Digest Admin Law
Digest Admin Law
Digest Admin Law
COA, Ruling:
G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012 (Per Diem; Good Faith)
The lack of legal basis to grant per diems to ex officio members of the
Facts: PEZA Board, including their representatives, has already been settled by
no less than the Court En Banc in the case of Bitonio, Jr.where we held
The PEZA Board of Directors is composed of 13 members which include that the amendatory law, R.A. No. 8748, purposely deleted the last
the Undersecretaries of the Department of Finance, the Department of paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7916 that authorized the grant of per
Labor and Employment, the Department of the Interior and Local diems to PEZA Board members as it was in conflict with the proscription
Government, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the laid down in the 1987 Constitution. We held in Bitonio, Jr.:
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Public Works and
Highways, the Department of Science and Technology and the The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law
Department of Energy. Said Undersecretaries serve in ex officio capacity which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to
and were granted per diems by PEZA for every attendance in a board cure such defect. In particular, Section 11 of R.A. No. 7916 was
meeting. amended to read:
On September 13, 2007, the PEZA Auditor Corazon V. Espao issued SECTION 11. The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)
Notice of Disallowance Nos. 2006-001-101 (02-06) to 2006-021-101 Board. There is hereby created a body corporate to be known as the
(01-03) on the payments of per diems to ex officio members of the PEZA Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) attached to the Department
Board for the period 2001-2006 of Trade and Industry. The Board shall have a director general with the
rank of department undersecretary who shall be appointed by the
The disallowance was based on this Courts April 4, 2006 En Banc President. The director general shall be at least forty (40) years of age,
Resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari in Cyril del Callar, et al., of proven probity and integrity, and a degree holder in any of the
Members of the Board of Directors, Philippine Economic Zone Authority following fields: economics, business, public administration, law,
v. COA and Guillermo N. Carague, Chairman, COA which assailed COA management or their equivalent, and with at least ten (10) years relevant
Decision No. 2006-009 dated January 31, 2006 affirming the March 29, working experience preferably in the field of management or public
2002 decision of the Director, then Corporate Audit Office II, administration.
disallowing the payment of per diems of ex officio members of the PEZA
Board of Directors. Said disallowance was based on COA Memorandum The director general shall be assisted by three (3) deputy directors
No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997 implementing Senate Committee general each for policy and planning, administration and operations, who
Report No. 509 and this Courts ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. shall be appointed by the PEZA Board, upon the recommendation of the
Executive Secretary. director general. The deputy directors general shall be at least thirty-five
(35) years old, with proven probity and integrity and a degree holder in
Issue: any of the following fields: economics, business, public administration,
Does the PEZA have legal basis in granting per diems to the ex law, management or their equivalent.
officio members of its Board? And if there is no legal basis, was there The Board shall be composed of thirteen (13) members as
good faith in PEZAs grant and the ex officio members receipt of the per follows: the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry as
diems? Chairman, the Director General of the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority as Vice-chairman, the undersecretaries of the Department of
Finance, the Department of Labor and Employment, the Department of
[the] Interior and Local Government, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of
Public Works and Highways, the Department of Science and Technology, and emphasized that a public official holding an ex officio position as
the Department of Energy, the Deputy Director General of the National provided by law has no right to receive additional compensation for
Economic and Development Authority, one (1) representative from the the ex officio position.
labor sector, and one (1) representative from the investors/business sector
It bears stressing that the Civil Liberties Union case was promulgated in
in the ECOZONE. In case of the unavailability of the Secretary of the
1991, or a decade before the subject disallowed payments of per
Department of Trade and Industry to attend a particular board meeting,
diems for the period starting 2001 were made by PEZA. Thus, even
the Director General of PEZA shall act as Chairman.
if the Bitonio case was only promulgated in 2004 when part of the
As can be gleaned from above, the members of the Board of Directors disallowed payments have already been made, PEZA should have been
was increased from 8 to 13, specifying therein that it is the guided by the Civil Liberties Union case and acted with caution. It
undersecretaries of the different Departments who should sit as board would have been more prudent for PEZA, if it honestly believed that
members of the PEZA. The option of designating his representative to there is a clear legal basis for the per diems and there was a chance that
the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the this Court might rule in their favor while the Bitoniocase was pending, to
last paragraph as to the payment of per diems to the members of the withhold payment of the per diem instead of paying them. PEZAs actual
Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation knowledge that the disbursements are being questioned by virtue of the
was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution. notices of disallowance issued to them by the COA and knowledge of the
pronouncements of the Court in the Civil Liberties Union case and in
Prescinding from the above, the petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to other cases where ex officio members in several government agencies
receive a per diem for his attendance at board meetings during his tenure were prohibited from receiving additional compensation, militate against
as member of the Board of Directors of the PEZA. its claim of good faith.
PEZAs insistence that there is legal basis in its grant of per diems to The petition is DISMISSED. The assailed COA Decision No. 2009-081
the ex officio members of its Board does not hold water. The dated September 15, 2009 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
constitutional prohibition explained in Civil Liberties Union case still
stands and this Court finds no reason to revisit the doctrine laid down
therein as said interpretation, to this Courts mind, is in consonance with
what our Constitution provides.
Neither can this Court give credence to PEZAs claim of good faith.
In common usage, the term good faith is ordinarily used to describe
that state of mind denoting honesty of intention, and freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with
absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which
render transaction unconscientious.
Definitely, PEZA cannot claim that it was not aware of circumstances
pointing to the possible illegality of the disbursements of per diems to
the ex officio members of the Board. In Civil Liberties Union, this Court
clarified the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution
DIMAGIBA V ESPARTERO OGCC to avoid any legal problem. Portes then sought the opinion of
LIVECORs Resident COA Auditor, Alejandro Fumar, regarding
FACTS petitioners' claim for additional gratuity, who opined that such gratuity
Petitioners Hilarion Dimagiba (Dimagiba), Irma Mendoza (Mendoza), payment would amount to double compensation.
and Ellen Rasco (Rasco) were employees of The Livelihood Corporation ISSUE
(LIVECOR), a government-owned and controlled corporation created
under Executive Order No. 866. Petitioner Dimagiba was the Group W/N the gratuities granted to petitioners dimagiba, mendoza and rasco
Manager, Petitioners Hilarion Dimagiba (Dimagiba), Irma Mendoza by hsdc constitute double compensation prohibited under article ix (b),
(Mendoza), and Ellen Rasco (Rasco) were employees of The Livelihood section 8 of the 1987 constitution
Corporation (LIVECOR), a government-owned and controlled
RULING
corporation created under Executive Order No. 866. Petitioner Dimagiba
was the Group Manager, LIVECOR and the Human Settlement YES The additional grant of gratuity pay to petitioners amounted to
Development Corporation (HSDC), now known as Strategic Investment additional compensation prohibited by the Constitution. Clearly, the only
and Development Corporation (SIDCOR), also a government-owned and exception for an employee to receive additional, double and indirect
controlled corporation, created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1396, compensation is where the law allows him to receive extra compensation
entered into a Trust Agreement3 whereby the former would undertake the for services rendered in another position which is an extension or is
task of managing, administering, disposing and liquidating the corporate connected with his basic work. The prohibition against additional or
assets, projects and accounts of HSDC. In HSDC Board Resolution No. double compensation, except when specifically authorized by law, is
3- 26-A4 dated March 26, 1990, it was provided that in order to carry out considered a constitutional curb on the spending power of the
the trust agreement, LIVECOR personnel must be designated government.
concurrently to operate certain basic HSDC/SIDCOR functions, thus,
LIVECOR personnel, namely, petitioners Dimagiba and Mendoza were In Peralta v. Mathay, 41 we stated the purpose of the prohibition, to wit:
designated as Assistant General Manager for Operations and Head, Inter- x x x This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that
Agency Committee on Assets Disposal and as Treasurer and Controller, a public office is a public trust. It is expected of a government official or
respectively. The same resolution provided for the designees' monthly employee that he keeps uppermost in mind the demands of public
honoraria and commutable reimbursable representation allowances welfare. He is there to render public service. He is of course entitled to
(CRRA). be rewarded for the performance of the functions entrusted to him, but
that should not be the overriding consideration. The intrusion of the
In a letter6 dated November 14, 1997, the Department of Budget and thought of private gain should be unwelcome. The temptation to further
Management informed LIVECOR of the approval of its personal ends, public employment as a means for the acquisition of
organization/staffing pattern modifications which resulted in the wealth, is to be resisted. That at least is the ideal. There is then to be
abolition of petitioners' positions. As a result, petitioners were separated awareness on the part of an officer or employee of the government that
from the service which entitled them to separation pay which includes he is to receive only such compensation as may be fixed by law. With
granting gratuity pay such a realization, he is expected not to avail himself of devious or
circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached to his position.42
In a Memorandum dated July 17, 1998 issued by LIVECOR
xxx
Administrator Manuel Portes (Portes), it was stated that any payment of
gratuities by the HSDC/SIDCOR to LIVECOR officers concurrently The gratuity pay being given to petitioners by the HSDC Board was by
performing HSDC functions shall not be processed without prior reason of the satisfactory performance of their work under the trust
clearance from him as the same shall be first cleared with the COA and agreement. It is considered a bonus and by its very nature, a bonus
partakes of an additional remuneration or compensation.43 It bears
stressing that when petitioners were separated from LIVECOR, they
were given separation pay which also included gratuity pay for all the
years they worked thereat and concurrently in HSDC/SIDCOR. Granting
them another gratuity pay for the works done in HSDC under the trust
agreement would be indirectly giving them additional compensation for
services rendered in another position which is an extension or is
connected with his basic work which is prohibited. This can only be
allowed if there is a law which specifically authorizes them to receive an
additional payment of gratuity. The HSDC Board Resolution No. 05-19-
A granting petitioners gratuity pay is not a law which would exempt
them from the Constitutional proscription against additional, double or
indirect compensation. Neither does the HSDC law under P.D. 1396
contain a provision allowing the grant of such gratuity pay to petitioners.
The second paragraph of Section 8, Article IX specifically adds that
"pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or
indirect compensation." This has reference to compensation already
earned, for instance by a retiree. A retiree receiving pensions or gratuities
after retirement can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if
he accepts another government position to which another compensation
is attached. The grant to designees Dimagiba et al. of another gratuity
from HSDC would not fall under the exception in the second paragraph
as the same had not been primarily earned, but rather being granted for
service simultaneously rendered to LIVECOR and HSDC. Hence, to
allow the release of the second gratuity from HSDC would run afoul over
the wellsettled rule that "in the absence of an express legal exception,
pension or gratuity laws should be construed as to preclude any person
from receiving double compensation. 44
BLAQUERA V ALACALA mistake which had to be corrected. In so acting, the President exercised a
constitutionally-protected prerogative --
FACTS
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too,
Petitioners are officials and employees of several government is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department
departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his,
1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292[1] (EO 292), otherwise known too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls
as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm,
Implementing Book V[2]of EO 292. On January 19, 1993, then President modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this
Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) issued Administrative Order No. context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the
29 (AO 29) authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for correctness of a decision of a department secretary. (Lacson-Magallanes
the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00[3] and reiterating the Co., Inc. v. Pao, 21 SCRA 898)
prohibition[4] under Section 7[5]of Administrative Order No. 268 (AO
268), enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of
approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed [a]ll departments, the Commission on Civil Service to grant benefits to government
offices and agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity personnel. AO 29 and AO 268 did not revoke the privilege of employees
Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section 1 to receive incentive benefits. The same merely regulated the grant and
hereof [are hereby directed] to immediately cause the return/refund of the amount thereof.
excess within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after
Sound management and effective utilization of financial resources of
the issuance of this Order. In compliance therewith, the heads of the
government are basically executive functions, [34] not the
departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the
Commissions. Implicit is this recognition in EO 292, which states:
herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners salaries or
allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. To Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. - There
prevent the respondents from making further deductions from their shall be established a government-wide employee suggestions and
salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come before this Court to incentive awards system which shall be administered under such rules,
seek relief. regulations, and standards as maybe promulgated by the Commission.
ISSUE In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the
Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is
Constitutionality of AOs
authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the
RULING honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the
government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior
The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant accomplishment, and other personal efforts contribute to the efficiency,
of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontentment, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or who
dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest
committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of in connection with, or in relation to, their official employment.(Chapter
incentives and awards. The President was only exercising his power of 5, Subtitle A, Book V) (underscoring ours)
control by modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive
benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office Conformably, it is the President or the head of each department or
of the President, thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of agency who is authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in the
government resources. In the view of the President, respondents did a honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the
government. It is not the duty of the Commission to fix the amount of the autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
incentives. Such function belongs to the President or his duly empowered Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
alter ego. independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of
our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and
Anent petitioners contention that the forcible refund of incentive benefits
cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the
is an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation, suffice it to Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant
state that [n]ot all contracts entered into by the government will operate reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy
as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its should cease to be a meaningless provision.
sovereign and proprietary acts (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136
SCRA 487).[35] The acts involved in this case are governmental. Besides, Untenable is petitioners contention that the herein respondents be held
the Court is in agreement with the Solicitor General that the incentive personally liable for the refund in question. Absent a showing of bad
pay or benefit is in the nature of a bonus which is not a demandable or faith or malice, public officers are not personally liable for damages
enforceable obligation. resulting from the performance of official duties. [36]
It is understood that the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the
Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, and Office of the discharge of official duties.[37] Absent any showing of bad faith or malice,
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy, are not covered by the there is likewise a presumption of regularity in the performance of
amount fixed by the President. As explained in Bengzon vs. Drilon (208 official duties.[38]
SCRA 133):
In upholding the constitutionality of AO 268 and AO 29, the Court
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the reiterates the well-entrenched doctrine that in interpreting statutes, that
Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the which will avoid a finding of unconstitutionality is to be preferred. [39]
Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we
contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received.Indeed,
recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix
no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and
rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law
circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed
for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and
such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were
disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in
due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude,
the course of the discharge of their functions.
confident that they richly deserve such benefits.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and
Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10
112056 are hereby DISMISSED, and as above ratiocinated, further
typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even
deductions from the salaries and allowances of petitioners are hereby
informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty
ENJOINED.
and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of
their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints
on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize
the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
OCA V ENRIQUEZ On 10 April 1991, respondent filed a Manifestation informing this Court
of the promulgation of the above resolution and praying that "by virtue
FACTS of the dismissal of the Criminal Case filed against the respondent before
In a letter dated 19 January 1987, one Eliodoro C. Cruz of Compania the Sandiganbayan, the Administrative Case . . . be likewise dismissed."
Maritima, Inc. informed this Court that the company's lawyer filed with ISSUE
the Tanodbayan on 12 December 1986 a complaint for falsification of a
public document, use of falsified documents, robbery and the violation of W/N dismissal of criminal action forecloses institution of administrative
R.A. No. 3019 against herein respondent Ramon G. Enriquez, Deputy action
Sheriff of Branch XXXI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
RULING
and others. The said company lawyer requested that an investigation be
conducted on the administrative aspect of the case. Be that as it may, its dismissal of the criminal case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence was never meant, as respondent doggedly
In his 20 January 1987 letter to Mr. Cruz, then Court Administrator Leo
believed and arrogantly asserted, to foreclose administrative action
D. Medialdea, who later became a member of this Court, informed the
against him or to give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The
latter that as a matter of policy, the administrative aspect of the case "will
Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, was simply saying that the
be undertaken by this Office upon the filing of a corresponding
prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond
information by the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan."
reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction 2 because of
Consequently, an Information for falsification of a public document was the presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantee an
filed against the respondent with the Sandiganbayan on 6 October 1988. accused. 3 Lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 12987 and was assigned to mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of
the Second Division. A copy of the Information was furnished the Office evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
of the Court Administrator on 17 October 1988. doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of
evidence. 4 Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in
On 1 February 1989, then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro, administrative proceedings which merely requires in these cases such
pursuant to this Court's en banc resolution of 12 March 1981 and on the relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
basis of the Information filed with the Sandiganbayan, administratively support a conclusion. 5
charged the herein respondent with the crime of falsification of a public
document and with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service Going back to Our findings, there is no doubt in Our minds that the
committed in the manner alleged in the said Information respondent (a) falsified the Minutes of Sale and the Sheriff's Certificate
of Sale; (b) violated Sections 22 and 25, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court by
Instead of filing the answer/explanation as ordered, the respondent not conducting another bidding assuming one was held on 12 May
forwarded to the Court Administrator a letter on 20 February 1989 1986 after the alleged highest bidder, Patriarca, failed to pay the bid
informing the latter that Criminal Case No. 12987 was still pending price, by executing in the latter's favor a certificate of Sheriff's Sale and
resolution before the Sandiganbayan and that therefore, he (respondent) by delivering the auctioned vessels despite the failure to pay: (c) illegally
should not be held administratively liable. sold the vessels to Cailian on 23 May 1986 without a public bidding; and
On 15 May 1989, the Sandiganbayan, acting on a demurrer to evidence, (d) maliciously connived and conspired with Patriarca, Cailian and others
promulgated a Resolution granting the same and dismissing the case to cover up such illegal acts by making it appear, by means of an
against the respondent "for insufficiency of evidence." antedated deed of sale, that Patriarca sold the vessels to Cailian.
Respondent is therefore guilty of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He not only
deliberately violated the integrity of official acts of an employee of the
court, but also undermined the faith and trust of the public in the
Judiciary. He has transgressed the constitutional command that as a
public office is a public trust, all public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice and lead modest lives. 6 In Jereos vs. Reblando, 7 We laid down
the rule that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice, such as the court of which
the herein respondent is the assigned sheriff, should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must
not only be characterized with propriety and decorum, but above all else
must be beyond suspicion.
While it is but proper that the respondent should not be kept a minute
longer in the Judiciary, his dismissal from the service should not end this
case. In the light of the above findings of conspiracy with other parties,
including a certain Judge Luz who prepared the alleged deed of sale in
favor of Cailian, there is a need to dig deeper, in a manner of speaking, in
this case. This could open the door to the secret chambers of a rumored
syndicate which is in the business of fixing attachments and execution
sales.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS from the service,
effective immediately, respondent RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ, for gross
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except the monetary value
of his leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to his re-employment in
any branch or service of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.
Doctrine: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and evidence on record to support Respondent Courts conclusion that
exemplary damages and for attorneys fees for acts done in the Carrascoso did not act in bad faith. His letters to PCGG indicated his
performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these uncertainties as to the extent of the sequestration against the properties of
officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or the plaintiff. There is also denying that plaintiff is a very close political
gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public and business associate of the former President Marcos. Sequestration was
officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated also a novel remedy. Under these equivocalities, Carrascoso could not be
the plaintiffs constitutional rights. faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG, on what to do and
more so, to obey the instructions given. Besides, EO2 has just been
Facts: issued by President Aquino, freezing all assets and properties in the
Petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. filed a Petition for Review under Rule Philippines (of) former President Marcos and/or his wifetheir close
45 of the ROC seeking to set aside CAs decision, after it reversed a friends, subordinates, business associates
favorable decision of the RTC that ordered the private respondents to pay The extant rule is that public officers shall not be liable by way of moral
him moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of the suit, and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official
and denied his Motion for Reconsideration. duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross
Cojuangco, a known businessman-sportsman owned several racehorses negligence. Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed
which he entered in sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the either, in the absence of clear showing of any of the grounds provided
races on various dates, and won prizes together with the 30% due for therefor under the Civil Code. The trial courts award of these kinds of
trainer/grooms. He sent letters of demand for the collection of the prizes damages must perforce be deleted.
due him but private respondents PCSO and its then chairman Fernando Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that
Carrascoso Jr. consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the
withheld on advice of PCGG. Consequently, Cojuangco filed this case Civil Code, which provides:
before the Manila RTC but before the receipt summons, PCGG advised
private respondents that it poses no more objection to its remittance of Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
the prized winnings. This was immediately communicated to directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
petitioners counsel Estelito Mendoza by Carrascoso but the former or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person
refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had shall be liable to the latter for damages:
already been brought to court.
xxx xxx xxx
Issue:
(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law;
W/N the award for moral and exemplary damages against respondent
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer
Carrascoso is warranted by evidence the law
acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a
Held: violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of ones duties.
NO. Petitioner is only entitled to nominal damages.
We hold that petitioners right to the use of his property was unduly
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious PCGGs instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal
doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that
interest of ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. There is sufficient
there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the
racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any
such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration
order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the
requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize winnings of
petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a
violation of his property rights without due process of law.
Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to
a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for
the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered.
JOROLAN V ACUZAR purpose.[10] It usually refers to transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, where no discretion is left except what necessity
FACTS may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal
On May 2, 2000, respondent Aproniano Jorolan filed Administrative intention but implies wrongful intention and not to mere error of
Case No. 2000-01[4] against petitioner before the PLEB charging the judgment.[11] On the other hand, violation of law presupposes final
latter of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the Revised
with respondents minor daughter. Penal Code or any special law or ordinance. [12] The settled rule is that
criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each
On May 11, 2000, respondent also instituted a criminal case against other.[13] In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed
petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court of New Corella, docketed as whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is
Criminal Case No. 1712, for Violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act. criminal proceedings.[14] The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary
On May 15, 2000, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit [5] before the body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the PNP, has
PLEB vehemently denying all the accusations leveled against him. In jurisdiction over the case.
support thereof, petitioner attached the affidavit of complainants It is apparent from the foregoing provision that the remedy of appeal
daughter, Rigma A. Jorolan, who denied having any relationship with the from the decision of the PLEB to the Regional Appellate Board was
petitioner or having kissed him despite knowing him to be a married available to petitioner. Since appeal was available, filing a petition
person. for certiorari was inapt. The existence and availability of the right of
On July 24, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of
before the PLEB pending resolution of the criminal case filed before the certiorari.[16] Corollarily, the principle of exhaustion of administrative
regular court. The PLEB denied his motion for lack of merit and a remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention
hearing of the case was conducted. of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of the means
of administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is available
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board finds the respondent, within the administrative machinery of the administrative agency, then
SPO1 Leonito Acuzar, PNP New Corella, Davao del Norte Police Station this alternative should first be utilized before resort can be made to the
GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT (Child Abuse) which is punishable courts. This is to enable such body to review and correct any mistakes
by DISMISSAL effective immediately. without the intervention of the court.
ISSUE
W/N PLEB had no jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until
petitioner is convicted before the regular court
RULING
A careful perusal of respondents affidavit-complaint against petitioner
would show that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for
engaging in an illicit affair with respondents minor daughter, he being a
married man, and not for violation of law, as petitioner would like to
convince this Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or
unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional
TECSON V SANDIGANBAYAN With the revocation of her business permit, private complainant below
filed an administrative case against petitioner, for violation of Section 3
FACTS [c], R.A. No. 3019 and Section 60 of B.P. Blg. 337 (then Local
Petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the offense charged in Government Code) with the Department of Interior and Local
the Information, the Municipal Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. Government (DILG). The complaint was docketed as Adm. Case No. SP-
90-01 and referred to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur
Private complainant before the Sandiganbayan, Mrs. Salvacion Luzana, for appropriate action.
is a resident of Poblacion, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. She is a neighbor
of the petitioner. Not content with having instituted administrative proceedings, private
complainant below also filed a civil case against petitioner for damages
Upon the offer of Tecson, he and Mrs. Luzana agreed to engage in an with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, of Prosperidad, Agusan del
investment business. They would sell tickets at P100.00 each which after Sur. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. 716.
30 days would earn P200.00 or more. She would buy appliances and
cosmetics at a discount, with the use of the proceeds of the sales of A complaint was likewise filed with the Ombudsman for violation of
tickets, and resell them. No other details were disclosed on how the R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
business would operate, and Tecson does not appear to have contributed Act. This complaint was docketed as OMB Case No. 3-8-02919. It was
any monetary consideration to the capital. On September 27, 1989, they subsequently referred to the Sandiganbayan, which took jurisdiction.
began selling tickets. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur dismissed the
Tecson also acted as agent selling tickets. He got on that day early in the administrative case.
morning two booklets of tickets, for which he signed the covers of the Sandiganbayan, First Division rendered the assailed decision convicting
booklets to acknowledge receipt. Before noon of the same day he appellant of violating R.A. No. 3019.
returned after having already sold 40 tickets in the amount of P4,000.00,
bringing with him a Mayors Permit in the name of Mrs. Luzana for their ISSUE
business called LD Assurance Privileges. He asked for a cash advance of
Whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
P4,000.00 which he would use during the fiesta on September 29, 1989,
exonerating the accused serves as a bar by prior judgment to the decision
and he would not release the Mayors Permit unless the cash advance was
of the Sandiganbayan;
given him. Mrs. Luzana reluctantly acceded, saying that it was not the
due date yet, so he was getting the cash advances on his share. Tecson RULING
signed for the cash advance.
NO First, it must be pointed out that res judicata is a doctrine of civil
On October 3, 1989, Mrs. Luzana secured a Business Permit in law.[7] It thus has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the
accordance with the instructions of Tecson. The permit was in her name Sandiganbayan. Second, it is a basic principle of the law on public
but the same was for the operation of Prosperidad Investment and Sub- officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold
Dealership, the new name of the business. In the session of the responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or
Sangguniang Bayan of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur on October 17, 1989 omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly,
presided over by Tecson, Resolution No. 100 was passed revoking the criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if
business permit at the instance of the Provincial Director of the such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the
Department of Trade and Industry.[3] public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If
the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be
punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension,
removal from office, or otheradministrative sanctions. This
administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil
liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of an administrative case does not
necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar
acts, which were the subject of the administrative complaint. [8] We
conclude, therefore, that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Agusan del Sur exonerating petitioner in Administrative Case No. SP
90-01 is no bar to the criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan.
As to the amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 716 with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 6, of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, it is settled that a
complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance against a public
officer or employee cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the
complainant. This is because there is a need to maintain the faith and
confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and
instrumentalities.[9] The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the
order of the trial court dismissing Civil Case No. 716 did not bar the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
OCAMPO V OMBUDSMAN as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
[18]
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well
FACTS as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and
Jesus Ocampo is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, a administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should
subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration. not necessarily be binding on the other.
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of
imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or
extra-judicial killings].
xxxx