War and Peace APRC Report

‘War and Peace’ and the APRC Proposals1
Dr. Colin Irwin

University of Liverpool
www.peacepolls.org
May 2010
Key findings:
• The preliminary APRC proposals have gained more Sinhala support after the war so that
they are now equally acceptable to the Sinhala, Tamils, Up-Country Tamils and Muslims.
• Although the majority of Tamils and Muslims across Sri Lanka want a unitary state a
significant minority of Tamils from the Northern Province still want to keep the ‘right to
secession’. However most of them will give this up for the complete ‘package’ of APRC
reforms.
• The President, political and religious leaders can all influence support for these
preliminary APRC proposals but although Eastern Tamils will follow their politicians on
this issue Northern Tamils ‘Don’t Know’ how to respond to theirs.
• Although all communities strongly support language and fundamental rights Tamil
concerns about the special status of Buddhism has increased after the war as a political
issue.
1
This research is based on a preliminary set of proposals formulated in February 2009.
Contents
Page
About the poll 2
Introduction 2
Sinhala response 5
Tamil response 7
Up-Country Tamil response 11
Muslim response 13
Support for reform 15
Some further notes on Northern, Eastern and

Tamils in the rest of Sri Lanka 18
Political party response 20
A further note on the politics of ‘Religious Rights’ 28
Summary of results for the APRC proposals 29
Problems 30
If there is no reform 33
Those for or against the APRC proposals in Sri Lanka 35
Opposition to progressive reform outside Sri Lanka 37
Appendix: Questionnaire and additional results 39
1
About the poll
The research for this poll was carried out by the staff of Social Indicator of Colombo, on behalf of Dr.
Colin Irwin from the University of Liverpool who developed the peace polls method as part of the
successful Northern Ireland peace process. The survey work for the first poll in this series was
completed between March and May 2008 and included a random sample of 1,700 people from all parts
of Sri Lanka with the exception of the Northern Province. Using the same methods the survey work for
the second poll was completed a year later in March 2009 to test the then preliminary APRC proposals
against public opinion before the end of the war. A year later in March 2010 these same proposals were
tested again but with a larger sample that included the Northern Province. Additionally four versions of
the questionnaire were run to measure the impact that the support of the President, religious and political
leaders would have on the acceptability of the proposals (Table 1). All interviews were face-to-face and
the margin of error varied between +/- 2% and +/- 4.3% depending on the question and version of the
questionnaire being analysed. A copy of the questionnaire is given in the Appendix with additional
results.
Table 1. Sample plan
Neutral President Religious Political Total

Sinhala 300 250 250 250 1050
Tamil 200 100 100 100 500
Up-Country Tamil 200 75 75 75 425
Muslim 200 75 75 75 425
Total 900 500 500 500 2400
Introduction
The President of Sri Lanka established the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) to draft a set of
constitutional reforms that, following the war, would provide the country and all it’s citizens with a real
opportunity for enduring political stability, increased economic growth and improvements in the quality
of life. Critically, when tested against public opinion a year ago these proposals, with some minor
reservations were acceptable to a significant majority of both Sinhalese and Tamils (Table 2). But due to
the ongoing conflict the Tamils in the North could not be sampled then. With the end of the war and the
defeat of their leadership would they accept the APRC proposals? Additionally 21% of Sinhalese did not
know or were unwilling to give an opinion on such important issues at that time. With the end of the war
would their views change and if so would this be for or against the APRC proposals?
Table 2. Question: ‘Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined
here?’ (March 2009).
Per cent Yes No DK

Sinhala 67 12 21
Tamil 86 4 10
Up Country Tamil 92 0 8
Muslim 90 1 9
The poll run in March 2009 also indicated that the President then enjoyed unprecedented popularity
(93% ‘trust very much or trust quite a bit’ amongst the Sinhala) so it also seemed important to test the
effects his support and the support of religious and political leaders could have on the acceptability of
the APRC proposals. This was done by framing the questions in these terms and also by asking if such
support would change the views of the person being interviewed in a neutral version of the
questionnaire.
2
A summary of the APRC proposals as they existed in February 2009 is listed in Table 3 as a series of 14
‘show cards’. Those being interviewed were asked what they thought of each item on a given card. Was
it ‘essential’, ‘desirable’, ‘acceptable’, ‘tolerable’ or ‘unacceptable’? Then they were asked what they
thought of the ‘package’ as a whole, if they would support such a ‘package’ and under what
circumstances.
Table 3. The APRC proposals in summary form, as they existed in February 2009.
SHOW CARDS 1 to 14
1. The Structure of the State – Powers will be divided between the centre and the provinces under
a unitary state.
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces – These powers will be clearly defined in two
separate lists. One for the Centre and one for the Provinces.2
3. The Parliament - Will consist of two houses. The House of Representatives directly elected by
the people and the Senate elected by the Provincial Legislators with each Province having the
same number of Senators.
4. Amending the Constitution – Amendments affecting the powers of the Provinces can only be
made if a majority of Senators from each of the Provinces votes in favour together with not less
than two thirds of a joint session of both houses. Amending certain specific articles will also
require approval by the people at a referendum.3
5. The Powers of the President – The Executive Presidency will cease to exist at the end of the
incumbent’s term and be replaced by the Westminster system with a Prime Minister enjoying
majority support in the House of Representatives.
2
An additional constitutional item overlooked at the time of drafting the APRC proposals for this
questionnaire could be inserted here as follows:
Land and Water – The Central Government will retain State lands required for the functions in its list of
powers. All other State lands will go to the Provinces subject to the rights of persons owning or
occupying such land. The Provincial Government will be responsible for the management of these lands
with priority in land settlement being given to the needy of local Districts. An independent Commission
of experts with equal representation from the Central Government and Provinces will be established to
develop and oversee land and water use policies.
Although this item has not been tested against public opinion it seems unlikely that it should diminish
support for the APRC proposals.
3
Since drafting this questionnaire the APRC have refined the amendment procedure as follows:
Amending the Constitution – Amendments to the Constitution will require the approval of two thirds of
the members of each House of Parliament sitting and voting separately. Amending certain specific
articles will also require approval by the people at a referendum.
It is not expected that this change would significantly alter the results of the public opinion poll as it has
almost the same effect in law
3
6. The Powers of Local Authorities – The Local Authorities will have powers to make by-laws in
respect of subjects listed separately in the Constitution.
7. Language Rights – The Tamil and Singhala languages will have parity of status as national and
official languages and as languages of the courts. English can also be used for official purposes
where it is expedient to do so. Singhala and Tamil shall be the medium of instruction at the
school level as well as English if facilities are available. Singhala, Tamil and English shall be
used at institutes of higher education.
8. Religious Rights – Buddhism shall have ‘pride of place’ with religious freedom for all citizens
being guaranteed.
9. Fundamental Rights – Individual and Group Rights will be recognized including the equality of
all citizens and the protection of all persons before the law.
10. Electoral System – The House of Representatives and Provincial Legislators will be elected on a
mixed system of first past the post and proportional representation.
11. The Judiciary – Will be independent of the Executive. The Court of Appeal will function with
Divisions in the Provinces along with the Provincial High Courts.
12. Public Service – There will be separate services for the Centre and the Provinces with certain
categories of officers classified as all island services. The Village, Divisional and District levels
of administration will all come under the Provinces. As far as is practical the Public Service will
reflect the composition of the population and it will be independent.
13. Safeguards against secession – The Constitution will provide for adequate safeguards against
attempts by any Province to succeed from the State.
14. Law and Order - There will be a Sri Lanka police officers service consisting of senior officers
from all ethnic groups. Policing will be devolved to the Provinces with certain powers retained
by the centre. National security will be the responsibility of the centre.
4
Sinhala response
The results for the Sinhala community are listed in Table 4 for 2010 and Table 5 for 2009 with a rank
ordering of those items they consider ‘essential or desirable’ in Tables 6 and 7.
The key percentages to look at in Tables 4 and 5 are the levels of ‘unacceptable’. First of all it should be
pointed out that these results are very good when compared to places like Northern Ireland and the
Middle East where levels of ‘unacceptable’ of 50 per cent plus had to or have yet to be negotiated.
Having said that of course Sri Lanka is not Northern Ireland or Israel and Palestine. The political context
in Sri Lanka is very different.
Table 4. Sinhala response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)
Sinhala per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

1. The Structure of the State 25 42 14 3 8 8
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 19 40 16 3 11 11
3. The Parliament 19 33 18 4 12 15
4. Amending the Constitution 22 40 14 5 6 13
5. The Powers of the President 23 37 13 5 15 8
6. The Powers of Local Authorities 13 36 18 9 15 10
7. Language Rights 47 35 8 3 5 2
8. Religious Rights 64 25 5 2 2 1
9. Fundamental Rights 60 31 7 1 2
10. Electoral System 21 34 15 7 8 15
11. The Judiciary 37 39 14 2 3 6
12. Public Service 24 36 21 4 5 11
13. Safeguards against secession 43 33 10 3 4 7
14. Law and Order 39 32 10 2 9 7
15. All of the reform proposals taken together
20 38 22 7 4 10
as a ‘package’
Table 5. Sinhala response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)
Sinhala per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 9 21 19 6 15 29
9. Fundamental Rights 35 36 16 2 3 7
11. The Judiciary 18 28 16 4 10 24
12. Public Service 13 28 21 6 6 25
14. Law and Order 21 25 16 7 14 17
13 21 25 11 9 22
as a ‘package’
The most important finding to note here is that the level of ‘unacceptable’ has fallen significantly across
most of the APRC proposals from a high of 23% ‘unacceptable’ for the ‘The Powers of the President’ in
2009 to only 15% in 2010. Most significantly the levels of acceptability have risen, while, at the same
5
time the ‘Don’t Knows’ in 2010 are half of what they were in 2009. Perhaps the Sinhala who were
reluctant to express their views before the end of the war had, for the most part, positive views of the
APRC proposals but were only willing to express those views now that the war is over or, perhaps, post
war they have decided to be magnanimous towards their Tamil countrymen and women when they have
been faced with military defeat especially in the context of growing confidence that their country will
not be divided. Whatever the reason the trend is clear and can be seen across all the results for the
Sinhala community.
Table 6. Sinhala priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2010)
Sinhala per cent ‘essential or desirable’

1st. Fundamental Rights 91
2nd. Religious Rights 89
3rd. Language Rights 82
4th. The Judiciary 76
5th. Safeguards against secession 76
6th. Law and Order 71
7th. The Structure of the State 67
8th. Amending the Constitution 62
9th. The Powers of the President 60
10th. Public Service 60
11th. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 59
12th. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ 58
13th. Electoral System 55
14th. The Parliament 52
15th. The Powers of Local Authorities 49
Table 7. Sinhala priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2009)
Sinhala per cent ‘essential or desirable’

1st. Religious Rights 76
2nd. Fundamental Rights 71
As to the benefits these are prioritised for the Sinhala in Tables 6 and 7. Interestingly the top three items
in 2009 were Religious, Fundamental and Language Rights at 76%, 71% and 68% ‘essential or
desirable’. In 2010 the order has changed a little with Fundamental Rights first at 91% (20% up on last
year) followed by Religious and Language Rights at 89% and 82% (up 13% and 14% respectively). As
one of the top priorities for the Tamil community remains ‘Language Rights’ this result continues to be
most encouraging for the prospects of long term peace.
6
Tamil response
The results for the Tamil community are listed in Tables 11 and 12 with a rank ordering of those items
they consider ‘essential or desirable’ in Tables 13 and 14.
Again the key percentages to look at in Table 11 and 12 are the levels of ‘unacceptable’ and again the
results are very good. However, unlike the results for the Sinhala there is little change between 2009 and
2010 with one notable exception. The one serious potential difficulty here is ‘Religious Rights’ at 28%
‘unacceptable’ in 2009 rising to 50% ‘unacceptable’ in 2010. But on the same issue 44% of Tamils
consider this feature of the APRC proposals to be ‘essential’ in 2009 falling to 22% in 2010. They are
clearly ‘split’ on this item. Why? And why is opposition to this constitutional provision so unusually
strong?
Perhaps the answer is to be found in the way the question was asked? In the summary proposals
‘Religious Rights’ was drafted as, ‘Buddhism shall have ‘pride of place’ with religious freedom for all
citizens being guaranteed.’ It seems very likely that those Tamils who considered this proposal to be
‘unacceptable’ were focusing on the suggestion that ‘Buddhism shall have ‘pride of place’ while those
who considered this proposal to be ‘essential’ were focused on ‘with religious freedom for all citizens
being guaranteed.’ The problem here seems to be a matter of education, understanding and or some sort
of good or bad previous experience in this regard. Clearly this item requires some explanation or
clarification to make sure there are no misunderstandings in the Tamil community and that their
religious freedom will be effectively guaranteed by a new Sri Lanka constitution. Unfortunately, with
the end of the war and the defeat of the Tamil insurgency in the North of the country more Tamils are
now concerned about the implications of this provision than they were before the end of the war.
Perhaps a certain amount of ‘triumphalism’ on the part of the Sinhala community or some sense of not
knowing their own position in a newly united Sri Lanka has aggravated this problem. The Government
may wish to consider what steps it can take to address this issue before it becomes a cause for
disaffection. Fortunately the end of a season of electoral politics and the formation of a new Parliament
will provide the people of Sri Lanka with a new opportunity for reconciliation.
With regards to the benefits of the APRC proposals the top items for the Tamils are ‘Language Rights’
at 85% ‘essential or desirable’, ‘Fundamental Rights’ at 76% and ‘The Judiciary’ at 73% in 2009 and
‘Fundamental Rights’ at 87%, ‘Language Rights’ at 86% and ‘The Judiciary’ at 84% in 2010 (Tables 13
and 14). Fortunately the Sinhala also welcome these reforms so there should be no political difficulty
with each community’s top priorities. In other conflicts around the world such a result is most unusual.
Top priorities generally require a degree of ‘horse trading’. It is perhaps a mark of the understanding of
each community’s needs by the other community that has produced this unusual but most welcome
result and/or the careful drafting of the All Party Representative Committee.
In 2009 it was not possible to undertake this research in the Northern Province. However in 2010 this
was now possible. Table 15 gives the results for the APRC proposals broken down for the Tamil
response in the Eastern Province and Northern Province separately and also for the rest of Sri Lanka
without these Provinces included - ‘Other Sri Lanka’.
There is little difference between these three samples with one exception. Again all three groups of
Tamils reject the ‘Religious Rights’ proposal at 52%, 49% and 49% ‘unacceptable’ in the Eastern,
Northern and ‘Other’ Provinces respectively. But Northern Tamils also reject the proposal for
‘Safeguards against secession’ at 28% ‘unacceptable’ although 52% believe it is ‘essential or desirable’,
18% ‘acceptable’, 7% ‘tolerable’ and only 9% ‘don’t know’. So like the other Tamils in Sri Lanka this
group remain a minority which is reduced further to only 7% ‘unacceptable’ for Northern Tamils and
3% for all Sri Lanka Tamils providing the other provisions of the APRC proposals are implemented
together as a ‘package’.
7
Table 11. The Tamil response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)
Tamil per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 46 27 14 2 4 8
11. The Judiciary 57 27 7 2 7
12. Public Service 38 39 17 1 1 6
14. Law and Order 41 32 14 5 5 4
42 24 17 5 3 8
as a ‘package’
Table 12. The Tamil response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)
Tamil per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 37 24 17 13 1 8
11. The Judiciary 49 24 12 7 1 6
12. Public Service 38 28 17 8 3 7
14. Law and Order 55 17 11 7 2 8
41 27 14 6 2 11
as a ‘package’
8
Table 13. Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2010)
Tamil per cent ‘essential or desirable’

1st. Fundamental Rights 87
2nd. Language Rights 86
3rd. The Judiciary 84
15th. Religious Rights 33
Table 14. Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2009)
Tamil per cent ‘essential or desirable’

1st. Language Rights 85
9
Table 15. Northern, Eastern and ‘Other’ Sri Lanka Tamils in the rest of the country (March 2010)
Eastern Tamil Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 45 29 20 3 3
5. The Powers of the President 59 23 9 6 3
6. The Powers of Local Authorities 39 31 28 2 2
7. Language Rights 69 12 19
8. Religious Rights 8 11 9 20 52
9. Fundamental Rights 54 29 15 2
12. Public Service 37 46 14 2 2
14. Law and Order 31 49 17 3
45 29 19 6 2
as a ‘package’
Northern Tamil Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 41 26 14 2 6 11
7. Language Rights 72 13 11 4 1
12. Public Service 27 41 25 1 1 5
14. Law and Order 31 22 21 8 11 7
32 21 20 8 7 12
as a ‘package’
Other Sri Lanka Tamil Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 49 31 7 4 9
4. Amending the Constitution 54 19 15 2 10
9. Fundamental Rights 78 16 2 4
10. Electoral System 49 24 13 3 12
11. The Judiciary 56 28 2 15
12. Public Service 53 28 9 10
14. Law and Order 65 27 2 2 2 4
53 24 13 10
as a ‘package’
10
Up-Country Tamil response
Although the recent war has largely been viewed as a conflict arising from Tamil grievances the APRC
proposals have been drafted for the benefit of all the communities in Sri Lanka. Like other Tamils the
Up-Country Tamils share an increasing concern about the ‘Religious Rights’ provision rising to 60%
‘unacceptable’ in 2010 from 46% in 2009 (Tables 16 and 17). Their top priority remains ‘Language
Rights’ at 91% ‘essential or desirable’ in 2009 and 94% in 2010 (Tables 18 and 19). So like other
Tamils they will accept the reforms proposed by the APRC as a package (only 2% ‘unacceptable’ in
2010) providing their major concerns are dealt with.
Table 16. The Up-Country Tamil response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)
Up-Country Tamil per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 30 25 13 8 8 16
11. The Judiciary 62 21 9 2 3 3
12. Public Service 41 22 22 4 11
14. Law and Order 66 18 7 2 2 5
50 26 14 2 2 6
as a ‘package’
Table 17. The Up-Country Tamil response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)
Up-Country Tamil per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 37 16 15 5 13 13
11. The Judiciary 52 20 7 6 3 13
12. Public Service 37 23 18 6 1 15
14. Law and Order 67 12 8 1 3 10
71 15 4 0 0 9
as a ‘package’
11
Table 18. Up-Country Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2010)
Up-Country Tamil per cent ‘essential or desirable’

3rd. Law and Order 84
Table 19. Up-Country Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2009)
Up-Country Tamil per cent ‘essential or desirable’

3rd. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ 86
12
Muslim response
Although the Muslim community were also split on ‘Religious Rights’ at 30% ‘essential’ and 17%
‘unacceptable’ in 2009 (Table 21) this concern, unlike their Tamil countrymen and women, seems to
have diminished at only 10% ‘unacceptable’ in 2010. Perhaps then it is not the ‘Religious Rights’ as
such that is the problem here but the special place Buddhism is given in the APRC proposals, the Tamil
defeat and a degree of associated Sinhala triumphalism?
But as Tamil speakers one of their top priorities is ‘Language Rights’ at 82% ‘essential or desirable’ in
2010 and 85% in 2009 (Tables 22 and 23). Clearly this problem needs to be addressed for the benefit of
all the minorities in Sri Lanka reviewed in this report.
Table 20. The Muslim response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)
Muslim per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 33 27 19 12 6 4
11. The Judiciary 47 31 13 4 1 5
12. Public Service 39 34 13 7 5 4
14. Law and Order 46 37 8 2 4 5
40 32 16 4 2 7
as a ‘package’
Table 21. The Muslim response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)
Muslim per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 22 42 17 4 5 10
11. The Judiciary 33 42 10 4 1 9
12. Public Service 34 40 9 7 1 9
14. Law and Order 35 38 11 4 3 10
27 45 13 4 0 10
as a ‘package’
13
Table 22. Muslim priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2010)
Muslim per cent ‘essential or desirable’

1st. Law and Order 83
2nd. The Structure of the State 82
4th. Fundamental Rights 82
Table 23. Muslim priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2009)
Muslim per cent ‘essential or desirable’

14
Support for reform
All these results are very good but if, for example, the people of Sri Lanka were asked to vote for them
in a referendum would the results be different? With this point in mind each person being interviewed
was asked if they would support this set of proposals as a simple ‘Yes’/ ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ question
(Table 24).
Table 24. Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here?
Per cent (2010) Yes No DK

Sinhala 83 9 9
Tamil 84 7 8
Muslim 80 13 8

Sinhala 67 12 21
Tamil 86 4 10
Muslim 90 1 9
For the Sinhala the results are significantly better up from 67% ‘Yes’ in 2009 to 83% ‘Yes’ in 2010 as
Sinhala ‘Don’t Knows’ move to the ‘Yes’ column. For the Tamils (86% to 84% ‘Yes’) and Up-Country
Tamils (92% to 86% ‘Yes’) the results are a little down in 2010 from 2009 but not significantly so. But
the Muslims have dropped ten points from 90% ‘Yes’ in 2009 to 80% ‘Yes’ in 2010 which brings them
more in line with other parties included in this poll. Nonetheless a stunning result over all with little or
no significant difference between Sinhala, Tamil, Up-Country Tamil and Muslim support for the APRC
proposals at an average of 83% ‘Yes’. Subject to some reservations over a couple of items a broad
consensus for constitutional reform has been achieved.
The question of leadership was also dealt with by asking, after all the other questions on the APRC
proposals had been asked, if the person being interviewed would change their view and switch from
‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ to ‘Yes’ if their leaders were for the proposals or if they would switch from ‘Yes’
to ‘No’ if they were against them. These results are given in Tables 25 to 32. The results are mixed with
no particular leader (President, Religious, Political) having any more significant effect on the outcome
than any other leader. However all these leaders do have the ability to influence support for the
proposals one way or another but as the ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Knows’ were so low for all the communities at
an average of only 17% the impact that they can have to raise support above the average of 83% is not a
great deal. They might be able to get above 90% but not much more than that. However, if all the leaders
worked together to undermine support for the APRC proposals their efforts would be felt. Together the
political elites of Sri Lanka could weaken the present consensus and reduce it to less than a simple
majority providing they worked together to this end. With little or no effort political reform is there for
the taking with the overwhelming support of the people or, with a concerted effort on the part of all the
political elites they could deny the people of Sri Lanka the prise they presently seek. The future of Sri
Lanka, as always, is in their hands.
15
Table 25. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of
constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:
Sinhala per cent Yes No DK

President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? 56 28 16
Your religious leaders supported them? 50 28 22
The political party you are closest to supported them? 54 30 16
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and
62 16 22
the political party you are closest to all supported them?
Table 26. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as
outlined here if:
Sinhala per cent Yes No DK

President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? 54 43 3
Your religious leaders were against them? 50 42 8
The political party you are closest to was against them? 56 40 4
44 50 6
the political party you are closest to were all against them?
Tamil per cent Yes No DK

35 32 32
outlined here if:
Tamil per cent Yes No DK

37 54 9
16
Up-Country Tamil per cent Yes No DK

28 39 33
outlined here if:
Up-Country Tamil per cent Yes No DK

60 38 2
Muslim per cent Yes No DK

56 26 19
outlined here if:
Muslim per cent Yes No DK

48 38 14
17
Some further notes on Northern, Eastern and Tamils in the rest of Sri Lanka
Table 33 gives a breakdown of the support for the APRC proposals for the Tamils in the Northern and
Eastern Provinces and in the rest of Sri Lanka. They all support the proposals in a range from 77% ‘Yes’
in the North to 89% in the East and 90% in the rest of Sri Lanka. However when asked what impact their
respective leaderships might have on their decision the Tamils in the rest of Sri Lanka and East can be
significantly moved to change their opinions by as much as 67% from ‘Yes’ to ‘No’ with only 2%
‘Don’t Know’ in the East when their politicians are involved in the decision (Tables 35 and 37).
However the Tamils in the North are not quite so easily moved with 39% from ‘Yes’ to ‘No’ and 15%
‘Don’t Know’ when the views of their politicians are taken into account (Table 39). The lowest turn out
in recent elections was in the North suggesting the Tamils in that Province have little confidence in their
political parties at this time. Unlike the political elites who led the Tamils in the Eastern Province out of
a disastrous war to peace and political influence the Tamils in the North lost their leadership in a bloody
defeat and it may take them some years to find new leaders who they can trust. This observation is
further supported by the results from another questionnaire where support for the APRC proposals is
framed specifically in terms of being supported by the informant’s political party. In this case Eastern
Tamil support rises from 89% to 96%. However, when the same question is put to the Northern Tamils
support drops from 77% to 32% with a very significant 54% ‘Don’t Know’ which is very probably due
to the political parties in the North not yet being firmly established in the post war era (Table 40).
Critically, however, they do support the APRC proposals with only 7% rejecting the package as
‘unacceptable’ (Table 15), but any effort to manipulate their views in this regard may presently have
little effect or even be counterproductive.
Per cent Yes No DK

Eastern Tamil 89 0 11
Northern Tamil 77 15 8
Other SL Tamil 90 4 6
constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:4
Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent Yes No DK

43 43 14
outlined here if:
Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent Yes No DK

41 54 5
4
As the number of persons saying ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ was very low in this sample the results in this
table are not reliable.
18
Eastern Tamil per cent Yes No DK

President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? 71 29
Your religious leaders supported them? 71 29
71 29
outlined here if:
Eastern Tamil per cent Yes No DK

26 71 3
Northern Tamil per cent Yes No DK

20 40 40
outlined here if:
Northern Tamil per cent Yes No DK

43 40 17
Table 40. If the political party you are closest to supported a package of constitutional reforms for Sri
Lanka as outlined here, would you support it?
Per cent Yes No DK

Eastern Tamil 96 0 5
Northern Tamil 32 14 54
Other SL Tamil 84 13 3
5
6
19
Political party response
As the SLFP is the President’s ruling party and has the largest number of seats in the Parliament it is to
be expected that their response to the APRC proposals (Table 41) most closely mirrors the response of
the Sinhala community in general (Table 4). This seems to be the case with significant percentages of
‘Don’t Knows’ in 2009 (Table 42) moving to the ‘essential’, ‘desirable’ and ‘acceptable’ columns in
2010 and the overall unacceptability of the package as a whole falling from 8% in 2009 to only 3% in
2010.
Table 41. The SLFP response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)
SLFP Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 20 35 20 4 11 11
11. The Judiciary 40 37 14 2 2 5
12. Public Service 23 38 20 5 4 10
14. Law and Order 40 34 10 3 8 6
23 36 24 6 3 8
as a ‘package’
Table 42. The SLFP response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)
SLFP per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 11 23 22 5 12 27
11. The Judiciary 20 31 14 5 8 23
12. Public Service 17 30 22 5 6 20
14. Law and Order 25 26 16 7 12 14
19 26 25 9 8 13
as a ‘package’
20
For the main opposition party, the UNP, there does not seem to be a great deal of difference between the
results for this question when asked in 2009 and 2010 with overall resistance to the package at only 3%
and 2% ‘unacceptable’ respectively (Tables 43 and 44). However, their enthusiasm seems to have waned
a little with those who consider the package to be ‘essential’ falling from 39% in 2009 to 29% in 2010.
They seem to have moved across to the ‘desirable’ column, which is now up from 29% in 2009 to 36%
in 2010. Similarly the JVP support for the APRC proposals has shown a decline from only 4%
‘unacceptable’ in 2009 going up to 9% ‘unacceptable’ in 2010 (Tables 45 and 46) and like the JVP and
UNP the SLMC support for these proposals is also a little down on last year from 0% ‘unacceptable’ in
2009 rising to 3% ‘unacceptable’ in 2010 (Tables 47 and 48) with significant shifts from the ‘essential’
column to the ‘desirable’ column for all three of these opposition parties.
Table 43. The UNP response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)
UNP Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 27 32 11 7 10 13
11. The Judiciary 45 32 13 1 2 7
12. Public Service 26 42 15 3 3 11
14. Law and Order 43 33 11 3 4 7
29 36 19 6 2 8
as a ‘package’
Table 44. The UNP response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)
UNP per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 24 24 18 10 11 13
11. The Judiciary 40 24 17 5 4 10
12. Public Service 31 26 23 7 1 12
14. Law and Order 43 24 12 7 4 10
39 29 16 6 3 6
as a ‘package’
21
Perhaps the explanation is quite simple. There has been a great deal of discussion about these proposals
since the end of the war particularly during the recent Presidential Election. Also the 2010 poll was
taken in March of this year between the Presidential and General Elections at a time when the party in
Government and their SLFP supporters felt confident about their future, including constitutional reform,
while the opposition parties, and their supporters, are not quite so willing to embrace change when they
are less certain about their political influence over the coming years. These results could change again
when the elections are all over but it seems very unlikely that they will change a great deal given their
stability from a time of war to a time of peace.
Table 45. The JVP response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)
JVP Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

1. The Structure of the State 14 38 13 35
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 6 40 19 27 9
3. The Parliament 19 45 17 1 17
4. Amending the Constitution 15 40 27 13 4
5. The Powers of the President 44 40 6 10
6. The Powers of Local Authorities 6 32 22 9 32
7. Language Rights 35 57 9
8. Religious Rights 36 48 9 8
9. Fundamental Rights 42 48 10
10. Electoral System 23 42 22 13
11. The Judiciary 20 62 14 4
12. Public Service 13 46 19 23
14. Law and Order 21 35 14 30
16 37 17 22 9
as a ‘package’
Table 46. The JVP response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)
JVP per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

11. The Judiciary 43 22 9 0 22 4
12. Public Service 26 52 0 9 4 9
14. Law and Order 39 35 0 9 13 4
30 26 9 26 4 4
as a ‘package’
22
Table 47. The SLMC response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)
SLMC Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 28 22 23 18 6 4
11. The Judiciary 49 26 15 4 2 5
12. Public Service 38 35 14 7 3 4
14. Law and Order 49 29 8 6 4 5
38 27 18 5 3 10
as a ‘package’
Table 48. The SLMC response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)
SLMC per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

11. The Judiciary 36 40 12 5 0 7
12. Public Service 30 43 10 13 3 3
14. Law and Order 36 43 10 2 2 7
28 38 26 3 0 5
as a ‘package’
23
However, the results have changed considerably for the TNA up from only 3% ‘unacceptable’ in March
2009 to 11% ‘unacceptable’ in March 2010 (Tables 49 and 50). Similarly those opposed to ‘Safeguards
against secession’ has risen from only 5% in 2009 to 25% in 2010, but then it is also 28% for Tamils in
the Northern Province (Table 15). ‘Religious Rights’ are also up for the TNA supporters from 47%
‘unacceptable’ in 2009 to 66% in 2010 and 49% for Tamils in the Northern Province. Two factors may
explain these changes. Firstly that the sample now includes the Northern Province where most of the
TNA supports are to be found and secondly that the ‘Religious Rights’ issue, or rather the ‘pride of
place’ of Buddhism issue has strong political connotations for TNA supporters.
Table 49. The TNA response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)
TNA Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

7. Language Rights 77 9 13 2
8. Religious Rights 14 7 6 7 66
12. Public Service 50 29 13 3 1 6
14. Law and Order 33 28 15 7 10 8
40 17 16 9 11 8
as a ‘package’
Table 50. The TNA response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)
TNA per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

3. The Parliament 42 28 16 13 1 0
11. The Judiciary 51 39 8 1 1 0
12. Public Service 40 35 17 5 2 0
14. Law and Order 71 17 8 2 1 0
40 34 20 3 3 1
as a ‘package’
24
When asked the constitutional package question again in a simple ‘Yes/No’ format the pattern of
responses for the political parties remains much the same (Table 51). The SLFP come out with the
strongest support up from 68% ‘Yes’ in 2009 to 87% ‘Yes’ in 2010 followed by the UNP at 80% ‘Yes
(down from 85% in 2009), then the TNA at 78% (down from 90% in 2009), then the SLMC at 74%
(down from 88% in 2009) and finally the JVP at 69% ‘Yes’ in 2010 down from 83% in 2009. As before
these results are most likely a result of ongoing discourse on constitutional issues, the inclusion of the
Northern Province in the sample and government verses opposition electoral politics.

SLFP 87 6 7
UNP 80 11 9
JVP 69 27 4
TNA 78 17 5
SLMC 74 14 12

SLFP 68 10 22
UNP 85 3 12
JVP 83 4 13
TNA 90 2 7
SLMC 88 5 7
One more observation that was to be expected can be taken from this political party analysis. The SLFP
can be significantly moved to change their opinion in favour of the constitutional proposals by their
President, religious leaders and party (Table 52) while the UNP are more influenced by their party and
not so much by the President (Table 54). The same goes for the TNA (Table 58).
SLFP per cent Yes No DK

65 17 18
outlined here if:
SLFP per cent Yes No DK

42 53 5
25
UNP per cent Yes No DK

34 34 32
outlined here if:
UNP per cent Yes No DK

45 51 4
JVP per cent Yes No DK

President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? 100
The political party you are closest to supported them? 92 8
46 8 46
outlined here if:
JVP per cent Yes No DK

President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? 50 50
The political party you are closest to was against them? 9 92
35 61 4
26
TNA per cent Yes No DK

President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? 81 19
19 34 47
outlined here if:
TNA per cent Yes No DK

29 67 5
SLMC per cent Yes No DK

The political party you are closest to supported them? 76 24
76 24
outlined here if:
SLMC per cent Yes No DK

38 51 11
27
A further note on the politics of ‘Religious Rights’
If it is the case that the problem with the ‘Religious Rights’ proposal is essentially political rather than
religious then it seems very likely that the reaction of Tamil speaking Christians and Sinhala speaking
Christians will be different if it is a political/ethnic problem but the same if it is a religious problem. An
analysis of these communities on this issue confirms support for the ‘political hypothesis’ with 39% of
Tamil speaking Christians considering these proposals to be ‘unacceptable’ and only 14% of Sinhala
speaking Christians sharing this view (Table 62). Additionally, the TNA ‘top’ this list at 66%
‘unacceptable’ suggesting it is a political issue for their supporters.
Table 62. Political, religious and ethnic response to the ‘Religious Rights’ provision in the APRC
proposals sorted in rank order by per cent ‘unacceptable’.
Religious Rights per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

TNA 14 7 6 7 66
Up-Country Tamil7 19 6 6 6 60 2
Tamil8 22 11 7 8 50 2
Tamil Christian 43 3 10 4 39 1
UNP 49 22 5 3 18 2
Sinhala Christian 46 25 4 11 14 0
Muslim 47 19 13 9 10 3
SLMC 56 19 8 7 8 2
JVP 36 48 9 8
SLFP 61 25 5 3 5 1
Sinhala 64 25 5 2 2 1
7
As the Up-Country Tamils were not directly involved in the Sri Lankan insurgency this result of 60%
‘unacceptable’ seemed to be too high. However, when those doing the interviews were asked about this
issue they pointed out that the survey work had been done in the largely Hindu Up-Country towns of
Hatton and Kotmale in the District of Nuwara Eliya where recent incidents had led to the raising of
religious tensions.
8
The Tamils represented here are a combination of Hindu and Christian Tamils. As the Christian Tamil
response to the ‘Religious Rights’ issue was 39% ‘unacceptable’ it necessarily follows that the Hindu
Tamil response to this question will be higher than the 50% recorded here.
28
Summary of results for the APRC proposals
Table 63 gives an island wide response to the APRC proposals. It was not possible to do this in March
2009, as access to the Northern Province was not possible before the end of the war. However, with the
benefit of a sample from all the Provinces in March 2010, including the Northern Province, it is now
possible to produce a weighted sample that is representative of Sri Lanka as a whole. At 25% ‘essential’,
34% ‘desirable’, 22% ‘acceptable’, 7% ‘tolerable’ and only 3% ‘unacceptable’ this is an excellent result
for the proposals taken together as a ‘package’ with only 8% ‘Don’t Know’. However, it should be
emphasised that when the same results are looked at from an ethnic perspective the special place for
Buddhism in the proposed constitution is presently a problem for Tamils at 50% ‘unacceptable’ (Table
11) and the future role of the President is a matter for concern for his SLFP supporters at 21%
‘unacceptable’ (Table 41).
Table 63. Sri Lanka response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)
Sri Lanka per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK
3. The Parliament 23 33 17 5 10 12
11. The Judiciary 42 36 13 2 2 6
12. Public Service 25 37 19 5 4 11
14. Law and Order 41 31 11 3 7 6
25 34 22 7 3 8
as a ‘package’
Similarly the result for Sri Lanka as a whole at 83% ‘Yes’, 9% ‘No’ and 8% ‘Don’t Know’ when asked
the more simple ‘Yes/No’ question regarding support for the constitutional package is very encouraging
(Table 64). The most important points to note here are that Sinhala and SLFP support has shifted from
the ‘Don’t Know’ column before the war to the ‘Yes’ column after the war and even the Northern
Tamils and TNA support the proposals at 77% and 78% ‘Yes’ respectively. However, when asked how
they felt about the proposals in the context of support from their political leaders the Northern Tamil
‘Yes’ dropped to only 32% with 14% ‘No’ and 54% ‘Don’t Know’ but when the Eastern Tamils were
asked the same question in the same context their ‘Yes’ rose from 89% to 96% (Table 40). Northern
Tamils, it would seem, need time to develop new political leaders who they can trust.
March Sri UC Eastern Northern Other
Sinhala Tamil Muslim SLFP UNP JVP TNA SLMC
2010 Lanka Tamil Tamil Tamil Tamil
Yes 83 83 84 86 80 89 77 90 87 80 69 78 74
No 9 9 7 12 13 0 15 4 6 11 27 17 14
DK 8 9 8 2 8 11 8 6 7 9 4 5 12
March Sri UC Eastern Northern Other

2009 Lanka Tamil Tamil Tamil Tamil
Yes - 67 86 92 90 - - - 68 85 83 90 88
No - 12 4 0 1 - - - 10 3 4 2 5
DK - 21 10 8 9 - - - 22 12 13 7 7
29
Problems
Before the end of the war in March 2009 all those being interviewed were asked to rate the importance
of 51 different problems collected from the different communities of Sri Lanka. However, in March
2010, after the war, it was no longer possible to ask questions about ‘The ongoing war’ or LTTE.
Similarly questions about the JVP and JHU in government could not be asked as the government had
been dissolved. So these items had to be cut from the questionnaire when it was repeated in March 2010
(Table 65).
Table 65. Problems asked in 2009 as being ‘Very significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of some significance’, ‘Of
little significance’ or ‘Of no significance at all’. Items struck through were not repeated in March 2010.
1. Unemployment
2. Lack of basic health care
3. The decline of the economy
4. Inflation
5. The ongoing war
6. Violence over the past 30 years
7. Escalating violence in the last 2 years
8. Fragmentation of the island into ‘cleared’ and ‘un-cleared’ areas
9. State aided colonization and change of demographics
10. Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East
11. Failure to protect historic Hindu sites
12. The continued violence of the LTTE
13. It is not possible to kill the last Tiger
14. The LTTE can only be weakened by war
15. A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups
16. Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces
17. The Police do not provide a police service for the public
18. The Police are predominately Sinhalese
19. The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese
20. Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life
21. Polarisation of civil society
22. Increasing number of IDPs
23. Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka
24. Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE
25. Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces
26. Abuse of Human Rights by the Police
27. Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces
28. Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice
29. All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces
30. Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes
31. Failure to implement language rights
32. Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment
33. Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems
34. Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems
35. Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems
36. Politicisation of the public service
37. Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU
38. Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU
39. Corrupt politicians
40. Vested interests in ongoing conflict
41. Non-productive Peace Secretariat
42. Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes
30
43. Politicians frequently changing party
44. Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation
45. State control over media
46. The failure of successive governments to find a political solution
47. Failure to implement 13th Amendment
48. Failure to implement 17th Amendment
49. Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka
50. The British Colonialism
51. Discrimination after independence
The full results for this question in 2009 and 2010 are given in the appendix in rank order of ‘Very
significant’ for the different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, Eastern Tamils, Northern Tamils, Tamils in the
rest of Sri Lanka and the major political parties. However, to summarize, Table 66 lists the top 5
problems for the Sinhala in 2010 and Table 67 in 2009. The top 5 problems for the Tamils in 2010, are
given in Table 68 and in Table 69 for 2009.
Table 66. Top 5 problems for the Sinhala in 2010
Sinhala per cent (2010) Very Significant

1st Inflation 68
2nd Corrupt politicians 64
3rd Unemployment 62
4th The decline of the economy 54
5th Politicisation of the public service 53
Table 67. Top 5 problems for the Sinhala in 2009

1st Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE 63
2nd The continued violence of the LTTE 61
3rd Vested interests in ongoing conflict 45
4th Violence over the past 30 years 42
5th It is not possible to kill the last Tiger 41
Lists of problems like these have been produced for many different conflicts around the world. Although
every list is different they all have one characteristic in common. If the items at the top of each
communities list is not addressed and the causes of the conflict remain in place then the conditions
required for long-term peace and stability will not be met. For example, in the Middle East the number
one priority for Israelis is security and for Palestinians it is a Palestinian state. If Israelis do not get
security and if Palestinians do not get a state there will not be peace in the Middle East.
Fortunately for the Sinhala of Sri Lanka their pre-war concerns have all been met. Their top 5 items in
March 2009 were ‘Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE’ 1st at 63% ‘very significant’, followed by ‘The
continued violence of the LTTE’ 2nd at 61%, then ‘Vested interests in ongoing conflict’ 3rd at 45%,
‘Violence over the past 30 years’ 4th at 42% and ‘It is not possible to kill the last Tiger’ 5th at 41% ‘very
significant’. None of these questions could even be asked in March 2010 as, with the end of the war and
defeat of the LTTE none of them were relevant and in this context any attempt to ask these questions
was met with incredulity and the interview could not be completed. After the war in March 2010 the top
5 items for the Sinhala were ‘Inflation’ 1st at 68% ‘very significant’ followed by ‘Corrupt politicians’ 2nd
at 64% then ‘Unemployment’ 3rd at 62%, ‘The decline of the economy’ 4th at 54% and ‘Politicisation of
the public service’ 5th at 53% ‘very significant’. These are all problems of the economy and good
governance. If not dealt with the government may lose its popularity and electoral mandate but not much
more than that.
31
Table 68. Top 5 problems for the Tamils in 2010
Tamil per cent (2010) Very Significant

1st Unemployment 66
2nd Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems 62
3rd The failure of successive governments to find a political solution 61
4th Inflation 60
Table 69. Top 5 problems for the Tamils in 2009

1st Discrimination after independence 66
4th All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces 60
5th Failure to implement language rights 60
In 2009 the top 5 problems for the Tamils were ‘Discrimination after independence’ 1st at 66% ‘very
significant’ followed by ‘Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their
problems’ 2nd at 63%, then ‘The failure of successive governments to find a political solution’ at 62%,
‘All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces’ 4th at 60% and ‘Failure to implement
language rights’ 5th also at 60% ‘very significant’. The government can take comfort from the fact that in
2010 this list has changed a little with ‘Unemployment’ now first on the Tamil list at 66% ‘very
significant’ and ‘Inflation’ 4th at 60%. So the government’s policy to stimulate the Sri Lankan economy
will go some way to resolving the problems of all Sri Lankans. However, the ‘Failure to provide Sri
Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems’ at 62% ‘very significant’ and ‘The
failure of successive governments to find a political solution’ at 61% remain the 2nd and 3rd priorities for
Tamils. Fortunately the government’s policies for constitutional reform as set out in the APRC proposals
are acceptable to the vast majority in all the communities of Sri Lanka. If the government were to bring
such reforms into law by the end of the year then it seems very likely that the constitutional problem
could be resolved and thus provide a political context within which the economic needs of the country
can be effectively addressed.
However policy makers should also be aware that there are some regional differences in Tamil priorities
and concerns. For the Tamils living in the Northern Province the top priorities remain issues of
constitutional and political reform both 1st and 2nd at 71% and 69% ‘very significant’ and
‘Unemployment’ 3rd at 64% (Table 70). However, in the East the passing of the war has given way to
slightly different priorities. For them ‘Violence over the past 30 years’ came 1st at 80% ‘very significant’
followed by ‘All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces’ 2nd also at 80%, then ‘Abuse
of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces’ 3rd at 74%, ‘The Armed
forces are predominately Sinhalese’ 4th and ‘Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment’ 5th
both at 70% ‘very significant’ (Table 71). As for the Tamils in the rest of the country their priorities are
not so very different to everyone else with an emphasis on issues of the economy and good governance
(Table 72).
Table 70. Top 5 problems for the Northern Tamils in 2010
Northern Tamil per cent (2010) Very Significant

1st Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems 71
2nd The failure of successive governments to find a political solution 69
3rd Unemployment 64
5th Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life 64
32
Table 71. Top 5 problems for Eastern Tamils in 2010
Eastern Tamil per cent (2010) Very Significant

1st Violence over the past 30 years 80
2nd All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces 80
3rd Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces 74
4th The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese 70
5th Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment 70
Table 72. Top 5 problems for other Tamils in the rest of Sri Lanka in 2010
Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent (2010) Very Significant

1st Inflation 79
2nd Unemployment 72
3rd Corrupt politicians 69
4th Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation 68
Similarly the needs of the Muslim and Up-Country Tamils are a little different, as well as the priorities
of those who support the major political parties (SLFP, UNP, JVP, TNA and SLMC) but as would be
expected party priorities tend to follow ethnic and regional concerns (see appendix for full results).
If there is no Reform
One of the most welcome results from the pre-war and post-war analysis of the APRC proposals was the
fact that Sinhala support for these proposals rose from 67% ‘Yes’ in March 2009 to 83% ‘Yes’ in March
2010 (Table 64). This was achieved by significant numbers of ‘Don’t Knows’ moving to the ‘Yes’
column in post-war Sri Lanka. Similarly when asked what they ‘think will happen if there is no reform
of the constitution to deal with the problems of the past’ the Sinhala who said they ‘Don’t Know’ in
2009 have now clearly expressed their view that there will be a political, economic and social cost to pay
(Table 73 and 74). In 2009 8% of Sinhala considered it ‘very probable’ that ‘The LTTE or new militant
groups will start terrorist actions again’ rising to 15% in 2010 (18% ‘probable’ and 34% ‘possible’) with
‘Don’t Knows’ falling from 25% in 2009 to only 6% in 2010.
Table 73. Sinhala concerns if there is no reform in 2010.
Sinhala per cent (2010) Very

Probable Possible Improbable
Very
DK
probable improbable
The international community will not
16 19 30 21 7 7
invest in Sri Lanka
The Sri Lankan economy will not
19 18 24 25 9 6
develop
India will continue to be involved in the
10 15 37 18 11 10
affairs of Sri Lanka
The LTTE or new militant groups will
15 18 34 16 11 6
start terrorist actions again
The present opportunity to make
peace/lasting solution will be lost for a 16 17 34 16 10 8
generation
33
Table 74. Sinhala concerns if there is no reform in 2009.

Very
DK
probable improbable
7 18 19 25 13 18
invest in Sri Lanka
7 18 22 23 15 15
develop
7 20 23 16 9 25
8 21 21 14 11 25
The present opportunity to make peace
11 16 19 18 13 24
will be lost for a generation
Following the same pattern of support for the APRC proposals there is little difference between the 2009
and 2010 results for this question for the Tamils at 41% ‘very probable’ in both 2009 and 2010 but a
slight drop in concern (and support for the APRC proposals – Table 64) for Muslims at 44% ‘very
probable’ in 2009 and 31% in 2010. Clearly there is a relationship between a persons support for the
APRC proposals and their concern for the future of Sri Lanka although this concern is felt more strongly
amongst Tamils than Sinhala (Table 75).
Table 75. Concerns if there is no reform in 2010 as per cent ‘Very probable’.
Per cent ‘Very North East Other UC

probable’ (2010) Tamil Tamil Tamil Tamil
The international
community will not 16 44 36 50 48 37 26 16 27 9 45 19
invest in Sri Lanka
The Sri Lankan
economy will not 19 51 40 67 50 49 27 19 30 19 64 23
develop
India will continue
to be involved in
10 39 27 38 53 24 31 10 23 23 42 33
the affairs of Sri
Lanka
The LTTE or new
militant groups will
15 41 37 59 32 47 31 16 24 19 53 33
start terrorist
actions again
The present
opportunity to
make peace/lasting
16 54 53 62 48 51 30 16 26 14 65 24
solution will be
lost for a
generation
34
Those for or against the APRC proposals in Sri Lanka
The results of this poll suggest that approximately 10% of the population of Sri Lanka are opposed to the
APRC proposals and that this 10% are a feature of both the Sinhala and Tamil communities, but clearly
not for the same reasons. So who are these 10% and what are their characteristics? In an effort to answer
this question a battery of demographic questions were asked at the end of the questionnaire not only to
ensure a good sample but also to explore the attitudes of those who supported or who did not support
constitutional reform. Table 76 lists these questions and demographic variables along with their
correlation coefficients for all those who said ‘No’ to the APRC proposals. These are quite easy to
interpret. If the coefficient is positive (+) then the variable in question is a characteristic of those who
said ‘No’. However if the coefficient is negative (-) then the variable is a characteristic of those who said
‘Yes’. Finally if the coefficient has one asterisk* then it is ‘significant’ and if it has two asterisks** it is
‘very significant’. (Copies of the questions used can be found in the appendix)
Variable Sinhala ‘No’ (N=882)9 Tamil ‘No’ (N=477)

Gender (male) 0.041 0.039
Age 0.044 0.024
Type of area (urban) 0.011 -0.094*
Income -0.071* 0.042
Education -0.012 0.108*
Central 0.043 -0.107*
North Central -0.077* -0.03
Northern -0.029 0.252**
Eastern 0.053 -0.122**
North Western -0.063 -0.015
Sabaragamuwa 0.002 0.029
Southern -0.031
Uva 0.055 -0.033
Western 0.019 -0.072
SLFP -0.111** -0.05
UNF 0.04 -0.078
JVP 0.116** -0.015
TNA 0.147**
SLMC -0.021
Importance of religion -0.072* -0.168**
Importance of own ethnic group -0.111** 0.002
Importance of being Sri Lankan -0.096** -0.259**
Contact with other ethnic group -0.015 -0.244**
Democratic value -0.125** -0.066
Victim of conflict 0.084* 0.089
There is a slight but insignificant positive correlation with gender suggesting males are a little more
likely to say ‘No’ to the APRC proposals than females. This is to be expected, as males tend to be
slightly more involved in conflicts and confrontation then females but not significantly so. Age does not
seem to be an important factor but there is a significant negative correlation for being urban and being a
Tamil who might say ‘No’ to the APRC proposals. So Tamils who might say ‘No’ tend to be rural. They
also tend to be from the Northern region, are better educated and are associated with the TNA. No
surprise there except perhaps for education. But the Tamils who are most likely to say ‘Yes’ to the
APRC proposals and who are most definitely NOT in the ‘No camp’ are the Tamils in the East. As
indicated in the ‘Problems’ section of this report there are significant differences between the Tamils of
the North and the Tamils of the East (Tables 70 and 71).
9
Comparisons of the value of the correlation coefficients can only be made within each group (Sinhala
or Tamil) but not between each group as the number in each group (N) is not the same.
35
From the available data the Sinhala who are most likely to say ‘No’ tend to be associated with the JVP
while those who would be most strongly ‘Yes’ live in the North Central region, might be a little poorer
and vote for the President’s party the SLFP. Significantly the importance of religion does NOT correlate
with saying ‘No’ for either the Sinhala or Tamils. Religious ‘radicalisation’ does play a role in other
conflicts around the world but this does not seem to be a feature of the conflict here according to this
data. However, the politics of religion may be a different matter as noted earlier in this report (see Table
62). Being Sinhala correlates with saying ‘Yes’ to the APRC proposals as does being Sri Lankan for
both Sinhala and Tamils. A lack of contact between Tamils and Sinhala may be a problem in Sri Lanka
as Tamils who do not have such contact are more likely to say ‘No’ to the APRC proposals. For Sinhala
democratic values correlates with saying ‘Yes’ but being a victim of the conflict, for them, also
correlates with saying ‘No’.
Those who know and understand Sri Lanka society better than this author will no doubt be able to add
more meaning and appreciation to the numbers briefly reviewed here. The important point to be made,
however, is that now that the whole of Sri Lanka is open to the kind of social research undertaken in this
poll such research will be able to make a positive contribution to peace making, peace building and
reconciliation in the future.
36
Opposition to progressive reform outside Sri Lanka
The years of careful negotiation by the members of the APRC, including informal discussions with
parties outside the APRC process, has led to the formulation of a set of proposals that are equally
acceptable to all the communities in Sri Lanka. This program of research has now been able to explore
and describe that support (or lack of support where applicable) in much detail pointing out the problems
where they exist.
Throughout the years of similar negotiations in Northern Ireland there was a considerable lack of
understanding of what was really going on in Northern Ireland in the USA. There many Americans of
Irish descent continued to support the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and their aspiration for a united
Ireland with little knowledge or appreciation of the power sharing arrangements being negotiated under
the terms of the Belfast Agreement. Similarly, it seems to be the case that the Tamil diaspora are not
fully aware of the efforts of the APRC to find a constitutional solution to their country’s problems. In
contrast to the detailed APRC proposals tried and tested here (Table 3) the members of the Tamil
community around the world were recently provided with the following statement in what they called a
Tamil Referendum:
‘I aspire to the formation of the independent and sovereign state of Tamil Eelam in the contiguous north
and east territory of the island of Sri Lanka on the basis that the Tamil speaking people in the island of
Sri Lanka make a distinct nation, have a traditional homeland and have the right to self determination.’
They were then asked to ‘Mark a cross (X) in the appropriate box’ which provided for only a ‘Yes’ or a
‘No’ response. These polls or referenda were held in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland for a total turnout of 207,058 votes cast out of a possible
323,500 to produce a combined result of 99.68% for the Tamil Eelam proposition and only 0.32%
against (Table 77).
Table 77. Results of the Tamil Referendum in April 2010
Country Total Polled ‘Yes’ per cent ‘No’ per cent

Australia 8,154 99.38 0.62
Canada 48,583 99.82 0.18
Denmark 4,147 99.49 0.51
France 31,148 99.86 0.14
Germany 23,089 99.41 0.59
Italy 3,680 98.79 1.21
Netherlands 2,750 99.67 0.33
Norway 5,633 99.11 0.89
Switzerland 16,441 99.80 0.20
UK 64,692 99.71 0.29
Total 207,058 99.68 0.32
It was very important that the Belfast Agreement was put to the people of both Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland (the South of Ireland) in a referendum to give the peace agreement political
legitimacy. In that referendum held on May 22nd 1998, 71% of the people of Northern Ireland voted
‘Yes’ and in a public opinion poll conducted on behalf of the parties in the negotiations, just 2 weeks
before the agreement was signed by the British and Irish governments on Good Friday 1998, 77% said
they would support the agreement. The opposition of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), who were
able to get their members to vote against it, can explain the drop of 6% between the results of the poll
and the referendum. So the poll was very accurate.
The results for the test of the APRC proposals in Sri Lanka are certainly as good as if not better than the
results for the Belfast Agreement poll, and in Northern Ireland the people there were able to make peace
37
on the strength of those results. Hopefully, now that the elections are over in Sri Lanka the new
government will take steps to bring the APRC proposals into constitutional law. With effective
implementation all the people of Sri Lanka can reasonably expect to share in all the benefits that will
inevitably flow from the peace and stability that these reforms can bring. Referendums that only offer
the options of independence for Tamil Elam or the status quo can’t achieve this. Neither of these two
options is what is wanted in Sri Lanka now. The people there are prepared to move on. However, it
remains an open question as to whether or not the political leadership in Sri Lanka will take this
opportunity to resolve the ‘national question’ once and for all. As far as the people are concerned this
door is open. Given the unprecedented electoral mandate handed to the President and his government by
the people they are now in an exceptionally strong position to lead them through.
38
Appendix
Questionnaire and additional results for questions 1 and 2 not given above
Political Reform in Sri Lanka
Good morning/afternoon/evening my name is _____ from _____ At this critical time we are conducting
a survey of public opinion to find out what the people of Sri Lanka believe needs to be done to bring
lasting peace and stability to the island.
The Research is being carried out by the staff of Social Indicator in Colombo.
The Survey involves interviewing two thousand people from all parts of Sri Lanka to complete a
representative sample in terms of age, gender, social class, political and ethnic affiliation and
geographical area.
Topics covered include:
• The range of problems faced by the people

• What you think will happen if reforms are not put in place
• The major elements of possible reforms for achieving lasting peace and stability
• Your views on some of these reforms
• Your views about yourself
• And finally some questions that tell us where you fit into our sample
All your answers will be kept completely confidential.
39
1. The Problems
People from different communities often hold very different views about the current problems faced by
them. Here is a list of some of the problems given to our research team from the different regions of Sri
Lanka. Which problems do you consider to be ‘Very significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of some significance’,
‘Of little significance’ or ‘Of no significance at all’.

1st Inflation 68
3rd Unemployment 62
6th Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes 52
7th Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice 50
8th Lack of basic health care 44
10th The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public 42
11th Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka 41
12th Politicians frequently changing party 38
13th Abuse of Human Rights by the Police 37
15th Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces 32
16th Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East 32
17th Increasing number of IDPs 28
19th State control over media 27
20th Polarisation of civil society 10 26
21st The failure of successive governments to find a political solution 25
22nd The British Colonialism 23
23rd Failure to implement language rights 20
24th Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces 19
25th Failure to implement 17th Amendment 19
26th Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems 17
28th Failure to protect historic Hindu sites 15
31st Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka 13
32nd Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes 13
33rd Discrimination after independence 13
34th The Police are predominately Sinhalese 13
36th State aided colonization and change of demographics 10
37th Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems 9
38th Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems 8
10
Divisions among civic organisations, political groups and media
40
1st Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE 63
2nd The continued violence of the LTTE 61
3rd Vested interests in ongoing conflict 45
6th The ongoing war 37
7th The LTTE can only be weakened by war 32
8th The failure of successive governments to find a political solution 32
10th Corrupt politicians 25
15th The British Colonialism 19
16th Polarisation of civil society 18
18th Non-productive Peace Secretariat 18
20th Inflation 17
21st Unemployment 15
22nd State aided colonization and change of demographics 15
23rd A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups 15
24th Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces 15
27th Discrimination after independence 15
31st Lack of basic health care 12
32nd The Police do not provide service for the public 11
33rd Politicians frequently changing party 11
41st All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces 9
42nd The Police are predominately Sinhalese 8
43rd The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese 8
45th Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka 7
46th Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes 6
48th Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU 3
49th Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU 2
41
1st Unemployment 66
4th Inflation 60
21st Politicisation of the public service 49
22nd Abuse of Human Rights by the Police 47
23rd Polarisation of civil society 44
31st Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems 34
32nd Failure to protect historic Hindu sites 33
33rd Failure to implement 17th Amendment 30
42
16th A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups 46
21st Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces 40
22nd Non-productive Peace Secretariat 39
23rd Increasing number of IDPs 38
25th Unemployment 37
26th Vested interests in ongoing conflict 37
28th The Police do not provide service for the public 36
29th The continued violence of the LTTE 35
31st Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation 33
32nd Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka 32
33rd Inflation 31
41st Polarisation of civil society 24
42nd Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE 22
43rd Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes 22
43
Up-Country Tamil per cent (2010) Very Significant
1st Inflation 78
2nd Failure to implement language rights 77
3rd All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces 75
22nd Violence over the past 30 years 50
23rd State control over media 50
31st Failure to protect historic Hindu sites 28
44
Up-Country Tamil per cent (2009) Very Significant
2nd The ongoing war 79
21st Abuse of Human Rights by the Police 47
22nd Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment 42
24th The continued violence of the LTTE 40
28th Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE 37
29th Inflation 35
31st It is not possible to kill the last Tiger 31
32nd Polarisation of civil society 31
33rd Politicisation of the public service 31
41st Increasing number of IDPs 21
42nd Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems 19
43rd The British Colonialism 19
45
Muslim per cent (2010) Very Significant
1st Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation 53
2nd Unemployment 50
3rd Violence over the past 30 years 50
4th Inflation 48
21st Failure to implement language rights 35
22nd The Police are predominately Sinhalese 34
31st Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East 24
32nd Politicians frequently changing party 24
33rd Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems 23
46
Muslim per cent (2009) Very Significant
1st The continued violence of the LTTE 57
2nd Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE 55
21st Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems 40
22nd Politicisation of the public service 39
23rd The Police are predominately Sinhalese 37
31st Corrupt politicians 33
32nd State control over media 33
33rd Unemployment 32
38th Inflation 27
43rd Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka 22
47
Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent (2010) Very Significant
1st Inflation 79
2nd Unemployment 72
21st Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces 43
22nd Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes 43
23rd Abuse of Human Rights by the Police 43
32nd State aided colonization and change of demographics 24
48
Eastern Tamil per cent (2010) Very Significant
2nd All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces 80
3rd Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces 74
9th Unemployment 62
16th Inflation 51
21st Failure to implement 13th Amendment 45
31st The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public 31
32nd Lack of basic health care 28
33rd The British Colonialism 26
49
Northern Tamil per cent (2010) Very Significant
2nd The failure of successive governments to find a political solution 69
3rd Unemployment 64
17th Inflation 48
22nd Abuse of Human Rights by the Police 45
50
SLFP per cent (2010) Very Significant
1st Inflation 66
3rd Unemployment 59
22nd State control over media 23
23rd Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces 22
32nd Discrimination after independence 16
33rd Failure to protect historic Hindu sites 15
51
UNP per cent (2010) Very Significant
1st Inflation 70
3rd Unemployment 63
21st Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka 30
22nd Increasing number of IDPs 29
23rd The Police are predominately Sinhalese 28
31st Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems 21
32nd Failure to implement 13th Amendment 20
33rd Discrimination after independence 20
52
JVP per cent (2010) Very Significant
1st Unemployment 80
2nd Inflation 64
3rd Politicisation of the public service 59
21st Failure to implement language rights 25
23rd Increasing number of IDPs 20
31st Failure to protect historic Hindu sites 14
32nd Discrimination after independence 13
33rd Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes 12
53
TNA per cent (2010) Very Significant
2nd The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese 77
22nd Increasing number of IDPs 55
27th Inflation 43
54
SLMC per cent (2010) Very Significant
2nd Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice 53
3rd Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems 53
12th Inflation 45
21st The Police are predominately Sinhalese 38
22nd Lack of basic health care 37
23rd Failure to protect historic Hindu sites 36
32nd Failure to implement 17th Amendment 28
33rd Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes 26
55
2. If there is no Reform
Q2.From the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if there is no reform of
the constitution to deal with the problems of the past. Please indicate which ones you consider to be
‘Very probable’, ‘Probable’, ‘Possible’, ‘Improbable’ or ‘Very improbable’.

Very
DK
probable improbable
16 19 30 21 7 7
invest in Sri Lanka
19 18 24 25 9 6
develop
10 15 37 18 11 10
15 18 34 16 11 6
generation

Very
DK
probable improbable
7 18 19 25 13 18
invest in Sri Lanka
7 18 22 23 15 15
develop
7 20 23 16 9 25
8 21 21 14 11 25
11 16 19 18 13 24
56
Tamil per cent (2010) Very
Very
DK
probable improbable
44 27 14 5 3 6
invest in Sri Lanka
51 26 13 4 2 4
develop
39 28 18 4 4 6
41 19 21 5 6 9
generation
Tamil per cent (2009) Very

Very
DK
probable improbable
44 26 19 3 3 4
invest in Sri Lanka
55 21 17 3 1 3
develop
34 28 24 8 1 4
41 22 19 3 1 14
52 22 14 2 1 8
Up-Country Tamil per cent (2010) Very

Very
DK
probable improbable
37 29 16 4 7 7
invest in Sri Lanka
49 26 13 4 4 5
develop
24 35 19 6 7 9
47 14 17 6 9 7
generation
Up-Country Tamil per cent (2009) Very

Very
DK
probable improbable
35 21 18 12 10 5
invest in Sri Lanka
63 10 9 10 4 4
develop
51 18 13 7 4 6
58 15 4 7 6 9
67 12 6 4 6 5
57
Muslim per cent (2010) Very
Very
DK
probable improbable
26 39 18 9 4 5
invest in Sri Lanka
27 23 31 11 5 4
develop
31 27 15 12 10 7
31 24 21 10 7 7
generation
Muslim per cent (2009) Very

Very
DK
probable improbable
45 32 11 4 0 7
invest in Sri Lanka
49 31 10 5 1 4
develop
24 38 23 4 1 11
44 27 13 1 2 13
36 38 12 3 1 10
58
Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent (2010) Very
Very
DK
probable improbable
48 25 8 7 5 8
invest in Sri Lanka
50 24 13 6 4 2
develop
53 21 12 5 7 3
32 20 19 9 15 6
generation
Eastern Tamil per cent (2010) Very

Very
DK
probable improbable
50 33 7 2 2 6
invest in Sri Lanka
67 23 3 2 1 4
develop
38 37 16 4 2 4
59 19 14 2 1 6
peace/lasting solution will be lost for a 62 31 5 2 1
generation
Northern Tamil per cent (2010) Very

Very
DK
probable improbable
36 25 27 5 2 5
invest in Sri Lanka
40 30 20 4 1 6
develop
27 28 27 5 4 10
37 18 27 3 2 14
generation
59
SLFP per cent (2010) Very
Very
DK
probable improbable
16 16 31 23 7 7
invest in Sri Lanka
19 17 25 26 9 5
develop
10 15 37 18 11 8
16 18 32 16 12 6
generation
UNP per cent (2010) Very

Very
DK
probable improbable
27 30 21 12 3 7
invest in Sri Lanka
30 24 18 17 5 7
develop
23 25 21 13 9 9
24 21 27 12 10 6
generation
JVP per cent (2010) Very

Very
DK
probable improbable
9 43 26 17 4
invest in Sri Lanka
19 30 23 23 4
develop
23 19 45 9 4
19 44 33 4
peace/lasting solution will be lost for a 14 28 49 4 4
generation
60
TNA per cent (2010) Very
Very
DK
probable improbable
45 24 15 5 6 4
invest in Sri Lanka
64 15 8 3 3 6
develop
42 25 18 5 3 7
53 16 21 3 3 3
generation
SLMC per cent (2010) Very

Very
DK
probable improbable
19 44 27 10 1
invest in Sri Lanka
23 21 44 10 1 2
develop
33 25 14 16 9 4
33 22 27 9 6 4
generation
61
3. A Program for Reform
With regards to the future peace and stability of Sri Lanka I am now going to present you with a number
of reforms on a series of cards. For each option you will be asked to indicate which ones you consider to
be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’ and for the purposes of this poll
‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ mean:
‘Essential’ – You believe this option is a necessary part of a secure, stable and better future for the
island and should be fully implemented.
‘Desirable’ – This option is not what you would consider to be ‘Essential’, but you think this option, or
something very similar to it, is a good idea and should be put into practice.
‘Acceptable’ – This option is not what you would consider to be ‘Desirable’, if you were given a choice,
but you could certainly ‘live with it’.
‘Tolerable’ – This option is not what you want. But, as part of a secure, stable and better future, you
would be willing to put up with it.
‘Unacceptable’ – This option is totally unacceptable under any circumstances. You would not accept it,
even as part of a secure, stable and better future for the island.
(VERSION 1 - Neutral)
You may use each of the terms ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ as
many times as you wish in each question.
(VERSION 2 - President)
If President Mahinda Rajapaksa strongly supported these proposals please indicate your support using
the terms ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ as many times as you
wish in each question.
(VERSION 3 - Religious)
If your religious leaders strongly supported these proposals please indicate your support using the terms
‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ as many times as you wish in
each question.
(VERSION 4 - Political)
If the political party you are closest to strongly supported these proposals please indicate your support
using the terms ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ as many times as
you wish in each question.
62
SHOW CARDS 1 to 14
15. The Structure of the State – Powers will be divided between the centre and the provinces under
a unitary state.
16. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces – These powers will be clearly defined in two
separate lists. One for the Centre and one for the Provinces.
17. The Parliament - Will consist of two houses. The House of Representatives directly elected by
the people and the Senate elected by the Provincial Legislators with each Province having the
same number of Senators.
18. Amending the Constitution – Amendments affecting the powers of the Provinces can only be
made if a majority of Senators from each of the Provinces votes in favour together with not less
than two thirds of a joint session of both houses. Amending certain specific articles will also
require approval by the people at a referendum.
19. The Powers of the President – The Executive Presidency will cease to exist at the end of the
incumbent’s term and be replaced by the Westminster system with a Prime Minister enjoying
majority support in the House of Representatives.
20. The Powers of Local Authorities – The Local Authorities will have powers to make by-laws in
respect of subjects listed separately in the Constitution.
21. Language Rights – The Tamil and Singhala languages will have parity of status as national and
official languages and as languages of the courts. English can also be used for official purposes
where it is expedient to do so. Singhala and Tamil shall be the medium of instruction at the
school level as well as English if facilities are available. Singhala, Tamil and English shall be
used at institutes of higher education.
22. Religious Rights – Buddhism shall have ‘pride of place’ with religious freedom for all citizens
being guaranteed.
23. Fundamental Rights – Individual and Group Rights will be recognized including the equality of
all citizens and the protection of all persons before the law.
24. Electoral System – The House of Representatives and Provincial Legislators will be elected on a
mixed system of first past the post and proportional representation.
25. The Judiciary – Will be independent of the Executive. The Court of Appeal will function with
Divisions in the Provinces along with the Provincial High Courts.
26. Public Service – There will be separate services for the Centre and the Provinces with certain
categories of officers classified as all island services. The Village, Divisional and District levels
of administration will all come under the Provinces. As far as is practical the Public Service will
reflect the composition of the population and it will be independent.
27. Safeguards against secession – The Constitution will provide for adequate safeguards against
attempts by any Province to succeed from the State.
28. Law and Order - There will be a Sri Lanka police officers service consisting of senior officers
from all ethnic groups. Policing will be devolved to the Provinces with certain powers retained
by the centre. National security will be the responsibility of the centre.
63
SHOW CARDS 1 to 14…
Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable
1. The Structure of the State
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces
3. The Parliament
4. Amending the Constitution
5. The Powers of the President
6. The Powers of Local Authorities
7. Language Rights
8. Religious Rights
9. Fundamental Rights
10. Electoral System
11. The Judiciary
12. Public Service
13. Safeguards against secession
14. Law and Order
as a ‘package’
Q4 (VERSION 1) Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined
here? Yes/No
(VERSION 2) If President Mahinda Rajapaksa strongly supported a package of constitutional reforms

for Sri Lanka as outlined here, would you support it? Yes/No
(VERSION 3) If your religious leaders strongly supported a package of constitutional reforms for Sri
Lanka as outlined here, would you support it? Yes/No
(VERSION 4) If the political party you are closest to strongly supported a package of constitutional
reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here, would you support it? Yes/No
Q5 (VERSION 1 ONLY) If answer is ‘No’ or ‘Don’t know’ or No Response:
Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:
1) President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Yes/No

2) Your religious leaders supported them? Yes/No
3) The political party you are closest to supported them? Yes/No
4) President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all
supported them? Yes/No
Q6 (VERSION 1 ONLY) If answer is ‘Yes’:
Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:
1) President Mahinda Rajapaksa did not support them? Yes/No

2) Your religious leaders did not support them? Yes/No
3) The political party you are closest to did not support them? Yes/No
4) President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all did
not support them? Yes/No
64
Q7 Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement:
"Democracy may have problems buts it's better than any other form of government."
(Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement?)
1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree
98. Don’t know/Not sure
99. No response
SECTION III: DEMOGRAPHICS

1. Sex:
1. Male 2. Female
2. Religion:
1. Buddhism
2. Hinduism
3. Islam
4. Roman Catholicism
5. Christianity (Non-RC)
6. Other _________
2.1. Which of the following BEST describes the importance of religion on your life?
1. It’s the most important thing in my life
2. It’s very important but it doesn’t dominate my life
3. It’s somewhat important in my life.
4. It’s not very important in my life
5. It’s not at all important in my life
3. Age: ________________
4. Ethnicity:
1. Sinhala
2. Tamil
3. Up-country Tamil
4. Muslim
5. Burgher
5. Other _________
4.1. How important is being (use group from question 4) to the way you think of yourself, very important,
important, neither important or unimportant, not very important, or not important at all?
1. Very important
2. Important
3. Neither important or unimportant
4. Not very important
5. Not important at all
65
4.2. And how important is being Sri Lankan to the way you think of yourself, very important, important,
neither important or unimportant, not very important, or not important at all?
1. Very important
2. Important
3. Neither important or unimportant
4. Not very important
4.3. How often you tend to come into contact with people from other ethnic groups?
1. Daily
2. Once a week
3. Once a month
4. Once a year
5. Rarely/Never
5. First language:
1. Sinhala
2. Tamil
3. English
4. Other _________
6. Occupation of the respondent (SINGLE CODE ONLY)
1. Executives, Managerial and 8. Housewife

Administrative Professionals
2. Professionals 9. Retired
3. Technicians and Associate 10. Business
Professionals
4. Clerk 11. Self employed
5. Travel, Restaurant, Protective 12. Elementary Occupations
Service Workers and Sales Workers
6. Agricultural and fisheries workers 13. Unemployed
7. Students 14. Other
7. Could you please tell me your educational qualifications? (SINGLE CODE ONLY)
1. Cannot read and write 8.Advanced Level

2. Literate but no formal education 9.Vocationally trained
3. Up to grade 5 10.Technically trained
4. Grade 6-9 11.Professional
5. Up to O’ Level 12.Undergraduate
6. O’ Level 13.Graduate and above
7. Up to Advanced Level
8. Total monthly income of the household:
1. Below Rs 5000 4. Rs 15,001-Rs 20,000

2. Rs 5001-Rs 10,000 5. Rs 20,001-Rs 25,000
3. Rs 10,001-Rs 15,000 6. Rs 25,001 & above
66
9. Please tell me that in your view, which political party is the closest to your personal political
ideologies?
1. SLFP
2. UNF
3. JVP
4. JHU
5. TNA
6. SLMC
7. EPDP
8. UCPF
9. NFF
10. NUA
11. Other _______________________________
10. Can you tell me if you have ever:
Yes No Don’t No
Conditions
know/Not sure response
1 2 98 99
a. Had a family member fight in the
1 2 98 99
conflict?
b. How about your friends or neighbours?
Have any of them had a family member 1 2 98 99
fight in the conflict?
c. Have you or any family member been
physically injured, killed, or disappeared in 1 2 98 99
the conflict?
d. How about your friends or neighbours? 1 2 98 99
e. Have you or anyone in your family had
property damaged or lost land in the 1 2 98 99
conflict?
f. Have you ever experienced any loss or
limitation of your rights as a result of the 1 2 98 99
conflict?
67
1. RESPONDENT’S NAME:
2. ADDRESS:
3. TEL NO:
4. PROVINCE 5. DISTRICT
1 Central 1 Colombo 11 Ampara
2 North Central 2 Gampaha 12 Trincomalee
3 Northern 3 Kalutara 13 Kurunegala
4 Eastern 4 Kandy 14 Puttalam
5 North Western 5 Matale 15 Anuradhapura
6 6 Nuwara Eliya 16 Polonnaruwa
Sabaragamuwa
7 Galle 17 Badulla
7 Southern 8 Matara 18 Moneragala
8 Uva 9 Hambantota 19 Ratnapura
9 Western 10 Batticaloa 20 Vavuniya
21 Mannar
22 Jaffna
6. DIVISIONAL SECRETARIAT:
7. GN:
8. TYPE OF AREA: 1. Rural 2. Urban
9. LGB:
10.DATE: 11.START TIME: 12.END TIME:
THANK YOU!
68

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‘War and Peace’ and the APRC Proposals1

Dr. Colin Irwin

About the poll 2

Up-Country Tamil response 11

Support for reform 15

Some further notes on Northern, Eastern and

Political party response 20

A further note on the politics of ‘Religious Rights’ 28

Summary of results for the APRC proposals 29

Those for or against the APRC proposals in Sri Lanka 35

Opposition to progressive reform outside Sri Lanka 37

Appendix: Questionnaire and additional results 39

Table 1. Sample plan

Neutral President Religious Political Total

Per cent Yes No DK

Table 4. Sinhala response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)

Sinhala per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

Table 5. Sinhala response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)

Sinhala per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

Table 6. Sinhala priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2010)

Sinhala per cent ‘essential or desirable’

Table 7. Sinhala priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2009)

Sinhala per cent ‘essential or desirable’

Tamil per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

Tamil per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

Tamil per cent ‘essential or desirable’

Tamil per cent ‘essential or desirable’

Eastern Tamil Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

Northern Tamil Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

Other Sri Lanka Tamil Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

Up-Country Tamil per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

Up-Country Tamil per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

Up-Country Tamil per cent ‘essential or desirable’

Up-Country Tamil per cent ‘essential or desirable’

Muslim per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

Muslim per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

Muslim per cent ‘essential or desirable’

Muslim per cent ‘essential or desirable’

Per cent (2010) Yes No DK

Per cent (2009) Yes No DK

Sinhala per cent Yes No DK

Sinhala per cent Yes No DK

Tamil per cent Yes No DK

Tamil per cent Yes No DK

Up-Country Tamil per cent Yes No DK

Up-Country Tamil per cent Yes No DK

Muslim per cent Yes No DK

Muslim per cent Yes No DK

Per cent Yes No DK

Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent Yes No DK

Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent Yes No DK

Eastern Tamil per cent Yes No DK

Eastern Tamil per cent Yes No DK

Northern Tamil per cent Yes No DK

Northern Tamil per cent Yes No DK

Per cent Yes No DK

SLFP Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

SLFP per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

UNP Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK

UNP per cent Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK