The Zing of Perceived Control:

Memetic Equilibrium as a Proximal Cause

In the Evolution of Religion
Christopher W. DiCarlo
University of Toronto

The purpose of this paper is to examine the origin and development of memetic
transference in light of currently known varying constraints on human cognitive
evolution. In order to get a relatively clear picture of such constraints, we must attempt to
faithfully and responsibly represent the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (or
EEA). Since sophisticated memetic transference appears to be a relatively recent
phenomenon, my analysis of the EEA shall be restricted mostly to the Upper Paeolithic
period. This will involve considering several contributing factors such as hominid
migratory patterns, food availability/acquisition, physiological changes (including gene
mutations), meteorological/climatological and geographic changes, tool use and other
artifact records e.g. objects of art, burial rituals, etc. After developing a fairly responsible
representation of the type of environment in which our ancestors evolved, I shall consider
the evidence for the emergence of consciousness and language, the use of human
reasoning skills, and specific neurobiological factors, in an effort to develop a hypothesis
regarding the origin and development of what I call memetic equilibrium. My hypothesis
involves the proposal that when consciousness and languages co-evolved to a sufficiently
sophisticated level, memetic responses to natural occurrences gave way to greater
symbolic representation and evolved conceptual schemas. As human consciousness
evolved, so too did our ancestors' capacity to consider and attempt to solve more
environmental problems. Problem solving, when considered satisfactory, produces a
feeling of environmental control, stability -- in short, memetic equilibrium. But the pay-
off is not merely practical, providing purely functional utility -- it is biochemical -- and it
comes in the form of neural rewards. The relationship between a newly emerging
conscious awareness and sophisticated languages in which to formulate representations
combined with the desire to maintain biological equilibrium, generated the necessity for
memetic equilibrium to fill in conceptual gaps (or lacunae) in terms of understanding
causality, morality, and mortality. The desire to explain phenomena in relation to

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maintaining survival and reproductive stasis (S-R Value), generated a normative stance in
the minds of our ancestors.

The EEA (Upper Paleolithic)

By the time of the late Middle to Upper Paleolithic periods (70-10kya), our ancestors
were, in many important respects, about as fully human as we are today. By the time they
had started leaving Africa (approximately 60-100 kya), they had moved into Eurasia with
increasingly sophisticated technologies:
Not only did they possess a new Upper Paleolithic stoneworking
technology, they made tools from bone and antler, they brought with them
art, in the form of carvings, engravings, and spectacular cave paintings;
they crafted intricate personal adornments; they afforded some of their
dead elaborate burials with grave goods; and their living sites were highly
organized with evidence of sophisticated hunting and fishing [techniques].
The pattern of intermittent technological innovation was gone, replaced by
constant refinement. Clearly, these people were us (Tattersall 2003, 26).

By 40kya, the physiological features of H. sapiens are pretty well identical to ours today.
Brain development had evolved from some 400 cubic centimeters to our current average
of about 1350 cc's. Our dentition and gut-size changed according to an omnivorous diet, a
reduced gut size due to a higher intake of protein through meat which helped supply the
necessary energy needed for the recently developed larger brain. 1 Human pharyngeal
development evolved to a point in which the larynx drops in our vocal tract by the age of
two thus allowing for greater articulation of sounds/speech.2 Geographically, by
approximately 20 kya, the last glacial maximum (LGM) was retreating. Meteorological
effects have brought about changes in weather patterns, changes in flora/fauna
development, and changes to survival strategies in terms of hunting, gathering, and
scavenging. For example, Isla Castaneda's team have determined through n-alkane
carbon isotope dating that the first migrations of Homo sapiens occurred during
extremely rainy and wet conditions this facilitating movement more easily:
Our data suggest that variability in the strength of Atlantic meridional overturning
circulation (AMOC) is a main control on vegetation distribution in central North
Africa, and we note expansions of C3 vegetation during the African Humid Period
(early Holocene) and within Marine Isotope Stage (MIS) 3 (≈50–45 ka) and MIS 5
(≈120–110 ka). The wet periods within MIS 3 and 5 coincide with major human
migration events out of sub-Saharan Africa. Our results thus suggest that changes in

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 AMOC influenced North African climate and, at times, contributed to amenable
conditions in the central Sahara/Sahel, allowing humans to cross this otherwise
inhospitable region. 3

In terms of genetic mutations, Richard Klein maintains that the foxp2 gene
mutation was possibly responsible for sparking language, and contributing significantly
to the development of both art and culture. As well, we have good reason to believe that
our ancestors would have existed in relatively small, kin-based, nomadic groups, hunting,
gathering, and scavenging for subsistence. By approximately 40kya, when the artifact
records indicate how symbolic thought was represented in many newly developed and
diverse ways, Homo sapiens were clearly at the forefront.4 And so, we now have at least a
cursory understanding of some of the numerous constraints which existed during the EEA
and contributed to the cognitive evolution of our ancestors. Let's now look more closely
at the emergence of consciousness and language during the Upper Paleolithic to see when
and how cultural advances were occurring.

The Co-Evolution of Language and Consciousness

Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote: “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world”
(Wittgenstein 1981, sec. 5.6). What cannot be thought cannot be said, and what cannot be
said, limits what one can know about the world. This may apply quite appropriately to
hominid evolution and the emergence of consciousness and language. For language is a
tool which requires intelligence (i.e. the necessary brain size), syntax (i.e. rules),
socialization (i.e. use/reference), vocalization (i.e. the necessary pharyngeal
development), and creativity. In terms of cultural language reference, ideas, procedures,
etc., I have adopted Richard Dawkins' useful term memes to refer to cultural units of
information which various cultures have invented, developed, and transferred to each
other. Dawkins defines memes as:
...tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of
building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by
leaping from body to body via sperms and eggs, so memes propagate
themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process
which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation (Dawkins 1976, 206).
By the time of the so-called Cultural Explosion (the period of the Upper Paleolithic
dating about 40-50kya), all of the necessary conditions were in place to bring about such

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an increase in hominid cultural activity (a ‘Perfect Storm’ of causal elements). I believe
the artifact records gives us some indication that intentionality and direction depicted in
symbolic representation reveals a sharp increase in material manipulation which could
not have been done without a fairly developed consciousness and languages which could
facilitate such expression. I maintain that consciousness and language are at least
necessary conditions for sophisticated symbolic representation, i.e. you simply cannot
make or paint the shape of a horse without some concept of 'horseness' to which the
figure or symbol (or meme) refers. The mental template and concept must be present
prior to the manipulation of materials. And such manipulation is a strong indication of
intentionality of representation.
Unlike any other species, we have a highly developed consciousness. But what,
exactly, is consciousness? When, exactly, did it develop and emerge? And what
evolutionary advantages would it have given our ancestors? I can provide a functional
definition which at least covers some of the necessary conditions which should
adequately serve our purposes here.
1. First of all, human consciousness involves perceptual awareness of our environment.
But all species (from amoeba to zebra) have perceptual awareness of their environments.
2. But unlike most species, we are aware that we are aware of ourselves, our
environment, and the relationship between the two. In other words, we are self-aware that
we are both distinct from and a part of (an) ecology. This is what we could refer to as a
type of second order or meta perception or metawareness.
3. We also have the capacity to recognize the relationship between our beliefs and our
ecology. We can, through trial and error, modify our memes in the attempt to increase the
likelihood of our survival. And we can acknowledge benefit or harm relative to those
beliefs and their efficacy as they are incorporated into survival strategies.
4. Another extremely important factor in the evolution of consciousness, is that we have a
strong sense of mortality. As depicted in the eventual customs and burial rituals of our
ancestors, we know, by analogy, that we are going to die. This paints a very clear
conceptual picture about our own lives.5
5. This has led to the emergence of a theory of mind. That is, we developed a very good
capacity not only for seeing the world from the vantage of others, but in making

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associations about the behaviour of others based on that capacity. This has given rise to
an increased ability in understanding social standing, making inferences about the
thoughts of others, spotting deception, and for emotional feelings such as empathy.
With a heightened (i.e. conscious) understanding our ancestors had of their social
ecological relationships, a reflective normativity relative to their environment(s) would
have developed in other words, value. Unlike any species before, Homo sapiens would
now have had a sense of worth relative to their view of themselves, others, and their
environment. For the first time in our history as a species, this would have established a
conscious recognition and incentive to maintain species or biological equilibrium. And
for the first time in human history, our ancestors would have had the capacity for
consciously directed self-improvement (however memetically defined).
Prior to the emergence of consciousness and language, and the development of
memes and memetic transfer, humans, like all species, can be defined functionally as pre-
conscious systematic reciprocating feedback machines acting in accordance to blind
algorithmic processes. We can now ask to what extent the macro programs of sex and
survival, and the varying constraints of the EEA, had led to the feedback of information
(memes) which created a biological or naturalized definition of value as that which was
consciously or reflectively considered to be 'good' to the organism. Good is defined here,
in the EEA, not as Plato would define it (as some universal Form), but as that which
establishes and attempts to maintain (a) biological equilibrium. Goodness, then, is
measured purely in terms of fitness for survival and reproduction (or what I call S-R
value). By 40kya, it appears that the necessary conditions for consciousness and
language had reached a critical point. Within varying ecological niches, cultures
developed identities (through memetic transference). A memetic equilibrium now
emergesBboth individually and throughout social groups. Fluctuations from the
equilibrium indicate positive and negative valueBfor the individual, the kin, or the group.
Deviations in the memetic equilibrium direct action and challenge current beliefs.
As we have seen in some of the artifact records there is a fairly clear indication of
a pattern of sophistication of materials manipulation increasing significantly around
40kya. When communication became more socialized and prevalent, the understanding
of environments by our ancestors would have given way to a greater capacity to

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conceptualize in ways both conducive to and nonconducive to survival. I believe there
were three memetic motivating factors for this in terms of developing explanatory
schema during the Upper Paleolithic:
1. Causality.
2. Morality.
3. Mortality.
It is my hypothesis that after our ancestors developed the capacity to consciously reflect
on their environment and their place in it, and strong cultures with thriving memetic
transferences developed, future experiences would have required explanation relative to
their conceptual (memetic) schemas. With the newly developed capacity for information
acquisition, and the conscious ability to direct inductions, the ancestral desire to solve
problems in the EEA would have involved the invention of novel memes. The greater the
ability for these memes to satisfy particular individuals within a social group, the greater
their value irrespective of whether or not the memes were ultimately conducive to
individual, kin or group survival. The memes did not always have to be conducive to
survival and reproductionBthey simply had to present in the minds of the group the
illusion of benefit.
1. Stress and Responses: Causality
In the process of human survival and in the effort to maintain biological equilibrium,
various stresses would have occurred e.g. predator avoidance, natural disasters, etc. With
the co-evolution of language and consciousness, greater problem-solving tools developed
which would have reduced stress in an effort to maintain both biological and memetic
equilibrium. Imagine the following thought experiment involving a situation some 30-40
kya in which our hominid ancestors witness the eruption of a natural disaster such as a
nearby volcano. Forty thousand years ago, however, such a powerful force would have
produced within our ancestors a conceptual gap. In order to fill this gap, rather than
advancing a plate tectonic model by which to understand this type of activity (for they
simply did not possess the mental maps to allow for this), it would have simply been
filled in with what was conceptually available to them at the time (what is sometimes
referred to by philosophers as facticity). In some instances, this may have taken the form
of a god-of-the-gaps. Of course, in place of a god, one might imagine the memetic

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invention of an evil deity as well e.g. demons, devils, etc. The important point to note is
that without more sophisticated forms of understanding in which to conceptualize causal
forces in the natural world, the attribution of agency to both fortuitous and harmful events
was intellectually economic and may simply have made sense. Notice how, even in the
21st Century, some inhabitants of New Orleans viewed Hurricane Katrina as a deliberate
and vengeful act of agency. For example, a group by the name of Repent believe that
Hurricane Katrina was a deliberate act of God (Christian) to wipe out the 'southern
decadence' of "drunken homosexuals engaging in sex acts in the public streets and bars". 6
And Fred Phelps, the founder of the Westboro Baptist Church and website:
www.GodHatesFags.com also stated that Hurricane Katrina was God's retribution for
homosexuals. In some instances, this may have taken the form of a god-of-the-gaps.
Problem Solving, Emotions and Neurotransmitters: The Zing
It is important to note that the S-R Value attained through memetic development and
transference is often contextual and only has to produce a neural payload in order to be
valued. Neurotransmitters are chemicals which relay, amplify and modulate electrical
signals between neurons and other cells. They affect our memory retention, perception of
pain, mood, and abilities to learn, by binding to specific receptor sites in our brains. There
are over 50 known types of neurotransmitters; the ones that concern us most include, but
are not limited to: endorphins, dopamine, serotonin (5-HT), oxytocin, and vasopressin.
Regions of the brain most commonly affected include the nucleus acumbens, caudate
nucleus, ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the medial prefrontal cortex. At the Canadian
Institute of Stress, for example, findings have demonstrated a clear indication that
transcutaneous stimulation of opioid neuropeptides reduces fatigue, impaired
psychomotor performance, and brainwave hyperstimulation.
In terms of cognitive abilities, learning, and problem-solving, there is an intimate
relationship between emotions, neurotransmitters, and the environment. Without a more
sophisticated symbolic form of representation, it is doubtful that our ancestors would
have been able to articulate specific natural occurrences in their environments which
elicited powerful emotional responses. Once the capacity to consciously and symbolically
represent such occurrences evolved, our ancestors would have found the need to
memetically explain gaps within their conceptual schemas. Those gaps most acutely

7
relevant to their survival/reproduction capacities would have caused the greatest amount
of stress (due to the potential decrease in S-R value and disequilibrium). We can make a
relatively safe assumption, then, that once the capacity for conscious memetic gap-filling
was possible, this would have been a powerful tool in dealing with environmental stress
conditions.
Sapolsky summarizes such an emotional neuro-endocrine feedback loop this way7:

The neural-
endocrine causal mechanism which is simplified here represents only one of many
diverse pathways stress responses feedback loop in different regions of the brain.
The fact that Sapolsky has acknowledged that threats can be either real or perceived is a
good indication of the power memes can have in terms of interpretations of threats. And
this does not mean that the memes had to satisfy criteria which we, today, believe to be
indicative of an epistemically responsible view of our world and ourselves. The memes

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simply had to do the job in satiating the need to reduce stress levels among individuals,
kin or groups. And sometimes, memetic equilibrium is more important than biological
equilibrium.
So memes can kill you. For example, immature proto-science in the form of
religious or mythological belief has and still does stand in the way of human survival. But
this is because our ancestors developed the conscious capacity to attribute value to those
concepts which brought about memetic equilibrium. And sometimes, the importance of
memetic equilibrium can eclipse biological equilibrium in terms of hierarchical value.
2. Stress and Responses: Morality
Understanding what triggers emotional responses to various experiences would have
generated the conscious and deliberate acts of directing behaviour in ways which can
alleviate stress and optimize neural payloads. Kin and group-shared interests and the
ensuing cooperation in those interests is yet another way in which memetic equilibrium is
maintained. And this can be found in a shared understanding of a list of do's and don'ts
which may or may not be endorsed by an unseen force but will, most likely, be endorsed
by the group. The various necessary conditions which developed throughout the EEA
have eventually allowed us to invent all kinds of ideas about how we should behave
towards one another, and towards those not belonging to our particular in group. In
relation to out groups who share different sets of memes, one can see the potential for
memetic disequilibria and conflict. Pecking orders can be viewed as proto-moral systems.
Crude: toe the line, or else! Once consciousness and symbolic representation reached a
sufficient point in cognition and expression, the attribution of moral incentives as rules
defining group behaviour would have developed as well.
3. Stress and Responses: Mortality
Once a group member died, and our ancestors possessed the necessary conditions to
acknowledge their own ignorance relative to their conceptual schemas, they would have
been able to observe that the dead individual differs from them in distinct, comparative
and disanalogous ways i.e. he is not like us any more, he is not moving, he smells bad, he
is changing i.e. decaying, something is wrong/bad (where badness again refers to a
disruption in memetic equilibria and decrease of S-R Value). To have made this
distinction between life and death and relate it back onto themselves through this

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conscious feedback loop would have been a very powerful comparative tool which would
have clearly identified our ancestors with a causal relationship about themselves and
others like them. A theory of mind would have transferred back onto them that
individuals who die are not coming back. So the idea of immortality: that a person is not
really gone, may fly in the face of reason, but it is one that would have provided a
memetic buffer which would have eased the primal angst of one's mortality. The
hereafter, then, is a memetic lie which fills a very big and emotionally troubling gap.
From the moment our ancestors first realized their mortality, we have been in denial of it.
It is a neural rush which feedbacks and provides what a particular group considers to be
important or valuable—hence, the eventual ritualized burials we see about 30kya.. The
stress of fear, the feeling of dread, expressed in its neuro-endocrinological relationship, is
appeased by gap-filling memes of mythologies of the hereafter. The mythologies can then
become highly ritualized. It restores some form of emotional stasis or equilibrium to
individuals within a group. It is an neural-induced deception devoutly to be wished. If it
goes unchallenged, and gains favour within a group, it may become firmly entrenched
and well respected. Awareness of one's own eventual demise, then, is a considerable
disruption to one's memetic equilibrium. In response, memes become developed as
neural-induced gap-fillers in order to establish and maintain memetic equilibrium.
For some, the allusions to Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory (CDT) will
seem apparent. However, the concepts of memetic equilibrium theory (MET) are quite
distinct in many ways. The central similarity between the two is the reference to
dissonance as a means of provocation in which one desires to return to equilibrium. On
that account, I think Festinger, Rollo May, Mandler et al, have made valuable
contributions in understanding this aspect of cognitive activity. As mentioned above, the
individual, kin and group can experience such dissonance and seek the necessary means
by which to return to memetic equilibrium. It is in this regard i.e. when conscious
recognition is present of dissonance or disequilibria and the desire to return to a stasis
that memetic equilibrium and cognitive dissonance theory are most similar. However, this
is where the similarity ends.
Memetic equilibrium theory (MET) provides a much broader treatment of
cognitively evolved traits than cognitive dissonance theory. This can be seen in the

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manner in which MET examines the historical transition regarding the origin of memes
during the hominin pre-conscious period to the gradual conscious state we see developing
rapidly during the cultural explosion 40-70 kya. Understanding the precursive and
necessary nature of the co-evolution of language and consciousness is crucial in
recognizing this gradual and eventual adaptation of understanding and interacting in
changing environments. Without it, we do not have an historical connection as to why
cognitively dissonant states would be considered problematic to us today. But MET
grounds the connection of disequilibria to the precursive transitional states in hominin
cognitive evolution from pre-conscious to conscious beings.
Another way in which MET differs from CDT is in the treatment of cognitive
states. Memes are not purely cognitive but also involve unconscious emotional cues
relating more to the limbic than pre-frontal cortex regions of the brain. Although pre-
conscious emotional states may gradually become consciously formulated and dealt with
in varying manners of reconciliation, they do not always manifest themselves in such a
manner. And so where Festinger maintained that dissonance can be alleviated by some
type of reconciliation procedure, memetic disequilibria can result from unconscious
activity that has not yet been brought into the conscious and cognitively directed realm.
Memes can act very much like viruses. They can mentally incubate without conscious
awareness and may gradually disrupt biological and memetic equilibrium in a purely
unconscious manner. In this way, memes sometimes have varying incubation periods and
rates of infection. The regulation of the manner in which memes manage to seep into the
consciously-directed thought-processes will vary from individual to individual, and group
to group. And so memes are not always consciously cognitive. It is important to
remember that hominin evolution had limbic systems developed long before pre-frontal
cortexes. In this regard, our ancestors were emotional beings long before they became
consciously cognitive and so-called rational beings.
The transition period between the unconscious and conscious developments in
hominin evolution provides another important factor of how MET demonstrates that S-R
value relating to biological equilibrium can be eclipsed by memetic preference and
perceived equilibrium. As we saw, above, a set of memes only has to produce the illusion
of benefit and perceived control; in actuality, they can be quite harmful to an individual,

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kin or group. Understanding how hominin cognitive evolution moved into this transitive
stage is important to understanding current cognitively dissonant states today. Without
MET, Festinger’s CDT is without evolutionary context and grounding.8 As well, I believe
MET provides the breadth by which to consider current and future developments in
cognitive behaviour e.g. mirror neuron studies, decision-making theories, risk analysis,
etc.9

Conclusion
I believe that we have significant evidence indicating many of the evolutionary
constraints which contributed to the transitional phases through which hominins evolved
cognitively from non-conscious to gradually increasingly conscious states. We have seen
how pre-conscious and linguistically limited hominins would have, like all species in the
EEA, developed patterns of behaviour consistent with increasing the likelihood of
survival-reproductive value (S-R value) and maintaining biological equilibrium. With the
co-evolution of language and consciousness, our ancestors were able to better understand
relationships in terms of causality, morality, and mortality. And this is where we begin to
see the incorporation of more and more memes into emerging and developing cultures.
As more and more memes develop within specific cultures, a memetic equilibrium
develops. Deviations from the memetic equilibrium may produce dissonance amongst
individuals, kin or groups. I have also argued that memes have the capacity to deviate
from biological equilibrium if the perceived benefit of the meme(s) is intended to
increase S-R value. And so there is an intimate connection between the memes of any
particular individual, kin or group and their biological equilibrium. We have also seen
how some memes may provide practical benefit which may increase the S-R value for the
individual, kin or group. When problem-solving is coherent with one's belief system,
there can be a practical payload—a shared meme within a community which may be
valued for specific practical reasons. It can solidify endorsement which further segregates
the very important beliefs from other types of beliefs, strategies, etc., and helps to
establish memetic equilibrium.
But memes can also provide the illusion of benefit and perceived control and can
actually decrease S-R value. Even if memes as explanations for things causal, moral, and

12
spiritual are inconsistent with physical constraints, the neural payload (the zing) may
eclipse the practical survival value e.g. if you chuck all the virgins into the volcano and
have no fertile women left, you eventually take the whole tribe out of existence.
And finally, we saw how memetic equilibrium theory (MET) develops a more
robust understanding of the various evolutionary constraints on cognitive behaviour than
Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory (CDT). Although there are overlapping
similarities in the manner in which individuals, kin or group may attempt to return to
memetic equilibrium, the breadth of MET provides evolutionary grounding and context
for the constraints which have given rise to cognitive dissonance.
Once we have the capacity to realize the benefit or feeling of having been right
in a certain respect relative to our current beliefs; once one has this knowledge of their
belief set and then can actively go about resolving a particular problem that is, in some
ways, consistent or coherent within that particular belief system, then one has the
capacity to recognize the memetic relationship between concepts, beliefs, and actions and
so emerges the conscious recognition and pursuit of S-R value. The desire to increase S-
R value provides the pursuit of a memetic equilibrium which feedback loops to one’s
biological equilibrium thus creating an intimate relationship which can become deeply
entrenched in individual, kin, and group behaviour.

This is one of the paradoxes of Homo sapiens: we experience the unity

and diversity of a mind shaped by eons of life as hunter-gatherers. We
experience its unity in the common possession of an awareness of self and
a sense of awe at the miracle of life. And we experience its diversity in the
different culturesBexpressed in language, customs, and religionsBthat we
create and that create us. We should rejoice at so wondrous a product of
evolution (Leakey, 1994,156).

Rejoice, indeed. What a zing!

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17
1
. Richard Wrangham and others have argued, of course, that the cooking of vegetables could have also
released the types of nutrients needed to supply energy for the rather quickly developing hominid
brains. See: Wrangham et al, 1999.
2
.See Lieberman:1975 and 1984.
3
. Isla S. Castañeda, Stefan Mulitza, Enno Schefuß, Raquel A. Lopes dos Santos, Jaap S. Sinninghe
Damsté, and Stefan Schouten Wet phases in the Sahara/Sahel region and human migration patterns in
North Africa PNAS published online before print November 12, 2009, doi:10.1073/pnas.0905771106.
4
. To consider just a small portion of the numerous artifacts which were appearing by 40kya, refer to
Appendix 1.
5
.Several authors have devoted considerable time to examining the effect of ancestral conscious
realization of imminent demise. See Boyer: 2001; Alper: 2001; and Atran: 2002.
6
See: http://www.repentamerica.com/pr_hurricanekatrina.html
7
. [Image and text from Scientific American, Vol. 289 No. 3: 89, September, 2003. Image and text for
explanatory use within this essay. Permission has not yet been granted for reproduction].

8
In historical reference, I believe Festinger, et al, owe a great deal to the Ancient Pyrhhonian Skeptics
who were among the first not only to recognize cognitively dissonant states but had developed a
systematic approach to dealing with such states.
9
See Rizzolatti and Sinigagalia, 2007, Pesaran, et al, 2008, Passingham, et al, 2006.