Business Associations Outline
Business Associations Outline
Business Associations Outline
Professor Post
(Exam: one very long hypo, which covers everything we do over the semester and has 20
or so questions attached to it; there will be an extra credit question on Corporate Responsibility)
I. Intro:
A. Business Associations: the study of the means and devices by which business id conducted by either
a single individual or cooperatively by a few or many individuals. The subject is broken down into
unincorporated associations – such as agency and partnership, and corporations.
The Statutes:
1. The Uniform Partnership Act (1914) – UPA*
2. The Uniform Partnership Act (1997 – RUPA*
3. The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996)
4. The Model Business Corporation Act (1969) – particularly the financial provisions – MBCA
5. The Model Business Corporation Act (1984) - RMBCA
*The Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) are uniform acts -
model statutes proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") for the
governance of business partnerships by U.S. States. Several versions of each have been promulgated, the earliest
having been put forth in 1914, and the most recent in 1997. The 1914 version of the UPA was subsequently enacted
into law in every state except Louisiana. The most recent revision has been enacted into law by more than 40
states.Both the UPA and the RUPA attempt to cover every conceivable detail of the business partnership, including
formation, the ownership of partnership assets, the assessment of fiduciary duties, the settlement of partnership
disputes, and termination.
In NJ, we have UPA 1997 (with some variations in numbering), and the statutory provision on
this is tile 42 section 10
Core questions turn on corporate governance. Who gets what? Who bears which risk? How is control
exercised and transferred?
Partnerships –
General Partnership – UPA definition: “an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners
a business for profit”
Creation -
By operation of law – Partnership can come into existence by operation of
the law, without any filing of papers.
Creation by ‘estoppel’– If two people represent to the outside world that
they are in partnership. See UPA §16.
1. Limited scope – Applies only where 3d party extends credit to the
partnership. Other forms of reliance inapplicable.
Life Span – Dissolution: Dissolves upon death, bankruptcy, or withdrawal of any partner.
Absent an agreement, any partner may withdraw and demand liquidation.
Liability to Outsiders – Partners have unlimited liability, personal assets at risk for partnership
obligations.
Under some statutes liability of partnership contracts is joint, so
partnership assets must first be exhausted.
LLP Statutes – Limit liability of partners for partnership debts and
obligation, unless partner supervised another partner or agent engaged in
wrongful conduct.
Financial Rights – Partners share equally in profits and losses, which are divided on dissolution.
No statutory right to profits.
No statutory right to compensation for services.
Firm Governance –
Binding the firm: Each partner is an agent of all other partners and can
bind the partnership, either by transacting business as agreed by the
partners (actual authority) or by appearing in the eyes of 3d parties to
carry on partnership business (apparent authority).
Control of firm – Unless otherwise agreed, majority vote needed to decide
ordinary partnership matters.
1. Extraordinary matters or those contravening agreement – require
unanimity.
Transferability of Ownership Interests – Partner cannot transfer interest unless all remaining
partners agree or partnership agreement permits it.
Partner may transfer his financial interest in profits and distribution,
entitling the transferee to a charging order.
Limited Partnership –
Formation – Must be created with written agreement among the partners and certificate filed
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with state official. RULPA §201.
Dissolution – Limited partnership lasts as long as the partners agree or,
absent agreement, until a general partner withdraws.
Nature – 2 kinds of partners
General – Each liable for all debts of the partnership;
1. Corporate general partner – General partners may be corporations.
Limited – Not liable for debts of partnership beyond their proportional
share of contributions.
1. No mgmt. participation –
Liability to Outsiders –
General Partner – Must be at least one unlimited liability
Limited Partners – Liable only to the extent of their investment.
1. No participation in control
Firm Governance –
Binding firm: General partners have authority to bind the partnership to
ordinary matters.
1. Limited partners have voting authority over specified matters, but
cannot bind the partnership.
Transferability of Ownership Interests –
General Partner – Cannot transfer interest unless all remaining partners
agree or partnership agreement permits it.
Limited Partner – Interests freely assignable.
Both – can assign their rights to profits and distributions.
Limited Liability Company (LLC) – Hybrid entity between corporation and partnership; Partnership
aspects – Members of LLC provide capital and manage the business according to their agreement;
Interests are not freely transferable; Corporation aspects – Members not personally liable for the debts
of the LLC entity.
Life Span – LLC arises with the filing of a certificate or articles of organization with a state
official.
i) Many LLC statutes require at least two members.
ii) Duration – Not limited by statutes.
Liability to Outsiders – LLC members, both as capital contributors and managers, are not liable
for LLC obligations.
i) Veil-piercing – Some LLC statutes suggest that members can become
individually liable if equity or justice requires.
Firm Governance –
S-Corporation – What is it? Incorporated under state law and retains all its corporate attribute,
including limited liability. But it is not subject to an entity tax. All corporate income, losses,
deductions, and credits flow through to shareholders.
Eligibility:
Domestic – S-Corp. must be domestic;
75 Shareholders – No more than 75 indiv. shareholders;
Certain tax-exempt entities can be shareholders, e.g. stock ownership
plans, pension plans, charities.
Aliens – No shareholder can be a nonresident alien;
One class of stock – There can only be one class of stock.
Limitation
When heavy losses are anticipated, the S-Corp. may be less desirable than a
partnership; S-Corp. shareholders can only write off losses up to the amount of
capital they invested.
Loss can be carried forward and recognized in future years.
Rules on deductibility of passive losses may limit deductions for S-Corp.
shareholders, just like partners in a partnership.
1. Introduction: Agency is a legal relationship that is crucial to any common law legal system because
most of the work in the world is done by agents working for their principal. The law of agency covers
both personal activities and business activities. You don’t need the formalities of a contract or
consideration in order to have an agency relationship, though they are very often present. Agency is a
conductor of liability. Agency is an agreement by one person (an agent) to act for a principal at the
principal’s direction and control. Either the principal or the agent can terminate the agency at any time –
in no event can the agency continue over the objection of one of the parties. 3 subdivisions of agency:
the servant-agent
the non-servant agent, and
the non-agent
Consequences of agency: One of the most crucial consequences is that any agency relationship creates
heavy fiduciary duties running both ways.
From the agent to the principal: is a duty to promptly and accurately account and disclose, the
fiduciary duty of loyalty, which includes a duty not to compete with her principle, also anything
the agent obtains as a result of her employment belongs to the principal, thus effectively a
barring the retention of secret profits, advantages, and benefits absent the principal’s consent .
From the principal to the agent: is a duty to compensate the agent, including reimbursing her
for out of pocket costs, unless the parties contract otherwise. The principal also has a duty to
cooperate with the agent and aid her in the performance of her duties.
Who is an agent?: the manifestation of consent requirement is objective – it doesn’t matter what
the principal truly intended, but rather, the agency relationship depends on what the agent
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believed the principal intended. Thus an agency relationship can arise even where the principal
subjectively intended no such relationship. Moreover, agency power to bind the principle can
arise even absent true mutual consent. Ways for an actual agency relationship to be formed:
By agreement
By ratification: occurs when the principal accepts the benefits or otherwise affirms the
conduct of someone purporting to act for the principal, even though no actual agency
agreement exists
Agency by Estoppel: a principal may act in suach a way that a 3rd party reasonably believes
that someone is the principal’s agent/ this is called agency by estoppel
2. Liability of Principal to 3rd Parties in Contract: after establishing that an agency relationship exists,
a 3rd party wanting to hold the principal liable must demonstrate the scope of the agent’s authority to act
for the principal. There are several sources of authority:
i) Actual Authority: may be expressly conferred on the agent, or reasonably implies by
custom, usage, or by the conduct of the principal to the agent. Such authority may be
either expressed or implied. The principal is bound.
a. Express Authority: is actual authority contained within the agency agreement (i.e.
expressly granted by the principal); i.e. “ I want you to do/be responsible for tasks x,
y, and z
b. Implied Authority: comes from the words or conduct between the principal and the
agent. It is often labeled to signify how it has arisen: a) incidental to express
authority; b) implied from conduct; c) implied from custom/usage/habit; and d)
implied because of emergency
ii) Apparent Authority: results when a principal manifests to a 3rd party that an agent is
authorized, and the 3rd party reasonably relies on the manifestation. There must be some
holding out by the principal that causes a 3rd party to reasonably rely on the
principal’s manifestation; suit by 3rd parties against the agent will disappear if the
principal expressly, implicitly, or by conduct ratifies or adopts the contract. This
action will make it as if there was actual authority from the beginning. But if the board
of directors does not ratify, 3rd party has a cause of action in restitution against agent.
Current approach in the courts: they stretch and strain to protect the expectations
of 3rd parties even when the principal’s manifestations of consent were illusory at
best.
a. Rationale: it is easier/more efficient to make the principal responsible for keeping
track of her agents as opposed to having the court do it
iii) Inherent Agency Power: not well defined, but is thought to be analogous to the doctrine
or respondeat superior in torts. Recognizes that it is inevitable that in the course of
performing her duties, either by mistake, negligence, or misinterpretation of her
instruction, an agent may harm a 3rd party or deal with one in an unauthorized manner. It
is an agency power that raises even in the absence of actual or apparent authority or by
estoppel. It arises from the designation by the principal of a kind of agent who ordinarily
possesses certain powers. The doctrine is based on a reasonable foreseeability rationale.
The test is whether the principal could reasonably foresee that an agent would take
the action she did; often based on the agent’s title (i.e. if you’re a ‘Buyer’, you can be
expected to have the power to buy stuff)
iv) Ratification: A person may affirm of ratify a prior act supposedly done on his behalf by
another by another that was not authorized at the time it was performed. Ratification
causes the agent’s act to be treated as if the principal had authorized it at the outset.
3. Agent’s Liability on the Contract: an agent’s liability on a contract depends on the statue of his
principal
i) Disclosed Principal: an agent who purports to contract for a disclosed principal is not
personally liable on the contract. In such a case, the agent negotiates the contract in the
name of the principal, and the agent is not a party to the contract. The parties’ intent is
that the principal be bound.
ii) Undisclosed or Partially Disclosed Principal: both the fact of agency and the principal’s
identity are not disclosed. In the partially disclosed principal cases, the 3rd party knows
that the agent is acting as an agent, but does not know the identity of the principal. An
agent acting on behalf of an undisclosed principal is personally liable on the contract
itself. Courts generally apply the same rule in partially disclosed principal cases. If the
agent has signed or described himself as an agent for an undisclosed person, he is
personally liable on the contract unless otherwise agreed.
ii) Independent Contractors aka Non-Agent Servants: arises when a principal retains
someone to do a certain job or achieve a specific objective. The principal retains no right
of control over the independent contractor as to how the work is performed. The
independent contractor determines for herself how she will achieve the end goal.
a. Respondeat superior: is built upon the premise that where there is a servant-agent
over whom the principal has the legal power over their physical activities, the
principal is liable whether or not he is negligent in hiring and training that agent. On
the other hand, respondeat superior doesn’t apply to a non-servant agent, though some
other theory like negligent hiring may apply. Officers of corporations are servant-
agents, but directors or outside law firms are not servant-agents.
b. Defining servant versus independent contractor: Restatement
1. The extent of control to which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the
details of the work.
2. Whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business.
3. The kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision.
4. The skill required in the particular occupation.
5. Whether the workman or the employer supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and
place of work for the person doing the work.
6. The length of time for which the person is employed.
7. The method of payment, whether by time or for the job.
8. Whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer.
9. Whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of master and
servant.
10. Whether the principal is or is not in business.
The Partnership statutes change the Agency relationship – every partner is an agent of the partnership
and of every other partner
Hypothecate: To pledge property as security for a debt without giving up possession or title. The pledged
property is said to be hypothecated. For example, a savings or trust account that is pledged or assigned as
collateral for a loan is called a hypothecated account.
II. Partnerships
Intro: A partnership is treated both as a separate entity from its partners (for some purposes) and as though
there is no separate entity but merely an aggregate of separate, individual partners. The partners are jointly
and severally liable for the obligations of the partnership per UPA §15. And for federal income tax purposes,
the income and losses of the partnership are attributed to the individual partner; the partnership itself does
not pay taxes. RUPA §201 expressly states that a partnerships is an entity, thus simplifying many partnership
rules such as those on property ownership and litigation.
UPA §6: Partnership Defined – an association of two or more personas to carry on a business as co-owners
for profit. A lawful partnership cannot be formed for nonprofit purposes.
UPA §9: Relationship between partners and the partnership – every partner is an agent, which carries with it
a fiduciary duty to act fairly and honestly
UPA §15: Liability – Joint and severable unlimited personal liability; misconduct of one partner could result
in the financial ruin of fellow partners
UPA §18: starts with language “subject to any agreement between partners”
(a): Profit/Loss – evenly divided, equally allocated; each partner is a residual claimant; even where
one person is providing only capital and the other only services
(e): Ownership & Management – equal
(g): New Members – unanimous consent of all the partners is required
(h): Dispute Resolution – ordinary matters = majority decides; other matters = requires unanimity
UPA §31: Exit Right – at will dissolution (if no writing for the original agreement)
UPA §33: Exit Effect – dissolution terminates all authority of any partner to act for the partnership
RUPA §202 Formation of Partnership – requires only a statutorily specified mutual manifestation of consent
(a): The association of 2 or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit forms a partnership whether or not the persons intended to form a partnership
(b): An association formed under a statute other than this one, a predecessor statute, or a
comparable statute of another jurisdiction is not a partnership under this Act
Way to tackle the question of whether a partnership exists – move from UPA §7 to §6
1. Partnership is a matter of contract
2. And so it is a matter of objective intent of the parties
3. Is there a prima facie case of partnership; did they share risk like co-owners; did they share control the
way co-owners do? Set up all the facts that lead you to your conclusion
4. What are the possible other classifications/what’s the other side of your agrument finding a partnership
5. Talk about the defintion of a partnership
The Need for a Written Agreement: Although there is no requirement that a partnership agreement be in
writing, there are several advantages to doing so
It may avoid future disagreements
Can be readily proved in court
May point out potential trouble spots
Facilitates allocation of tax burdens among themselves
Resolves death and/or retirement issues
Clarifies whether investments are lent rather than contributed
Satisfies the Statute of Frauds where real estate is involved
Assumed name statutes: If you are doing business under an assumed name, you are supposed to file an
assumed name certificate. As to a partnership, the statute is especially demanding in that, if you are a
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partnership and the firm name contains less than all of the names of all of the partners, the county recorder is
not to accept real estate documents unless there is an assumed name certificate filed. If the firm name is
Smith & Jones and there is only Smith and only Jones, you’re okay.
Note: If no partnership agreement, look to the default rules. The default rule per
UPA §18(a) is: profits are shared equally. Losses are shared in the same
manner as profits.
The RUPA approaches the fiduciary duty issue very differently from the UPA; it attempts to diminish the
vague, broad statements and uncertainty of the latter.
Fiduciary Duties: UPA §§20-22; RUPA §§403-405; 603 (duties during dissolution)
The Duty of Care: not big in partnerships because the assumption is that all partners are actively
involved in the running of the business; The standard here is gross negligence rather than just
negligence; essentially the duty of care owed in corporate law applied to partnerships
o Business Judgment Rule: a presumption created that business judgment makers were doing
their best for the business; so, it is the P’s burden to rebut this presumption; good-faith, fully
informed, & acted in the best interest of the corporation
The Duty of Loyalty: RUPA §404(b) – a partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other
partners is limited to:
o (1): Can’t appropriate a partnership opportunity
o (2): Can’t act as or on behalf of an adverse party
o (3): Can’t compete with the partnership/partners
Bane v. Ferguson (p. 49): Issue is whether retired partner has claim against firm for loss of pension.
Firm merged into larger firm and went out of business. P first theory of recovery was under UPA
§9(3)(c) one or more partners can not commit act that would make it impossible to carry out
ordinary business of partnership. 2nd was violation of fiduciary duty to him. Held: Bane was no
longer partner, therefore no fiduciary duty was owed to him. Business judgment rule: if judgment is
exercised within reasonable range of business judgment and turns out to be the wrong decision, there
is no liability; Rationale: no second guessing and allows people to make decisions.
Meinhard v. Salmon (p. 67): A person named Gerry leased Hotel Bristol to Salmon. Salmon needed
monies and asked Meinhard for funds. Meinhard agreed and Salmon was to pay him a portion of the
profits upon a time basis. The two were coadventurers. The majority of the duties fell upon Salmon.
They were not partners on paper. After the end of the lease of the Hotel, the new owner of the hotel
wanted to do some construction and the owner needed someone to help w/ his idea. Owner
approached Salmon and went ahead w/ a deal w/ Owner w/out informing Meinhard. Meinhard
found out after the fact about the deal and he sued Salmon for profits on the new deal.
Analysis:
Rule: Joint adventurers, like co-partners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues,
the duty of loyalty.
Salmon owed a duty of loyalty to inform Meinhard of the deal to allow Meinhard to compete.
RUPA §404 (a & b1) General Standards of Partner’s Conduct
Holding/Rule:
RUPA §103(b)(3) says that partners can’t agree to void fiduciary duties except:
They may identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of
loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable; or
All, a number, or a percentage of the partners may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of
all material fact, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty
A frequent issue involves whether property is partnership property of the individual property of a partner. All
property originally brought into the partnership or subsequently acquired, by purchase or otherwise, for the
partnership is partnership property per UPA §8(1). Where there is no clear intention expressed as to whether
property is partnership property, then courts consider all of the facts related to the acquisition and ownership
of the asset in question. Some of the factors considered are:
How title to the property is held
Whether partnership funds were used in the purchase of the property
Whether partnerships funds have been used to improve the property
How central the property is to the partnership’s purposes
How frequent and extensive the partnership’s use is of the property; and
Whether the property is accounted for on the financial records of the partnership
§25:
o (1): A partner is co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property holding as a
tenant in partnership
o (2): This means that
(a): Each partner, subject to this act and any agreement between the parties, has an
equal right to possessor specific partnership property for partnership purposes; but
he has no right to possess such property for any other purpose without the consent
of his partners
(b): The right of a partner as co-owner in specific partnership property is not
separately assignable
(c): Partnership property cannot be attached/executed towards the debts of an
individual partner; if the property is attached/executed towards the debts of the
partnership as a whole, it cannot be protected via the homestead or exemption
laws
(d): On the death of a partner, the other partners and not the executors of the
deceased partners will/estate can have a right to wind up the partnership affairs
except when the deceased partner was the last surviving one, when his right in
such property vest in his legal representative
Partner’s interest in the partnership: is her share of the profits and surplus, which is personal
property per UPA §26 even if it is real property that the firm owns
o Consequences of classification as personal property: the partner’s rights to any
individual property held by the partnership are equitable (the partnership holds title), and
this equitable interest is ‘converted’ into a personal property interest. This can be
important in the inheritance situations where real property may be given to one heir and
personal property to another
o Assignments: a partner may assign her interest in the partnership (unless there is a
provision in the partnership agreement to the contrary), and unless the agreement provides
otherwise, such and assignment will not dissolve the partnership per UPA §27(1)
The assignee has no right to participate in the management of the
partnership (i.e. he is not a partner )
But the assignee is liable for partnership obligations
Creditor’s rights: a creditor of an individual partner may not attach partnership assets. He must get a
judgment against the partner and then proceed against the individual partner’s interests
A general partner’s personal assets are considered part of the general fund to which a bankruptcy estate may
look to satisfy partnership debts.
Partnership creditors have first priority in the Partnership creditors have first priority in the assets of the
assets of the partnership. partnership.
Individual creditors have first priority in the Partnership creditors are placed on parity with individual
assets of the individual. creditors in allocating assets of an individual partner when
a partnership is bankrupt.
Martin v. Peyton (p. 125): Facts: Peyton (D) and others (D) loaned a partnership money so that it could
carry on its brokerage business. Rule: While words are not determinative, where a transaction bears
all of the aspects of a loan, no partnership arrangement will be found.
Young v. Jones: Facts: Investors claim that they lost $550,000 in capital as a result of Price Waterhouse-
Bahamas (D) negligent conducting of an audit and related documents upon which the investors (P) relied
to their detriment. Rule: Persons who represent themselves, or allow others to represent them to third
parties as a partner in either an existing partnership or with other parties who are not their true
partners, are liable to any third persons who relied to their detriment on the existence of that
apparent partnership.
UPA §7(1): Persons who are not partners as to each other are not partners as to third persons.
UPA §16(1): Partnership by Estoppel – One who holds herself out to be a partner, or who expressly or
impliedly consents to representations that she is such a partner, is liable to any 3rd person who extends credit
in good-faith reliance on such representations
Absent an agreement to the contrary, partners in a partnership have equal rights to participate in the
management of the business.
The default rule is that if there is a vote taken on specific matters, each partner has one vote and the
majority decision controls in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.
The partnership agreement may create classes of partners with different voting and financial rights.
Partners have apparent and actual authority to bind the partnership to obligations relating to the
business of the partnership. Thus, a partner may bind the partnership on obligations he or she
was not authorized to create.
National Biscuit Company v. Stroud (p. 55): Here we have a 50-50 two-man partnership running a grocery
store. The first partner said: “Don’t buy from X.” The second partner continued to buy from X, who knew
about the dispute. There could be no apparent authority. Instead, it sounds like inherent authority. One
partner can bind the partnership since the other partner didn’t control the majority (even if they have
a 2 party partnership). If they’ve got a disagreement and a 3rd person has knowledge of it, the
partnership can, but usually won’t, be bound. If 3rd party didn’t know of the disagreement, it is clear
that it will be binding on the partnership. Rule: They read UPA §18(e) & (h), which says that when you
have a deadlock among partners on this particular issue, any partner has actual authority for any typical
transaction. Substantially the same result would have been reached under restitution. But the court upheld the
contract. The acts of a partner, if performed on behalf of the partnership and within the scope of its
business, are binding upon all co-partners – UPA §15: all partners are jointly and severely liable for the
acts and obligations of the partnership.
Smith v. Dixon (p. 56): Under UPA §9, limits are imposed on partnership. Facts: Smith (D), manager of a
partnership consisting of his family members (D), agreed to sell land to Dixon (P). the other members of the
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partnership later refused to convey the property. Rule: The acts of a partner are biding upon the
partnership if he acted within the scope, or apparent scope, of his authority only.
Rouse v. Pollard (p. 59): Facts: Here we had a very prestigious New Jersey firm. A partner, Fitzsimmons
(D), decided he wasn’t making enough from the firm alone. He started confidential conferences with rich
old ladies and told them he was running his own private investment operation on the side. D promised to
invest Mrs. Rouse’s (P) money for her but, in fact, converted it to his own use. P sues partnership. Rule:
Partners are liable for the acts of the co-partners only if those acts are within the scope of the
partnership’s business.
Roach v. Mead (p. 62): Facts: Berentson (D) contended he was not vicariously liable for the negligent acts of
his partner, Mead (D), because such acts were outside the scope of the partnerships’ business. Rule: Each
partner is responsible to 3rd parties for the acts of the other partners when such could reasonably have
been thought by the 3rd party to fall within the purpose of the partnership.
Partnership Accounting:
A capital account essentially sets forth the partner’s ownership interest in the partnership.
A partner’s capital account equals the capital contributed by the partner less the amount of any
distributions to the partner plus the partner’s share of the profits less the partner’s share of the
losses.
The standard set of accounting principles that forms the norm for financial reporting in the United
States is known as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
o GAAP accounting is accrual accounting. If you sell something on credit, you take in the
income and you increase the capital account immediately. In other words, you accrue
immediately. For tax purposes, any business using an inventory must use the accrual
method. What does the Internal Revenue Code provide as to professionals? For service
professions, regardless of income, you can use the cash method, that is, accounts
receivable are neither an asset nor income until they are collected. The capital account
will not reflect unrealized receivables. If you are on the accrual method, the capital
account will reflect such receivables. Independent CPAs will certify statements on the
cash method, but they will put legends on the statements saying that a non-GAAP method
is being used. The pure cash method is not a traditional GAAP method.
These principles must also be followed by most publicly held corporations when publicly
reporting results
Accounting in large business involves two basic functions:
o The entering of records of transactions as they occur and
o The subsequent determination and reporting of results of operations on a periodic basis
(quarterly or annually)
Equity = Assets - Liabilities. This means that the net worth of a business is equal to its assets less
its liabilities.
There are four fundamental premises underlying financial accounting:
o Financial accounting assumes that the business that is the subject of the financial statements
is an entity
o All entries have to be in terms of dollars
o A balance sheet has to balanced
o Every transaction entered into by a business must be recorded in at least two ways if the
balance sheet is to continue to balance.
Journal Entries:
Debit means left-hand; credit means right-hand.
Ledger or T Accounts:
All debits go on the left side, all credits go on the right side.
Usually there is a separate T account for each item on the balance sheet, and as entries are made
in the journal they are also entered on the appropriate T account.
Law Firm Partnerships: in recent years, possibly because of economic pressure, law firms have begun to
swing away from lock-step systems of partner compensation. Less emphasis is being place don tenure and
seniority, and more consideration is being given to merit performance and attraction of new business. Among
the various compensation schemes, several factors govern the size of individual allocations. The following
are perhaps the most common:
Productivity and billable hours: with special recognition of those who regularly contribute the
most billed and collected hours
New business: credit given for production of new business is usually a percentage of the total
fees generated by the new business and continues for a predetermined period of time
Client liaison: recognition given for efforts to retain the larger clients, although those efforts
don’t produce an discernable, tangible results
Practice economics: recognition for prompt billing, client matter planning & control, accounts
receivable follow-up & cash collection, fees received from clients, other fees directly resulting
from partners’ work, profitability by type of law, avoiding write-offs, and overhead control
Management, administration, training, and supervision: recognition given to effective work
delegation, supervision and good staff relations
Leveraging: firms have thus had every incentive to grow rapidly by increasing the number of associates
relative to the number of partners, this process is known as leveraging
The Gunderson Effect: throwing more money at first year associates to attract and keep them which
spread across the country and into all areas of legal practice; the various effects of this phenomenon can
be found on p. 45 of the casebook
Sweat Bonuses: widely used arrangements within law firms by which associates receive extra bonuses in
a year if they record more than a specified number of billable hours.
Lampert, Hausler & Rodman PC v. John F. Gallant, et al (p. 103): what is the issue in this case? Their
business is practicing law; fighting with each other over the righ to the proceeds from contingency cases;
everything depends on what the partner’s initial agreement was and what fiduciary duties each owes to
the other; law practices can’t enforce non-compete covenants on each other b/c it interferes with the
clients right to choose their own counsel
Meehan v. Shaughnessy (p. 104): This is an unusual partnership agreement in that it lumps rightful and
wrongful dissolution together and provides what is going to happen. The court looks at the agreement and
basically ratifies the agreement. It sees no conflict between the agreement and the UPA. In this case,
some of the partners went to young associates and solicited business for their new firm. They held that
the old per se rule of setting up shop while being employed didn’t apply to a law firm because at a law
firm the main parties to be protected are the clients, and the clients can’t get good service unless there is
work up front. The court found a violation, holding that the old partners had a right to have their
solicitation sent to the clients at the same time that the departing partners sent theirs. Note that you
can’t forcibly take clients with you.
Gibbs v. Breed, Abbott & Morgan (p. 107): question is ‘how do you play nice when you are breaking
up?’ and ‘what’s required to be nice?’; In Gibbs, a case involving the question whether departing law firm
partners had breached fiduciary duties they owed to the partnership; Two attorneys, Charles F. Gibbs and
Robert W. Sheehan, were partners of Breed, Abbott & Morgan (Breed, Abbott) specializing in trusts and
estates. They withdrew from Breed, Abbott in 1991 to join Chadbourne & Parke (Chadbourne). At the
time, they were the only active partners in the Breed, Abbott trusts and estates department. What are the
rules with respect to soliciting clients when leaving a firm? Issue No. 1: Commencing at a point before
they announced their intent to others in their firm, the fiduciaries (partners in the Gibbs case; officers and
directors in Duane Jones and Lord, Geller) discussed among themselves plans to depart and take some of
the business of the enterprise with them (a law practice in Gibbs; an advertising business in Duane Jones
and Lord, Geller). Issue No. 2: The departing fiduciaries took with them confidential information relating
to firm clients.
Dissolution: the change in the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the
carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of the business UPA §29
Dissolution of a partnership does not immediately terminate it; the partnership continues until all of
tis affairs are wound up per UPA §30
RUPA §§601-603 & 701-705
o Refers to what UPA calls dissolution as ‘Dissociation’
o Dissolution in the RUPA is used to refer only to an event that leads to the winding up of
the business
Major facet that distinguishes partnerships from corporations is that each partner has the power to
dissolve the relationship at any time
Causes of dissolution: unless otherwise provided for in the partnership agreement, the following may result
in a dissolution
Expiration of partnership term:
o Fixed Term: even where the partnership is to last for a fixed term, partners can still terminate
at will (but it will be a breach of the agreement by the terminating partner, which may result
in damages charged to the terminating partner)
o Extension of term: the partners can extend the partnership by creating a partnership at will on
the same terms
Choice of a partner: any partner can terminate at will; however, if it is motivated by bad faith, it
may be a breach of the agreement
Assignment: an assignment of a partner’s interest is not an automatic dissolution, nor is the levy of a
creditor’s charging order against a partner’s interest. But an assignee or the creditor can get a
dissolution decree on expiration of the partnership term or at any time in a partnership at will per
UPA §§30-32
Death of a partner: the surviving partners are entitled to possession of the partnership assets and are
charged with winding up the partnership affairs without delay per UPA §37; the surviving partners
are also charged with a fiduciary duty in liquidating the partnership and must account to the estate of
the deceased partner for the value of the decedent’s interest
UPA RUPA
Dissolution (§29): Any change of partnership Disassociation (§601): A partner leaves, but the
relations, e.g., the exit of a partner. partnership continues, e.g., pursuant to agreement.
Winding up (§37): Orderly liquidation and Dissolution (§801): The onset of liquidating of
settlement of partnership affairs. partnership assets and winding up its affairs.
Collins v. Lewis (p. 85): Facts: Lewis (D) persuaded Collins (P) to enter into a partnership for the operation
of a cafeteria; the venture failed to make money, allegedly because of Collin’s lack of cooperation. Rule: A
partner who has not fully performed the obligations imposed on him by the partnership agreement
may not obtain an order dissolving the partnership.
Cauble v. Handler (p. 89): Facts: Cauble and Handler (D) were business partners until Cauble died. The
administratrix (P) of his estate thereafter sought Cauble’s share of the partnership assets. Rule: If a
partnership continues to do business after it has been formally dissolved, the non-continuing partner
of his representative may elect to receive his share of the profits earned by the firm after the date of
the dissolution per UPA §42
Adams v. Jarvis (p. 93): Facts: Adams (P), Jarvis (D), and a third doctor (D) entered into a partnership for
the practice of medicine; P later withdrew and claimed a right to share in the partnership’s existing accounts
receivables. Rule: A partnership agreement which provides for the contribution of the firm’s business
despite the withdrawal of one partner and which specifies the formula according to which partnership
assets are to be distributed to the retiring partner is valid and enforceable.
8182 Maryland Associates, Limited Partnership v. Sheehan (p. 98): A fast-growing mid-sized law firm,
where one of the lawyers (D) did financial work. They saw growth in the area and decided to sign a long-
term lease. Legal business was great for a while in the 1980’s, then it turned sour in the late 1980’s for about
four years. When that lawyer left, what was the effect on the dissolution of the firm? landlord here was
treating the law firms as if it was an entity (meaning that it was always obligated aggregately); D says he’s
not liable here because he left before the K was effective and way before the firm breached it; the court says
the K is effective the moment it is signed by all parties; court says not just contractual but also real
Bohatch v. Butler &Binion (p. 114): Butler worked for particular partner at a law firm and later became
partner herself; over time, she received internal reports, which led her to believe that partner had over-
reported his billable hours; she reported it to managing partner. After an incestuous and corrupt investigation,
the firm found that the billing was reasonable. Client raised concerns about B’s work. B asked to leave. B
filed suit for breach of partnership agreement and fiduciary duty. Held: that a law partnership had no tort
duty not to expel one of its partners for reporting suspected over-billing by another partner, reasoning
that the fiduciary duty that partners owe one another does not include a duty to remain partners or
else answer in tort damages.
Must be filed with the Secretary of State; some states also require advertisement/announcement that LLP will be
forming/operating in the area and that a receipt that shows that notice was published for 6 weeks must be filed
with he with secretary of state as well
Revised Limited Partnership Act – said that (and is the law in NJ) you’re not liable as a general partner unless
you participate in control of the biz in a way that is similar to the way a general partner would have; you’re not
liable unless 3rd party reasonably relied on the idea that you were a general partner; also there is a laundry list of
activities that don’t count as exercising/participating in the control of the biz
The formation of business corporations is firmly in the hands of the states. Also, per the Internal Affairs
Doctrine: the law of the incorporating state govern relations among directors, officers, and shareholders.
Because a corporation is held to be a separate legal entity, the corp normally incurs debts and obligations in it
sown name that are not the responsibility of its owners (shareholders). At the same time, the corporation is not
responsible for the debts and obligations of its owners (again, the shareholders). For exceptions to this default
position, see the section on piercing the corporate veil below.
A. Promoters
Contracts Referring to the Fact that the Corporation is not Yet Formed:
If the contract entered into by the promoter on behalf of the corporation recites that the
corporation has not yet been formed, the liability of the promoter depends on what the court
finds to be the parties’ intent.
If the corporation is never formed, or is formed but then immediately defaults, the promoter
will probably be liable.
If the corp is formed, and then shows its intent to take over the contract, then the court may
find that both parties intended that the promoter be released from liability.
Stanley J. How & Assoc., v. Boss (p. 236)Facts: Boss (D) signed a contract, on behalf of a
corporation not yet formed, with How (P). Rule: A promoter will be liable on a contract
he entered into on behalf of a corporation yet to be formed unless the other party
agree to look to some other person or fund for payment
Process of incorporating:
1. Choose a state of incorporation - choice of law issues, internal affairs of the corp are governed by this
state’s corp laws. Most small local corps stick to their state, while big ventures that will probably go
public go to DE (50%) or NY (5%).
2. Articles of incorporation (AOI) are filed (RMBCA §1.25) with the Secretary of State (or equivalent)
by an incorporator (RMBCA §2.01), usually a lawyer; Articles must include per RMBCA §2.02(a):
Name of Corporation – Articles must state corporation’s complete name and include a reference
to its corporate statues, e.g. “Corporation,” “Incorporated,” or “Inc.”; Sec of State will check the
records to make sure that the name is still available
o Different from other names in state – Must be “distinguishable upon the records”
(RMBCA §4.01), or in some states it must not be “deceptively similar” to another.
The Number of shares that the corporation is authorized to issue
Registered office and agent – Articles must state the corporation’s address for service of process
and for sending official notices. (RMBCA §2.02)
o Registered agent – Often, the Articles must also name a registered agent at the office on
whom process can be served. (RMBCA §§ 2.02, 5.01)
o Changes – Change is registered office must be filed with the Secretary of State.
Capital structure of corporation – Articles must specify the securities the corporation will have
authority to issue.
o Describe classes of authorized shares, no. of shares of each class, and privileges, rights,
limitations, etc. associated with each class. (RMBCA §6.01)
Purpose and powers of the corporation – The Articles may (but need not) state corporation’s
purposes and powers. Modern corporations can engage in any lawful business. (RMBCA §§
3.01, 3.02)
o Ultra vires doctrine – With decline of this, a “purposes” clause far less important.
Capitalization – no minimum required
Number of shares that the corp is authorized to issue, not how many they actually plan to issue
Clases of Shares/Stocks
Names of Incorporators
Names of Directors - (either elected by incorporators or simply just named in the certificate of
incorporation)
Signature of an officer (usually an incorporator)
Limitation of liability of directors
Opt-out provision – re: pre-emptive rights of shareholders
Carmen Corral 28 Spring ’06
o Opt-in: RMBCA §6.30 provides that no preemptive right exists unless provision for it is
expressly made in the articles of incorporation. This protects 3rd parties because then
everyone’s consciously agreeing to this.
o Opt-out: protects shareholders, may be more fair b/c corporation has more access to
information than the shareholders.
Optional provisions – Articles can contain a broad range of other provisions to “customize” the
corporation MBCA §2.0(b)
o Voting provisions – Calling for greater-than-majority approval of certain corporate
actions, such as mergers or charter amendments;
o Membership requirements – Example: Directors must be shareholders, or that
shareholders in a professional corporation be members of a profession; or
o Management provisions– Requiring shareholders approve certain matters normally
entrusted to the Board, such as executive compensation.
Amendment: they can be amended at any time, but usually require that
o the amendment be one that could have been adopted initially and
o any class of shareholders who would be adversely affected by the amendment must
approve the amendment by majority vote
3. By-laws – once the corp has been formed by filing of the articles, it should then adopt bylaws, which
govern the corporation’s internal affairs (procedural)
Contents: may specify (1) date, time and place for the annual mtg of shareholders, (2)
number of directors, (3) whether cumulative voting for directors will be allowed, (4) listing
of the officers of the corporation together with a description of the duties of each, (5) what
constitutes a quorum for a mtg of the directors
Not usually filed with the Secretary of State and not matters of public record.
Amendments: usually may be amended easily, usually provide that they may be amended
either by the Bd or shareholders
If they conflict with the articles, the articles control
Incorporators:
Role – Purely mechanical: sign the articles and arrange for their filing. If the articles
do not name directors, the incorporators select them at an organizational meeting.
Fade away – After incorporation, the incorporators fade away and have no more
continuing interest in the corporation.
Corporation as incorporator – In some states, the incorporators must be natural
persons, but the trend is that a corporation may act as an incorporator RMBCA
§§2.01, 1.40(16)
Filing Process: Simple process, under the MBCA, the state officials must accept the Articles
for filing if they meet minimum criteria RMBCA §1.25
Public documents – Once the Articles are filed, they become public documents.
o Confirming existence:
Certificate of existence or certificate of incorporation from Secretary
of State;
Receipt returned by Secretary of State when Articles are filed;
Copy of Articles with original acknowledgement stamp by Secretary
of State
Certified copy of the original articles obtained from Secretary of State
for fee
Problems with Filing - corp can go on despite the following:
Carmen Corral 29 Spring ’06
o late filing
o failure to file articles
o incomplete filing (info missing)
4. Incorporation: Unless delayed effective date is specified, the corporate existence begins when the AOI
are filed RMBCA §2.03(a)
5. Organizational meeting - an actual meeting is not usually necessary, just a record of all the activities
listed below. There are firms in the business of incorporating new businesses. They have standard fill in
the blank articles that accomplish what the “org meeting” entails; Creates the working structure of the
corporation, but follows a script devised by the corporate planner.
Election of directors – Unless initial directors named in Articles will remain in office
Approving Bylaws – Govern internal structure of corporation
o Bylaws have assumed greater importance in corporate practice.
o Must be consistent with the Articles and state law. RMBCA §2.06.
o Not enforceable if they deviate too far from the traditional corporate model.
Electing officers
Adopting pre-incorporation promoters’ contracts - including lawyers’ fees for
establishing corporation
Designating a bank for deposit of corporate funds
Authorizing issuance of shares
Setting consideration for shares
5. Shareholders meeting - bylaws are officially voted on
De Facto Corporation: a corporation arising from the good faith attempt to comply with the statutory
requirements of establishing a corporation; cures formal defects in incorporation that prevent it from
being a de facto corporation. So long as the following test was met, there is limited liability for the SH
and promoters, just as there would have been were it a de jure corp.
The usual test was fourfold:
o There must be a statute under which incorporation was permitted,
o There must have been a good faith or colorable attempt to comply with the statute,
o The defect was unknown to the principals
o There must have been actual user of the corporate privilege.
At common law, this would be sufficient to shelter the would-be incorporator from personal
liability.
Today, most states have abolished the de facto doctrine and impose personal liability.
De Jure Corporation: corporation that results from the incorporators’ full satisfaction of the statutory
requirements of establishing a corporation. It is, for all intents and purposes a fully formed corporation.
Corporations by Estoppel: creditor who deals with the business as a corporation, and who agrees to look
to the corporation’s assets rather than the shareholder’s assets will be estopped from denying the
corporation’s existence. This applies mostly to contract cases because some corp relationships must pre-
exist. Thus, tort cases don’t usually apply.
Robertson v. Levy (p. 241): The corporation comes into existence only when the certificate has been
issued. Before the certificate issues, there is no corporation de jure, de facto, or by estoppel-Under §
Cranson v. International Business Machines Corp. (p. 245): An officer of a defectively incorporated
association was not subjected to personal liability. Rule: Two doctrines have been used by the courts
to clothe an officer of a defectively incorporated association with the corporate attribute of
limited liability: 1) the Doctrine of De Facto Corporations, where there is evidence showing (a) the
existence of law authorizing incorporation, (b) an effort in good faith to incorporate under that existing
law, and (c) actual exercise of corporate powers and 2) The doctrine of estoppel where the person
seeking to hold the officer personally liable has contracted or otherwise dealt with the association as a
corporation.
Limited Liability:
Corporations have limited liability.
Shareholders can only lose the amount they invested.
Rationales for limited liability:
o Decreased need to monitor managers.
o Reduces the costs of monitoring other shareholders.
o By promoting free transfer of shares, gives managers incentives to act efficiently.
o Makes it possible for market prices to impound additions information about the value of firms.
o Allows more efficient diversification.
o Allows investors to finance a business without risking other assets
Benefits and Drawbacks of Limited Liability –
o Very important to contractual relations because
It allows investors to limit their risk according to the amount invested
It makes value of shares predictable (no hidden liabilities beyond the amount invested) and
thus easily traded (very important for publicly held corps)
Lenders have the security that liability will be limited to the assets of the corp and
conversely it makes clear which assets will be available to satisfy the loan
o Problematic in torts because
The victim of the tort is an involuntary creditor that could not have taken protective measures
(ie requiring extra collateral for a loan)
Undercapitalized corps may act recklessly (cab example) knowing their liability is limited
Closely held corps are usually more vulnerable to have other assets reached in case of a tort
(where as it’s not common in airlines, railroad and other major publicly traded corps)
o On balance, despite theses tort disadvantages, the contractual advantages prevail because
without limited liability it would be much more difficult to raise capital
How to Incorporate - The modern trend is to limit the articles of incorporation to provisions that are required
by law to appear in that public document while all other substantive provision are placed in documents that
are not filed of public record. -Formal requirements for filing of documents are set out in RMBCA, Chapter
1
The Decline of the Doctrine of Ultra Vires (p. 223) -Ultra Vires: An act undertaken by a corporation that is
beyond the scope of its authority pursuant to law or its Articles of Incorporation. The doctrine of Ultra Vires
is declining in importance and should not be applied to purposes clauses of articles of incorporation.
Common Law Roots – In the 19th century, state legislatures chartered American corporations for
narrow purposes with limited powers. The doctrine was fashioned by the courts to invalidate
corporate transactions beyond the powers stated by the charter.
Modern Ultra Virus Doctrine – Modern corporation statutes eliminate vestiges of inherent
corporate incapacity. Neither the corporation nor any party doing business with the corporation can
avoid its contractual commitments by claiming the corporation lacked capacity. RMBCA §3.04(a)
o 3 Exclusive Means of Enforcing a Corporate Limitation under the RMBCA:
Shareholder suit – Which enjoins the corporation from entering into or continuing an
unauthorized transaction. RMBCA §3.04(b)(1)
Corporate suit against directors & officers – Corporation on its own or by another
on its behalf can sue directors and officers (current or former) for taking unauthorized
action. The officers/directors can be enjoined or held liable for damages. RMBCA
§3.04(b)(2)
Suit by state attorney general – State atty. gen. can seek judicial dissolution if the
corporation has engaged in unauthorized transactions, under a “state concession”
theory of the corporation. RMBCA §§3.04(b)(3), 14.30
Corporate Powers, not Corporate “Duties” – Do not confuse limitations on corporate power with
corporate duties (i.e. corporation’s duty not to engage in illegal conduct and management’s fiduciary
duties)
Charitable contributions? – Courts have accepted that corporations have implicit powers to make
charitable gifts that in the long run may benefit the corporation.
o Most state statutes specifically permit corporations to make charitable donations. See
RMBCA §3.02(13) & (15)
o Gifts cannot be for unreasonable amounts and must be for a proper purpose.
Carmen Corral 32 Spring ’06
711 Kings Hwy. Corp. v. F.I.M.’s Marine Repair Serv., Inc. (p. 224): Facts: 711 (P) leased premises to
FIM (D) to use as a movie theatre, but then sought to declare the lease invalid on the ground that the
intended use was outside the scope of business activities allowed in the charter. Rule: No act of a
corporation and no transfer of property to or by a corporation shall be held invalid by reason that
the corporation was without capacity or power to do such act except in an action brought by a
shareholder.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (p. 386): Facts: As a matter of corporate law, "corporations exist only to
maximize returns to their shareholders." Mr. Ford had decided that the Ford Motor Company should
drastically reduce its dividend payout to shareholders and instead invest in an expansion plan that would
reduce car prices for consumers and create employment. The court criticized Ford "for forgetting that, 'a
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.'" Rule: that
Henry Ford owed a duty to the shareholders of the Ford Motor Company to operate his business
for profitable purposes as opposed to charitable purposes.
McQuade v. Stoneham (p. 418): Rules: 1) An agreement among shareholders that attempts to
divest the directors of their power to discharge an unfaithful employee of the corporation is
illegal as against public policy; and 2) Stockholders may not, by agreement among
themselves, control the directors in exercise of the judgment vested in them by virtue of their
office to elect officers and fix salaries.
Clark v. Dodge (p. 422): Rules: 1) Where the directors are the sole stockholders, there seems
to be no objection to enforcing an agreement to vote for certain people as officers; and 2)
Limitation to “faithful, efficient, and competent” officers. Rationale: 1) Since unanimous
agreement, no third party (minority) shareholder is harmed; and 2) not complete divestment
Carmen Corral 33 Spring ’06
of director power, since they may still dismiss for cause. Director level agreements valid so
long as they are unanimous
Zion v. Kurtz (p.432): Facts: Zion and Kurtz were the only shareholders. Zion and Kurtz
entered into a shareholders’ agreement providing that the corporation would not engage in any
business or activities without Zion’s consent. Despite this agreement, Kurtz caused the
corporation to act without Zion’s consent. Rule: 1) May limit director’s power in the Articles
of Incorporation; 2) under GCL §350, shareholders of close corporation may limit directors
in shareholder agreements, but must register as close corporation first; and 3) However,
since Kurtz agreed to do what is necessary to make Agreement enforceable – he is estopped to
rely upon the absence of those amendments (registration) from the corporate charter. Rationale:
1) Not against public policy, as evidenced by statutes allowing such action; and 2) since
unanimous among shareholders, no intervening third parties harmed. Dissent: 1) Statutory
mechanisms there to provide notice, and cannot be ignored; 2) permitting deviations from the
statutory norms for corporations should only be under controlled conditions; and 3) must protect
potential shareholders and potential creditors.
REJECTED IN DELAWARE: Nixon v. Blackwell (p. 438) – Delaware will not
follow Zion v. Kurtz (create certainty and provide precedent in Court of
Chancery)
Piercing the Corporate Veil: The corporate law concept piercing (lifting) the corporate veil describes a legal
decision where an officer, director, or shareholder of a corporation is held liable for the debts of the
corporation despite the general principle that those persons are immune from suits in contract or tort that
otherwise would only hold the corporation liable. Corporations exist in part to shield their shareholders from
personal liability for the debts of a corporation. Prior to the invention of the limited liability corporation in
the 17th century, any partner in a general partnership could be held responsible for all the debts of the
corporation. As the capital needed to finance the largest projects grew, and along with it the necessity of
raising money, investors were reluctant to invest because of the risk involved in essentially guaranteeing the
entire debt of the business entity. Generally, the plaintiff has to prove that the corporation was set up to
perpetrate a fraud, or at least show that the incorporation was merely a formality and that the corporation
never held proper shareholder meetings to distribute profits as dividends. This is quite often the case when a
corporation facing legal liability transfers its assets and business to another corporation with the same
management and shareholders. It also happens with single person corporations that are managed in a
haphazard manner. As such, the veil can be pierced in both civil cases and where regulatory proceedings are
taken against a shell corporation. Generally, courts are hesitant to pierce the corporate veil, except in
situations where outright fraud seems likely. Almost always doen to closely held corps with few
shareholders.
Vertical Piercing: where specific shareholder(s) are held personally liable for specific corporate
acts/obligations; if they are natural people; or to shareholders that are another corporation, in which case it is
a parent-sub relationship
Individual shareholders -If the corporation’s shares are held by individuals, the following are factors that
the court looks to in deciding whether the veil should be pierced:
Tort v. contract: Courts are more likely to pierce the veil in a tort case where the creditor is
involuntary, than in a contract case, where the creditor is voluntary
Fraud: veil piercing is more likely where there has been grievous fraud or wrongdoing by the
shareholders
Inadequate capitalization: veil piercing is most likely if the corporation is inadequately capitalized,
though most courts do not make inadequate capitalization alone enough for veil piercing (zero
capital or siphoning)
Failure to observe corporate formalities: shareholder meetings, keeping books, etc.
Bartle v. Home Owners Coop. (p. 254) Westerlea was a wholly owned subsidiary of Home Owner’s Coop.
Appellate court agreed with the trial court that the corporate veil of Westerlea should not be pierced. The law
permits the incorporation of a business for the very purpose of escaping personal liability. There is no
requirement that a corporation make a profit. Strong dissent: the business was run in such a way that it was
impossible to make a profit. The objective of Westerlea was to benefit stockholders of Home Owner’s Coop.
RULE: Where there has been neither fraud, misrepresentation, nor illegality, the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil will not be invoked to hold a corporation liable for the debts of a wholly owned
subsidiary. (Deception/Misrepresentation)
DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. (p. 256) A corporation is an entity, separate and
distinct from its officers and stockholders, and that its debts are not the individual indebtedness of its
stockholders. This power to pierce the corporate veil is to be exercised reluctantly and cautiously and the
burden of establishing a basis for the disregard of the corporate fiction rests on the party asserting such
claim. Factors to look at in piercing: under-capitalization, failure to observe corporate formalities, non-
payment of dividends, insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time, siphoning of funds of the corporation
by the dominant stockholder, non-functioning of other officers or directors, absence of corporate records, the
fact that the corporation is merely a facade for the operations of the dominant stockholder. RULE: The
conclusion to disregard the corporate entity may not rest on a single factor, but must involve a number
of such factors; in addition, it must present an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.
Baatz v. Arrow Bar (p. 263) Parties injured by a drunk sued the bar that served him. Factors that indicate
injustices and inequitable consequences and allow a court to pierce a corporate veil are: 1) fraudulent
representation by corporation directors, 2) undercapitalization, 3) failure too bserve corporate
formalities, 4) absence of corporate records, 5) payment by the corporation of individual obligations,
6) use of the corporation to promote fraud, injustice or illegalities. (Alter Ego)
Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp (p. 268)-The doctrine of limited liability is intended precisely to protect a
parent corporation whose subsidiary goes broke. We think the doctrine would largely be destroyed if a
parent corporation could be held liable simply on the basis of errors in business judgment. Under
Missouri law, a P must show 1) complete domination of finances, policy and business practices, 2)that
control must be used to commit fraud or wrong, 3) the aforesaid control and breach of duty must be the
proximate cause of the injury or unjust loss complained of. (Under-capitalization)
Fletcher v. Atex, Inc. (p. 272) Facts: Fletcher (P) brought suit against Atex (D) and Eastman Kodak (D), its
parent company, to recover for injuries incurred from the utilization of computer keyboards procured by
Atex. Rule: Under applicable state law, the court may pierce the corporate veil of a company and hold
its shareholders personally liable only in cases involving fraud, or where the company is a mere
instrumentality or alter ego of its parent company. (Instrumentality)
Roccograndi v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (p. 297):Facts: Three shareholders in a family
corporation appealed a ruling saying that they couldn’t basically lay themselves off from their own
company to collect unemployment checks because they were really self-employed and had the power to
United States v. Bestfoods (p. 337) bedrock principle is that here is an equally fundamental principal of
corporate law, applicable to the parent-subsidiary relationship as well as generally, that the corporate veil
may be pierce and the shareholder held liable for the corporation’s conduct when, inter alia, the
corporate form would otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most
notably fraud, on the shareholder’s behalf.
Reverse Piercing: where the corporation is held liable for specific individual shareholder acts/obligations
Sweeney v. Kane (p. 298): corp. set up to shield estate money awarded to the wife; court has no problem
piercing here since whole corp. was set up to shield funds from creditors/was an instrumentality and to
refrain from piercing would result in an injustice; Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable concept that
allows a creditor to disregard a corporation and hold its controlling shareholders personally liable for the
corporate debt. Reverse-piercing flows in the opposite direction and makes the corporation liable for the debt
of the shareholders.
Pepper v. Litton (p. 303): Facts: Litton was the sole shareholder of Dixie Splint Coal Company. Pepper sued
the company for royalties he was due on a lease. Before this case came up, Litton made the company
confess a judgment, pay him claims for back salary, and then declare bankruptcy. The district court
disallowed Litton’s claim, but the Court of Appeals reversed, saying that the previous judgment was res
judicata. Issue: Did the bankruptcy court have the power to disallow Litton’s judgment against the company
of which he was the sole shareholder? Rule: Bankruptcy courts sit in equity and can set aside deals that
don’t have the hallmarks of an “arms-length bargain”. Analysis: Basically, the Court says that you can’t
hide behind a one-man corporation to avoid being liable to creditors. Conclusion: The Supreme Court
reverses the Court of Appeals and reinstates the decision of the district court.
Successor Liability:
Nissen Corp v. Miller (p. 307): Facts: The plaintiff bought a treadmill from American Tredex. Soon after
that purchase, Nissen bought the company, but excluded assuming any tort liability. Five years later, the
plaintiff was injured while using the treadmill. A year or so after that, American Tredex was officially
dissolved. Almost a year after that, the plaintiff sued American Tredex and Nissen. Nissen won summary
judgment, but the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court, and Nissen
appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Issue: Should the court adopt the “general rule of non-liability
of successor corporations” with the four “traditional exceptions”, or should it add an exception for
“continuity of enterprise”? Rule: NEW RULE, in Maryland! The general rule is adopted with the four
traditional exceptions (listed on p. 308 of the casebook) but not the continuity of enterprise exception.
Analysis: The petitioners and respondents put forth some different juicy policy arguments. If only I had
more time to brief them! Conclusion: Nissen is found to be not liable as a corporate successor.
Raising capital may be with funds that are in the form of equity capital or debt. Debt usually must be repaid at
some time, usually with interest. Equity capital is composed of contributions by the original entrepreneurs in the
firm, capital contributed by other investors usually in exchange for ownership interests in the business, and
retained earnings of the enterprise. The Securities Act of 1933 imposes substantial disclosure requirements on
the public sale of securities
Shares generally -
Shares are the units into which the proprietary interests in a corporation are divided
All shares within a single class must have the same rights.
If a corporation issues only one class of shares, they may be referred to as common shares, capital
shares, or simply shares or stock.
RMBCA §6.01(b) sets forth two fundamental rights of shareholders:
o (1) right to vote for the election of directors and other matters, and
o (2) they are entitled to the net assets of the corporation when distributions are made.
Watered Shares: are par value shares issued for property that has been overvalued and is not
worth the aggregate par value of the issued shares.
Par Value: (or stated value) of shares is a nominal value assigned to each share. At one time par
value represented the selling or issuing price of shares, but in modern corporate practice, par
value has little or no significance.
o Share Subscriptions and Agreements to Purchase Securities
Historically, the traditional method of raising capital for a new corporation was by
public subscriptions pursuant to which persons agreed to purchase a specified
number of shares contingent upon a specified amount of capital being raised.
Modern practice is to use simple contractual agreements to purchase securities
rather than a formal subscription agreement.
o Authorization and Issuance of Common Shares Under the RMBCA
The price must be the same if shareholders are to be equally treated.
The number of authorized shares must be at least equal the number the
corporation plans to issue
o Par Value and Stated Capital
In 22 states, the articles of incorporation must stat the par value of the shares
of each class.
The remaining states, like the RMBCA, have eliminated or made optional the
concept of par value, and the current trend is toward the elimination of this
concept as an historical anomaly
Eligible and Ineligible Consideration for Shares: MBCA (1969) §19 shares issued for a promissory note are
prohibited
Carmen Corral 40 Spring ’06
Hanewald v. Bryan’s Inc. (p. 327)-It is the shareholder’s initial capital investments which protects their
personal assets from further liability in the corporate enterprise. Notion of limited liability. Facts: After
Bryan’s Inc. (D) went out of business without paying off a promissory note or the lease on his store,
Hanewald (P) filed suit against the corporation and the Bryan (D) family members, to whom the
corporate stock had been issued, seeking to hold them personally liable. Rule: A shareholder is liable to
corporate creditors to the extent his stock has not been paid for. A corporation that issues its stock
as a gratuity commits fraud upon creditors who deal with it on the faith of its capital stock. The
Bryan’s had a statutory duty to pay for the stock issued to them by Bryan’s Inc.
Earned Surplus: the tax base from which to calculate the major portion of a corp’s franchise tax; earned
surplus is the corp’s reportable federal net income, less certain foreign-source income, plus officer and
director compensation
4. Debt Financing
Distributions:
Two primary ways that corps commonly distribute their assets or earnings to its shareholders
a. Paying dividends
b. Repurchasing some of its shares from shareholders (Buy-out)
Dividends – a cash payment made by a corp to its common shareholders pro rata
a. Decision whether to pay dividends is always affected by tax status
b. Cannot pay out dividends if a corp. can’t pay its creditors.
c. How much discretion does the Board have in paying out dividends?
i. Compelling a Corp to Pay Dividends – If an adequate corp surplus is available for the
purpose, directors may not withhold dividends in bad faith, but the mere existence of an
adequate surplus is not alone sufficient for the court require issuance of a dividend.
ii. Gottfried v. Gottfried (Sup. Ct. of NY, 1947) RULE: if an adequate corporate surplus is
available for the purpose, directors may not withhold the declaration of dividends in
bad faith. Courts cannot compel absent bad faith.
(A) Factors for the ct. to infer bad faith: intense hostility of the compelling faction against
the minority; exclusion of the minority from employment by he corp.; high salaries or
bonuses or corporate loans made to the officers in control; the fact that majority may be
subject to high personal income taxes if substantial dividends are paid; existence of
desire of majority to acquire the minority. [if none are motivating cause, then no bad
faith] – Are the directors acting out of concern for personal rather than corporate
interests?
(B) Ct. finds that Bd. may be unduly conservative but no bad faith and will not substitute
the judgment of the Bd. There may a good reason-remember double taxes.
iii. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (Sup. Ct of Michigan, 1919) Decisions to issue dividends must
be made with shareholders’ benefits in mind, not the general public’s. (An unusual
circumstance that ct. intervened, Ford should have tempered his reasons to withhold
dividends for a valid business interest; or have social good in the charter.)
Public Offerings:
A public offering is the sale of securities by an issuer or a person controlling the issuer to members of
the public.
Normally registration of a public offering under the Securities Act of 1933 is required, though in some
instances exemptions from registration may be available.
Preemptive rights give an existing shareholder the opportunity to purchase or subscribe for a
proportionate part of a new issue of share before it is offered to other persons.
A preemptive right protects shareholders from dilution of value and control when new shares are issued.
In modern practice, preemptive rights are often limited or denied by provisions in the governing
corporate documents.
Makes it easier for the people who are managing it and goes towards the increasing separation between
management control and the economic interests within the corp.; moved from being opt out to being
opt in - - in other words, you only have preemptive rights if you choose to have them from the
outset; would make sense to opt in if you’re dealing with a closely held corp. (the site of the most
vicious battles for control); probably should put preemptive rights in the charter document/Articles
of Incorporation
o Created by common law, entitle stockholder to retain proportional ownership despite the
issuance of new stocks. “Finally, he has the right to vote for directors and upon all propositions
subject by law to the control of the stockholders, and this is his supreme right and main
protection.” P. 370 of the case book
o Equity dilution: when per share price is unfair: if new shares are issued at a price above value of
existing shares, there is no dilution. When issued below existing value, then equity dilution. If
issued with no voting rights, no vote dilution.
Issuing stock at book value is an example of e. dilution.
o Vote dilution involves control: Stocks sold at fair price.
o Stokes: Proposition to double capital of the company by bringing in a new control group; P had
4% interest diminished to 2%.
o In a public corporation: you don’t want preemptive rights b/c they are a nuisance.
o Since ~ 1930: stats have authorized a denial of preemptive rights.
Older, p. rights exist unless you opt out, i.e. “there will be no preemptive rights.”
Newer, you must opt in per RMBCA §6.30, set of default provisions.
people with face value preferred “plain vanilla” nonvoting don’t need preemptive
rights, b/c they can’t have equity or vote dilution.
Does no provide for nonvoting common stock or preferred shares with voting
rights. If you have either you have a conflict betw vote dilution and equity
dilution. You can’t grant p. rights to one without incurring problems with the
other.
For Rights Granted: see RMBCA §6.30(b) (1)-(2)
For Rights not Granted: see RMBCA §6.30(b) (3) – (6)
Stokes v. Continental Trust Co. of City of New York (p. 368) Facts: Stokes (P), a shareholder of
Continental Trust (D), demanded that they sell him an equivalent number of newly issued shares of
Carmen Corral 43 Spring ’06
stock to the proportion he now holds. Rule: A corporation must allow a shareholder to purchase
newly issued stock at the fixed price to allow him to keep his proportionate share of the stock;
power of individual stockholder to vote according to his shares cannot be interrupted or
prevented.
Katzowitz v. Sidler (p. 372) Facts: Two of three directors of a close corporation voted an additional
issuance of stock which they opted to purchase and which the third director refused. When the
corporate assets were sold, the proceeds were distributed in proportion to the stock owned, and the third
director sought to have this distribution set aside. Rule: Where new shares are offered in a close
corporation, existing shareholders who do not want to or are able to purchase their share of the
issuance are not estopped from bringing an action based on a fraudulent dilution of their interest
where the price for the shares is inadequate. preemptive rights - 3rd guy had them but didn’t use them
here; logical outcome would be “tough!”; but court is offended by the disparity between the book value
and sell price of the stock and the actions of the two guys so, it decides to use a different standard - -
they saw a freeze-out
Gottfried v. Gottfried (p. 382): Facts: Minority stockholders (P) sought to compel the board of directors
(D) to declare dividends on the common stock, alleging that such dividends had not been paid upon
consideration other than the best welfare of the corporation or its stockholders. Rule: If an adequate
corporate surplus is available for the purpose, directors may not withhold a declaration of
dividends in bad faith.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (p. 428): Facts: Ostensibly to lower the price of its autos and increase jobs, the
Ford Motor Co. (D) decided to discontinue the payment of dividends. Rule: Ordinarily, the directors
of a corporation alone have the power to declare a dividend, but the courts will intervene to
Carmen Corral 44 Spring ’06
require that a dividend be paid if it is discovered that the refusal of the directors to do so is based
in fraud or an intention to conduct the affairs of the corporation not for the shareholders.
Wilderman v. Wilderman (p. 390) Facts: Joseph Wilderman (D), as president of a family-owned
business, paid himself large sums w/o the approval of his wife, Eleanor (P), who was the company’s
only other director, officer and shareholder. Rule: In the absence of a specific authorization by the
company’s board of directors, a corporate executive may receive only compensation that is
reasonably commensurate with his functions and duties.
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. (p. 396) Facts: Donahue (P), a minority stockholder in a close
corporation, sought to rescind a corporate purchase of shares of the controlling shareholder. Rule: A
controlling stockholder (or group) in a close corporation who causes the corporation to purchase
his stock breaches his fiduciary duty to the minority stockholders if he does not cause the
corporation to offer each stockholder an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of shares to
the corporation at an identical price.(Flatly rejected in Delaware where the entire fairness test is
applied); reason court sees closely held corps as being like partnerships because the a) majority of
shareholders also participate in management, direction, and operations of the corp.; b) they can refuse to
pay dividends; c) they can force payment of high rent; d) can force corp to sell its shares at an
inadequate price, etc. (see p. 400); boils down to vulnerability of the minority shareholders – a) small
number of shareholders; b) not a ready market for corporate stock; and 3) the substantial majority of the
shareholders participate in the management, direction, and operations of the corporation
Equity Insolvency Test
Older statutes prohibited payments of dividends if the corporation was, or as a result of the payment
would be, insolvent in the equity sense. This test is retained, appearing in RMBCA §6.40(c)(1)
In determining whether the equity insolvency test has been met, certain judgments or assumptions as
to the future course of the corporation’s business are customarily justified
Equity (or equity interest) in general refers to the extent of an ownership interest in a venture. In this
context, ownership interest refers to the economic concept that an owner’s equity in a business is
equal to that business’ assets minus its liabilities and amounts allocable to senior securities.
Equity financing is raising money by the sale of common or preferred shares.
Insolvency may be either equity insolvency or insolvency in the bankruptcy sense. Equity insolvency
means the business is unable to pay its debts as they mature while bankruptcy insolvency means the
aggregate liabilities of the business exceeds its assets.
Introduction:
Competing Tenets:
o Corporate fiduciaries owe their duties to corporation, not to individual shareholders;
o Board of Directors manage the corporation’s business, which includes authorizing lawsuits in the
corporate name.
Structure of Derivative Suits – 2 in 1: Shareholder (1) sues the corporation in equity (2) to bring an
action to enforce corporate rights
Federal securities class action suits: SEC rules are supreme; 10b; gave rise to huge group of securities
lawyers; the court decided to try to reign this in – language started to appear in decisions re: strike suits
(suits alleging securities fraud where the case if pretty damn week but out of embarrassment or
whatever, the D/corp. would likely just settle); now you can’t bring a federal securities suit if you don’t
own stock; doesn’t have to do with a purchase and a sale but holding on to stock; congress then came
back and said you can only sue in federal court if your claim is re: securities law; but when they wrote
the legislation, they carved out certain exceptions: (anti-trust suits you get treble damages)
Recovery – Any recovery in derivative litigation generally runs to the corporation the shareholder P
shares in the recovery only directly. Damages are for the full amount of harm to the entire corp so the
corp collects and all SH benefit equally. Whereas individual suits recover the SH’s precise share (which
is probably too small to be worth the expense of litigation). Plus if the derivative suit is successful, the
corp pays SHs legal expenses.
o Plaintiff’s Expenses – In derivative litigation, the corporation pays the successful P’s litigation
expenses, including attorney’s fees if the proceeding has resulted in a substantial benefit to the
corp RMBCA §7.46(1)
Many states require the P to post a high bond to cover the D’s legal expense if the action
is unsuccessful. Lawyers have gotten around the bond requirement by posing it as a
representative action (direct suit) instead of a derivative action.
o Defendant’s Expenses – the P can be order to pay the D’s litigation expenses, including
attorney’s fees if the proceeding was commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for
an improper purpose per RMBCA §7.46(2)
o Opponent’s Expenses – parties can be ordered to pay their opponent’s expenses, including
attorney’s fees, incurred because of the filing of a pleading, motion, or other paper which was not
well grounded in fact, submitted in bad faith, or was interposed for an improper purpose such as
Aronson v. Lewis (p.733): Facts: Fink owns 47% of company’s outstanding shares. Fink had an
employment agreement with Prudential which provided that upon retirement he was to become a
consultant to that company for ten years. Claim of “over compensation” to Fink as waste of corporate
assets and Fink too old to render services. Claim that since Fink controls the board, dominates the
directors. Holding: The plaintiff has failed to allege facts with particularity indicating that the directors
were tainted by interest, lacked independence, or took action contrary to company’s best interests in
order to create a reasonable doubt as to the applicability of the business judgment rule. Only in the
presence of such reasonable doubt may a demand be deemed futile.
a. The demand requirement exists to
1. insure that a stockholder exhausts his intra-corporate remedies
2. provide a safeguard against strike suits
b. Business Judgment can be claimed only by
1. disinterested directors whose conduct otherwise meets the tests of business
judgment
a. no appearance on both sides of the transaction
b. no self-dealing
2. directors informed of all material information reasonably available to them.
c. In determining demand futility, the court must decide whether, under the
particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that:
1. the directors are disinterested and independent (for reasonable doubt in order to
escape business judgment rule), and
2. the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of a
business judgment (court must explore the substantive nature of the transaction
and the board’s ratification of it (gift or waste))
Cuker v. Mikalauskas (p. 743): Facts: PECO Energy Company’s board of directors (D) sought to quash
tow derivative actions initiated by its minority shareholders. Rule: Under PA law, application of the
business judgment rule permits a corporation’s board of directors to terminate a derivative suit
initiated by the company’s minority shareholders
Mickshaw v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (PA, 1950) (holding that director's statement
binding upon corporation although he had no actual authority; the board's silence was a
sufficient ratification). An act of a single director will be binding upon a corporation
if it subsequently ratified or acquiesced to by a majority of the directors.
In re Drive In Development Corp. (p. 512) holding that Secretary of a corporation had
actual authority to bind the corporation for a loan guaranty, although he
misrepresented the fact that the resolution was never approved
Shareholders: (citizens) ultimate power (votes) but not immediate power to affect day-to-day activities.
Board of Directors: (town council/parliament) as a body it has long-term, large-scale policy and principles
decision-making authority, but no power to act individually. Essentially, any action that has a substantial effect
on the distribution of risk/return on SH. (Names CEO, controls compensations and reviews financial reports.);
authority of directors RMBCA §§8.01, 8.21
Chairman of the Board: Board usually has a one (who may also be the President) and the following
subcommittees:
Executive Comm - inside officers (has lost importance because it’s redundant)
Compensation Comm - meant to align interests of officers with SH, usually made up of outsiders
Audit Comm - put together corp’s financial statements for investors (most important for publicly
traded corps), includes both insider and outsiders (now more of the latter)
Officers: (executive/Mayor) the day-to-day executive power (i.e. hire/fire employees). Carry out the policy
decisions made by board. Can’t make certain decisions w/o board approval. They are answerable to the SHs, but
can refuse a SH’s request.
How officers can/can’t bind corp: ordinary vs extraordinary standard The standard can be viewed as a
matrix: x-the effect on long-term capital structure (which could require Board approval) y-reasonableness of
expectations (understood through the normal course of dealings).
1. President/CEO/Vice-President that orders food despite board’s prohibition bind the corp to pay the
restaurant (though they may have to personally pay corp back later) because it is reasonable for
restaurant owner to believe President has this authority, though technically he may not.
Lee v Jenkins (p. 514) - Yardley, the Pres of Jenkins, was able to recruit Lee from his old job by
offering to extend his current pension plan. By the time Lee planned to collect 30yrs later he was
denied the pension. Judge Medina describes how to draw the line between ordinary vs extraordinary
actions by an officer that bind the corp concluding that officers have the authority to award
pension plans to employees binding on the corp, but not to offer lifetime employment. This was
the former. Note: long-term employment Ks can have a major effect on the financial structure, yet
they don’t appear on the balance sheets as debt, but rather as some fuzzy form of operating leverage.
This should strengthen the case for requiring Board approval of such Ks.
6. Shareholder Actions:
Auer v. Dressel (p. 438) – Shareholders could properly make a non-binding recommendation
that the corporation’s former president be reinstated, even though the recommendation had no
binding effect on the board.
Structural Variation for Closely Held Corps: Small corps are sometimes allowed a variation similar to a direct
democracy. No board, just SH meetings. SH effectively replace the board in making big decisions and can
serve as officers, etc. This only works for very small corps. DE §§341-356 limits this option to non-publicly
traded corps of <30 SHs. However, this variation is not used as much now that LLCs can accomplish the
same.
In NJ:
Remove Directors – Article 6-6 (which says: shareholders can remove directors with cause and they
can remove directors without cause unless otherwise barred from doing so in the articles of
incorporation - - NJ gives a lot of power to shareholders
Amend the by-laws – Article 2-9 (which says that bylaws can be amended by the directors but that can
always be undone by the shareholders afterwards; if the shareholders are amending it can be in the
articles of incorporation that the directors cannot come after and change;
Replace the exiting directors (aka fill the vacancies) - Article 6-5 (which says the shareholders would
want to have a provision put into the articles of incorporation to say that they get to fill future vacancies
otherwise, that power will rest with the directors)
B. Meetings/Valid Votes
Voting Rights
Consist mainly of right to elect directors, but also include:
1. Charter amendment after BOD approves
2. Mergers after BOD approves
3. Dissolution after BOD approves
4. Selling off assets
Annual Meeting
Date usually set forth in bylaws RMBCA 7.01
If corp wants to change date, must make sure date is set w/in 6 mos. after end of fiscal year or 15 mos.
after last annual meeting. RMBCA 7.03(a)
Special Meeting
Note a special meeting can be called by the BOD (or whoever authorized to under A of I or bylaws) OR by
SH of at least 10% of votes to be cast
Corp can raise or lower the 10% mark (but can’t go higher than 25%)
Election of Directors
A quorum is needed under RMBCA 7.25(a)
Proceeds by plurality voting RMBCA 7.28(a). Ex: 5 directors to be elected from a slate of 10. Winners are
the 5 w/the most votes.
Staggered terms of directors: ensures BOD will always have some directors w/experience. Also makes
takeover less likely b/c won’t be able to put all people on BOD at once.
Two methods of plurality voting: straight and cumulative.
The person in whose name shares are registered is called the record holder and may or may not be
the person who is the actual owner of the shares, usually referred to as the beneficial owner. See
above more detailed description.
Cumulative Voting - method of voting that allows substantial minority shareholders to obtain
representation on the board of directors. When voting cumulatively, a shareholder may multiply the
number of shares he owns by the number of director positions to be filled at that election, and cast
that number of votes for any one candidate or spread that number among two or more candidates.
these votes can be spread amongst as many candidates as the shareholder desires. A way to
make sure that minority shareholders have some representation on the board.]
Formula: To elect X number of directors, a shareholder must have more than SX /
(D+1) + 1 shares, where S equals the number of shares voting and D equals the total
number of directors to be elected. (Adding 1 at the end assures the number of shares
you will need for a proper outcome.
Good for a proxy fight; voting directors. Much harder in publicly traded setting,
because we don’t know how many people will cast votes, etc.; Works better in a
closely held corporation.
Positive: What is the use of cumulative voting when you only get one director on the
board. 1) having a voice to influence 2) get more information 3) may change dynamic
of meeting b/c somebody is watching
Negative: 1) factionalizing board of directors, which is not necessarily in the best
interests of shareholders as a group
Galler v. Galler (p. 423): Shareholder agreements are enforceable even if they deviate from
state corporation law practice; especially: 1) in closely held corps; 2) in order to give business
effect to the intentions of the parties; 3) so long as it does not injure creditors, other shareholders, or
the public
Salgo v. Matthews (p. 445) Facts: A corporate election inspector (D) appointed by Salgo (D) refused
to accept several proxies, which, if accepted, would have enabled Matthews (P) to win his proxy
fight against Salgo (D). Rule: Shares of stock may be voted only by an authorized representative
of the party designated in the corporate records as legal owner of the shares.
Ringling Bros. Barnum and Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling (p. 456) Facts: Ringling (P) and
Haley (D) entered into a stock pooling agreement by which they agreed to always vote their shares
together, but when Haley refused to agree on a vote for director or vote as directed by the arbitrator,
who was provided for in the agreement, Ringling sought to enforce the arbitrator’s decision. Rule: A
group of shareholders may lawfully contract with each other to vote in such a way as they
determine.
Lehrman v. Cohen (p. 476) Facts: Dispute between rival factions, Lehrman (P) and Cohen (D) over
issuance of class AD stock and its voting power. Rule: The creation of a new class of voting stock
does not divest and separate the voting rights, which remain vested in the stockholders who
created it, for the other attributes of the ownership of that stock. Voting trust - An agreement
establishing a trust, whereby shareholders transfer their title to share to a trustee who is authorized to
exercise their voting powers.
Buy-Sell Agreements: parties contractually determine what happens to the corp stock after a triggering event
in the hopes of avoiding shareholder disputes and can also solve owners’ estate planning problems
Possible triggers:
o An owner or shareholder becomes disabled
o Married owners or shareholders divorce
Default Rule
o Shareholders may remove directors without cause by a simple majority vote at a meeting
specially called for that purpose.
o All directors stand for election annually, unless it is a staggered or classified board.
Staggered Board
Rules of staggered board §41(d) – must be provided for in articles of incorporation, bylaws, or
amendment of bylaws adopted by the shareholders. (Directors not able to amend bylaws to make
such changes to avoid entrenchment.)
Rationality of Staggered Board
Anti-takeover mechanism. It takes at least two-years to gain control over the board.
Stability – having experienced members on the board at all times
Autonomy – since elected for three years less likely to be swayed by management
Shareholder Value – staggered boards reduce returns by 8 to 10% to shareholders,
because it takes away control form shareholders, making the stock less desirable
Now movement by institutional shareholders to de-classify boards
If staggered board created in bylaws, then may amend the bylaws
If in articles of incorporation, then directors may block amendment
May make a predatory proposal for suggesting that they make an amendment
Hostile takeovers allow shareholders to replace poorly performing directors,
with better performing directors
Removal of Directors
Removal of Directors
o The default rule of modern codes generally grants shareholders the right to remove directors
with or without cause by simple majority vote.
o Del. G.C.L §141(k): can remove any or all directors without cause, except that:
Deadlocks in closely held corporations arise when you have two shareholders or factions and an even
number of directors. One or more factions of shareholders is then able to block corporate action when they
disagree with some aspect of corporate policy. Usually arise:
o in the election of a director
o at the level of the board of directors if there is an even number of directors and no single faction
of shareholders has power to elect a majority of the board.
Deadlocks may be avoided by careful planning (i.e. initial distribution of shares is allocated to more than
two parties)
Two types
Carmen Corral 57 Spring ’06
o Shareholders – usually involving 50/50 factions w/ equal voting power (cumulative voting may
help resolve); if shareholders are deadlocked, the corp may continue to operate under the guidance of
the Bd in office when the deadlock arose
o Directors – usually involves Bd w/ an even amt of members (can be prevented w/ heightened
majority or quorum requirements)
Gearing v. Kelly (p. 492) Facts: When Mrs. Meacham (P) refused to attend a directors meeting, the
Kelly’s (D) elected Hemphill, and the Meacham-Gearing faction objected. Rule: where one
shareholder intentionally or deliberately fails to attend a meeting for the purpose of preventing
a quorum, the court will not set aside the results of the election that occurred at the meeting;
court’s reasoning based on notions of equity and fact that even if the shareholder had been
present, the same result would have occurred
In Re Random & Neidorff, Inc. (p. 495) Facts: Random (P) and his sister Neidorff (D) were the sole
shareholders in a music publishing corporation. Due to a mutual dislike and distrust, they were
deadlocked as to the election of directors and the declaration of dividends Rule: Where corporate
dissolution is authorized by statute in the case of deadlock or other specified circumstances, the
existence of the specified circumstances does not mandate the dissolution. The court will
exercise its discretion, taking into account benefits to the shareholders as well as injury to the
public. Here the court considered: (1) no stalemate or impasse; (2) corp is flourishing; and (3) there’s
no grievance recognizable by the court
Dissention:
Dissention in a closely held corporation refers to personal quarrels or disputes among shareholders that
may make business relations unpleasant and interfere with the successful operation of the business.
Dissention may occur w/o constituting oppression or causing a deadlock or adversely affecting the
corporation’s business.
Oppression:
in a close corporation involves conduct by controlling shareholders that deprive a
minority shareholder of legitimate expectations concerning roles in the
corporation, including participation in management and earnings; abusive
tactics by majority shareholders that limit or exclude minority
shareholders.
has been described as an expansive term that is used to cover a multitude of
situations dealing with improper conduct, including significant misconduct by those in
control of the corp & waste of assets; courts try to narrow its definition
does not carry an essential inference of imminent disaster; it can contemplate a continued course of
conduct; does not carry an essential inference of illegal behavior or mismanagement, some course have
association oppression with violations of the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing as imposed in
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype (p. 44 Above)
may include non pro-rata (proportional) distributions of corporate assets.
Freeze-out: Majority shareholders in a company using their power to deprive one or more
minority shareholders of their role in governing the company. This is done to force the minority
shareholders to sell their stock at a reduced price and exit the company.
In order to prove oppression (and therefore be granted a right to dissolution), must show
o From Wiedy’s Case in NY (p. 502 CB)
o The majority’s conduct substantially defeats
o Your reasonable expectations, when objectively viewed, were both
o Reasonable under the circumstances AND
o Were central to your decision to decide to invest in the corp/join the venture
‘You’ = a minority shareholder
is the most common violation for which a buy-out was found to be an appropriate
remedy in many jurisdictions.
Remedies only available if shareholder has voting rights per RMBCA §6.30(b)(4),(5)
Judicial Dissolution: Involuntary dissolution comes in “sub-flavors” at common law: a court can enter an
order of dissolution when it finds (1) fraud, (2) oppression (in a close corporation), or (3) deadlock (by
statute). Here’s an important legal point: all dissolution orders by courts are on the equity side of the docket
(as opposed to the law side).
RMBCA §14.30(2) – model statute granting discretionary judicial dissolution to the court; contains specific
grounds for dissolution
(i) Director deadlock – irreparable harm to the corp. required to be present or threatened
(ii) Oppression – harm required
(iii) Shareholder deadlock – no harm required
(iv) Waste – harm required
Other Remedies:
Allowing dissolution by less than a majority – written into bylaws or Articles of Incorporation
as a shareholder agreement, but make sure that subsequent purchasers or creditors have notice
(legend)
Buy-Out Agreements (2 types) – provides effective exit strategies
o In the event of an unreasonable agreement, one solution is for one shareholder to buyout
the other at fair value per the court’s determination
o Courts have turned to this remedy (court-ordered buyouts) where it is unfavorable to
dissolve a deadlocked company.
o The court may mandate a buyout of the interest of a minority shareholder at a judicially
determined price.
o If the majority shareholder is unwilling to purchase the interest, the court may then order
involuntary dissolution.
o RMBCA §14.34 outlines a buyout remedy in deadlock or oppression cases. It is less
flexible than remedies devised by the courts. It is triggered only if a suit is brought for
involuntary dissolution.
Cross-purchase agreement between shareholders that they will buy the other's
shares.
Davis v. Sheerin (p. 500): Here we have despicable conduct on the part of the majority
shareholder. The majority shareholder claims that the minority shareholder isn’t a
shareholder at all! The minority shareholder brings an action for oppression. Since what
the majority shareholder was doing was arguably oppressive, the minority shareholder
claims that the court should enter an order forcing the majority shareholder to buy the
minority shareholder’s shares at market value without a minority discount. The problem
was that until five years before, Texas had a statute authorizing this remedy. The statute
was modeled after Michigan and California. The Texas legislature had since repealed the
statute. The court held that as a court of equity they have inherent jurisdiction under
judge-made law to enter the buy-out order.
Davis v. Sheerin.
1. Does SH have a preemptive right to purchase additional shares under statute or
A/I? RMBCA §6.30(a)
a. RMBCA §6.30(a) says no, unless “A/I so provide.”
b. If not, see #5, below.
c. If so, is SH exempt from PE rights provision anyway? RMBCA, if it
applies, has default exceptions in RMBCA §6.30(b)(3)(i)&(ii) =
compensation exception. (iv) shares not for $.
2. Did SH waive PE right? RMBCA §6.30(b)(2) allows. May waive if not timely
raised. Stokes says SH’s offer that was too low isn't a waiver.
3. Remedy? Specific performance or expectation damages?
4. Does SH have a right not to purchase addt'l shares w/o facing dilution?
Katzowitz v. Sidler says in a CHC, majority SHs must show a good business
reason to sell additional shares cheaply. If no good reason, i.e., a freeze-out
tactic, then SH has right not to buy, and not to face dilution.
5. Even if SH has no PE right via statute, still has a Katzowitz (no freeze-out) right,
supra #4.
6. If ALL SHs exercise PE rights, no dilution, & additional cap. needed raised
from present SHs.
7. If BOD acts in bad faith unfair to minority SHs, may be limited by a general
fiduciary duty.
Appointment of Provisional Director – helps guide the corp through crisis towards
stabilization
o In evaluating candidates for provisional director, the court may consider: degree and
quality of past involvement in the corporation, an understanding of the corporation’s
history and current situation, experience and abilities, degree of impartiality
o NJ requires impartiality - - one of the 11 jurisdictions that require that the
provisional director of a co. be impartial/not related to anyone else involved
Abreu v. Unica Indus. Sales, Inc. (p. 507): Alternative Remedies to Dissolution; Facts:
After Abreau (P) filed a shareholder’s derivative action for a usurping of a corporate
opportunity by one of the directors of Ebro Foods, Inc., the court removed one of Ebro’s
RMBCA §§8.40, 8.41, 8.42: says little purpose in statutorily requiring that there be certain officers and
statutory requirements for each as it may sometimes create problems of implied or apparent authority or
confusion with non-statutory offices the crop desires to create; possible source of this info would be the
corp’s bylaws
o Proposed Model Bylaws to be used with the RMBCA:
President: principal executive officer of the corporation, and subject to the control of the
board of directors, shall in general supervise and control all of the business affairs of the
corporation.
Secretary: keeps minutes of proceedings, sees that all notices are duly given in
accordance of the bylaws, acts as custodian of corporate records, authenticates records of
the corporation
Treasurer: has charge and custody of all funds and securities of the corporation, receives
and gives receipts for monies due.
See RMBCA §8.21 – Action without Meeting: designed to prevent informal board practices
In the Matter of Drive-in Corp. (p. 512): P, Inc. owned 100% of S, Inc. P, Inc. is borrowing money from a
bank. P, Inc. happens to be in pretty bad shape itself, while the subsidiary, S, happens to be in good financial
shape. The bank wants what is known as an “upstream written guaranty” by S, Inc. of S’s liability to the
bank. The corporate secretary for S, Inc. fills out a certificate and delivers it to the bank stating that S’s
board of directors has duly met and has unanimously approved the S guaranty. Based on that, S’s president
has signed the guaranty on behalf of S, Inc. Later, there is a bankruptcy and the bank files its claim both
against P, Inc. and S, Inc. There are two touchy issues: (1) It just so happened that the board of directors of
S, Inc. didn’t actually meet, and an upstream guaranty is so unusual that only the board of directors could
approve it. S, Inc. says “Sorry, the board didn’t meet, despite what the corporate secretary did. Without a
board meeting, we’re not liable on the guaranty!” On the agency issue, the court holds that there is
Carmen Corral 61 Spring ’06
apparent authority. The notes indicate some contrary authority. In the later case, a reasonable person
would have been put on notice if the secretary was lying. (2) There also were the fraudulent conveyance
statutes. Here, the attorney for S did not properly raise the issue in the bankruptcy court. In a big 1990’s
Third Circuit case, upstream guaranties were said not to be per se fraudulent.
Black v. Harrison Home Co.: Facts: Black (P) purchased property which the Harrison Home Co. (D) had,
through its president, agreed to sell. A company resolution required joint action by the president and
secretary whenever property was to be sold. Rule: The president of a corporation has no authority to
execute contracts on behalf of the company in the absence of a bylaw or a resolution of the board of
directors permitting him to do so. Common Law rule regulating authority of management to execute
contracts or commit property, in the absence of some approval of the board, is very, very strict.
Lee v. Jenkins Bros. (p. 514) Facts: Lee (P) sought to enforce a promise made by Jenkins’ (D) president in
1920, when Lee (P) was hired, that Jenkins would pay Lee a $1500 pension at age 60, “regardless of what
happens.” Rule: A president has authority only to bind his company by acts arising in the usual and
regular course of business but not for contract of an extraordinary nature.
Controlling Interests:
Perlman v. Feldmann (p. 528) Facts: Feldmann (D), a director and dominant stockholder of Newport
Steel, sold, along with others, the controlling interest of that steel manufacturer, to steel users, along
with the right to control distribution. Rule: A corporate director who is also a dominant shareholder
stands, in both situation, in a fiduciary relationship to both the corporation and the minority
stockholders if selling controlling interest in the corporation, it’s accountable to it (and the
minority shareholders) to the extent that the sales price represents payment for the right to
control.
Litwin v. Allen (p. 670): Facts: Stockholders (P) brought a derivative action against Trust Co. (D), its
subsidiary, Guaranty Trust (D), and J.P. Morgan (D) for a loss resulting out of a bond transaction.
Rule: A director is not liable for loss or damage other than what was proximately caused by his own
acts or omissions in breach of his duty. A director owes to his corporation a loyalty that is undivided
and an allegiance un-influenced by no consideration other than the welfare of the company
Smith v. Van Gorkom (p. 681): Facts: The trial court held that because Van Gorkom (D) and the other Trans
Union directors had three opportunities to reject the merger proposal, they acted with due deliberation and
their conduct fell within the business judgment rule. Rule: Directors are bound to exercise good faith
informed judgment in making decisions on behalf of the corporation. Business Judgment Rule: Doctrine
Carmen Corral 63 Spring ’06
relieving corporate directors and/or officers from liability for decisions honestly and rationally made
in the corporation’s best interest. Del. Gen. Corp. Law
In re Caremark Intern. Inc. (p. 701): Where a director in fact exercises a good faith effort to be informed
and to exercise appropriate judgment, he or she should be deemed to satisfy fully the duty of attention.
Absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of
espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists
Gall v. Exxon Corp. (p. 720): Facts: At trial of Gall’s (P) shareholder derivative suit against Exxon (D),
claiming illegal bribes by the corporation, Exxon moved for summary judgment, claiming that it was in the
corporation’s sound business judgment and to refuse to sue on Gall’s complaint.
Rule: The decision of corporate directors, whether or not to assert a cause of action held by the
corporation, rests within the sound business judgment of management
1. Self Dealing
Self-Dealing Transactions:
Kinds of transaction we’re concerned with – (3 conditions)
o Where a key player and the corp are on opposite sides;
o Where the key player has helped influence the corp’s decision to enter the transaction;
o Where the key player’s financial interests are at least potentially in conflict with the financial
interests of the corp
In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, the court defined self-dealing as when the parent, by
virtue of domination over its sub, caused the sub to act in such a way that parent receives
something from the sub, to the exclusion of and to the detriment to the minority
shareholders of the sub.
Intrinsic Fairness Test is applied when it is shown that the transaction in question is a
self-dealing one (no presumption of good faith); Marciano v. Nakash (DE, 1987) (holding
that transaction was self-dealing but the transaction was fully fair to the corporation).
RMBCA § 8.62-director’s action is effective if transaction received the affirmative vote
of the majority of those directors or on a committee of the vote who voted on the
transaction after required disclosure
o Section 144 (Del.) exceptions. A self-dealing transaction will not be void if:
Knowledge of and approval by majority of the disinterested directors;
Knowledge of and approval by shareholders;
Fair to the corporation at the time authorized, approved or ratified.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. (DE, 1983) (introducing the no valid business purpose rule) Del
does not accept this view but it has been applied in a few jurisdictions
Marciano v. Nakash (p. 759): Facts: A loan to Gasoline, Ltd. by certain board members was validated as
a fair transaction. Rule: A transaction by a corporation with its insiders will be valid if intrinsically
fair
Carmen Corral 65 Spring ’06
Heller v. Boylan (p. 764): Facts: Heller (P) and six other stockholders in American Tobacco Company
claimed that the bonuses paid top executive officers bore no relation to the services for which they were
given. Rule: If a bonus payment has no relation to the value of services for which it is given, it is in
reality a gift in part, and the majority stockholders have no power to give away corporate
property against the protest of the minority
Brehm v. Eisner (p. 769): compare this to the Smith v. Van Gorkum case: shareholders say: 1) they
weren’t fully informed per the Van Gorkum standard (the process was inappropriate) and 2) there was
also a violation of their duty of care b/c they could have terminated this guy for cause and paid nothing
but instead offered him the no fault package; court says there are those cases when it’s so egregious
on its face that board approval cannot meet the business judgment standard; so, the court
concludes that there is a lack of egregiousness in the decision to give the compensation package
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien (p. 777): Facts: A minority stockholder in Sinven, Levien (P) accused
Sinclair (D), the parent company, of using Sinven assets to finance its operations. Rule: Where a parent
company controls all transactions of a subsidiary, receiving a benefit at the expense of the
subsidiary’s minority stockholders, the intrinsic fairness test will be applied, placing the burden
on the parent company to prove the transactions were based on reasonable business objectives.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. (p. 783): Rule: When seeking to secure minority shareholder approval for a
proposed cash-out merger, the corporations involved must comply with the fairness test, which has
two basic interrelated aspects:
o fair dealings - which imposes a duty on the corporations to completely disclose to the
shareholders all information germane to the merger, and
o fair price - which require that the price being offered for the outstanding stock be equivalent
to a price determined by an appraisal where “all relevant non-speculative factors” were
considered.
2. Corporate Opportunity
The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine—a fiduciary concept that limits the power of officers, directors,
and employees to take personal advantage of opportunities that belong to the corporation; is
decided/considered by the court on a case-by-case basis and apply a fairness test (should the opportunity,
in all fairness, have belonged to the corp); It is an opportunity that a fiduciary to a corporation has to
take advantage of information acquired by virtue of his or her position for the individual’s benefit.
In order to plead corporate usurpation, the P must show, among other things, that the company had the
financial means to take advantage of the alleged opportunity
Corps may renounce an opportunity voluntarily in order to enable an officer, director, or shareholder to
take advantage of it per Delaware GCL §122(17)
Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris (p. 797) Rule: Prior to availing herself of an
opportunity property belonging to the corporation, an officer or director must first fully
disclose the opportunity to the corporation, and allow the board of directors the
opportunity to reject it by a majority vote of the disinterested directors
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. (p. 396) (holding that in a closely held corporation, controlling
stockholders are held to a higher standard of good faith and inherent fairness). Rule: in close
corporations only, controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders when
involving self-dealing transactions (similar to the duty directors owe to the corp) and must accord
her an equal opportunity to sell shares to the corp.
Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc.: not closely-held—controlling interest [absent looting of corp.
assets, conversion of a corp. opportunity, fraud or other acts of bad faith] are free to be sold and
purchased at premium price.
In the early days, corporate charters were granted by the gov’t on the theory that the corp would contribute to
the public interest as well as make money for shareholders only. In the 1930’s, a debate began about the
responsibility of corps; this debate is still going on (with inconclusive results).
Some argue that a crop’s objective should be to produce the best possible goods and services, that no
other legal standard is enforceable, and that any other standard allows an unhealthy divorce between
management (making suck decisions) and ownership.
Others argue that corps have a ‘social responsibility’ and that they must balance the interests of the
shareholders, employees, customers, and the public at large.
Property Conception of the Corporation: corp is seen as the private property of its stockholder-owners; its
purpose is to advance the purposes of these owners (predominantly to increase their wealth) and the function
of the directors as agents of the owners, is faithfully to advance the financial interests of the owners.
Social Entity Conception of the Corporation: sees the corp as a social institution with a public purpose; it
comes into being and continues as a legal entity only with gov’tal concurrent; promoted by the state’s interest
in promoting the general welfare; the board of directors’ duties extend beyond assuring investors a fair
return,, to include a duty of loyalty, in some sense to all those interested in or affected by the corp; the corp
itself is capable of bearing legal and moral obligations. This is the majority approach today.