G.R. No.

L-46437 May 23, 1939

EUFEMIO P. TESORO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent-appellee.

Antonio Barredo y Padagas for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Kapunan, Jr. for appellee.

MORAN, J.:

On October 10, 1934, petitioner, Eufemio P. Tesoro, was convicted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila of the crime of falsification of a public document and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from two (2) to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days, to pay a fine of one hundred
pesos (100), or undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. This penalty was to expire on
October 28, 1937. On November 14, 1935, the then Governor-General Frank Murphy granted the
petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted, subject to the following conditions:

1. That he will live in the City of Manila and will not change his residence without first obtaining
the consent of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence;

2. That he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner;

3. That he will report, during the period of his parole, to the Executive Secretary of the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence, during the first year, once a month, and thereafter, once every three
months.

Should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall again be in full force
and effect.

On December 3, 1937, petitioner was charged in the justice of the peace court of San Juan, Rizal, with
the crime of adultery alleged to have been committed with one Concordia Dairo, wife of petitioner's
brother-in-law, Jose Nagar. To the complaint were attached the affidavits of the complainant Jose Nagar,
of Luz Nagar and of Epimaco Nagar. The case was thereafter forwarded to the Court of First Instance of
Rizal where the provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information which, however, was dismissed for
non-appearance of the complainant.

Sometime in the month of February, 1938, the same Jose Nagar lodged a complaint with Board of
Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts supporting the criminal action aforementioned,
charged the petitioner with violation of the conditions of his parole. On February 3, 1938, petitioner was
summoned to appear before the board for a hearing on the aforecited complaint, but petitioner asked for
postponement until the day following. On February 4, 1938, petitioner addressed a letter to the board
denying the charge of illicit relations with the complainant's wife the included therewith the supposed
retraction of Epimaco Nagar of what the latter had stated in his former affidavit. On the same date Simeon
Figalang, a parole officer assigned to investigate the case, submitted his report to the board, and, on the
strength thereof and papers supporting it, the acting chairman of the board addressed a communication
to the President of the Philippines, recommending the arrest and reincarceration of the petitioner. And on
February 19, 1938, the President issued the following order:

To any lawful officer:

Whereas, Eufemio P. Tesoro, convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of
falsification of an official document, and sentenced to an indeterminate term of from 2 years to 3
 years, 6 months and 21 days' imprisonment, plus P100 fine, was granted pardon on parole by His
Excellency, the Governor-General, on November 14, 1935, under certain conditions, one of which
provides that he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner,
and

Whereas, said Eufemio P. Tesoro has violated this condition in that, in the latter part of
September, 1937, and continuously thereafter, he betrayed the confidence of his brother-in-law,
Jose Nagar, by maintaining adulterous relations with the latter's wife, under the following
circumstances: Upon the death on September 18, 1937, of parolee Tesoro's wife (sister of Jose
Nagar) and in order to mitigate the grief of the bereaved family and to help in the keeping of the
house and caring of the children of said parolee, Jose Nagar and his wife came to live with the
parolee in San Juan, Rizal; but taking advantage of the frequent absences of Jose Nagar from
the house, parolee Tesoro made advances to Jose Nagar's wife, Concordia Dairo, succeeded in
having illicit relations with her and even went to the extent of taking away the woman from her
legitimate husband, after the couple had moved from his home, and he is now living with her in
adultery.

Therefore, by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by section 64 (i) of the Administrative
Code, you are hereby ordered to arrest parolee Eufemio P. Tesoro and to commit him to the
custody of the Director of Prisons, Manila, who is hereby authorized to confine said person for the
service of the unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally committed
to prison.

By virtue of this order, the petitioner was arrested and recommitted to the custody of the Director of
Prisons. Thereupon, petitioner sued for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons, and upon
denial thereof by the trial court, took the present appeal.

Section 63 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the petitioner was granted parole, gives the
Governor-General the following powers and duties:

To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or

unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any
convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the
arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the
condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, provides as follows:

The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such
conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall
have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly.

Appellant contends that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, above quoted, in so far as it confers
upon the Chief Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles, has been impliedly repealed by the
aforecited constitutional provision, as the latter omitted to specify such power in connection with the
powers granted therein to the President of the Philippines. This contention is untenable. The power to
pardon given the President by the Constitution, "upon such conditions and with such restrictions and
limitations as he may deem proper to impose," includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. (20
R.C.L., 577; 46 C.J. 1205.) If the omission of the power of parole in the Constitution is to be construed as
a denial thereof to the President, the effect would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before
the adoption of the Constitution, have been released conditionally by the Chief Executive. That such
effect was never intended by the Constitutional Convention is obviously beyond question.
Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no legal authority to investigate
the conduct of the petitioner, and recommend the revocation of his parole. By the terms of his parole,
petitioner agreed to report the executive secretary of the board once a month during the first year of his
parole, and, thereafter, once every three months. By his consent to this condition, petitioner has placed
himself under the supervision of the board. The duty to report on the part of the petitioner implies a
corresponding power on the part of the board to inquire into his conduct, and a fortiori to make
recommendations to the President by whose authority it was acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles
necessarily carries with it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such
power of revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental power of inquiry and
investigation, the President of the Philippines is not precluded by law or by the Constitution from making
use of any agency of the government, or even of any individual, to secure the necessary assistance.
When, therefore, the President chose to intrust his power of inquiry upon the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence, a government agency created precisely for the concern of persons released on parole, he
acted both upon legal authority and good judgment.

Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime is
necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having violated his conditional parole. Under condition
No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed that he "will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in
an orderly manner." (Emphasis ours.) It was, therefore, the mere commission, not his conviction by court,
of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the petitioner may be deemed to have violated his
parole. And under section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order
"the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the
condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." (Emphasis ours.)

Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the violation of the conditional parole. He
claims that, according to the weight of the evidence, the violation took place, not "in the latter part of
September, 1937," as found by the President, but after October 28, 1937, the date when the parole was
supposed to expire. But that as it may, where, as in the instant case, the determination of the violation of
the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the courts will not
interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings. The petitioner herein having consented to place his
liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, he cannot invoke the aid of the
courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.

Besides, even conceding that the petitioner's violation of the parole took place after October 28, 1937,
when his maximum penalty was to have expired, we still find no error in the order of the arrest and
recommitment. It is the petitioner's contention that, upon the expiration of his maximum term of
imprisonment, his conditional parole also expires, and, therefore, his liberty becomes absolute subject to
no conditions contained in his parole. In other words, he holds the view that the period during which he
was out on parole should be counted as service of his original sentence. We do not subscribe to this
contention.

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 189644 July 2, 2014

NEIL E. SUYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CHIEF PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICER,
DAGUPAN CITY,Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 27 March 2009,
which affirmed the Orders dated 31 March 20062 and 26 June 20063 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City. The RTC found that Neil E. Suyan (petitioner) had violated the conditions of
his probation and thus, ordered that his probation be revoked. The instant petition likewise assails
the Resolution dated 9 September 20094, which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned Decision dated 27 March 2009. The facts as found by the CA are summarized as
follows:

On 27 October 1995, an Information was filed against petlt10ner, charging him with violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425.5 During arraignment, he pleadedguilty to the
charge. The RTC thereafter proceeded with trial.

On 22 November 1995, petitioner was convicted of the crime, for which he was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of six (6) years of prisioncorreccional and to pay the costs. On even date, he filed his
application for probation.

On 16 February 1996, the RTC issued a Probation Order covering a period of six (6) years.6 While
on probation, petitioner was arrested on two occasions, more specifically on 2 September and 20
October 19997 for violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425. Two separateInformations were
filed against him, both of which were filed with the RTC of Dagupan City. One of these cases was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-03073-D before Branch 43 (Branch 43 case), and the other case
as Criminal Case No. 99-03129-D before Branch 41.

On 1 December 1999, Atty. SimplicioA. Navarro, Jr. (Atty. Navarro), then the Chief Probation and
Parole Officer of Dagupan City, filed a Motion to Revoke Probation (Motion to Revoke).8 Atty.
Navarro alleged that petitioner has been apprehended twice for drug possession while on probation.
The former further alleged that petitioner was considered a recidivist, whose commission of other
offenses while on probation was a serious violation of the terms thereof.Atty. Navarro also pointed
out that petitioner was no longer in a position to comply with the conditions of the latter’s probation,
in view of his incarceration.9

On 15 December 1999, the RTC issued an order revoking the probation of petitioner and directing
him to serve the sentence imposed upon him.10 It denied11 his Motion for Reconsideration.12

Aggrieved, on 6 April 2000 petitioner filed a Rule 65 Petition13 with the CA (first CA case),14 wherein
he assailed the revocation of his probation. He argued that he was denied due process as he was
not furnished with a copy of the Motion to Revoke; and whenthe motion was heard, he was not
represented by his counsel of record.15
On 2 January 2006, the CA in its Decision,16 granted the Rule 65 Petition by annulling and set aside
RTC’s revocation of petitioner’s probation. The CA ruled that the trial court had not complied with the
Probation Law and the procedural requisites for the revocation of probation under the Revised Rules
on Probation Methods and Procedures, enumerated as follows:17

1. No fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations was conducted by the Probation

Officer. 2. The Probation Office should havereported to respondent court the result of said
investigation, if any, upon its completion.

3. There was no Violation Report under P.A. Form No. 8, the contents of which are
enumerated under Section 38 of the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures.

4. No warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court after considering the nature and
seriousness of the alleged violations based on the report, if any.

5. The petitioner should have been brought to respondent court for a hearing of the violations
charged, during which petitioner – with the right to counsel – should have been informed of
the violations charged and allowed to adduce evidence in his favor.

The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings, for the purpose of
affording petitioner his right to due process pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 968, and the
Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures.

In compliance with the CA Decision, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke.18 On 17
February 2006, a Violation Report dated 13 February 200619 was filed by the DagupanCityParole and
Probation Office recommending the revocation of probation.20 The Violation Report provides in part:

D. CASE SUMMARY

At the outset of his probation period, probationer showed manifested negative attitude by incurring
absences and not attending rehabilitation activities despite constant follow-up by his supervising
officers. He continued with his illegal drug activities despite counselling and warning from this Office.

Obviously, probationer has failed to recognize the value of freedom and second chance accorded
him by the Honorable Court, his conduct and attitude bespeaks of his deviant character, hence he is
unworthy to continuously enjoy the privilege of probation.

On 22 March 2006, the prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence. A Certification dated
23January 2006 (Certification),21 issued by Manuel Z. de Guzman, was offered as evidence to prove
that petitioner had been convicted in the Branch 43 case (one of the two cases subsequently filed
against him, as stated earlier); and that he had served his sentence from 30 September 2000 until
his release, by reason of the expiration of his maximum sentence on 8 September 2003.Thereafter,
petitioner filed his Comment on the Formal Offer without disputing the Certification.22

On 31 March 2006, the RTC issued an Order23 revoking the probation. It ruled that it had granted
petitioner due process by affording him the full opportunity to contest the Motion to Revoke; but that
instead of rebutting the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of a violation report
when his probation was first revoked.24The RTC further held that there was positive testimony and
documentary evidence showing that petitioner had indeed violated the conditions of his probation.
He never rebutted the fact of his commission of another offense and conviction therefor while on
probation.25 He filed a Motion for Reconsideration,26 but it was denied.27
Aggrieved, petitioner again filed an appeal with the CA.28 This time, he alleged that he had been
deprived of his constitutional right to due process when his probation was ordered revoked.29 He
further alleged that he had not been given ample opportunity to refute the alleged violations
committed by him while on probation. The probation officer did not conduct a fact-finding
investigation of the alleged violations, and, consequently, petitioner was not furnished any results.
After considering the nature and seriousness of the alleged violations, the RTC did not issue any
warrant for his arrest, as he had not been affordedan opportunity to adduce evidence in his favor
with the assistance of his counsel.30

With regard to the specific groundsfor revocation, petitioner claimed that the evidence adduced
against him did not refer to the grounds cited in the Motion to Revoke, but instead, the evidence
referred to alleged violations of Condition Nos. 3, 9 and 10 of the Probation Order.

The CA denied his appeal. With regard to the procedural issues discussed in the assailed Decision,
it ruled that petitioner was afforded due process. A full-blown trial was conducted precisely to allow
him to refute the allegations made in the Motion to Revoke. It held further that petitioner wasted this
opportunity when, instead of rebutting the allegations mentioned in the Violation Report, he merely
questioned the absence of such a report when his probation was first revoked. It added that the
procedural infirmities in the Motion to Revoke were cured when the RTC conducted a hearing in
accordance with the directive laiddown in the First CA Case.

With regard to the substantive issue of revocation, the CA ruled that, for having been apprehended
twice for the commission of two offenses similar in nature, petitioner violated oneof the conditions
prescribed in the Probation Order. He even admitted tohaving served out his sentence for those
offenses.

Aggrieved yet again, petitioner filed an appeal with this Court. On procedural grounds, he alleges
that there was no fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations conducted by the probation
officer, and thus no results were furnished him. Likewise, no warrantof arrest was issued by the
RTC. Neither was he affordedany opportunity to adduce evidence in his favor with the assistance of
counsel.

On substantive grounds, petitioner alleges that he already showed repentance after his conviction. In
his first case, he readily admitted his accountability by pleading guilty to the charge. Thus, he was
convicted and he subsequently applied for probation. He further alleges that, of the two cases filed
against him, one was ordered dismissed; he has already served his sentence for the other. Since
then, no derogatory information has been received either by the probation office orthe trial court.
Petitioner points out that he has already reformed his ways and is thus entitled to the grace of law.
He contends that the CA should have ordered him to resume his probation pursuant to the positivist
theory adopted in our criminal justice system.

ISSUE

The sole issue to be resolved inthe instant case is whether the probation was validly revoked. THE
COURT’S RULING

We rule that the probation ofpetitioner was validly revoked.

On the procedural grounds, we do notsubscribe to his contention that his right to due process was
violatedafter the RTC had already conducted a full-blown trial on the Motion to Revoke, in
compliance with the directive of the CA. Based on record, he had ample opportunity to refute the
allegations contained in the Violation Report.
The essence of due process is thata party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in
support of his case; what the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to
be heard.31 When the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard
and to air his side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his
cry for due process must fail.32

We adopt the ruling of the CA inthat petitioner squandered his own opportunity when, instead of
rebutting the allegations mentioned in the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of any
such report when his probation was first revoked.

On substantive grounds, we believe that there was sufficient justification for the revocation of his
probation.

Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his
sentence for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense
1âwphi1

is a direct violation of Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order,33 and the effects are clearly outlined in
Section 11 of the Probation Law.

Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render the
probation order ineffective. Section 11 states:

Sec. 11.Effectivity of Probation Order. - A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at
which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his
failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another
offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation.
(Emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in revoking the probation of petitioner and ordering him
to serve the penalty for the offense for which he was placed on probation.

As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full obedience to the
terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this
privilege.34 Regrettably, petitioner wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain outside
prison bars, and must now suffer the consequences of his violation.35 The Court's discretion to grant
probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused.36 Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has
the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
27 March 2009 and Resolution dated 9 September 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 95426 are both
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson
G.R. No. 123936 March 4, 1999

RONALD SORIANO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. RODOLFO V. TOLEDANO, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 69, Third Judicial Region, Iba Zambales; THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF,
Third Judicial Region, Iba, Zambales; Ms. NELDA DA MAYCONG, Suprvising Parole and
Probation Officer and Officer-in-Charge, Zambales Parole and Probation Office; and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No.
35550, 1 which upheld the trial court's orders holding petitioner in contempt and revoking his
probation.

The fact of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Ronald Santiago was convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to
homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property on December 7, 1993. 2 His
application for probation was granted on March 8, 1994, and among the terms and conditions
imposed by the trial court were the following: 3

xxx xxx xxx

7. He shall meet his family responsibilities.

8. He shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not change

employment without prior notice to the supervising officer; and/or shall pursue a
prescribed secular study or vocational training.

xxx xxx xxx

11. He is to indemnify the heirs of the victim Isidrino Daluyong in the amount of
P98,560.00 as ordered by the Court.

xxx xxx xxx

On April 26, 1994, Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin A Fadera filed a motion to cancel petitioner's
probation due to his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and a
supplemental motion alleging petitioner's commission of another crime for which at that time he
was awaiting arraignment. The Zambales Parole and Probation Office filed a comment
recommending that the petitioner be allowed to continue with his probation and that he be
required instead to submit a program of payment of his civil liability.

On June 20, 1994, the trial court denied the prosecutor's motion and directed petitioner to
submit a program of payment of the civil liability imposed upon him.
Thereafter, probation officer Nelda D. Maycong received information that petitioners father who
owned the vehicle involved in the accident which killed Daluyong, received P16,500.00 as
insurance payment. This amount was not turned over to the heirs of Daluyong and Da Maycong
considered this a violation of the terms and conditions of the probation. She submitted a
manifestation to the trial court praying that the petitioner be made to explain his non-compliance
with the court's order of June 20, 1994, or that be cited for contempt for such non-compliance.
Da Maycong also asked that petitioner be made to submit a program of payment as soon as
possible. The trial court granted his prayers in an order dated August 15, 1994. Petitioner was
once again ordered to submits his program of payment. Petitioner instead filed a motion for
reconsideration explaining that he did not receive a copy of said order on June 23, 1994 but
failed to notify petitioner. Thus, the latter failed to comply with said order.

On October 4, 1994, the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner in contempt of court for
his failure to comply with its orders of June 20, 1994 and August 15, 1994. The court likewise
revoked the grant of probation to petitioner and ordered that he be arrested to serve the
sentence originally imposed upon him. According to the trial court, among the violation
committed by petitioner as regards his probation are his failure to (1) meet his responsibilities to
his family, (2) engage in a specific employment, and (3) cooperate with his program of
supervision.

Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. He claimed that
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of,
jurisdiction in holding petitioner in contempt and revoking his probation. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, holding that petitioner's "stubborn unwillingness" to comply with the
orders of the trial court "shows his refusal to reform himself and to correct a wrong." 4

According to the Court of Appeals:

Where probation was approved and probationer has proven to be unrepentant

and disrespectful and even showed clear defiance to two lawful court orders, as
in the case of herein petitioner, the court is not barred from revoking the same. 5

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of
merit.

Hence, this petition for review, in which petitioner makes the following assignment of errors. 6

1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge

committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was deliberate refusal
on the part of petitioner to comply with his orders dated June 20, 1994 and
August 15, 1994 and subsequently declaring petitioner in contempt.

2. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge

committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the probation order he earlier
issued in favor of petitioner on the ground that petitioner failed to satisfy the
award of civil indemnity for the heirs of the accident victim.

3. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge

committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the probation order he earlier
 issued in favor of petitioner on the ground that the latter violated the conditions of
his probation three times.

Petitioner asserts that he had no intention to ignore the orders of the trial court. The court's
order of June 20, 1994 was received by his counsel who, however, did not notify petitioner.
Petitioner says that his "former counsel's irresponsible delay (in informing him of the order)
should not prejudice him." 7

He explains that his non-compliance with the order to submit a program of payment of his civil
liability is, ultimately, due to his poor financial condition. He only relies on his parents for
support. He claims that it is impossible for him to formulate a payment program because, in the
first place, he is in no position to comply with the same.

Petitioner avers that to require him to satisfy his civil liability in order to continue to avail of the
benefits of probation is to violate the constitutional proscription against unequal protection of the
law. He says only moneyed probationers will be able to benefit from probation if satisfaction of
civil liability is made a condition.

Petitioner contends that his enjoyment of probation should not be made to depend on the
satisfaction of his civil liability. He invokes the separate opinion of Justice Isagani A. Cruz
in Salgado v. Court of Appeals, 8 particularly Justice Cruz' reservation about the validity of
imposing satisfaction of civil liability as a condition for probation such an imposition is in the
nature of an amendment of the decision of the trial court in the criminal case against him, which
cannot be allowed since the decision is already final and executory. He further invokes the
majority decision in Salgado and asserts that "any program of payment of civil liability must take
into consideration the needs and capacity of petitioner." 9

Petitioner claims that his failure to meet his responsibilities to his family and to engage in gainful
employment is not deliberate but is due to his poverty. He adds that his being unskilled, with a
criminal record to his name, does not exactly enhance his chances for employment.

Finally, petitioner cites our decision in Baclayon v. Mutia: 10

. . . Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each

case should be judged on its own merits — on the basis of the problems, needs
and capacity of the probationer. The very liberality of the probation should not be
made a tool by trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms. 11

In his comment, the Solicitor General asks for the dismissal of the petition. The only issue to be
resolved according to him is whether or not petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of
his probation warrant its revocation. The Solicitor General argues that petitioner has committed
violations, thus justifying the trial court' s revocation of the grant of probation. He further points
out that our ruling in Salgado is inapplicable to the case of petitioner since what was involved
in Salgado was a program of payment already imposed upon petitioner therein. In this case,
however, it is petitioner who is being asked to submit his own program of payment and he had
not submitted any such program:

The only issue for us to resolve in this case is whether or not the revocation of petitioner's
probation is lawful and proper.
Petitioner asserts that his non-compliance with the orders of the trial court requiring him to
submit a program of payment was not deliberate. To our mind, his refusal to comply with said
orders cannot be anything but deliberate. He had notice of both orders, although the notice of
the order of June 20, 1994 came belatedly. He has, up to this point, refused to comply with the
trial court's directive, by questioning instead the constitutionality of the requirement imposed and
harping on his alleged poverty as the reason for his failure to comply.

Contrary to his assertion, this requirement is not violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Note that payment of the civil liability is not made a condition precedent to
probation. If it were, then perhaps there might be some basis to petitioner's assertion that only
moneyed convicts may avail of the benefits of probation. In this case, however, petitioner's
application for probation had already been granted. Satisfaction of his civil liability was not made
a requirement before he could avail a probation, but was a condition for his continued
enjoyment of the same.

The trial court could not have done away with imposing payment of civil liability as a condition
for probation, as petitioner suggests. This is not an arbitrary imposition but one required by law.
It is a consequence of petitioner's having been convicted of a crime, 12 and petitioner is bound to
satisfy this obligation regardless of whether or not he is placed under probation.

We fail to see why petitioner cannot comply with a simple order to furnish the trial court with a
program of payment of his civil liability. He may, indeed, be poor, but this is precisely the reason
why the trial court gave him the chance to make his own program of payment. Knowing his own
financial condition, he is in the best position to formulate a program of payment that fits his
needs and capacity.

Petitioner blames his former counsel's "irresponsible delay" in informing him of the trial court's
order to come up with a program of payment for his failure to make such a program. Petitioner
wants to take exception to the rule that notice to counsel is notice to client.

We find no reason to make an exception in this case. Petitioner's counsel has not been shown
to be grossly irresponsible as to cause prejudice to petitioner's rights. 13 Moreover, we note that
petitioner later on discovered that such a court order was received by his counsel. He could
have endeavored to comply with the order then. In the June 20, 1994 order, he was given 10
days from receipt of the order within which to comply. The same period was given him in the
order of August 15, 1994. Petitioner does not claim that he failed to receive notice of the latter
order. In fact, he submitted a motion for reconsideration of said order, but still without the
required program of payment.

No justifiable reason has been given by petitioner for ignoring those two orders. The trial court
could not be faulted for citing him in contempt for his failure to comply with its orders. Nor did it
abuse gravely its discretion in issuing said orders. Hence, we are in full agreement with
respondent appellate court's decision as well.

Moreover, petitioner's continued refusal to submit a program of payment, along with his prayer
for the deletion of the requirement of payment of civil liability from his probation order, creates
the impression that he wants to completely avoid paying his civil liability. This he cannot do. He
cannot escape payment of his civil liability, with or without a program of payment.
Petitioner's reliance on Salgado is misplaced. In that case, the trial court itself formulated the
manner by which Salgado was to satisfy his civil liability. He was able to comply for a few
months. When he started skipping his payments, his victim sought the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce full payment of the civil liability. The trial court granted this motion and it
was sustained by the Court of Appeals which ruled that the program of payment amounted to an
amendment of the decision of the trial court ordering payment of civil liability but without a
program of payment. Since the trial court's decision had already become final, it can no longer
be amended by imposing a program of payment, in installments, of the civil liability.

We held in Salgado, that the program of payment is not an amendment of the decision of the
trial court because it does not increase or decrease the liability and the obligation to pay is to be
fulfilled during the period of probation.

Unlike in Salgado, herein petitioner was being asked to make a program of payment. But he
failed to do so. Hence, in this case, there is yet no program of payment to speak of, because of
petitioner's stubborn refusal and delay as well as failure to abide by the trial court's orders.

Petitioner's reliance on Baclayon is likewise misplaced. In that case, what was being assailed as
an unrealistic condition was the trial court's requirement that petitioner therein, a teacher
convicted of Serious Oral Defamation, refrain from exercising her profession. This condition was
deemed unreasonable because teaching was the only profession she knew and it appeared that
she excelled in teaching. No unrealistic condition similar to the one in Baclayan has been
imposed upon petitioner herein.

As regards the other violations committed by petitioner, the question of whether or not petitioner
has, indeed, violated the terms and conditions of his probation is evidently a factual one which
had already been passed upon by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Settled is the
rule in this jurisdiction that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight, more so
when they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 14 as in this case.

Besides, petitioner himself admits in his petition that he is unemployed and only depends on his
parents for support. He can barely support his family. 15 Petitioner ought to be reminded of what
is incumbent on a probationer, including those requirements that the trial court may set.

As Section 10 of the Probation Law states:

Sec. 10. Conditions of Probation. — . . .

The court may also require the probationer to:

(a) Cooperate with a program of supervision;

(b) Meet his family responsibilities;

(c) Devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment
without the prior written approval of the probation officer

xxx xxx xxx

 (e) Pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training;

xxx xxx xxx 16

Clearly, these conditions are not whims of the trial court but are requirements laid down by
statute. They are among the conditions that the trial court is empowered to impose and the
petitioner, as probationer, is required to follow. Only by satisfying these conditions may the
purposes of probation be fulfilled. These include promoting the correction and rehabilitation of
an offender by providing him with individualized treatment, and providing an opportunity for the
reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison
sentence. 16a Failure to comply will result in the revocation of the order granting probation,
pursuant to the Probation Law:

Sec. 11. Effetivity of Probation Order. — A probation order shall take effect upon
its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the
consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of the
conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense, he
shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on
probation."16b (Emphasis supplied.)

Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion of
the trial court. 17 Its grant is subject to certain terms and conditions that may be imposed by the
trial court. Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power
to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.

Moreover, having admittedly violated the terms and conditions of his probation, petitioner cannot
now assail the revocation of his probation. Regrettably, he has squandered the opportunity
granted him by the trial court to remain outside prison bars, and must now suffer the
consequences of those aforecited violations.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
in C.A. G.R. SP No. 35550 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 CASE No. SB-12-CRM-0110

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES … Plaintiff

versus

NAPOLEON B. BAGUILAT … Accused

PRESENT: LAGOS, J, ACTING CHAIRPERSON, CRUZ, J* AND MEDONA-ARCEGA,

JJ

Promulgated: February 9, 2017

RESOLUTION

LAGOS, J:

This treats of the Application for Probation filed by accused Napoleon Baguilat y
Bulayungan, who was convicted of the instant charge for violation of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code (Direct Bribery) in Criminal Case No. Sb-12-Crm-0110 per Court's
Decision promulgated on May 24, 2016. Accused was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
indeterminate imprisonment of Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) day of
Prision Correctional as minimum to Three (3) Years Six (6) Months and Twenty (20)
Days of Prision Correctional Medium as Maximum and to pay a Fine of Two Hundred
Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.

In Compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated September 29, 2016, Probation
and Parole Officer Marito S. Cantiga submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report
dated December 1, 2016 which bears the approval of Supervising Probation and Parole
Officer and Officer-in-Charge Romeo G. Cachin, recommending the approval of
accused's probation in this case.

After having evaluated the Post-Sentence Investigation Report, the Court finds the
recommendation therein for the granting of the probation of the accused to be in order.

WHEREFORE, the application for probation of accused Napoleon B. Baguilat is

GRANTED. The accused shall undergo probation, under the following conditions which
he must comply, to wit:

1. The probation shall be for a period of Three (3) Years, to be counted from
Probationer's initial report for supervision;
2. Probationer shall report initially to the Chief Probation and Parole Officer at Room No.
B-06. Hall of Justice, Quezon City within Seventy-Two (72) hours from receipt of the
Order granting Probation;

3. He shall, thereafter, report to his Supervising Probation and Parole Officer at least
TWICE A MONTH, unless otherwise modified by the Chief Probation and Parole Officer
or Court, as the case may be;

4. He shall reside at 11-V Francisco St., Krus na Ligas, Quezon City and shall not
change his residence without prior approval of the Supervising Probation and Parole
Officer, or Court, as the case may be;

5. He shall refrain from associating with persons of questionable character, and shall
not commit any crime or any other offense;

6. He shall secure a written permit to travel outside the jurisdiction of the Chief
Probation and Parole Office from the Chief Probation and Parole Officer and from the
Court, if such travel exceeds thirty (30) days;

7. He shall render community service and will participate in tree-planting activities;

8. He shall allow the Supervising Probation and Parole Officer or an authorized

Volunteer Aide to visit his home and place of work;

9. He shall meet his family responsibilities;

10. He shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not change said
employment without prior notice to the supervising officer and/or pursue a prescribed
secular study or vocational training;

11. He shall not commit any crime or any other offense;

12. He shall undergo medical, psychological or psychiatric examination and treatment

and enter and remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose;

13. He shall cooperate with his program of supervision, shall satisfy any other condition
related to his rehabilitation and not unduly restrictive of his liberty incompatible with his
freedom of conscience.

In the event the Petitioner fails to observe the preceding conditions and/or has
committed any material misrepresentation in his application for probation, his probation
may be revoked by the Court or the conditions thereof modified.
SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines.

RAFAEL R. LAGOS
Acting Chairperson
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNALDO P. CRUZ
Associate Justice

MARIA THERESA V. MENDOZA-ARCEGA

Associate Justice
 Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010.

FACTS: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his
conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission
to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence
of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that
the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave
caution and only for strong reasons.” Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the
denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail
under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s
theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent,
bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a
penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of
bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

HELD: NO, discretionary nature of bail mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114 does not mean
automatic grant of bail in case of appeal.

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly,
the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial
discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution
and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial
court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach.
This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and
the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial
court’s initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the
accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws.
This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing
in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused
faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or
other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous
and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court
processes.