(Timothy E. Eastman, Hank Keeton) Physics and Whit (BookFi) PDF

Physics and Whitehead
SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought

David Ray Grifn, editor
Quantum, Process, and Experience
Edited by
Timothy E. Eastman
and
Hank Keeton
State University of New York Press

Cover image: This ghostly apparition is actually an interstellar cloud caught in the process
of destruction by strong radiation from the nearby star, Merope. This haunting picture of
Bernards Nebula, located in the Pleiades, suggests the interconnectedness, openness,
order, and creativity of the universe. Modern physics now understands the multi-scale
coupling, interdependence, and pervasiveness of such stellar radiation and space plasmas.
Image Credit: NASA and The Hubble Heritage Team (STScI/AURA)
Acknowledgment: George Herbig and Theodore Simon (Institute for Astronomy,
University of Hawaii)
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Physics and Whitehead : quantum, process, and experience / edited by Timothy E.
Eastman and Hank Keeton.
p. cm. (SUNY series in constructive postmodern thought)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7914-5913-6 (alk. paper) ISBN 0-7914-5914-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Whitehead, Alfred North, 18611947 Congresses. I. Eastman, Timothy E.
II. Keeton, Hank. III. Series.
B1674.W354P48 2003
192dc22
2003059022
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To John B. Cobb Jr.
whose encouragement and support of the dialogue between process
thought and natural science made this work possible.
And in memory of scholars whose work substantially advanced the
dialogue between process thought and natural science.
David Bohm (19171992)

Milic Capek (19091997)
Charles Hartshorne (18972000)
Ivor Leclerc (19151999)
Victor Lowe (19071988)
Ilya Prigogine (19172003)
This page intentionally left blank.
Contents
Preface ix
Series Introduction xv
Part I. Physics and Whitehead 1

1. Introduction to Process Thought 3
Philip Clayton
2. Duality without Dualism 14
Timothy E. Eastman
3. Whitehead as Mathematical Physicist 31
Hank Keeton
4. Evidence for Process in the Physical World 47
John A. Jungerman
5. Dialogue for Part I 57
Part II. Order and Emergence 61

6. Constraints on the Origin of Coherence in Far-from-Equilibrium
Chemical Systems 63
Joseph E. Earley Sr.
7. Whiteheads Philosophy and the Collapse of Quantum States 74
Shimon Malin
8. A Historical Reality That Includes Big Bang, Free Will, and
Elementary Particles 84
Geoffrey F. Chew
vii
viii Contents
9. Whiteheadian Process and Quantum Theory 92

Henry P. Stapp
10. Dialogue for Part II 103
Part III. Fundamental Processes 127

11. The Primacy of Asymmetry over Symmetry in Physics 129
Joe Rosen
12. Spacetime and Becoming: Overcoming the Contradiction
Between Special Relativity and the Passage of Time 136
Niels Viggo Hansen
13. The Individuality of a Quantum Event: Whiteheads Epochal
Theory of Time and Bohrs Framework of Complementarity 164
Yutaka Tanaka
14. Physical Process and Physical Law 180
David Ritz Finkelstein
15. Dialogue for Part III 187
Part IV. Metaphysics 197

16. Whiteheads Process Philosophy as Scientic Metaphysics 199
Franz G. Riffert
17. Whitehead and the Quantum Experience 223
Jorge Luis Nobo
18. Dialogue for Part IV 258
Glossary 275
Bibliography 287
Contributors 299
Note on Supporting Center 303
Index 305
SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought 321
Preface
The Center for Process Studies in Claremont, California held a conference on

Physics and Time in August 1984 with David Bohm, Ilya Prigogine, Henry
Stapp, and other leading scientists and philosophers. During that conference, a
spontaneous conjunction of energies emerged from a conversation between two
participants who also appear in these pages (Stapp and Keeton). Stapp pre-
sented a paper on Einstein and Alfred North Whitehead, after which Keeton
asked Stapp if they might collaborate on reinterpreting Whiteheads gravita-
tional theory of 1922. Stapp suggested they write a paper together and discuss
the project over lunch that day. As they left the auditorium, other conference
participants joined the conversation, swelling the original pair to more than 25.
It was a loud and energetic session, and two more of those joining the effort
that day also appear in this volume (Eastman and Tanaka). Our enthusiasm for
the project of reinterpretation grew into a broad collaboration lasting nearly 10
years, including research, annual gatherings, and publications. The present vol-
ume is an extension of that collaboration. In the decades preceding 1984, efforts
to explore and enhance process concepts within modern scientic research had
gradually accelerated (see Bibliography, especially Internet resources).
In the 1940s one major work was published (Lillie), and in the 1950s
three volumes appeared (Agar, Smith, Synge). The 1960s included a major
investigation of Whiteheads philosophy of science (Palter) and a study empha-
sizing Whiteheads relativity theory (Schmidt). In the next three decades the
pace quickened. The 1970s saw three signicant works on Whitehead and sci-
ence (Fitzgerald, Fowler, Plamondon), and the 1980s had 11 major volumes,
including one on mathematics (Code), one on logic (Martin), one a collection of
papers from the 1984 conference mentioned above (Grifn), and a collection of
papers on postmodern science (Grifn). The 1990s experienced increasing pro-
ductivity and diversity in 13 major works on process thought and natural sci-
ence: in the elds of biology (Birch), computer science (Henry), philosophy of
science (Athern), and physics (Fagg, Jungerman, Lobl, Ranke, Shimony, Stapp,
ix
x Preface
Stolz). Then a major effort was mounted by the Center for Process Studies
during 199798 with two special focus issues in Process Studies, Process
Thought and Natural Science (Eastman, ed.). In the past century, there have
been more than 200 signicant publications focusing on Whitehead or a pro-
cess-relational perspective and the physical sciences. Of these, more than 90%
have appeared since 1950, and 25% in the past decade alone. This rapid in-
crease of interest in Whiteheads philosophy and its associated variations re-
ects a growing recognition of the creative possibilities a process perspective
brings to contemporary science and human experience. The 1998 conference
papers included in this volume are a continuation of that momentum, with a
focus on Whiteheads contributions to mathematical physics, and the implica-
tions of his philosophy for contemporary physics.
Whiteheads academic career spanned more than ve decades, from 1880
well into the twentieth century, covering a variety of elds from mathematics
and symbolic logic to philosophy of nature and philosophy of science, to epis-
temology, cosmology, and metaphysics. Chronologically, his publications have
been popularly grouped into three general categories parallel to this demarca-
tion of interests, no category being completely exhaustive or mutually exclu-
sive. A careful reading of materials published throughout his career reveals an
uncanny and persistent hallmark of continuity between specic focus and broad
generalization within and between each work. During his early work in mathe-
matics and logic (18801912generally the years at Trinity College, Cam-
bridge) he clearly enlarged his specic concentration on mathematics to include
applications for other more physical sciences. As he gradually generalized those
early investigations into the foundations of broader science, he naturally began
expressing his evolving insights using more philosophical language and catego-
ries (19121924generally the years in London at University College and the
Imperial College of Science and Technology). This more philosophical dis-
course led to even broader categorical investigations that resulted in the chal-
lenging cosmology of his mature thinking (19241947generally the years at
Harvard Universitys philosophy department, and retirement). The threads link-
ing this complex scheme of progressively more comprehensive ideas can be
found within each work, and exhibit themselves throughout his career. His abil-
ity to maintain and expand those threads within the wide range of his interests
is a hallmark. Other thinkers (e.g., Alexander, Bergson, James, Peirce) track
parallel paths through similar issues, and together help constitute an emerging
eld within philosophy focusing on relationality and the process nature of the
universe. This philosophical eld was described as process philosophy in the
1960s and found institutional support at Harvard and the University of Chicago.
Most interpreters of Whiteheads thought focus on the more philosophical
works of his Harvard years, but the authors in the present volume seek an
expansion of those ideas into the contemporary worlds of quantum and rela-
tivity physics. In both of these worlds, Whitehead has inspired contemporary
Preface xi
thinkers to suggest new and challenging interpretations for current experimental

data and to formulate innovative schemes expanding the foundations of physics.
Although Whitehead worked actively during the formative years of quantum
theory, he published no works dealing with those developments in particular.
Interestingly, much of the current interpretive work focusing on his ideas dem-
onstrates just how parallel his thinking was to that of Bohr, de Brolie, Heisen-
berg, and Schrodinger on matters of continuity and atomicity. In fact it is the
subtly profound nature of Whiteheads quantum thinking, woven into the fabric
of his emerging philosophy of nature, that stimulates several authors in this
present volume.
However, from very early in his career, in numerous publications and
lectures, Whitehead wrestled openly with the concepts surrounding space-time
and motion, nally resulting in his own version of gravitational theory in 1922.
What inspired Whitehead to formulate his own theory? As a mathematical
physicist, he was aware of the success Einsteins rst theory of relativity en-
joyed in the scientic community. But what intrigued Whitehead most was the
philosophical basis of Einsteins theory. For Whiteheads own theory, he begins
with different philosophical assumptions. After 1905 his work, both mathe-
matically and philosophically, revealed his growing dissatisfaction with the
classical concepts of mass, time, and space. He had a strong intuition that Ein-
stein, and with him the mainstream scientic community, was traveling a path
that might look entirely different if the journey began with different assump-
tions. For Whitehead, the profound coupling of mass and energy that Einstein
proposed in his special theory was a brilliant development. But something else
was revealed in this mass-energy relationship. A sense of limits appeared in the
concepts. Whitehead saw something beyond or behind the focus on mass-en-
ergy and realized he was looking at the coupling relations themselves, not just
mass or energy. If these new relativistic theories about the interaction of mass-
energy resulted in renement of the basic concepts, what might happen if the
concepts themselves were radically reconceived? How might gravity be con-
ceived differently?
Whitehead began at a place quite foreign to most scientists during the
early part of the century. Rather than focus on the things that were being mea-
sured and tested (whether massive objects or massless objects), Whitehead
choose to focus on the events that constituted or included those things instead.
What does it mean to focus on events rather than on things as objects? The
papers in this volume approach this question from a variety of angles. They
seek to explore the conceptual adjustments required if event-like structures re-
place object-like structures in physical theories, both quantum and relativistic.
The authors of the chapters in this volume have collaborated from the
standpoint of a felt need. That need emerges from inquiries into the limits of
mass-spacetime concepts, in the face of experimental data suggesting that foun-
dational concepts of mass-spacetime have reached particular limits of appli-
xii Preface
cability. This book emerged from three seminars offered at the Third Interna-
tional Whitehead Conference held in August 1998 in Claremont, California,
under the sponsorship of the Center for Process Studies. These workshops were
one stage in the process of uniting the variety of voices into a cohesive whole.
The sequence of the workshops largely parallels the structure of the present
volume, to which the editors have added introductory and concluding sections,
with bibliography.
Part I consists of an introduction to process thought (Clayton), a summary
of contrasts between classical, modern, and postmodern scientic-theoretic cat-
egories (Eastman), and an overview of Whiteheads work as a mathematical
physicist (Keeton), culminating in suggestions for a process physics (Junger-
man). Following each set of chapters is a selection of the workshop dialogue
pertinent to that section.
Part II focuses on order and the phenomenon of emergence by exploring
coherence in chemical systems (Earley), comparing Whiteheads actual entities
and the collapse of quantum states (Malin), developing a foundation of physics
based on the contrast between the classical material reality and a Whiteheadian
historical reality (Chew), and interpreting experimental choice in quantum the-
ory (Stapp), followed by pertinent workshop dialogue.
Part III focuses on fundamental processes by exploring the relationship
between symmetry and asymmetry in physics (Rosen), interpreting special rela-
tivity to account for temporality (Hansen), revising quantum individuality using
quantum logic to dene commensurability (Tanaka), and reimaging the concept
of physical law in terms of the its relationship with dynamics and kinematics
resulting in the notion that process replaces law in very stimulating and chal-
lenging ways (Finkelstein), followed by further dialogue.
Part IV expands the focus from physics to metaphysics by comparing
process metaphysics with the scientic metaphysics of Bunge (Riffert) and
speculatively revisioning the role of human experience as quanta of information
with extensional relations and causality (Nobo), plus dialogue. This section en-
larges major themes emerging from the workshops and presents signicant op-
portunities for further development at the interface of process and physics.
We hope this work, together with the bibliography and related Web site,
will stimulate further research and constructive thinking employing the expand-
ing resources of process thought.
We are especially grateful to the following: John B. Cobb Jr. and the
codirectors of the Center for Process Studies for their unagging support of
academic advancement; Philip Clayton for special organizing; Jorge Nobo for
general editing; our patient spouses, Carolyn Brown and Norma Jean Standlea,
for their advice and encouragement throughout this project; Lyman Ellis for
professional video recordings of the workshops; and key workshop participants
beyond those directly contributing to this book, Ian Barbour, Murray Code,
Lawrence Fagg, Stanley Klein, and Robert Valenza. Our thanks as well to the
Preface xiii
Center for Process Studies, Sam Dunnam, and others who provided signicant
support for the workshop. We extend our gratitude to the staff of SUNY Press
who created the opportunity for expressing this vision, especially Ms. Jane
Bunker, Senior Acquisitions Editor, Ms. Judith Block, Senior Production Editor,
and Jennifer Giovani, Marketing Manager.
Introduction to SUNY Series in Constructive
Postmodern Thought1
The rapid spread of the term postmodern in recent years witnesses to a growing
dissatisfaction with modernity and to an increasing sense that the modern age
not only had a beginning but can have an end as well. Whereas the word
modern was almost always used until quite recently as a word of praise and as a
synonym for contemporary, a growing sense is now evidenced that we can and
should leave modernity behindin fact, that we must if we are to avoid de-
stroying ourselves and most of the life on our planet.
Modernity, rather than being regarded as the norm for human society
toward which all history has been aiming and into which all societies should be
usheredforcibly if necessaryis instead increasingly seen as an aberration.
A new respect for the wisdom of traditional societies is growing as we realize
that they have endured for thousands of years and that, by contrast, the exis-
tence of modern civilization for even another century seems doubtful. Likewise,
modernism as a worldview is less and less seen as The Final Truth, in compari-
son with which all divergent worldviews are automatically regarded as super-
stitious. The modern worldview is increasingly relativized to the status of one
among many, useful for some purposes, inadequate for others.
Although there have been antimodern movements before, beginning per-
haps near the outset of the nineteenth century with the Romanticists and the
Luddites, the rapidity with which the term postmodern has become widespread
in our time suggests that the antimodern sentiment is more extensive and in-
tense than before, and also that it includes the sense that modernity can be
successfully overcome only by going beyond it, not by attempting to return to a
premodern form of existence. Insofar as a common element is found in the
various ways in which the term is used, postmodernism refers to a diffuse
1
The present version of this introduction is slightly different from the rst version, which
was contained in the volumes that appeared prior to 1999.
xv
xvi Physics and Whitehead
sentiment rather than to any common set of doctrinesthe sentiment that hu-
manity can and must go beyond the modern.
Beyond connoting this sentiment, the term postmodern is used in a con-
fusing variety of ways, some of them contradictory to others. In artistic and
literary circles, for example, postmodernism shares in this general sentiment but
also involves a specic reaction against modernism in the narrow sense of a
movement in artistic-literary circles in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Postmodern architecture is very different from postmodern literary
criticism. In some circles, the term postmodern is used in reference to that
potpourri of ideas and systems sometimes called new age metaphysics, although
many of these ideas and systems are more premodern than postmodern. Even in
philosophical and theological circles, the term postmodern refers to two quite
different positions, one of which is reected in this series. Each position seeks
to transcend both modernism, in the sense of the worldview that has developed
out of the seventeenth-century Galilean-Cartesian-Baconian-Newtonian science,
and modernity, in the sense of the world order that both conditioned and was
conditioned by this worldview. But the two positions seek to transcend the
modern in different ways.
Closely related to literary-artistic postmodernism is a philosophical post-
modernism inspired variously by physicalism, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin
Heidegger, a cluster of French thinkersincluding Jacques Derrida, Michel
Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Julia Kristevaand certain features of American
pragmatism.2 By the use of terms that arise out of particular segments of this
movement, it can be called deconstructive, relativistic, or eliminative post-
modernism. It overcomes the modern worldview through an antiworldview, de-
constructing or even entirely eliminating various concepts that have generally
been thought necessary for a worldview, such as self, purpose, meaning, a real
world, givenness, reason, truth as correspondence, universally valid norms, and
divinity. While motivated by ethical and emancipatory concerns, this type of
postmodern thought tends to issue in relativism. Indeed, it seems to many
thinkers to imply nihilism.3 It could, paradoxically, also be called ultramodern-
2
The fact that the thinkers and movements named here are said to have inspired the decon-
structive type of postmodernism should not be taken, of course, to imply that they have nothing in
common with constructive postmodernists. For example, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Derrida, and De-
leuze share many points and concerns with Alfred North Whitehead, the chief inspiration behind
the present series. Furthermore, the actual positions of the founders of pragmatism, especially Wil-
liam James and Charles Peirce, are much closer to Whiteheads philosophical positionsee the
volume in this series titled The Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy: Peirce, James,
Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshornethan they are to Richard Rortys so-called neopragmatism,
which reects many ideas from Rortys explicitly physicalistic period.
3
As Peter Dews points out, although Derridas early work was driven by profound ethical
impulses, its insistence that no concepts were immune to deconstruction drove its own ethical
presuppositions into a penumbra of inarticulacy (The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Con-
temporary European Culture [London: New York: Verso, 1995], 5). In his more recent thought,
Series Introduction xvii
ism, in that its eliminations result from carrying certain modern premisessuch
as the sensationist doctrine of perception, the mechanistic doctrine of nature,
and the resulting denial of divine presence in the worldto their logical con-
clusions. Some critics see its deconstructions or eliminations as leading to self-
referential inconsistencies, such as performative self-contradictions between
what is said and what is presupposed in the saying.
The postmodernism of this series can, by contrast, be called revisionary,
constructive, orperhaps bestreconstructive. It seeks to overcome the mod-
ern worldview not by eliminating the possibility of worldviews (or metanarra-
tives) as such, but by constructing a postmodern worldview through a revision
of modern premises and traditional concepts in the light of inescapable presup-
positions of our various modes of practice. That is, it agrees with deconstructive
postmodernists that a massive deconstruction of many received concepts is
needed. But its deconstructive moment, carried out for the sake of the presup-
positions of practice, does not result in self-referential inconsistency. It also is
not so totalizing as to prevent reconstruction. The reconstruction carried out by
this type of postmodernism involves a new unity of scientic, ethical, aesthetic,
and religious intuitions (whereas poststructuralists tend to reject all such unitive
projects as totalizing modern metanarratives). While critical of many ideas
often associated with modern science, it rejects not science as such but only
that scientism in which only the data of the modern natural sciences are allowed
to contribute to the construction of our public worldview.
The reconstructive activity of this type of postmodern thought is not lim-
ited to a revised worldview. It is equally concerned with a postmodern world
that will both support and be supported by the new worldview. A postmodern
world will involve postmodern persons, with a postmodern spirituality, on the
one hand, and a postmodern society, ultimately a postmodern global order, on
the other. Going beyond the modern world will involve transcending its individ-
ualism, anthropocentrism, patriarchy, economism, consumerism, nationalism,
and militarism. Reconstructive postmodern thought provides support for the
ethnic, ecological, feminist, peace, and other emancipatory movements of our
time, while stressing that the inclusive emancipation must be from the destruc-
tive features of modernity itself. However, the term postmodern, by contrast
with premodern, is here meant to emphasize that the modern world has pro-
duced unparalleled advances, as Critical Theorists have emphasized, which must
not be devalued in a general revulsion against modernitys negative features.
From the point of view of deconstructive postmodernists, this reconstruc-
tive postmodernism will seem hopelessly wedded to outdated concepts, because
Derrida has declared an emancipatory promise and an idea of justice to be irreducible to any
deconstruction. Although this ethical turn in deconstruction implies its pulling back from a
completely disenchanted universe, it also, Dews points out (67), implies the need to renounce the
unconditionality of its own earlier dismantling of the unconditional.
xviii Physics and Whitehead
it wishes to salvage a positive meaning not only for the notions of selfhood,
historical meaning, reason, and truth as correspondence, which were central to
modernity, but also for notions of divinity, cosmic meaning, and an enchanted
nature, which were central to premodern modes of thought. From the point of
view of its advocates, however, this revisionary postmodernism is not only
more adequate to our experience but also more genuinely postmodern. It does
not simply carry the premises of modernity through to their logical conclusions,
but criticizes and revises those premises. By virtue of its return to organicism
and its acceptance of nonsensory perception, it opens itself to the recovery of
truths and values from various forms of premodern thought and practice that
had been dogmatically rejected, or at least restricted to practice, by modern
thought. This reconstructive postmodernism involves a creative synthesis of
modern and premodern truths and values.
This series does not seek to create a movement so much as to help shape
and support an already existing movement convinced that modernity can and
must be transcended. But in light of the fact that those antimodern movements
that arose in the past failed to deect or even retard the onslaught of modernity,
what reasons are there for expecting the current movement to be more success-
ful? First, the previous antimodern movements were primarily calls to return to
a premodern form of life and thought rather than calls to advance, and the
human spirit does not rally to calls to turn back. Second, the previous anti-
modern movements either rejected modern science, reduced it to a description
of mere appearances, or assumed its adequacy in principle. They could, there-
fore, base their calls only on the negative social and spiritual effects of moder-
nity. The current movement draws on natural science itself as a witness against
the adequacy of the modern worldview. In the third place, the present move-
ment has even more evidence than did previous movements of the ways in
which modernity and its worldview are socially and spiritually destructive. The
fourth and probably most decisive difference is that the present movement is
based on the awareness that the continuation of modernity threatens the very
survival of life on our planet. This awareness, combined with the growing
knowledge of the interdependence of the modern worldview with the militar-
ism, nuclearism, patriarchy, global apartheid, and ecological devastation of the
modern world, is providing an unprecedented impetus for people to see the
evidence for a postmodern worldview and to envisage postmodern ways of
relating to each other, the rest of nature, and the cosmos as a whole. For these
reasons, the failure of the previous antimodern movements says little about the
possible success of the current movement.
Advocates of this movement do not hold the naively utopian belief that
the success of this movement would bring about a global society of universal
and lasting peace, harmony, and happiness, in which all spiritual problems,
social conicts, ecological destruction, and hard choices would vanish. There is,
after all, surely a deep truth in the testimony of the worlds religions to the
Series Introduction xix
presence of a transcultural proclivity to evil deep within the human heart, which
no new paradigm, combined with a new economic order, new child-rearing
practices, or any other social arrangements, will suddenly eliminate. Further-
more, it has correctly been said that life is robbery: A strong element of
competition is inherent within nite existence, which no social-political-
economic-ecological order can overcome. These two truths, especially when
contemplated together, should caution us against unrealistic hopes.
No such appeal to universal constants, however, should reconcile us to
the present order, as if it were thereby uniquely legitimated. The human pro-
clivity to evil in general, and to conictual competition and ecological destruc-
tion in particular, can be greatly exacerbated or greatly mitigated by a world
order and its worldview. Modernity exacerbates it about as much as imaginable.
We can therefore envision, without being naively utopian, a far better world
order, with a far less dangerous trajectory, than the one we now have.
This series, making no pretense of neutrality, is dedicated to the success
of this movement toward a postmodern world.
David Ray Grifn

Series Editor
Part I
1
Introduction to Process Thought
Philip Clayton
What Is Metaphysics?
Metaphysics is not new to the twentieth century. The authors in this volume
who engage in metaphysical reection or who speak of A. N. Whitehead as one
of the great metaphysicians of this century are part of the heritage of a tradition
running back at least 2,400 years. Various treatments of metaphysics in general,
and of Whiteheads work in particular, have emphasized the connections with
Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Leibniz and Bergsonto name just a few of
the antecedents.1 What is this deep preoccupation of which the present volume
represents the newest installment?
Metaphysics must surely represent one of the oldest and most audacious
pursuits of the human mind. It lies at the origins of the Western intellectual
tradition and of natural philosophy, making it one of the progenitors of science
itself. To engage in metaphysical reection is to attempt to give a rational and
systematic presentation, in the most rigorous manner possible, of ones re-
sponses to some of the most perplexing and profound questions that humans
have posed: What is the ultimate nature of reality? Is it unied or atomistic? Is
change illusory or is it fundamental? Is subjectivity pervasive within the world,
or is consciousness an incidental by-product of processes that are at core funda-
mentally physical?
Methodological Assumptions
Alfred North Whitehead, the philosopher most often cited in the chapters that
follow, was a metaphysiciana thinker interested in fundamental questions of
this sort. But he was also part of (and helped to cause) a transformation in how
metaphysics is perceived and pursued. In contradistinction to the German Ideal-
ists and the British Neo-Idealists who preceded him, Whitehead took the results
3
4 Philip Clayton
of physics as his major starting point for philosophical reection. In the forma-
tive years that preceded his work as a systematic philosopher, he was preoc-
cupied with thinking through the logical foundations of mathematics and the
sciences and with the implications of special and general relativity. A series of
articles written at this time show him wrestling with conceptual transformations
required by the effects of gravity on space, the speed of light as a limiting
velocity, and the switch to space-time as the fundamental unit of physical the-
ory. The attempt to understand the physical world fuels Whiteheads work as
well as the research contained in this volume.
It is Whiteheads commitment to comprehending the natural world that
makes him a model for most of the chapters that follow. Each author takes
contemporary physicsempirical results, widely accepted theories, or general
directions in theory developmentwith utmost seriousness, and most actually
begin with concrete experimental results. But none of the authors writes merely
as a physicist. Each detects lines of reection and inference emanating outward
from physics, creating vector spaces in which meta-physical questions are
posed and proposals evaluated. This type of reection is controlled by the re-
sults of the natural sciences, and some of the theories presented here are in
principle open to future empirical verication or falsication. At the same time,
these chapters are not reducible to the discipline of physics; they wrestle with
questions that demand a type of reection that is broader and less constrained
than direct work in natural science. In our view, this is the appropriate genre for
physics and philosophy after Whitehead.
Why Should Physicists Concern Themselves with Metaphysics

of Any Kind?
At rst blush, it is not obvious that physicists need to concern themselves with
metaphysics of any kind. After all, the physical sciences since (at least) New-
ton, and especially in our century, have repeatedly dened themselves in oppo-
sition to philosophical reection. A rm grounding in empirical observations
and controlled experiments, the application of rigorous laws that allow for pre-
diction, and above all the power of mathematical formalismall of these
methods have been used by physicists in this century to justify a rm demarca-
tion (Karl Popper) between physics and metaphysics. Why should we con-
cern ourselves with inexact and untestable theories, the physicist may respond,
when physics offers the most highly attested theoretical structure the human
mind has ever obtained? Why explain the precise by means of the less precise?
Where the tools of mathematical and experimental physics allow for genuine
scientic control, there we do physics. And when the conditions for empirical
science are unsatised, we turn the microphone over to others of whatever
persuasionas long as they do not claim factual warrant for their specula-
tions.2
Introduction to Process Thought 5
This desire to draw a sharp demarcation between physics and philosophy

is shared by few, if any, of the authors in the present volume. Instead, each
author has found some area of metaphysical reection (in most cases process
philosophy, and in many cases the work of Whitehead in particular) to make a
specic and valuable contribution to some area of physical theory. Sometimes
the process-philosophical categories help one comprehend the types of results
that physicists have achieved in recent decades; sometimes the compatibility (or
even mutual entailment) between process metaphysics and a particular set of
physical results (decoherence, say, or nonseparability) is emphasized; and
sometimes process categories are used as the source for new hypotheses or new
directions of research. In every case, the authors claim, an understanding of
physical science is achieved that a sharp demarcation between science and non-
science would make impossible.
It is difcult not to view this mutual interaction between directly physical
work and broader philosophical categories as positive. The decades of combat
between theoretical physics and speculative philosophy were characterized by a
certain rigidity, a defensiveness that had more to do with turf-protection than
with genuine theoretical progress. I would venture to suggest that no author in
this book is confused about the standards for successful work in physics; cer-
tainly none equates physics and philosophy. Yet they also see that rigor of
physical theory is not compromised by the use of broader conceptual resources;
distinction allows for cross-fertilization. There are gains in both directions.
Readers will nd in these pages a more rigorous type of metaphysics than that
which dominates the metaphysics section of their local bookstoresa meta-
physics that is responsive to the complex theoretical developments in physics,
that is prepared to abandon beliefs that conict with empirical data, and that
seeks to be of service in clarifying the foundations of contemporary natural
science.3 Conversely, they will also nd a mode of doing science that is more
open to questions at the boundaries, one in which physics enters freely into
dialogue with neighboring disciplines.
What Is Process Thought in General?

A process is a structured series of events in which time (or space-time) plays a
crucial role in the structuring. Thus Nicholas Rescher denes process as a
sequentially structured sequence of successive phases which themselves are
types of events or occurrences (in the case of an abstract process) or denite
realizations of such types (in the case of a concrete process). A structureless
sequencejust one darn thing after anotheris not a process.4
The broader commitment of the essays in this book lies in the notion of
process itself. At the same time, fundamental themes of Whiteheads work con-
tinue to preoccupy the writers in this volume; many hold Whiteheads catego-
ries to be particularly valuable for making sense of results in contemporary
6 Philip Clayton
physics. It is intriguing to see how many dimensions of Whiteheads system are

still fruitful for reection on the foundations of physics. Indeed, some will
argue that developments in physics since the 1920s provide an even greater
physical justication for Whiteheads basic principles than was available at that
timeincluding some cases where physical theories have become established
of which Whitehead could have had scant premonition. If one looks at the
physical speculations of Geoffrey Chew (ch. 8) on the one hand and the philo-
sophical speculations of Jorge Nobo (ch. 17) on the otherboth of which are
clearly informed by Whiteheadean categoriesone recognizes how broad is the
range of potential application.
At the same time, the aim has not been to canonize Whitehead but to use
his work as a starting point for philosophical reection on contemporary empir-
ical and theoretical physics. Where modifying Whiteheads thought (even radi-
cally), or replacing it with process insights derived entirely from other thinkers,
is more useful in the dialogue with contemporary physics, authors have not
been shy to do so. Process thought refers, after all, to a loosely knit family of
theories rather than to one particular theory. In Reschers words, process philos-
ophy is not a doctrinal monolithic tendency predicated in a particular thesis or
theory, but a general and programmatic approach. To see it as a unied doctrine
would in fact be as much an error as it would be to identify it with the teach-
ings and ideas of a single thinker.5
Key Themes in Whiteheads Thought

Still, since many of the papers owe not only their method and style of reection
but also some of their theory to Whitehead, a brief summary of his position is
necessary. Our goal cannot be to provide an overall summary of Whiteheads
metaphysics: many excellent secondary sources are available,6 and othersin
particular those involving the ethical, historical, and religious aspectsare not
as relevant to our specic interest in the foundations of physics. Three simple
tenets, however, recur in the essays that follow:
1. Experiential units, constitutive of both processes and objects, are
basic elements of reality.
2. Time is not an incidental aspect of reality, added on to fundamen-
tally static things; instead, temporal change is a fundamental fea-
ture of the physical world itself. The switch in relativity theory to
space-time means that time is not just an index of change for
things, which really exist only as three-dimensional objects. Dura-
tion thus becomes an intrinsically spatiotemporal notion.
3. Objects should not be taken in isolation, dened on their own, and
then considered in their relations to other objects. Instead, rela-
tions are primary, and objects are dened in terms of the network
of relations of which they are partrelations between other parts
of the physical world, between other temporal instances present
and past, and perhaps between nonphysical moments as well. Ulti-
mately, the entire physical cosmos represents a single system in
terms of which individual objects are to be dened.
For present purposes, it will have to sufce to limit the presentation to a half
dozen observations about the resulting interpretation of the physical world:
1. On this view, process is metaphysically prior to substance. Where Ar-
istotle, and later Aquinas and his followers, began by dening individual sub-
stances and the essential features associated with each, Whitehead took as his
starting point the process itself. (If one wished to put it less radically, one could
say that Whitehead redenes substance in terms of process, or that he makes
process and substance coterminous in every experiential unit.) A physics that
begins with individual objects or that construes individual atoms as the primary
building blocks of reality would, for example, be closer to Aristotle; a physics
of elds of which objects are the expression (as in quantum eld theory) stands
much closer to Whitehead.
2. It follows from the rst point that there is no being without becoming.
The becoming/being distinction goes back to the earliest days of Western meta-
physics; indeed, the focus on pervasive becoming and the transitory nature of
lived reality is equally fundamental within many of the Eastern traditions. Par-
menides was famous for the emphasis on the Logos or static reality (all is
one), while Heraclitus is remembered for the brief fragments of his philosophy
of becoming: all is ux and you cant step into the same river twice. White-
heads metaphysics offers a comprehensive theory of ubiquitous becoming.
Each actual occasion, which is the basic experiential unit of reality for White-
head, exists only for a momentjust long enough to take in or prehend the
realities of the previous events and to form a response to them (the subjective
form).7 When an occasion has formed its subjective response or prehension it
immediately passes out of existence as an active experiential entity with its own
perspective.8 Moving into a state of objective immortality, it then becomes
available as a datum for subsequent actual occasions. Reality thus consists of
this continual ow of events, each enjoying its own duration.
3. These basic experiential units of reality are not separable objects, but
occasions-in-connection or, more specically, occasions-of-experience-in-con-
nection. As a result, Whitehead advocates the doctrine of the continuity of
nature. He writes, This doctrine balances and limits the doctrine of the abso-
lute individuality of each occasion of experience. There is a continuity between
the subjective form of the immediate past occasion and a subjective form of its
primary prehension in the origination of the new occasion.9 This limitation on
individuality is reminiscent of the classical philosophical idea that the whole is
8 Philip Clayton
prior to the parts, a position shared in common by most idealists, by Neoplato-

nists, and by most of the Eastern Vedanta traditions.
The matter here is a bit more complex, however. Whitehead is, after all, a
particular type of atomist; he takes the individual actual occasion as the basic
building block of his metaphysics.10 Societiesthat is, groups of occasions
standing in a determinant relationship to one another over timeare merely
composites of individual occasions and have subsidiary reality. Yet the beauty
of Whiteheads position is that each individual occasion is nonetheless inte-
grally related to all other occasions. It is atomism without isolation: nothing
exists as an island unto itself, but all things, in the moment of their coming into
existence, are linked to all previous events, and each in turn becomes the objec-
tive data for future events. It could be said that on the classical philosophical
problem of the One and the Many, Whitehead places slightly more emphasis on
the Many. But this Many is so intimately and organically interlinked that it
produces not the reduction to individual parts for which classical atomism was
notorious but rather a single unbroken web of interconnection. As George Bos-
worth Burch summarizes the view in his note from Whiteheads 192627 lec-
tures, every actual entity requires all other entities, actual or ideal, in order to
exist.11
4. It follows from what we have said so far that complexes of relations
are primary, not discrete objects. Keeping in mind Whiteheads nonsentient
generalization of experience (see chapter 17) one might say that subjectivity
and objectivity are equally primordial in every experience. The deepest level of
reality consists of the ow of actual occasions or individual events of becom-
ing. Past occasions in their objective form as data are merely inputs for the
actual occasions in their present-tense subjectivity. Immediate events are the
only real agents, responsible for making the universe what it is.
Having introduced this topic, one must immediately note that Whitehead
does not advocate some form of subjectivismfor instance, the view that all
reality is composed out of subjects that are like human subjects. Whitehead is
seeking to establish some features of experiencing that are general enough to
apply to all levels of reality. For this reason, his position is a pan-experiential-
ism, not pan-psychism: there is experience at all levels of reality, but there are
not psyches at all levels. Subjectivity at the human level is a very complex and
high-level emergent capability generated through vast complexes of prehen-
sions and interactions. When Whitehead states that subjectivity is prior to ob-
jectivity he is making a technical, metaphysical claim about actual occasions
and not about human psyches.
This primacy of a network of relations over discrete objects is a perspec-
tive that is easily recognized by modern physicists who have worked with eld
theories. Scientists understandably wish to construe human subjectivity as the
result of underlying objective physical processes. Consciousness, for example,
many would take as an emergent property of the more fundamental physical
level of reality. To put it differently, by disciplinary training, physicists will

tend to stretch the explanatory power of objective reality up the ladder of
complexity in the natural world toward (or to) human mental experience, rather
than stretching the realm of subjective reality down the ladder to fundamental
physical processes. Whitehead followed a different intuition: the subjective and
the objective both joined together actively in every event to create greater com-
plexity and possibility. Explaining one simply in terms of the other results in a
reductio ad absurdum, which Whitehead felt was a stumbling block for modern
philosophy and science. Such classical dualisms are avoided in a new duality of
process (see chapter 2).
5. As a result of the previous point, Whitehead places great stress on the
phenomenon of feeling. Breaking the normal link of feelings and consciousness,
he attempts to dene a notion of physical feeling. In one classic (albeit dense)
summary of the position, he writes,
Thus in a simple physical feeling there are two actual entities concerned; one of
them is the subject of that feeling, and the other is the initial datum of the feeling.
A second feeling is also concerned, namely, the objective datum of the simple
physical feeling. This second feeling is the objectication of its subject for the
subject of the simple physical feeling. The initial datum is objectied as being the
subject of the feeling which is the objective datum: the objectication is the per-
spective of the initial datum.12
The details of physical and conceptual feelings in this quotation need not
detain us. Still, one cannot fail to notice the direction of movement. Whitehead
starts with a moment of experiencing and moves outward: backward to the data
that are experienced, and forward to the subjects reactions to its own experi-
ence.
This metaphysics stands opposed to any physics that would make the
standpoint of an individual particle secondary or unimportant. There is no ho-
mogenization in Whiteheads thought: rather than conceiving all of his basic
atomic units as identical, he emphasizes that each of them has its own perspec-
tive on the universe (or at least on that part of the universe that it can prehend).
That particular perspective is intrinsic for dening what it is and what its subse-
quent effect on its environment will be. Whitehead is thus a perspectivalist par
excellence.
6. Whiteheads metaphysics has been called a philosophy of organism.13
There is deep insight in this designation: in many ways, the biological metaphor
remained fundamental to his thinking, as Charles Birch has emphasized in nu-
merous publications.14 All things are understood as growing and developing, as
having their own perspective and striving toward their own goals, as being
interlinked like various organisms within one overarching ecosystem. Many of
10 Philip Clayton
the features of biological organisms are thus understood to pertain to all units of
reality, rather than merely emerging out of a physical-chemical substrate.
The philosophy of organism might be useful for an evolutionary cosmol-
ogy such as that of Lee Smolin,15 according to which Darwinian principles
control the evolution and then survival (and even reproduction) or collapse of
multiple universes. But generally physicists have resisted a biological model of
physical processes, tending instead to view biological processes as ultimately
reducible to their underlying physical constituents and laws.
7. I have omitted many of the features of Whiteheads thought frequently
discussed in the secondary literature: questions of culture and history, initial
aims, eternality, creativity, values, and the host of theological questions con-
cerning the existence of God and values. These debates, however fascinating,
are not directly relevant to this work on physics and philosophy.16 There may be
broader value in Whiteheads thought, and perhaps in many respects it will
prove of interest for theologians and ethicists. Our task, however, is to probe it
on one dimension only: its connection with contemporary physics, and in par-
ticular its usefulness for constructing a metaphysics that is responsive to, and
helpful for, interpreting the world of experience.
Event Metaphysics
The essays in this volume are not the rst to apply Whiteheads metaphysics to
contemporary science; similar applications have been made in the past by
(among many others) David Bohm, Karl Pribram, Ilya Prigogine, Rupert Shel-
drake, and Henry Stapp.17 In this sense the present volume stands within a long
tradition of interaction between Whitehead and emerging scientic thought. It
does, however, represent one of the most extensive and diverse applications yet
made of process thought to the eld of physics.
In particular, some very signicant constructive work has been done in
these pages using Whiteheadian or quasi-Whiteheadian concepts such as occa-
sion, event, process, and eld. This work is newand difcultenough that a
few summary comments are in order. Without intending either to summarize the
authors work or to replace it with a different conception of my own, I wish to
close by drawing attention to the uniqueness and importance of this speculative
work for the interpretation of contemporary physics. As a shorthand, I will refer
to this shared position (to the extent that there is one) as event metaphysics
(EM).
Whitehead has been criticized in the past for interpreting actual occasions
too heavily using the conceptual framework of organisms, thereby making these
occasions into a type of mini-thing. By contrast, the core proposition of EM is
that the basic unit of reality is not a thing at all but rather an eventan occur-
rence or happening. Only an ontology of events can do justice to this insight,
and thing language (on this view) must be carefully subordinated to event lan-
guage.
Among the various candidates for an ontology of events, the language of
elds in contemporary physical theory is particularly attractive. Field language
stresses the principle of continuity. In quantum eld theory, for example, the
eld is sometimes expressed at a particular space-time point as an object; still,
the microphysical object that we detect remains an expression of the eld rather
than being understood as a basic physical given. Indeed, it is probably more
accurate and less confusing in the end to speak of the resulting phenomenon as
an event than as an object.
One might say that there are essentially three ways to interpret the phys-
ics in question, that is, three ways to understand the mathematical formalism.
One could interpret physical theory as about objects in the world, with elds
understood as derivative from objects; it could be about the elds, with objects
as merely the expression of elds; or elds and objects could be understood as
equally fundamental. According to EM, the third position is the most appropri-
ate interpretation of contemporary physics. In an event understood as the actu-
alization or concretization of a eld, both sidesthe eld and its actualiza-
tion of certain space-time parametersare equiprimordial.
Many further questions remain: How are elds and events to be under-
stood, and what is their nature? How do these basic events produce the macro-
physical world of our experience? Are they self-organizing or self-determining
in any way? Are all collections of events mere aggregates, or can groups of
events form larger objects that have a reality of their own?
However these questions are answeredand they are answered in rather
different ways by the authors of these collected essaysit is clear that this list
of questions is closely linked to some of the fundamental interpretive questions
that have challenged physicists. Direct links can be drawn between the features
of EM and key interpretive issues such as the measurement problem, the col-
lapse of the wave function, the connection of relativistic and quantum physics,
the relation between quantum and classical physics, and the more recent de-
bates surrounding Bells theorem, inseparability, and decoherence. It is our
hope that the present volume will contribute toward understanding the evolution
of physics during the twenty-rst century.18
Notes
1. See William A. Christian, An Interpretation of Whiteheads Metaphysics (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1959); Lewis S. Ford, The Emergence of Whiteheads
Metaphysics: 19251929 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984); William
W. Hammerschmidt, Whiteheads Philosophy of Time (New York: Russell and Russell,
1975); Lewis S. Ford and George L. Kline, eds., Explorations in Whiteheads Philosophy
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1983); F. Bradford Wallack, The Epochal Nature
12 Philip Clayton
of Process in Whiteheads Metaphysics (Albany: State University of New York Press,

1980); A. Johnson, Whiteheads Theory of Reality (New York: Dover Publications,
1962); and Jorge Luis Nobo, Whiteheads Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity (Al-
bany: State University of New York Press, 1986).
2. See E. O. Wilson in Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf,
1998); Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life
(New York: Ballantine, 1999).
3. Some might argue that metaphysics has received such a bad name among
scientists that one should not even use the same term for both activities. But it is neces-
sary to nd some label for the sort of reection that scientists and others engage in when
they reect more broadly on scientic results and their implications. Since metaphysics
or natural philosophy have been used to designate this sort of reection since the dawn
of Western philosophy, I argue that it is better to ght for the term than to switch.
4. See Nicholas Rescher, On Situating Process Philosophy, Process Studies
28/12 (1999): 3742, quote p. 38, also Nicholas Rescher, Process Metaphysics: An
Introduction to Process Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York, 1996).
5. Ibid., On Situating Process Philosophy, 41f.
6. See, for example, the works cited in note 1.
7. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press,
1978), 30.
8. See chapter 17.
9. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 1933),
235.
10. For an effective critique of Whiteheads atomism, see Wolfhart Pannenberg,
Atomism, Duration, Form: Difculties with Process Philosophy, Metaphysics and the
Idea of God, trans. P. Clayton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), chapter 6. On the ques-
tion of groups of occasions, the effective size of actual entities, and the causal efcacy of
a nexus in Whitehead, see also chapter 17.
11. Ford, Emergence, 312.
12. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 308.
13. Dorothy Emmet, Whiteheads Philosophy of Organism, 2nd ed. (London:
Macmillan; New York: Saint Martins Press, 1966).
14. Charles Birch, On Purpose (Kensington, NSW, Australia: New South Wales
University Press, 1990); Nature and God (London: SCM Press, 1965); with John B.
Cobb Jr., The Liberation of Life: From the Cell to the Community (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1981); and Birchs contribution to John B. Cobb Jr. and David
Ray Grifn, eds., Mind in Nature: Essays on the Interface of Science and Philosophy
(Washington: University Press of America, 1977).
15. Lee Smolin, The Life of the Cosmos (New York: Oxford University Press,
1997).
16. For further details see John B. Cobb Jr. and David Ray Grifn, Process Theol-
ogy: An Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976).
17. For a good summary of some of these applications see John P. Briggs and F.
David Peat, Looking Glass Universe (New York: Cornerstone Library, 1984).
18. I am grateful to Joseph Bracken for in-depth discussions that helped in the
formulation of this section. Brackens own work in this direction can be found in (inter
alia) Society and Spirit: A Trinitarian Cosmology (London and Toronto: Associated Uni-
versity Presses, 1991); and The Divine Matrix: Creativity as Link Between East and West
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995).
2
Duality Without Dualism
Timothy E. Eastman
It is a matter of common sense that the world is composed of a multiplicity of

discrete, separable objects. Indeed, this worldview of perceptual objects is prac-
tical and essential for everyday life. As the atomic theory of matter emerged, it
was rather natural to assume that atoms were small-scale counterparts of every-
day objects. Indeed, such a simplistic, philosophical atomism became an ac-
cepted part of the implicit metaphysics of classical physics. Similarly common-
sensical is the basic distinction between mind and matter which, with Descartes,
was elevated to a philosophical rst principle.
Descartess mind-matter distinction became the prime exemplar of dual-
ism, the notion that certain concepts related in experience are not really related
but belong to different categories, and that the apparent relationship of such
dual pairs derives only from secondary connections. In contrast, the process-
relational approach emphasizes a duality without dualism that afrms the
fundamental connection of such concepts as being/becoming, mind/matter, and
symmetry/asymmetry, but does so in a way that avoids a simplistic symmetry
of the dualities.
In particular, contrasts are presented of the form both A with respect to x
and B with respect to y instead of simple dualisms that set up some form of
absolute A versus B opposition. In this way, a process framework grounds the
both-and approach described below, which is embodied in the transition from
classical to modern physics. By correlating various dualities in modern physics
and philosophy, we demonstrate a new tool for testing certain philosophical
claims and for suggesting new hypotheses of interest in physics. The nuanced
correlates discussed by Whitehead and some process philosophers are closer to
complementary pairs in modern physics than traditional dualisms.
14
Duality Without Dualism 15
Perceptual Objects and Particularism

The worldview of perceptual objects, with its discreteness and separability, has
continued its imaginative hold up to the present day, although many aspects of
modern physics support a process-relational understanding of the world, as
Whitehead proposed (Jungerman 2000). In contrast to this process interpreta-
tion, it has been claimed that eld theories are radically reductionistic: the
whole reality of a eld in a given region is contained in its parts, that is to say,
its points (Howard 1989, 235). This common view of eld theories is ratio-
nalized by assuming that the discreteness and separability of mathematical
points can be simply mapped onto physical systems. A more technical state-
ment of this claim is that by modeling a physical ontology upon the ontology
of the mathematical manifold, we take over as a criterion for the individuation
of physical systems and states within eld theories the mathematicians crite-
rion for the individuation of mathematical points (236). Einstein presupposed
the kind of separability indicated here and used it, along with a locality princi-
ple, as part of his strong attack on the completeness of quantum theory.
Yutaka Tanaka (ch. 13) demonstrates the construction of Bells inequal-
ities, applicable to certain quantum systems and their experimental testing,
which have provided a denitive test of the assumptions of separability and
locality. These assumptions together have now been shown conclusively as
false (see chapters in Cushing and McMullin 1989). This experimental discon-
rmation of Bells inequalities conrms quantum over classical prediction. Paul
Teller refers to the assumption of ontological locality, employed in setting up
Bells inequalities, as particularism (Teller 1989, 215) and points out that this
assumption allows only one kind of locality: causal locality. In discussing the
correlations revealed by the Bell inequality violations, Teller states that recog-
nizing relational holism and avoiding particularism allows one to see The
correlation . . . as simply a fact about the pair. This fact . . . need not itself be
decomposable in terms of . . . more basic, nonrelational facts (222).
There are numerous historical and philosophical reasons to be skeptical of
classical notions of separability and particularism, as shown by Leclerc (1986,
1986), and to be skeptical of the nonrelational, container view of space and
time that is generally linked with the worldview of classical physics (Capek
1971; Angel 1974).
Experience and Dualities

Stapp (1993) has shown how high-level consciousness or mind can be consid-
ered as an integral part of basic physical systems without assuming a simplis-
tic reductionism or turning to mind-body dualism. One essential, non-
reducible feature of quantum measurement is determining which question is
posed (Stapp, ch. 9). As shown below, dualities are common in modern science,
16 Timothy E. Eastman
but these are dualities that need not be interpreted as simple dualisms. Whitehead
used experience-like features as a basic analogue for his treatment of actual
entities and systems (Clayton, ch. 1). However, the use of this analogue is not
pan-psychism as so commonly supposed because Whitehead does not treat
actual entities as simply small-scale mental entities (psyches) that compose all
large-scale mental entities. Instead, Whiteheads basic hypothesis is that some
type of low-level experiencing (prehension) is ubiquitous and a basic metaphysi-
cal principle (Nobo, ch. 17). Grifn (1988) has shown why a better term is pan-
experientialism. The multilevel systems approach with emergence that has long
been common in process approaches in considering the problem of high-level
consciousness is now seen by many as a logical consequence of a nonlinear,
dynamical treatment of living systems (Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Kaufmann
1993). On this basis, a Whiteheadian pan-experientialism appears as a natural
hypothesis for answering how Stapps posing of the question to quantum systems
is resolved more generally.
Whiteheads philosophy is a type of general systems theory that he called a
philosophy of organism.1 Clayton (ch. 1) shows how it frames an ecological
perspective that arises naturally from a comprehensive event metaphysics. Al-
though the basic elements of his system, actual entities, are generally treated as
microscopic in scale, Whitehead never associates any particular size with actual
entities. One problem with a simple microscopic interpretation is revealed by
Nobo (ch. 17) through detailed analysis of Whiteheads discussion of the two
aspects of becoming: concrescence (microscopic in orientation) and transition
(macroscopic in orientation). Tanaka (ch. 13) addresses a second problem that
emerges in quantum measurement theory wherein an individual quantum event
is not necessarily microscopic. The simultaneous correspondence of the EPR
experiment shows us the individuality of a quantum process at long distances . . .
the region of an individual quantum process may have an arbitrary size with
respect to space-time coordinates. A. H. Johnson reports that Whitehead directly
acknowledged an overemphasis on the microlevel in his works and recognized
the need for a category of emergence so that nexus of actual entities can have
emergent properties, both concepts being implicit in Whiteheads works and
made explicit by Johnson (1983, 53). Nobo (ch. 17) and Lango (2000) both
develop details concerning how the enduring objects of our everyday life are
constituted from societies or nexus of actual entities.
Relational Holism
Alfred North Whitehead attacked various types of particularism and container
views and introduced a comprehensive system of thought that replaces inert
substance with relations, and expands upon a philosophy of organic, relational
holism.2 Related philosophical approaches have been introduced as systems the-
ory (Laszlo 1972; Auyang 1998), hierarchy or complexity theory (Chandler
1999), dialectical holism (Harris 1988), ecological perspectives (Nisbet 1991),

evolutionary worldviews (Jantsch 1980), and varieties of holism in pragmatism
and contextualism (Rescher 1999).
These various forms of relational holism are gaining in recognition for the
following reasons:
1. Quantum theory is inconsistent with the classical notion of a

philosophical atom (Leclerc 1986) and requires us to renounce
objects (Finkelstein 1996, 35).
2. A detailed analysis of parts and wholes in low-energy physics pro-

vides for the rigorous establishment of emergence; that is, the
exhibition of macroscopic properties radically different from those
of the constituents (Shimony 1987, 421).
3. Field theory, evolution, and systems concepts more generally illus-

trate how physical systems cannot be simple classical substances,
sufcient unto themselves, but are constituted by their interactions
and relations with other particle and eld entities.
4. Experiments show the failure of Bells inequality and thus explic-

itly deny the combined assumptions of separability and locality
used to create the inequality. Leading theorists in the philosophy
of physics agree that particularism is false and are seriously con-
sidering various types of relational holism as a viable metaphysi-
cal framework most compatible with the physics results (Kitch-
ener 1988; Cushing and McMullin 1989).
5. Einsteins relativity is a relational theory of space and time that is

incompatible with the container view held in association with
classical physics and strongly associated with particularist and re-
ductionist approaches (Angel 1974; Capek 1961, 1971).
6. The linguistic turn in philosophy is a wrong turn because exis-

tence is not simply a matter of the satisfaction of a description
(Bradley 2002) as assumed for weak theories of existence. In
contrast, those who engage in the business of modern science and
technology generally presume a strong theory of existence. White-
head takes account of arguments made for the linguistic turn even
while maintaining critical realism.
Table 2.1 orders those concepts which are common across all three con-
ceptual systems under discussion here (classical, quantum, process) along with
those that exhibit contrasts or that illustrate complementary aspects between
the classical and quantum frameworks. Here, quantum refers to mod-
Table 2.1. Comparison of Common, Contrasting, and Complementary Concepts in Physics
Classical Quantum Process Contributor
Concepts in Long-range order Long-range order Interconnectedness Jungerman, Tanaka

Common Unpredictable evolution Unpredictable evolution Future as open Hansen, Jungerman
(praxis) (praxis)
State-denite values State-denite probability Probabilities and denite- Finkelstein, Malin
values ness
Laws as absolute Laws as invariant relations Generality, coherence, con- Chew, Riffert
sistency
Methodological and epis- Methodological reduction Methodological reduction Riffert, Stapp
temological reduction
Contrasting Space, time separation Space-time relations Interactive relatedness Clayton, Hansen, Keeton
Concepts Predictable evolution Unpredictable evolution Innovation/novelty Jungerman, Malin
(theory) (theory)
State, trajectories No state, nonunique trajec- Creative advance Finkelstein, Nobo
tories
Objects No object physics Act, process Finkelstein, Malin
Laws as absolute Laws as habits Cosmic epochs Chew, Finkelstein
Absolute system Relative systems Interactive relatedness Chew, Clayton, Nobo
No experiential aspect Experiential aspect Experience as paradigm Clayton, Nobo, Stapp
No intrinsic limits Fundamental limits Limits, approximation Chew, Stapp
Global time Local time Local temporalism Hansen, Tanaka
Reductionist Reduction without reduc- Reduction without reduc- Earley, Finkelstein
tionism tionism
Complementary Symmetry Both symmetry/asymmetry Dualities without dualism Eastman, Rosen
Concepts Space only; time spatialized Both space/time Becoming and being Clayton, Hansen
Particles only Both particles/waves Actual entities Chew, Finkelstein, Nobo
Determinism only Both prediction/determina- Subjective aim Finkelstein, Nobo
tion and indeterminism
Continuity only Both continuity and quanti- Coordinate and genetic an- Tanaka, Nobo
zation alyses
Order only Both order/disorder, novelty Innovation/novelty Earley, Jungerman
External relations Both external/internal rela- Relations as fundamental Clayton, Earley, Nobo
tions
Substance/objects only Both substance and process/ Subject/object, process Finkelstein, Malin, Tanaka
events
Global time Both global/local time Historical reality Chew, Eastman
Note: Classical, quantum, and process concepts are ordered here by those concepts which are common across all three conceptual systems along with those
that exhibit contrasts or that illustrate complementary aspects between classical and quantum frameworks. Contributors to this volume that address each
concept are listed at the right.
ern physics broadly, exemplied especially by quantum theory and relativity

theory.
Concepts in Common
Concepts that are roughly common across the classical, quantum, and process
frameworks are listed in the rst major row of the table. For each concept,
related process phrases or terms are listed in the process column followed by
contributors to this volume who provide more detail concerning that concept.
Methodological (technique-based) reduction is common throughout just as it is
an integral part of scientic method. Epistemological (knowledge-based) reduc-
tion fails in the quantum case because, as noted by Stapp, the physics alone
does not specify which question is posed. The interconnectedness emphasized
in process thought is now recognized as important in nonequilibrium, dissipa-
tive structures (Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Earley, ch. 6) and is common to
all systems requiring long-range eld interactions via the electromagnetic or
gravitational elds, i.e., all macroscopic physical systems.
The temporal development of all complex systems, classical or quantum,
is not predictable in absolute detail. Chew points out that approximation is an
intrinsic part of all measurement, although classical physics suggested erro-
neously that precision had no limit in principle. Unlimited specication of
values or of states in classical physics has a counterpart in quantum physics in
the specication of wave functions but, as shown by Born (1949), wave func-
tions are associated with probability distributions and not with simply located
states of objects as suggested in classical physics. In this way, quantum physics
incorporates both probabilities and deniteness.
Insofar as modern physics continues to seek a unied eld theory with the
presumption of one law or set of physical relationships, there is commonality in
this sense between classical and modern physics. Methodologically, this em-
phasis on lawlike behavior in physical systems is a key part of scientic meta-
physics with the criteria of generality, coherence, and consistency as discussed
in detail by Riffert (ch. 16). However, Finkelstein (ch. 14) points out that this
emphasis on lawlike behavior need not require ultimate reduction to a single set
of physical relationships.
Contrasting Concepts
Numerous books emphasize contrasts between classical and modern physics. A

pioneer in this genre is Milic Capek (1961). He documented how the worldview
of classical physics included a container view of space and time, within which
space is a container for objects and a spatialized time is a container for events.
In contrast, relativity theory is based on dynamic space-time relations, even
though Minkowski space-time diagrams (in which time and space are plotted
along X and Y coordinates) can suggest a mere spatialization of time. Spatial

and temporal relations are fundamentally linked via the Lorentz transformations
in a symmetric but not fully equivalent way due to an imaginary coefcient for
time in the geodesics (Bunge 1967). Classical physics treated all systems within
some global, absolute coordinate frame. In contrast, relativity enables the basic
physical relationships or laws, including Maxwells laws of electromagnetism,
to remain invariant in form between moving frames but at the expense of con-
sidering all systems as frame dependent. Whitehead was well versed in rela-
tivity theory (Whitehead 1922) and recognized the need for such frame depen-
dence as early as 1905, independent of Einstein (Whitehead 1906). Further,
Whiteheads 1905 memoir undertook the unication of geometry and physics
by means of . . . symbolic logic. . . . Not until 1916, in the General Theory of
Relativity, did Einstein express the unication of geometry and physics
(Schmidt 1967, 4).
The temporal development of all classical systems is theoretically predict-
able in absolute detail. Thus, classical states, trajectories, systems, and system
evolution are treated as fully speciable. As noted above, the unlimited preci-
sion of classical physics is incorrect both in principle and in practice. Modern
physics has been built upon the recognition of fundamental limits that were
denied in classical physics: relativity theory requires propagation velocity
limits, and quantum theory embodies Plancks constant limit to the specication
of conjugate variables such as velocity and momentum. Finkelstein proposes to
extend these limits even to the primary physical relationships themselves in a
way reminiscent of Whiteheads discussion of cosmic epochs.
Classical physics presupposes a Gods-eye view of natural systems and an
associated, unique global time. Relativity theory drops global time altogether
and retains only local, frame-dependent times. Such local time is incorporated
in Whiteheads local temporalism, as discussed in detail by Hansen (ch. 12).
One way to offset this loss of global time is to introduce two times in a model
of historical reality, as proposed by Chew (ch. 8). Local temporalism remains
central but is then augmented by a measure of an actual occasions total history.
Because of the particularism assumed in classical atomism, combined
with unlimited specication of classical states and trajectories, a reductionist
metaphysics is generally associated with classical physics. Nevertheless, Kant,
Bergson, and other philosophers tried to make some opening within the classi-
cal paradigm for consciousness and other wholistic features without resorting to
any simple dualism. In contrast to the apparent reductionism of classical
physics, quantum physics can have composite states that are not generally re-
ducible to states of discrete constituents (Howard 1989, 253). Indeed, if one
questions the reduction of elds to mere mathematical points, collisionless
space plasmas represent a classical system within which the basic dynamics is
reducible only to the scale of Debye screening spheres, which is roughly one
kilometer in Earths outer magnetosphere. There is no possible contiguity in
Humes sense in such a system, which is effectively without collisions because

particle densities are only about 0.01 to 10 per cubic centimeter. The exchange
of forces in such plasmas is without contact and mediated via electric and
magnetic elds (Eastman 1993).
Meaningful reference to objects at all scales is presumed in classical
physics. In contrast, our everyday world of perceptual objects has no counter-
part in quantum microphysics. Discrete self-identical objects, the essence of the
classical notion of substance, are replaced with interacting wave-particle enti-
ties. Finkelstein points out that Bohr and Heisenberg talked about no object
physics. In his major work, Quantum Relativity, Finkelstein (1996) system-
atically develops a new conception of act and process to supplant objects. Rela-
tivity theory makes reference to events and clocks but contains no fundamental
reference to objects (Schmidt 1967, 30). Objects and substances may be consid-
ered as derivative notions in modern physics and need not be treated as primary
concepts as they were in classical physics.
Complementary Dualities in Both Physics and Philosophy

Modern physics comprises many complementary pairs or dualities, and a num-
ber of these are correlated with dualities in philosophy. Further, the transition
from classical to modern physics can be illustrated as the movement from one
to both poles of various dualities, as shown in Table 2.2. The basic form of this
transition is from A only to A plus B where A and B are complementary pairs.
The worldview of classical physics tended to make A terms exclusive or ulti-
mate in some way that is now recognized as misleading or incomplete. Just as
classical physics can be considered as a limiting case of quantum and relativity
physics, its A characterizations can be considered as a limit or subset of more
complete A-B complementary pairs. The quantum and process views construct a
more inclusive duality in each case that treats A only as a type of classical limit
analogous to how Newtons equations can be retrieved as a classical limit to
equations for quantum dynamics.
This explicit recognition of dualities is becoming increasingly understood
as an integral part of modern physics (Witten 1997). The corresponding both-
and approach cuts through most of the alleged puzzles that are so much a part
of the current genre of physics popularizations. Many of these puzzles de-
pend on the comparison of a conrmed physics result with a presupposition
linked to the worldview of perceptual objects or, effectively, of classical
physics. For example, the insistence on identifying a simply-located particle
going through one slit or the other in a two-slit quantum experiment depends on
treating particles only as traditional philosophical atoms and not as quantum
wave-particle entities. When properly constructed, the puzzle dissolves.
Although the both-and and duality themes of process thought are empha-
sized here, we wish to avoid another simplistic reduction. Dualities are often
Table 2.2. Movement from One to Both Poles Simultaneously of Various

Dualities in the Transition from Classical to Modern Physics
Classical Physics Modern Physics
Substance only; materialism Both substance and event-oriented descriptions

External relations only Both external and internal relations
Continuity only; no ulti- Both continuity and quantization
mate discreteness
Symmetry only Both symmetry and asymmetry
Space only; time spatialized Both space and time; coupled space-time metric
Determinism only Both predictability/determination and indeterminationa
Particles only Both particles and waves
Parts only Both parts and wholesb
External only (source for Both external and internal sources of order; self-organi-
order) zationc
Efcient cause only Both efcient cause and other typesd
a
The term determination is used here to denote the predictability of causal order as practiced in
science, whereas determinism is a metaphysical claim requiring philosophical argument. Science is
neutral with respect to the philosophical question of determinism.
b
Macroscopic processes emerge in collisionless space plasmas where the large-scale dynamics are
immune from the details of microphysics. In turn, some systems such as superuids exhibiting
Bose-Einstein condensation have a close coupling of micro- to macroscale, and there are other
systems that ll in between these two extremes (E. Siregar, S. Ghosh, and M. L. Goldstein. Non-
linear entropy production operators for magnetohydrodynamic plasmas. Phys. Plasmas 2, no. 5,
1481 (May 1995); see also T. E. Eastman. Micro- to macroscale perspectives on space plasmas.
Physics of Fluids B (Plasma Physics) 5, 2671 (1993).
c
For an in-depth study of nonlinear systems, self-organization, and their application to biological
systems and evolution, see Stuart A. Kauffman, At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of
Self-Organization and Complexity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
d
Mario Bunge, Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1959).
enclosed in triadicities, encouraging us, with Peirce, to think in trichotomies

not mere dichotomies, the latter being crude and misleading by themselves.3
Similarly, the complementary pairs of modern physics often point beyond them-
selves to higher levels of abstraction or other (meta)physically constructed solu-
tions.
Dualities of various types permeate philosophy and undergird Platos dia-
logical method. Table 2.3 lists many such dualities adapted from a list by
Charles Hartshorne, who discusses a technique for relating the terms of each
dual pair.4 This list of philosophical dualities shows how many important topics
lend themselves to a dual or complementary construction and that these du-
alities are often not merely symmetric in character.
The Western intellectual bias is very different from that of Chinese cul-
ture. Chinese scholars David Hall and Roger Ames distinguish two modes of
Table 2.3. Dualities in Philosophy

Relative Absolute
Dependent Independent
Internally related Externally related
Experience, subject Things experienced, object
Whole, inclusive Constituent, included
Effect, conditioned Cause, condition
Later, successor Earlier, predecessor
Becoming Being
Temporal Atemporal
Concrete Abstract
Particular Universal
Actual Possible
Contingent Necessary
Finite Innite
Discrete Continuous
Complex Simple
Asymmetry Symmetry
thinking. Correlative or analogical thinking, the dominant mode in classical

Chinese culture, seeks to account for states of affairs by appeal to correlative
procedures rather than by determining agencies or principles (Hall and Ames
1995, xviii). It accepts no priority of permanence over process and presumes no
ultimate agency responsible for the general order of things. Causal thinking, the
dominant Western mode, tends to assert a priority of being over becoming and
to see the cosmos as a single-ordered world and as the consequence of some
primordial agency. Hall and Ames argue that correlative thinking is dominant in
Chinese culture, whereas causal thinking is recessive. In turn, causal thinking is
dominant for the West, whereas correlative thinking is recessive. The Western
tendency to convert certain dualities into either a dualism or a univocal priori-
tization of one pole over the other is also offset by correlative thinking. In a
correlative sensibility such as we nd within the Chinese tradition, terms are
clustered with opposing or complementary alter-terms. Classical Chinese may
be uncongenial to the development of univocal propositions for this reason
(230).
With the philosophical dualities of Table 2.3 as both motivation and a
basis of comparison, I now consider in Table 2.4 various dualities in modern
science as exemplied by quantum and relativity theory.
Some of the physics dualities are direct correlates to those in the philoso-
phy list (discreteness-continuity; actuality-possibility; synthetic-analytic; asym-
metry-symmetry; and nal act-initial act, associated with successor-predeces-
sor). These dualities have a structure that is similar in both physics and
Table 2.4. Dualities in Physics

Field Source/matter Field theories
Wave Particle Bohrs complementarity
Momentum Position principle (Wilkins 1987)
Magnetic Electric Gauge theories (Witten 1997)
Discreteness Continuity Topology (Geroch 1985, 142)
Actuality Possibility Quantum properties (Bub 1997)
Nonlinear Linear Both classical and quantum
Final act/absorption Initial act/emission Quantum actions
Synthetic Analytic Geometrya
Asymmetry Symmetry Linear mappings (Geroch 1985, 116)
Episystem System Quantum system cut
Nonlocal Local Quantum levels
a
The qualitative (coordinate-free) and quantitative (coordinate-based) formulations of geometry are
traditionally called synthetic and analytic geometry. Analogously, one may speak of synthetic and
analytic quantum theory (Finkelstein 1996, p. 186).
philosophy. For example, an analysis of asymmetry and symmetry in physics

yields the same result as applying Hartshornes interpretive rules for dual pairs
in philosophy. Rosen (ch. 11) states this result as follows: Asymmetry is a
necessary condition for symmetry. For every symmetry there is an asymmetry
tucked away somewhere in the world.
Shimon Malin (ch. 7) argues that the collapse of quantum states in quan-
tum physics enforces a balance between actuality and potentiality, and between
complexity and simplicity. The actuality-possibility duality is often debated in
interpretations of modern science. One apparently explicit way in which this
duality enters is in an analysis of the uniqueness theorem for quantum measure-
ment theory. As stated by Bub (1997, 239), Classically, only the actual proper-
ties are time-indexed; quantum-mechanically, both the actual properties and the
possible properties are time-indexed . . . there is nothing inherently strange
about the notions of possibility or actuality in quantum mechanics.
Classical physics is often thought as superior to quantum physics at the
macroscopic scale, which is often regarded as simply linear. However, Finkel-
stein (1996, 388) points out that classical non-linearity is a simplication of
the quantum non-linearity inherent in the many-system kinematics of the com-
posite system whose classical limit we take.
The nal act-initial act pair in Table 2.4 is discussed in depth by Finkel-
stein (1996).
Initial and nal actions taken together are collectively called external (or terminal)
actions. . . . The duality between initial and nal modes, between before and after
the fact, is the most important symmetry of quantum theory. . . . Often we call
initial actions creation operations and nal actions annihilation operations.
There is no need, however, to imagine creation from nothing or annihilation to

nothing. These are acts of an experimenter with a large reservoir of quanta from
which to draw and in which to deposit. Some use the terms emission and ab-
sorption which have more appropriate associations. (14; see also 17, 40, 47, 48)
The philosophical pairing of whole-constituent has two related physics

entries, episystem-system and nonlocal-local. In quantum physics, episystem is
dened as follows:
What acts on the system we will call the episystem. The episystem consists of
everything playing a signicant part in the experiment that is not part of the
system, including the experimenter, the apparatus, the recording system, and an
entropy dump. We call this division of an experiment into system and episystem,
the system cut. . . . An action vector does not describe a state of being of the
system but an action of the episystem on the system. (Finkelstein 1996, 16)
The system cut is permeable and movable (395).

Applying Hartshornes interpretive rules for dual pairs to episystem-sys-
tem results in the proposition that an episystem necessitates some system;
whereas a system necessitates only that there be some episystem or other, yet
which particular episystem is contingent. The unavoidable yet contingent pres-
ence of an episystem is widely recognized in quantum physics and is a central
part of the argument by Stapp (ch. 9) that necessarily a question must be posed
to quantum systems, although there is some contingency in both details about
the episystem and the answer that nature gives to any particular question.
Nonlocal-local pairs naturally emerge in quantum physics and resolve the
meaning of action. The action principle is the key variational principle of
physics. However, in classical physics, there is no reason why a particles mo-
tion should be affected by values of the action on paths it does not take. In
contrast, Quantum physics is kinematically nonlocal though dynamically local.
Quanta only act where they are, but most initial and nal actions, even sharp
ones, do not determine where they are (Finkelstein 1996, 372).
Dualities Without Dualism

As we have seen, there is substantial correspondence between many duality
pairs in philosophy and physics. In those cases where the correspondence is
most clear, the physics results may have important philosophical implications.
Where the physics pairings have less clear counterparts in the philosophy list,
for example with gauge theory dualities, those cases should be fruitful areas of
study. For example, the magnetic-electric pair and other such pairings in gauge
theory are deeply linked to symmetry principles and are closely related to the
asymmetry-symmetry pairing. Philosophical analysis of these cases, such as the
application of Hartshornes interpretive rules, points to the need for transcend-
ing simple symmetry and recognizing symmetry breaking, a key result of mod-
ern physics (Witten 1997).
Finding a Balance
The process-relational tradition has occasionally opted for the Heraclitean ex-
treme that all is change. However, Whitehead and most recent process philos-
ophers have worked toward a middle ground in which being and becoming,
permanence and change must claim coequal footing in any metaphysical inter-
pretation of the real, because both are equally insistent aspects of experience
(Kraus 1979, 1).
Notes
1. The famous general systems theory of Ervin Laszlo was inspired by White-
heads philosophy. I found . . . that the organic synthesis of Whitehead can be updated
by the synthesis of a general systems theory, replacing the notion of organism and its
Platonic correlates with the concept of a dynamic, self-sustaining system discriminated
against the background of a changing natural environment [Ervin Laszlo, Introduction
to Systems Philosophy: Toward a New Paradigm of Contemporary Thought (New York:
Gordon and Breach, 1972), viii]. However, his systems theory is classical whereas
Whiteheads philosophy of organism has clear quantum aspects [private communication,
David Finkelstein, March 29, 2002].
2. The term holism is taken broadly here to suggest systems with signicant inter-
dependence and emergence, yet with hierarchical organization that provides for relative
independence of components. A view that emphasizes discrete, independent elements
without relations is here called a particularism.
3. Charles S. Peirce, the great American philosopher and originator of pragmat-
ism, considered triads as much more adequate than dyads or tetrads as intellectual instru-
ments (Hartshorne 1970, 100).
4. The dualities in philosophy listed in Table 2.3 are adapted from the table of
Metaphysical Contraries in Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis (1970, 100101).
Hartshornes interpretive rules for dual pairs are located on these same pages. In Table
2.3, the dual pair asymmetry/symmetry is added based on Rosens analysis. Hartshorne
associates his r-terms (left column of Table 2.3) with Peirces Seconds and Thirds and
his a-terms (right column) with Peirces Firsts.
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3
Whitehead as Mathematical Physicist
Hank Keeton
To appreciate the depth of Whiteheads engagement of mathematics and

physics, we need to set a detailed context for his work. In 1880 Whitehead was
enrolled at Trinity College, Cambridge, and continued his association there for
the next 30 years. His biographer, Victor Lowe, has published a comprehensive
history of Whiteheads life in Whitehead: The Man and His Work (WM&W ) and
I am indebted to his thoroughness for many biographical details not recorded
elsewhere. In the early years of his tenure at Trinity, Whitehead learned mathe-
matical physics from W. D. Niven, a former student of Clerk Maxwell, after
Maxwell came to England in 1871 and published his Treatise on Electricity and
Magnetism in 1873. It is probably at the inuence of Niven that Whitehead
chose Maxwells Treatise for his fellowship dissertation in 1884. Whitehead
was hired as a special math tutor that same year, giving personalized instruction
to other studentsan appointment signifying not only his stature in mathemat-
ics, but also an honor much sought after. That tutoring post led to an appoint-
ment as assistant lecturer for the school year 188586, and three short years
later he received a full lectureship, which he held until 1910 when he left for
London.
It is these years at Trinity that shaped the course of Whiteheads schol-
arship, and they are marked by several distinct features. First, as a student, he
was coached by Dr. E. J. Routh, FRS, one of the great mathematical coaches
for a whole generation of Cambridge mathematicians (WM&W, 98). White-
head also had the opportunity to meet and discourse with Arthur Cayley, one of
the great English mathematicians of the 1880s. It is not clear how Whitehead
rst learned about the work of Hermann Grassmann, but in 1888 Whitehead
offered the rst Cambridge course on Grassmanns Ausdehnungslehre (The Cal-
culus of Extension), and it became a foundation for his work in mathematics
and symbolic logic. The idea that a consistent theory of n-dimensional space,
31
32 Hank Keeton
like Grassmanns, has uses beyond those of three-dimensional geometry, had

not arrived. Whiteheads lectures in 1887 [academic year 188788] and 1890
on the Ausdehnungslehre paid special attention to its applications (WM&W,
154, emphasis added). It is important to note that Whitehead used the advance-
ments of Grassmanns mathematics directed toward applications in the physical
world. By the time Whitehead published his rst major work in 1898, A Trea-
tise on Universal Algebra, with Applications (UA), he credited the inuence of
the two decades of intense development in mathematics and logic from 1844
to 1862 with providing the foundation for his own work: Grassmanns works
(1844, 1862), William R. Hamiltons Quaternions (1853), and George Booles
The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847), and Symbolic Logic (1859). As
Whitehead recounted, My whole subsequent work on Mathematical Logic is
derived from these sources.1
The application of these developments in symbolic logic was hitched to
Maxwells star:
We may speculate that it was either while Whitehead was writing his fellowship
dissertation on Maxwells treatise or soon thereafter that there grew in his mind a
strong desire to work out eventually a theory of the relation between matter . . .
and spacein other words, between electromagnetism and geometry. But the rst
task in Whiteheads large scheme of work was to make a detailed investigation of
systems of abstract mathematical ideas that were being symbolized in various
ways and applied to physics. (WM&W, 156, emphasis added)
This rst task of the larger scheme of work became public through the trea-
tise of 1898.
The importance of UA cannot be overstated: Whitehead worked for seven
years, from 1891 to 1898, on the rst volume of the originally envisioned two-
volume work, investigating the various systems of Symbolic Reasoning allied
to ordinary algebra (WM&W, 190). One of the keys to understanding his inten-
tions lies in that portion of the titlewith Applicationsoften eclipsed in
reference. Whitehead intended to systematize, expand, and apply the resultant
systems of logic to areas where the formulations might suggest or reveal new
insights. His orientation toward spatial relations is the most direct example of
application, and the generalizations he sought in the new parabolic and hyper-
bolic geometries became more clearly evident in the years immediately follow-
ing this publication. Whiteheads organization of the volume reveals much of
his underlying intent. The volume is divided into books or parts, the rst
being introductory, and the second devoted to The Algebra of Symbolic
Logic where he explores the application of Booles algebra to regions of
space. Part III, Positional Manifolds, explores non-metrical n-dimensional
spatiality. The fourth part examines Grassmanns ideas, with the intent to apply
them to the notion of forces (again non-metrical) in Part V. Part VI expands the
Whitehead as Mathematical Physicist 33
calculus of extension, and applies it to elliptical, parabolic, and hyperbolic ge-

ometries. Part VII applies them to the Euclidian 3-space, with an examination
of curved surfaces, and generalizations that hint of topological transformations.
This was his rst major published work, and Whitehead had already set
the tone for his intellectual lifes work. The symbolic logic of UA is understood
not as symbols for numbers, but representing processes of connecting elements
within a consistent and comprehensive scheme. The scheme is generalized be-
yond its immediate focus on algebraic systems, with the intent that it will apply
to a broader range of experience. The rst volume of UA was the basis for his
election as a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1903. The advancements repre-
sented by this work, plus the work in two papers submitted to the American
Journal of Mathematics, led to his being awarded the Doctor of Science degree
by Trinity in 1905. Upon completion of Volume 1, Whitehead immediately
began work on Volume 2 and proceeded with that comparative study of all the
algebras, new and traditional, until 1903, when for reasons partly linked to joint
efforts with Bertrand Russell, he left the work unnished. It is currently un-
available and presumed lost. During this time Russell and Whitehead began
their decade-long collaboration on the logical foundations of mathematics,
Principia Mathematica (PM), which was an effort to axiomatize all of then-
known mathematics using Peano and Russells logical notation. In 1931, Kurt
Godel derived a famous proof showing the basic incompleteness of any axi-
omatic system based on number theory, using PM as his primary example.
Contrary to many popular characterizations, Godels proof does not disprove
any of Whitehead and Russells work, but in effect shows only that their stated
goal was unachievable using the strict axiomatic method they employed.2 The
fourth volume of PM was intended to focus on geometry, written principally by
Whitehead, but like UA Volume 2 was not completed.
In UA it was clear from the outset that the pure nature of the new algebras
was not the limit of Whiteheads interest. He wanted to explore their applica-
tion to the physical world, and for Whitehead that meant to geometry and
physics. He employed symbolic logic as a tool for generalization and interpreta-
tion, seeking the broad connections that obtained between the algebras and the
physical world. Later, he would use these same methods to investigate the ele-
ments of physics and philosophy, always seeking the most general foundational
level within and among these aspects of the world of experience. More than
twenty years after embarking on this series of projects, in 1912, Whitehead
applied for the Chair of Applied Mathematics at University College, London
stating that, [d]uring the last twenty-two years I have been engaged in a large
scheme of work, involving the logical scrutiny of mathematical symbolism and
mathematical ideas. This work had its origin in the study of the mathematical
theory of Electromagnetism, and has always had as its ultimate aim the general
scrutiny of the relation of matter and space (WM&W, 155156, emphasis
added). Although UA Volume 2 did not appear in print, the work behind it, and
34 Hank Keeton
the ideas within it, most assuredly did not disappear. Instead, Whitehead read a
paper in 1905 (published in 1906) before the Royal Society of London that
bears a striking resemblance to the stated goals of that unpublished second
volume of UA, but applied to geometry instead. The paper was titled On Math-
ematical Concepts of the Material World (MC ), and in it Whitehead proposes
a conceptual scheme, with specic suggestions for extending and applying the
scheme to electromagnetism and gravitational laws, utilizing the linear algebras
and Hamiltons quaternions, especially the notion that the relation of multiplica-
tion between symbols could be associative, and did not have to be commuta-
tive. There is a sense that this paper was really a shadow of UA Volume 2, not
just because its content was so similar to that project and its appearance so
contiguous, but also its natural progression from Whiteheads fellowship disser-
tation to UA Volume 1 is further evidenced in the steps he takes in this very
complex work. More than 30 years later, after publishing his major philosophi-
cal volumes, Whitehead conded to Victor Lowe that he considered MC one of
his best pieces of work.3
The seminal place of MC in an overview of Whiteheads thought is sig-
nicant. In this relatively short memoir, he planted seeds in mathematics, phys-
ics, and philosophy that would bear mature fruit throughout the rest of his life.
Those seeds were rmly rooted in symbolic logic, which was his primary mode
of investigation, and MC clearly showed the evolving nature of his ideas. Al-
though in this work he employed instants of time, which almost seem classical
in their mathematical expression, it is quite obvious when he developed Con-
cept V that he understood the relationship between space and time in a much
more complex fashion; not conned by the absolute nature imparted to them in
Newtons theories. The year 1905 was propitious in other ways, for Einstein
also published two papers on the electrodynamics of moving bodies, inspired
by Maxwells work in electromagnetism. These papers formed the basis for
Einsteins special theory of relativity, which Whitehead interpreted in his own
way, starting from similar inspiration, but following a different path. For now,
as we unpack Whiteheads role in mathematical physics, we will focus on his
memoir of 1905, and highlight aspects of it that play crucial roles in his later
work.4
The object of this memoir is to initiate the mathematical investigation of

various possible ways of conceiving the nature of the material world. In so far as
its results are worked out in precise mathematical detail, the memoir is concerned
with the possible relations to space of the ultimate entities which (in ordinary
language) constitute the stuff in space. . . . In view of the existence of change in
the material world, the investigation has to be so conducted as to introduce, in its
abstract form, the idea of time, and to provide for the denition of velocity and
acceleration. The general problem is here discussed purely for the sake of its
logical (i.e., mathematical) interest. (MC, 11, emphasis added)
At the outset of this stage in Whiteheads work he tells us some interesting

details about the progress of his larger scheme of work. He is now extending
the scope of that project specically into the nature of the material world,
using the logic of relations between space and the ultimate entities. It is clear
he is speaking practically about matter, but at the same time it must be under-
stood that for him, the notations used in symbolic logic do not mean only
matter. He intends to follow the symbolic logic of spatial relations between
stuff, whatever that stuff may be. This is crucial to his later work, because we
see in MC the logical progression from points as stuff, to linear reals as stuff,
and nally arrive at the end of the memoir with linear objective reals (vec-
tors), verging on denitions of motion, velocity, and acceleration that will issue
in newly formulated laws of electromagnetism and gravitation. Not bad for an
investigation into the physical world using symbolic logic as the primary tool!
Mass and energy are not assumed, but are derived from the relations between
the linear objective reals. (It is important to avoid confusion in terminology by
not transposing the common philosophical denition of objective to White-
heads intent. Here objective means experienceable and will later be applied
to subjective forms of experience through the extensive-topological scheme
of Process and Reality [PR] Part IV).
When Whitehead extends the work of this 1905 memoir, and in 1922
derives his own relativistic laws in The Principle of Relativity, with Applica-
tions to Physical Science (R), he states,
The metrical formulae nally arrived at are those of [Einsteins] earlier theory, but
the meanings ascribed to the algebraic symbols are entirely different. . . . I deduce
that our experience requires and exhibits a basis of uniformity, and that in the case
of nature, this basis exhibits itself as the uniformity of spatio-temporal relations.
This conclusion entirely cuts away the causal heterogeneity of these relations
which is essential to Einsteins later theory. (R, v, emphasis added)
This does not mean that space-time is uniform, but that the relations constitut-
ing space-time are uniform. Much will be said about this throughout the years
following 1922, and in some chapters of this present volume.
This ash-forward to 1922 is intended to help set the stage for under-
standing Whiteheads evolving orientation toward the physical world, and the
particular interest such orientation might have for present-day physicists and
philosophers. In MC (1905) he takes his investigative enterprise into a broader
orbit from the algebras, and specically engages geometry, which is one of his
chief intellectual interests. At the same time, his scope is broader than even the
geometries can contain, and he asserts his intention to account for the existence
of change in the material world, providing denitions for velocity and accelera-
tion. It is essential to understand that although his notation using symbolic logic
does not evidence time in a form other than instants, it is an incomplete grasp
36 Hank Keeton
of his overall project to conclude that his orientation toward time was strictly
classical and not relational.
The outline of the 1905 memoir has a simplicity that belies its content.
Whitehead identies ve concepts he intends to investigate, the rst two being
representations of the classical conception of the physical world, and the re-
maining three progressively engaging the actual world of change. He warns the
reader early that his intentions are not limited by particular meanings com-
monly afforded terms in such investigations. For instance, he invokes Leibnizs
theory of the Relativity of Space, noting that it
. . . is not a concept of the material world, according to the narrow denition here
given. It is merely an indication of a possible type of concepts alternative to the
classical concept . . . a wider view suggests that it is a protest against dividing the
class of objective reals into two parts, one part (the space of the classical concept)
being the eld of fundamental relations which do not include instants of time in
their elds, and the other part (the particles) only occurring in the elds of funda-
mental relations which do include instants of time. In this sense it is a protest
against exempting any part of the universe from change . . . this theory . . . has
never been worked out in the form of a precise mathematical concept. . . . Our
sole purpose is to exhibit concepts not inconsistent with some, if not all, of the
limited number of propositions at present believed to be true concerning our
sense-perception. (MC, 14, emphasis added)
He intends to follow Leibnizs lead, nd a class of objective reals that is not

separated from time, derive the fundamental relations obtaining upon that class,
and express these objective reals and their relations in a concise mathematical
formalism that accurately accounts for change in the world of sense perception.
Concept I represents the classical concepts whose objective reals are
points of space and particles of matter. The essential relations (R) of this con-
cept have as their eld the classical points of space, and are triadic between a
minimum of three points in a unique order. But we must account for change in
this space, so a second division of the objective reals is created, comprising
particles of matter that are capable of motion. Then an extraneous relation is
deduced whereby a single point of space, a single particle of matter, and a
single instant of time are related, and these relations are unique. [T]he impene-
trability of matter is secured by the axiom that two different extraneous rela-
tions cannot both relate the same instant of time to the same point. The [classi-
cal] general laws of dynamics, and all the special physical laws, are axioms
concerning the properties of this class of extraneous relations. Thus the classi-
cal concept is not only dualistic, but has to admit a class of as many extraneous
relations as there are members of the class of particles (MC, 29, emphasis
added). Even if all the extraneous relations were to be grouped as a class, as
relations of particles occupying points of space, the resulting axiom for the
class would be a single axiom of occupation and the laws of physics are the
properties of this single extraneous relation O [occupation] (MC, 29). The

structure of his argument, even at the outset of the memoir, clearly evidences
his intuition that relations constitute the class of physical experience from
which the laws of physics are derived.
Concept II is a monistic variant of Concept I, where the concept of parti-
cles is abolished, and we transform the extraneous relations into dyadic rela-
tions between points of space and instants of time. . . . The reason for the
original introduction of matter was, without doubt to give the senses some-
thing to perceive. If a relation can be perceived, this Concept II has every
advantage over the classical concept (MC, 29). As Whitehead progresses in his
investigation, some very subtle steps occur. It is here that he introduces the
notion that relations may be the ultimate objects of perception, but as this
investigation is strictly mathematical-geometrical, he does not pause to examine
the consequences of such a suggestion. Such a full examination does not in fact
appear in a systematic way until PR, more than twenty-ve years later.
Concept III is an effort to couple dynamics with the previous concepts
and abandon the prejudice against moving points. The essential relation (R) of
this concept becomes tetradic, between three objective reals and an instant of
time. Since Whiteheads investigation is focused on geometric relations, these
reals may be considered related points or related lines, so he can derive from
three intersecting straight lines the kinetic axes, and thereby dene velocity and
acceleration. He has not used any classical formulae to accomplish these re-
sults, limiting himself to logical formalism and geometry. This concept has the
advantage over Concepts I and II that it has reduced the class of extraneous
relations to one member only. . . . The concept pledges itself to explain the
physical world by the aid of motion only (MC, 31). Whitehead derives two
variants on this concept to account for persistence of the same objective reals
in motion, as well as the continuity of motion of single corpuscles, creating
the denition of identity for the objective reals.
So far, what Whitehead has accomplished is the formalization of the clas-
sical concepts of space, matter, and time, using only symbolic logic and Euclid-
ian geometries. But his intent is to examine possible relations between matter
and space in a changing world, and he is not satised with the limitations of the
classical formulations. In Concept IV he introduces a complex scheme for de-
ning entities in terms of their intersections within a region, and the order of
that intersection. He calls these points intersection-points (shortened to inter-
points), not to be confused with the simplistic concept of a common point of
two intersecting lines in Euclidian geometry. The theory of interpoints depends
on that of similarity of position in a relation (MC, 35). The essential relations
in this Concept are pentadic, with an instant of time, and one objective real
intersecting three other objective reals in a unique order. In the point-ordering
relation, Whitehead makes his shift from plain to projective geometry, and de-
nes classes of interpoints by their ordering relations. He derives two versions
38 Hank Keeton
of this Concept, IV-A being dualistic, and IV-B a monistic variant. For the
purposes of setting the stage of Whiteheads context in physics, it is important
to note that this Concept establishes relations between entities (interpoints)
which will serve his purposes later in the paper he delivers to the First Congress
on Mathematical Philosophy in Paris, titled The Relational Theory of Space
(RTS), where the notion of interpoints is generalized into a notion of inclusion.
For the 1905 concepts, what is most important is their logical consistency and
applicability to the world of sense perception. It is necessary to assume that
the points in this concept [IV] disintegrate, and do not, in general, persist from
instant to instant. For otherwise the only continuous motion possible would be
representable by linear transformations of coordinates; and it seems unlikely
that sense-perceptions could be explained by such restricted type of motions
(MC, 43, emphasis added).
Concept V introduces a crucial notion of dimension, which is dened by a
property of classes of linear objective reals. These properties (or dimensions)
are derived from geometrical relations, and exist in ways not commonly used in
ordinary language. For example, Whitehead derives atness in terms of
classes and sub-classes of classes with a particular property. His denition of
atness does in fact apply to three-dimensional space in a classical sense, but
its logical structure translates differently when applied to properties other than
atness. It is this peculiar property of atness which has masked the impor-
tance in geometry of the theory of common -subregions (MC, 45). This Con-
cept is an effort to dene regions, and actions within those regions, again based
upon geometrical relations. Insights from projective geometry inform his argu-
ments, and the ordering of relations evidences an intuition of topological rela-
tions not yet formalized systematically by either Whitehead or others. The cul-
minating concept of this memoir utilizes the Theory of Interpoints, Theory
of Dimensions, and the unique property of homaloty (similar to atness of a
class of punctual lines), to dene linear objective reals, which are the precursors
of actual entities and the events of his mature cosmology. The geometry in
this Concept V includes more than does the geometry of Concept I. For in
Concept I geometry has only to do with points, punctual lines, and punctual
planes; but in Concept V geometry has, in addition, to consider the relation of
the objective reals (which are all linear) and of interpoints to the above enti-
ties. In this respect, geometry in Concept V merges into physics more than does
geometry in Concept I (MC, 69, emphasis added).
It is clear that Whitehead made signicant progress on his larger
scheme with this memoir of 1905. If it is in fact a shadow of UA Volume 2,
then it reveals a depth of innovation unparalleled at the time, linking the new
algebras with non-Euclidian geometries in ways not previously explored. It is
one step in a much larger vision, which continues to unfold through his inter-
pretive process using symbolic logic to investigate geometry, and deducing
physical laws without relying on experimental data. He concludes this effort by
prescribing three cases for understanding the characteristics of the electron, and
the forces conjectured to be present with it. What is wanted at this stage is
some simple hypothesis concerning the motion of objective reals and correlat-
ing it with the motion of electric points and electrons. From such a hypothesis
the whole electromagnetic and gravitational laws might follow with the utmost
simplicity. The complete concept involves the assumption of only one class of
entities forming the universe. Properties of space and of physical phenomena
in space become simply the properties of this single class of entities (MC, 82,
emphasis added).
In 1906 and 1907 Whitehead published two volumes on geometry, The
Axioms of Projective Geometry (APG) and The Axioms of Descriptive Geometry
(ADG), wherein he formalizes many of the denitions, axioms, and proposi-
tions investigated in MC. These two volumes are designed to be read together
as two parts of a classication scheme extending the details of the point-order-
ing relations explored in the 1905 memoir. Projective geometry yields ordering
relations in closed series, while descriptive geometry yields ordering relations
in open series. These two tracts are more mathematical in nature, and less
philosophical in scope, but they represent development of the earlier notions in
a systematic fashion. It should be remembered that during this same period,
Whitehead and Russell were collaborating on their decade-long project of for-
malizing mathematics by using symbolic logic to investigate number theory.
Godels 1931 incompleteness theorem notwithstanding, their work on PM in
terms of classes and properties of classes continued to inuence their subse-
quent work.
Whiteheads progression of ideas takes another form in RTS (1914), ex-
tending the link between UA and MC that creates a powerful web of ideas
heralding Whiteheads distinctly philosophical period. In UA Whitehead uses
symbolic logic to investigate the foundations of Euclidian and non-Euclidian
algebras, applied to extended regions of space. In MC he continues that project
by linking symbolic logic and algebra to investigate the foundations of plain,
elliptical, hyperbolic, and parabolic geometries in terms of relations between
extended volumes of space, culminating in axioms of projective geometry, and
denition of the cogredient point (at innity). He also opens the door to topol-
ogy with his interpretation of the point-ordering relation for extended volumes.
MC represents an advancement of his theory of extension (further developed in
RTS), and also an effort to derive adequate denitions of velocity and accelera-
tion, in order to account for the existence of change in the material world.
Considering that Whitehead has included time in his investigations with repre-
sentations only of instants and differences between instants, it seems quite natural
in the overall progression that he begins to see time as an element of relation
with extension, similar to that which has been his focus for space. Whiteheads
natural propensity for relation carried every expectation that at some stage
in his development, the extended nature of time would somehow be included
40 Hank Keeton
within the scope of his inquiries. And indeed, in 1914 RTS reveals his thinking
on that matter by introducing time as a lapse. According to ordinary physics,
the perceptions resulting from changing relations between physical objects oc-
cur during a certain lapse of time (RTS, 3, emphasis added).
The extendedness of time is not so much a problem as are apparent differ-
ences between the lapses of time experienced by different subjects (the question
of simultaneity). [T]he real problem of time is the formation of a common
time for the complete apparent world independent of the different times of the
immediate apparent worlds of the various perceiving subjects (RTS, 5, em-
phasis added). To begin accommodating the existence of change, he considers
the lapse of extended time in conjunction with the continuity of spatial volumes
and addresses the concept of limits and boundaries. This type of extendedness
and connection leads him to consider surfaces as regions of intersection (inter-
points from MC ) and derive the concept of inclusion, using more overtly philo-
sophical language, still accompanied by symbolic notation. This notion, to-
gether with distinctions of part-whole, divisibility, continuity, and limits, allows
Whitehead to derive distinctly topological concepts in terms of inclusion
classes. He derives the relations of covering and T-incident to expand the notion
of his new T-space. It is unknown why he chooses the variable T in this work,
applying it in a manner different from his other works, but its suggestiveness
may not be strictly coincidental. Whitehead closes this paper with the announce-
ment that he hopes to develop and expand these concepts in a work soon to be
published, presumably An Enquiry Concerning The Principles of Natural
Knowledge (PNK ) in 1919.
It is clear that Whiteheads orientation toward physics remains rmly
rooted in the operations of symbolic logic, and in the fundamental concepts of
space, time, and matter, variously conceived. It is equally important to acknowl-
edge the methodological consistency throughout his investigations. He con-
tinues to use symbolic logic, not experimental data or metrical-dimensional
values, as the basis for his arguments. We will see that this methodological
distinction forms the basis for his divergence from Einsteins formulations of
relativity. In 1915, Whitehead presents a paper titled Space, Time, and Rela-
tivity (STR), wherein he expands his growing notion of the logical relativity of
extended space and extended time, develops further the concept of durations
and temporal extension, and in general continues to rene the theory of exten-
sion.
A thorough review of his logical notation might reveal when in his scheme
of extension he links the persistence of motion with continuity, resulting in
temporal extension. It happens sometime between 1914 and 1919, because by
PNK he speaks very clearly about how the spatial relations must now stretch
across time (PNK, 6). It is not the nature of space, but rather the nature of
extension applied to space-time that motivates Whitehead as his investigations
become more philosophical. In an integral development of the ideas in PNK,
Whitehead participated in a symposium in 1919 titled Time, Space and Mate-

rial: Are They, and If So in What Sense, the Ultimate Data of Science (TSM)
before publishing The Concept of Nature (CN ) in 1920. His participation in this
symposium gave him the opportunity to coin the term creative advance, ex-
pand the projective-topological nature of cogredience, and begin speaking in
terms of event-particles. The theory of extension is also shown to include
many aspects of space and time that had earlier been not so attributed.
In PNK-CN 5 Whitehead continues the work begun in MC and derives
congruence as a class of relations of extension (PNK, 51), and he expands his
emerging theory of events to include projective-topological relations described
philosophically (PNK, 59). At each step his theory of extension continues to
evolve, and objects are described as a class of relations between events. He
begins to develop the formalization of the method of extensive abstraction,
which is derived directly from the fundamental axioms of extension (extensive
connection) (PNK, 101ff ). He accents the existence of multiple time systems
and durations, which emerge from the theory of extension when applied to
motion, continuity (point ordering), and permanence (PNK, 110ff ). Whitehead
derives a complex geometry, and nally completes his goal (stated in MC, 82)
of formally deriving laws of motion suitable to the extensional scheme in its
present form. Objects and events are further differentiated, and the class of
causal relations is enhanced and expanded (PNK, 121). Together, PNK and CN
serve as introductory chapters for Whiteheads formal theory of relativity pre-
sented in R. Whitehead states very clearly what are his differences from Ein-
steins theory and the Maxwell-Lorentz assumptions on which Einstein relied:
. . . we must not conceive of events as in a given Time, a given Space, and
consisting of changes in given persistent material. Time, Space, and Material
are adjunct of events. On the old theory of relativity, Time and Space are rela-
tions between materials; on our theory they are relations between events
(PNK, 26, emphasis added). The divergence chiey arises from the fact that I
do not accept [Einsteins] theory of non-uniform space or his assumptions as to
the peculiar fundamental character of light-signals (CN, vii, emphasis added).
The metrical formulae nally arrived at are those of [Einsteins] earlier theory,
but the meanings ascribed to the algebraic symbols are entirely different (R,
iii, emphasis added). Whiteheads theory of relativity has been the focus of
much attention in the scholarship, to the extent that other similar theories have
been classied as Whiteheadian-type theories. In the effort to set his context
in physics, that portion of his history speaks for itself.
Scholars have been inspired by Whiteheads work in areas beyond strictly
mathematics and physics. His fundamental contribution to mathematical logic,
however the formal outcome of PM is characterized, is incontrovertible.6 Very
recent work, requiring thorough consideration of logical notation amended by
Russell, has yielded new insights into PM *89.16, thereby recovering mathe-
matical induction and extending the applicability of Whitehead and Russells
42 Hank Keeton
work.7 In a concise summary of many of the issues outlined in this historical

review, Paul Schmidt described the range of Whiteheads signicance for the
natural sciences.
In the realm of science the [philosophy of organism] provides

(1) an ontological basis for causal connection,
(2) a basis for vectors [and a new denition of tensors] in physics,
(3) a foundation for the notion of energy,
(4) an interpretation of the quantum character of nature [see chapters 7, 9, 13,
17],
(5) an interpretation of vibration and frequency,
(6) a foundation for induction,
(7) a relational theory of space-time [see chapter 12],
(8) a basis for the notions of rest, motion, acceleration, velocity, and simul-
taneity [see chapters 12, 13],
(9) an explanation of the relation between geometry to experience, and
(10) a foundation for the biological notion of an organism and the sociological
notion of a society.8
Many of these themes have been explored in depth by interpreters of White-

head, and his work continues to inspire explorations into understanding them
from new perspectives.
Following the lines of Schmidts point (4) above, Henry J. Folse wrote in
1974, we might ask what is the prognosis for any future rapport between
process philosophy and quantum theory. The Copenhagen interpretation has
come under considerable criticism in recent years, much of which draws its
strength upon an appeal to the classical ontology of mechanistic materialism. It
would seem that the Copenhagen interpretation and process philosophy would
make good allies in any battle against resurgent substantival materialism.9
Readers of the present volume will be informed from several perspectives on
this estimation of Whiteheads relevance for quantum theory. His relativistic-
gravitational concepts still provide current stimulation for theorists. In working
on Whiteheads theory, Eddington stumbled upon a previously unknown form
of the Schwarzschild metric, a form thus discovered a full thirty-six years be-
fore Kruskals famous singularity-free systems of 1960. Writing in 1989, A. T.
Hyman describes the impact of this development by saying that [t]hus, far
from being a useless relic of an obscure philosopher, Whiteheads theory has
actually contributed signicantly to the progress of gravitational research during
the past thirty years.10 Even more recently, Joachim Stolz wrote Whitehead und
Einstein in 1995,11 which was reviewed by Robert Valenza in the journal Pro-
cess Studies.12 The review highlighted the signicant contribution Stolz made to
the reconstruction of Whiteheads philosophy. Valenza, who (together with
Granville Henry) is sometimes a critic of logicism,13 especially the variety man-
ifest in UA and PM, modies some nuances of his Whiteheadian critique and
lauds Stolzs thesis that there exists a deep structure in the development of
Whiteheads thought evidencing a general covariance principle. That inter-
pretation parallels the historical review comprising the bulk of this summary of
Whitehead as a mathematical physicist. The foundation of Whiteheads mature
event ontology is the functoriality of symbolic logic applied to regions of
space-time. Stolzs proposed reconstruction of Whiteheads philosophy in light
of this insight may serve as an inspiration to many who explore the demanding
environment of Whiteheads complexity.
It should come as no surprise that topological invariance and other prop-
erties14 such as mapping15 are now seen under new illumination by develop-
ments Whitehead uncovered during his career. Information theory, eld theories
of cognition,16 and other allied disciplines, are also beginning to incorporate
input from his work.
Whitehead began his career with symbolic logic and mathematics, and
when he applied those tools to the material world, he discovered elds of rela-
tions of events, classes of relations of events, and an emerging topology of
forms of relations. Rather than focus on objects existing in the elds of space-
time, Whitehead focused on the events that constituted, or included, those ob-
jects instead. His contribution to the nineteenthtwentieth century conceptual
revolution in physics, (propagated by Maxwell, Lamor, Lorentz, Einstein, and
Minkowski), developed in ways that reinforced a new balance between mass-
energy objects and the events or elds that embed them. Whitehead ultimately
developed a cosmology where object-being and event-becoming were pro-
foundly and extensively connected. Today contemporary science is embracing
living systems and ecological models, while modern physics is incorporating
quantum-relativistic phenomena and eld theories. These movements clearly
illustrate new fundamental understandings of both change and permanence,
suggesting the continued fruitfulness of Whiteheads process vision.
Abbreviations
Works by Alfred North Whitehead

ADG The Axioms of Descriptive Geometry. In Cambridge Tracts in Mathemat-
ics and Mathematical Physics, no. 5, ed. J.G. Leathem and E.T. Whittaker.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907.
APG The Axioms of Projective Geometry. In Cambridge Tracts in Mathemat-
ics and Mathematical Physics, no. 4, ed. J.G. Leathem and E.T. Whittaker.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1906.
CN The Concept of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920; re-
print, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955.
MC On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World. In Alfred North White-
head, an Anthology, ed. F.S.C. Northrup and M.W. Gross, 782. New York:
The Macmillan Press, 1953.
44 Hank Keeton
PM Principia Mathematica, with Bertrand Russell. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-

versity Press, 19101913; v. I, 1910; v. II, 1912; v. III, 1913.
PNK An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge. 2nd ed. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1955.
PR Process and Reality, corrected edition, ed. D.G. Grifn and D.W. Sher-
burne. New York: The Free Press, 1978.
R The Principle of Relativity with Applications to Physical Science. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922.
RTS The Relational Theory of Space, trans. by P.J. Hurley. University of San
Diego, 1976.
STR Space, Time and Relativity. In The Interpretation of Science, ed. with
intro. A.H. Johnson, 90107. New York-Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961.
TSM Time, Space, and Material: Are They, and If So in What Sense, the Ulti-
mate Data of Science. In The Interpretation of Science, ed. with intro.
A.H. Johnson, 5668. New York-Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961.
UA A Treatise on Universal Algebra, with Applications, v. I (no other pub-
lished). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898.
Works by Other Authors

WM&W Lowe, Victor. Alfred North Whitehead: The Man and His Work. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
Notes
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Autobiographical Notes, in The Library of Living
Philosophers: The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (New
York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951), 9.
2. Morris Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times, 3 vols.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 1206.
3. Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1962; paper, 1966), 157.
4. I hold this position contra Lowe and others. See note 16, WM&W, 301. Lowe
references a letter from Whitehead to Russell in September 1911, wherein Whitehead
specically states that the idea suddenly ashed on me that time could be treated ex-
actly the same way as I have now got space . . . the result is a relational theory of
time. . . . As far as I can see, it gets over all the old difculties, and above all abolishes
the instant in time . . . But Lowe follows this with a very curious report of a conversa-
tion with Russell in 1965, where I asked whether Whitehead, like himself, favored the
absolute theories of space and time early in their collaboration. No, he answered, and
added, I think he was born a relativist(WM&W, 299, emphasis added). That conviction
is shared in full by this author. Whitehead spoke, thought, and wrote in symbols. The
meaning associated with those symbols was not numerical; neither was it simple. If he
does not state the full meaning of the symbols, it is our own projection that creates those
meanings. It is almost impossible to conceive that such a mind as his, so thoroughly

immersed in the generalizing of concepts relating to logical, geometrical, and spatial
relations, would isolate time as an exception to those generalizations. Whitehead, in
remarking about the differences (in MC ) between the punctual concepts (I and II) and
the linear concepts (III, IV, and V), states about Concept III (leading to Concept IV) that
The concept pledges itself to explain the physical world by the aid of motion only. It
was indeed a dictum of some eminent physicists of the nineteenth century that motion is
the essence of matter. But this concept takes them rather sharply at their word. There is
absolutely nothing to distinguish one part of the objective reals from another part except
differences of motion. The corpuscle will be a volume in which some peculiarity of the
motion of the objective reals exists and persists (MC, 31). In fact, when motion is
considered, it will be found that the points of one instant are, in general, different from
the points of another instant, not in the sense of Concept III that they are the same
entities with different relations, but in the sense that they are different entities (MC, 33,
emphasis added). Whitehead was working out the details of a radically generalized con-
cept of matter in relation to space and time, and his formalism, as well as his descrip-
tions, give clear evidence that the logic of differences between these complex relations is
the basis for his physical theory. The fact that he used instants of time in the formalism
does not, or should not, shroud the distinction of the corpuscles that provide the basis for
the denition of velocity and acceleration. The corpuscles are precursors of durations in
PNK (1919). The seeds are planted in the logical analysis, and it is simply the interpre-
tive scheme that requires further elucidation; like that recounted to Russell in the letter of
September 1911, a mere six years after presentation of the memoir. To say the relational
theory of time is not present in MC is to miss the structure and direction of the work. No
scholarship is gained by maintaining either position in isolation. Acknowledgement of
the process is enough.
5. (CN, vi) Whitehead is quite clear that the two volumes PNK and CN should
be read and considered together. His writing at this stage has become predominantly
philosophical, with adequate formalism accompanying sections he deemed to require
such elucidation.
6. Jan Lukasiewicz, Aristotles Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal

Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951).
7. Gregory Landini, The Denability of the Set of Natural Numbers in the

1925 Principia Mathematica, Journal of Philosophical Logic 25, no. 6 (1996): 597
615.
8. Paul F. Schmidt, Perception and Cosmology in Whiteheads Philosophy (New

Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967), 17374.
9. Henry J. Folse Jr., The Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Theory and

Whiteheads Philosophy of Organism, in Tulane Studies in Philosophy; Studies in Pro-
cess Philosophy I, vol. xxiii (1974): 4647.
10. A. T. Hyman, A New Interpretation of Whiteheads Theory, in Il Nuovo

Cimento 104B, no. 4 (1989): 389.
46 Hank Keeton
11. Joachim Stolz, Whitehead und Einstein: Wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Studien

in Naturphilosophischer Absicht (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, 1995).
12. Robert J. Valenza, review of Whitehead und Einstein: Wissenschaftsge-
schichtliche Studien in Naturphilosophischer Absicht, by Joachim Stolz, Process Studies
29, no. 2 (2000): 37881.
13. Granville C. Henry and Robert J. Valenza, Whiteheads Early Philosophy of
Mathematics, Process Studies 22, no. 1 (1993): 2136.
14. Newton C.A. DaCosta, Otavio Bueno, and Steven French, Suppes Predicates
for Space-Time, Synthese (1997): 27179.
15. James Bradley, The Speculative Generalization of the Function, Tijdschrift
voor Filosoe 64 (2002): 253271.
16. Joachim Stolz, The Research Program in Natural Philosophy from Gauss and
Riemann to Einstein and Whitehead: From the Theory of Invariants to the Idea of a Field
Theory of Cognition, Prima Philosophia 10, no. 4 (1997): 15764.
4
Evidence for Process in the Physical World
John A. Jungerman
Introduction
From the world of the extremely small (atoms, nuclei, and their constituents), to
nonlinear self-organizing systems on a human scale, and nally to the vast
regions of the cosmos itself, at every level we nd interconnectedness, open-
ness, creativity, and increasing order.
These are fundamental tenets of process thought through its description of
events, or occasions of experience, which the process philosopher Alfred North
Whitehead assumes are its basic entity. Process philosophy asserts that an
event, or society of events, is inuenced by or connected to previous events.
The event harmonizes this information with its goals and makes a choice
among alternatives, an openness that may lead to creativity and novelty.
It is impressive that process thought is often in agreement with discov-
eries in physics that occurred decades after its formulation. I would now like to
discuss in turn interconnectedness, openness, creativity, and increasing order in
more detail (see also J. Jungerman, World in Process: Creativity and Intercon-
nection in the New Physics, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000).
Interconnectedness
According to the general theory of relativity, there is an interdependence of
time, space, mass-energy, and gravity. They are all interlinked. Time is itself
part of a process. The general theory also predicts that accelerating masses will
give off gravitational radiationa prediction recently veried with great preci-
sion by long-term observation of a binary pulsar.1 The special and general theo-
ries of relativity give us a connection between concepts that were previously
thought to be separate. Such interrelatedness is in accord with process
thoughtit shows a dynamic and interconnected universe.
47
48 John A. Jungerman
Again, twentieth-century physics has shown us new connections between

concepts originally thought to be separate: light is both a wave and a particle,
and matter itself is not only a particle, but also has a wave aspect. We are
invited to a transcendent conception of a wavicle for both light, or more gener-
ally electromagnetic radiation, and matter. Wave-particle duality is a fact of the
physical universe. These discoveries are illustrations of the fundamental tenet
of process thought that the world is formed of interconnectionsin this in-
stance conceptual ones.
Quantum mechanics is in accord with a holistic conception of the uni-
verse in that interconnectedness lies at its heart. This was another of Einsteins
objections to quantum mechanics. He foresaw spooky interactions at a dis-
tance, which he rejected. Yet in the late twentieth century there has been ample
experimental evidence that particles once formed in a quantum state remain in
this state and are connected to each other even though separated at great dis-
tances. In 1997 a group of Swiss physicists demonstrated that the quantum
mechanical correlation was intact over a distance of 10 kilometers using ber
optic telephone lines.2 Thus, the connection observed is independent of dis-
tance.
Particles formed from three quarks, such as the proton and the neutron,
are called baryons. In addition to the neutron and proton, other baryons have
been found, and these contain new types of quarks. In fact, four quarks in
addition to the up and down quarks that form neutrons and protons have been
discovered and given the quaint names charm, strange, bottom, and
top. The last, the top quark, was found in 1995.
Atoms in an excited state decay to their ground state by emission of a
photon. In an analogous manner, protons and neutrons have been found to have
excited states that are formed from baryons made from up, down, charm, and
strange quarks. They decay to protons and neutrons by emission of photons as
well as other particles, which may themselves be structured. In this way these
baryons form a web of connections, in agreement with process thought.
Self-organizing systems at the human scale form connections among tril-
lions of molecules. A thin layer of heated oil with a thermal gradient and far
from equilibrium forms an exquisite pattern of Benard cellsan intimate con-
nection among the myriad of molecules involved. The gravity of our sun makes
it possible for the earth to be at just the right distance to be hospitable to life.
The low-entropy electromagnetic radiation from the sun makes life possible
an essential connection for all of us. We humans are connected by necessity and
dependent on plants and animals for our survival and depend on each other
through our cultures to provide not only the necessities of life, but also the
means to expand our creativity.
Within the cosmos there are many interrelationships. Gravity forms gal-
axies from cosmic dust and, with the passage of time, it creates stars by com-
pressing them so that nuclear reactions can begin. We again share a common
Evidence for Process in the Physical World 49
connection in being stardust together from a supernova explosion some six

billion years ago. This time can be estimated by noting that the abundance of
U-235 now is about 0.7 percent of that of U-238. Assuming that in the super-
nova event these isotopes were produced in approximately equal amounts, we
can ask how long it would take for the shorter-lived U-235 to decay to its
present abundancegiving the six-billion-year gure.
Openness
Process philosophy asserts that when an individual event makes a selection,
there is an openness, a selection among alternatives. The entity takes into ac-
count the past, as well as the goals and possibilities for the future, but the nal
action is unique and unpredictable. There is corroboration of this idea in the
physical world.
Heisenbergs uncertainty principle shows us that there is a lack of deter-
minism at the microlevel. This implies that the universe is not preordained but
has an inherent openness in its evolution. For example, if an electron passes
through a double slit to form an interference pattern, it is not possible to predict
at which fringe the electron will be found by a detector. It is as if the electron
makes an individual selection among alternative fringes, subject to the overall
statistical demands of quantum theory.
Neither can we predict when a virtual particle pair will be created ex
nihilo in a vacuum, or when virtual photons and gluons will be exchanged to
bind atoms and nuclei. We can only predict the aggregate behavior of thousands
of similar particlesthat is, the probability that an event will occur.
Einstein disliked quantum mechanics precisely because its view of nature
is of a statistical character with nothing to say about individual events. His
statement that God does not play dice with the universe shows the deep
religious conviction that drew Einstein away from quantum mechanics, which
he regarded as an incomplete theory. Yet the possibility that each particle in
some sense determines its own destiny is in accord with the process philosophy
of Whitehead and his successors, such as Charles Hartshorne. It should be
noted that, although there are some impressive conrmations of Whiteheads
philosophy by quantum mechanics, they are only partial.3
Again in nonlinear self-organizing systems we nd that often we can
never specify their initial conditions accurately enough to permit a long-term
prediction of their future course, if at all. Predictions of the weather can only be
made for a few days at most because we simply cannot dene sufciently all
the conditions in the atmosphere at any given moment in order to calculate its
future behavior.
The cosmos is a dynamic place with the birthing and dying of stars. We
can observe these events, but we are unable to predict when or where they will
happen. A supernova was observed near us (remnants are the Crab nebula) in
1054 a.d., another about 400 years ago, and again in 1987 in the Magellanic
cloud, about 170,000 light years away. We now observe dozens of new ones
every few months by computer surveys of the far reaches of space.4 But we
have no idea when or where another will appear.
Creation of Order and Novelty

It is a reasonable assumption that the cosmos has created familiar order at times
billions of years in the past and to the edges of the known universethat
physical laws seem to be the same even under these extreme conditions of
space and time. We do know that astronomical objects hundreds of millions of
light years away, and therefore hundreds of millions of years in the past, display
the same physical constants as we observe on earth at present.
For example, the ne structure constant derived from the hyperne struc-
ture of stellar hydrogen has the same value to less than a percent as found in a
laboratory on earth.5 Again, long-term observation of the binary pulsar 1913
16 shows that its gravitational constant is either the same as on earth or could
differ by 10% over a time equal to the age of the universe.6 Why is there such
lawfulness? It could have been otherwise: randomness and chaos or endless
repetition. The answer of process theology is that the divine lure guides the
universe toward maximum enjoyment and creativity for all its entities: hence
the evolution of the universe toward more complexity and organization. With-
out lawfulness and order this would have been impossible.
The vacuumthe space where there are no atoms or the space within an
atomis not empty. It is lled with continuous creativitythe birthing and
dying of a myriad of particle pairs. We have experimental evidence conrmed
by a quantum electrodynamics that these transient particle pairs are in fact part
of the world we live in. Indeed, they are part of uswithin the atoms of our
bodies.
One of the experimental conrmations is the Lamb shift of the rst ex-
cited state of the hydrogen atom. The energy level is slightly shifted due to the
polarization of the vacuum produced by the virtual particle pairs. That is, the
virtual particle pairs in their transient existence act like a dielectric within the
atom, reducing the effective electric eld between the proton and electron by a
small, but detectable degree. Theory and experiment agree to one part in 10
billiona truly impressive result. If virtual particle pairs are not considered,
the agreement is reduced to one part in a million (Diracs relativistic theory of
the electron).
What holds the quarks together to form nuclei of atoms, or other baryons?
What holds atoms themselves together? Modern eld theory posits force car-
riers that accomplish thisvirtual particles that are born and die by the billions
of trillions each second. In other words, forces are created by events. Here, at
the most elementary level of matter, we nd corroboration of process thought

events are primary in the way the world is held together.
There are four known forces in nature: the strong force, the electromag-
netic force, the weak force, and the force of gravity (in order of decreasing
strength). The strong and weak forces operate only at the nuclear level, whereas
the electromagnetic and gravitational forces are long range and act in our every-
day world. All these forces can be described as resulting from an exchange of
mediating particles that are born on one particle and die on another.
The mediating particles within the atom are virtual photons, whose cre-
ation and absorption provide the electromagnetic force that holds the electrons
to the nucleus. Within the nucleus of the atom the mediating virtual particles
are called gluons; their creation and absorption provide the strong force that
holds the quarks together to form the nucleus. This is the view of modern eld
theory (called a eld theory to emphasize that a eld of particles is producing
the force).
Again, in complex systems far from equilibrium, there is self-organizing
creativity. In the example of heated oil referred to earlier, when the thermal
gradient in the oil is sufcient, it breaks up spontaneously into hexagonal Be-
nard cells. Rotation of the liquid is in opposite directions in adjacent cells. At
the critical temperature difference between the upper and lower plates, when the
system changes from conductive to convective ow, the sense of a cells rota-
tion is established. No matter how carefully the system is controlled, the rota-
tion senseright- or left-handedis unpredictable. A huge number of parti-
cles, about a trillion billion in a typical Benard cell, are organized in a coherent
fashion and each of the cells is further organized with respect to all the other
cells in the system. Typical intermolecular forces are about a hundred millionth
of a centimeter, whereas the cell is millions of times larger. Here we have self-
organization and creativity with complex behavior of a new type: the dissipa-
tive structure.
Much more complex creativity occurs in life forms. Highly organized life
forms, such as humans, are capable of a great deal more enjoyment and cre-
ativity than, say, a slime mold. Yet, even at that basic level of life there is
rhythmic pulsation of creativity, a search for nourishment, and reproduction.
The big bang was a period of magnicent creativity: the space in our
universe was created in an expanding bubble of intense radiation. As the radia-
tion cooled, matter and eventually atoms were formed. Billions of years of
creativity followed: galaxies formed, stars ignited. Supernovae produced heavy
elements and spewed them into the cosmos. Finally, ve billion years ago, our
solar system formed and conditions for life as we know it were produced on our
planet. The universe is not static but continuously evolvingin the past its
composition was very different from its composition at present.
Our knowledge of and justication for the big bang and subsequent evo-
lution of the cosmos are intimately connected with our knowledge of the nu-
clear and subnuclear realm. There again we nd an order among the subnuclear
particles: in the standard model, six quarks and six leptons grouped into three
families organize the complexity of hundreds of subnuclear particles.
Hartshorne argues that asymmetry is essential as a metaphysical principle
so that order can be created: This pattern, symmetry within an overall asym-
metry, we meet again and again. I see in it a paradigm for metaphysics.7 In this
reference Hartshorne refers to appeals made in physics to symmetry as a suf-
cient argument and regrets not being able to respond to this assumption in my
ignorance. Joe Rosen, in a recent paper in Process Studies titled Response to
Hartshorne Concerning Symmetry and Asymmetry in Physics and in chapter
11 of this volume, reassures Hartshorne that indeed, asymmetry is basic in
physics too.8 He gives as an example the asymmetry in mirror reection in
weak interactions. To this could be added the excess of matter over antimatter
in the universe (which may or may not be linked to the asymmetry found in
K-mesonic decay) and the ow of time from the past to the future in the macro-
world.
Process, Evidenced by Events, Is Primary

At a fundamental level, birthing and dying of particle pairs ll the vacuuma
series of events. The electrical forces that hold atoms together are thought of in
the eld theory of physics as arising from a series of exchanges of photons
between the electrons and the nucleusagain a series of events. Similarly,
quarks that constitute the protons and neutrons of the atomic nucleus are held to
each other by a series of exchanges of gluon events. It is remarkable that
Whiteheads process metaphysics, formulated in the 1920s, is so compatible
with these ideas, some of which did not emerge from physics until the 1940s
and later.
Matter, such as a table or a chair, seems so solid to us, but this is a
limitation of our senses. In fact, so-called solid matter is just emptiness, except
for a dance of virtual particles. The mass in matter occupies an extremely min-
iscule volume. Since we are now more familiar with the constitution of matter,
we are in a position to understand just how incredibly empty matter really is.
First, electrons have very little atomic mass and are points to the limit of
our measurements. Second, more than 99.9% of the atomic mass is in its nu-
cleus. Finally, that mass is found in pointlike particles, quarks. Recent experi-
ments performed with protons that had an energy of a trillion electron volts (at
the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory near Chicago) show that the quarks
are pointlike to 1017 centimeters or less. Since atomic diameters are about 108
centimeters, the ratio of a quark diameter to an atomic diameter is at most one
in 109, or one in one billion or less.
The fraction of the atomic volume in which the mass of an atom is lo-
cated is less than the cube of 109. This is less than 1027 of the atomic volume
itselfless than one part in a thousand trillion trillion, 1027! A thousand trillion
trillion is a very large number. If we estimate all the grains of sand in all the
beaches of earth, the number is about 1020 or ten billion trillion.9 The number
1027 is ten million times larger. Matter is really empty space to an astonishing
degree.
However, the empty atom is lled with virtual pairs and also with pho-
ton and gluon force carriers that are continually being birthed and dyinga
dynamic, creative process at the most elementary level of matter. So solid mat-
ter is not really solid at all, but empty; at the same time it is lled with dynamic
radiation, or a complex of events in the language of process philosophy. Sub-
stance is really an effect of our macroscopic human senses; at the microscopic
level the world is a series of eventsa process.
From this we can appreciate that apparently solid matter is really space
lled with an unimaginable number of eventsnot only those from sponta-
neous particle pairs but also from the virtual photons, gluons, bosons, and grav-
itons that are the force carriers. As mentioned previously, the hydrogen atom is
held together by a trillion billion virtual photon exchanges every second. To
hold together the quarks that constitute that atoms proton requires the ex-
change, the birthing and dying, of a trillion trillion gluons every second. Thus,
the world at its most elementary level is really the realm of events, not sub-
stances. Hence, the fallacy of substance thinking.
Since our memories permit us to recall the past, there must be a record of
it somewhere in our brains. A record means that there was an event, so every
conscious experience is associated with an event.10
Substance thinking sees connections as external to substances. Connec-
tions are secondaryan afterthought. It is like the collision of two billiard
balls. The connection in the moment of collision is momentary and unimpor-
tant. The substances, the billiard balls, are what is important. On the other hand,
events are constituted by their interconnections with other eventsa web of
connectionsas evidenced by a myriad of virtual photons and gluons that are
birthing and dying within matter. Their transitory existence gives rise to the
forces that hold atoms and their nuclei togetherso that we ourselves and the
world about us can exist.
With our new knowledge of cosmology and the primacy of process, what
emerges is a new mythology only decades olda creation story appropriate to
our age that gives us a sense of connection and allows us to place ourselves in
the universea sense of place that is sorely needed. Swimme and Berry pro-
vide a highly readable exposition of what they call the universe story.11
Physics as Process
New theories extend old ones as our knowledge of the physical universe ex-
pands. When a superb theory arises, such as the theory of relativity, then this
process leads us to a new vision of the cosmos, a transcendence of the old

theories. The development of both the special and general theories of relativity
demonstrates that science itself is a process. Even such revered concepts as
Newtons laws are subject to modication. Science is contingent and ever-
evolving. No ideas are xed for all time.
Space and time become seen in a new way, as space-time. Matter and
energy form one entity: mass-energy. Time itself depends upon the presence of
matter or the observation of a moving clock. The universe is predicted to ex-
pand by the general theory of relativity, and indeed it does, whereas it was
considered static in the Newtonian worldview. The theory also predicts gravita-
tional radiation, and evidence for it has recently been established.12
Again, quantum mechanics is of more general applicability than classical
mechanics. The latter is regarded by physicists as included in quantum me-
chanics when quantum numbers are large. Classical mechanics is often a useful
approximation for our macroworld but, at the atomic and nuclear level, quan-
tum mechanics is essential. It gives us a description that is strange but compati-
ble with process thoughtwith events as primary, making choices among alter-
natives, an openness, and a mysterious interconnectedness.
More recently we are beginning to understand complex systems consist-
ing of trillions of atoms with self-organizing nonlinear behavior. Again, new
ideas for this new level of complexity are emerging.
In cosmology, old models of the universe are replaced in order to explain
new observations. The Copernican system replaced the earth-centered system of
the Greeks and of the rst millennium a.d. The steady state model of the uni-
verse, popular in the 1950s, could not explain microwave background radiation
and was eventually superseded by the present big bang model.
The universe is evolving, as well as our knowledge of it. The human
enterprise is evolving. Physics, and science generally, is a part of that enter-
prise, and is an ongoing evolutionary process.
Notes
1. D. Kleppner, The gem of general relativity. Physics Today (April 1993), p. 9.
2. A. Watson, Quantum spookiness wins, Einstein loses in photon test. Science
279: 481 (25 July 1997).
3. As Abner Shimony points out (Search for a Naturalistic World View, Vol. II
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 291), Whiteheads conceptual frame-
work of quantum theory is that of the Bohr model and its antecedents. No reference is
ever made in his works to the new and much more successful quantum theory of Schro-
dinger, Heisenberg, and others. Shimony argues that this leads to disagreements between
quantum mechanics and Whiteheads view of an occasion of experience when one con-
siders a system of identical particles or attempts to dene all characteristics of an actual
occasion with indenite precision.
4. James Glantz, Exploding stars ash new bulletins from distant universe.
Science 280: 1008 (15 May 1998).
5. P. Sistema and H.Vucetich, Time variation of the fundamental physical con-
stants: Found from geophysical and astronomical data. Physical Review D 41: 1034
(1990), and Time variation of the fundamental physical constants II: Quark masses as
time-dependent variables. Physical Review D 44: 3096 (1991).
6. T. Dumour, G.W. Gibbons, and J.H. Taylor, Limits on the variability of G
using binary pulsar data. Physical Review Letters 61: 1151 (1988).
7. Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (La Salle, IL:
Open Court Publishing, 1970), 210.
8. Rosen, Joe, Response to Hartshorne concerning symmetry and asymmetry in
physics. Process Studies 26/34: 318 (1997).
9. Let us assume that a cubic centimeter of beach sand contains 10,000 grains.
Then a cubic meter will contain a million times this, or 10 billion grains (or 1010 grains).
Assume a beach 1 kilometer long, 100 meters wide, and 1 meter deep. This beach
contains 100,000 cubic meters of sand, and therefore 1015 grains of sand are on the
beach. If we assume there are 100,000 kilometers of beaches in the world and each
contains 100,000 cubic meters of sand, then the total number of grains of sand in all the
beaches is 1020.
10. Henry P. Stapp, Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics (Berlin: Springer Ver-
lag, 1993), 127.
11. Brian Swimme and Thomas Berry, The Universe Story: From the Primordial
Flaring Forth to the Ecozoic Era (San Francisco: Harper, 1992).
12. Kleppner, The gem of general relativity.
5
Dialogue for Part I
The dialogue presented below occurred in response to John Jungermans paper.

Stapp: At the beginning of your talk, you mentioned increase in order,
whereas the normal idea is that entropy increases and that, on the whole, order
decreases. In your opinion, is there any evidence against the normal idea that
entropy increases, hence order decreases, on the whole?
Jungerman: The laws of thermodynamics still apply so far as I know. On the
other hand, we in this room are all evidence of order, a particular order that
goes against the second law. We use the low entropy from the sun and the
plants and animals that we consume to create order in our bodies. We are
indebted to those low entropy sources for our own existence. You can ask
where that came from and for that youll have to go back ultimately to the big
bang, which itself must have been a low entropy source, so that we could exist
and be in accord with the second law of thermodynamics. I am certainly not
proposing to abolish that sacred law of physics. On the other hand, we do see
elements of order and we ourselves are examples of that; its what Gregory
Bateson called the sacramental or what Schrodinger called negative entropy.
Stapp: Do you then see evidence for a process that works against disorder?
Jungerman: It seems to me that self-organizing systems create order against
the second law, but that doesnt mean that overall the second law is violated but
locally it is in these systems. If you look at it globally, the second law works,
but if you look at it locally, there is order being created so it depends on your
perspective.
Jungerman: I would like to address to Henry Stapp the same question: Is
there anything in your work that illuminates the idea of emergent order against
the second law of thermodynamics?
Stapp: Von Neumann points out that a quantum system, represented by a
density matrix and evolving according to the Schrodinger equation, doesnt
57
58 Physics and Whitehead
change its entropy: the order doesnt degrade. He is not doing any ne graining
or anything like that. You just look at the whole Schrodinger state. Basically the
system doesnt change. It is just a unitary evolution and thus the entropy does
not change. On the other hand, if you have a collapse of the wave function, the
entropy does change: the collapse increases the negentropy. (Negentropy de-
notes negative entropy, which is a measure of order.) This effect gives you the
potential of injecting order into the universe: each collapse picks out of a host
of possibilities, something thats very special. This puts negentropy into the
universe: every time a collapse occurs, there is this apparent increase of the
negentropy of the universe. I nd this a very attractive idea because then the
universe could start in a very uniform state, without this tremendous negentropy
(hence great order) that ordinary thermodynamics would require. The order
could be put in bit by bit as these collapses occur. So theres a possibility that
these collapses, if they really occur, are what is responsible for the fact that
negentropy can run downhill all the time: its because its being increased all
the time by the collapses.
Fagg: I heard a talk a few months ago by Freeman Dyson on the subject of
entropy. The second law of thermodynamics applies to a closed system and, as
John was talking about, if you make the system global it still applies, even
though locally you can get these negative entropy results. Dyson subscribes
these days to an open universe. If so, on a really global or cosmic scale, the
second law cannot really apply.
Valenza: For a moment, lets shift our measure of order away from the classi-
cal physicists notion of entropy. Another notion of order is provided by an
information-theoretic notion. I sit in front of my computer screen, black-and-
white, and it has a million pixels on it. A state vector for that system would
mean a million bits of informationa string of on and off. On the other hand, if
one of Dr. Jungermans hexagons is on my screen, I could say that I need a
million bits of information to specify it, but I could also say that with just a few
bits of information a generative mechanism could be specied from which the
pattern evolves and, in that sense, there is a very high level of order on that
computer screen. That notion of order is not equivalent to entropy (or negative
entropy), and in a completely deterministic system that measure of order be-
comes an invariant. With that idea of order, is the order of the universe increas-
ing or decreasing?
Chew: I can only venture a guess based on my model [see chapter 8]. If you
consider the universe to include all this non-material history, then there is a
sense, a quantum-mechanical sense, in which it may be that nothing changes,
but Ive got this huge non-material component and this tiny material compo-
nent, and any question you ask will almost surely be focused on this material
Dialogue for Part I 59
component. Thus things could look very different from this statement that noth-
ing is changing.
Finkelstein: If were going into these borderline areas far outside ordinary
experience, then we must be careful in carrying our concepts along. I suggest
that the concept of entropy makes sense for systems in equilibrium and in no
case is it really meaningful to speak of the entropy of the universe. To deter-
mine the entropy of a system, you have to be able to carry out a thermodynamic
cycle on it or, if you put it in informational terms, there has to be someone
outside the system getting the information. The universe, by denition, there-
fore does not have an entropy. We speak at best metaphorically when we speak
of the entropy of the universe.
Noemie Kenna: I was originally in physics but am now working in theology
and religion. I think that the Whiteheadian concept of experience is very perti-
nent to this discussion because in material sciences we know that uctuations in
thermodynamics have a distinct impact on atomic structure at the nest level.
Each uctuation causes permanent change in the material that forever alters the
future of the process. This relates to what John said about the universe becom-
ing more ordered and that everything in the universe is an accumulation of all
of the past experiences that have had physical impacts on the matter. This
means that you have creativity in which suddenly new forms come into being.
This idea of experience is where science and philosophy are coming together
(see chapter 17).
Part II
Order and Emergence
6
Constraints on the Origin of Coherence
in Far-from-Equilibrium Chemical Systems
Joseph E. Earley Sr.
Consideration of how dynamic coherences arise from less organized antece-

dents (concrescence) is one of the central concerns of Whiteheads thought.1
Other chapters in this volume consider how his concepts may apply in various
branches of physics, including quantum mechanics. But many of the coherences
that are of human interest are macroscopic. Earlier interpreters generally re-
garded Whiteheads actual entities as exclusively submicroscopic. There is now
a growing consensus that Whiteheads conceptual scheme ought also to be ap-
plicable to larger items. The origin of dynamic coherence in far-from-equilib-
rium chemical systems has been widely studied experimentally and theoreti-
cally, and is now rather well understood. The chemical level illustrates many
features that are also characteristic of more complex aggregations (biological
and social, for instance), but chemical systems are more amenable to experi-
mental and theoretical investigation. This chapter considers some aspects of the
origin of chemical coherence.
Logicians and analytical philosophers tend to be more comfortable with
mathematics and mathematical physics than with chemistry. This seems appar-
ent in current treatment of wholes and parts. The term mereology (coined by
Lesniewski) is used generally for any formal theory of part-whole and associ-
ated concepts.2 A mereological whole is an individual that is composed of
parts that are themselves individuals. Any two (or more) individuals can com-
pose a mereological wholethe star Sirius and your left shoe, for instance.
Concerning such aggregates, D. M. Armstrongs doctrine of the ontological
free lunch seems valid:
whatever supervenes, or . . . is entailed or necessitated, . . . is not something on-

tologically additional to the supervenient, or necessitating, entities. What super-
63
64 Joseph E. Earley Sr.
venes is no addition of being. . . . Mereological wholes are not ontologically addi-

tional to all their parts, nor are the parts ontologically additional to the whole that
they compose. This has the consequence that mereological wholes are identical
with all their parts taken together. Symmetrical supervenience yields identity.3
This kind of mereology may well be quite appropriate to deal with some ques-
tions of mathematics,4 but it seems quite inadequate for dealing with situations
that chemists encounter. Chemical combination is not well understood in terms
of mere addition of properties of components. Chemical combination generates
properties and relations that are not simply related to the properties and rela-
tions of the components. Entities that are important in other branches of sci-
ence, and in other parts of culture, have all the complexity of chemical combi-
nationand more. It does not seem that the standard approach to mereological
questions has wide applicability, much less metaphysical generality.
It may well be that every system of reckoning must have a unitsome
thing, or class of things, that may properly be taken as simple (not composite),
at least for the sake of the reckoning. For instance, Armstrong observes:
the existence of atoms, whether particulars or universals, is held to be a question

for science rather than metaphysics, and one that we should at present remain
agnostic about. The world divides, as Wittgenstein wrote, but it may divide ad
innitum, and there be no terminus, even at innity.5
If, strictly speaking, there are no simples (atoms, in the classical sense), but
yet we need to deal with entities that are relatively atomic,6 then we require
what Armstrong calls unit-determining propertiesqualities that give rise to
unithood.7
Before getting into what sort of things unit-determining properties might
be, we have to decide which level (spatial, temporal, or other) is appropriate to
use in this discussion. Whitehead is usually interpreted as holding that there is a
fundamental level of description, perhaps at some submicroscopic level of spa-
tial size.8 But if we hold the alternative positionthat there are no classical
atoms, merely entities that are relatively atomic, then it is not at all obvious
that any spatial, temporal, or other level has priorityit seems that there may
well be no fundamental level. In this alternative view, we ought to be able to
consider working at any spatial or temporal level whatsoever. We might even
hope that we could identify unit-determining features that were operative at
many levelsthat might provide warrant for a consistent, adequate, and appli-
cable metaphysics.
In previous centuries, chemists used to say that certain chemicals had
high afnity for certain materials (those with which they reacted) and low
afnity for others (with which they did not react). Zinc was said to have high
afnity for acids, copper much less afnity, and gold hardly any afnity for
those acids. Tables of chemical afnities were the stock in trade of many pre-
Origin of Coherence in Chemical Systems 65
twentieth century chemists. In Brussels in the 1920s, Theophile de Donder

(18721957) put chemical afnity on a rm quantitative footing.9 Consider a
reaction:
aAbB....pPqQ....,
the law of mass action asserts that there exists a constant, K, such that:
K [P]ep [Q]eq . . . . . / [A]ea [B]eb . . .
Where brackets denote concentrations (or activities), exponents are sto-

ichiometric coefcients (from the balanced chemical reaction equation) and,
importantly, the subscript e indicates that the equation is valid only when the
reaction has reached chemical equilibrium. The chemical afnity of a reaction
mixture is dened:
A R T ln K / Q.
where Q is a quotient of the same form as the equilibrium constant (K ), but

involving actual concentrations (activities) of the reaction mixture, whatever
they may be, not equilibrium concentrations (activities). Chemical afnity (A, a
state function) is the measure of the driving force of a chemical reaction. A
reaction system with high afnity is said to be far from equilibrium. If A is
small, the system is considered to be close to equilibrium. At equilibrium, the
afnity is zero.
The concept of afnity was not used in Lewis and Randall, the thermo-
dynamics text regarded as denitive in the United States for the middle third of
the twentieth century.10 Many chemists are uncomfortable with the concept.
Probably logicians would nd it odd as well. Afnity is a propertybut a
property of what? Not of an individual molecule, nor of a collection of like
molecules, but of a macroscopic reaction mixturea collection of molecules of
diverse sorts. This is also true of such relatively unproblematic properties as
pressure and volume. But, in contrast to pressure and volume, afnity involves
a relation. Afnity is dened with respect to a specic reaction. One and the
same reaction mixture might have various values of afnity with regard to the
several possible reactions that could occur between the chemicals that constitute
the reaction mixture.
It is a matter of discussion among logicians as to whether several distinct
mereological wholes can have exactly the same constituents.11 There is no doubt
among chemists that one and the same chemical reaction mixture can produce a
wide variety of different results, depending on the presence of diverse catalysts,
for instance. A pot full of assorted amino acids can readily generate a myriad of
different proteins (or a mixture of them), depending on what RNAs are present.
The single pot would have an array of different values of chemical afnity, one
value for each conceivable product.12
In a sense, chemical afnity is like distance. What is the distance from
Claremont? Distance to where? Claremont is about 40 miles from Los Angeles,
but several thousand miles from Cambridge, England. The quantity distance
from Claremont is meaningful only if a specic destination is designated.
Chemical afnity is a proper state function (like volume or pressure) of a
chemical sample, but only if a particular reaction is specied. It would not be
surprising if some philosophers refused to accept such a notion.13 Chemical
afnity is an odd sort of propertybut one that is rigorously dened and useful
in both theory and practice.
Ordinarily, chemical reaction mixtures change in such a way as to
smoothly approach an equilibrium statethat is, concentrations change (either
increase or decrease) while chemical afnity (with respect to the reactions that
are occurring) steadily decreases. But certain far-from-equilibrium reaction
mixtures behave quite differently. Rather than monotonously changing, concen-
trations of particular components of these mixtures oscillate regularly and re-
peatedly around an unstable steady state.14 Often, these mixtures spontaneously
become structured in space, as well as in the time dimension. If the reaction
mixture is a closed system (one that does not exchange energy or chemicals
with its surroundings), then oscillations of components gradually decrease, and
spatial structures fade, as the system gets closer to the condition of equilibrium.
Such a gradual decay of oscillation can be avoided by arranging matters so that
reactants are continuously fed into the system, and reaction products are re-
moved as they are formed. Such open systems are always far from equilib-
riumspatial structures and/or oscillations can be maintained indenitely while
these systems convert high-energy-content materials into low-energy-content
materials. These spontaneously organized chemical systems are called dissipa-
tive structures.15 Such oscillating chemical systems resemble structures of
more familiar types, inasmuch as they have the ability to withstand disturbance.
A dissipative structure, if caused to deviate from its regular oscillatory pattern,
will tend to return to the same pattern.
When Nature involves what seems to be a constant concentration of some
chemical, close examination often shows that the concentration is maintained
near an average value by some sort of oscillatory network of processes. Many
technological devices work in a similar way. A home thermostat does not main-
tain a preset temperature steadily, but rather achieves the purpose for which it
was designed by small oscillations of temperature above and below the target
value. We now recognize that manyperhaps allof the entities formerly
thought to be substantial and perduring are, in fact, resultants of networks of
processes. The question we need to consider is: What sorts of relationships
between components must exist in order that a collection of processes would
behave as one unit? Ivor Leclerc discussed this question, but did not come to a
specic conclusion of general relevance.16 We now consider chemical dissipa-

tive structures (oscillating reactions) as examples of how unit determination
arises. Similar unit-determining properties (better, unit-determining closures of
relations) can be seen to occur elsewherefrom the quantum level to the cos-
mological level, and at many intermediate ones.
In order for a chemical dissipative structure (oscillating reaction) to exist,
the system must be far from equilibrium (have high afnity) and there must be
no stable equilibrium state accessible to the system. When parameters change, it
sometimes happens that a previously stable stationary state (or equilibrium)
becomes unstable. For instance, at ordinary air temperatures, heat that is gener-
ated by fermentation inside a haystack diffuses out of the pile of dried grass,
and a stable, quasi-equilibrium, steady state is eventually reached. However, if
the ambient air temperature comes to be much higher than usual, the rate of exit
of chemically generated heat would be reduced, and the haystack would heat
up. Since fermentation occurs more rapidly at higher temperatures than at lower
temperatures, retention of heat in the haystack would cause still further heat to
be generated, and generated faster and faster. The nonequilibrium steady state
would become unstable. The pile of hay would quickly become quite hot, and
might burst into ame.17
The circumstance that increase of temperature causes increase of the re-
lease of heat, and yet further rise in temperature, is a particular example of
autocatalysis. A chemical reaction produces a product (heat in this case) that
increases the rate of production of that product. Autocatalytic processes abound
in nature. Many nuclear reactions produce neutrons that can initiate yet further
nuclear reactions. Genes are biological catalysts that make copies of them-
selves, through quite complicated mechanisms. Human groups socialize their
members to engage in behavior that tends to increase the number of members
of the group. Resources invested in bull markets produce yet further resources,
which enable additional investment. Each such process can destabilize prior
steady statesequilibria or quasi-equilibria.
Every dissipative structure must involve at least one autocatalytic reac-
tion. The simplest kinds of autocatalysis (to which others can be reduced) can
be represented:
AX2X Rate k [A] [X] quadratic autocatalysis

A2X3X Rate k [A] [X] 2
cubic autocatalysis
Any autocatalytic process can be the basis of a clock reactiona reaction that
appears quiescent for a long period of time, and then bursts into activity: a
solution changes color rapidly after a time without apparent change, or a hay-
stack suddenly bursts into ame. A virus (an autocatalytic agent) may lurk
undetected for years, then replicate explosively. The length of the delay (the
induction period) depends on the initial concentration of autocatalyst. The

rate of production of autocatalyst will initially be low if the starting concentra-
tion of the autocatalyst is small. But no matter how low that rate is (so long as
it is not exactly zero), the concentration of the autocatalyst continually in-
creases, and the autocatalytic reaction steadily gets faster. This gives rise to the
long induction period followed by a sudden rapid rise of the autocatalyst con-
centration. All dissipative structures are based on autocatalysis of one kind or
another.
But something else is required to turn an autocatalytic process into a
dissipative structure: there has to be some way to reset the clockto return
the autocatalyst concentration to a low value. This requires the existence of at
least one additional chemical, the exit species. The autocatalyst is often called
X, and the exit species designated Z. Here are representations of two types of
chemical oscillators; both based on cubic autocatalysis, but each using a differ-
ent strategy to reset the clock. (Both of these are open systems, with chemicals
entering and leaving the system.)
A2X3XZ Z X P AXQ
In this rst set of reactions, Z is a byproduct of the autocatalytic process; Z also

has the ability to remove the autocatalyst. As the autocatalytic reaction pro-
ceeds, the exit species Z builds up through the reaction shown on the left. In the
reaction set shown in the center, Z combines with X to remove the autocatalyst.
In the rightmost set of reactions, the autocatalyst is fed into the system and also
departs from the system (e.g., decomposes). A is the (constant) supply of reag-
ents; P and Q are products that play no other part in the reactions.
Z2X3X AXP AZQ
In this second case, Z is not a product, but is a reactant in the autocatalytic

reaction. Z is used up as the autocatalytic reaction (shown on the left) proceeds.
Once Z is depleted, autocatalysis stops. Both the autocatalyst X and the exit
species Z are fed into the system, and both leave the system by decomposition
(center and right reactions).
In these two sample cases, autocatalysis is controlled by an exit species.
In the rst case, the autocatalytic reaction is choked off by buildup of a toxic
by-product. In the second case, the autocatalysis is starved by shortage of a
necessary reactant. Any chemical oscillation that is based on cubic autocatalysis
can be shown to correspond to one or the other of these two reaction types.18
Oscillations based on quadratic autocatalysis must involve three (or more) vari-
ables, usually including a feedback species, generally called Y. Like reactions
based on cubic autocatalysis, oscillations based on quadratic autocatalysis are
reducible to only a few basic patterns.
For simplicity, we conne our attention to a version of the second cubic

autocatalytic system shown above, with spontaneous linear (not autocatalytic)
formation of X from Z and spontaneous decompositions of X to produce an
inactive product.
AZXP Z2X3X
There are only two variables, X and Z. Important parameters in this system
include proportionality (rate) constants for each of the three chemical reactions
shown, and for the input of Z. We may examine the behavior of the system as
two of these parameters are variedwhile values of other parameters are held
xed. For parameter values that correspond to one region of this two-dimen-
sional parameter space, there is a stable steady state with high autocatalyst con-
centration (the thermodynamic branch). Lets say this state is blue. For parame-
ter values corresponding to another region of the parameter-space diagram,
there is a stable (self-restoring after disturbance) steady state with low values of
the autocatalyst concentration (the ow branch)lets say that this non-
equilibrium steady state is red. For parameter values corresponding to a third
region of the two-dimensional parameter space, both of these nonequilibrium
steady states are stable. In this region of parameter space, the system is said to
be bistable. For parameters corresponding to points in this region of parameter
space, the color of the system may be either blue or red, depending on its past
history. If this region of parameter space is entered from the blue side, blue will
prevail; if it is entered from the red side, red will obtain. (There is a third
nonequilibrium steady state in the bistable system, but it is unstableany uc-
tuation will cause the system to move to one or the other of the two stable
nonequilibrium steady states, the red one or the blue).
A fourth region of the two-dimensional parameter space often exists. If
the two variable parameters happen to correspond to a point in this fourth re-
gion, sustained oscillations of concentrations occur. In this region of parameter
space, both blue and red nonequilibrium steady states are unstable. The system
moves repeatedly from states approximating the blue nonequilibrium steady
state to something approximating the red nonequilibrium steady state. Concen-
trations of all chemicals continuously oscillate in time. In such cases, a plot
showing the state of the system at various times, in a two-dimensional concen-
tration space (one dimension for each of two concentrations), yields a closed
trajectory that goes around a point corresponding to the unstable (third) none-
quilibrium steady state. In contrast, parameter values that correspond to points
in the other three regions of the two-dimensional parameter space yield a trajec-
tory (in concentration space) that approaches either the red or the blue non-
equilibrium steady state.
A proper dissipative structure corresponds to such a limit cycle in some
appropriate space. That is, there is a single, closed curve that describes the
sequence of states that the system follows over time. This same single, unique
trajectory is eventually attained no matter what the starting conditions might be.
In the case that we are discussing, the appropriate space is the [X] [Z] plane.
If we wish, we could divide the curve in two-dimensional concentration space
that describes this limit-cycle trajectory into four segments, using as dividers
the points at which each of the two variables changes direction of motion
(reaches a maximum or minimum in concentration).
In one segment, X increases rapidly, while Z decreases. This seg-
ment is dominated by the autocatalytic reaction.
In a second segment, the autocatalyst X begins to decrease while Z
continues to decline. In this segment, the autocatalytic reaction
competes with decomposition of the autocatalyst.
In the third segment, X decreases to a low concentration and Z
increases a great deal. The autocatalytic reaction is now largely
shut off, but decomposition of the autocatalyst is proceeding, and
the feed of Z is signicant.
In the fourth segment, both Z and X increase somewhat. The con-
centration of X has fallen so low that decomposition of the auto-
catalyst is no longer important. As the feed increases the Z concen-
tration, nonautocatalytic production of X from Z becomes signi-
cant.
When the X concentration passes a certain critical value, the auto-
catalytic reaction reaches a high rate, and loss of Z exceeds the
rate at which Z is being fed in, so a rapid increase of X and con-
comitant decrease of Z begins. This is the phase noticed rst above.
The cycle is complete. As James Joyce would have it, Finagin.
As with cycles of other sorts, there is no point at which this cycle may
properly be said to begin. Also, division of this cycle into just four phases is
quite arbitrary. Closure of the network of processes to yield the set of states of
affairs described by the limit cycle is a real and signicant feature of this col-
lection of processes, but dividing the cycle exemplies the fallacy of mis-
placed concreteness.
In order for the oscillation to have long-term stability, its trajectory must
pass through to the same set of conditions during each oscillation, a stringent
condition.19 Compared to the total range of parameter space, the region in which
this condition is met may be quite small. But still, this region is often large
enough that considerable tolerance (more or less, depending on the other pa-
rameters) exists for variation in parameters. Frequently, setting up such experi-
ments using aqueous solutions requires only bartenders precision. Variation
of parameters, within the oscillatory region, gives rise to changes in the fre-
quency and the amplitude of the oscillations.
Here, then, are the constraints on origin of a dissipative structure in a chemical

dynamic system:
Afnity must be high. (The system must be far from equilibrium.)
There must be an autocatalytic process.
A process that reduces the concentration of the autocatalyst must
exist.
The relevant parameters (rate constants, etc.) must lie in a range
corresponding to a limit cycle trajectory.20 That is, there must be a
closure of the network of reaction such that a state sufciently
close to the prior condition is achieved at the corresponding part of
each oscillation.
If all these constraints continue to be met, the dissipative structure con-

tinues to exist, and may serve as a center of agency. Interactions of the system
with the rest of the world are quite different in the presence of the dissipative
structure than they would be in the absence of that self-organized coherence. In
this sense, the closure21 of a network of relationships that gives rise to a dissipa-
tive structure is the unit-determining feature required to secure unithood, in
Armstrongs terminology. The effects of the structure as whole are the resultant
of the effects of the components, but the concentrations of the components that
exist at any instant are the effects of the closure of the limit cycle. This is a
denite example of a kind of downward causationan inuence on the com-
ponents arising from the thing those components constitute.
Similar situations, where closure of a network of processes has important
effects, occur in many elds. The postulate of de Broglie, central to the devel-
opment of quantum mechanics, is strikingly similar in some respects to the
positions being advocated here. In systems involving electrons and atomic nu-
clei, there are stringent conditions on the closure of sets of relationships. Once
that closure is attained, a system maintains its coherence indenitely, and can
function as a unit in yet higher-level coherences. Networks of interaction also
abound in biochemistry, molecular biology, organismic biology, and ecology. In
favorable cases, systems in all these areas display unit-making closure of rela-
tionships quite similar to those displayed by dissipative structures.
The toy model used to illustrate the discussion of chemical coherence
given above is basically the same as the model generally used to understand the
generation of calcium oscillations in biological cells.22 These oscillations are
known to function in the control of complex biological organs, such as the

human brain. Remarkably, it is the frequency, not the amplitude, of the calcium
oscillations that is decoded as the controlling signal.23 The signal is generated
by the unit-determining closure of the regulatory network that denes a dissipa-
tive structure composed of processes in the brain, and the information that is
transmitted results from subtle alteration in the parameters that control that
oscillation. There seems to be no way to deal with effects of this sort using
standard mereology. This difculty is of central signicance in questions of
philosophy of mind and of human action,24 but its outline is clear even in the
simpler chemical cases discussed in this chapter.25
If we understand the word mereology in its general sense, as a theory of
parts and wholes, (rather than as the specic system of Lesniewski), it seems
clear that a new, more discriminating, mereology is needed. An adequate logic
of wholes and parts must be capable of dealing with coherences of the types
considered here, in which closure of a network of relationships gives rise to
signicant effects (both external and internal) that would not exist, absent that
closure.
Notes
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Second Summer Sympo-
sium on the Philosophy of Chemistry of the International Society for the Philosophy of
Chemistry, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge University, England, August 37, 1998
and (in absentia) at the Silver Anniversary Whitehead Conference, The Center for Pro-
cess Studies, Claremont, CA, August 49, 1998.
2. Peter Simons, Parts, A Study in Ontology. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 5.
3. D. M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1997, p. 12.
4. David K. Lewis, Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwells, 1990.
5. Armstrong, A World of States, p. 263.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., pp. 189191.
8. For an alternative interpretation, see J. E. Earley Sr., Towards a Reapprehen-
sion of Causal Efcacy, Process Studies 24: 3438 (1995); and J. E. Earley Sr., Natu-
ralism, Theism, and the Origin of Life, Process Studies 27: 267279 (1998).
9. Dilip Kondepudi and Ilya Prigogine, Modern Thermodynamics: From Heat
Engines to Dissipative Structures. New York: Wiley, 1998.
10. Gilbert Lewis and Merle Randall, Thermodynamics. New York: McGraw-Hill
(2nd ed.), 1961.
11. Armstrong, A World of States.
12. In such a case, the reaction products would be kinetically determined, not
thermodynamically determined, and the catalysts, not the afnities, would account for
which product(s) were, in fact, produced.
13. It seems worth noting that Peter Van Inwagen asserts that distances do not
exist! Seminar at Georgetown University, April 17, 1998.
14. Stephen Scott, Oscillations, Waves, and Chaos in Chemical Kinetics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992.
15. Gregoire Nicholis and Ilya Prigogine, Self-Organization in Far-from Equilib-

rium Systems. New York: Wiley, 1977.
16. Ivor Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence. New York: Humanities Press,
1972; and The Philosophy of Nature. Washington: Catholic University of America Press,
1986.
17. Scott, Oscillations, Waves, and Chaos.
18. M. Eiswirth, A. Freund, and J. Ross, Adv. Chem. Phys., 190: 127 (1991); J.
Phys. Chem. 95: 1294 (1991).
19. In certain systems (that are more complex than the simple examples discussed
here), this requirement is somewhat relaxed, and the oscillation becomes irregular, even
chaotic. In these cases, the closed trajectory in two-dimensional space lies on an object
of fractal dimension (a strange attractor) rather than on a single curve.
20. Or to a strange attractor (see preceding note).
21. Joseph E. Earley Sr., Varieties of Chemical Closure in Closure; Emergent

Organizations and Their Dynamics, J. L. R. Chandler and G. Van de Vijver, editors,
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 901: 122131 (2000); Joseph E. Earley
Sr., How Dynamic Aggregates may Achieve Effective Integration, Advances in Com-
plex Systems, 6: 115126 (2003).
22. Albert Goldbeter, Biochemical Oscillations and Cellular Rhythms: the Mo-
lecular Bases of Periodic and Chaotic Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996.
23. James W. Putney Jr., Calcium Signaling: Up, Down, Up, Down . . . Whats
the Point? Science, 279: 191192 (9 January 1998); Paul De Koninck and Howard
Schulman, Sensitivity of CaM Kinase II to the Frequency of Ca2 Oscillations, Sci-
ence 279: 227230 (9 January 1998).
24. Alicia Juarrero, Dynamics in Action; Intentional Behavior as a Complex Sys-

tem. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999.
25. Additional examples relevant to this point are discussed in: Chemical Expla-
nation: Characteristics, Development, Autonomy, Joseph E. Earley Sr., editor. Annals of
the New York Academy of Science, 988 (2003).
7
Whiteheads Philosophy and the Collapse
of Quantum States
Shimon Malin
Introduction
The January 1963 issue of Reviews of Modern Physics contains a paper by J.
M. Burgers titled, The Measuring Process in Quantum Theory.1 The rst four
sections of the paper are, indeed, devoted to the quantum measurement prob-
lem. However, in the fth and last section, Philosophical Excursion, the au-
thor points out that Alfred North Whiteheads philosophical system is uniquely
suitable for providing quantum physics with metaphysical underpinnings. Bur-
gers paper turned out to be the beginning of a subdiscipline devoted to the
study of Whitehead and contemporary physics.
On March 3, 1964, A. Shimony gave a lecture titled Quantum Physics
and the Philosophy of Whitehead at the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy
of Science. The lecture contained a detailed, point-by-point comparison be-
tween process philosophy and quantum physics, as well as suggested changes
in Whiteheads system, designed to accommodate the ndings of quantum the-
ory. The text of the lecture, together with Burgers comments on it, were pub-
lished in Volume 11 of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science.2
By the mid-1980s an increasing interest in the subject of Whitehead and
contemporary physics led to the participation of leading physicists and philoso-
phers in a conference, the proceedings of which appeared as a book titled
Physics and the Ultimate Signicance of Time.3 And the lively Whitehead and
Physics workshops at the Silver Anniversary International Whitehead Confer-
ence in Claremont, California, in August 1998, as well as the publication of the
present volume, clearly demonstrate that interest in issues raised by compari-
sons of process philosophy and the discoveries of physics in general, and quan-
tum physics in particular, is still growing.
74
Whitehead and the Collapse of Quantum States 75
In the present essay we compare Whiteheads actual entities with the

collapse of quantum states in light of what Erwin Schrodinger calls the prin-
ciple of objectivation. The essay is structured as follows: the next section is a
presentation of relevant quantum mechanical concepts and ideas, including the
collapse of quantum states. In the third section we summarize some of the
important characteristics of Whiteheads actual entities. Schrodingers principle
of objectivation is the subject of the fourth section. The fth section is an
interlude devoted to the question of whether the indeterminism in quantum
mechanics makes room for creativity. In the sixth section we discuss the corre-
spondence between processes of collapse of quantum states and Whiteheads
actual entities. The seventh section is devoted to an analysis of the nature and
inception of processes of collapse in light of this correspondence. Our results
are summarized in the nal section.
Quantum States and Their Collapse

How do quantum systems change with time? Quantum systems undergo two
kinds of change; one takes place in situations in which the quantum system is
isolated from the environment, and the other results when it interacts with its
environment. When the system is isolated, the quantum state (the mathematical
entity that describes the quantum system) changes in a completely deterministic
way, following a mathematical equation, such as Schrodingers equation. How-
ever, when the system interacts with its environment, e.g., when it is being
measured, it undergoes a sudden, discontinuous, and unpredictable change,
called the collapse of the quantum state.
The difference between the two kinds of change can be analyzed in terms
of superpositions of quantum states. When isolated, a quantum system is sub-
ject to the principle of superposition: If a state A and a state B are possible
states for the system, then a superposition of the two states is also a possible
state. Consider, for example, a quantum system that consists of a single elec-
tron, which may be in located in some region A, and may be located in some
other region B; the two quantum states that describe an electron in regions A
and B respectively are both possible. In this case the sum, or superposition, of
these two quantum states is also a possible quantum state.
Such a sum indicates that if the location of the electron would be mea-
sured, there is some probability of nding it in region A, and some probability
of nding it in region B. Such a superposition cannot survive a process of
measurement (interaction with the environment). If the electron is observed,
i.e., its position is measured, the electron will be found either in region A or in
region B, never in both.
A delightful explanation of the principle of superposition is contained in
Robert Gilmores book, Alice in Quantumland:
76 Shimon Malin
Alice entered the wood and made her way along a path which wound
among the trees, until she came to a place where it forked. There was a signpost at
the junction, but it did not appear very helpful. The arm pointing to the right bore
the letter A, that to the left the letter B, nothing more. Well, I declare,
exclaimed Alice in exasperation. That is the most unhelpful signpost I have ever
seen. She looked around to see if there were any clues as to where the paths
might lead, when she was a little startled to see that Schrodingers Cat was sitting
on a bough of a tree a few yards off.
Oh, Cat, she began rather timidly. Would you tell me please which way I
ought to go from here?
That depends a great deal on where you want to get to, said the Cat.
I am not really sure where . . . began Alice.
Then it doesnt matter which way you go, interrupted the Cat.
But I have to decide between these two paths, said Alice.
Now that is where you are wrong, mused the Cat. You do not have to
decide, you can take all the paths. Surely you have learned that by now. Speaking
for myself, I often do about nine different things at the same time. Cats can prowl
around all over the place when they are not observed. Talking of observations, he
said hurriedly, I think I am about to be obs . . . At that point the Cat vanished
abruptly.4
A process of measurement leads to a discontinuous and unpredictable

choice of one among the terms that make up the superposition. This is the
collapse of the quantum state. Pursuing our example of a quantum system that
consists of a single electron, let us suppose that the electron is about to impinge
on a TV screen. A TV screen can be considered a device for measuring the
position of the electron. Before the electron hits the screen, the location of the
impingement is not yet determined. Any location may be hit. The electron is in
a state of superposition of all the points on the screen. As it interacts with the
screen, however, it ends up hitting one particular location. Its quantum state has
collapsed to this particular spot.
So far we have mentioned a few characteristics of a simple quantum
system, such as an electron. Can one come up with a concept of an electron that
accommodates these characteristics? The answer to this question is controver-
sial. In the context of the present essay, however, we will adopt the mainstream
interpretation of quantum mechanics suggested by Werner Heisenberg. Accord-
ing to Heisenberg, the interplay between the two modes of quantum systems,
being isolated and being measured, is an interplay between potentialities and
actualities. When an electron is isolated, it does not exist in the actual world; it
exists merely as a eld of potentialities (e.g., a potentiality for being in region
A as well a potentiality for being in region B). When it is being measured,
however, the interaction with the measuring apparatus brings it into momentary
actual existence. It actually exists at a particular spot on the TV screen. Its
momentary existence there is called an elementary quantum event.
Heisenbergs interpretation implies that the collapse of a quantum state is

not a process in time. Space and time represent relationships among actual
things. The collapse is a process of emergence from potentiality to actuality.
Therefore the collapse is an atemporal process that leads to the emergence of an
elementary quantum event in space-time.
Whiteheads Actual Entities

We will come back to quantum systems and quantum states in later sections.
The present section is devoted to the second ingredient of our analysis: White-
heads actual entities. These actual entities are, according to Whitehead, the
atoms of reality:
Actual entitiesalso termed actual occasionsare the nal real things of

which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to nd
something more real. They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, and
so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. But, though there
are gradations of importance, and diversities of function, yet in the principles
which actuality exemplies all are on the same level. The nal facts are, all alike,
actual entities; and these actual entities are drops of experience, complex and
interdependent.5
Listed below are some of the most important characteristics of actual entities.
1. They are neither purely subjects nor purely objects; they have both
subjective and objective characteristics, as we will see.
2. They are short-lived, ashing in and out of existence in space-
time. The apparent existence of enduring objects is due to many
collections of actual entities, coming one after the other in quick
succession, like frames in a movie.
3. Each actual entity is a nexus of relationships with all the other
actual entities.
4. An actual entity is the process of its own self-creation.
5. This self-creation involves accommodating and integrating within
itself (comprehending, or prehending in Whiteheads terminology)
all the previous actual entities as settled facts that cannot be
changed, and all the future actual entities as potentialities. This
process of self-creation involves a sequence of phases, which are
delineated and analyzed in detail in Whiteheads magnum opus,
Process and Reality.5 An example: Listening to an orchestra play-
ing a symphony involves, at each moment, accommodating the
sounds produced by the orchestra. This accommodation depends,
in turn, on many collections of past actual entities, such as pre-
78 Shimon Malin
vious knowledge and training in music, associations with the sym-

phony, etc. Notice that at each instant there is one experience.
6. The end product of the process is one new actual entity, one
throb of experience. The fundamental building blocks of the
universe are, then, elementary experiences. We live not in a uni-
verse of objects, but in a universe of experience.
7. Subjectively, i.e., for itself, an actual entity is a pulse of experi-
ence. In particular, the end of the process of self-creation is called
the satisfaction of the actual entity. Although its subjective exis-
tence is momentary, objectively, i.e., for other, future actual enti-
ties, it is a settled fact: The fact that it did happen cannot be
erased. The end of . . . [its] private lifeits perishingis the
beginning of its public career.6
8. The point that is crucial for our purposes is this: The process of
self-creation of an actual entity is not a process in time; it is,
rather, an atemporal process leading to the momentary appearance
of the completed actual entity in space-time. Quoting Whitehead:
In the process of self-creation which is an actual entity the ge-
netic passage from phase to phase is not in physical time . . . the
genetic process is not the temporal succession. . . . Each phase in
the genetic process presupposes the entire quantum.7
Schrodingers Principle of Objectivation

Schrodingers principle of objectivation is the third ingredient of our analysis.
In the latter part of his life Erwin Schrodinger, one of the founding fathers of
quantum mechanics, published a number of books on a variety of subjects: the
general theory of relativity, cosmology, thermodynamics, philosophy, the rela-
tionship between science and humanism, and even biology. His book What Is
Life? was inuential among both physicists and biologists, and played an im-
portant part in the process that led to the discovery of DNA. One of the lesser
known among these late books appeared in 1958 under the title Mind and Mat-
ter. It contains the text of the Tarner lectures, which were delivered for Schro-
dinger at Trinity College in Cambridge, England, in October 1956 (Schrodinger
could not go to England to deliver his lectures because of ill health).8
The third lecture is titled The Principle of Objectivation. It is devoted
to a presentation and discussion of an unconscious assumption that underlies
our perceptions, as well as our science:
By this [i.e., by the principle of objectivation] I mean what is also frequently

called the hypothesis of the real world around us. I maintain that it amounts to a
certain simplication which we adopt in order to master the innitely intricate
problem of nature. Without being aware of it and without being rigorously system-
atic about it, we exclude the Subject of Cognizance from the domain of nature that
we endeavor to understand. We step with our own person back into the part of an
onlooker who does not belong to the world, which by this very procedure becomes
an objective world. [italics added]9
Schrodingers point is similar to what Whitehead called, in his book Sci-

ence in the Modern World, the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.10 I look at a
tree. The statement there is a tree out there is an abstraction. The concrete
fact is I see a tree out there. Indeed, the rst statement, there is a tree out
there, may not even be true. When I say it, I may be hallucinating. In contrast,
the second statement, I see a tree out there, is valid even if I am dreaming or
hallucinating. Schrodinger and Whiteheads point is that we are so used to
mistaking the abstract for the concrete that the fundamental fact of experiencing
is excluded from scientic analysis. With this exclusion the universe becomes,
for science, a lifeless object. Thus the standard view of the universe as inani-
mate is a characteristic of the scientic method, not of the universe.
Does Quantum Indeterminism Make Room for Creativity?

The present section is devoted to the last hurdle we have to surmount in order
to be in position to compare the ndings of quantum mechanics with process
philosophy.
As Whitehead points out, the Newtonian worldview allows no room for
free will or creativity. The Newtonian framework is completely deterministic.11
The state of the universe at present and in the future is predetermined, down to
the smallest detail, by its state in the distant past. By contrast, quantum me-
chanics is not completely deterministic. Processes of collapse involve unpredic-
tability. Pascal Jordan, who collaborated with Max Born and Werner Heisen-
berg in the discovery of quantum mechanics, was the rst to point out that this
element of unpredictability makes room for free will. Erwin Schrodinger, how-
ever, relying on the work of the philosopher Ernst Cassirer, rejects Jordans
claim. He writes:
According to our present view the quantum laws, though they leave the single
event undetermined, predict a quite denite statistics of events when the same
situation occurs again and again. If these statistics are interfered with by any
agent, this agent violates the laws of quantum mechanics just as objectionably as
if it interferedin pre-quantum physicswith the strictly causal mechanical law.12
(italics original)
If Schrodinger is right, then Whiteheads system and quantum mechanics

are incompatible. Creativity, the most general characteristic of the universe ac-
cording to Whitehead, has no place in the quantum mechanical scheme of
things. But is Schrodinger right? I believe that Schrodinger is wrong. In princi-
ple there is no contradiction between the intentionality of agents and the statisti-
80 Shimon Malin
cal predictability of the outcome of many events. Thus drivers drive with the
intention of avoiding accidents; and yet insurance companies business is based
on the correct predictions of the statistics of accidents.
Let us analyze this issue in a simple context. Consider a large number of
people, each of whom is tossing a coin once. Consider the following two sce-
narios: (1) The people have no control over the results of the tossings; hence
these results are random. (2) Each participant has complete control over the
result; he or she can determine the result to be heads or tails. And it so hap-
pened that roughly half the participants intend the result to be heads, and the
other half tails. In both of these scenarios, the results of the tossings would
appear to be random.
In practice, these considerations are hardly relevant to the behavior of
quantum systems. In all likelihood, the creative intentionality of electrons is
very minimal indeed, and the result of their collapses is truly random (subject
to an appropriate statistical distribution). In principle, however, it is important
to point out that there is no contradiction between quantum physics and White-
heads philosophy. Pascal Jordan was right. The quantum indeterminacy does
make room for creativity and free will.
Correspondence Between the Collapse of Quantum States

and Whiteheads Actual Entities
According to Heisenbergs interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Quantum
States and Their Collapse), the quantum mechanical universe is an interplay of
potentialities and actualities. Quantum states represent potentialities, some of
which are actualized in acts of measurement. A measurement brings about,
through the process of the collapse of a quantum state, what John Wheeler
called an elementary quantum event. Such an event is a ash of actual exis-
tence; it appears out of a background of potentialities, and disappears back
into it almost immediately.
This concept of collapse is remarkably similar to Whiteheads concept of
actual entities. According to both quantum mechanics and Whiteheads para-
digm, reality is not made of enduring objects, but of ashes of existence that
disappear almost as soon as they appear. Furthermore, in both accounts, the
processes that lead to these appearances are atemporal! There is, however, an
important difference between actual entities and processes of collapse. While
actual entities are throbs of experience, processes of collapse have no subjective
aspectthey are completely objective. This is due to the fact that quantum
mechanics, like all of our science, is based on what Schrodinger called the
principle of objectivation (see above). If processes of collapse have, in fact, a
subjective side, there is no way for this subjective side to appear in their quantum
mechanical description. We can summarize the situation by saying that if we
consider processes of collapse as representing the objectivized aspect of actual
entities, the agreement between Whitehead and quantum mechanics is perfect.
The Collapse of Quantum States: A Whiteheadian Analysis

The conclusion we have reached in the previous section has consequences re-
garding the process of collapse. One remarkable consequence is this: For the
past 70 years, physicists have been searching for the mechanism of the process
of collapse, and no such mechanism was found. From a Whiteheadian perspec-
tive this is hardly surprising. If the collapse is an aspect (the objectivized as-
pect) of the self-creation process of an actual entity, it cannot be the result of a
mechanism, since a mechanism precludes creativity. There could possibly be
some mechanism(s) involved in a partial determination of the outcome of a
collapse. A complete determination of such an outcome is clearly incompatible
with process philosophy. This is an important conclusion, but a Whiteheadian
analysis of the process of collapse can go much further. Consider the following
question: What brings about the beginning of such a process? Physics has pro-
vided no answer. Let us consider, however, the beginning of the atemporal
process of self-creation that an actual entity is. According to Whitehead, this
beginning, the arising of a subjective aim, is rooted in God:
God is the principle of concretion; namely, he is that actual entity from which
every temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation
starts. That aim determines the initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects for
conceptual feelings; and constitutes the autonomous subject in its primary phase
of feeling with its initial conceptual valuations, and with its initial physical pur-
poses.13
What can be the reason for the arising of such an initial aim in the case of
actual entities that correspond to processes of collapse? To arrive at an answer
to this pivotal question, let us contemplate what the universe would have been
like had there been no processes of collapse. To describe such a universe, a
universe without collapse, we cannot help stretching the language. This imagi-
nary universe is far from the actual one; our language was not designed for its
description. Please bear this in mind as we proceed.
To begin, a universe without collapse is a universe of potentialities rather
than actual events; the transition from the potential to the actual never takes
place. Suppose, however, that potentialities could become actual without dis-
turbing the superpositions we discussed earlier; in other words, suppose that in
every measurement the whole superposition, rather than one of the potentialities
that make it up, becomes actual. What then?
Consider the example of an electron impinging on a TV screen. The elec-
tron has hit the screen, but no atom has been singled out. In a sense, then, the
electron has hit all the atoms. In our universe, a universe with collapse, one
atom is singled out. In a universe without collapse, however, the superposition
remains a superposition. Every atom on the screen is being hit to a certain
extent.
What next? In our universe the hitting of one atom starts a series of
82 Shimon Malin
processes that end up with a visible ash at the location of this atom. In a world
without collapse there will be trillions and trillions of ashes; ashes every-
where, each ash existing, however, only to a certain extent, because each ash
is still just an element in a superposition of ashes. Each of these ashes is, to a
certain extent, sending up myriad photons that affect the physical world around
the screen in immensely complicated ways. The eye of the viewer, for example,
would receive to a certain extent myriad photons not from one location on the
screen, but from all locations. The same applies to the atoms in the walls and in
the furniturethey too will be affected by immensely complex superpositions
of photons coming from everywhere on the screen.
In a universe without collapse, then, every interaction leads to a tremen-
dous increase in complexity, and there is no process that works in the reverse
direction, i.e., toward simplication. Let us come back now to our own uni-
verse. I suggest that the answer to the question, Why does God initiate pro-
cesses of collapse? is this: The function of the collapse is to simplify. If there
was no collapse, each and every interaction would have made the universe
immensely more complicated, and this trend toward increasing complexity
would have continued unchecked. In the real world there is a process that re-
verses this trendthe collapse! Because of the collapse, the level of complex-
ity increases and decreases as quantum systems switch back and forth between
the potential and the actual. An electron that is moving toward a screen is in a
state of superposition of possibilities. The impingement on one particular atom
on the screen means that the superposition has collapsed, the electron has be-
come actual, and its quantum state has become simplerthe electron is inter-
acting with a single atom. As a result of this interaction, and the processes that
follow, photons are emitted. Each photon is a new eld of potentialitiesa
superposition of possibilities as to the choice of the atom it (the photon) will
hit. The situation is complex again. Now there are new collapseseach photon
interacts with one particular atom. Things are simpler again. And so on.
Collapses occur because they are essential ingredients in the interplay of
opening up and closing down. As the actual becomes potential, there is an
opening up into a superposition of many coexisting possibilities. As the poten-
tial becomes actual, there is a closing down: Most potentialities are denied
actualization as one of them is singled out. The chosen one becomes an actual
event, only to change immediately into a superposition of possibilities for the
next collapse. And so the dance goes on.
Conclusion
Born, Heisenberg, and Jordans discovery of quantum mechanics, as well as
Schrodingers discovery of wave mechanics, was contemporaneous with White-
heads discovery of process philosophy. During the period in which he devel-
oped his system, Whitehead was unaware of the work of the quantum physi-
cists. This makes the correspondence between process philosophy and the nd-
ings of quantum mechanics all the more remarkable.
This correspondence is not complete. And it cannot be complete because
of the principle of objectivation, which precludes subjective aspects from scien-
tic inquiry. The correspondence between actual entities and processes of col-
lapse is, however, as close as this limitation of the scientic method, i.e., the
principle of objectivation, allows it to be.
Identication of processes of collapse as the objectivized aspects of actual
entities has far-reaching consequences. It precludes the existence of a mecha-
nism that completely determines the outcome of a collapse, and it suggests a
raison detre for processes of collapse: their existence brings about a balance
between complexity and simplicity in the unfolding of the universe.
Notes
1. J. M. Burgers, The Measuring Process in Quantum Theory, Reviews of
Modern Physics, 35 (1963): 145.
2. A. Shimony, Quantum Physics and the Philosophy of Whitehead, Boston

Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II (1968).
3. D. R. Grifn, ed., Physics and the Ultimate Signicance of Time (Albany:

State University of New York Press, 1986).
4. Robert Gilmore, Alice in Quantumland (New York: Copernicus, 1995), 49.
5. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 18.
6. V. Lowe, Introduction to Alfred North Whitehead, in Classic American Phi-

losophers, ed. M. H. Fisch (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951), 404.
7. Whitehead, Process and Reality, 283.
8. E. Schrodinger, What Is Life? with Mind and Matter and Autobiographical

Sketches (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
9. Ibid., 118.
10. A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Free Press,
1967), 51.
11. Ibid., 77.
12. E. Schrodinger, Nature and the Greeks and Science and Humanism (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 164165.
13. Whitehead, Process and Reality, 244.

8
A Historical Reality That Includes Big Bang,
Free Will, and Elementary Particles
Geoffrey F. Chew
Introduction
This chapter forecasts development of a natural science based not on material
reality but rather on a Whiteheadian historical reality.1 Such a science would
come to grips with the hitherto-inaccessible phenomenon of free will. The term
free will, as used here, means any inuence on universe history not describable
as materialistici.e., not describable in terms of matter controlled by local
causality. In the foreseen scientically meaningful historical reality, there is
parallel with what David Bohm has called implicate order.2 The envisaged
broader reality would combine local Whiteheadian process with quantum prin-
ciples and global evolution of the universe (cosmology). There would be ex-
plicit differentiation between the local time of individual occasions and a global
time providing meaning for the presenta concept not recognized by classi-
cal physics but essential to quantum mechanics.
Material reality, currently epitomized by representation of the universe
through the elementary particles of grand unication theory (GUT), will be
recognized within global historical reality as a localized causal component of
universe historythe only portion of reality that science has so far been able to
dene. I expect quantum cosmology to elaborate Whiteheads process so as to
allow material reality (e.g., causally interrelated elementary particles) to be rec-
ognized not as a priori but as an aspect of a universe history that includes the
impact of free will. (Importance of global evolution has led to my preferring the
word history to Whiteheads term, process. The term process carries a local
connotation.)
Whitehead is identied at this conference primarily as a philosopher, not
as a scientist. Why do I expect his approach eventually to reshape natural sci-
84
Historical Reality 85
ence? One consideration is that Whiteheads process invoked a concept whose

precise denition requires mathematical language of a type developed by physi-
cists, not by philosophers. A more important substantial consideration is that, in
the face of growing human appreciation of evolution, physics cannot inde-
nitely sustain a stance that disregards the history of the universe. Process puts
history up front while managing to recognize material reality as an important
feature of mature regions of the universe, even though not the only feature
and a feature not present everywhere.
Whiteheads process involves what we shall call here pre-events3 indi-
vidually localized (in a sense that requires careful attention) in Hilbert space.
(The term Hilbert space characterizes the mathematical language with which
physicists state quantum principles.) At a Whiteheadian pre-event something
happens, although not to matter. The notion of matter is subordinated to the
notion of happening. Matter corresponds to certain very special patterns of
pre-event patterns that may or may not develop. The vast majority of pre-events
do not belong to matter patterns. The foregoing may be restated in familiar
physical language by saying that Whitehead subordinates energy to impulse.4
Localized energy is not a priori; the occasions that build our universe are
localized impulses. When a pattern of localized impulses exhibits a certain per-
sistently repetitive regularity, the repetition provides meaning for energy. But
all impulse patterns need not be repetitive: Historical reality has both material
and nonmaterial content, the latter predominating.
Because free will, whatever the precise meaning of this term, has impact on
history, historical reality includes free will. The commonsense belief that free
will locates outside material reality might be an illusion; perhaps free will is no
more than a manifestation of causally behaving elementary particles; perhaps
historical reality adds nothing to materialism. I do not believe such to be the case.
One inuential consideration stems from the cosmological idea of the big
bang. Studies of the big bang notion by many different workers using many
different approaches concur in concluding that in the extremely early universe,
ordinary physical concepts fail. Historical reality, if it is to embrace early as
well as late universe, must include nonmaterial components.
A second set of considerations stems from my personal efforts during the
past two years to represent historical reality through a chain of pre-events after
big bang and before the present, each pre-event locating an impulse. A promis-
ing pattern has been found for representation of elementary particles, but all
pre-events in a Whiteheadian chain cannot congregate in such patterns. I shall
expand below on this assertion.
I should dearly like to report discovery of a pre-event pattern associable
with locally exercised free will. This I cannot do. But there is far more than
material content in historical reality. Let me now consider more precisely the
meaning I attach to material reality, making a link to the traditional meaning
of natural science.
86 Geoffrey F. Chew
Material Reality
The term material reality or materialism as used in this chapter refers to those
aspects of our universe characterizable as material in the general sense intro-
duced by Einstein. In Einsteins sense, matter is synonymous with localized
energy, so light and gravity as well as atoms are forms of matter. Both elds
and strings are material in the sense of this chapter.
Ever since the astounding successes of Isaac Newton 300 years ago, physics
(originally called natural philosophy) has been based on energy localized in
space and time. Twentieth-century science was forced by experimental observa-
tions of matter at small scales to introduce a set of principles called quantum
mechanics; principles that entail noncausal uncertainty aspects that continue
today, after decades of study, to bafe the wisest humans. (The noncausal impli-
cations prevented Einstein from ever accepting the completeness of quantum
mechanics.) Often these weird aspects are called nonobjective, and I agree
that they should be so described. But quantum mechanics heretofore has failed
to dislodge localized energyi.e., matteras the underpinning of natural phi-
losophy. What this chapter calls material reality includes not only gravity,
light, electrons, and any other forms of matter (such as strings) but the Hilbert-
space representation thereof, as described in the most advanced physics gradu-
ate courses. Maintaining Newtons materialistic worldview, quantum physicists
have heretofore supposed that all Hilbert-space labels refer to matter. (To
what else might these labels conceivably refer? The reader will by now not be
surprised to hear that Hilbert space labels may refer to history.)
The achievements of a science based on matter have been so impressive
as to raise hopes for an eventual materialistic theory of everything. How is it
conceivable that such phenomena as consciousness and what appears to be free
will might be manifestations of localized energy? A persuasive consideration is
that decisions affect the behavior of matter: I decide to raise my arm and matter
responds. Given such linkage between matter and what seems to be free will, is
it not reasonable to seek understanding of all reality through energy? Success
for a materialistic theory of everything would mean absence from universe his-
tory of nonmaterial content. Free will would be an illusion.
I have by now repeatedly indicated my failure to envisage complete suc-
cess for materialism. I believe there to be a major nonmaterial component of
historical reality.
A Model of Historical Reality

My expectations for the future of science have been inuenced by a cosmologi-
cal model I have been pursuing over the past decade in a search for the quan-
tum mechanical meaning of space and time. Roughly two years ago I began to
connect the model with Whiteheads idea of a chain of historya global uni-
Table 8.1. Sample Time Scales Within Historical Reality

Our present age (here and now, since big bang) : 1017 sec
Human lifetime : 109 sec
Scale of human consciousness : 1 sec
Period of atom : 1015 sec
Minimum duration of elementary particle : 1025 sec
Age step between pre-events along history chain : 1043 sec
verse history comprising a huge collection of discrete ordered pre-events. I

found in the model explicit realization of a key Whiteheadian supposition: that
objects (i.e., matter) correspond to regular localized repeating patterns of large
numbers of occasions. The model locates an impulse at each pre-event; spacing
between successive pre-events is on the scale of Planck timeroughly 1043
seconds. The identity of an object, such as an electron or the reader of this
book, resides in the detailed structure of its repeating pre-event pattern.
To give a sense of the tremendous range in time scales incorporated into
our very inclusive history, Table 8.1 provides a sample.
Energy derives from regular and enduring collections of impulses. But all
impulses do not lead to energy. I found in the model that most pre-events fail to
build rigid patterns exhibiting the causal regularity characteristic of matter, i.e.,
characteristic of energy. This model of historical reality, in other words, has
explicit nonmaterial content. In fact, because a single chain of Whiteheadian
pre-events constitutes the history of the universe, with every pre-event in prin-
ciple inuencing and being inuenced by every other pre-event, it is at rst
sight difcult to imagine any meaning for materialism in historical reality. How
might there be individually identiable particles obeying local Einsteinian cau-
sality within a global Whiteheadian chain of history?
The mechanism provided by the model depends on screened magnetism
in combination with a meandering of the history chain back and forth in local
time. Within space-time regions that are large on a Planck scale while tiny on a
human scale, a tightly woven fabric of causally related pre-events is possible.
Stability of this material fabric is magnetodynamic. Different fabric patterns
correspond to different forms of matter. Elementary particles in the GUT sense
correspond to tower pre-event patterns,5 with the width of a tower being
roughly a hundred times larger than the Planck length (1031 meters). This
factor relates to the ratio of elementary magnetic and electric charges. A parti-
cle scale roughly 1018 times larger than Planck scale controls vertical tower
structure.6
The model classies local patterns of pre-events into two different catego-
ries, one suited to material (tower) fabric and the other not. The latter admits
irregular patterns associable with a vacuum that provides geometry for space-
88 Geoffrey F. Chew
time at suitably large scales. Particle rest mass is conjectured to stem from
coupling between Whiteheadian irregular vacuum patterns and regular matter
(tower) patterns. Vacuum patterns may constrain material history by damping
quantum uctuations at scales large compared to particle scalea damping
described in Copenhagen quantum mechanics as wave-function collapse.
Robustness of matter pre-event fabric depends in the model on strongly-
conning magnetic impulses.
Interpretation needs to be found for loose vacuonic strands of history
that lie outside material fabric even though comprising pre-events that, individ-
ually, are similar to those building material reality. The vast majority of history
consists of such loose strands, which inuence material history, although not in
the manner, according to the laws of materialistic physics, by which one piece
of matter inuences another.
Freedom from the causal constraints of tightly woven material fabric sug-
gests for loose event strands a historical role that is unstable and unpredictable
by current science. This role cannot be described by a science that recognizes
only the material component of history. Might loose strands underlie what I
have called locally exercised free will? I have been unable to nd a persua-
sive argument to the contrary.
How can scientic study of loose event strands be even imagined? How
can questions, to say nothing of answers, be formulated? I believe the response
to this query to lie in mathematics and requirements of consistency. In my
model, appreciation of the very special pre-event fabric interpretable as matter
comes through mathematics. Ordinary language, with all its nouns, is so preju-
diced by material reality as to be unsuited to the asking and answering of
questions about historical reality, but mathematics provides a language.
One immediately identiable limited goal, closely connected to material
reality, is a mathematical meaning for observation within historical reality. Any
observation is a part of history, and human ingenuity may be able to identify
the essential mathematical characteristics of a Whiteheadian pre-event pattern
that qualies as an observation on one piece of matter carried out by another.7
An associated pre-event pattern, less of a challenge to dene, would be record
of observation or memory. Articial intelligence theory, already under devel-
opment, promises here to be of assistance. Historical meaning of observation
will interlock with but probably not be contained within material fabric. Record
of observation, on the other hand, promises to reside in this fabric. Memory,
after all, is a component of an objects identity.
Any individual measurement is a portion of history, and its pre-event
pattern links the measurement to surrounding history. Why did the observation
occur? Such a question parallels the question, Why did elementary particles
emerge from an early universe where particles had no meaning? Contemporary
physics-cosmology is attacking the latter question with ideas such as ination.
Why should science not contemplate the reason behind observation? You may
say, Because the reason involves free will and science is helpless to deal with
free will. But according to my model, free will controls the history in which
matter emerges from nonmatter.
The acausal aspect of loose pre-events does not mean such pre-events are
above the lawfollowing no rules. They are part of a single Whiteheadian
chain of history. Furthermore, the meandering of loose pre-event strands of
history, even though acausal and locally unpredictable, is subject to global con-
straints: Free will is cosmologically constrained.
A global character need not put free will investigation beyond human
reach. Cosmology has proved to be a fruitful area for human enterprise, even
though some of my most respected physicist colleagues assert inability to think
about the entire universe.
Recognition of observation as simply part of Whiteheadian history would
remove wave-function collapse as a separate puzzle. I see one mystery, not two.
Connection between free will and quantum mechanical collapse has often been
conjectured. What about free wills cosmological aspect: its connection to big
bang? Like all models, the one I have been studying allows arbitrariness in
global initial conditions. Once it is acknowledged that mysterious global condi-
tions inuence loose pre-event strands throughout history, one appreciates that
none of the speculations in this chapter diminish the role of God in the uni-
verse. But agreeing that Gods role may be manifested through free will does
not mean to me that effort is futile to improve understanding of Whiteheadian
pre-events located outside the fabric of material reality.
Is historical reality independent of observer? When, in a criticism of
Copenhagen quantum mechanics, Einstein insisted that the moon is really
there, he expressed desire for a universe whose meaning transcends observers
and measurement. Historical reality, by recognizing observers and measure-
ments to be merely aspects of history, accords with Einsteins wish.
A curious quantum mechanical feature of the historical reality model, a
feature brought to my attention by Henry Stapp, is that it provides a global
meaning for the present through a center of the universe. The homogeneous
universe principle has constrained cosmology both before and after recognition
of universe expansion. No notion of a preferred spatial location, qualifying as
center, has proved appealing. Such an idea would conict with the relativistic
philosophy that dominated twentieth-century physics and cosmology, though
not with the fact that the observed universe fails to be homogeneous at nite
scales. Spontaneous symmetry breaking, a feature of quantum physics, is be-
lieved to account for clumping of matter in the universe. In my Whiteheadian
model, breaking of symmetry also selects a center of our universe which, al-
though difcult to detect, provides meaning for the presenta meaning that
applies to the entire universe and facilitates global quantum mechanics.
90 Geoffrey F. Chew
Conclusion
David Bohm wrote an intriguing little book distinguishing what he called im-
plicate order from explicate order. Although Bohm ignored evolution of the
universe, I like to associate the material classical reality of localized energy
with Bohms explicate order. Explicate order would comprise that very special
component of classical historical reality that is bound up in tightly woven mate-
rial fabric. Implicate order would comprise complete quantum historical real-
itysuperpositions of meandering chains of pre-events, only a tiny portion of
which lie within material fabric. The remainder is inaccessible to objective
science and embraces free will.
It may be useful to appreciate that in our history, the total number of
Whiteheadian pre-events is huge but not innite, depending (unsurprisingly) on
the global age of the universe. Because the total number of pre-events increases
with global age, it is plausible that qualitatively new pre-event patterns will
develop indenitely. Remember that the tightly woven fabric of materialism
could not exist when the universe was very young. Conversely, when the uni-
verse is much older than it is today, pre-event patterns may develop with a
signicance that goes beyond that of matter and presently appreciated mani-
festations of free will.
Momentarily, my efforts are focusing not on free will but on details of the
material fabric interpretable as light. My long-standing identity as a materialis-
tic physicist compels me to give higher priority to light than to free will. After
light, the mystery of rest mass must be attacked. Then comes gravity. But exer-
tions in my physicist identity will not cause me to forget free will. Understand-
ing anything about a pre-event pattern associable with free will would for me
eclipse in satisfaction any imaginable physical illumination generated by con-
templation of historical reality.
Note Added in Proof

The spirit of the text survives in my present thinking, although, alas, model
development over the past three and a half years would cause me now to use
very different language. The major development has been to associate White-
headian pre-events with Feynman paths, rather than with Hilbert space. I now
understand Hilbert space to be essentially materialisticbased on enduring
processwhereas Feynman paths embrace the nonenduring process on which
my essay focuses. In my model, path space is hugely larger than Hilbert space.
Notes
I am indebted to Philip Clayton for a critical reading of the original version of this
paper, leading to sharpened terminology in the present version.
1. A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality. New York: MacMillan, 1929.

2. D. Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul,1980.
3. Pre-events are quantum occasions each labeled by a (nite) set of Hilbert-space
parameters.
4. The psychological meaning for the word impulsea precursor to exercise of
free willis curiously suggestive of free wills inclusion within historical reality. In
physics the word impulse describes a sudden transfer of momentuma blow.
5. Particle birth or death at tower ends (bottom or top) corresponds to the more
usual notion of eventnot the Whiteheadian occasion here called pre-event. The
time scale characterizing particle birth and death lies far above the Planck time scale
even though far below human scale. Grand unied theory refers to any of the theories
attempting to nd a common basis for quarks and leptons and their associated force
elds.
6. G.F. Chew, Coherent-State Dyonic History, Pre-Event Magneto-Electrody-
namics and Elementary-Matter Propagation Via 3-Scale Square-Tower History Lattice,
Berkeley Lab Preprints (1998).
7. The characteristic that identity of observables not be destroyed by the observa-
tion promises to depend on smallness of the elementary electric-charge unit. Further
essential to meaning for observation is diluteness of material history, a feature absent in
the early universe.
8. Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order.
9
Whiteheadian Process and Quantum Theory
Henry P. Stapp
Introduction
Quantum theory has been formulated in several different ways. The original
version was Copenhagen quantum theory, which was formulated as a practical
set of rules for making predictions about what we human observers would ob-
serve under certain well-dened sets of conditions. However, the human ob-
servers themselves were excluded from the system, in much the same way that
Descartes excluded human beings from the part of the world governed by natu-
ral physical laws.
This exclusion of human beings from the world governed by physical
laws is an awkward feature of Copenhagen quantum theory that is xed by
orthodox quantum theory, which is the form devised by von Neumann and
Wigner. This orthodox form treats the entire world as a quantum system, in-
cluding the brains and bodies of human beings. Some more recent formulations
of quantum theory seek to exclude from the theory all reference to the experi-
ences of human observers, but I do not consider them, both because of their
technical deciencies and because they are constitutionally unequipped to deal
adequately with the causal efcacy of our conscious thoughts.1
The observer plays a central role in both Copenhagen and orthodox quan-
tum theory. In this connection, Bohr, describing the 1927 Solvay conference,
noted that:
an interesting discussion arose about how to speak of the appearance of phenom-

ena for which only statistical predictions can be made. The question was whether,
as to the occurrence of such individual events, we should adopt the terminology
proposed by Dirac, that we were concerned with a choice on the part of nature,
or as suggested by Heisenberg, we should say we have to do with a choice on the
92
Whiteheadian Process and Quantum Theory 93
part of the observer constructing the measuring instruments and reading their
recording.2
The point here is that two very different kinds of choices enter into the
determination of what happens.
1. First some particular question must be posed.
2. Then nature gives an answer to that particular question.
The second kind of choice is described by Dirac as a choice on the part of
nature as to what the outcome of a given observation will be. For this kind of
choice, quantum theory gives a statistical prediction: it species, for each possi-
ble outcome of the observation, the probability for that outcome to appear. This
is the famous statistical element in quantum theory.
But that choice of outcome is out of human hands, and it is not the focus
of this study.
The rst kind of choice is also essential to the quantum process. It is the
choice by the experimenter of which aspect of nature to probe. In the context of
an experiment being performed by a scientist on some external physical system,
this choice by this experimenter of which experiment to perform is decided by
some process going on in the experimenters mind/brain. In the Copenhagen
interpretation, that mind/brain process is placed denitely outside the system
being investigated. But if, following von Neumann, we take the view that quan-
tum theory ought to cover all physical systems, including human brains, then
the system that is determining which question will be put to nature becomes
part of the system being studied.
Posing the Question

The starting point of this study is the fact that contemporary quantum theory is
ontologically incomplete. Two fundamental questions remain unanswered. The
theory requires that a sequence of specic questions with yes or no answers
be put to nature, whereupon nature promptly delivers an answer. The relative
statistical weights of the two possible answers, yes or no, are then specied
by quantum theory. But what is not specied by contemporary quantum theory
is:
1. what determines which questions are put to nature, and
2. what determines whether the individual answer to a posed ques-
tion is yes or no?
The objective here is to begin to answer these questions, adhering to the
naturalistic principle that the actually occurring experiences supervene on the
entire history of the physical universe, which is the full history of the evolving
94 Henry P. Stapp
quantum state of the universe. However, that condition of supervenienceal-

though it means that given the full physical history, the full experiential history
is xeddoes not determine whether our experiences enter as causes or ef-
fects; or as both or neither.
To make the following discussion of these issues clear to physicists, I
shall use the language and symbols of quantum theory. However, I shall try to
explain things in a way that others can understand if they merely regard the
symbols I use as pictorial abbreviations of the ideas that I describe.
The (physical) state (of the universe) is represented by the (density opera-
tor) S. A possible experience is labeled by the letter e. The connection of this
experience to the mathematical formalism is via the correspondence;
e Pe
where Pe is the projection operator
Pe SUMe i i .
Here SUMe is over the maximal set of basis states i that are compatible with
experience e.
The basic dynamical connection is this: If S is the state of a system before
experience e occurs, then the state of the system after this experience occurs is:
S Pe S Pe
This change is called the reduction of the wave packet: the reduction is to the
unique new form that incorporates the restriction imposed by the new knowl-
edge supplied by the experience e, and that introduces no other information into
the state.
There is a basic difference in philosophy at this point between the
Copenhagen view espoused by Bohr et al. and the view proposed by von Neu-
mann. Bohr assumed that the state involved in the quantum description is the
state of some relatively small system that has been prepared in some specied
way by experimenters, and that the projection operator Pe acts in the space
associated with that small system. The surrounding world was not represented
in the theoretical description except by way of the scientists specications, via
ordinary language, of the experimental setup. Thus the whole quantum pro-
cedure was considered to be merely a procedure that allows scientists to make
statistical predictions about what would appear to themselves under those well-
dened observationally specied conditions. However, the great bulk of the
physical world was not represented in the quantum description, except via our
descriptions of our experiences. This radical restriction on the scope of science,
and of its description of nature, was rejected by Einstein and many others.
Von Neumann adopted the view that one ought to assume that, because
measuring devices and human bodies are made up of atoms, the laws of quan-
tum theory, if universal, ought to work also for these physical systems, and
hence in principle for the entire physical universe, and that any partial descrip-
tion was articial. By following through the mathematics of that more global
perspective, von Neumann showed that one could indeed suppose that the laws
of quantum theory applied to the whole physical universe (at least in the non-
relativistic approximation and for the somewhat primitive idea of the makeup of
the world that prevailed in the 1930s), and that the projection operator Pe could
then be supposed to act on those degrees of freedom of the universe that corre-
spond to the brain of the observer. This transformation S Pe S Pe selects out
from S and retains only those states of the brain that are compatible with the
knowledge that constitutes experience e.
This procedure allows one to recover, in principle, all the predictions of
the technically simpler, but ontologically unsatisfactory, Copenhagen theory. It
provides a conception of the universe that is in accord with all the predictions
of quantum theory, and is in general accord with the classical idea that there is
a causal chain in the physical universe that links the observed event in the
external world to the brain of the observer of that event, and that this connec-
tion leadsunder appropriate conditions of alertness and attention, etc.to a
corresponding mind-brain event of the kind we know.
The only reductions of wave packets that are needed in the von Neumann
picture, in order to reproduce the predictions of the pragmatic Copenhagen
interpretation, are reductions associated with human experiences: these give the
increments in our knowledge. Of course, it is unacceptably anthropocentric to
single out our particular species in a general ontological approach. So I assume
that this process in human brains is just a special case of a general natural
process. However, I focus here on that special case, because we have direct
access to the subjective aspects in that case.
Von Neumann builds into his formulation the demand that a specic ques-
tion must be posed by invoking his famous Process 1. To understand this, note
that for any P, the following identity follows from simple algebra:
S PSP (1 P) S (1 P) PS (1 P) (1 P) SP.
Posing of the question is represented by the von Neumann reduction (i.e., by

the von Neumann Process 1). For some possible experience e,
S Pe S Pe (1 Pe) S (1 Pe).
The two interference terms, which involve both P and (1 P), are dropped.
The rst term (after the arrow) is the part of the state S that corresponds
to the denite outcome Yes, experience e occurs now! The second term corre-
96 Henry P. Stapp
sponds to the denite outcome No, experience e does not occur now. The
other two terms are stripped away by the von Neumann Process 1.
This action on S denes which question is put to nature. Nature will then
give the answer yes with probability
Tr Pe S / Tr S SUMe i S i / SUM i S i .
Here Tr denotes the trace operation, the sum SUMe is dened as before, and
SUM is the sum over all members of the basis set.
Quantum theory makes this denite statistical prediction about which out-
come will appear, after the denite question is posed. But it does not specify
what the question will be, beyond the requirement that answer yes must cor-
respond to some identiable experience. Which question is posed is in the
hands of the observer. This freedom places in the hands of the observer great
power to control the course of physical events in his or her brain, without in
any way conicting with the constraints imposed by the known laws of nature.
The argument for this follows.
Light as Foundation of Being

There are many theoretical reasons for believing that our experiences are corre-
lated mainly to the electromagnetic properties of our brains. Our experiences
have a classical character, and the closest connection of quantum mechanics to
classical mechanics is probably via the so-called coherent states of the electro-
magnetic (EM) eld.3 These coherent states integrate a vast amount of informa-
tion about the motions of individual atomic nuclei and electrons; motions that
cannot be expected to affect our thoughts except via their integrated activity.
These coherent states are probably the most robust feature of brain dy-
namics, with respect to perturbations caused by thermal and other noise.4 I shall
not go into more detail here, except to say that the coherent low-frequency part
of an EM eld in the brain can be decomposed approximately into mesoscopic
modes, each of which behaves like a simple harmonic oscillator. The coherent
state description is in terms of this collection of mesoscopic harmonic oscilla-
tors. For each such oscillator, the ground state is a certain gaussian state in both
of its internal variables p and q: exp qq/2 or exp pp/2. This gaussian
cloud of possibilities is centered at the origin q 0 and p 0 in both q and
p. If one shifts this state so that it is centered at some other point (Q, P), then
this center point will move around a circle of xed radius with constant veloc-
ity, which is just the motion in these variables that a classical particle would
follow for the simple harmonic oscillator case.
I shall assume that the mind-brain connection is via these coherent states
of the EM eld, and will examine the effects on the brain of mental action by
considering the effects of mental action on these low-frequency mesoscopic

coherent states of the EM eld in the brain.
Effects of Mental Action on Brain Behavior

I rst show that, within the framework of quantum theory, the mere choice of
which question is asked can inuence the behavior of a system, even when an
average is made over the possible answers to the question. This demonstration
is intended for physicists and is quite short. Other readers can perhaps get the
gist.
The issue is this:
Can X Tr [QPSP Q(1 P)S(1 P)] depend on P?

Take Q sz, S (1 sz) [With sx, sy, and sz, the Pauli sigma matrices]
If P S/2 then X 2.
If P (1 sy)/2 then X 0.
This just conrms, as a matter of principle, that it matters which question

is posedand answeredeven if one averages over the possible answers.
Thus the gross behavior of a system can depend in principle upon which ques-
tions the system is asking, internally, where the gross behavior is obtained by
averaging over the answers that nature gives to these questions.
I give two examples of how ones behavior could be inuenced in this
way, simply by controlling, via ones attention, which question is posed.
The rst example is an application of the quantum Zeno effect. This ef-
fect is well understood, theoretically, and has, at least in a certain sense, been
conrmed experimentally.5 The point is that, according to quantum theory, a
very rapid sequence of posings of the same question freezes the answer: if the
answer to the rst question is yes, then the answer yes will, according to
the quantum principles, keep on occurring. Thus the mere fact that the question
is asked repeatedly in rapid succession keeps the system in the subspace where
the answer is yes, even in the face of strong mechanical forces that would
quickly take it out of that subspace if the questions were not being asked.
This effect might be connected to the psychological experience that in-
tense concentration on an idea tends to hold that idea in place. For example, if
one is holding up some heavy object, then intense mental focus of attention on
an experience e of willful effort could produce a very rapid sequence of such
experiences e, each resulting in a collapse of the wave function associated with
the brain to a state compatible with this experience e. The effect would be to
guide the evolution of the brain state, holding this idea in place, in spite of
strong purely physical forces that would to tend move the brain away from this
state.
A second example is this. Suppose we are representing the brain, insofar
98 Henry P. Stapp
as its interface with consciousness is concerned, by coherent states of the EM

eld. This state is a Gaussian state represented by N exp [(q Q)(q
Q)/2], where N is a normalization constant.
Suppose I ask the question: Will I nd the state to be N exp [(q
Q)(q Q)/2]? The probability that the answer is yes is the square of:
N2 dq exp [(q Q)(q Q)/2] exp [(q Q)(q Q)/2]

exp [(Q Q)(Q Q)/2].
For small Q the probability is (1 (Q Q)(Q Q)).

Suppose one has a large distance L in Q space, but breaks the distance
into n small intervals, for which the above approximation is adequate, and asks
the succession of questions: Is the state the Gaussian centered at the end of each
of the succession of intervals?
Then the probability, at the end of this process, of nding the state to be
the Gaussian centered at L is (1 (L/n)(L/n)n). In the limit of large n this is
unity: the mental effort of focusing attention in this way will, with high proba-
bility, according to the statistical rules of quantum theory, have changed the
state of the brain to this other state in spite of the absence of any tendency for
this to happen via action of the Schrodinger equation.
These effects may seem strange. But the point is that there is a loose
connection in quantum theory: the physical principles themselves do not specify
which question is posed. This opens up the logical possibility that, strictly
within the bounds of orthodox quantum theory, our conscious thoughts per se
could be entering into the mind-brain dynamics in a way reducible neither to
purely mechanical effects governed by the Schrodinger equation of motion nor
to the random effects of natures choices of outcomes, nor to any combination
of these two effects. There is a rigorous need for some third process, which I
call the Heisenberg process, and which selects which question is put to nature.
This process is not reducible to the Schrodinger process of evolution between
jumps via the Schrodinger equation, or to the Dirac process that selects an
answer once the question is posed. Thus in orthodox (vN/W ) quantum theory
there must be these three processes entering into mind-brain dynamics: mind-
brain dynamics has a tripartite causal structure, one component of which is
naturally mental or experiential, since it must choose a question that has an
experientially recognizable answer.
What Determines Which Question is Posed?

What sort of process might one imagine to be lling this logical gap in contem-
porary quantum theory?
Once one becomes open to the notion that maybe our conscious thoughts
have a reality in their own right, it becomes apparent that there is a natural
causally efcacious place for them in quantum mind-brain dynamics. The point
is that, according to the basic quantum precepts, the occurrence of a conscious
thought associated with a quantum system is supposed to cause a reduction of
the state of that system to the reduced state that is compatible with the incre-
ment in knowledge that constitutes that conscious knowing. In vN/W quantum
theory, this reduction will be a reduction in the brain state of the person who
has the thought. This newly actualized brain state must tend to actualize the
functional properties implicit in the conscious thought: it must initiate the brain
activities that the thought feels are being initiated. Thus the evolution of this
brain state must generate messages going out to various motor centers, if the
thought is about generating actions. But, in any case, the Schrodinger evolution
must also be generating instructions for the creation of a brain state correspond-
ing to a succeeding thought. However, the natural diffusion caused by the
Heisenberg uncertainty will entail that the quantum state actually generated by
the brain process will be somewhat fuzzy: a host of possibilities will be created.
But this diffusion can be counteracted in part, and the process kept on a focused
and intended track, by askingi.e., attending tothe right questions.
We know that often, when we have a thought that initiates an action, we
also initiate a monitoring that will test to see whether the action is proceeding
as intended. That command to monitor is an instruction to attend to some
question at some later time. I propose that in general our thoughts issue, as part
of their intentional aspect, commands to attend in the future to certain ques-
tions, and that these directives supply the missing component of the quantum
dynamics: they pose the particular questions that are put to nature. Then the
necessary posings of the questions become an aspect of quantum mind-brain
dynamics.
Since the question to be posed is supposed to be of the form Is an
experience of such-and-such a kind occurring? it would appear that the ques-
tion really ought to be part of the mental, rather than physical, side of the mind-
brain dynamics. The aspect that makes the mental side essentially different
from the physical aspect governed by the Schrodinger equation is that the latter
process is mechanical: it is governed by local causal connections. But con-
scious thoughts correspond to global properties of brains. They are associated
with the action of the operators P, and these operators must be nonlocal be-
cause any local projection operator P would introduce an innite amount of
energy into the system.
The essential point here is that quantum theory has a lacuna that can very
naturally be lled in such a way as to allow our thoughts to exercise real,
though not absolute, control over the mechanical aspects of mind-brain dy-
namics. This bringing of the experiential aspect of nature into the causal struc-
ture is very much in line with the ideas of Alfred North Whitehead.
100 Henry P. Stapp
Whitehead and the Quantum Mind/Brain

It may be useful to expand upon this nal point concerning Whitehead. To
bring the issue into focus, I shall rst briey summarize the main points de-
scribed above about the connection of mind to brain within quantum physics,
and then consider the possible relevance of Whiteheadian thought.
The main point of the above discussion is that the original Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum theory placed the human experimenter outside the
system that was described in the mathematical language of quantum theory. In
that early approach, the human experimenter has three roles. The rst is as a
receptacle for the experiences that are the database of science. The second is to
pose to nature a sequence of particular yesno questions that nature imme-
diately answers by either returning the experience associated with the answer
yes, or by returning no experience. The third role is as a scientist who com-
municates to his colleagues what he has done and what he has learned, and
thus contributes to the ongoing scientic enterprise. Our interest here is in the
second role as the chooser of what question to ask. This choice is not xed
by any laws or processes that are contained in or entailed by Copenhagen quan-
tum theory. This is, rst, because Copenhagen quantum theory places the hu-
man observer outside the system governed by the quantum laws, which are the
only known precise laws, and second because in Copenhagen quantum theory
the human observer is treated in a practical way, and in practice the choice of
which experiment to perform is effectively free: it depends on the observers
intentions and a host of inscrutable and empirically uncontrolled factors.
Von Neumann considered a sequence of different ways of dividing nature
into two parts: the rst part is the observed system, which is described in terms
of quantum mathematics, and the second part is the observing system, which is
described in terms of human experiences. Von Neumann showed that it made
no practical difference which of the various placements of the dividing line
between the two parts of nature he used. In each case, the choice of which
question to put to nature was represented by his Process 1, which was outside
the control of known physical laws, but was ascribed to the mental processes of
the participant/observer. Von Neumanns nal placement of the dividing line put
all systems composed of atomic constituents and physical eldssuch as the
electromagnetic and gravitational eldson the side described in terms of
quantum mathematics, and thus placed only the consciousness of the partici-
pant/observer outside the mathematically described physical world. However,
there must be a dynamic connection between the mind and the brain: the mind
of the observer is obviously connected to what is going on in his brain, and his
choice of which questions to put to nature inuences his brain in ways con-
trolled in principle by the quantum laws, once the neural correlates of our
conscious experiences are known. This connection is via the quantum Zeno
effect, which shows explicitly how the choice of questions, and their timings,
can inuence the course of events in the probed system, which, in this case, is
the brain of the participant/observer.
This description summarizes the quantum mechanics of the mind/brain
system within the von Neumann formulation of quantum mechanics. It opens
the door to the natural incorporation of causally efcacious conscious thoughts
into contemporary basic science. But it only opens the door: it does not specify
how the brain and the conscious thoughts act together to formulate the neces-
sary questions, and their timings. This is a problem to whose solution White-
headian process theory might contribute.
A scientist with physicalist leanings would be prone to try to create some
sort of purely physical process to produce the needed questions. This would
make our conscious thoughts into either redundant side effects, or redescrip-
tions of processes that can be completely described in purely physical terms.
But either of these options renders mysterious the fact that experiences exist as
the psychological realities that populate our streams of consciousness. The fact
that, at least within the Copenhagen and von Neumann approaches, the ques-
tions posed are supposed to have experienceable answers means that experien-
tial realities must play some special sort of role in the dynamical processing.
But in that case, quite independently of the ultimate truth about the basic nature
of these realities, it makes good theoretical sense to take these realities as they
are actually are known to us, namely as constituents of human streams of
conscious experiences, and weave them into the physical world described by
quantum theory in just the way that such experiences t into the quantum
framework, namely as efcacious agents. But they must also conform to philo-
sophical requirements of rational coherence. That establishes the link to White-
head, whose central endeavor was to create a rationally coherent scheme that
weaves experiential-type realities into physical reality by making them integral
parts of eventlike actual occasions, which are naturally identiable with the
psychophysical events that are the basic realities of von Neumanns formulation
of quantum theory.
The brain is of course the carrier of potentialities generated by past
events. It carries the physical correlates of appetites for various particular reso-
lutions of the conicting potentialities. While the physicalist might seek to ex-
plain the process in purely physical terms, the Whiteheadian approach recog-
nizes the descriptions in terms of potential experiences as valid and useful
descriptions of real aspects of nature. It makes use of the huge partial under-
standing of mind/brain process provided by exploring the structure of human
experience itself. Quantum theory does not encourage the idea of taking the
physically described aspect of brain process as dynamically complete. It calls
for a psychophysical process of the creation of events that actualize experience-
able potentialities.
A central Whiteheadian-type notion is that each actual event must have
both an aspect that xes, experientially and physically, what is taken from the
102 Henry P. Stapp
past, and also an aspect that creates experiential and physically manifested po-
tentialities for the future. Each event has an intentionality that does not just take
randomly from the past, but rather takes selectively from the past particular
potentialities whose actualizations create potentialities for future events that
serve some purpose. Quantum theory seems to allow mind/brain events of this
kind, and Whiteheadian thought can be viewed as an effort to provide the be-
ginning of an understanding of the structure of such events.
Whiteheadian thought also provides an approach to the question of how
one extends quantum dynamics to times and regions where consciousness as we
know it is absent. All of nature is composed of actual occasions of the same
genus, and thus even primordial events must have aspects that have some kin-
ship to our conscious thoughts.
Notes
1. H.P. Stapp, Flagstaff Talks, (1999); available from http://www-physics.
lbl.gov/stapp/stapples.html ; Internet.
2. N. Bohr, Discussions with Einstein, in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist,
ed. P.A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1951), 223.
3. J.R. Klauder and E.C.G. Sudarshan, Quantum Optics (New York: Benjamin,
1968); R.J. Glauber, Coherence and Quantum Detection, in Quantum Optics, eds. S.M.
Kay and A. Maitland (New York: Academic Press, 1970); H.P. Stapp, Exact Solution of
the Infra-Red Problem, Physical Review 28D (1983): 13861418; T. Kawai and H.
Stapp, Quantum Electrodynamics at Large Distances, Physical Review 52D (1995):
24842532.
4. O. Kuebler and H.D. Zeh, Dynamics of Quantum Correlations, Annals of
Physics 76 (1973): 405418; H.P. Stapp, Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (New
York: Springer-Verlag, 1993), 130; W.L. Zurek, S. Habib, and J.P. Paz, Coherent States
via Decoherence, Physical Review Letters 70 (1993): 11871190.
5. W. Itano, D. Heinzen, J. Bollinger, and D. Wineland, Quantum Zeno Effect,
Physical Review 41A (1990): 22952300.
10
Dialogue for Part II
The dialogue presented below occurred in response to presentations by Shimon

Malin, Geoffrey Chew, and Henry Stapp.
Stapp: Let me ask about your vacuum. In Whiteheadian thought you have the
impression that experiential or objective events are at work here, so is there any
possibility that experience as we know it would be understandable and explain-
able as a property of your vacuum? Ordinarily, physicists think of the vacuum
as particles without any experiential quality. Would you say that your vacuum
could be something different?
Chew: Yes. Im coming more and more to believe that it could be.
Nobo: Im very excited about Professor Chews paper because it brings
physics closer to features of Whiteheads thought that are generally neglected
among Whitehead scholars. These are features having to do with a theory of
extension which is metaphysicalthat is something prior to the becoming of
actualities, prior in a supersessional sense, and which gets structured as a result
of the becoming of actualities and those structures, in some cases, can be con-
strued as spatio-temporal. The internal structure of the occasion or the pre-event
mirrors certain extensive-genetic relationships in the becoming of eventities
[see Bibliography: Nobo, 1986]. But the immediate issue concerns entropy or
disorder increasing as a function of particles. Were talking about a different
kind of information if I read Chew right. Its an information regarding the
history and relationships of pre-events. You could have order increasing there
that is not manifested in the decreasing order of particles.
One of the things Im interested in is that what youre calling the histori-
cal element seems to correspond to what Whitehead called supersession, and a
supersessional order is much more primitive, more basic, than temporal order. It
gives rise to it and is connected to the theory of extension in that the superses-
sional order is encoded into the very structure of the extensive standpoint of the
eventities, or the actual occasions. The whole history of the universe up to the
103
becoming of that eventity is projected into its internal structure so that the
information about that history is in that eventthe complete history of the
universe up to that point.
That temporal dimensions or durations arise presupposes not only patterns
of eventities, but their interaction. We can correlate those patterns that we can
measure as so much physical time, but the supersessional relation is much more
basic. Ill formalize what I am talking about so physicists can make use of it
[see Nobo, ch. 17].
Stanley Klein: Its very clear to many people that religion has a powerful role
in shaping human behavior and inuences the way the culture is going to go.
Its my feeling that with a stronger coupling between knowledge of science and
its images, and expressions of spirituality, the world would become a better
place. And it seems to me that Whiteheads process thinking can play an impor-
tant role in that.
Thirty years ago at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Geoffrey was doing
very adventuresome thinking. Those were the bootstrap days, and one of the
things that came out of the S-matrix approach that he pioneered was that it got
coupled into the popular domain. Fritjof Capras books and a number of others
linked bootstrap theory with Buddhism and Eastern ways of thinking, and that
actually had some inuence on the big world, on theology, and how people
thought about the universe. Physics has some amazingly beautiful understand-
ings, incredibly beautiful symmetries that havent made it to the outside world.
It might be that the Whitehead intermediary, process thinking, is enoughit
might be other things. What is it that we physicists can do to better connect
with philosophy and theology?
I dont think that we need to go to Chews complex 4 4 matrices and
pre-events to get a sense of how physics has a strong non-material aspect. In
fact, the present standard quantum mechanics that we know and love has a dual
structure and a non-material element. Henry points out this duality in his elo-
quent writings. The public needs to see better physics images and metaphors
than weve provided. I came to this conference because of my belief that a
coupling of Whitehead with quantum mechanics is the avenue to link physics
better with philosophy and the man in the street.
Murray Code: Whitehead in Science and the Modern World points out that
there are two abstractions which we must use if we are to explain both matter
and spirit, and that puts me in mind of the kind of duality here. Materiality and
spirituality are a typical duality. The problem of language keeps coming up here
whether or not our understanding keeps improving as we become more knowl-
edgeable about smaller and smaller things. To be more specic, I was intrigued
by Chews comment about what it is that causes patterns to have duration, and
what is the observation of one pattern by another. This implies to me that
communication is in some sense a fundamental part of the world. Have you
Dialogue for Part II 105
ever thought about Peirces semiotics in terms of trying to understand the vac-
uum and what is going on in the non-material side? In this non-material world,
communication appears to be occurring, but the language for this is missing.
Chew: I do not have any language yet. I agree with you completelyits an
extremely important issue.
Robert Valenza: In your pre-material, pre-event world, is there some identi-
able aspect of your theory, some parameter lurking in the 16 slots of that
matrix that says in the non-material world why pre-coherence, if that is the
right word, even emerges? This is why a larger time-scale reality evolves in
such a way that human biological systems nd it very effective to use particle
and substance ontology in conducting our hunting and shing, and shaping each
other.
Chew: There is in the model, as presently formulated, need for a huge dimen-
sionless parameter, of the order 1030, and I do not know where that parameter
comes from. But it is essential for the universe to manifest the qualitative fea-
tures that it does, that there be some huge parameter that sets the big ratio
between scales that is so essential. You would not get anything like the universe
we know, if you did not have that huge parameter built in, and I dont know
where it comes from. Im hoping that some beautiful discrete mathematics will
say that a number like that is picked up.
Lawrence Fagg: Is that at all related to the cosmological constant?
Chew: No, its notits related basically to what sometimes people say is the
smallness of the gravitational constant expressed on particle scale: the ratio of
the particle scale to the Planck scale.
Nobo: In Whitehead the universe, from the metaphysical point of view, is an
open universe. Regarding Kleins issue about theology, it is certainly possible
within the Whiteheadian metaphysical scheme to have God be the cause of
what is interpreted as the big bang. It is not strictly Whiteheadian, since I take
an aspect of the universe to be eternal, supersessionally antecedent to any be-
coming, and out of that there is spontaneous becoming, which is the primordial
actuality.
But its not God until the decision that constitutes itself into a creator of
the rst set of what we might call worldly occasions. Its partly a self-constitut-
ing decision and partly a transcendent decision, which uses the same concep-
tuality which afterward we would use to see how one actual occasion can be, in
an important sense, the determining cause of why another occasion comes into
being or is begotten by the universe. The interesting thing is that you dont need
a concept of an innite density. You just need eventities, a nite set such that
each member of that set gives rise to an indenite number of other eventities so
you have a quick expansion of the members of this growing history of even-
tities which not too much later would give rise to particles and enduring enti-
ties.
Fagg: When youre talking about innite densities youre talking about the
initial event?
Nobo: Physics has to read an innite density into the big bang because it has
to have those particles come out of that innite density, but Im saying that in
Whitehead that is not necessary. You have a nite set alpha of eventities, but
they very quickly, in a few generations, can expand at an indenite rate and
account for the expansion of the universe.
Chew: A feature of my model, which physicists typically nd very puzzling,
was only emphasized in my own consciousness fairly recently as a result of
discussions with Henry Stapp: there is an important meaning for the present.
That the present has a widthnot precisely dened here as a width. In the
model, this width is more or less what I call the observer scale. So if you want
to associate a number with it, its something like 1015 seconds, thats a huge
interval in terms of the basic step size, which you remember is 1043 seconds,
so you can get all sorts of patterns within the width which is the present but its
still very, very tiny on the scale of human consciousness. So its perfectly con-
sistent with the normal idea that the present is well dened but at the same time
there being lots and lots of room there for complicated patterns to develop.
In the model all the new history develops in the presenttheres a de-
nite region. Youve got all this past history and theres a little strip therethats
where new history develops. However, if you push the age of the universe back
too far, you will cause the distinction between past and present to disappear. If
you try to talk about an age of the universe that is less than 1015 seconds
(cosmologists often do this) there isnt any distinction between past and present
in that regionnormal psychological time at least is blurred.
Eastman: The time width being discussed seems very analogous to a notion
that David Finkelstein introduces in his book Quantum Relativity and that he
refers to as a chronon. Does this relate directly to what Geoff has brought out
here?
Finkelstein: The chronon is a quantum of time [and an elementary process].
There would be a technical problem if there were such a thing as the present.
Of course, relativity makes the idea of the present very observer-dependent,
particularly for systems in motion. Im sure thats taken into account in all these
discussions. But there is also a large difference in the sizes we give our time
units.
Since the philosophy of organism is a cell theory of actuality, it makes
sense to ask if the cells have any sizes associated with them, and, if so, what is
this typical size? Many physicists think that the fundamental cell has a size that
is roughly the Planck length or the Planck time. If you look at any operational
way of actually measuring elds at points determining locations of events and
so on, you never get down to the Planck length. There are many, many ob-
structing effects. Even black hole formation cuts off some 10 or 12 orders of
magnitude above the Planck length [when the eld is measured throughout the
experimental volume rather than just at one point]. If you consider the Compton
effect and limits on the cell size, the only way that anyone could possibly think
that the Planck length was the fundamental cell size is to imagine a universe as
nothing but gravitydening the Planck length and time or the numbers just
made from Plancks constant, gravity, and the speed of lightand that would
be a totally inconsistent picture of nature, because then there would be nothing
to measure gravity with. Gravity is one theory that cant be of everything.
So, if there are cells, I think that theyre much bigger than the Planck
length. And then the question of where the Planck length comes from might
have been answered by Weisskopf in his very rst paper on renormalization,
where he points out that the Planck length is e137 (note: e 2.71828 . . .)
times typical particle sizes (137 comes from the coupling constant of electro-
magnetism). This looks as if gravity might be a statistical phenomenon, as
many other physicists have suggested.
Eastman: What would be more fundamental?
Finkelstein: Im not sure that the idea of fundamental is fundamental. What
is fundamental is an axiom, and physics is experimental, not axiomatic; there is
no one outside physics to formulate its axioms. But I am still trying to model
all processes as patterns of chronons.
Chew: Jorge Nobos comments remind me of two features coming out of my
model. One is that relativity is not a feature of the model. The universe has a
center in the model, and relativity is an illusion associated with these huge
scales. To put it crudely, its like saying that the portion of the universe to
which we are accessible is such a small portion that even though the universe
has a center theres no way of us discovering that because were conned to
looking at a relatively small part of it. But its quite essential in this model that
relativity not be an exact idea; its only an approximate idea which is based on
the huge ratios.
The second feature is that gravity is not a priori either. The notion of
gravity depends on the notion of energy, and the notion of energy doesnt arise
until you get patterns that are big enough to show this persistence. On what
scale is gravity rst situated? My guess is that it is between what I call particle
scale and observer scale. Its somewhere in that region that gravity begins to
have a meaning, but certainly not at the lower scales.
Klein: Do your pre-events have dynamic properties? How does one maintain
causality, and how do pre-events become real events?
Chew: Well, those are constraints on what I call the history lattice. There are
electrodynamic constraints which have the usual ideas of causality built into
them.
Klein: Is there a Lagrangian for pre-events?
Chew: Lagrangian is a notion related to energy, so there is no Lagrangian.
Klein: So how do you maintain causality?
Chew: As a constraint on the lattice. There has to be a certain relationship
between the pre-events and the lattice that is causally consistent. There is
time. If you look at my preprint on magneto-electrodynamics, you will see a
detailed description of this.
Stapp: Two questions: If gravity only comes in later, why is the Planck scale
dened earlier?
Chew: In the model, I would say that there is a unit that is the spacing of the
pre-events along the chain and that is a basic constant of the model. Im hoping
that it will turn out later that this unit is related to gravity. But its wishful
thinking that the model will describe gravity.
Stapp: My second question is in regard to the remark by Murray Code. He
says that physicists, on the whole, deal with the physical and thats certainly
very true. On the other hand, the very point that Stanley Klein was making is
that quantum mechanics, in the way its really formulated, brings in an ob-
server. There has been a lot of effort to get the observer out of quantum me-
chanics. The founders of quantum theory found it necessary to bring the ob-
server in. It is true that Bohr dismissed them in a certain sense by saying that
we cant deal with biological systems and therefore diverted the attention of
physicists away from the observer and experiential aspects of reality. It seems
somehow to be in the works since the beginning, as Stanley was stressing, and
at least a few physicists are concerned particularly with this question of how the
observer plays a role in the whole thing. Quantum mechanics certainly opens
the door for this in a very natural way.
Klein: Heres the problem. The equations of physics are reductionistic. If you
go outside this room and ask a typical scientist about what is causing me to
raise my hand, they will give you a chain of arguments that is mechanistic
based on how neurons are processing. It is very deterministic because quantum
effects are quite negligible. We have a science story with no place for free will.
The big question facing this science-theology connection, the subject-object
connection, is how do you get a totally reductionist ontology to also allow total
free will? Thats the problem. Did Whitehead offer a solution? If so, I would
love to know where to read that. To have total reductionism and still have total
free will is difcult. I think that quantum mechanics does provide a framework
for tackling that problem. I believe that some of the things that Henry Stapp
and Abner Shimony have written about are in that directionI have to adver-
tise Shimony. In Penroses latest book, Shimony has an important essay on an
augmented Whiteheadone combining Whitehead and quantum mechanics to
address this very tricky business of how you get a reductionist theory to be not
reductionist.
Fagg: So youre saying that quantum mechanics qualies the idea of a total
reductionism?
Klein: Yes, the rules for quantum mechanics are very precise, except that you
have this funny duality. There is the realm of the observed and the realm of the
observer. You cant reduce the observer to the observed. Von Neumann showed
that the quantum split was movable. You can move the split up high so that the
equations of quantum mechanics and biology apply to my moving my hand. So
that does look pretty reductionist. But there will always be the collapse that
isnt reductionist.
Finkelstein: I would like to qualify the remark that quantum theory is totally
reductionist. Indeed, its the least reductionist of our physical theories in that for
the rst time, for example, one could know everything possible about a system
of particles and know nothing whatever about the position of any particle in the
system. This is totally unthinkable in classical physics. In classical theory,
every property and symbol is simply a collection of and and or combina-
tions of properties of individuals. This expresses the reductionism of classical
physics. And thats just not the way it is in quantum theory. If you have a
benzene ring, you dont know where the bonds are.
Klein: Let me rst say that I agree with Finkelstein that the intrinsic duality
of quantum mechanics has loosened the reduction. The act of observation in
quantum mechanics (collapse of the wave function in some interpretations) is
not reducible. I think the presence of a movable split makes that nonreduction
more palatable. However, other than the collapse event, the chain from quantum
electrodynamics to human behavior seems reducible. Just because you dont
know where the bonds are in benzene doesnt mean it isnt reductionist. The big
problem here is carefully dening the word reductionist. Philosophers have
adopted the word supervenience to have a more precise, but similar, meaning. I
suspect that if we have a disagreement on whether human behavior is reducible
to atoms, it is because we are dening reduction differently.
Finkelstein: But it isnt the split that solves itits no longer reductionist.
Fagg: When you say split, do you mean the split between the observer and
the experiment?
Klein: Yes.
Nobo: Quite often the indeterministic aspect of quantum mechanics is dis-

missed as irrelevant to the free will issue in philosophy because statistically it
just about cancels out. But that assumes already that our stream of experience is
nothing but neurons and ultimately particles interacting. The advantage of this
approach is that our stream of experience is analyzable into the same basic
types of entities that Professor Chew is talking about. Here I identify eventities
with pre-events. That argument doesnt hold if at the quantum level we can
speak of individual events that are in principle unpredictable and if our experi-
ences of events are, in some sense, exactly at that same level, then they are, in
some respects, self-determining. We have to attribute self-determination to our-
selves (what Grifn calls hard-core common sense), but we can also attribute
some measure of self-determination to more elementary, less complex occa-
sions. Reduction is also somewhat of a shamthere are a lot of promissory
notes in the reductionism of science.
Klein: The subjective aspect, of consciousness or feeling, is where I think
quantum mechanics, by working between consciousness and events, has a place
for the observer, the subjective. But what Im talking about is the objective
aspect. Is there anything that happens that can be measured and that isnt reduc-
tionist?
Nobo: You already threw the baby out with the bath wateryou said any-
thing that is measurable. Why does everything have to be measurable in reality?
Obviously there is reduction in the sense of reducing higher-level laws or prop-
erties to lower-level laws or properties, but I dont think that you can do this
across the board, even for measurable things.
Klein: Are events measurable for Whitehead?
Nobo: It depends on whether you are talking about actual occasions, societies
of actual occasions, or interactions of these. I think that they have measurable
features, but not all the features are measurable.
Stapp: This is in regard to this question of reductionism. As we have seen, it
can be dened in different ways and depending on the denition you might get
different conclusions. Perhaps my talk ought to have been entitled Is Mind
Slave to Body? Is there some possibility that it is not slave to body? That there
is something, given a complete description of the systems universe, that is not
determined. In quantum mechanics there are two simple answers. If you have
statistical laws, perhaps mind could bias the statistics. But that would be outside
quantum mechanics. If you want to stay with quantum mechanics, it says that
there is no bias in these laws, you should stick with these laws. There is another
way that you might evade this question by saying, Well, if you have only
statistical predictions as to what is going to happen, you have some possibility
for an intrusion of some choice from outside quantum mechanics which is
nonetheless controlling the way things should go. But I would also regard that
as outside the bounds of quantum mechanics. Thats essentially another way of
saying that this freedom you want to give is not a true freedom. As shown in
my paper, there is a place for something outside the physical universe that can
come in and change the physical system.
Open dialogue (panel plus audience):
Clayton: Geoffrey, from your comments this morning and from previous dis-
cussions, I understand that you question the future of dualismyou do not
want to have a place for an observer or something outside the model. That
would mean that whatever you nally say about quantum mechanics, it
wouldnt be Copenhagen or any interpretation with an observer outside. White-
head didnt have such dualism either. That makes you two allies against a neo-
Whiteheadian rationalism that seeks to incorporate dualism.
Chew: I think thats fair. Let me be more explicit with this phenomenon
called Everett branching, which is the bugaboo of quantum mechanics. If you
try to say that there is nothing beyond quantum mechanics then you get stuck
with the crazy many worlds picture. So how do I imagine this might be dealt
with in the model? I hope it will turn out that many worlds means many physi-
cal worlds. If you insist on writing your wave function just in terms of Hilbert
space parameters that have to do with matter or substance, then you get stuck
with these puzzles. Imagine that the complete wave function includes all these
things which I vaguely call vacuum and which play a part in the whole
dynamic, and imagine that these are built up of Whiteheadian actual occasions
which have the same set of 16 parameters as actual occasions that form matter.
However, they just form different patterns, and these patterns dont fall into the
categories that science has so far been able to deal with, characterized by this
persistent matter. Maybe the wave function will nally exhibit the feature that
the inuence of all this non-material history picks out one of the usual Everett
branches and by some interference effect gets rid of the other ones. Thus you
end up with just one material branch, which cannot be understood if you insist
on working with a Hilbert space that only has material labels on it. You have
got to use these non-material aspects in the Hilbert space or youll never have a
chance.
Clayton: Thats an important clarication, because the vacuum comes out

now as non-material and the word vacuum might be misleading.
Chew: Yes, physicists do talk about vacuum and to that extent it could be
misleading, but the meaning of vacuum here is quite different than usual.
Klein: Geoffrey has done something very much like David Bohm. He has a
different language in which a non-material component has the avor of a
Bohmian quantum potential that knows where the two slits are to guide the pre-
events.
Marcus Ford: My question is, if Whitehead were here, how would he re-
spond? Might he say that Professor Chew is allowing the Eliatic camel to get
his pugnacious nose under the Heraclitean tent and Dr. Chew has missed the
main point of Process and Reality wherein I, Whitehead, have tried to say there
that the least bits of the universe are not bits at all and the building blocks are
not blocks? Were talking about events, and the glue that holds them together is
known as prehensions, and when prehensions occur there is an interpenetra-
tion so that there are no distinct lines between self and other, between this and
that. We start with an event that remembers a past, anticipates a future, and is
part of a society of other events that interpenetrate. Every individual has a
temporal as well as a spatial dimension. Would he say that youve missed the
point in Process and Reality, or would you say that Ive missed the point?
Chew: I could not detect anything in your list of Whiteheadian principles that
my model doesnt satisfy. The model starts without any meaningful endurance
or substance and has to build meaning for both out of patterns and change. My
understanding is that thats okay with Whitehead.
Ian Barbour: It seems to me that Whitehead and Hartshorne put considerable

emphasis on differences in the organizational levels of the world as organiza-
tional duality or, better, organizational pluralities, not just two kinds of orga-
nization. Im not sure that Whitehead would expect the kind of action at the
sub-quantum level or pre-event that Geoffrey was talking about. Im very sym-
pathetic with emphasis on the event character of objects, but what I think is the
way that Whitehead protects against reductionism is not by positing something
going on at the very, very bottom or one that is mental or spiritual in itself, but
by positing rather radical differences in the way that patterns of events at higher
organizational levels work to exert causative inuence, you might say, from the
top down. In other words, to provide a lure. I get the impression from Geof-
freys presentation that some of these non-physical elements can be explained
from the bottom up.
Chew: Thats not clear. In the model, there is a big bang boundary condition.
Even at the big bang, there already are a huge number of pre-events; the history
chain is already very long. It is simple in a sense that has to do with loop
structure, but its also complex. There has to be built in this huge factor that I
talked about, so the boundary condition at the big bang has to know about these
huge gaps in scale that are going to develop. Thus, it is not entirely building up
from the bottom. You must have built in already considerable organizational
complexity and anticipation in the boundary conditions for all this complexity.
Isabelle Stengers: When does the Hilbert space enter into your modelat
the very beginning?
Chew: Yes, so far I have not been able to exclude a Hilbert space at the
beginning. But you are not committed to material labels on the Hilbert space.
And at this stage there is no commitment to stationary states, which is a com-
pletely separate question. What I have is basically the direct product of 16
simple Fock spaces.
Finkelstein: Probably your coupling to Hilbert space is more general than

that.
Tanaka: There is a sharp distinction between events and actual occasions in

Whiteheads philosophy. Actual occasion is a metaphysical concept whereas
event has a physical, experiential basis. How should one think about temporal
possibility?
Chew: One needs to distinguish at least two concepts of time in this scheme.
I talked about the age of the pre-events. I mentioned that they dont have to
keep advancing along the chain. There is a sequence so that the chain has a
sense of always advancing, but as you move along the chain the age doesnt
have to keep moving forward. In fact, the characteristic that distinguishes mat-
ter as opposed to vacuum is that to describe matter you need the notion of
event, already a cluster or pattern of pre-events bouncing back and forth. Other-
wise, you cannot represent matter. All of that takes place at particle scale that is
way, way below observer scale, which is where measurement rst arises. You
cant have a notion of measurement at particle scale; you must have huge pat-
terns that are much, much bigger, and then when you get to those very big
patterns then there is a second time which controls this present idea. Remem-
ber I said that there is a width to the present and the whole band keeps moving
forward, and thats the time in which the age of the universe, if you like, keeps
moving forward. But within that band you still have all that bouncing back and
forth, which is building the meaning of individual events.
When the age of the universe moves forward one step, it opens up some
room for new history to develop. Question: what controls that new history, what
limits it? And there is an inuence from the immediate past reected in the
constraints, the lattice constraintscausal electromagnetic constraints. You are
just not allowed to have histories which violate these, but there are still plenty
of possibilities which obey these. There the model goes along perhaps naively
with the standard quantum mechanical idea that there is a unitary operator
which acts on the wave function that is there before the step is made and that
tells you how the wave function will be in the new step. This involves the
entire history, including all this vacuum stuff, and it is not controlled by the
purely material component and certainly not by the immediate past.
Clayton: What about a modern theory of causality which goes beyond White-
head? Thats an insightful critique about Whitehead trying to take into account
self-organizing systems, and it is a response to your precise question, What
about a broader theory of causality?
Jungerman: I think that different levels of nature can have their own laws,
and all is not reducible to elementary particles.
Chew: I want to make some remarks about this notion of measurement or
observation that has taken on such importance in quantum mechanics. My com-
ment is that, from the historical point of view that I am currently favoring,
theres nothing special about an observation. Its just simply a particular pattern
of history, a localized pattern of history, a collection of events that have certain
characteristics. Among them is the characteristic that is the subpattern which
corresponds roughly to the observer and the subpattern which corresponds
roughly to that which is observed. And although they get interlocked, they
dont mess each other up so much that the identities of the two get spoiled. You
can qualitatively say this, you can imagine it, but to quantify that, to say exactly
how much messing up you will allow in an observation is pretty obscure, and
Im certainly not in a position to do that. But, in order for such patterns to exist
at all, it is nontrivial.
One requirement is that the material component of the universe has to be
rather dilute. You happen to be over there and I happen to be over here in order
for me to be able to look at you and not completely get entwined with you and
mess you up. And that depends on the fact that this is an extremely dilute phase
of the universe that were functioning in. That diluteness by the way is speci-
cally related to what I said was the relatively small component of history which
is material, most of it being non-material. Most of the rest of the universe that
isnt matter dominates the total of whatever we have available to put history
into. So diluteness is one essential characteristic and that isnt present in the
very early universe. It has to expand a great deal before you can even begin to
talk about observation.
The second requirement is the smallness of the elementary electric
charge. Henry Stapp emphasized that brain activity is electromagnetic, but cer-
tainly any pattern of history that you could call a measurement is electromagne-
tic. It is mediated by photon arcs, and at the ends of the photon arcs you have
these very tiny electric charges that are causing those photon arcs to either be
born or die without disturbing terribly whatever it is theyre running into. So
observation and measurement, which is the cornerstone of a large part of
Copenhagen ideas, is not obvious. Its a very special feature of our portion of
the universe. And of course if it werent there, we couldnt accumulate knowl-
edge that depends on such local conditions.
Measurement is electromagnetic. There could be no such thing as mea-
surement without the very special properties of electromagnetism such as the
extremely small mass of the photon and the small charge of the electron. The
matter that is built out of these ingredients has to have certain characteristics or
you couldnt imagine measurement. But all these discussions about collapse of
the wave function and all the puzzles of quantum mechanics that go along with
notions of measurement almost always are carried out without any recognition
or attention to the fact that this is an electromagnetic process. That seems to me
to be a deciency. Ive always believed that if you could really understand how
these special characteristics of electromagnetism are essential to measurement,
you would make more progress in the puzzles and paradoxes of quantum me-
chanics.
In the particular model that Ive been pursuing, there are two distinct
meanings for time. There is the global time that applies to the whole universe,
and then there is the local time that applies to what I call pre-events or histories
within the universe. Again, if there really are two meanings for time, you better
pay attention to that when you start struggling with these tricky issues.
In my model there is a double cone in which the history of the universe is
located for a given age of the universe, and the size of the double cone is
parameterized by the age of the universe. But the history is the interior of the
double cone so as the universe keeps expanding the size increases and the
present keeps moving forward and its in the present where measurements are
being made. Remember, the present has a width, so you still have to specify
those local times inside the width of the present to have a complete specica-
tion of whats going on.
Klein: What seems to be needed is to add the subjective element of experi-
ence to quantum mechanics. Something panexperiential has to be added. I have
a feeling that electromagnetism is essential to this. Photons may be the extra
ingredient, not only for measurement but also for the extra elements that arise
in process thinking.
Stapp: My question is whether Geoffreys vacuum is physical or mental, and
it seems that it could very well be mental or have mental aspects. The endeavor
that I am involved in is actually using quantum mechanics as it exists today,
and looking at the most simple ontology (von Neumann, I believe), where the
mind is left out of the part of nature that is normally regarded as being de-
scribed by a wave function and the evolution of the wave function. It may be
that in your other picture its there and thats quite possible. The idea that
something could come out of nothing at all, it seems to me, is an absurdity. The
idea that this chance decision comes out of nothing at all I certainly reject. So I
tried to carefully pose the question not in terms of total freedom of the universe
but freedom of the part that we associate with experience, from the part that is
well dened in quantum mechanics, which is this evolution of the wave func-
tion of the physical part of the universe. So I could formulate the question in a
particular way by identifying the physical with the evolving wave function as
its understood today in quantum mechanics, and ask about freedom relative to
that.
Klein: Since Geoffrey picked up on this photon business, I would like to go
along with that in the context of the quantum Zeno effect that was brought up.
The thing that I would urge everyone to read in connection with the quantum
Zeno effect is in a book review by Joe Rosen on Henry Stapps Mind, Matter
and Quantum Mechanics [Process Studies, 26/34, pp. 328330], and the last
paragraph is very interesting. By the way, its a very laudatory, positive, and
well-written review. Stapp goes through a process that I also hope that David
Finkelstein would do, which is a translation of Whiteheads language into the
language of physics. In particular, he examines three aspects of Whiteheads
thinking and their parallels in quantum mechanics. But then in Rosens last
review paragraph he says, Well, lets look at how the brain works. He gives
the identical structure to Whitehead and to quantum mechanics, including the
global, long-range, coherence, etc. And so let me do that with Zeno and maybe
hook in photons.
The idea of the Zeno effect is that if you attend repetitively to a single
idea, you can freeze it and stop it from evolving. Well, there are simple brain
mechanisms that could freeze an idea. Similarly, its very easy to make a neural
network with attention that could shift as well as freeze an idea. And so I would
like people rst of all to look at Rosens very well-written paragraph and I
would like Henry, David, or others to comment on this translation of Whitehead
having parallels with quantum, but then it might also have parallels in classical
neural dynamics with feedback.
Stapp: Yes, I would like to answer, because thats just exactly the point of
freedom that I was emphasizing in my last talk. For the chaos mechanism or
any of those neural networks, if its a classical system, then that mechanism
causing it to freeze in place or to move is itself controlled by the system just
prior to it. The physical in and of itself is doing the whole job. Theres no
freedom of anything outside, whereas I claim that in quantum mechanics theres
a difference. If you dene the physical system in terms of the wave function or
state vector then there is something outside that is not determined by that physi-
cal system: namely, what question is going to be posed, and that freedom is
able to change and control the behavior. So I claim theres an essential differ-
ence between the chaos mechanism and the one that Im talking about.
Chew: I want to introduce a word to the discussion that I have not yet heard
but which I feel is an extremely useful word that natural science has come up
with which philosophers dont seem to like. Ive always felt that this was a
defect in most philosophy, but I understand that Whiteheads philosophy is an
exception. The word is approximation. If you start thinking from a physical
science point of view, you realize that no statements about the universe can be
absolutely exact. They must all be approximate because, for example, as I men-
tioned earlier, measurement is inherently an approximate idea. There is no such
thing as exact measurement, and since all of our ideas are based on observation,
observational knowledge, and so on, its difcult to believe that there are any
statements that humans can make about the universe that could be exact state-
ments. And this connects to these ideas that have been discussed; for example,
the smallness of the elementary electric charge. It appears to be very, very
important but because you depend on it, the fact that it isnt zero means that all
these lovely statements you make based on its smallness are not quite exact.
They are all approximate because its not zero, and the same thing can be said
about the largeness of the age of the universe. We have all these scientic
concepts that are based on the notion that tomorrow is pretty much the same as
today. Anything that happens today could be reproduced tomorrow, and thats
what natural science is based on. But that is based on the idea that the age of
the universe is innite. That the universe is not expanding. But its changing.
Tomorrow is not the same as today.
There is no exactly reproducible experiment. There is no statement about
the universe that you can make that is absolutely exact, given the fact the age of
the universe is nite. You can go down the list with many other parameters.
Science has come up with these huge ratios which we call dimensionless num-
bers which give you some understanding of why certain approximations can be
extremely accurate. When you have a ratio as big as 1017, it makes certain
approximations so accurate that humans dont bother to keep remembering that
this is only an approximation. The human lifetime isnt long enough to make it
worthwhile to worry about the fact that the age of the universe is nite. In any
case, I believe that its important to keep this word approximation in the vocab-
ulary, and Im very pleased to hear that Whitehead does this. I hope he consis-
tently agrees that no word that he denes so carefully can have an absolutely
precise meaning. It has to have an approximate meaning.
Clayton: Well, he does, roughly.
Finkelstein: Im delighted by the lovely things that Geoffrey just said.
Malin: My question to Henry is the following. You spoke about freedom in
what I think were two phases; one was the freedom to ask the question. You
seem to imply that the collapse of the wave function comes from the conscious-
ness of the observer. If youre implying that, you must be aware of the well-
known objections to that position.
Stapp: No, Im not implying that. I tried to draw a very sharp distinction
between two kinds of choices. First, theres a choice that seems to be assignable
to a small system, like a human being or a brain or something like this. Quan-
tum mechanics seems to allow that choicethe choice of what question to ask
is assigned to this small system. Since its a choice of basically what experience
Im going to look for, its very much like directing your attention. Basically,
when I direct my attention to some extent, its asking, Is it this? So Im
making a close alliance between the choice of asking the question and the
choice of a small system to attend to, but the answer to the question for large
systems is apparently far from local. Its not connected with the observer, and
thats the quote that I had. Its connected with nature, so nature answers the
question. But maybe its the small system that has the option to ask which
question nature will answer. So there is a division of labor.
Malin: Let me make one more comment. If we say with Dirac that nature
makes a choice, then of course the question that people have been working on
for 70 years or so is how does nature make the choice, and is there a mecha-
nism? And it seems to me that, if we believe in Whitehead, we must say there
cannot be a mechanism that completely determines it because, if there is, there
is no place for creativity, which is one of his most fundamental concepts.
Stapp: The importance of what I have said today is that you can answer the
one question without answering the other. This question of how nature chooses
is really a big question, but maybe we can tie the question of how we human
beings pose the question to something that is much more accessible to study, in
fact scientic study.
Clayton: Do you agree with Malin that one cant have a fully deterministic
mechanism and still have creativity?
Stapp: I believe in the law of sufcient reason. There has got to be some
reason behind every choice. Nature in its totality must have some mechanism
for answering these, but it doesnt have to be local. According to quantum
ideas, the whole universe can be involved in that choice. So thats a big, big
question. But if we can focus on another question, the observers choice, and
make that associated with a local human system or some other local system,
then we have something we can attack.
Nobo: I was struck by the fact that Whitehead uses the phrase organic mech-
anism in Science and the Modern World. It may be an unhappy phrase, since
mechanism has the connotation of complete determinism, but I think you can
interpret it to mean a partial determinism. That the earlier partly determines the
later but leaves elbow room for self-determination, and so there is a mecha-
nism and this is the wholistic aspect. Its the universe as a whole determining
earlier phases of an event but leaving later phases open.
Malin: In other words, its not complete determinism?
Nobo: No, it is a mechanism of sorts, but not a complete determinism. It
strikes me that theres a parallel to the business of asking a question. It may be
that one event puts a question to the next event. Its a question and an impera-
tive. Do this if you can. In Whitehead, an experience really cuts across what
you were calling subjectivity and what Whitehead calls physical experi-
ence. The physical experience is the more mechanical, deterministic, earlier-
to-later; the subjective experience is where the freedom is, but that freedom
puts a question to the next event, so to speak. Im playing with an idea here. If
we think of every event being partly informed by the past and partly self-
informing or self-forming, then that self-formation together with the earlier in-
formation can put a question to the future. In Whitehead, every subjective aim
has a transcendent component. The aim is at intensity of experience in the
present and in the relevant future, so that this transcendent element is the ques-
tion being put to the future.
Stapp: Let me rst say that the events that Im talking about, that you can
call occasions or actual occasions, are more in line with Whiteheads earlier
thinking where he was talking about human experience that is associated with a
large organism, and not these tiny little things that are even smaller than parti-
cles. Once you start with the idea of a human-type experience, of course, you
realize that thats not enough to build a whole world out of, because we werent
always around, and so you have to have some generalization of it. Its natural to
go the route that Whitehead did down to these tiny little things. Im not at all
sure thats really the way you need to generalize. In fact I see a lot of problems
with it, which I wont go into, but I dont like that way at all. I think events are
a much higher-level thing even if theyre not human. The way it works at that
level, as both Whitehead and Heisenberg were saying, is that as this event or
occasion occurs, it creates potentialities for the future.
Nobo: Thats Whiteheads intent.
Stapp: Im thinking of things at this higher level and not at the mechanical
level where it has these powers which are almost rigidly formed. Thats a way
to go too, but Im certainly not focusing on that level. Although its potentiality,
and although its a good way to talk about it the way Heisenberg talks about it,
I nd it difcult to think that theres nothing in the whole universe, or the whole
totality of existence, that is controlling it. So I think that you can draw a dis-
tinction between physical and non-physical on the basis of quantum mechanics.
In other words, the physical is the part that is represented by the quantum
mechanical wave function, and that only represents potentialities. But theres
got to somehow be a bigger, deeper reality that nally decides it, and its the
whole universe somehow thats coming into play. But thats a big problem.
Nobo: For Peirce, matter was mind hidebound in habit. In Peirce and in
Whitehead, theres a possibility of thinking that one level of reality becomes
habit ridden. You have constants, then you have a level that builds on that,
which for a while has freedom, indeterminacy, and novelty, but it too becomes
hidebound. Then you go to a higher level and, if we can make that hierarchy of
levels meaningful in theory, then you could have your constants at one level,
and your tendencies, trends, and so forth at another level. Its possible that once
something becomes a constant, its always a constant. But theres always a level
where you wouldnt have the determinacy, mechanism, and so forth. My ques-
tion to Professor Stapp is how would you answer someone who says that the
question that youre posing is itself determined by earlier states of the brain?
Stapp: If, by earlier states of the brain, you mean the quantum mechanical
description of the brain in terms of the wave function and the state, then its
not. There has to be something outside the quantum mechanical system that
poses the question to the quantum mechanical system. Thats how it works.
Quantum mechanics by itself doesnt determine what the question is going to
betheres something outside. That doesnt mean its outside of nature. It
means outside this narrow denition of what is physical, namely what the phys-
icists call physical, and the generalization of classical physics to these wave
functions. Its outside that physical. The physical is local, and evolves accord-
ing to local deterministic equations. Its outside that narrow denition of
physics, although the denition is broad in the sense that it covers all of quan-
tum mechanics, except for the decision and experiences of the observer. If you
call those things as being outside the physical, then these choices are not made
by the physical brain.
Fagg: Dr. Stapp, in the early part of your lecture, you mentioned a whole list
of subjective things like thoughts and feelings and so forth, as arising and then
dying. Let me note that there are some feelings that go on for a whole life-
timetraumatic experiences, for example. The other thing is that I simply did
not understand this business of repeated observations as developing and freez-
ing. Is this a freezing in the brain, or in the system that the brain is occupied
with observing?
Stapp: Yes, I was suggesting that our experiences are associated particularly
with certain aspects of the brain which identify the electromagnetic properties,
electromagnetic eld, of the brain, and I list a number of advantages of it. An
individual particle is so tiny its hard to think that its affecting thoughts very
much, so the states of the electromagnetic eld somehow average over lots of
things. When you look at it in this way, youre getting a nice averaging that
seems to be more closely connected to our experiences. Theres this particular
feature of the brain that Im focusing on, and saying thats the particular feature
thats connected with experience. Then youre able to talk about these Gaussian
wave packets that I mentioned.
Focusing your attention, asking a particular question repeatedly, translates
into Is this particular Gaussian wave packet here? In other words, youre
asking some particular question about that wave packet. Now the rest of the
brain can be doing all sorts of things while youre asking this particular ques-
tion. If this is a particularly important feature of the brain, which is controlling
lots of other things that are going on, your freezing of that particular aspect of
the brain remains in place. For example, if youre holding up a heavy weight,
the feeling you have is that by focusing your attention on some particular
thought, you are working against some sort of force that is wanting to do some-
thing else, and youre holding the weight in place. Im suggesting that youre
holding in place some particular aspect of the brain thats in charge of lots of
other things, and its not the whole brain thats being frozen, its just a particu-
lar aspect of the brain thats being frozen.
Audience: Professor Stapp, are you saying that at some level consciousness
plays a major role in the unfolding of events? Perhaps its more like the maps
that we create of events. Its basically just a map, like Whitehead would say,
the map is not the territory. He was not that invested in the way that we
explain natural laws, but rather saying the territory itself is much larger than our
map of it. The map did not create any event in the territory. What happens
when we as human beings do something that is unprecedented and impossi-
ble? Ill give you an example. When John Kennedy announced that we were
going to the moon in 10 years, this was something we as human beings had
never done before. We had no map. The territory was unknown to us. Yet what
we did in that process is that we imagined ourselves being successful doing it,
and entered into an experiential acceptance that we were successful. Essentially,
we went from an acceptance to an accomplished fact, an event that was pulling
us toward it. We allowed that event to organize not just our thinking, but our
action that led to that event, to the consequence we had desired to achieve. How
do you explain that? Where does that t in the logic of science, and the logic of
physics?
Stapp: It seems to me that it ts very naturally and easily into this point of
view. This point of view really is saying that our experiences are creating ten-
dencies for future things to happen, and if you have a certain structure of your
experience, if youre talking about a human experience, it has a lot of the future
in it. Most experiences have intentionality in them. Im about to raise my hand,
or Im intending to raise my hand. Theres always this looking forwardness
of your experiences, and of course they can look a long way ahead to being on
the moon, and you put into action that whole sequence. That sort of thing ts
beautifully into this view of the universe.
Audience: So you dont think that theres an element that comes in there that
is not anticipated by your experience? I think that our experiences are not a
very good future, because all our experiences can tell us is what we have al-
ready done. They can only give us a limited outcome, and if we had never done
something before, our experience would not lead us into doing things that we
have never done before.
Stapp: I think the human brain has the capacity to pull together ideas from
different sources and combine them in different ways. You do get new ideas no
one else has ever had before, and you could make it a mystical thing if you
want, but Im not sure thats really so necessary. It seems to me that the human
brain creates these potentialities that might account quite naturally for the way
new ideas come up. This idea that I just told you today, I didnt have several
months ago, but a lot of tendencies were there, and I talked to some people, and
I think it ultimately emerged out of a conuence of inuences acting on me.
Malin: Schrodinger, in a wonderful little essay called the Principle of Objec-

tivation, makes the point that all of science, including quantum mechanics,
works under the assumption that the perceiver, or what he calls the subject of
cognizance, is kept out of the picture. Thats how science starts, and I think
the best t of Whitehead into physics would be to consider physics as a pro-
jection of Whiteheads idea into the objectivized domain. In other words, if you
do that, if you remove the subject of cognizance from the picture, then the
objectivized picture you are left with gets to be very close to quantum me-
chanics.
Mark Germain: Neurologists and psychologists want to point out that, in

terms of talking about the brain, there is an empirical datum that we can look
at. Two things seem to support Professor Stapps ideas as they were presented
today. One of them is that the intentional matrix is actually the place in the
brain where consciousness can most uniquely be located. The intentional matrix
is primarily in the brain stem, and slightly higher, and if you have stroke or
damage to any part of the brain, you will recover complete consciousness, you
will be completely awake. You might have less to be conscious of because
youve lost a portion of the brain, but you still would be completely conscious.
But if the intentional matrix is examined at one of its more fundamental levels,
then the loss shows. You can literally see this in people oating in and out of
consciousness, on the basis of the way some things press on this part of the
brain.
There is a lot of theory and evidence that supports this idea of attention
being the basic control parameter in conscious process. The other thing relevant
to Professor Stapps model is the fact of actually discrete brain states. The brain
goes through chaotic process for the most part, and theres a period of change
in the state of the brain that is followed by a relative period of stability, and
then change from stability and so on. So you can break down these discrete
states. As to what extent they might correlate to states that Professor Stapp
introduces would have to be determined experimentally. I think that a lot of
things that hes saying can be ushed out experimentally because they do have
correlates with what is actually happening.
Clayton: This changing focus of attention which is not identied with any
particular brain state is not a way of speaking that a neuroscientist would be
comfortable with, is it?
Germain: Well, the intentional matrix basically raises the brain to a certain
energy state, its called activation, and the activation in terms of energy can
be thought of in a lot of different ways. Neuronal matrices form basins of
attraction, and the state then is drawn into a basin of attraction based on an
energy minimum. For instance, when a rabbit sniffs, they have this process of
activation that forms attractors that represent different odors of what things are.
Along the lines that Professor Stapp has said, then you have the experience and
you have to match the experience with the brain state, and thats the process by
which the states actually go into one of these specic attractors which match
the odor.
Audience: What do we do about individuals with multiple personalities or

persons under hypnosis?
Germain: Theres a process that leads to consciousness and states that are the
end product of that process, but that process can vary. For example, in someone
who has multiple personalities, each state is actually the becoming of an iden-
tity. Reality is discontinuous in a Whiteheadian sense, so the identity is actually
matched with the brain states in the same way that experiences match with the
brain state. If you act in a certain way with your multiple personality and if
thats personality A, then personality A will be the one that comes into play.
Theres a lot more complex process theory involved with that, and how identity
works and how it relates to brain states. As far as hypnosis goes, hypnosis is
basically bringing down the activation energy of the brain state. Youre more or
less in a state of quietness. The direction of your questions is coming from the
therapist who is leading you along in the process. So in that case, the executive
if you will, the one asking the question, is actually outside of you.
Keeton: Geoff Chew was indicating that in his current model for quantum
mechanics and relativistic explanations of the world of experience, there is a
very small component related to matter and a very large component that is non-
material. So the model includes elements which, from a classical standpoint,
had explanatory meaning or content relative to the material aspects of the
model, but for the non-material its a little more difcult to talk about, for
instance, their causal relationship to experiences. What Im hearing Germain
say in explaining the rise of consciousness, and locating consciousness, White-
head would describe as committing the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.
How would you describe the non-material, non-physical aspect of conscious-
ness?
Germain: Actually, I think I tend a little more toward a subjective model that
reality is basically units of experience, and experiences are all interrelationships
which occur in a hierarchy. In other words, electrons have very little experi-
ence, and yet it builds up in larger and larger systems, which then can express a
higher level of experience. There is no concrete collapse of the wave function.
The actual event is subjective, and we are subjective entities. In a sense, this is
almost like the many-worlds idea, except that there is only one mind.
Clayton [to Stapp]: When youve heard these comments do you say, Yes,
thats what Im trying to say, or are you resisting these points?
Stapp: Well, I thought I was in agreement with him until this last remark. I
am certainly thinking that we are not living in a many worlds situation, and that
there are these actual occasions that collapse the wave function to some particu-
lar form. Thats certainly the basis of the way Ive been talking, and I think its
quite compatible with Whitehead. That is, that an actual thing occurs and it
somehow uses up the potentialities in one particular sort of way, and the other
incompatible possibilities are no longer possibilities. Of course, they would be
potentialities for other events. There are denite decisions that are made. That it
happens this way and not that way, so its not a many world interpretation. Its
not that all the things that quantum theory says are possible are all existing
simultaneously, and theres no choice anywhere.
Germain: Those are two ways of looking at it and I dont know how to
describe whats between them, but if you look at the view that there is this sum
of all possible worlds, then it really wouldnt be possible for part of the wave
function to perish. It has a primordial existence in some sense.
Eastman: [to Finkelstein] You mentioned the many-worlds interpretation. It
seems to me that for Everett and others who take that interpretation as literally
about actualization are implicitly making a philosophical claim. This claim is
basically a denial of real potentialities. You have the wave function propagating
and creating all of the multiple worlds and actualizing every one of them. In
other words, they treat potentiality as itself multiply instantiated and multiply
actualized. In this way, they are implicitly making the philosophical claim that
there is no real potentiality. Whitehead wants to say that potentiality is real
although not actualthere are many real potential worlds and not many ac-
tualized worlds. Taking a position regarding the reality of multiple worlds
necessarily involves making a philosophical claim. Physicists who buy into a
particular interpretation of the many-worlds concept are implicitly making such
a philosophical claim, perhaps without knowing it.
Finkelstein: For me the whole business about multiple universes is the result
of a graduate student who never really met quantum mechanics. He met this
collapsing theory and wants to do something about it. He didnt think of giving
up the idea of objects all together. Its a very Whiteheadian, Heisenbergian,

Einsteinian idea. So he took this other road. I cant make any sense of it. I cant
follow the road. I dont see the point. It seems to me ignoring the real point of
quantum theory. I agree completely with your analysis. In fact, I was very
informed by what you said.
Eastman: There is effectively a denial of real potentiality in most many-
worlds interpretations?
Finkelstein: Yes, thank you very much for pointing that out.
Joseph Bracken: I would like to ask Henry Stapp about the relationship be-
tween electromagnetic events going on in the brain area and what is usually
called the mind. You were saying that the interaction goes on at the electromag-
netic level in there and you didnt say much about brain cells. Is it your feeling
that brain cells dont produce their own results to inuence us, and the only
feedback is at the electromagnetic level?
Stapp: My idea here was that with these neurons with calcium and potassium
ions, and all of these charged particles moving in and out at a very rapid rate,
and gates opening and closing, theres a tremendous amount of activity in every
individual neuron. With all these billions of neurons, theres a tremendous
amount of electrical activity. This electrical activity produces an electromag-
netic eld and this eld is kind of a way of integrating and getting a picture of
what all these things are doing. Its a consequence of what theyre doing. Its
not that youre leaving them out, youre saying that theres a higher-level de-
scription that is a consequence of what all those neurons are doing. The sugges-
tion was that consciousness really interfaces with that higher-level description
rather than going directly down to individual ions that are going through some
microchannel in some neuron; thats too low a level. Consciousness doesnt
directly interface with that; only indirectly, by virtue of the electromagnetic
eld that it has created.
Bracken: I think I follow that, but Im just wondering whether you felt that
there isnt another level in which cells as a whole produce a result, a eld or a
concrescence, in addition to the general electromagnetic eld produced by their
parts?
Stapp: Thats a good question. The point is that in quantum mechanics, as
well as in classical mechanics, there is a question of the choice of variables and,
for example, if you have two particles you can choose to talk about this or that
particle, or you can choose to talk about the center-of-mass of these two parti-
cles. These are two ways that you can talk about the same system, and some-
times its useful to do one thing or the other. When you are talking about the
collapse, there is a question about the variables in which the collapse is going
to occur and, if you say that these collapses are at this very high level of
integration, its kind of like saying that the center-of-mass of something is at

some place. Theres still a tremendous amount of other process that could be
going on. Its like dealing with a kind of relative coordinates. There are so
many ways to slice the process up into what variables youre going to use. So,
yes, its quite conceivable that there could be lower-level events going on that
are not incompatible with the high-level events. They occur basically in higher-
level variables like the ones Im talking about, namely, the electromagnetic
eld, which is more overall.
Clayton: And indeed these lower levels could serve the same function that
consciousness serves?
Stapp: I think you have to say that, if you want to follow this idea that
experiences are real things, and you want to say it has this role in the world that
quantum mechanics in this simple point of view gives to it. If you say that it
basically makes a choice that this happens, then you also need something fur-
ther down the lineother things that are possible that wont have this experien-
tial quality. And if it can happen in simpler systems, you can certainly ask the
question, Well, cant these simpler sort of collapses occur in our brain also? I
cant see a reason why it couldnt happen and not be incompatible with the
higher-level kind of events that we are conscious of.
Here I am and I suddenly say, Im going to raise my hand or lower my
hand. Within this scheme Im proposing, its quite possible that an experiential
event says raise, and it raises because an experiential event actualized a cer-
tain state of the brain, and that has consequences extending through other
mechanisms of the brain, which cause these neural impulses to go out. The
conscious thought is organizing the brain in such a way to make this thing
happen, and thats at the very simplest level.
Part III
Fundamental Processes
11
The Primacy of Asymmetry
over Symmetry in Physics
Joe Rosen
Introduction
Charles Hartshorne includes in one of his books (1970, pp. 205226) a chapter,
The Prejudice in Favor of Symmetry, in which he discusses the symmetry
and asymmetry of logical relations. Here are some extracts from the chapter,
not in their original order. I think they give the essence of what Hartshorne is
aiming at.
Symmetry is in a sense a lack of order. (221)

From symmetrical relations asymmetries cannot be derived! (218)
Look to the asymmetrical relations and the rest will tend to take care of them-
selves. (223)
Here, as always, symmetry is a partial or abstract aspect of what, in its concrete
wholeness, is an asymmetry. Yet in its partial role symmetry is as ultimate as
asymmetry. (221)
This pattern, symmetry within an overall asymmetry, we meet again and again. I
see in it a paradigm for metaphysics. (210)
Especially in the chapter summary:
In this chapter I have argued that non-symmetrical concepts are logically primary,
and symmetrical concepts derivative. Yet both are needed to make an intelligible
philosophy. The two things to avoid are taking symmetry as primary, and failing
to do justice to symmetry in its proper subordinate role. Metaphysicians have
129
130 Joe Rosen
tended to commit both of these mistakes in different aspects of their systems.

(226)
And nally:
Another example: . . . In other words, the appeal to symmetry is not a sufcient

argument. (I am aware that in physics it is often taken to be so. I have not, in my
ignorance, been able, so far, to interpret this in terms of the views set forth in the
present essay.) Asymmetry is basic in formal logic; with what right does one
assume the reverse everywhere else? (222223)
Hartshorne actually has more to say in the chapter, such as comments on

process taken as creation of novelties and, following Capek (1961), on the
primacy of time (asymmetric) over space (symmetric). But the above sampling
will sufce for our purpose.
In the present chapter I respond, as a physicist, to Hartshornes complaint
about appeals to symmetry in physics, showing how and when such appeals are
justied. Then I show that, just as in Hartshornes paradigm for metaphysics,
even in physics asymmetry is primary.
Symmetry in Physics
For those readers who feel the need to get up to speed in symmetry, and espe-
cially symmetry in science, I dare suggest two books I have written for that
very purpose. One is a semipopular introduction (Rosen, 1975), while the other
is considerably more sophisticated (Rosen, 1995).
The appeal to symmetry as a sufcient argument in physics, with which
Hartshorne expresses his dissatisfaction, is usually based on either of two prin-
ciples. One principle is simplicity, also called Occams razor, which is:
Unless there is evidence to the contrary, we assume the situation is as simple, i.e.,
as symmetric, as possible.
For example, are the laws of nature, such as the speed of light in vacuum,
the same in all directions? With no evidence to the contrary, we immediately
assume the simplest, that the laws of nature are indeed the same in all direc-
tions. That also goes by the name isotropy of space. The symmetry here is
symmetry of the laws of nature under all rotations about a point.
How is it that symmetry and simplicity are practically synonymous? Con-
sider the previous example. Clearly, having the same laws of nature in all direc-
tions is a simpler situation than having different laws of nature in different
directions. Instead of a different physics for each direction, we more simply
have the same physics valid for every direction. That is the essence of the
simplicity-symmetry connection. Symmetry involves some kind of regularity,
Asymmetry over Symmetry in Physics 131
so the same physics repeats itself. That is simpler than a different physics for
each instance.
For a more general consideration, start with Hartshornes statement (1970,
p. 221), Symmetry is in a sense a lack of order. Order is practically syn-
onymous with distinguishability, discriminability, irregularity, and heteroge-
neity. Indeed, symmetry is inversely related to order, distinguishability, discrim-
inability, irregularity, and heterogeneity. On the other hand, distinguishability,
discriminability, irregularity, and heterogeneity are inversely related to indis-
tinguishability, indiscriminability, regularity, and homogeneity. So symmetry is
directly related to regularity and homogeneity (to keep things brief). Thus, we
have the more symmetry, the more regularity, and the closer to homogeneity,
and vice versa.
Now, if we take simplicity to mean requiring as little physics as neces-
sary, then regularity and homogeneity do imply simplicity; the same physics is
repeated, rather than additional physics being required. The more regular and
the more nearly homogeneous, the less physics needed and the simpler the
situation. Thus simplicity and symmetry are directly related.
Such considerations are tied to the logical principle of insufcient reason:
Absent reason for a difference, rather assume no difference.
For the example of the speed of light in vacuum, with no supporting or

contradicting experimental evidence, let us assume the speed of light in direc-
tion A is different from that in direction B. Then the speed of light will be
greater in one direction, say A, than in the other. But what reason do we have to
assume this rather than the opposite, that the speed of light is greater in direc-
tion B? With insufcient reason, we are guided to give up the assumption and
instead take the speed of light to be the same in both directions.
Now, it can happen, and indeed it has happened and will surely happen
again and again as we delve deeper into natures workings, that the acquisition
of new experimental evidence obviates the principle of insufcient reason. An
excellent example has to do with symmetry of the laws of nature under mirror
reection (or more precisely, spatial inversion). For ages it had been taken for
granted that the same laws of nature govern all physical systems and their
mirror image systems. Stated in other words, if any physical process is allowed
by nature, then the mirror image process is also allowed (or both forbidden).
After all, with no evidence to the contrary and plenty in support, why assume
otherwise? Well, in the 1950s nature was shown to be laughing at our simplify-
ing assumption, as reasonable as it had been, when experiments revealed that in
certain cases nature does indeed discriminate between systems and their mirror
image counterparts. (Those cases involve the weak nuclear interaction. See, for
instance, Neeman and Kirsh, 1996.)
132 Joe Rosen
The other principle upon which symmetry arguments in physics are often
based is the symmetry principle (Rosen, 1995, 104; 1975, 108):
The symmetry group of the cause is a subgroup of the symmetry group of the
effect.
Or less rigorously:
The effect is at least as symmetric as the cause.
The symmetry principle is derived from the existence of causal relations

in science (or in any other eld, for that matter). The idea is that, knowing the
symmetry of a cause, one has excellent reason to assume the same symmetry
(and possibly even more) for any effect of the cause. (I call that the minimalis-
tic use of the symmetry principle [Rosen, 1975, 106]. The symmetry principle
can also be used, knowing the symmetry of an effect, to place a bound on the
symmetry of its cause, which I call the maximalistic use [Rosen, 1975, 121].)
As a physics example of a symmetry argument based on the symmetry
principle, we might take any electrical circuit consisting, for simplicity, solely
of interconnected batteries and resistors. For this example the batteries, the
resistors, and their connections uniquely determine the currents in all the wires.
So the connected circuit is a cause and the currents are its effect. Thus one can
take any symmetry the circuit might possess and validly use it as sufcient
argument for the currents to possess the same symmetry. If, for instance, the
circuit has reection symmetry and is thus equivalent to its mirror image, then
the currents in the circuit will possess reection symmetry too. (Fortunately, the
weak nuclear interaction is not involved here.)
That works as well outside physics, wherever there are causal relations
and the symmetry principle is valid. In mathematics, one can consider an equa-
tion as a cause and the set of its solutions (but not any individual solution!) as
an effect. If, for example, a polynomial equation in one unknown x contains
only even or only odd powers of x, it is symmetric under change of sign of x,
x x. By the symmetry principle, the set of roots of the equation must also
possess that symmetry. So we are assured that the nonzero roots of such an
equation consist solely of positive-negative pairs.
The symmetry principle can be formulated equivalently in terms of asym-
metry:
Any asymmetry of the effect is an asymmetry of the cause.
Or also:
The cause is at least as asymmetric as the effect.

The Primacy of Asymmetry in Physics

Here is a summary of an argument presented in full in Rosen (1995, pp. 157
161). In the nal analysis, what symmetry boils down to is that a situation
possesses the possibility of a change that leaves some aspect of the situation
unchanged. Expressed most concisely:
Symmetry is immunity to a possible change.
Thus the two essential components of symmetry are:

1. Possibility of a change: It must be possible to perform a change
(although the change does not actually have to be performed).
2. Immunity: Some aspect of the situation would remain unchanged,
were the change performed.
If a change is possible and some aspect of the situation is not immune to

it, and the system rather would change concomitantly were the change carried
out, we have asymmetry. Note that the same situation might be both symmetric
and asymmetric under the same change, depending on which of its aspects are
being considered. For instance, the statement Beauty is truth, truth beauty
preserves its meaning but changes its graphical appearance under beauty
truth interchange.
Change is the production of something different. For a difference to exist,
in the sense of having physical meaning, a physical gauge for the difference, a
standard, a frame of reference, is needed. So the existence of a standard is
necessary for the existence of the difference and the possibility of change. And
the nonexistence of an appropriate standard makes a putative change impossi-
ble.
To be able to gauge a difference, a standard cannot be immune to the
change that brings about the difference, to the change for which it is intended to
act as reference. Otherwise it could not serve its purpose. As an example, con-
sider proton-neutron interchange. That change can be gauged by referring to a
standard proton, say, preserved in the vaults of the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST). If your system consists of a single neutron and
you perform proton-neutron interchange, you have indeed made a change; be-
fore, your particle was different from the NIST standard, while afterward it
became the same. In this example, the standard proton is indeed affected by
proton-neutron interchange; it changes into a neutron, which is something else.
On the other hand, a standard proton-neutron pair cannot serve as such a
gauge. If you attempt proton-neutron interchange on your system consisting of
a single neutron, you nd no change at all. Before your attempt your particle
was the same as one of the standard pair, and after your attempt it was still the
same as one of the standard pair, so you made no change at all. And the useless
134 Joe Rosen
standard pair is indeed immune to proton-neutron interchange, under which it

remains a proton-neutron pair (or neutron-proton pair, if you will, but still the
same).
Thus for a change to be possible for a situation, there must be some
aspect of the situation that is not immune to the proposed change and can serve
as a standard for the change. So for a situation to possess symmetry, it must
have both an aspect that can change (serving as a standard for the change and
giving the required possibility of a change) and an aspect that does not change
concomitantly (giving the required immunity to the possible change). In other
words, the possibility of a change, which is a necessary component of symme-
try, is contingent on the existence of an asymmetry of the situation under the
change. Hence the result:
Symmetry implies asymmetry.
Asymmetry is a necessary condition for symmetry. For every symmetry there is

an asymmetry tucked away somewhere in the world.
As an example, consider a uniform equilateral triangle. We normally as-
cribe it the symmetry that its appearance is immune to 120 rotation (about the
axis through its center and perpendicular to its plane). We normally do that,
because we have plenty of standards for 120 rotation, such as the walls of the
rectangular room (asymmetric under 120 rotation), so 120 rotation is a possi-
ble change. But if the equilateral triangle were a universe unto itself, there
would be no standard for 120 rotation, so it would not be a possible change,
and the triangle would then not possess the symmetry we normally ascribe it.
The symmetry exists because the total situation, that of the equilateral triangle
together with its surroundings, does possess aspects that are not immune to
120 rotation and can serve as standards for 120 rotation. The equilateral trian-
gle is symmetric only in the context of its surroundings.
We can summarize our results concerning symmetry, change, immunity,
standard, and asymmetry in the following diagram, where arrows denote impli-
cation:
Possibility of Standard for Asymmetry

Symmetry a change the change under the change
Immunity to
the change
Thus, for there to be symmetry, there must concomitantly be asymmetry

under the same change that is involved in the symmetry. The existence of the
symmetry depends on the existence, somewhere in the world, of a correspond-

ing asymmetry.
Such considerations can be extended. Any nite physical system might, at
least theoretically, possess perfect symmetry, i.e., immunity of all aspects of the
system to some change. The standard for the change would, as usual, lie in the
systems surroundings. The universe, by denition, has no surroundings, so any
standard for change of the universe must be contained within the universe itself.
Thus a putative perfect symmetry of the universe would be a self-contradiction.
As all aspects of the universe would be immune to whatever change the uni-
verse is supposed to be symmetric under, there would be no aspect that could
serve as a standard for the change. So the change would not be possible, and
there would be no symmetry. Hence the cosmic conclusion:
The universe cannot possess perfect symmetry.
As an example, consider spatial displacement symmetry, immunity to dis-

placement from here to there. As far as we can tell at present, the laws of
physics are displacement symmetric; the same laws seem to be valid every-
where. Could the universe then possess perfect spatial-displacement symmetry?
If it did, all aspects of the universe, and not only the laws of physics, would be
immune to spatial displacement. But then there would be absolutely no differ-
ence between here and there, there would be no standard for spatial displace-
ment, and spatial displacement would be impossible. As a matter of fact, it is
the inhomogeneous distribution of matter in the universe that allows differentia-
tion among locations and serves as a standard for spatial displacement.
References
I would like to express my thanks to Tim Eastman for bringing Hartshornes chapter to
my attention.
Capek, Milic. 1961. The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics. New York: Van
Nostrand Reinhold Co.
Hartshorne, Charles. 1970. Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method. La Salle, IL: The
Open Court Publishing Co.
Neeman, Yuval and Yoram Kirsh. 1996. The Particle Hunters, 2nd ed. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Rosen, Joe. 1975. Symmetry Discovered: Concepts and Applications in Nature and Sci-
ence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Expanded and reprinted. New
York: Dover Publications, 1998.
Rosen, Joe. 1995. Symmetry in Science: An Introduction to the General Theory. New
York: Springer-Verlag.
12
Spacetime and Becoming:
Overcoming the Contradiction Between
Special Relativity and the Passage of Time
Niels Viggo Hansen
For us believing physicists, the distinction between past, present and future
is only an illusion, even if a stubborn one.1
Albert Einstein
Passage versus Physical Extension: A Classical Problem

Modern science has taught us that the passage of time doesnt really t into
physical reality. In the world of our experience, there is an obvious difference
between the facts of the past, the acuteness of the present, and the open possi-
bilities of the future. But in the universe disclosed by modern physics, the
notion of a now seems to be inconsistent, let alone the passage of this now
through the continuum of time.
Since the time of experience seems to be at odds with the scientic con-
cepts of space and time, some have drawn the conclusion that everyday notions
of change and becoming are illusory. Others have taken this inconsistency to
show that scientic abstraction blocks an understanding of the depth of funda-
mental questions of existence and temporality. Others claim that a coherent
understanding of time is a metaphysical chimera.
This chapter is an attempt to outline a fourth response that is more ade-
quate. It points to a way of overcoming the contradiction by realizing that it
depends on certain tacit assumptions in the interpretation of physical continua
of space and time, and of the temporal aspects of experience. Without these
assumptions, even strong notions of dynamism and becoming can be compati-
ble with the special theory of relativity. The suggested solution is a radically
processual and relationist interpretation based on Whiteheads process meta-
physics. It involves a reading of special relativity as a source of new and deeper
136
Spacetime and Becoming 137
(radicalized rather than weakened) understanding of temporality, in technical as

well as existential applications.
The idea that there is some kind of conict between a systematic under-
standing of time and the intuitive or experienced sense of change and becoming
is not new. In fact, it has very ancient roots: it can be traced back at least to the
origins of Western philosophy, e.g., in Zeno and Parmenides. But in the context
of twentieth-century physics there is a specic version of the classical problem
that seems more immune to classical solution models. The modern Whitehead-
inspired solution suggested in this chapter involves a reconstruction of some
ideas central to Western thinking about time. I suggest the reason why the
process interpretation has not been considered seriously yet has to do with the
power still exerted in our secularized culture by a certain theological framework
for our ideas of time. However, the suggested solution to the problem of rela-
tivity and becoming does not require the assumption of any theological frame-
work.
The Contradiction and Two Traditional ResponsesA Synopsis

I will briey review the structure of the metaphysical conict, and two of the
three traditional kinds of response. The remaining third major group of classical
responses (which I will classify as antiscientistic temporalism, a view that is
sometimes erroneously ascribed to Whitehead) will then be treated in some
detail, before I unfold Whiteheads processual reconstruction of time and tem-
porality and its signicance for the problem at hand.
The Conict
The conict revolves around the issue of the existence of a frame-independent
simultaneity relation. The special theory of relativity (SR) explicitly abandons
the assumption of the context-independent existence of a unique temporal se-
quence of the events populating the universe. According to SR, the sequence of
events, and with it the denition of time, depends on the choice of inertial
system, the working denition of some real or ideal unaccelerated entity to
count as unmoving for the sake of measurements and calculations. If two events
are situated in such a way that a light ray or any other kind of causal inuence
from A can reach B (that is, if the speed of light is enough to reach B from A,
so that B is within As light cone), then their sequence is always A before B
although the measure of time elapsed may be different (cf. the famous twin
paradox). If B is outside As light cone, the situation is much more ambiguous:
you can dene frames of reference within which it is before, simultaneous with,
or after Awhatever you prefer. Furthermore, according to the principle of
special relativity, there is no feature of the physical universe that could make
the choice of inertial frame anything but arbitrary. The frame used for measure-
138 Niels Viggo Hansen
ment and calculation is selected for convenience in the context. In fact, physi-
cists and engineers routinely operate with several frames convenient in different
respects, using the mathematical hub of SR, the Lorentz transformations, as the
translation procedure.
The reason why this relativistic ambiguity of simultaneity and sequence is
in conict with standard notions of dynamic time, temporal becoming, or the
passage of time is that the passage of time has traditionally been strongly
associated with the image of a universal ontological state of affairs. If time
really passes, and if there is a real difference between past, present, and future,
we tend to assume that our present is part of a universal present: an instant or
very tiny timespan which is now everywhere. Consequently, for every event in
the entire cosmos there would be an absolute temporal fact about its belonging
to one of three regions: it is now in the future, in the present, or in the past. But
for this to be the case in every event that can be here-and-now, there must be a
unique series of events for the temporal regions to sweep through. Equivalently,
there must be an ontologically unique relation of simultaneity dening B as
simultaneous with A if it is present when A is present. Clearly this global
temporal fact contradicts the principle of the equal status of all possible inertial
frames, each dening a different sequence of events, and a different relation of
simultaneity.
How could a real now pass through time, or through events in time, if
the denition of time and the sequence of events are only conventionally de-
ned according to local preferences? Given SR, time and event sequences can-
not really possess dynamic and modal properties: past, present, and future must
ultimately be illusory, as Einstein puts it in the initial quote. (For a classical
explicit version of the argument that SR and dynamic passage are incompatible,
see Putnams Time and Physical Geometry.2)
I think Einstein, Putnam, and many others are mistaken: temporal becom-
ing ts in simply and beautifully with SR. But in order to see this, we will need
to construct an alternative to a metaphysical prejudice common to almost all
Western thinking about time.
The Antimetaphysical Response

The antimetaphysical response to the contradiction avoids such speculation,
claiming that metaphysical speculation gets us into trouble in the rst place. On
this view, everyday lived time and technical calculated time are part of differ-
ent language games and practices, and it is a mistake to require them to cohere
exactly. In particular, there is no single entity which is referred to in all the
different contexts where the word time is used. Rather than trying to ground
things in abstract entities, we should look at concrete practices.
This response expresses the important insight that the unchecked hyposta-
tization of local, specialized bits of language creates metaphysical problems (cf.
Whiteheads analysis of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness). However, this

insight is not enough to sort things out. The attempt to create coherence be-
tween language and practices, and the creative metaphorical use of language to
do things beyond its native eld of practice, is not something we could sim-
ply learn to renounce. If we could, language would become dull and impotent.
It is interesting to notice here that even the most brilliant contributions to the
reorientation of philosophy toward concrete sociolinguistic contexts, such as
Wittgensteins, are thoroughly speculative in the sense that they are mediated
by creative interpretative application of certain terminologies and metaphors
language game and family likenessfar beyond their native use. Further-
more, the adoption of an antimetaphysical attitude by less brilliant minds often
seems to lead only to the suppression of explicit metaphysical discussion, not to
overcoming implicit metaphysical assumptions. Therefore, the antimetaphysical
response to the conict is very often combined with one of the other classical
responses: either assuming the metaphysics of passage or the metaphysics of
temporal extension as unquestionable, and subjecting only the other side of the
conict to antimetaphysical scrutiny. In fact, it appears that in questions of
time, change, and process it is particularly difcult to avoid metaphysical as-
sumptions. Whiteheads suggestion (echoing Hegels) is that we can make the
critical insight useful by turning it explicitly constructive, making our inescap-
able metaphysical activity the philosophical project rather than the problem. We
must learn to understand abstraction as a concrete process.
The Scientistic Atemporalist Response

The scientistic atemporalist response accepts the expressions of fundamental
scientic theory, here SR, as revealing the structure of reality. Consequently this
response implies that the passage of time is some kind of illusion, a myth, a
derivative phenomenon to be explained on the basis of physical theory. Tempo-
ralism, here and in the following, denotes that time is something more than a
kind of extension or a series, whether this something is expressed in terms of
passage, ontological or modal difference between past and future, emergence,
or becoming. Conversely, atemporalism accepts the existence of a temporal
continuum or series, but denies this something more.
In order to offer a coherent solution to our problem, scientistic atemporal-
ism must show it is conceivable that the phenomena, experiences, and practices
of the language of temporality (terms such as change and tomorrow as well as
more speculative ones: emergence, nowness) can be reconstructed or explained
away on the grounds of basic physical theory. Indeed, some atemporalists claim
to have accomplished this task, but only by taking temporality in a very re-
stricted sense.
Some confusion has arisen because the temporalist notion of becoming is
intuitive, and more or less vague. Some atemporalists as well as some temporal-
ists have conned the discussion to one isolated aspect of temporality, the
now allegedly passing through a continuum of extended time or a sequence
of events. Grunbaum, Williams, and other atemporalists have argued that the
function of nowand with it the other pure temporal modalities, future
and pastcan be fully accounted for in terms of indexicality, that is, the
place and perspective of an event within a sequence of events of ontologically
equal status. If temporality had no more to add to such indexicals than the
reference to a completely disembodied inner feeling that now is now and
now passes, then the atemporalist reduction would have a strong case. And it
would not be using much of the furniture of fundamental physics, just the
continuum of physical time.
However, it is obvious that concrete temporality is not just characterized
by position, the sense of presence of a particular event and absence and dis-
tance of events, but also by orientation, the sense of difference between past
events (remembered and/or traceable to some extent) and future events (never
remembered, not traceable, and considered open possibilities). This modal
asymmetry is very evident in the experienced difference between our access to
past events (memories and traces, at least partial) and to future events (no
memories and traces, but an experience of openness to planning and unplanned
surprises). A scientistic atemporalist account of this must combine the index-
icality with some appeal to the physical and biological accounts of cognition
and volition. What is of interest in our discussion is not the details of such
accounts of complex interactions, but only the way that the physicalist reduc-
tion must ultimately anchor them in the fundamental laws of physics. This must
happen via some invocation of ordinary physical causality. There is a general
stream of causes from the world into the cognizing system, forming the one-
way stream of traces and memories, and another one-way stream of causes
from the mental/neural to the world. For now, I will not challenge the idea that
some kind of reductionist account of that type could in principle be correct and
complete. But this puts the metaphysical burden on the scientistic atemporalist
to account for the asymmetric structure of causality.
There are many attempts at such accounts of asymmetric causality and
asymmetric streams and losses of information (and hence of the apparent, lived
worlds overwhelming asymmetry) based on the assumption of a fundamental
microphysical reality of symmetric nature. Invariably, they depend on one of
two anchor points in fundamental modern physics: the second law of thermo-
dynamics, or the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics (the famous
collapse of the wave function). I have argued elsewhere that neither of these
anchor points serves the purpose of explaining the asymmetric temporal fea-
tures of the concrete, lived world.3 Here I must leave out a detailed discussion
of various strategies and versions of such explanations, and just state my con-
clusion: The invocation of thermodynamics or quantum mechanics as resources
for a scientistic atemporalist account of temporality either breaks down by sim-
ply resting on implicit assumptions of temporalism, or depends on some version

of an anthropic or transcendental argument. This latter argument not only con-
strues temporal nowness, passage, and orientation as mind-dependent and as
having no physical correlate, but also delegates the larger part of physics
explanatory power into the abyss of mind-dependence.
In conclusion, it does not seem plausible that a workable model for coher-
ent scientistic atemporalist reconstruction of the structure of apparent tempo-
rality has been found. This by no means proves classical temporalism, which is
connected with equally serious problems. But it weakens the idea that a coher-
ent understanding can be achieved purely on the basis of physical theory. It
pushes us back either into the antimetaphysical idea renouncing our require-
ments of coherence beyond local language games, or compels us forward to
constructing new models of temporalist accounts.
Temporalist Antiscientistic Responses

A third main group of traditional responses to the controversy is based on
temporalism. Explicit temporalism is very often formulated in reaction to scien-
tistic atemporalist understandings of time.
On temporalist views, immediate experience and participation in life
gives evidence of a fundamental immediately evident fact of temporality.
Change, becoming, and passage express something that is not only imme-
diately evident, but also necessarily involved and presupposed in the experience
and understanding of everything else. So if physical concepts of time are in
conict with this fact, this demonstrates an inadequacy or limitation in the
physical concepts. Thus we repeat the structure of the atemporalist response:
the idea of a fundamental or true time whose nature is adequately expressed in
concepts belonging to one side of our clash between spacetime and becoming
and whose nature is distorted in concepts on the other side. But the roles are
now reversed, so that it is time as a continuum, as in scientic and technical
use, which is diagnosed as the derivative and perspective-distorted view of
time. In this sense, temporalism tends to link with antiscientism.4
Characterizing Temporality
Temporalism requires a dynamic concept of temporality to express immediate
fact. But what belongs to this fact and its expression? In our discussion, we
have used temporality loosely to imply a realist interpretation of experienced
time, and to include some more or less overlapping commonsense and common
language features such as nowness, change, passage of time, modal difference
between past and future, and unidirectionality. But is this list complete, and
does it point to a singular phenomenon or concept at all? We have already seen
a certain ambiguity regarding which aspects of passage the atemporalists
should be required to reconstruct as a perspective effect. As we saw, the answer

to this question strongly affects the plausibility of the atemporalist argument: if
the atemporalist is given the benet of the doubt, and is only required to ac-
count for nowness, the argument is much stronger than if the unidirectionality
of memory and causation is included.
So it is part of the philosophical project of a temporalist response to
provide a systematic expression of temporality in the rst place. Temporalist
philosophers may point out that it is exactly because change and becoming have
been bracketed out by theoretical thought that we have very explicit concepts of
temporal extension but very vague concepts of temporality. But a temporalist
response to the clash that does not simply fall back on an antimetaphysical
claim of incompatible discourses must assume a twofold task: rst, temporalism
must be dened and then the construction of physical time, time as extension,
must be accounted for.
Classical Temporalism
Some proponents of temporalism in the classical form of passage may not
agree to this project at all. They may underestand temporality as explicitly and
coherently captured by an unambiguous referent of common speech of past,
present, and future, identied as the passage of the now occupying each point
through the continuum of extended time. They would not criticize concepts of
technical time as derived or distorted; they would merely claim the need for
adding the concept of passage (analogous to McTaggarts A-series of passage
simply being superimposed on the B-series of extended time). In fact, classical
temporalism expresses temporality in a way completely dependent on an under-
lying concept of extended time. Hence classical temporalism is a compromise
response, attempting to give a realist construal to extension, and to passage-
through-extension at the same time. However, our initial question was the prob-
lem of incompatibility in such a classical compromise.
Modern Radical Temporalism: Bergson and Heidegger

A tradition of much more radical formulations of temporality took shape in the
beginning of the twentieth century, explicitly developing alternative accounts of
temporality, not framed by notions of extended time, but based exclusively on
the concrete experienced/lived world. Bergson and Heidegger developed partic-
ularly explicit and inuential suggestions of such a radical temporalism. For
radical temporalism, the continuum of time is not an underlying structure that
simply needs to be supplemented with temporality in the shape of the now
point. Rather, temporality itself is basic, and has a character completely differ-
ent from extension, so that extended time is an abstraction or construction out
of it, useful for particular purposes.
Bergsons Natural Temporality

In Bergsons account,5 temporality is a fundamental common nature of all kinds
of existencemental and biological aspects of human as well as nonhuman
nature, organic as well as inorganic, subjective as well as objective. The com-
mon ground is continuous change. It is essential to Bergsons point that conti-
nuity and change are two aspects of the same phenomenon, that they are ulti-
mately joined just as they are in concrete experience. Bergsons term for this
original phenomenon of temporality is temps duree. One might be tempted to
translate this into time of duration, but time of ongoing is probably more
precise. In any case, it is essential to grasp the sense in which Bergson uses
duration here: it is denitely not meant to invoke the idea of an interval in a
mathematical continuum of time. Rather, he would have us look at the actual
concrete present as experienced and lived. The suggestion is that if we let
awareness be with this immediate fact, rather than the abstract understanding
of it via acquired concepts of extension, it will clearly exhibit Bergsonian dura-
tion, or ongoing continuous change.
This Bergsonian original fact of temporality is described as rooted in
immediate experience in a very concrete bodily way. Insisting that it is not a
phenomenon of disembodied consciousness, Bergson refuses to reserve it for
conscious or even living beings. It is essentially a feature common to every-
thing deserving the word concrete. Whenever temporality is absent in descrip-
tions or understandings of some aspect of reality, time has been ltered out: the
product of abstraction. Continuing a romantic tradition, Bergson considers ab-
straction to be foreign and hostile to the concrete fullness of life, which is
readily available in intuition and aesthetics. Indeed, he proposes an aesthetic
cultivation of sensibilities for concrete fullness, in order to counter restricting
intuition through technical xation and abstraction.
Yet Bergson is not simply supporting art and poetry against science. In-
stead, he tries to propose an understanding and ideal of real science as some-
thing beyond mere abstractioncontinuing a romantic line of thought strongly
reminiscent of Schellings. This is essential for understanding Bergsons outspo-
ken interest in scientic developments, particularly those which concern the
understanding of time and development, such as biological evolutionary theory,
and the theories of relativity.
As a consequence of this insistence on the presence of radical becoming
in concrete reality, and of the insistence on the ontological primacy of concrete
experience, Bergson arrives at conclusions with direct bearing on Einsteins SR
and its interpretation.6
First, Bergson claims that SR does not have to be understood to contra-
dict the central intuition of temporality, if temporality is construed along the
lines of Bergsons temps duree, and if one drops certain restrictions on the full
and radical appropriation of relativity. They are restrictions stemming from the
implicit continuation of classical assumptions, restrictions Bergson claims Ein-

stein fails to overcome. Therefore, according to Bergson, Einstein was unable to
grasp the full radicality of his own theory. As you will see, I suggest we follow
Bergson in this line of reasoning.
However, Bergson also suggests that the intuition of radical temporality,
allied with the core insight of relativity, reestablishes the idea of a cosmic,
ontological simultaneity, the common state of affairs of modality. Here, unfor-
tunately, Bergson has made his case for temporalism inconsistent, easy prey for
refutation. I will take a closer look at Bergsons most central and technical
argument for this. It contains a rather simple error mysteriously overlooked by
Bergson. Perhaps even more mysteriously, it forces Bergson to embrace a
McTaggartian picture of the relation between extension and passage.
Bergson versus Einstein on Duration and Simultaneity

Bergson uses one of Einsteins thought experiments to illustrate the notion of
inertial systems and the derivation of the famous relativistic effects, including
time dilation and relativity of simultaneity relations. In Einsteins example, a
train and an embankment correspond to two inertial frames of reference, i.e.,
they are both unaccelerated, but there is relative movement at a speed assumed
high enough for relativistic effects to be notable. The only other elements in the
Einsteinian example are two strokes of lightning, singly striking each end of the
train. Einsteins project is to deduce the consequences of assuming that the laws
of nature, including the speed of light, are invariant to change of inertial frame
of reference. Since this results in conict with the classical assumption of an
absolute relation of simultaneity, Einstein avoids that assumption in the rst
place, and ends up disproving it. Retaining the speed of light as an invariant, he
can introduce standards based on it for measurement of length and for simul-
taneity, unambiguous but relative to either train or embankment, i.e., to either
frame of reference. Basically this is all Einstein needs to derive the famous
transformation rules for converting measurements of time, length, mass, etc. in
one inertial system to those in another, given their relative velocity.
Einstein thereby derived the Lorentz transformations, which were already
well known. However, Einstein gave them a radically new interpretation as
transformation rules between equally valid frames, rather than deformations in
relation to a fundamental frame. Bergson was eager to embrace this equal status
of frames of referencewhich was, for Bergson, the core of relativity and a
support for the claim of a true immediate time inherent in every concrete phe-
nomenon.
Bergson complains that Einsteins interpretation of his own procedure
takes the computed abstractions for real time and space, and forgets the imme-
diate fact of temporality, which is, for Bergson, what relativity should be about.
There is a true or proper time for any frame of referencethis is in accordance
with Einsteins assumptions, except that Einstein would object to any ontologi-
cal signicance of true. For Einstein, it simply means the reference system is
xed to a clock. For Bergson, true time is identied with the immediate time
for some concrete dead or living thing, or a group of such things, and this is the
only time that could possibly be experienced or observed. The modied times
and spaces described in the Lorentz transformations are not real because they
are not observable. As Bergson claims, they are abstract calculations and con-
structions for coordination. Thus, the dilated time in the train, as calculated
by an observer sitting on the embankment using the t Lorentz transformation,
is not real; it is what would be the case for an impossible observateur phan-
tasmagorique experiencing things from a perspective (the trains) moving in
respect to its own body at astronomical speeds. The real and observable is what
is available to a real observer, who is always a concrete living being in a
concrete physical environment, and in his or her own real time; the only time
real and observable in his or her bodys frame of reference.
This leads Bergson to a frontal attack on Einsteins use of the train exam-
ple (and the generalized mode of derivation it represents). The argument is
extended and full of brilliant phenomenological arguments concerning the need
for understanding abstractions of time in their connection to concrete tempo-
rality. As far as relativity and simultaneity are concerned, the hub of the argu-
ment against Einstein can be stated as two rather simple points. First, Bergson
insists that the equal status of all inertial frames of reference means that all
relativistic effects, such as time dilation, are perfectly mutual and symmetri-
cal. No matter whether we are in the train or on the embankment, the time of
the other system always appears in abstract calculations to be dilated, whereas
concrete time is not. Since it cannot possibly be the case that time measured or
experienced on the embankment is shorter than time measured in the train and
that it is also shorter in the train than on the embankment, and since by com-
plete relativity the relativistic relation between the two real times is taken to be
fully mutual and symmetrical, they cannot really be different. Second, Bergson
claims it is not legitimate to analyze events happening within some real rigid
object (such as the train) using a frame of reference different from that xed to
the object itself (by using the frame xed to the embankment). Thus Einsteins
analysis of the train-in-the-thunderstorm example, assumed to demonstrate that
two lightnings simultaneous in the embankment system are nonsimultaneous in
the train system, is illegitimate because it tacitly assumes the embankment sys-
tem to be the true and fundamental framework for analyzing train happenings,
thus overriding the constraints of complete relativity. Bergson considers Ein-
steins conclusions to be false and conterintuitive.
These two main points in the technical aspects of Bergsons argumenta-
tion are not just in disagreement with Einsteins theorythey clearly violate
and misrepresent the theoretical structures and procedures they purport to dis-
credit. Therefore, it is very difcult to construe this part of Bergsons argument

as anything but erroneous. Milic Capek has written an insightful exegesis of
Bergsons critique of SR, convincingly showing many aspects of it to be still
alive, at the very least in the sense that Bergsons claims are worthy of further

discussion.7 What Capek shows to be alive are, rst, the claim of a concrete
temporality underlying the production of abstract time and, second, the claim
that SR and the Lorentz transformations can be seen as respecting, rather than
violating, the constraints imposed by concrete temporality, including the con-
straints imposed by causality (unique seriality within any chain of causal rela-

tions). However, even Capek has difculties making the most essential distinc-
tion between what is living and what is dead in Bergsons critique. In fact, he
blurs that distinction by trying to partly defend Bergsons failed attempt at
showing frame-independent simultaneity to follow from, and be necessary for,
concrete dynamic temporality. By doing so, Capek unfortunately invites the
continuation of the idea that the issue of dynamism under SR is the same as the
issue of simultaneity.

It is interesting in this connection to notice that Capek points to White-
heads treatment of the problematic as a restatement of the Bergsonian project
of a temporalist reinterpretation of SR, avoiding some errors of Bergsons argu-
ment. Whiteheads solution to this problem was not fully expressed until Pro-
cess and Reality in 1929.
It is obvious that Bergson took the scientic discovery of the immense
history of nature, and especially the enfoldment of the evolution of humanity
into that process, as an insight of great philosophical potential for human self-
understanding and self-expression. The fact that such a development of meta-
physical understanding in concert with the development of scientic construc-
tions has been a major project for Bergson only makes it so much more striking
that he and his great followers were unable to see the implications of SR as a
potential for developing and rening the notion of temporality, claiming instead
that the intuition of temporality is absolutely and unquestionably contingent on
frame-independent simultaneity. What we are questioning in this project must
be an extremely deep-rooted tacit assumption.
Heideggers Temporality Without Nature

Martin Heidegger was very much aware of the fundamental difference between
his radical notion of existential temporality and the extended time of physics,
measurement, and chronology. In sharp contrast to Bergson, he made no at-
tempt at building compromises, but rather emphasized the need for keeping
them apart; not falling prey to the tendency of understanding temporality and
existence in light of nature. For Heidegger, this tendency is a constant pull
toward inauthentic understandings of temporality, not just inauthentic in the
sense of a misrepresentation, but also in the more radical sense that it leads us
to live inauthentically; the impossible attempt at escaping the openness and
responsibility inherent in true temporality, which is basically situated agency.

Furthermore, this tendency always provides us with the most immediate, avail-
able, and well-known grasp of timethe time as available within our projects
rather than the temporality unfolding themso that a determined, authentic
attitude is required in order to stay clear of it. Thus, in Heideggers version of
radical temporalism, the contrast to notions of extended time is seen as a virtue,
something to be insisted upon rather than overcome.
Also, in contrast to Bergson, common sense is taken as mostly an expres-
sion of the inauthentic and fallen understanding of time, rather than a major
resource supporting the expression of more adequate concepts of time. How-
ever, this immediate fallen character of commonsense understandings is not
their exhaustive characterization according to Heideggerif we were in such a
state of complete illusion, Heideggers hermeneutic-phenomenological project
could not even get started. A more precise rendering of Heideggers view is that
common sense is ambiguous, that it is some kind of mixture of authentic and
inauthentic understanding of temporality; a mixture that generally leads us to
insert a few patches or echoes of genuine temporality as subordinate features in
a picture dominated by inauthentic, vulgar time. In this way, a rst attempt at
a Heideggerian account of the commonsense notion of passage might nd in it
an echo of authentic temporality, vaguely represented into quantitative time
through reduction to a point, the now, placed in the continuum. In the ade-
quate and authentic understanding Heidegger wants to advance by philosophical
means, the roles are reversed so that it is extended time that is enfolded in
temporality as a particular derivative mode. He does not accept such a point-
like commonsense notion of present as an adequate representation of true
temporalityas most thinkers in the temporalist camp have done. In fact there
is an important sense in which Heidegger does just the reverse, focusing on
agency in combined terms of future (possibility) and past (situatedness) rather
than presence (facts, states, and things). This is signicant. It means that
Heideggers account can be taken to imply that presence, and hence co-pres-
ence, is not a fundamental and universal feature of strong temporality, but a
derivative and local one. As we shall see, this implied insight is really the core
of the Whiteheadian reconciliation between relativity and temporality. Heideg-
ger did not explicitly work out the implication that co-presence is a derivative,
local, and mediated pattern of relational time, and furthermore he emphatically
avoided the connection between temporality and nature, particularly nature as
channeled through science and technology.
Indeed, it seems that Heidegger was aware that SR posed particular prob-
lems for notions of temporality. In a footnote in Sein und Zeit,8 Heidegger
insists that the implications of SR for the understanding of time can only be
discussed and understood once we have found and explicated the existential
sense of time and take it as the basis. Heidegger may very well have written
this with Bergsons hopeless struggle against Einstein in mind, wishing to stay
clear of any such commitment toward a particular notion of physical time over
another. In Heideggers view, any construction of physical time is bound to be
so much of an externalization and hypostatization of a certain aspect of the
temporality of practice that contradiction should be expected rather than
avoided. Hence, a genuine coherent understanding of the relation would only be
possible by reducing any physical notion of time to the role of a practical
bookkeeping device, so derivative as to have no ontological signicance be-
yond that revealed by a hermeneutics of its underlying practice entirely inde-
pendent of its technical details. On the face of it, this denial is all that Heideg-
ger has to offer us as an answer to the contradiction.
The denial is closely related to a fundamental split in Heideggers account
of the way extended (vulgar) time gets constructed. The basis is the project
character of human existence, which interprets itself inauthentically into the
three temporal modalities (extatic modes as Heidegger calls them, i.e., tempo-
rality projected out of itself ). This accounts for the structure of the notions of
past, future, and present, and Heidegger points out, in close accordance with
Priors idea of a temporal logic, that all other temporal notions can be con-
structed out of these. But of course this cannot possibly account for the actual
content, the events placed in these regions, or the regularity in these events
allowing for a sequentiality of an appropriately rhythmic character to allow for
the properties of real chronologies, calendars, and clocks. Therefore, in order to
account for these, Heidegger makes a reference to something completely differ-
ent confronting existential temporality as a background for its projects. This
something is the rhythmical sequence of day and night, the movement of the
sun making the frame for the workday and the antique peasants clock allow-
ing project-involved existing beings to meet at a previously agreed time. This
reference to nature constitutes a peculiar break in Sein und Zeits developments,
which have been expressed programatically in existential terms excluding na-
ture until the very end of the book. Just because existence and its temporality is
considered so perfectly transcendental, the metrical and topological properties
out of which vulgar time is made must issue from a completely different
origin, the realm of pure unmediated nature. So, while Heidegger takes impor-
tant steps beyond the traditional Western metaphysics of time in his character-
ization of existential temporality, he reduces nature to the role of that which is
encountered in the fallen/vulgar mode of this temporality.
Heidegger had the profound insight that presence is a particularly deriv-
ative mode of temporality, rather than the paradigmatic mode of being. But he
avoids making the kind of connection between natural and human temporality
that could allow this insight to solve the puzzle of simultaneity and becoming.
Instead, he amplies the contradiction by claiming that nature is at the same
time the unmediated background of practice, and irrelevant for the temporality
of practice.
Bergsons explicit attempt to handle the tension between SR and becom-
ing failed because his notion of dynamic time consistent with complete rela-
tivity was, in the end, loaded with a classical metaphysics of presence under-
mining the relativity. Heidegger, although he went further in overcoming this
metaphysics, claimed his radicalized temporality to be so much devoid of na-
ture, and particularly so much in contrast with the constructions of natural sci-
ence, that nobody, and least of all Heidegger, may have noticed the constructive
solution to the paradox it makes possible. Generally, radical temporalist re-
sponses to the controversy have tended to fail in this respect because of anti-
scientistic reservations, and moderate temporalism failed because of its reliance
on the classical notion of absolute simultaneity.
Whiteheads New Solution: Radical but Local Temporality

None of the accounts discussed so far have dissolved the contradiction between
special relativity and temporality by taking both seriously. They have taken
either SR, becoming, or both to be without ontological importance, providing
no specications for what is actually or could possibly be the case in the world.
Of course it may well be too naive to imagine that the two kinds of
language (the everyday talk about today, tomorrow, a minute ago, etc.,
and physical calculations involving space/time systems such as the Lorentz
transformations) are fully explicated as representations of context-independent
facts. There are many good reasons why both of these language complexes are
something richer and more interesting than just representations of the same pool
of context-independent facts, with differences consisting of selection of differ-
ent subsets of this pool, as well as procedures of projection and representation.
They are something richer and more interesting because they are also aspects of
collectives and practices involved in the making of facts and perhaps even the
making of conditions for something to be a fact in the rst place. I am not
going to discuss in this context the various modes and models of constructed-
ness and historicity of facts; I have done so in a previous article on the histori-
city of scientic objects9 for further reference to the very extensive current
debates on modes of scientic realism and constructivism, see the most recent
works of Andy Pickering or Bruno Latour.10
Still, the conict we have been discussing about temporality is really so
basic that it is very hard to see how it can be dissolved through reference to
involvement, contextuality, historicity, and constructedness, unless these are
taken in the sense of a very extreme kind of skepticism.
If there is any such thing as a fact, and not just a collection of incoherent
states of mind and discourse, then either there are temporal facts (e.g., that you
have already read the previous sentence) or there are atemporal facts (e.g., that
your reading of it is later than my writing of it). If there are temporal facts,
then either they have the universal character generally assumed in Western
metaphysics before Einstein, or they do not.
In other words, Bergson was right that no matter how much contextuality
is involved, we cannot seriously hold at the same time both that there are
concrete facts involving distant simultaneity, and also that such facts cannot
exist in the physical universe. Surely one could claim that such immediate facts
are eliminated in the production of physical descriptions (if description is
taken at a sufciently theoretical level, this is undoubtedly true) but if concrete
facts of co-presence are there before clocks and measuring rods are used, they
will still be there in the background when these things are employed. If that is
the case, then there will be an ontologically privileged system of reference, a
set of events concretely simultaneous. What SR reveals is that this will be a
very strange sense of concreteness, since it will not be discoverable or observ-
able in any way. It will be one of a multitude of inertial frames of reference that
will be, in any observable sense, equally valid. Unless Bergson or others will
claim to have intuitive, non-physical access to knowledge about what happens
on Mars or in Andromeda right now, the distant part of the concrete fact
would be entirely devoid of anything really happening in the world or really
observed. Indeed, distant simultaneity has difculties with being concrete in
another and much stronger sense than the one in which atemporalists claim
passage and presence to be unreal. The sense of what is present is concrete,
detectable, and real if anything is, just as long as we consider it apart from the
question of what may be the case at the same time at very distant places.
This local concreteness is the turning point of Whiteheads radical sug-
gestion of a solution of the paradox by unfolding an explicit account of a more
general, concrete, and exible way of conceiving the form of a temporal fact.11
The idea is simply that a concrete temporal fact is not global but local.
Such a notion of local temporalism would be a very satisfactory solution
to the paradox of SR and becoming, if the notion were thinkable at all. As we
have seen, what creates the contradiction we have been discussing is that SR
replaces the absolute relation of simultaneity and the equivalent unique se-
quence of events by a weaker constraint on the spatiotemporal order of events.
But if real and concrete temporality can be conceived without dependence on
the stronger constraint, then clearly the contradiction vanishes. In fact, White-
head showed that the weaker constraint contained in SR is exactly what is
needed.
This idea is so surprisingly simple and solves the paradox so beautifully
and completely that it is a very strange phenomenon in the history of ideas that
it has hardly been considered by any other contributor to the rather extensive
discussion of the contrast between relativity and becomingnot even after
Whitehead proposed it.
Why not? I can think of two kinds of reason for this.
The rst kind of reason is the way Whitehead presented it. He developed
it as an integral moment in his general metaphysics of concrete processuality, in
his notoriously difcult magnum opus Process and Reality. This major work of
twentieth-century philosophy is sadly neglected, but it must be admitted that

Whitehead did not succeed in making it a user-friendly introduction to his phi-
losophy. Rather, it is as dense and rich as, e.g., the works of Heidegger, Hegel,
or Kant. Furthermore, the hermeneutic work of gaining access to a philosophi-
cal work of that kind of density is rarely undertaken unless one has the impres-
sion that it will be deep, usually because of its reputationwhich Hegel and
Heidegger have much more of than Whitehead. A further complication is that
Whitehead wrote another book, The Principle of Relativity, presenting an alter-
native formulation of the general theory of relativity (GR) but not the point
about SR which is our focus here. This book is not as dense as Process and
Reality, and the result is that the rare occasions when Whiteheads contributions
to the interpretation of the theories of relativity are discussed, the main contri-
bution is almost always overlooked.
The second kind of reason is more philosophically interesting. Why does
the appropriation of this simple philosophical point depend on the readability of
Whiteheads Process and Reality? Why did nobody else discover and present
it? It is very difcult to grasp the idea because of an implicit metaphysics,
probably one that projects a particular theological content into a tradition which
is no longer aware of being theological. Grasping the Whiteheadian alternative
was almost like a religious conversion for meunfathomable before but simple
and almost self-evident afterward.
Therefore, in order to explicate the Whiteheadian alternative, it will be
expedient to rst ask how it is that the traditional notion seems so obviously
truethe traditional metaphysical notion that a temporal fact must be global. In
other words, why is the question of becoming always posed, by its friends as
well as its enemies, as if either there are global temporal facts or there are no
temporal facts? It seems to be so deeply enfolded into our notion of time that it
is usually assumed without saying. Very few have given any kind of argument
for it. But I did nd, in two of the most respected twentieth-century proponents
of temporalism, some vague or partial arguments for continuing this traditional
metaphysics into their formulation of temporalism.
The rst proponent is Bergson, who seems to seek support for the notion
by an appeal to his very sympathetic idea of solidarity between human, organic,
and inorganic existence. They all share in immediate temporality, he says, and
he draws the conclusion that therefore they all share one temporal fact. But as
soon as we ask if this really follows, it becomes clear that it does not. The stars
in the sky can have their own local temporal facts, even if they are just as
temporal as ours.
The other proponent is Prior.12 He explicitly asks if it is possible, since SR
seems to imply it, to entertain the notion that there are no global temporal facts.
He rejects it with an appeal to our way of conceiving and expressing concrete
temporal facts. We sometimes say, e.g., Thank God, thats all over now, and
clearly refer to a very real and signicant state of affairs. What we refer to,
Prior claims emphatically, is denitely something different from Thank God,

the end of that event is [atemporally] earlier than my utterance of this sen-
tencein other words, we refer to what is in McTaggartian terms A-type facts
rather than B-type facts. Prior takes this to demonstrate that there are facts of
temporal modalitysome things are now, some things are past, and then still
other things have not happened yet but may co-occur in the future. I would like
to point out that even if this kind of phenomenological evidence of temporality
is basically valid, it demonstrates only the existence of local temporal facts, and
no further. Priors argument makes sense precisely when the past events in
question are in the speakers local past, meaning the concrete past which is able
to affect him, that which constitutes his situation, that which is potentially
knowable. The abstract idea of a nonlocal past provides no support for his
argument. There is no reasonable Thank God, thats all over now about
events that have happened on Mars during the last minute or in Andromeda
during the last million yearsevents which are not yet part of the speakers
causal past. Of course Prior may say that it is possible to think or even know
some scheduled eventsay, a friends examto be over at a distant place
say, on Mars. But then we will have to remind Prior that the problem posed by
SR is just that there is no physically privileged time system to synchronize
Priors clock with the one in the Martian University. Hence, even if Prior will
claim the existence of a metaphysically privileged time system, he will have no
way of determining which one it is. He will either have to make an arbitrary
guess of when to initiate his relief, or else phase it in gradually over the approx-
imately 10 minutes duration (depending on the variable distance of the planets)
of the relativistic ambiguity of simultaneityor nally, he could postpone his
relief until the event is denitely and unquestionably over, that is, when it is
part of Priors causal past. I trust you will join me in recommending the third
option to him, the only one that has anything to do with the way feeling works
in real life. And of course, this demonstrates only a local temporal fact and no
more than that. Why did we inject Mars into the story, when Prior was simply
making a point about ordinary temporality with an ordinary earthly example? I
am sorry to depart from the solidity of Earth and practice, but it is exactly what
we need to do in order to discover what Priors earthly example does not imply:
a global temporal fact. Priors example functions locally and practically, and the
kind of temporal fact it demonstrates is precisely local and practical.
Whiteheads reformulation of a temporal fact should not be read as some-
thing far-fetched, but rather as a (re-)naturalization: it is taken back into the
concrete relations between real processes as they actually happen, and saved
from the burden of carrying an instantaneous cosmic state of affairsan ideal
of global simultaneous presence corresponding to the idea of the Gods-eye
perspective. But in this naturalization it is important to see that Whitehead
preserves, even in a very radical form, the central insight of temporality: the
ontological difference between past, present, and future, experienced locally.
Whiteheads approach is to systematize and explicate an existing, vaguer

notion of processurality to the extent that traditional metaphysical notions of
substance and time do not reinstall themselves as implicit background, as they
might do via an idea of a time and space that processes happen in. Instead,
Whitehead builds a relational account of time and space as a system of certain
kinds of relations between processes. The relational interpretation of time is of
course a proposal well known at least since Leibniz argued it against Newtons
absolute view of time. It is also well known that Einstein, too, was inuenced
by this relationist tradition.13 But because Einstein and others have combined a
relational view of time with an atemporal viewthat is, a view of time as
constructed out of before-after relations, with no place for the now or pres-
ent type of factit is important to stress that the relational account of time
and space is not just able to accommodate truly temporal facts, but that also it
allows the expression of a more radical notion of temporality than the tradi-
tional one based on absolute time. This radicalized notion is that of change
happening in an active, immanent sense rather than events situated in a contin-
uum traversed by a now-pointer ultimately external to the events.
So, one central point in Whiteheads system is that processes are them-
selves activethe temporal modalities are a function of the happening of pro-
cesses themselvesthe basic realities in the world pass from potentiality
through actuality into pastness. Each process is a unit of becoming, and accord-
ing to Whitehead it becomes in solido; it is not some temporally extended
entity placed on an axis of time along which it could be played, like an audi-
otape, one stage or movement after the other. The idea is not that it is of zero
extension like a point. It is the more radical idea that it is something different
from extensionsomething out of which extension is manifested. Within this
relational system, according to its properties, it may become meaningful to
assign the process a nite extension. I have represented this idea of integral
becoming by taking the arrowhead signifying dynamism inside each process
unit rather than putting it on the traditional axis of underlying time. However,
this account of modality should not be taken as only monadic. The other
equally important element in Whiteheads processual and relational account of
time are the relations to other processes. They are deeply involved in the very
sense of the modalities. One may think of the relations represented in Figure
12.1 as a kind of family tree. They are relations between parent and child
processes, causal relations in which the outcome of a parent process adds to the
beginning conditions of each of its child processes. Each child process can have
many parent processes, and vice versa.
Whiteheads picture implies that such branching and rejoining is generally
the case. What it means for something to have already happened, Whitehead
says, is that it has produced a determinate resultto terminate is to be determi-
natebut this result should not be understood substantially. Result means it
is available to be part of the initial conditions for new processes. Or perhaps
Figure 12.1. Family tree model of causal process.
better, it is taken in by these processesthe terminated parent processes are

indeed said to be there, in some sense and to some degree repeated within the
actively new process. It is really all that the new process can be, apart from
its own core of creativity.
Thus, a process is something happening in a particular determinate situa-
tion in the sense that it is causally inuenced by a certain set of terminated
parent processes. In turn, the process is something which produces some deter-
minate result in the sense that it produces, more or less deterministically and
more or less creatively, some coherent and determinate (and in this sense uni-
ed) expression out of the multiplicity of its situation. This unied, determi-
nate expression can be ingressed by some other, new processes.
This categoreal account of the simple concept of process is mostly a
description of well-known aspects of what it means for something to happen in
the concrete world. What may be controversial is the linking of it with a rela-
tionist account of time and space. Whitehead is explicit about the idea that the
concrete dynamism of processes can be understood as the ground of extension
rather than the reverse. This is the rst element of the Whiteheadian solution to
the tension between extension and becoming: the modalities are not really situ-
ated in space and time at all, but in the concrete processes whose web of
relations gives rise to space and time.
If we attempt to save temporality through appeal to such relational
concepts and internal processual temporality alone, and then identify the rela-
tional web with the time of physics, we would have a strangely dualistic pic-
turereminiscent of the one I argued that Heidegger creates with the dynamic
units reserved for a particular kind of being: human existence. Modality would
be an inner state completely out of joint with the world. Temporal facts would
not only be local, they would be completely private. And what is more, the
content of these private facts would not really have three modal options; it
would always be present at the only relevant time, the time of the utterance.
Hence it would be tautological. It would be true after all, as Grunbaum claims,

that becoming is an irrelevant subjectivistic addition to a world whose content
is completely indifferent to it.
The other essential element in the Whiteheadian account is the explication
of a strongly dynamic character of the relations in question. That is to say,
dynamism in Whiteheads account is not just inside the processes, it is also
outside, in their relations. The ways of being related to other processes are an
integral part of being a process. Therefore, many of the specications of pro-
cessuality in Whiteheads categoreal scheme have the form of explanations of,
and constraints on, the ways processes relate. Whitehead describes the features
of processural relatedness particularly important to our purpose as: causal,
asymmetrically internal character of the relations, and the notion of a causal
universe. Causal relations are the primary kind of temporal relations, and they
are all that concern us in the present discussion of temporality.
Causality is asymmetric in a way that is deeply involved in the nature of a
process. The process is a transition from the possibilities opened by a specic
situation into a determinate outcome, and the determinacy of an outcome is
nothing different from its availability as part of the situation for new processes.
Causality is this one-way transfer from the terminated to the actual process, and
it means that the parent process not only gives something to the child process,
but in an important sense it gives to itself: it is in the new process, repeated in
it. In this sense the relation is so strongly asymmetric that it can be charac-
terized as internal from one side, and external from the other.14
Closely related to this idea of dynamic causality is the notion that each
process adds something, leaves its mark on all of its entire branching tree of
child processes. As a corollary, there is no completely identical repetition of
any process, or, in Whiteheadian terms, any process leaves its mark on the
subsequent branching chains of processes. Other cyclic congurations such as
Figure 12.2 are not possible. This condition expresses the absence of backward
causality and a universal condition of irreversibility. It also means that no char-
acter of an enduring object can be absolutely changeless, and that no change
can be completely undone. Of course trust may be regained and damages re-
paired, etc., but not without some other aspects of the situation changing.
Another Whiteheadian categoreal constraint on causal relations essential
to our discussion here is that no two processes can have the same universe or
the same past. This universe of any process is its family tree of parent, grand-
parent, etc. processes: everything that can affect it and be available to it. It
typically consists of a few terminated processes that affect the actual process
strongly and a larger number of processes with a more marginal inuence. The
conguration that is ruled out is the kind represented in Figure 12.3: two sepa-
rate processes with exactly the same universefor Whitehead they would not
be two, but only one process. Two separate processes may share all kinds of
subsets of universes, and typically do, but not their entire universe.
Figure 12.2. Cyclic congurations and backward causality.
It is in this notion of the unique universe of each process that Whiteheads

categoreal scheme explicitly states the nonexistence of global temporal facts.
Whitehead even uses the term the principle of relativity for the principle that
the being of terminated entities is expressed in their potentiality for the be-
coming of new process entitiesto be part of their specic universes. The
terminology seems to imply that Whitehead was aware that this shift in the
notion of what it is for the past to be solves the puzzle of relativity and
becoming, by including relativity in a new and more coherent grammar of be-
coming. On this account, a fact is truly something that is done, as the etymol-
ogy suggests; it is a certain set of terminated processes available to a new actual
process. Such a fact is strongly temporal; it involves the pastness of the termi-
nated processes in this universe, and nothing in the future of this actual process.
Also, such a fact is not private at all, in the sense of just being on the inside
of the process unit. On the contrary, the pastness of everything in the universe
is public in the sense that each of its elements is available to everybody in
some appropriate causal neighborhood. Each becomes objective by being avail-
able as an object to new processes. And nally, such a fact is local in the sense
that nothing secures its instantaneous transmission into objectivity for the entire
cosmos. Thus, the process ontology suggested by Whitehead enables us to for-
mulate a coherent concept of local temporal facts, and hence an idea of becom-
ing with no dependence on simultaneity. This solves our problem in principle;
contradiction is resolved.
Some Further Qualications and Ramications

of the Whiteheadian Solution
First, you may want to raise an objection to the previous move. I went directly
from Whiteheads categoreal principle of relativity to the nonexistence of global
Figure 12.3. Two separate processes with exact same universe.
temporal facts, which does not follow in a strict sense. What does follow is that
there are local temporal facts and not necessarily global ones. As I said, this
particular principle in Whiteheads categoreal scheme only states that no two
processes can have the same universe, that is, the same family tree of prede-
cessors. However, this of course does not rule out the special degenerate case
of a singular thread of events (Fig. 12.4). In such a case, there would still be a
different temporal fact for each of the processesnamely everything that is
past when it is actualand this fact can be said to be global in the sense that
this fact is then valid for the entire cosmos. However, it is obvious that such a
single causal chain does not represent something physically interesting or other-
wise usefulexcept in the construction of very minimalized models (e.g.,
Markov chains). The constraint involved in this minimalization, that there be no
splitting causal trees, corresponds to an absolutely isolated system of zero spa-
tial extension. However, in the general case involving branchings and joinings
of causal chains, the Whiteheadian category implies precisely that there are
only local temporal facts: the different temporal facts of different processes,
analogous to the content of backward light cones of different events accord-
ing to SR. As universe can be included in Bs or vice versa, in the special case
that one is a child process to the other, but in the general case (Fig. 12.5), their
universes overlap partially. In this general case there is no ultimate determina-
tion which one is rst, or that they are simultaneous. Whitehead clearly advo-
cates the same metaphysical insight in a beautifully simple form he repeats
several times in Process and Reality: there is no unique seriality of events.15
I should say a bit more about the sense of the diagrams I have used. It
may seem problematic to represent something temporal in a diagram. It
amounts to a spatialization of timeor, in this case, a spatialization of tem-
porality that is supposed to underlie time. The problem is that different pro-
cesses and different temporal facts look as if they are together, one beside the
other, equally actual, available in the same sensewhereas the point of tempo-
rality is just that they are not, or at least that any two processes can only exist
together in the sense that they are both past to some other actual process. One
Figure 12.4. Amodal serial chain of events.
could interpret such diagrams as conrming the traditional view that processes
and relations are all there in an ultimate atemporal reality, through which the
ghostly now may or may not pass. But they need not be read that way, just as
your use of a planning calendar containing entries for both 1 January and 31
December of the current year does not commit you to think that your acts and
experiences of both of these days exist in an ultimate atemporal reality. The
diagrams represent, just as words do, some structures of processual relation-
ships that can be discussed without deciding on the modalities. But this ques-
tion has a further interesting ramication. As long as we discuss a singular
serial chain of events (Fig. 12.4), it would be possible to make a drawing
representing the temporal fact of the matter of the entire systemwe could
draw all the past events in one color, say black to suggest solidity and ground,
draw the one present event in another, say green to suggest growth, and for the
future events we could either skip them altogether or draw them with some airy
color, say light blue, to suggest that they are only potentialities. For a White-
headian branching system (Fig. 12.5), temporal modality will no longer t into
one spatial picture. It would only be possible to map the modality correspond-
ing to one actual process, and its past and future ramications. Notice that this
dependence on one particular event would in fact not be different from what is
the case in the more traditional modality map you may draw on Figure 12.4.
But drawing such a trivially consistent map of modalities in the chain of events
in that monolithic world, you would not encounter the question of modalities
elsewhere, as there is no elsewhere. In the general case involving an else-
where, there is no modal question of what is present elsewhere at the same
Figure 12.5. General case with partial overlap of universes.

time as the actual event, because there is no system of time and space at this basic
level of modality and causality. Time is constructed out of these relations and
depends on more special constraints, regularities, and contexts than discussed so
far. If conditions are met for the possibility of constructing space and time, not
just one but many time systems can be constructed. Modality is not in time.
There is an interesting similarity between the notion of local temporal fact
(reducing presence to a very modest role) and Heideggers Zeitlichkeit. Here
too, temporality is more strongly tied to past and future, and clearly in the local
sense of situatedness and potentiality. The modal reality behind presence is
local actuality, the acting of the local process in question; but presence gets
hypostatized into a much larger region and even a paradigm of being, while
Daseins own temporality forgets itself in the background. For Heidegger too,
this huge region of presence is a construction carried by projects. But White-
head takes this account of presence much further in two respects. First, tempo-
rality is not exclusively or even primarily situated in conscious or practice-
involved processes of human existence. And second, the construction of time
systems and regions of presence is well grounded in regularities and procedures
Whitehead constructs with mathematical rigor.16
I argued above that the notion of local rather than global temporal facts is
a consequence of Whiteheads categoreal characterization of the process as on-
tologically primary. Of course, someone may object that we are not obliged to
accept a metaphysical principle because it follows from some particular spec-
ulative construction. This is obviously true as long as the system has not been
established from rst principles, or empirically, or however else one might
imagine a metaphysics to be grounded. In any case, Whiteheads process meta-
physical scheme is not intended as something which is established, or which
ought to get established, once and for all. Rather, it is an attempt at contributing
to an ongoing enterprise of constructing and rening concepts and grammars,
seeking to integrate as many aspects as possible of evidence, experience, and
practices in a coherent conceptual structure. Such an attempt should not exclude
any practical, scientic, or experiential background as overseen halves of the
evidence, and at the same time it should not just aim at superimpositions of
unconnected ideas but at the production of richer and deeper concepts to make
meaningful and relevant contrasts out of what appears at rst to be contradic-
tory, irrelevant, and/or useless. So this is the gentle tone of voice that should be
heard in the process metaphysical suggestion: it is proposed as a conceptual
structure that may make coherent sense of vastly different and apparently con-
tradictory elds of language and practice, which is exactly what experienced
temporality and scientic time are. And it seeks legitimacy not by pointing to
aprioristic authority from some unquestionable fundamentals somewhere else,
but rather from turning out to be richer and more useful than other schemes in
this kind of situation. So in looking at Whiteheads systematic development of
the concept of process, we nd not so much authority as instead a particularly
rich, radical, and exible structure.17
But shouldnt the metaphysical project be committed to afrming exactly

such experiences and notions as presence, co-presence, and simultaneity, which
are such a dominant feature in language and experience, and also in most physi-
cal descriptions except for the anomalous SR? Yes, it must be committed to
showing how and when these structures work, but it is not committed to taking
them as fundamental, if that creates conceptual stiffness and closedness. And
indeed it can be argued (as I did above when we discussed Priors Thank God
its over) that the notion of local temporal fact covers our concrete experience
and language at least as well as the classical notion of global temporal fact.
Furthermore, as I mentioned, Whitehead has given a detailed account of the
way time systems can be constructed given certain kinds of regularities in pro-
cessual relations, so that a common time system can be well established in
practice, accommodating all the well-known uses of chronology and chronolog-
ically determined simultaneity.18 Also, Whitehead argues that this construction
of simultaneity is not just a scientic procedure. We have a very vivid immedi-
ate impression of being in a space of presence, Whitehead argues, because such
constructionongoing and spontaneousis always involved in human and
probably many other complex processes. What happens, he argues, is that sys-
tems with a sufciently complex mode of experience will take reliable pro-
cessual regularities into account and thus project inuences and impressions
into a scheme of the kind of extensione.g., the dimensionalitysupported by
all processes in a sufciently large region (cosmic epoch). We are participants
in a rhythm of the epoch, and through this rhythm, Whitehead accounts for the
complex fact that we continuously sense ourselves and everything else in a very
real and unlimited space of co-presence, even while everything sensed is causal
past. So in the end, on the process account, we are well justied in nding our
friends and all kinds of other things in the present, but this is a practical pres-
ence that need not and cannot be supported by global temporal facts in the
fundamental modal/causal sense. Practical simultaneity is of course not just a
question of sensation, it is very much a question of coordination between organ-
isms and other processes sharing partial pasts and futuresa question of what
Whitehead termed unison. Unison and rhythm, two musical metaphors, have
the advantage of showing this kind of accordance to be something produced by
participants.
The speed of light is very high compared with all of the processes and
movements relevant for our projects. Therefore, in practical earthly engineering,
the zone of elsewhere (which is completely out of reach of the causal trees of
any given event) is temporally very thin. A very precise practical synchronization
can be achieved without worrying about the choice of inertial systemany
choice will do; the difference will be microscopic. But the speed of light is not
part of Whiteheads incorporation of relativity into the metaphysics of process.
Whitehead implies there is a difference between physical and metaphysical rela-
tivity. Besides being interesting and important as a physical theory, SR became a
provocationproviding both a possibility and a necessity of making implicit a
principle of even greater generality: a basic feature of temporality and causality

altogether. Physical relativity is much more specic and detailed, but it includes
and implies the metaphysical principle Whitehead explicated as signicant in
understanding things also in elds, with little relation to geometry and electro-
magnetic radiation. If Whitehead is right about this, it will be because local
processuality is a useful grammar also in understanding history, thought, music,
etc.
In contemporary discussions of the issue of simultaneity and relativity, it
is frequently argued that relativitys challenge to classical temporalism has van-
ished because the currently favored cosmological solutions to the equations of
Einsteins general theory of relativity imply the existence of an inertial system
with a uniquely simple relation to the overall cosmological evolution and is
objectively denable (by the isotropy of the 3K background radiation). It may
or may not be true that a more or less context-independent chronology can be
dened thus, but I think the challenge of SR has a deeper character than what
can be resolved by this response. First, because the conditions expressed in the
equations of relativity have to be more fundamental than the features of the
cosmological models satisfying GR, whether or not it is true that all reasonable
solutions possess the appropriate kind of symmetry (all solutions corresponding
to an inhabitable cosmos or a cosmos in other respects similar to what we
observe). And, more generally, this is not a satisfactory way of handling meta-
physical problems. True, the history of metaphysical questions and answers has
always been deeply involved with scientic developments. If Whitehead is right
this must be so, because the metaphysical project is really a necessary ongoing
improvement of concepts and grammars to take into account new elements of
practice, culture, and science. But metaphysical development requires the pro-
duction of deeper coherence, not just the concatenation of results.
Therefore, if one fundamental theory of science is in conceptual conict
with what we take to be fundamental to everyday time, this is a serious meta-
physical problem even if another scientic theory gives some hope that the
conceptual conict will not turn into a direct empirical conict. In other words,
adopting this response as a defense of classical temporalism is accepting that the
question of passage-becoming is simply a yes-no question depending on ndings
of physical cosmology. But I suspect most adherents of classical temporalism
would not accept a negative conclusion from physical cosmology regarding the
existence of a privileged time system as evidence simply dismissing temporality,
just as Prior would not accept such a consequence to follow from SR.
Theological End Note: Where Does God Stand

on the Simultaneity Issue?
Seen in the light of the proposed renaturalized understanding of presence as
local, the global presence implied in notions of universal time is the ideal of
transportation and mediation so perfect that it becomes independent of incarna-
tion in real-world transporting and mediating agencies. The ideal, positive, and
unmediated existence of a universal present may be the continuation, into ap-
parently post-theological thinking about time, of a deeply ingrained, Western
theology of omnipotence and omniscience. It still makes it so very difcult for
us to imagine processuality as concrete and local, and it necessitates a very
systematic and explicit metaphysics of process to start shifting this deep habit
of thought. It is a very interesting dimension of Whiteheads suggestion that it
is coupled with a revision rather than a denial of the connection between theol-
ogy and concepts of time. If structures of a traditional distant ruler God
inhabit understandings of time even in supposedly nonreligious modern thought,
then a constructive theological shift of divine virtues from omnipotence and
omniscience toward participation and wisdom could be more radical and far-
reaching. A series of discussions of God, relativity, and the simultaneity issue
indicate that even process theologians have yet to fully afrm the strength of
their own tradition at this particular, important point.19 Elsewhere I have given
some suggestions of how this could be done.20
As Einstein indicates in the famous words of comfort quoted at the begin-
ning of this chapter, developments in fundamental physics can enable deep
metaphysical insights into the nature of things. But Whitehead indicated a way
of grasping SRs lesson on temporality as even deeper and more radical than
Einstein thought.
Notes
1. Einstein to Vero and Mrs. Bice, 21 March 1955. Einstein Archive, reel 7-245;
reprinted in Albert Einstein-Michele Besso Correspondence 19031955 (Harmann, Paris,
1972), pp. 537538.
2. H. Putnam, Time and Physical Geometry, Journal of Philosophy, no. 64
(1967): 240247.
3. N.V. Hansen, Modern Physics and the Passage of Time, in Time, Creation
and World Order, ed. M. Wegener (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1999), 121138.
4. I use the term antiscientistic not in the sense that the attitude necessarily
involves hostility toward the natural sciencesit may or may notbut only in the
restricted sense that it rejects the scientistic idea that the results of natural science
provide the answers to fundamental ontological/metaphysical questions. Antiscientism is
the view that science, whatever other virtues it may possess, teaches us nothing about
such questions.
5. H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. A. Mitchell (New York: Macmillan,
1984).
6. H. Bergson, Duree et Simultanete: A Propos de la Theorie dEinstein (Paris:
Alcan, 1923).

7. Milic Capek What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Bergsonian Critique of
Relativity, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 125 (1991): 296323.
8. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tubingen: Neimeyer, 1993), 417.
9. N.V. Hansen, Interpretations in the Historicity of Objects, Philosophia 25, 3

4 (1996): 83113; available from http://hjem.get2net.dk/niels viggo hansen/work/.
10. Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1993); Andy Pickering, The Mangle of PracticeTime, Agency and Science (Chi-
cago: Chicago University Press, 1995); Andy Pickering, ed., Science as Practice and
Culture (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992).
11. A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978). The
central idea of a transformation of the metaphysics of time and change based on a notion
of local concrete temporal fact is the books main project. The explicit suggestion of
locality of temporal fact is stated from the beginning in The Categoreal Scheme in Part I,
particularly the 4th and 5th Category of Explanation, explicitly named The Principle of
Relativity.
12. A. Prior, Some Free Thinking About Time, in Logic and Reality, ed. Cope-
land (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
13. See Einsteins Introduction in Max Jammer, The Concept of Space (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).
14. In close parallel to Schellings statement that the past is aufgehoben in the
present. One may also note the striking structural resemblance with Russell and White-
heads set theoretical reconstruction of the sequence of numbers.
15. Of course there may be the kind of practical representations of coordinated

timing instantiated in SR by the choice of an inertial system, but there is no context-
independent ontologically warranted sequence.
16. Whitehead, Process and Reality, 294ff, for an exposition of extensive ab-
straction.
17. Ibid., 318, for a programmatic presentation of philosophys role and aim as
one of ongoing development of deeper (more coherent) and wider (more relevant and
inclusive) conceptual structures.
18. See note 16.
19. Charles Hartshorne, Bells Theorem and Stapps Revised View of Space-
Time, Process Studies 7, no. 3 (1977): 183191; David R. Grifn, God and Rela-
tivity, Process Studies 21, no. 2 (1992).
20. N.V. Hansen, Time, Change and Construction: On Some Contributions to a

Reconstruction of the Metaphysics of Time, available from http://hjem.get2net.dk/
niels viggo hansen/work/.
13
The Individuality of a Quantum Event:
Whiteheads Epochal Theory of Time
and Bohrs Framework of Complementarity
Yutaka Tanaka
Whiteheads Epochal Theory of Time: Genetic Analysis

and Coordinate Analysis
The distinction between two modes of analysis of an actual occasion, i.e., ge-
netic and coordinate, is fundamental to Whiteheads epochal theory of time.
Genetic analysis divides the concrescence (the process of becoming con-
crete), and coordinate analysis divides the satisfaction (the concrete thing).
The concrete is in its satisfaction, and the concrescence is the passage from
real potentiality to actuality. Both can be objects for analysis but under the
different perspectives. Whitehead states:
Physical time makes its appearance in the coordinate analysis of the satisfac-
tion. The actual entity is the enjoyment of a certain quantum of physical time.
But the genetic process is not the temporal succession: such a view is exactly what
is denied by the epochal theory of time. Each phase in the genetic process presup-
poses the entire quantum, and so does each feeling in each phase. The subjective
unity dominating the process forbids the division of that extensive quantum which
originates with the primary phase of the subjective aim. The problem dominating
the concrescence is the actualization of the quantum in solido.1
The above passage seems to have annoyed many commentators on Pro-

cess and Reality. The genetic analysis of an actual occasion divides the con-
crescence into primary, intermediate, and nal phases, which, according to
Whitehead, are not in physical (i.e., coordinate) time. One phase of genetic
division must be prior to another: but what sort of priority is this? William
164
The Individuality of a Quantum Event 165
Christian discusses and rejects four possible ways of interpreting this type of
priority: (1) priority in physical time, (2) the logical priority of a premise to a
conclusion, (3) a whole-part relation, and (4) a dialectical process of the
Hegelian development of an idea. Then he says, though genetic priority may
have some analogies with other sorts of priority, we must accept it as something
of its own kind, but he does not analyze further the sui generis character of
genetic divisions.2 Charles Hartshorne also questions the validity of genetic
analysis, and proposes to accept only the succession of phases in physical time.3
What I will show in this chapter is the importance of the distinction
between genetic and coordinate analysis and its relevance to the interpretation
of quantum physics, especially the relation of Heisenbergs indeterminacy prin-
ciple to temporality, the Bohr-Einstein debates, and the recent experimental
refutation of the Bell inequality.
If we take into consideration the impact of quantum physics on the emer-
gence of Whiteheads metaphysics, as Lewis Ford shows in detail in his book,4
we naturally expect that the epochal theory of time has something to do with
the quantum jump, or the discontinuous transition from potentiality to actu-
ality. But we need to be cautious. The references to quantum physics in Science
and the Modern World are mainly to the initial stages of quantum theory in the
early 1920s, and there is no textual evidence concerning whether Whitehead
knew the nal stages of quantum physics established by Bohr, Heisenberg,
Schrodinger, and other contemporary physicists. The composition of Process
and Reality began at the Gifford Lectures in 1927, and the same year was
memorable in the history of quantum physics: Bohr stated his principle of com-
plementarity and stressed the individuality of quantum events in his Como
Lectures; and Heisenberg published his paper on the indeterminacy principle in
Zeitschrift fur Physik. Only two years later, in 1929, Process and Reality was
published. Although Whitehead did not mention Bohrs principle of comple-
mentarity nor Heisenbergs indeterminacy principle, there is a striking corre-
spondence between Whiteheads metaphysical analysis of an actual occasion on
the one hand, and Bohrs and Heisenbergs physical analysis of quantum events
on the other hand.
The purpose of this chapter is not to conrm or disconrm the historical
inuence of Bohr or Heisenbergs ideas on Whiteheads metaphysics. That is an
interesting study in itself, but will remain only a conjecture. Rather, I will
consider rst the problem of temporality in the interpretation of Heisenbergs
indeterminacy principle, and then discuss Bohrs concept of the individuality
of quantum events, both under the Whiteheadian perspective. I will show that
Whiteheads distinction between genetic and coordinate analysis of an actual
occasion proves to be relevant to the interpretation of the delayed-choice exper-
iment in quantum physics. This experiment is about the indeterminate past,
which will tantalize process thinkers who take the determinate past for granted,
and think that only the future is indeterminate.
166 Yutaka Tanaka
Lastly, I will present a new approach of quantum logic to analyze Bohrs

concept of the individuality of a quantum event. This approach uses the con-
cept of divisibility of an event by another event, and denes the concept of
commensurability of events. Then I will characterize the classical world by
saying that all events are commensurable with each other, whereas the quantum
world is characterized by saying that some events are incommensurable with
each other. This analysis may be interesting to Whiteheadian scholars because it
will teach us that the concept of the individuality of a quantum event denies
atomism insofar as atomism presupposes the divisibility of a complex event into
atomic component events. Many scholars think of Whiteheads epochal theory
of time as temporal atomism and arbitrarily conjecture the existence of a
temporal atom with a very minute duration. Once we accept the quantum logi-
cal analysis and apply it to the epochal theory of time, we will understand the
key concept is the individuality of an actual occasion, and not atomism of
any kind.
Heisenbergs Indeterminacy Principle and Time:

Is There the Indeterminate Past?
In The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory, Heisenberg insists on the
essential contingency of the future in his famous principle of indeterminacy.
This principle states that we cannot exactly predict the future state of a physical
system on the basis of knowledge of the past. What we can predict is only a
probabilistic future that is testable, not by a single experiment, but only by
statistical ensembles. The contingency of the future in this sense is a common
notion of physicists today who have accepted the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum physics.
Consider the future behavior of a photon impinging on a half-silvered
mirror (beam splitter): if it reects from the mirror, it will travel along route ,
and if it goes through the mirror, it will travel another route, . We do not know
which route the photon will choose in advance, but can conrm afterward its
choice by using the photodetector: the exchange of energy between the photon
and the photodetector will demonstrate the particle-character of a photon, which
cannot travel two different routes simultaneously. If the photodetector E at the
end of route clicks, then the photodetector F at the end of route does not
click, and vice versa. The classical description of a particle presupposes deter-
minism in principle, without any reference to an observer. The use of statistics
only shows our ignorance of the physical system. There is nothing indetermi-
nate in the system itself both in the past and in the future.
Against such a standpoint, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
physics proposes the indeterminacy principle. It claims statistical analysis is
essential because we cannot predict the future behavior of a particle precisely in
the individual case because of the indivisible relation of an observer and ob-
served. Heisenberg refrains from talking about the reality of any intermediate
states of a physical system between actual observations.
When applied to future events, the indeterminacy principle seems reason-
able to common sense because common sense well knows future contingency.
But what about past contingency? If the indeterminacy principle stresses the
indivisible connection between the observer and the observed, does the same
principle apply not only to the future but also to the past? Not being omniscient
about the past, we often need to retrodict, i.e., conjecture about what happened
in the past on the basis of present data. That the past is determinate in all its
aspects without any observer is the postulate of physical realism, which cannot
be accepted unconditionally by the Copenhagen interpretation. Then must we
accept the idea of the indeterminate past in some sense in quantum physics?
Indeed, Heisenberg was aware of this question and discussed it in The
Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory:
The Indeterminacy Principle does not refer to the past: if the velocity of the elec-
tron is at rst known and the position then exactly measured, the position for
times previous to the measurement may be calculated. Then for these past times
pq is smaller than the usual limiting value, but this knowledge of the past is of
a purely speculative character, since it can never (because of the unknown change
in momentum caused by the position measurement) be used as an initial condition
in any calculation of the future progress of the electron and thus cannot be sub-
jected to experimental verication. It is a matter of a personal belief whether such
a calculation concerning the past history of the electron can be ascribed any physi-
cal reality or not.5
In the above citation, Heisenberg did not reject the idea of the indetermi-
nate past, but thought that such an idea was of a purely speculative character
and a matter of a personal belief, because it cannot be subjected to experi-
mental verication. To Heisenberg in the 1920s, only the prediction of the fu-
ture was important, and the mathematical theory assisted him to calculate the
probability of the end-state given the initial state: the description of the inter-
mediate development of the system between two objectively recorded or re-
cordable states did not seem to correspond to physical reality.
On the other hand, Einstein, as a critic of quantum physics, did not admit
Heisenbergs standpoint, especially that the indeterminacy principle does not
refer to the past. In the paper Knowledge of Past and Future in Quantum
Mechanics, Einstein proposed an imaginary experiment, in which the possi-
bility of describing the past path of one particle would lead to predictions as to
the future behavior of a second particle of a kind not allowed in the quantum
mechanics.6 So Einstein concluded that the principle of the quantum me-
chanics must involve an indeterminacy in the description of past events which
is analogous to the indeterminacy in the prediction of future events.7
This should be understood in the context of Einsteins argument against
168 Yutaka Tanaka
S A B
D E
F
Figure 13.1. Schematic diagram of Wheelers delayed-choice experiment.
the completeness of quantum physics in the same way that the EPR argument
showed that the completeness of quantum physics led to absurdity. In other
words, Einstein did not positively assert the existence of indeterminate past
events, but only intended to deduce it as the necessary conclusion of the com-
pleteness of quantum physics.
The problem of the indeterminate past reappeared about 50 years later in
J. A. Wheelers discussion of the delayed-choice experiment (Fig. 13.1). This
experiment is not imaginary but is an actual one that uses one particle (say,
photon) instead of two particles as in Einsteins case.8 Laser light incident on a
half-silvered mirror A divides into two beams: one is along the path ABD(),
and the other is along the path ACD(). In this experimental arrangement the
detection of a given photon by either by E or F sufces to determine which of
the two alternative routes the photon traveled. This is the particle mode of the
experiment. The photon travels either route or route .
If a second half-silvered mirror D is inserted at the crossing points, the
two beams are recombined, part along the route into E, and part along the route
into F. This will cause wave interference effects, and the strengths of the beams
going into E and F respectively will then depend on the relative phases of the
two beams at the point of recombination. These phases can be altered by adjust-
ing the path lengths, thereby essentially scanning the interference pattern. This
is the wave mode of the experiment. The photon travels in some way along
both routes, and , at the same time.
Now the crucial point is that the decision of whether or not to insert the
second half-silvered mirror D can be left until a given photon has almost ar-
rived at the crossover point. Thus one decides whether the photon shall have
come by one route, or by both routes after it has already done its travel.
After conrming the fact that what we can say of past events is decided
by (delayed) choices made in the near past and now, Wheeler discusses the
possibility that the phenomena called into being by the present decision can
reach backward in time, even to the earliest days of the universe:
To use other language, we are dealing with an elementary act of creation. It

reaches into the present from billions of years in the past. It is wrong to think of
the past as already existing in all detail. The past is theory. The past has no
existence except as it is recorded in the present. By deciding what questions our
quantum registering equipment shall put in the present we have an undeniable
choice in what we have the right to say about the past.9
The interpretation of the indeterminacy principle will be altered if we

accept the concept of past indeterminacy. Heisenberg originally considered this
principle as the limit of the exactitude of two incommensurable quantities at the
simultaneous measurement. But the indeterminacy of past events that have not
been recorded has a connection, not with their simultaneous measurability, but
rather with the denability of their historic routes. That the denition of the
past route or history of a particle depends on the present choice of an experi-
menter is the meaning of the indeterminate past.
Bohrs Framework of Complementarity

Bohrs principle of complementarity is more closely connected with the indi-
viduality of a quantum event than with the indeterminacy principle. His em-
phasis is mainly on the denition of a quantum process, and not on the un-
avoidable disturbance or physical inuence of the observer on the
observed. His arguments rest on the insight that in quantum physics we are
presented with the inability of the classical frame of concepts to comprise the
peculiar feature of indivisibility, or individuality, characterizing the elemen-
tary process. The quantum paradox arises from the apparent contradiction be-
tween the exigencies of the general superposition principle of the wave descrip-
tion, and the feature of individuality of the elementary atomic processes.
Stressing the impossibility of any sharp separation between the behavior of
atomic objects and the interaction with measuring instruments that serve to
dene the conditions under which the phenomena appear, he writes:
The individuality of the typical quantum effects nds its proper expression in the
circumstance that any attempt of subdividing the phenomena will demand a
change in the experimental arrangement introducing new possibilities of interac-
tion between objects and measuring instruments which in principle cannot be con-
trolled. Consequently, evidence obtained under different experimental conditions
170 Yutaka Tanaka
cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as comple-

mentary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible
information about the objects.10
Bohr distinguishes two modes of the description of a quantum process,

which are complementary but exclusive: one is the space-time coordina-
tion, and the other is the claim of causality. The two modes of description,
though united in the classical theories, should be considered as complementary
but exclusive features of the description in quantum physics.
Heisenberg summed up the framework of complementarity in the follow-
ing diagram:11

Space-Time Coordination Causal Relationship
Quantum process is described Alternatives Expressed by mathematical laws
in terms of space and time related but
but statistically physical description of phenomena
indeterminacy principle. in space-time is impossible.
Now we are ready to compare Bohrs (physical) framework of complementarity

with Whiteheads (metaphysical) distinction between coordinate and genetic
analysis of an actual occasion. The structurally similar arguments really charac-
terize the theory of concrescence and space-time coordination in Process and
Reality. Whiteheads discussion of causality, efcient or nal, belongs to the
genetic analysis of an actual occasion in his Theory of Prehension. The internal
development of concrescence of an actual occasion is the theme of this anal-
ysis. But according to Whitehead, this internal process itself does not occur in
physical time. Physical time makes its appearance in the coordinate analysis of
the satisfaction. Each phase in the genetic process presupposes the entire quan-
tumthat is the point of the epochal theory of time.
The distinction between genetic and coordinate analyses has a bearing on
the divisibility of the space-time region. The region of an actual occasion is
divisible according to the coordinate analysis, but is undivided in the genetic
growth. The epochal theory of time stresses the genetically indivisible character
of an actual occasion.
Interpreters of Whiteheads metaphysics, as far as I know, do not seem to
have grasped fully the individuality of an actual occasion. The epochal theory
of time was usually discussed through Zenos paradox of motion and change,
and considered as the metaphysical postulate that makes it possible for us to
talk about becoming at all. I do not say it is wrong, but only that such a
metaphysical postulate is not sufcient to the concrete analysis of becoming
and its relation to space-time. For example, the epochal theory of time is often
characterized as temporal atomism.12 But atomism is not a happy word in the
sense that it has a connotation of a mechanical worldview. Whiteheads stan-
dard usage is the cell theory of actuality, and not the atomic theory of actu-
ality. Moreover, an individual quantum event is not necessarily microscopic.
The simultaneous correspondence of the EPR experiment shows us the indi-
viduality of a quantum process at a long (macroscopic) distance. The delayed-
choice experiment shows us that the individual quantum process may have the
indeterminate past according to the coordinate divisions of space-time. So the
region of an individual quantum process may have an arbitrary size with respect
to space-time coordinates.
In the next section I will analyze the concept of individuality by using a
quantum logical analysis and show that the concept of completeness, which
Einstein presupposes in his criticism of quantum physics, is irrelevant to the
quantum world.
A Quantum Logical Analysis of the Indivisibility

or Individuality of an Event
There is a hidden presupposition when we apply classical logic to the empirical
world, namely, that all events are divisible with each other, or that all events are
commensurable. This presupposition fails to be the case in the quantum world,
so that one of the most fundamental laws of classical logic cannot claim univer-
sal validity. In order to dene the divisibility and commensurability of
events, some preliminary discussions are in order.
Suppose we have predictions of two events, a and b:
a: The wind will blow tomorrow. b: Rain will fall tomorrow.
The two statements that predict the weather tomorrow are, strictly speak-
ing, not propositions. Truth-values of propositions must be eternal in the sense
that they must be xed independent of the time when any speaker states them.
We cannot x truth-values of the above statements today unless we are deter-
minists. Tomorrow we can verify these predictions, but today we are not able to
assign truth-values to these contingent statements. The truth-table approach of
classical logic is irrelevant to the contingent world of quantum physics.
I will give an introduction to quantum logic, which is wider than classical
logic in its application in the sense that it can analyze contingent events in
addition to determinate propositions. Readers need not follow the logical appa-
ratus below to understand the overall argument, which is laid out in the text.
We dene the divisibility of events as follows:
aDb: The event a is divisible by the event b

(1)
aDb def a (a b) (a b)
172 Yutaka Tanaka
The right-hand side of this denition is the equivalence that we implicitly as-
sume in our everyday talk. The wind will blow tomorrow is equivalent to
The wind will blow and rain will fall tomorrow, or the wind will blow and rain
will not fall tomorrow.
We can use Venns diagram to visualize the divisibility of events.
a b
a b ab ab

Divisibility of events shown in this Venn diagram presupposes Boolean alge-

braic structure that characterizes classical logic. It is noteworthy that both Witt-
gensteins Tractatus and Russells Logical Atomism implicitly presuppose that
all events are divisible with each other: their analysis depends on the truth-
table. Classical logic with the Boolean algebraic structure is the background of
their worldview. If we denote p1 a b, p2 a b, p3 a b, and p4
a b, we may call pk (1 k 4) atomic events because they make up
the nonoverlapping and exhaustive set of events. So we can decompose a, a,
b, b into atomic events pk. In such a logical atomism, the world divides into
facts, and the facts consist of atomic events (das Bestehen von Sach-
verhalten)if we use Wittgensteins phrase in the Tractatus. The set of atomic
events is called the logical spectrum of the world.
Note that the logical spectrum of the world may be relative to our de-
scriptive language. It may be simple and rough (as in the above case) or it may
be very ne (as in the case of a professional weather forecaster). Atomic events
may be decomposed by another logical spectrum, and we will get the descrip-
tion of the world in more and more detail. The point of logical atomism is not
the existence of absolutely atomic events, but the divisibility of any event into
more atomic events.
The usual formulation of quantum logic does not use the truth table, to
say nothing of Venns diagram. Quantum logical analysis is rather difcult in its
usual formulations, so I will give a very simple and understandable semantical
denition of quantum logic by using the concept of divisibility.
We dene the concept of commensurability of events:
aCb: the event a is commensurable with the event b

(2)
aCb def. aDb & bDa
Note that & is the symbol of semantics (metalanguage), and must be

distinguished from of the object-language.
Now we can dene the classical world in the following way.
The world W is classical def (ab)(a W & b W) aCb (3)
In the classical world all events are commensurable with each other, i.e.,
all events are divisible with each other. Let 0 denote the null event, which is
stipulated by the contradictory statement a a, and let 1 denote the all-inclu-
sive event, which is stipulated by the tautology a a. Then we can give a
natural meaning to the concept of the complete description of the classical
world by using the logical spectrum dened as follows:
The set of nonoverlapping and exhaustive events B bk is called a
logical spectrum,
i.e., i j, bi bj 0 and kbk 1

In the classical world, any event a can be decomposed into the logical sum
of atomic events with respect to the logical spectrum B as a k(a bk).
More generally, if there are multiple logical spectra B1, B2, B3, . . . Bl, a
can be decomposed as a k(l) (a b1k(1) b2k(2) . . . blk(l)), where blk(l )
is a member of Bl and k(l ) is the sum of all possible combinations of blk(l ).
If we conne ourselves to the classical world that contains a nite number
of events, then we can easily stipulate the condition of the complete descrip-
tion of the classical world.
Let us use the abbreviation wm b1k(1) b2k(2) ... blk(l )
Then we may say that the whole set of logical spectra B1, B2, B3, ... Bl
gives the complete description of the classical world if a wm 0 or a wm
wm for any event a. That is, any event can be decomposed to the logical sum
of wm, and we need no additional logical spectrum. Each wm may be called an
(absolutely) atomic event, and logical atomism is a suitable characterization of
the classical world.
If we assign equal probability for every atomic event wm, then we can
calculate the a priori probability of the event a.
n
P( a ) = P( w m ( a ) ) = N
m( a )
where N is the total number of atomic events, and n is the number of m(a) such
that a wm wm.
174 Yutaka Tanaka
The above description of the classical world is the logical basis of classi-
cal physics. The divisibility of any event a (a b) (a b) is always
presupposed, and we may say that one aim of physicists is to invent a new kind
of logical spectrum so that we may get nearer to the ideal of the complete
description of the world.
Quantum physics tells us that the divisibility formula a (a b)
(a b) does not always hold. In other words, there is a case in which the
event a is indivisible by the event b. For example, let a be the spin of the
electron is up along x-axis, and b be the spin of the same electron is up along
y-axis. Then a is indivisible by b, because of the indeterminacy principle.
Note that the indivisibility of an event a does not mean that a is indivis-
ible by any other event, but that there are some events by which a is indivisible.
So we can dene the individuality of an event as follows:
The event a has the character of individuality def. (x)( aDx) (4)
As there exist quantum events with the character of individuality, we

cannot use the probabilistic formula p(a) p(a b) p(a b) when a is
indivisible by b. As explained later, this is the reason why the Bell inequality
breaks down in quantum events.
The next task is to dene the quantum world through the concept of
divisibility. The quantum world is the world of quantum logic, which has the
algebraic structure of an orthomodular lattice. It is known that the orthocomple-
mented lattice is orthomodular if and only if the divisibility relation aDb is
symmetrical.13 So we can dene the quantum world as follows:
The world W is a quantum world if the relation of divisibility is sym-
metric, and there exist incommensurable events in W.
W is a quantum world def. (a,b)(a W & b W) (aDb bDa)

& (a,b)(a W & b W & aCb) (5)
The distinction between classical and quantum worlds is analogous to the

situation in relativity physics in which Riemannian geometry holds as a gener-
alization of Euclidean geometry. Some theorems of Euclidean geometry applied
to empirical data are not necessarily true in the relativistic world, especially
when gravitational effects are strong. In a similar way, some laws of classical
logic applied to empirical data are not necessarily true in the quantum world,
when we observe incommensurable events.
Although we can get classical logic by adding the condition of commen-
surability to quantum logic, quantum logic should not be considered a weird
or strange logic invented by logicians. Rather, quantum logic is more faithful
than classical logic to concrete experimental contexts, because it does not pre-
suppose the dogmatic thesis of divisibility of all events. Classical logic is em-
bedded in the deterministic world of classical physics where all propositions

have the established truth-values independent of observers. An atomistic view
of events is implicitly presupposed in classical physics. On the other hand, in
quantum physics, where irreducible contingency appears in the context of ob-
servation, the existence of an indivisible event is established. The individuality
of a quantum event can involve macroscopic spatiotemporal extension. It can
extend over two temporally distant locations that involve the indeterminate
past in the coordinate division, as in the delayed-choice experiment.
In the next section, we discuss the indivisibility of a quantum event that
extends over two spatially distant locations, i.e., the so-called EPR correlation.
Bells Inequality as an Analytical Result in the Classical World

The experimental test of Bells inequality, which the French physicist Alain
Aspect conducted in 1982, attracted the attention of those who were interested
in philosophical problems of quantum physics. This experiment manifested one
of the most paradoxical characteristics of quantum systems: the nonseparability
of two contingent events, involving the correlation of polarized photon pairs at
a distance. Both philosophers and physicists were reminded of the celebrated
debate between Bohr and Einstein about the completeness of quantum me-
chanics in the 1930s. The imaginary experiment, which Einstein used in his
polemics against the alleged completeness of quantum mechanics, became real
through the progress of technology. The combination of conceptual analysis and
experimental tests revived the controversy about the philosophical status of
quantum physics. The test of Bells theorem became a starting point for re-
freshed research into the nature of quantum events.
In this section, I will deduce the generalized Bells inequality as an ana-
lytical (necessary) result in the classical world, which I have dened in the
previous section. The classical assumption about the divisibility of an event into
the atomic components causes Bells inequality. We need only an elementary
theory of probability and information, and no additional physical knowledge to
derive Bells inequality.14
Suppose that A ai, B bj are two logical spectra, e.g., the set of
observable values in physical experiments. According to information theory, if
we measure A and B and get the value ai and bj, the newly acquired information
is
I(ai) log p(ai) I(bj) log p(bj)
The joint information of ai and bj is
I(ai bj) log p(ai bj)

176 Yutaka Tanaka
Similarly, the conditional information of ai given bj is
I(ai bj) log p(ai bj)
According to Bayes theorem,
I(ai bj) I(ai bj) I(bj) I(bj ai) I(ai)
The mean value of information of A and B is, respectively,
H ( A) = p(ai ) I (ai ) H ( B) = p(b j ) I (b j )

i j
Let the expectation of the joint information of (A and B) be H (A B).
H ( A B) = p(ai b j ) I (ai b j )
i, j
The conditional information of A given bj is
H( A bj ) = H (ai b j ) = p(ai b j ) I (ai b j )

i i
The conditional information of A given B is the mean value of H(A bj).
H ( A B) = p(b j ) H ( A b j ) = p(ai b j ) I (ai b j )

j i, j
The new formulation of Bayes theorem is
H(A B) H(A B) H(B) H(B A) H(A)
Let I(ai;bj)be the correlation information between ai and bj.
I(ai;bj) I(ai) I(ai bj) I(bj)I(bj ai)
Though the value of this correlation information may be positive or nega-

tive, its mean value must be non-negative according to Gibbs theorem.15
p( ai b j )
H ( A; B) = p(ai b j ) I (ai ; b j ) = p(b j ) p(ai b j ) log p( ai )
0
i, j j i
So we can get the fundamental inequality

H(A B) H(A) H(A B) (6)
Now we can deduce the generalized Bells inequality from (6)

Suppose and are two separated physical systems. has two logical
spectra A and A. has also two logical spectra B and B. Let ai, ak, bj, bl be
discrete observable values of A, A, B, and B.
In the classical world where all events are divisible with each other, there
exists the joint probability for every possible combination such as p(ai ak
bj bl).
So we can generalize the fundamental inequality (6) as follows:
H(A B) H(B) H(A B) H(A B A B)

H(A B A B) H(B A B) H(A B) H(B) (7)
Using H(A B A B) H(A B), H(B A B) H(B A), we sub-
tract H(B) from both sides of (7), and get the generalized Bells inequality as
follows:
Bell-I: H(A B) H(A B) H(B A) H(A B) (8)
We can rewrite (8) in the symmetrical form by using the concept of information
distance introduced by Schumacher.16 Dening the information distance (A, B)
between A and B as
(A, B) H(A B) H(B A)
we get the symmetrical representation of the generalized Bells inequality.
Bell-2: (A, B) (A, B) (B, A) (A, B) (9)
Note that the inequality (7) presupposes commensurability between A and A

and between B and B. So this inequality loses its meaning in the case of
incommensurable observables.
On the other hand, the inequality (8) is meaningful in the quantum world
because only commensurable pairs of observables (A and B), (A and B), (A
and B), and (A and B) appear.
So we can empirically test Bells inequality (8) to decide whether our
world is classical. The results of empirical tests by Aspect and others clearly
show Bells inequality does not hold. This experiment is analogous to the cru-
cial experiments of general relativity, which tell us that our world is non-
Euclidian, i.e., not at space-time. There is an experimentarily veried sense
in which we say our world is not a classical world.
Then what about the completeness of quantum physics against which
178 Yutaka Tanaka
Einstein protested? Does the disconrmation of Bells inequality prove the

completeness of quantum physics? As I argue elsewhere, the valid conclusions
of the EPR arguments and Bells theorem, even if we accept classical presup-
positions, is the nonlocality of an indivisible quantum event, and not the incom-
pleteness of quantum physics.17 Einsteins concept of completeness of a physi-
cal theory implicitly presupposes the classical world where the relation of
divisibility holds. In the quantum world where incommensurable (not mutually
divisible) events exist, the very concept of completeness does not hold. There-
fore, we must say that quantum physics is neither incomplete nor complete in
the classical sense.
The breakdown of Bells inequality shows that the seemingly plausible
logic that all events are divisible does not hold in the quantum world. The
crucial point, however, is how we should understand the key concept of di-
visibility. We have analyzed the concept of individuality in Bohrs sense in
terms of quantum logic to elucidate the difference between the classical and the
quantum worlds. The individuality in question does not assert the existence
of atomic events, each with a minute spatiotemporal extension. Rather, quantum
physics denies the worldview of classical logic, which we may characterize as
logical atomism after Wittgensteins Tractatus, because the quantum world
contains incommensurable events which classical logic a priori excludes.
What Bohr understands as individuality is not a spatiotemporal atom-
ism but the complementary descriptions of quantum phenomena, i.e., causal
relationships and space-time coordinations. Physical atomism implies a mecha-
nistic worldview in that the description of the whole can be reduced to the
descriptions of its elementary parts. Logical atomism presupposes that all prop-
ositions describing events have xed truth-values and are commensurable with
each other. Both kinds of atomism are not relevant to quantum physics today,
and to the philosophy of organism in Process and Reality.
Notes
1. A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Free Press, 1978), 283.
2. W.A. Christian, An Interpretation of Whiteheads Metaphysics (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1967): 8081.
3. C. Hartshorne, Whitehead and Ordinary Language, Southern Journal of
Philosophy, 7 (1969): 437445.
4. L. Ford, The Emergence of Whiteheads Metaphysics: 19251929 (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1984).
5. W. Heisenberg, The Physical Principles of Quantum Theory (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1930), 20.
6. A. Einstein, R.C. Tolman, and B. Podolsky, Knowledge of Past and Future in
Quantum Mechanics, Physical Review 37 (1931): 780781.
7. Ibid.
8. J.A. Wheeler, Law Without Law, in Quantum Theory and Measurement,
eds. J.A. Wheeler and W.F. Zurek (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Princeton Se-
ries in Physics, 1983), 182213.
9. Ibid., 194.
10. N. Bohr, Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic
Physics, in Quantum Theory and Measurement, eds. J.A. Wheeler and W.F. Zurek
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, Princeton Series in Physics, 1983), 18.
11. Heisenberg, Physical Principles, 65.
12. Ford, Emergence. Temporal atomicity is Fords usage, with which I dis-
agree, though I owe much to his insights into the compositional history of Process and
Reality.
13. M. Nakamura, The Permutability in a Certain Orthocomplemented Lattice,
Kodai Mathematics Series 9 (1957): 158160.
14. This argument is based on the probability theory of S. Wantanbe, Knowing
and Guessing: A Quantitative Study of Inference and Information (New York: Wiley,
1969). Braunstein and Caves show that Watanabes formulation of non-Boolean informa-
tion theory is closely related to Bells theorem in S.L. Braunstein and C.M. Caves,
Writing out Better Bell Inequalities, Proceedings of Third International Symposium of
Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1989): 161170.
15. Watanabe, Knowing, Chapter 1, Theorem 11.
16. B.W. Schumacher, Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of Information,
Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, no. 9 (1990).
17. Y. Tanaka, Bells Theorem and the Theory of RelativityAn Interpretation
of Quantum Correlation at a Distance Based on the Philosophy of Organism, The Annals
of the Japan Association for the Philosophy of Science 8, no. 2 (1992): 119.
14
Physical Process and Physical Law
David Ritz Finkelstein
I would like to thank the conveners for this chance to recall some of my debts
to Whitehead. I am no disciple, but I was certainly inuenced by his thought,
more than I realized at the time. I will tell the story in roughly chronological
order.
Quantum Logic
In high school I read science ction. One of the novels of L. Sprague de Camp
had intriguing symbolic logic equations (only in the original pulp versions,
the hard-cover editions are bowdlerized). The idea of an arithmetic of ideas
intrigued me and sent me to the Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and
Russell, probably my rst contact with Whiteheads thought.
As a high school student, I couldnt get into the central stacks of the New
York Public Library at rst, but the Harlem branch library had two volumes of
the Principia, which I plowed happily through.
It took me some years to recover from the chronic logicism I thus con-
tracted in Harlem. Nowadays I think that making logic fundamental is a mis-
take, because it separates it from dynamics. This split exists in classical
thought, but quantum theory fuses logic and dynamics into one simple algebraic
unity that should not be divided.
Even at the time, I felt let down by the Principia and the other books on
logic I tried. They were all obviously right, merely common sense. I had ex-
pected to nd that logic too had undergone some spectacular imagination-
straining upheaval, just as geometry had under Einstein. It seemed that it had
not.
180
Physical Process and Physical Law 181
In fact it had, but I did not nd out until I stumbled across von Neu-
manns quantum logic (von Neumann, 1955) later in college. Since so much of
physics still used the archaic classical logic, I felt at once that I had found my
lifes work. Whiteheads aphorism, Geometry is cross-classication, helped
me to understand von Neumanns quantum logic. One can still say that quan-
tum logic is projective geometry interpreted as cross-classication of quantum
systems.
Whitehead did not make a sharp distinction between mathematics and
logic. That would have been against the main aim of Principia: to reduce math-
ematics to logic. Von Neumanns point was that there is a physical logic just as
there is a physical geometry, and it is not a part of mathematics any more than
physical geometry is. I am not sure Whitehead would have accepted this view,
since he preserved a at space-time in his theory of gravity.
Quantum Process
Whiteheads Process and Reality also made it easier for me to understand some
of modern physics. Whitehead had set out to found a cosmology not on the
intuitions of Newton but on the latest state of our information about the world,
which means the basic ideas of relativity and quantum theory. I nd these ideas
all through his work.
One problem is that while relativity swept the eld within a few years
after its enunciation, quantum theory was split up into dialects. Different people
describe the same experiences in remarkably different languages. This is con-
fusing even to physicists. How can you tell when physicists agree if they sound
so different? It is certainly confusing to the general public. I think this Tower of
Babel leads many people still to think of quantum theory as a problem to be
solved rather than the solution of a problem.
The pioneering wave theory of Count Louis de Broglie, who never ac-
cepted Heisenbergs radical quantum view, still has great inuence. Wigner pro-
mulgated a non-Copenhagen way to express quantum theory that he termed
orthodox. Orthodox quantum theory drops the quantum wholeness and ob-
jectlessness that Bohr and Heisenberg emphasized, and treats the wave function
as the fundamental variable object of quantum theory. It speaks just as if the
system under study were a wave, but one that collapses when we make mea-
surements on the system.
There are systems whose states are wave functions. They are called
waves. A quantum is not a wave. Wave functions represent acts of preparing
the quantum and measuring its properties. There are two such processes in
every experiment, input at the beginning and outtake at the end. We do one,
then we do the other. Many teachers of quantum theory mistake one process
following another for one object collapsing into another.
182 David Ritz Finkelstein
Quantum Actuality
Describing the process and not the product is still a new thing in physics. In
classical physics, one represses the observer and the act of observation and
talks naively about things as they are, as if we had direct knowledge of
things as they are. I heard someone here too say that physics is about things
as they are. I hate to disagree, but physics today is about what goes on, not
about what is; about actuality, not reality. This usage of actuality is one of my
favorite Whiteheadisms.
Heisenberg formulated the quantum theory in the same city and decade in
which Kandinsky coined the phrase non-objective art. I assume that Heisenberg
borrowed from Kandinsky when he called quantum theory non-objective
physics. The main idea of quantum theory is to talk about what you do, not
about things as they are; to represent the whole process and use the theory to
estimate whether it will happen. Heisenberg set up an algebra of observables in
which the fundamental elements are operators, and could just as well be called
processes. They represent what we do, not what is.
Input and outtake processes seem to be special cases of Whiteheads gen-
eral concept of process. I suppose that the operational aspect of modern
physics, which is so powerful in relativity theory and quantum theory, as well
as the precedent of existentialism, encouraged Whitehead to take the idea of
process as fundamental. In modern physics we learn to do this. The event of
relativity theory is a tiny process, and the experiments of quantum theory are
extended processes.
Quantum Law
Our philosophy and theology inuence our physics. To understand the develop-
ment of physics, we should take seventeenth-century theism into account.
Newton is an anomaly in this respect. In the rst place, he did not believe
in a closed physical theory, a xed governing law. Newton was no Newtonian.
He took it for granted that God steps in now and then to keep things working in
a reasonable way:
Since Space is divisible ad innitum and matter is not necessarily in all

places, it may also be allowed that God is able to create particles of matter of
several sizes and gures and in several proportions to Space and perhaps of differ-
ent densities and forces and thereby to vary the laws of nature and make worlds of
several sorts in several parts of the universe. At least I see nothing of contradic-
tion with all this. (Newton, 1730, Query 32)
This implies that God does experiments to learn, and so that God is unn-
ished and develops, a heresy of the Old Unitarians. Newton went to some pains
to conceal this belief, unsuccessfully attempting to destroy all copies of the

above quotation.
What puzzles me most about the theory of a variable dynamical law is
that if such creativity prevails in the universe, how do we account for all the
non-creativity that seems to prevail? If the elements of nature are creative, how
come so much of nature goes by rote? Why does the apple fall every time we
drop it? I get back to this question later.
I have gone through four stages of separation from the concept of xed
universal law:
1. Polynomy: When I began to teach physics, I told my students that
physics was the search for the laws of nature.
2. Mononomy: After I read more of Einstein, I taught that physics
was the search for the Law of Nature. I thought this was an inspir-
ing insight.
3. Anomy: Then I suspected that there is no law.
4. Panomy: Now I think that there actually is a law, an evolving law
like Newtons rather than an absolute one like Laplaces, and all
there is is that law.
For the rst hundred years or two after Newton, most physicists assumed
mononomy, one xed, absolute law. Most of the other fundamental absolutes of
classical physics have been relativized since then. First Newtons absolute
space fused with his absolute time, and in the process both were relativized. In
todays physics, one of the few survivors of the mechanical doctrine is still the
idea that there is a xed law. Unied eld theory, grand unied theory, theory
of everything, and string theory may still incorporate this faith.
In quantum theory, one becomes doubtful about the doctrine of absolute
law. If we observe the law, we change it. If we cannot observe it, who needs it?
By kinematics I mean the theory of the description of motion. Kinematics
is the linguistics of physics. It sets up a formal language, a syntax, usually
dreadfully mathematical, and a semantics, something like a dictionary relating
the terms of the language to the experiences that go on or do not go on, includ-
ing all the measurements you could make and all the experiences you could
have in principle. Then a dynamics, an absolute law, is supposed to be what
selects a subclass of these kinematic possibilities. Finally, the boundary data
complete the process of selection.
Then what in actuality singles out the actual from all that is possible?
Whitehead is explicit about thisit is the aim of the organism.
But organisms change their aims. So this sounds as if Whitehead too is
giving up the idea of an immutable natural law.
Certainly C. S. Peirce, a profoundly evolutionary thinker, rejected the

idea of an absolute law. He insisted that the law had to evolve like everything
else, and he even described the process by which he thought it evolved. He
began with a rst ash where today we speak of the big bang. He invoked a
habit-forming tendency in nature much as we speak of Bose-Einstein statis-
tics today.
I was gratied at this meeting to discover something that probably every-
one here knows, that Whitehead indeed imagined the law itself as mutable.
Here on page 27 of the program for this meeting is question 10, the last, in the
nal examination that Whitehead gave at Harvard in 1927:
Potency refers to the continuum of nature, Act to the community of atomic

creatures. Potency is the character of the creativity due to the creatures. Explain
this doctrine, pointing out its bearing (a) on the logical inconsistency in the notion
of a continuous becoming of an extended continuity of creatures, (b) on the doc-
trine of an evolution of laws of nature, (c) on the meaning of future.
So Whitehead too had believed that there is no denite xed law of na-
ture. That law also is part of the creative process. In modern times, J. A.
Wheeler is eminent among physicists who insist that the laws of nature are
mutable. As he puts it, There is no law but the law of averages. To which I
would add which is not a law. It does not tell you what is going to happen on
any occasion.
As I have already mentioned, dynamics is kinematics plus law. This sep-
aration is a modern remnant of the old distinction between space and time.
The original formulation of quantum theory deals with operations at one
moment. It is fundamentally nonrelativistic therefore; as has been pointed out
from the start by such founding fathers of quantum theory as Bohr, von Neu-
mann, and Wigner. Kinematics is the structure of the instant, dynamics is about
how to get from one instant to another.
A true network theory of the kind that Geoffrey Chew shared this morn-
ing might describe processes in a way that does not introduce a distinction
between space and time, or kinematics and dynamics. Actual processes or
events or transitions do not connect events at the same time but take time to
cover space. It describes a physical process by giving its ne structure from
input to outtake. Each such description then assigns an amplitude to every other
description. There seems no place in such a theory for a separate law of nature.
The description of the process sufces. Perhaps the process is the law.
That is my main point. The search for a separate law, which has evoked
considerable criticism within physics already, may be a relic of another century.
Whitehead saw that earlier than most.
Updates
My students and I at Georgia Tech are looking at a new algebraic formulation
of quantum physics. For us, the law is not only a variable, it is the only vari-
able; just as the geometry is not only a variable in Einsteins unied eld the-
ory, it is the only variable.
Like Whiteheads theory of organism, ours is a cellular theory of actu-
ality. This raises at the start the question of how the elementary quantum pro-
cesses of the universe compose into the whole. What is their statistics?
First we tried iterated Fermi-Dirac statistics, then Bose-Einstein, and now
we have settled on an iterated Clifford statistics that seems most promising
(Baugh et al., 2001).
In Clifford statistics the collective is described by a Clifford algebra with
one generator for each element of the collective. The Clifford elements can be
interpreted as permutations. This gives a new meaning to spinors, the sub-
stratum supporting this algebra. A spinor too describes a collective, not an
individual.
Von Neumanns concept of quantum logic has serious limitations. It is not
operationally simple, it lacks the higher levels of logic, and it is based in irre-
versible processes of ltration.
Clifford algebra is operationally simple. It can be used to represent not
irreversible ltrations but reversible beam-splittings. It can be iterated to repre-
sent the higher levels of logic. It is extensional, providing a class for each
predicate. As an algebraic logic it evades the three problems I mentioned with
von Neumanns.
This work has been greatly forwarded lately by a belated recognition of a
guide to relativization put forward by Irving Segal (Segal, 1951) and by Inonu
and Wigner in the early 1950s. They provide an idol-detector, a way to spot
false absolutes of the kind that Francis Bacon called idols (of the tribe, cave,
marketplace and theater), and an idol-smasher, a specic way to break each idol
that it detects.
The absolute universal law is among the highest of these idols. The con-
stant imaginary i of quantum theory and the space-time of eld theory are also
idols ripe for smashing. We break all of these at once in our current exploration
of Clifford statistics and feed them into the variable law.
Why has the belief in a single law worked so well? The corresponding
question for geometry is answered, Because the gravitational constant in Ein-
steins law of gravity is so small. This makes space-time stiff in the classical
theory. Probably the same constant accounts for the stiffness of natural law in
the classical theory, because the geometry of space-time is just the dynamical
law for a small probe. In both cases, I suppose that the quantum structure of
space-time or law admits a classical model because of a cosmic quantum con-

densation that forms the present vacuum.
In my talk, I said an impolite thing about the concept of a wave function
of the universe. I accused it of being non-operational. I have edited this out
because in the meantime I have seen the error of my ways, thanks to Segals
criterion. The experimenter too is an idol in the usual quantum theory. Smash-
ing this idol lets in quantum descriptions of the experimenter and probably of
the cosmic process. Since time is a variable of the experimenter, not the system,
we must smash the idol of the classical experimenter to get to the quantum
structure of time and the chronon.
From the original quantum-theoretic viewpoint, the wave function of the
universe is a solecism. It rejects the quantum idea of describing just the acts of
the experimenter, and pretends to describe what actually goes on everywhere in
the universe.
Now I believe that this is the right thing to do. We must go beyond
operationalism if we wish a cosmology that takes into account the facts of
quantum theory.
To be sure, applying quantum theory to the universe implicitly puts an
all-powerful, all-knowing observer outside the universe looking in at it. But
Laplace used just this metaphor in classical cosmology without disaster, and it
seems just as useful in quantum cosmology. We still describe the process, not
the product, but now it is the cosmic process. We can draw inferences about
what we experience from the theory of what a Cosmic Experimenter would
experience.
I am happy to learn that Bohr, who was originally infuriated by the notion
of a quantum universe, softened to it by 1936, expounded a doctrine of univer-
sal relativity, and called for a theory that took into account the quantum nature
of the entire experiment, as many do today (Bohr, 1936).
References
Baugh, J., D. R. Finkelstein, A. Galiautdinov, and H. Saller. Clifford algebra as quan-

tum language. Journal of Mathematical Physics 42: 1489 (2001).
Bohr, N. Causality and complementarity. Philosophy of Science 4: 2934 (1936).
Newton, Isaac. Opticks, 4th edition, Wm. Innys, London (1730). Republished, Bell, Lon-
don (1931).
Segal, I. E. A class of operator algebras which are determined by groups. Duke Mathe-
matics Journal 18: 221 (1951).
Von Neumann, J. Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (trans. R. T. Beyer).

Princeton University Press, Princeton (1955).
15
Dialogue for Part III
The dialogue presented below occurred in response to presentations by David

Finkelstein and Yutaka Tanaka.
John Lango: The question I have is about the relevance to Whiteheads meta-
physics. Whitehead is primarily inuenced by relativity theory, a subject he
worked on, and only tangentially inuenced by quantum theory. Many of the
radical developments of quantum theory were going on in the 1920s while he
was writing Process and Reality [see Bibliography: Whitehead, 1929] so its
understandable why he would be less inuenced by them. It seems to me that
there are real problems with squaring his metaphysics with quantum theory.
Your interpretation of Heisenberg is that he talked about processes, the process
of interrogating nature or experimenting with nature, whereas Process and Re-
ality reects the metaphysical vision of Platos Timaeus where the whole uni-
verse consists in processes, and what physicists do in questioning nature
through experimentation is just one subset of those processes. So it seems to me
that what Heisenberg is doing is more naturally understood in terms of the
idealist tradition of Hume and Kant and that it squares much less with what I
think are more objectivist ancient Greek-like approaches to the process of
Whitehead.
Finkelstein: Certainly Heisenberg formulated his quantum theory in terms of
very special processesmeasurementsbut Im sure that what Geoffrey said
earlier, that measurements are not that different from other processes, theyre
not that special, is something that most physicists take for granted, including
Heisenberg.
Stapp: Its certainly true that Whitehead was a great scholar in relativity the-
ory and he wrote books on it and had his own variation. But I think its proba-
bly likely that he was aware of quantum jumps. It was 1915 when Bohr came
up with that idea, and I think that fed into his idea that actual occasions are
event-like, with a jump, and of things happening. A world based on happenings
187
probably was given a lot of support by his awareness of the rudimentary devel-
opments in quantum theory even before the late 1920s. There was a lot of
quantum theory in the air, and he must have known about it and been inu-
enced. And he does mention quantum theory now and then.
Klein: I think you are correct that there are discrepancies between Whitehead
and modern quantum theory, and I recommend to anybody a chapter in Pen-
roses book by Abner Shimony [see Bibliography: Shimony, 1997], whos a big
Whitehead fan but who advocates an augmented Whiteheadianism. There are a
lot of similarities that Henry has pointed out. David has pointed out further
similarities with potentialities, etc. There are these very close matches, but its
missing something, and what Shimony is talking about is an augmented White-
headism and maybe thats what we should be talking about. Lets not take
Whitehead of the 1920s too seriously, but imagine an augmented Whitehead, as
if he were around now with knowledge of Bells theorem and modern issues.
Would it just be augmented or would it require a fundamental transformation of
some or all of his categories?
Clayton: It has often been said that Whitehead didnt take into account much
of quantum theory, understood at least according to the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion. Are you trying to augment or transform Whitehead and/or rethink some of
the standard sayings of quantum theory to bring them together? Can you clarify
the common ground in the two projects that youre involved in?
Stapp: John Lango convinced me that Whiteheads idea of platonic ideals is
maybe not a good thing. You dont need platonic ideas. The Aristotelian idea of
forms as potentialities is much more useful for the quantum view of the uni-
verse, so I think that you probably do want to sort out what you want to take
out of Whitehead. Certainly as a physicist, he didnt have the benet of a lot of
experience that we haveyou dont regard him as the authority.
Clayton: And at the same time youre breaking with some standard inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics when you bring in dialogue with this new
Whitehead.
Stapp: Well, what is standard? There are so many interpretations, and in most
interpretations physicists want to keep mind outthat mind is something we
better get out of the system. On the other hand, if you want an ontological
interpretation, you can take the simplest view of von Neumanns idea that there
is a state of the universe that collapses and has certain structures. That is,
ontologically speaking, a very simple way to develop quantum theory. From
that simplest view you automatically get these things. The observer is pushed
out somehow and his or her questions have to remain.
Finkelstein: I tried to line up the ideas of Whitehead with those of quantum
theory, and it doesnt work completely [see Bibliography: Finkelstein, 1997].
Dialogue for Part III 189
The concept of the concrescence of occasions is a problem. Whitehead indi-

cates that an occasion can be resolved into concrescences of other occasions in
a non-unique way, its variable, that sounds very much like the resolution of a
vector into components in several different ways, and that makes concrescence
sound like quantum superposition. But then theres nothing anywhere in the
structure that sounds like the other important operation in quantum theory,
which is multiplicationthe combining of a proton and a neutron to make a
deuteron or the building up of an atom, etc. And of course thats necessary.
Lango: Between concrescence and quantum superposition, I think with con-
crescence theres nal causation. I dont think theres nal causation in quantum
superposition, and so that leads me to think that theres a radical discrepancy
between Whitehead and a quantum picture of the world. In fact, during this
whole discussion I never heard the term nal causation mentioned, and thats
an essential ingredient in Whiteheads metaphysics. Its a strange ingredient and
its one thing that prevented Whiteheads philosophy from being the philosophy
of the twentieth century. Thats another example of where its difcult to square
quantum theory with Whitehead without transforming Whitehead.
Finkelstein: By all means, I would like to transform him. Im sure that

Whitehead is the last person who wants to stop the process. And in quantum
theory there is something that could be called nal and initial causation. In
Diracs language theyre called kets and bras; the ket represents the process
by which you begin an experiment like putting a photon into a polarizer, and
the bra represents the action you carry out at the end of the experiment when
you have an analyzer and see whether the photon gets through to your eye. That
ends the experiment, so its quite nal.
Tanaka: Whitehead wrote the book The Principle of Relativity [see Bibli-
ography: Whitehead, 1922]. The meaning of Whiteheads principles of rela-
tivity in his physical works is similar to Einsteins but with slight differences. In
Process and Reality, the principle of relativity has a metaphysical meaning. It
means a thoroughgoing relationality between actual occasions. The physical
world is not absolute. It can change from cosmic epoch to cosmic epoch, and
dimensions of spacetime are also changeable. The present four dimensions of
spacetime are an accidental fact to Whiteheads cosmology. So to Whitehead
the relationality of actual occasions is basic in a metaphysical sense, and the
physical roles must be deduced from the metaphysical relationalities. But the
physical role itself cannot be conrmed on empirical grounds because empirical
testing requires a uniform sense in the subjective world.
I want to emphasize the meaning of the experiential aspect of actual occa-
sions. Many physicists deny the experiential aspect of elementary events in the
physical world. But I think that such events and objects are abstractions from
actual occasions, more exactly the relationality of actual occasions. So I am
very much inspired by Professor Stapps ideas of the experiential aspect and
then to deduce physical objects so that subjectivity is present also in the micro-
scopic level. Whitehead only stated this idea in the general, metaphysical sense.
He did not construct a concrete physical theorythat is the physicists role.
The question I have for David Finkelstein is that I think he must stress the
relativization of classical logic. Your main idea for the interpretation of quan-
tum physics is that the classical logic of classical physics cannot hold in the
most basic description of the world because it does not accept the relationality
of quantum events. Einstein rejects the completeness of quantum physics be-
cause, in part, he assumes classical logic.
I ask Professor Finkelstein, when you relativize absolute dynamic roles,
what is your own background logicis it classical logic or quantum logic?
Finkelstein: First of all, thank you for your kind remarks about my old work,
but I no longer believe it. When I rst came across von Neumanns lovely idea
of quantum logic, rst in his book and then in a paper with Birkhoff, on the
revision of logic involved with quantum theory, I was still rather fresh from
going through Whitehead and Russell, and Whitehead, when they wrote Princi-
pia, was a thoroughgoing logicist. He really thought logic was fundamental,
and so anything that changes logic must be very important. And its still true,
yes its important, but thats not the best way to look at it. I think, from the
point of view either of organism or of quantum theory, logic is sort of an
epiphenomenon, a very high level description of the actual dynamical processes
that go on. In fact, the von Neumann logic is peculiarly timeless, its not
enough for physics, you cant build a physical theory on Boolean algebra alone.
You certainly cant build physics out of a Boolean algebra of things at just one
moment, and you certainly cant do it out of the von Neumann modications of
Boolean algebra. You need a deeper theory, and I think that dynamics or kine-
matics (I no longer distinguish between the two) is that deeper theory. Logicism
is just an early stage that everybody has to go through.
Tanaka: A difference between Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead,
in their attitude towards mathematics, was that Russell wanted to reduce mathe-
matics to logic, but Whitehead on the contrary reduced mathematics to algebra.
Whitehead was more of an applied mathematician; he majored not in pure
mathematics but in applied mathematics and theoretical physics. He constructed
a new theory of gravitation that is different from Einsteins theory. Algebra is
more to the center for him than logic, so I think there is commonality between
Whiteheads ideas of mathematics and Finkelsteins ideas of quantum logic.
Finkelstein: I hadnt realized that. Thank you very much for pointing it out.
Malin: The idea that the laws of nature are habits of nature is something
which Whitehead believed in, and it is certainly very attractive. Now, if its
true, the way we would expect it to manifest is to see that the constants of
nature are variable. So far as I know there is a very precise measurement that
they are not variable to 1 in 1012 or something like thatvery accurate. How
do we deal with that? Well, one way is to say that Whitehead is wrong. Another
way is to say that they do vary but they have not detected it yet. And another
possibility is that there is an interconsistency between the different laws of
nature that we havent realized yet, which brings about the fact that they cannot
change, some self-consistency condition. So what do you think about that?
Finkelstein: I associate the idea that natural law is just a habit with Peirce
more than Whitehead. Did he share that idea also?
Malin: Oh, yes.
Finkelstein: Thank you. The idea that things or happenings tend to increase
their probability of happening again, we dont call it habit anymore in physics,
of course, we call it Bose-Einstein statistics. Thats a guess that natural law is a
condensation phenomenon. Im very much inclined to the view that Geoffrey
put forward earlier that really its all in the vacuum. I suspect that the things we
call laws today are simply phenomenological descriptions of the quantum ne
structure of the vacuum. That I guess is a condensation phenomenon. The lim-
ited number of possible laws is the result of a limited number of possible
phases. And so the apparent constancy of law arises because there are jumps
between them, just as there are between the various crystalline forms of ice.
You dont have a smooth variation from one to the other. It takes a real disaster.
Fagg: How congenial are your ideas on this with Wheelers talking about
mutability of law, law without law, and so forth?
Finkelstein: He simply came to this conclusion before I did. I have no prob-
lem with it at all.
Fagg: If youre dealing with the entire universe, then where is the observer?
Its outside the universe, for which there is no physical outside. Im not up to
date on Jim Hartle and Murray Gell-Mann, but the last I remember reading
about their work, theyre talking about a coarse-graining kind of quantum me-
chanics in which they are able to average over parts of the wave function of the
universe that are insignicant. They invoke the idea of decoherence and so
forth, and they seem to feel that they can proceed with this without the neces-
sity of an observer.
Finkelstein: At the beginning of ones encounter with quantum theory, there
really are two roads, probably more than two, but I want to conrm one particu-
lar junction. If you look at Kandinskys paintings, you can say there are no
objects on the canvas because hes a bad painter, or you can say he didnt think
there are objects and he wanted to express this in his work. Likewise, if you
look at the quantum theory of Bohr and Heisenberg, you can say they left out
an ontology because theyre not great physicists, they had to get the experi-
ments working and so on, they just wanted the answers. Or, if you actually read
what they say, you see its a matter of principle that they didnt give an ontol-
ogy. They really thought in terms of process as primary. Its not that something
is left out. Heisenberg called it nonobjective physics because he didnt think
there are objects. Now, if you take that road, then you work algebraically with
the processes themselves, but if you insist on objects, if you insist on an ontol-
ogy, rather than a kinematics, youll have to run around desperately for some-
thing these operators can act on. And Schrodinger provided wave functions for
this. You have to ignore the fact that von Neumann is very careful about indi-
cating that a quantum system does not have a wave function.
A quantum system does not have a state. When we take up quantum
theory, we make a list of the questions we can ask of a quantum system. The
question What is your state? is not in that list. You can ask about the energy,
the momentum, etc., but nowhere are you allowed to ask, What is the state?
So in an important sense there is no quantum variable corresponding to the
state. You put one in because its suggested by the mathematics and because
were desperate for an object. And if you do that, then you have to wonder
about the crazy things this state does. To conceal the fact that it doesnt exist,
you have to make it collapse at critical times. The whole business of collaps-
ing states obviously comes from clutching the idea that a quantum system has a
state. Remember that in von Neumanns book the wave function is something
that describes not one quantum system but what he calls a reiner Fall, which
translates as a homogeneous case. For a homogeneous case you just need to
have some way of making quantum systems, and you make a lot of them all the
same way. So as Belinfante, Dirac, and others say, Ahah! its the way you make
the quantum system thats described by the wave function, or the psi vector, or
what have you. Its the process.
I like that very much, but then you dont pull one member out of the
ensemble and say it has a state which somehow tells you what the whole ensem-
ble is. You cannot look at a quantum system and see how it was made. It doesnt
have enough information in it. You can ask it any question, but you will not nd
out from it how it was made. So its totally nonoperational, totally counterex-
periential to introduce the idea that a quantum system has a state. Theres a huge
variety of so-called states actually representing questions we choose to put, and
the system will come up with either a yes or a no depending on, in part, its
past and, in part, on a decision thats made on the spot.
Thats the other choice that Henry Stapp speaks of. There really are two
choices. We decide the question, and nature or the system or a collective or
God decides yes or no. But all you get from the experiment is one bit. You
put in a huge amount of information, rotate a polarizer or tune a particle detec-
tor, and all you get out is a yes or no. To imagine that the system is
carrying an innite amount of information besides this yes or no doesnt
agree with our experience.
Eastman: In contrast to experiments that can be linked rather directly to ex-

perience, Whitehead also introduced the extensive continuum. Can someone
comment on this abstract concept?
Tanaka: Whitehead distinguished between spacetime and an extensive con-
tinuum, the latter being a proto-spacetime. Since Whitehead discusses the ex-
tensive continuum, he drops the dimensionality of spacetime. Dimensionality is
a physical concept; we are located in three dimensions of space and one of
time, a physical, contingent fact. In the extensive continuum there is mutual
immanence of pre-events despite the fact of temporal order in the physical
world. Whitehead explicitly says that every event is immanent in other events
regardless of the causal order. My paper is a tentative formulation of White-
heads extensive continuum as a proto-space-time.
Finkelstein: Since I may be involved a little in getting you started on this

project, I feel that I should point that theres a limit to how much satisfaction
you can get out of quantum logic of this kind. If you think of the letters A, B,
and so on as representing processes, then a simple way to combine two pro-
cesses is to do one after the other. That goes on in the laboratory all the time.
You put one polarizer after another, for example. But thats not what occurs in
this kind of quantum logic. Here we deal with A B and A B. To verify
that A B equals C, it really takes an innite number of experiments of the
kind I just mentioned, the serial composition type. That doesnt mean anything
here is wrong or inadequate, it just suggests that it cant be fundamental.
A more fundamental thing is the dynamical composition of processes in
terms of which the and can then be expressed. There is another unsatisfy-
ing feature of this quantum logic for me, which again doesnt mean its wrong,
it just means that more work has to be done. With classical logic theres an
important kind of extensionality. Each property corresponds to a set of individ-
uals, those having that property, and each set corresponds to a property, the
property of belonging to that set. (I understand there are problems when you get
to innite sets and problems of self-reference. We now know how to take care
of these nowadays, in fact, von Neumann is one of the pioneers in doing this,
but I point out that he only did this for classical logic.) Extensionality cannot
really be asserted for this system of quantum logic. There isnt the quantum set
theory to go with this quantum logic to make it an extensional theory. To make
a set theory requires a further algebraic structure that is still lacking here. You
require it to go to the higher-order logic. This is all rst-order logic, and you
cant do physics with a rst-order logic. You need the whole apparatus, the
hierarchy of statements about statements about statements, and thats still lack-
ing.
Eastman: Youre saying that current quantum logic is intrinsically incom-

plete?
Finkelstein: At any rate, the quantum logic that we have seen used today is a
small part of what is needed. [I am avoiding the word incomplete only because
of its technical meanings.]
Tanaka: I think that quantum propositional logic is rather simple. It has the
modular orthocomplemented structure of a projective lattice. There are many
difcult problems with quantum predicate logic, so I cannot resolve these prob-
lems, especially as one applies quantum logic to innite structures. Classical
logic is very straightforward and we can easily use it as a tool of innities, but
quantum logic cannot be used so easily as a tool for innities. So when we
deduce many things we easily use the classical logic, but I want to say that the
fundamental principle of classical logic does not hold necessarily in this world
the world we live in. So the conclusion of my quantum logic paper is that in the
quantum logical world, the analytical truths of the classical world do not neces-
sarily hold, so we can say that we live in the quantum physical world after the
experimental disproof of Bells inequalities.
Finkelstein: I agree: We need a more quantum logic.
Valenza: I would like to ask Professor Tanaka to repeat his argument against
this linear ordering underlying actual events as, for example, in the Bell Aspect
experiments, followed by a response by Professor Stapp.
Tanaka: For three events E1, E2, and E3 at locations l1, l2, and l3, if all
events lie in a well-ordered sequence of occurrence as Professor Stapp assumes,
there must be an unambiguous temporal order between events E1 and E2. One
of the two events must be prior to the other. A difculty of the above picture is
that there does not seem to be any experimental apparatus to really determine
which event is prior, E1 or E2.
Stapp: It is precisely because there is no empirical way to determine the
order in which the actualizations located in spacelike separated regions occur
that there is freedom to make the ordering at the ontological level go either one
way or the other. The basic ontology goes beyond what the empirical tests
reveal.
Tanaka: So your full theory operates at the ontological level and not just the
physical level. Your model is very welcome to Hartshornes type of process
metaphysics, so I try to give another version more faithful to a Whiteheadian,
ontological framework.
Stapp: Hartshorne certainly liked the idea that occasions occur in a well-
dened order. I think that the Whiteheadian idea of an actual occasion is that an
actual occasion, in its coming into being, xes where it is. In my understanding
of Whitehead, he talks about this actual world for an event, which I interpret as
being the events that have already occurred in the backward light cone of that
event, and that are xed and settled. This is ne if you have a well-dened idea
of coming into being in which the space-time location of the actual occasion is
already xed. Then you know its backward light cone, and its actual world, the
world upon which the occasion can draw causally, in the Whiteheadian point of
view. But if you have two possible events and youre not saying which event
comes into being rst, then you dont know enough. This event might decide to
locate itself in the backward light cone of the other one. So you seem to arrive
at some sort of logical problem in making the Whiteheadian idea work, if you
dont say that they occur in a certain sequential order. What is xed and settled
if the order of coming into being is not denite? That is just reading Whitehead
literally. Now I heard you say something about each event being immanent in
the other, and how that was going to get you out of this difculty, but I did not
understand that notion well enough to comment upon it.
Eastman: Jorge Nobo has referred to a certain range, width or duration, to
include space-like separated regions other than ones in the backward light
conespace-like separated regions that give rise to this dilemma that were
now referring to. Perhaps there is some duration that is necessarily part of this.
Does the concept of duration help in this discussion?
Stapp: Whitehead, in order to deal with this sort of problem, gets into the
idea of presentational immediacy. That is, when you experience some distant
event, it has the appearance of happening now even if you have access only
to your past, and are causally inuenced only by the past. Nonetheless, you
perceive the faraway event as happening now, even though you dont really
have causal access to the region where it seems to be happening. You have an
indirect access because of your access to the past of that faraway event, and
that past will propagate into the location of that event. This is somewhat like
how the human brain works. You have processes in the brain that automatically
account for delays and that create a nice picture as though the things are all
happening now. But that picture is constructed from various things that actually
happened in the past. So its some sort of an illusion that experience is in the
now. But I dont think that this sort of shufing, which can be accounted by
classical processing, can account for causal inuence of the type that the dis-
conrmation of Bells theorem seems to require. If you have another idea of
Whitehead according to which two events can be immanent in each other,
within an evolving universe, then I will be glad to listen. But there certainly is a
problem reconciling the correlation data of quantum theory with any theory that
allows causal effects only in the forward light cone of their causes.
Part IV
Metaphysics
16
Whiteheads Process Philosophy
as Scientic Metaphysics
Franz G. Riffert
Why Whitehead and Bunge?

This chapter tries to explicate some parallels between analytic philosophy and
process philosophy. It is intended to show that process thought and analytical
convictions may be quite consonant on a formal-methodological level. But
since there is not just one process philosophy and even less one analytic philos-
ophy, we rst have to adjust our task, limiting our undertaking to two concrete
exponents of these two traditions.
Rescher correctly pointed out that under the heading of process philoso-
phy there are distinct approaches to implementing its pivotal idea of per-
vasiveness and fundamentality of process, ranging from a materialism of physi-
cal processes (as with Boscovitch) to speculative idealism of psychic processes
(as in some versions of Indian philosophy) (IPP 8). Whiteheads particular
process philosophy is used here because he attempted to connect with and build
upon scientic results. Prigogine and Stengers, for instance, confess that they
are truly fascinated by his [Whiteheads] unusual resoluteness to reach com-
prehensive consistency (DN 101, my translation). And they go on: White-
heads cosmology is so far the most ambitious attempt of such a philosophy.
Whitehead saw no basic contradiction between science and philosophy. . . . The
aim was to formulate a minimum of principles with the help of which, all
physical existencefrom stone to mencould be characterized (DN 102, my
translation). A similar reaction came even much earlier, in 1951, from the logi-
cian and philosopher Bochenski: His [Whiteheads] work is the most complete
philosophical treatment of the results of (natural) sciences we own (EPG 106,
my translation). Many similar quotations could be added. It is no question that
Whitehead is one of the outstanding gures in the elds of logic and meta-
199
200 Franz G. Riffert
physics in the twentieth century. This is the reason why his work will be the
exponent of process philosophy for the following comparison.
However, not only process philosophy is multifaceted. Even more so is
the analytic tradition in philosophy. It has developed into several branches or
schools. One can at least distinguish between logical positivism, ordinary lan-
guage philosophy and critical rationalism.
An attempt to compare Whiteheads metaphysics to the rst two men-
tioned branches of analytic philosophy only can yield an abyss of fundamental
differences. Logical positivism, as developed in the Vienna Circlefor in-
stance by Rudolf Carnap (LAW ), Moritz Schlick (MV ), and Alfred J. Ayer
(LTL)in its very essence is of a strict antimetaphysical attitude. The so-called
criterion of meaning was formulated as the verication principle: The meaning
of a proposition is the method of its verication (MV 148). Since metaphysical
propositions are not veriable, they are claimed to be meaningless. Meta-
physics, in the eyes of the positivists, was reduced to bare nonsense. That one
will not be able to nd any substantial positive relations between Whiteheads
thought and the logical positivists rejection of any kind of metaphysics what-
soever does, of course, not need any further demonstration.
The same also holds for the relationship between Whiteheads philosophy
and the so-called Oxford Model (Strawson, IDM; Tugendhat, VES ) within the
analytic tradition. Ordinary language philosophy is the attempt to get to truths
by the mere analysis of ordinary languages and their (deep) grammatical struc-
tures. Whitehead opposes this approach quite openly in the following passage:
There is an insistent presupposition sterilizing philosophic thought. It is the
belief, the very natural belief, that mankind has consciously entertained all the
fundamental ideas that are applicable to its experience. Further it is held that
human language, in single words or in phrases, explicitly express these ideas
(MT 173). Whitehead has called this belief The Fallacy of the Perfect Dictio-
nary (MT 173). He was convinced that pure descriptive analysis of natural
languages in the end would be barren. His alternative approach couldaccord-
ing to Strawson (IDM 9)be termed revisionary or constructive: Words and
phrases must be stretched towards a generality foreign to their ordinary use
(PR 4). This was the revisionary procedure Whitehead used when he states that
an actual entity is a feelinga clear and deliberate metaphor. Only by revi-
sionary proceduresjust like in sciencescan metaphysicians hope to push
the limits of knowledge. (For a detailed discussion on that topic see McHenry,
DRT and Haak, DRM.) So here again we arrive at a deep difference: White-
heads process approach and the Oxford Model seem to be incompatible. Any
attempt to nd parallels between these two approaches seems to be hopeless
from the start.
I now turn to the last-mentioned school of analytic philosophy: critical
rationalism. Sir Karl Popper founded the critico-rationalist position. He held
neither that there is any clear-cut demarcation line between fruitful sciences and
senseless metaphysics, nor that pure analysis and description of the grammati-
Whiteheads Scientic Metaphysics 201
cal structures of natural languages is the onlyeven less the bestway of

attaining fundamental and innovative philosophical insights.
All (re-)formulations of the criterion of meaning have proven decient,
being either too narrow and thereby excluding some type of science (for in-
stance the formal sciences or even all factual sciences, Popper, LF 11), or too
wide and thereby including metaphysics (Stegmuller: HGP 42528). Hence
Popper (CR, LF ) and his followers (Bunge, TBP; Albert, TKV 48; Weingartner,
GM; Lenk, PFF ) rejected these different formulations of the positivist criterion
of meaning. Metaphysics, though in Poppers view still unrefutable, had its
merits at least in (a) providing useful and heuristic insights for scientists in their
efforts to develop new theories and (b) by presenting solutions for nonscientic
questions such as ethical and/or existential ones. There can be no doubt that
metaphysical systems have been of important inuence on the course of scien-
tic developments (see Koyre, EG 174ff ). Alternative metaphysical approaches
enable scientists to look at problems from different perspectives and thereby to
focus on features of certain elds of problems hitherto simply neglected. In this
way, metaphysical systems are useful by proposing alternative views and en-
hancing theory pluralism, which is the presupposition of theory competition
(TKV 25, 49).
This positive valuation of metaphysical theories opens the possibility to
compare critical rationalism to Whiteheads metaphysics. Among the critical
rationalists, philosopher and physicist Mario Bunge (FP) developed this posi-
tive view of metaphysics furthest. In several books and articles (see for instance
MMM, TBP, SMP) he established formal methodological criteria that meta-
physical systems have to meet in order not to be dogmatic but critical or, as he
put it, scientic. He even tried to construct such a metaphysical theory that is
sensitive toward these criteria, his so-called thing-ontology. Therefore his for-
mal methodological account of metaphysics, not his substantial account, will be
chosen for a comparison with Whiteheads process approach. On the substantial
level the two approaches are quite different.
So rst we turn toward Bunges criteria, which have to be adequately
combined with a metaphysical approach in order to qualify as scientic (be-
low). Next we shall examine whether Whiteheads process metaphysics quali-
es as such a scientic metaphysics.
Bunge: Scientic Metaphysics

The critical rationalist Bunge is very clear in stating that sciences are (implicitly
or explicitly) inuenced by ontological theoriesfor good or for bad. This
being the case, we have to do our best in making our presupposed (though often
unconsciously held) metaphysical positions explicit and thereby open them to
criticism. This is the chief source for Bunge to establish certain criteria; meta-
physical approaches have to provide for some enhancement of criticism.
Bunge distinguishes between three types of metaphysics: plain, exact, and
scientic. These three types are ordered hierarchically inasmuch as each later
one is a more fully developed kind of metaphysics. The term plain metaphysics
encompasses all approachestraditional and contemporarythat neither use
formal sciences (logic and mathematics) explicitly as helping tools, nor take
care of results of scientic research, but at least make an appeal to any kind of
rational argumentation. Neglecting the formal and the factual sciences renders
this type of metaphysics highly decient in Bunges view. Since the develop-
ment of physics in the seventeenth century and the extraordinary progress of
formal sciences, especially in the twentieth century, these decits have to be
taken very seriously, and hence leave these approaches unacceptable for todays
scientic community.
Nevertheless, plain metaphysics still plays a heuristic role in metaphysical
research. They are a rich mine of problems and insights (MMM 145). Cer-
tainly these valuable concepts, that may inspire metaphysical thinking, have to
be rened and accommodated to the requirements of scientic metaphysics.
The next and more advanced type of metaphysics Bunge calls exact
metaphysics. This set of metaphysical theories are built with the explicit help
of logic or mathematics (TBP 8). Because of its use of formal sciences, this
type of metaphysics is an advance compared to plain metaphysics. But still
there is a disadvantage: it neglectsat least to great extentthe research re-
sults of the nonformal (factual: natural and social) sciences. Exponents of exact
metaphysics are, for instance, Leibniz, Bolzano, and Scholz (see TBP 8). Bunge
even mentions Whitehead as a representative of this metaphysical type. Dis-
cussing the main possibilities to generate scientic metaphysical theories,
Bunge states: Overhauling theories in exact metaphysics. Example: revising
Whiteheads theory of space and time to render it consistent with relativity
physics and manifold geometry, and freeing it from phenomenalist ingredients
(MMM 147).
The scientic metaphysical approach is characterized by a strong effort to
take into full consideration the results of scientic research.1 This is very ambi-
tious, to say the least. Bunge has to admit: As for scientic metaphysics it is
still largely a program (TBP 8). Nevertheless, in his Treatise on Basic Philoso-
phy (8 volumes), Bunge has undertaken an extensive and fascinating attempt to
realize this program of building a scientic metaphysics according to his own
criteria. What now are these criteria? In his work Method, Model, and Matter
he has given a list of six formal methodological criteria, which are described in
the following sections.
Generality
In contrast to scientists, each dealing with a specic domain of discourse, a
metaphysician has to search for the most general features of reality and real
objects (MMM 145). Here Bunge quotes Charles Sanders Peirce (CPP 5). This
difference in the generality of the domains of discourse between sciences and
ontologies is the only difference.2 There is no difference in method; both sci-

ence and metaphysics use the same retroductive method in research.3 This leads
Bunge to maintain that ontology is general science and the factual sciences
are special metaphysics. In other words, both science and ontology inquire into
the nature of things but, whereas science does it in detail . . . metaphysics is
extremely general (TBP 16). Within this point of view, the search for a so-
called criterion of meaning, as the representatives of the Vienna Circle did, has
become meaningless.
Generality is a criterion for all three types of metaphysical approaches. So
this rst criterion does not distinguish between plain, exact, and scientic meta-
physics.
Systemicity
As just mentioned, a scientic metaphysics is nothing but a very general scien-
tic theory, differing from specic sciences only in its wide range of applica-
tion. According to this position, a metaphysical approach is like any other sci-
ence. Hence, it has to be undertaken in a systematic way. The requirement of
systemicity requires that all basic notions of a metaphysical approach have to
be connected with each other in order to form the basic relations, i.e., axioms,
of the theory. In Bunges own approach these basic notions are attribute, thing,
part, change, event, process, life, mind, and value, to mention the most impor-
tant. This axiomatic basis is the starting point for further deductive extensions.
Such a system functions as a hypothetico-deductive frame.
A system has certain advantages over simple aggregations of basic ideas:
a system allows for better testing and so enhances criticism. The basic concepts
being distributed among the axioms secure a logical connection between the
axioms. The whole system is tested (indirectly) even if only one part (i.e., one
axiom) is tested explicitly. So basic notions and axioms that might otherwise
not be testable gain indirect support by corroboration from other directly tested
axioms (see SR 308).
Bunge mentions some more specic criteria for scientic systems. Since
ontologies are general sciences, they have to fulll these requirements too.
These conditions can be split into two classes: syntactical and semantical ones.
The rst-mentioned set of conditions, because of their formal character, will be
dealt with when criterion three (explicit uses of formal sciences) is discussed.
The semantical conditions are discussed below.
1. First, Bunge demands that a systematic approach has to be built on

a common universe of discourse (SR 392). This requirement
states that a realm of objects has to be indicated. In other words, a
single set of objects of reference has to be introduced explicitly.
This criterion is a prerequisite of deducibility.
2. Second, semantical homogeneity (SR 392): all predicates used

within the axioms of a system have to be members of the same
semantical family. Since it is not easy to decide whether semanti-
cal heterogeneity is simply the result of lacking insight into a
deeper unity (SR 393), this criterion is of minor importance in our
metaphysical context for metaphysical systems, which by deni-
tion aim at transcending the narrow boundaries (i.e., narrow se-
mantical families) of special scientic disciplines.
3. Bunges third sub-criterion is called semantical closure (SR
393): it is introduced to call a halt to the smuggling in of new
concepts and ad hoc hypotheses in order to save the system from a
breakdown. Usually such new concepts and ad hoc hypotheses are
brought into play in order to save a theory by explaining otherwise
unacceptable consequences. This procedure would lead to an on-
going theoretical readjustment of the theory in question and would
render empirical refutation impossible.
4. The last one is called conceptual connectedness (SR 394): The
purpose of this criterion is to prevent the axioms from falling apart
unconnected. It is fullled, if and only if no primitive concept
occurs in a single axiom of the set (SR 394). If the concepts are
not distributed among the axioms, the axioms are not connected
with each other. Hence no deduction can take place.
The content of these four subcriteria will be discussed when turning to the topic
of systemicity in Whiteheads approach.
Exactness
Metaphysical systems, like scientic systems, have to meet the requirement of
exactness. This criterion for Bunge is best satised by explicit application of
formal sciences, especially logic and mathematics. That means that the basic
concepts and axioms have to be dened in a logical manner, using logico-
mathematical symbols and their background theories. The explicit use of formal
sciences contributes to the enhancement of systemicity by making the intercon-
nections between the concepts clearer and more denite. Thereby it puries
them (to a certain extent) from the host of ambiguities of ordinary languages.
Finally they enable blind formal procedures in deducing consequences from
the axiomatic basis.
At this point, we present Bunges more distinct formal-syntactical sub-
criteria. Bunge mentions four desiderata in his book Scientic Research:
1. First, he calls for formal consistency (SR 436): No contradictions
whatsoever are to follow by correct deductions from the axiomatic
matrix. This requirement is important, since from an inconsistent
theory everything follows: a statement ( p) and its contradicting

statement (p). Hence an inconsistent theory becomes irrefutable
and at the same time is refuted: the hypothetico-deductive method
breaks down.4
2. Second, external consistency (SR 437) is required: the system in
question has to be related in a way free of contradictions to other
noncompetitive, yet well-conrmed (scientic) theories. Bunge
elaborates this criterion to one of the main criteria for scientic
metaphysical approaches. It will be discussed in the next section.
3. Third, primitive independence (SR 439): the independence of
the basic concepts (primitives) among themselves is demanded.
This means that no basic term should be denable by other basic
concepts of the same theory.
4. Finally, axiom independence (SR 441): it is required that none
of the axioms of the system in question can be deduced from other
axioms making up the axiomatic matrix. If this were the case, the
derivable axiom would instead be a theorem. We shall return to
these syntactical subcriteria when discussing the criterion of ex-
actness in the Whiteheadian context.
Connectedness to Sciences
So far we have only dealt with necessary conditions for plain and exact meta-
physical systems. Criterion 1 (generality) is met by plain metaphysics; criteria 2
(systemicity) and 3 (exactness) are necessary for exact metaphysical ap-
proaches. The three requirements still left are necessary conditions for scientic
metaphysics.
As already mentioned in the last section (syntactical subcriterion 2), sci-
entic metaphysical systems have to be connected to well corroborated and
noncompetitive scientic theories. It is not quite clear if Bunge holds a weak or
a strong interpretation of connectedness. The strong interpretation of connect-
edness is indicated by the term coherence (TBP 16; also see MMM 158).
Through such strong connectedness, the scientic and metaphysical systems
would be related in an implicative way. The weak interpretation of connected-
ness may be conrmed by expressions such as consonance (TBP 15) or being in
tune with (MMM 145). These terms suggest the less ambitious relation of com-
patibility between metaphysical and scientic systems.
The weak interpretation can be conceived as the minimal condition,
whereas the strong interpretation can be understood as an ideal that has to be
aimed at in order to develop the scientic metaphysics fully. It requires that the
relation of deducibility should hold between the metaphysical system and scien-
tic theories. Of course, specifying conditions and auxiliary hypotheses have to
be added in order to be able to deduce the basic concepts or axioms of scientic

theories from a metaphysical system. Hence the two systems (metaphysical and
scientic) are related in a hypothetico-deductive way.
Since metaphysical systems aim at extreme generality, their concepts can
hardly be confronted with particular facts and events. Nevertheless, they can be
tested empirically. This test is executed by using intermediate theories of a
lesser generality, which are the sciences. They establish an indirect contact with
empirical facts for metaphysical theories. The evidence for a theory in scien-
tic metaphysics consists of judgements about its ability (a) to cohere with
science. . . . In short, the test for scientic metaphysics is science (MMM 158).
This relation can be formalized in the following (oversimplifying) way:
(TM CS1) TS
(TS CS2) PX EY
Formula 1: Indirect connectedness of metaphysical theory to empirical observa-

tion, where TM metaphysical theory; TS scientic theory; CS1, CS2
specifying conditions, auxiliary hypotheses; PX prognosis X (expressed in
scientic language); EY empirical evidence Y (expressed in observation lan-
guage); logical implication; logical conjunction; translation
(from observation language to scientic language and vice versa). We shall
return to this formula when discussing Whiteheads approach. The following
two criteria can be conceived as specications of criterion 4 (connectedness to
science).
Elucidation of Philosophical and

Scientic Key Concepts
Elucidation of key concepts in philosophy or in the foundations of science
(MMM 145) is required from scientic metaphysical systems. As mentioned
before, scientic theories and more specic philosophical theories, such as an-
thropology and ethics, rest on and are inuenced by metaphysical presupposi-
tions. Hence, to clarify the metaphysical presuppositions implies a clarication
and elucidation of the basis of scientic and specic philosophical theories. So,
for instance, a metaphysical system should shed some light on the role of math-
ematics by determining its metaphysical status.
Capacity of Transforming Metaphysical Approaches

into Scientic Theories
This criterion species the way a metaphysical system is connectable to more
specic scientic theories. It is so by being enriched with specic assump-
tions (MMM 146). The same is true for (general) factual scientic theories:
they can only be tested empirically by adding auxiliary hypotheses and specify-
ing conditions (MMM 158). Newtons theory can only be tested empirically by
adding auxiliary hypotheses and/or specifying conditions, including idealiza-
tions of any kind. So his theory of gravitation, for instance, can only be tested
by supposing that the only signicant gravitational sources are the sun, the
earth . . . etc. There is no empirical meaning of Newtons Law of Gravita-
tion by itself apart from specifying conditions. So this criterion species the
way general factual theories, be they metaphysical or scientic, can be tested
empirically. If we add specic conditions to a metaphysical system, we may
arrive at a new scientic theory. We now turn to Whiteheads approach.
Whiteheads Process Metaphysics as a Scientic Metaphysics

In this section I examine whether Whiteheads metaphysical approach meets the
above Bungean criteria. We need to analyze some of Whiteheads works be-
cause he reected his methodological commitments nowhere extensively.
The Metaphysical Domain of Discourse

This criterion has to be met by any metaphysics, be it plain, exact or scientic.
There is indeed no difculty nding passages in Whiteheads philosophical
writings that support how his metaphysics was intended as an extremely general
theory. Metaphysical categories are . . . tentative formulations of the ultimate
generalities (PR 8). For Whitehead, as for Bunge, it is this generality that
distinguishes metaphysical systems from scientic ones and not any basic meth-
odological differences (PR 5), for they both are preceded by the same meth-
odology that Whitehead once calledlong before Popper used the same term
(LF )the logic of discovery (FR 67). This leads us straight to the second
criterion.
Hypothetico-Deductive System
The basic, most general concepts of a metaphysical approach have to be linked
in order to build a system. Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a
coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas (PR 3, italics mine). Here
Whitehead leaves no doubt that he did not just present an array of loosely
connected insights but tried to build a metaphysical system by connecting the
basic concepts.
Whitehead formulates his set of axioms in the so-called categoreal
scheme of Process and Reality. McHenry (AMW ), for instance, has convinc-
ingly argued that the categoreal scheme is built parallel to the axiomatic core of
the Principia Mathematica and therefore can be conceived as an axiomatic
matrix (AMW 176). Hence it is a matrix from which true propositions appli-
cable to particular circumstances can be derived (PR 9). Whitehead becomes

even more clear when he discusses the advantages such systems offer. The use
of such a matrix is to argue from it boldly and with rigid logic (PR 9). More
consequences can be deduced from interconnected basic assumptions than from
isolated notions. Hence, more and better tests can be executed on the basis of a
metaphysical system! A systematic connection of basic notions gains the char-
acter of generating ideas coherent with itself and receiving continuous verica-
tion (FR 69f ).
Thus, Whitehead sees the same advantages in system building as does
Bunge. We now examine Bunges more detailed semantical subcriteria.
1. The common universe of discourse: Whitehead indeed has done
justice to this subcriterion by explicitly introducing one set of
(fundamental) entities: namely actual entities. Of course there are
eight categories of existence introduced in the categoreal scheme,
but the actual entities are the most fundamental ones because all
other forms of existence are derivatives or aspects of actual enti-
ties. Even the concept of God is no exception (PR 19). Whitehead
himself stressed the fact that his approach is one of one type of
actual entities, a one-substance cosmology (PR 19).
2. Semantical homogeneity: this criterion loses its raison detre in the
metaphysical domain and has to be restricted to the elds of spe-
cial sciences. Whitehead argues that ideally the general metaphysi-
cal theory should encompass all sciences. Its [the metaphysics]
business is not to refuse experience but to nd the most general
interpretative system. Also it is not a mere juxtaposition of various
sciences. It generalizes beyond any special science, and thus pro-
vides the interpretative system which expresses their interconnec-
tion (FR 86). Providing a general interpretative system of differ-
ing sciences implies an effort to transcend the specic domains
and their corresponding narrow semantics. Otherwise, there would
be no difference from old systems and hence no progress could be
expressed. Whitehead has frequently defended his unusual exag-
gerated use of ordinary notions by referring to this need of ex-
pressing novel insights in order to transcend limitations of tradi-
tional thought systems. The technical language of philosophy
represents attempts of various schools of thought to obtain explicit
expression of general ideas presupposed by the facts of experi-
ence. It follows that any novelty in metaphysical doctrines exhibits
some measure of disagreement with statements of the facts to be
found in current philosophical literature. . . . It is, therefore, no
valid criticism on one metaphysical school to point out that its
doctrines do not follow from the verbal expression of the facts
accepted by another school (PR 12). This may sufce to show
that Whitehead was fully aware of that issue and why he did not
cling to this criterion in the metaphysical context.
3. Semantical closure: Whiteheads position toward this subcriterion
is not explicit, but it is reasonable to assume that he agreed with it.
In the opening passage of section II The Categories of Process
and Reality he states: Every entity should be a specic instance
of one category of existence, every explanation should be a spe-
cic instance of categories of explanation, and every obligation
should be a specic instance of categoreal obligations (PR 20).
This implies that if these ideals were fully realized, which White-
head of course doubted (PR 20), no ad hoc introduction of new
concepts or hypotheses would be necessary and hence semantical
closure would be obtained. Thus, the above quotation indicates
that Whitehead tried to keep his system semantically closed.
4. Conceptual connectedness: Whitehead again meets this subcri-
terion when, in discussing coherence, he writes that the funda-
mental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presup-
pose each other so that in isolation they are meaningless (PR 3).
This somewhat obscure formulation becomes fully clear if we turn
to another passage where Whitehead takes up the discussion of
coherence: Incoherence is the arbitrary disconnection of rst
principles. In modern philosophy Descartess two kinds of sub-
stance, corporeal and mental, illustrate incoherence. There is, in
Descartess philosophy, no reason why there should be a one-sub-
stance world, only corporeal, or a one-substance world, only men-
tal (PR 6). The category of mental substance has no connection
to the category of corporeal substance; hence Descartess system
falls to isolated pieces. Descartess approach has fallen short of
conceptual connectedness. If there is an axiom that does not even
contain one concept that another axiom contains as well, the sys-
tem ceases to be a system. Hence Whitehead can maintain: The
requirement of coherence is the great preservative of rationalistic
sanity (PR 6).
So far we have shown that Whiteheads approach meets all semantical
subcriteria that areaccording to Bungerelevant to scientic systems. We
now turn to the relation between sciences and metaphysics.
The Role of Formal Sciences in Metaphysics

This criterion may be the most controversial one. First it may be astonishing to
notice that an outstanding logician, as Whitehead surely was, never tried to
apply explicitly the mathematical and logical instruments in any of his late
philosophical writings. This is amazing since the coauthor of the Principia

Mathematica in his days surely was among those few who were most qualied
to do so. This factin connection with a few misleading passages in his later
worksmay have given rise to the opinion that Whitehead thought that the
task of formalization in the domain of metaphysics was impossible. The analyt-
ical philosopher (critical rationalist) Peter Kirschenmann in one of his essays
describes Bunges ideas about an exact metaphysics, which will contrasted
with Whiteheads conception that speculative metaphysics cannot be exact
(IES 86). Metaphysical approaches according to Whiteheadso Kirschenmann
continuescannot be exact because they are not characterizable by a denite
mathematical structure (IES 95). Even some Whiteheadians share this convic-
tion (see, for instance, L. Armour, LEW 203).
I now present a few indications that Whitehead is in agreement with this
Bungean criterion even though he never undertook an attempt to achieve this
goal.
1. In his early so-called logical phase (see UW 117299), Whitehead
wrote a treatise that attracted almost no attention at the time it was
published, although Whitehead himself thought it to be one of his
masterpieces (see PSM 33). It is On Mathematical Concepts of
the Material World (MCM), published in 1905 during his cooper-
ation with Bertrand Russell. In this article Whitehead outlines ve
different cosmologies, from each of which Euclidean geometry,
i.e., its axioms, should be derivable and which thereby should
prove to be able to represent the most general characteristics of
time, space and entities in time and space (WPR 343). Whitehead
uses formal logic extensively in this essay. Thus, he did use formal
logic as a tool in theory construction in one of his earliest philo-
sophical papers. Of course, that does not necessarily imply that the
late Whitehead still believed in the usefulness of such attempts.
2. In his magnum opus, Process and Reality, he demands that a
metaphysics has to be a logical system. The term logical has its
ordinary meaning, including logical consistency, or lack of con-
tradiction, the denition of constructs in logical terms, the exem-
plication of general logical notions in specic instances, and the
principles of inference (PR 3, italics mine). For the characteristic
of logical consistency Whitehead essentially postulates Bunges
subcriterion of formal consistency. The demand to dene the basic
notions in logical terms and to apply the rules of inference clearly
implies the task of formalization. Whitehead entertained such for-
malizations in his essay On Mathematical Concepts of the Mate-
rial World. Later, Whitehead stated that Logic implies symbols
(MT 61).
3. Another indication that Whitehead held formalization of meta-

physical systems possible, and even necessary, lies in the fact that
the structure of the core of Process and Realitythe categoreal
schemeequals a logical calculus. The basic concepts are dened
and the axioms are explicitly stated. This again supports the as-
sumption that he believed the formalization of this core to be pos-
sible. How else could his demand be understood to state the
scheme with the utmost precision and deniteness (PR 9)? Only
precisely formulated systems allow one to infer from it with rigid
logic (PR 9).
4. Further, Whitehead also was well aware of the advantages of for-
malization. He stressed its usefulness in enhancing economy of
mental efforts: By relieving the brain of all unnecessary work, a
good notation sets it free to concentrate on more advanced prob-
lems, and in effect increases the mental power of the race. Again,
it is hard to see why this advantage of economizing our rational
powers should end at the entrance to the eld of metaphysics.
5. Of special importance in this context is an utterance that White-
head once made when talking to the logician R. M. Martin, which
is mentioned by Martin in his essay An Approximate Logical
Structure of Whiteheads Categoreal Scheme. It demonstrates
very clearly that Whitehead appreciated any attempt to formalize
the core of his metaphysical system: Whitehead himself would
have welcomed it [formalization of the categoreal scheme]. On
one occasion, in fact, in conversation . . . he commended [me] to
this effort, adding that he would have attempted such an account
himself had he had the time, but it was essential to make the
intuitive sketch rst in the few remaining years allotted him for
philosophical writing (ALS 25). Hence, the fact that Whitehead
did not formalize the axiomatic core of his system is not due to his
conviction that such formalization is impossible or useless, but to
the lack of time that was left for him. We must keep in mind that
he was 63 years old when he became a professional philosopher at
Harvard after decades of working as a logician and mathematical
physicist. R. M. Martin has undertaken a rst promising attempt to
formalize the categoreal scheme (see ALS). Another very promis-
ing direction in formalizing central parts of Whiteheads meta-
physics was taken by Granville Henry (FC). He applied PROLOG
programming structures on Whiteheadian key notions such as ac-
tual entity and eternal object and thereby hoped to gain some
new perspective on the structure of concrescence of actual enti-
ties (FC 17; see also PCP).
These ve references should make clear that any attempt to characterize

Whitehead as a philosopher with an antimathematical or antilogical attitude
must be mistaken. On the contrary, Whitehead thought formal sciences to be
important tools for any kind of research. Mathematics is the most powerful
technique for the understanding of pattern, and for analysis of relationships of
patterns. . . . If civilization continues to advance, . . . the overwhelming novelty
in human thought will be the dominance of mathematical understanding (ESP
84). Since metaphysical theories investigate the most general patterns of reality,
it is hard to see why Whitehead should have excluded it from being a eld of
application for mathematics.
I now examine Whiteheads thesis that formal sciences presuppose meta-
physics. This is of interest here because it differs strikingly from Bunges ac-
count. While, according to Whitehead, logic presupposes metaphysics (MT
107), Bunge maintains, The relation between logic and ontology is that of
presupposition or logical priority: any cogent metaphysics presupposes logic
(TBP 14).
From Whiteheads point of view, a metaphysical system that does not
provide a place of interpretation for formal sciences is not comprehensive (see
PR 3). Indeed, this seems to be a severe problem in Bunges approach. For
instance, L. Apostel states: How can it be explained that there exists a system
producing mathematics? . . . is one of the main questions of regional (not
general) ontology and the question What in reality makes mathematics applica-
ble to it, while mathematics is not created in constant interaction with the exter-
nal world? is another basic question of general ontology (SRO 4). And Apos-
tel reminds Bunge that these two matters should be claried if work is to
progress in a satisfactory manner (SRO 4). As we have mentioned, Whitehead
has discussed the status of mathematics and mathematical (as well as logical)
entities (particulars, variables, predicates, inferences . . .) within his metaphysi-
cal approach (see also Codes detailed investigations on that topic: OO, espe-
cially chapter II). After this extensive discussion of the formal criteria, we now
turn to the last three criteria that render a metaphysical system scientic.
Relations Between Metaphysical and Scientic Systems

To recapitulate, Bunges view is that metaphysical systems have no direct con-
tact with empirical facts because of their generality. True, ontological theories,
whatever their degree of scienticity, cannot be tested empirically (TBP 21).
The test of metaphysical theories is an indirect one, mediated by theories of less
general scope: scientic theories.
We now show that Whitehead conceived the relation between metaphysics,
sciences, and empirical fact in essentially the same way: A special scheme [of
science] should either t in with the general cosmology, or should by confor-
mity to fact present reasons why the cosmology should be modied (FR 76).
How does Whitehead conceive this tting together of the metaphysical and
the scientic systems? Also it [metaphysics] is not a mere juxtaposition of

various sciences. It generalizes beyond any special science, and thus provides
the interpretative system which expresses their interconnection (FR 86).
Whitehead had in mind that a metaphysical system comprises all basic notions
of single sciences and thereby integrates them into a unity (PR 116). But the
basic concepts of the sciences do not follow necessarily from cosmological
systems. To be deducible, additional specifying conditions and/or auxiliary hy-
potheses are needed. Otherwise the more specic and complex content of scien-
tic patterns could not be deduced from the more general theory of less content.
Whitehead leaves no doubt on that point when writing about the relation be-
tween his process metaphysics and what he terms the principles of psychologi-
cal physiology (PR 103): These principles are not necessitated by this cos-
mology; but they seem to be the simplest principles which are both consonant
with that cosmology, and also t the facts (PR 103).
We have shown that Bunge conceived the relation between both kinds of
systems in a hypothetico-deductive manner. Hence, the victory of any scientic
theory that is consonant with a certain metaphysics does not imply the victory
of the metaphysics. This would mean to commit the fallacy of the afrmation of
the consequence.5 On the other hand, the falsication of a scientic theory that
is consistent with a certain metaphysical theory could entail its refutation. How-
ever, things are more complicated, of course, for in order to be able to deduce
from a schemeas we have seenit is necessary to add additional specifying
conditions, and hence the falsication of the consequence only entails that at
least one of the statements of the antecedents must be wrong. Things become
still more complex if we take into account that deductions from scientic theo-
ries need additional auxiliary and specifying conditions too. So indirect corrob-
orations and/or falsications are far from being denitive. Whitehead was well
aware of that fact: The only logical conclusion to be drawn, when a contradic-
tion issues from a train of reasoning, is that at least one of the premises in-
volved in the inference is false (PR 8).6
This may sufce to make clear that Whitehead held a hypothetico-deduc-
tive method between metaphysics and sciences while on the other hand he was
well aware of the problems of this procedure in the metaphysical context.
Elucidation of Philosophical Concepts

and Scientic Assumptions
Whitehead held the opinion that the basic notions of the more specic schemes
be it sciences or specic philosophic disciplinesin general have to be deriv-
able from metaphysical principles. Thereby metaphysical systems function as
interpretative schemes of the sciences. Hence it follows that in cases where this
is possible, the metaphysical system sheds light on these less general systems.
Whitehead conceived this task of metaphysics as important: It has been a
defect of modern philosophies that they throw no light whatever on any scien-
tic principles. Science should investigate particular species, and metaphysics

should investigate the generic notions under which those specic principles
should fall (PR 116). On several occasions Whitehead tries to make clear that
his approach does not fall short of that demand. So he maintains, for instance,
that his process metaphysics is able to elucidate the basic principles of the
physics of his day. But the general principles of physics are exactly what we
should expect as a specic exemplication of the metaphysics required by the
philosophy of organism (PR 116). Here once again the kind of connection
between metaphysical and scientic system becomes clear. But Whitehead ex-
presses the relation even more distinctly at the end of a section titled The
Quantum Theory in his Science and the Modern World. The point illustrated
by this example is that the cosmological outlook, which is here adopted, is
perfectly consistent with the demands for discontinuity which have been urged
from the side of physics (SMW 136). On the other hand Whitehead, of course,
was fully aware that metaphysical principles cannot simply be applied to the
special elds of sciences. Specifying conditions have to be added: Scientic
descriptions are, of course, entwined with the specic details of geometry and
physical laws, which arise from the special order of this cosmic epoch in which
we nd ourselves (PR 116).
This relation of process metaphysics to physics, frequently mentioned by
Whitehead in his works, has been investigated quite often.7 There have also
been a series of books and articles published that explore the relationship of
process philosophy to biology and psychology,8 but less frequently to chemistry.9
So Whiteheads approach, indeed, is one of the few philosophical approaches of
the twentieth century that can be explicitly and comprehensively related to sci-
entic research results.
Concerning the task of throwing light on philosophical subdisciplines
such as ethics and anthropology, Whitehead again offers promising hints. Only
one shall be mentioned here: In the categoreal scheme (categories of obligations
viii and ix, PR 27f ) Whitehead explicitly identies the source of the concept of
freedom within his system. He also mentions the relevance of that concept for
ethics. Referring to category ix of the categories of obligations, he writes: The
point to be noticed is that the actual entity, in the state of process during which
it is not fully denite, determines its own ultimate deniteness. This is the
whole point of moral responsibility (PR 255, italics mine). We shall not pursue
that topic any further here. However, we hope that it has become clear that
Whitehead fullls the demand of elucidating more specic philosophical con-
cepts outside the domain of metaphysics as well as basic scientic notions.
Metaphysics as Presupposition of
and Candidate for Science
The aforementioned has shown how both Bunge and Whitehead viewed meta-
physics as general systems that could be connected to the more special systems
by adding more specic characteristics that allow for implicative reasoning. In

that sense, a metaphysical system is a presupposition of a special science. It is a
candidate for a special science in as far as it canby adding specications
mutate into a science.
Concluding Remarks
What has been said so far should sufce to substantiate that Whiteheads pro-
cess philosophy meets Bunges formal methodological criteria or was at least
designed to be able to meet them (explicit formalization). This implies that
Whiteheads metaphysics can be termed a scientic metaphysics. His process
metaphysics hence is a serious alternative to Bunges materialist thing ontol-
ogy. Since, according to the critical rationalists, the rivalry of theories cannot
be dispensed without the sacrice of progress in every eld of human thinking,
one can only hope that members of this branch of philosophy will dedicate
more intensive study to Whiteheads process approach.
However, it was the founder of critical rationalism, Sir Karl Popper, who
qualied Whitehead in one of his most inuential books, The Open Society and
Its Enemies, as one of the two most inuential irrationalist authorities of the
present (OSE 247) that represented his philosophy without argument (OSE
450). Poppers critique of Whiteheads philosophy may have been one of the
main reasons for the fact that Whiteheads process metaphysics was hardly ever
mentioned by exponents of critical rationalism and even less often discussed. In
the light of the outcome of the investigations presented in this chapter, this
judgment must be qualied as a severe misunderstanding or even ignorance of
Whiteheads work.10 More than 30 years later, Popper seemed to have changed
his opinion concerning Whiteheads way of philosophizing. In his book
(coauthor, Sir John Eccles) The Self and Its Brain, he stated: Today the uni-
verse does not appear as an assemblage of things, but as a multitude of interac-
tions and processes (like especially Whitehead had stressed) (SB 7). On one
occasion, in fact when Popper was rewarded with the title Doctor Honoris
Causa at the Catholic University of Eichstatt, the author talked to him on that
topic. When asked if he had changed his judgment about Whiteheads meta-
physics since the publication of The Open Society and Its Enemies, and if he
would value it positively today, his answer was Yes. You can express it that
way.
In line with Poppers later positive view of Whiteheads metaphysics, the
analytic philosopher Marx Wartofsky wrote that building a metaphysical system
should be attempted only with the clear-headed awareness of mutual relevance
of scientic theory and discovery on the one hand and critical metaphysics on
the other. And he continued by referring to Whiteheads approach: There has
been only one such grand design in this century, whose scope, rigour and depth
earn for it such a title, as far as I can tell; and whose difculty has left it, for the
present, without signicant heuristic force for science. Perhaps it remains to be
rediscovered (MHS 170; see also Simons, MS 378).11 So one can only hope
with Wartofsky that other critical rationalists will follow Popper and at least
draw more critical attention to Whiteheads work in particular and to the pro-
cess approach in general.
Abbreviations
AEC Michel Weber. The Art of Epochal Change. Eds. F. Riffert and M. Weber.
Searching for New Contrasts. Whiteheadian Contributions to Contemporary
Challenges in Psychology, Neurophysiology and the Philosophy of Mind.
Vienna: Lang, 2003 (in press).
ALS Richard M. Martin. An Approximative Logical Structure for Whiteheads
Categoreal Scheme. Ed. R. M. Martin. Whiteheads Categoreal Scheme and
Other Papers. The Hague, 1974, 126.
AMW Leemon B. McHenry. The Axiomatic Matrix of Whiteheads Process and
Reality. Process Studies 15/3 (1986), 172180.
APE David R. Grifn (Ed.). Archetypal Process Evanston. Illinois: Northwestern
CAP D. S. Clark. Whitehead and Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. Process
Studies 16/1 (1987), 2634.
CBF Marcel Kinsbourne. Consciousness: The Brains Private Psychological
Field. Eds. F. Riffert & M. Weber. Searching for New Contrasts: Whitehea-
dian Contributions to Contemporary Challenges in Psychology, Neurophysiol-
ogy and the Philosophy of Mind. Vienna: Lang, 2003 (in press).
CCC A. Karim Ahmed. Causality, Chaos, and Consciousness. Process Studies
27/34 (1998), 255266.
CMP Granville C. Henry & Robert Valenza. The Concept of Mass in Process The-
ory. Process Studies 27/34 (1998), 292307.
COP Avraham Schweiger. The Common Origin of Perception and Action: A Pro-
cess Perspective. Eds. F. Riffert and M. Weber. Searching for New Contrasts:
Whiteheadian Contributions to Contemporary Challenges in Psychology, Neu-
rophysiology and the Philosophy of Mind. Vienna: Lang, 2003 (in press).
CPP Charles S. Peirce. Scientic Metaphysics. Eds. Ch. Hartshorne and P. Weiss.
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vol. 6, Harvard: The Belknap of
Harvard University Press, 1960.
CR Karl R. Popper. Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientic Knowl-
edge. London: Routledge & Kegan, 1963.
CRE Jean Piaget. La construction du reel chez lenfant. Neuchatel: Delachaux et
Niestle, 1937.
CWQ Stuart Hameroff. Consciousness, Whitehead and Quantum Computation in
the Brain: Panprotopsychism Meets the Physics of Fundamental Spacetime
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MPC Roger Sperry. Mental Phenomenas Causal Determinants in Brain Function.
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MV Moritz Schlick. Meaning and Verication. Philosophical Review 45 (1963),
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ONP Franz Riffert. On Non-Substantialism in Psychology. International Journal
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PP David Roy. The Promise of Process Psychology. Eds. F. Riffert & M. We-
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PR Alfred North Whitehead. Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. Cam-
PSI Clive Sherlock. The Presumptive SelfImplications of Process Philosophy
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PSM Wolfe Mays. Whiteheads Philosophy of Science and Metaphysics. The Hague:
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(in press).
WP Claude Dumoncel. Whiteheads Psychology. Eds. F. Riffert and M. Weber.
Searching for New Contrasts: Whiteheadian Contributions to Contemporary
Challenges in Psychology, Neurophysiology and the Philosophy of Mind.
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matics. Southern Journal of Philosophy (1969), 341349.
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cago Press, 1960.
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Riffert and M. Weber. Searching for New Contrasts: Whiteheadian Contribu-
tions to Contemporary Challenges in Psychology, Neurophysiology and the
Philosophy of Mind. Vienna: Lang, 2003 (in press).
ZD Joseph Bochenski. Zeitgenossische Denkmethoden. Munich: Francke 1980.
ZDE W. v. O. Quine. Zwei Dogmen des Empirismus In Von einem logischen
Standpunkt. Frankfurt a. M.: Ullstein, 1951, 2750.
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burg: Meiner, 1908.
Notes
1. The term scientic metaphysics was rst introduced by Charles Sanders
Peirce (CPP).
2. For the purpose of this chapter, it is not necessary to distinguish between the
terms ontology and metaphysics.
3. This research method has been given different names: retroduction is the
term Hanson (PD 85ff ) has introduced; Bochenski has called it reduktiv (ZD 101) and
Peirce nally spoke of abduction (CPP 90).
4. A formal demonstration is given in Popper (WD).
5. For details see W. C. Salmon (L 57f ).

6. Of course this is an oversimplication, since deduction is made possible only
by introducing additional specifying conditions and auxiliary hypotheses. Hence either
the metaphysical system (i.e., at least one of its laws or hypotheses involved in deduc-
tion) or at least one of the additional conditions may be wrong. Good introductions to
this problem of holism of theory testing are presented by Duham (ZST ), Quine (ZDE ),
and Putnam (MHE ).
7. See, for instance, Ahmed (CCC ), Henry and Valenza (CMP), Fagg (ETI ),
Finkelstein and Kallfelz (OP), Mays (PSM ), Eastman (PTN ), Papatheodorou and Hiley
(PTS ), Malin (QPR), Rosen (SAP), Schulkin (SCN ), Jungerman (WIP), Stengers (WLP),
Athearn (WNP), and Palter (WPS).
8. So far there have been several attempts to elaborate the implications of pro-
cess philosophy for different elds of psychology. Some of them are: Albertazzi (PTE ),
J. Brown (MAN, WOV, FCM ), Burgers (ECA), J. B. Cobb (T ), Dumoncel (WP), Fetz
(VWP, WCP), Grifn (APE, PPS, UWK, PPM), Hameroff (CWQ), Hartshorne (PPO), A.
Johnson (PAW ), Kinsbourne (CBF ), Kraus (ISW ), Regan (MP), Riffert (IRP, SCC,
ONP), Riffert and Cobb (PMP), Riffert and Weber (SNC ), Rodrigo (WCF ), Roy (TPP,
PP), Schweiger (PAP, COP), Seager (WRP), Sherlock (PSI ), Sperry (MPC ), Vanzago
(OAM ), Weber (AEC ), Weeks (HPP), G. Wolf (PSP, PBO).
9. For an overview concerning the relations between process philosophy and
sciences in general, see Riffert (IRP 399402).
10. For a critical discussion of some of Poppers critical comments on White-
heads approach in the Open Society and Its Enemies, see Pilon (PUW ).
11. From the side of process philosophy there have been several interesting at-
tempts to determine the relationship between process philosophy and the analytic tradi-
tion. See, for instance, Leemon McHenry (QW ) and Quines response (RLM ), Nicolas
Rescher (SPP), D. S. Clark (CAP) and Granville Henry and Robert Valenza (EOS ).
Outstanding are the works of Nicolas Rescher (IPP), George Lucas (RW ), and the spe-
cial focus on analytic philosophy in Process Studies (1996) edited by George Shields
(including articles by George Shields (IAP), Leemon McHenry (DRT ), Nicolas Rescher
(PPP), Richard Gale (DST ), and George Lucas (SS ). Shields in his article gives the most
comprehensive overview available at the moment about published works on the mutual
relationship between process philosophy and analytic philosophy.
17
Whitehead and the Quantum Experience
Jorge Luis Nobo
Toward the end of their 1996 book, The Nature of Space and Time,1 physicists
Stephen Hawking and Roger Penrose take opposite sides in a discussion of
whether quantum theory should be interpreted epistemologically or ontolog-
ically. Of immediate interest is the fact that Penrose, in arguing for an ontologi-
cal interpretation, considers the likely relevance of an adequate theory of expe-
rience. As he puts it,
in order to explain how we perceive the world to be, within the framework of QM,
we shall need to have one (or both) of the following:
(A) A theory of experience.
(B) A theory of real physical behavior. (NST, 128)
Penrose is himself committed to some theory of real physical behavior. Accord-

ingly, he thinks that those who, like Hawking, fail to support such a theory have
an obligation to develop a theory of experience that consistently dispenses with
real physical behavior. But theories of experience, he adds, are dangerous to
adopt.
Penrose does not explain why it would be dangerous to adopt a theory of
experience. Perhaps he thinks any such theory would undermine the objectivity
and universality that are the hallmarks of scientic knowledge. Perhaps he be-
lieves a theory of experience is likely to erect an impenetrable barrier between
apparent and real physical behaviors. Whatever his reasons, Penrose must be
prepared to admit that the presumed dangers of a theory of experience can be
avoided by any such theory that does not dispense with real physical behavior,
does not cut off physical behavior from experience, and, more to the point,
essentially links the ontological status of real physical behavior to that of expe-
rience in general.
Essentially interrelated theories of experience and of real physical behav-
223
224 Jorge Luis Nobo
ior are hallmarks of Whiteheads speculative philosophy. These interrelated the-

ories are aspects of a novel metaphysical theory that seems inherently well-
suited to provide a rm philosophical foundation for an ontological interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics. Accordingly, my ultimate goal in this essay is to
sketch aspects of Whiteheads metaphysics that are most likely to be of some
relevance to the concerns of quantum theorists. But those same aspects bear on
broader ontological and epistemological issues that are of interest in science
and philosophy alike.2
I
The adequate conceptualization of our experience so as to provide a coherent
interpretation of its ingredient elements is, for Whitehead, the dening goal of
speculative philosophy: the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary
system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can
be interpreted (PR, 3). This endeavor is made necessary by the fact that every
activity of theorizing begins with human experience, addresses some problem
or puzzle or difculty encountered in human experience, is wholly conducted
within the inescapable connes of human experience, and determines its own
degree of success or failure by comparing the expectations it yields with the
subsequent actual deliveries of human experience. This fact requires the recog-
nition that human experience has primacy for the construction of any theory
whatsoever. But truly to recognize the theoretical primacy of human experience
is to recognize that human experience must itself be adequately conceptualized
and elucidated, and thus must itself be the subject of a theory more fundamental
and more comprehensive than any other. Other theories deal only with aspects
of, or abstractions from, our experience. But speculative philosophy must ad-
dress our experience as a concrete whole, and must exhibit all abstractions from
it in their proper relationships, each to the others and all to our experience as a
whole.
As Whitehead understands it, concrete human experience, in each of its
concrete moments, is not an external relation between someone experiencing
and something experienced (AI, 233). It is, instead, an integral inclusive reality
within which, as aspects of itself, there are differentiated, among others, the
human organism from his or her environment, the human subjectivity from the
human body, the subjective response from the object responded to, the subjec-
tively added from the objectively given, the self-determining from the other-
determined, the private from the public, the present from the remembered past
or the anticipated future, and, more generally, the experiencing from the experi-
enced. Concrete human experience is not the sum of these contrasting aspects,
but their aboriginal context and unity. Thus understood, concrete human experi-
ence is the original datum from which all other disciplines abstract their respec-
Whitehead and the Quantum Experience 225
tive subject matters. The elucidation of that datum as one concrete whole is one
chief aim of Whiteheads speculative philosophy.
It should be immediately noted that Whitehead does not equate concrete
human experience with human subjectivity; for the latter is only an ingredient
aspect of the former. This fact by itself may allay some of Penroses fears
concerning the dangers of a theory of experience. The immediate datum for all
theorizing includes, but also greatly exceeds, anything that can be meaningfully
and consistently construed as subjective. It should be noted also that not just
quantum theory, but every theory less comprehensive than speculative philoso-
phy requires for its complete cogency a theory of human experience; for any
theory whose subject matter is an abstraction from our concrete experience
cannot be fully understood until what its subject matter is abstracted from is
itself fully understood.
Whiteheads characterization of concrete human experience and the var-
ious contrasts it harbors may seem mistaken to those who consider experiences
to be ephemeral states of enduring mental substances or ephemeral processes
undergone by enduring human brains. But the theoretical primacy of human
experience entails that the nature of concrete human experience cannot be com-
pletely explained in terms of any theory whose subject matter or experiential
basis is some limited aspect or other of such experience; for the theory that
explains the limited aspect can fully explain the whole only if aspect and whole
are in all essential respects homogeneous. But since no abstract aspect of expe-
rience can be fully homogeneous with the whole of concrete experience, no
theory adequate to such an aspect can be fully adequate to such a whole. To
think otherwise is to commit what Whitehead termed the fallacy of misplaced
concreteness (SMW, 5354). Materialism and idealism alike commit this fal-
lacy, each trying to reduce all of human experience to a different preferred
abstraction from the concrete wholeness of such experience. Matter-mind dual-
ism embraces both of those abstractions, but fares no better because it forgets
that the physical and the mental are alike abstractions from our concrete experi-
ence (SMW, 58).
The theoretical primacy of human experience must weigh heavily in the
framing of any ontology. Whatever else may be said to exist or to be real, our
experiences exist and are real. Even if all the various aspects of a concrete
moment of experience are not what they appear to be, are in some sense illu-
sory, then, still, as appearances or illusions they exist or are real, and the con-
crete moment of experience that includes them exists or is real. Hence, there is
no getting away from the fact that human experiences belong to that community
of realities we call the universe. If we do not know that, we do not know
anything. Moreover, if we know, as in fact we do, that other things exist besides
our experiences, it must be because our experiences contain within themselves
clues to, and hence are signicant of, all other existents. But our experiences
can be thus signicant only if all else, including the commerce of other exis-
226 Jorge Luis Nobo
tents among themselves, has commerce with them. One task of speculative
philosophy, therefore, is to determine hownot whetherall else has in some
sense commerce, or communication, with human experience.
The theoretical primacy of our experience must also weigh heavily in the
articulation of any epistemology. The only realities accessible to us are our own
experiences, whatever communicates with, or makes a difference in, our experi-
ences, and, as a special case of the latter, whatever is a necessary ontological
presupposition of the existence of our experiences. Therefore, since human
knowing is a modality of human experiencing, our knowledge is subject to the
same threefold restriction. Neither the range of possible human knowledge nor
the criteria for the actual attainment of any portion of that range can exceed or
be torn from our experiences, what communicates with them, or their necessary
ontological presuppositions. If we appeal to the past, it must be because our
experience somehow requires and exhibits the reality of that past. If we plan for
the future, it must be because the potentiality for that future is somehow dis-
played in our experience.
On the other hand, human knowledge is not the only species of knowl-
edge possible, for human experience is not the only species of experience. In-
deed, to properly understand human experience is to understand it as a species
of something more general and more pervasive than itself. This conclusion
follows from the fact that speculative philosophy, in having to be adequate to
the reality of human experience, must be adequate to the reality of everything
else, including the reality of nonhuman experiences and, hence, of experience
in general. Also, human experience is a recent addition to reality. Accordingly,
we must conceive of reality as compatible with the emergence, and even the
eventual disappearance, of human experience. This means that we must be able
to conceive of human experience as signicant of all realityreality with or
without the concurrent existence of human experience. This can be done most
straightforwardly if human experience is thus signicant not because it is hu-
man, but because it is experience. This means, in effect, that being signicant
of all reality must be a property of all experience, not just of human experience.
But this fact, if it is a fact, must itself be signied by human experience; for
only in our experiences can we nd the signs of any other reality we may wish
to distinguish or posit.
It follows that speculative philosophy must seek to exhibit reality in gen-
eral and experience in general as interdependent natures. To accomplish this
broader task, it must restrict reality to experience, whether human or not, and to
whatever communicates with some experience or other, including the necessary
ontological presuppositions of every experience whatsoever. For Whitehead, the
conceptualization of reality in general as inclusive of, and as signied by, expe-
rience in general is the task of metaphysics, the most basic major subeld of
speculative philosophy. Metaphysics seeks the generalities that must be true of
all possible worlds. But a possible world that is knowable in principle can only
be a world in which, sooner or later, experience obtains.
Metaphysics has no choice but to derive its ultimate notions from actual
human experience and from the one actual world therein revealed. Metaphysi-
cal ideas, Whitehead holds, can be obtained only by generalizing from the es-
sential features of all our experiences. This is the method of imaginative, de-
scriptive, or philosophic generalization: the utilization of specic notions,
applying to a restricted group of facts, for the divination of the generic notions
which apply to all facts (PR, 5). The divining of the generic in the specic
may begin from any aspect of our experience that serves as subject matter for
some discipline or other. But the goal is always the same: to nd concepts and
principles that, suitably generalized, can illuminate other aspects of any experi-
ence or any experience as a whole. Thus, the success of the generalization is
always to be tested by the applicability of its results beyond the restricted locus
from which it originated (PR, 5). What is ultimately sought, though, is a
generality transcending any special subject-matter (PR, 10), but also indispens-
able for the elucidation and interpretation of any concrete moment of experi-
ence, whether human or not. The notions derived from the various restricted or
specialized loci can attain the required transcendence and indispensability only
if they can be coherently correlated and contextualized in terms of the utmost
generalizations obtainable by applying the method to human experience in its
concrete and integral wholeness. Thus, generalization from the individual
wholeness of concrete moments of human experience is indispensable to the
creation of any viable metaphysics. It is also the only way to avoid the fallacy
of misplaced concreteness.
If any in principle knowable possible world must include some world-
states in which experiences obtain, it seems plausible to explore the working
hypothesis that experiences necessarily obtain in every possible world-state of
any possible world. Whiteheads metaphysics is explicitly based on such a
working hypothesis: that the ultimate individual actualities of the universe have
the metaphysical characteristics of concrete moments of human experience,
suitably generalized (AI, 221). These ultimate individual actualities are techni-
cally referred to as actual entities, or, equivalently, as actual occasions or
occasions of experience. Actual entities constitute one of the seven meta-
physical genera, or categories, of proper existents posited by Whitehead.3 But
the genus of actual entities is metaphysically basic because the remaining six
genera consist of existents that either are differentiable but inseparable features,
aspects, relationships, or states of actual entities, or are eternal ontological pre-
suppositions of all actual entities. For example, the genus nexus comprises all
entities made up of interdependent occasions; and the genus eternal object con-
sists of all entities (but not all realities) functioning as ontological presupposi-
tions of all occasions. Nexus, like their component occasions, are entities that
become. On the other hand, eternal objects are entities that do not become, but
are presupposed by the becoming of every occasion because each occasion
becomes denite through the ingression into (or reproduction within) its nature
of some set or other of eternal objects. Insofar as they are immanent determi-
228 Jorge Luis Nobo
nants of our experience, eternal objects are the real, uncreated universals that
we encounter as qualia, patterns, and structures: e.g., a color, an emotion, a
shape, or a scalar form of energy.
The postulation of actual entities, or occasions of experience, as meta-
physically basic is what Whitehead refers to as the working hypothesis of his
metaphysics. I refer to it as the postulate of metaphysical experientialism.
The postulate is not intended as a self-evident truth. This point bears emphasiz-
ing because the old conception of metaphysics as a deductive discipline starting
from self-evident truths dies hard (PR, 710). True enough, metaphysics seeks
the ultimate generalities indispensably relevant to the true description of every
possible world state. But, as Whitehead says, the accurate expression of the
nal generalities is the goal of discussion and not its origin (PR, 8). Accord-
ingly, metaphysical categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious;
they are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities (PR, 8). But the
postulate of experientialism, although tentative, is not a shot in the dark. It
takes seriously the theoretical primacy of human experience for all disciplines;
it recognizes the implications of that primacy for ontology and epistemology; it
takes at face value the manifest wholeness and irreducibility of each concrete
moment of our experience; and it seeks the ultimate nature of reality in the only
place it can look for it or hope to nd it: in experiences own generic nature.
Whiteheads metaphysical experientialism, then, is no more and no less
than a plausible working postulate on which to essay the construction of a
scheme of metaphysical ideas adequate to the successful interpretation of our
experience and of our world. Such an interpretation is what Whitehead means
by a philosophical cosmology, which is both the goal and the second major
subeld of speculative philosophy. Whether it can ground the construction of a
successful cosmology is the ultimate test of a metaphysical scheme, a test at
once empirical, hermeneutical, and heuristic. The construction of the cosmol-
ogy is not a deduction from the metaphysics. The cosmological ideas must
specify and supplement the metaphysical ones because the actual world, for all
its exhibition of generalities and necessities, is inevitably specic, is in some
respect or other contingent, and is always in some regard or other singular or
unique. It follows that the metaphysical ideas discussed below will require con-
siderable specication and supplementation before they can ground a viable
ontological interpretation of quantum physics.
II
In Whiteheads metaphysics, actual occasions are the ultimate discrete and in-
divisible realities constituting the actual world. The conception of an actual
occasion is reached primarily by descriptive generalization from, rst, the para-
doxical relationship between any one concrete moment of our experience and
the world of which it is part, and second, from the becoming, being, and inter-
dependence of successive concrete moments of our experience. In both cases,

the generalization is toward features that are essential to any experience, how-
ever basic or primitive, and away from features that are uniquely human, and
even away from features that we have reason to think are uniquely associated
with what we normally regard as living organisms. For example, neither
thought nor consciousness nor sense-perception is a metaphysical, or necessary,
feature of occasions of experience. On the other hand, each occasion of experi-
ence necessarily involves a process in which the occasion unconsciously grasps
the objective reality of earlier occasions as efcient causes of its own existence
and as determinants of its own initial ingredient subjectivity. Also, although
begotten and partly determined by its correlative actual world, each occasion
must be partly self-determining. In fact, for Whitehead, the technical meaning
of actual cannot be torn from the notion of self-determination or, equivalently,
of self-realization. To be actual is to be, or to have been, self-realizing (PR,
222).
Actual occasions are drops of experience, complex and interdependent
(PR, 18). The manner of their interdependence is of special interest. Actual
entities are interdependent because they are mutually immanent. The doctrine
of mutual immanence is a straightforward theoretical interpretation of the para-
doxical relationship that obtains between any one concrete moment of our expe-
rience and the world of which it is a component. Since, on all plausible ac-
counts, any concrete moment of human experience is construed as embodying a
nite locus within the world, the said experience and the remainder of the
world must be outside each other. Nonetheless, what is manifested within that
moment of experience is the entire world and not a nite region of itat least,
it is the world as extending well beyond the here and now of the experience in
question. Thus the paradox: there is a dual aspect to the relationship of an
occasion of experience as one relatum and the experienced world as another
relatum. The world is included within the occasion in one sense, and the occa-
sion is included in the world in another sense (MT, 163).
Since the actual world, on this theory, is made up of actual occasions, the
same paradoxical relationship necessarily obtains between any two, or more,
occasions of experience. Any set of actual occasions are united by the mutual
immanence of occasions, each in the other (AI, 197). This mutual immanence
of all occasions is sufcient to dene the metaphysical category of nexus: the
term Nexus does not presuppose any special type of order, nor does it presup-
pose any order at all pervading its members other than the general metaphysical
obligation of mutual immanence (AI, 201). Since no occasion can exist except
as connected to, or in a nexus with, all other occasions, the actual world is a
nexus. Any nexus less inclusive than the actual world may exhibit additional
types of order pervading its respective members. Indeed, any enduring entity is
construed by Whitehead as a limited nexus of occasions exhibiting some type
or other of contingent order among its members. But all contingent types of
230 Jorge Luis Nobo
order, and even their attendant types of disorder, alike presuppose the generic
order of mutual immanence (AI, 228).
Given the discreteness of occasions, which entails their mutual transcen-
dence, their mutual immanence is undoubtedly a paradoxical doctrine. But it is
a paradox not unfamiliar to quantum physicists, who daily contend with the
interconnectedness of quantum phenomena or with the holistic inuence of the
universe on local events. Thus, quantum physics and ordinary experience alike
call out for a resolution of the paradox of mutual immanence (MT, 163). The
elucidation of this paradox is the basic task Whitehead assigns to his scheme of
metaphysical categories: The world within experience is identical with the
world beyond experience, the occasion of experience is within the world and
the world is within the occasion. The categories have to elucidate this paradox
of the connectedness of things:the many things, the one world without and
within (AI, 228).
The need to account for the mutual immanence, or connectedness, of
things is the main reason why the postulate of experientialism recommends
itself to Whitehead. After noting the impossibility of accounting for the con-
nectedness of things in terms of any ontologysuch as Descartess mind-mat-
ter dualismwhose primitive entities are only externally related to each other
(AI, 22021), he says: But if we hold, as for example in Process and Reality,
that all nal individual actualities have the metaphysical characters of occasions
of experience, then on that hypothesis the direct evidence as to the connected-
ness of ones immediately present occasion of experience with ones imme-
diately past occasions, can be validly used to suggest categories applying to the
connectedness of all occasions in nature (AI, 221).
Elsewhere (in WMES) I have discussed at length how a presystematic
analysis of memory suggests many of Whiteheads metaphysical categories and
doctrines. Here I must restrict the discussion to a few of the suggested doctrines
themselves. One such doctrine is that each actual occasion is in essence a be-
coming ending in a being that functions as a datum for the becoming of all later
occasions. Each actual occasion is both its becoming and its being, both the
creative activity and the created product, both process and outcome (PR, 84).
The occasions being is created, or constituted, or produced, by its own becom-
ing (PR, 23, 166). As a becoming, the occasion is an actuality in attainment; as
a being, the same occasion is an attained actuality. In deference to the impor-
tance of its ingredient, self-determining subjectivity, an actuality in attainment
is said to be a subject and, in deference to the objective roles it plays beyond
itself, the attained actuality is said to be a superject (PR, 29). Since the at-
tained actuality is the occasion as fully made, it is also referred to as the occa-
sions individual satisfaction.
The succession of an occasion qua becoming by the same occasion qua
being is only a special case of the fact that each occasions becoming involves
it in an intra-occasional supersession of phases of existence. This supersession
of phases is not in physical time. By physical time Whitehead means the time of
relativity physics. Such time, he holds, is only a contingent feature of the actual
occasions forming what he calls our cosmic epoch, roughly the actual world
insofar as we can trace the relevance to us of its history and pervasive features.4
Physical time is one of the features that become, but physical time is not the
becoming of the features (PR, 283). This is one reason why it is misleading to
refer to occasions as events. Actual occasions, unlike events in relativity
physics, are not divisible into earlier and later events, and are not point instants.
Nonetheless, the becoming of an occasion is a process proceeding from phase
to phase, each phase being the real basis from which its successor proceeds
towards the completion of the thing in question (PR, 215). Moreover, through
the ingression of appropriate eternal objects, each predecessor-phase is ab-
sorbed into the successor-phase without limitation of itself, but with additions
necessary for the determination of an actual entity in the form of individual
satisfaction (PR, 149). In other words, the becoming of the occasion is a cu-
mulative process because what each of its creative phases produces remains a
determinate feature of that occasion. The occasion as a being, superject, or
satisfaction is the nal synthesis of all the accumulated determinations.
Supersession is inter-occasional as well as intra-occasional. Each occa-
sion supersedes other occasions, it is superseded by other occasions, and it is
internally a process of supersession, in part potential and in part actual (IS,
241). In inter-occasional supersession, the terminal, or superjective, phase of
any one occasions existence is immediately superseded by at least one other
occasions initial, or dative, phase of existence (IS, 240). In general, the con-
verse relation also holds: the initiation of an occasions becoming immediately
supersedes the termination of at least one other occasions becoming. But two
exceptions must be noted: God, who is the primordial instance of becoming and
the only unceasing one; and the rst set of nondivine occasions. Gods initial
stage of becoming supersedes only those factors of the universe that are presup-
posed by, and manifested in, the becoming of every actuality, including God.
Among those factors are the eternal objects. The initial divine stage is the
unconditioned valuation and ordering of eternal objects into abstractive hier-
archies of sets of eternal objects capable of joint ingression as determinants of
occasions (SMW, 16769; PR, 31). Abstractive hierarchies are logical con-
structs (SMW, 170). They do not create the eternal objects capacities for joint
ingression; rather, they effect a primordial reduction of the innite possibilities
for such joint ingressions (SMW, 17779). The completed initial divine stage is
termed Gods primordial nature. It conditions the becoming of all other di-
vine stages and of all other nondivine actualities.5 The rst set of nondivine
actual entities is made up of occasions that supersede only Gods primordial
nature.
The term supersession stands both for the creative process constituting
the becoming of an occasion and for the peculiar relations generated by that
232 Jorge Luis Nobo
process. With equal truth it can be said that the process is supersessional be-
cause it generates supersessional relations, or that the said relations are super-
sessional because they are generated by a supersessional process. The relata of
supersession are successively created, and are either successive occasions or
successive phases in the becoming of an occasion. In both modes, however, the
relation of supersession involves much more than the relation of succession.
First of all, in each instance of the relation, whether inter- or intra-occasional,
the earlier, or already created, relatum always remains in existence either to
partly determine (in inter-occasional supersession) or to condition (in intra-
occasional supersession) the creation of the later relatum.6 Second, in each in-
stance of either mode, the creation of the later relatum involves a taking into
account of, and hence constitutes a reaction to, the earlier relatum.7 Finally, also
in each instance of either mode, the later relatum incorporates within itself the
earlier relatum: the later occasion includes within its own nature a reproduction
of the earlier occasion; and the later phase absorbs the earlier phase.8
Since the existence of a superject is never abolished by the existence of
later occasions, and since earlier occasions are reproduced in later ones, actu-
ality is both cumulative and reproductive. The accumulated superjects function
as the absolutely initial data for the creative processes whereby occasions later
than themselves are begotten. But the creative process that begets a new occa-
sion also reproduces within the said occasion all the individual superjects con-
stituting that occasions correlative metaphysical past. As thus reproducedor
as thus causally objectied, to use Whiteheads technical termthe occasions
of the past function as objective data for the nascent ingredient subjectivity of
the novel occasion in the making. In themselves, the past occasions remain
beyond the new occasion; but as reproduced they are within the new occasion,
though not within the new occasions ingredient subjectivity. In this manner, the
cumulative and reproductive nature of actuality explains how earlier occasions
can simultaneously transcend and be immanent in later occasions.
The causal objectication in a given occasion of all occasions earlier than
itself is metaphysically necessary. All such objectications are produced by the
very rst phase of the occasions becoming. Therefore, in regard to inter-occa-
sional supersession, earlier than is a metaphysical notion dened as follows:
any occasion x is earlier than any other occasion y if, and only if, the becoming
of x is completed before the becoming of y is initiated. Equivalently, the meta-
physical past of any given occasion is the nexus of all occasions that are caus-
ally objectied in it. The occasions metaphysical past is broader than the occa-
sions associated backward light cone; for, without regard to any space-like
separation, all occasions in the occasions metaphysical past are causally objec-
tied within the occasions nature and locus. As thus objectied, the past occa-
sions constitute the given occasions physical memory (IS, 243). Since causal
objectication is a transitive, asymmetric, irreexive relation, physical memory
is the reason why each occasion contains, within its own nature and locus, the
chronology of inter-occasional supersession leading up to the initiation of its

own becoming.
In causal objectication, the particular nature and unique identity of one
occasion is reproduced within the particular nature and unique identity of an-
other occasion. This is a revolutionary and much misunderstood doctrine. De-
spite Whiteheads explicit claim that the doctrine was intended to blur the sharp
distinction between universals and particulars, most of his interpreters have
been unable to take the doctrine literally. Yet the doctrine makes complete and
nonparadoxical sense once it is understood that each attained actuality is in
essence a quantum of information; for any determinate quantum of information
is inherently a reproducible reality. Each actuality in attainment is in essence
the becoming of a novel quantum of information, but a quantum which, because
of the causal objectication in it of its correlative past, subsumes within itself
the history of the universe up to the initiation of that quantums becoming. It
should be immediately noted, however, that causal objectication is not the
transmission of a signal. By the same token, causal objectication is presup-
posed by the transmission and signicance of any signal. I return to this point
later.
The analysis of an occasion as the becoming and being of a quantum of
information involves all of Whiteheads metaphysical genera, or categories, of
existents: occasions, eternal objects, nexus, subjective forms, prehensions, con-
trasts, propositions, and multiplicities. The causally objectied occasions and
nexus constitute the information inherited from the past. But every occasion
adds to the information it receives from the past. The novel information in-
cludes the deniteness of the occasions subjective responses to its immanent
objective data. The particular deniteness of a particular response is what
Whitehead terms a subjective form. Each subjective form results from the
ingression of an eternal object, or set of eternal objects, into the locus of the
occasions ingredient subjectivity. Subjective forms include emotions (which
include what we normally think of as scalar forms of energy), desires, valua-
tions, purposes, adversions, aversions, moods, and various species of conscious-
ness (PR, 24).
The particularity of a subjective form cannot be torn from the partic-
ularity of the subject to which it belongs, nor from the particularity of the
datum to which it responds and refers. Each subjective form expresses how the
subject ingredient in the experience responds to some datum or other ingredient
also in the experience. The datum provokes the subjects response, but not nec-
essarily the how, or nature, of the response. The completed subjective operation
of taking into account the provoking datum and responding to it with a denite
subjective form is termed a prehension. The provoking, or objective, datum
of a prehension may be any entity belonging to any of Whiteheads metaphysi-
cal categories of existents, including another prehension or set of prehensions.
A prehension whose complex objective datum is the integration of two or more
234 Jorge Luis Nobo
intra-occasionally earlier prehensions is called an integral prehension. Insofar

as an occasions ingredient subject is self-determining,9 its process of becoming
is an autonomous weaving together of prehensions (PR, 108). In this process,
simple prehensions serve as data for a variety of integrative prehensions, which
in turn serve as data for even more complex integrating prehensions. Ever more
encompassing, but progressively fewer, integrating prehensions are generated in
the successive phases of the occasions becoming. The nal all-integrating pre-
hension is the completed occasion, or satisfaction (PR, 26).
Any synthesis of objective data brought about by an integral prehension is
termed a contrast. The terminal contrast of objective data is termed the ob-
jective datum of the satisfaction; for it is the complex objective referent of the
satisfactions complex subjective form. But the satisfactions complex subjec-
tive form is itself a terminal contrast; for the category of contrast also includes
any realized synthesis of entities of whatever type. In fact, contrast is the most
inclusive of the categories of noneternal existents, and is an open-ended cate-
gory in respect to the evolution of contingent species of itself (PR, 22).
Since a contrast is a mode of synthesis of various entities in one prehen-
sion, it includes the metaphysical category of proposition as one of its meta-
physically necessary special cases: a proposition is the prehensible contrast of
an actual entity, or of a nexus of actual entities, with a set of eternal objects
expressing a possible determination of the actual entity or of the nexus. Propo-
sitions are data for propositional prehensions, and may serve as data for very
complex integrative prehensions of various kinds, including judgments and
other intellectual prehensions. At least one propositional prehensionthe occa-
sions subjective aimplays a decisive metaphysical role by guiding the occa-
sions subjective process of self-completion to its nal determination. The sub-
jective aim involves a proposition prehended by the subject with the subjective
form of purpose to realize it in that process of self-creation (PR, 25). In other
words, some set or other of eternal objects prehended by the subject constitutes
the nal subjective deniteness at which the subject aims. This nal denite-
ness is nothing other than an ideal of superjective existence to be progressively
realized by the subject. Accordingly, what is generated in the self-determining
phases of an occasions becoming is the outcome of the subjective aim of the
subject, determining what it is integrally to be, in its own character of the
superject of its own process (PR, 241). This is why each actual entity is at
once the subject of self-realization, and the superject which is self-realized
(PR, 222).
The relevant possibilities aimed at by the subject are broad and general in
the earlier phases of self-completion, but, through the subjects own autono-
mous decisions, become progressively narrower and more specic in the later
phases. Decision, in this regard, is a technical term. In general, it does not mean
a conscious choice, though it may mean that in regard to the experience of
high-grade occasions. The term is intended in its root sense of a cutting off (PR,
43). What is cut off is always some possibility for the determination of some
actual entity or other, or of some actual nexus or other. For example, if the
subjective forms autonomously realized by a subject be these, they cannot also
be those; if these data are integrated in this manner, they cannot also be inte-
grated in that manner.
In its technical sense, decision belongs to the essence of actuality. White-
head captures this feature in his principle of efcient, and nal, causation, also
termed the ontological principle (PR, 24), which asserts the relativity of
decision; whereby every decision expresses the relation of the actual thing, for
which a decision is made, to an actual thing by which the decision is made. But
decision cannot be construed as a casual adjunct of an actual entity. It consti-
tutes the very meaning of actuality. An actual entity arises from decisions for it,
and by its very existence provides decisions for other actual entities which
supersede it (PR, 43). In immanent decisions, the actual thing for which a
decision is made, and the actual thing by which a decision is made, are one and
the same autonomous subject (PR, 88). In transcendent decisions, on the other
hand, the actual thing for which a decision is made is an occasion in the future
of the occasion by which the decision is made (PR, 254).
Every subject makes both kinds of decision because the relevant possi-
bilities it entertains have to do not only with its own nal deniteness, but also
with the role its causally objectied superject may play in occasions in its
relevant future (PR, 27). Indeed, the subjects immanent decisions aim at inten-
sity in its own subjective form; and its transcendent decisions aim at intensity in
the subjective form of occasions in its relevant future (PR, 27). The relevant
future consists of those occasions anticipated by the present subject by reason
of the real potentiality for them to be derived from itself (PR, 27). Strictly
speaking, therefore, the subject can only realize what I term the immanent com-
ponent of its subjective aim; for the aim at intensity in the relevant futurethe
subjective aims transcendent componentcan be realized only by the descen-
dant, or descendants, of the subject. In fact, since the immanent component is
itself twofold, even the simplest subjective aim has three components: an im-
manent component inherited from an immediate ancestor; an autonomously de-
cided transcendent component to be realized by an immediate descendant; and,
also autonomously decided, another immanent component mediating between
the other two components. More complex subjective aims may involve a series
of two or more descendants. In the anticipation of descendants, what the subject
prehends are not the descendants as such, but the potentiality from which and
by which such descendants will arise. Also prehended as inherent in that poten-
tiality is the necessity that its own superject be causally objectied in, and
subjectively conformed to, by them (IS, 24244).
Each occasions generic necessity to anticipate at least one immediate
descendant is what Whitehead means by physical anticipation (IS, 243). The
initiation and locus of an occasions becoming is determined by its being physi-
236 Jorge Luis Nobo
cally anticipated by at least one immediate ancestor. The anticipating occasion

is then, in the strictest sense of the term, the efcient cause of the when and
where of its immediate descendants existence; for it is the completion of the
anticipating occasion that immediately elicits the initiation of its descendants
becoming at the anticipated locus. All other occasions in the descendants meta-
physical past will be efcient causes of its objective content, but not of its
origination then and there. Thus, [the] whole antecedent world conspires to
produce a new occasion. But some one occasion in an important way conditions
the formation of a successor (MT, 164).
What Whitehead calls a successor, I have been calling an immediate
descendant to distinguish between those successors that are physically antici-
pated and those that are not. Conversely, I also distinguish between immediate
ancestors and mere predecessors. All four notions are dened in terms of the
relation of causal objectication, which, as said earlier, is transitive, asymmet-
ric, and irreexive. Thus, occasion x is a predecessor of some other occasion y
if, and only if, (1) x is causally objectied in y, and (2) x is not causally
objectied in any occasion that is also causally objectied in y. On the other
hand, x is an immediate ancestor of y if, and only if, (1) x is a predecessor of y,
and (2) x physically anticipates y. Similarly, occasion z is a successor of occa-
sion y if, and only if, (1) y is causally objectied in z, and (2) y is not causally
objectied in any occasion that is also causally objectied in z. On the other
hand, z is an immediate descendant of y if, and only if, (1) z is a successor of y,
and (2) z is physically anticipated by y.
Physical anticipation is a special mode of anticipatory objectication, the
latter being the manner in which the metaphysical potentiality for all future
occasions achieves objective reality within an occasions experience. An occa-
sions physical anticipation of a descendant constitutes a transcendent decision
by that occasion as to when and where in that potentiality the descendant in
question is to have its locus. The decision is, in part, an autonomous structural
determination of the anticipating occasion. Its nature and transcendent effective-
ness alike require an appeal to the eternal ontological presuppositions of all
occasions. These presuppositions, to be examined below, must also be invoked
to account for the manner in which the metaphysical potentiality for an occa-
sions contemporaries achieves objective reality in the occasions experience. In
a higher-grade occasion, this presentational objectication of the potentiality in
which its contemporaries are arising is the immanent eld whose subsequent
diversication by physical imagination constitutes the terminus of sense-per-
ception (IS, 245). In any concrete moment of human experience, physical imag-
ination is primarily a function of brain activity, but its ultimate data are the
physical anticipations made by occasions in the immediate past of that concrete
moment.
The doctrine of physical anticipation is also essential for understanding
Whiteheads conception of a social nexus and of the actual world as such a
nexus. A social nexus, also termed a society, is a nexus of occasions such that
some of its members are metaphysically later than, and genetically linked to,
other members, and such that all its members exhibit certain features and rela-
tions in common by reason of inheriting them from their ancestors in the soci-
ety. The actual world, insofar as it is made up of earlier and later occasions, is a
social nexus.
Occasions in a nexus are genetically linked, or form a genetic nexus, if
every later member is physically anticipated by, and conforms to, at least one
earlier member or other. Here to conform means to repeat, re-enact, or reiterate
some feature or relation exhibited by the particular nature of the ancestor or
ancestors. When the conformation is in respect to subjective form, the later
subject conforms the deniteness of its subjective form to some element of the
deniteness of the subjective form of an earlier occasion as objectied for it. In
any such case, a signal may be said to be transmitted from the earlier occasion
to the later one, but, for the expression of this doctrine, reiterated would be a
more appropriate term than transmitted. Any restriction of such transmissions
to successors must be construed as cosmological rather than metaphysical.
Also, two successive occasions, though supersessionally contiguous, need not
be extensively contiguous with each other. Time in the supersessional sense is
not another form of extensiveness (SMW, 125). The notion of extension to
which I am alluding will be explained later. It is one of the eternal ontological
presuppositions of all occasions.
A genetic nexus is properly a society only when at least three generations
of its members are such that the later generations conform to the earliest gener-
ation in respect to the same set of features and relations. Any generation within
a society, except the rst and the last, is preceded and succeeded by generations
exhibiting more or less the same set of features and relations. The particular set
of features and relations shared by all generations of a given society constitutes
the dening characteristic of that society. A society prolongs itself, or continues
to exist, for just as long as its dening characteristic continues to be reiterated
by the latest generation of the genetic nexus. If conformation fails signicantly,
or if it shifts to a signicantly different set of features and relations, the society
will have ceased to exist, even though the genetic nexus may continue to exist,
albeit with a different dening characteristic and, hence, as a different society.
The continuing existence of a society is compatible with its gaining and losing
nonessential, or nondening, characteristics.
A society may be made up of subordinate societies, and may also include
some nonsocial nexus. Thus, the actual world is, for the most part, a society of
societies of societies, with its most pervasive features and relations attaching to
nearly all members, and the less pervasive ones attaching only to members of
one or another subordinate society. As a society that is ever prolonging itself,
the actual world always includes occasions that are still in process of becoming.
But the term actual world is also used by Whitehead to refer to a determinate
238 Jorge Luis Nobo
world-state correlative with a given actual occasion. The occasions actual

world is then synonymous with the given occasions metaphysical past. In yet a
third sense of the term, actual world may signify the entire universe correlative
with a given occasion, and thus be understood to include not only the actualities
in the past of the given occasion, but all actualities that are metaphysically
contemporary with it, and also the potentiality for actualities in its metaphysical
future (IS, 242). Two occasions are metaphysically contemporary if neither is
causally objectied in the other. Similarly, an occasions metaphysical future is
the ever-expanding nexus of occasions in which the said occasion is causally
objectied. Again, these relationships of contemporaneity and futurity are not in
any way dependent on the speed of light and hold regardless of any space-like
separation between the occasions involved.
At the lowest level of societal inclusiveness is what Whitehead referred to
as a personally ordered society: a society such that no two of its members are
contemporaries with each other. My stream of experience is, in the main, a
personally ordered society, but so is an electronic society. My stream of experi-
ence is a subordinate component of the complex social nexus constituting my
brain. A complex society made up of interacting strands of personally ordered
societies is termed a corpuscular society. Personally ordered societies within
a corpuscular society may split and coalesce as part of their interactions. Cor-
puscular and personal societies may be created and annihilated in elds com-
posed of genetic and nonsocial nexus.
Societies are the true enduring entities of Whiteheads metaphysics. In
our experiences, aspects of their dening characteristics constitute the familiar
enduring objects of our everyday life: e.g., stars, rocks, desks, animals, and
human beings. Other such aspects constitute the unfamiliar enduring objects
posited by science: e.g., molecules, atoms, and electrons. In each case, however,
the enduring object is either the whole or a part of the dening characteristic of
a society perceived or conceived in abstraction from the society of which it is
the dening characteristic. In both cases, the relevant dening characteristics
are ultimately derived from the societies as causally objectied in our experi-
ences. But causal objectication normally abstracts from the qualitative content
of the occasion or nexus being objectied. Moreover, in us, additional abstrac-
tions and transmutations are involved in the generation of the sensa constituting
the qualitative terminus of sense-perception. Thus, as given in our sense-per-
ception, or even as conceived by science based on sense-perception, enduring
objects are extreme abstractions from the more complex natures of societies.
Metaphysical materialism mistakes these abstractions for the ultimate constitu-
ents of the universe.
The distinction between an enduring object and an enduring society is
metaphysically important. Quantum physics may constitute the rst scientic
context where concrete societies of occasions, and not just their abstract den-
ing characteristics functioning as enduring objects, have to be taken into ac-
count. If so, each enduring object should be construed either as a single in-
gressed eternal object or as a contrast of ingressed eternal objects. As such,
enduring objects are repeatable. Therefore, the same enduring object may be
abstracted from several societies. It follows that two enduring objects may be
indistinguishable even though they are associated with two perfectly distinct
societies. For example, electrons are enduring objects; consequently, any two
electrons are exactly alike in all respects, except their situations. On the other
hand, any two electronic societies are perfectly distinct. Also, since they are
made up of eternal objects, enduring objects are non-temporal and non-spatial,
however much we may associate them, in our cosmic epoch, with the spatio-
temporal volumes in which they are situated. Thus, enduring objects do not age,
whereas enduring societies do.10 Also, enduring objects can be created, annihi-
lated, and created again. On the other hand, an enduring society has a beginning
and may have an end; but, once ended, it cannot begin again.11
A human subject experiences itself both as a concrete enduring society
and as an abstract enduring object. By reason of the three components of sub-
jective aims, each occasion in a human stream of experience subjectively en-
joys itself as realizing an aspect of a complex subjective aim belonging to the
personally ordered society of which it is a passing moment. It is then prehend-
ing a personal, or enduring, aim that, through the mediating brain, affects and is
affected by the enduring body in its interplay with the environment. For this
reason, the momentary subject normally identies with the body and construes
itself as a moment in the life of a self-conscious bodily organism. But this
identication with the body, though ontologically well founded, can be present
in various degrees and may be absent. In any case, though the body changes
signicantly over time, and though various personal aims of varying endurance
succeed one another with great rapidity, certain general characteristics of the
body, certain types of subjective form, and certain abstract features of the per-
sonal aims remain the same and are integrally prehended by each momentary
subject as constituting an enduring self-identical character, or personality, resid-
ing in all such moments of subjectivity. This resident personality, or enduring
object, is objectively real and, insofar as it elicits conformation from moment to
moment, is causally efcacious. Nonetheless, it is an abstract entity, though
only in Whiteheads sense of the term; for referring to it as an abstraction
merely means that its existence is only one factor of a more concrete element
of nature (CN, 171). The relevant point is that abstract and concrete entities
have different ways of functioning in experience. Not surprisingly, therefore, an
amnesiac loses his conscious grasp of much or all of his abstract personality
without thereby losing his conscious grasp of his temporal continuity with a
unique, concrete personal past currently beyond recollection. The amnesiac also
grasps his potential future as possibly the locus for regaining, or recollecting,
his old self or for constructing a new one. The Western philosophical tradi-
tion elevates the abstract self into the status of a concrete substance; whereas
240 Jorge Luis Nobo
the Eastern tradition dismisses it as illusory. On this point, given Whiteheads

metaphysics, both traditions are mistaken: the substance-like concreteness is
illusory, but the abstract self is real.
III
Enduring things, whether societies or abstract objects, are products of the super-
sessional process. But eternal things are the elements required for the very
being of the process (SMW, 108). These eternal elements are realities presup-
posed by, and manifested in, the becoming and being of every actuality, God
included. They are the ontological presuppositions of all experiences or, equiva-
lently, of all ontologically basic acts of becoming. As such they are the only
factors in the concrete universe that do not issue from the becoming of actual
entities. There are four such factors and they constitute what the universe is by
way of eternal potencyan inexhaustible power to beget interconnected, self-
completing occasions. The four factors are: eternal objects, the reproducible
ultimate essences that can function as immanent determinants of anything that
becomes; creativity, the whereby of all becoming; extension, the wherein of all
becoming and of all interconnected non-eternal existence; and envisagement,
the whereby of all taking into account and the wherein of all eternal objects
apart from their ingression into actualities. These eternal factors jointly function
as an envisaging creative prespace that is sensitive to its holistic states in re-
spect to the determination of each of its loci of actualization.
The eternal factors are presupposed by and manifested in every actuality
because each actuality is an individualization of the integral wholeness of the
universe (PR, 225) and, hence, an individualization of its eternal factors as well
as of its history of attained actualities (PR, 223).12 Thus, every occasion is a
creative taking into account of the world-state that is given for it; and thus, too,
every occasion is a nite extensive region rendered determinate by the ingres-
sion into it of a selection of eternal objects. But the eternal factors of the
universe also transcend each such manifestation. Thus, the universes eternal
factors, as well as the actual world correlative with a specied occasion, are
alike items in the universe with which the said occasion is at once mutually
immanent and mutually transcendent. Accordingly, the doctrine of mutual im-
manence, stated most generally, is the claim that every item in the universe,
including all the other actual entities, are constituents in the constitution of any
one actual entity (PR, 148). Each actuality is a new incarnation of the con-
cretely evolving universe.
Whiteheads concrete universe is the eternal universe as inclusive of the
determinations that accrue to it through the becoming and being of intercon-
nected actual entities. The accruing determinations constitute the ever-expand-
ing nexus of actual entities that is what the universe is by way of actuality.
Thus, the actual universe is a nexus embedded in eternity. In their becoming
and being, the actual entities making up that nexus not only manifest the eternal
universe, but are also constrained by its eternal properties. In what follows, we
rst examine the more relevant properties of eternal extension; then we analyze
the supersessional history of a particular occasion to explicate the remaining
eternal properties of the universe.
Eternal extension, which in itself is neither temporal nor spatial, is an
innite, unbounded continuum that is devoid of all quality and is completely
indeterminate in respect to dimensions or geometrical axioms. This continuum
is innitely differentiable, and in that sense divisible, into potential regions of
itself exhibiting such topological relations as complete inclusion, partial over-
lap, mutual externality, and contiguity. Since potential regions have no real
boundaries, they are said to be improper regions and are one expression of
the continuums indeterminacy. But though in itself indeterminate, eternal ex-
tension is determinable, and its determination is effected by the becoming and
being of actual occasions. Every actual occasion bounds, structures, embodies,
and qualitatively determines a nite region of the eternal continuum, each its
own. The embodied region is the formative locus, or formative standpoint, of
the occasions becoming and being. Because each such locus is determinately
bounded and structured, it is said to be a proper region.
What Whitehead terms the separative property of extension forbids the
overlapping of formative loci (SMW, 64; PR, 309). These loci and the occasions
that embody them must be mutually transcendent. It follows that schemes of
jointly actualizable proper regions constitute a proper subset of schemes of
merely potential regions. The former schemes, but not the latter, are meta-
physically relevant. Nonetheless, both kinds of schemes can play a role in the
analysis of formative standpoints and of objectied occasions and nexus.
A second metaphysical property of extension requires that its proper re-
gions retain everlastingly any structural or qualitative determination gained
from, or crystallized by, the creative activities of the occasions whose stand-
points they are. For this reason, the products of each phase in an occasions
becoming, and hence the completed occasion itself, are permanent additions to
the concrete universe. Supersession and experience are irreversible processes.
What has become does not unbecome. Actuality is necessarily cumulative.
Actuality is also necessarily reproductive. A third constraining property
of eternal extension is its modality, or projectiveness (SMW, 6574, 91). By
reason of this property, all extensive loci are each projected into the others and,
hence, as projections, are each immanent in the others. Modal projection holds
for potential loci as well as for proper ones. What is projected into a potential
region is the current extensive structure of the universe. But the structure that
the region thus gains is only potential. As long as the region remains merely
potential, the projection it harbors shifts with every progressive shift in the
actual extensive structure of the universe. Indeed, what transforms a potential
region into a proper region embodied by a nascent occasion is the determinate
242 Jorge Luis Nobo
crystallization of the universal projection the region bears at the initiation of the
occasions becoming. In other words, what is permanently projected into a nas-
cent proper region is the extensive structureactual and potentialof the uni-
verse correlative with the initiation of the becoming of the occasion embodying
the region in question. The crystallization is effected by the ingression into the
region of a complex contrast of eternal objects establishing the regions bound-
ary and its modal differentiation into proper and improper subregions. By virtue
of this crystallization, or permanent projection, the extensive structure of the
occasions formative region forever mirrors the extensive structure of the uni-
verse-state by which the occasion is begotten.
Relative to the initiation of an occasions becoming, whatever proper re-
gion is already completely determinate is projected into the occasion in that
character and thus with its particular complement of objective and subjective
content. Such projections constitute proper subregions of the formative region
into which they are projected and are the causal objectications of all occasions
in the metaphysical past of the occasion in question. All other regions, includ-
ing proper regions embodied by incomplete occasions, are projected into the
occasion as merely potential regionsregions that are differentiable but as yet
undifferentiatedexcept that the occasions own proper region is projected into
itself as bounded but otherwise devoid of actual structure or content. Thus,
what is self-projected is only the state of the nascent region relative to the
initiation of its becoming. This limited self-projection allows the region to mir-
ror its own extensive location, or collocation, relative to the extensive location
of all other occasions, actual or potential.
The projection of one region into another is termed the modal presence
of the former in the latter. It is also termed the modal aspect of the former
from the latter. The self-projection of a region within itself is termed its self-
aspect. In turn, the projection of the rest of the universes extension into the
region is termed the regions nonself-aspect, or other-aspect. A regions
other-aspect is the said region minus its own self-aspect. The other-aspect com-
pletely surrounds the self-aspect and is the intra-occasional locus of the world
as objectied within experience. In turn, the self-aspect is the intra-occasional
locus of what we have been referring to as the ingredient subject. It is also
the locus for all the subjective forms belonging to that subject. By the same
token, the other-aspect is the locus of all causal, presentational, and anticipatory
objectications.
The mutual modal immanence of extensive regions is metaphysically
more basic than the mutual objectication of actual occasions. For one thing,
modal projections of extensive regions provide the loci, or niches, for all three
modes of objectication.13 For another, presentational and anticipatory objec-
tications occur universally only in respect to the potential extensive regions
that might be embodied by hypothetical occasions contemporary with, or in the
future of, the occasion in which the objectications occur. In other words, since
relative to the becoming of a given occasion, say C, there are no already exist-
ing occasions in its future, and since metaphysically contemporary occasions
cannot be causes of one another, the immanence in C of occasions later than, or
contemporary with, itself can only be in respect to some essential element of
their respective natures that precedes their respective existences and that can
thereby play a role in C. The element in question, for each such occasion, is its
extensive standpoint; for the extensiveness of each such standpoint, though not
its embodiment and structuring by an occasion, is an eternal feature of the
universe. Thus, the extensiveness of any such standpoint can play an objective
role in Cs experience because, qua potential region, it is modally immanent in
the other-aspect of Cs own formative standpoint. At the very least, C is inter-
nally related to the respective extensive regions from which all the other occa-
sions have arisen, are arising, or will arise.
The metaphysical relation between a region and its modal presences in
other regions involves both extension and envisagement and is here termed
ontic reference. Ontic reference is a reciprocal relation between a projector
region and any of its projections into other regions. But it is that relation as an
immediate terminus of envisagement or, derivatively, of experiencing. The pro-
jector and its projection signify each other because each refers to the other as
termini of envisagement. Also, insofar as projector regions are embodied by
individual occasions, ontic reference obtains between occasions and their objec-
tications in other occasions.
To facilitate the illustration of ontic reference and the modal structure of
occasions, I introduce the following notational conventions. First, let &***
stand for the innite continuum of eternal extension, and let any capital letter
followed by two asterisks stand for a nite potential region of &***. Second,
let any capital letter followed by only one asterisk stand for the formative re-
gion of an actual occasion, and let an actual occasion be designated by the same
capital letter used to denote its formative locus, but without the asterisk. Third,
in designating modal presences, let the upper and lowercase versions of an
asterisked letter respectively denote a region and its modal projection, and let
proper or improper subregions of a proper region be indicated by means of a
slash notation such that what is to the left of the slash is a subregion of what is
to the right of the slash. Finally, let &**/... stand for the modal projection into
the region to the right of the slash of all of &*** that is entirely outside the
region in question. I continue to use occasion C as our explanandum and frame
of reference. Also, I analyze each phase of becoming into a creative subphase
issuing in a created subphase.
The very rst creative subphase of Cs becoming transforms C** into C*
and thereby crystallizes its modal structure of proper and improper subregions.
The most important feature of that structure is the contrast between c*/C* and
&**/C*, respectively Cs self-aspect and other-aspect. Now c*/C* bears the
relation of mutual ontic reference with the rest of C*, and &**/C* bears the
244 Jorge Luis Nobo
same relation with all regions of &*** that are entirely outside C*. Also, if B
and L are predecessors of C, then b*/&**/C* and l*/&**/C* are the modal
presences in C* of B* and L*, respectively. Mutual ontic reference then obtains
between each projector and its corresponding projection in C*. Moreover,
b**/c*/C* and l**/c*/C* are differentiable subregions of Cs self-aspect that
respectively bear mutual ontic reference with b*/&**/C* and l*/&**/C*. No-
tice that what is true for individual causal objectications is true for all the
modal presences into which &**/C* is actually or potentially differentiated.
From the point of view of the ingredient subject embodying c*/C*let
us term it c/Contic reference is either experientially transcendent or experi-
entially immanent. In transcendent reference, the projection is an immanent
differentiation of the occasions formative locus, whereas the projector is be-
yond that locus. The subject c/C prehends the projection as referring to a pro-
jector that is beyond its experiential domain, but that is not beyond the envis-
agement of which that domain is a localized and creative enrichment. Thus, c/C
experiences b*/&**/C* as referring beyond C* to B*; but it does not experi-
ence B* itself. Equivalently, c/C experiences the contents of b*/&**/C* as the
self-revelation of an occasion, B, whose revealed existence and essence tran-
scends that particular self-revelation, but which, for C, would be indistinguish-
able from nonentity if it were not so revealed.
The very meaning of intra-occasional objectivity depends on this funda-
mental relation of transcendental reference. Because of it, whatever is contained
in &**/C* is for c/C something other than its own subjectivity, though it may
be the subjective deniteness of some other occasion. It is also the reason why
the objective immanence of the universe in each nite locus of experience is
intuitively taken to be the self-revelation of what is other than, and independent
of, the recipient of that self-revelation. From the point of view of the ingredient
subject, &**/C* is the perspectival self-disclosure of its world. Subject c/C
derives from, is objectively anchored to, and prehends a world transcending its
experience. For, it belongs to the nature of this perspective derivation, that the
world thus disclosed proclaims its own transcendence of that disclosure. To
every shield, there is another side, hidden (AI, 228). The world disclosed in
experience is the projection, or objectication, of the world hidden from experi-
ence. But objectication is self-revelation (PR, 227). In this manner, White-
heads categories do elucidate this paradox of the connectedness of things:
the many things, the one world without and within (AI, 228).
In revealing itself within a given occasion, the world reveals its self-
revelation in and for other occasionsoccasions earlier than, concurrent with,
or later than, the occasion in question: for the reciprocal ontic reference of
regions is itself objectied in and for any given occasion. On this theory, then,
the modal and referential texture of each occasion of experience ever proclaims
the falsehood of solipsism and subjectivism. No experience can be what it is
except as anchored to, and signicant of, what is other than itself. Likewise, the
subject ingredient in an occasion cannot be what it is except as referring to

what is other than itself, the world as ingredient in the same occasion. Indeed,
the importance of the modal differentiations of an occasions self-aspect is that
the subjective form embodying each such differentiation refers beyond itself to
a corresponding region of the occasions other-aspect. For example, the subjec-
tive form of c/Cs prehension of b*/&**/C* embodies b**/c*/C* and thereby
bears an essential ontic reference to Bs objectication in b*/&**/C*.
The immanent, or intra-experiential, reference of subjective form to ob-
jective datum is self-evident in sense-perception. I fear the dog I see baring its
fangs at me. In this concrete moment of my experience, there is not the slightest
question regarding what my fear refers to. The fear is a modication of my
subjectivity; the dog is an item in the objective content of my experience; and
my fear refers to the dog. Even if the dog is a hallucinationwhich means that
it fails the test of trans-occasional objectivity within one enduring perceiver or
among a community of such perceiverswhat I fear is not in my mind, but is
out there in my objective experience, even if in no one elses. Notice, nally,
that on this theory the so-called intentionality of consciousness is only a special
case of immanent reference, and that immanent reference is itself only a special
case of ontic reference. Intentionality is not some mysterious property co-emer-
gent with a mysterious human consciousness; rather, it is a special case of a
metaphysical feature of all ultimate actualities.
The importance of the modal structure of an occasions formative region
cannot be exaggerated; for it is the reason why every experience bears an ontic
reference to past, present, and future. For example, in the course of Cs becom-
ing, the other-aspect of its formative locus is nally differentiated into three
potential, or improper, subregions: rst, pa**/&**/C*, the relatively well-
dened, smallest potential subregion encompassing the modal presences of the
formative loci of all occasions in Cs metaphysical past, each such locus bounded,
embodied, and structured by a causal objectication; second, pr**/&**/C*, the
less well-dened, smallest potential subregion encompassing the modal pres-
ences of the formative loci of Cs metaphysical contemporaries; and third,
fu**/&**/C*, the remainder of the other-aspect, which thus constitutes a poten-
tial subregion encompassing the modal presences of the formative loci of all
occasions in Cs metaphysical future. The rst of these potential subregions is
the eld of Cs metaphysical past as modally immanent in C*. It is the eld
housing Cs physical memory. The differentiation of this eld from the rest of
Cs other-aspect is an aboriginal feature of Cs dative phase.
On the other hand, the differentiation of Cs other-aspect into separate
elds harboring respectively the presentational objectications of occasions
contemporary with C and the anticipatory objectications of occasions in Cs
future is not an aboriginal feature of Cs dative phase. Therefore, this further
differentiation is to be ascribed to the intermediate phases of Cs becoming. But
the differentiation will itself be based on information provided by the modal
246 Jorge Luis Nobo
presence in C of its causally objectied past. The information in question is a

function of the physical anticipations that are necessary ingredients of all occa-
sions (AI, 196), including the physical anticipations made by all occasions in
Cs immediate past. Conditions permitting, the immediate descendants of these
immediately past occasions will embody their anticipated loci. Accordingly, if
C is an occasion of sufcient propositional complexity, this information will
allow it to determine, within certain limits of probability, which subregion of its
other-aspect is the modal presence of the transcendent extensive region likely
serving as the substratum for Cs contemporaries. The smallest potential sub-
region that includes all modal presences rescued in this manner from the other-
wise undifferentiated other-aspect constitutes the modal presence in C of Cs
contemporary world. It is Cs eld of presentational immediacy. In turn, the
modal presence of Cs future world is what remains of the other-aspect after the
subtraction from it of Cs elds of physical memory and presentational imme-
diacy. This remaining eld, the eld of futurity, is the modal presence in C of
that potential region of eternal extension wherein the formative locus of Cs
immediate descendant may be physically anticipated with some probability of
success. Thus, if !d**/fu**/&**/C* stands for the objective datum of c/Cs
physical anticipation of an immediate descendant, then, conditions permitting,
that descendant will be begotten as the embodiment of D**. In this fashion, an
occasions physical anticipation of an immediate descendant functions as an
imperative (hence, the exclamation mark in the notation) that, if at all possible,
must be heeded by the activity begetting the descendant.
Regardless of Cs contingent complexity as an occasion, pr**/&**/C*
necessarily becomes the objective datum for one of c/Cs bare regional feelings.
This general regional feeling . . . is the whole of . . . [c/Cs] direct physical
feeling of the contemporary world (PR, 316). The region in question is then
the simple terminus of c/Cs perception in the pure mode of presentational
immediacy. On the other hand, if C is a high-grade occasion, such as those
constituting a stream of human experience, pr**/&**/C* is differentiated into
regions of itself by means of sensa generated by Cs physical imagination under
the causal inuence of brain states. In fact, all sensawhether they are associ-
ated with perception, recollection, waking or dreaming fantasy, or hallucina-
tionsare generated by physical imagination under the causal inuence of
brain states. What differentiates these modalities of presentational immediacy
from each other is the set of causal objectications providing the information to
which the sensa conform. Thus,
physical imagination has normally to conform to the physical memories of the

immediate past: it is then called sense-perception and is non-delusive. It may
conform to the physical memories of the more remote past: it is then called the
image associated with memory. It may conform to some special intrusive element
in the immediate past such as, in the case of human beings, drugs, emotions, or
conceptual relationships in antecedent . . . occasions: it is then variously called

delusion, or ecstatic vision, or imagination. (IS, 245)
Since the brain is itself a social nexus harboring the stream of experience
as a subordinate social nexus, it should be clear that all modalities of presenta-
tional immediacy derive their sensory content and regional differentiations from
information provided directly by physical memory and indirectly by physical
anticipation. Perception of this information is termed perception in the pure
mode of causal efcacy. When contrasted with sense-perception, it is also
termed, somewhat misleadingly, nonsensuous perception. Whatever its desig-
nation, this mode of perception is metaphysically necessary and basic. Through
it, every occasion perceives all occasions in its past as causally efcacious in
bringing about its own existence and in partially determining its nascent nature.
Also through it, every occasion perceives all potential occasions in its future as
subject to the causal efcacy of its own nal nature. In contrast with the funda-
mentality and universality of causal efcacy, any modality of presentational
immediacy is derivative and may be negligible or even absent.
What in human or animal experience is ordinarily referred to as sense-
perception is really, in Whiteheads theory, an ongoing interplay between pre-
sentational immediacy and causal efcacy. This interplay is termed perception
in the mixed, or impure, mode of symbolic reference because the termini of
prehensions in either mode are individually or collectively signicant of the
termini of prehensions in the other mode. In us, but not necessarily in all other
animals, conceptual and propositional analyses of symbolic reference provide
the objects of conscious and unconscious knowledge. On the other hand, if we
abstract presentational immediacy from the interplay of symbolic reference, we
are left with Humes mutually independent sense-impressions and, hence, with
a resulting skepticism concerning causation, induction, and knowledge in gen-
eral. Equivalently, such an abstraction leaves us with what Santayana referred
to as the solipsism of the present moment. Humes appeal to human nature or
custom and Santayanas appeal to animal faith are both unseemly attempts to
dodge the unacceptable implications of their theories of experience. The fail-
ures of their theories to provide any basis for empirical knowledge is a reductio
ad absurdum of any attempt to construe sense-perception as the foundation of
all experience and knowledge.
Whiteheads contention is that, were causal efcacy not the primitive
mode of perception, the sensa of presentational immediacy would be meaning-
less and uninterpretable. Any such sensum is silent as to the past or the future.
How it originates, how it will vanish, whether indeed there was a past, and
whether there will be a future, are not disclosed by its own nature. No material
for the interpretation of sensa is provided by the sensa themselves, as they stand
starkly, barely, present and immediate. We do interpret them; but no thanks for
the feat is due to them (AI, 180). Interpretation is possible only on the evi-
248 Jorge Luis Nobo
dence or information drawn from the vast background and foreground of non-
sensuous perception with which sense-perception is fused, and without which it
can never be (AI, 181). Conscious mnemonic imagination provides a good
example not only of the dependency of presentational immediacy on causal
efcacy, but also of the insufciency of materialism. The images associated
with conscious recollection are generated by physical imagination under the
causal inuence of brain activity. But the images are conditioned by, and refer
to, physical memory. For this reason, conscious recollection can never be com-
pletely explained in terms of brain activity. As Whitehead puts it: The ordinary
mechanistic account of memory is obviously inadequate. For a cerebration in
the present analogous to a cerebration in the past can, on this theory, only
produce an image in the present analogous to the image in the past. But the
image in the present is not the memory of the image in the past. It is merely an
image in the present (IS, 244). The image in the present does copy some
aspect or other of the past experience, but its character of being a copy arises
from its comparison with the objectication of the past which is the true mem-
ory (IS, 244).
Due to the transitivity of causal objectication and of modal presences in
general, physical memory is all-inclusive, extremely redundant, and non-
specialized. For that reason, social nexus of any signicant complexity eventu-
ally develop derivative systems of selectively germane memories mapped onto
the structure and behavior of their subordinate societies. An animal brain in-
volves a complex hierarchy of such derivative memory systems, their various
mappings and codes coordinated by the common physical memory that funds
them all. By means of such systems, a brain can develop and coordinate con-
stantly updated systems of appropriately encoded representations of the organ-
ism, its environment, and their actual and potential interactions. In the context
of symbolic reference, the contents of all modalities of an organisms presenta-
tional immediacy symbolically code and decode such representations. It must
be added that the mutual signicance of presentational immediacy and causal
efcacy on which symbolic reference rests would be impossible apart from the
mutual immanence and mutual ontic reference of the various components of
each occasions modal structure.
The modal structure of an occasions formative region functions as an
indicative scheme that not only permanently enshrines the occasions colloca-
tion in the extensive continuum, but also captures the initiation and termination
dates of the occasions becoming, the former date in its physical memory of its
immediate ancestor and the latter in its physical anticipation of its immediate
descendant (PR, 67). The initiation, or alpha, date is the supersessional juncture
between the occasions dative phase and the superjective phase of an immediate
ancestor; whereas the termination, or omega, date is the supersessional juncture
between the occasions own superjective phase and the dative phase of an im-
mediate descendant. The chronological order of supersessional junctures is one
and the same with the chronological order of immediate causal objectications.
This is one reason why the complex supersessional chronology of occasions up
to a given occasion is enfolded within the extensive locus of the said occasion;
for, in the occasions dative phase, the causal objectications of all past occa-
sions are systematically disposed in their relative supersessional order, accord-
ing as one is, or is not, immediately included in another (PR, 293).
An occasions alpha and omega dates are particular supersessional rela-
tions the occasion bears to an immediate ancestor and an immediate descen-
dant, respectively. Nonetheless, each such relation also marks, or indicates, a
more general supersessional relation between the occasion and its immediately
past, or immediately future, universea supersessional relation that the occa-
sion may share with other occasions. For an occasions alpha date also marks
the occasions supersession of its immediate metaphysical past, and its omega
date also marks the supersession of the occasion by its immediate metaphysical
future. It then follows that two or more occasions may supersede the same
immediate past or may be superseded by the same immediate future. In other
words, the initiation of two or more occasions may supersede the same determi-
nate state of the universe; and, conversely, the same determinate state of the
universe may supersede the termination of two or more occasions.
It thus becomes apparent that the alpha and omega dates of particular
occasions mark supersessional junctures between occasions and states of the
universe. The relations thus marked will be referred to as universal instants in
the supersessional chronology of occasions. Two occasions, say b and c, have
alpha dates that mark the same universal instant if, and only if, (1) every prede-
cessor of b is a predecessor of c, and (2) every predecessor of c is a predecessor
of b. Two alpha dates are said to be equivalent if they mark, or indicate, the
same universal instant in the supersessional chronology of occasions. Similarly,
the omega dates of b and c are said to be equivalent if, and only if, (1) every
successor of b is a successor of c, and (2) every successor of c is a successor
of b.
An occasions alpha and omega dates jointly dene its locus in the super-
sessional chronology of occasions. The unique combination of an occasions
extensive and supersessional loci is termed its position. No two occasions can
share the same position even if they have equivalent alpha dates and equivalent
omega dates. Hence, an occasions position is a sufcient expression of its
unique particularity. Moreover, because it is instituted with its dative phase, an
occasions position grounds its self-identity through its successive phases of
becoming. For the same reason, no genetic fallacy is committed when we iden-
tify the occasion qua subject with the occasion qua superject. Also, an occa-
sions position is derivatively the position of its self-aspect. Finally, because
each causal objectication of a given occasion reproduces the said occasions
internal modal structure, the objectication necessarily exhibits the same posi-
tion as the superject it reproduces. Thus, the superject and any one of its causal
250 Jorge Luis Nobo
objectications are two and the same particular. The superject embodies the
occasions formative locus, whereas each causal objectication embodies a
proper subregion within the standpoint of some later occasion or other. This is
why the completed occasions extensive location is not simple but multiple. But
wherever it is thus located, it exhibits one selfsame position and is thereby one
selfsame particular. Thus, according to Whitehead, the oneness of the universe,
and the oneness of each element in the universe, repeat themselves to the crack
of doom in the creative advance from creature to creature, each creature includ-
ing in itself the whole of history and exemplifying the self-identity of things
and their mutual diversities (PR, 228).
Causal objectication cannot be construed as the transmission of a signal
precisely because a completed actuality exhibits one selfsame position in its
formative locus and in the respective extensive loci of each of its causal objec-
tications in its metaphysical future. Except that there may be some abstraction
from its subjective deniteness, the total quantum of information that is C em-
bodies the selfsame positional locus that is exhibited alike by C*, c*/&**/D*
and, say, c*/&**/N*. For the same reason, at least some of the new information
created by c/C at c*/C* is also found at c*/c*/&**/D* and at c*/c*/&**/N*.
But there has been no transfer of information from one positional locus to a
different positional locus. On the other hand, if the subjective form of D has
been conformed to the subjective form of C, then some feature originated at
c*/C* and causally objectied at c*/c*/&**/D* has been reiterated at d*/D*.
Since c*/c*/&**/D* and d*/D* exhibit different positional loci, the feature in
question may be construed as a signal transmitted from one occasion to an-
other. The feature is a signal precisely because, as in its new positional locus, it
necessarily refers to its old positional locus: it signies its source. Thus, the
conformal prehensions of earlier occasions by later occasions account for the
transmission of signals; but it is causal objectication that makes conformation
possible by universalizing each completed occasion into an objective compo-
nent of all occasions in the said occasions metaphysical future.
The modal scheme, immanent reference, transcendent reference, and the
objectication of transcendent reference cooperate with yet another property of
extensionits prehensive propertyto account for the integral unity of every
proper region and thus of the occasion embodying it. As a local manifestation
of the prehensiveness of extension, each proper region is the integral and indis-
soluble union of the modal presences within itself of all extensive regions,
actual or potential (SMW, 6465). By reason of ontic reference, the proper
region is the intraexperiential unity of its own self-aspect with its own other-
aspect, and of all more specialized modal presences within itself. This integral
unity of the occasions formative locus is the reection, into the locus, of the
eternal unity of the universe. In this manner, the proper region is, from the
onset of its existence, the real potentiality for the individual integrity of
the several prehensions that will arise in response to its objective content, and
for the integration of all such prehensions into the one nal prehension that is
the superjective satisfaction. In other words, the integrity of the formative locus
grounds the integrity of the experiencing embodying that locus; and the integ-
rity of the experiencing grounds the referential integration of the various objec-
tications in the other-aspect through the integration of the corresponding sub-
jective forms in the self-aspect (PR, 308). On the other hand, the teleological
integrity of the subjective process of self-completion is grounded in its autono-
mously modied subjective aim.
The real potentiality harbored by C* at its inception is itself the realiza-
tion and particularization of the eternal potentiality harbored by C**. This real-
ization requires a reference to the actual world correlative with the initiation of
Cs becoming and a reference to the eternal universe qua envisaging creativity.
The correlative actual world, as just this nexus of just these attained actualities,
comes into existence with the completion of Cs immediate ancestor, say B. The
completion of Bs becoming is the efcient cause of the immediate initiation of
Cs becoming, but what determines which potential region is to serve as Cs
formative locus is !c**/fu**/&**/B*, the objective datum of Bs physical antici-
pation of C. However, without the envisaging creativity of the universe, the
becoming of C could not even begin; for what does not exist cannot bring itself
into existence. Hence, C, as in its rst subphase of partially determinate exis-
tence, is begotten by the envisaging creativity of its correlative universe. The
individualizing activity is then said to be functioning as a vehicle for a tran-
scendent decision made by B in respect to C. In effect, the individualizing
activity is adapting the new to the old. Such an adaptation would not be possi-
ble if C**, or any subregion of it, were already actualized by another occasion.
Not all physical anticipations are successful. We may speculate that their fail-
ures were common in the very early universe as each occasion physically antic-
ipated a very large number of immediate descendants, but that habits of orderly
prolongation for genetic nexus gradually evolved and thereby increased the
probability of successful physical anticipations. Perhaps some laws of conserva-
tion are manifestations of such habits.14
Once it is individualized, the envisaging creativity is owned by C qua
self-determining subject; but Cs phases of self-determination are preceded by
three individualizing phases in which C is both begotten and partially deter-
mined by the state of the universe correlative with the initiation of Cs becom-
ing. Aside from the fact that they beget a new occasion, these phases are repeti-
tive in nature. The rst creative subphase produces the rst created subphase, or
dative phase, which harbors the reproduction of all past occasions. The second
creative subphase produces a subphase of conformal physical prehensions, that
is, of prehensions whose respective objective data are causal objectications,
and whose respective subjective forms repeat some of the eternal objects exem-
plied in the subjective forms of the respective objective data. The third cre-
ative subphase produces a subphase of conformal conceptual prehensions, that
252 Jorge Luis Nobo
is, of evaluative prehensions whose objective data are the eternal objects exem-
plied in the subjective forms of the conformal physical prehensions. In this
manner, the individualizing phases beget not only the occasions initial objec-
tive content, but also its initial conformal subjectivity.
In the individualizing phases, C is other-realized and thus not yet actual
in Whiteheads technical sense of that term: C is merely real. But once the
universe has been individualized in Cs formative region, Cs subjective self-
realization begins. The envisaging creativity has become the nascent subjects
experiencing activity: c/C now owns the experiencing process and autono-
mously completes itself, progressively fashioning the nal deniteness of its
subjective form and thereby referentially integrating the objectications given
for it. The autonomous subjective phases are originative in nature. They begin
with a phase of novel conceptual prehensions whose data are eternal objects
whose germaneness to Cs inherited character is a function of Gods primordial
evaluation and ordering of all eternal objects; for c/C prehends the causal objec-
tication of God and is thereby inuenced by Gods primordial aim that any set
of eternal objects already ingressed in an occasion shall constitute a lure for the
ingression of other eternal objects that are not yet ingressed in that occasion,
but which, in some abstractive hierarchy or other, are proximately relevant to
those that are already ingressed. This divine inuence is noncoercive and con-
stitutes what Whitehead refers to as the secular function of God.15 The pos-
tulation of this inuence is meant to account for the temporal worlds exhibition
of a tendency toward qualitative and structural order, and toward new forms of
both types of order, that is not wholly explicable by the statistical probabilities
of occasions making this or that type of decision (PR, 20607). Abstractive
hierarchies promote order without determining or preguring it.
The phase of novel conceptual prehensions is followed by successive
phases of origination and integration until the subject completely realizes the
immanent component of its subjective aim. Notice that, in this process, C be-
comes progressively more denite, but remains the selfsame occasion because
its position does not change. It thus combines self-identity and self-diversity
(PR, 25). This is what allows Whitehead to say that actual entities become but
do not change (PR, 59, 7980; AI, 204). Change is the difference between
successive occasions in a social nexus of occasions (PR, 73, 79).
The self-realization of any occasion contrasts with its other-realization by
its correlative universe. These two processes presuppose each other, but are
distinct in their functions. In the becoming of every occasion, the repetitive
phases effect a transition from a just-completed autonomous subject-superject
to an incomplete autonomous subject-superject. These phases thus constitute
what Whitehead refers to as the macroscopic process of transitionmacro-
scopic because what the process must take into account, its determining scope
of envisagement, is the world writ large, the macrocosm including and tran-
scending the nascent occasions formative locus. In turn, the subsequent origi-
native phases effect a progressive growing together, or concrescence, of prehen-

sions whereby the occasion attains its nal unity of satised, or fully made,
experience. These originative phases thus constitute what Whitehead refers to
as the microscopic process of concrescencemicroscopic because what the
process must take into account, its conditioning scope of experiencing, is the
world writ small, the microcosm immanent in the occasions formative locus.
The two processes are respectively the processes of efcient causation and of
nal causation, provided these are conceived as interdependent aspects of an
occasions becoming. Here is how Whitehead summarizes this important meta-
physical doctrine:
There are two species of process, macroscopic process and microscopic

process. The macroscopic process is the transition from attained actuality to actu-
ality in attainment; while the microscopic process is the conversion of conditions
which are merely real into determinate actuality. The former process effects the
transition from the actual to the merely real; and the latter process effects the
growth from the real to the actual. The former process is efcient; the latter pro-
cess is teleological. The future is merely real without being actual; whereas the
past is a nexus of actualities. The present is the immediacy of the teleological
process whereby reality becomes actual. The former process provides the condi-
tions which really govern attainment; whereas the latter process provides the ends
actually attained. (PR, 214)
IV
If we hypothesize that certain empirical relations of abrupt or instantaneous
succession may manifest the supersessional junctures of occasions or of genera-
tions belonging to the same social nexus, then the distinction between the pro-
cess of macroscopic transition and the process of microscopic concrescence,
together with the distinction between causal objectications and conformal sub-
jective forms, may illuminate the distinction between holistic and local inu-
ences on any given occasion or event.16 Contingently evolved, or cosmological,
laws appear to restrict most occasions to conform signicantly only to prede-
cessors with which they are extensively contiguous. Since we interpret signals
to be complex qualications of subjective form, this would mean that, by some
such law, or set of laws, our cosmic epoch sets an upper limit for the speed at
which a signal may travel in spatio-temporalized extension. But a cosmological
restriction on the transfer of information by conformation is not a restriction on
the metaphysically necessary universalization of information by causal objec-
tication. For this reason, occasions in the metaphysical past of a given occa-
sion, but not in or on its past light cone, still provide it with information that
can exert an inuence on its immanent and transcendent decisions. And what is
true of an occasion is also true for enduring societies. They can inuence each
254 Jorge Luis Nobo
other not only through the conformal reception of signals, if any, but also
through their causal objectications in one another.
Additional illumination for the distinction between global and local inu-
ences may be gained from the doctrine that every occasion has some informa-
tion about some of its metaphysical contemporaries by reason of the physical
anticipations made by the immediate ancestors of the said contemporaries. This
information may be of special relevance for two or more occasions with equiva-
lent alpha dates, whatever their space-like separation. It may be even more rele-
vant for enduring societies with a common origin and such that each constituent
occasion of one society is paired with a constituent occasion of the other soci-
ety by virtue of both occasions having equivalent alpha dates and equivalent
omega dates. In the latter case, one transitional process begets each pair of
occasions and, as a vehicle for past transcendent decisions, may from their
inception coordinate the possibilities offered for their respective autonomous
decisions. Then, from the perspective of a later occasion belonging to a human
stream of experience, the paired occasions, regardless of the space-like separa-
tion of their respective formative regions, would constitute one quantum event.
These suggestions as to the possible explanatory value of Whiteheads
metaphysics are vague and empirically on the cheap. Whether they, and others
like them, can be translated into empirically testable hypotheses remains to be
seen. But the other contributions to this volume justify my optimism regarding
the relevance of Whiteheads metaphysics to contemporary physics. In any
case, my goal has been to present aspects of Whiteheads metaphysics in a
manner suggestive of possible applications. I now return to and conclude that
task.
If we assume the adequacy of Whiteheads metaphysics, the supersessional
process exhibits a rhythmic alternation between efcient transition and tele-
ological concrescence that grounds the mutual relevance of holistic inuences
and local self-realizations. Throughout it all, and aside from its eternal factors,
the universe manifests itself as an evolving, self-forming, informational system.
On the one hand, the universe is ever being informed by the becoming and
being of actual occasions. On the other, the becoming and being of every actual
occasion is informed by its correlative universe. The information of the uni-
verse by the becoming of occasions is the transformation of eternal potentiality
into noneternal, but permanent, actuality. The information of each occasion by
its correlative universe is efcient causation complemented by the teleological
self-formation of each occasions subjective self-aspect. In this manner, every
quantum increment in determinate information affects the whole, and the whole
affects every such quantum. Finally, each actual or potential increment is inter-
nally related to all other actual or potential increments.
In this informationally coherent universe, knowledge is information that
has become the object of conscious self-formation, including conscious percep-
tion, conscious recollection, and conscious anticipation. But, as such, knowl-
edge is necessarily a player in the rhythmic swing from self-formation to other-

formation, and from other-formation to self-formation. Each cognizing occa-
sion, with its complement of immanent and transcendent decisions, is a com-
plex causal link, at once efcient and teleological, between two determinate
states of the universe. Conscious decisions do make a difference in the uni-
verse.
Moreover, since all information may be thought of as protoknowledge, or
as an in-principle possible terminus of knowledge, it is now evident that we can
construe the actual occasion as an onto-epistemic quantum equally relevant to
matters ontological and matters epistemological. The distinction between being
and knowing has been blurred. It should also be evident that the actual occasion
is both a quantum of becoming and a quantum of determinate being, a subject-
superject; and that it is both a quantum of metaphysical extension and a quan-
tum of metaphysical time, a metaphysical topo-chronon. Accordingly, White-
heads metaphysics of actual occasions appears eminently suited for the task of
generating a philosophical cosmology that can do justice to quantum physics
without erecting a barrier between our cognitive experience and the real physi-
cal behavior of the entities and processes we claim to know.
Abbreviations
Books by Alfred North Whitehead

AI Adventures of Ideas (1933; reprint, New York: Free Press, 1967).
CN The Concept of Nature (1919; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1964).
FR The Function of Reason (1929; reprint, Boston: Beacon Press, 1958).
IS The Interpretation of Science (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961).
MT Modes of Thought (1938; reprint, New York: Free Press, 1969).
PR Process and Reality (1929; New York: Free Press, 1978).
RM Religion in the Making (1926; reprint, New York: Meridian, 1960).
S Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect (1927; reprint, New York: Capricorn,
1959).
SMW Science and the Modern World (1925; reprint, New York: Free Press, 1967).
Books by Other Authors

MMQM Stapp, Henry P. Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics (Berlin: Springer
Verlag, 1993).
NST Hawking, Stephen and Penrose, Roger. The Nature of Space and Time
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
SNWV Shimony, Abner. Search for a Naturalistic World View (2 vols. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
256 Jorge Luis Nobo
WIO Bohm, David. Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1980).
WMES Nobo, Jorge Luis. Whiteheads Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity (Al-
bany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1986).
Notes
1. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). NST in subsequent citations.
Citations from other books are also by abbreviations keyed to titles listed under Abbre-
viations.
2. The aspects in question are presented under an interpretation and development
for which I have argued at length in WMES and in Experience, Eternity, and Primor-
diality: Steps Towards a Metaphysics of Creative Solidarity, Process Studies 26 (1997):
171204.
3. An eighth category of existentsmultiplicitiesis said to be improper. Of
signicant interest for logic, the category of multiplicities is not germane to the limited
concerns of this paper (PR, 30).
4. PR, 66, 9091, 28889, and 30405. See also WMES, 21422 and 24648.
5. Gods unending becoming yields completed divine stages that are each a de-
terminate synthesis of all the data available at the initiation of the stage in question. Data
are entities. Eternal objects are the only data for the primordial stage; but all subsequent
divine stages have as data some set or other of completed occasions. These subsequent
stages constitute what Whitehead calls the consequent nature of God.
6. RM, 8990; IS, 243; PR, 149, 154, 21415, 236; AI, 19495.
7. SMW, 42, 69; RM, 11112; IS, 24142; S, 39, 58; PR, 56, 15455; AI, 252
55, 280.
8. PR, 7, 5051, 14849, 16566, 220; AI, 19293, 197; IS, 24344.
9. The term ingredient subject is not Whiteheads. Whitehead uses subject to
refer to the total occasion. I believe this is a mistake that hides Whiteheads most impor-
tant insights concerning the nature and structure of experience. I have argued as much in
WMES, 35154, 36465, 38587, 39091. In that book, however, I referred to the
ingredient subject as the empirical subject, and to the total occasion as the metaphysi-
cal subject.
10. If the distinction between enduring society and enduring object is missed,
very different conclusions will be reached on these matters. Accordingly, compare my
conclusions with Shimonys in SNWV, vol. 2, 294, 298, 303.
11. Recent experiments involving Bose-Einstein condensates [http://jilawww.
colorado.edu/bec/] show that if one concentrates a large number of identical bosons in a
small region, their wave functions can overlap so much that the bosons lose their iden-
tity. Like electrons, bosons are enduring objects and can be exactly alike in all respects,
except for their spatio-temporal situation. However, any two bosonic societies will re-
main perfectly distinct. Moreover, if those two societies participate in a Bose-Einstein
condensate, their existence comes to an end. When a boson as enduring object emerges
from the condensate, that boson marks the beginning of a new bosonic society.
12. The individualization of this history may be relevant to the theoretical con-
cerns pursued by G. Chew in his contribution to this volume (chapter 8).
13. Modality is the main reason for Whiteheads rejection of simple location. By
reason of modality, every occasion pervades the continuum. Also by reason of it, every
occasion has an intrinsic reality at its formative locus, and an extrinsic reality at every
locus in which it is objectied. Cf. SNWV vol. 2, 293.
14. That the laws of nature reect the habits of the entities making up nature is a
view shared alike by Peirce and Whitehead. The view is also held by David Finklestein,
as evident in his contribution to this collection (chapter 14).
15. In my development of Whiteheads metaphysics, another secular function of
God is to physically anticipate the set of occasions constituting the initiation of the
temporal world, or nondivine, noneternal universe. We may surmise that each member of
this set physically anticipated a large number of immediate descendants. We may sur-
mise also that, in the earliest stages of the temporal universe, each occasion physically
anticipated a large number of immediate descendants, so that the ratio of immediate
descendants to common immediate ancestor was unimaginably high. We may also as-
sume that, with the gradual evolution of contingent forms of orderly prolongation for
genetic nexus, primitive enduring societies and their associated enduring objects
emerged, struggled for survival, proliferated, and evolved into the familiar physical enti-
ties of our cosmic epoch. With these or similar assumptions, the origination and rapid
expansion of the temporal universe would receive its required metaphysical explanation.
16. Notice that Whiteheads process of macroscopic transition is analogous to
David Bohms holomovement, a fact not lost on C. Papatheodorou and B. Hiley in their
jointly authored Process, Temporality, and Space-Time (Process Studies 26, 24778).
The difference between the enfoldment of information throughout all space and time,
and the transmission of a signal corresponds to the difference between global causal
objectication and local physical conformation. See Bohm, WIO, 168.
18
Dialogue for Part IV
Chew: I sometimes like to say that reality is electromagnetic. A particular

feature of electromagnetism which has often impressed me is the role of electric
screening in creating boundaries for objects. For example, the fact that I can
think of this soda can as a separate object is due to the fact that the can has a
huge amount of electric charge but, because of the almost exactly equal and
opposite amounts of charge, the electric elds dont leak out very much. So
when I approach that soda can I dont feel it until I touch it, and then theres the
boundary. So that boundary effectwhich is so much at the root of the way we
look at the world and how we see the world as made up of separate objectsis
a basic notion rooted in electromagnetism.
Fagg: Thats a very good point. Because of this screening, thats why electro-
magnetism isnt quite as inuential cosmologically as gravitation.
Eastman: In high-density, collisional neutral environments like the soda can,
or the air in this room, the scale of the screening is very small and boundaries
are sharp. Some of my research concerns plasma domains located halfway to
the moon within the Earths magnetotail where the Debye length or screening
distance within the collisionless space plasma is about one kilometer. The
plasmas there are highly interconnected, and that gets multiplied because of the
overlapping of Debye spheres. In this way, you have long-range interactions
going on from earth radii scales to hundreds of earth radii in which you have
rather substantial coupling. Thus, the spatial scales of both electrical screening
and electromagnetic coupling between different systems can vary dramatically.
Klein: I would like to get back to the topic of seeing what we can do to
connect Whiteheads process thinking to quantum thinking. One way of ap-
proaching it is to read Whiteheads text carefully and try to gure out what his
words meant and what they might mean in the modern age. This approach of
starting with Whitehead gets us into lots of linguistic battles about what White-
head meant when he said this or that. The other approach is to take Whiteheads
258
Dialogue for Part IV 259
writing loosely and to understand the spirit of Whitehead. Since quantum me-
chanics, as we have seen, has many ingredients in common with process think-
ing, why dont we just take quantum mechanics as the basis for process think-
ing rather than the Whitehead text, and lets try to discuss what needs to be
added to present quantum mechanics. I personally think that Henry Stapps
version of quantum mechanics is sufciently rich that maybe nothing extra is
needed. Lets discuss what extra ingredients might need to be added to the
quantum framework to bring it to the richness that Whiteheads metaphysics
brought to process philosophy.
In order to make progress on extending quantum mechanics to encompass
Whiteheads worldview, it would be good to compare lists summarizing the
essential ingredients of the following four worldviews: The rst one is the
Whitehead list, the second one is the quantum list [see the introduction in Paul
A. M. Dirac, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics, Vol. 27, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1982], the third one is the classical list from Rosen [Process
Studies 26/34: 328330, 1997] and the fourth is from the paper by Finkelstein
and Kallfelz [Process Studies 26/34: 279292, 1997]. Here is the parallel list
by Rosen for the topic of classical evolution:
1. Classical evolution is, in general, effectively unpredictable.
2. Under classical evolution, a system may continually pass through

a limited range of states in an almost periodic manner, and a tiny
change of conditions can cause the system to change abruptly its
behavior and settle into a single state, just like quantum collapse.
3. States of complex classical systems can involve long-range pat-

terns and order, as emphasized, for example, by those of us doing
brain modeling.
Eastman: Clearly, the panel and others here are open to modications of
Whiteheads metaphysics. Were not just into what has sometimes been referred
to as Whiteheadian scholasticism. Using the best of contemporary physics and
philosophy, we can be carrying out the cutting edge of such a program. So
whats missing?
Stapp: The outline that I gave of quantum mechanics in my talk left open two
questions, and I took it right out of Bohrs discussion of Diracs idea that nature
chooses the answers, and Heisenbergs idea that we choose the questions. This
means that quantum mechanics in its present form is incomplete. So lets say
the project is to start with present quantum mechanics, and then use White-
headian ideas to add whatever more is needed. By beginning in this way, you
have at least a solid foundation that is based on scientic evidence. You will
start with a coherent, logical structure grounded on scientic evidence, and then
use Whitehead to enrich it to the extent thats needed to bring it up to White-

headian standards of completeness.
What appears to be missing at the moment in the quantum description is
how these two questions get answered. How does nature answer the question of
whats actually going to happen, and how does the sequence of questions put to
nature get selected? Whitehead is basically suggesting, at least the way I read
him, that the processes by which those questions get answered are basically
psychological in nature, not local mechanistic. So I think there will be some-
thing essential missing from quantum mechanics until the basically experiential
process is added.
Finkelstein: One of the elements in Whitehead is a uniform way of looking at
organization at all levels. Nowadays its called systems theory. I think that we
can say that Whitehead anticipated some elements of systems theory by a few
decades. And we dont have a systems theory thats founded on quantum the-
ory. It seems to us today that systems behave very differently at the quantum
level, at the macroscopic level, and so on. I suppose theres a uniform way of
looking at all these levels, but I havent seen it, and I certainly wouldnt swear
to produce one, but I am interested in setting about trying.
Chew: Do we all share the belief that the observer has to be recognized ex-
plicitly in any statement of what quantum mechanics amounts to?
Stapp: Certainly, at the practical level thats what quantum theory is.
Chew: Now do you agree that this condemns our formulations to be approxi-
mate?
Finkelstein: Yes, denitelyas any other. Any statement usually is stated by
somebody. Usually theres a speaker, and a speaker isnt able ever to have
maximum information about the speaker. Since all the little details about where
my left toe is right now have some impact on distant stars, theres no way that I
can make an exact statement about the world. The bigger the speaker and the
smaller the system, the more chance there is of making reasonable statements
about the system, but as the world gets bigger, eventually I get to look pretty
small, and the idea that I can make a perfectly accurate statement about the rest
of it is lunacy, its futile.
Eastman: For a decade, if not centuries, the general public has thought about
physics as being the exemplar of exact understanding in the details, and now
we have some of the most eminent physicists of the country agreeing that its
necessarily approximate.
Finkelstein: I think that it was an hallucinatory phase, roughly from 1750 to
somewhere in the last part of the nineteenth century, and now we have reached
the end of this little island, were getting into our boats and joining the rest of
humanity.
Eastman: And perhaps with that, getting into some of the murkiness of the
real world and not just the thin ether of our concepts. There is that essential
interplay.
Finkelstein: That blooming confusion.
Chew: Would you include an estimate of the accuracy of the formulation in
the formulation?
Finkelstein: I think that could be done actually, but it wont be an exact
estimate.
Valenza: Do you gentlemen have any rst impressions on whether or not the
eternal objects that play an essential role in Whiteheadian metaphysics are
required in what you propose?
Eastman: In Whitehead there are real potentialities. The process of becoming
involves an incorporation of both previous actualities and potentialities, or eter-
nal objects in Whiteheads scheme, so there is both the incorporation of pre-
vious actualities and a range of possibilities that are part of the prehensive
unication that constitutes any actual occasion.
Klein: How necessary is that to process philosophy and theology?
Finkelstein: I think its important. Were speaking of real potentialities,
which are crucial in the Whitehead system and also in quantum theory. Heisen-
berg spoke about this quite early on in the game. Wave functions, vectors,
are examples of potentialities that may or may not become actualized.
Klein: Thats a wonderful matching of quantum to Whitehead, but then I
thought theres this new thing called an eternal potentiality.
Finkelstein: Remember, when were doing quantum theory we dont ask
where wave functions come from, we treat the observer as eternal. We always
have these possibilities available to him. Thats part of the approximation for
us. We dont look at those changes, so we might pretend they dont happen.
Eastman: Some physicists might wish to entirely avoid real potentialities,
and one example of this is in the many worlds interpretation. In that view, the
collapse of the wave function and its possible alternatives are all actualized in a
multiple of realized worlds so that there is no real potentiality. In contrast,
Whitehead would say that there is real potentiality where things may become
either A versus B.
Stapp: I think thats the sort of quantum mechanics were talking about
with real potentialities. David said the other day that the other one is nonsense.
Didnt you say something to that effect?
Finkelstein: I probably didI get carried away.
Bracken: I found a real connection that wasnt noted between this notion of
real potentiality and nality because efcient causality organized into an overall
system tends to reduce everything to actuality. If theres a system that is some-
how actual, you can go backwards and forwards in time because it already has
a certain actuality as a system of thought. Only when you introduce nal cau-
sality and subjectivity do you really get real potentialitythe opportunity for
real creativity and novelty to emerge. And thats where there really is a clash
between classical science and Whitehead because hes going back to a pre-
modern understanding of science where nal causality played a very important
role, but hes not doing it in the relatively unsophisticated way that was prac-
ticed by Aristotle and Aquinas.
Nobo: On the issue of an actual entity deciding where it comes to be, that
may be Hartshorne but its not Whitehead. Where the occasion comes to be is
determined by the past and specically by at least one actual entity in the
immediate past. Whitehead, as I interpret him, has a cumulative theory of actu-
ality. Once a region of the continuum becomes determinate, it remains determi-
nate. Because of that, it can function in later occasions where the holistic pro-
cess projects the information of that entity into later entities. Its a very
redundant system because the information that has been accumulated is con-
stantly being projected into every new actual occasion, which then completes
itself. But part of its process of becoming involves a structural determination
that has a causal effect on where in extension, and when in the supersessional
order, its immediate descendent will come to be.
Stapp: So an event itself has no input into where its going to be; its already
xed where its going to be?
Nobo: That is correct. The event is begotten by the universe with a partial
determination, and an incomplete occasion, in the act of completing itself, an-
ticipates at least one successor. But it can anticipate more than one, so you can
have a splitting of world lines and you can also have coalescences of world
lines. I would like you to consider the possibility that there is such a thing as a
metaphysical double cone of which the light cone is a subset and that, until
quantum physics, the metaphysical cone has been irrelevant. But when you
have to deal with quantum physics, theres a possibility that now the metaphysi-
cal cone becomes important. Its just like the light cone. An occasion has a past,
a future, and an elsewhere region for contemporaries. The occasion is the frame
of reference. Relative to that frame of reference, there will be events such that
one is earlier than the other, but both are contemporaries with the frame of
reference. These relations dont depend on light, which is a special case de-
pending on local causation. I do agree with what you said about modifying
Whitehead, and this is one of the modications that we need to make. Theres a
difference between causal objectication and conformation that tends to be ig-
nored in the interpretation of Whitehead, but going beyond that I think White-
head goofed when he said that an actual entity has to conform to every entity in
the past. If it only conforms to some, then that conformation relation is what is
going to give you local causality requiring contiguity and so forth. But the
relation of causal objectication is going to give you what appears to be, what
is, in a sense, instantaneous communication. And there is a way in which we
can have some information about contemporaries metaphysically because they
are anticipated by their antecedent events. Im very excited about this but now
have to formalize it.
Barbour: I was once a physicist and became a theologian, and what I would
like to ask is from a more theological perspective. Physicists want to start from
and stay as close to physics as possible. Whitehead, in his more metaphysical
stage particularly, was very concerned about a system that would include reli-
gious sensitivities as well as scientic ones and, if one looks at that side of
Whitehead, Im wondering if one isnt pushed to extend Henry Stapps position
to ask, Isnt God asking the question in some situations? It seems to me that
this opens another dimension. I dont think that Whitehead would have ap-
proved of those theologians today who are exploiting quantum mechanics by
saying that God intervenes at the quantum level to determine one of the poten-
tialities. Thats certainly a possible way to go, and it doesnt violate the laws of
physics, but God is not pushing electrons around. He would be actualizing one
potentiality among other potentialities. If every action is Gods doing, then
there are all kinds of problems theologically, especially the problem of evil (see
Bibliography: Grifn, 1976, 1991). I think that most contemporary theologians
who make use of quantum indeterminacy want to say that it must be a rare kind
of event and the processes must be subject to the statistical distributions that we
know are not violated.
There is one other problem that Hartshorne was quite concerned about,
and I am wondering if anybody would want to comment on it, namely, what is
Gods relation to the system (see Bibliography: Hartshorne, 1970)? And I
would be interested whether Bells theorem in your eyes throws any new light
on this. The problem is that for us its ne to say that E1 and E2 are events that
are out of communication with each other. The separation interval is longer
than a signal at the velocity of light could be communicated. At the practical
level, we can remain agnostic about which event is rst and accept the destruc-
tion of absolute simultaneity for human observers. But if God is related to all of
this, presumably Gods omniscience isnt subject to that kind of limitation of
the transmission of information at the velocity of light. Either one has to get
beyond Hartshorne and say that God is presenting initial aims relevant to the
particular event that God is relating to, so that for God himself, with the rela-
tivistic time effect and the destruction of simultaneity, you could say that God
presents an absolute frame. However, most physicists would resist that, but I
think that its an issue. Following Hartshornes having raised it, several people
have tried to reply to it. What is the implication of the Bells theorem result of
the nonlocality feature (see Bibliography: Cushing and McMullin, 1989)? As
human observers we can step to one side and remain agnostic about it since no
causal inuence can go between events outside of each others light cone, but
theyre both included in Gods omniscience. Does that throw any light on that
aspect of Whiteheads attempt to relate God to each event? I guess what Im
essentially asking, if anyone wants to do it, is obviously more speculative and
wont come out of the physics alone. It will come out of a concern for relating a
God who may be known in other ways, known for Whitehead in other avenues
of human experience, and relating that to the ndings of either quantum me-
chanics or relativity. This is obviously a very large agenda. Are there any par-
ticular points that anybody would want to respond to? Whether what you have
been saying throws any light on Gods interaction with the world that is clearly
a part of the process conceptuality?
Stapp: Well, rst let me talk about things in physics before getting to God. I
realize that your emphasis is on God but, rst, there is a small point, but maybe
an important one. You said no physicist would prefer a special frame. But you
must remember that the basic thing about the theory of relativity is that the laws
are supposed to be invariant under certain transformations: the general laws are
supposed to be frame independent. That statement is very different from saying
that the world itself is frame independent: the world itself is denitely not
frame independent. The world itself has one particular structure, which is not
invariant under Lorentz transformations. So a big distinction has to be drawn
between the nature of the world and the nature of the general laws.
As far as the world itself is concerned, there was a big bang apparently, and
our experiments are done in our one world that was created with a particular
structure. Amazingly enough, if you look back in all directions it seems that there
was a preferred frame. The parts moved out from the big bang in all directions
with various velocities, and by looking at the light coming from these various
parts, it looks like there was a preferred rest frame in which the big bang occurred.
This is the rest frame of the background radiation, and it is measured with great
accuracy, 1 in 105. That is, when you look out in all directions, you nd that
theres a common rest frame of the background electromagnetic radiation. So in
the actual world in which we live, there is a preferred frame.
Theres another result along the same lines. In the Schilpp volume on
Einstein, there is a chapter by Kurt Godel, of Godels theorem fame [Albert
Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, Vol. 7, Paul A. Schilpp, ed., Fine Communca-
tions, 2001]. He points out (I dont know if its still true but it probably still is
true) that in every known cosmological model there is, in fact, a natural se-
quence of nows. A natural sequence of preferred instantaneous nows is built
into each of the cosmological models. Thus there are two reasons for saying
that we dont necessarily have to think the order of coming into being has to be
relativistically invariant. We have two good reasons for saying that maybe its
not that way: that maybe there is a preferred order for coming into being.
Theres nothing really contrary to relativity theory about that. Relativity
theory says two things: (1) the general laws that control causal evolution are
invariant under relativistic transformation; and (2) no signal can be transmit-
ted faster than light. Those requirements are both satised in quantum theory;
theres no problem with either of them. If the laws are correct, theres no possi-
bility of sending a signal faster than light, and the laws of evolution of the
(Heisenberg picture) operators are relativistically invariant. But the boundary
conditions are not relativistically invariant! The actual evolution of the actual
world itself depends on the actual world itself, so the actual unfolding process
itself is certainly not relativistically invariant. Theres no real logical contradic-
tion between the principles of relativity and the possibility that in the actual
process of unfolding of the actual world there is a preferred rest frame. The
actual world apparently started out with a preferred frame, and this frame will
certainly be preserved by general laws that are relativistically invariant. The
actual process of unfolding of the actual world must necessarily depend on the
actual world, and hence on any preferred frame dened by that world. The
effort to make the process of the unfolding of the actual world relativistically
invariant is irrational.
Bells theorem, on the other hand, says that if you believe that the experi-
menters have a free choice (and you cant get anywhere unless you are willing
at least to imagine that the experimenters have a choice to do this experiment or
that one), then you cannot impose the condition that their choices can have no
effects outside the future light cone of the region where the choice is imple-
mented. If you try to impose that condition, then a logical contradiction ensues.
This result seems to be telling us that there are faster-than-light inuences, in
spite of the fact that there can be no faster-than-light signals. This is what
quantum theory seems to be saying. So, if you want to say this is Gods doing,
then you can say that God has his own view of the universe, and that he has no
problem with having faster-than-light inuences but no faster-than-light signals.
He merely needs to work in the preferred frame of the universe, allow inu-
ences to act only into the future, and follow the quantum rules.
Klein: I think you get into a major problem that is the one Ian Barbour actu-
ally mentioned: namely, the problem of evil. For the same reason that you dont
want God to have omniscience in collapsing wave packets, in general you sure
dont want God to have the omniscience to do these little micro things, because
then youll have the problem of evil. Most theologies that I know of dont give
God that kind of inuence.
Tanaka: I would like to comment on the theological implications of Bells
theorem. One difference between Whitehead and Hartshorne is that, for Hart-
shorne, God is a society of divine occasions with personal order, so Hartshorne

needs the cosmological now. Hartshorne is annoyed by the general theory of
relativity, in the usual understanding where we say here-now instead of a
cosmological now, which does not have an objective counterpart in the general
theory of relativity. We can accept Professor Stapps model and say that there is
something like a cosmological now in the causal structure without violating
relativity theory and its idea of spacetime. In my Whiteheadian model, the
theoretical relation between God and the world is something like this. Max
Jammer, the Hebrew historian of science, wrote in his Concepts of Space (3rd
ed., Mineola, NY: Dover Publ., 1992) that the Newtonian concept of absolute
space has an origin in the Hebrew idea of God as a person. Newton says that
absolute space is a sensorum dei, sense organ of God, so absolute space is
something like the space we experience. One possible reading of Whitehead is
that the extensive continuum is something like an absolute space in the New-
tonian sense, so that God is omnipresent with everything in the extensive con-
tinuum.
Klein: How does Whitehead deal with evil?
Tanaka: Whitehead distinguished creativity and God. There is a metaphysical
concept called creativity, which is more fundamental than God as an actual
entity. If God is omnipotent being, Whitehead says that then there is a very
serious problem with the actual existence of evil in this world.
Forizs: I would like to comment on the problem of evil. In my view, White-
head solved that problem. The solution is connected with the problem of objec-
tive immortality. There is no such thing in Whiteheads philosophy as God
isolated from the metaphysical scheme which denes a primordial nature of
God, and a consequent nature of God. The primordial nature is actually de-
cient, conceptually abundant, and unconscious; on the other hand, the conse-
quent nature is actually abundant and in a sense conscious. There is a beautiful
sentence in Whiteheads Process and Reality that God is in a sense a sufferer,
so he suffers, and his suffering converts in a sense the ruin. It uses the ruin,
losses in the temporary world, and converts this ruin into his own nature, so in
a sense even the Holocaust is a part of the consequent nature of God. Contribut-
ing to loss is often all too easy for humans. Whats difcult is to work through
the suffering and go beyond it. The Holocaust shows the real power of the
Whiteheadian scheme, the categoreal scheme. Objective immortality means that
every single decision is part of the consequent nature of God. You cannot ex-
plain away the Holocaust. All you can do is to consider how and why it could
have happened, and how to remember it fully yet go beyond it. The Holocaust
is not a shame on God; its a shame on us.
Klein: From what Ive heard of process theology, God is more of a positive
force. How does that mesh with the notion that God is always present on these
process decisions in creating evil?
Forizs: That is Gods function in the old-fashioned sense. For Whitehead,

God is a process. God is an actual entity in the making.
Fagg: Whitehead commented somewhere in Religion in the Making that the
limitation of God is of goodness and the strength of God is of an ideal.
Barbour: I think the process answer to the problem of evil involves a number
of elements. David Grifn has written two very good books on it [Grifn, 1976,
1991] and it involves the whole idea of divine self-limitation. The fact is that in
the Whiteheadian system, no event is entirely deprived of Gods action, and
God is not the God who coerces anything to happen. In fact, God cant make
anything happen alone. God introduces elements into whats already there and
is bound by those structures and usually respects the lawful character of things,
and no act is purely the act of God. God is the fellow sufferer who understands
and participates in the world. There tends to be a problem with this in tradi-
tional theology. Whitehead strongly reacted to the monarchial God, the sover-
eignty, the omnipotent God. God doesnt know the future because the future
cant be known. Omniscience is very restricted and omnipotence, in particular
the traditional notion of omnipotence, is very strongly rejected in Whiteheads
writings. While there is a problem of evil, I dont think its a problem with a
God as lure; a God of persuasion if you want to use an anthropomorphic term.
Not a sovereign God in the traditional sense. Even creation is never out of
nothing.
Bracken: I would like to introduce one distinction that Whitehead does not
always make, and that is, when you talk about evil, you need to distinguish
between deliberate attempts to produce negative results and what I would call
tragedy, that is the conuence of freedom with nobody making a decision on
this. I think its important to make that distinction when we talk about evil,
because in a world in which you have free creatures, even with good intentions
and with as much knowledge as you possibly could have, the future is some-
what open. You can then have destructive events happening with no bad intent,
whereas evil would be the bad intent to produce negative results.
Eastman: Earlier, we have noted how Whitehead needs to be modernized
from a scientic point of view. Can someone comment on the need for such
modernization from the point of view of developments in philosophy and meta-
physics?
John Wygant: Whitehead does need to be modernized in the light of what
has happened in the past 70 or more years. In doing that, I think that it is
important to distinguish between his metaphysical scheme thats outlined in the
second chapter of Process and Reality and the applications that he makes of it
in Part II. The more important question is, How do the metaphysical categories
need to be modernized? Those categories are very, very abstract and general
and compatible with a lot of different scientic theories. I think theyre compat-
ible with action-at-a-distance theories, theyre compatible with contact theories,

and theyre compatible with different versions of quantum theory. The point is
that the nature and method of metaphysics is really very different from the
nature and method of science, so in revising I think one also has to look at
whats happened in the last 70 years in metaphysics as well. Now, as to the
problem of universals which was raised by the topic of eternal objects as a
point in case, a lot has been said about the problem of universals and the issue
of eternal objects in the intervening 70 years. No one here has mentioned the
topic of societies, but thats how Whitehead makes the connection between his
categories and ordinary objects, and his concept of societies is an essential
concept. A society perpetuates a dening characteristic from occasion to occa-
sion, and that dening characteristic is an eternal object, a kind of Aristotelian
potentiality. Whats most relevant for that are the many developments in meta-
physics, especially modal logic, since the 1960s. There has been extensive dis-
cussion of substantialism in metaphysics, and thats relevant to a reevaluation
and interpretation of what Whitehead says about societies, eternal object, and so
on. As you engage in your project, I think you have got to think through what
the nature of metaphysics is and how it relates to physics (its not as obvious as
some of the things youve suggested), but also to take into account what has
happened during the intervening 70 years in metaphysics as well [see Bibliogra-
phy: Kim and Sosa, 1995].

This dialogue section provides concluding remarks by the panelists.

Valenza: I have always accepted Whitehead as a working hypothesis and
have had a lot of intellectual fun trying to chase out the consequences of it. Ive
always been astounded by the mans depth and intelligence, but have always
felt ill at ease with the grounding of process metaphysics, which either isnt
well grounded or threatens an innite regress. It disturbs me that that happened
in these meetings to the extent that we get into trouble with language crossing
categories when something is physical or protophysical. That still hasnt been
sorted out. Insofar as our discussions highlight that issue, theyre useful, but
there are some very deep questions, both physical and metaphysical, that need
to be asked about the whole process system. Unless theyre asked or at least a
coherent and systematic conversation emerges about these issues, then we are in
each others way in terms of making progress.
Chew: One of the questions I was hoping to get an answer to at this meeting
was whether or not Whiteheads cosmological scheme was based in some way
on a notion of matter. I know that its based on a notion of process, theres no
question about that, but does Whiteheads notion of process carry with it some
implied, a priori meaning for matter? I will proceed in a Whiteheadian spirit
and, as Phil Clayton indicated, I have been inspired by this discussion. I dont
know why, but I feel more motivated, even more than I was, to try to develop
this idea that a cosmology can be based on a notion of history where the history
doesnt start with some notion of matter, but the notion of matter is emergent
from certain patterns of history. There also is a much larger component of
history which is nonmaterial, and I have heard here all sorts of possible rele-
vance for this idea about nonmaterial history.
Tanaka: I think that there is no matter in Whiteheads metaphysics. White-

head criticized the concept of matter in Science and the Modern World. In the
conceptual scheme of Process and Reality there is nothing like matter; instead
Whitehead proposes creativity as an ultimate category. Whitehead says that
there are enduring objects. He did use that word, but there is no matter in the
conventional sense in Whiteheads metaphysics, and to Whitehead the historical
reality is most basic, with no substantial substratum.
Eastman: Whitehead carries out a critique of the notion of self-identical sub-

stance, the classical type of substance or the philosophical concept of substance.
What we refer to as matter, as substance, are things that emerge in the ongoing
process of becoming and being. Its in this dialectic of the prehensive unica-
tion of things into actual entities and then into sequences of occasions (the
being of any actual entity is constituted by its process of becoming; its prehen-
sive unication of past particles, elds, and its own immediate past self). From
that whole process you get what we refer to as substances, the physical world,
the table and everything; so there is a notion of substance, its just not the
classical notion.
Jungerman: I think that the fact that were meeting here exemplies that
even after 70 years Whitehead has a lot to offer in inspiring us and, at the same
time, it seems clear from our discussions that he certainly isnt the last word; he
needs to be updated. Im very encouraged and excited by physicists here who
might actually develop some models based on physics that could provide a rm
foundation for the metaphysics. Its a great start, but it seems to be terribly
ambitious when you think about religious experience or feelings and emotions,
and trying to incorporate those things into quantum mechanics. Im glad Im
not doing it.
Fagg: The discussion of quantum problems has really stimulated a lot of

thought in my mind and I really appreciate that. Also, Im especially interested
in what Geoff Chew is trying to do with his model and even more interested in
his statements about how quantum theory must come to grips with electromag-
netism, especially in the problem of measurement. Hes absolutely right. Its
very rarely ever mentioned whenever any discussion of quantum theory and its
interpretation comes into play.
Tanaka: Metaphysics originally comes from Aristotle with his book written
after (meta-)physics, thus the term metaphysics. So Aristotles metaphysics pre-
supposes the physics. Similarly, Whitehead wrote books about physics [Princi-
ple of Natural Knowledge, Concepts of Nature and Theory of Relativity]. He
was well versed in relativity physics and its vital signicance for contemporary
physical processes before he began to write his own metaphysics. There is
another aspect of metaphysics; that it must be the science of the most concrete
elements of our experience. We must go deeper than usual, so he tried to do a
phenomenological analysis of our own experience; the depth structure of expe-
rience in the world. Experience is very important in Whiteheads metaphysics.
In one sense, Whitehead is a radical empiricistthat is my understanding.
Eastman: As one tries to work with these metaphysical propositions, as
Whitehead says, you start in the ground of immediate experience and you y
off, as in an airplane, to work with conceptualities and models. But you neces-
sarily must land again and be grounded in immediate experience and test your
hypotheses or concepts both in metaphysics and in the sciences.
Klein: For me our discussions were both inspiring and stimulating. I was
stimulated from engaging with many people on these deep metaphysical issues.
I enjoyed the episode where David Finkelstein, Henry Stapp, and I got together
for lunch and discussed the possibility of coming up with a minimalist set of
quantum postulates on which we felt everyone would agree. The next step
would be to compare this structure with Whiteheads metaphysics to determine
what, if anything, needs to be added or subtracted from Whiteheads frame-
work. I doubt if the three of us will carry out this project, but the project still
seems reasonable to me and I do hope a Whitehead scholar will be inspired to
carry it out. Quantum physics is presently our best description of reality, and
any metaphysics without a quantum basis will be awed.
The most inspiring portions of our discussions were the aspects where we
were discussing the connections between quantum mechanics, Whitehead, phi-
losophy, and theology. The central question is where will future societies get
grounding for their values. It disturbs me to think that physicists, biologists, and
other scientists might become arbiters of values. Plenty of other people, includ-
ing theologians, are doing that quite successfully. The problem isnt how to
come up with values; the problem is how to develop a comprehensive frame-
work, a metaphysics, that provides a home both for the scientic world and the
world of values. From our discussions I have gained condence that the triple
meshing of Whiteheads process thinking with the detailed structure of quantum
mechanics and with the world of values and meaning is a feasible enterprise.
Thats a pretty good outcome from a wonderful conference.
Stapp: Our experience here has been an event in the adventure of ideas.
Specically I think that all of us here are, in our own way, trying to advance
human understanding of this world that were living in, and its obviously a
meeting of different currents, of different ways of understanding this world.
This cross ltration of ideas is a very good thing to happen. We physicists come
here concerned with a certain part of human experience about the world. But as
physicists trying to push the frontier a little bit, we are always coming up
against philosophical questions of one sort or another. So I think its very good
for us to have an opportunity to come in contact with, and exchange ideas with,
people who are working in a philosophical tradition that is close enough so that
we can really exchange ideas. Because the ideas from the two sides are close
enough, I would hope that maybe some of the ideas coming from physics could
help supply what is needed to advance Whiteheadian metaphysics, and vice
versa. This cross-fertilization of ideas could be a signicant event in the ad-
vancement of our ideas about how the world works.
Finkelstein: First of all, its inspiring to be among so many seekers for the
truth or a better way of looking at nature and life. The idea which has attracted
me for decades has been that of a quantum view of nature since for me, quan-
tum theory is a process theory. Whiteheads attempt at a process theory of
nature is particularly important for me as an indication of how such an enter-
prise might proceed. I certainly didnt imagine getting involved in a search for
quantum theology and I feel that I dont have much to contribute to such a
search, but the search for a quantum philosophy strikes me as worthwhile and if
God happens to drop in, Im open. I really did come with some basic questions.
Im trying to get myself to give up the search for the law of nature which has
driven me for decades and so Im delighted to get reinforcement, from White-
head himself apparently.
Let me spell out my full belief, which is based on the precedent of gen-
eral relativity. Once we used to think that there was a right geometry, and
then for a century people began wafing and looking around for the right
geometry. Maybe Euclid was wrong. Then along came Riemann and Einstein
and they say no, geometry itself is a variable, and then Einstein comes along
and says, no, geometry is the only variable in the unied eld theory. So,
nowadays we do these things more quickly and so, from the suggestion that the
law is a variable, I go immediately to the inference that its a quantum variable,
everything is quantum. Superposition of the different laws are therefore as good
as the laws themselves and, nally, with a variable this complex, who needs
any other?
So probably if the law is a variable, its the only one. Thats somehow
different than the search for the law of nature. I look aroundthere it is. Ive
been looking all my life for it and look, there it is. Right in front of me all this
time. But something is still missing. There is this remarkable tendency for
events to take a certain course, again and again, and its not just enough to say
look around and say thats the way things are. We need more explanation, and
Im convinced that this has to do with the structure of the vacuum. Im search-
ing for those features which make a vacuum a vacuum, a t substratum to serve
as a carrier of the law of nature. The general impression this meeting makes
for me is one of great encouragement. There are lots of people looking in this
general direction.
Nobo: As you can judge from my demeanor, I have been extremely excited
by the meeting, all three sessions. I have been tremendously stimulated, even
challenged. Im going to go home and start working on some of this. Im very
pleased to see that some ideas of Whitehead that I always maintain have been
neglected are precisely the ones that are making an impact on or have some use
for physicists. Again, thats very encouraging. Papatheodorou unfortunately
didnt make it, but while reading his article with Basil Hiley [Process Studies,
26/34: 247278, 1997; electronically reprinted in Eastman and Keeton, PSS
2003 (see Bibliography/Internet Resources)], I noticed that he pays more atten-
tion to part IV of Process and Reality. It strikes me that most people who call
themselves Whiteheadian seldom look at part IV of Process and Reality, per-
haps because it is too technical. Part IV is about extension and things like that,
and the kinds of things that some Whiteheadians are interested in, experience or
aesthetics, they can nd in the other parts. But its there and also in Science and
the Modern World and in earlier books that you get some of the ideas that are
most useful for physics.
Im thrilled that these ideas are being looked at, and perhaps some of you
will be interested in exploring them further. Im also very thrilled by the fact
that here we have a group of eminent scientists, and not one of them suffers
from what we sometimes call scientism, the belief that you can base a world-
view solely on science. Its exhilarating for me because even in philosophy we
have so many thinkers that are slaves to science, what Whitehead called the
obscurantists of the modern age. They laugh ideas out of court because they
dont t the current fashionable way of talking or the current fashionable way
of thinking. Some of you expressed uneasiness about talking philosophy among
philosophers. You need not fearyoure all philosophers.
Barbour: Very briey, Ive appreciated being able to attend most of your
sessions. I only wish I could have attended all of them. I respect the careful
grounding in the evidence that physical scientists provide, and I agree with the
reluctance to move rapidly towards some natural theology. I am concerned as a
theologian that the theological community makes use of science in a way that
respects its integrity. I dont think that one can derive theology from a scientic
picture alone. I am surprised that biological scientists were not represented in
this workshop, not one biologist (for relevant works in biology, see for example
Birch, 1990, 1995). I think that if we want to make any continuity with the
biological world we have got to further broaden our categories, but I do greatly
respect the sensitivity to the limitations of science that have been expressed by
several of you. I do think that the connections with theology tend to be more
general ones, the kind of elements of holism, and recognition of the interplay of
law and chance. These must be taken seriously in any worldview, including that
of theologians, so I have greatly beneted from what I have heard and am eager
to see what further developments might come out of this without expecting that
one will be able to develop a metaphysics purely out of quantum mechanics and
relativity.
Glossary
action principle: Action is the integral of the Lagrangian of a physical system with
respect to time. Of all possible motions, the dynamical motion of a system of particles
and elds is one for which the action is stationary (not always a minimum).
actual entity: In Whiteheads metaphysical system, the category of actual entityalso

termed actual occasion or occasion of experienceis the basic metaphysical genus of
existents. The other metaphysical genera of the system consist of existents that are either
generic operations, features, or relationships of actual entities (see contrast, nexus, pre-
hension, proposition, and subjective form) or are uncreated ontological presuppositions
of all actual entities (see creativity, envisagement, eternal object, and extension). Actual
entities are the nal real constituents of the actual world. They are discrete and intercon-
nected, and their generic properties are those Whitehead deemed essential to any discrete
moment of experience, human or nonhuman. Actual entities are drops of experience,
complex and interdependent (see Bibliography: Whitehead, 1929, Process and Reality,
18).
actual occasion: See actual entity.
asymmetry: Vulnerability to a possible change.
atomism: The view that there are discrete irreducible elements of nite spatial or tem-
poral extent. For propositions, the view that relations are external and that some true
propositions are irreducible (logical atomism).
autocatalytic (chemical) reaction: A (chemical) process that increases in speed as it

progresses. Non-autocatalytic reactions generally become slower as time passes. How-
ever, if a chemical substance produced by a reaction happens to increase the speed (rate)
of the chemical reaction that produces it, then that product is said to be an autocatalyst
and the reaction rate increases without limit, unless some necessary reactant other than
the autocatalyst becomes depleted. This sequence of events (mechanism) is called prod-
uct activation or direct autocatalysis. Several other relatively simple chemical mecha-
nisms (e.g., inhibition by a reactant) also yield autocatalytic behavior (indirect auto-
catalysis).
275
276 Glossary
baryon: An elementary particle formed of three quarks, for example, a proton or a

neutron.
Bells theorem: A mathematical proof, assuming locality, that determinate projections
for the spins of electrons are incompatible with spin correlations predicted by quantum
theory. Observational tests supporting Bells result suggest that reality must be nonlocal.
These results appear to resolve Einsteins EPR argument, which indicated a necessary
incompleteness to quantum mechanics (derived from John Bell, 19281990).
Boolean algebra: An algebraic system that treats variables, such as computer language
elements or propositions, with the operators AND, OR, IF, THEN, NOT, and EXCEPT
(derived from George Boole, 18151864).
bootstrap: The notion that the nature of matter reects self-consistency rather than
arbitrary elementary constituents. See S-matrix approach.
Bose-Einstein statistics: See quantum statistics.
causality: The relationship between a cause and its effects. There are determinate,
statistical, and other types of causal relations. The causal principle, roughly that the same
cause always produces the same effects, is essential to science.
change: In considerations of symmetry or asymmetry, the production of something
different.
classical logic: See logic, quantum and classical.
closure: Completion of a collection of items or relationships in such a way as to yield
a set that is, in some sense, complete.
collapse of a quantum state: The change in a quantum state as a quantum system
undergoes a transition from the potential to the actual during a measurement.
concrescence: In Whitehead, the process of concrescenceor the microscopic pro-
cessis the second stage in the becoming of an actual entity. The rst stage is the
process of transition. In the stage of concrescence, the process of becoming, though
conditioned by the determinations of transition, is self-determining. The process of con-
crescence is thus a process of self-causation. Since concrescence is guided by the actu-
alitys subjective aim, it is also a process of nal causation.
contrast: In Whitehead, contrast is the most encompassing category of existence, ex-
cluding only existents belonging to the category of eternal object. A contrast is any
synthesis of items in an actual entity.
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory: A synthesis of Bohrs complemen-
tarity interpretation and Heisenbergs ideas on the uncertainty principle. Sometimes re-
ferred to as the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics.
cosmic background radiation (CBR): The total radiation from outer space that is not
associated with specic, identiable sources (considering photons but not particles). The
equivalent blackbody temperature of the CBR is approximately 3K.
covariance: See relativistic invariance.
Glossary 277
creativity: In Whitehead, creativity is that eternal aspect of the universe by reason of

which there is an endless becoming of actual entities. It individualizes itself, and thus
manifests itself, in the becoming of every actual entity. But it is never exhausted by such
individualized manifestations.
Debye screening: Within a plasma there is a redistribution of space charge to prevent

penetration by external electrostatic elds. The length scale associated with such shield-
ing is called the Debye length, and shielding clouds of this dimension are called Debye
spheres. See plasmas.
decoherence: Environment-induced loss of interference terms in quantum solutions

that can contribute to resolving some problems in quantum measurement theory.
diachronic: Covering events at different times.
dielectric: Material placed between plates at different electrical potentials (capacitor).
dissipative structure: An arrangement of processes, taking place in an open system (a

dened spatial region that can exchange material and/or energy with its environment),
such that any alteration in that arrangement (whether internally or externally generated)
engenders a response that tends to restore the original arrangement (see limit cycle).
Dissipative structures contrast with equilibrium structuresself-restoring arrangements
of items that persist in closed (isolated from the environment) systems. Interaction with
the outside world tends to break up equilibrium structures (such as an ice crystal), but
such interaction is necessary for persistence of dissipative structures (such as a ame in
the tip of a gas jet).
dualism: For metaphysics, the view that for any given domain there are two indepen-
dent and mutually irreducible substances (e.g., the Cartesian dualism of matter and
mind). For epistemology, the view that there is a duality of the content immediately
present to the mind (e.g., sense datum) and the perceived object.
dynamic system: In chemistry, a collection of interrelated processesstates of affairs

that change as time progresses. Such combined interactions may lead to a unique equilib-
rium statea condition that maintains itself indenitely (without changing the surround-
ings) by means of the balance of countervailing changes. Alternatively, such combina-
tions of changes may produce one or more nonequilibrium steady statesconditions that
maintain a particular set of properties, while exchanging material and/or energy with the
environment. Nonequilibrium steady states may be either stable (self-restoring after dis-
turbance) or unstable (destroyed by any disturbance). In the condition known as bista-
bility, two stable nonequilibrium steady states exist, as well as a third, unstable, steady
state. The condition of the overall system will correspond to one or the other of the two
stable steady states, depending on the past history of the system.
dynamics: The analysis of energy, force and associated motions. See kinematics.
electromagnetism: See force elds.
electron: A pointlike particle that contains one unit of negative charge and has a mass
of 0.5 Mev/c2. Electrons form the component of atoms outside the nucleus.
278 Glossary
entelechy: In Aristotles philosophy, the mode of being of a thing whose essence is

completely realized or actualized, in contrast to potentiality of the form.
envisagement: In Whitehead, envisagement is that eternal aspect of the universe by
reason of which every individualization of creativity is in part a function of the state of
the universe correlative with the initiation of that individualization.
epistemology: One of the two main branches of philosophy, which is devoted to
studies of the origin, methods, structure, and validity of knowledge. See metaphysics (or
ontology).
epochal theory of time: Whiteheads theory that temporal process is a discrete succes-
sion of epochs, each having the duration needed for the emergence and completion of an
actual occasion; also called a cell theory or atomic theory of time.
EPR argument: An argument by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) that quantum
mechanics is necessarily incomplete. It is based on two metaphysical principles, the
separability principle and a locality principle, and derives an inconsistency between these
realist principles and predictions of quantum mechanics. Einstein appears to have lost
this argument (see Bells theorem, nonseparability).
eternal object: In Whitehead, the only category of existence whose members are not
created by the becoming of actual entities. A geometrical form, a shade of blue, an
emotion, and a scalar form of energy are all examples of eternal objects. Basically they
are qualia and patterns whose reproduction within, or ingression into, an actual entity
render determinate the latters objective and subjective content. Thus, relative to actual
entities, they are said to be forms of deniteness or pure potentials for the specic
determination of fact. But, in themselves, eternal objects are each an existent with a
unique individual essence conjoined with a nonunique relational essence that it shares
with some other eternal objects. Apart from their joint ingression into an actual entity,
eternal objects are isolated from one another.
Euclidean geometry: See geometry, Euclidean and Riemannian.
experience: In Whitehead, experience refers both to an experiencing process and to the
experience product generated by that process. The experiencing process is one and the
same with the becoming of an actual entity; and the experience product is that same
actual entity as a being, or as already become. The essential features of experiencing do
not include consciousness or sense perception, but do include receiving, taking account
of, and responding to, data that are primarily actual entities already become and eternal
objects. The receiving of data constitutes the objective side of experiencing, whereas the
responding to data constitutes the subjective side. A completed actual entity is a determi-
nate synthesis of objective data and subjective responses. Such a synthesis is both the
aim and product of the actual entitys process of becoming, or experiencing.
extension: In Whitehead, extension (or extensive continuum) is a technical term with a
variety of related meanings. In the metaphysical theory, extension is an eternal aspect of
the universe: it is an innite, indeterminate continuum differentiable into potential nite
regions that only become actual when embodied by the becoming and being of individ-
ual actual entities. The nite region embodied by an actual entity is its extensive stand-
point, is uniquely its own, and does not overlap with the extensive standpoint of any
Glossary 279
other actual entity. Extension, in this sense, is neither physical space nor physical time;
rather, the becoming of actual entities effects the spatialization and temporalization of
extension. In the cosmological theory, under the inuence of relativity physics, it is
assumed that actual extensive standpoints contingently constitute an ever-expanding
four-dimensional continuum of spatiotemporalized extension. This assumption is in no
way necessitated by Whiteheads metaphysics.
extensionality: In the logic of classes, there is an axiom of extensionality which effec-
tively assumes that everything is a class, and treats the words set and class as syn-
onymous.
extensive connection: See topology and extension.
Fermi-Dirac statistics: See quantum statistics.
Feynman diagram: In quantum eld theory and especially for quantum electrody-
namics, simple diagrams can effectively replace complex mathematical terms of the eld
equations.
Feynman paths: Classical action-carrying potential paths in space-time whose ag-
gregation determines wave-function propagation.
nal causation: See concrescence.
ne structure constant: A fundamental dimensionless constant of physics, the ne
structure constant ( 1/137) derives from studies of closely spaced groups of lines
observed in the spectra of the lightest elements.
Fock space: The fundamental representation of the innite-dimensional Heisenberg
algebra. See Hilbert space.
force elds: Four fundamental interactions are distinguished in modern physics: grav-
itational, electromagnetic, weak nuclear, strong nuclear. The characteristic strengths of
these force elds are 1039, 102, 105, and 1, respectively. Both gravity and electro-
magnetism are long-range force elds, whereas both nuclear forces are very short range
(1013 cm or less). See gauge theory.
gauge theory: Gauge invariance is central to current theories of the fundamental inter-
actions. Derived from Weyls work in relating scale changes and the equations of electro-
dynamics, gauge theories constructed to embody various symmetry principles have been
very successful in representing the fundamental interactions. See force elds.
geometry, Euclidean and Riemannian: Geometry is the mathematics of the proper-
ties and relationships of points, lines, surfaces, and solids. The system of geometry that
dominates our practical affairs is a modied version of the assumptions of Euclid of
Alexandria (325265 b.c.). Georg Riemann (18261866) introduced a new system of
geometry to handle curved surfaces and curved spaces. Einstein used this Riemannian
geometry to develop his general relativity theory, providing a quantitative representation
of both gravity and accelerated reference frames.
gluon: A virtual particle that is exchanged between quarks that constitutes the strong
force. Gluons not only interact with quarks, but with each other.
280 Glossary
grand unication theory (GUT): A theory that seeks to provide a common derivation
for the color and electroweak forces and for quarks and leptons.
hermeneutics: The science and methodology of interpretation; a discipline initiated

through biblical analysis in the nineteenth century.
Hilbert space: A vector representation space for the properties of quantum systems. A
nite-dimensional Hilbert space is a nite-dimensional Euclidean space in which vectors
are represented as complex numbers instead of real numbers.
holism: The theory that the world is composed of organic or interrelated wholes which
are more than their constituent parts. See particularism.
hyperne structure: A slight shift in the frequency of radiation from atoms due to the
interaction with the atoms nucleus.
hypothetico-deductive method: This method is used in factual sciences as well as in

metaphysics. It is constituted, according to Whitehead, by a balanced mutual relationship
between three elements: (1) the creative element, which accounts for an imaginative
construction of hypotheses and theories and as such is free of all kinds of restrictions; (2)
the rational element, which secures the coherence and internal consistency of the hypoth-
eses forming the theory and the possibility of deduction of consequences from this axi-
omatic base; and (3) nally, the empirical element, which calls for at least the possibility
of indirect empirical testing of metaphysical theories through the integration of mediat-
ing scientic schemes.
idealism: Any philosophical framework whose basic interpretive principle is that of

Idea, Mind, or Spirit. Process philosophers generally avoid traditional dualisms such as
idealism/materialism and mind/body. See realism.
implicate order: Physicist David Bohm introduced a distinction between an explicate

order, comprising the given world of experience, and a holistic implicate order, which is
a fundamental causal order in parallel with and underlying the explicate order.
indeterminacy principle: For particular observable pairs (e.g., position and momen-
tum; energy and time), precise measurement of one observable necessarily causes uncer-
tainties in possible knowledge of the complementary observable.
kinematics: The study of motion excluding the effects of mass and force. See dy-
namics.
K-meson: One of the strongly interacting elementary particles with baryon number 0.
Observations of K-mesons rst indicated an intrinsic time asymmetry in high-energy
physics interactions.
Lagrangian: The difference between total kinetic energy and potential energy for a
dynamic system of particles expressed as a function of generalized coordinates and their
time derivative.
Lamb shift: A small change in the frequency of the light emitted by a hydrogen atom
due to the existence of virtual pairs.
Glossary 281
lattice eld theories: Theories where spacetime, rather than being continuous, consists
of a discrete set of points at which elds are dened.
leptons: Elemental fermions, which have spin 1 statistics (see quantum statistics), elec-
trons, muons, neutrinos, and tauons are all leptons. See also quarks.
limit cycle: A unique sequence of states of a dynamic system, each described by two
or more variables (say, x and y), such that the sequence traces out a closed curve in the x,
y plane which encloses a single point (x, y) that corresponds to an unstable steady state
of the systemand furthermore, that any deviation from that sequence of states (the
limit cycle) engenders a response that tends to restore the system to one of the states of
the limit cycle. All trajectories of the system eventually reach the limit cycle, irrespective
of their starting conditions. Autocatalysis is necessary (but not sufcient) for existence of
a limit cycle.
linguistic turn: The point of view that meaning is constituted by linguistic practice of
a community and that there is no external standard for such practice.
logic, quantum and classical: Logic investigates the structure of propositions and de-
ductive reasoning by focusing on the form of propositions instead of their content. Clas-
sical logic derives from Aristotle and is captured in modern Boolean logic. In contrast,
some physicists argue that quantum theory requires a non-Boolean or quantum logic. The
basic logical structure for deductive reasoning is the syllogism wherein one can infer, for
example, from major premise If A then B and minor premise A that B is true. Similar
logical implication is obtained through disjunctions. For example, one can infer the truth
of A from combining the major premise A or B and minor premise not B.
logical conjunction, disjunction, and implication: See logic, quantum and classical.
logicist: The claim that all mathematics can be derived from logic. Implementing this
reduction was the goal of Whitehead and Russells Principia Mathematica. This goal
proved untenable by 1931 with the discovery of Godels incompleteness theorems for
axiomatic systems.
metaphysics and sciences, relations between: See sciences and metaphysics, relations
between.
metaphysics (or ontology): One of the two main branches of philosophy, which is
devoted to studies of the nature of being or ontology. See epistemology. Plain: A theory
of the most general features of reality and real entities. Exact: A theory of the most
general features of reality and real entities which makes explicit use of formal sciences
(logic, mathematics, game theory) in theory construction (reducing the ambiguities of
ordinary language by dening the basic terms explicitly and making explicit the relations
between the basic notions and axioms) and theory criticism (testing internal and external
consistency). Scientic: An exact metaphysical theory which further takes into account
the (main) results of contemporary scientic research.
metasystem level: Level of description embracing both experimenter and system un-
der study.
282 Glossary
Neoplatonism: Arising in the second century a.d. as extensions of Platonism, the view
that ideal patterns or universals are existent substances and that body and soul are inde-
pendent substances.
nexus: In Whitehead, any set of actual entities is a nexus. The term does not presup-
pose any special type of order, nor does it presuppose any order at all pervading its
members other than the general metaphysical obligation of mutual immanence (see
Bibliography: Whitehead, 1933, 201). The mutual immanence of discrete actual entities
is an apparently paradoxical doctrine that receives consistent explanation in terms of
Whiteheads theory of metaphysical extension (see chapter 17). Nexus are classied into
various main types according to the specic contingent forms of order they exhibit. A
social nexus, or society, is by far the most important type of nexus.
nonseparability: The supposition that Bells theorem results on spin correlations indi-
cate a fundamental connectedness between occasions, including some regions outside the
normal causal light cone of relativity theory. However, nonlocal correlations depend on a
common initial event at the source of the associated particles or photons.
objectication: In Whitehead, objectication refers to the manner in which one actual

entity is immanent in another actual entity. There are three modes of objectication:
causal, presentational, and anticipational. The different natures of the three modes cannot
be understood apart from the properties of metaphysical extension (See chapter 17).
occasion of experience: See actual entity.
ontology (or metaphysics): The theory of being qua (as) being. For Aristotle, ontol-
ogy is the science of the essence of things. See metaphysics.
particularism: The view that all apparent wholes are mere aggregates of discrete,
separable parts. See holism.
phenomenology: The descriptive analysis of subjective processes. Roughly, pure phe-

nomenology and pure logic are mutually independent disciplines. Modern usage of the
term derives from Husserl (18591938).
photon: The particle aspect of light, or more generally, electromagnetic radiation. Pho-
tons have no rest mass and carry one unit of angular momentum in units of h-bar. Each
photon has an energy which is Plancks constant, h, multiplied by its frequency.
Planck scale: An exceedingly short distance, equal to 1.6 1035 m, based on com-
bining Plancks constant, the speed of light, and the gravitational constant.
plasmas: Plasmas are an electrically conducting interactive mix of uncharged particles,

positively charged particles, negative electrons, electric elds, and magnetic elds. The
fraction of uncharged particles in a plasma varies dramatically, from more than 95% in
the lower ionosphere to less than 1% in the solar wind, the continuous stream of plasma
from the sun. In contrast with neutral gases and liquids, plasmas are noted for their
highly interactive properties and collective effects. They make up more than 99% of the
visible universe. See Debye screening and the plasma Web site at http://www.
plasmas.org.
Glossary 283
prehension: In Whitehead, the activity of prehending is the most concrete creative

operation involved in the becoming of an actual entity. Its created product is the most
concrete component of an actual entity already become. Each prehension is analyzable
into a subject, an objective datum, and a subjective form. The subject is the actual entity
insofar as it autonomously decides its own nal subjective deniteness. The objective
datum is any entitysuch as another actual entity, an eternal object, or a nexusthat is
taken into account and responded to by the subject in its process of self-formation. And
the subjective form is the deniteness with which the subject clothes itself in response to
that datum. The subjective form is how the subject denes itself in response to that
datum.
proposition: In Whitehead, a proposition is the prehensible contrast of an actual entity
or nexus with an eternal object, or a set of eternal objects, expressing a possible deter-
mination of that actual entity or nexus. A proposition may serve as the datum for a
propositional prehension. The prehension of a proposition does not require conscious-
ness. However, in a high-grade actual entity, a few propositions may be consciously
prehended against a vast background of unconsciously prehended ones. Self-referential
propositional prehensions are possible, and one kind, termed the subjective aim, is ge-
neric to all actual entities.
pulsar: A rapidly rotating neutron star that emits radiation in pulses linked to its rota-
tional period.
quantum logic: See logic, quantum and classical.
quantum measurement theory: The analysis, for different interpretations of quantum
mechanics, of what observables can have determinate values in a given quantum state.
quantum state: A mathematical entity that contains all the available information about
the probabilities of all possible measurements on a quantum system.
quantum statistics: Statistical physics endeavors to deduce information about macro-
scopic properties of a system based on analyzing statistics of its microscopic constitu-
ents. In application to quantum systems, a basic distinction is found between particles
having half-integer spin or Fermi-Dirac statistics and integer spin systems with sym-
metric quantum wave functions, which display Bose-Einstein statistics. Since electrons
have spin 12, Fermi-Dirac statistics apply and no two electrons can simultaneously oc-
cupy the same quantum state. The resulting Pauli exclusion principle forms the basis for
generating the periodic table of the elements.
quark: A pointlike constituent of neutrons, protons, and mesons. The quarks contain
all the nucleon mass and are indivisible as far as we know. Three quarks form a baryon,
such as a proton, neutron, and other short-lived particles. Two quarks form mesons. See
also leptons.
realism: For ontology, the theory of the reality of abstract terms or universals in which
universals exist before things, in contrast to nominalism, for which universals have a
being only after things. In epistemology, realism holds that it is possible to have faithful
and direct knowledge of the actual world. Process philosophers generally avoid tradi-
tional dualisms such as idealism/realism and mind/body. If one insists on the idealism/
284 Glossary
realism pairing, it can be argued that Whitehead was both an idealist and a realist. See
idealist.
reductionism: Reduction is the subsumption of one conceptual scheme by another. In
metaphysics, reductionism holds that there are systematic identities between entities of a
higher level and those in a lower, reducing level. In epistemology, reductionists typically
point to semantic equivalences between propositions in the higher level and those in a
lower, reducing level. Reduction in science is the effort to systematically explain one
scientic theory by laws and phenomena in another lower-level theory.
quantum mechanics, eld theory: The physical theory of matter, electromagnetic ra-
diation, the force elds, and their interactions. See force elds.
relativistic invariance: Properties of a system are invariant if they are unchanged dur-
ing a change in the frame of reference. The Lorentz transformation needs to be applied
to length and time measurements to achieve relativistic invariance. In comparison, the
classical Galilean transformation is a good approximation at low speeds but differs no-
ticeably from the Lorentz transformation at high speeds, especially those approaching the
speed of light. Applying relativistic invariance enables the laws of physics to have the
same form for any system of coordinates; this is called the principle of covariance.
Riemannian geometry: See geometry, Euclidean and Riemannian.
S-matrix approach: Theory based on the general principles governing particle colli-
sions (such as frame independence, causality, and probability conservation), rather than
on arbitrarily specied eld equations.
science and metaphysics, relations between: Stimulation: On the one hand, a scien-
tic metaphysics provides a most general scheme of reality from which (with the help of
additional specifying hypotheses and limiting conditions) specic notions can be log-
ically derived, which may function as basic concepts in a science and thereby throw new
light on old scientic problems, transform them, and initiate new scientic research
strategies and experiments. Criticism: Science is a critic of metaphysics. The more spe-
cial schemes of the sciences mediate between the abstract and general metaphysical
scheme and empirical fact as disclosed by experimentally guided observation, the greater
is the possibility that the metaphysical system receives indirect empirical support (conr-
mation) or criticism (falsication). If a scientic approach that is initiated by a meta-
physics does not lead to fruitful new insights issuing in new experiments yielding posi-
tive, i.e., conrming results, not only this scientic approach must be modied or even
abolished, but also the initiating metaphysics has to be reconsidered.
screening: See Debye screening and plasmas.
semantics: The study of the meaning of signs and symbols.
society: In Whitehead, a society is a nexus made up of successive generations of actual
entities exhibiting a common form of order that the members of each generation inherit
from the members of the preceding generation. The common form of order is the soci-
etys dening characteristic. Societies, or their dening characteristics, are the enduring
objects of nature.
space plasma: See plasmas.
Glossary 285
spin network: A quantum-theoretic network of coupled spins used by Roger Penrose

as an atomistic geometry of the surface of the sphere.
spinor: A vector describing spin of the electron.
state vector: Polarization and other quantum states are represented by matrices called
state vectors. See wave function.
steady state model: A model of the cosmos in which hydrogen is steadily created so
that the cosmos will continue in a steady state.
subjective aim: In Whitehead, the subjective aim of an actual entity is what guides its
process of becoming. It involves a proposition prehended by the actual entity with the
subjective form of purpose to realize its process of becoming. The actual entity is itself
the logical subject of the proposition, and an eternal object, or set of eternal objects, is
the logical predicate of the proposition.
subjective form: In Whitehead, a particular subjective deniteness gained by an actual
entity by reason of its prehension of some datum or other. The deniteness of each
subjective form is due to the ingression of an eternal object or set of eternal objects.
substantialism: The view that all reality is basically composed of substances whose
change of conguration constitutes change without reference to any fundamental process
as in process thought.
supersession: In Whitehead, supersession is a technical term standing both for the
process constituting the becoming of an actual entity and for the chronological relations
generated by that process. The relata of supersession are either actual entities or phases
in the becoming of each actual entity.
supervenience: The relationship between the characteristics of a collection and the
properties of the components that compose that collection. For ordinary macroscopic
objects (shoes, ships, sealing wax), the mass of a collection is simply the sum of the
masses of the components. However, much of the energy produced by the Sun derives
from the circumstance that the mass of the nucleus of the helium atom is somewhat less
than the mass of four hydrogen nuclei (protons) that may be taken to compose it. The
standard philosophical treatment of wholes and parts (mereology) treats parts as being
unaffected by their aggregation into larger units. This approach may not apply to all
composites of philosophic and/or scientic interest. To the extent that the existence of a
composite changes the characteristics of the components, the properties of the aggregate
may not correspond exactly to (supervene on) the sum of the corresponding properties
of the parts of that aggregate.
symmetry: Immunity to a possible change.
synchronic: Covering all events at one time.
syntactics: Formal (content-free) analysis of the linguistic forms of languages.
topology: The study of geometric spaces that are invariant under deformation.
transition: In Whitehead, the process of transitionor the macroscopic processis
the rst stage in the becoming of an actual entity. The second stage is the process of
286 Glossary
concrescence. In the stage of transition, the process of becoming is determined by the

state of the universe correlative with the initiation of the process. The process of transi-
tion is thus a process of efcient causation.
uncertainty principle: See indeterminacy principle.
uranium: A silvery-white metallic element of atomic number 92, which has fourteen
isotopes, of which U-238 is the most abundant. The isotope U-235 is ssionable with
slow neutrons and, in a critical mass, is capable of sustaining a chain reaction that can
proceed explosively.
vacuum: Observationally, there is no pure vacuum anywhere in the universe, which is
permeated by radiation, particles and plasmas even if extremely tenuous in most space
plasma regions. See plasmas. In quantum eld theory, ground states are referred to as a
vacuum. The electromagnetic, weak, and strong elds have uctuations about a vanish-
ing expectation value in such a vacuum. See virtual particle pair.
vector: A quantity having both magnitude and direction. See state vector.
Venn diagram: Classes can be diagrammed as overlapping circles, which can help test
the logical consequences of given Boolean propositions. (John Venn, 18341923).
virtual particle: A particle that is formed for a very short period of time and then
ceases to exist.
virtual particle pair: A pair of particles produced spontaneously in the vacuum as a
result of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. For example, an electron and positron can
be produced and exist for a very short time.
wave function: The state of motion of a particle can be described by a complex wave
function (x, y, z; t). The probability of nding the particle in a volume element dV at
point (x, y, z) and time t is equal to *. Wave functions are commonly represented by
linear operators or matrices called vectors; examples include what are termed ket, bra,
and state vectors.
wave packets: Groups of waves, traveling at the group velocity, which are combined
disturbances of a set of sine waves with a limited range of frequencies and wavelengths.
The pure sine waves used to dene phase velocity do not really exist because they would
require innite spatial extent.
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Internet Resources
Resource Guide to Physics and Whitehead, eds. Timothy E. Eastman and Hank Kee-
ton, Process Studies Electronic Supplement 2003, http://www.ctr4process.org/
publications/pss/.
Contributors
Timothy E. Eastman, editor, has carried out basic research in plasma physics and
space physics for over 25 years and has been national coordinator for space plasma
research for six years while at NSF and NASA headquarters. Working with QSS Group,
Inc., Dr. Eastman is group manager for space science support at the Space Science Data
Operations Ofce located at NASAs Goddard Space Flight Center in addition to being a
consultant in plasma science and applications. He is well known for discovering the low-
latitude boundary layer of Earths magnetosphere and other research results important to
current work in solar-terrestrial relations and space weather. In addition to space physics
research, Eastman has pursued philosophical interests through extensive reading and
graduate level studies, conferences and publications, especially in the area of process
philosophy. He has given formal responses in conferences to Hilary Putnam and Henry
Stapp, and edited special issues on process thought and natural science in two issues of
the Process Studies journal (Process Studies. 26/34 (1997); 27/34 (1998)). In collab-
oration with Dr. Keeton, he created a comprehensive guide to physics and Whitehead
published in Process Studies Electronic Supplement (Resource Guide to Physics and
Whitehead, PSS 2003; http://www.ctr4process/publications/pss/)
Hank Keeton, editor, became interested in Whiteheads thought after deciding to do

graduate work in philosophy, rather than physics. But his inclination toward particle
physics led him to work on the Alvarez experiment at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
in the early 1970s. This combination of interests led him to complete his Ph.D. under
Bernard M. Loomer at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, concentrating on
Whiteheads evolution from theoretical physics into philosophical metaphysics. Keeton
explored the mathematical development of Whiteheads theory of extensive connection
in his doctoral work. Since then, he has continued to be active at the interface between
process thought and the philosophy of science, with an emphasis on current develop-
ments in theoretical physics. His greatest hope is that the evolving ideas of process
philosophy will assist current developments in relativity and quantum mechanics.
Other Contributors (alphabetical ordering)
Geoffrey F. Chew of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory is a leading theorist in

fundamental physics. He originated the famous S-matrix theory, which has been very
299
300 Contributors
inuential in high energy physics. The book of essays related to his work A Passion for
Physics (C. De Tar, C. Tan, and J. Finkelstein, editors, World Science, 1985) was pre-
pared in Dr. Chews honor. Most recently, he has been developing an historical quantum
cosmology.
Philip Clayton is Ingraham Chair at the Claremont School of Theology and holds
doctoral degrees in both philosophy and religious studies from Yale University. He is the
author of Explanation from Physics to Theology [Yale Press, 1989], God and Contempo-
rary Science [Eerdmans, 1998] and The Problem of God in Modern Thought (Eerdmans,
2000), and co-editor of seven volumes, including Quantum Mechanics: Scientic Per-
spectives on Divine Action [Notre Dame, 2001] In Whom We Live and Move and Have
Our Being: Panentheism and Science [Eerdmans, 2003], Evolutionary Ethics: Human
Morality in Biological and Religious Perspective [Eerdmans, 2004], and Science and the
Spiritual Quest: New Essays by Leading Scientists [Routledge, 2002]. Professor Clayton
is a leading scholar in the science and religion eld and is principal investigator of the
Science and the Spiritual Quest project at the Center for Theology and the Natural
Sciences in Berkeley, California.
Joseph E. Earley, Sr. is a professor emeritus of chemistry at Georgetown University
who has specialized in far-from-equilibrium chemical systems. In addition to his fore-
front work in modern chemistry, Professor Earley is active in the emerging eld of
philosophy of chemistry. He is the editor of Individuality and Cooperative Action
(Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 1991) and the editor of Chemical Ex-
planation: Characteristics, Development, Autonomy (New York Academy of Sciences,
New York, 2003).
David Ritz Finkelstein of the Georgia Institute of Technology is a leading theorist in
fundamental physics. He is the author of Quantum Relativity: A Synthesis of the Ideas of
Einstein and Heisenberg (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1996). Professor Finkelstein is cur-
rently developing a quantum theory based on elementary processes rather than elemen-
tary particles.
Niels Viggo Hansen is now at the Danish Ministry of Health, Knowledge and Re-
search Center for Alternative Medicine, engaged in the development of scientic ap-
proaches and methods for the understanding and assessment of alternative and comple-
mentary medicine. Before this, he worked at the Department of Philosophy, University
of Aarhus, Denmark, with metaphysical, epistemological, and sociological dimensions of
the philosophy of science. In his philosophical work, he has been particularly interested
in exploring and articulating a line of thought, radical constructivism, which claims to
overcome the classical realism/idealism dichotomy and is a common legacy of a few
radically processual thinkers including Whitehead, Deleuze, and the second century Bud-
dhist saint-philosopher, Nagarjuna.
John A. Jungerman is Professor Emeritus of the University of California at Davis.
His research has been primarily in nuclear physics. He was Founding Director of the
Crocker Nuclear Laboratory there. He studied process philosophy with Dr. Rebecca Par-
ker, President of the Starr King School for the Ministry. Most recently he has authored
The World in Process, Creativity and Connection in the New Physics (State University of
New York Press, Albany, 2000).
Contributors 301
Shimon Malin teaches at Colgate University in Hamilton, New York. His research is
in various aspects of quantum eld theory, relativity, and cosmology and has authored
two books, Representations of the Rotation and Lorentz Groups with M. Carmeli [Dek-
ker Inc., New York, 1976] and Nature Loves to Hide: Quantum Physics and Reality
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001).
Jorge Luis Nobo is professor of philosophy at Washburn University in Topeka, Kan-
sas. He is a leading scholar of metaphysics, process philosophy, and Whitehead, and is
the author of Whiteheads Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity (State University of
New York Press, Albany, 1986).
Franz G. Riffert is a philosopher and psychotherapist with the Institute for Education
at the University of Salzburg, Austria. He has written three books, including Whitehead
und Piaget: Zur interdisziplinaren Relevanz der Prozephilosophie (Peter-Langer,
Vienna, 1994), and a forthcoming edited volume, (together with Michel Weber) soon to
be submitted, entitled Searching for New Contrasts: Whiteheadian Contributions to Con-
temporary Challenges in Psychology, Neurophysiology and the Philosophy of Mind (Pe-
ter-Lang, Vienna, 2003, in press).
Joe Rosen is former chair of the Department of Physics and Astronomy at the Univer-
sity of Central Arkansas. A distinguished contributor to the study of symmetry, he is the
author or editor of ten books, including Symmetry in Science: An Introduction to the
General Theory [Springer, 1995] and The Capricious Cosmos: Universe Beyond Law
[Macmillan, 1991]. Dr. Rosen is now a consultant and resides in Rockville, Maryland.
Henry P. Stapp of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory is a leading theorist in
fundamental physics, especially the quantum theory of measurement. His most recent
work Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics [Springer, 1993] has moved into issues of
the origin of mind and consciousness, always with solid roots in the physics.
Yutaka Tanaka is professor in the department of philosophy at Sophia University in
Tokyo. He is director of the Japan Internet Center for Process Studies, editor of Process
Thoughts (Japanese philosophical journal), and director of Touri-Kadan (forum of classi-
cal Japanese poetry). Dr. Tanaka has written From Paradox to Reality Kouro-sha (Kyoto,
1993, in Japanese) and Whitehead Koudan-sha (Tokyo, 1998, in Japanese).
Note on Supporting Center
This series is published under the auspices of the Center for Process Studies, a
research organization afliated with the Claremont School of Theology and
Claremont Graduate University. It was founded in 1973 by John B. Cobb Jr.,
Founding Director, and David Ray Grifn, Executive Director; Marjorie Suc-
hocki is now also a Co-director. It encourages research and reection on the
process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, and related
thinkers, and on the application and testing of this viewpoint in all areas of
thought and practice. The center sponsors conferences, welcomes visiting schol-
ars to use its library, and publishes a scholarly journal, Process Studies, and a
newsletter, Process Perspectives. Located at 1325 North College, Claremont,
CA 91711, it gratefully accepts (tax-deductible) contributions to support its
work.
303
Index
absolute law, in classical physics, 183; rejec- adventure of ideas, 270

tion of, 184 afnity, in chemistry, 65
absolute space, Newtonian concept of, 266 aim of the organism, 183
absolutes, 183; spotting of false, 185 algebra, 32; Boolean, 172; Euclidian and non-
abstract self, as real, 240 Euclidian, 39; of observables, 182
abstraction, 79, 139, 143 algebraic
abstractions analysis, of processes, 192; formulation of
and transmutations, 238; from wholeness of quantum physics, 185; logic, 185; struc-
experience, 225 ture, of quantum logic, 174; systems, 33
abstractive hierarchies, 231, 252 alpha and omega dates, 248, 254
abundances, 49 ambiguities, of ordinary languages, 204
act(s), 18, 25; of becoming, 240; of observa- amnesiac, experience of an, 239
tion, repressed in classical physics, 182; analytic philosophy, 199, 200, 222; and syn-
and process, 22; represented by wave thetic, 25
functions, 181 ancestor, immediate, 236, 248
actual entities (see actual occasion), xii, 16, 38, anomy, 183
63, 75, 77, 78, 80, 83, 200, 208, 211, 214, anthropic argument, 141
227, 228, 235, 240, 252, 263, 269; as anticipations, 246, 248; physical, 235, 251, 254
metaphysically basic, 227 anticipatory objectication, 236
actual occasion(s) (see actual entities), 7, 21, antimetaphysical attitude, 200
47, 101, 103, 111, 113, 119, 164, 165, antimetaphysical response, 138
166, 170, 187, 189, 189, 194, 195, 228, antiscientism, 141, 162
229, 230, 231, 233, 241, 243, 254, 255, antiscientistic, 162
261; as actuality in attainment, 230; as in- approximate idea in Chews theory, relativity
cluded in the world, 229; mutual objec- as an, 107
tication of, 242; pre-events and, 91 approximation, 19, 20, 54, 116, 117, 260
actual world, 195, 251; as determinate world- Aristotelian potentiality, 268
state, 237; as a nexus, 229; as a social Aristotle, 3, 188, 262. 270
nexus, 236, 237; as a society of societies, arithmetic of ideas, 180
237; as specic and contingent, 228 art, non-objective, 182
actuality, as both cumulative and reproductive, astronomical objects, 50
232; cell theory of, 171; focus of physics, asymmetry, 19; of causality, 155; in physics,
182; meaning of, 235; as necessarily cu- 133; of the world, 140
mulative, 241; as necessarily reproductive, atemporal facts, 149; process, 77; reality, 158
241; and possibility (see possibilities and atemporalism, 139
actuality), 24; quantum, 182 atomic event, 173
actualization, 101, 102, 240; in quantum exper- atomism, 14, 21, 166, 175; logical, 172, 178;
iments, 194 physical, 178
ad hoc hypotheses, 204 atomist, 8
305
306 Index
atoms, 48, 65 both-and approach, 14, 19, 22, 23

augmenting Whitehead, 267 boundary conditions, 112, 183, 265; effect,
autocatalysis, 67 258
autocatalyst, 68 Bracken, Joseph, 125, 262, 267
autocatalytic reaction, 70, 71 brain, 101, 120, 122, 125, 239, 248; activity,
auxiliary hypotheses, 205, 207 236; as a complex social nexus, 238;
axiom independence, 205 dynamics, 96; electromagnetic properties
axiomatic basis, 203; matrix, 205, 207 of, 96; interactions and process of, 215;
axioms, 206; of extension, 41; linkage among, of the observer, 95; as a social nexus,
204; and predicates, semantical family for, 247
204 brain state(s), 123; causal inuence of, 246;
evolution of, 97, 99;
backward causality, 155, 156; light cones, 157, bras, quantum notation of, 189
195 Bub, Jeffrey, 25
Bacon, Francis, 185 Bunge, Mario, xii, 201, 207, 208, 209, 214
Barbour, Ian, 112, 263, 264, 267, 272 Bunges materialist thing ontology, 215
baryons, 48 Burgers, J.M., 74
basis states, 94
Bayes theorem, 176
Capek, Milic, 15, 17, 20, 129, 146
beam-splittings, 185 catalyst, 65
becoming, 7, 105, 227, 235, 237, 242, 248, categoreal account, 154; investigations, x
251, 252, 255, 262, 269; of actualities, categoreal scheme, 155, 207, 214, 266; as a
103; analysis of, 170; and being, 230, logical calculus, 211
240, 241, 254; being and interdependence, categories, 227; or genera of existents, 233; of
of experience, 228; of eventities, 103, Process and Reality, 209
104; grammar of, 156; idea of, 156; inte- category of nexus, 229
gral, 153; interdependent aspects of, 253; causal chain, 95
intermediate phases of, 245; notion of, causal
139; of the occasion, as a cumulative pro- component, 84; connection, 42, 99; con-
cess, 231; radical, 143 straints, 113
being, 7; and becoming, 14, 19, 24, 27, 43, causal efcacy, 248; of an enduring object,
156, 231, 233; and knowing, 255 239; as primitive mode of perception,
Bell Aspect experiments, 194 247; perception in the pure mode of, 247;
Bells inequality, 15, 17, 174, 175, 178, 194; and presentational immediacy, sense-
generalized, 177; test, 177 perception as interplay between, 247
Bells theorem, 11, 178, 179, 263, 264, 265 causal inuence of brain states, 246
Benard cells, 48, 51 causal locality, 15
Bergson, Henri, x, 3, 21, 142, 143, 144, 145, causal objectication, 232, 233, 236, 238, 242,
151; argument, 145 244, 246, 248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 262,
big bang, 51, 57, 84, 85, 106, 112, 184, 257, 263
264 causal process, family tree model of, 154
binary pulsar, 47, 50 causal relations, 41, 153, 155, 178; and sym-
biological processes, 10, 23, 272 metry, 132
Birch, Charles, ix, 9, 272 causal structure, 99, 101
Bohm, David, ix, 10, 84, 90, 257 causal thinking, 24
Bohmian quantum potential, 112 causality, 108, 146, 170; as asymmetric, 155;
Bohr, Niels, 22, 92, 94, 108, 165, 170, 175, asymmetric structure of, 140; backward,
178, 181, 184, 186, 187, 191 156; claim of, 170; efcient, 262; nal,
Boole, George, 32 262; local, 87
Boolean algebra, 172, 190 causally efcacious, past as, 247
Born, Max, 20, 79, 82 causation, 5; downward, 71; efcient, 2; nal,
Bose-Einstein condensates, 256; statistics, 184, 189, 235; local, 262
185 cause and effect, 24
bosons, 256 cell theory of actuality, 106, 171, 185
both subjective and objective characteristics, Center for Process Studies, ix, x, xii, 72,
77 303
Index 307
chain of history, 86, 89 ings, 9, 81; prehensions, 252; systems,

change, 133, 143, 252; existence of, 40; and classical, quantum, process, 17
permanence, 27, 43; and time, meta- concrescence, 16, 63, 81, 164, 189, 211, 253;
physics of, 163 theory of, 170
chaos mechanism, 116 concrete fact, 79, 143, 150; human experience,
chemical afnity, 65, 66, 71; combination, 65; 224; processuality, 150
concentrations, 65; equilibrium, 65; os- conformal conceptual prehensions, 251; physi-
cillators, 68; reactants, 66; reaction equa- cal prehensions, 251, 252; subjective
tion, 65, 66; systems, 63 forms, 253
Chew, Geoffrey, xii, 20, 21, 8491, 103, 104, conformation, 237, 250, 262
105, 106, 107, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, conjugate variables, 21
116, 117, 257, 258, 268, 269, 299 connectedness to sciences, 205; of things, 230,
Chinese culture, 23 244
choice, 117, 118; by the experimenter, 93, 110 conscious
chronological order of supersessional junctures, decisions, as making a difference in the uni-
248 verse, 255; experience, 53, 101; recollec-
chronology of supersession, 233 tion, 248; self-formation, 254; thoughts,
chronon, 106, 186; metaphysical, 255 92, 98, 101, 126; and unconscious knowl-
class of relations, 41 edge, 247
classes, 38 consciousness, 98, 100, 101, 102, 117, 121,
classical 122, 123, 125, 245, 254; as not meta-
experimenter, 186; framework, 17, 18, 19, physically basic, 229; subjective aspect of,
22, 23, 37, 54, 109, 166, 185; logic, 171, 110
174, 178; consequent nature of God, 256, 266
classical physics, 54,182, 183; as deterministic, consistency, formal, 204
175; logical basis of, 174 consonance, 205
classical world, 173; 177 constancy of law, origin of, 191
Clayton, Philip, xii, 313, 16, 111, 188, 300 constants, 119, 120
Clifford statistics, 185 container view, 17, 20
clock reaction, 67 contemporary occasions, metaphysically, 243
closed physical theory, denial of, 182 context-independence, of facts, 149
closure of network of processes, 70, 71 contiguity, 241, 263
Cobb, John, 303 contiguous occasions, 237
Code, Murray, ix, 105, 212 contingency, 54; of the future, 166; irreducible,
cogredience, 41 175
coherence, 18, 63, 162, 205, 209 contingent events, 171
coherent states of electromagnetic eld, 96 continuity, 11, 19, 23, 24, 25, 40, 143
collapse of quantum states, 25, 75, 76, 79, 80, continuum, as innitely differentiable, 241
81, 88; of the wave function, 58, 89, 109, contradiction, lack of, 210
125, 140, 181, 192 contrast, 234; of eternal objects, complex, 242;
collocation, 242 of ingressed eternal objects, 239
commensurability, 174; of events, 172 coordinate analysis, 164, 170
common sense, 110, 147, 167, 180 Copenhagen interpretation, 42, 88, 89, 92, 93,
common universe of discourse, 208 94, 100, 101, 166
communications, 104 corpuscles, 45
complementary descriptions, 178 correlation information, 176
complementary pairs, 14, 23 correlations, quantum, 48; in quantum physics,
complete description of the world, 174 195
completeness correlative thinking, 24
concept of, 171; failure of, 178; of quantum correlative universe, 252, 254
physics, 168 cosmic epochs, 18, 21, 160, 189, 231, 253
complexity, levels of, 82; theory, 16 cosmic
composite states, 21; system, 25 evolution, 51; process, 186; state of affairs,
conceptual 152
and propositional analyses of symbolic refer- cosmological
ence, 247; connectedness, 204, 209; feel- inuences, 258; models, 16; now, 266
308 Index
cosmology, 54, 84, 89, 181, 210 dimensionless numbers, 117

cosmology Dirac, Paul, 50, 93, 189, 192, 259; process, 98;
one-substance, 208; philosophical, 228, 255; relativistic theory, 50
quantum, 186 disciplines, original datum for, 224
course-graining, for quantum physics, 191 discourse
covariance principle, 43 common universe of, 203, 208; domains of,
created subphases, 243 202; metaphysical domain of, 207
creation discourse, common universe of, 208
and annihilation operators, 25; story, 53 dissipative structures, 20, 51, 66, 67, 68, 69,
creative 71, 72
advance, 41, 250; prespace, 240; process, divisibility
53, 184, 230, 231, 232, 241; subphase, of events, 171, 172, 174; formula, 174; of
243, 251 space-time region, 170
creativity, 59, 79, 118, 240, 251, 252, 266, doctrine
269; and novelty, 47, 262 of absolute law, 183; of mutual immanence,
criteria 240
formal methodological, 215; for scientic domains of discourse, 202
metaphysics, 202 dualism, 9, 14, 24, 111, 230
critical dualistic concept, 36
rationalism, 215; realism, 17 dualities, 16, 22, 23, 24; in physics, 24, 25
criticism, enhancement of, 201 duality
crystallization of the universal projection, 242 104, 109; of process, 9; wave-particle, 48;
cumulative theory of actuality, 262 without dualism, 14, 19
duration(s), 6, 40, 41, 45, 104, 143, 195
dative phase, 231, 245, 248, 249, 251 dynamic causality, 155
datum for becoming, 230 dynamics 26, 180, 184; or absolute law, 183;
de Broglie, Louis, 181 and kinematics, 190
Debye
screening, 21; spheres, 258 Earley, Joseph, xii, 20, 6373, 300
decay of oscillation, 66 Eastern philosophical tradition, 240
decision(s), 234, 235; immanent, 235; tran- Eastman, Timothy, ix, xii, 1430, 124, 195,
scendent, 235; immanent and transcen- 258, 261, 269, 270, 299
dent, 255 ecological perspective, 16, 43
decoherence, 11, 191 ecosystem, 9
deducibility, 205; prerequisite of, 203 Eddington, Arthur, 42
deduction, 222; prerequisite for, 204 efcient
deductive extensions, 203 causality, 262, 235, 253, 254; cause, 23,
dening characteristics of a society, 251, 229, 236; transition, 254
237 Einstein, Albert, xi, 15, 21, 34, 40, 43, 89, 94,
delayed choice experiment, 165, 168 138, 144, 145, 153, 162, 167, 171, 175,
density operator, 94 178, 264, 271
Descartes, Rene, 14, 92, 209, 230 Einsteins relativity, as relational theory, 17;
descendant, immediate, 235, 248 theory of relativity, 41; train example,
descriptive 145
generalization, 228; geometry, 39 electric screening, 258
determinacy, of outcome, 155 electromagnetic
determinate world-state or actual world, 237 eld, 100, 120, 125; force, 51; radiation, 48,
determination and indetermination, 23 264
determinism, 19, 23, 49, 79, 118, 166, 171, electromagnetism, 33, 35, 114, 115, 258,
175 269
deterministic electrons, 256
equations, 120; system, 108; world of classi- elementary particles, 84, 85, 87
cal physics, 175 elsewhere, zone of, 160
diluteness, 114 emergence, 8, 16, 17, 77, 226
dimension, 38 emergent order, 57
dimensionality, 160; of spacetime, 193 emission and absorption, 26
Index 309
empirical exit species, 68

knowledge, basis for, 247; subject (see in- experience, 18, 118, 124; conceptualization of,
gredient subject), 256 224; generalization of, 8; general property
empiricist, radical, 270 of, 226; generic nature of, 228; of a hu-
enduring object(s), 257, 269; as an abstract en- man subject, 239; importance of, 270; in
tity, 239; apparent existence of, 77; as ex- the now, as an illusion, 195; ontological
treme abstractions, 238; as repeatable, primacy of, 143; physical, 119; of quan-
239; vs. enduring society, 238 tum systems, 192; species of, 226; sub-
enduring society, 253; and enduring object, im- jective aspect of, 119; and supersession,
portance of distinction between, 256 as irreversible processes, 241; theory of,
enduring things, products of supersessional 223
process, 240 experiencing, fact of, 79
energy, concept of, 42 experiential
enfoldment of information, 257 aspect of nature, 99; process, need for, 260;
entropy, 57, 59; and negentropy, 58 units, 6
envisagement, 240, 243, 244 experientialism, 230; postulate of, 228
envisaging creative prespace, 240 experientially immanent, 244; transcendent,
ephemeral processes, 225 244
epistemological reduction, 18 experimental arrangement, 169; setup, 94,
epistemology, 226, 228, 255 100
epochal theory of time, 164, 165, 166, 170 extension, 160, 240; and becoming, tension be-
EPR tween, 154; calculus of, 31; emergence of,
arguments, 178; experiment, 16 153; eternal, 241; ground of, 154; macro-
equilibrium scopic, 175; properties of, 250; separative
state, 66; systems, 59 property of, 241
eternal extension, 243; as determinable, 241; extensional
modalilty or projectiveness of, 241 logic, 185; standpoint, 103
eternal extensionality, 193
factors, 240; objects, 211, 227, 228, 231, extensive
240, 251, 252, 261, 268; potency, 240; connection, 41; extensive continuum, 248,
properties, 241; universe, 251 266; , as proto-spacetime, 193; loca-
eternity, 240 tion, as multiple, 250; locus, 249; regions,
ethics and freedom, 214 243, 246; , mutual modal immanence
Euclidean geometries, 33, 37, 174 of, 242; standpoint, 243; structure of oc-
event(s), 8, 112, 113, 182 casions region, 242; structure of the uni-
commensurability of, 172; as indivisible, verse, 241; -topological scheme, 35
178; and immanence, 195; levels of, 126; external
as a misleading term for occasions, 231; consistency, 205; relations, 19, 230
metaphysics, 10, 16; ontology, 43; order
of, 150; as primary, 50, 51; vs. thing lan- fact, context-independence, 149; global tempo-
guage, xi, 11 ral, 152,160; as not global, but local, 150;
eventities or actual occasions, 105; or pre- historicity, 149; local temporal, 152, 156,
events, 110 163; temporal, 154
event-oriented descriptions, 23 factual sciences, 202; as special metaphysics,
event-particles, 41 203
evil, problem of, 263, 265, 266, 267 Fagg, Lawrence, ix, 120, 258, 267, 269
evolution, 18, 23; classical, 259; global, 84; of faith in xed law, 183
laws of nature, 184 fallacy
evolutionary cosmology, 10 of the afrmation of the consequence, 213;
exactness, 204, 205 of misplaced concreteness, 70, 79, 139,
exchange of mediating particles, 51 225, 227; of the perfect dictionary, 200;
excited states, 48 of simple location, 257; of substance
existence thinking, 53
of our experiences, 226; phases of, 230; of a false absolutes, 185
society, 237; falsications, 213
existentialism, 182 family tree model, of causal process, 154
310 Index
far-from-equilibrium chemical systems, 63; re- genetic

action, 66, 71 analysis, 164, 170; genetic division, phases,
faster-than-light inuences, faster-than-light, 164, 165; nexus, 237, 251 priority, 165;
265 process, 78
fear, 245 geometry, 33, 35, 39, 180; as cross-
feedback species, 68 classication, 181; Euclidean, 174; non-
feeling, 9; as metaphor, 200 Euclidean, 177; Riemannian, 174; of
Fermi-Dirac statistics, 185 space-time, 88, 185; as variable, 185
Feynman paths, 90 Germain, Mark, 122, 123, 124
eld theory, 11, 15, 17, 20, 21, 25, 43, 51, Gibbs theorem, 176
52 global
nal act, 49; -initial act pair, 25 causal objectication, 257; or holistic inu-
nal causation, 189, 235, 253, 262 ences, 253; temporal facts, 160; , non-
ne structure constant, 50 existence of, 156; time, 21
nite gluons, 51
locus, 229; potential region, 243 God
Finkelstein, David Ritz, xii, 17, 20, 22, 25, 26, consequent nature of, 256; Hebrew idea of,
59, 106, 107, 109, 124, 180194, 257, 266; limitation and strength of, 267; as
259, 260, 271, 300 lure, 267; primordial aim of, 252; primor-
Fock spaces, 113 dial nature of, 231; role of, 263, 264; sec-
forces, 32, 50, 51 ular function of, 252, 257; and
Ford, Lewis, 165 simultaneity, 162; in the universe, 89
Ford, Marcus, 112 Godel, Kurt, 33, 264; proof, 33, 39, 264
Forizs, Laszlo, 266 Gods-eye perspective, 152
formal Grand Unication Theory (GUT), 84, 87l
consistency, 204; methodological criteria, grand unied theory, 91, 183
201, 202, 215 Grassmann, Hermann, 31, 32
formal sciences, 202, 204; as presupposing gravitation, 35; cosmological inuence of, 258
metaphysics, 212; role in metaphysics, gravitational
209 constant, 50, 105, 185; eld, 100; force, 51;
formalization, 215; advantages of, 211; of radiation, 47; research, 42
metaphysical systems, 211 gravity, 48, 107; as a statistical phenomenon,
formal-methodological level, 199 107
formal-syntactical sub-criteria, 204 Grifn, David, ix, 16, 303
formative locus, 245, 250, 251, 253; regions, Grunbaum, Adolph, 140, 155
243, 248; standpoint, 243
foundations of science, 206 hallucination, 245
fractal dimension, of chemical trajectory, Hansen, Niels Viggo, xii, 21, 136163, 300
73 Hartshorne, Charles, 23, 26, 27, 52, 129, 165,
free will, 84, 89, 90, 108, 110; and creativity, 194, 262, 263, 264, 266, 303
80 Hartshornes interpretive rules for dual pairs,
freedom, 115, 117; and ethics, 214 23, 26
fundamental, 107 Hawking, Stephen, 223
future, metaphysical, 250; occasions meta- Heidegger, Martin, xvii, 142, 146148, 154,
physical, 238 159
futurity, eld of, 246 Heisenberg(s) interpretation, 77, 80; picture,
265; process, 98; uncertainty, 99
gaps, in the quantum description, 260 Heisenberg, Werner, 22, 49, 76, 82, 119, 165
gauge, 133; theory, 26 167, 170, 181, 182, 187, 191
Gaussian wave packets, 120; state, 98 Henry, Granville, ix, 42, 211
genera of existents, 227 Heraclitus, 7, 112
generality, 202, 205; of metaphysics, 20; ulti- heresy of the Old Unitarians, 182
mate, 207 hermeneutic-phenomenological project, 147
generalization, descriptive, 228; from human hermeneutics, 148
experience, 227 Hilbert space, 85, 86, 111, 113
generic order of mutual immanence, 230 Hiley, Basil, 257, 272
Index 311
historical reality, 19 individuality, 7; of an event, 174; of a quantum

historicity, of facts, 149 event, 166, 169, 171, 178
history, 84, 104; of attained actualities, 240; indivisibility, of a quantum event, 178
developing, 106; notion of, 269; of pre- indivisible event, 175
events, 103; of the universe, 93 induction, 41, 42; period, 68
holism, 27, 48, 273 inertial frame of reference, 144, 145
holistic inuences, 254 inuences, 265; on any given occasion, local
holistic states, 240 and global, 253, 254
Holocaust, 266 information
holomovement, Bohms, 257 distance, 177; quantum of, 233; non-
homaloty, 38 Boolean, 179; , theoretic notion of or-
homogeneous der, 58; theory, 43, 175
case, 192; universe principle, 89 informational coherent universe, 254
human consciousness, 245 ingredient subject, 234, 242, 256 (see empiri-
human experience, 9, 227; contrasting aspects cal subject)
of, 224; differentiations of, 224; primacy ingressed eternal objects, 239
of, 224 ingression, 154, 227, 231, 233
human experimenter, 100 initial datum, 9
human knowing, as a modality of human expe- input and outtake, in quantum experiments,
riencing, 226 181, 182
human subject, as both enduring object and integral
enduring society, 239; experience of, inclusive reality, 224; prehension, 234
239 intellectual prehensions, 234
human subjectivity, 225 intensity, 235
Hume, David, 22, 187, 247 intentional aspect, 99; matrix, 122, 123
hypnosis, 123 intentionality, 79, 102, 121; of consciousness,
hypothetico-deductive system, 203, 206, 207, 245
213 interactions, long-range, 258
interconnectedness, 20, 47, 53, 230
idealism, 225 interconnection, 8, 18; basic assumptions,
idealist, 3, 8; tradition, 187, 199 208; between concepts, 204; of sciences,
ideas, cross-fertilization of, 271 213
identical repetition, absence of, 155 interdependence, 226, 229
idol-detector, 185 interference terms, 95
idols, idol smashing, 185, 186 intermolecular forces, 51
illusion, of experience in the now, 195 internal relatedness, 254
immanence, of events, 195 International Whitehead Conference, xii, 74
immanent Internet resources, for physics and Whitehead,
decisions, 235; reference, 245, 250 272, 297, 299
immediate ancestor, 236, 248 inter-occasional supersession, 231
immediate descendant (see successor), 235, interpretations, of quantum theory, 188
236, 248 intertial systems, 160, 161
immortality, objective, 266 intra-occasional
implicate order, 84 objectivity, 244; supersession, 231
improper regions, 241 invariance, 21
impulse, 91; and energy, 85 invariant laws, 264
inauthentic understandings, 146 irreversibility, 155
incarnation of the universe, each actuality as a
new, 240 James, William, x, xvii
inclusion, 40 Jordan, Pascal, 79, 82
inclusive reality, 224 Jungerman, John, ix, xii, 57, 269, 300
indeterminacy principle, 165, 166, 170
indeterminate past, 167, 169 Kandinsky, Wassily, 182, 191
indexicality, 140 Kant, Immanual, 3, 21, 151, 187
indicative scheme, 248 Keeton, Hank, ix, xii, 3146, 123, 299
indistinguishability, condition for, 239 kets, quantum notation of, 189
312 Index
kinematic possibilities, selection among, 183 190; higher levels of, 185,193; modal,
kinematics, 26, 183, 184 268; as not fundamental, 180; quantum,
Klein, Stanley, 104, 108110, 116, 188, 258, 166, 171, 172, 174, 181, 190, 193, 194;
265, 270 symbolic, 32
knowledge, 254, 255; basis for, 247 logical atomism, 172; failure of, 178
logical
Lagrangian, 108 basis, of classical physics, 174; calculus of
Lamb shift, 50 the categoreal scheme, 211; consistency,
Lango, John, 187, 189 210; positivism, 200; spectrum, 173
language, 138, 268; ambiguities of, 204; con- logicism, 42, 180, 190
structive approach to, 200, 208; formal, Logos, 7
syntax, 183; games, 139, 141; object, 173; long-range forces, 51
of temporality, 139; of time, 149; transla- Lorentz transformation, 21, 138, 144, 149, 264,
tion, 206; Whiteheads vs. that of physics, 265
116 Lowe, Victor, 31, 33, 44
Laplace, Pierre-Simon, 183, 186 lure for ingression, as noncoercive inuence,
Laszlo, Ervin, 27 252
Lattice
constraint, 108; orthomodular, 174 macroscopic
law(s), xii, 18; and chance, interplay of, 273; process of transition, 252, 257; spatiotem-
as condensation phenomenon, 191; of poral extension, 175
conservation, 251; as evolving, 183; xed Malin, Shimon, xii, 25, 7483, 118, 122, 190,
universal, 183; of gravity, 185; as im- 301
mutable, 183; of mass action, 65; as mu- many worlds interpretation, 111, 124, 125, 261
table, 184; plus kinematics, as dynamics, mapping, 43
184; quantum, 182; of sufcient reason, Markov chains, 157
118; as variable, 185; variable dynamical, Martin, Richard, ix, 211
183 mass, 52
laws of nature, 130, 183, 253, 257; as evolv- mass-energy relationship, xi, 54
ing, 184; as habits, 190; as invariant, materialism, 23, 42, 86, 87, 199, 225, 238
264; as precise, 191; search for the, mathematical
271 entities, status of, 212; formalism, 4; logic,
laws of physics, 37 32, 41; physics, 34; rigor, 159
Leclerc, Ivor, 15 mathematics, 31, 43, 88, 132, 181, 204, 212;
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 3, 36 from algebra, 190; and logic, as the for-
leptons, 52 mal sciences, 202; from logic, 190; role
levels of description, 65 of, 206
light, 262 matter, 35, 52, 53, 85, 86, 119; and antimatter,
light cone, 253; backward, 194; forward, 52; as complex of events, 53; concept of,
195 269; -mind dualism, 15, 225, 230; notion
limit-cycle trajectory, 70, 71 of, 268; (tower) patterns, 88; vs. vacuum,
limits, fundamental, 19, 21 113
linear objective reals, 38 Maxwell, James Clerk, 21, 31, 43
linear system, in chemistry, 69 Maxwell-Lorentz assumptions, 41
linguistic turn in philosophy, 17 McHenry, Leemon, 207
linguistics of physics or kinematics, 183 McTaggart, J. M. E., 142, 152
local meaning, criterion of, 200
causation, 262, 263; inuences, 253; physi- measurement, 114; like other processes, 187;
cal as, 120; physical conformation, 257; notion of, 113; problem of, 269; process,
processuality, 161; self-realizations, 254; 75; in quantum physics, 140
temporal facts, 152, 156, 16;3 temporal- mechanical doctrine, 183
ism, 150, 151; time, 21 mechanistic worldview, 178
locality, 15 memory, 246, 248; physical, 232; presystema-
logic, 181, 204, 210; classical, 171, 190, 193; tic analysis of, 230
of discovery, 207; and dynamics, fused in mental action, 96
quantum theory, 180; as epiphenomenon, mereology, 63, 72
Index 313
metalanguage or semantics, 173 modality, 159, 257

metaphor of the airplane, 270 model scheme, 250
metaphorical use of language, 139 modern physics, 21
metaphysical modernism, xv
activity, as inescapable, 139; assumptions, modernity, xv, xvii, xix
139; categories, basic task of, 230; , as molecules, 48
tentative formulations, 228; , need for moment of experience, 229
modernization, 267; , of proposition, monomy, 183
234; conict, 137; contemporary, 238; do- motion, description of, or kinematics, 183
main of discourse, 207; double cone, 262; multiplicities, 256
experientialism, postulate of, 228; expla- mutual
nation, 257; future, 238, 250; and past, immanence, 230, 232, 240, 248; , of occa-
245; past, 232, 238, 253; presuppositions, sions, 229; modal immanence of extensive
206; subject, 256; speculation, 138; topo- regions, 242; objectication of actual oc-
chronon, 255 casions, 242; transcendence, 230
metaphysical system(s), 204; construction, 215;
criteria for, 201; formalization of, 211; as natural
interpretive schemes of the sciences, 213; philosophy, 3, 12; science, 84; and social
as presupposed by special sciences, 215; sciences, 202; theology, 272
and scientic theory, 207, 212, 213 nature, continuity of, 7
metaphysically contemporary occasions, 243 network theory, 184
metaphysics, new age, xvii networks of interaction, 71
metaphysics (see ontology), 3, 4, 12, 160, 162, neural network, 116
227, 270; as application area for mathe- neurons, 125
matics, 212; as not a deductive discipline, Newton, Isaac, 34, 86, 182, 183; laws, 54; law
228; developments in, 268; event, 10; ex- of gravitation, 207
act, 202; and formal sciences, 209; link to Newtonian, absolute space, 266; Newton as not
observation, 206; merits of, 201; and on- a, 182
tology, 221; plain, 202; presupposed by nexus, 16, 227, 233, 234, 241; category of,
formal sciences, 212; and science, rela- 229; nonsocial, 237; of relationships, 77
tionship of, 203, 206, 212; scientic, 199, Nobo, Jorge, xii, 16, 103105, 110, 118, 119,
201; task of, 226; of time and change, 223257, 262, 272, 301
163; types of, 201 non-Euclidean geometries, 38
method nonlinear dynamics, 16
of extensive abstraction, 41; of philosophic non-linearity, 25
generalization, 227 nonlocal and local, 26
methodological nonlocal operators, 99
criteria, 202; reduction, 18 nonlocality, 264; of quantum event, 178
microscopic process of concrescence, 253 non-material component, 58
mind-body non-objective art, 182; physics, 182, 192
distinction, 14; dualism, 15, 225, 230; nonrelational facts, 15
mind-brain nonseparability, of events, 175
dynamics, 98102; event, 95 novelty, 18
mind-matter dualism, 15, 225, 230 now, cosmological, 266; sequence of, 264
Minkowski space-time diagrams, 20 nuclear and subnuclear realm, 52
misunderstanding, of Whitehead, 215 number theory, 39
mnemonic imagination, 248
modal object, 87; language, 173; and subject, 24
asymmetry, 140; differentiations, 242, 245; objectication, 9; anticipatory, 236; causal,
immanence, 243, 245; logic, develop- 262; presentational, 236
ments in, 268; presences, 246, 244, 248, objective, 35, 156; content, 236; datum (data),
250; , or modal aspect, 242; projection, 9, 232, 233, 234; form, 8; immanence, of
241; properties, 138 the universe, 244; immortality, 7, 266; re-
modal structure, internal, 249; of occasions, 243, ality, 236
248; of an occasions formative region, 245 objectivications, causal, presentational, and an-
modalities, 148, 154, 158 ticipatory, 242
314 Index
objectivity, 8, 223; intra-occasional, 244 oscillating chemical systems, 66

objectlessness, quantum, 181 oscillation reaction, 67
objects, 6, 7, 18, 19, 22, 191; discrete, 8; en- oscillations of concentration, 69, 70
during, 238; and events, 43; of perception, oscillators, of the brain, 96
37; and physical events, as abstractions, Oxford model in philosophy, 200
189; to renounce, 17; as separable, 258
observables, algebra of, 182 Palter, Robert, ix
observation, 88, 89, 114, 175; diluteness as re- panexperiential, 115
quired for, 91 panexperientialism, not panpsychism, 8, 16
observed system, 100 panomy, 183
observer, 93, 108, 109, 188; human, 92, 100; panpsychism (see panexperientialism), 8, 16
scale, 106 Papatheodorou, C., 257, 272
observing system, 100 paradox
Occams razor, 130 of the connectedness of things, 244; of mu-
occasion(s) tual immanence, 230; of special relativity
analysis of, 233; locus in the supersessional and becoming, 150
chronology, 249; metaphysically contem- Parmenides, 7, 137
porary, 243; self-aspect, 245 particle constituents, 48
omniscience, 265 particles and waves, 23
one-substance cosmology, 208 particularism, 1517, 21, 27
ontic reference, 243, 244, 245, 248, 250 parts and wholes, 17, 23, 24, 26, 63, 72
ontological passage of time, 138, 139, 141, 142
approach, 95; incompleteness, of quantum passage-becoming, 162
theory, 93; interpretation, 188; level of or- past
dering, 194; presupposition, 226, 236; , as already existing, 169; metaphysical, 232;
of all experience, 240; primacy of experi- occasions metaphysical, 238
ence, 143; primary, of events, 159; princi- pastness of things, 156
ple, 235; signicance, 148; state of Pauli sigma matrices, 97
affairs, 138; status of physical process, Peirce, Charles Sanders, x, xvii, 23, 27, 119,
linkage to experience, 223; theories, 201; 184, 191, 202, 221, 257; semiotics, 105
, as not empirically testable, 212 Penrose, Roger, 223
ontology (see metaphysics), 191, 212, 225, perception
228, 255; of events, 11; as general sci- in mixed mode of symbolic reference, 247;
ence, 203; mathematical manifold, 15; and in the mode of causal efcacy, 247
metaphysics, 221; of objects, 192; physi- personally ordered society, 238, 239
cal, 15; vs. science, 203 perspective, 7, 9, 142
open perturbations, to brain states, 96
universe, 105; systems, 66, 68 phases
openness, 49 of becoming, 234, 243; of existence, 230; of
operationalism, 186 an occasion, 231
operators or processes, fundamental elements phenomenological
as, 182 arguments, 145; analysis, 270
order(ing), 18, 23, 57, 58; chronological, 248; philosophical
of coming into being, 195, 265; contin- atom, 17, 22; cosmology, 228; dualities, 24;
gent types of, 230; of eternal objects, problems of quantum physics, 175
Gods primordial evaluation and, 252; philosophy
of events, 150; and novelty, 50; at onto- of organism (see Whiteheads metaphysics),
logical level, 194; supersessional, 262; 9, 10, 16, 42, 106, 178, 214
vs. symmetry, 131; tendency towards, role and aim, Whiteheads defense of, 163;
252 speculative, 5
ordinary language philosophy, 200 physical
organic mechanism, 118 anticipation, 235; feeling, 9; laws, 38, 39, 50;
organically interlinked, 8 memory, 232, 245; processes, fundamental,
organicism, xvii; and society, notions of, 42 9; realism, 167; as that represented by the
originative phases, 253 wave function, 119; state, 94; theory, 11;
orthodox quantum theory, 92, 98, 181 time (see time), 142, 164, 170, 231
Index 315
physicalism, xvii primordial

physicalist, 101; , reduction, 140 actuality and God, 105; nature of God,
physics, 4, 6, 11, 20, 48, 271; about actuality, 266
not reality, 182; as experimental, 107; lan- principle
guage of, 183; modern, 15; non-objective, of complementarity, 165, 169, 170; of con-
182; as process, 53; and process philoso- cretion, 81; of inference, 210; of objec-
phy, relationship of, 214 tivation, 75, 78, 80, 83, 122; of relativity,
Planck 137; , Whiteheads, 156, 189; of rela-
constant, 21; length, 87; scale, 107; time, tivity, 137; of sufcient reason, 131; of
87 superposition, 75
Planck, Max, 21 Prior, Arthur, 151, 152
plasmas, 21, 23, 258 Probability
Plato, 3, 23, 187 distributions, 20; of an event, 173
pluralities, organizational, 112 problem(s)
polarization of the vacuum, 50 of causation induction, Humes, 247; of evil,
polynomy, 183 265267; of measurement, 269; of time,
Popper, Karl, 4, 200, 201, 207, 215 40; of universals, 268
position, of an occasion, 249 process, 5, 7, 18, 154, 155, 184, 192, 199
positional locus, 250 aspects of, 253; and becoming, 153, 237,
positivists, 200 262, 269; concept of, 159; description in
possibilities, 49, 58, 96; and actuality, 24, 25, physics, 182; framework, 1719, 43; as
183; cutting off of, 235 fundamental, 182; as having local conno-
possible world, 227 tation, 84; metaphysics (see Whiteheads
postmodernism, xv metaphysics), xii, 5, 214, 268; as on-
constructive, xvii; deconstructive, xvii tologically primary, 159; ontology, 156;
postulate of experientialism, 228, 230 as primary, 192; physics, xii; -relational
potential approach, 14, 15, 27; theology, 50,
region, 241; subregions, 245 266
potentiality(ies), 122, 124, 235, 236, 250, 251 process philosophy (see Whiteheads meta-
as real but not actual, 124; and actuality, 76, physics), x, xii, 6, 47, 82, 104, 199, 213;
77, 8082, 101, 102, 153, 164, 188, 231, and physics, relationship of, 214; and sci-
261; denial of, 125; of the future, 226 ences, 222
pragmatism, xvii, 17 Process Studies, x, 303
predecessors, 236 processes
predicate logic, 194 of connecting elements, 33; or operators,
pre-event patterns, 85, 8790 fundamental elements as, 182
pre-events and process, 85 processuality
prehension(s), 7, 8, 16, 77, 112, 233, 239, 251, concrete, 150; local, 161
253, 261, 269 processural relatedness, 155
intellectual, 234; integral, 234; propositional, projection operator, 94, 95
234; theory of, 170 projective
prehensive property of extension, 250 geometry, 39, 181; lattice, 194
presence, 147, 159; as local, 162 projector regions, 243
present, 106, 138; idea of the, 113; meaning PROLOG programming structures, applied to
for, 89; observer dependence, 106 Whiteheads work, 211
presentational immediacy, 195, 248 proper
and causal efcacy, sense-perception as in- regions, 241, 242; , integral unity of, 250;
terplay between, 247; eld of, 246; mo- subregions, 250; , subregions of the
dalities of, 247; pure mode of, 246 formative region, 242
presentational objectication, 236 properties, eternal, 241
presuppositions proposition(s), 234; truth values of, 171
of all experience, 240; ontological, 226, propositional prehensions, 234
236 psyches, 16; human, 8
Prigogine, Ilya, ix, 10, 16, 20, 199 psychological
primitive physiology, 213; realities, 101
concept, 204; independence, 205 psychology, 222
316 Index
quantization, 23 reasoning, symbolic, 32

quantum, onto-epistemic, 255 reduction, 18, 20
quantum epistemological, 20; of innite possibilities
actuality, 182; collapse as simplication, 82; for ingression, 231; methodological, 20;
condensation, 186; cosmology, 84; elec- of the state, 99; of the wave packet, 94,
trodynamics, 50; event, 76, 254; , as 95
nonlocal and indivisible, 178; , scale reductionism(istic), 15, 17, 19, 21,108, 109;
of, 171; experiment, 22, 49; , input and promissory notes of, 110; Whiteheads
outtake in, 181, 182; uctuations, 88; protection against, 112
framework, 1719, 22, 23, 42, 166, 171, refutation, undermining of, 204
194; indeterminacy, 80; of information, region(s),
233; law, 182; logic, 166, 174, 181, 185, and its modal projection, 243; proper and
190, 193, 194; , as projective geometry, improper, 241; potential, 241
181; logical analysis, 172; measurement relatedness, 18
theory, 16, 25; paradox, 169; of time and relation(s), 16, 17, 35
extension, 255; philosophy, search for, asymmetric, internal character of, 155; be-
271; and process, agreement between, 79, tween a region and its modal presences,
80, 92, 102, 104, 165, 178, 181, 182, 185, 243; between space and time, 34; causal
187, 188, 192, 222, 254, 258, 271; pro- and temporal, 155; and chemical afnity,
cess-, composition of, 193; , modes of 65; complexes of, 8; dynamic character
description, 170; -relativistic phenomena, of, 155; of extension, 41; external and in-
43; state, 75; variable and states, 192; ternal, 23, 24, 155; fundamental, 36, 37;
wholeness and objectlessness, 181; world, generated, by the process of becoming,
174; Zeno effect, 97, 100, 116, 120, 121 231; of events, 43; geometric, 37, 38; of
quantum physics (see quantum theory), 15, 17, matter and space, 33, 37; network of, 9;
20, 42, 48, 54, 74, 86, 89, 9294, 97, supersessional, 232, 249; topological, 38,
100102, 104, 120, 169, 174, 175, 180, 241; web of, 154
224, 230, 238, 255, 262, 269, 270 relational
algebraic formulation of, 185; as basis for holism, 15, 16; theory of space, 38; , of
process thinking, 259; completeness of, space-time, 42; , of space and time, 17;
178; ontological interpretation of, 228 , of time, 44
quantum system relationality, x, 189, 190
as without a state, 192; as without wave relationist tradition, 153
function, 192 relationship, analysis of, mathematics, 212
quantum theory (see quantum physics), 108, relativistic invariance, 265
109, 182184, 186, 187; dialects of, 181; relativity
orthodox, 92, 181 of decision, 235; theory, 20, 182, 187, 265;
quarks, 48, 50, 52 , general, 271
quaternions, 33 relativization, guide to, 185
question, that is posed, 15, 20, 93, 95100, relativized absolutes, 183
117, 118, 188 religion, 104
religious
radical empiricist, Whitehead as, 270 experience, 269; sensitivities, 263
rational coherence, 101 repeated, in the new process, 155
rationalism, critical, 200 repetitive nature of phases, 251
real reproducible reality, 233
potentialities, 261; world, murkiness of, Rescher, Nicholas, 5, 199
261 rest
reality frame, 264; mass, 88
atemporal, 158; electromagnetic, 258; histor- retroduction or abduction, 221
ical, 19, 84, 86, 87, 89; integral inclusive, Riemann, Georg, 271
224; of intermediate states, 167; intrinsic Riemannian geometry, 174
and extrinsic, 257; material, 84, 86; objec- Riffert, Franz,, xii, 20, 199222, 301
tive, 9; of the past, 226; reproducible, Rosen, Joe, xii, 25, 129135, 301
233; signicance of experience for, 226; Russell, Bertrand, 33, 39, 41, 44, 172, 180,
subjective, 9 190
Index 317
Santayana, George, 247 simultaneity, 144, 160; ambiguity of, 138, 152;
satisfaction, 164, 230, 231, 253; or completed and becoming, 156; distant, 150; relation,
occasion, 234 137
scale(s), 107; of quantum event, 17; of time, situated agency, 147
87 sizes
Schmidt, Paul, ix, 42 atomic, 52; of the cells, 106
Schrodinger, Erwin, 75, 78, 82, 122, 192; (s) skepticism, 247
cat, 76; equation, 57, 75, 98; evolution, S-matrix approach, 104
99; process, 98 social nexus, 236, 247, 252, 253; or society,
Schwarzschild metric, 42 237
science society(ies), 8, 16, 268; corpuscular, 238; per-
as exemplar of exactness, 260; factual, 202; sonally ordered, 238; subordinate, 237; as
formal, 202; as less general, 206; and true enduring entities, 238
metaphysics, 201; , relationship of, sociolinguistic contexts, 139
206; vs. ontology or metaphysics, 203; solar system, 51
and process philosophy (see quantum and solipsism, falsehood of, 244; of the present
process), 222 moment, 247
scientic space and time, 23; arising from web of rela-
analysis, 79; knowledge, 223; metaphysics, tions, 154; distinction between, 184; and
xii, 20, 199, 201, 202, 205, 215; , ori- matter, 40, 43, 45
gin of term, 221; , tested by science, space-like separated regions, 194, 195, 238
206; method, 79; world, 270 space-time, 54; and becoming, 136; concepts,
scientism, xvii, 272 xi, 11; coordinates, event size in, 171,
scientistic, 162; atemporalist response, 139 175; coordination, 170, 178; dimensions,
screening, electric, 258 as contingent, 189; location, 195; region,
second law of thermodynamics, 57, 58, 140 divisibility of, 170; relations, 18, 19; stiff-
selection, process of, 183 ness, 185
self as abstract vs. concrete substance, 239 spatialization of time, 157
self-aspect and other-aspect, 242 spatio-temporal
self-conscious organism, 239 extension, 253; notion, 6
self-creation, 77, 81, 234 specifying conditions, 207
self-determination, 110; or self-realization, and speculative philosophy, 207, 210, 224, 226;
the meaning of actual, 229 goal of, 224
self-determining subjectivity, 230 spinors, 185
self-evident truths, problem with, 228 stable steady state, 69
self-formation, 255 standard model, in high-energy physics, 52
self-identity and self-diversity, 252 standpoint, 250
self-organization, 23, 48 extensive, 243; formative, 243
self-organized coherence, 71 Stapp, Henry, ix, 10, 15, 20, 26, 57, 89, 92
self-organizing systems, 49, 51, 54, 57 102, 108, 110, 115122, 124126, 187,
self-projection, 242 188, 194, 195, 259261, 264, 265, 270,
self-realization, 252 271, 301
semantical state function, in chemistry, 65, 66
closure, 204, 20; conditions, 203; homoge- states, 18, 21; and quantum variables, 192
neity, 204, 208; subcriteria, 208 stationary state or equilibrium, 67
semantics, 183; or metalanguage, 173 statistical
sense-perception, 238, 245247 ensembles, 166; laws, 110, 166, 170; predic-
as not foundational, 247; as not meta- tion, 96
physically basic, 229; terminus of, 236 statistics
separability, 15 Bose-Einstein, 184, 185, 191; Clifford, 185;
separate objects, 258 Fermi-Dirac, 18; quantum, 49, 79, 93, 98
sequential order, 195 Stengers, Isabelle, 16, 199
seriality of events, 157 stoichiometric coefcients, 65
Shimony, Abner, ix, 17, 54, 74, 109, 188, Stolz, Joachim, 42, 43
256 string theory, 183
simply-located particle, 22 strong force, 51
318 Index
subject, 230 Tanaka, Yutaka, ix, xii, 15, 16, 113, 164179,
subjective 189, 190, 193, 194, 266, 269, 270, 301
aim, 81, 119, 234, 235, 239, 251; denite- tautology, 173
ness, 234; forms, 7, 35, 233, 235, 237, teleological
242, 245, 250252; phases, 252; re- concrescence, 254; process, 253; self-
sponses, 233; self-aspect, 254; self- formation, 254
realization, 252; unity, 164 temporal
subjectivism, 8 and atemporal, 24; atomism, 166, 170;
subjectivism, falsehood of, 244 change, 6; fact(s), 149, 152, 154; , as
subjectivity, 8 global, 151,160; , as local, 150, 156;
determinants of, 229; generalization of, 190; , locality of, 163; modalities, 140, 152,
human, 225; of the occasion, 232; self- 154; order, 103; relations, 155
determining, 230 temporalism, 19, 21, 139, 141, 149; classical,
subject-superject, 252, 255 142; local, 151; modern radical, 142
subordinate societies, 237 temporalist antiscientistic response, 141
substance(s), 7, 19, 22, 53, 269 temporality, 140143, 146149, 155, 158, 159,
classical, 17; descriptions, 23; -like concrete- 162; authentic, 147; concrete, 146; lan-
ness, as illusory, 240; ontology, 105 guage of, 139; radical, 144; radical but lo-
substantialism, 268 cal, 149
successor (see immediate descendant), 235, test(ing)
236, 248 of concepts, 270; and criticism, 203; of gen-
superject, 230, 232, 234, 235, 249, 250 eralizations, 227; of a metaphysical
superjective phase, 231, 248 scheme, 228; of theories, 222
superjective satisfaction, 251 theology, natural, 272
supernovae, 49, 51 theory(ies)
superposition, 75, 76, 81, 82; principle, 169, of causality, 114; of dimensions, 38; exis-
189 tence, 17; of events, 41; of everything,
supersession, 103, 230, 231 86, 183; of experience, 223; of extension,
chronology of, 233; and experience, as irre- 40, 41, 103; of human experience, 225; of
versible processes, 241; of phases, as not interpoints, 38; of organism, 185; plural-
in physical time, 231 ism and competition, 201; of relativity, xi,
supersessional 47, 264; , general, 21, 47, 54, 137, 151,
chronology of occasions, 249; junctures of 161, 266; , Whiteheads, 190; testing,
occasions, 248, 253; order, 103, 249, 262; 222
process, 240, 254; relations, 104, 232 thing ontology, of Bunge, 201
supervenience, 63, 93, 109 time (see physical time), 6, 19, 39, 47, 159
symbolic and change, metaphysics of, 163; dilation,
logic, 31, 33, 34, 35, 3740, 43; reference, 145; as extension, 142; global, 84; as
perception in the mixed mode of, 247, global age, 115; -indexed properties, 25;
248 language of, 149; local, 84, 115; passage
symmetrical concepts, as derivative, 129 of, 136; physical, 231; quantum of, 106;
symmetry, 19 relationist interpretation, 136; scales, 87;
and asymmetry, 2325, 27, 52, 129; break- and space, 210; , relational account of,
ing, 89; components of, 133; implies 153; , as relativized, 183; spatialization
asymmetry, 134; principle(s), 26, 132; of, 157; in supersessional sense, not an-
summary of results, 134 other form of extensiveness, 237; systems,
syntactical conditions, 203 160; , multiple, 41; understandings of,
syntax or formal language, 183 162; as variable, 186; Whiteheads solu-
synthesis, of accumulated determinations, 231 tion, 149
system topological
cut or split, 26, 109; and episystem, 25, 26; invariance, 43; relations, 241; transforma-
size, 118 tions, 33
systemic connection of basic notions, 208 topology, 39, 40
systemicity, 203, 205 total occasion (see metaphysical subject),
systems, 21; physical, 20; theory, 16, 17, 27, 256
260 tragedy, 267
Index 319
trajectory(ies), 21; in concentration space, 69, wave-particle entities, 19, 22, 25, 48
70 wave theory, 181
transcendent waves, states of, 181
decisions, 251, 235, 236; element, 119; ref- weak force, 51
erence, 250 Western
transcendental, 148; argument, 141 intellectual bias, 23, 24; philosophical tradi-
transforming Whitehead, 188, 189 tion, 239; philosophy, 137; theology,
transition, 16, 252 162
transmission of signals, 250, 257 Wheeler, John, 168, 184, 191
transmutations and abstractions, 238 Whitehead
truth values, of propositions, 171, 175 Whitehead, Alfred North, x, xvii, 3, 21, 31
twin paradox, 137 35, 42, 44, 74, 82, 99, 180, 184, 190,
194, 199, 210, 212, 214, 215, 257, 270,
ultimate generalities, 207 303; categoreal scheme, basic task of,
uncertainty principle, 49 230; as logician and mathematician, 209;
unied eld theory, 183, 185 as mathematical physicist, 43; as scholar
unique universe, for each process, 156 of relativity theory, 187
unison and rhythm, 160 Whiteheadian process theory, 101
unitary Whiteheads contribution, 151, 199; discovery,
evolution, 58; operator, 113 of local temporalism, 151; metaphysical
unit-determining experientialism, 228;
closure of relations, 67, 71; properties, 65 Whiteheads metaphysics (see philosophy of
universal organism), 6, 9, 10, 52, 74, 103, 105, 136,
instants, 249; present, 138 150, 154, 159, 165, 187, 189, 201, 211,
universality, 223 213, 215, 224, 230, 238, 254, 255, 262,
universals, 228; problem of, 268; and particu- 271; and Bohms holomovement, 257; as
lars, 24, 233 scientic metaphysics, 207; working hy-
universe, 225; as affected by conscious deci- pothesis of, 227
sions, 255; as evolving informational sys- Whiteheads
tem, 254; of experience, 78; global age of philosophy (see Whiteheads metaphysics),
the, 90; as inanimate, 79; integral whole- 16, 199; relativistic laws, 35; relativity
ness of the, 240; observer for, 191; for a theory, 189; signicance, 42, 43, 215;
process, uniqueness of, 155; story, 53; and speculative philosophy, aim of, 225; the-
symmetry, 135; wave function of, 186 ory of relativity, 41
unstable steady state, 66 wholeness
quantum, 181; of the universe, 240
vacuum, 50, 87, 103, 111, 115, 186, 191, 272 wholes, mereological, 64, 65
Valenza, Robert, 42, 268 Wigner, Eugene, 92, 181, 184, 185
Values Wittgenstein, Ludwig, xvii, 139, 172, 178
and meaning, 270; world of, 270 World
variable dynamical law, theory of, 183 of experience, as projection or objectica-
vectors and tensors in physics, 42 tion, 244; as included within the occasion,
Venns diagram, 172 229; itself, as not invariant, 264; as a
verication, 208; principle, 200 nexus, 229; as a social nexus, 236, 237;
virtual as a society of societies, 237
particle pairs, 50, 52; photons, 51 worldview(s), 259
von Neumann formulation, 101; process, 95, classical physics, 20; evolutionary, 17; mod-
96; quantum logic, 185 ern, xv; modern physics, 21; Newtonian,
von Neumann, John, 57, 9295, 100, 109, 115, 54, 79; of perceptual objects, 14, 22; post-
181, 184, 188, 190, 192, 193 modern, xvii; premodern, xvii
Wygant, John, 267, 268
wave function, 111, 181; evolution of, 115; as
representing acts of preparation, 181; of Zeno of Elea, 137
the universe, 186 Zenos paradox of motion and change, 170
SUNY series in Constructive Postmodern Thought
David Ray Grifn, series editor
David Ray Grifn, editor, The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals
David Ray Grifn, editor, Spirituality and Society: Postmodern Visions
David Ray Grifn, God and Religion in the Postmodern World: Essays in Postmodern
Theology
David Ray Grifn, William A. Beardslee, and Joe Holland, Varieties of Postmodern
Theology
David Ray Grifn and Huston Smith, Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology
David Ray Grifn, editor, Sacred Interconnections: Postmodern Spirituality, Political
Economy, and Art
Robert Inchausti, The Ignorant Perfection of Ordinary People
David W. Orr, Ecological Literacy: Education and the Transition to a Postmodern World
David Ray Grifn, John B. Cobb Jr., Marcus P. Ford, Pete A. Y. Gunter, and Peter Ochs,
Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy: Peirce, James, Bergson,
Whitehead, and Hartshorne
David Ray Grifn and Richard A. Falk, editors, Postmodern Politics for a Planet in
Crisis: Policy, Process, and Presidential Vision
Steve Odin, The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism
Frederick Ferre, Being and Value: Toward a Constructive Postmodern Metaphysics
Sandra B. Lubarsky and David Ray Grifn, editors, Jewish Theology and Process
Thought
J. Baird Callicott and Fernando J. R. da Rocha, editors, Earth Summit Ethics: Toward a
Reconstructive Postmodern Philosophy of Environmental Education
David Ray Grifn, Parapsychology, Philosophy, and Spirituality: A Postmodern Explo-
ration
Jay Earley, Transforming Human Culture: Social Evolution and the Planetary Crisis
Daniel A. Dombrowski, Kazantzakis and God
E. M. Adams, A Society Fit for Human Beings
Frederick Ferre, Knowing and Value: Toward a Constructive Postmodern Epistemology
Jerry H. Gill, The Tacit Mode: Michael Polanyis Postmodern Philosophy
Nicholas F. Gier, Spiritual Titanism: Indian, Chinese, and Western Perspectives
321
322 David Ray Grifn
David Ray Grifn, Religion and Scientic Naturalism: Overcoming the Conicts
John A. Jungerman, World in Process: Creativity and Interconnection in the New Physics
Frederick Ferre, Living and Value: Toward a Constructive Postmodern Ethics
Laurence Foss, The End of Modern Medicine: Biomedical Science Under a Microscope
John B. Cobb Jr., Postmodern and Public Policy: Reframing Religion, Culture, Educa-
tion, Sexuality, Class, Race, Politics, and the Economy
Catherine Keller and Anne Daniell, editors, Process and Difference: Between Cos-
mological and Poststructuralist Postmodernisms
Nicholas F. Gier, The Virtue of Nonviolence: From Gautama to Gandhi

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Physics and Whitehead

SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought

Quantum, Process, and Experience

State University of New York Press

2003 State University of New York

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever

For information, address State University of New York Press,

Production by Judith Block

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Part I. Physics and Whitehead 1

Part II. Order and Emergence 61

9. Whiteheadian Process and Quantum Theory 92

Part III. Fundamental Processes 127

Part IV. Metaphysics 197

The Center for Process Studies in Claremont, California held a conference on

thinkers to suggest new and challenging interpretations for current experimental

David Ray Grifn

Why Should Physicists Concern Themselves with Metaphysics

This desire to draw a sharp demarcation between physics and philosophy

What Is Process Thought in General?

physics. It is intriguing to see how many dimensions of Whiteheads system are

Key Themes in Whiteheads Thought

prior to the parts, a position shared in common by most idealists, by Neoplato-

level of reality. To put it differently, by disciplinary training, physicists will

of Process in Whiteheads Metaphysics (Albany: State University of New York Press,

It is a matter of common sense that the world is composed of a multiplicity of

Perceptual Objects and Particularism

Experience and Dualities

1999), dialectical holism (Harris 1988), ecological perspectives (Nisbet 1991),

1. Quantum theory is inconsistent with the classical notion of a

2. A detailed analysis of parts and wholes in low-energy physics pro-

3. Field theory, evolution, and systems concepts more generally illus-

4. Experiments show the failure of Bells inequality and thus explic-

5. Einsteins relativity is a relational theory of space and time that is

6. The linguistic turn in philosophy is a wrong turn because exis-

Concepts in Long-range order Long-range order Interconnectedness Jungerman, Tanaka

ern physics broadly, exemplied especially by quantum theory and relativity

along X and Y coordinates) can suggest a mere spatialization of time. Spatial

Humes sense in such a system, which is effectively without collisions because

Complementary Dualities in Both Physics and Philosophy

Table 2.2. Movement from One to Both Poles Simultaneously of Various

Substance only; materialism Both substance and event-oriented descriptions

enclosed in triadicities, encouraging us, with Peirce, to think in trichotomies

Table 2.3. Dualities in Philosophy

thinking. Correlative or analogical thinking, the dominant mode in classical

Table 2.4. Dualities in Physics

philosophy. For example, an analysis of asymmetry and symmetry in physics

There is no need, however, to imagine creation from nothing or annihilation to

The philosophical pairing of whole-constituent has two related physics

The system cut is permeable and movable (395).

Dualities Without Dualism

Capek, Milic. 1961. Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics. Princeton: D. Van

To appreciate the depth of Whiteheads engagement of mathematics and