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HILMI M. ZAWATI*

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................45

II. GENDER-BASED CRIMES AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LIBYA....................48

1. GENDER-BASED CRIMES AS A WEAPON OF WAR .....................................48
a. RAPE ACCOUNTS ..............................................................................48
b. CHALLENGES FACING THE VICTIMS ................................................50
2. LIBYAS PROJECT FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PEACE-BUILDING....53

III. WARTIME RAPE UNDER LIBYAN LAWS ...........................................................57

1. LAWS OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD .......................................................58
2. THE LIBYAN PENAL CODE .........................................................................60
3. LIBYAS OBLIGATIONS UNDER DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW TO
PROSECUTE ALLEGED CONFLICT-RELATED GENDER-BASED
CRIMES .................................................................................................60
a. OBLIGATIONS UNDER DOMESTIC LAW .........................................60
b. OBLIGATIONS UNDER GENERAL CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW .........................................62
c. OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ..63
d. OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ..64

IV. THE DILEMMA OF PROSECUTING GENDER-BASED CRIMES UNDER LIBYAN

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE .......................................................................66
1. LEGAL IMPUNITY AND LAWLESSNESS ......................................................66

*
Hilmi M. Zawati, D.C.L. (McGill), M.A. in international comparative law (McGill), Ph.D. (CPU),
M.A. (Punjab), Post-Graduate Diploma in law (Khartoum), LL.B. (Alexandria), is currently
president of the International Legal Advocacy Forum (ILAF), and an international criminal law
jurist and human rights advocate. Zawatis most recent work is his book Fair Labelling and the
Dilemma of Prosecuting Gender-Based Crimes at the International Criminal Tribunals (New York,
N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2014). An earlier version of this paper was presented at Sexual
Violence in the Recent Conflicts in Libya and Syria: Challenges to Protecting Victims and
Pursuing Accountability, a conference organized by the Faculty of Law and the Munk School of
Global Affairs, University of Toronto, 8 February 2013. The author would like to thank Ibtisam
M. Mahmoud, Librarian at McGill University Health Centre, for research assistance, and Steve
Millier for editing the rough draft of this work. I am also grateful to the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) for making funds available to present this work, grant
number 3010325 (collaborator). Thanks are due also to the two anonymous referees for their
enlightening comments. To simplify the text, wherever possible, masculine pronouns comprise
the feminine and singular expressions the plural.

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8(-!%$9!:,;17!&&<C%>!!/??@A!%B%#<#CDD>!
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! +#"

2. RULE OF LAW V MILITIA JUSTICE ............................................................. 67

3. LACK OF SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER.................................................. 69
4. LACK OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS ..................................................... 72

V. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE V RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: KEY MECHANISMS FOR

GENDER-SENSITIVE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LIBYA ...................... 73
1. LEGAL JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM ............................................................... 75
2. GENDER TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AS RESTORATIVE JUSTICE:
LIBYAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION ....................... 76
3. ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS: WHO HAS JURISDICTION OVER
LIBYAS GENDER-BASED EGREGIOUS CRIMES? ................................. 80

VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 90)

We as Libyans cannot begin Saifs trial. There is no central power to

prosecute him.1
Ahmed al-Jehani, the Libyan
Coordinator for the ICC

I. Introduction
In the recent Libyan armed conflict, as well as in most internal and
international wars, civilians, particularly women and children, have formed
the primary target for all forms of sexual violencebest expressed as
conflict-related gender-based crimes.2 These crimes have been systematically
conducted on a large scale against both Libyan women and men as a weapon
of war with the intention of damaging the fabric of Libyan society, driving a
wedge between families and tribes, and undermining Libyan social and
community cohesion.
Addressing wartime rape and other forms of sexual violence at the
outset of any Libyan truth and reconciliation campaign would help ensure a
durable peace, amnesty, transparency, and accountability among Libyan
communities and tribes.3 Failure on the part of the Libyan government and
the General National Congress to restore justice and build peace may well
trigger cycles of revenge and place the whole country on the horns of a
dilemma.
However, in the aftermath of internal conflict and civil war, which
usually result in mass violence and gross human rights violations,
transitional justice must be an essential element and an integral component

1
Barak Barfi, Libyas Unwilling Revolutionaries, Online: Project Syndicate (3 July 2012)
<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/libya-s-unwilling-revolutionaries> Accessed
on: 13 February 2013) [Libyas Unwilling Revolutionaries].
2
UN Department of Political Affairs, Guidance for Mediators: Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual
Violence in Ceasefire and Peace Agreements (New York, N.Y.: United Nations Publications, 2012) 8.
3
Ibid, at p. 9.
+$" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

of any political or legal process that aims at achieving conflict resolution and
peace-building.4 To ensure accountability, establish equity, make justice and
achieve reconciliation, Libyan transitional justice should involve a full range
of socio-legal mechanisms that would help the Libyan people deal with
widespread or systematic human rights violations, particularly conflict-
related gender-based crimes committed by all parties to the conflict.5
Ultimately, transitional justice has to be constituted of different measures
and processes, including criminal justice, truth-seeking and reconciliation
commissions, reparations to victims, and institutional reforms.6
This article argues that the incompetence of the current Libyan
transitional justice system, manifested in its failure to respond adequately to
conflict-related gender-based crimes, impedes access to justice for victims,
encourages the culture of impunity, and leaves the Libyan peace-building
process open to the danger of collapse. Accordingly, this analysis deals with
gender-based crimes in a war setting as a case study and with transitional
justice as a combination of a variety of socio-legal approaches to provide
both victims and perpetrators with a sense of justice.7
In another work, the author defined the term gender-based crimes as
those crimes committed against individuals based on socially constructed
norms of maleness and femaleness, while sexual violence is a subset of these
crimes.8 In this connection, Article 1 of the Declaration on the Elimination of

4
Jens David Ohlin, On the Very Idea of Transitional Justice, (Winter/Spring 2007) The
Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 52; Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M.
Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to
Reconciliation, (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 574; Matiangai Sirleaf, Regional Approach
to Transitional Justice? Examining the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth &
Reconciliation Commission for Liberia, (2009) 21 Florida Journal of International Law 209; Par
Engstrom, Transitional Justice and Ongoing Conflict, (1 November 2011). Available at SSRN:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2004313> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn. 2004313> (Accessed
on: 15 January 2013) at p. 18 [Transitional Justice and Ongoing Conflict].
5
Secretary-Generals Report on Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies, 3 August 2004, S/2004/616.
6
Andrew B. Friedman, Transitional Justice And local Ownership: A Framework for the
Protection of Human Rights, Electronic copy available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1919874>
(Accessed on: 15 January 2013) at p. 4; Hemi Mistry, Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring,
Chatham House (1 February 2012) at pp. 3-4 [Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring]; Cyble
Cochran, Transitional Justice: Responding to Victims of Wartime Sexual Violence in Africa
(2008) 9 The Journal of International Policy Solutions 33 [Responding to Victims of Wartime
Sexual Violence in Africa]; Katherine M. Franke, Gendered Subjects of Transitional Justice,
(2006) 15:3 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 813; The 2012 International and Transitional
Justice Forum: Drawing Lessons From Local Processes to Improve Regional and International
Perspectives of Justice, Avocats Sans Frontires and others (30th -31st July 2012) at p. 2
[International and Transitional Justice Forum]; UN Support Mission in Libya, Transitional Justice
Foundation for a New Libya, 17 September 2012, at p.1.
7
Fionnuala N Aolin & Catherine Turner, Gender, Truth, and Transition, (2007) 16 UCLA
Womens Law Journal 233; International and Transitional Justice Forum, supra note 6, at p. 2;
Rosemary Nagy, Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections, (2008) 29:2 Third
World Quarterly 276; Zachary D. Kaufman, The Future of Transitional Justice, (2005) 1 St.
Antonys International Review 58.
8
Hilmi M. Zawati, Fair Labelling and the Dilemma of Prosecuting Gender-Based Crimes at the
International Criminal Tribunals (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2014) at p. xiii [Hilmi
M. Zawati].
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! +%"

Violence against Women states that violence against women means any act
of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical,
sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of
such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in
public or in private life.9 The 1995 Beijing Declaration and the Platform for
Action expanded this definition to incorporate gender-based crimes and
other violations of womens rights in a wartime setting, including systematic
rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, coercive/forced
use of contraceptives, and forced abortion.10
In addressing the above argument, this research study examines four
overarching themes, which emerge in the course of the following sections.
The first deals with Libyas conflict-related gender-based crimes and
transitional justice. It focuses on gender-based crimes as a weapon of war in
the recent Libyan Civil War conducted by both government forces and
paramilitaries and to a lesser degree by rebel fighters. It also examines
Libyas project of transitional justice and peace-building process. The second
section reviews wartime rape crime under Libyan laws. It looks into the laws
adopted by the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) before the
handing over of power to the elected General National Congress (GNC) on 8
August 2012 and into Libyan Penal Law and its amendments. Finally, this
section affirms Libyas obligations under the norms of international law to
protect victims and prosecute alleged gender-based crimes.
The third part of this analysis underlines the dilemma of prosecuting
gender-based crimes under Libyan transitional justice. It brings to light four
major obstacles to adequately addressing gender-based crimes under the
Libyan transitional justice system, including legal impunity and lawlessness,
lack of the rule of law v. militia justice, absence of security and public order,
and lack of democratic institutions. Finally, this study scrutinizes three key
mechanisms for gender-sensitive transitional justice in Libya, involving
urgent reform of the justice system by incorporating the international crimes
listed in Articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) into the provisions of the Libyan Penal Code, establishing an
unprejudiced truth-seeking and reconciliation commission to investigate and
address gender-based crimes committed by all parties to the recent civil war
in Libyaincluding those committed by rebel brigades during and after the
warand finally setting up a Libyan special court as a hybrid judicial system
for legal accountability similar to the systems founded in Sierra Leone and
Cambodia. Finally, this inquiry concludes by elucidating the findings of the
above sections and answering the question of what must be done to improve
Libyan transitional justice so as to adequately address gender-based crimes
and end the culture of impunity.

9
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women GA Res. 48/104, 48 UN GAOR Supp.
(No. 49) at 217, UN Doc. A/48/49 (1993).
10
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, 15 September
1995, A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995) at paras. 15 & 15 bis.
+&" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

II. Gender-Based Crimes and Transitional Justice in Libya

In order to grasp fully the two main components of this studyconflict-

related gender-based crimes and the Libyan transitional justice systemit is
necessary at the outset of this work to briefly discuss the horrific use of
wartime rape and other forms of sexual violence by all parties to the Libyan
civil war, whether during or after the conflict, and its damaging impact on
the fabric of Libyan society, on the one hand, and the role of the Libyan
transitional justice system in addressing the needs of the victimsregardless
of their tribal or political orientationrestoring justice, and building peace,
on the other.
1. Gender-Based Crimes as a Weapon of War
a. Rape Accounts:
(i) Rape of Libyan Women and Minors
It has been largely reported that thousands of Libyan women, children
and men were drafted for different forms of conflict-related gender-based
crimes conducted by both government forces and militias, and to a lesser
extent by rebel fighters during and after the conflict, 11 whether at the
victims homes or in detention centres for the purpose of extracting
information.12 These crimes included systematic mass rape, gang rape,13
sexual torture,14 sexual enslavement,15 sexual terrorism, gender-based
persecution, male rape,16 and forced nudity.17 Investigations revealed that

11
See 8000 Wartime Rape Cases in Libya, 2000 of Them by Rebel Forces: An Interview with Seham
Sergewa, Free Libya Satellite Channel (11 June 2012) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=9jbV5ly9waE> (Accessed on: 16 February 2013), (Arabic). See also Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Libya, infra note 12, at para. 525.
12
The Battle for Libya: Killings, Disappearances and Torture, Amnesty International, September 2011,
Index: MDE 19/025/2011, at pp. 76-77 [the Battle for Libya]; Militias Threaten Hopes for New
Libya, Amnesty International, February 2012, Index: MDE 19/002/2012, at p. 14 [Militias
Threaten Hopes for New Libya]; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Libya, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/68 (2 March 2012) para. 69 [Report of
the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya].
13
A case in point is the famous instance of Iman al-Obeidi, a lawyer form Benghazi, bursting
into the Rixos Hotel in Tripoli to tell the foreign media that she had been tortured and gang
raped by fifteen members of the government forces. See Human Rights Watch, Libya:
Transitional Government Should Support Victims, Promote Justice for Sexual Violence, (19
September 2011) at p. 1; Karen Leigh, Rape in Libya: The Crime that Dare Not Speak its Name,
Time (Thursday, 9 June 2011). Online: <http://www. time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,2076775,00.html> (Accessed on: 15 February 2013).
14
Michelle Faul, Hundreds of Women Raped By Gaddafi Militia, The Independent (Sunday, 29
May 2011). Online: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/hundreds-of-
women-raped-by-gaddafi-militia-2290609.html> (Accessed on: 15 February 2013); Report of the
International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, supra note 12, at para. 504.
15
It was reported to the Independent Civil Society Fact-Finding Mission to Libya by numerous
sources that Tawerghans sold girls from Misrata for 7,000 dinars. See Report of the Independent
Civil Society, infra note 20, at para. 171.
16
Some reports claim that when Qadhafi was captured by Misrata rebel fighters on 20 October
2011, a militiaman sexually assaulted him by thrusting a bayonet in his anus. See Human Rights
Watch, Death of a Dictator: Bloody Vengeance in Sirte, (October 2012), at p. 28 [Death of a
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! +'"

Qadhafi himself had ordered that a supply of anti-impotence drugs be given

to his soldiers and mercenaries and that he had authorized them to
deliberately rape Libyan opponent women in a brutal, continuous, and wide-
scale campaign.18 Despite uncertainty about the exact numbers and locations
of Libyan rape victims, and the difficulty of investigating allegations of
sexual violence conducted during armed conflict, high-ranking officers in the
Libyan Revolutions Military Council have affirmed that Libyan rebels found
cellphone pictures and videos of rape,19 as well as condoms and Viagra in the
vehicles and uniform pockets of Qadhafi loyalists who were captured on the
battlefield.20 Accordingly, these attacks constituted crimes against humanity,
as they were widespread and reportedly inflicted upon the civilian

Dictator]; Jennifer Nimry Eseed, The International Criminal Court's Unjustified Jurisdiction
Claims: Libya as a Case Study, (2013) 88:2 Chicago-Kent Law Review 572 [Jennifer Nimry
Eseed].
17
According to Colonel Salim Juha, leader of the Misrata insurgents, who spoke recently on Al
Jazeera, many women in Misrata and its suburbs were forced to strip naked in front of strangers
or their children, while others were brutally raped in their homes and severely traumatized. See
Richard Sollom & Hani Mowafi, 32nd Brigade Massacre: Evidence of War Crimes and the Need
to Ensure Justice and Accountability in Libya, Physicians for Human Rights, December 2011, at
p. 19-20 & 31; Hilmi M. Zawati, infra note 20.
18
Manpavan Joth Kaur, Mercenaries in Libya: Impact of Legal Impunity, RSIS
Commentaries, No. 43/2011 (17 March 2011), at p. 1; Physicians for Human Rights, Witness to
War Crimes: Evidence from Misrata, Libya, (August 2011), at p. 16 [Witness to War Crimes].
19
The author received two cellphone video clips of sexual torture. One of them shows
government security forces sexually torturing a Libyan woman, while the other demonstrates
the sexual torture of a man by rebel investigators. The author was unable to independently
verify them. See also Libyan Rebels: Proof of Systematic Rape on Cell Phones. Duration: 3:52:00.
Directed by Sara Sinder, CNN, 2011. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
XWDdUv42VNY> (Accessed on: 15 February 2013).
20
Battle for Libya: Rape Used As a Weapon of War, Online: Aljazeera News Chanel (27 March
2011) <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISLz8Fv0eik> (Accessed on: 25 October 2013); Arab
Organization for Human Rights, et al., Report of the Independent Civil Society Fact-Finding
Mission to Libya, (January 2012), at para. 110 [Report of the Independent Civil Society];
Elizabeth Marcus, Rape and the Arab Spring: The Dark Side of the Popular Uprisings in the
Middle East, Center for American Progress (December 2011) at p. 3 [Elizabeth Marcus]; Ewen
MacAskill Gaddafi 'Supplies Troops with Viagra to Encourage Mass Rape', Claims Diplomat,
Online: The Guardian (29 April 2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/29/
diplomat-gaddafi-troops-viagra-mass-rape> (Accessed on: 11 October 2013); Hilmi M. Zawati,
Hidden Deaths of Libyan Rape Survivors: Rape Casualties Should be Considered Wounded
Combatants Rather than Mere Victims of Sexual Violence, The National Law Journal (9 January
2012) 35; Hilmi M. Zawati, Libyan Rape Casualties as Veterans of a Just War, Not a Shameful
Statistic, 207:2 The New Jersey Law Journal (9 January 2012) 31 [Hilmi M. Zawati]; ICC to
Investigate Reports of Viagra-Fueled Gang-Rapes in Libya, Online: CNN World (17 May 2011)
<http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/05/17/libya.rapes.icc/index.html> (Accessed
on: 25 October 2013); Jlia Garraio, Arresting Gaddafi Will Be the Most Effective Way to Stop
these Rapes: Sexual Violence in the Western Medias Coverage of the War in Libya, in Jlia
Garraio, Mihaela Mihai & Teresa Toldy, eds., (Coimbra: Centro de Estudos Sociais,
Universidade de Coimbra, 2012) 112; Leila Mokhtarzadeh, Ending War Rape: A Matter of
Cumulative Convictions, (2013) 36 Fordham International Law Journal 1054; Owen Bowcott,
Libya Mass Rape Claims: Using Viagra Would be a Horrific First Reports of the Distribution
of 'Viagra-type' Pills to Troops Add an Unprecedented Element to Gaddafis Alleged War
Crimes, The Guardian (9 June 2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/09/
libya-mass-rape-viagra-claim> (Accessed on: 11 October 2013); Patrick Cockburn Amnesty
Questions Claim that Gaddafi Ordered Rape as Weapon of War, Online: The Independent (24
June 2011) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/amnesty-questions-claim-
that-gaddafi-ordered-rape-as-weapon-of-war2302037.html> (Accessed on: 11 October 2013).
#)" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

population, with knowledge of the reason for the attack.21

(ii) Rape as a Strategic Weapon of War
Utilising rape as a political weapon of war was not a strategy unique to
undermining Libyan society. It was carried out in the civil wars of the 1990s
that took place in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and in other
war zones around the world. What makes the Libyan case different is the
patriarchal and conservative nature of Libyan society, which holds womens
chastity and honour as among the most highly regarded of values. For this
reason, wartime rape has caused severe damage to the social foundations of
the Libyan community and its familial relations, and has served as a horrific
tool of political repression.22 This notion has been clearly reflected in the
following statement by a key informant to Physicians for Human Rights: If
Qaddafi destroys a building, it can be rebuilt. But when he rapes a woman,
the whole community is destroyed forever. Qaddafi knows this, and so rape
is his best weapon.23
b. Challenges Facing the Victims
(i) Socio-legal Challenges
Rape is an endemic of war and previously considered a collateral
damage in many armed conflicts. But in Libya, it was deliberate, systematic,
and widespread. Rape campaigners in Libya were aware that wartime rape,
unlike physical wounds, can permanently devastate the victims life,
particularly in Libyas highly patriarchal and conservative society, which
holds womens honour in the highest regard.24 They were mindful of the fact
that raping a Libyan woman, whether in peacetime or in armed conflict,
would cast an extended profound shame and humiliation on her and the
entire family.25 Indeed, raping a Libyan woman simply means, in many
cases, sentencing her to death, physically, 26 psychologically, or socially.27

21
Report of the Independent Civil Society, supra note 20, at para. 114; Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Libya, supra note 12, at para. 118.
22
Elizabeth Marcus, supra note 20, at p.1; Gang-Raped for Two Days, Tortured and Strangled:
Libyan Woman Finally Reveals Full Horrific Details of Attack by Gaddafis Thugs, Online: Mail
on Line (13 April 2011) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1376235/Libya-Iman-al-
Obeidi-describes-rape-o> (Accessed on: 15 February 2013); Paul Salem & Amanda Kadlec,
Libyas Troubled Transition, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2012), at p. 11 [Libyas Troubled Transition].
23
Witness to War Crimes, supra note 18, at p.15. See also David Cairns, Libya: Gaddafi's Men
Use Rape as Weapon of War Online: First Post Newsgroup IPR (2011)
<http://www.stopdemand.org/ afawcs0153418/CATID=5/ID=222/SID=499253057/Libya>
(Accessed on: 15 February 2013); Kareem Fahim, Claims of Wartime Rapes Unsettle and Divide
Libyans, New York Times (20 June 2011 A11, available online at: <http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/06/20/world/africa/20rape.html?pagewanted=all&_r= 0> (Accessed on: 16 February
2013).
24
Elizabeth Marcus, supra note 20, at p. 3.
25
Hilmi M. Zawati, supra note 20.
26
To safeguard their honour and protect them from rape and shame, particularly in wartime
settings, some Arab families may force their daughters into an early marriage. Women may also
be killed to prevent expected rape. It has been reported that a Syrian man shot dead his
daughter as they were being approached by a group of Syrian government forces to prevent the
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! #("

Raped women may commit suicide, being unable to bear the stigma and
shame, or be killed by relativesfollowing the pattern of honour killing
or be rejected by families.28
In a recent interview, Seham Sergewa, a psychologist in Benghazi
Hospital and human rights activist, provides that approximately 30% of
married raped women were subsequently divorced by their husbands and
20% abandoned and not treated as wives anymore, while the rest tended
either to isolate themselves, flee the country to the unknown, or kill
themselves.29 In this connection, campaigners for the US-based organization
Physicians for Human Rights reported that three teenage sisters aged 15,
17, and 18 had gone missing after Qaddafi troops arrived in Tomina. They
had been raped in the al-Wadi al-Akhdar elementary school for three
consecutive days. They were then murdered by their father, who slit their
throats in an honour killing for bringing shame on the family.30 Of course,
this is a social value that contravenes Islamic law, which prohibits
victimizing the victim and encourages Muslim men to marry raped women
and treat them gently.31
Furthermore, there is a constant cause of concern that the Libyan Penal
Law does not distinguish between adultery in peacetime and rape in conflict

shame of being raped. See Syria: A Regional Crisis-The IRC Commission on Syrian Refugees,
International Rescue Committee (January 2013), at p.7. See also Hamida Ghafour, Rape
prevalent in Syria conflict, The Toronto Star (14 January 2013), available online at:
<http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1315048--rape-prevalent-in-syria-conflict>
(Accessed on: 16 February 2013).
27
If a raped woman were single, she would lose the opportunity to get married since she had
lost her virginity before marriage, despite this having happened without her consent. And if she
were married she might be divorced. See Sophie McBain, Breaking the Silence: Confronting
Rape in Post-War Libya: A Network of Secret Crisis Centres are Struggling to Help the Swathe
of Rape Victims in the Wake of the 2011 Libyan Uprising, Online: The Guardian (10 June 2013)
<http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-
network/2013/jun/07/confronting-rape-post-war-libya> (Accessed on: 8 October 2013).
28
Libya: War and Rape, Online: Aljazeera show- People & Power (29 June 2011) <https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=iP_fFP3b3W0> (Accessed on: 17 February 2013). Hilmi M. Zawati, supra
note 20.
29
Interview with Seham Sergewa on the Impact of Rape on Libyan Women and Families, Free
Libya Satellite Channel (14 November 2011) <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=2WmgD6n3igA> (Accessed on: 16 February 2013), (Arabic).
30
See Witness to War Crimes, supra note 18, at p. 15; Chris Hughes, Dad Murders Three
Teenage Daughters Raped by Gaddafi Thugs, Daily Mirror (31August 2011). Online:
<http://www.mirror.co.uk/ news/uk-news/dad-murders-three-teenage-daughters-150740>
(Accessed on: 15 February 2013).
31 C
Abdul-CAzz Ibn Bz, Majmc Fatw wa Maqlt Mutanawwicah [Collection of Legal Opinions
and Various Articles], 14 vols. (al-Riyad, Saudi Arabia: Maktabat al-Macrif, 1996) 8:241; Hilmi
M. Zawati, Review Essay of Forgetting Children Born of War: Setting the Human Rights Agenda in
Bosnia and Beyond, by R. Charli Carpenter (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2010),
ILAF Review Articles 1 (2012), at pp. 12-14. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2193110> (Accessed on: 15 February 2013); Jd al-Haq CAl Jd al-Haq, Buhth wa
Fatw Islmiyyah f Qady Mucsirah [Treatises and Islamic Legal Opinions on Contemporary
Issues], 4vols. (Cairo: Dr al Hadth, 2005) 3:175; Rape of Bosnian Muslim Women. Produced and
Directed by Davor Rocco, running time 00:33:00, the Islamic Relief Organization, Croatia, 1993.
(Videocassette); Wounded Souls: Women of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Produced and Directed by the
Islamic Relief Organization, running time 00:32:00, the Islamic Relief Organization, 1994.
(Videocassette).
#*" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

settings. It treats a woman who was sexually abused in wartime, i.e., entirely
against her will, in the same manner as a woman who of her own accord
engages in sex out of wedlock. This is another barrier to justice, which makes
victims reluctant to come forward and seek judicial remedy. However, the
final Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya affirms this
dilemma and reveals that the Commission had difficulties in collecting
evidence in cases of wartime sexual violence. It maintains that the reluctance
of victims to disclose information about their ordeal was due to the
associated stigma, on the one hand, and to Libyan law which discriminates
against female victims, on the other.32 Law No. 70 of 1973, which establishes
the hadd penalty for zina (adultery) and modifies some of the provisions of
the penal code, criminalizes zina, which is defined as sexual intercourse
between a man and a woman who are not bound to each other by marriage.33
It prescribes for illicit intercourse punishment by flogging, or by flogging
and imprisonment, 34 regardless of whether or not it was consensual or
whether it took place in war or peacetime. Should pregnancy result, the
woman has virtually no choice but to give birth, forcing a victim of rape to
choose between raising the child of the rapist and shunning him. The conflict
between reason and emotions, in this case, eventually produces another
horribly painful trauma.
(ii) Health Challenges
Victims of conflict-related gender-based crimes may suffer from a range
of medical problems, including sexually transmitted diseases and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In the case of the former, victims were
especially vulnerable due to the fact that some of the rapists had been
recruited by the Qadhafi regime from Sub-Saharan Africa, 35 meaning that
they may well have infected their victims with HIV. According to the
UNAIDS and WHO AIDS epidemic update reports, Sub-Saharan Africa is
the region most heavily affected worldwide by HIV, accounting for over two

32
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, supra note 12, at papa 497.
33
Law No. 70 of 1973, regarding the establishment of the hadd penalty for zina (adultery) and
modifying some of the provisions of the penal code, Art. (1).
34
Ibid, Article 2 (1).
35
The government security forces and paramilitaries, who allegedly committed most of wartime
rape accounts, were formed of three major different groups: Libyan troops loyal to Qaddafi; the
Qadhafi orphans, including children whom he adopted in the aftermath of the early 1990s civil
wars in Eastern Europemany of whom may have been rape orphans as in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia alone there were thousands of women who were forcibly
impregnated, resulting in thousands of unwanted children; and finally, African mercenaries. See
Alex de Waal, African Roles in the Libyan Conflict of 2011, (2013) 89: 2 International Affairs
366; Bill Van Auken The Rape of Libya, Online: World Socialist Web Site (26 August 2011)
<http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/08/liby-a26.html> (Accessed on: 22 October 2013);
Diana Wueger, Libya, Online: Women under Siege (8 February 2012) <http://
www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/profile/libya> (Accessed on: 22 October 2013);
Thomas Miles Libyas African Mercenary Problem, Online: The Tomathon (20 February
2011) <http://tomathon.com/mphp/2011/02/libyas-african-mercenary-problem/> (Accessed
on: 22 October 2013).
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! #!"

thirds (67%) of all people living with the virus.36

However, due to the trauma, shame, and stigma linked to sexual assault,
and due to the fear of family ostracism, many victims prefer to suffer in
silence rather than seek medical help and psycho-social counselling (all
characteristic of PTSD). In this connection, Colonel Salim Juha, leader of the
Misrata insurgents, speaking recently on the widely seen Aljazeera show Bil
Hudd (without borders),37 provides that many women in Misrata and its
suburbs were forced to strip naked in front of strangers or their children,
while others were brutally raped in their homeswatched by family
membersand severely traumatized. Quite apart, therefore, from the danger
to womens health overall, ignoring the sufferings of those women and
destroying rape evidence would encourage the culture of impunity and
constitute a barrier to justice.38
2. Libyas Project for Transitional Justice and Peace-Building
For the purpose of this analysis, the term transitional justice refers to a
variety of approaches, both judicial and non-judicial,39 that the Libyan
transitional government may undertake to deal with widespread or
systematic human rights abuse as it moves from the revolution stage to the
rule of law, to sustainable peace, democracy, and respect for the rights of all

36
Missale Ayele, Public Health Implications of Mass Rape as a Weapon of War (M.Sc., Institute of
Public Health, Georgia State University, 2011), at p. 28; Sub-Saharan Africa: Latest
Epidemiological Trends, Online: UNAIDS Fact Sheet (24 November 2009) <http://
www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/pub/factsheet/2009/
20091124_fs_ssa_en.pdf> (Accessed on: 17 February 2013). See also Colin McInnes, Conflict,
HIV and AIDS: a new dynamic in warfare?, (2009) 21:1 Global Change, Peace & Security 99-
114; Jessica Kruger, A Comparative Analysis of Genocidal Rape in Rwanda and the Former
Yugoslavia: Implications for the Future (M.A., Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and
Criminology, Eastern Michigan University, 2011); Libya: The Hounding of Migrants Must Stop,
International Federation for Human Rights, 2012, at p. 32 [The Hounding of Migrants Must
Stop]; Lahoma Thomas and Rebecca Tiessen, Human Security, Gender-Based Violence and the
Spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa: A Feminist Analysis, (2010) 44:3 Canadian Journal of African
Studies 479-502; Zaryab Iqbal and Christopher Zorn, Violent Conflict and the Spread of
HIV/AIDS in Africa, (2010) 72:1 The Journal of Politics 149162.
37
The Future of the Libyan Revolution after Liberation: An Interview with Colonel Salim Juha,
leader of the Misrata insurgents, Online: Aljazeera show Bil Hudd (without borders) (26
October 2011) <http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/pages/6313feb8-dd85-469b-9575-
bb7fbb5a37b0> (Accessed on: 17 February 2013). (Arabic)
38
Margot Wallstrm, Introduction: Making the Link between Transitional Justice and Conflict-
Related Sexual Violence, (2012) 19:1 William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law 2.
39
Andrew B. Friedman, Transitional Justice And local Ownership: A Framework for the
Protection of Human Rights, at pp.4-5. Electronic copy available at: <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1919874>; Dorota Gierycz, Transitional Justice Does It Help or Does It Harm? NUPI
Working Paper No. 737, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2008, at p. 5 [Transitional
Justice Does It Help or Does It Harm]; Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring, supra note 6, at
p. 3; Law No. (17) for the Year 2012 on Establishing the Rules of National Reconciliation and
Transitional Justice, National Transitional Council, Libya, 26 February 2012, at Art. 1 [Law No.
(17)]; Romi Sigsworth, Gender-Based Violence in Transition, Centre for the Study of Violence
and Reconciliation (September 2008), at p. 14 [Gender-Based Violence in Transition]; Rosemary
Nagy, Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections, (2008) 29:2 Third World
Quarterly 276; UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General: The Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616 (23 August
2004), at para. 8.
#+" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

Libyan citizens.40 This process requires that the Libyan people tolerate
exposure to the painful legacy of the past in order to achieve justice for all
citizens, reconcile Libyan society, and prevent future abuses. 41
To achieve this goal, the NTC adopted in 2012 a number of laws,
including Law No. 17 on the Establishment of Rules of National
Reconciliation and Transitional Justice,42 Law No. 26 on the Higher Body
for Implementation of the Criteria of Integrity and Transparency,43 Law No.
35 On an Amnesty for Some Crimes,44 and Law No. 38 regarding Some
Procedures Relating to the Transitional Period.45 Moreover, the Council
established the National Council of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms as an independent body, in December 2011, to investigate
violations of human rights.46
Furthermore, a two-day conference on Truth and Reconciliation in
Libya was organized on 12-13 December 2012 by the Fact-Finding and
Reconciliation Commission and the Human Rights Committee of the General
National Congress, in partnership with the United Nations Support Mission
in Libya (UNSMIL) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP).47 After
two days of deliberation, the participants discussed the relevance and
challenges of truth-seeking, the role of victim groups, as well as the legal and
institutional framework required for truth-seeking. The conference also
looked at the role of the Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Commission and
that of tribal leaders in reconciliation, and called on Libyan authorities to
display the political will necessary to pursue transitional justice.48 However,
the conference failed to raise crucial issues, including the lack of security and
poor governance, which has resulted in a fragile judicial system and
tendency towards revenge and collective punishment.49
Nonetheless, after a closer look at the above laws, one may argue that
they fell short of the Libyan Peoples expectations. For example, Law No. 35

40
UN General Assembly, The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, a
Statement by Fathallah al-Sanusi al-Jadi, Member Libyas Mission to the United Nations, Sixty-
Seventh Session, before the Sixth Committee, On Item (83), New York (10 October 2012) [The
Rule of Law at the National and International Levels].
41
UN Support Mission in Libya, Transitional Justice Foundation for a New Libya, 17 September
2012, at p. 2.
42
Law No. (17), supra note 39.
43
Law No. (26) for the year 2012 on the High Commission for the Application of National Standards and
Integrity, National Transitional Council, Libya, 4 April 2012 [Law No. (26)].
44
Law No. (35) for the YEAR 2012 on Amnesty for Some Crimes, National Transitional Council,
Libya, 2 May 2012 [Law No. (35)].
45
Law No. (38) for the Year 2012 on Some Special Measures Regarding the Transitional Period,
National Transitional Council, Libya, 2 May 2012 [Law No. (38)].
46
The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, supra note 40.
47
Conference on Truth and Reconciliation Opens in Tripoli, Online: UNSMIL (12 December
2012) <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&
ItemID=791590&language=en-US> (Accessed on: 17 February 2013).
48
Conference on Truth and Reconciliation in Libya Concludes with Recommendations on the
Way Forward, Online: UNSMIL (12 December 2012) <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/
Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&ItemID=807743&language=en-US> (Accessed
on: 17 February 2013).
49
Ibid.
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! ##"

addresses only violations of human rights by former government agents

between 1 September 1969 and 15 February 2011. In other words, it fails to
consider violations committed individually or collectively by the rebels or
the transitional governments agents. Moreover, Article 7(4) of the above law
stipulates the exclusion of the members of the Revolutionary Committees
from all platforms of national reconciliation as a precondition for
reconciliation and implementation of transitional justice.50 By the same token,
Law No. 26 prohibits a large segment of the Libyan population listed in
Article 8(B) General Regulations51 up to 60%, specified in 16 categories
who held leading positions in the former Libyan government over the past
35 yearsfrom holding 18 leading positions, listed in Article 9, in the
political, economic, military, diplomatic, and educational domains.52 In
addition, Law No. 35 excludes from amnesty Qadhafis wife, children
(biological and adopted), brothers, sisters, sons and daughters in-law, and
assistants. The latter category is open to interpretation depending on

50
Law No. (35), supra note 44, Art. 7(4).
51
Law No. (26), supra note 43, Art. 8(B). It states: These regulations are intended to apply to
incumbents of positions or candidates for them from the former regime regardless of a positive
role played in the February 17 Revolution. They cover the following roles: 1. Those who had
proven membership in the revolutionary committees and were active members; 2. Members of
the Revolutionary Guard, the Popular Guard, or revolutionary work team; 3. Student union
heads after 1976; 4. All those known for glorifying the former regime or calling for the ideology
of the Green Book, whether in media or in direct talks with citizens; 5. All those who stood
opposed to the February 17 Revolution whether by incitement, financial participation, or
otherwise; 6. All those accused or sentenced for any crime of wasting or stealing public funds; 7.
All those involved in prisons or torture of citizens during the period of the previous regime; 8.
All who have undertaken any act against Libyan dissidents both abroad and at home; 9. All who
have undertaken operations to seize peoples property during the period of the previous regime
or afterward; 10. All corrupt individuals who squandered the money of the Libyan people
became rich at their expense, and made riches and accounts home and abroad; 11. All business
partners with Gaddafis sons and the heads of the former regime; 12. All those who took jobs of
leadership related to the Gaddafis sons and their institutions (such as Watassemo Association,
the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charity and Development Associations, the Libya of
Tomorrow Foundation, etc.); 13. All those who were opponents abroad, negotiated with the
regime, and consented to work in leadership positions with the former regime against the
interests of the Libyan people; 14. All those who unlawfully obtained gifts or in--kind funds
from the former regime; 15. All those who attended graduate studies in the ideology of the
Green Book; 16. Members who were named to the Council of Leaders of the Revolution, Free
Unionist Officers, and Comrades.
52
Ibid, Art. 9. This prohibition includes the following positions and functions: 1. The head and
members of the National Transitional Council; 2. The head and members of the Government; 3.
Office of the Transitional Council; 4. Office of the Prime Minister; 5. Agents and assistant agents
of ministers; 6. Ambassadors and diplomats; 7. Heads of local councils; 8. Heads and members
of local administrations (governors, mayors, and members of municipal councils); 9. Heads and
members of boards of directors of public bodies, companies, and institutions; 10. Executive
directors of public companies, bodies, and institutions; 11. Security and military leaders (leaders
of the security services, the army, immigration control, and first and second class officers); 12.
Heads of companies (domestic, foreign, and oil investment and national companies, without
exception); 13. Financial monitors; 14. University presidents, deans of faculties, heads of
departments, and managers of institutes, schools, and all educational and research institutions;
15. Heads and board members of trade unions, heads of student unions; 16. Candidates of the
elections of the General National Congress; 17. Chair and Members of the General National
Congress and its office; 18. All those charged with any function before the interim National
Transitional Council or interim Government.
#$" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

personal interests and political orientation. 53

Finally, Law No. 38 is in conflict with the norms of international treaties
and covenants on human rights. For example, Article 4, which put rebels
above the law, provides that there shall be no penalty for military, security,
or civil actions dictated by the February 17th Revolution that were performed
by revolutionaries with the goal of promoting or protecting the revolution.54
Earlier reports suggested that this amnesty law was drafted in order to
appease Libyas tribal leaders who apparently fear that anti-Qadhafi rebels
will be held accountable for human rights violations they committed during
the uprising.55
Moreover, Article 5 of the same code abolishes the right of individuals
who were arbitrary detained by rebels from legally pursuing the government
or its agents. It states that even if a court acquits a person who was detained
by militia, that person has no right to initiate a criminal or civil complaint
against the state or the militia, unless the detention was based on fabricated
or mendacious allegations.56
Likewise, Article 6 of the same law authorizes the Ministries of Defence
and Interior to take measures that restrict a persons movements or place
him/her under house arrest if they are considered a threat to public security
or stability, based on the persons previous actions or affiliation with an
official or unofficial apparatus or tool of the former regime.57
Nonetheless, the above law violates Libyas Constitutional Declaration of
3 August 2011.58 While Article 6 of the Declaration states that Libyans shall
be equal before the law and enjoy equal civil and political rights without
discrimination of any kind, Article 7 provides that human rights and basic
freedoms be respected by the State. The State has committed itself to joining
international and regional declarations and charters which protect such
rights and freedoms. But its clear that the blanket amnesty granted for rebels
and the transitional governments agents violates Libyas obligations under
international law to investigate and prosecute serious violations of
international humanitarian and human rights law.59

53
Law No. (35), supra note 44, Art. 1; Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL), Press Statement, LFJL
Strongly Condemns New Laws Breaching Human Rights and Undermining the Rule of Law, (7
May 2012), p.1 [Laws Breaching Human Rights and Undermining the Rule of Law].
54
Human Rights Watch, Libya: Amend New Special Procedures Law, (11 May 2012), at p. 1
[Amend New Special Procedures Law]; Law No. (38), supra note 45, at Art. 4.
55
Mark Kersten, Impunity Rules: Libya Passes Controversial Amnesty Law, Online: Justice in
Conflict (8 May 2012) <http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/05/08/impunity-rules-libya-passes-
controversial-amnesty-law/> (Accessed on: 1 January 2013) [Libya Passes Controversial
Amnesty Law].
56
Law No. (38), supra note 45, at Art. 5.
57
Amend New Special Procedures Law, supra note 54, at p. 1; Law No. (38), supra note 45, at Art.
6.
58
The Constitutional Declaration, National Transitional Council, Libya, 3 August 2011 [the
Constitutional Declaration].
59
Christi L. Thornton & Clarinsa v. Grives, The Contribution of the Arab Spring to the Role of
Transitional Justice and Amnesty Laws: A Review of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, Electronic copy
Available at: <http://works.bepress.com/clarinsa_grives/1> [Contribution of the Arab Spring
to the Role of Transitional Justice and Amnesty Laws].
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! #%"

Nevertheless, the Libyan case is not unique. In the aftermath of internal

and extraterritorial armed conflicts, other states have issued amnesty laws to
protect or to reward its agents for their role in protecting political regimes,
establishing stability or state-building. Louise Mallinder provides several
examples of governments that have acted in this way on the cessation of
hostilities, such as: Jimmy Carters 1977 amnesty to state agents liable for
crimes during the Vietnam war;60 the 1982 Guatemalan amnesty laws
designed to protect the governments security forces who had participated in
actions against rebellion; and Algerias 2006 amnesty law to protect its armed
forces against prosecution for crimes committed during the civil war that
followed the military suspension and nullification of the parliamentary
elections won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an Algerian political
party, in 1992.61
Likewise, states may also amnesty crimes under international law. A
case in point is the American pressure placed on the UN Security Council to
issue Resolution 1487 (2003), adopted on 12 June 2003, to exempt the
American troops and personnel serving in any UN force in Iraq from
prosecution for international war crimes under the Rome Statute of the ICC.62

III. Wartime Rape under Libyan Laws

This part examines the crime of wartime rape under recent laws adopted

60
Kieran McEvoy & Louise Mallinder, Amnesties in Transition: Punishment, Restoration, and
the Governance of Mercy, (2012) 39:3 Journal of Law and Society 410.
61
Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the Peace and Justice
Divide (Oxford; Portland, Ore.: Hart, 2008) 66. For further readings, see Louise Mallinder,
Amnesties and International Criminal Law, in William A. Schabas & Nadia Brnaz, eds., The
Handbook of International Criminal Law (New York, N.Y.: Routledge 2010. Available at SSRN:
<http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1531701> (Accessed on: 21 October 2013); Louise Mallinder, Can
Amnesties and International Justice be Reconciled?, (2007) 1:2 The International Journal of
Transitional Justice 208230; Louise Mallinder, Exploring the Practice of States in Introducing
Amnesties, in Kai Ambos, Judith Large, Marieke Wierda, eds., Building a Future on Peace and
Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Peace and Development, the Nuremberg Declaration on Peace
and Justice (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2009) 127-171; Louise Mallinder, The Ongoing Quest for
Truth and Justice: Enacting and Annulling Argentina's Amnesty Laws (May 2009). Available at
SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531759> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.1531759>
(Accessed on: 21 October 2013); Louise Mallinder, The Role of Amnesties in Conflict
Transformation, Online: School of Law, Queens University Belfast (11 March 2009)
<http://www.queens.ie/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/InstituteofCriminologyandCriminalJ
ustice/Research/BeyondLegalism/filestore/Filetoupload,163783,en.pdf> Accessed on 21
October 2013; Louise Mallinder, Uruguays Evolving Experience of Amnesty and Civil Society's
Response (16 March 2009). Transitional Justice Institute Research. Available at SSRN:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1387362> or <http://dx.doi.org/ 10.2139/ssrn.1387362> (Accessed
on: 21 October 2013); Louise Mallinder & Kieran McEvoy, Rethinking Amnesties: Atrocity,
Accountability and Impunity in Post-Conflict Societies, (2011) 6:1 Journal of the Academy of
Social Sciences 107-128.
62
Hilmi M. Zawati, Impunity or Immunity: Wartime Male Rape and Sexual Torture as a Crime
against Humanity, (2007) 17:1 Journal on Rehabilitation of Torture Victims and Prevention of
Torture 37; UN Security Councils Resolution 1487 (2003), Requesting that the ICC shall for a 12
months period starting 1 July 2003 not commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution of any case
arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing state not a Party to the Rome
Statute over acts or omissions relating to a UN established or authorized operations (12 June 2003) UN
Doc. S/RES/1487 (2003).
#&" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

by the NTC during the transitional period following the fall of the former
regime, and under the Libyan Penal Code of 1953 and its amendments. It
reveals that the failure of Libyan legislators before and after the recent civil
war to amend the Libyan Penal Code and incorporate international crimes
embodied in Articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, and to recognize the
norms promulgated in several international treaties and conventions of
human rights, has resulted in a lacuna in Libyan criminal law and in the
competence of the latter to adequately address conflict-related gender-based
crimes committed by all parties to the conflict. It also underlines Libyas
obligations under the provisions of domestic and international humanitarian
and human rights law to criminalize and prosecute alleged gender-based
crimes and bring justice to both victims and perpetrators.
1. Laws of the Transitional Period
Since it was established on 27 February 2011 and until the handing
over of power to the elected General National Congress on 8 August 2012,
the NTC has adopted dozens of laws and decisions, although none of them
has explicitly condemned wartime rape or other forms of gender-based
crimes as crimes of war or crimes against humanity. This was despite the fact
that the Council was keenly aware that hundreds of Libyan women and men
had been drafted for widespread and systematic rape in Misrata, Zawya,
Ajdabya, and other ravished cities by former government security forces and
paramilitaries, including African mercenaries.
Sexual crimes are implicitly mentioned twice in the transitional Law,
viz., Law No. 17 and Law No. 35, respectively. Article 4(2) of Law 17,
referring to the jurisdiction of the newly established Fact Finding and
Reconciliation Commission, lists damages sustained as a result of attack on
honour (cird in Arabic) as being one of the many other incidents that will be
examined and investigated by the Commission. Attacks on cird might be
broadly interpreted as slandering, defamation, rape, or any other form of
sexual violence.63 Another instance may be found in Article 1(3) of Law 35
where reference is made to al-muwqaca bil-quwwah,64 which literally means
having sex with someone by force.65 This crime, however, happens in
peacetime just as it does in the midst of armed conflict! Having that said,
none of the transitional laws has criminalized conflict-related gender-based
crimes or prosecuted it.
2. The Libyan Penal Code
Historically speaking, The Libyan Penal Code was adopted by a royal
decree on 28 November 1953.66 The code, which contains 507 articles, was
largely influenced by the Italian Penal Code, and was subjected to twenty-

63
Law No. (17), supra note 39, at Art. 4(2).
64
Law No. (35), supra note 44, at Art. 1(3).
65
Mahmd Ibn CUmar al-Zamakhshar, Ass al-Balghah [The Genesis of Eloquence] (Beirut: Dr
al-Macrifah, 1982) s.v. waqaca. (Arabic Dictionary).
66
Libyan Penal Code, 28 November 1953 [Libyan Penal Code].
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! #'"

two amendments, the most worthy of note being two substantive

amendments in 195667 and 1975 respectively. The latter amended 32 articles
in the section entitled crimes against the public interest, to include 21
articles providing for death penalty for crimes against the interests of the
State.68
When the Penal Code was adopted in 1953, only a few international
humanitarian and human rights treaties had been adopted, including: the
United Nations Charter, 1945;69 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
1948;70 the Four Geneva Conventions, 1949;71 the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950;72 and the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
1948.73
At the national level, the Code was preceded only by the Libyan
Constitution, which had been promulgated in 1951,74 and included several
general rules relevant to human rights law, such as the legality principle,75
the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law,76 and the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty.77

67
Law No. 48 of 23 September 1956, which provided for the cancellation of 9 articles, adding 20
articles, and modifying two hundred and thirteen articles.
68
Under Law No. 38 of 1975.
69
United Nations Charter, (1945), Signed at San Francisco, 26 June 1945. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3
Bevans 1153, Entered into force on 24 October 1945. Libya was admitted to the United Nations
on 14 December 1955 [United Nations Charter].
70
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Adopted on 10 December 1948, GA Res. 217A (III), 3 UN
GAOR (Resolutions, part 1) at 71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948); Reprinted in 43 American Journal of
International Law Supp. 127 (1949) [Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
71
Including Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field (Geneva I), Opened for signature 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No.3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 (Entered into force on 21 October 1950) [Geneva I], Ratified/acceded by Libya on 22
May 1956; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva II), 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (Entered into force on 21 October 1950)
[Geneva II], Ratified/acceded by Libya on 22 May 1956; Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War (Geneva III), Opened for signature 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No.3364,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Entered into force on 21 October 1950) [Geneva III], Ratified/acceded by Libya
on 22 May 1956; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva IV),
Opened for signature 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No.3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Entered
into force on 21 October 1950) [Geneva IV], Ratified/acceded by Libya on 22 May 1956.
72
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Opened for
signature 4 November 1950, Europe. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (Entered into force on 3
September 1953). It was not signed by Libya.
73
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, GA Res.
260A (III), 3 UN GAOR at 174, UN Doc. A/810 (1948), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [Genocide Convention].
Acceded by Libya on 16 May 1986.
74
The Constitution of Libya, contained 213 articles, was promulgated by the National Constituent
Assembly on 7th October 1951 and abolished by a military coup detat on 1st September 1969.
Available online at <http://www.libyanconstitutionalunion.net/
constitution%20of%20libya.htm> (Accessed on: 18 February 2013) [The Constitution of Libya].
75
Article 17 of the Libyan Constitution of 1951 states the No offence may be established or
penalty inflicted except shall be subject to the penalties specified therein for those offences; the
penalty inflicted shall not be heavier than the penalty that was applicable at the time the offence
was committed.
76
Ibid.
77
Article 15 of the Libyan Constitution of 1951 provides that Everyone charged with an offence
shall be presumed to be innocent until proved guilty according to law in a trial at which he has
$)" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

However, despite the several amendments made over the past sixty
years, it is an unfortunate fact that none of the above agreements norms
came to be reflected in the provisions of the Libyan Penal Code. In other
words, Libyan legislators utterly failed during this long period of time to
incorporate international crimes into the Libyan Penal Code or to take steps
to domesticate war crimes and crimes against humanity embodied in the
Rome Statute of the ICC. Accordingly, Libya has no criminal jurisdiction
over such crimes.
Nonetheless, Book III of the Libyan Penal Code, entitled Offences
against Freedom, Honour, and Morals, does condemn different forms of
sexual violence in 17 articles (407-424), where an inventory is made of
gender-based crimes that may be expected to occur, and to be dealt with, in
peacetime.78
3. Libyas Obligations under Domestic and International Law to Prosecute
Alleged Conflict-Related Gender-Based Crimes
Although the Rome Statute of the ICC does not include a provision
explicitly requesting States to adopt the principle of universal jurisdiction for
the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, listed in
Articles 6-8, in their own domestic criminal law, it does insist that it is the
duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible
for international crimes.79 In fact, the failure of the Libyan legislator, either
before or after the recent civil war, to incorporate these crimes into the
Libyan Penal Code leaves the country in a vacuum juris that will likely result
in unfair trials, chaos, and bloody cycles of revenge.
However, Libya is obligated to investigate, prosecute, and bring to
justice persons having allegedly committed international crimes, including
gender-based crimes, whether they belong to the former regimes security
forces or to the rebels, under a number of legal principles and provisions of
different domestic, international humanitarian and human rights law
instruments, and under regional treaties ratified by Libya.
a. Obligations under Domestic Law
On the national level, there are several legal instruments that would
make it an obligation on the part of the Libyan transitional government to
criminalize and prosecute gender-based crimes. Article 14 of the 1951 Libyan
Constitution provides that Everyone shall have the right to resource to the

the guarantees necessary for his defence. The trial shall be public save in exceptional cases
prescribed by law.
78
Including: carnal connection by force (Art. 407); indecent assaults (Art. 408); seduction of
juvenile (Art. 409); indecent acts between persons of the same sex (Art. 410); abduction with
intention to marry (peacetime forced marriage) (Art. 411); abduction for the commission of
indecent acts (Art. 412); abduction without force of a juvenile under fourteen years of age or a
mental defective (Art. 413); incitement to prostitution (Art. 415); forced prostitution (Art. 416);
and trafficking in women to foreign territory (Art. 418). See Libyan Penal Code, supra note 66.
79
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998), 37
I.L.M. (Entered into force on 1 July 2002), the Preamble [The Rome Statute of the ICC].
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! $("

Courts, in accordance with the provisions of the law.80 Similarly, Articles 6

& 7 of the Constitutional Declaration of 3 August 201181 emphasize the
following values to the Libyan people without any kind of discrimination:

Libyans shall be equal before the law, enjoy equal civil and political rights
with, have the same opportunities in all areas and be subject to the same
public duties and obligations, without distinction on the grounds of religion,
belief, language, wealth, gender, kinship, political opinions, social status, or
tribal, regional or familial adherence.82
The State shall safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms,
endeavor to join the regional and international declarations and covenants
which protect these rights and freedoms and strive for the promulgation of
new covenants which recognize the dignity of man as Allahs representative
on earth.83
Moreover Article 39 of the Libyan Military Penal Code of 1974 provides
that Crimes shall not lapse by time. Provisions relevant to proscription of
crimes shall not apply to crimes perpetrated by military personnel or those
provided for in the present Law or those which are under the jurisdiction of
martial courts.84
Furthermore, Article 60 of the Libyan Code of Criminal Procedure for
Armed Personnel (1999) guarantees the defendants right to examine the
prosecution witnesses regarding their testimony. Article 64 of the same code
entitles the defendant to have an interpreter if he/she does not understand
Arabic.85
As well, Article 31(C) [criminal justice] of the Libyan Constitutional
Proclamation of 11 December 1969 provides that the defendant shall be
presumed innocent until proven guilty. All necessary guarantees for the
exercise of his defense shall be provided. The accused or imprisoned shall
not be subjected to mental or physical harm.86
In addition, Article 9 of the Great Green Charter of Human Rights of the
Jamahiriya states that The Jamahiriyan society guarantees the right to bring
a suit or action before the law and the independence of the judicial system.
Each of its members is entitled to a fair and complete trial.87
Finally, Article 30 of Law No. 20 of 1991 on Promoting Freedom provides
that Every person is entitled to judicial redress according to the law. The
Court shall provide all the necessary guarantees, including legal

80
The Constitution of Libya, supra note 74, at Art. 14.
81
The Constitutional Declaration, supra note 58.
82
Ibid, at Art. 6.
83
Ibid, at Art. 7.
84
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Military Penal Code, 1974, at Art. 39.
85
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Libyan Code of Criminal Procedure for Armed Personnel (1999), at
Articles 60 & 64.
86
Libyan Arab Republic, Libyan Constitutional Proclamation, adopted on 11 December 1969, at
Art. 31(c).
87
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Great Green Charter of Human Rights in the Jamahiriyan Era, adopted
on 12 June 1988 by The General Congress of the People of the Popular and Socialist Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, at Art. 9.
$*" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

representation. 88

b. Obligations under General Concepts and Principles of

International Criminal Law
The Libyan transitional government is obliged to prosecute or arrest and
extradite perpetrators of gender-based crimes to the ICC under the aut dedere
aut judicare principle, part of the jus cogens rule. Accordingly, the duty to
prosecute and extradite perpetrators of such heinous and serious crimes
which may constitute a threat to international peace and security if
committed on a large scale as a political weapon of warapplies under the
customary international law doctrine of universal jurisdiction as a
mandatory and affirmative obligation.89 In other words, Libya cannot
derogate from its duty to prosecute or extradite perpetrators indicted by the
ICC, and any state that ignores or fails to fulfil its duty in this respect is in
breach of its mandatory obligations as a member of the international
community.90
Moreover, several United Nations documents have emphasized that war
crimes and crimes against humanity, including wartime rape and other
gender-based crimes, are hostis humani generis, and that there are no
limitation barriers to prosecutions for such profound crimes under
international humanitarian and human rights law. Articles 55 and 56 of the
United Nations Charter oblige member states to act jointly and individually
in cooperation with the international community to achieve justice by

88
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Law No 20 of 1991 on Promoting Freedoms, entered into force on 1
September 1991, at Article 30.
89
The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which Libya had ratified on 22 May 1956, explicitly
incorporate the principle aut dedere aut judicare by imposing an obligation on High Contracting
Parties to search for persons alleged to have committed, or given orders to commit, grave
breaches of these conventions, and to bring themregardless of their nationalityto justice,
or transfer them, in accordance with a states own legislation, to stand trial before the courts of
another High Contracting Party. See Hilmi M. Zawati, Gender-Related Crimes in Armed Conflict
Settings: Legal Challenges and Prospects (Lewiston, N.Y: The Edwin Mellen Press). (Forthcoming,
2014) at p 274 [Hilmi M. Zawati]; Geneva I, supra note 71, at Art. 49; Geneva II, supra note 71, at
Art. 50; Geneva III, supra note 71, at Art. 129; Geneva IV, supra note 71, at Art. 46; Laura M.
Olson, Re-enforcing Enforcement in a Specialized Convention on Crimes against Humanity:
Inter-State Cooperation, Mutual Legal Assistance, and the Aut Dedere Aut Judicare Obligation,
in Leila Nadya Sadat, Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity (New York, N.Y.:
Cambridge University Press, 2011) 326; M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition and World
Public Order (Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.: Sitjhoff-Oceana Publications, 1974) 7; UN Commission on
Human Rights, Progress Report on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights
Violations, Prepared by Mr. Guiss and Mr. Joinet, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ Sub.2/1993/6 (19 July 1993)
para. 55.
90
Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing
War Criminals to Accountability, (1996) 59:4 Law & Contemporary Problems 167; Enik
Horvth, et al., Gender-Based Violence Laws in Sub-Saharan Africa, The New York City Bar in
collaboration with the Center for Reproductive Rights, and the Cyrus R. Vance Center for
International Justice, 2007, at p. 14167; United Kingdom: Universal Jurisdiction and Absence of
Immunity for Crimes against Humanity, Amnesty International, 1 January 1999, AI-Index: EUR
45/001/1999, at p. 19.
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! $!"

respecting and observing human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
people without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.91 These rights
are articulated and protected by several UN treaties and resolutions, some of
which endorsed the Nremberg principles and individual responsibility for
war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity.92
c. Obligations under International Humanitarian Law
Libya is also obligated under the norms of the Geneva Conventions and
their Additional Protocols to investigate and prosecute grave breaches of the
conventions, including gender-based crimes during national and
international armed conflicts. On 22 May 1956, Libya acceded to and became
a Contracting Party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including the Fourth
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of
War.93 However, Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, prohibits ill-
treatment and molestation of civilians, wounded combatants, and hors de
combat. It proscribes certain acts, inter alia, violence to life, mutilation, cruel
treatment, torture, outrage upon personal dignityin particular humiliation
and degrading treatmentand passing sentences without a duty constituted
court or carrying out summary executions.94 Moreover, Article 27 of the same
convention explicitly requires Contracting Parties to protect women against
all forms of sexual violence. It states that women shall be especially
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape,
enforced prostitution or any form of indecent assault.95
Article 4(e) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)96 took a further step by explicitly considering

91
United Nations Charter, supra note 69, at Arts. 55 & 56.
92
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (26 July 1996) Articles 19-22;
Reprinted in Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman., eds., Substantive and
Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The Experience of International and National
Courts, vol. 2, part 1 (The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 335-410;
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Crime in International Law: Obligations Erga Omnes and the Duty to
Prosecute, in Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon, eds., The Reality of International Law:
Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1999) 210; Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, Sources in International Treaties of an Obligation to Investigate, Prosecute, and
Provide Redress, in Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ed., Impunity and Human Rights in International
Law and Practice (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1995) 25; Principles of International
Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, GA Res. A/RES/3074 (3 December 1973) paras. 1 & 6;
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nremberg Tribunal and in the
Judgement of the Tribunal, GA Res. A/RES/95 (I) (11 December 1946); Stephen P. Marks,
Forgetting The Policies and Practices of the Past: Impunity in Cambodia, (1994) 18:2 Fletcher
Forum for World Affairs 20; UN Commission on Human Rights, Systematic Rape, Sexual
Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict: Final Report Submitted by Ms. Gay J.
McDougall, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (22 June 1998) at para. 25.
93
Geneva IV, supra note 71.
94
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 71, at Art. 3.
95
Ibid, at Art. 27.
96
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, (Protocol II), Opened for signature
on 12 December 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (Entered into force on 7 December 1978).
$+" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

rape and other forms of sexual violence, in particular humiliating and

degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent
assault, committed in non-transnational armed conflicts as outrages upon
personal dignity.97
d. Obligations under International Human Rights Law
Libya is a signatory to a number of core international human rights
treaties, which require it, as a State Party, to take effective legislative,
administrative, and judicial measures to prevent, prosecute and punish
crimes committed against civilians. These treaties include: the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;98 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;99 the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women;100 the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment;101 the United Nations Convention against Transitional
Organized Crime;102 the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity;103 the African
[Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples Rights;104 and the Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa.105
Under the provisions of the above treaties, Libya is obligated to
prosecute gender-based crimes deliberately perpetrated against the civilian
population during the recent armed conflict in Libya, and to provide victims
with an effective remedy, including judicial, social, and adequate

Ratified/acceded by Libya on 7 June 1978.

97
Ibid, at Art. 4(2)(e).
98
Genocide Convention, supra note 73.
99
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1966), GA Rex. 2200 (XXI), 21 UN GAOR,
Supp. (No.16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, 1976 Can. T.S. No. 47 (1966).
(Entered into force on 23 March1976). Acceded by Libya on15 May 1970 [Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights].
100
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, (1979), GA Res.
34/180, 34 UN GAOR, Supp. (No.46) at 193, UN DOC. A/34/46 (1979). (Entered into force on 3
September 1981). Acceded by Libya on16 May 1989.
101
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA
Res. 39/46, 39 UN GAOR, Supp. (No.51) at 197, UN Doc. A/39/51 (1984), reprinted in 23
International Le Aterials 1027 (1984), Substantive changes noted in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) (Entered
into force on 26 June1987). Acceded by Libya on 16 May 1989 [Convention against Torture].
102
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 25, annex I, U.N.
GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001), entered into force Sept.
29, 2003. Ratified by Libya on 18 June 2004.
103
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, G.A. res. 2391 (XXIII), annex, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968), entered into force Nov. 11, 1970. Acceded by Libya on 16 May 1989.
104
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, Adopted on 27 June 1981, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, (1981); Reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (Entered into force on 21
October 1986). Ratified by Libya on 19 July 1986 [African Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights].
105
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa,
Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Maputo, CAB/LEG/66.6
(Sept. 13, 2000); reprinted in 1 African Human Rights Law Journal 40, entered into force Nov. 25,
2005 [Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa]
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! $#"

reparations. As a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR), e.g., Libya has an obligation to provide an
accessible, effective, and enforceable remedy to the victims of crimes. Article
2(3)(b) of the same instrument provides that such remedy should be
determined by competent judicial, administrative, or legislative authorities,
or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
state. 106
Moreover, rape and other forms of sexual violence, including sexual
torture, violate the right of Libyans not to be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, and obligate the Libyan authorities to take
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent
such acts in any territory under Libyan jurisdiction.107 In addition, the
Security Councils Resolution 1325 (2000) calls on all parties to armed
conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-
based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse.108
Likewise, Resolution 1820 (2008) emphasizes that sexual violence, when
used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target
civilians or as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian
populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict.109
On the regional treaties level, Article 5 of the African [Banjul] Charter on
Human and Peoples Rights, provides that Every individual shall have the
right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the
recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of
man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.110 By the same token, Article
11(3) of the above Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, focussing as it
does on the protection of women in armed conflicts, requests that States
Parties, including Libya, protect women against all kinds of violence,
particularly rape and other forms of sexual exploitation. The same article
stresses that such acts should be considered war crimes, genocide and/or
crimes against humanity and that their perpetrators be brought to justice
before a competent criminal judicial body.111

106
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 99, at Art. 2(3)(b).
107
Convention against Torture, supra note 101, at Art. 2(1).
108
UN Security Councils Resolution 1325 (2000), Women and Peace and Security (31 October 2000),
UN Doc. S/RES/1325 (2000), 40 I.L.M. 500-502 (2001), at para. 10 [UN Security Councils
Resolution 1325].
109
Rosemary Grey & Laura J. Shepherd, Stop Rape Now?: Masculinity, Responsibility, and
Conflict-related Sexual Violence, (2012) 16:1 Men and Masculinities 116; UN Security Councils
Resolution 1820 (2008), Noting that Rape and other Forms of Sexual Violence can Constitute a War
Crime, a Crime against Humanity, or a Constitutive Act With Respect to Genocide (31 March 2008) UN
Doc. S/RES/1820 (2008), at para. 1 [UN Security Councils Resolution 1820].
110
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, supra note 104, at Art. 5.
111
Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, supra note 105, at Article 11(3). See also Christine
Ocran, Recent Developments Actualities: The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, (2007)15 African Journal of International &
Comparative Law 150; Helne Combrinck, Rape Law Reform in Africa: More of the Same or
More Opportunities?, in Clare McGlynn & Vanessa E. Munro, eds., Rethinking Rape
Law: International and Comparative Perspectives.(New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2010) 124.
$$" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

In sum, the above humanitarian and human rights law instruments, not
only oblige the Libyan transitional government to prosecute conflict-related
gender-based crimes and bring perpetrators to justice, but underline its duty
to prevent future violations.

IV. The Dilemma of Prosecuting Gender-Based Crimes

Under Libyan Transitional Justice
The fall of Qadhafis totalitarian regime due to a popular uprising in
October 2011, as is often the case with the collapse of autocratic systems, left
Libya faced with serious challenges as a result of inheriting the former
regimes socio-political problems. Other factors making the situation difficult
were the social construct and culture of the Libyan people, the new dramatic
political and security situation, and the failure of the Libyan consecutive
transitional governments to restore justice and public order. An examination
of the new socio-legal scene in Libya identifies four major challenges facing
Libyan transitional justice in any future effort to prosecute wartime rape and
other forms of sexual violence, namely legal impunity and lawlessness,
weakness of the rule of law as opposed to insurgents justice, absence of
security and public order, and the lack of democratic institutions.
1. Legal Impunity and Lawlessness
Implementing an effective transitional gender justice program in post-
Qadhafi Libya requires the Libyan transitional justice system to
independently investigate the vast scope of sexual crimes committed by the
former regimes security forces during and before the armed conflict, as well
as those crimes committed by rebel forces and the transitional governments
agents during and after the uprising. In other words, to ensure justice for all,
Libyas transitional justice system must investigate, prosecute and hold
accountable all persons who allegedly committed conflict-related gender-
based crimes, whether for extracting information from detainees or as a
revenge attack against communities discerned to be supporters of the former
regime. Moreover, the system should also emphasize that victims rights to
effective remedies be determined by competent judicial, administrative or
legislative authorities, not by insurgents councils.112
Nonetheless, a closer look at the Libyan transitional laws, particularly
Law No. 38, shows that these laws were promulgated in a way that makes
them retributive rather than constructive. As already noted at the outset of
this work, Article 4 of the above law, which provides blanket immunity for
persons who carried out the task of toppling the former regime, approves the
status of lawlessness and encourages the culture of impunity.113 Early reports
suggest that this amnesty law was drafted in order to address the tribal

112
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 99, at Art. 2(3)(b).
113
The Hounding of Migrants Must Stop, supra note 36, at p. 70; Kevin Jon Heller, The
International Commission of Inquiry on Libya: A Critical Analysis, (2012). Electronic copy
available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2123782>, at p.37; Law No. (38), supra note 45, at Art. 4;
Laws Breaching Human Rights and Undermining the Rule of Law, supra note 53, at p. 2.
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! $%"

leaders concerns of holding members of relative rebel forces accountable for

human rights violations allegedly committed during and after the
uprising.114
In contrast to Article 12 of the Libyan Constitution,115 which stresses that
all Libyans shall be treated equally before the law, Law No. 17 regarding the
establishment of rules of national reconciliation and transitional justice limits
cases to be addressed by the Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Commission to
crimes allegedly associated with the former regime between 1 September
1969 and 23 October 2011, while crimes committed by rebels and transitional
governments agents remain unconsidered.116 Furthermore, this law specifies
the disqualification of all members of the former regimes revolutionary
committees, revolutionary guards, and secret security forces from all
platforms of national reconciliationregardless of the fact that many of them
were not involved in attacks against Libyan civiliansas a precondition for
reconciliation and implementation of transitional justice.117
In light of the above discussion, one might say that the provisions of
Laws 35 and 38 demonstrate the lack of thought that went into the law-
making process, effectively invalidating much of what the transitional justice
law is attempting to achieve.118 Moreover, they promote a culture of
impunity by allowing a significant number of people who allegedly
committed gender-based and other serious crimes to walk free, based on
their political affiliation. At the same time, the above laws preserve a culture
of selective justice, which was in turn a direct cause of the popular revolution
against the former regime.119
2. Rule of Law v. Militia Justice
Restoring the rule of law in post-Qadhafi Libya requires that every
Libyan citizen, regardless of his political affiliation or tribal linage, be subject
to the law, which must be fair, non-discriminatory, respectful of the human
rights of the Libyan people, and be applied by a competent and fair legal
system that complies with the international criminal law and human rights
standards, embodied in the provisions of different international human
rights and humanitarian law treaties ratified by Libya over the past sixty
years.120 Supremacy of the law in Libya implies improving security for all

114
Kevin Jon Heller, Surprise, the NTC Amnesties Its Own Crimes, Online: Opinio Juris
(Wednesday, 9 May 2012) <http://opiniojuris.org/2012/05/09/surprise-the-ntc-amnesties-its-
own-crimes/> (Accessed on: 20 February 2013); Libya Passes Controversial Amnesty Law, supra
note 55; Libyas Transition: The Current State of Play, Atlantic Council & Rafik Hariri Center for
the Middle East, November 2012, at p.2;Nasos Mihalakas, A New Federalism for Libya and the
Arab Spring, Online: Netherlands Aid (11April 2012) <http://www.nl-
aid.org/continent/northern-africa/a-new-federalism-for-libya-and-the-arab-pring/> (Accessed
on: 20 February 2013).
115
The Constitution of Libya, supra note 74, at Art. 12.
116
Law No. (17), supra note 39, at Arts.1&2.
117
Ibid, at Art.7.
118
Libyas Troubled Transition, supra note 22, at p.12.
119
Amend New Special Procedures Law, supra note 54, at p.1.
120
Mohamed Eljarh, Peace, Security and the Rule of Law Reform in Libya, Online: Middle East
$&" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

citizens,121 reforming the Libyan justice system, providing an effective

transitional justice through truth and reconciliation committees, granting
adequate reparations to victims, and prosecuting conflict-related crimes,
including wartime rape and other forms of sexual violence.122 It must also
ensure Libyan womens security and access to justice by providing gender-
sensitive justice and by prosecuting gender-based crimes perpetrated by all
parties to the conflict.
It goes without saying that the blanket amnesty provided to the Libyan
rebel militias by several laws adopted by the NTC, particularly Article 4 of
Law No. 38, on the one hand, and the failure of Libyan lawmaker to
incorporate crimes listed in the Rome Statute of the ICC123 into the Libyan
Penal Code, on the other, has weakened the States governance and resulted
in a fragile judicial system that puts fair trials out of reach.124
Indeed, one of the serious challenges facing the current transitional
government is the immediate need to gain control over hundreds of militia
groups and disarm them.125 Rebel groups are affecting most aspects of
Libyans livesincluding security and justice126and forming several quasi-
states and de facto authorities within the Libyan state.127 Thousands of
Libyans were, and still are, vulnerable to kidnapping by rebel militias. Some
of the latter are held in different detention facilities outside the jurisdiction of
Libyas justice system, while others have been subjected to extrajudicial
killing,128 or assassination in mysterious circumstances.129

Online (10 January 2012) <www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=49918> (Accessed on: 21

February 2013) [the Rule of Law Reform in Libya]; UN Development Programme, Rule of Law:
Building Lasting Peace through Justice and Security, (October 2012), at p. 1.
121
Libya: Rocky Road Ahead for Libyas Tawergha Minority, IRIN, Tripoli, Libya, 13
December 2011.
122
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States:
Amnesties. (New York, N.Y.: United Nations Publications, 2009), at 33-35.
123
The Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 79, at Arts. 6-8.
124
Hilary Homes, Fair Trials Still out of Reach in Libya, Amnesty International Canada (7
September 2012) [Fair Trials Still out of Reach in Libya].
125
Militias Threaten Hopes for New Libya, supra note 12, at p. 32; Sarah Leah Whitson, In
Libya, Building the Rule of Law, The New York Times (29 December 2011). Online:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/opinion/in-libya-building-the-rule-of-law.html>
(Accessed on: 21 February 2013) [Sarah Leah Whitson].
126
The general prosecutor in al-Zawiya, 50 km to the west of Tripoli, told Amnesty International
that the judicial system is functioning in difficult and tense circumstances as armed militias
control most aspects of life in the city. He added that a group of armed militias stormed the
court room and threatened one of the judges as they thought he had imposed a light sentence on
an alleged Qadhafi supporter. In another similar incident, a group of armed men abducted a
public prosecutor in al-Zawiya, held him for several hours and dragged him to the prosecutions
office demanding that he must be punished for ordering the release of a detainee they accused
of committing crimes. See Fair Trials Still out of Reach in Libya, supra note 124.
127
Fair Trials Still out of Reach in Libya, supra note 124; Libyas Unwilling Revolutionaries, supra
note 1.
128
This includes the killing of Muammar Qadhafi and his son Mutasim on 20 October 2011. The
NTC promised an investigation into these deaths but nothing has as yet emerged. Moreover,
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch documented the summary execution of 65
Libyan citizens on 23 October 2011 by rebel forces outside the Mahari Hotel in Sirte. See Militias
Threaten Hopes for New Libya, supra not 12, at. p. 33; Sarah Leah Whitson, supra not 125.
129
A case in point is the assassination of Abdul-Fattah Younes al-Obeidi, who defected to the
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! $'"

During and in the aftermath of the conflict, rebel fighters arrested and
arbitrary detained thousands of suspected security forces of the former
regime, loyalists, and alleged foreign mercenaries. They continue to hold
many of these in secret detention facilities without indictment or trial and in
inhuman conditions, subjecting many of them to humiliation, torture, sexual
torture, rape or threat of rape, mutilation and torture leading to death. 130 To
cite but one example, Thuwwar al-Zintan, a rebel militia group functioning in
western Libya, captured Saif al-Islam Qadhafi (hereinafter Saif al-Islam) on
19 November 2011, locked him in a secret place, and refused to hand him
over to the Libyan transitional government. Since then the NTC and
successor transitional governments have utterly failed, for more than 15
months,131 to provide him with a fair trial under the jurisdiction of the Libyan
justice system or execute the ICCs arrest warrant and extradite him to the
Court in The Hague.132 In this respect, Ahmed al-Jehani, Libyas
representative to the ICC, has said: we as Libyans cannot begin Saifs trial.
There is no central power to prosecute him.133 This is an egregious violation
of Saifs right to be tried without undue delay, and a proof of the
incompetence of the Libyan judicial system. The competence of any judicial
body depends on its capacity to deliver justice in a timely, efficient, and
impartial way. The current Libyan judicial system has shown itself incapable,
thus far, of meeting this standard.
3. Lack of Security and Public Order
Libya is currently facing a cluster of complex security challenges. The
most direct challenge to Libyas transition is the lack of central authority and

opposition in February 2011 and became the commander-in-chief of the rebel forces. On 27 July
2011, a group of rebel fighters took him for questioning in a military camp in Gharyounes. It has
been reported that he was shot dead together with his aides in late July 2011. Recently, Hassan
Jumah al-Jazzawi, a judge investigating the death of al-Obeidi, was assassinated in Benghazi.
See Christine N. Myers, Tribalism and Democratic Transition in Libya: Lessons from Iraq,
(2013) 7:5 Global Tides 1-28. Available at: <http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/
globaltides/vol7/iss1/5> (Accessed on: 11 October 2013) 18; Militias Threaten Hopes for New
Libya, supra not 12, at. pp. 32-33.
130
Amnesty International, Libya: Militia Stranglehold Corrosive for Rule of Law, News (4 July
2012), at p. 1; Libya: Rule of Law or Rule of Militias?, Amnesty International, 5 JULY 2012, Index:
MDE 19/012/2012, at pp. 17-18 & 24 -25 [Rule of Law or Rule of Militias?]; Militias Threaten
Hopes for New Libya, supra not 12, at. p. 32.
131
Jonathan ODonohue, Libyas Defining Moment: Justice or Revenge? Gaddafi-regime
Officials must be Tried in the International Criminal Court to Ensure a Fair Trial, Online:
Aljazeera (22 September 2013) <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/
09/201392210557425280.html> (Acceded: 3 October 2013); Saif al-Islam in Libyan Court for
First Time: Son of Former Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi Appears in Zintan Court over ICC
Delegation Case, Online: Aljazeera (17 January 2013) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
africa/2013/01/20131171676991400.html> (Accessed on: 17 January 2013) [Saif Al-Islam in
Libyan Court for First Time]; Vivienne Walt, Libyas Disaster of Justice: The Case of Saif al-
Islam Gaddafi Reveals a Country in Chaos, Online TIME (28 June 2013)
<http://world.time.com/2013/06/28/libyas-disaster-of-justice-the-case-of-saif-al-islam-
gaddafi-reveals-a-country-in-chaos/> (Accessed on: 3 October 2013).
132
Warrant of Arrest for Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, No. ICC-01/11 (27 June
2011) [Warrant of Arrest for Saif al-Islam Qadhafi].
133
Libyas Unwilling Revolutionaries, supra note 1.
%)" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

public order. Tens of thousands of armed revolutionaries, approximately

125,000, are operating within more than one hundred brigades and spread
throughout Libyan territory.134 Each of these groups claims its share of
legitimacy, operates separately from other groups, and has its own
procedures regarding organization, arrest, and detention.135
These groups have refused several calls from the NTC and transitional
governments to surrender their arms and merge into the national army and
security forces. This is however prevented by the state of mistrust existing
between individual groups, on the one hand, and between them and the
central government, on the other. This situation has complicated the state of
security and would obstruct any attempt to reach reconciliation, peace-
building and restoring justice.136
However, this status of fragmentation reflects Libyas socio-cultural
landscape. Before independence in 1951, Libyan tribes functioned to a
considerable extent as independent political, economic, and military bodies.
This has been a feature of Libyas political and economic life over the past
sixty years; in fact, more than 70% of the population, despite considerable
migration in the 1960s and 1970s to Tripoli and other large cities during the
oil boom, still identify themselves as members of a tribe, retaining the same
tribal values and trends.137 This socio-cultural identity is profoundly rooted

134
Arturo Varvelli, The Role of Tribal Dynamics in the Libyan Future, International Society for
Performance Improvement (ISPI), Analysis No. 172, May 2013, at p.5; Chris Hughes, Libya:
Tribal Warfare Looms in Battle for Power in Post-Gaddafi Era, Online: Mirror (23 August 2011)
<http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/libya-tribal-warfare-looms-in-battle-149199>
(Accessed on: 3 October 2013); Florence Gaub, The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-
proofing and Repression, (2013) 36:2 Journal of Strategic Studies 239; Igor Cherstich, Libyas
Revolution: Tribe, Nation, Politics, Online: Open Democracy (3 October 2011) <http://
www.opendemocracy.net/igor-cherstich/libyas-revolution-tribe-nation-politics> (Accessed on:
3 October 2013); Libya: Fragile Security, Fragmented Politics, (2013) 19:2 IISS Strategic
Comments xv; Yahia H Zoubir & Erzsbet N Rzsa, The End of the Libyan Dictatorship: The
Uncertain Transition, (2012) 33:7 Third World Quarterly1270; Rosan Smits, et al., Revolution and
Its Discontents: State, Factions and Violence in the New Libya (The Hague, Conflict Research Unit,
the Clingendael Institute, 2013) 42.
135
Graeme Smith, In Libya, the Revolution Will be Tribalized, Online: The Globe and Mail (7
March 2011) <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/in-libya-the-revolution-will-be-
tribalized/article569819/> (Accessed on: 3 October 2013); Holding Libya Together: Security
Challenges After Qadhafi, International Crisis Group, Middle East/North Africa Report N115 (14
December 2011) at p. 3 [Security Challenges After Qadhafi]; Katarina Marcella Pedersen, After
Gaddafi, What Now? Issues of Transitional Justice (M.A., Georgetown University, 2013) 47; Libyas
Troubled Transition, supra note 22, at p. 7; Mathieu Galtier, Militias are Taking over in Post-
Gadhafi Libya, Online: USA TODAY (3 January 2013) <http://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/world/2013/01/03/libya-militias/1802523/> (Accessed on: 3 October 2013); Youssef
Sawani & Jason Pack, Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Qadhafi: The Islamist,
Regionalist, and Amazigh Challenges, (2013) 18:4 The Journal of North African Studies 524.
136
Hanan Salah, Dispatches: Law and Order in Libya, Tripoli-Style, Online: Human Rights
Watch (27 August 2013) <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/27/dispatches-law-and-order-
libya-tripoli-style> (Accessed on: 3 October 2013); Michael Shkolnik, Libyas Fragmentation:
Tribal Conflict, Islamism, and the Quest for Power, United Nations Association in Canada, 15
May 2012; Paul Iddon, A Clear-Cut Reminder of Libyas Tribal Divisions, Online: Digital
Journal (2 May 2013) <http://digitaljournal.com/ article/349326> (Accessed on: 3 October
2013); The Rule of Law Reform in Libya, supra note 120.
137
Haala Hweio, Tribes in Libya: From Social Organization to Political Power, (2012) 2: 1
African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review 114 [Haala Hweio]; Meftah Ali Dakhil, Migration,
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! %("

in the Libyans political and economic life and is strongly reflected in the
formation of post-Qadhafi security forces and rebel brigades.138
Inevitably, the lack of security has resulted in poor governance, a fragile
judicial system, and difficulties in breaking with the legacy of impunity
inherited from the former regime.139 The absence of a centralized authority
resulted in the failure of the transitional government to protect foreign
diplomatic corps in Benghazi,140 as well as Libyan high ranking officials,141
and minorities. The latter case is best illustrated by the case of African
workers and immigrants who became a legitimate target of frequent
arbitrary arrests and abusement.142 The lack of the transitional governments
control over armed militias promotes a large scale of retaliation attacks,

Development, and Place Preferences: The Example of Libya (Ph.D., Dissertation, University of
Kentucky, 1989) 33; Mohamed Farag Malhauf, A Study of Newly Developed Communities in Libya
(Ph.D., Dissertation, University of California-Berkeley, 1979) 21.
138
Hilmi M. Zawati, Aftermath of Rape and Sexual Violence: The Dilemma of Libyan Women Wartime
Rape Survivors, International Speakers Lecture Series, Faculty of Law, Queens University,
Kingston, Ontario, 29 March 2012; Seth Kaplan, Understanding Libya: The Role of Ethnic and
Tribal Groups in Any Political Settlement, Online Fragile States (1 March 2012)
<http://www.fragilestates.org/2012/03/01/understanding-libya-the-role-of-ethnic-and-tribal-
groups-in-any-political-settlement/> (Accessed on: 3 October 2013).
139
Divided We Stand: Libyas Enduring Conflicts, International Crisis Group, Middle East/North
Africa Report N 130 (14 September 2012).
140
The attack on the US diplomatic mission in Benghazi on 11 September 2012, and the failure of
the transitional government to respond adequately to the incident, illustrates the lack of the rule
of law and the constant failure of the government to impose it. See Barak Barfi, Libyas Anti-
Military Militias, Online: Project Syndicate (7 January 2013) <http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/replacing-militias-with-national-security-forces-in-libya-by-barak-
barfi> (Accessed on: 24 February 2013).
141
Recently, on 6 January 2013, Mohamed Magarief, head of the Libyan General National
Congress, was attacked by gunmen during his visit to Sebha to meet with members of local
tribes on the subject of tribal clashes between Awlad Suleiman and Qadhadhfa tribes, which left
several dead on both sides. Moreover, at the time of writing this paper, Ali Zeidan, the Libyan
prime minister, has been abducted and held for several hours by armed men associated with the
fragmented Libyan security apparatusthe Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR)
and the Anti-Crimes Unit. This is yet another high-profile example of the state of confusion and
lawlessness in Libya two years after the fall of the Qadhafi regime. See Details Emerge of
Attack on Magarief in Sebha, Online: Libya Herald (6 January 2013) <http://
www.libyaherald.com/2013/01/06/reports-emerge-of-magarief-assassination-attempt-in-
sebha/> (Accessed on: 24 February 2013); Freed Libyan Prime Minister Urges Calm: Ali Zeidan
was Held for Several Hours by Former Rebel Brigades, Online: Aljazeera (10 October 2013)
<http://www.aljazeera. com/news/africa/2013/10/freed-libyan-prime-minister-urges-calm-
2013101015129385582.html> (Accessed on: 11 October 2013); Kim Sengupta, Is No One Safe in
Libya? PM has to be Rescued from Kidnap Gang : Ali Zeidan was Freed after Half a Day, but his
Abduction Highlights a Nations Slide into Chaos, Online: The Independent (10 October 2013)
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/is-no-one-safe-in-libya-pm-has-to-be-
rescued-from-kidnap-gang-8870655.html> (Accessed on: 11 October 2013); Libyan Prime
Minister Seized by Armed Men," Online (10 October 2013) <http://www. aljazeera.com/
news/africa/2013/10/libyan-pm-ali-zeidan-kidnapped-by-armed-men-2013101042630477468
.html> (Accessed on: 11 October 2013); Mahmud Turkia Show of Power by Libya Militia in
Kidnapping, New York Times (10 October 2013) <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/
world/africa/libya.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0> (Accessed on: 11 October 2013).
142
The battle for Libya, supra note 12, at pp. 9 & 80; Human Rights Watch, Libya: Cease
Arbitrary Arrests, Abuse of Detainees Thousands Arrested Without Review in Tripoli, (30
September 2011), at p. 2; Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, supra note
12, at para. 62; Rule of Law or Rule of Militias?, supra note 130, at p. 15.
%*" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

including rape and other forms of sexual violence, against groups or

communities believed to be loyalists to the former regime. Some townships
and districts in Western Libya have been ethnically cleansed and turned into
virtual ghost towns, particularly Tuwergha, Bani Walid, and Sirte.143
However, security is essential to the Libyan transitional justice process,
just as it is also critical to preventing future conflicts and stopping rape
retaliation attacks, bringing justice to wartime rape victims, providing fair
trials to perpetrators, and helping the Libyan people to tolerate the painful
legacy of the past, so as to achieve justice for all citizens.
4. Lack of Democratic Institutions
Despite the differences between the three consecutive regimes that have
governed Libya since independence in 1951, they all shared a consensus in
considering the Libyan tribes as an important component and central player
in shaping the Libyan state and contributing to its political identity.144 King
Muhammad Idris al-Sanusi, the first and last king of Libya, who was
interested in reigning more than governing, had used the Libyan tribes as
social associations to strengthen his control over the country and as an
alternative to democratic institutions.145 However, although the King tried in
the middle of the 1960s to transfer responsibilities under the jurisdiction of
the tribes over to government institutions, the tribal structure continued to
be in a strong position when Qadhafi toppled the monarchy on September 1,
1969.146
To reinforce his regime during the 42 years of his authoritarian rule,
Qadhafi marginalized the army and distributed weapons to many informal
tribal groups. Then, to further consolidate power, he dismantled the
traditional state institutions and replaced them, according to his political
vision, with revolutionary committees.147 These committees formed the
courts, carried out wide-ranging powers of arrest, and controlled the media
and other aspects of Libyans lives.148 Furthermore, taking advantage of the

143
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Building the New Libya: Lessons to Learn and to Unlearn, (2013) 34
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 372; Security Challenges after Qadhafi,
supra note 135, at p. 27.
144
Haala Hweio, supra note 137, at 112.
145
Barak Barfi, Rebuilding the Ruins of Qaddafi, Online: Project Syndicate (22 December 2011)
<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/rebuilding-the-ruins-of-qaddafi> (Accessed
on: 24 February 2013) [Rebuilding the Ruins of Qaddafi].
146
Dirk Vandewalle, Libya since Independence: Oil and State-Building (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1998), at p. 196 [Libya since Independence]; Haala Hweio, supra note 137, at p.
116.
147
Emanuela Paoletti, Libya: Roots of a Civil Conflict, (2011) 16:2 Mediterranean Politics 317;
Mohammed El-Katiri, State-Building Challenges in a Post-Revolution Libya, U.S. Army War
College, October 2012, at p. 23 [State-Building Challenges in a Post-Revolution Libya]; Saskia
van Genugten, Libya after Gadhafi, (2011) 53:3 Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 70 [Libya
after Gadhafi]; Thomas Hsken, Tribal Political Culture and the Revolution in the Cyrenaica of
Libya, in Libya from Revolution to a State Building: Challenges of the Transitional Period. A
Conference sponsored by the Libyan Centre for Studies and Research, Doha, Qatar, 7-8 January
2012, at p. 7.
148
Rebuilding the Ruins of Qaddafi, supra note 145.
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! %!"

fact that tribalism is a factor of daily life in Libya,149 Qadhafi implemented

the strategy of divide and rule by pitting Libyan tribes one against
another,150 which led to the formation on February 17th of rebel brigades
spread all over the country. This resulted in the emergence of some 140
militant groupsapproximately the number of the existing Libyan tribes
and clansfighting against each other for legitimacy and rule.
By weakening the states institutionsthe cornerstone in any process of
state building and democratizationand supporting the rise of the tribal
politicization to further his autocratic regime, Qadhafi turned Libya, despite
its great natural resources, into an underdeveloped, consumerist police
state.151 As Haala Hweio suggests, there was a direct relation between
weakening Libyas institutions and the increase in the role of the tribes in
political life, on the one hand, and the long-term plan of Qadhafi to remain in
power, on the other.152
In light of the above accounts, it is fair to say that the NTC and the
consecutive traditional governments have inherited a state without political
institutions or an effective judicial system. This situation has resulted in a
dual authority over the country, unskilled political leaders,153 and failure by
the government to reign in militias and restore the rule of law and public
order. These constitute the major challenges that Libyans need to face in
traversing the transitional period on their way to sustainable peace, state-
building, and democracy. 154

V. Transitional Justice v. Retributive Justice: Key

Mechanisms for Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in
Libya
There are a variety of international instruments that emphasize the right
of Libyan victims of gross and systematic violations of human rights to
obtain an effective remedy and various forms of reparation. These
instruments can provide them with a transnational judicial and non-judicial
framework that would enable them to appear before national judicial bodies

149
State-Building Challenges in a Post-Revolution Libya, supra note 147, at p. 1.
150
Christopher S. Chivvis, et al., Libyas Post-Qaddafi Transition: The Nation-Building
Challenge, RAND Corporation, 2012, at p. 11.
151
Craig R. Black, Deterring Libya: The Strategic Culture of Muammar Qadhafi, Future War
fair Series No. 8, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, US,
October 2000, at p. 10; Haala Hweio, supra note 137, at p. 118; Libya since Independence, supra
note 146, at p. 9; State-Building Challenges in a Post-Revolution Libya, supra note 147, at p. 7;
Ulla Holm, Libya in Transition: The Fragile and Insecure Relation between the Local, the
National and the Regional, in Louise Riis Andersen, ed., How the Local Matters
Democratization in Libya, Pakistan, Yemen and Palestine (Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish
Institute for International Studies, DIIS, 2013), at p. 27.
152
Haala Hweio, supra note 137, at p. 120.
153
Barak Barfi, Libyas Transition to Transition, Online: Project Syndicate (15 March 2012)
<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/libya-s-transition-to-transition> (Accessed
on: 27 February 2013).
154
Libya after Gadhafi, supra note 147, at p. 70; Rebuilding the Ruins of Qaddafi, supra note 145.
%+" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

exercising universal jurisdiction, regional courts of human rights,

international committees, and truth and reconciliation commissions to seek
redress.
As has already been noted at the beginning of this analysis, mechanisms
for gender-sensitive transitional justice in Libya may comprise a wide range
of options, including those offered by judicial and non-judicial bodies.155 The
latter option may involve several national justice-serving measures: truth-
seeking, fact-finding, and reconciliation commissions, which aimed at the
investigation of gender-based crimes perpetrated by both state and non-state
actors before, during, and after the recent eight-month civil war. Similar
commissions, e.g., the truth and reconciliation commissions of South Africa,
Sierra Leone, Peru, etc., usually conclude their reports by providing the
results of their investigation and recommendations for amnesty, legal
prosecution, and reparation to victims.156 Accountability mechanisms may
include Libyas civil and criminal courts, the ICC,157 and perhaps a special
court for Libya, composed of domestic and international judges and
applying both Libyan and international criminal law.
In order to overcome the challenges posed by the failure of consecutive
Libyan governments over the past sixty years to reform the judicial system
and to incorporate international crimes identified in different international
legal instruments, particularly the Rome Statute of the ICC,158 it is necessary
that the current transitional government utilize a number of overlapping key
mechanisms in order to achieve gender-sensitive transitional justice in Libya.

155
Gender-Based Violence in Transition, supra note 39, at p. 14; Kai Ambos, The Legal
Framework of Transitional Justice: A Systematic Study with a Special Focus on the Role of the
ICC, in Kai Ambos et al. (eds.), Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional
Justice, Peace and Development (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2009) 19 [The Legal Framework of
Transitional Justice]; The Rule of Law Reform in Libya, supra note 120; Sirkku K. Hellsten,
Transitional Justice and Aid, Working Paper No. 2012/06, United Nations University, January
2012, at p.16.
156
Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring, supra note 6, at p. 9.
157
Based on the prosecutors investigation into the situation in Libya pursuant to the Security
Councils Resolution 1970 (2011), arrest warrants were issued on 27 June 2011 by the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber I to Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Gaddafi, and Abdullah al-Senussi, for their
individual responsibility in crimes committed by governments security forces after 15 February
2011 in different locations of the Libyan Territory. See The International Criminal Court, the
Office of the Prosecutor, First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to
the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), (26 February 2011); The International
Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor, Second Report of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), (9
November 2011); The International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor, Third Report
of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to
UNSCR 1970 (2011), (4 June 2012); The International Criminal Court, the Office of the
Prosecutor, Fourth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN
Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), (7 July 2012); Prosecutors Application
Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammad Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi,
and Abdullah al-Senussi, Pre-trial Chamber I, Case No. ICC-01/11 (16 May 2011); UN Security
Councils Resolution 1970 (2011), Situation Referred to International Criminal Court (26 February
2011), UN Doc. S/RES/1970 (2011) [UN Security Councils Resolution 1970]; Warrant of Arrest
for Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, supra not 132.
158
The Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 79, at Arts. 6-8; Transitional Justice and the Arab
Spring, supra note 6, at p. 4.
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! %#"

The following section underlines three significant mechanisms that can help
in this effort, including: urgent legal justice system reform; an effective truth
and reconciliation process involving the participation of Libyan feminist
legal scholars and activists; and a special court for Libya with a hybrid legal
systemsimilar to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)159 and the
Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)160to
adequately prosecute and punish conflict-related gender-based crimes and
provide justice for both victims and perpetrators, regardless of their political
affiliation or tribal lineage and the time-frame of the offences. The
employment of these mechanisms by the transitional government would
partly fulfil its obligations under international law and be consistent with the
Security Councils resolutions.161 These resolutions demand that states ensure
womens involvement in all aspects of post-conflict reconciliation and peace-
building,162 and emphasize accountability for crimes committed during any
conflict against women, including wartime rape and other forms of sexual
violence.163
1. Legal Justice System Reform
For many years, domestic and international criminal laws avoided
recognizing wartime rape and other forms of sexual violence as punishable
crimes under their provisions. After the incorporation of gender-based
crimes into the laws of some national courts164 exercising universal
jurisdiction,165 as well as into the statutes of international tribunals and
courts, there has been a tendency in many recent post-conflict trials for the
above judicial bodies to prosecute high-ranking officers for inciting rape and
other gender crimes, leaving the actual perpetrators to remain at large. As a
result, many of the atrocities committed against women and men go
unpunished and victims see their claims ignored.166
Accordingly, reforming the inherited defective Libyan legal system is a
condicio sine qua non for an effective gender-sensitive transitional justice that

159
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone (16 January 2002), 2178 U.N.T.S. 138.
160
Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of
Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/
1004/006).
161
Particularly, UN Security Councils Resolution 1325, supra note 108; UN Security Councils
Resolution 1820 supra note 109; UN Security Councils Resolution 1888 (2009), Women and Peace
and Security (30 September 2009) UN Doc. S/RES/1888 (2009); UN Security Councils Resolution
1889 (2009), Women and Peace and Security (5 October 2009) UN Doc. S/RES/1889 (2009).
162
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Review of the Sexual Violence Elements of the
Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Light of Security Council Resolution
1820 (New York, N.Y.: United Nations Publications, 2009), at pp. 13-14.
163
Nahla Valji, A Window of Opportunity? Making Transitional Justice Work for Women (New York,
N.Y.: United Nations Development Fund for Women, 2010) 1 [Making Transitional Justice Work
for Women].
164
Fore example, see Canadian Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, R.S.C., 2000, c.24.
165
R. v. Dsir Munyaneza, (22 May 2009) Montreal Superior Court, 500-73-002500-052,
C.A.H.W.C.A., at 737.
166
Gender-Based Violence in Transition, supra note 39, at p. 15.
%$" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

guarantees Libyan womens rights and especially their participation in post-

conflict policy-making and decision-taking on equal footing with Libyan
men.167 Needless to say, the Libyan transitional government has inherited a
flawed legal system that lacked independenceand therefore the confidence
of the Libyan peopleover the past four decades, and does not specifically
incorporate international crimes embodied in the Rome Statue of the ICC,
including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, extrajudicial
killings, and gender-based crimes.168 This lacuna in the law may prevent
Libyan judicial bodies from prosecuting and punishing those responsible for
previous and recent international crimes committed in a number of war-torn
Libyan cities and towns.169 Moreover, a gender-sensitive transitional justice
requires that gendered legal norms be included in and considered as an
integral part of the Libyan Penal Code. This process is necessary to develop a
new legal understanding of the harms of rape and other forms of sexual
violence in war settings.170
2. Gender Transitional Justice as Restorative Justice: The Libyan Truth
and Reconciliation Commission
This long-term and painstaking non-judicial mechanism requires that
both perpetrators and victims acknowledge, remember and learn from the
past with the aim of transforming Libyan society from a state of war and
lawlessness into one of sustainable peace, rule of the law, democracy, and
state-building.171 This will require truth-seeking, and fact-finding and

167
Christine Bell & Catherine ORourke, Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice?
An Introductory Essay, (2007) 1 The International Journal of Transitional Justice 25 & 30; Helen
Scanlon & Kelli Muddell, Gender and transitional justice in Africa: Progress and prospects,
(2009) 9:2 African Journal on Conflict Resolution 25; Rashida Manjoo & Calleigh McRaith,
Gender-Based Violence and Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Areas, (2011) 44 Cornell
International Law Journal 17; Report of the Secretary-General, Womens Participation in
Peacebuilding, UN Doc A/65/354S/2010/466 (7 September 2010), paras. 4 & 18; Making
Transitional Justice Work for Women, supra note 163, at p. 25.
168
The battle for Libya, supra note 12, at p. 10; Contribution of the Arab Spring to the Role of
Transitional Justice and Amnesty Laws, supra note 59, at p. 9; Leila Hanafi, Libya and the ICC:
Inspiring Transitional Justice Reform, Online: JURIST-Hotline (16 May 2012) <http://
jurist.org/hotline/2012/05/leila-hanafi-libya-ICC.php> (Accessed on: 27 February 2013)
[Inspiring Transitional Justice Reform]; Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on
Libya, supra note 12, at para. 770.
169
To be able to prosecute international crimes in its courts, Libya has to incorporate core crimes,
particularly crimes against humanity into its domestic criminal code. For further discussion, see
Leila Nadya Sadat, A Comprehensive History of the Proposed International Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, in Leila Nadya Sadat, Forging a
Convention for Crimes against Humanity (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 474.
170
Campbell, Kirsten, The Gender of Transitional Justice: Law, Sexual Violence and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, (2007) 1 The International Journal
of Transitional Justice 428.
171
Anja Mihr, Transitional Justice and the Quality of Democracy From democratic institution
building to reconciliation, in Anja Mihr, ed., Transitional Justice: Between Criminal Justice,
Atonement and Democracy (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2012) 32; Martina Fischer, Transitional
Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice, Online <http://www.berghof-
handbook.net/documents/publications/ fischer_tj_and_rec_handbook.pdf> (Accessed on: 28
February 2013), p. 407; Romi Sigsworth, Gender-Based Violence in Transition, Concept Paper,
in Violence and Transition Project Roundtable Sponsored by Centre for the Study of Violence
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! %%"

reconciliation commissions. The main object of this process, which can only
complement but not substitute for criminal justice,172 is to investigate
conflict-related gender-based crimes, bring justice to Libyan women and men
victims of wartime rape and other forms of sexual violence, and emphasize
their rights to justice and remedy pursuant to the principle ubi jus ibi
remedium, regardless of their political affiliation or tribal lineage, or of
whether they were abused before, during or after the recent civil war.
Libyan victims fundamental rights to an effective remedy are thus
clearly established and crystallized in international humanitarian and human
rights law.173 They have been enshrined in the norms of international
customary humanitarian law pre-WWI; the Treaty of Versailles; the
judgements of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ); and the
Harvard Draft, which provides in Article 7 that states are responsible for
injuries caused by an act or omission of the state.174
The international human rights instruments that entered into force after
the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, and that were ratified by
Libya, recognize the victims substantive rights to effective and adequate
remedy, whether these rights were violated by other individuals or by
government authorities, intentionally or through negligence. Article 8 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the first provision to emphasize
the victims substantive right to obtain an effective remedy, implying that the
remedy must be individualized and adjudicatory.175 On the other hand, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which
emphasizes the civil and political rights listed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, elucidates the victims right to an effective remedy in Article

and Reconciliation Transitional Justice Programme, Johannesburg, 7 9 may 2008, at p. 18;

Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, et. al., Transitional Justice and Reconciliation. In Inclusive Security,
Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action. Hunt Alternatives Fund, 2007, at p.2;
Transitional Justice Does It Help or Does It Harm, supra note 39, at p. 4; Transitional Justice
and Ongoing Conflict, supra note 4, at 6.
172
The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice, supra note 155, at 34.
173
Human Rights Watch, Truth and Justice Cant Wait: Human Rights Developments in Libya
amid Institutional Obstacles, (December 2009), at p. 59.
174
In the Chorzow Factory case, 1928, the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that
it is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation. See Chorzow Factory, Merits, Judgement
No. 13 (1928) P. C. I. J., Series A, No. 17, p. 29. See also: Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, Local
Remedies in International Law (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 88; Harvard
Draft of the Law of Responsibility of States for Damages done in their Territory to the Persons or Property
of Foreigners (Supplement to 1929) 23 American Journal of International Law 131; Karen Parker &
Jennifer F. Chew, Compensation for Japans World War II War-Rape Victims, (1994) 17:3
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 524-525; Reparation for Torture: A Survey of
Law and Practice in Thirty Selected Countries, Redress, Report, April 2003, p. 10; Sompong
Sucharitkul, State Responsibility and International Liability in Transnational Relations, in
Jerzy Makarczyk, ed., Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in
Honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski (Boston, Mass.: Kluwer Law International, 1996) 286; Treaty of
Versailles, 28 June 1919, 2 Bevans 43; Reprinted in Leon Friedman, ed., The Law of War: A
Documentary History, vol. 1 (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1972) 417-434.
175
It states that [e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
See Universal declaration of Human Rights, supra note 70, Article 8.
%&" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

2(3). It extends this right to violations committed by government personnel

and officials by ruling out the defences of sovereign immunity or following
superior orders, and by obliging governments to investigate and prosecute
violations regardless of the fact that they were committed by persons in an
official capacity.176
Similar norms are explicitly embodied in several regional and
international human rights law instruments, particularly those treaties and
conventions codified in the aftermath of WWII177 and during the 1990sthe
years of proliferation of United Nations human rights treaty bodies and
monitoring mechanismswhich produced dozens of reports on the human
rights situations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.178

176
Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reads:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

a. To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
b. To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his rights
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
c. To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.

See Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 99, Article 2(3).
177
Michael OFlaherty, Treaty Bodies Responding to States of Emergency: The Case of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, in Philip Alston & James Crawford, eds., The Future of UN Human Rights
Treaty Monitoring (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 439 & 444; Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in
International Law, (1990) 78 California Law Review 475 & 478; Rebecca J. Cook, State
Responsibility for Violations of Womens Human Rights, (1994) 7 Harvard Human Rights
Journal 169; Ren Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 2002) 43; UN Commission on Human Rights, Question of the
Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political): Final Report Prepared by Mr.
Joinet Pursuant to Sub-Commission Decision 1996/119, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20 (26 June
1997), p. 7.
178
Between 1992 and 1998, Special Rapporteurs of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Ren
Deqni-Squi, M. Tadeuse Mazowiecki, and Elisabeth Rehn, submitted dozens of reports on the
situation of human rights in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, some of which are listed in the
following:
Reports submitted by Ren Deqni-Squi on the situation of human rights in Rwanda: UN
Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by
Mr. Ren Deqni-Squi, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (28 June 1994); UN Commission on Human
Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. Ren Deqni-Squi, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1995/12 (12 August 1994); UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. Ren Deqni-Squi, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/70 (11 November 1994); UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. Ren Deqni-Squi, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/71 (17 January 1995); UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. Ren Deqni-Sgui, Special Rapporteur, under Paragraph 20
of Resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/7 (28 June 1995); UN Commission on
Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. Ren Degni-
Sgui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under Paragraph 20 of Resolution S-3/1
of 25 May 1994, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/68 (29 January 1996); UN Commission on Human
Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. Ren Degni-Sgui,
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under Paragraph 20 of Resolution S-3/1 of 25
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! %'"

This right, which is also incorporated in conventional and customary

international humanitarian law, including the 1907 Hague Convention IV
and the Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, may take
the form of restitution, rehabilitation, truth commissions, or monetary
compensation.179 The basic principles and guidelines of these forms were

May 1994, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/61 (20 January 1997).

Reports submitted by M. Tadeuse Mazowiecki on the situation of human rights in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia: UN Commission on Human Rights, Analytical Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by M. Tadeuse Mazowiecki, Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Pursuant to Paragraph 14 of Commission Relations
1992/S-1/1 of 14 August 1992, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9 (28 August 1992); UN Commission
on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 1993/50 (10 February 1993); UN
Commission on Human Rights, Fourth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/8,
(26 September 1993); UN Commission on Human Rights, Periodic Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1994/3 (5 May 1993); UN Commission on Human Rights, Second Periodic Report on
the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/4 (19 May 1993); UN Commission on Human Rights, Fourth
Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted
by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/8 (26 September 1993); UN Commission on
Human Rights, Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47 (17 November 1993);
UN Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/4 (10 June 1994).
Reports submitted by Elisabeth Rehn on the situation of human rights in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia: UN Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia: Report Submitted by Ms. Elisabeth Rehn, Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1995/89, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1996/63 (14 March 1996); UN Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Periodic Report Submitted by Ms. Elisabeth Rehn, Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Pursuant to Paragraph 45 of Commission Resolution
1996/71, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/5 (17 July 1996); UN Commission on Human Rights, Situation of
Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Periodic Report Submitted by Ms. Elisabeth
Rehn, special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Pursuant to Paragraph 45 of Commission
Resolution 1996/71, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/9 (22 October 1996); UN Commission on Human
Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Final Report of Ms.
Elisabeth Rehn, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human
Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/63 (14 January 1998); UN Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Human
Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Report on the Human Rights Situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina Submitted by the Special Rapporteur Ms. Elisabeth Rehn, Pursuant to Commission
Resolution 1997/57, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/13 (15 October 1997); UN Commission on Human
Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Republic of Croatia Submitted by Ms. Elisabeth Rehn, Special Rapporteur,
Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1997/57, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/14 (31 October 1997); UN
Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia:
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Submitted by Ms.
Elisabeth Rehn, Special Rapporteur, Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1997/57, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/15 (31 October 1997).
179
Recommendation on the Issue of Comfort Women,: Supplementary Explanation, Japan Federation
of Bar Association Report, 1995, at p. 5; Responding to Victims of Wartime Sexual Violence in
Africa, supra note 6, at p. 36; UN Commission on Human Rights, Study Concerning the Right to
Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Final Report Submitted by Mr. Theo van Boven, Special
Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ Sub.2/1993/8 (2 July 1993) [Boven Final Report]; UN
Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Restitution,
&)" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

proposed by Theo van Boven, the United Nations special rapporteur, in his
1993 final report on reparations for gross violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms. Noting that it is usually too difficult for a victim to
obtain an optimal remedy for gross violations committed on a massive scale
e.g. systematic mass rape and genocide in the former Yugoslavia and
RwandaBoven asserted that to restore justice, the responsibility of the
perpetrator must be established and the rights of the victim preserved to the
fullest possible extent. In other words, remedies must be both effective and
adequate180a principle which the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is
supposed to emphasize, notwithstanding its limited success due to the lack
of enforcement powers and procedural obstructions.181
It should also be noted that the Libyan Fact-Finding and Reconciliation
Commission, established pursuant to Law No. 17 for the year 2012, will not
work properly without abolishing Law No. 38, particularly Article 4.182
Indeed, the failure to investigate crimes committed by the rebels during and
after the conflict would encourage the culture of impunity and undermine
the truth and reconciliation process.183
3. Accountability Mechanisms: Who Has Jurisdiction over Libyas
Gender-Based Egregious Crimes?
The debate over where to hold Saif al-Islam and other conflict-related

Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Grave Violations of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human
Rights Resolution 1998/43, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/65 (8 February 1999); UN Commission on
Human Rights, Final Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Restitution,
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Grave Violations of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Mr. Cherif Bassiouni, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human
Rights Resolution 1999/33, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62 (18 January 2000).
180
However, Bovens principles and guidelines were revised by M. Cherif Bassiouni, an
independent expert, who replaced the special rapporteur in 1998. A final version of Bassiounis
report was submitted in 2000 and circulated for comments by the Office of the High
Commissioner in 2002. A revised version of Bassiounis report deleted all references to
international humanitarian law and changed the title to: Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Law.
Finally, the Commission called for Alejandro Salinas to make another revised version by
consulting Boven and Bassiouni, taking into consideration remarks made by organizations and
governments. A final revised draft was submitted on 1 October 2004. See Boven Final Report,
supra note 179, at paras. 131 & 137; Dinah Shelton, The United Nations Principles and
Guidelines on Reparations: Context and Contents, in Koen De Feyter, et al., eds., Out of the
Ashes: Reparation for the Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations (Antwerpen, U.K.:
Intersentia, 2005) 15-18; Reparation: A Sourcebook for Victims of Torture and other Violations of
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Redress, Report, March 2003, p. 15; Torture
Survivors Perceptions of Reparation: Preliminary Survey, Redress, Report, 2001, p. 13; UN
Commission on Human Rights, Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during
Armed Conflict: Final Report Submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (22 June 1998).
181
Hilmi M. Zawati, supra note 89, at 273.
182
Law No. (17), supra note 39; Law No. (38), supra note 45, at Art. 4; Libya: Transitional
Government Should Support Victims [1] Promote Justice for Sexual Violence, Human Rights
Watch (19 September 2011); Libyan Women Demand Support for War Rape Victims, Reuters,
Tripoli, Libya, 26 November 201.
183
Contribution of the Arab Spring to the Role of Transitional Justice and Amnesty Laws, supra
note 59, at p. 44.
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! &("

criminal suspects and under whose jurisdiction they fall has led to a
continuous legal tug of war between the various Libyan transitional
governments and the ICC.184 While Libya insists on its right to try suspects at
homewhere the alleged crimes were committedin Libyan courts and
before Libyan judges, the latter has repeatedly asked the Libyan NTC and
successive transitional governments to surrender Saif al-Islam and Abdullah
Senussi (hereinafter Senussi) to the Court, confirming its jurisdiction over
their trial pursuant to the UN Security Councils Resolution 1970 (2011)
adopted unanimously under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and pursuant to
Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute of the ICC on 26 February 2011.185 This
Resolution refers the situation in Libya to the ICC and requests the Libyan
transitional government to cooperate fully with the Court and the
Prosecutor.186
Acting on the above resolution, the Prosecutor initiated investigations
and sought arrest warrants on 16 May 2011 against Muammar Qadhafi, Saif
al-Islam and Senussi for responsibility for alleged crimes against humanity
committed in Libya between 15 and 28 February 2011.187 On 27 June 2011, the
Pre-Trial Chamber I accepted the Prosecutors application,188 and issued
three warrants of arrest for the above officials in relation to murders and
persecutions allegedly committed after 15 February 2011 by state security
forces.189 Accordingly, the Registry filed, on 4 July 2011, its request to the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the arrest and surrender of Muammar
Mohammed Abu Minyar Qadhafi, Saif al-Islam and Senussi.190 Proceedings
against Muammar Qadhafi were officially terminated on 22 November
2011,191 following his capture and execution by rebels from Misrata near his

184
Leila Hanafi, Libya and the ICC: in the pursuit of justice?, Online: Middle East Monitor (9
May 2012) <http://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/3737-libya-and-the-icc-
in-the-pursuit-of-justice> (Accessed on: 1 March 2013) [Libya and the ICC]; Mark S. Kersten,
After the War: Negotiating Justice in Post-Gaddafi Libya, in Kirsten Fisher and Robert Stewart
(eds.), Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring, (Routledge, Forthcoming 2013), at p. 12
[Negotiating Justice in Post-Gaddafi Libya]; Mike Corder, Court Mulls Where Gadhafis Son Should
Be Tried, Associated Press, The Hague, Netherlands, (9 October 2012) [Court Mulls Where Gadhafis Son
Should Be Tried]; Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring, supra note 6, at p. 9.
185
UN Security Councils Resolution 1970, supra note 157, at para. 4.
186
Ibid, at para. 5. See also Anna F. Triponel & Paul R. Williams, The Clash of the Titans: Justice
and Realpolitik in Libya, (2013) 28 American University International Law Review 800.
187
Prosecutors Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammad Abu Minyar
Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah al-Senussi, Pre-trial Chamber I, Case No. ICC-
01/11 (16 May 2011).
188
Decision on the Prosecutors Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed
Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Pre-Trial Chamber 1,
Case No. ICC-01/11 (27 June 2011).
189
Warrants of Arrest in Respect of Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-
Senussi, Pre-trial Chamber I, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11-2, ICC-01/11-01/11-3, ICC-01/11-
01/11-4 (27 June 2011).
190
Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-
Senussi, Request to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the arrest and surrender of Muammar
Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Registry,
Case No. 01/11-01/11-5 (4 July 2011).
191
Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-
Senussi, Decision to Terminate the Case Against Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi,
&*" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

hometown of Sirte on 20 October 2011.192

Subsequent to the capture of Saif al-Islam on 19 November 2011 by rebel
fighters from Zintan, one of Libyas most powerful militia factions, the
prosecutor visited Libya and conducted several meetings with Libyan
officials. In a joint press conference with the Libyan Minister of Justice, the
latter stated that Saif al-Islam could be tried in Libya in coordination with the
ICC.193 During the conference, the Prosecutor mentioned Libyas right to try
Saif al-Islam in Libya and insisted that the ICC would not intervene if the
Libyan authorities proceeded along those lines.194 On the occasion of that
visit, Abdurrahim El-Keib, the Prime Minster of the NTC, expressed Libyas
desire to try Saif al-Islam and Senussi in Libya, and asserted that Libya was
moving forward with an investigation into crimes against humanity
allegedly committed by them in February 2011.195 On the other hand, he
asserted that Libya, which was then in the process of adopting a new penal
law incorporating international crimes, namely, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and the crime of genocide,196 would provide the suspects with
fair and independent trials.197 Nonetheless, in complete contrast to what had
been stated by or attributed to the Prosecutor, the ICC issued a press release
the following day emphasizing that Libya was obligated to surrender the
suspect and cooperate fully with the Court in accordance with Resolution
1970. If it was the wish of the Libyan authorities to prosecute Saif al-Islam,
they would have to submit an application to the Pre-Trial Chamber I,
challenging the admissibility of the case pursuant to Articles 17 and 19 of the
Rome Statute of the ICC. The acceptance or rejection of the inadmissibility of
the case would be left to the discretion of the Judges of the ICC.198

Pre-Trial Chamber 1, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11-28 (22 November 2011).

192
Death of a Dictator, supra note 16, at 32.
193
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi could be Tried in Libya, Says ICC Prosecutor, Reuters, Tripoli, Libya, 22
November 2011.
194
The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Request to Disqualify the
Prosecutor from Participating in the Case Against Mr. Saif Al Islam Gaddafi, The Appeals
Chamber, Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11 (3 May 2012), at para. 13.
195
The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Application on Behalf of the
Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.
ICC-01/11-01/11 (1 May 2012) Annex A (Public) Press Statement by H.E. Dr. Abdurrahim El-
Keib, Prime Minister of the Transitional Council of Libya on the Occasion of the Visits of Mr.
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Court.
196
The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Application on Behalf of the
Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.
ICC-01/11-01/11 (1 May 2012). Annex J (Public) National Transitional Council Decree
Recognising the Applicability of International Crimes within Libyan Laws; The Prosecutor v. Saif
Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya
Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 (1
May 2012) Annex K (Public) Letter to Dr. Ahmed Sadiq al-Jehani from Mostafa Eissa Lindi
Regarding incorporating Articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC in the Libyan Penal Code.
197
The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Application on Behalf of the
Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.
ICC-01/11-01/11 (1 May 2012). Annex H (Public) Memorandum Explaining the Guarantees of
the Accused in Front of the Libyan Judicial System through the Accusation and Trial Phases.
198
Press Release, 23 November 2011, Course of Action before the ICC Following the Arrest of
the Suspect Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi in Libya, ICC-CPI-2011/11/23-PR746.
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! &!"

Some months later, despite the fact that the NTC had assured the Pre-
Trial Chamber on 23 January 2012 that Libya had no intention at that time to
challenge the admissibility of the case, nevertheless, seeking to defer Saif al-
Islams surrender under Article 94,199 the Libyan government reversed its
decision and brought on 1 May 2012 an application to the ICC under Article
19(2)(b) of the Rome Statute challenging the admissibility of the case
concerning Saif al-Islam and Senussi.200 The application indicates that Libyan
authorities have already started investigating the suspects, and under the
principle of complementarity set forth in Article 17 of the Rome Statute of the
ICC, the Court has an obligation to rule in favour of this application.201 The
Libyan government also argued that denying Libyas right to try former
regime officials would compromise the sovereignty of the country, and
undermine the whole process of Libyan transitional justice. While Ahmed al-
Jehani, the Libyan lawyer representing the Libyan government at the Court,
has asserted that the ICCs trying of Saif al-Islam would discourage
reconciliation and sustainable peace in Libya and render the principle of
complementarity meaningless, Melinda Taylor, Saif al-Islams court-
appointed lawyer, emphasizes that the Court should not trust the Libyan
governments pledges and its fragile judicial system. She maintains that if the
ICC hands the case over to the Libyan authorities, Saif al-Islam will lose his
life in a completely vindictive and arbitrary trial that would have nothing to
do with justice.202 She stresses that the Libyan authorities are motivated not
by the desire for justice but for revenge.203 However, the Pre-Trial Chamber I
of the ICC rejected on 31 May 2013 the challenge to the admissibility of the
case against Saif Al Islam and reminded Libya of its obligation to deliver the
defendant to the Court.204
On the other hand, Payam Akhavan, McGill University professor of law
and member of Libyas legal team to the Court, argues that the ICC need

199
The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Request to Disqualify the
Prosecutor from Participating in the Case Against Mr. Saif Al Islam Gaddafi, The Appeals
Chamber, Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11-44-Anx1-Red. (3 May 2012).
200
The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Application on Behalf of the
Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.
ICC-01/11-01/11 (1 May 2012), at para. 1 [Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya
Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute]. See also Amin Nouri, The Principle of Complementarity
and Libya Challenge to the Admissibility before the International Criminal Court (M. A., Lund
University, 2013), at p.46.
201
Ibid.
202
Anna Bishop, Failure of Complementarity: The Future of the International Criminal Court
Following the Libyan Admissibility Challenge, (2013) 22 Minnesota Journal of International
Law 409-410; Court Mulls Where Gadhafis Son Should Be Tried, supra note 184; Taylor Breaks Silence to
Raise Fair Trial Fears, Online: ABC/AFP (7 July 2012) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-07-
06/taylor-breaks-silence-on-libyan-detention/4115916> (Accessed on: 31 December 2012).
203
Death awaits Gaddafis son in Libya, AFP, The Hague, Netherlands (10 October 2012);
Timothy William Waters, Libyas Home Court Advantage: Why the ICC Should Drop Its Qaddafi
Case, Foreign Affairs (2 October 2013) <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/139961/
timothy-william-waters/libyas-home-court-advantage> (Accessed on: 3 October 2013).
204
Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Decision on the Admissibility of the
Case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11 (31 May
2013), at para. 219.
&+" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

only take steps to conduct a criminal prosecution when states fail to

prosecute or are not able to investigate crimes. Yet in the Libyan case, the
country is willing to put Saif al-Islam on trial; so the question really revolves
around Libyas capacity to prosecute him.205 In this connection, human rights
groups have warned that a local fair trial for Saif al-Islam is impossible, as
revenge is more likely be served than justice.206 The lack of security and
public order indicate that a guilty verdict will automatically result in the
death penalty.207
Legally speaking, the ICCs jurisdiction over a case is restricted by the
principle of complementarity, incorporated in Article 17(1)(a), which
provides that the Court should take over a case only when a State is
unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution.208 In the
case of a non-State Party, the ICC cannot investigate and prosecute alleged
crimes under the provisions of the Rome Statute unless the UN Security
Council refers the case to the Prosecutor pursuant to Article 13(b) of the
Statute and under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as has happened with
regard to Libya and Sudan.209 Accordingly, as a non-State Party, Libya is not
obligated under the provisions of the statutory laws of the ICC to cooperate
with the Prosecutor or the Court, but it is so obligated by virtue of the
referral.210

205
M. Christopher Pitts, Being Able to Prosecute Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi: Applying Article 17(3)
of the Rome Statute to Libya, (2014) Emory International Law Review, 2014 Forthcoming.
Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2245790>, at p.23; Bridget Wayland, Libyan
Tug of War: International Law Professor Payam Akhavan is Playing a Key Role in One of the
Most Closely Watched Cases in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Online: Focus online/News
from the Faculty of Law/McGill University (20 December 2012)
<http://publications.mcgill.ca/reporter/2013/01/libyan-tug-of-war/> (Accessed on: 1 March
2013).
206
Frdric Mgret & Marika Giles Samson, Holding the Line on Complementarity in Libya:
The Case for Tolerating Flawed Domestic Trials, (2013) 11:3 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 572.
207
Michael Petrou, Tripoli vs. The Hague: Two Courts Vie to Try Gadhafis Son-Libya and the
International Criminal Court are at warover who gets to stage a trial for Saif al-Islam
Gadhafi, Online: Macleans (23 May 2012) <http://www2.macleans.ca/2012/05/23/tripoli-vs-
the-hague-two-courts-vie-to-try-gadhafis-son/> (Accessed on: 1 March 2013); Owen Bowcott
Saif Gaddafi Should Go on Trial in Libya, War Crimes Tribunal Told: Tripoli Urges ICC to
Abandon Legal Claim to Try Dictators Son, and Relative Abdullah al-Senussi, and Let Them
Face Justice at Home, Online: The Guardian (1May 2012) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2012/may/01/saif-gadaffi-trial-libya-icc> (Accessed on: 1 March 2013).
208
Darryl Robinson, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity, (2010) 21 Criminal
Law Forum 72; Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article
17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process, (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 263; Kirkland
Green, The Libya Cases at the ICC and the Libyan Governments Admissibility Challenge
Online: American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal
Court: AMICC (14 December 2012), <http://www.amicc.org/docs/Libya_Challenge. pdf>
(Accessed on: 28 February 2013); Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War
Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court (Antwerpen, Belgium: Intersentia, 2002) 55; The Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 79, at
Article 17 (1) (a).
209
Ibid, Article 13 (b); Jennifer Nimry Eseed, supra note 16, at 580.
210
Paragraph 5 of the UN SC Resolution 1970 reads: Libyan authorities shall cooperate fully
with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this
resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! &#"

In this connection, one may argue that since Libya is in the process of
reforming its judicial system by incorporating international crimes into its
penal code, by investigating and showing willingness to try suspect
members of the former regime and provide them with independent and fair
trials, and by being in no way obligated under any provision of the Rome
Statute to cooperate with the ICC, including article 86, the Court has a
binding duty to declare the cases against Saif al-Islam and Senussi
inadmissible. This fine-sounding argument could be challenged on different
bases, including the fact that the primacy of domestic courts related to the
principle of complementarity, spelled out in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, is
based on both willingness and ability.211 It is true that Libya is willing to
prosecute Saif al-Islam and other former regime officials for alleged crimes
committed in Libya against Libyans during the recent conflict, but it has no
capacity to do so under its current laws and given its fragile judicial system
inherited from the former regime, as well as the retributive justice prevailing
under the current transitional regime. Accordingly, Libya is in fact obligated
under the UN SC Resolution 1970 to comply with the ICC requests to
surrender Saif al-Islam and other wanted suspects to the Court, while the
Pre-Trial Chamber I is the only judicial body empowered to decide on the
Libyan authorities application of inadmissibility.212 However, while the
application for the admissibility of Saif al-Islams case is still pending at the
time of writing this work, 213 the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC ruled on 11

under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations
to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor. See Carsten Stahn, Libya, the
International Criminal Court and Complementarity: A Test for Shared Responsibility, (2012)
10: 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 330; UN Security Councils Resolution 1970, supra
note 157, at para. 5.
211
The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Prosecutions Response to
Libyan Governments further submissions on issues related to the admissibility of the case
against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11 (12 February
2013), paras. 21-22.
212
Dapo Akande, Is Libya Under an Obligation to Surrender Saif Gaddafi to the ICC? What
Does the Rome Statute Say?, Online: EJIL Talk (26 November 2011) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/
is-libya-under-an-obligation-to-surrender-saif-gaddafi-to-the-icc-part-i-what-does-the-rome-
statute-say/> (Accessed on: 28 February 2013); Dapo Akande, The Effect of Security Council
Resolutions and Domestic Proceedings on State Obligations to Cooperate with the ICC, (2012)
10:2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 301-303; Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Challenges
for the International Criminal Justice and the ICC following the Arrest of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi,
Online: American Society of International Law, Accountability Series (Spring 2012)
<http://www.asil.org/accountability/spring_2012_4.cfm> (Accessed on: 1 March 2013); The
prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, PCD Request for the Pre-Trial Chamber
to Make a Finding of Non-Compliance, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 (27
March 2012).
213
Generally, see The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Application for
leave to reply to the Response of the Libyan Government to the Urgent Application on behalf
of Abdullah Al-Senussi for Pre-Trial Chamber to order the Libyan Authorities to comply with
their obligations and the orders of the ICC of 1 February 2013, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.:
ICC-01/11-01/11 (5 February 2013); The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi,
Defence Response on behalf of Mr. Abdullah Al-Senussi to Government of Libyas Application
for Leave to Appeal the Decision on the Urgent Application on behalf of Abdullah Al-Senussi
for Pre-Trial Chamber to order the Libyan Authorities to comply with their obligations and the
orders of the ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11 (14 February 2013); The
&$" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

October 2013, after a protracted legal dispute between the latter and the
Libyan government, that the case against Senussi is currently subject to
domestic proceedings conducted by the Libyan competent authorities and
that Libya is willing and able genuinely to carry out such investigation.
Therefore, the Judges concluded that the case is inadmissible before the
Court, in accordance with the principle of complementarity enshrined in
Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, founding treaty of the ICC.214 Of course,
the prosecutor may still appeal this decision pursuant to Article 19(10) of the
same statute, especially as the Libyan justice systems capability to deliver a
fair judgement to the defendant is still in question due to the incompetent
legal system, absence of security, lack of public order, and poor governance.
In fact, Ali Zeidan, the Libyan prime minister, was kidnapped on 10 October
2013 for a few hours by armed militiamen in Tripoli.215
Nevertheless, this analysis triggers three accountability measures to
bring members of the former regime who allegedly committed or instigated
conflict-related crimes, including gender-based crimes, to justice:
First, local justice, where Libyan authorities request that Saif al-Islam
should stands trial in Libya under the jurisdiction of the local judicial system.
This is valid to the extent that justice ought to be served where crimes have
been committed, reinforcing the integral role of national criminal law in
setting grounds for punishments and their socio-pedagogical influences. It
also sends a direct message to both victims and perpetrators that when a
crime occurs, justice not only be done, but must be seen to be done 216
However, this mechanism must be excluded at the present time for many of
the reasons mentioned at the outset of this work. The capacity of the Libyan

Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Public Redacted Version of the
Response to the Libyan Governments further submissions on issues related to admissibility of
the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11 (18
February 2013); The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Request for Leave to
Reply to the Libyan Governments Response to Urgent Defence Request of 21 January 2013,
Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11 (22 February 2013); The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Response to the Libyan Government s Request for leave to
reply to Responses by OTP, OPCV and OPCD to Libyan Governments further submissions on
issues related to the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Pre-Trial Chamber I,
Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11 (22 February 2013).
214
Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Decision on the Admissibility of the
Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11 (11 October
2013), para. 311. See also ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I Decides that the Al-Senussi Case is to Proceed in
Libya and is Inadmissible before the ICC, Press Release, ICC-CPI-20131011-PR953 (31 May 2013).
Available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/
press%20releases/Pages/pr953.aspx> (Accessed on: 11 October 2013); Owen Bowcott, Gaddafi
Spy Chief's Trial Should be Held in Libya, ICC Rules: Abdullah al-Senussi Faces Death Penalty
for Allegedly Ordering Massacres during 2011 Revolution that Overthrew Regime, Online: The
Guardian (11 October 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2013/oct/11/gaddafi-spy-
chief-trial-libya-icc-rules> (26 October 2013).
215
Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Declaration of Judge Christine Van
den Wyngaert on the Admissibility of the Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, Pre-Trial Chamber
I, Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11 (11 October 2013), para. 2.
216
A. Simester & G. Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Portland, Or.: Hart, 2007) 32; B.
Mitchell, Multiple Wrongdoing and Offence Structure: A Plea for Consistency and Fair
Labelling, 64:3 Modern Law Review 398; Hilmi M. Zawati, supra note 8, at p. 6.
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! &%"

judicial system to deliver a fair trial must be seriously questioned after 42

years of lawlessness, absence of accountability and rule of law during and
after an eight-month bloody civil war, and in the light of a transitional justice
that has actively legislated impunity. 217 Indeed, the current Libyan judicial
system is not functioning effectively, suffers from the defects of the past,
lacks impartiality, and continues to be a tool of repression. Two years since
the fall of the former regime, the NTC and transitional governments are
completely unable to provide accountability, sustainable peace, state-
building, civil society, and the rule of law. Accordingly, it would be
impossible to secure a fair trial for the suspects. The lack of public order and
the inability to provide justice and redress to both victims and suspects have
motivated the international community to apply the principle of R2P and
encourage Libya to immediately launch serious criminal justice reform, and
to deliver Saif al-Islam and other former regime officials to the ICC.218
Moreover, holding Saif al-Islam incommunicado in the rebels custody at
Zintan for more than two years in poor conditions,219 without access to a
lawyer or an official indictment,220 is in conflict with Article 55 of the Rome

217
Alexander Knoops, Prosecuting the Gaddafis: Swift or Political Justice?, (2012) 4:1
Amsterdam Law Forum 90; Law No. (38), supra note 45, at Art. 4.
218
Inspiring Transitional Justice Reform, supra note 168; Libya and the ICC, supra note 184.
219
Generally, see The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Public Redacted
Version of OPCD Observations on Libyas Submissions Regarding the Arrest of Saif Al-Islam
(ICC-Ol/ll-Ol/ll-51-Conf, 2 February 2012), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11 (3
February 2012); The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Public Redacted
Version Urgent Report Concerning the Visit to Libya, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.: ICC-01/11-
01/11 (2 March 2012); The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Public
Redacted Response to the Notification and Request by the Government of Libya in response to
Decision on Libyas Submissions Regarding the Arrest of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Pre-Trial
Chamber I, Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11 (30 March 2012); The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi &
Abdullah Al-Senussi, Public Redacted Version of the Corrigendum to the Defence Response to
the Application on behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute,
Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11 (31 July 2012).
220
When the mission of the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence (OPCD) visited Libya, they
were told by a Libyan law officer that Saif al-Islam was not interrogated for war crimes, but in
connection with allegations concerning the fact that he allegedly did not have a licence for two
camels, and issues concerning the cleaning of his fish farms. However, Libyas legal team to the
Court has denied this story and considers it an inappropriate and unsubstantiated allegation by
the OPCD against Libya. See Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya Pursuant to
Article 19 of the ICC Statute, supra note 200, at para. 94; Kamal Abdallah, Gaddafis Men Face
Charges, Online: Al-Ahram Weekly (24 September 2013) <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/
News/4188/19/Gaddafi%E2%80%99s-men-face-charges. aspx> (Accessed on: 3 October 2013);
The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Public Redacted Addendum to the
Urgent Report Concerning the Visit to Libya, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No.: ICC-01/11-01/11
(5 March 2012), para. 38; Chris Stephen, Melinda Taylor Lashes out at Libya and ICC, Online:
Libya Herald (16 December 2012) <http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/12/16/icc-lawyer-
melinda-taylor-lashes-out-at-libya-again/> (Accessed on: 31 December 2012).
It is also worthy of note that Saif al-Islam appeared before a secret hearing on 17 January 2013 in
Zintan after 14 months after his capture on 19 November 2011. He was facing charges related to
a visit by the Court mission. He was charged with involvement with the ICC delegation
members who were carrying papers related to the national security of Libya. Melinda Taylor,
Saif al-Islams defence lawyer, who was a member of the delegation, has argued that he will not
receive a trial that would meet international standards credibility. She adds that his appearance
before a Libyan court violates the UN SC Resolution 1970, and calls on the Security Council to
impose Sanctions on Libya. See Jamie Dettmer, Justice for Gaddafi Heir? ICC Fears Saif al-
&&" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

Statute, which provides for the rights of persons during an investigation. 221 It
also infringes the principles of the right to fair warning or maximum
certainty,222 and the right to be tried without undue delay.223
Nevertheless, leaving aside the ICC request to transfer the defendant to
stand trial in The Hague, a pre-trial proceedings session has convened
behind closed doors in Tripoli on 24 October 2013 against 38 leading Qadhafi
regime figures, including Saif al-Islam; Senussi; Al-Baghdadi Al-Mahmoudi
(the former Prime Minister), Abu Zaid Omar Dorda (Qaddafis External
Security Agency head), and Abdulati El-Obaidi (the former Foreign
Minister).224 The defendants were charged with murder, kidnapping,
complicity in incitement to rape, plunder, sabotage, embezzling public funds
and committing acts harmful to national unity.225 For security reasons, only a
few of the indictees have appeared in court, pleading not guilty to all charges
levelled against them by the prosecution. Saif al-Islam, who is facing trial in
Zintan on a separate charge of trading information threatening Libyas
national security, didnt appear at the pre-trial hearing as militiamen refused
to deliver him to the court in Tripoli. However, the lack of security and the
wide scale lawlessness dominating the Libyan criminal justice system pose a
serious challenge to its ability to ensure fair and impartial trials for all
concerned.226

Islam Trial Wont Be Fair, Online: Daily Beast Company (January 18, 2013) <http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/18/justice-for-gaddafi-heir-icc-fears-saif-al-islam-
trial-won-t-be-fair.print.html> (28 February 2013); Saif Al-Islam in Libyan Court for First Time,
supra note 131.
221
The Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 79, at Art. 55.
222
Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 6th ed., (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University
Press, 2009), at pp. 63-64; Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 103 S. Ct. 1855; 461 U.S. 352; 75 L. Ed. 2d 903;
1983 U.S. LEXIS 159; 51 U.S.L.W. 4532, at p. 15.
223
The Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 79, at Art. 67(1)(c); Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, United Nations SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175. Annex, at 40, UN Doc.
S/25704, 3 May 1993. (As Amended on 19 May 2003 by Security Councils Resolution 1481), at
Article 21(4)(c); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Security Councils
Resolution S/RES/955 (1994) Annex, Adopted in the Security Councils 3454th meeting on 8
November 1994, at Article 20 (4)(c); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc.
S/2002/246, appendix II, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138. (06/03/2002), at Article 21(4)(c). See also Prosecutor
v. Samuel Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, and Allieu Kondewa, (2004) Decision on Prosecuting
Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, 20 May 2004, SCSL-03-14-PT., Valerie Oosterveld,
Lessons from the Special Court for Sierra Leone on the Prosecution of Gender-Based Crimes,
(2009) 17:2 American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy, and the Law 3.
224
Libya Court Indicts Gaddafi Aides over 2011 Uprising, Online: Agence France-Presse (24
October 2013) <http://www.rappler.com/world/regions/middle-east/42163-libya-gaddafi-
aides-indictment> (Accessed on: 28 October 2013); Libya Court Indicts Former Gaddafi Aides
over Crimes during 2011 Uprising, Online: Tripoli Post (25 October 2013)
<http://www.tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=1&i= 10752> (26 October 2013).
225
Chris Stephen, Gaddafis Son, Intelligence Chief and PM Among Defendants in Crucial
Trial: Most Important Trial in Libyas Post-Gaddafi Era Switched to Maximum Security Prison
in Tripoli over Fears of Violence, Online: The Guardian (19 September 2013)
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/19/ gaddafi-son-pm-trial> (Accessed on: 3
October 2013); Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui, Libya Must Surrender Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi to
International Criminal Court, Online: Amnesty International (18 September 2013) <http://
www.amnesty.org/en/news/libya-must-surrender-saif-al-islam-al-gaddafi-international-
criminal-court-2013-09-18> (Accessed on: 30 October 2013).
226
Chris Stephen, Libya Prepares for Its Trial of the Decade: Government Refused to Hand
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! &'"

The second accountability measure is the ICC, whether it should conduct

the trials in The Hague or in Tripoli. Due to the willingness and yet inability
of the Libyan authorities to prosecute Saif-al-Islam in Libya, and its
reluctance to transfer him to the Court, on the one hand, and to prevent
vindictive/victors justice in Libya, contribute to the reform of the Libyan
judicial system, and help in restoring the rule of law and sustainable peace,
on the other, the ICC can hold the trial in Tripoli227 pursuant to Article 3(3) of
the Rome Statute, which provides the [t]he Court may sit elsewhere,
whenever it considers it desirable, as provided in this Statute.228 Holding
trials for the former regime officials by the ICC in Tripoli would maintain the
standards of international criminal justice and encourage Libya to
demonstrate its commitment to international law. This would also address
Libyas concerns and desire to try war crimes suspects on the Libyan soil,
and encourage wartime rape victims to come forward and testify in a climate
of greater security and judicial effectiveness.229
Finally, as the above mechanism was evidently refused by the Libyan
transitional government, a third option could be a hybrid judicial system for
legal accountability akin to those systems established in different war-torn
countries.230 This is a relatively new judicial mechanism in international
criminal justice whereby international and local judges and prosecutors
apply domestic and international law. A hybrid judicial system, which
involves international and national components, could be more acceptable to
Libyan authorities for several reasons, including the unique opportunity it
would present for actors in the Libyan criminal justice system to share
proceedings with experienced international judges, prosecutors, and
lawyers; maintain Libyas sovereignty; contribute to the restoration and

Muammar Gaddafis Son and Spymaster over to International Criminal Court for War Crimes,
Online: The Guardian (17 September 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
sep/17/libya-trial-gaddafi-senussi> (Accessed on: 3 October 2013); Libya: A Rebuff to the ICC
Authorities Fail to Surrender Gaddafis Son to ICC, Despite Ruling, Online: Human Rights
Watch (September 19, 2013) <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/19/libya-rebuff-icc>
(Accessed on: 30 October 2013); Libya Court Indicts Gaddafi Aids and Son, Online: News 24
(24 October 2013) <http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Libya-court-indicts-Gaddafi-aides-
son-20131024-2> (26 October 2013); Neil Durkin, Saif Gaddafis Trial in Libya is Victors
Justice, Online: Huffington Post (21 September 2013) <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/neil-
durkin/saif-gaddafi-trial_b_3956043.html> (Accessed on: 3 October 2013).
227
This is what Mark Kersten calls an in situ trial. See Mark Kersten, ICC Confirms: Trial in
Libya by the Court is a Possibility!, Online: Justice in Conflict (21 November 2011) <http://
justiceinconflict.org/2011/11/21/icc-confirms-trial-in-libya-by-the-court-is-a-possibility/>
(Accessed on: 6 March 2013); Mark Kersten, Trying Saif, Senussi in Libya: Why is Moreno-
Ocampo so Lenient?, Online: Justice in Conflict (12 January 2012) <http://justiceinconflict.org/
2012/01/12/trying-saif-senussi-in-libya-why-is-the-moreno-ocampo-so-lenient> (Accessed on: 7
March 2013); Rebecca Lowe, Gaddafi Trial: International or Libyan Law?, Online:
International Bar Association (12 December 2011) <http://www.ibanet.org/
Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=21dd8269-4920-4bab-aaa6-5de4f7c2fdb4> (Accessed on: 7 March
2013).
228
The Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 79, at Art. 3(3).
229
Negotiating Justice in Post-Gaddafi Libya, supra note 184, at p. 20.
230
For example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary Chambers of the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina
(WCCCBH), and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
')" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!

reform of post-conflict judicial system; and strengthen Libyas position on

the international stage as a transformed country, newly emerged from
statelessness to accountability and the rule of law.231

VI. Conclusion
This analysis argues that the incompetence of the current Libyan
transitional justice system, manifested in its failure to respond adequately to
conflict-related gender-based crimes, impedes access to justice for victims,
encourages the culture of impunity, and leaves Libyas peace-building
process open to danger. In pursuing this inquiry, this research study
examines Libyas gender-based crimes under transitional justice and
affirmed its obligations under the norms of international law to protect
victims and prosecute alleged gender-based crimes. It also underlines the
dilemma of prosecuting gender-based crimes under Libyan transitional
justice by exploring four major obstacles to adequately addressing gender-
based crimes under the Libyan transitional justice system, including legal
impunity and lawlessness, lack of the rule of law v. militia justice, lack of
security and public order, and lack of democratic institutions. Finally, this
work scrutinizes three key mechanisms for gender-sensitive transitional
justice in Libya, involving urgent justice system reform, establishment of an
independent truth-seeking and reconciliation commission to investigate
gender-based crimes committed by all parties to the recent civil war, and
finally, the setting up of a Special Court for Libya as a hybrid judicial system
for bringing perpetrators to justice and bring justice to victims.
However, in spite of the willingness of the Libyan government to
prosecute and try Saif al-Islam and other former regime official in Libya and
by Libyan courts, and despite guarantees made by the Libyan authorities to
provide suspects with high quality trials that meet all international
standards, the chance for a fair trial remains very small. Libyas pledge to the
ICC and to the international community to amend its laws by incorporating
international crimes embodied in articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC
and its commitment to provide for an independent judiciary have proved the
oppositeit is not the case in practice, especially, in terms of security, the
rule of law, and a competent and independent judicial system, all of which
can be described as inadequate. This results in a lack of trust on the part of
victims seeking redress and on the part of suspects confined in the militias
and transitional governments jails awaiting fair trials. .
At this critical juncture, the international community should help Libya
to domesticate international criminal and human rights law and avoid the

231
Brendan Leanos, And Justice for All: Understanding the Future of the International Criminal
Court through the Situation in Libya, (2012) Fordham Law Review 108; Elizabeth B. Ludwin
King, New Beginnings: A Hybrid Approach to Accountability in Libya, (2011) 2 Wake Forest
Law Review Online 1; Vanessa A. Arslanian, Beyond Revolution: Ending Impunity and
Lawlessness during Revolutionary Periods (2013) 36:1 Boston College International and
Comparative Law Review 31. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2174477>.
 Q6F?HKTN/@J!KF@O3/KN<6H3LNHP!JH@PH6<EL?HP!K6/MH?!/@!3/EUL! '("

trap of retributive and victors justice. If Libya fails to include international

crimes in its penal law, it will have no jurisdiction over conflict-related
crimes, including allegedly crimes committed by Saif al-Islam, Senussi, and
other former regime officials, as it violates the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege, embodied in Article 22(1) of the Rome Statute of the ICC.232
Given the fact that the ICCs jurisdiction over Libyas conflict related
crimes has emerged from under the coat-tails of the UN Security Council,
pursuant to the UN SC Resolution 1970 (2011), and is accordingly limited to
investigating and prosecuting crimes committed by members of the former
regime between 15-28 February 2011, the Court has completely failed to
investigate and prosecute crimes committed by both sides of the conflict after
that date, including the alleged sexual abuse of Muammar Qadhafi, and his
arbitrary execution along with his son Mutasim on 20 October 2011.
Moreover, the ICC prosecutor has also failed to investigate gender-based
crimes committed by rebel militias during and after the civil war,
particularly those committed in rebels detention facilities with a view to
extracting information or taking revenge. Killing of captured combatants in
war settings is a crime of war under Article 8(2)(b)(vi) of the Rome Statute of
the ICC.233 Furthermore, the failure of Libyan authorities and the ICC to
prosecute these crimes will promote the culture of impunity, increase
barriers to justice, and encourage extrajudicial retaliation in Libyas tribal
society.

232
The Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 79, at Art. 22(1).
233
Ibid, at Article 8(2)(b)(vi).