Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19650

September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork for a
promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for
participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified
period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted,
participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or
consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon
request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer Contest", the contestant whose estimate
is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest, the
second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac
hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in
each station will then be qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified
contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners of that
region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila,
accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest". The regional second-prize and thirdprize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize
winners will be placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners will be
made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as
consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission
of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in
advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of
which read as follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the following classes, whether sealed
as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the
mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting
to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or
chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is engaged in conducting any
lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of
any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of
any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may
instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the mails,
with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class mailed
by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer service.The Director of Posts
may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or

scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any
person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the
mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of
any postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or company,
whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by
regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such
person or company or its agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru
counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery
provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the
provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a
reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest
was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice
on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest
involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his
letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the
contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General
Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law,
and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public". After issues were
joined and upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' announced to
be conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the
respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first, whether the petition states a sufficient
cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We
shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the applicable legal basis for the remedy at
the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64,
Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain
conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved
must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951;
Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31,
1956). The gravamen of the appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, our
duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of significant points stand out in bold
relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every
legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the
appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress
transgressions thereof particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative
Code, against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion
scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other
media, it was found expedient to request the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction
in the premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme
and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to the correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus
reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The confidence with which the
appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was
climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to be
issued against it and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the
use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded,
undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of
a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical question or issue. The
contenders are as real as their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the
issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's

proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to
hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous
shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y
Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is
long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others"
which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the
case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963
ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of construction because the said appellant
"simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room
for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the circumstances here
presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is
not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that
the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or
not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an
inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of construction or interpretation as
any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount to nothing more
than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law
has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed
and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of
speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity,
passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases
cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d.,
152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into which it has been cast, would be to
force it to choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery
provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the
mails for purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its
concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a selfappointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As
we weigh these considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order
to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law we can see in the present case any imposition upon our
jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand down in this case if he believes that it
will not have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be
bound. But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute
itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the
actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we
entertain no misgivings that our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not without precedent. In Liberty
Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the
county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were
conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a
declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see
also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super.
124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982
and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against,
or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for
the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the
resolution of the second issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal authorities under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court
declared that

While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that of the United
States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The
term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize
concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration;
second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S.,
497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919],
39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the disputed scheme to
be the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of
the element of consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in the same case just cited,
this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by
chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal
schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in which the invitation to participate
therein is couched. Thus
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have to buy anything? Simply estimate
the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from to , and win
valuable prizes . . . ." .
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any
value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the
entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or
turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head
the stern injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies
which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not
only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex products simply to win a prize
would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of
any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs
reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of value.
1awphl.nt

Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion, would naturally benefit the sponsor in
the way of increased patronage by those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by
securing entry blanks". The required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest.
The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a valuable
consideration for the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution
of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor. The following,
culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does receive, some benefit in the way of
patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing; does not supply the element of consideration. Griffith Amusement Co. vs.
Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a
lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property
by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have
concentrated on the issue of consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its
tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was predicated,
amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a
lottery for want of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not essential, the determination of
whether or not the proposed contest wanting in consideration as we have found it to be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be
passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, there appears to be a
consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods
are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur.,
654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of

Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37
Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is
no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified
contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassed within the broadest sweep that the
term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think that the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the
opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the element
of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable
Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698,
114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes
within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P.
2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and
County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs.
State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is
explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851,
the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element of
consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel.
Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is,
therefore, that every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with the word "lottery". With the
meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneuticsnoscitur a sociis which Opinion 217
aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned it is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.
Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly,
there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein
included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the determination thereof being an
accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a
medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift
enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit
and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of
value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to
participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to
evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not
being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm.
ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold that, under the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated
are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule
that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION, ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO, COMMANDING OFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT
COMMAND, PC, AFP, and ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, respondents.
Jose C. Espina and Potenciano Flores for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
Gaspar V. Tagalo for private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court is confronted once again with the question of whether or not it is a court or a labor arbiter that can pass on a suit for
damages filed by the employer, here private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products. Respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma 1 then of the
Court of First Instance, now of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, was of the view that it is a court and denied a motion to
dismiss filed by petitioners National Federation of labor and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union, its officers and members. It was
such an order dated July 20, 1982 that led to the filing of this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. In the order assailed, it was required
that the officers and members of petitioner union appear before the court to show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should not
be issued against them and in the meanwhile such persons as well as any other persons acting under their command and on their
behalf were "temporarily restrained and ordered to desist and refrain from further obstructing, impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of
its property and free ingress to or egress from plaintiff's Manufacturing Division facilities at Lumbayao, Zamboanga City and on its road
right of way leading to and from said plaintiff's facilities, pending the determination of the litigation, and unless a contrary order is issued
by this Court." 2
The record discloses that petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March 5, 1982, filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment,
Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of
the monthly paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga
City. 3 Such employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of
monthly living allowances. 4 Then came, on May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike against private respondent, alleging
illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice, non-payment of living allowances; and
"employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. 5 It was followed by the union submitting the minutes of
the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of which 79 voted for yes and three voted for no." 6 The strike began on May
23, 1982. 7 On July 9, 1982, private respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge against the officers and members
of petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order." 8 It
was alleged that defendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and
suppliers free ingress to or egress from such premises. 9 Six days later, there was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of
the restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. It was contended that the
acts complained of were incidents of picketing by defendants then on strike against private respondent, and that therefore the exclusive
jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance.10 There was, as noted
earlier, a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Four days after such petition was filed, on August 3, 1982, this Court required respondents to answer and set the plea for a preliminary
injunction to be heard on Thursday, August 5, 1982. 11 After such hearing, a temporary restraining order was issued, "directing
respondent Judge and the commanding officer in Zamboanga and his agents from enforcing the ex-parte order of injunction dated July
20, 1982; and to restrain the respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the until otherwise case effective as of [that] date
and continuing ordered by [the] Court. In the exercise of the right to peaceful picketing, petitioner unions must abide strictly with Batas
Pambansa Blg. 227, specifically Section 6 thereof, amending Article 265 of the Labor Code, which now reads: '(e) No person engaged
in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's
premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.' " 12
On August 13, 1982, the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining the original jurisdiction of respondent Judge and maintaining
that the order complained of was not in excess of such jurisdiction, or issued with grave abuse of discretion. Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, 13 on the other hand, instead of filing an answer, submitted a Manifestation in lieu thereof. He met squarely the issue of

whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction, and answered in the negative. He (i)ncluded that "the instant petition has merit and
should be given due course."
He traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same time the decisions issued by this Court after each of such
changes. As pointed out, the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdictional. 14 So it was applied by this
Court in Garcia v. Martinez 15 and in Bengzon v. Inciong. 16 On May 1, 1978, however, Presidential Decree No. 1367 was issued,
amending Article 217, and provided "that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral
and other forms of damages." 17The ordinary courts were thus vested with jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages in the case
of illegal dismissal of employees. 18 That is not, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the end of the story, for on May 1, 1980,
Presidential Decree No. 1691 was issued, further amending Article 217, returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus
enabling them to decide "3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees
compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; [and] (5) All other claims arising from employer-employee relations
unless expressly excluded by tills Code." 19 An equally conclusive manifestation of the lack of jurisdiction of a court of first instance
then, a regional trial court now, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code. It took effect on August 21, 1981.
Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) is now worded thus: "(2) those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment." 20 This is to be compared with the former phraseology "(2) unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those that
involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment." 21 It is to be noted that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 made
no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for
damages arising from employer-employee relations.
Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious character of this petition. certiorari and prohibition lie, respondent Judge being
devoid of jurisdiction to act on the matter.
1. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It
means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the
authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. That was
squarely within the express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has been the constant ruling of this
Court even prior toLizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 22 a 1913 decision. The ringing words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland still call
for obedience. Thus, "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 23 It is so even after the lapse of
sixty years. 24
2. On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has spoken in three decisions. They all reflect the utmost
fidelity to the plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court, that ossesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a
claim for damages arising from picketing or a strike. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, 25 the issue was set forth in the opening
paragraph, in the ponencia of Justice Escolin: "This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises anew the legal question
often brought to this Court: Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an employee against his employer for
recovery of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages the court of general jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of the National
Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]?" 26 It was categorically held: "We rule that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the
case." 27 Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in
words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the
forum, the issue before us should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in force. We find that law in presidential Decree
1691 which took effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: ... Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving
all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or
underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except
claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. All
other claims arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code." 28 That same month, two other cases
were similarly decided, Ebon v. De Guzman 29 and Aguda v. Vallejos. 30
3. It is regrettable that the ruling in the above three decisions, decided in March of 1982, was not followed by private respondent when it
filed the complaint for damages on July 9, 1982, more than four months later. 31 On this point, reference may be made to our decision
in National Federation of Labor, et al. v. The Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment, 32 promulgated on September 15, 1983. In
that case, the question involved was the failure of the same private respondent, Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., to admit the striking
petitioners, eighty-one in number, back to work after an order of Minister Blas F. Ople certifying to the National Labor Relations
Commission the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. It was noted in
the first paragraph of our opinion in that case: "On the face of it, it seems difficult to explain why private respondent would not comply
with such order considering that the request for compulsory arbitration came from it. It ignored this notification by the presidents of the
labor unions involved to its resident manager that the striking employees would lift their picket line and start returning to work on August
20, 1982. Then, too, Minister Ople denied a partial motion for reconsideration insofar as the return-to-work aspect is concerned which
reads: 'We find no merit in the said Motion for Reconsideration. The Labor code, as amended, specifically Article 264 (g), mandates that
whenever a labor dispute is certified by the Minister of Labor and Employment to the National Labor Relations Commission for
compulsory arbitration and a strike has already taken place at the time of certification, "all striking employees shall immediately return to
work and the employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike." ' " 33 No valid distinction can be made between the exercise of compulsory arbitration vested in the Ministry of Labor

and the jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the light of the express provision of the Labor Code as set forth
in Article 217. In both cases, it is the Ministry, not a court of justice, that is vested by law with competence to act on the matter.
4. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and
original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. It can be affirmed that even if they were not that explicit,
history has vindicated the view that in the appraisal of what was referred to by Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc.
v. Management & Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co., Inc. 34 as "the rather thorny
question as to where in labor matters the dividing line is to be drawn" 35 between the power lodged in an administrative body and a
court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that
unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an administrative agency]." 36Certainly, the present Labor
Code is even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and equally so in the interest of greater promptness in the disposition
of labor matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of determining what essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that
may be incurred by either labor or management as a result of disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of July 20, 1982, issued by respondent Judge, is nullified and set aside.
The writ of prohibition is likewise granted and respondent Judge, or whoever acts in his behalf in the Regional Trial Court to which this
case is assigned, is enjoin from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 716 (2751), except for the purpose of dismissing it. The
temporary restraining order of August 5, 1982 is hereby made permanent.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.
De Castro, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22301

August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiffappellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of
the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The
undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number,
with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding
authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May
counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to
possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm
without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question
the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly
specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the
following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information
was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the
lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented
four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2,
1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and
Quezon City on a confidential mission;2the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the
effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above
exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the
provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were
given time to file their respective memoranda.
1wph1.t

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and
ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of
the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,

municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials
and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first
and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the
appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes,
sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by
section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory
provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with
authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997

LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO
LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable
property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest
products in favor of the government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way
to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for
brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao,
Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to
submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation.
On June 22, 1989, 1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and
ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.
Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan,
which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989. 2 Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the
Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents' statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for
reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending resolution however of
the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and
Executive Director Baggayan 4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, 5 which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck
to private respondents. 6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court
contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989. 7 Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a
petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court's order ruling that
the question involved is purely a legal question. 8 Hence, this present petition, 9with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9,
1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993, 10 the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners
was granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for
replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O.
277. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls
within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to
be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have
no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by
petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of
petitioners for reversal is in order.

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought, The
premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. 11 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the
case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of
action. 12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment
of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that
the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has
been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to
dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a
battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness
of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, 13 (2) when the
issue involved is purely a legal question, 14 (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, 15 (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, 16 (5) when there is irreparable injury, 17 (6)
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of
the latter, 18 (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, 19 (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim, 20 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, 21(10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him
following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In
their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, 23 private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to
which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:
xxx xxx xxx

If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should be
considered as an appeal to the
Secretary. 24
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By
appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary
course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's
intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and
management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private
respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 25 In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary, 26 which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, 27this Court held:
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation
of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances
prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there
was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention
has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard. 28 One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than
oral argument, through pleadings. 29 In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. 30 Indeed, deprivation of due process
cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, 31 as in the instant
case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration
dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan, In Navarro III
vs.Damasco, 32 we ruled that :
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A

formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned
upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the
DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705,
as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:
Sec. 68. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments,implements and tools illegaly [sic]
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents' thinking not only because the aforequoted
provision apparently does not mention nor include "conveyances" that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large
extent, due to the fact that private respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and
inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted herein below:
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation.
In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly
authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense
and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Emphasis
ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to
confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase "to dispose
of the same" is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should
be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter." In the construction of statutes, it must be read in
such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. 33 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be
achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress
the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 34 In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:
But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more responsive to present situations and realities" and in
view of the "urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country," that the government opted to add Section
68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings.
More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws
through criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most revealing:
"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the
benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant
enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain
inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive
to present situations and realities;"

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only
"conveyances," but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the
"court" in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the
power on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section
68-A would have no Purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the
problem perceived in EO 277, supra. 35

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July
12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order,
a copy of which was given to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part, viz.:

. . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the crime, we
uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could a criminal case be
filed against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . 36
We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the intention of
petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is
that it was not used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner thereof
for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used
in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12,
1989, petitioners pointed out:

. . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further amended by Executive Order No. 277
specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest products not
covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering of
the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor
liable. . . 37
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so
that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act constituting a
crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the
provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and
disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or
permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 68, P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277)
Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license. Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall bepunished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending Section 68,
P.D. 705 as amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or
possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words "shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for
any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. 38
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken
and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of
the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have
been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ
ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's
recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by
the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the
property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. 39 "To detain" is defined
as to mean "to hold or keep in custody," 40 and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with
the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the
property is sufficient. 41 Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own
affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of

detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is
exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property. 42 Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a
wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners
because it was transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705
as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by
the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws.
Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally
permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the
DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the
Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or
prohibition. It reads:
Sec. 8. REVIEW All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any
person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of
thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in
accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed
by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution
dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby
made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988
RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the respondent judge *in Spec. Proc. No. 37
of Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero
Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:
Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate
intents and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that
the former be freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana
Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names
'Bonilla' and 'Marcos' be changed with "Agonoy", which is the family name of the petitioners.
Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of
the New Civil Code.

Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local Civil Registry of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of the petitioners. 1
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37. 2
The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the office of the Solicitor General
and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial
offices in Laoag City. 3
On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed
an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate
daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to
adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code. 4
After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its decision, granting the petition for adoption. 5
Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).
The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda RamosAgonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;
xxx xxx xxx

In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held that "to add grandchildren in this article where no
grandchil is included would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included".
But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez, 6 that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the reduction of their legititimes. It would also
produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation
between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that
may have been made.
We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are
clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent
judge, do not include grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted;
stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction. 7
Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who
have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and
which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or
legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to
adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word
"descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of
having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. 8 The present
tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a
useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective. 9 Under the law now in force, having legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is
AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay
election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition
for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on
October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,
1995. 1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC,
however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall
election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining
order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and
his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without
COMELEC approval. 2
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election an January 13, 1996; hence,
the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the
Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the
required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply. 3
Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or
one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is
now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every
three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court
considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no
recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during
his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election.
[Emphasis added]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,i.e., that every part of
the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 The
evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b)
construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election,
that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to
include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of
public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every

three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by
petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and
the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. 5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided
under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. 6
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. 7 Thus, the
interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the
Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanism of
recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."
Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court
made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose
and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the
spirit that vivifieth". . . 8
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according
to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses,
hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription
is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the
official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It
would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring
to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that
the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on
May 1997. 9
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the
Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA
FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and
CARMEN S. FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN
and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD
and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III,
all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA, ELIZABETH,
DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA;
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA,
VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.
Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.
Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, dated December 16, 1968 dismissing
petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working
at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the
tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and
deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Portion of the
complaint reads:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless negligence and
imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men
working underground at the time, and in utter violation of the laws and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by
the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the
mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and rock below it,
thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date,
at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, with the collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure,
approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water, accompanied by surface boulders, blasted
through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the underground
workings, ripped timber supports and carried off materials, machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of
exit, thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men above referred to, including those named in the next preceding
paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs herein;

10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said date, five (5)
were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number,
including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact that
up to then, a great many of them were still alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to
defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties
in the premises;
xxx xxx xxx
13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above referred to, in their Report of investigation, pages
7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men working underground the necessary security for
the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it had vast financial resources, it having made, during the
year 1966 alone, a total operating income of P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per
its llth Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00 as
of December 31, 1966;
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 42-44, rec.)
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based on an industrial
accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former
Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to
dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of
the Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, particularly:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.
(b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case on the
ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the said order, respondent Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27, 1968
and allowed Philex to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was opposed by
petitioners.
On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the established
jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for
work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding that if
the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition.
In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS- PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR
DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT.
A
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of action since the complaint is
based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in
failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. They also assert that since
Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those contained in the annexes are
deemed admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the distinction between the claims for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil
Code. They point out that workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or death of
the working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for
damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton
negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5 and 46
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of
a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee,
his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws
because of said injury ...
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ...
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims of workmen against their
employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission," subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from the exclusive character of recoveries
under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional compensation in case the employer
fails to comply with the requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex voluntarily paid
the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased miners, except the heirs of
Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code.
In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara, now President of the University of
the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department,
and Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter,
submitted their respective memoranda.
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:
Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmen's
Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say, whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively
restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they
have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or
exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether
they may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee or worker, or the heirs in case of his
death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court

on the basis of negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise. He submits that the
remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his
death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue in the
regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the
same as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to
avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice
versa.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they have
amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the resolution of September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition only insofar as
the aforesaid petitioners are connected, it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.
WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint
for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners
did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation
appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. The complaint
instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a
consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in
ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to
the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97
Phil. 100).
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual relationship. The alleged gross and
reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may
be held liable for damages. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith, read:
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is able shall be
those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as assessed by the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under the Civil
Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under
the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and
insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is
created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).
In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the
death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer
(Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his
rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through the
act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation between the defendant's negligence and
the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of
the deceased or injured employee that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden to
prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60
SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation Commission then, now Employees
Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain
any provision for an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the heirs to claim
limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two hundred (P200.00)
pesos, and medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an additional compensation
of only 50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other

precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount sought to be
recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the
Commission.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an employee who suffered an accident
not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his
employer. Under the Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act
was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social legislation designed to give relief to the
workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs.
WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of
action between availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under
the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the
employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a
choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
In Pacaa WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third- party tortfeasors in the regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out that the injured worker has the choice of remedies but cannot
pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the
Workmen's Compensation Act as against an ordinary action.
As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages against the respondents
(defendants below), because he has elected to seek compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and his
claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission) was being processed at the time he filed this action in the
Court of First Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much
more extensive than the amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they should not be
deemed incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to choose either to recover from the
employer the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the
tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller indemnity obtainable by the first course is
balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of proving the causal connection between the defendant's
negligence and the resulting injury, and of having to establish the extent of the damage suffered; issues that are apt
to be troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded
from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission.
Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative
action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner,
the excess accrues to the latter.
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party tortfeasor, said rule should
likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been dismissed in the resolution of
September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the
heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted
notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full
as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such
allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the
lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of the
official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by
Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October
19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.).
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude
them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its
contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said
violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the
Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on

ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments
made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case. The Court merely applies and gives
effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973
Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code
of 1950.
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:
Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the
concern of the State (Art. II).
Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and minors, and shall regulate the
relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The State may
provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the
people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish,
maintain and ensure adequate social services in, the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security to
guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); "... afford protection
to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers and employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane
conditions of work"(Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution and re-stated
as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus:
Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The
State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work. (emphasis supplied).
The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code cannot be impliedly
repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it
was amended by R.A. No. 772 on June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the
aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional
mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code
seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal
provisions of the New Civil Code.
The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are statements of legal principles
to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs.
Barnette, with characteristic eloquence, enunciated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U.S. 625,
638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis supplied).
In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the New Labor Code and the Civil Code
direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, promulgated on May 1, 1974,
but which took effect six months thereafter, provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this
Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law-making
body intended right and justice to prevail. "

More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts
shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer."
Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provided:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a
personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws,
because of said injury (emphasis supplied).
Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same may stipulate with such laborers
that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through
accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment; and all service contracts made
in the manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed to include such agreement.
Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772
on June 20, 1952, thus:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a
personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws,
because of said injury.
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers
that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries received outside the Island through accidents
happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the
right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs,
should such law be more favorable to them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code, because
said Article 173 provides:
Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone
otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation
under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code,
Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eightysix, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight
hundred Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System during the period of
such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely (emphasis supplied).
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No.
1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws whose
benefits are administered by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS).
Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not even remotely, much
less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the
New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New
Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art.
167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines.
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled:

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute
evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as
of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270, 272-273
[1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA
247; 124 Phil. 763).
The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it was amended by Commonwealth Act
No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or injured employee to the compensation
provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs.
Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the
fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater
damages; but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied
Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs. Manila
Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both penned by Justice
J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor.
Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer, neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act did, with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the
cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the
social justice guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American Federal Constitution, nor in the various
state constitutions of the American Union. Consequently, the restrictive nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's
Compensation Act cannot limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially Article 1711 of the New Civil
Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution.
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. The right to life is guaranteed specifically
by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or
wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers which are inherent in
underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the
worker and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such
gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of
the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian.
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New
Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the
implementing legislation aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code subvert the rights of the
petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the
New Labor Code are retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in
1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which has been discarded soon after the close of
the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli
Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are dangerous to life, limb
and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of liveand-help others to live. Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's
keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's keeper. No man is an island. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and
ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in
1837 during the era of economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries
continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him; because the decision
derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his
inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate the quotation from Prisley, thus:
"The mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the
servant than he may reasonably be expected to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War
which generated so much hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.

"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man's survival and ennobles him.
In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
C
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. "
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the court, in the
language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human
beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the infinite
capacity to anticipate all situations.
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the American Constitution foresaw and
recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American
Constitution and the statutes.
'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies that the power of the Judiciary to
nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson went farther
to concede that the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).
Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison I Cranch 127 1803), which
was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907, quoted
by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the
limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " (The Nature of the Judicial
Process, p. 113). In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint of the judge"
(U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert
Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert pages of the Constitution and all
statute books."
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New
Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is
correctly termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor Code,
does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices
required by the law for the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer
remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the employer
has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee.
The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its
primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222
NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of judges has
threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ... Precedents established in those items exert an unhappy influence even
now" (citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 387).
Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted, although with a cautionary undertone: "that judges
do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific
Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845,
852- 853), Justice Holmes pronounced:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific
of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. x x x. When we come
to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our
government could not go on.
To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free from it is to legislate yet it
is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two competing principles of policy shall prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot
carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches

into waterlight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the
Constitution requires.
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but grudgingly concede that in certain cases judges
do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial
tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald
Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who either deny the
power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples of the
exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases that gave rise to
judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest or individual welfare, particularly the lowly
workers or the underprivileged.
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory enactments expanding the scope of such
provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964),
Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused under custodial investigation his
rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him against the use of force or intimidation
to extort confession from him. These rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in Section
20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism of the American Supreme Court
led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was developed by American judicial decisions,
not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And these
judicial decisions have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as in Section 9 of Rule
117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second offense is the same as the first offense if the second offense is
an attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense.
The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also developed by judicial decisions in the United
States and in the Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853).
Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes equal
but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294), holding that the
equal protection clause means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-equal facilities in the
same school-which was extended to public parks and public buses.
De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a conservative,
capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working women-according primacy to property rights over human rights.
The case of People vs. Pomar is no longer the rule.
As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice Holmes had been railing against the
conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for
the working man. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of
West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social
justice in the form of guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity
leave for women employees.
The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political questions have been evolved and
grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed.
1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).
It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a separate concurring opinion in the case of
Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing in both the
American and Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation of powers
and the doctrine on political questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of
powers and political questions and invoking American precedents.
Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to
review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or executive act.
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS
REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF
HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of
his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the
present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on
the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend
more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner
of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged;
that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel
some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and
wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting
on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such
as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the
Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to
the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in
the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that
"the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil
laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or
her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole,
tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant
case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and
duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge
of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There
had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony
of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison
testified: 8

COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is
better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each
other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the
part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and
Justice Ricardo C. Puno,10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these
friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes thepermanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.

Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more
cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982
MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna seeks the reversal of the decision dated August 14, 19741 in CA-G.R. No.
13243-CR entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Mapalad Aisporna, defendant-appellant" of respondent Court of
Appeals affirming the judgment of the City Court of Cabanatuan 2rendered on August 2, 1971 which found the petitioner guilty for having
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act (Act No. 2427, as amended) and sentenced her to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on November 21,
1970 in an information 3 which reads as follows:
That on or before the 21st day of June, 1969, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
act as agent in the solicitation or procurement of an application for insurance by soliciting therefor the application of
one Eugenio S. Isidro, for and in behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized insurance company,
registered under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in the issuance of a Broad Personal Accident
Policy No. 28PI-RSA 0001 in the amount not exceeding FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) dated June 21, 1969,
without said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of the
Insurance Commissioner, Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts, 4 as found by the respondent Court of Appeals are quoted hereunder:
IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that since 7 March, 1969 and as of 21 June, 1969, appellant's husband,
Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros, with
license to expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C; on that date, at Cabanatuan City, Personal Accident Policy, Exh. D was
issued by Perla thru its author representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve (12) months with beneficiary
as Ana M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during lifetime of policy, and for reasons not
explained in record, present information was filed by Fiscal, with assistance of private prosecutor, charging wife of
Rodolfo with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for having, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously acted, "as agent in
the solicitation for insurance by soliciting therefore the application of one Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla
Compaa de Seguros, ... without said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from
the office of the Insurance Commission, Republic of the Philippines."
and in the trial, People presented evidence that was hardly disputed, that aforementioned policy was issued with
active participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo, against which appellant in her defense sought to show that being the
wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and
was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and
so she left a note on top of her husband's desk to renew ...
Consequently, the trial court found herein petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court's decision was affirmed by the
respondent appellate court finding the petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence,
this present recourse was filed on October 22, 1974. 5
In its resolution of October 28, 1974, 6 this Court resolved, without giving due course to this instant petition, to require the respondent to
comment on the aforesaid petition. In the comment 7 filed on December 20, 1974, the respondent, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, submitted that petitioner may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. 8 On April 3,
1975, petitioner submitted his Brief 9 while the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent, filed a manifestation 10 in lieu of a Brief on
May 3, 1975 reiterating his stand that the petitioner has not violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, petitioner assigns the following errors

11

allegedly committed by the appellate court:

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RECEIPT OF COMPENSATION IS NOT
AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME DEFINED BY THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 189 OF THE
INSURANCE ACT.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO EXHIBITS F, F-1, TO F-17,
INCLUSIVE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PETITIONER'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN PETITIONER.
We find the petition meritorious.
The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section. In other words, it is necessary to determine whether or
not the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its
second paragraph.
The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as follows:
No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any commission
or other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have first
procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company as
hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of
applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance, any commission or other compensation
from any insurance company doing business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a
certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first day of
January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the Insurance Commissioner only upon
the written application of persons desiring such authority, such application being approved and countersigned by the
company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon a form approved by the Insurance Commissioner,
giving such information as he may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or
renew and to revoke any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid, however, in any event
after the first day of July of the year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon
the application of the company.
Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or transmits for
a person other than himself an application for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to
act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby
become liable to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company is subject.
Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On the
conviction of any person acting as agent, sub-agent, or broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the
business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued to him
and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to such convicted person.
A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act
from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this section and,
finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation.
The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 of the aforesaid
Act but under its first paragraph. Thus
... it can no longer be denied that it was appellant's most active endeavors that resulted in issuance of policy to Isidro,
she was there and then acting as agent, and received the pay thereof her defense that she was only acting as
helper of her husband can no longer be sustained, neither her point that she received no compensation for issuance
of the policy because
any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company
or transmits for a person other than himself an application for a policy of insurance to or from such
company or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance
agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties,
requirements, liabilities, and penalties, to which an agent of such company is subject. paragraph 2,
Sec. 189, Insurance Law,

now it is true that information does not even allege that she had obtained the insurance,
for compensation
which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the Insurance Law in its 2nd paragraph, but what appellant
apparently overlooks is that she is prosecuted not under the 2nd but under the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189 wherein it is
provided that,
No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker, in the solicitation or procurement of applications
for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance any commission or other
compensation from any insurance company doing business in the Philippine Island, or agent
thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority to act from the insurance commissioner,
which must be renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter.

therefore, there was no technical defect in the wording of the charge, so that Errors 2 and 4 must be
overruled.12
From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent appellate court seems to imply that the definition of an insurance agent under the
second paragraph of Section 189 is not applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in the first paragraph. Parenthetically, the
respondent court concludes that under the second paragraph of Section 189, a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains
an insurance for compensation, but, in its first paragraph, there is no necessity that a person solicits an insurance for compensation in
order to be called an insurance agent.
We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance agent as found in
the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the
aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within
the intent of Section 189. Hence
Any person who for compensation ... shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, ...
Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true with respect to the agent mentioned in the other
two paragraphs of the said section. The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the
term "agent" mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would
give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the
statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious
whole. 13 A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. 14 The meaning of the
law, it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses
or sentences but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole. 15 Every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context. This means that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment, not separately and independently. 16 More importantly, the doctrine of
associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or
with which it is associated. 17
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the
first paragraph, to receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid
section. The appellate court has established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for the issuance of
the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro. Nevertheless, the accused was convicted by the appellate court for, according to the latter, the
receipt of compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of
the Insurance Act.
We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect
compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the
solicitor was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. 18 In the case of Bolen vs. Stake, 19 the provision of
Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as insurance solicitors
without license, and while acting in such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It must be noted
that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio
Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be
sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved. 20
After going over the records of this case, We are fully convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains, that accused did not violate
Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the accused is acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Acting C.J.,) Makasiar, De Castro, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Plana, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII, and VICENTE G.
ACABAN, respondents-appellees.
Sy Santos, Del Rosario and Associates for petitioners-appellants.
Tagalo, Gozar and Associates for respondents-appellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
The only issue in this petition for certiorari to review the orders dated March 4, 1972 and March 27, 1972, respectively, of the Court of
First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 75138, is whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court
process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405. *
On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest
Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared
the defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy
Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment by default was rendered against the defendants.
To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant B & B Forest Development
Corporation with the China Banking Corporation. Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court
and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank' cashier invited the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was alleged, prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits.
Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court.
In an order dated March 4, 1972 the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion. However, Tan Kim Liong was ordered "to inform the Court
within five days from receipt of this order whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of defendant B & B Forest
Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from this
Court." Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down by order of March 27, 1972. In the same order he was directed "to
comply with the order of this Court dated March 4, 1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt of copy of this order, otherwise his arrest
and confinement will be ordered by the Court." Resisting the two orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong instituted
the instant petition.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads:
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in
bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person other than
those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits.
Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years
or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions
enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5

and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to this case, the
position of the petitioners is that the bank deposit of judgment debtor B & B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to
garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforequoted provisions of law.
We do not view the situation in that light. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the
defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment
issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the
discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became Republic Act 1405,
that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. Thus:
Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to
clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
for, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual is attached by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.
Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such
person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper
assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such inquiry is not authorized by this proposed law.
Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money
deposited is allowed. Let us assume, for instance, that there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or
for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring
out into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by this amendment or by this law?
Mr. RAMOS. It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited, or rather, the inquiry is made only for the
purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government; but when
the object is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by
the law.
Mr. MARCOS. And it protects the depositor, does it not?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor.
Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of the deposit.
Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit.
Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question. Therefore, preliminary garnishment or attachment of the deposit is
not allowed?
Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization.
Mr. MARCOS. I am glad that is clarified. So that the established rule of procedure as well as the substantive law on
the matter is amended?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes. That is the effect.
Mr. MARCOS. I see. Suppose there has been a decision, definitely establishing the liability of an individual for
taxation purposes and this judgment is sought to be executed ... in the execution of that judgment, does this bill, or
this proposed law, if approved, allow the investigation or scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to execute the
judgment?
Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory.
Mr. MARCOS. Yes, but, as I said before, suppose the tax liability is P1,000,000 and the deposit is half a million, will
this bill allow scrutiny into the deposit in order that the judgment may be executed?
Mr. RAMOS. Merely to determine the amount of such money to satisfy that obligation to the Government, but not to
determine whether a deposit has been made in evasion of taxes.
xxx xxx xxx

Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of a sum of money the plaintiff
wishes to attach the properties of the defendant to insure the satisfaction of the judgment. Once the judgment is
rendered, does the gentleman mean that the plaintiff cannot attach the bank deposit of the defendant?
Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan to which I replied that outside the very
purpose of this law it could be reached by attachment.
Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases it can be attached?
Mr. RAMOS. That is so.
(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp. 3839-3840, July 27, 1955).
It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the
prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to
insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the
disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable
debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash
and depositing the same in a bank.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the lower court dated March 4 and 27, 1972, respectively, are hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners-appellants.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Teehankee, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37867 February 22, 1982
BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINES VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE G. BAUTISTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the CFI Manila, Branch III, and CALIXTO V.
GASILAO, respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of respondent Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch III, rendered on October 25,
1973 in Civil Case No. 90450 for mandamus filed by Calixto V. Gasilao against the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans
Administration.
The facts as found by the Court a quo to have been established by the pleadings find by the parties are stated in the decision under
review from which We quote the following:
Calixto V. Gasilao, pauper litigant and petitioner in the above-entitled case, was a veteran in good standing during
World War II. On October 19, 1955, he filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9, Republic Act No. 65. The
claim was disapproved by the Philippine Veterans Board (now Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans
Administration).
Meanwhile, Republic Act 65 was amended by Republic Act 1362 on June 22, 1955 by including as part of the benefit
of P50.00, P10.00 a month for each of the unmarried minor children below 18 of the veteran Republic Act No. 1362
was implemented by the respondents only on July 1, 1955.
On June 18, 1957, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65 was further amended by Republic Act 1920 increasing the life
pension of the veteran to P100.00 a month and maintaining the P10.00 a month each for the unmarried minor
children below 18.
Fortunately, on August 8, 1968, the claim of the petitioner which was disapproved in December, 1955 was
reconsidered and his claim was finally approved at the rate of P100.00 a month, life pension, and the additional
Pl0.00 for each of his ten unmarried minor children below 18. In view of the approval of the claim of petitioner, he
requested respondents that his claim be made retroactive as of the date when his original application was flied or
disapproved in 1955. Respondents did not act on his request.
On June 22, 1969, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65 was amended by Republic Act No. 5753 which increased the life
pension of the veteran to P200.00 a month and granted besides P30.00 a month for the wife and P30.00 a month
each for his unmarried minor children below 18. In view of the new law, respondents increased the monthly pension
of petitioner to P125.00 effective January 15, 1971 due to insufficient funds to cover full implementation. His wife was
given a monthly pension of P7.50 until January 1, 1972 when Republic Act 5753 was fully implemented.

Petitioner now claims that he was deprived of his right to the pension from October 19, 1955 to June 21,
1957 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 a month each for his six (6) unmarried minor children
below 18. lie also alleges that from June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968 he is entitled to the difference of
P100.00 per month plus P10.00 a month each for his seven (7) unmarried nor children below 18. Again,
petitioner asserts the difference of P100.00 per month, plus P30.00 a month for his wife and the
difference of P20.00 a month each for his four (4) unmarried minor children below 18 from June 22, 1969
up to January 14, 1971 and finally, the difference of P75.00 per month plus P30.00 a month for his wife
and the difference of P20.00 a month for his three (3) unmarried minor children below 18 from January
15, 1971 to December 31, 1971. 1
According to the records, the parties, through their respective counsels, filed on September 24, 1973 the following stipulation of facts in
the lower Court:
STIPULATION OF FACTS

COME NOW the parties thru their respective counsel, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully state that they
agree on the following facts which may be considered as proved without the need of the introduction of any evidence
thereon, to wit:
1. Petitioner was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took active participation in the liberation
drive against the enemy, and due to his military service, he was rendered disabled.
2. The Philippine Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board, (now Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office) is an agency of the Government charged with the administration of different laws giving various benefits in
favor of veterans and their orphans/or widows and parents; that it has the power to adopt rules and regulations to
implement said laws and to pass upon the merits and qualifications of persons applying for rights and privileges
extended by this Act pursuant to such rules and regulations as it may adopt to insure the speedy and honest
fulfillment of its aims and purposes.
3. On July 23, 1955, petitioner filed a claim (Claim No. Dis-12336) for disability pension under Section 9 of RA 65,
with the Philippine Veterans Board (later succeeded by the Philippine Veterans Administration, now Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office), alleging that he was suffering from PTB, which he incurred in line of duty.
4. Due to petitioner's failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service
connected illness, his claim was disapproved by the Board of the defunct Philippine Veterans Board on December 18,
1955.
5. On August 8, 1968, petitioner was able to complete his supporting papers and, after due investigation and
processing, the Board of Administrators found out that his disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits
of section 9 of RA 65, and was therefore given a pension of P100.00 a month and with an additional P 10.00 a month
for each of his unmarried minor children pursuant to RA 1920, amending section 9 of RA 65.
6. RA 5753 was approved on June 22, 1969, providing for an increase in the basic pension to P200.00 a month and
the additional pension, to P30.00 a month for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children. Petitioner's monthly
pension was, however, increased only on January 15, 1971, and by 25% of the increases provided by law, due to the
fact that it was only on said date that funds were released for the purpose, and the amount so released was only
sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase.
7. On January 15, 1972, more funds were released to implement fully RA 5753 and snow payment in full of the
benefits thereunder from said date.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a decision be rendered in accordance with the foregoing
stipulation of facts. It is likewise prayed that the parties be granted a period of (15) days within which to
file their memoranda. 2
Upon consideration of the foregoing and the Memoranda filed by the parties, the lower Court rendered judgment against therein
respondent Board of Administrators, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered for petitioner and the respondents are ordered to
make petitioner's pension effective as of December 18, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month; and the rate increased
to P100.00 per month plus P10.00 per month each for his ten unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from
June 22, 1957 up to August 7..1968; to pay the difference of P100.00 per month plus P30.00 per month and P20.00
per month each for his ten unmarried children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1969 up to January 15, 1971, the
difference of P75.00 per month plus P22.50 per month for his wife and P20.00 per month each for his unmarried nor
children then below 18 years of age from January 16, 1971 up to December 31, 1971.
SO ORDERED.

Manila, October 25, 1973. 3

In its Petition before this Court, the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, challenges the abovementioned decision of the Court a quo on the following grounds:
1. The lower Court erred in ordering the petitioners to retroact the effectivity of their award to respondent Calixto V.
Gasilao of full benefits under section 9 of RA 65 to December 18, 1955, the date when his application was
disapproved due to dis failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service
connected illness, and not August 8, 1968, the date when he was able to complete his papers and allow processing
and approval of his application.

2. The lower Court erred in ordering payment of claims which had prescribed.

3. The lower Court erred in allowing payment of claims under a law for which no funds had been
released. 4
The question raised under the first assigned error is: When should private respondent Gasilao's pension benefits start
The lower Court, quoting excerpts from Our decision in Begosa vs. Chairman Philippine Veterans Administration, 5ruled that Gasilao's
pension benefits should retroact to the date of the disapproval of his claim on December 18, 1955, and not commence from the
approval thereon on August 8, 1968 as contended by the Board of Administrators.
Petitioner maintains the stand that the facts of the Begosa case are not similar to those of the case at bar to warrant an application of
the ruling therein on the retroactivity of a pension award to the date of prior disapproval of the claim. In the Begosa case, the Supreme
Court speaking thru then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Fernando, affirmed the decision of the lower Court, and ruled in part as
follows:

From the facts just set out, it will be noted that plaintiff filed his said claim for disability pension as far back
as March 4, 1955; that it was erroneously disapproved on June 21, 1955, because his dishonorable
discharge from the Army was not a good or proper ground for the said disapproval and that on
reconsideration asked for by him on November 1, 1957, which he continued to follow up, the Board of
Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, composed of herein defendants, which took over the
duties of the Philippine Veterans Board, finally approved his claim on September 2, 1964, at the rate of
P30.00 a month. 6
Had it not been for the said error, it appears that there was no good ground to deny the said claim, so that
the latter was valid and meritorious even as of the date of its filing on March 4, 1955, hence to make the
same effective only as of the date of its approval on September 2, 1964 according to defendant's stand
would be greatly unfair and prejudicial to plaintiff. 7
In other words, the favorable award which claimant Begosa finally obtained on September 2, 1964 was made to retroact to the date of
prior disapproval of the claim on June 2, 1955 for the reason that such disapproval was erroneously made.
In the instant case, on the other hand, the herein claim of respondent Gasilao was denied on December 18, 1955 because of his
"failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service-connected illness" (Stipulation of Facts, Par.
4, ante). Nonetheless, the Stipulation of Facts admitted in par. 1 that "Petitioner was a veteran in good standing during the last World
War that took active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military service, he was rendered disabled."
From this admission in par. 1, it can reasonably be deduced that the action on the claim of Gasilao was merely suspended by the
Philippine Veterans Administration pending the completion of the required supporting papers and evidence to establish his serviceconnected illness. Hence, Our ruling in the Begosa case making retroactive the award in favor of the veteran still holds.
Republic Act No. 65 otherwise known as the Veterans' Bill of Rights, as amended, does not explicitly provide for the effectivity of
pension awards. However, petitioner seeks to remedy this legislative deficiency by citing Section 15 of the law which in part reads as
follows:
Sec. 15. Any person who desires to take advantage of the rights and privileges provided for in this Act should file his
application with the Board ...
Petitioner contends that since the foregoing section impliedly requires that the application filed should first be approved by the Board of
Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefits should commence form the date
of he approval of the application.
This stand of the petitioner does not appear to be in consonance with the spirit and intent of the law, considering that Republic Act 65 is
a veteran pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor those entitled to the rights,
privileges and benefits granted thereunder, among which are the right to resume old positions in the government, educational benefits,
the privilege to take promotional examinations, a life pension for the incapacitated, pensions for widow and children, hospitalization and
medical care benefits.
As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to compensate, as far as may be, a class of men who
suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered,8 and more particularly, those who have
become incapacitated for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. 9 A veteran pension law is,
therefore, a governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especially during
times of war or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it is the general rule that a liberal construction is

given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is
to be considered with other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must depend on its own particular language. 10
Significantly, the original text of RA 65 provided that:
Sec. 6. It also shall be the duty of the Board (then the Philippine Veterans Board) to pass upon the merits and
qualifications of persons applying for the rights and/or privileges extended by this Act, pursuant to such rules as it
may adopt to insure the speedy and honest fulfillment of its aims and purposes. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing provision clearly makes it incumbent upon the implementing Board to carry out the provisions of the statute in the most
expeditious way possible and without unnecessary delay. In the Begosa case, it took nine years (from June 2, 1955 to September 2,
1964) before the claimant finally obtained his pension grant, whereas in the instant case, it took about twelve years (from December,
1955 to August 8, 1968) for respondent Gasilao to receive his pension claim. To Our mind, it would be more in consonance with the
spirit and intentment of the law that the benefits therein granted be received and enjoyed at the earliest possible time by according
retroactive effect to the grant of the pension award as We have done in the Begosa case.
On the other hand, if the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the corresponding application which would be
dependent on the discretion of the Board of Administrators which as noted above had been abused through inaction extending to nine
years, even to twelve years, the noble and humanitarian purposes for which the law had enacted could easily be thwarted or defeated.
On the issue of prescription, petitioner cites Article 1144 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law; and
(3) Upon a judgment.
Petitioner now contends that since the action was filed in the lower Court on April 13, 1973 seeking the payment of alleged claims which
have accrued more than ten (10) years prior to said date, the same should have been disallowed as to the prescribed claims.
The obligation of the government to pay pension was created by law (Sec. 9, R.A. 65). Hence, the ten-year prescriptive period should
be counted from the date of passage of the law which is September 25, 1946, the reason being that it is only from said date that private
respondent could have filed his application. Taking September 25, 1946 as the point of reference, the actual filing of Gasilao's
application on July 23, 1955 was clearly made within and effectively interrupted the prescriptive period. It is not the date of the
commencement of the action in the lower Court which should be reckoned with, for it was not on said date that Gasilao first sought to
claim his pension benefits, but on July 23, 1955 when he filed his application with the defunct Philippine Veterans Board. As We had the
occasion to state in the case of Vda. de Nator vs. C.I.R., 11 "the basis of prescription is the unwarranted failure to bring the matter to the
attention of those who are by law authorized to take cognizance thereof."
The Stipulation of Facts do not show and neither do the records indicate when Gasilao attempted to reinstate his claim after the same
was disapproved on December 18, 1955. What is evident is that he did take steps to reinstate his claim because on August 8, 1968,
herein petitioner finally approved his application. We find it more logical to presume that upon being properly notified of the disapproval
of his application and the reasons therefor, Gasilao, being the interested party that he was proceeded to work for the completion of the
requirements of the Board, as in fact he was successful in meeting such requirements. There is nothing in the record to show
intentional abandonment of the claim to as to make the prescriptive period continue to run again.
The third ground relied upon in support of this Petition involves the issue as to whether or not the payment of increased pension
provided in the amendatory Act, R.A. 5753, could be ordered, even where there was no actual release of funds for the purpose,
although the law itself expressly provided for an appropriation. In the case ofBoard of Adminitrators, Philippine Veterans Administration
vs. Hon. Agcoili, et al., 12 penned by Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, the same issue was treated in this wise:
... The inability of the petitioner to pay Abrera the differential of P60.00 in monthly pension is attributed by it, in its own
words, "to the failure of Congress to appropriate the necessary funds to cover all claims for benefits, pensions and
allowances." And the petitioner states that it has "no alternative but to suspend (full implementation of said laws until
such time, as sufficient funds have been appropriated by Congress" to cover the total amount of all approved claims.
We find the explanation of the petitioner satisfactory, but we nevertheless hold that as a matter of law Abrera is
entitled to a monthly pension of P120.00 from January 1, 1972 when Republic Act 5753 was implemented up to the
present, if his physical disability rating has continued and continues to be 60%. Payment to him of what is due him
from January 1, 1972 must however remain subject to the availability of Government funds duly set aside for the
purpose and subject further periodic re-rating of his physical disability.

But even if we have thus defined the precise terms, nature and scope of the entitlement of the
respondentAbrera, for the guidance of petitioner, we nevertheless refrain from ordering the petitioner to
pay the amount of P120.00 per month from January 1, 1972 that is due to the respondent by virtue of the
mandate of section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended by Republic Act 5753, because the Government
has thus far not provided the necessary funds to pay all valid claims duly approved under the authority of
said statute. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court a quo is hereby modified to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is hereby ordered to make Gasilao's pension effective December 18, 1955 at the
rate of P50-00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each of his then unmarried minor children below 18, and the
former amount increased to P100.00 from June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968.
The differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for
the period from June 22, 1969 to January 14, 1972 by virtue of Republic Act No. 5753 are hereby declared subject to
the availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Melencio-Herrera and Plana, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15045

January 20, 1961

IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP
OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.
Feria, Manglapus and Associates for petitioner-appellant.
Legal Staff, Social Security System and Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the Social Security Commission a request
that "Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or
partially, operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. The request was based on the claim that the said Act is a labor law and
does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is limited to businesses and activities organized for profit. Acting upon the
recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social Security Commission in its Resolution No. 572, series of 1958, denied the request. The
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional objections, requested for reconsideration of
the resolution. The request, however, was denied by the Commission in its Resolution No. 767, series of 1958; hence, this appeal taken
in pursuance of section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.
Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in the System shall be compulsory upon all members
between the age of sixteen and sixty rears inclusive, if they have been for at least six months a the service of an employer who is a
member of the System, Provided, that the Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the System unless he
shall have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if admitted for membership during the first year of
the System's operation at least fifty employees, and if admitted for membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at least
six employees x x x." The term employer" as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who
carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who
is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government" (par. [c], see. 8), while an "employee" refers to "any
person who performs services for an 'employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives
compensation for such services" (par. [d], see. 8). "Employment", according to paragraph [i] of said section 8, covers any service
performed by an employer except those expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any of its
political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the Government, domestic service
in a private home, employment purely casual, etc.
From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly
excluded.
Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should following the principle of ejusdem generis be limited to
those who carry on "undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain," because
the phrase ,activity of any kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business, industry, undertaking." The contention
cannot be sustained. The rule ejusdem generisapplies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and
intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. (Grosjean vs. American Paints Works [La], 160 So. 449). In the case
at bar, the definition of the term "employer" is, we think, sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or
entities not organized for profit, like herein appellant, within its meaning. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an
exception in which said institutions or entities are not included. And, certainly, had the Legislature really intended to limit the operation
of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the Government
and yet make an express exception of it.
It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions organized for
religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and
8). That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is
clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law.
In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to cover only employment for profit or gain, appellant also cites
the discussions of the Senate, portions of which were quoted in its brief. There is, however, nothing whatsoever in those discussions

touching upon the question of whether the law should be limited to organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said discussions dwelt
at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a
profit. But this is readily explained by the fact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are corporations and
industries which are established primarily for profit or gain.
Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law and, consequently, following the rule laid down in the case of Boy
Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos (G.R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958) and other cases1, applies only to industry and occupation for
purposes of profit and gain. The cases cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that the law therein involved expressly limits its
application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishments, or enterprises. .
Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy of the Republic of the Philippines to develop,
establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines
and shall provide protection to employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act No.
1161, as amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power. It affords protection to labor, especially to working
women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of the Church to ameliorate living
conditions of the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of its provisions to relations between capital and labor in
industry and agriculture.
There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of the Social Security Law violates the
constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds for the use, benefit or support of any priest who might be employed by
appellant. The funds contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the members which are
merely held in trust by the Government. At any rate, assuming that said funds are impressed with the character of public funds, their
payment as retirement death or disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provisions of the Constitution, since such
payment shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee.
Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law impairs appellant's right to disseminate religious
information. All that is required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to the System for covered employees in its employ. These
contributions, contrary to appellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on employment." Together with the contributions imposed
upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572 kind 767, series of 1958, of the Social Security Commission are hereby
affirmed. So ordered with costs against appellant.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Barrera, JJ., concur in the result.
Bengzon, J., reserves his vote.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28869

June 29, 1968

PANTALEON V. PELAYO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, GAUDIOSO M. TIONGCO, RAUL B. PICHON, ELIAS B. LOPEZ, MANUEL C. SOTTO,
MANUEL M. GARCIA, CORNELIO P. MASKARINO, FELICIDAD SANTOS, CIPRIANO VILLAFUERTE, JR., DOMINGO VIDANES,
TOMAS MONTEVERDE, JR., BENIGNO BANGOY, ANTONIO S. CASTILLO and BONIFACIO TAMAYO, respondents.
Fernandez, Nazareno and Inigo for petitioner.
Acting City Fiscal Raul B. Pichon for himself and respondents Mayor Elias B. Lopez, et al.
Maskarino, Carrillo and Associates for respondents Vice Mayor Manuel C. Sotto, et al.
Ramon Barrios for respondent Commission on Elections.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The decisive issue raised in this, a petition for certiorari, 1 turns to the validity of the Commission on Elections' (Comelec) February 7,
1968 resolution annulling petitioner's proclamation of January 13, 1968 as the 10th councilor-elect of Davao City and directing the "new
City Board of Canvassers of Davao City ... to canvass and proclaim the 10th councilor-elect," and its March 14, 1968 resolution ruling
out petitioner's move to reconsider, and ordering the "new City Board of Canvassers of Davao City to continue and complete the
canvass of all the votes cast in all the precincts in the City of Davao, but to hold in abeyance the proclamation of the winning candidate
until further orders of this Commission."
The problem the petition deposits exacts articulation of the controlling facts.

1vvphi1.nt

On December 4, 1967, the board of canvassers of Davao City convened and proceeded to canvass the November 14, 1967 election
returns of Davao City for the positions of, amongst others, Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Councilors.
On December 19, 1967, the board issued a "Certificate of Votes of Candidates" upon canvass terminated on December 18 to
inform the public of "the status of votes cast for each candidate." This certificate shows: Petitioner Pantaleon V. Pelayo, Jr., official
Liberal Party candidate, garnered 16,541 votes as against 16,495 2 of respondent Gaudioso M. Tiongco of the Nacionalistas. The
margin is only 46 votes.
Seven days afterwards, that is, on December 26, 1967, the board of canvassers proclaimed: Mayor-elect Elias B. Lopez; Vice-Mayorelect Manuel C. Sotto; and nine councilors-elect Manuel M. Garcia, Cornelio Maskario, Felicidad C. Santos, Cipriano Villafuerte,
Domingo R. Vidanes, Tomas Monteverde, Jr., Benigno S. Bangoy, Antonio S. Castillo, and Bonifacio Tamayo.
Readily seen is that the 10th councilor was left out. And this, because on December 23, 1967, the Court of First Instance of Davao, in
Election Case 1571, 3 stopped the board from proclaiming the 10th councilor-elect. 4
Directing attention to Election Case 1571, we find that respondent Tiongco, on December 11, 1967, lodged with the Davao court a
petition for the correction of returns under Sections 154 and 163 of the Election Code. He there averred that votes reading "David
Pelayo" were erroneously credited for petitioner Pantaleon V. Pelayo, Jr. David Pelayo, it turns out, is a brother of petitioner, and an
independent candidate who ran for councilor. David Pelayo was however previously ruled out as a nuisance candidate by Comelec;
and Comelec's view was sustained by this Court. 5 Tiongco's petition in the above case, as finally amended, contained three causes of
action, thus: (1) correction of election returns of precincts where David Pelayo's votes were allegedly credited for petitioner; (2) judicial
recount of votes allegedly upon discrepancies in the election returns of Precincts 314, 88 and 120; and (3) mandamus to compel the
canvassing board "to credit petitioner fifty-nine (59) votes in Precinct 74 and not to credit Pelayo, Jr., with any vote in Precinct No.
421." 6
Except for the fact that 10 votes were added to those of respondent Tiongco, as a result of the judicial recount of the votes in
Precincts 421, 314, 120 and 74 (one vote in Precinct 120 and nine votes in Precinct 314), 7 the petition did not give any substantial
advantage to Tiongco. For, per the court's decision of January 10, 1968, Pelayo's lead was merely reduced to 36 votes; the petition was
denied in all other respects; and the restraining order lifted and set aside.
The restraining order out of the way, the board of canvassers, on January 13, 1968, proclaimed petitioner Pantaleon V. Pelayo, Jr., the
10th councilor-elect with 16,531 votes. 8

On January 15, 1968, respondent Tiongco returned to court in Election Case 1571 with a petition praying not only to reconsider the
decision of January 10, 1968, but also to annul petitioner's proclamation. This he amended on January 18, 1968. In said amendment,
Tiongco raised for the first time the issue of the validity of the composition, and the legality of the actuations, of the city board of
canvassers. Tiongco's gripe was directed at Comelec's order of November 23, 1967 appointing Judge Vicente Calanog of the City
Court of Davao in lieu of Acting City Fiscal Raul B. Pichon.
Tiongco's motion to reconsider, as was his petition to annul the proclamation, was rejected by the court. 9
Tiongco filed a "Second Motion for Reconsideration Preparatory to Certiorari" dated February 20, 1968. To our knowledge, this second
motion remains unresolved. 10
Even before the court in Election Case 1571 could act on respondent Tiongco's first motion to reconsider of January 15, 1968, said
respondent lodged with Comelec a letter-petition 11 dated January 24, 1968 amplified by a supplemental letter-petition 12 dated January
25, 1968. 13 Tiongco retraced the events which led to the filing of Election Case 1571, the result thereof and the subsequent
proclamation of petitioner as the 10th councilor-elect. He charged that that proclamation was "highly questionable and irregular as it is a
malicious and deliberate scheme to defeat the right of petitioner to seek further remedies in Election Case No. 1571," and was made
against standing orders of Comelec. 14 He submitted, as he did in the Court of First Instance, that the board was illegally constituted as
Raul B. Pichon, the Acting City Fiscal, was substituted by City Judge Vicente Calanog. He claimed, too, that the old board was bereft of
authority to proclaim petitioner for the reason that the new set of elected city officials automatically became the members of and
composed the city board of canvassers and all the previous members ceased ipso facto to be members of the board. 15 He then prayed
for the nullification of the proclamation of petitioner; the reconstitution of the city board of canvassers; and a directive to make them
recanvass Pelayo's and Tiongco's votes and proclaim thereafter the 10th councilor-elect.
Admittedly, petitioner was not served with a copy of the aforesaid letter-petition and supplemental letter-petition before Comelec.
Neither was he notified of the hearing thereof. 16
On February 7, 1968, on the basis alone of Tiongco's representations, Comelec came out with a resolution, viz:
Considering that the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City which made the proclamation on January 13, 1968 was illegally
constituted, in that it is contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Santos v. Comelec, L-16413, January 26, 1960, where it
was held that "the municipal board of canvassers composed of the members of the present municipal council shall constitute
the board of canvassers after January 1, 1959", the Commission RESOLVED to annul, as it hereby annuls, the proclamation
of Pantaleon Pelayo, Jr., as the 10th councilor-elect of Davao City made by the above-stated City Board of Canvassers on
January 13, 1968, and to direct the new City Board of Canvassers of Davao City to be composed of the following to canvass
and proclaim the 10th councilor-elect of Davao City in the November 14, 1967 elections:
1. City Fiscal Raul Pichon
2. City Mayor Elias Lopez
3. Vice-Mayor Manuel Sotto
4. Councilor Bonifacio Tamayo
5. Councilor Domingo Vidane
6. Councilor Tomas Monteverde
7. Councilor Benigno Bangoy
8. Councilor Felicidad Santos
9. Councilor Manuel Garcia
10. Councilor Antonio Castillo
11. Councilor Cornelio Maskarino
12. Substitute member to be a pointed vice the 10th City Councilor
13. Councilor Cipriano Villafuerte

Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member

On February 16, 1968, Pelayo moved to reconsider.

On February 19, 1968, Comelec gave telegraphic instructions to the new board "not to canvass the votes and not to proclaim the 10th
councilor-elect of said City." Nonetheless, the new board started canvass. On the day following, February 20, 1998, said board was
informed of the date set for the hearing of Pelayo's motion for reconsideration. 17
On February 24, 1968, Comelec resolved to give the parties until February 28 to submit their memoranda, and at the same time
instructed its Law Department to wire the chairman of the canvassing board that "suspension of canvass and proclamation of the 10th
councilor-elect of Davao City is continued until further orders of this Commission." 18
On March 14, 1968, Comelec resolved to overturn Pelayo's motion for reconsideration, and to order the new board "to continue and
complete the canvass of all the votes cast in all the precincts in the City of Davao, but to hold in abeyance the proclamation of the
winning candidate until further orders of this Commission."

Petitioner's second motion for reconsideration of March 23, 1968 before Comelec was withdrawn by a pleading dated April 16, 1968.

19

But before this withdrawal, petitioner came to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction presenting mainly
the issue specified at the start of this opinion.
We issued a cease-and-desist order.
Upon the petition, the separate returns of respondents (1) Gaudioso M. Tiongco, (2) Raul B. Pichon in behalf of the new city board of
canvassers, (3) Manuel C. Sotto, Manuel M. Garcia, Cornelio P. Maskarino, Cipriano Villafuerte, Jr., and Antonio S. Castillo, and (4)
Comelec, and after hearing on oral arguments and the memoranda, the case is now before us for a decision on the merits.
1. Was Acting City Fiscal Raul B. Pichon unlawfully excluded as chairman of the old board of canvassers? This question cropped up
because while respondent Tiongco considered good and valid the appointment of substitutes in the formation of the board of
canvassers, he levelled a major attack against the appointment of City Judge Vicente Calanog as chairman of the board instead of
Acting City Fiscal Raul B. Pichon. His reason: Fiscal Pichon was neither disqualified nor incapacitated.
Fiscal Pichon, prior to his temporary designation by the Secretary of Justice as Acting City Fiscal, was the Fourth Assistant City Fiscal
of Davao City. But under the Davao City charter, the fiscal next in rank to the City Fiscal automatically "shall perform the duties" of City
Fiscal in the latter's absence or sickness or inability to act or for any other reason, or in case of temporary vacancy. 20
Of course, one cannot easily tag Fiscal Pichon's designation as politically motivated. But not to be so easily shunted aside are certain
disturbing circumstances. It was made on October 27, 1967 18 days before election day. He was catapulted over the he of three
assistant city fiscals who outrank him. That designation was temporary "effective immediately and to continue until the date of the
adjournment of the regular session of the Congress of the Philippines next following these designations unless sooner revoked." To the
unanointed, these facts could appear as out of the ordinary.
To be adverted to is that in Comelec's dispute resolution of February 7, the new city board of canvassers was created with Acting City
Fiscal Pichon as chairman. In the present proceedings, Fiscal Pichon filed the answer on behalf of that new board, although, of course,
the Liberal members of the new city board repudiated his representation before this Court. 21 They filed their own answer joining hands
with petitioner. This is not unexpected. Party lines appear to have shaped up after Comelec annulled the January 13, 1968
proclamation. The tenth berth in the city council is hotly contested. The Liberals in the canvassing board have some apprehension
about Fiscal Pichon's impartiality. Petitioner Pelayo charges that a majority of the said new board including Fiscal Pichon, its
chairman at the meeting of February 19, insisted in defying Comelec's instructions telegraphic and by long distance telephone
to suspend canvass and proclamation in view of the pendency of his motion for reconsideration. And this, even before the substitute for
the 10th councilor had been appointed.
On Fiscal Pichon's right to sit in the board, Comelec's answer to the petition herein is quite illuminating. It gives the reason why Judge
Vicente Calanog was appointed in lieu of Acting City Fiscal Pichon, thus: "[i]t has been the policy of the Commission on Elections not to
allow appointees of the Executive in an 'Acting' capacity to sit as members of the canvassing board." Elaborating on the meaning of
"acting" capacity, Comelec goes on to say the following: "[t]his kind of appointment is usually done a few months before election day, to
ease out undesirable officials and put in more favored ones, which is not conducive to the holding of free, orderly and honest elections."
It really is beyond the bounds of accepted candor to say that some such "acting" officials will always act with fairness. No cause or
reason exists why we should downgrade Comelec's opinion. The chairman of a canvassing board should be removed from the
temptation of falling into partiality. Especially so in the present case where there is a tight fight for the tenth council berth and a tight
contest for supremacy in the Davao City council. As presently constituted, the city council of Davao City is composed of five
Nacionalista councilors, four Liberal councilors plus one vice-mayor, also a Liberal, who is its presiding officer. 22 Fairness in the
actuations of the chairman should not be subject to misgivings or suspicion. That chairman should not be beholden to anyone.
Nor can we say that Comelec is without authority to substitute Judge Calanog for Fiscal Pichon. For, Comelec's powers are broad, both
in the statutory and constitutional sense. It is not to be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less
responsible organization. Great latitude is accorded Comelec in adopting means and methods to insure accomplishment of the great
objective for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections. 23 Comelec has the choice of means. 24 As we have
said in Uso Dan Aguam vs. Commission on Elections, L-28955, May 28, 1968:
By constitutional mandate, Comelec "shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law." The Constitution enjoins
Comelec to "decide save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections." And, all of these are
aimed at achieving an ideal: "free, orderly, and honest elections." Implementing the constitutional precept, Congress legislated
in Section 3 of the Revised Election Code that, in addition to the powers and functions conferred by the Constitution, Comelec
has "direct and immediate supervision over the provincial, municipal, and city officials designated by law to perform duties
relative to the conduct of elections."
The present case is not to be considered as within the coverage of our resolution in Campos vs. Commission on Elections, L-28439,
December 29, 1967. The factual configuration in the Campos case will readily bring the present out of the reach of that resolution.
In Campos, the Acting Provincial Fiscal, Bienvenido Reyes, was automatically entitled to sit in the board, 25 for the reason that he was

the first assistant provincial fiscal. There was no regular Provincial Fiscal. Fiscal Reyes stepped into the shoes of the latter. So that
in Campos, we declared that Fiscal Reyes was entitled to sit. Not so here. Fiscal Pichon would not qualify to act as City Fiscal in the
absence of the regular City Fiscal for the reason that he is situated way below in the echelon of the assistant city fiscals. In this posture,
Comelec had no alternative but to effect a substitution, as it was done here.
We rule, therefore, that the substitution of Acting City Fiscal Pichon by City Judge Vicente Calanog is proper.
2. But argument is here advanced that the proclamation made by the old board of canvassers on January 13, 1968 is, null and void. It
is said that the term of office of the elected city officials who by law are members thereof had expired, and, consequently, also their
substitutes.
This argument dwindles in strength on the face of the fact that the board of canvassers is a body entirely different and distinct from the
city council of Davao City. The board of canvassers is created for a specific purpose; canvass and proclamation, and no more. Its term
of office does not coincide with the term of office of the officials concerned. It terminates as soon as its functions are finished. Only then
does it adjourn sine die and thus becomefunctus officio. 26 As a corollary thereto, it normally retains its authority as a board until it shall
have completed its functions and accomplished its purposes. They may be public officers in another capacity. Yet they are neverfunctus
officio as election officers until they have totally discharged their duties. They cannot be disrobed until then. Public policy and interest
prop up this position. For, they are agents of the State. They are purely and distinctly election officers. Thus, in Aquino vs.Commission
on Elections, L-28392, January 29, 1968, this Court clarified the role of a city board of canvassers in the following language:
The city board of canvassers is an entity that is entirely different and distinct from the city board or city council of a chartered
city. Similarly, a provincial board of canvassers, or a municipal board of canvassers, is an entity entirely different and distinct
from the provincial board of a province, or the municipal council of a municipality, as the case may be. While members of a city
board (or city council), or a provincial board or of a municipal council, are members also of a city board of canvassers, or
provincial board of canvassers, or of a municipal board of canvassers, as the case may be, they do not act in the board of
canvassers in the capacity of city councilmen, or in the capacity of a member of the provincial board, or in the capacity of a
member of a municipal council, but as election officials to perform functions specifically provided by law. The board of
canvassers exists for a specific function that is, to canvass the result of the election as shown in the election returns and to
proclaim the winning candidates. Once this specific function had been performed the existence of the board of canvassers is
ended and terminated.
The factual environment in the present case lends itself to the view just expressed. There is no question in our mind that were it not for
the injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Davao in Election Case 1571, petitioner could have been proclaimed with the nine
other councilors on December 26, 1967. For, as early as the 18th of December, the canvass had been made. And, on December 19,
the results of the canvassing were published. It would not seem out of context to say that petitioner's proclamation was merely
suspended by the court action, and resumed when finally the decision came. Would it be reasonable to take the remaining task of
proclaiming but one of the so many candidates for city elective officials out of this board, which task was after all performed by that
board very shortly after the main proclamation? A sense of justice convinces us that this should not be done here.
The pronouncement in Santos vs. Commission on Elections, L-16413, January 26, 1960 where the new members of the municipal
council of Hagonoy, Bulacan, were directed to properly complete the canvass of the votes for Mayor (by canvassing the return in
Precinct 7) is out of focus here. There, the two boards of canvassers did not perform their duties properly. Not so here. More
important is that in Santos, the legality of the constitution of the new board was never disputed by any party. Here, petitioner questions
precisely the legality of the composition of the new board named by Comelec whose members except for one are the newly
elected officials. We are thus called upon to squarely decide the problem. And we do so now.
We hold that the old city board of canvassers lawfully proclaimed petitioner as 10th councilor-elect of Davao City.
3. More to this. The injustice that may visit upon petitioner by a change in the composition of the board of canvassers is easily
discernible here. Let us take a look at the composition of the old board and the new board.
The old board, which proclaimed the City Mayor, the Vice-Mayor, and the nine councilors was compound of the following:
1. Dominador Zuno
2. Crispina Principe
3. Zacarias Solon
4. Pedro Sanvicente
5. Samuel Dumlao
6. Vicente Albay
7. Patrocinio Quitain
8. Pablo Piatos
9. Vicente Calanog
10. Barbara Pioquinto
11. Isidro Palacio

City Councilor
City Councilor
City Councilor
City Superintendent of Schools vice City Mayor
City Engineer vice City Vice-Mayor
City Public Services Officer vice City Councilor
Register of Deeds vice City Councilor
City Agriculturist vice City Councilor
City Judge vice City Fiscal
Clerk of Court vice City Councilor
Chief, City Fire Department vice City Councilor

12. Amando Barbadillo

City Veterinarian vice City Councilor
13. Justiniano San Agustin vice City Councilor
To be noted is that in this old board of canvassers, an overwhelming majority are substitutes who are career public officials named
pursuant to Section 159 of the Revised Election Code; they are not card-carrying party members. They carry the presumption of being
impartial.
Compare the old board to the new board created by Comelec in its February 7, 1968 resolution, as follows:
1wph1.t

1. City Fiscal Raul Pichon

2. City Mayor Elias Lopez
3. Vice-Mayor Manuel Sotto
4. Councilor Bonifacio Tamayo
5. Councilor Domingo Vidanes
6. Councilor Tomas Monteverde
7. Councilor Benigno Bangoy
8. Council Felicidad Santos
9. Councilor Manuel Garcia
10. Councilor Antonio Castillo
11. Councilor Cornelio Maskarino
12. Substitute member to be appointed vice the 10th City Councilor
13. Councilor Cipriano Villafuerte

Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member

A radial change in the composition of the board is obvious. In the line-up of the new board, with exception of Acting City Fiscal Raul B.
Pichon, the chairman, there are six Nacionalistas, namely, Mayor Elias Lopez, and Councilors Tomas Monteverde, Jr., Felicidad
Santos, Domingo Vidanes, Benigno Bangoy, and Bonifacio Tamayo. The five Liberals, as heretofore mentioned, are Vice-Mayor Manuel
Sotto and Councilors Manuel Garcia, Cornelio Maskarino Cipriano Villafuerte, and Antonio Castillo. The substitute for the 10th councilor
has not yet been named. There is a precarious balance of power. That in all probability they will vote in the canvass and proclamation
along party lines, is a statement that reflects the temper of the times. The act of the majority of the board during the February 19, 1968
canvass is, indeed, an outcropping of this inclination. The circumstances carry their own badge of unfairness to petitioner. He is at a
distinct disadvantage. As to him, there is as of how adverse superiority in numbers. In deliberations where political fortunes are at stake,
minority protestations have rung hollow. Power lends itself to misuse. This is a situation which should give pause to an impartial
observer.
4. But if as respondent Gaudioso M. Tiongco contends the old board of canvassers was illegally constituted, then that body could
not canvass and proclaim any candidate as duly elected. The proclamation of petitioner necessarily is null and void. And so also must
the proclamation of all the other city elected officials of Davao City. On this assumption, these elected members of the new board
cannot then lay claim to the position they are now holding; they are not entitled to be members of the new board of canvassers
constituted by Comelec in its February 7, 1968 resolution to canvass the votes for and proclaim the 10th councilor. Petitioner should not
suffer from discrimination.
5. Viewed from a different direction, we believe that the intent and meaning imparted by Section 28 of the Revised Election Code
support the proposition that the newly elected officials should not sit in the board.
Section 28 declares that any member of a municipal council "who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent to act in
said body in the performance of the duties thereof relative to said election." If a mere candidate is disqualified, then we should say that
one who had been elected as such candidate stands on no higher a level. Because, in the first instance, membership in the board of
canvassers for a given election is mainly based on the political composition of the city officials, namely, the Mayor and the city council,
with the City Fiscal to be excepted. The political complexion of the board may change after the election as is the case here. And,
prejudice to a candidate may result, as is the case with petitioner. That is good reason enough to say that the newly elected city officials
in a given election are disqualified to act as members of the board of canvassers for any other elective city position in the same
election. Since the eleven elected members of the new board heretofore mentioned are disqualified, there is no new board to speak of
which may make the canvass of the votes and proclamation of the 10th Councilor. It is well to remember that a void proclamation is no
proclamation at all. 27
We accordingly hold that the new board named by Comelec's resolution of February 7, 1968 is illegally constituted and, therefore,
cannot act as a city board of canvassers in the present case.
For the reasons given
The resolutions of the Commission on Elections of February 7 and March 14, 1968 are hereby set aside and declared null and void;

The proclamation of petitioner as 10th councilor-elect of Davao City made by the board of canvassers on January 13, 1968 is hereby
declared valid and in full force and effect; and
IN CONSEQUENCE, the temporary restraining order issued herein is hereby made permanent.
Costs against respondent Gaudioso M. Tiongco. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondent appellee.
Gregorio E. Fajardo for appellant.
Gregorio Baroque for appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:
In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of such decision relying on what it
considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically the first two paragraphs thereof: "... (1) A
member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative
authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in the
agreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the member
to the co-operative. (2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if so required by the co-operative by a request in
writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make the claimant and remit forth with the amount
so deducted to the co-operative." 1
To show that such is futile, the appealed decision, as quoted in the brief for petitioner-appellant, stated the following: "Then petitioner
contends that under the above provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the
payroll collection from the respondent's employees' wages and salaries. As can be clearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of Rep.
Act 2023 hereinabove quoted which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority
in the deduction from the employees' wages and salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct from
the salaries or wages payable to members of the employees' cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the union and to pay
the same to the credit union. In other words, if Rep. Act 2023 had been enacted, the employer could not be compelled to act as the
collecting agent of the employees' credit union for the employees' debt to his credit union but to contend that the debt of a member of
the employees cooperative credit union as having first priority in the matter of deduction, is to write something into the law which does
not appear. In other words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the
employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory character does not convert
the credit union's credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to
give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so
expressly declared. Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Arts. 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on
preference of credits. 2
Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor with the respondent-appellee, which, in its brief, succinctly pointed out "that
there is nothing in said provision from which it could be implied that it gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that payable to
petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent company, in issuing the documents known as Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "P", which establish the
order of priority of payment out of the salaries of the employees of respondent-appellee, did not violate the above-quoted Section 62 of
Republic Act 2023. In promulgating Exhibit "3", [and] Exhibit "P" respondent, in effect, implemented the said provision of law. 3
This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its face, it would appear that no favorable
action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.
1. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so
applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been to alter
the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly appertains to the legislative branch. As was pointed out
in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals: 4 "It has been repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there
is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our
decisions have consistently born to that effect. 5.
2. Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on which he would
base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more rigorous analysis would have prevented him from instituting a a suit of
this character. In J.R.S. Business Corporation v. Montesa, 6 this Court held. "Man-damus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that
there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful
exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled. 7 The opinion continued in this wise:"According to
former Chief Justice Moran," only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights are
of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. In support of the above view, Viuda e Hijos de
Crispulo Zamora v. Wright was cited. As was there categorically stated: "This court has held that it is fundamental that the duties to be
enforced by mandamus must be those which are clear and enjoined by law or by reason of official station, and that petitioner must have
a clear, legal right to the thing and that it must be the legal duty of the defendant to perform the required act.' As expressed by the then
Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion: "It is well establish that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right
sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful." To the same effect is

the formulation of such doctrine by former Justice Barrera: "Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already
imposed." 8 So it has been since then. 9 The latest reported case, Province. of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, 10 this court
speaking through Justice Concepcion Jr., reiterated such a well-settled doctrine: "It has also been held that it is essential to the
issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the imperative
duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. 11
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.