and The SecDev Group, 2009.

Wald, Charles. New Thinking at EUCOM the Phase Zero Campaign. Joint Force
Quarterly No. 43 (4th Quarter 2006): 7275.

Warner, Michael. Cybersecurity: A Pre-history. Intelligence and National Security, 27:5,

(2012).

Woods, Kevin M. Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from
Saddams Senior Leadership. Suffolk, VA: Joint Center for Operational Analysis.
United States Joint Forces Command, 2006.

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 JMO-48

CONFLICT TERMINATION:
DEFEAT MECHANISMS AND CRITERIA (Seminar)

Planning for termination and post-conflict operations should begin

as early as possible. It must be an interagency, multinational, integrated
effort.

Professor William Flavin,

U. S. Army War College

A. Focus:

This session examines the termination of armed conflict at the operational level of
war. It focuses on how the successful application of defeat mechanisms can achieve
objectives and how termination criteria can ensure the continued military leverage recently
won through the defeat of enemy forces.

B. Objectives:

Understand how defeat mechanisms can aid in the destruction or capture of enemy forces.
Examine how termination criteria assist in the preservation of the advantages gained
through combat.
Analyze the relationship between defeat mechanisms and termination criteria in the
planning and execution of combat at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

The purpose of combat is to defeat armed enemies through the organized application
of force to kill, destroy, or capture by all means available. Defeat mechanisms and
termination criteria play a complementary role in ensuring military victory. The use of
defeat mechanisms enables a force to focus on what is necessary to compel the enemy to
surrender. According to Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, there are two basic
defeat mechanismsattrition and disruption. The former is the destruction of a forces
material capabilities while the latter is the destruction of a forces cohesive and coordinated
organization. Generally speaking, attrition is often seen as a more costly alternative to
disruption.
Defeat mechanisms are the methods used by forces to produce physical or
psychological effects in accomplishing objectives against enemy opposition. Commanders
then translate these effects into tasks to subordinate forces. Defeat mechanismswhich
include destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolateare often used in combination to
increase their effectiveness. The destruction of forces through lethal combat power can occur
193
with a decisive attack or in a series of actions over time. Dislocation compels the enemy to
react to a specific action in a way that places the enemy force in an unfavorable position.
Disintegration aims to degrade enemy capabilities through the disruption of command and
control, denying the enemy situational awareness. Isolation denies the enemy access to
capabilities in order to limit the enemys ability to conduct operations effectively or to
influence events on the battlefield.
The development of termination criteria is a critical step in the planning process.
These criteria are the conditions that must be met before the conclusion of an operation. In
the early stages of planning, it is incumbent upon commanders and their staffs to identify the
conditions that should exist in order to terminate military operations on terms favorable to the
victorious force. Not doing so could jeopardize the advantages gained through a successful
operation and place higher level objectives at risk. Termination criteria must be briefed to
Secretary of Defense to ensure the criteria are linked to the attainment of strategic end states.
The development and use of defeat mechanisms and termination criteria are critical to long-
term success.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Richard Shuster, C-422.

D. Discussion Topics:

How are defeat mechanisms employed to achieve objectives?

What is the role of a commander in developing termination criteria?

How can termination criteria facilitate the consolidation of victory and long term success?

What is the relationship between defeat mechanisms and termination criteria?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

Hecht, Eado. Defeat Mechanisms: The Rationale Behind the Strategy. Infinity Journal,
Volume 4, Issue 2, Fall 2014. (NWC 5060).

U. S. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System (JOPES). Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures. Washington, D.C.:
CJCS, 29 September 2006. Read B-13B-15.

__________. Joint Operation Planning. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, D.C.: CJCS,
11 August 2011. Read III-18 to III-20, pp. III-38 to III-44.

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G. Supplementary Reading:

Berdal, Mats R. Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the
Termination of Armed Conflicts. New York, Oxford University Press, 1996.

Boul, John R. Operational Planning and Conflict Termination Joint Force Quarterly Issue
29 (Autumn/Winter 20012002): 97102.

Cordesman, Anthony. Iraq and Conflict Termination: The Road to Guerrilla War?
Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 July 2003.

Fondaw, Jeffrey E. Conflict Termination: Considerations for the Operational Commander.

Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Paper, May 2001.

Guthrie, Colonel (USMC) John W. The Theater Commander: Planning for Conflict
Termination. Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, 2006.

Phinney, Catherine. Enhancing Conflict Termination through Problem Solving.

Peacekeeping & International Relations 26 (JanuaryFebruary 1997): 15-17.

Rotermund, Manfred K. The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities. Carlisle,
Barracks: U. S. Army Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999.

Soucy, Robert R., Kevin A. Shwedo, and John S. Haven II. War Termination and Joint
Planning. Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1995): 95101.

Tuck, Christopher. Conflict Termination in Iraq. RUSI Journal 149 (October 2004): 17-21.

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 JMO-49

STABILITY OPERATIONS (Seminar)

Stability Operations are a core U. S. military mission that the

Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency
equivalent to combat operations.

DoD Directive 3000.05

16 September 2009

A. Focus

This session will explore the important concept of stability operations. Recent
experiences in both Afghanistan and Iraq, along with U. S. military operations in Somalia,
Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo in the 1990s have clearly demonstrated that the U. S. military
must be prepared to conduct a wide range of operations. Many of these operations are found
at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, yet require just as much, if not more planning,
training, and preparation. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 of 16 September 2009
says that stability operations should be given the same priority as combat operations. Based
on the types of missions American forces might encounter in the next decade, stability
operations should be an area of study of high importance.

B. Objectives:

Understand the role of stability operations in the range of military operations and how it
fits into the planning for future operations.
Comprehend the joint phasing model where stability operations must be addressed in all
phases.
Comprehend the role of other U. S. governmental agencies in support of stability
operations.
Understand that planning for stability operations is as important as planning for combat
operations.
Understand the various lines of effort as they pertain to stability operations.

C. Background:

Throughout the history of the U. S. armed forces, the military has engaged in some
form of stabilization operation. Due to its role as an expeditionary force in the latter half of
the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the Marine Corps created the Small
Wars Manual to help focus military forces on operations in foreign lands before, during, and
after conflicts. Following the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II, the U. S.
military achieved great success restoring order to both nations.
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 The Cold War ushered in the new threat of the Soviet Union and the spread of
international communism. Not unreasonably, the U. S. military saw a conflict with the Soviet
Union as its greatest threat and prepared for a large scale conventional war. Consequently,
with the exception of a portion of the Vietnam War, the American military lost focus on post-
war stabilization activities. Peace operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo after the
end of the Cold War helped develop nation-building skills for some military personnel, but
were not considered an important or primary mission.
Operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq proved the essential role the U. S. military
plays in stability operations. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, published in
November 2005 and then again in September 2009, makes stability and reconstruction
operations a core mission for U. S. military forces. The current joint doctrine for stability
operations underwent multiple revisions based on lessons from both Iraq and Afghanistan.
This joint publication provides the functional lines of operations intended to guide planning
and execution and provides the basis for analyzing and planning stability operations. The
current joint publication follows closely along the lines of an interagency guideline published
the U. S. Institute of Peace in 2009. The two documents, however, describe the functions of
stability operations slightly differently, but are aligned closely enough to ensure a whole of
government approach. Although ideas are still evolving, not much new has been written on
this topic in the last few years.
There is some fear that the ideas forged with the blood of many Soldiers, Sailors,
Airmen, and Marines who died attempting to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan will again fall into
obscurity. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated, [a]lthough our forces will
no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations, we will preserve the
expertise gained during the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. There are also some think tanks that state the U. S. military should
not be used for rebuilding nations. This familiar tome has come and gone over the years, but
the truth remains that throughout history, many generations of the American military, along
with other agencies in the U. S. Government, have performed a wide variety of tasks within a
stability operations construct. This session will expose students to the current thinking and
doctrine on this topic.

The point of contact for this session is Professor George Oliver, C-426.

D. Discussion Topics:

What has history taught us about the role of the military in stability operations?

What does the phrase establish a safe and secure environment mean in the context of
stability operations? Are there different levels of security and how might lack of security
affect other agencies working in the region?

What role does the military have in humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization, rule of
law, and governance when transitioning from major combat operations to enable civil
authorities? Do varying levels of security have an impact on what the military does in these
areas?

198
How does the military integrate and synchronize its work with other U. S. government
agencies?

How does the military integrate its efforts with other organizations, such as the United
Nations, regional organizations and non-governmental organizations?

What planning considerations should the commander include in the course of action
development for phase IV and phase V?

How would you critique planning for stability operations in Afghanistan?

E. Products:

An in seminar discussion of the assigned case studies below..

F. Required Readings:

Hicks, Kathleen and Eric Ridge. Planning for Stability Operations: The Use of Capabilities-
Based Approaches, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, December 2007. Scan Chapter 1, and read chapters 2 and 3. (NWC 6054).

Oliver, George F. Stability Operations Primer, Newport, RI: U. S. Naval War College
2014. (NWC 3186A).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability Operations, Joint
Publication (JP) 3-07. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 29 September 2011. Read: Executive
Summary, pages xv to xxix and Chapter 2, pages II-1 to II-18, Scan Chapter 3

__________. Joint Operation Planning. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, D.C.: CJCS,
11 August 2011. Scan pp. III-38 to III-44.

Afghanistan Case Study: Readings assigned by moderator:

Brown, Frances Z. The U. S. Surge and Afghan Local Governance: Lessons for Transition,
Washington, D.C.: U. S. Institute of Peace, Special Report, August 2009. (NWC
6053).

Patterson, Rebecca and Jodi Vittori. Why Military Officers Should Study Political
Economics. Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 75, 4th Quarter (October) 2014. (NWC
6051).

Perito, Robert. Afghanistans Police: A Weak Link in Security Sector Reform,

Washington, D.C.: U. S. Institute of Peace, Special Report, August 2009. (NWC
6052).

199
G. Supplementary Readings:

Binnendijk, Hans, and Patrick Cronin, eds. Civilian Surge. Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University, 2009.

Cerami, Joseph R., and Jay W. Boggs, eds. The Interagency and Counterinsurgency
Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Roles. Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2007.

Chiarelli, Peter W. and Patrick R. Michaelis. Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-
Spectrum Operations. Military Review (JulyAugust 2005): 417.

Chiarelli, Peter W. and Peter and Stephen M. Smith. Learning from Our Modern Wars: The
Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future, Military Review, September-
October 2007.

Earle, Caroline R. Taking Stock: Interagency Integration in Stability Operations, Prism,

vol 3, no. 2, June 2012.

Osburg, Jan, Christopher Paul, Lisa Saum-Manning, Dan Madden, Leslie Adrienne Payne.
Assessing Locally Focused Stability Operations. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo
Center, 2014.

Ricks, Thomas E. Fiasco. New York: Penguin Press, 2006.

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction
Experience. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government printing Office, 2009.

Szayna, Thomas S, Derek Eaton, James E. Barnett II, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Terrence K.
Kelly, Zachary Haldeman. Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations.
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2009.

Taw, Jennifer M. Mission Revolution: The U. S. Military and Stability Operations, New
York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

Terry, James P. Stabilization Operations: A Successful Strategy for Post-conflict

Management, Joint Force Quarterly, issue 58, 3rd Quarter 2010, pages 45-47.

U. S. Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP 3-07). Stability.

Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, August 2012.

U. S. Department of State, Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, Washington, D.C.:

Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, 2008.

200
United States Institute of Peace and the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.
Washington, D.C.: U. S. Institute of Peace Press, 2009.

Wright, Donald, and Timothy R. Reese. On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The
United State Army in Iraqi Freedom, May 2003 January 2005. Leavenworth, KS:
Combat Studies Institute, 2008.

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 JMO-50

TABLETOP EXERCISE #3
PRC-TAIWAN CASE STUDY (Seminar and Exercise)

I would say that he (Chinese CNO Wu) doesnt want to build a

navy thats equivalent to the U. S. He wants to build a navy that surpasses
the U. S.
Admiral Gary Roughead (USN, Ret)
Former U. S. Chief of Naval Operations.

A. Focus:

This tabletop exercise is a six-hour discussion and practical exercise spread over two
days that is designed to synthesize the material covered in the trimester thus far. The session
will require students to revisit the unique considerations of naval capabilities/limitations and
employment considerations relevant to a variety of warfare areas. A review of operational
art, maritime warfare theory, and operational law will be required to successfully complete
this exercise. The PRC-Taiwan Vignette provides a fictional future scenario for students to
apply knowledge and understanding of naval forces employment considerations and maritime
command and control in a discussion of the operational design of a major, joint maritime
operation. The focus of this session is on the operational design of a major maritime
operation. This is not a planning exercise but rather a realistic backdrop to facilitate
professional discussion on naval warfare.

B. Objectives:

Apply knowledge of the naval capabilities, limitations, and employment considerations to

operations in a high-intensity combat environment against a near-peer competitor.
Reinforce knowledge of maritime force capabilities, roles, functions, employment
considerations, limitations.
Design a major naval/joint operation.

C. Background:

Designing a major naval/joint operation resembles in many ways designing a major

land operation. However, considerable differences exist because of the characteristics of the
physical environment in which maritime forces operate as well as other aspects of the factor
of space. Clearly, maritime forces are employed very differently than forces of their
terrestrial brethren. In generic terms an operational design for a major naval/joint operation
includes the following elements:

203
 ultimate operational (and sometimes limited strategic) and intermediate
objectives; force requirements; balancing operational factors against the
ultimate objective; identification of critical factors and centers of gravity;
initial positions and lines of operations; directions/axes; the operational idea;
and operational sustainment.

The operational idea (or scheme) is the very essence of a design for a major
naval/joint operation. The operational idea for a campaign should be developed first, because
the strategic objective always dominates the operational objectives. It provides a framework
for the operational idea of each subordinate major operation. The operational commander
should make sure the subordinate operational ideas in each phase of a maritime campaign are
consistent with his own operational idea.
The operational idea for a major naval/joint operation is developed during the
operational commanders estimate of the situation, and the idea should be further elaborated
upon and refined during the planning process. A soundly conceived operational idea should
include selected principles of war; a method for defeating the enemy; application of sources
of power; the sectors of effort; main forces and supporting forces, the point of main attack (or
defense); concentration in the sector of main effort; operational maneuver and fires;
protection of the friendly center of gravity; anticipation of the point of culmination;
deception; sequencing; synchronization; branches and sequels; phasing; tempo; momentum;
and reserve.
It is critical to understand how maritime forces can be used to support and enable
success of the other component commanders (land, air, SOF, and so forth) objectives, and
ultimately a JTF mission. This fictional vignette is intended to generate discussion of
capabilities, limitations, and operational design of a major naval operation. It is not desired
that students expend time discussing the viability of the scenario presented, or the probability
of American intervention in the portrayed crisis. Students need to simply accept the task of
discussing potential operational designs or schemes and how maritime forces could be
effectively employed in this situation.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Bill Hartig, C-428.

D. Discussion Topics:

Moderators will guide seminars through discussion. The seminar discussion will be from the
point of view of the U. S. Naval Joint Force Maritime Component staff with the following
tasks:

Employment considerations given threat, capabilities, environment, and mission.

Command and Control options.

What broad capabilities and options do U. S. Naval forces bring to a Joint Force Commander
and how could these be integrated in to joint operations?

204
What vulnerabilities exist in U. S. forces that could be exploited by the adversary in
exercising sea denial operations? How could the JFMCC compensate for those
vulnerabilities?

How might the U. S. commander limit threats to his/her forces and vital lines of
communication (LOCs) from PRC surface, subsurface, and air threats?

E. Products:

The principal product of this tabletop exercise, exclusive of a professional discourse, are
the main elements of operational design (including operational idea) for denying control of
the surface / subsurface / air in the Taiwan Strait and its approaches, and obtaining control of
the surface / subsurface / air in the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea. Include the
integration of offensive / defensive cyber war capabilities in the struggle for sea control /
denial, an operational idea for defense / protection of blue shipping in the South China Sea,
and an operational idea for attack of Red maritime trade in the Sea areas adjacent to
Mainland China. Moderators will issue specific taskings in seminar.

F. Required Readings:

Office of Naval Intelligence. The Peoples Liberation Army Navy; A Modern Navy with
Chinese Characteristics. Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009.
(NWC 5032). Read: Chapter 3, pp. 1630.

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. PRC-Taiwan Vignette,

2010. (NWC 4027E). Read.

___________. Joint Military Operations Department. Reference Guide, Forces/

Capabilities Handbook. Newport, RI: Naval War College, July 2011. (NWC 3153P).
(Issued). Scan.

__________. Selected U. S. Navy and The People Republic of China Army (Navy) (PLA(N))
Tactical Capability Handbook Slide Pack. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016.
Scan. (NWC 2164).

U. S. Navy, U. S. Marine Corps, U. S. Coast Guard. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U. S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
Guard. March 2015. (NWC 2134) Scan: pp. 8-18.

Vego, Milan. Chinas Naval Challenge. Proceedings 137, No. 4 (April 2007). (NWC
4121).

205
G. Supplementary Readings:

Erickson, Andrew, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray. Chinese Mine Warfare: A
PLA Navy Assassins Mace Capability. U. S. Naval War College China Maritime
Studies Institute number 3. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, June 2009. Read
pp. 41-53. (NWC 2131).

Navy Warfare Development Command. Joint Force Maritime Component (C/JFMCC)

Planning and Execution, TACMEMO 3-32-06. Newport, RI: NWDC, November
2006.

Yuan, Jingdong. Emerging Maritime Rivalry in the South China Sea. Territorial Disputes,
Sea-Lane Security, and the Pursuit of Power. Sydney: International Security
Research Programme, University of Sydney, September 2012.

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 JMO-51

PROBLEM SOLVING AND COMPLEXITY (Seminar)

We are not interested in generals who win victories without

bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us
take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting
our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come
along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms.

Carl von Clausewitz,

On War, 1832

A. Focus:

This seminar provides you with some of the formalized language of both the science
and the doctrine regarding problems and problem solving. The seminar will introduce you to
various structural considerations regarding problems as well as present the concept of
complexity as it relates to problem solving. It will introduce students to the language of
problem solving and set the conditions for a deeper understanding of material to be discussed
in the following session, The Logic of the Commanders Estimate and Decision.

B. Objectives:

Understand the relationship between planning and problem solving.

Recognize the differences in problem structure and the various methodologies available
to problem solvers to address them.
Discuss the language of problem solving.

C. Background:

In the next seminar, The Logic of the Commanders Estimate and Decision, we will
distinguish between deductive and inductive reasoning in estimating a military situation; and
in doctrinal terms, estimating a situation is synonymous with planning. Planning is the
vehicle used in the Department of Defense to solve problems. We should think of planning
as a learning process, as mental preparation that improves our understanding of a situation.
In its simplest terms, planning is thinking before doing. Even if the plan is not executed
precisely as envisionedand few arethe process should result in a deeper situational
awareness that improves future decision making. We should thus think of planning as a
learning activity that facilitates the exercise of judgment and not as merely a mechanical
procedure.
The very first step in estimating a situation is to understand the environment in which
the problem exists. In the past, this fell squarely into the J-2 Intelligence Directorates cone of
207
fire. We are all familiar, or should be, with the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operating Environment (JIPOE) which provides commanders and planners information on
the environment and the enemy. Unfortunately, the problems we will face as modern day
officers manifest themselvesalmost universallyas complicated problems. They are
complex and they are often actually complex adaptive systems (CAS). To begin to
understand this type of problem, an ill-structured problem that manifests itself as a CAS, we
need far more than the Intelligence Directorate can provide.
As military professionals, we often seek a scientific understanding of war. This
approach is appealing because the human mind tends to organize its perceptions according to
familiar analogies and metaphors, like the powerful images of traditional Newtonian physics.
Our military doctrine abounds with terms like leverage, center of gravity, and mass.
Similarly, as you discovered in your studies in the Theater Security Decision Making
Department, many political scientists treat political entities as "unitary rational actors," the
social equivalents of Newton's solid bodies hurtling through space.
Real political units, however, are not unitary. Rather, they are collections of
intertwined but fundamentally distinct actors and systems. Their behavior derives from the
internal interplay of both rational and irrational forces, as well as from the peculiarities of
their own histories and of sheer chance. Planners who accept the unitary rational actor model
as a description of entities at war will never understand either side's motivations or actual
behavior. Such planners ignore their own side's greatest potential vulnerabilities and deny
themselves potential levers and targetsthe fault-lines that exist within any human political
construct. In fact, treating an enemy entity as a unitary actor tends to be a self-fulfilling and
counterproductive prophecy, reinforcing a sense of unity among disparate elements which
might otherwise be pried apart. Fortunately, the physical sciences, as well as Department of
Defense planners, have begun to embrace the class of problems posed by social interactions
like human politics and war. Therefore, "hard-science" metaphors for war and politics can
still be useful. The appropriate imagery, however, is not that of Newtonian physics. Rather,
we need to think of planning in terms of biology, and particularly ecology.
To survive over time, the various participants in any ecosystem must adaptnot only
to the "external" environment but to each other. These agents compete or cooperate,
consuming and being consumed, joining and dividing, and so on. In fact, from the standpoint
of any individual agent, the behavior of the other agents is itself a major element of the
environment. The collective behavior of the various agents can even change the nature of the
"external" environment. For example, certain species, left unchecked, can turn a well-
vegetated area into a desert. Our opponent, or threat, coupled with the ecology in which we
operate, requires planners who are intelligent, agile, and well-versed in operational art.
Earlier we spoke of the complex adaptive system. What exactly is that? A complex
adaptive system (CAS) is characterized by four main points; they are first, and obviously,
complex. Students are well advised to consider complexity as opposed to complicated.
Complicated systems, such as an internal combustion engine, are well mapped and consist of
a subsystem of parts. If we remove a part, the system will not work. A complex system,
however, adapts. If we remove a part, the system discovers a work-around and modifies
itself. That brings us to the second point of a CAS, it is adaptable. It learns from its
environment and adjusts. The CAS, in addition to being adaptable and complex, is also
interconnected. Subsystems relate to each other and the actions of one may affect many.

208
Last, a CAS manifests diversity. There is diversity in the system in the number of
stakeholders as well as positions, opinions, objectives, and so forth. The subject of
complexity as it relates to military problems will be discussed in this seminar and referred to
in future sessions.
Much like the example above, military operations in the twenty-first century are
exceedingly complex and generally address ill-structured problems. An ill-structured
problem has no stopping rules, multiple and conflicting feedback loops, and is not suited well
to algorithmic processes. A system created by such a multiplicity of internal feedback loops,
by definition, is a complex adaptive system. Such systems nest one inside the other,
constructing, interpenetrating, and disrupting one another across illusory "system
boundaries." It is in this volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment that you,
as professional problem solvers, must plan and operate.
You will come to appreciate the similarities between the various processes and
discover that military planning is highly nonlinear and requires a deep appreciation of
operational art, organization, human dynamics, and further requires a nuanced leadership
approach in order to reach a common and acceptable solution.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Bill Hartig, C-428.

D. Questions:

How does a problems structure relate to the methodology to resolve it?

Why do (or should) we first assess the structure and typology of a problem before we begin
trying to resolve it?

If many of the problems we confront in the modern operating environment manifest

themselves as Complex Adaptive Systems, how can they be adequately described?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Hartig, William J. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department. Problem
Solving and the Military Professional. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2010.
(NWC 1029).

__________. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department. Thinking

About Complexity. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2012. (NWC 1141).

U. S. Naval War College. Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) Workbook. Newport,
RI: Naval War College, 1 July 2013. (NWC 4111J w/Chg 1). Read Appendix D,
Design. (Issued).

209
G. Supplementary Readings:

Banach, Stefan J. and Alex Ryan. The Art of Design: A Design Methodology. Military
Review (MarchApril 2009): 105115.

Chisholm, Donald. Ill-Structured Problems, Informal Mechanisms, and the Design of

Public Organizations. In Jan-Erik Lane, ed. Bureaucracy and Public Choice.
London: Sage, 1987.

Dewey, John. How We Think. Boston: Heath, 1910.

__________. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt, 1920.

__________. The Public and Its Problems. Athens, OH: Swallow Press, 1985 [1927].

Duggan, William. Strategic Intuition: The Creative Spark in Human Achievement.

New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Gladwell, Malcolm. Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking. Boston, MA: Little
Brown & Company, 2005.

Hacker, Diana and Nancy Sommers. A Writers Reference. 7th ed. Boston, MA: Bedford /
St. Martins, 2011.

Klein, Gary A., and J. Weitzenfeld. Improvement of Skills for Solving Ill-Defined
Problems. Educational Psychologist 13 (1978): 3141.

Landau, Martin, and Donald Chisholm. The Arrogance of Optimism: Notes on Failure-
Avoidance Management. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management No. 3
(1995): 6780.

Neustadt, Richard E., and Ernest R. May. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for
Decision-Makers. New York: Free Press, 1986.

Lindblom, Charles E. The Science of Muddling Through. Public Administration

Review 19 (1959): 7988.

Rittel, Horst, and Melvin M. Webber. Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning.

Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 15569.

Schn, Donald. The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. New York:
Basic Books Inc., 1983.

210
Simon, Herbert A. The Executive as Decision Maker and Organizational Design:
Man-Machine Systems for Decision Making. In Herbert A. Simon, The New
Science of Management Decision. New York: Harper and Row, 1960.

__________. The Architecture of Complexity. Proceedings of the American

Philosophical Society 106 (1962): 46782.

__________. The Structure of Ill-Structured Problems. Artificial Intelligence 4 (1973):

181201.

__________. On How to Decide What to Do. Bell Journal of Economics 9 (1978):

494507.

__________. The Sciences of the Artificial, 3d ed. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996.

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 JMO-52

THE LOGIC OF THE COMMANDER'S

ESTIMATE AND DECISION (Seminar)

Before undertaking a task the commander makes an estimate of the

situation and formulates a plan of action. The estimate follows in general
the accepted form. In scope and thoroughness it is commensurate with the
size and importance of the task and the time available.

Navy Department, War Instructions

Paragraph 217, 1944

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is on explaining and analyzing the mental processes and the
role of the commander/staff in the estimate of the situation and in making sound military
decisions.

B. Objectives:

Know the historical roots of the commander's estimate of the situation and understand the
logical reasoning applied in the process of estimating the situation.
Understand the relationship between process and the format of the estimate of the
situation
Comprehend the role and importance of the commander in the estimate of the situation

C. Background:

One of the principal responsibilities of commanders at any level of command is to

make decisions for the employment of their forces in combat. Various automated decision
aids can never replace the commanders experience, judgment, and wisdom in making a
sound decision. Some of the most successful military commanders have and still use a mental
process of estimating the situation before making a decision.
The first systematic estimate of the situation was used by the Prussian army in 1850.
The Prussian / German Chief of General Staff, General (later Field Marshal) Helmuth von
Moltke, Sr., used what the Germans call Lagebeurteilung, or the assessment of the
situationa mental process of reasoning in order to reach a sound decision. Other armies in
Europe gradually introduced the Prussian method of conducting the estimate of the situation.
In the United States, the Army's Infantry School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas adopted the
Prussian model in 1909 when Captain Roger S. Fitch published his Estimating Tactical
Situations and Publishing Field Orders. One year later, the U. S. Army officially adopted
Fitch's document as its standard training manual. In 1911, the President of the U. S. Naval
213
War College, Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers (1849-1925) adopted the "applicability system"
or "estimate of the situation" as the method in teaching students on how to make sound
military decisions. Afterward, the estimate of the situation became of one of the key subjects
taught and applied in the Naval War College's curriculum. The Navy's standard manual for
estimating the situation, Sound Military Decision published by the Naval War College in
1936 during tenure of Rear Admiral E. C. Kalbfus (1877-1954) as the President. Afterward,
it was revised several times and extensively used by the U. S. Navy.
The estimate of the situation is the very foundation of any sound decision-making
process, whether it be personal life, business, or in military affairs. In making a decision, one
must collect all the facts and then determine what options are open and what might stand in
the way of these options. Each option is then weighed against possible obstacles and in
terms of their advantages and disadvantages. The estimate process should end with a sound
decision. In military terms, the commanders estimate of the situation is understood as a
logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the factors affecting a
military situation to determine a course of action to accomplish a given mission. The
estimate is a reasoned solution to a problem in which each step in the process incrementally
leads to a decision that, without these steps, could be arrived at only by accident. The
purpose of the estimate of the situation is not to justify a decision previously arrived at but to
develop ma reasoned, well informed approach to solving a military problem.
In general, any estimate process consists of (1) a general part and (2) a reasoning
process. The general part consists, of a general appreciation of the existing situation;
formulating the end to be attained with a view of localizing the problem, and comparison of
basic data. The reasoning process is used to arrive at a selection of the method for attaining
the desired end. Before one starts to reason, one must possess knowledge of the situation,
recognize what is to be accomplished, and examine the factual elements at one's disposal.
After the problem is localized (the mission) the next step is to use reasoning to make
conclusions and then convert conclusions into a plan of action (the decision).
Reasoning can be defined as the action of thinking about something in a logical,
sensible way, or simply the process of exercising the faculty of reason. It starts with the
input (premises) and produces output (conclusions). In each specific case of surmising a
conclusion, inferences are made on the basis of various bits of available information. Logical
reasoning is the very foundation of a sound estimate of the situation.
Reasoning can be inductive or deductive. Inductive reasoning is used to discover
general laws from particular facts. In inductive reasoning, the conclusion is reached by
generalizing or extrapolating from initial information. In contrast, deductive reasoning
proceeds to discover particular truths from general truths. It links premises with conclusions.
If all premises are true, the terms are clear, and the rules of deductive logic are followed, the
conclusion reached is necessarily true. It is essentially an analytical process, while inductive
reasoning is a synthetic process. In inductive reasoning if arguments are sound, the
conclusions are merely supported by the premises while in deductive reasoning if the
arguments are sound then the conclusion is guaranteed. Deductive reasoning is
predominantly applied in the estimate of the situation process. In some cases, however,
inductive reasoning might be applicable.
Reflective thinking is used in a general appreciation of the initial situation in the
estimate process. It refers to the process of analyzing and making judgments about what has

214
happened. It cannot be successful without critical thinking. A critical thinker collects
information, evaluates, draws conclusion using logic and assesses logical conclusions. In
contrast, a non-critical thinker collects information and then draws conclusions without logic.
Critical thinking and reflective thinking are often used synonymously.
In general, a situation pertains to a state of affairs or combination of circumstances at
a certain moment. In military terms, a situation can also be described as the entirety of
conditions that exist in a certain area and certain time and affect the conduct of ones military
action. Political, diplomatic, military, economic, demographic, informational, ethnic,
religious, environmental, and other situations exist at the same time. In general, the scale of
the military objective to be accomplished determines the scope of the military situation that
must be evaluated. Hence, tactical, operational, and strategic (national-strategic and military
or theater-strategic) situations can be differentiated. The larger the objective, the more
complex the situation in terms of space, time, and force. The military situation is
characterized through the status and actions of opposing forces; terrain; state of weather, and
time of day and year; and other conditions. A military situation can consist, in turn, of
ground, air (space), and naval situations, respectively.
Estimating the situation means analyzing the causality of all its elements and their
influence on the accomplishment of ones mission. For that purpose, the operational
commander should divide the situation into its constituent parts and determine how each part
affects the employment of both the enemy and friendly forces, and, in some cases, neutrals as
well. The commander must also determine how to make maximum use of favorable factors in
the situation for the employment of friendly forces while at the same time accounting for
those elements that can potentially preclude or weaken ones combat actions.
The commanders estimate of the situation should be a thorough and methodical
process of reasoning. Great care should be taken that no relevant factors are omitted or,
worse, willfully ignored in the analysis. Hasty and superficial considerations should be
avoided. The process in itself will not necessarily result in the best decision, or even a sound
decision. The commanders and their staffs should bear in mind that there are several
methods for conducting the estimate as a whole and its individual steps. They should know
the advantages and disadvantages of each method and then apply the one best suited to the
mission and the situation and the commanders personal preferences and experience.
A standardized format for conducting an estimate of the situation is highly useful in
ensuring that a certain logical process of reasoning is applied in conducting the estimate of
the situation. However, the format is merely an arrangement by means of which the
commanders thoughts may be developed in a logical order. The estimates format should be
based on logic and common sense. It contributes to the commanders decision only to the
extent that it provides a solid framework for systematic analysis and reasoning. Yet the
soundness of the estimate ultimately rests on the commanders earnest thought, mental
ability, character, and experience. Rigidly applying the estimates format would invariably
lead to a faulty application of the process. It may well result in a decision that is not sound.
Clarity of thinking also suffers when more time and effort are spent on formalities than on
the essence of the estimate.
The principal elements of the commanders estimate of the situation are as follows:
(1) the mission; (2) initial situation; (3) enemy courses of action; (4) friendly courses of
action: and (5) the decision. There is no commonly agreed method of conducting the estimate

215
of the situation. In generic terms, the commanders estimate encompasses the following
steps: mission analysis, estimate of the physical/human environment, the enemy situation and
the friendly situation (and in some cases the situation of the neutrals), analysis of the
opposing courses of action, comparison of friendly courses of action, and the decision. Steps
in the estimate can be expanded or condensed according to the nature of a given problem.
The commander cannot conduct a proper estimate of the situation and make a sound
decision without accurate, timely, and relevant information. Clearly, the most important
basis for making decisions is information on the enemy and friendly subordinate forces. In
general, the clearer the given picture, the better uncertainties will be mastered, and the more
accurate the estimate and the sounder the decision will be. The focus should at all times be on
the facts of the situation. In transmitting their reports to the higher commander, subordinate
commanders are duty-bound to tell the absolute truth as they see it. Embellishment and
exaggeration must be avoided. In forwarding reports to the higher commander, subordinate
commanders must always be clear about what their subordinates actually did observe, what
others observed, and what only speculation is. All subordinate commanders should report on
the situation to higher commanders as quickly and as fully as possible and pass on all
important information.
In conducting the estimate of the situation, the commander should focus his mental
efforts on the most important things. The facts of the situation should be clearly
differentiated from assumptions or speculation. All the facts should have a proof. The
commander should remain calm, should think quickly but should not act in haste, and should
rethink through the situation and make the decision independently while receiving reports
from his subordinates. The commander should express the decision in short, clear sentences.
The more the commander practices conducting the estimate of the situation, the more
likely the commander is to make sound decisions. One of the main prerequisites for making a
sound decision is a full understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of the estimate as a
whole and its principal elements. If the process is properly applied, the estimate of the
situation should ensure that the commander and his staff do not leave out any factor of
importance that has a bearing on the decision. At the same time, no amount of education or
training will ensure that the commander makes a sound decision unless it is coupled with
sound judgment and wisdom based on practical experience.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Bill Hartig, C-428.

D. Discussion Topics:

Discuss the historical roots of the commanders estimate of the situation.

How is reflective reasoning used in conducting an estimate of the situation? Describe

advantages and disadvantages of deductive and inductive reasoning.

What is the relationship between the mental process and the format of the estimate of the
situation? What are advantages and disadvantages of each?

What is the role of information and reports in conducting an estimate of the situation?

216
Explain and discuss the role and importance of the commanders and their staffs in the
estimate of the situation. What is the role of automated decision aids in the estimate process?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

Burwell, David, W. Logical Evolution of the Military Decision Making Process. Fort
Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army
Command and General Staff College, 2001. (NWC 1203).

U. S. Naval War College. Sound Military Decision. U. S. Naval War College. Newport,
RI: Naval War College Press, 1942. Read: Part One, Chapter I, Command and its
Problems and Chapter II, Mental Processes and Human Tendencies. (NWC 6047).

U. S. Navy. Navy Planning. Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 5-01. Washington, D.C.:
Department of the Navy, December, 2013. Read Annex F-6, Commanders Estimate
(Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Cowan, Thomas H. A Single Flexible, Rigorous Decision Making Process. Fort

Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army
Command and General Staff College, 1996.

Fitch, Roger S., Estimating Tactical Situations and Composing Field Orders Fort
Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School, 1909.

Michel, Rex M., Historical Development of the Estimate of the Situation. Fort Leavenworth,
KS: U. S. Army Research Institute, 1990.

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 JMO-53

ADAPTIVE PLANNING AND EXECUTION

SYSTEM (APEX) (Seminar)

In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but
planning is indispensable.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, USA

A. Focus:

This session introduces the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX), which
is designed, in part, to bridge the gap between deliberate and crisis action planning to
provide the nations strategic leadership with a more responsive planning process, both in
preparation time and option flexibility. The session begins with an overview of the Joint
Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the service chiefs in translating national policy
objectives into definitive planning guidance. Currently, planning guidance for combatant
commanders and their staffs can be found in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force
(GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Planning guidance to the services
may also be found in the document Sustaining U. S. Global Leadership Priorities for 21st
Century Defense.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the purpose of the JSPS.

Comprehend how the GEF, JSCP, and Global Force Management Implementation
Guidance (GFMIG) drive the planning cycle and frame planning requirements for the
combatant commander.
Understand how APEX bridges the gap between deliberate and crisis action planning.

C. Background

Mandated by Title 10 USC, the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS are pivotal in
translating national security objectives into definitive planning guidance for the combatant
commanders and the joint force. The combatant commanders are responsible for the actual
development of the GEF and JSCP directed campaign plans, but are dependent on support
from the services, other combatant commanders, and the combat support agencies during the
planning and execution process.
APEX is the system used by the CCDRs to produce theses directed contingency, or
deliberate, plans. It is a set of ideas unifying efforts across people, processes, products, and
technology. It is designed to speed up the deliberate planning processto make deliberate
219
plans more relevant, more usable. APEX provides for increased flexibility at the Theater
Strategic and Operational levels and enables shared understanding of problems, threats, and
options. APEX requires In-Progress Reviews (IPRs) for directed contingency plans,
increased civil-military dialogue, campaign, posture, and interagency planning, resource-
informed planning and assessment, Global Force Management, and trained military planners
to facilitate rapid plan development.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Michael McGauvran, C-414.

D. Discussion Topics:

What is the value of the enormous effort we expend on deliberate planning?

What do the GEF, JSCP, and GFMIG provide planners?

Adaptive Planning is designed to preserve the best characteristics of contingency planning

and crisis action planning with a common process. How does APEX meet this challenge?

E. Product:
None.

F. Required Readings:

McGauvran, Michael. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department. A

Primer for: The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), Guidance for Employment of
the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Adaptive Planning and
Execution (APEX) System, and Global Force Management (GFM). Naval War
College: Newport, RI. 30 December 2015. (NWC 2061F).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Operation Planning. Joint
Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 11 August 2011. Read Chapter I pp. I-
1 thru I-7, Chap II pp. II-1 thru II-39, and Appendix H on Global Force Management.
(Issued).

U. S. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Sustaining U. S. Global Leadership Priorities for

21st Century Defense. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 5 January 2012. Scan. (NWC 2111).

G. Supplementary Readings:

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCSM 3130.03. Adaptive
Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance. 18 October 2102.

220
 JMO-54

ORDERS AND ORDER DEVELOPMENT (Seminar)

To plan well is to demonstrate imagination and not merely to apply

mechanical procedures. Done well, planning is an extremely valuable activity
that greatly improves performance and is an effective use of time. Done
poorly, it can be worse than irrelevant and a waste of valuable time. The
fundamental challenge of planning is to reconcile the tension between the
desire for preparation and the need for flexibility in recognition of the
uncertainty of war.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 5, Planning, 1997

A. Focus:

Planning is problem solving and orders development is the mechanism used to

convey the planning groups intellectual labor to subordinate commands for execution.
Orders development and orders writing is a common task that all commanders and staff
officers should understand.

B. Objectives:

Understand the Orders Development Process, the contents of an Operations Plan / Order,
and the standard format used for Operations Plans / Orders.
Understand the importance of orders reconciliation / crosswalk prior to issuing the order.
Gain an understanding of the issues for consideration, inputs, and outputs of the Orders
Development Process sufficient to produce a basic Operations Order.

C. Background:

As Spruance Course graduates, you will likely participate in the orders development
process, perhaps tasked with writing a staff estimate, base plan, or a specified annex to an
operations plan or order. To meet this task, you must be able to read a higher headquarters
order, develop a supporting order, and communicate that order clearly to subordinate units in
a timely manner.
In the very near future we will conduct a series of practical planning exercises that
conclude with orders briefs. You will use this seminar and associated reference readings to
develop portions of operations orders to communicate the commanders intent, guidance, and
decisions that are products from the planning process. Orders development communicates the
commanders intent, guidance, and decisions in a clear, useful form understandable by those
executing the order. The operations order is the means of transmitting this key and pertinent
information concerning execution to all units in or attached to the issuing headquarters. The
221
order should only contain critical or new informationnot routine matters normally found in
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The Chief of Staff (CoS), the J-5 (Plans) or the J-3
(Operations) Officer, as appropriate, is normally responsible for orders development. Orders
development also includes an essential two-step quality control approach during the writing
phase of the order or plan. Reconciliation is an internal review that the staff conducts of the
entire order. It identifies gaps and discrepancies in the order. Specifically, the staff compares
the Commanders Intent, the mission, and Commanders Critical Information Requirements
(CCIR(s)) against the concept of operations and supporting concepts. The Crosswalk is an
external review of higher and adjacent orders to ensure unity of effort and to ensure the
Higher Headquarters (HHQ) Commanders Intent is met.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Bill Hartig, C-428.

D. Discussion Topics:

How does the operational design generated as a result of the planning process become
codified for action?

Do we use deductive or inductive reasoning in developing an operations order? Explain your

answer.

Describe the difference between an operations order and a Commanders Estimate.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Depuy, William E., Concepts of Operation: the Heart of Command, the Tool of Doctrine,
Army 38, no. 8 (August 1988): 26-40. (NWC 4114).

U. S. Department of the Navy. Navy Planning. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 5-01.
Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy, December 2013. Read pp. 6-1 to 6-9, and
Annex L-2. (Issued).

__________. Universal Naval Task List (UNTL). OPNAVINST 3500.38B. Norfolk, VA:
Department of the Navy, 30 January 2007. Scan.

__________. Universal Joint Task Manual (UJTM). CJCSM 3500.04F. Washington, D.C.:
CJCS, 1 June 2011. Scan.

__________. Universal Joint Tasks, Washington. D.C.: CJCS, 1 November 2015.

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/ujtl_tasks.pdf. Scan.

222
G. Supplementary Readings:

__________. Joint Operation Planning. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, D.C.: CJCS,
11 August 2011.

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224
 JMO-55

TABLETOP EXERCISE #4: AN ANALYSIS OF VADM KINKAIDS

OPERATIONS ORDERLEYTE ASSAULT (Exercise)

There is a distinction between ability as a leader of men and ability as a

strategist or tactician. The commander may be a great leader, a natural
leader, and fail through lack of knowledge. Leadership is the art of inspiring,
guiding, and directing bodies of men so that they ardently desire to do what
the leader wishes. But the wishes of the leader will not bring victory unless as
a commander he has the strategic knowledge and the tactical skill to make a
good plan.

Navy Department, War Instructions,

Paragraph 108, 1944

A. Focus:

During our studies of Joint Operational Warfare, Operation KING II, of the
MUSKETEER Campaign Plan, provided the backdrop against which we studied the theory
of warfare. In the previous session, Orders and Orders Writing, you were exposed to the
Department of Defense processes and formats for orders. More importantly, you now
understand that orders translate the critical and creative thought of a commander and his staff
into products that direct actions of both subordinate elements and operational functions in
time and space.
This exercise builds on previous sessions and seeks to foster creative thought through
the analysis and evaluation of Vice Admiral Kinkaids Operation Plan 12-44 for Operation
KING II (Leyte Assault). You will have the opportunity to review VADM Kinkaids
OPORD through the lens of Operational Art to gain a better understanding and appreciation
of one of the Commanders principal tools used to direct operations.

B. Objectives:

Analyze VADM Kinkaids Operation Order for Operation KING II through the lens of
Operational Art.
Understand how Operational Art, in particular Commanders Intent, Operational Idea, and
Operational Design, are captured and articulated in the five-paragraph OPORD.

C. Background:

As you saw in the previous session, the five-paragraph OPORD is a directive issued
to subordinate commanders to coordinate and execute a specific operation(s). In short, the
OPORD is the physical product of a staff or planning groups effort and serves as a vehicle to
225
direct the execution of an operation(s) in accordance with the commanders intent. Effective
orders will clearly articulate the commanders vision and intent, the commanders operational
idea, and the associated operational design. They should:

Clearly convey the commanders intent and purpose.

Be authoritative, simple, brief, clear, complete and timely.
Allow subordinates flexibility in execution.
Contain critical facts and necessary assumptions.
Be positive and authoritative in expression
Use doctrinal language and avoid meaningless or vague expressions.

Vice-Admiral Kinkaids operation order in support of the Leyte Operation was one of
many operations orders written during the Second World War; it was the cumulative result of
past experience and lessons learned. It is similarbut not identicalto the formats found in
APEX, NWP 5.01, and any of the other services planning documents. It has, therefore,
stood the test of both time and combat.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel Anthony New, USA, C-411.

D. Discussion Topics:

Explain VADM Kinkaids Commanders intent. Does is effectively communicate his

personal vision of victory and the conditions and methods for obtaining it? What would
you change and why?

How well does VADM Kinkaids Operational Idea (Vego) or Operational Approach (Joint
Doctrine) describe the broad actions the force must take to achieve the military end state?

Does the Operations order communicate command support relationships between VADM
Kinkaids forces and the Landing Force (6th Army)?

Identify and describe other elements of Operational Art found in VADM Kinkaids OPORD.

Identify any additional gaps or weaknesses in the OPORD. How would you improve it?

E. Products:

A critical analysis of the operations order that was developed by VADM Kinkaid and
staff in support of Operation KING II.

F. Required Reading:

Commander, Allied Naval Forces Southwest Pacific Area (and Seventh Fleet). Operation
Plan 12-44, Serial 00019-A, dated 25 September 1944: KING TWO. (NWC 6046).

226
U. S. Department of the Navy. Navy Planning. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 5-01.
Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy, December 2013. Review pp. 6-1 through 6-9
and Appendix L-1 thru L-3-19). (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Depuy, William E., Concepts of Operation: the Heart of Command, the Tool of Doctrine,
Army 38, no.8. (August 1988).

U. S. Army. The Operations Process. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5. Washington,

D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2012.

U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Planning Process. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
(MCWP) 5-1. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Marine Corps, 2010.

U. S. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)
Planning Formats and Guidance, CJCSM 3130.03. Washington, D.C.: 18 October
2012.

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 JMO-56

INTRODUCTION TO THE
NAVY PLANNING PROCESS (Seminar)

Planning is everything Plans are nothing.

Field Marshall Helmuth Graf von Moltke,

1880-1891

A. Focus:

This session introduces students to the Navy Planning Process (NPP). Students will
become familiar with the navy planning process as described in NWP 5-01, Navy Planning.
In later sessions, students will apply the NPP, and critical and creative thought, to a fictional
scenario and develop selected portions of an operations order.

B. Objectives:

Understand the Navy Planning Process, its linkage to Operational Art and problem
solving, and orders development.
Comprehend the similarities between the NPP and the Joint Operational Planning
process.
Understand the purpose and process of mission analysis, COA development, COA
analysis (war gaming), COA decision and orders development.

C. Background:

The Navy Planning Process (NPP), as described in NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, is a
means to assist naval commanders and their staffs in analyzing problems and developing an
operational idea, design, and orders. The modern day Navy Planning Process is a maturation
of the Commanders Estimate of the Situation developed during the interlude between the
World Wars and used in WWII by the Navy. While the NPP considers information often
unique to the maritime environment, Navy planning procedures are very similar to those used
by the other services. Additionally while concentrating primarily at the tactical and low-
operational levels of war, the NPP also conforms to joint planning doctrine, which most often
is used at the operational and theater-strategic levels of war. The tenets of operational art are
the foundation of all of planning processes and are crucial to any operations success. In the
previous seminar, Analysis of VADM Kinkaids Operations Order, we discovered the vehicle
by which a commanders operational design is transmitted to those tasked with execution of
the tasks contained therein.

229
 The NPP consists of six discrete steps: mission analysis, course of action development,
course of action analysis (war gaming), course of action comparison and decision, plans and
orders development, and transition. Understanding the details of the NPP is necessary first
step for in the very near future; we will utilize the process to develop an operations order to
resolve a military problem based on a fictional scenario in and around the island of Borneo.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Dan Caldwell, USN, C-414.

D. Discussion Topics:

How is Operational Art captured in the Navy Planning Process?

The NPP is often portrayed as a rigid, serial, step by step process. Is it? Justify your
response.

Where does the NPP and JOPP differ significantly? Can the NPP be used in Joint
Operations?

E. Product:
None

F. Required Reading:

U. S. Department of the Navy. Navy Planning. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 5-01.
Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy, December 2013. Read 1-1 thru 5-6. (Issued).

U. S. Naval War College. Sound Military Decision. U. S. Naval War College. Newport,
RI: Naval War College Press, 1942. Review Part One, Chapter 1, Command and its
Problems and Chapter II, Mental Processes and Human Tendencies. Read Part One
Chapter V, The Four Steps in the Solution of a Military Problem. (NWC 6047).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 5-0: Joint
Operation Planning. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.: 11 August
2011. Review pp. IV-1 to IV-44.

G. Supplementary Reading:

Department of the Air Force. Annex 3-0: Operations and Planning. McClelland AFB, AL:
Curtis Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education: 14 October 2011.

U. S. Army. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 5. The Operations Process. Washington,

D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. 17 May 2012.

230
U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-01. Marine Corps
Planning Process. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.
2010.

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 JMO-57

THE STRUGGLE FOR SEA CONTROL (Exercise)

He who commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as
little of the war as he will.

Francis Bacon, 1561-1626

A. Focus:

This session presents students the opportunity to apply the Navy Planning Process
(NPP) using a fictional crisis scenario in and around the island of Borneo. Students, as Joint
Force Maritime Component Commander staff members, will develop an Operations Order
(OPORD) that establishes local and temporal sea control and sets conditions for a forcible
entry operation onto the island of Borneo.

B. Objectives:

Employ the Navy Planning Process in resolving an ill-structured problem.

Gain an understanding and appreciation of the planning considerations associated with
the employment of a naval force in an Anti-Access / Area Demined (A2/AD)
environment.
Employ the concepts and principles of maritime command and control.
Create an Operations Order that captures the operational design developed by the
Planning Group.

C. Background:

Gaining a conceptual understanding of the Navy Planning Process, accomplished in

The Introduction to the Navy Planning Process earlier, is the first step in becoming a
maritime planner. During this exercise, students will expand their understanding of the NPP
through practical application. You will be assigned to a JFMCC staff Operations Planning
Group (OPG) and conduct the NPP following the receipt of a Warning Order (WARNORD).
More specifically, your OPG will leverage their understanding of the NPP, operational art,
naval warfare theory, and operational leadership and thinking to create an OPORD that
captures the Commanders operational idea/design.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Dan Caldwell, USN, C-414.

D. Discussion Topics:
None.

233
E. Products:

Students will, through a moderator led application of the NPP, develop an operational
design for gaining, maintaining, and exploiting sea control in an A2/AD environment in
order to project U. S. joint power onto the island of Borneo. The end product is an OPORD
(with Annexes A, (Task Organization) B (Intelligence), C (Operations), and J (Command and
Control)).

F. Required Reading:

Specific reading guidance will be assigned by moderators.

U. S. Naval War College. A Borneo Case Study for Expeditionary Warfare. Newport, RI:
Naval War College, April, 2015. (NWC 6036H). (Issued).

__________. Joint Military Operations Department. Forces/Capabilities Handbook.

Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2014. Scan. (NWC 3153P). (Issued).

__________. Selected U. S. Navy and The People Republic of China Army (Navy) (PLA(N))
Tactical Capability Handbook Slide Pack. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016.
Scan. (NWC 2164).

U. S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Navy Planning. Naval Warfare
Publication (NWP) 5-01. Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy, December 2013.
Scan. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Reading:

Department of the Air Force. Annex 3-0: Operations and Planning. McClelland AFB, AL:
Curtis Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, October 14, 2011.

U. S. Army. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 5. The Operations Process. Washington,

D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 17, 2012.

U. S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0: Joint Operation
Planning. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., August 11, 2011.

U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-01. Marine Corps
Planning Process. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps,
2010.

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 JMO-58

TABLETOP EXERCISE #5: CRITIQUING THE

OPERATIONS ORDER (Exercise)

My mental faculties remained in suspended animation while I obeyed

the orders of higher ups. This is typical with everyone in the military.

MajGen Smedley Butler USMC, 1933

A. Focus:

The purpose of an operations order is to translate the commanders decision into oral,
written, and/or graphic communication sufficient to guide implementation and promote
initiative by subordinates. The operations order, once completed, becomes the principal
means by which the commander expresses his or her decision, intent, and guidance. It is the
physical product of our intellects and our processes for understanding problems and coming
up with creative and innovative ways of resolving them. Previously, you analyzed and
critiqued the operations order that VADM Kinkaids staff developed for the seizure of Leyte.
During this session, you will again demonstrate critical thought by a through a critique of
another seminars operations order.

B. Objectives:

Analyze a commanders operational idea, the articulation of decisions, and how a

commander directs military operations through written operations orders.
Apply the order development process which includes preparation of the base order and
annexes, reconciliation, and crosswalks to the evaluation of another seminars operations
order.

C. Background:

Commanders are the most important participants in the planning process, with the
staff performing essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations. One of the
most important tasks of the staff is to clearly articulate the commanders operational
idea/design to subordinates in the form of an order. The development of the order begins
during mission analysis and continues throughout the planning process. The orders
development step; however, is the formal part of the process that communicates the plan to
subordinate units for execution. It is important to understand that operations orders are not
meant for those who write them but for those who receive and execute them. As such,
operations orders should be as clear, simple, and as concise as each situation permits.
This session provides yet another opportunity for critical thought. You will analyze
another seminars operations order to gain a better understanding of how an operations order
235
communicates a commanders operational idea/design to subordinatesand brief your
fellow seminar on your conclusions. The other seminar will do the same for your seminar.
At the conclusion of this seminar, students will be able to identify positive practices and
pitfalls in orders writing to improve future orders development and will have selected an
order for execution.

The point of contact for this session is LtCol J. P. Brown, USMC, C-403.

D. Discussion Topics:

Is the operations order clear and does it use simple, understandable English and proper
military (doctrinal) terminology?

Is the operations order concise and complete, stating all major tasks to subordinates clearly to
include the tasks purpose?

Is the affirmative form of expression used throughout to reinforce the authoritativeness of the
operations order?

Is the plan simple, eliminating all reasonable possibilities for misunderstanding?

Is the plan flexible? Does the operations order instruct only as far as conditions can be
reasonably foreseen?

Based on our understanding of mission command, evaluate the order from the perspective of
the ones tasked to execute it. Does it allow for initiative?

How well does the operations order express the commanders intent behind the ordered
actions to ensure the intelligent cooperation and initiative of subordinates?

To what extent does the operations order provide the necessary command organization and
clearly articulate command-and-support relationships and assign responsibilities?

To what extent is the operations order internally validmeaning are the annexes supportive
of the base plan mission, tasks, and specific coordinating instructions?

E. Products:

Seminars will provide candid, constructive feedback to the seminar whose order has
been critiqued. Students, led by the moderator team, will select one of the operations orders
for execution.

236
F. Required Reading:

U. S. Department of the Navy. Navy Planning. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 5-01.
Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy, December 2013. Review pp. 6-1 to 6-9, Scan
Appendix L. (Issued).

U. S. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Operation Planning, Joint
Publication (JP) 5-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, August 11, 2011. Read IV-44 to IV-
57, Scan Appendix A. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Depuy, William E., Concepts of Operation: the Heart of Command, the Tool of Doctrine,
Army 38, no. 8 (August 1988).

U. S. Army. The Operations Process. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5. Washington,

D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2012.

U. S. Department of the Navy. Navy Tactical Task List (NTTL). OPNAVINST

3500.38B/MCO 3500.26/USCG COMDTINST M3500.1B CH-1. 20 March 2008.
Navy Doctrine Library System website Tactical Task tab.
https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil/thinkmap/Thinkmap.aspx

U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Planning Process. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
(MCWP) 5-1. Washington, D.C., U. S. Marine Corps, 2010.

U. S. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)
Planning Formats and Guidance, CJCSM 3130.03. Washington, D.C.: October 18,
2012.

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238
 JMO-59

NAVAL OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR (Lecture)

Maritime security protects U. S. sovereignty and maritime resources,

supports free and open seaborne commerce, and counters weapons
proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, illegal exploitation of the
maritime environment, and unlawful seaborne immigration.

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 2015

A. Focus:

The focus of this lecture is on the range of activities that navies conduct in support of
national interests at sea that are short of war. The growing complexity and strategic
importance of todays globalized maritime domain suggests the need for a firm
understanding of the principles that underpin naval operations outside the context of high
intensity armed conflict.

B. Objectives:

Examine the objectives and methods of naval operations short of war.

Understand the role of the principle of legitimacy in naval operations short of war.

C. Background:

The role of naval power in circumstances short of war is much different today than it was
in the days of Mahan. Naval forces have always been used for non-war-fighting tasks during
times of peace, but naval activities short of war now can have strategic effects like never
before. The modern context is different from the last due to three factors: the impact of
globalization on maritime commerce, changes in the threat environment, and the evolution of
international maritime law.
The first of these, the impact of globalization on maritime commerce, has made the
global web of maritime trade more complex, more interdependent, and more vital to the
worlds economic well-being than ever before. It has also made the maritime transportation
system more vulnerable to disruption. Protecting this critical economic link is a vital national
interest and a pillar of global stability.
The second element that has changed the maritime operating environment is the evolution
of the threat. New technologies and the vulnerabilities of the increasingly interconnected
maritime transportation system have raised the potential impact of crime and terrorism to a
strategic level. Today, small sub-national groups and rogue states can create devastating
effects with far-reaching consequences.

239
 The third factor that makes the peacetime naval operating environment different today is
the continuing evolution of international maritime law. For centuries, international maritime
law was essentially restrictive in nature, aiming to impose a degree of fairness on the conduct
of belligerents. In recent years a number of treaties and agreements have changed the
dominant maritime law paradigm from one of separation to one of cooperation on matters of
common interest. A level of international maritime cooperation in pursuit of common
interests is possible today that would have been inconceivable a generation ago.
Success in this environment will depend on a firm understanding of the underlying
principles of contemporary naval operations short of war, especially where they differ from
the more familiar principles of naval warfare. Arguably the most important of these is the
principle of legitimacy. Naval activities short of war aim to influence behavior and their
efficacy often hinges on the activities being seen as legitimate. Legitimacy in turn is largely
contingent on the right choice of a regime of authority for action. Where the law of armed
conflict governs conduct during high intensity conflict, there is a broad and growing array of
legal regimes that both enable and constrain activities short of war. Choosing the right
regime of authority for action and fully understanding the implications of that choice can
make the difference between strategic success and failure.

The point of contact for this session is Professor I. T. Luke, C-431.

D. Discussion Topics:

Describe some of the tasks that make up the contemporary range of naval operations short of
war.

What are the objectives of the various naval operations short of war? How do these tasks
contribute to the furtherance of national interests at sea?

What features make the peacetime naval operating environment different from the wartime
environment? How should these influence the planning and conduct of naval operations short
of war?

What role does the principle of legitimacy play in naval operations short of war?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Luke, Ivan T. Legitimacy in the Use of Seapower Newport, RI: U. S. Naval War College,
Joint Military Operations Department, July 2015. (NWC 2133).

Vego, Milan. On Naval Power. Joint Force Quarterly, (3d Quarter, 2008): 8-17. (NWC
2070).

240
G. Supplementary Readings:

Cable, James. Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval

Force. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.

Eaglen, Mackenzie M., James Dolbow, Martin E. Andersen, and James J. Carafano. Securing
the High Seas: Americas Global Maritime Constabulatory Power. Heritage Special
Report SR-20. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2008.

Kraska, James. Grasping The Influence of Law on Sea Power. Naval War College
Review 62, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 73-83.

Luke, Ivan T. Lets Get Serious About Peacetime Ops, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
139, no. 10 (October 2013): 54-48.

__________. Naval Operations in Peacetime: Not Just Warfare Lite, Naval War College
Review 66, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 11-26.

Rubel, Robert C. Command of the Sea: An Old Concept Resurfaces in a New Form. U. S.
Naval War College Review 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 21-33.

Till, Geoffrey. A Changing Focus for the Protection of Shipping in The Strategic
Importance of Seaborne Trade and Shipping: A Common Interest of Asia Pacific, ed.
Andrew Forbes. Canberra, Australia: Sea Power Centre Australia, 2002.

__________. Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century. 3d ed. London and New
York: Routledge, 2013.

Truver, Scott C. Mines and Underwater IEDs in U. S. Ports and Waterways: Context,
Threats, Challenges, and Solutions Naval War College Review 61, no. 1 (Winter
2008): 106-127.

Vego, Milan. Employment of Naval Forces in Operations Short of War. Joint Military
Operations Department, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, RI. December 2009.

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 JMO-60

NAVAL SUPPORT OF FOREIGN POLICY (Seminar)

A man-of-war is the best ambassador.

Oliver Cromwell, September 1643

A. Focus:

This session will explain and analyze the use of one's naval forces in support of national
foreign policy (both national and under mandate by the United Nations). The focus of the
session is on advantages and disadvantages in the employment of naval forces as a tool of
foreign policy, the methods of naval diplomacy, and the use of naval forces in conflict
prevention and management.

B. Objectives:

Understand advantages and disadvantages in the employment of naval forces in

support of foreign policy.
Comprehend the main methods used in cooperative naval diplomacy.
Know the main methods in applying coercive naval diplomacy.
Understand main methods in the employment of naval forces in conflict prevention
management.

C. Background:

Navies have been used in support of foreign policy by all major powers throughout
history. In some situations naval forces can not only be the best but also the only instrument
available to a political authority in support of its foreign policy objectives. Their main
advantages are flexibility, mobility, and political symbolism. Naval forces have diverse
capabilities that can be quickly tailored to the situation at hand. They are also largely self-
sufficient and do not require extensive support from the land. Naval forces can be employed
in support of the countrys diplomatic initiatives in peacetime and time of crisis, or for naval
diplomacyactions aimed to create a favorable general and military image abroad, establish
ones rights in areas of interest, provide reassurance to allies and other friendly countries,
influence the behavior of other governments, threaten seaborne interdiction, and, finally,
threaten the use of lethal force. Deployment of naval forces during times of tension or crisis
to back up diplomacy and thereby pose an unstated but clear threat is what yet another tool
for statesmen, the use of a navy as coercive tool.
Navies are much more suitable than armies or air forces in their international
acceptability and ability to make the desired impact. They can be used symbolically to send a
message to a specific government while not in themselves posing a threat to an opponent.
243
When a stronger message is required, naval diplomacy can take the form of employment of
carefully tailored forces with a credible offensive capability, aimed to signal that a much
more capable force will follow; or it can give encouragement to a friendly country by
providing some reinforcement. The threat of the use of limited offensive action or coercion
might be designed to deter a possible aggressor or to compel him to comply with a
diplomatic demarche or resolution.
Employment of naval forces in support of foreign policy also has some inherent
limitations. Naval forces are generally more effective in influencing behavior of rational state
actors than no-state actors. Their effect is often less than desired if they are more or less
permanently deployed in a certain sea/ocean area. Naval forces are relatively slow to arrive
to the scene of action unless they are permanently deployed. Their effect is usually indirect
rather than direct. Their employment is rather unpredictable in their results. Deployment of
ones naval forces into the crisis area can actually cause more hostility not less. Naval forces
rarely present a looming menace the way ones ground force deployed in large number close
to the targeted country.
Naval forces can be used in naval diplomacy and conflict prevention and management.
Naval diplomacy is defined as the employment of ones naval forces to further foreign policy
objectives by influencing the thoughts and actions of foreign decision-makers and changing
their behavior. Distinction is made between cooperative and coercive naval diplomacy.
Cooperative naval diplomacy is aimed to visibly demonstrate the benefits to the targeted
country if it reacts favorably to peaceful demonstration of one's naval power. In general,
cooperative naval diplomacy consists of routine forward naval presence, sudden operational
deployments, exercises/maneuvers, and port visits (routine, operational, diplomatic).
Coercive naval diplomacy (or popularly called "gunboat diplomacy") is described as the
threat of the use or using a limited naval force to secure ones advantage or averting loss,
either in furtherance of an international dispute or against foreign nationals within the
territory or jurisdiction of their own state. In general, a coercive diplomacy seeks to reverse
actions which have already occurred. It consists of a combination of diplomatic actions and
the threat of, or the use of military force, including a naval force, to persuade an opponent to
adopt a certain pattern of behavior against his wishes. Coercive naval diplomacy does not
necessarily involve the use of lethal force. Its purpose including extracting diplomatic or
financial concessions, obtaining access to naval/air bases on foreign territory, prevent a proxy
of another power from obtaining access to a certain sea/ocean area, and rescue of one's
nationals. Coercive naval diplomacy requires the employment of one's naval forces in a
demonstrative manner and in discrete and controlled increments. The main methods of
coercive naval diplomacy are show the flag (sending a powerful warship or group of
warships to an unscheduled port visit), major naval exercises/maneuvers, operational
deployment into the crisis area, unilateral or multilateral naval demonstration, rescue
operations, and retaliatory raids.
Conflict prevention includes diverse military activities conducted either unilaterally or
collectively under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and are aimed at either preventing
escalation of disputes into armed conflict or at facilitating resolution of armed violence.
These actions range from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployment of naval forces.
Under the UN Charter, conflict prevention should be conducted with strict impartiality,
because all sides in a dispute have to agree to involve other countries as mediators. The main

244
methods for conflict prevention include threat of using a naval force, preemptive naval
deployment, sending additional forces to the crisis area, conducting intensive reconnaissance
of the crisis area, deploying a naval force close to the targeted country, public display of
one's naval power, drastic increase/reduction of combat readiness of one's naval forces, and
international naval demonstration. Naval forces, especially aircraft carrier strike groups and
amphibious task forces, have a greater chance of success in disputes among nation-states than
in ethnic conflict or civil war. To be effective, such a deployment should be accompanied by
a clear willingness on the part of the international community to use overwhelming force if
necessary. Otherwise, the preventive deployment of naval forces would rarely produce the
desired effect.
Crisis management calls often for controlled capacity for violence or threat of violence
resident in the ones naval forces ranging from benign influence to preventive deployments
in support of achieving political objectives. The main methods used during conflict
management are similar to those used in conflict preventionoperational deployments and
increasing the levels of combat readiness of ones naval forces. Optimally, each method
should contain several direct or indirect signals to be conveyed to the target decision makers,
and to friendly and neutral observers.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Milan Vego, C-426.

D. Discussion Topics:

Explain and discuss the key advantages in the employment of naval forces in support of
foreign policy. What are their disadvantages?

What are the main methods used in cooperative naval diplomacy?

Explain and analyze the main methods in applying coercive naval diplomacy.

What are the main methods in the employment of naval forces in conflict prevention and
management?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

Cassell, Joseph, F. Naval Preventive Diplomacy. Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army War College,
2001. (NWC 1211).

Rowlands, Kevin. "Decided Preponderance At Sea." Naval War College Review. Autumn
2012, Vol. 65, No. 4, 89-105. (NWC 1217).

Scarlett, Matthew. "Coercive Naval Diplomacy." Research Paper. Newport, RI: Joint
Military Operations Department, U. S. Naval War College, May 2009. (NWC 1120).

245
G. Supplementary Readings:

Alily, George. Naval Diplomacy: A Critical Component of National Power. Princeton, NJ:
Sungai Books, 2001.

Booth, Ken. Navies and Foreign Policy London: Routledge, 2014.

_________. Law, Force, and Diplomacy at Sea. Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1985.

Cable, James. Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991: Political Applications of Limited Force.

London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2nd ed., 1981.

Cassel, Joseph D. Jr. Naval Preventive Diplomacy. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War
College, 2001.

Dismukes, Brad and James M. McConnell. ed., Soviet Naval Diplomacy. NY: Pergamon
Press, 1979.

Ditzler, Brent A. Naval Diplomacy Beneath the Waves: A Study of Coercive Use of
Submarines Short of War. Graduate Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey,
CA. 1989. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a220400.pdf.

Forbes, Andrew, ed. Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Power Projection. Proceedings of the
Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Conference, 2013. Canberra: Sea Power Centre,
2014.

Hagan, Kenneth. American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889. Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1973.

Hendrix, Henry J. Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The U. S. Navy and the Birth of
the American Century. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009.

Le Mire, Christian. Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Drivers and Challengers.
London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

Lerner, Michael B.. The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign
Policy. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2002.

Mandel, Robert. "Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy." International Studies Quarterly,

Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 1986).

Matzke, Rebecca Berens. Deterrence through Strength: British Naval Power and Foreign
Policy under Pax Britannica. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2011.

246
McConnell, James M. and Anne M Kelly. Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-
Pakistani Crisis. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, Professional Paper No.
108, February 1973.

Wills, John E. China and Maritime Europe, 1500-1800: Trade, Settlement, Diplomacy, and
Missions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

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248
 JMO-61

HOMELAND SECURITY (Seminar)

This maritime strategy describes how we will design, organize, and

employ the Sea Services in support of our national, defense and homeland
security strategies.

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 2015

A. Focus:

This seminar focuses on the contributions of naval forces to the task of securing the
United States homeland against irregular maritime threats. This session includes a practical
exercise to explore the capabilities and tactics of naval forces when responding to a
developing maritime terrorism scenario.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the vulnerability of the U. S. homeland to irregular maritime threats.

Understand the tactics and capabilities of naval forces that apply to the task of protecting
the homeland.

C. Background:

The U. S. homeland is vulnerable to a range of potential maritime asymmetric threats

including terrorism, illicit trafficking, trans-national crime, and environmental damage. The
job of securing our maritime borders against these threats is challenging for a number of
reasons. For one, the immensity of our maritime borders alone makes the task daunting. The
United States has over 95,000 miles of coastline and 360 seaports. Additionally, the nature
of the maritime operating environment makes the task of discriminating between potential
threats and legitimate users of the sea very difficult. Additionally, with the U. S. economy
highly dependent on the free flow of maritime trade, there is an economic imperative of not
interfering with legal commerce. Further complicating the task, no single U. S. department,
service, or agency has overall responsibility for maritime security although the Navy and the
Coast Guard share much of the load.
As stated in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21), U. S. naval forces
aim to interdict and defeat threats as far away from the homeland as possible. This assumes,
of course, the threats are identified early. Maritime domain awareness is the key to early
threat identification. Defeating threats far from the homeland also assumes that naval forces
are positioned forward to respond. Forward naval presence is cited in CS21 as a fundamental
principle for just this reason.

249
 Defeating irregular maritime threats requires different tactics and capabilities than high
intensity naval combat, and different principles apply. Most irregular maritime threats call for
a law enforcement-like response rather than more conventional military action. As such the
perceived legitimacy of such actions often depends on the choice of an appropriate regime of
authority and acting in a way that is consistent with that authority, particularly in the use of
force.

The point of contact for this session is Professor I. T. Luke, C-431.

D. Questions:

Describe the range of potential irregular maritime threats against the United States homeland.
Which of these threats represents the greatest risk or vulnerability, and why?

Explain the aspects of the maritime domain that make it difficult to secure the U. S.
homeland against irregular maritime threats.

What is maritime domain awareness and why is it so hard to achieve?

Describe the objectives and methods used by naval forces to secure the homeland against
irregular maritime threats. How do naval tactics differ between homeland security and
conventional naval combat?

How does the principle of legitimacy apply to maritime homeland security?

Is maritime security the same as maritime superiority or sea control? Why or why not?
Does it matter?

E. Products.
None.

F. Required Readings:

Luke, Ivan T. U. S. Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department. The
Challenges of Maritime Homeland Security and Defense. Newport, RI: Naval War
College, January 2013. (NWC 3148C).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Allen. Thad. Friend or Foe? Tough to Tell. U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 134, no. 10
(Oct 2008): 14-19.

Greenberg, Michael D., et. al. Maritime Terrorism, Risk and Liability. Santa Monica, CA:
The Rand Corporation, 2006.

250
Jones, Eric C. and Joseph E. Vorbach. The Maritime Domain Awareness Conundrum.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 137, no. 10 (Oct 2011): 28-33.

Luke, Ivan T. Naval Operations in Peacetime: Not Just Warfare Lite Naval War College
Review 66, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 11-26.

___________ . Lets Get Serious About Peacetime Ops. U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
139, no. 10 (Oct 2013): 54-58.

Parfomak, Paul W. and John Fritelli. Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks, and
Protection Priorities. CRS Report for Congress RL 33787. Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, 2007.

Till, Geoffrey. Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 3d ed. London and New
York: Routledge 2013.

The White House. National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan for the National Strategy for
Maritime Security. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. December, 2013

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 JMO-62

COMBATING PIRACY (Seminar)

The Navy has been involved in various approaches to suppressing or

eliminating piracy. Consistently, the most effective method has been to attack
and destroy the pirate base of operations. While the most effective, this is the
most difficult, politically.

Peter M. Swartz and Christine Fox,

Piracy and the United States Navy,
Canadian National Review, 2005

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the recent increase in piracy and examines the degree to which
the U. S. military may effectively address the problem of piracy. The seminar examines the
current issues regarding increased piracy in the East African areas and possible maritime
approaches to the problem at the operational level.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the historical concepts of piracy and its more modern applications.
Comprehend the military and non-military consequences of piracy and what those
ramifications imply for operational planners.
Examine and understand the challenges of combating piracy by U. S. and coalition forces
working in coordination with other organizations (such as the UN).
Examine the considerations involved with planning joint operations to deal with complex
adaptive systems.
Comprehend the relationships between state fragility and maritime security.

C. Background:

Piracy, an international crime consisting of illegal acts of violence, detention, or

depredation committed for private ends, and the pirates who commit it has been a scourge of
the global maritime environment throughout history. Attempting to gain wealth and power,
this seaborne scourge has attacked merchant shipping and coastal communities throughout
the world. While pirates typically operated independently, they have cooperated with
governments to attack the maritime economy of other hostile states. Pirate fleets threatened
Mediterranean shipping lanes in ancient times and had to be forcibly eliminated by Roman
legions and fleets. Weaker maritime powers often supported pirates as an inexpensive
investment that could harm another states economy while simultaneously adding wealth to
their own. Letters of marquee and reprisal were issued in times of war to adventurous
253
civilian mariners, allowing them to attack the Kings enemies while concurrently turning a
profit. Nations discovered that pirates were much harder to eradicate after conventional
conflict had ended, causing the European maritime powers to devote considerable time and
force to eradicate the menace they had helped create. During the rampant imperialism of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European nations conducted numerous minor operations
to quell or suppress piracy in their colonies, permitting the unfettered flow of seaborne
commerce back to homeland. The combination of advanced naval technology, numerous
bases and dedicated naval forces provided the means to suppress piracy throughout most of
the world during the twentieth century.
Despite these advances, piracy returned to the headlines following the end of the Cold
War. Increasing global maritime trade, greater numbers of weaker states unable to control
their maritime expanses, and decreasing global naval consensus to enforce the freedom of the
seas allowed pirates to occupy ungoverned niches from which to assail merchant shipping.
Attacking ships in important maritime chokepoints, pirates gained greater visibility from
maritime insurance institutions and shipping firms. Desiring to maintain the free flow of
trade and energy resources, naval forces were tasked to respond to this new, yet ancient,
maritime threat.
The waters off of the Horn of Africa are perhaps the perfect storm for piracy. Here, a
nexus of fragile and vulnerable states, a vital maritime chokepoint, and large numbers of
undefended merchant vessels provide a happy hunting ground for pirates. International
efforts to prevent and suppress piracy have achieved some successes, but the pirates are still
able to successfully attack and seize ships. The establishment of a Combined Task Force to
deal with the problem may be an important first step, but the operational commander must be
able to use all elements of national power (from lawyers to Marines) to mitigate the threat.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Paul Povlock, C-410.

D. Discussion Topics:

What are the most effective tactics to use against pirates?

Does the aggregation/disaggregation of naval forces for counter-piracy operations work the
same way as for defeating conventional military threats?

Historical case studies suggest that the best way to eliminate piracy is to strike at the pirate
bases, yet this has not been attempted in the Horn of Africa. Why not?

How does the concept of legitimacy affect operations to combat piracy?

Explain the impact of treating pirates as criminals as compared to unlawful combatants.

Is piracy maritime terrorism? How does the operational commander distinguish the
differences?

254
What are some of the challenges of setting up an operational level command to deal with
piracy in the Horn of Africa?

Should a United Nations-led intervention be the preferred option of choice to deal with
piracy in the Horn of Africa?

What other sources of national power might be employed to support military forces in the
mitigation of piracy in the region?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

Murphy, Martin. 2012. Piracy. CIWAG case study series 2011-2012, eds. Andrea Dew and
Marc Genest. Newport, RI: U. S. Naval War College, Center on Irregular Warfare
and Armed Groups. Read pp. 12-72. (NWC 4142).

G. Supplementary Reading:

Alexander, John. Piracy: The Best Business Model Available. JSOU Report. McDill AFB,
Tampa, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2013.

Chalk, Peter. The Maritime Dimension of International Security. RAND Report. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2008.

Chalk, Peter, Laurence Smallman, and Nicholas Burger. Countering Piracy in the Modern
Era. RAND Report. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009.

Genovese, Scott. The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan: The Unified U. S.
Maritime response to Maritime Piracy. Proceedings of the Marine Safety and
Security Council 69, no.1 (Spring 2012): 56-57.

Hastings, Justin V. and Sarah G. Phillips. Maritime Piracy Business Networks and
Institutions in Africa. African Affairs 114, no. 457 (2015).

Kraska, James. Coalition Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
Cooperative Strategy 28 (2009): 197-216.

Kraska, James and Brian Wilson. Somali Piracy: A Nasty Problem, a Web of Responses.
Current History, (2009).

__________. Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword. World Policy Journal (Winter
2008/2009): 41-52.

255
Liss, Carolin. The Privatisation of Maritime Security-Maritime Security in Southeast Asia:
Between a Rock and a Hard Place? Working Paper, Perth Australia: Asia Research
Center, 2007.

Mller, Bjrn, Hoist the Jolly Roger: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Naval Strategy
(preliminary version, 16 November 2008).

__________. Piracy, Maritime Terrorism, and Naval Strategy. Copenhagen: Danish

Institute for International Studies, 2009.

OMeara , Richard M. Maritime Piracy in the 21st Century: A Short Course for U. S. Policy
Makers. Journal of Global Change and Governance 1, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 1-8.

Swartz, Peter M. U. S.-Greek Naval Relations Begin: Antipiracy Operations in the Aegean
Sea. Alexandria, VA: Center for Strategic Studies, 2003.

Swartz, Peter M. and Christine Fox. Piracy and the United States Navy. Draft.
Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 2005.
http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/pdf/Schwartz-Fox_Dec08.pdf (accessed 16 November
2010).

United Nations Security Council. On Fight Against Piracy And Armed Robbery At Sea
Off The Coast Of Somalia. S/Res/1851. (2008).

__________. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea. 1983. Articles 100-106 and 111.

U. S. Department of the Navy. Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, The Commanders

Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy,
2007.

U. S. Government Accountability Office. Maritime Security, Actions Needed to Assess and

Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering
Piracy off the Horn of Africa. Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2010.

U. S. National Security Council. Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership &
Action Plan. Washington, D.C.: NSC, 2008.

U. S. Navy, U. S. Marine Corps, U. S. Coast Guard. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U. S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
Guard. March 2015.

__________. Naval Operations Concept 2010, Implementing the Maritime Strategy.

Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2010.

256
Vego, Milan. Counter-Piracy: An Operational Perspective. Newport, RI: Naval War
College, 2009.

Weir, Gary. Fish, Family, and Profit. Naval War College Review 62, no. 3 (Summer
2009): 15-29.

The White House. The National Strategy for Maritime Security. Washington, D.C.: The
White House, September 2005.

__________.United States Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan. Washington,
D.C.: The White House, June 2014.

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 JMO-63

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/

DISASTER RELIEF (Seminar)

In August 2010, the NavyMarine Corps team once again

aggregated two ARG/MEUs in that region, but this time for the purpose of
conducting humanitarian assistance operations in the wake of flooding
caused by torrential rains in Pakistan.

A Cooperative Strategy for 21ST Century Seapower, 2015

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the military mission area of Foreign Humanitarian

Assistance, Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) operations. Sometimes conducted as an immediate
response effort after an earthquake, tsunami, or other natural disaster, and other times as part
of more complex, longer-term contingency operations, FHA/DR is an important element in
the spectrum of military operations for which the joint force commander must plan.
FHA/DR missions differ from other missions in a number of ways. For example, military
forces participating in FHA/DR are not in the lead, but rather operate in support of the larger
U. S. effort, led by the U. S. Agency of International Developments Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which sets the objectives, priorities, and exit criteria. Also,
FHA/DR missions are logistics-intensive; the joint logistics function is normally the main
effort.

B. Objectives:

Appreciate the complexity of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations, the range

of potential military FHA/DR tasks, and the factors which should be considered when
planning or executing FHA/DR.
Understand the role of USAID/OFDA as the lead federal agency for foreign humanitarian
assistance and the military-USAID/OFDA relationship during FHA/DR operations.
Understand the capabilities and limitations specific to the use of expeditionary maritime
forces in FHA/DR.

C. Background:

It is often in the national interest of the United States to render assistance when other
nations experience large scale human suffering due to natural or man-made disasters. Aside
from altruistic or moral motivations, U. S. interests are often furthered by such relief efforts.
The 2004 post-earthquake and tsunami Humanitarian relief operations in Sumatra is an
example where an opportunity existed to cast U. S. personnel, especially U. S. military
259
personnel, in a positive light in a nation of strategic interest where we would otherwise have
limited / no access. Such operations sometimes constitute the most effective kind of strategic
communications.
While the focus of this session is on the militarys role in foreign disaster response, it
is important to recognize that the U. S. military only participates in a fraction of the instances
where the United States provides assistance. In recent decades the United States government
has responded to approximately 50-60 foreign disasters a year, while the U. S. military
participated in only about 10 percent of these. The military normally becomes involved only
when a particular military capability is needed and offers a significant advantage. The
Department of State is the lead (supported) agency for U. S. foreign disaster relief efforts,
and exercises this responsibility primarily through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA), a subcomponent of the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
When the U. S. military conducts FHA/DR operations, it is done in support of
USAID/OFDA. Most often, the preponderance of U. S. disaster response material assistance
is provided by civilian organizations, contractors and NGOs, under contract to OFDA.
Whether the military is involved or not, a defining characteristic of disaster relief FHA is
surprise; and the primary challenge is factor time, or the lack thereof. Obviously we can
never know in advance when or where a disaster will strike, so other than preparing based on
historical trends and known vulnerabilities; we can never be fully ready before the crisis
occurs. Additionally, the very nature of disaster response is that speed of response is crucial.
Disaster victims need help now. Planning time for disaster relief operations is, therefore,
almost always minimal; typically often a matter of days, if not hours. To a large degree, a
delayed response is a failed response. When the military is called to assist with foreign
disaster relief operations, it is often because one or more military capabilities can help
address the issue of factor time.
The challenge of factor time is exacerbated by the inescapable fact that situational
awareness in the initial stages of disaster response is almost always poor. Key planning
factors such as the extent of the suffering, priority of needs, status of infrastructure,
availability of resources, and even the political landscape are often unknown or
inaccurately reported early-on. When coupled with the no-notice nature of these operations,
this means that we often end up deploying with whatever forces are readily available, rather
than those actually needed, and conducting our planning very much on the fly. The 2011
Pacific Tsunami, the 2010 Haitian earthquake, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and the 2005
Pakistani earthquake demonstrate how these challenges shape DoD FHA disaster response
operations.
Planning for FHA is particularly challenging. All geographic combatant commanders
maintain functional plans for humanitarian assistance. However, the nearly infinite variation
in potential disaster types and locations in a combatant commanders AOR renders it
impossible to pre-plan responses much beyond the cursory level. Once a disaster occurs,
speed of response is of the essence, and planning is often done on the fly. Given these
constraints, a solid understanding of the fundamental factors and considerations unique to the
HA mission is crucial.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel Greg Bell, USA, C-408.

260
D. Discussion Points:

Describe the range of military tasks that might be useful in FHA/DR. What military
components could provide those tasks?

What characteristics of expeditionary maritime forces make them particularly useful for
FHA/DR response? What limitations constrain their use in this role?

When planning for or executing FHA/DR, do any of the joint functions deserve more or less
emphasis than for other types of operations?

To what degree does Operational Art apply to missions such as FHA where there is no
sentient enemy to analyze and attack?

What are the key considerations for developing and executing an exit strategy for FHA/DR
operations?

E. Products.
None.

F. Required Readings:

OConnor, Cathal. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster-Relief Operations:

Lessons Learned and Best Practices. Naval War College Review 65, no. 1 (Winter
2012): 152-160. (NWC 3163).

Shaw, Eric. U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Operation
Unified Assistance: 2004 Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami Humanitarian Relief.
Newport, RI: Naval War College, May 2013. (NWC 6050).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance,
Joint Publication (JP) 3-29. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 3 Jan 2014. Read Executive
Summary and Chapters I and III.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Braithwaite, Kenneth J. U. S. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: Keys to Success in

Pakistan. Joint Force Quarterly, 44 (2007): 19-22.

Ear, Jessica. Education Crucial to future U. S, HADR Missions. Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies (accessed 7 January 2015). http://www.apcss.org/education-crucial-
to-future-u-s-hadr-missions.

261
Elleman, Bruce A. Shaping the Maritime Environment: An Operational History of the U. S.
Navys Role in Unified Assistance. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 17
August 2006.

__________. Waves of Hope, The U. S. Navys Response to the Tsunami in Northern

Indonesia. Newport Paper 28. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, February
2007.

Headquarters, Department of the Army. Working With the Office of U. S. Foreign Disaster
Assistance. GTA 41-01-006, October 2007.

Natsios, Andrew S. Commanders Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian

Emergencies. Parameters 26 (Summer 1996): 50-66.

United Nations. The Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support United Nations
Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies. New York: United Nations
Headquarters. March 2003.

U. S. Agency for International Development. Bureau for Humanitarian Response. Office of

Foreign Disaster Assistance. Field Operations Guide (Version 4.0, September 2005).

U. S. Institute of Peace, Taking It To The Next Level: Civilian-Military Cooperation in

Complex Emergencies, Virtual Diplomacy Initiative.

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Inter-organizational Coordination

during Joint Operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-08. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 24
June 2011.

Vohr, James A. Haiti Disaster Relief: Logistics is the Operation. Military Review (July-
August 2011): 76-82.

Wilhelm, Phillip. USAID and DoD Roles in Foreign Disaster Response Joint Center for
Operational Analysis Journal IX, no. 3 (September 2007): 30-34.

262
 JMO-64

INSURGENCY (Seminar)

In great campaigns, the opponents system is understood; he is guided by

like precedents, and is governed by the same code; it is only when some great
reformer of the art of war springs up that it is otherwise. But each small war
presents new features, and these features must if possible be foreseen or the
regular troops will assuredly find themselves in difficulties and meet with
grievous misfortune.

Colonel C. E. Callwell,
Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice, 1906
___________________________________________________________________________

A. Focus:

This session begins a discussion of the so-called Small Wars. Our first session
focuses on the fundamental characteristics and types of insurgencies. By framing the
operational environment to distill the root causes of insurgency, students will better
understand the challenge of designing counterinsurgency operations. Using elements of
operational art and analytical frameworks adapted to evaluate complexity, students will gain
the capacity to understand the operational environment and analyze the nature and typology
of a problem that clearly manifests itself as a Complex Adaptive Systeminsurgencies.
This, in turn, will enable them to devise effective operational plans for countering that
insurgency.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the role of violence in revolutionary warfare.

Comprehend the joint doctrine perspective on insurgency.
Using theory, doctrines, and analysis of historical case studies, understand the common
causes of insurgency, the fundamental structure of insurgencies, and how insurgencies
are generally sustained.

C. Background:

Although the U. S. military has historically participated in numerous conflicts against

insurgents, it has been far more enthusiastic about conflict at the upper end of the range of
military operations. Conflicts involving one (or more) insurgencies drag on for years, are rife
with political/strategic/operational challenges, and are the least likely to respond to the
conventional application of military force. We may safely assume that insurgencies will
continue, although their environment, specific forms, and tactics may change. Military
officers and members of civilian agencies must understand how to operate in politically
263
uncertain and ambiguous environments against weak foes that play by very different rules.
To successfully fight an insurgency, one should understand the nature of the
insurgencywhat caused it, what sustains it, and so forth. This is difficult, as while
insurgencies share certain fundamental characteristics, each insurgency is unique. Historical,
cultural, political, and economic factors must be recognized as integral to a meaningful
analysis. A design methodology may be of particular use in identifying the complex,
adaptive nature of the environment, the root causes of the conflict, possible objectives, and
possible operational approaches.
Insurgency is discussed over the next two sessions in order to make connections and
draw conclusions about insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in the contemporary
environment. This session, however, is devoted to the theory and analysis of insurgency.
The next session, Counterinsurgency focuses on both understanding and countering
insurgencies through the examination of historical case studies.

The points of contact for this session are Colonel Chris Connolly, USA, C-431 and Captain
Carl Tiska, USN, C-426.

D. Discussion Topics:

Explain the relationship between the existence of an insurgency and the perceived legitimacy
of a host nation government or occupying force. How can a government establish legitimacy?

Explain the relationship of the operational factors of time, space, and force with an objective
involving an insurgent adversary.

Describe the factors that must be present for an insurgency to develop and possibly succeed.
Which do you feel are the most important? Why?

Explain how environmental factors determine insurgent objectives, approaches, and access to
resources.

Describe how the political / social / cyber environment can be used by an insurgent to
achieve their objectives.

Some argue that in the future, insurgencies will increase in frequency while incidents of
conventional warfare will recede. Do you agree with this outlook? Why?

How has the global al-Qaeda threat differed from earlier insurgencies (or does it differ)?

E. Products
None

264
F. Required Readings:

Fall, Bernard B. The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Naval
War College Review (Winter 1998): 46-57. [Originally published in the April 1965
NWCR from a lecture delivered at the Naval War College on December 10, 1964].
(NWC 3097).

Murphy, Martin N. The Blue, Green, and Brown: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency on the
Water. Contemporary Security Policy 28 (April 2007): 63-75. (NWC 4041).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Counterinsurgency, Joint

Publication (JP) 3-24. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, November 22, 2013. Scan: Chapter I
and Read: Chapter II and III-1 thru III-3.

Waghelstein, John, and Donald Chisholm. Analyzing Insurgency. Newport: Naval War
College, 2006. (NWC 3099).

Case Studies:

Greenberg, Lawrence M. Extract from "The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a

Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955." Washington,
D.C.: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1987. (NWC 3102A).

Povlock, Paul A. A Guerilla War at Sea: The Sri Lankan Civil War. Small Wars Foundation,
2011. (NWC 3189).

Waghelstein, John D. Military-to-Military Contacts: Personal ObservationsThe El

Salvador Case. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2005. (NWC 3038).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Asprey, Robert B. War in the Shadows. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975.

Callwell, C. E. Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. 3d ed. Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press, 1996.

Metz, Steven and Raymond Millen. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century:
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response. Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army Strategic Studies
Institute, 2004.

ONeill, Bard. Insurgency and Terrorism. London: Brasseys, 2005.

265
Record, Jeffrey. Beating Goliath, Why Insurgencies Win. Washington, D.C.: Potomac
Books, Inc., 2007.

Springer, Phillip B., and Marcello Truzzi, eds. Revolutionaries on Revolution. Pacific
Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1973.

Tse-Tung, Mao. On Guerilla Warfare. 2d ed. Edited by Samuel B. Griffiths. Champaign, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 2000.

United States Marine Corps. Small Wars Manual. With an Introduction by Ronald Schaffer.
Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1996. [Originally Published 1940].

266
 JMO-65

COUNTERINSURGENCY (Seminar)

Even a well-crafted COIN campaign is not a silver bullet if the strategic level
policy is flawed.

Christopher Tuck
___________________________________________________________________________

A. Focus:

This session complements the previous seminar, Insurgency and addresses the
challenge of designing counterinsurgency operations. Having learned to analyze an
insurgency, the aim of this session is for the student to appreciate the aggregation and
integration of methodsfrom design through operational art to current doctrinerequired to
develop an effective counterinsurgency operation.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the fundamental elements of planning for and conducting COIN operations.
Comprehend the relevance of various elements of operational art in planning COIN
operations.
Apply analytical frameworks for analyzing counterinsurgency operational approaches.
Using theory, doctrines, and analysis of historical case studies, compare the relative
effectiveness of military power against the other instruments of national power in COIN.

C. Background:

Since the end of World War II, the U. S. military has compiled a record of mixed
results in counterinsurgency operations. There are a variety of reasons for this and none are
conclusive. U. S. involvement in counterinsurgency has often failed for political reasons or
mismatched strategy. Many argue the reason that senior military leaders struggle with the
challenges of counterinsurgency operations is that they offer a completely different type of
complexity than conventional operationscomplexities that do not fit easily into Joint or
Service planning processes.
Counterinsurgency operations involve greater uncertainty and ambiguity because
factor time often encompasses a decadeor decades. Moreover, shifting social and political
issues make operational assessments difficult to judge, even in hindsight. Theory and
doctrine clearly underscore the impotency of conventionally strong militaries in combating
insurgents; the military is then often cast in a supporting role to civilian agencies during
counterinsurgency. Ironically, the military often remains responsible for the heavily lifting in
a whole of government operational approach; such contradictions are often the norm in
COIN operations. Finally, as discussed in the insurgency session, astute adversaries
267
constantly adapt at the tactical and operational levels, often deliberately remaining weak
while presenting the appearance of defeat. Consequently, it follows that information
operations figure prominently in counterinsurgency efforts, to include the cogent use of the
cyber domain.
This session focuses on developing a successful operational design for COIN
operations. It provides students with the opportunity to employ analytical frameworks to
evaluate specific cases of insurgency / counterinsurgency, some of which succeeded, failed,
or is ongoing. A historically grounded understanding of the basic characteristics of effective
counterinsurgency efforts will provide a foundation for designing future counterinsurgency
operations.

The points of contact for this session are Colonel Chris Connolly, USA, C-431 and Captain
Carl Tiska, USN, C-426.

D. Discussion Topics:

What characteristics are common to effective counterinsurgency operations? Which do you

consider the most important?

How do operational planners determine the role of military force in COIN operations? How
do planners effectively integrate other instruments of national power?

Some insurgencies operate in the maritime domain, ranging from inshore and near-shore
waters to offshore operations. What advantages do insurgents gain from operating in the
maritime domain? What challenges do insurgents face when operating in maritime domain?

In what ways can naval forces contribute to counter-insurgency operations?

Why do insurgencies with similar characteristics call for very different counterinsurgency
methods and operations? How does this impact development of doctrine?

Does the application of operational art differ between COIN operations and conventional
warfare? Why (and in what ways) is operational design different?

Why is it difficult for operational commanders to design effective COIN operations?

E. Products:

Students will read the case studies below and brief the seminar on relevant insurgency/
COIN practices.

268
F. Required Readings:

Dunigan, Molly, Dick Hoffmann, Peter Chalk, Brian Nichiporuk, and Paul DeLuca.
Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012. Read: pp. 1-49 and 94-96. (NWC 3205).

Peterson, Terrence. "Myth-Busting French Counterinsurgency." War on the Rocks,

December 3, 2015. (NWC 3199).

Sepp, Kalev I. Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review Volume LXXXV, No.
3 (May-June 2005): 8-12. (NWC 3119).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Counterinsurgency, Joint

Publication (JP) 3-24. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, November 22, 2013. Read: Chapter
III-4 thru III-25, Chapter V-1 thru V-7, and Scan Appendix D.

Case Studies (Continued from JMO-64):

Greenberg, Lawrence M. Extract from "The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a

Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955." Washington,
D.C.: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1987. (NWC 3102A).

Povlock, Paul A. A Guerilla War at Sea: The Sri Lankan Civil War. Small Wars Foundation,
2011. (NWC 3189).

Waghelstein, John D. Military-to-Military Contacts: Personal ObservationsThe El

Salvador Case. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2005. (NWC 3038).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Beckett, Ian F. W. Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: Guerillas and Their

Opponents since 1750. London: Routledge, 2001.

Callwell, C. E. Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. 3d ed. London: General Staff
War Office, 1906.

Cassidy, Robert M. War, Will, and Warlords: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and

Pakistan, 2001-2011. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2012.

__________. Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly. Military Review (September
October 2002): 4153.

Cordesman, Anthony H. The Iraq War and Its Strategic Lessons for Counterinsurgency.
Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 December 2005.

269
Croziat, Victor J. Naval Forces in River War. U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 92
(October 1966): 52-61.

McClintlock, Robert. The River War in Indochina. U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 80

(December 1954): 1303-11.

Sarkesian, Sam C. Americas Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons
for the Future. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984.

Tomes, Robert R. Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare. Parameters (Spring 2004): 16

28.

U. S. Marine Corps. Small Wars Manual. With an Introduction by Ronald Schaffer.

Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1996. [Originally Published 1940].

Vick, Alan J., Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Gill, and Karl P. Mueller. Air Power
in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and
Assistance Missions. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006.

270
 JMO-66

HYBRID AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE,

AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (Seminar)

If the war [between Israel and Hizballah] showed anything, it was how
insidious the effect of professional lingo can be. How does one distinguish
strategic intelligence superiority from operational-tactical intelligence
dominanceso thick was the nonsense, and such the resulting verbal confusion,
that the need to reform officer training and educationbecame one of the
cardinal lessons to emerge from the conflict.

Martin Van Creveld, The Changing Face of War

___________________________________________________________________________

A. Focus:

This session complements the preceding two seminars on Insurgency and

Counterinsurgency by examining the concepts of hybrid warfare and unconventional warfare
in order to address the challenges of determining the patterns of conflict in the contemporary
environment as well as the challenges of shaping an effective operational approach for
seemingly incomprehensible (and therefore insoluble) conflicts. While the nature of warfare
arguably remains unchanged, its character, or how warfare is waged, changes on an
evolutionary (and sometimes revolutionary) scale. This session will additionally examine the
role of civil-military operations as part of a military campaign, particularly counter-
insurgencies.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend evolving trends in warfare and the implications of these for operational
planning and execution.
Understand contemporary notions of hybrid warfare and unconventional warfare, and
their effect on joint doctrine.
Evaluate the effectiveness of contemporary state and non-state actors in achieving their
objectives through use of hybrid warfare and unconventional warfare operational
approaches.
Understand the nature of civil-military relations at the operational level of war.
Examine the Joint Force Commanders responsibilities for Civil-Military Operations.
Understand how civil-military operations fit into the overall campaign plan or operational
plan and how its effective use complements stability operations.

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C. Background:

Unconventional warfare and hybrid warfare are terms that are used to capture
multiple and evolving patterns of modern conflict. For example, strategists and military
experts struggle to categorize the current conflict in eastern Ukraine or the multiple conflicts
sweeping Syria /Northwestern Iraq. While the former example could be a state (Russia)
fomenting instability in another state (Ukraine) through unconventional means, the latter
includes a chaotic mix of insurgent groups vying for political control of Syria; internationally
recognized terrorist groups with opaque agendas; and non-state actors that are seeking to
establish regional political control irrespective of the international borders of several states.
In the past, conflicts such as these may not have mattered much to U. S. strategic
calculations. In todays global security environment, where second and third order effects are
not limited by geography, this is no longer true. Non-state actors and terrorist organizations
actively recruit and procure resources using information networks that span the globe and
easily cross language, culture, ethnic, and religious boundaries. Insurgent groups have a far
greater access to successfully co-opt external military and diplomatic support in order to
negate the traditional advantages possessed by adversarial government regular forces.
Weaker states increasingly are turning to the cyber domain in order to find asymmetric ways
to compete with stronger military and economic powers. Strong regional powers are using
unconventional warfare and proxy forces to pursue strategic objectives while avoiding
diplomatic and economic condemnation by the international community. While history may
provide comparable examples, most would agree that the exponential growth of computer
networking over the last 20 years has afforded new and innovative opportunities for armed
groups and organizations to successfully pursue their objectives while avoiding the
debilitating blows by strong, professional military forces such as the U. S. military.
Creating unity of effort among instruments of power is the essence of civil-military
operations. Civil-Military Operations are not a new phenomenon stemming from the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. In almost every conflict there has been some form of civilian-military
interface. Civil-Military Operations are conducted across the range of military operations,
but their real value is during the planning and transition to post-hostility operations and,
ultimately, the transition to conflict termination and retrograde operations. Regardless of the
type of mission, the current battle field finds a host of civilian agencies and organizations
working alongside military units. Intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental
organizations, civilian contractors, local governments, personnel from various agencies
within the U. S. Government are all present, as well as the civilian population living in the
area of the conflict. How the military interacts with these civilian personnel is critical to the
Joint Force accomplishing its objectives.

The points of contact for this session are Colonel Chris Connolly, USA, C-431 and Captain
Carl Tiska, USN, C-426.

D. Discussion Topics:

Are emerging trends in warfare new, or do they represent a return to historical ways of
prosecuting war?

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Discuss the common threads in several concepts of conventional, irregular, hybrid,
unconventional, political, and unrestricted warfare. How do these concepts differ?

How do irregular forces use Land, Sea, Air, and Cyber domains asymmetrically against a
state that employs traditional regular military forces?

How can the U. S. counter states engaging in unconventional warfare?

What complexities do hybrid warfare and unconventional warfare present to the joint force
commander and staff when conceptualizing military operations? Are existing planning
processes adequate for addressing these challenges?

How do effective civil-military operations contribute to unity of effort of effort in execution

of assigned missions?

Describe what civilians might be present in the operating environment and how might the
joint task force effectively work with them.

What is the role of civil affairs in staff planning and in executing COIN operations?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Boot, Max and Michael Doran. CFR Policy Innovation Memorandum 33 Political Warfare.
New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2013. (NWC 4152).

Crowell, Richard M. Analyzing Hybrid Warfare. Newport RI: Naval War College, 2015.
(NWC 3084C).

Ikins, Dexter The Shadow Commander. The New Yorker, September 30, 2013. (NWC
3026).

Hoffman, Frank G. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges. Joint Force Quarterly, No. 52 (1st
Quarter, 2009): 34-39. (NWC 7008).

Lacquement, Richard A. Integrating Civilian and Military Activities. Parameters 40, No. 1
(Spring 2010): 20-32. (NWC 3195).

Maxwell, David S. 'Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare? Small Wars

Journal, October 23, 2014. (NWC 3204).

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U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Civil-Military Operations. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-57, 11 September 2013. Read: II-14 to II-26, IV-1 to IV-13 and
Annex A to Appendix A, pp A-A-1 to A-A-6.

G. Supplementary Readings:

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Against the United States. Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 2004.

Blanchard, Christopher M. Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology. Washington, D.C.:

Congressional Research Service, 2005.

Gray, Colin. Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air
Force Symposium 2007: Counterinsurgency. 24-26 April 2007.

__________. Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
2006.

Hoffman, Frank G. Conflict in the 21st Century. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies,
Arlington VA, December 2007.

Krause, Michael G. Square Pegs for Round Holes: Current Approaches to Future Warfare
and the Need to Adapt. Working Paper No. 132. Australia: Land Warfare Studies
Centre, June 2007.

Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. Unrestricted Warfare: Chinas Master Plan to Destroy
America. Peking: Natraj Publishers. 2007.

Mattis, James N. Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 131 (November 2005): 18-19.

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 JMO-67

PEACE OPERATIONS (Seminar)

Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.

Dag Hammarskjld,
UN Secretary General, 1953-1961

A. Focus:

This session focuses on peace operations from an operational level perspective. It

considers the central issues of the evolution of peace operations, the role of peacekeepers in
conflict settings, UN peacekeeping missions globally and the basic principles of
peacekeeping. This session will approach peace operations as they are conducted today and
will also address how naval forces might be involved in peace operations.

B. Objectives:

Comprehend the evolution of peace operations since their inception in the late 1940s and
how the United States military might perform such an operation.
Comprehend the difference between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and
peacebuilding.
Understand the role of international organizations, especially the United Nations, in
exercising their responsibility to maintain international peace and security by conducting
peace operations.
Comprehend how naval forces might be involved in peace operations.
Comprehend how the United States might use peace operations to enhance foreign policy
by training peacekeepers or committing U. S. forces to peace operations;
Comprehend how other nations view peacekeeping and the value to their military.

C. Background:

The commitment of U. S. forces to peace operations (peacekeeping and peace

enforcement, peacemaking and peacebuilding) has proven controversial during the last few
decades. Of the two basic camps in this policy debate, one favors a broader use of U. S.
forces in many roles while the other reserves the role of the U. S. military for war fighting.
The issues of combat readiness, the flexibility in the use of force, command and control
arrangements, and the role of the U. S. military in the postCold War era have been and
remain an integral part of this debate. With U. S. involvement in Afghanistan waning after
over a decade of war, the Department of Defense is looking at the possibility of re-engaging
with U. S. participation in peacekeeping missions. Consider how might a geographic

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combatant command use peacekeeping to help end a conflict or stabilize a country emerging
from war?
This seminar will focus on peace operations as they are conducted mostly by the
United Nations, but also the role of regional organizations, such as NATO, in peace
operations. The United States has a long history of participating in peace operations and the
related stability operations (peace operations is a subset of stability operations). Shortly after
the end of the Cold War and during the Clinton Administration, the U. S. military was more
involved in peace operations. American forces found themselves deployed to the Sinai,
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo in a peacekeeping role. Even some American
peacekeepers were used in less known conflicts, which included Liberia, East Timor, the
Middle East and the Western Sahara.
After 9/11 and the commitment of U. S. forces to Afghanistan and Iraq, there was less
use of American forces in peace operations. Commitments to the Sinai and Kosovo,
however, remained for Army National Guard Forces. Yet globally, peace operations
conducted by the United Nations continued unabated and actually expanded. Historically, the
U. S. Army conducted more peace operations than the other services, but naval forces have
played various roles. Following World War I, U. S. naval forces were involved in what could
be labeled peace and stability operations in Turkey. Admiral Mark Bristol, USN, was
appointed the High Commissioner for U. S. activities in Turkey and the surrounding waters
of the Black Sea and the Straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles. For the Allies, the British High
Commissioner was largely in charge of the peace process brought about by the Armistice.
Admiral Bristol was appointed the senior U. S. diplomat for relations with Turkey. In this
capacity he was responsible for the U. S. management of the terms of the Armistice as well
as providing much needed relief supplies. He commanded all U. S. forces in Turkey which
included some ground elements and a dozen or more naval vessels, which included, at one
point, twelve destroyers.
U. S Marines were also involved in peace operations in Somalia (1992) and the initial
occupation of Kosovo (1999). The U. S. Navy played a huge role in bringing peace to the
civil war that erupted in Bosnia (1992-1995) and Kosovo (1999). Acting in support of a UN
Security Council Resolution, the U. S. Navy enforced sanctions against the Former Republic
of Yugoslavia that helped bring the warring parties to the negotiating table in Dayton, Ohio
(reading for this seminar). Similarly, the U. S. Navy played a key role through Operation
ALLIED FORCE which opened the door for a negotiated settlement with Serbia in 1999.
UN peacekeeping has evolved considerably since the first UN peacekeeping mission
in 1948. UN peace operations underwent a complete and thorough review after the failures
of peacekeepers in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. Since this review in 2000, UN
peacekeeping has dramatically improved. Consequently, the UN Security Council has
increasingly called upon military forces from around the globe to bring peace to war torn
regions. As of the end of April 2015 there were a little over 107,000 uniformed personnel
from 121 nations participating in 16 UN peacekeeping missions. To many, the UN is now
performing the mission given to it by the drafters of the UN Charter: save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war.
Given the large number of long-simmering intra-state and inter-state conflicts in the
world today and the increasing interconnectedness of economic and security issues across
states and regions, it is quite possible that the U. S. military will find itself planning and

276
executing peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. This session will expose students
to the challenges of modern day peace operations, familiarize them with the existing
doctrine, and increase their comprehension of the issues involved in planning and preparing
for peace operations. Additionally, this seminar will expose students to possible roles of
naval forces in peace operations.

The point of contact for this session is Professor G. Oliver, C-426.

D. Discussion Topics:

What is the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement? What operational
factors should be considered when planning for these missions?

What role does the United Nations play in international peacekeeping, and how does the UN
go about establishing a peacekeeping mission?

How do other nations view UN peacekeeping?

How might the Sea Services contribute to peace operations?

What is the Global Peace Operations Initiative and how does this program advance U. S.
foreign policy? Why would a Geographic Combatant Commander be concerned with peace
operations?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Curran, David. Training for Peacekeeping: Towards Increased Understanding of Conflict

Resolution, International Peacekeeping, March 2013. (NWC 3096).

Oliver, George. Evolution of International and UN Peacekeeping. Unpublished. (NWC

3008E).

Reddy, Kathleen. Operation SHARP GUARD: Lessons Learned for the Policy Maker and
Commander, Newport: U. S. Naval War College student paper, 13 June 1997.
(NWC 6049).

Siegel, Adam B. An Examination of Maritime Peace Operations, in James Wirtz and

Jeffrey Larsen, ed. Naval Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations: Stability from
the Sea, New York: Routledge, 2009. (NWC 6045).

U. S. Department of State. Global Peace Operations Initiative, Fact Sheet, Washington,

D.C.: U. S. State Department, June 17, 2015. (NWC 6043).

277
U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Peace Operations. Joint Publication
(JP) 3-07.3. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 1 August 2012. Read Executive Summary: vii
to xvii and scan Chapter 1.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Adebajo, Adekeye. UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan
Conflicts. Boulder, Colorado: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2011.

Beers, Henry P. United States Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters, 1919-1924.

Department of the Navy, Administrative Reference Service Report No. 2, June 1943.

Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin. Understanding Peacekeeping.
Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004.

Berman, Eric and Katie E. Sams. Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities.
Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000.

Daniel, Donald C.F., Patrick Taft, and Sharon Wiharta, ed. Peace Operations: Trends,
Progress, and Prospects. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008.

Durch, William J. ed. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative
Analysis. New York: St Martins Press, 1993.

__________. ed. UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s.
New York: St Martins Press, 1996.

__________. Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Institute of

Peace and Henry Stimson Center, 2006.

Fleitz Jr., Frederick H. Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Cause, Solutions, and U. S.
Interests. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

Headquarters, African Union. African Standby Force Peace Support Operations Doctrine.
Addis Ababa: African Union, 2006.

Hillen, John. Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations. Washington, D.C.:
Brasseys, 1998.

Oliver, George F. The Other Side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do
It, in Harvey Langholtz, Boris Kondoch, and Alan Wells ed., International
Peacekeeping Journal, Vol 8. Boston: Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004.

Pugh, Michael. Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: A Framework for United Nations
Operations, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994.

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Pushkina, Darya. A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping
Mission, International Peacekeeping, Vol 13, no 2, June 2006 pp 133-149.

Quinn, Dennis J. ed. Peace Support Operations and the U. S. Military, Washington, D.C.:
Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1994.

Sloan, James. The Evolution of the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping, Journal of Strategic
Studies, 37-5, 673-702.

Tardy, Thierry. A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace Operations,

International Peacekeeping, Vol 8, no 2, 152-167, 2011

Shawcross, William. Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeeping, Warlords, and a World of Endless
Conflict. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.

Staley, Robert S. Wave of the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping, New
York: International Peace Academy, 1992.

United Nations. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. New
York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008. Website:
http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_EN
G.pdf.

__________. United Nations Peace Operations: 2012 Year in Review. United Nations
Department of Public Information, UN Headquarters, New York, NY, June 2013.
Website: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/publications.shtml, accessed 13
November 2014.

__________. Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting

our strengths for peace: politics, partnership, and people. New York: Report of the
UN General Assembly and Security Council, New York, document number A/70/95
S/2015/446, 17 June 2015.

__________. A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.

New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field
Support, July 2009.

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 JMO-68

JMO EXAMINATION TWO (Individual Effort)

In the absence of orders, go find something and kill it.

General Erwin Rommel

A. Focus:

This session is designed to allow Spruance Course students to demonstrate a synthesis

of the education presented to date and to demonstrate higher order thinking skills in a
complex, uncertain, and ambiguous situation involving the use or contemplated use of
military force. The scope of the examination is trimester-wide, meaning that any topic or
combination of topics can be expected to be examined. As such, students must apply their
understanding of the discrete sessions previously addressed in a holistic manner in creating a
suitable answer to the presented question(s).

B. Objectives:

Synthesize course concepts through the analysis of JMO course material.

Create a reasoned response to the examination questions demonstrating an internalization
of the various concepts of the Joint Military Operations curriculum.
Demonstrate critical thinking skills.

C. Background:

The examination questions will be issued on 26 May 2016 at 1700 and student
responses are due to the moderators NLT 1700 27 May 2016. Grading criteria for Spruance
Course examinations may be found on page xxiii of this syllabus.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Eric Shaw, C-425.

D. Discussion Topics:

See examination question sheet.

E. Products:

A written examination that demonstrates student mastery of the subject matter

presented in the Spruance Course Joint Maritime Operations trimester thus far.

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F. Required Reading:

The examination will be based on JMO course material presented to date.

G. Supplementary Reading:
None.

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 JMO-69

THE WAR AT SEA EXERCISE (Wargame)

By December 2010, the PLA had deployed between 1,000 and 1,200
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to units opposite Taiwan. To improve
the lethality of this force, the PLA is introducing variants of missiles with
improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads

Department of Defense
Report on the Chinese Military, 2011

A. Focus:

The final event in the JMO curriculum is a continuation of the sea control exercise.
In this phase of the exercise, students will fight their order against a thinking entity that
knows his/her enemys capabilities and can deduce with fair accuracy his/her intentions.
This is an educational wargame that requires students to apply many of the principles and
concepts studied throughout the trimester in order to accomplish the assigned mission. While
the challenges confronting the students in this exercise are realistic, the situations used to
highlight these issues and the solutions the students select are strictly hypothetical. The goal
for the College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College students is understand
the challenges in gaining sea control in order for the joint force to exploit it.

B. Objectives:

In addressing a complex conflict that is both volatile and unpredictable, and under time
constraints, assess combat actions and adjust accordingly.
Apply the analytic framework of the Joint Operation Planning Process for developing
potential solutions to military problems.
Determine objectives and operational approaches that support major combat operations
and theater strategy and synchronize efforts at the operational level to facilitate
component tactical success.
Develop and present a series of plans through military briefs and written products
associated with the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP).

C. Background:

This final planning exercise is an opportunity for students to re-examine the ill-
structured problems presented in the Borneo scenario and develop a creative operational
approach that addresses the requirements levied on the Joint Force. The strategic
environment constrains resources and political patience is fleeting. U. S. military dominance
in each domain is not assured at all times. These constraints and limitations require critical
283
and creative thought that balance the competing objectives of the joint force and must result
in a unified effort.
This scenario picks up from The Struggle for Sea Control exercise. Your
Commander, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, has approved your
operations order to establish local sea control in the vicinity of Bintulu, Sarawak Province,
East Malaysia. Day One of this exercise is also day one of combat at sea; it is D-Day.
Adjudication of your operations order by the Wargaming Department will present new
conditions that you will have to assess and readdress using the Joint Operation Planning
Process (JOPP). You may be required to develop fragmentary orders or in some cases
generate a new operations order (with selected annexes) in a time constrained environment.
The role of cyber operations will be exercised by both sides; both offensively and
defensively, meaning students may be operating for periods of time in a cyber denied
environment. Lastly, maritime operational law and the Law of Armed Conflict will impact
combat actions for the U. S. Commander and staff.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Jamie Gannon, C-424.

D. Discussion Topics:

How does an Operations Planning Team (OPT) adapt the JOPP to solve an ill-structured
problem?

Describe a method for analyzing combat reports in the absence of perfect knowledge.

Describe how an OPT anticipates future changes in the operating environment caused by
military or other actions.

How does an OPT effectively leverage joint force capabilities when planning and executing
operations?

How does a Joint Force best integrate elements of national power to accomplish operational
objectives?

E. Products:

Products developed during the Final Planning Event may include Fragmentary
Orders, Warning Orders, Operations Orders with selected Annexes, Staff Estimates, Courses
of Action and Mission Briefings, and other Joint Planning related products depending on the
situation presented by the enemy and the reaction of the Planning Group.

F. Required Reading:

U. S. Naval War College. A Borneo Case Study for Expeditionary Warfare: Newport, RI:
Naval War College, April, 2015. Scan. (Issued). (NWC 6036H).

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_____________. Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) Workbook. Newport, RI: Naval
War College, 1 July 2013. (NWC 4111J w/Chg 1). Scan as required. (Issued).

__________. Selected U. S. Navy and The People Republic of China Army (Navy) (PLA(N))
Tactical Capability Handbook Slide Pack. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016.
Scan. (NWC 2164).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCSM 3130.03. Adaptive
Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance. Scan. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:
None.

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