US vs.

LOO HOE
G.R. No. 12473
September 18, 1917
FACTS:
Loo Hoe was found guilty of a violation of the Opium Law and was sentenced to be deported. The sentence was executed.
However, he returned to the Philippine Islands, in violation of the terms of said sentence.
A complaint was filed by the deputy prosecuting attorney and Loo hoe was brought to trial, and upon arraignment plead guilty
and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of four months, and at the termination of said sentence of imprisonment, to be
again deported and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: WON the penalties for jail breaking under Article 127 is applicable to sentence executed by deportation.
HELD:
No.
If the defendant who has been sentenced to imprisonment breaks jail, the executive departments of the Government may do two
things:
a. It may, in proper cases, proceed against him under article 127 and other provisions of the Penal Code; and
b. it may simply arrest him and return him to jail.
Whether the executive department of the Government will pursue one or the other of these statutory remedies lies within the
discretion of that department of the Government.
The violation of the judgment of deportation by the appellant is not punishable as contempt under section 232. The judgment of
deportation was final. The sentence had been duly executed. The court had lost all jurisdiction over the defendant in that case.
The judgment was executed by the executive department of the Government; and if the defendant has escaped the penalty
imposed by the court, the executive department of the Government has its remedy by enforcing the terms of the sentence again.
The SC is also of the opinion that none of the provisions of article 127 of the Penal Code is applicable to the present case. The
penalties for jail breaking under said article (127) cannot be applied to the acts of the defendant.

People vs Abilong
G.R. No. L-1960
November 26, 1948
FACTS:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947,in the City of Manila, Philippines, FlorentinoAbilong, the accused, being then
a convictsentenced and ordered to serve destierro duringwhich he should not enter any place within theradius of 100 kilometers
from the City of Manila forattempted robbery, evaded the service of saidsentence by going beyond the limits made againsthim
and commit vagrancy.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in imposing a penaltyon the accused under article 157 of the RevisedPenal Code, which does not
cover evasion ofservice of "destierro."
RULING:
It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo
privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as
not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant
by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. Under the case of People vs.Samonte, as
quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his
liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area."

Tanega v Masakayan
GR No. L-27191
February 28,1967
Facts:
Petitioner was convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City. She was found guilty once again by the Court of First
Instance where she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of
P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs.The Court of First Instance of Quezon City, on
January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, execution was
deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This prompted the
respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest.
Petitioner was never arrested. Petitioner moved to quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March 23, 1965.
(Ground: Penalty has prescribed. On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed upon the accused
has to be served", rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
WON Prescription of sentence has commenced
Held:
NO. Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty. By Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code, light penalties
"imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year. The period of prescription of penalties — so the succeeding Article 93
provides — "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". Elements of
evasion of service of sentence are:
the offender is a convict by final judgment;
he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty";
he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.
Article 157: provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by breaking
doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or
through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, ... "
evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking"
Petitioner was never placed in confinement and the prescription of penalty does not run in her favor.

PARULAN vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

G.R. No. L-28519
February 17, 1968
FACTS:
Parulan was serving life imprisonment (commuted to 20 years by the President) in Muntinlupa. In Oct 1964, he was transferred to
Fort Bonifacio. He escaped in the same month, but was recaptured in Manila.
He was prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Art. 157 of the RPC. The CFI in Manila found
him guilty and sentenced him accordingly.
He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the Director of Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered “to
release immediately and without delay the body of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement.” Parulan contended that
his confinement illegal because the sentence of conviction imposed upon him for the crime of evasion of service of sentence was
rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with which he was charged.
ISSUE:
WON the CFI of Manila with jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the sentence upon Parulan for evasion of
service of sentence.
HELD:
Yes. Transitory or continuing offenses are crimes where some acts material and essential to the crime occur in one province and
some in another. The court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has jurisdiction to try
the case. There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may have occurred in a single
place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the violation of the law is deemed to be continuing.
When the prisoner in his attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose
of the law, moves from one place to another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts, set
on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be validly said that after
the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully consummated, for, as long as he continues to
evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any
place where he may be found. The right of arrest without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the
escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime — evading the service of his sentence.

Del Castillo vs. Torrecampo

GR No 139033
December 18, 2002
Facts:
Del Castillo was charged for violation of Section 178(nn) of the 1978 Election Code. The trial court found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as
maximum. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. During the execution of judgment on October 14, 1987, petitioner was
not present. The presiding Judge issued an order of arrest and the confiscation of his bond. Petitioner was never apprehended. 10
years later, petitioner filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed upon him had already
prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial court.
Issue:
Whether the penalty imposed upon Del Castillo had prescribed
Held:
No. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under said
provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same
Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping
during the term of his sentence. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of
Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not
been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In
fact, even before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the
compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the
execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who
are deserving. Petitioner’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is
therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

BASILONIA v. VILLARUZ
GR Nos. 191370-71
Aug 10, 2015
FACTS:
On June 19, 1987, a decision was promulgated against Basilonia et al in a criminal case for murder of Atty. Isagani
Roblete.
Almost two decades passed from the entry of judgment, on May 11, 2009, Roblete, claiming to be the son of the
deceased victim, Atty. Roblete, filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment alleginh, among others, that despite his
request to the City Prosecutor to file a motion for execution, the judgment has not been enforced because said
prosecutor has not acted upon his request.
The trial court granted the motion for execution and ordered the bondsmen to surrender Basilonia et al. Due to
petitioners' failure to appear in court after the expiration of the period granted to their bondsmen, the bail for their
provisional liberty was ordered forfeited and the sheriff issued the writ of execution.
Basilonia et al contended that trial court has no more jurisdiction to order the execution of judgment since the penalty
has already prescribed.
ISSUE:
WON the penalty of imprisonment already prescribed and the civil liability arising from the crime already extinguished.
HELD:
Evasion of service of sentence is an essential element of prescription of penalties. The culprit should escape during
the term of imprisonment in order for prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run. The
period of prescription of penalties as provided in Article 93 states - "shall commence to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence."
Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code explains the concept of evasion of service of sentence:
ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise,
deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the
penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are:
1. the offender is a convict by final judgment;
2. he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty; and
3. he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.
By the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by
the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape
shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by
using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution.." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."
Thus, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. "Escape" in legal
parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of
his custody. It applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in
deprivation of liberty, and that the period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of
sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.
This is not applicable in the case at bar. For the longest time, they were never brought to prison or placed in
confinement despite being sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment. Prescription of penalty of imprisonment
does not run in their favor. Thus, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over
the motion for execution and in eventually granting the same.