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What factors should Treasury consider as it thinks about the additional funding needed to meet future
redemptions from the Feds SOMA Treasury portfolio? For example, when should Treasury begin
increasing auction sizes and in what tenors? How should Treasury plan for any unforeseen shocks to
borrowing needs over the period when the Fed is normalizing the SOMA portfolio? Are there any
disruptive secondary-market impacts related to unwinding the SOMA portfolio that Treasury needs to
consider? (E.g., market dislocations as the stock of lendable securities in SOMA declines?) If so,
what might Treasury consider to address such concerns?
1
Agenda
2
1. Expectations for balance sheet normalization
3
Summary of expectations for Fed balance sheet normalization
The FOMC will announce a phasing out of Treasury and MBS reinvestments at the
September FOMC meeting to start October 1st, 2017.
When conducting monetary policy, the FOMC will maintain the current floor system. We
estimate steady state reserves of $650 billion, which includes a buffer.
The balance sheet will reach normal levels by 1Q 2021.
At time of normalization, Treasury holdings to be $1.7 trillion, down from $2.5 trillion now.
After normalization, the Fed will reinvest all maturing Treasuries on a pro-rata basis across
auctions. Maturing MBS will be reinvested in T-bills.
The Feds holdings of Treasuries will grow by $100-200bn per year post normalization.
The impact on 10y premiums should be 40bp over the period.
4
FOMC approach to reducing SOMA holdings
The Committee intends to gradually reduce the Federal Reserve's securities holdings by decreasing its
reinvestment of the principal payments it receives from securities held in the System Open Market
Account. Specifically, such payments will be reinvested only to the extent that they exceed gradually
rising caps.
For payments of principal that the Federal Reserve receives from maturing Treasury securities, the
Committee anticipates that the cap will be $6 billion per month initially and will increase in steps of $6
billion at three-month intervals over 12 months until it reaches $30 billion per month.
For payments of principal that the Federal Reserve receives from its holdings of agency debt and
mortgage-backed securities, the Committee anticipates that the cap will be $4 billion per month
initially and will increase in steps of $4 billion at three-month intervals over 12 months until it reaches
$20 billion per month.
The Committee also anticipates that the caps will remain in place once they reach their respective
maximums so that the Federal Reserve's securities holdings will continue to decline in a gradual and
predictable manner until the Committee judges that the Federal Reserve is holding no more securities
than necessary to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively.
- Addendum to the FOMC Policy Normalization Principles and Plans, September 2017
5
Current Federal Reserve Balance Sheet
4,000 4,000
3,500 3,500
3,000 3,000
2,500 2,500
2,000 2,000
1,500 1,500
1,000 1,000
500 500
0 0
Jul-07 Jul-10 Jul-13 Jul-16 Jul-19 Jul-22 Jul-07 Jul-10 Jul-13 Jul-16 Jul-19 Jul-22
TSY MBS Other Assets Reserves Total Dep RRP CCY
Currency in Circulation Growth likely to decline as rates rise
Currency in circulation growth is a function of the opportunity costs of holding cash and GDP growth. Other factors like currency
digitalization could also be influential. Similar to the 2004-2006 Fed hiking cycle, currency demand growth will likely decline
relative to GDP as the Fed continues to raise interest rates.
%, y/y % %, y/y
CCY in Circulation vs CCY in Circulation vs GDP Growth
20 9 20
10yr Bond Yields
8
15 15
7
10 10
6
5 5
5
0 0
4
-5 3 -5
Jun-60 Jun-70 Jun-80 Jun-90 Jun-00 Jun-10 Jun-60 Jun-70 Jun-80 Jun-90 Jun-00 Jun-10
10yr TSY Yields CCY in Circulation (rhs, % GDP) Nominal GDP Growth Currency in Circulation Growth
Modest Increases in FMU Deposits Held at the Fed
On January 2015, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve announced the 8 clearing houses designed as systemically
important Financial Market Utilities (FMUs) could establish deposit accounts at the Federal Reserve. Since then, FMU deposits
client margin balances have grown by about $70bn.
$bn
"Other" Deposits, including FMUs
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13 Jan-15 Jan-17
At this point, we suspect all eligible cash held by FMUs has made its way to a Fed account. And while its possible that more entities
receive the FMU designation in the future, we arent aware of any additional entities currently under review. As a result, we
forecast FMU margin account growth inline with broader banking system deposit growth.
Steady State Excess Reserves Likely Higher than Pre-Crisis
The November 2016 FOMC minutes indicated that SOMA participants are generally in favor of maintaining the floor system for
monetary policy management. This requires maintaining the minimum supply of reserves at remains on the flat portion of the bank
reserve demand curve.
Post crisis regulations, including the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), have likely increased banking system demand for reserves.
We estimate that system wide HQLA is currently $1.9 trillion, of which 22% is bank reserves. We expect this to grow inline with
deposits over time. Our $650bn steady state reserve forecasts are based on estimated future bank reserve demand ($500bn)
plus an additional buffer to maintain the floor system ($150bn).
Treasury and Projected MBS Maturities vs Announced Caps
During many months, the actual proceeds of SOMA Treasury and MBS maturities are expected to be less
than the respective cap. After the first year, monthly maturing MBS proceeds are estimated to come under
the cap most of the time, while Treasury proceeds will be under the cap around half of the time.
$bn Monthly SOMA MBS Prepay Scenarios $bn Monthly SOMA TSY Maturities
30 vs Reinvestment Caps 80 vs Reinvestment Caps
70
25
60
20
50
15 40
30
10
20
5
10
0 0
Dec-17 Sep-18 Jun-19 Mar-20 Dec-20 Sep-21 Dec-17 Sep-18 Jun-19 Mar-20 Dec-20 Sep-21
Static Rates FWD MBS Caps TSY Maturities (Par) TSY Caps
Rates +/- 50 bps from forwards would imply size of terminal MBS holdings ~ +/- $ 60 bn
Projections of Fed Balance Sheet Size: Various Scenarios
Under alternative scenarios for steady state reserves and currency growth, the length of time required to normalize
the balance sheet varies from roughly 2.5- to 6-years, and the projected incremental Treasury funding need varies
from $510bn to $1tril.
$bls Fed Balance Sheet Size $bls Fed Balance Sheet Size
CCY growth of 6% CCY growth of 2%
5,000 5,000
Steady State Reserves of $1tr Steady State Reserves of $300bn
4,500 4,500
4,000 4,000
3,500 3,500
3,000 3,000
2,500 2,500
2,000 2,000
1,500 1,500
1,000 1,000
500 500
- -
Jan-09 Jan-12 Jan-15 Jan-18 Jan-21 Jan-09 Jan-12 Jan-15 Jan-18 Jan-21
Projected Size Actual Size Projected Size Actual Size
Projected Reserves Actual Reserves Projected Reserves Actual Reserves
Date Steady State Reached Under Various Scenarios Projected Treasury Funding Need Under Various Scenarios
Reserves Reserves
$bls
$300B $650B $1T $300B $650B $1T
2% 3Q2023 3Q2021 3Q2020 2% 1030 850 650
CCY Growth 4.5% 1Q2022 1Q2021 2Q2020 CCY Growth 4.5% 890 730 560
6% 4Q2021 3Q2020 1Q2020 6% 810 650 510
Dollar duration impact of the B/S reduction in Treasuries
In our base case, incremental dollar duration supplied to the Treasury market would reach $4T* (or $470B in 10Y
equivalent**) due to the reduction in the Treasury portfolio from October 2017 to March 2021 (at which point
tapering stops as reserves level of $650B is reached).
$bns
SOMA Roll-Off $tril Cumulative Dollar Duration Impact of
300 Reducing the Treasuries Portfolio
6
275
Treasury Roll-off
$5.2 tril
250
Roll-off stops 2Q2023 5
225
Roll-off stops 1Q2021 $4.0 tril
200 Roll-off stops 1Q2020 4
175
$3.0 tril
150 3
125
100 2
Dollar duration = par amount x duration, Treasury auctions are assumed to be increased on a pro-rata basis.
** Calculated by dividing the dollar duration by the 10Y Bond current duration (8.6)
10yr Term Premium Impact
Based on a number of studies of the privately held supply impact on 10yr Term premiums, we estimate the
decline in SOMA securities holdings over the next 4yrs could raise 10yr Treasury yields by 40bps, all else
equal.
We expect the impact on the MBS spread to be a further 10-15 bps in the absence of regulatory changes.
2. Expectations for resulting Treasury issuance
17
Primary dealer surveys forecast rising budget deficits
Budget deficits have widened from post-crisis lows as Primary dealers expect deficits to widen
revenue growth has slowed down amid a steady increase 4.5%
in outlays 4.2%
Source: New York Fed Primary Dealer Survey, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research Outlays, 12M, yoy growth, %
18
Borrowing needs over coming years median estimates
Borrowing needs are likely to be substantial higher over the Current cash balance is likely low relative to desired level
coming years if budget deficits widen as per the PD survey
450
In 2017, the Treasury partly financed deficits by reducing its 400
cash balance. Returning the cash balance to desired levels,
350
will add to borrowing needs
300
Student loans related borrowing needs remain elevated at
250
$75-$100bn
200
Overall, borrowing needs could be in the range of $850bn-
150
$1trillion over the coming years as compared with $500-
$550bn in 2017 100
50
0
Jan-17 Feb-17 Mar-17 Apr-17 May-17 Jun-17 Jul-17
Borrowing needs are likely to be significantly Treasury Cash Balance, $bn
higher over the coming years
Student loans related borrowing needs remain significant
150
50
Others (mainly Std loans) 75 90 90 90
25
Net Borrowing Needs 525 880 920 1,010
0
Note: The cash balance is assumed to be $250bn at YE-17, rising to $300bn by YE-18.
Source: New York Fed Primary Dealer Survey, US Treasury, Haver Analytics, Barclays May-12 May-13 May-14 May-15 May-16 May-17
Research Direct Loan financing, 12M Rolling sum, $bn
19
Addons: elevated in 2018 but below 2017 levels in 2019/2020
SOMA addons would be substantially smaller under the proposed strategy, than in the status quo
Of the ~$425bn maturing in the Feds Treasury portfolio in 2018, ~$195bn would be reinvested. Still addons would be higher than
those in 2017 which are expected to be ~$180bn.
SOMA addons should fall to ~$110bn in 2019 and ~$80bn in 2020. The distribution of maturing Treasuries suggests that the
reduction would come mainly at month end auctions.
Assuming that the normalization process is complete by early 2021, the Fed would need to resume reinvestments of maturing
Treasuries in 2021.
Net Treasury purchases related to re-investing pay-downs in the Agency portfolio and those needed to keep reserve balances
unchanged (mainly, keeping up with the increase in the currency in circulation) will likely be conducted in the secondary market.
SOMA add-ons will still be elevated in 2018 Addons at month end auctions (2s,5s,7s) would fall much
falling below 2017 levels in 2019/2020 more than those at mid-month auctions (3s,10s,30s)
50
450 45
45
400 38
40
35
350 35 33
31
300 229 30
0 26
24 24
250 267 25
21
20
200 20 17
18 203 14 15
150 15
271 10
10 8 8
100 194 5
177 4 4
5 2
50 111 0
79
0
0 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 30y TIPS/ FRNs
CY-17 CY-18 CY-19 CY-20 CY-21 2018 2019 2020
Amount Reinvested Amount Not Reinvested
Source: Federal Reserve, New York Fed, US Treasury, Barclays Research
20
Treasury issuance likely to rise significantly over coming years
Both net and gross issuance to public would need to steadily rise over the coming years.
Primary reason for increased net issuance is higher borrowing needs ($475-$500bn higher in CY-20 vs. CY 17). Assuming that the
share of T-bills is steadily raised to ~16%, net issuance ex-bills would still need to be $325bn higher in 2020 vs. 2017.
Annual gross issuance ex-bills would need to increase more. The amount of maturing debt which has to be refinanced is
scheduled to steadily rise (~$250bn higher in CY-20 vs. CY 17).
Reduced SOMA addons further add to gross issuance to public but are not the primary direct reason for increasing issuance;
Would be $100bn lower in 2020 ($80bn) vs. 2017 ($180bn)
As compared with 2017, annual offering amounts ex-bills would be ~$275bn higher in CY-18, ~$475bn higher in CY-19 and
~$670bn in CY-20.
While SOMA addons would increase in 2021, offering amounts to public need not have to fall as 1. budget deficits may rise
further, 2. the Treasury may want to stabilize the share of the T-bill universe, thus reducing the net cash raised via T-bills and 3.
the amount of maturing debt that needs to be refinanced rises further.
21
Deficits: PD median versus Administration forecasts
Others 75 90 90 90
22
Treasury financing needs: PD median vs Administration forecasts
Administration
$bn CY-17 CY-18 CY-19 CY-20 CY 18 vs. 17 CY 19 vs. 17 CY 20 vs. 17
a. Net Borrowing Needs 525 640 570 550 115 45 25
b. Net Bill Issuance* 124 203 203 208 79 78 84
c. Net Issuance ex-bills (a-b) 401 437 367 342 36 -33 -59
d. Maturing Debt ex-bills 1,824 1,872 1,972 2,036 49 148 212
e. Gross Issuance ex-bills (c+d) 2,224 2,309 2,339 2,378 85 115 154
12 2.5
-20
11
2.0
-25
10
-30 9 1.5
Jul-12 Jul-13 Jul-14 Jul-15 Jul-16 Jul-17
1.0
3m T-bills vs OIS, bp, lhs T-bills, % debt, rhs
Jul-04 Jul-07 Jul-10 Jul-13 Jul-16
Source: New York Fed ACM Model, SPF, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research 10y inflation swaps, % 10y CPI infl expectations, %
24
Given median fiscal forecast and potential limits on auction sizes,
an across-the-board increase in issuance is a viable option
In addition to ex-ante costs considerations, the distribution of the required increases should take into account the maximum size Treasury can issue
without significant yield deviation, though this may change over time (use primary dealer survey as a guide).
Assuming no changes in auction sizes this year, the Treasury is scheduled to issue (in gross terms) ~$2.05 across all tenors including TIPS and
FRNs, ~$1.75trn in 2y-30y nominal coupons , ~$1.15trn in 5y-30y nominal coupons and ~$1trn in 2y-5y nominal coupons in 2017.
Sc 1: An across-the-board proportional increase of auction sizes by about 20-25% would suffice through 2019. Such a percentage increase
would be within the range PDs have highlighted in the latest auction size survey
Sc 2: If increasing sizes proportionally only for 2y-30y nominal coupon issues, the required % increase would be roughly 25-30%; still mostly
within the desired range.
Sc 3: If increasing sizes proportionally only for 5y-30y nominal issues, the required % increase would be roughly 40%; well above what PDs
have noted that can be absorbed without significant yield deviation.
Sc 4: If increasing sizes proportionally only for 2y-5y nominal fixed coupon issues, the required % increase would be almost 50%; within the
limit for 2y and 3y but well above that for the 5y.
Hence, Scenarios 1 and 2 seem more desirable.
70%
CY-17
Issuance CY-18 CY-19 CY-20 60% 58% 57%
54%
Required Increase in Annual Gross
Issuance (ex-bills), $bn +274 +477 +672 50%
20%
Sc 2. Only 2y-30y Nom Cpns. 1,752 16% 27% 38% 21%
10%
Sc 3. Only 5y-30y Nom Cpns. 1,152 24% 41% 58%
0%
Sc 4. Only 2y-5y Nom Cpns. 1,008 27% 47% 67% 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 30y 5y TIPS 10y 30y 2y FRN
TIPS TIPS
% Increase before the Maximum is Reached Sc 1 Sc 2 Sc 3 Sc 4
Source: Federal Reserve, New York Fed, US Treasury Primary Dealer Survey, Barclays Research
25
Issuance: PD median versus administration forecasts
CY-17
Issuance CY-18 CY-19 CY-20
Required Increase in Annual Gross
Issuance (ex-bills), $bn +68 +181 +252
Administration
% Increase vs 2017 Levels
Sc 1. All Tenors including FRNS/TIPS 2,047 3% 9% 12%
Sc 2. Only 2y-30y Nom Cpns. 1,752 4% 10% 14%
Sc 3. Only 5y-30y Nom Cpns. 1,152 6% 16% 22%
Sc 4. Only 2y-5y Nom Cpns. 1,008 7% 18% 25%
CY-17
Issuance CY-18 CY-19 CY-20
Required Increase in Annual Gross Primary dealer median
Issuance (ex-bills), $bn +274 +477 +672
Note: *T-bills as a % of outstanding debt is assumed to gradually rises to 16% by YE-20. The amount of maturing debt in future years is estimated assuming a
proportional increase in all nominal auction sizes starting early next year. Source: Federal Reserve, New York Fed, US Treasury, Barclays Research
26
Impact on auction stop out rates of across-the-board increases
would be limited
The impact of across-the-board increases in auction sizes on auction stop out rates would also be limited
Judging from the latest primary dealer survey on auction sizes, raising auction sizes would have the biggest effect on stop out
rates on longer tenors. For a $1bn/mo change over a 12 month period, the median forecast is for the stop out rate to be 4bp and
5bp higher 12 month forward for 30y Nominals and TIPS respectively.
Assuming that auction sizes are raised to required levels (based on the % increase needed in 2019) over a 12 month period, the
effective increase in auction sizes per month would be less than a $1bn/month under Scenarios 1 and 2. For longer tenors, the
increase would be less than $0.5bn/mo.
This also suggests that the Treasury should distribute the increases rather than concentrate them in a few tenors
Median for a
Current New $1bn/M Standard
Issue Sizes, $bn Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 increase, bp deviation, bp
2y 26 6 7 0.5 0.6 1 1.0
3y 24 6 6 0.5 0.5 1 1.4
5y 34 8 9 0.7 0.8 2 2.4
7y 28 6 8 0.5 0.6 2 3.5
10y 23 5 6 0.4 0.5 3 2.9
30y 15 3 4 0.3 0.3 4 4.3
5y TIPS 16 4 0.3 3 3.0
10y TIPS 13 3 0.2 3 3.9
30y TIPS 7 2 0.1 5 5.8
2y FRN 15 3 0.3 1 1.9
27
An across-the-board increase in auction sizes would also ensure
a modest further lengthening of the average maturity
The share of T-bills outstanding would rise from current low levels.
The weighted average maturity (WAM) would also gradually rise over the coming years, after having stalled at ~70 months for the
past couple of years.
Were the Treasury to instead rely just on T-bills (or say issues upto the 5y tenor) to meet the increase in borrowing needs, the
WAM is likely to fall.
25 75
T-bills, % of Marketable Debt Weighed Average Maturity, months
20 70
15 65
10 60
5 55
Dec-10 Dec-12 Dec-14 Dec-16 Dec-18 Dec-20 Dec-10 Dec-12 Dec-14 Dec-16 Dec-18 Dec-20
28
Treasury financing needs with a large jump in T-bills share
29
Summing up issuance needs
Net and gross issuance to public would need to steadily rise over the coming years for three main reasons:
Treasurys borrowing needs are likely to be substantial higher over the coming years as budget deficits steadily
widen, especially if a fiscally expansionary policy is put in place
The amount of maturing debt which needs to be refinanced is also scheduled to rise
SOMA run-off will simply add to these factors, but will not be the main driver
The Treasury should consider increasing auction sizes across all tenors in addition to the traditional manner of
responding to cyclical debt needs, which relies primarily on the short end:
Ex-ante cost considerations suggests that there is room to expand the T-bill universe and increase term issuance as
well. Low inflation risk premia suggests the increase in TIPS issuance could be smaller
Likely limits on issue sizes and the impact on auction stop out rates also suggest distributing the required increases
rather than concentrating them at either the front end or the long end.
Under this proposal, the WAM would gradually increase. Were the Treasury to concentrate increases at the front end
of the curve, WAM is likely to fall.
31
Takeaways
Part 1: Risk premium compression. Central bank balance sheet expansion, declining bond risk
premium, and lower yields induced rising investor bond demand and tighter credit spreads. Corporates filled
the demand gap with a surge in borrowing used for equity buybacks. Pure financial engineering.
Part 2: Risk Premium decompression, accelerators: Small increases in yields can potentially lead
to large changes in risk premium. Credit is the key transmission. Pro-cyclical behavior of investors who
piggy backed central bank purchases and ECB tapering are possible accelerators to the rise in US risk
premium in a tail risk event.
Part 3: Let markets clear. A downside risk in a stress scenario is a meaningful decline in risk assets. But
it isnt systemic. Banks and households have not leveraged to higher asset prices. It is a financial engineering
shock.
32
Low Risk Premium Driven by Declining Real Yields
Risk premium have declined with lower real yields, counter to historic norm of risk narrowing with higher real yields
33
Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch. Wall Street Journal. Haver Analytics. Tse Capital Calculations.
Corporate Bonds Satisfy Surge in Investor Demand
Mutual fund and ETFs have been main vehicles for risk premium compression, and corporates filled the demand gap
34
Source: Federal Reserve Board. Tse Calculations.
Corporate Leverage is High, More Sensitive to Higher Rates
Consequence corporates have peak leverage based on expectations of permanently lower rates and tight spreads
35
Source: Morgan Stanley. Barclays Bank. Federal Reserve Board. International Monetary Fund. Tse Calculations.
Bond Demand-Supply = Larger Private Risk Premium
More challenging than 2013 tantrum investors have more bonds to absorb, risk premium on private debt will rise
36
Source: Federal Reserve Board. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Haver Analytics. Tse Capital Estimates.
Pro-cyclical Bond Inflows Amplify Impact on Credit Spreads
Redemptions from bond funds have a large impact on corporate bond spreads, amplifying the rise in credit spreads
37
Source: Bank of England Financial Stability Paper Number 42. Tse Capital Calculations.
ECB Tapering Adds Impulse to Higher US Yields
ECB asset purchases compressed German real yields and lowered yields in the US already working in reverse
38
Source: European Central Bank. Goldman Sachs. Tse Capital Calculations.
Stress Scenario Example: Rising Risk Premium Faster Rise
in Credit Spreads
Amplification from normalization could possibly come from wider credit spreads and be transmitted to equity
buybacks and valuations
BBB Corporate Spread Key Input: Judgment on rise in credit risk premium
-Stress scenario: spreads tighten as real rates rise (-15bp)
-Rise in corporate financing gap to 1% of GDP through Q1 2018 (+50bp)
-Amplification from bond redemptions (+100bp)
-No amplifiers from Euro area tapering or other factors
39
Source: Tse Capital Calculations.
How Will The Repo Market be Impacted?
Fed normalization estimated to increase borrowing costs of benchmark 2s, 5s, and 10s by a modest 5bps on average
Fed on-the-run bond holdings versus the repo spread to general collateral (2y, 5y, 10yr)
40
Source: New York Federal Reserve Bank. Bank of America Merrill Lynch. Tse Capital Calculations.
Annex 1: Fed estimate of term premium impact
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/effect-of-the-federal-reserves-securities-
holdings-on-longer-term-interest-rates-20170420.htm.
Annex 2: June 2017 Survey of primary dealers (dated as this
was before Fed announced details)
Expectations for the composition of the Federal Reserve Systems balance sheet, on average, in 2025,
conditional on not moving to the ZLB at any point between now and the end of 2025
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/markets/survey/2017/jun-2017-spd-results.pdf.