Business Association Outline

Business Association Outline
Agency Law
❖ An agency relationship is a fiduciary relationship where a person or entity, the agent, has either the express or
implied authority to act on behalf of another person or entity, the principal. By virtue of this relationship, the
principal may be liable to a third party, in contract or tort, for her agent’s act (so far as it was within the
scope/authority (or apparent authority)). However, this agency relationship can be terminated at any time and for
any reason by either party, by conduct, previous agreement, or communicating to the other party its termination
➢ Agency law governs the relationship between the principal and agent and also governs both parties
liabilities in respect to third parties.
➢ Each state has their own law regarding agency, this is both common law and some by statute. Restatement
of Agency is a source of the law but only very persuasive.
I. Definition and Creation of the Agency Relationship

❖ Agency is a fiduciary relationship that arises when
➢ 1) both the principal and agent manifest assent, by express or implied conduct,
➢ 2) that the agent shall act on
■ (a)the principal’s behalf AND
■ (b) subject to the principal’s control, AND
➢ Rst (third) of Agency §1.01. This relationship may arise by either express or implied consent and is limited
based on the scope of their relationship.
● If all of the elements are met then there is an agency relationship.

○ The intent to enter into an agency relationship or not, along with how the parties lable their relationship, is
not dispositive to the question of whether the agency relationship is formed.
○ The relationship does not need to be a business relationship, it just needs to be that one manage some
affair for another by authority and on account of the latter
○ “when one ... asks a friend to do a slight service for him, such as to return for credit goods recently
purchased from a store,” an agency relationship exists even though no compensation or other
consideration was contemplated. Rest. 2d § 1(1) cmt. B
● RST 1.02: Whether a relationship is characterized as agency in an agreement between parties or in the context of
industry or popular usage is not controlling.
○ A contract provision disclaiming an agency relationship could be relevant, but is not dispositive, in
determining whether an agency relationship exists.
● In essence, a person or entity is an agent of the principal if they are essentially acting for the same end, the agent is
the extension of the principal. Unless there is an finding of an independent business or relationship where then
there is no agency relationship
● Gorton v. Doty, 69 P.2d 136 (Idaho Supreme Court 1937):
○ Facts: Pf’s father sued Df for injuries his son sustained in an accident. The child was a student at the school
Df worked. Df was a teacher. Student was in a car accident on his way to their football game, the car was
owned by the DF, but the coach of the team was driving it to get to the game. Df had volunteered her car
for use of these purposes. No compensation was provided between the DF and the coach for driving Df’s
car. Df told coach that she would give her the car to drive to the game if he drove it. The school district
reimbursed the cost of gasoline.
○ Holding: Due to the fact that the Df provided Garst her car on the condition he drive the car, Garst was
acting on Df’s behalf (because she could have driven herself) and that was under her control that he drive
the car--an agreement both parties assented to.
○ Analysis: The court reasoned that the DF could of driven her car to the game with the students herself, but
that she designated the coach to drive for her, it was a condition precedent for the use of her car that the
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Garst should drive. Therefore, the court reasoned that due to this condition of Garst driving to use the car,
Garst was designated to act on Df’s behalf and that Garst and Df assented to this agreement. Deeming that
payment or contract be nondispositive
○ Dissent: Principal Lacked control element because they simply loaned Garst the car, Garst acted on his own
by driving the car and Garst did not act on Doty's behalf because it was not benefiting Doty and was not in
representation of Doty. The P/A relationship existed between the School district and Garst not Df and Garst.
■ Additionally, he disagreed with the finding because it is inapplicable that Df be held liable for” each
and every act done or performed by Garst as though she had been personally present and personally
performed each and every act that was done or performed by Garst,” And that Garst was actually
acting for Df’s interests and on her behalf
■ Cited a number of court cases stating that simply loaning the car is not enough to create an agency
relationship…despite the fact the Majority said it was a prima facie est when the owner of an asset
loans it to another
● A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill (Minn Supreme Ct. 1981):Facts: Pf sued Df for breach of K due to the fact that
they were principal’s of the now failed Warren whom defaulted on their obligations. Df extended Warren a working
capital line of credit, based on the arrangement Warren would deposit its sales with Cargill and credited to it’s
account. Df and Warren entered into a new agreement in 1967 with additional covenants (audited financial
statements, approval for capital expenditures, take on additional debt etc.). Df made an initial trip to Warren to
inspect its books, there DF’s representatives stated to Warren that they would be periodically reminded to make
improvements recommended by Cargill and asked for written requests for withdrawals from undistributed earnings
in the future. Df continued to review Warren’s operations and provided Warren with sample business forms that had
Cargill’s insignia on it, and Warren used those to develope their business forms. At that time Warren was shipping
Cargill 90% of its grain. Df was daily touch with Warren and sent a regional manager to work with Warren on a day-
to-day basis. Warren acted as Cargill’s agent in seeking and executing K’s with local farmers to sell their new grains.
Later Warren became financially insolvent and collapsed with both Df’s and other debt on their books that they
defaulted on.
○ What was the arrangement between CArgill and Warren?
● •Security agreement (loan of working capital, financing Warren; drafts drawn on Cargill with both
names)
● –Business improvement recommendations
● –Veto rights over borrowing & distributions
● –Inspection and audit rights
● –Power to discontinue financing
● •“Strong paternal guidance” – regional Cargill manager involved in day-to-day of Warren’s operations
● •Contract for Warren to act as Cargill’s agent w/r/t getting third party farmers to grow a certain type of
wheat seed and Cargill as named counterparty (also sunflower seeds)
● •Warren was shipping to Cargill ~ 90% of its cash grain
○ What happened when it became evident that WArren had serious financial problems?
● •Several farmers inquired at Cargill regarding Warren’s status and were initially told that there would be
no problem with payment.
● •Cargill refused to provide Warren additional financing.
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● •In the final days of operation, Cargill sent an official to supervise the elevator, including disbursement of
funds and income generated by the elevator.
○ Holding: An agency relationship was formed because all three elements were met. Although there was no
express contract, the nature of the interactions between Df and Warren implied that such agreement was
formed. Therefore, DF was liable to Pf for K.
○ Analysis: All three elements were met. 1) by directing Warren to implement its recommendations, Cargill
manifested its consent that Warren would be its agent. 2) Warren acted on Cargill’s behalf in procurring
grain for Cargill as the part of its normal operations which were totally financed by Cargill. 3) Agency
relationship was established by Cargill’s interference with the internal affairs of Warren, which constituted
de facto control of the elevator.
1. Mutual Assent by Both Principal and Agent

❖ Based on the objective actions of both parties, both parties must, by express or implied conduct and statements,
agree or assent to the principal-agent relationship/their association with one another.
➢ This is a reasonable person standard based on the objective conduct or statements of both parties,
regardless of the parties subjective frame of mind.
a. No writing or consideration is required,
i. but some states require an enforceable writing (K) when the contract the agent is to enter into
with a third part is within certain provisions of the Statute of fraud (e.g., land transactions)
b. Expressed Agency/Consent
i. An agency that occurs when a principal and an agent expressly agree to enter into an agency
agreement with each other
1. Exclusive agency contract, power of attorney
ii. Express agency contracts can be either written or oral, unless the SOF stipulate that they must be
written
c. Implied Agency
i. There doesnt have to be specific mention of “agency” or a written agreement for an agency
relationship to exist
ii. Can be implied from the conduct of the parties
iii. The extent of the agent’s authority is determined from the particular facts and circumstances of
the particular situation.
iv. Gorton v. Doty: Court stated that no writing or formal oral agreement was necessary that the
parties are in a P and A. Simply the fact that GArst agreed to drive the car as condition for Df
providing the car was an assent to be in association with Df and Df to Garst
v. A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill (Minn Supreme Ct. 1981): An agreement may result in the
creation of an agency relationship although the parties did not call it an agency and did not intend
the legal consequences of the relation to follow. The existence of the agency may be provided by
circumstantial evidence, which shows a course of dealing between two parties, where the
principal is shown to have consented. By directing Warren to implement its recommendations,
Cargill manifested its consent that Warren would be its agent.
2. The Agent Shall Act on the Principal’s Behalf and Subject to Principal’s Control
a. On The Principal’s Behalf
❖ The relationship and actions the agent takes must be for the benefit of the principal to further the
principal’s ultimate objective or provide the principal opportunities.
➢ The agent is acting in a representative capacity or to further the principal’s interests.
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i. Gorton v. Doty: It was on the Df behalf that Garst drive the car because volunteering her car was
on condition that Garst be the only one who drove the car. She could have done it herself, but she
designated him to do it.
ii. A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill (Minn Supreme Ct. 1981): Warren acted on Cargill’s behalf in
procuring grain for Cargill as the part of its normal operations which were totally financed by
Cargill
iii. HYPO: Chad owns a shopping mall. Dan rents a retail store in the mall under a lease in which Dan
promises to pay Chad a percentage of Dan's monthly gross sales revenue as rent and Chad has
veto rights over the type of store that Dan is permitted to run in the space. Is Dan the agent of
Chad?
1. A: No, there is some measure of control but there is not "on behalf of" because while Dan
is paying rent and pays a slice of Gross Sales revenue, he is in business for himself. And, is
not doing it for anyone else's business. Chad is just the landlord and he is not the agent of
his landlord in running his business
iv. HYPO: Same facts, except that Dan additionally agrees to collect the rent from the mall’s other
tenants, per Chad’s instructions, and remit it to Chad in exchange for a monthly service fee. Is Dan
the agent of Chad? (And if so, for what purpose or scope?)
1. A: Yes, because there is mutual assent for Dan acting on behalf of Chad to collect the rent
from the other leasees, a relationship that Chad controlss and directs. However, the
agency is only limited to the collecting of the rent for Chad. Dan is not Chad's agent for
the operation of Chad's business.
b. Subject To the Principal’s Control

❖ The principal has the power and right to direct the agent as to the goal of the relationship. Rst 3d. Agency §
1.01. The principal does not need to direct every action of its agent, but just that the agent is being
controlled as to the Principal’s end/objective.
i. Control is a concept that embraces a wide spectrum of meanings, but within any relationship of
agency the principal initially states what the agent shall and shall not do, in specific or general
terms. Additionally, a principal has the right to give interim instruction or directions to the agent
once their relationship is established. Rst. 3d. §1.01 (cmt. f.).
ii. The principal is in charge of the agent’s action within the scope of their dealings/agreement
1. E.g., an employer tells an employee what to do, what time to be at work, and how to get
things done on behalf of the employer
iii. A “principal need not exercise physical control over the actions of its agent” so long as the
principal may direct “the result or ultimate objectives of the agent relationship.” Green v. H & R
Block, Inc., 735 A.2d 1039, 1050 (Md. 1999).
1. Meaning the Principal does not need to direct every action of the agent but just that the
agent is controlled in achieving its end result.
iv. Rst 3d. Agency §1.01: Controll, however defined, is by itself insufficient to establish agency. In the
debtor-creditor context, most courts are reluctant to find relationships of agency on the basis of
provisions in agreements that protect the creditor’s interests...an unusual example to the contrary
is A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill
v. Gorton v. Doty: The court did not directly state that Garst was under the Df’s control, but infered it
by their finding that Garst could borrow the car only if he drove. Therefore, controlling his actions
in that respects.
vi. Norris v. Cox (Miss. App.): “An emancipated child is no longer under its parent’s control. Nor can it
be said that the Cox children were acting for their mother and father by simply living on the
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disputed property. There were no obligations imposed on the children. The Coxes merely allowed
their children to live on land which they claimed.”
vii. A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill (Minn Supreme Ct. 1981): Agency relationship was established
by Cargill’s interference with the internal affairs of Warren, which constituted de facto control of
the elevator.
1. A creditor who assumes control of his debtor’s business may become liable as principal
for the acts of the debto in connection with the business (Veto power is not a take over).
2. The court looked at a number of factors to determine control of the business: 1) constant
recommendations to Warren 2) Cargill’s right of first refusal on grain 3) Warren’s inability
to enter into financial transactions without Df approval 4) Df’s right of entry to carry on
periodic checks and audits 5) Df’s correspondence and criticism regarding Warren’s salary
structure 6) Df’s determination of paternal guidance 7) Draft and forms were printed on
Df’s name imprinted 8) financing of Warren’s purchases of grain and operating expenses
9) Cargill’s power to discontinue the financing of Warren’s operations.
viii. Hypo: Two families, Cox family and Norris Family, and the plot in the middle area between their
plots is disputed. Cox's adult children placed mobile homes on this plot of land and then tried to
claim adverse possession because they were acting as the Cox's agent in continuously occupying
the land
1. Court held that the children were no longer under the control of the parents because
they were not being told what they can and cannot do, i.e., they were not being directed
by the parents to reach an ultimate goal.
Quick Summary: Formation of Agency

•Agency relationship based on concept that parties mutually agree:
–Agent will act on behalf of principal.
–Agent will be subject to principal’s control. (Rest. 3d § 1.01)
•Parties’ labeling and popular usage is not controlling. (Rest. 3d § 1.02)
•Manifestation for agency can be express, or it can be implied from conduct. (Rest. 3d § 1.03)
•Examples of applying these concepts (Gorton v. Doty, Cargill, hypos)
•Also note terminology (Rest. 3d § 1.04)
II. Rights and Duties Between Principal and Agent

❖ The creation of the principal-agency relationship has legal consequences for both the principal and agent
interactions with each other. The principal owes the agent certain obligations, while the Agent is the fiduciary to the
principal.
1. Principal’s Obligations to Agent

❖ A principal has an obligation to deal with the agent fairly and in good faith
❖ The principal has the duty to reimburse or indemnify the agent for:
➢ 1) the terms of any contract between them (e.g., any promised payments)
➢ 2) when the agent makes a payment within the scope of actual authority or that is beneficial to the
principal unless the agent acts officiously in making the payments;
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➢ 3) when the agent suffers a loss that fairly should be borne by the principal in light of their relationship.
❖ If the principal requests certain services from the agent and the agreement is silent regarding, the agent is
generally entitled to reasonable compensation.
● The principal should also generally cooperate with the agent and not unreasonably interfere with
the agent’s performance of his or her duties.
● A compensated agent has the usual contract remedies against the principal and an agent has a
right to possessory lien for any money due from the principal.
2. Agent’s fiduciary Duties to Principal

❖ An agency is a fiduciary relationship in which the agent owes the principal fiduciary duties of care, loyalty,
information and confidentiality. If an agent breaches any of these duties without the consent of the fully
informed principal, the agent could be liable to the principal for any resulting damage and may have to
disgorge profits made,
➢ These duties arise or can arise in agency, partnership, corporations, and LLCs.
a. A fiduciary is someone who stands in a special relation of trust, confidence, or responsibility in
certain obligations to others. An agent is a fiduciary because they must put their principal’s
interest ahead of their own. This is because the agent is acting as an extension of the principal,
within the scope of the relationship, and as a separate person they must act as if they were the
principal themselves to help/facilitate the satisfaction of the objective. For the principal will not
act adversely to their own interests.
b. If the action is totally out of control/scope of the Agency relationship then there is no breach of
fiduciary duty, as long as it is outside the scope
c. General Automotive Mfg. v. Singer (1963): Facts: Df was hired by the Pf as a general
manager/employee as a machinist for their shop, for an indefinite period and the Df was to devote
his entire time, skill, and attention to the employment during hte term of this employment and not
to engage in any other business or vocation of a permanent nature during the term of this
employment. Df was an instrumental part of the PF’s business, helping with all aspects of the
business operations, including marketing, technical assistance, and collections. During this
employment, a large number of orders came in for Automotive which Df decided Automotive
could not adequately perform. Df never informed Automotive about the orders. Instead he sent
the customers to another store and obtained a broker fee for his referral. Df then set himself up as
a business as a manufacturing broker, while he was under the employment of the Pf, without
disclosing that to them or obtaining their consent.
i. Holding: Df was liable for violating his duty of loyalty and information and thus forced to
disgorge profits to the principal. Found he was acting in competition with the Pf.
ii. Analysis: Df was obligated to act in the best interest of his principal/in the utmost good
faith and loyalty as to not adversely affect the interests of the principal by acquiring
private interests of his own. Df owed the duty to disclose these deals to the Principal so
that the Principal could know that there is demand and they were not able to supply the
demand at this point so that they could decide to expand their services or not. By failing
to disclose all the facts relating to the orders and by receiving secret profit Df violated
fiduciary duty to act solely for the benefit of the Pf/Principal.
d. Estate of Eller v. Bartron (Del Sup Ct. 2011):Facts: Real estate agent was the broker for both sides
of the Purchase/Sale. The initial purchaser submitted a bid for the house and the same day hired
the initial seller’s agent to serve as seller’s agent for the second sale they had lined up. The agent
then convinced the initial seller to accept the initial purchaser’s bid, which was much lower than
asking price and the 2nd sale price, without disclosing his conflict of interest or the purchaser’s
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interest in flipping the house. The Df obtained a commission on both transactions. Df never
disclosed the dual agency.
i. Holding:
ii. Analysis: A real estate agent is the agent of his clients, acting on their behalf and control.
Additionally a typical person depends on the experience and knowledge of a real estae
agent to arrange the best transaction. Although Pf waived his right to the dual agency on
the initial transaction, he was required to know that the Df was representing the third
party on a subsequent sale to the same property. Df’s failure to disclose the dual agency
prevented the PF/Principal from having an opportunity to assess her risks in respect to
the third parties additional sale. Must have, at the least, told Pf of the buyer’s intention to
immediately re-sell the property because they knew it was selling for a low price,
therefore the Pf is trying to get the highest price possible for it.
e. Duty of Care, Competence, and Dilligence

❖ General Standard: If the agent is paid, an agent must act with ordinary, reasonable care in similar
circumstances to carry out the acts. If the agent is unpaid, must not be grossly negligent
❖ Special Skills or Knowledge: If an agent claims to have special skills or knowledge, then the agent
has a duty to act with the care normally exercised by agents with such skills or knowledge
i. Standard of care is subject to agreement between principal and agent (e.g., exculpatory
agreements)
ii. Duties:
1. Duty to act in accordance with any contract with the principal
2. Duty of care, competence, diligence
3. Duty to act only within the scope of actual authority and duty to obey
4. Duty of good conduct
iii. Estate of Eller v. Bartron (Del Sup Ct. 2011): Was not good conduct to secretly represent
the buyer in a subsequent transaction. Failing to disclose the adversarial position
breaches a duty of care.
f. Duty of Loyalty
❖ The agent must put the interests of the principal ahead of their own on all matters connected with
the agency.
i. An agent must not put his or her interests ahead of those of the principal when the agent
is acting with the agency relationship
ii. EX: the agent must not compete with the principal, act adversely to the principal, take a
business opportunity that belongs to the principal, or abuse the agent position to earn
unauthorized side profits, bribes, or tips.
iii. Duties:
1. Duty of loyalty
2. Duty not to acquire a material benefit from a third party for actions taken on
behalf of the principal or through the agent’s use of position
3. Duty not to act as adverse party to the principal
4. Duty to refrain from competing with the principal during agency relationship
5. Duty not to use the principal’s property for the agent's own purposes
iv. General Automotive Mfg. v. Singer: By taking the secret profits and acting as a
manufacturing agent and sending orders to another shop constituted that DF was acting
in competition with his Principal. He was being compensated by the third parties through
his brokerage balance
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v. Estate of Eller v. Bartron (Del Sup Ct. 2011): Did not act in the primary principal’s best
interest by representing the buyer in a subsequent transaction so to secretly receive an
additional, and greater, commission.
g. Duty of Information and Confidentiality

❖ Information: An agent has a duty to provide information to the principal that the agent knows or
has reason to know that the principal would wish to have or the facts that are material to the
agent's duties to the principal.
❖ Confidentiality: The agent must not disclose or misuse confidential information, which remains in
force even after the agency relationship has terminated.
i. Duties:
1. Duty to disclose information to the principal that the agent knows or has reason
to know the principal wishes to have or is material to the agent’s duties to the
principal
2. Duty of confidentiality (not to communicate confidential information of the
principal for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party
3. Duty to notify the principal of info that the agent knows or has reason to know
the principal would want to know
ii. General Automotive Mfg. v. Singer: Df had the duty to inform the Pf that these orders
were being sought by the business for them to decide whether they need to expand
operations or not.
iii. Estate of Eller v. Bartron (Del Sup Ct. 2011): Did not provide the primary principal
information about a bid the buyer received to then sell the property at a much higher
price than the original bid buy PF and Buyer.
h. Disclosure, Consent and Breach of Fiduciary Duty
❖ Conduct by an Agent would not otherwise be a breach of fiduciary duty if the fully informed
Principal consents to the action, provided that the Agent acts in good faith.
❖ If an agent breaches any of these duties without the consent of the fully informed principal, the
agent could be liable to the principal for any resulting damage and may have to disgorge profits
made
a. Consent
b. Fully Informed Principal
❖ The principal has been disclosed all material facts in providing consent
c. General Automotive Mfg. v. Singer: Df did not provide information to the principal at any
point.
d. Estate of Eller v. Bartron (Del Sup Ct. 2011): An agent who acquires a position adverse to
the principal, but fails to disclose it, simultaneously breaches the duties of loyalty and
care. Although the Df disclosed the agency relationship as to the primary sale, the Df did
not disclose the relationship to then represent the buyer-seller in a second sale and that
they received a bid much greater than the Pf’s bid.
III. Consequences of Creating an Agency Relationship: Contract and Tort Liability

❖ A principal can be held liable to a third party for the actions of their agent. This liability stems from both contract
and tort law. The chief justification for the principals’ accountability for the agent’s acts are the principal’s ability to
select and control the agent and to terminate the agency relationship, together with the fact that the agent has
agreed, expressly or implicitly, to act on the principal’s behalf subject to the principal’s control. Rst. 3d. Agency
§1.01.
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➢ The person claiming agency and authority have the burden of proving that it exists
1. Principal’s Contract Liability to Third Party

❖ A Principal can incur contract liability to a third party based on the 1) actual authority of their agent 2)
apparent authority of the agent 3) undisclosed principal liability 4) ratification 5) estoppel.
➢ It is possible for more than one of these bases to be present in a particular factual circumstance,
but any one of these bases would be sufficient for holding a principal (or purported principal)
liable.
➢ ANALYSIS TIP: start with the first basis of authority and then go down the list to see if another
basis occurs.
a. Actual Authority
❖ A principal is subject to liability upon contracts made by an agent acting within his actual authority
if made in proper form and with the understanding that the principal is a party.
❖ Actual authority is authority that the agent reasonably believes she has based on the principal’s
expressed or implied manifestations that the principal wishes the agent to act in that manner to
accomplish the Principal’s objective--including acts necessary or incidental which are not expressly
stated.
➢ An agent has actual authority when 1) the principal communicates to the agent, in words
or conduct (i.e., express or implied), 2) about the activities in which the agent may engage
and 3) the obligations the agent may undertake
➢ (1) An agent has actual authority to take action designated or implied in the principal's
manifestations to the agent and acts necessary or incidental to achieving the principal's
objectives, as the agent reasonably understands the principal's manifestations and
objectives when the agent determines how to act. Rst 3d. Agency
❖ An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences
for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal’s expressed or
implied manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act--including those
acts necessary or incidental to achieving the principal’s objective. . Rst. 3d. §2.01
i. Specific conduct by the principal in the past permitting the agent to exercise similar
powers is crucial.
ii. Mill St. Church of Christ v. Hogan (1990): Facts: Pf, HOGAN, filed a workers comp claim he
received painting the interior of the DF’s premises. Df’s “elders” hired PF’s brother to
perform the work and decided that Gary Petty would be hired if Pf’s brother needed help,
although Pf’s brother typically hired Pf for the work. When Df’s called to contract,they
made no mention of Gary Petty. Pf’s brother performed all the work entailed in the
project until the point he needed help. He was not told to hire Petty nor did the elder’s
discuss it with him. Pf’s brother hired Pf, without the knowledge of Df, to help with the
work. Within an hour of working Pf fell and was injured. Df paid all of Pf’s and Pf’s
brother’s time.
1. Issue: Did Pf’s brother have the implied authority to hire his brother, PF, to
perform his duties?
2. Held: YES, Pf’s brother had implied authority to hire PF
3. Analysis: Must focus upon the agent’s understanding of the authority he/she has
based on statements or conduct of the principal’s manifestation, past conduct of
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the principal, that the principal wishes the agent to have such authority. Specific
conduct by the principal in the past permitting the agent to exercise similar
powers is crucial.
a. Pf’s brother had allowed him a helper in prior projects, when needed.
Never told Pf or Pf’s brother about their intent for him to only hire
another person. And Pf’s brother needed another person to complete
the job he was hired to complete
iii. Principal’s Manifestations
❖ A principal’s manifestations can be an 1) explicit instruction (express) as well as 2) what a
reasonable person in the agent’s position would understand to be reasonably included
(implied) in those instructions in order to accomplish those objectives.
1. Implied authority can be inferred from the words the principal used, from
custom, or from the relations between the parties. Including incidental
authority--the idea that the agent can do incidental acts that are related to a
transaction that is authorized
2. Mill St. Church of Christ v. Hogan (1990): Principal’s hired Pf’s brother, as they
have done in the past with knowledge they have allowed him a helper. They
never told him he could not hire another individual nor did they specify the exact
person he could hire if needed.
iv. Agent’s Reasonable Belief
❖ An agent’s belief is reasonable if the activity the agent is performing has been 1)
explicitly instructed OR 2) is what a reasonable person in the agent’s position would
understand to be reasonably included in those instructions in order to accomplish the
objective
1. Reasonable Belief (Rst. 3d Agency)
a. (2) An agent's interpretation of the principal's manifestations is
reasonable if it reflects any meaning known by the agent to be ascribed
by the principal and, in the absence of any meaning known to the
agent, as a reasonable person in the agent's position would interpret
the manifestations in light of the context, including circumstances of
which the agent has notice and the agent's fiduciary duty to the
principal.
b. (3) An A’s understanding of the principal's objectives is reasonable if it
accords with the principal's manifestations and the inferences that a
reasonable person in the agent's position would draw from the
circumstances creating the agency.
2. Implied authority
a. Can be inferred from the words the principal used, from custom, or
from the relations between the parties. Including incidental authority--
the idea that the agent can do incidental acts that are related to a
transaction that is authorized
3. Incidental Authority:
a. The agent can do incidental acts that are related to a transaction that is
authorized.
b. If the principal’s manifestation to an agent expresses the principal’s
wish that something be done, it is natural to assume that the principal
wishes, as an incidental matter, that the agent take the steps necessary
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and the agent proceed in the usual and ordinary way, if such has been
established, unless the principal directs otherwise
c. The underlying assumptions are that the principal does not wish to
authorize what cannot be achieved if necessary steps are not taken by
the agent, and that the principal’s manifestation often will not specify
all steps necessary to translate it into action.
4. Mill St. Church of Christ v. Hogan (1990): To determine whether the Principal
reasonably meant for the agent to have certain authority, and whether the
agent’s interpretation is reasonable, the agent can consider the principal’s
conduct in the manifestation to complete the task along with course of
dealing/past conduct/statements or lack of statement made. Here, in the past,
PF’s brother was allowed to hire a helper for church jobs, when needed, he was
not told who to hire or restricted on that fact. To complete the job as needed,
i.e. incidental, Pf’s brother needed an assistant and thus hired Pf. Df even noted
that he may have need to hire more help.
TIP: Implied v. Apparent Authority (Mill St Church v. Hogan):

● Implied authority is actual authority circumstantially proven which the principal actually
intended the agent to possess and includes such powers as are practically necessary to carry
out the duties actually delegated
● Apparent authority is the authority the principal holds the agent to possessing. It is a matter of
appearances by the principal, which 3rd parties come to rely.
b. Apparent Authority
❖ Apparent authority arises from 1) the manifestation of a principal, or apparent principal, 2) that
give a third person the reasonable belief that an agent or other actor has authority to act on
behalf of the principal or apparent principal.
➢ The principal must have made a manifestation that led a third party to reasonably believe
that the agent or actor had the authority to act
i. Apparent authority may be the basis for contract liability where an agent acts beyond the
scope of their actual authority or where there is not even a true agency relationship.
ii. Apparent authority depends on the reasonable beliefs of the third party
iii. Apparent authority protects third parties who acted reasonably with a traceable
manifestation to the principal or apparent principal
1. If the agent acts outside of their scope of actual authority, the Principal has a
claim against the agent. But that is a separate issue
iv. Opthalmic Surgeons, Ltd. v. Paychex:Facts: OSL, Pf, and Paychex, DF, entered into a
contract for payroll processing services and direct deposit services. Paychex performed its
services based on the information their cleint’s provide them. OSL employed Connor who
from mid-1990s until 2006 handled payroll for OSL, was the office manager, and
designated payroll contact. Paychex contacted Connor regularly regarding OSL’s payroll,
constant communication. In 2001, Connor requested Paychex direct deposit more money
than required to pay her salary. Paychex never reached out to anyone else at OSL.
Paychex sent OSL reports confirming all payments to Connor, as indicated, and the
Principal, PF, never saw them.
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1. Holding: Connor had apparent authority based on her position that OSL put her
in and designated contacts traceable to the Principal, where it appeared that she
had the power to authorize additional paychecks. Placing Connor in a position
where it appeared that she had authority to order additional checks and by
acquiescing to Connor’s acts through failure to examine the payroll reports, OSL
created apparent authority in Connor that Paychex reasonably relied on her
authority to issue additional paychecks.
2. Analysis: Over the years Connor communicated with Paychex regularly and
would call in multiple weeks of paychecks with no objection from OSL. There was
no conversation between Dr. Andreoni and Paychex regarding any limitation of
authority and it is reasonable for Paychex to assume its clients may need a
change and that the payroll contact would be authorized to convey such a
change. Also OSL failed to object to any transaction Connor authorized for a
principal’s inaction creates apparent authority when it provides a basis for a third
party reasonably to believe the principal intentionally acquiesces in the agent’s
representations or actions.
3. Policy: The principal has the obligation to check the transactions/actions of their
agents.
v. Jackson et al. v. Odenat et al v. Mondesir, 3rd party Df: Facts : Odenat used Pf’s
copyrighted work given to him by Mondesir, DF. Pf sued Df for copyright infringement.
Odenat claimed that due to the course of conduct between Odenat and Mandesir there
was apparent authority for PF. PF knew of the images but never took them down.
1. Analysis: There needs to be an actual manifestation from the principal to the
third party, in some respects, for apparent authority to attach. The individual
cannot unilaterally act and imbue himself with apparent authority. Additionally,
there was no evidence that PF knew or reasonably should have known that
Mondesir was telling Odenat that he could use the image, therefore there could
not be silence as reliance of a principal’s manifestation
vi. Manifestation traceable to the principal or apparent principal

❖ For apparent authority, the manifestation to the third party must be traceable back to the
principal. Manifestations could be words or conduct. Examples of a traceable
manifestation are communications through an intermediary to the third party or by the
principal giving the agent a certain title or position.
1. Rst. 3d. Agency §2.03: Manifestations include explicit statements that a principal
makes directly to a third party, as well as statements made by others concerning
an actor’s authority that reach the third party and are traceable to the principal.
2. Opthalmic Surgeons, Ltd. v. Paychex: OSL placed Connor in the position of
designated Paychex contact and head of the payroll. There was also no
objections to any of the transactions, therefore the inaction was conduct
traceable to the principal, knowing that actions were taking place. If the third
party may reasonably believe that a subsequent act or representation by the
agent is authorized because it conforms to the prior pattern observed by the
third party. The belief is traceable to the principal’s participation in the pattern
and failure to inform the third party that no inferences about the agent’s
authority should be based upon
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3. Jackson et al. v. Odenat et al v. Mondesir, 3rd party Df: No manifestation to the

principal because Mondesir was not Pf’s agent and could not imbue himself with
apparent authority especially when there were no facts that the principal knew
or reasonably should have known about the transaction. Thus, the silence as
reliance cannot be traced back to the principal
vii. Gives a third party a reasonable belief the agent has the authority
1. Examples of a traceable manifestation are communications through an
intermediary to the third party or by the principal giving the agent a certain title
or position
2. Opthalmic Surgeons, Ltd. v. Paychex: OSL failed to object to any transaction
Connor authorized for a principal’s inaction creates apparent authority when it
provides a basis for a third party reasonably to believe the principal intentionally
acquiesces in the agent’s representations or actions. OSLs failure to object to the
“extraordinary” transactions would reasonably convey to a third party that it
acquiesced in its agent’s act. If the third party may reasonably believe that a
subsequent act or representation by the agent is authorized because it conforms
to the prior pattern observed by the third party. The belief is traceable to the
principal’s participation in the pattern and failure to inform the third party that
no inferences about the agent’s authority should be based upon
3. Jackson et al. v. Odenat et al v. Mondesir, 3rd party Df: There were no facts that
gave the Df a reasonable belief that the agent has authority. The agent had no
title on the initial transaction and only told Odenat that he could use it, without
true authorization or even being a known agent. The silence was not enough
because there were not enough facts suggesting the principal knew or
reasonably should have known.
c. Undisclosed Principal Liability

❖ Def: An undisclosed principal is a principal that the third party does not know exists at the time the third
party interacts with the agent. Therefore, they do not know that the person is an agent.
❖ Rule: If the agent was acting within the scope of authority, when dealing with the third party, both the
undisclosed principal and agent can be held liable on that basis. But even if the agent was not acting within
the scope of actual authority, the undisclosed principal could still be held liable if either of the provisions of
§ 2.06 applies:
❖ (1) an undisclosed principal is subject to liability to a third party who is justifiably induced to make
a detrimental change in position by an agent acting on the principal’s behalf and without actual
authority if the principal did not take reasonable steps to notify them of the facts
❖ (2) An undisclosed principal may not rely on instructions given an agent that quality or reduce the
agent’s authority to less than the authority a third party would reasonably believe the agent to
have under the same circumstances if the principal has been disclosed
i. Agent acting with actual authority:
1. Rest. 3d § 6.03: When an A acting with actual authority makes a contract on
behalf of an undisclosed P, both P and A are bound.
ii. •Agent acting without actual authority: Rest. 3d § 2.06:
1. An undisclosed principal is liable for its agent’s actions–acting without actual
authority – if a third party detrimentally relies on the agent and the principal has
notice and does not take reasonable steps to notify the third party of the facts.
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2. An undisclosed principal can’t rely on narrowing an agent’s authority to less than

what a third party would reasonably believe the agent to have under the same
circumstances if the principal had been disclosed.
iii. The rule protects the reasonable expectations of third parties by providing a basis for
liability against the principal when claims of actual and apparent authority are not
available and when circumstances might otherwise permit the principal opportunistically
to speculate at the expense of third parties.
iv. A mjrty of courts permit a third party to file suit against both the principal and agent, but
either may object and then the third party will have to elect prior to judgement which
one she wants to hold liable. IF the 3rd party discovers the identity of the principal after
obtaining a judgement against the agent, she can later sue the principal if the judgement
has not been satisfied.
v. Policy: It is not fair and the principal is in the best position to prevent the innocent third-
party from getting harmed by their agent's actions. Because if this were not the case, how
would the supplier's be able to protect themselves against the actions of the undisclosed
principals. Should not support a situation that allows for a secret limitation and for a
principal to walk away unscathed from a K due to the limitation not known by the 3rd
party.
vi. Wateau v Fenwick (1893):Facts: Df bought a beer house and kept in place the previous
manager. However, the license was always in the manager’s name. The Df and the
manager had a K that said the manager had no actual authority to buy any goods for the
business except ales and mineral waters, all other goods supplied by Df. Manager
contracted to buy cigars and Bovril on credit from a third party. Pf sued Df for the price.
1. Analysis: The business was the Df’s but the name was kept by the Manager
whose name was over the door. The Pf never learned of the DF during the
transaction. Although the credit was to the manager without his actual authority,
the cigars were those items usually supplied and dealt with at a bar/ale house
2. Holding: The Df was liable for the credit given to the Df’s manager, because it
was one within the normal course and scope of activities of a person acting in
that position and the non-disclosure of the agency relationship and the lack of
authority would frustrate the purpose of commerce
a. The third-party is able to hold the previously undisclosed principal liable
for the contract which the agent was not originally allowed to contract
with because otherwise if you didn’t hold the undisclosed principal
liable there would be a secret limitation of authority that when the
principal found out about the agent's actions (without the innocent
third-party knowing) they could walk away with no loss.
d. Ratification
❖ DEF: Ratification is the affirmance of a prior act done by another whom did not have the authority
to act on the principal’s behalf or in that manner, whereby the act is given effect as if done by the
agent acting with actual authority
❖ A person may ratify an act, either by express or implied conduct, if the agent acted or purported to
act as an agent on the principal’s behalf and the following are met:
➢ Capacity: A person may ratify an act if the person existed at the time of the act, and the
person had legal capacity at the time of the ratification.
➢ Knowledge: Ratification requires that, at the time of the ratification, the principal or
purported principal is fully aware of all material facts involved in the transaction
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➢ Scope: Ratification is all or nothing--there is no partial ratification. It is ineffective unless it

encompasses the entirety of an act, contract, or other single transaction.
➢ Legality: Ratification is ineffective if performance of the contract would be illegal at the
time of ratification
➢ Timing: Ratification must occur before the third party has manifested intention to
withdraw from the transaction.
■ Ratification is ineffective if it would be inequitable to the third party as a result of
a material change in circumstances
➢ Effect on Nonparties: Ratification is not effective to diminish the rights or interest of
innocent third person
i. Express Ratification: objectively manifests acceptance of the transaction
1. E.g.,: BOD ratify a manger’s entering into a supply K
ii. Implied ratification: person engages in conduct that justifies a reasonable assumption
that the person consents to the transaction.
1. E.g.: when a principal accepts the benefits of an unauthorized transaction
entered into purportedly on her behalf.
iii. Effect of ratif=validation of the K as if the Principal had originally authorized it and the
relieving of liability for the purported agents breach of fiduciary duty. Both parties are
bound to the K following ratification
iv. Zions GAte R.V. Resort v. Oliphant (2014):Dispute over a 99 year lease between Pf and DF
that conveyed rights to a recreational vehicle pad and lot to Oliphant. Pf’s manager
signed a lease on behalf of Df as payment for DF’s work at the manager’s discretion. Df
stated the lease was invalid because manger had no authority to enter into the lease
without the consent of other managers.
v. Actual authority: Manager had no actual authority because of the principal’s expressed
instructions that other managers must consent to the lease. This actual authority is in the
LLC agreement and manager managed articles deposited with the Secretary.
vi. Apparent Authority: There was no apparent authority despite the manager’s title
because under Utah LLC law they have to deposit their LLC operating agreements with
the state, that state how the managers interact. In those articles, the LLC agreement
states that managers must get consent to enter into a lease agreement. This is a
manifestation from the principal to the third party, thus it is unreasonable to determine
otherwise because the Df had constructive knowledge from the principal regarding the
lack of authority.
vii. Ratification:Ruled that there was a disputed issue of material fact relating to the
ratification. A principal, who knows all the material facts, may acquiesce to the
unauthorized actions of the agent and by doing so accept them. However, there was no
evidence in the record that proved Pfs knew the manager entered into the particular
lease in question.
e. Estoppel
❖ A person who has not made a manifestation that an actor has authority as an agent and who is not
otherwise liable as a party to a transaction purportedly done by the actor on that person’s account
is subject to liability to a third party who justifiably is induced to make a detrimental change in
position because the transaction is believed to be on the person’s account if:
➢ (1) the person intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or
15
➢ (2) having notice of such belief and that it might induce others to change their positions,
the person did not take reasonable steps to notify them of the facts.
i. Estoppel does not create a binding contract between the parties, it is simply a doctrine
that can prevent a principal or purported principal from avoiding an obligation by arguing
that no authority existed at the time the agent or actor entered into a contract
ii. Can apply regardless of whether an agency relationship actually existed--it is typically
raised where a purported agent did not have actual or apparent authority, but the
plaintiff asks the court to hold the Df liable due to some fault
iii. Estoppel v Apparent Authority
1. Estoppel requires a showing that the third party detrimentally changed position
in reliance on the principals or purported principal, whereas apparent authority
does not require showing of detrimental reliance
2. Estoppel is a one=way street: it allows the third party to hold the principal liable,
but does not give the principal any rights against the third party (unless the
principal were to ratify the transaction)
iv. Remedy is for damages rather than making Df a party to K.
v. Hoddeson v Koos Bros. (1957): Pf entered into a store looking to buy furniture. Upon
entering a man came up to them asking if they needed help. He proceeded to assist them
and after the Pfs selected their items, he took out a small pad of paper and
“wrote/recorded” their orders and calculated the total price of $168 to which the Pfs paid
on the spot, no receipt was given. The furniture never came and the Df had no record of
the transaction. The Pfs could not definitively remember which salesman was the one
that helped them and all five salesperson on staff that day denies helping the Pfs.
However, the court looked into the principal’s dereliction of duty of care and precautions
for the safety and security of the customers along with loss occasioned by deceptions of
an apparent salesman.
vi. Holding: The law will not allow a principal to defensively avail himself of the impostors
lack of authority when they did not act in reasonable care to prevent such actors from
taking place that would lead an ordinary person of reasonable prudence and
circumstances to believe that the impostor was an agent.
2. Agents Contract Liability to the Third Party

❖ An agent’s contract liability to the third party depends on whether the agent entered into the
contractual obligation with the third party on behalf of a 1) disclosed, 2) unidentified, or 3)
undisclosed principal.
a. Disclosed Principal
❖ When making a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal, if an agent acts with actual or apparent
authority, then only the principal and the third party are bound by the K. The agent is not a party
to the K unless the agent and the third party agree otherwise.
i. The third party who knows that the agent is acting on someone else’s behalf (i.e.
principal) expects that they are contracting not with the agent but with the ultimate
principal.
b. Unidentified Principal
❖ When entering into a K on behalf of an unidentified principal, if an agent acts with actual or
apparent authority, then the principal, the agent, and the third party are parties to the contract
UNLESS the agent and the 3rd party agree otherwise regarding the agent’s liability.
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➢ A principal is unidentified if, when an agent and third party interact, the third party has
notice that the agent is acting for a principal but does not have notice of the principal’s
identity.
c. Undisclosed Principal
❖ If an agent, with actual authority, makes a contract on behalf of an undisclosed principal, the
agent and the third party are parties to the K.
i. If A person makes a K with a 3rd party on behalf of a principal that the agent knows or has
reason to know does not exist or lacks capacity, the agent become a party to the K.
ii. Comes up for a person acting on behalf of a corp that has not yet formed
d. Implied Warranty of authority
i. A person who purports to make a K, representation, or conveyance to or with a 3rd party
on behalf of another person, lacking power to bind that person, gives an implied warranty
of authority to the third party and is subject to liability to the third party for damages for
loss caused by breach of that warranty, including loss of the benefit expected from
performance by the principle UNLESS
1. The principal or purported principal ratifies the act; OR
2. The person who purports to make the K, representation, or conveyance gives
notice to the 3rd party that no warranty is given: OR
3. The 3rd party knows that the person who purports to make the contract,
representation, or conveyance acts without actual authority.
ii. An agent breaches the implied warranty of authority when she purports to make a K with
a third party on behalf of a principal but lacks authority to bind that principal
3. Third Party K Liability
a. In almost all situations in which the 3rd party could hold the P and A to the K, the P or A
can hold the 3rd party to the K. Except estoppel.
b. BUT, in a situation with an undisclosed or unidentified principal, a third party may avoid a
contract if either:
i. The agent falsely represents that it does not act on behalf of a principal or
fraudulently misrepresents the principal’s identity
ii. The principal or agent had notice that the third party would not have dealt with
the principal had the principal been disclosed or evidence that there is an
unforeseen increased burden to the third party due to the performance being
due to the principal and not the agent
Summary of Liability on Contract
Principal Bound/liable if one (or more) of the following is present:

• Actual authority
• Apparent authority
• Undisclosed principal liability
• Ratification
• Estoppel
Agent Unless otherwise agreed, not bound when the principal’s existence and identity
are disclosed
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Bound when either the principal’s existence or identity are not disclosed
Can also be liable for breach of the implied warranty of authority
Third Party Bound when the principal or agent could be held to the contract, except under
the estoppel doctrine which functions as a “one-way street”
Some exceptions when the principal is undisclosed or unidentified (where the

agent falsely represented the lack of a principal or the principal’s identity; where
notice that third party would not have dealt with the principal had the principal
been disclosed or evidence of unforeseen increased burden because of the
principal)
4. Tort Liability: Agent Liability

❖ An agent always remains liable for a tort that he or she commits
a. An agent is subject to liability to a third party harmed by the agent’s tortious conduct. Unless an
applicable statute provides otherwise, an actor remains subject to liability although the actor acts
as an agent or an employee, with actual or apparent authority, or within the scope of
employment.
5. Tort Liability: Principal Liability for Agent’s Action

❖ A principal can be held either 1) directly or 2) vicariously liable for the torts of an agent
a. Directly Liable
❖ A principal, along with her agent, may be held directly liable for torts committed to a third party
because of a combination of the acts of the agent and the principal.
Examples:
i. The agent acts with actual authority to commit a tort or the principal ratifies the agent’s
conduct
ii. The principal is knowingly negligent in hiring, supervising, or otherwise controlling the
agent
1. If P is only negligent in hiring the agent, the principal is liable only for her own
negligence in hiring, not for the contractor's negligence unless there is a basis for
vicarious liability
iii. The principal delegates performance of a “nondelegable” duty and the agent fails to
perform the duty
1. IF a duty is non-delegable, it means that the principal remains liable for the
fialure to fulfill the duty even if he or she had an agent performing the task. Ex
landlord and property owners have non-delegable duties to their tenants and
invitees, cannot absolve liability by hiring an agent
iv. The activity engaged in is inherently dangerous (e.g. demolition, blasting, or any activity
which is likely to cause harm or damage unless precautions are taken)
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b. Vicarious Liability
❖ A principal is vicariously liable for their agents actions in two situations:
➢ 1) when an agent is a) an employee b) who commits a tort c) while acting within the
scope of employment (Respondeat Superior); OR,
➢ 2) When an agent commits a tort when acting with apparent authority in dealing with a
third party on or purportedly on behalf of the principal (Apparent Agency)
**if the 3rd party succeeds in holding the principal vicariously liable for the agent’s tort, the
principal is then usually separately entitled to indemnification from the agent. May not be practical.
i. Respondeat Superior
❖ To be liable under respondeat superior, the agent must be 1) an employee and 2) acting within the
scope of employment when the tort occurred
1. Employee
❖ The principal is liable in tort for the actions of their employee, not the actions of an
independent contractor/non-employee agent.
❖ An individual is an employee, for purposes of vicarious liability, when the principal control
or has the right to control the manner and means by which the agent performs his or her
duties. This is determined by balancing factors
➢ Extent of control that agents and principal agreed the principal may exercise
over the details of the work
➢ Whether the agent is engaged in a distinct occupation or business
➢ Whether the type of work done by the agent is customarily done under a
principal’s direction or without supervision
➢ The skill required in the agent's occupation
➢ Whether the agent or the principal supplies the tools and other instrumentalities
required for the work and the place to perform it
➢ The length of time during which the agent is engaged by a principal
➢ Whether the agent is paid by the job or by the time worked
➢ Whether the agent’s work is part of the principal’s regular business
➢ Whether the principal and the agent believes that they are creating an
employment relationship; AND
➢ Whether the principal is or is not in business
a. Policy
i. (Fairness principle) Want to hold the principal liable for torts
over the type of agents it holds a higher degree of controll
becaue if they get the benefit of higher control they should get
a corresponding obligation of liability. That is if they control the
exact means of action (employee)they should get obligation to
be liable for those agent’s actions.
ii. Principal is the lowest cost avoider because they are in the best
position to prevent the agent from improper conduct and have
the greatest incentive to prevent harm to others
iii. Principal does not supervise the details of the independent
contractor’s work only needs the outcome and is therefore not
in as good a position to monitor the work and prevent
negligent performance
b. O’Connor v. Uber: Test: California Test of Employment, 2 step test
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i. 1) Pf needs to come forward with evidence they provided

services for an employer, the employee has established a
prima facie case that the relationship was one of a employee
a. Once this is proved the burden to prove
independent contractor shifts to the employer
ii. 2) The rights to control the manner and means to direct the
iii. Analysis:
1. Facts to first prong of the test:○ Uber only gets money
if the driver has rides. Set the $ for ride. Set
qualifications for drivers
2. Second Prong: Pf state that the K allows for Uber to
fire the employees at any time. Dispute about the
Manual on whether it was suggestions or instructions
and it was not clear if the driver could be fired for not
complying with the manual. Df said it was
independent contractor right because the driver
decides how much and when they are going to drive,
they drive their own vehicles, and the agreement the
drivers sign says that they are not in an employment
relationship. But the parties labels are relevant but
not controlling
Relationship type Employee Non-employee agent Non Agent (service

formerly known as provider)
“independent
contractor”)
Description Agent has the • Agent has the • No agency relationship

power to act on the power to act on the
principal’s behalf principal’s behalf
• Principal controls • Principal sets forth
the results and the desired results
physical conduct but does not
control the agent’s
physical conduct
(examples: lawyer, real
estate broker, stock
broker)
Legal Rules Principal is liable for Principal is not liable There is no agency
the employee’s tort if it for the non-employee relationship
occurred within the agent’s tort except in and no liability in agency law
scope of employment special cases (listed
above regarding the
direct liability of the
20
principal)
2. Within the scope of employment

❖ A principal’s vicarious liability only results if the employee’s tort occurred within the
scope of employment. According to the Rst 7.02, an employee acts within the scope of
employment when performing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of
conduct subject to the employer’s control. An employee’s act is not within the scope of
employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not intended by
the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.
a. Frolic and Detour
i. frolic=when an employee substantially deviates from or abandons the scope of
employment
ii. Detour=the employee is still engaged in the scope of employment but strays
slightly from the assignment
b. Intentional Torts
i. P can be found liable for A’s intentional tort occurred within scope of
employment
c. Motive/Purpose Test: If the tortious act occurs within an independent course of conduct
not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer. I.e. whether the
employee was motivated at least in part by a desire to serve the employer when the
conduct that constituted the intentional tort occured. Three question
1) Was the conduct of the same general nature as, or incidental to, the task the
agent was employed to perform?
2) Did the conduct occur substantially within the authorized time and space
limits of employment? (Detour vs. Frolic)
3) Was the conduct motivated at least in part by a purpose to serve the
principal?
d. Foreseeability test: Whether the employee’s conduct should fairly have been foreseen
from the nature of the employment or whether the risk of such conduct was typical or
incidental to the employer’s enterprise
e. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort (Negligence-Motive and Purpose): FACTS:Chef manager

was operating a restaurant at the bottom of the hill. Asked to check on the restaurant,
Mid Gad, half-way up the hill (no specification on what time to check on it). Chef ski's four
runs and then gets into an accident right above the Mid Gad restaurant and it was unclear
whether he was on his way back to the restaurant at the bottom of the hill
i. TEST: Those acts which are so closely connected with what the servant is
employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be
regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the
objectives of the employment
1. Three criteria
a. 1) Was the conduct of the same general nature as, or
incidental to, the task the agent was employed to perform?
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b. 2) Did the conduct occur substantially within the authorized

time and space limits of employment? (Detour vs. Frolic)
c. 3) Was the conduct motivated at least in part by a purpose to
serve the principal?
2. • Did you substantially act as to be considered to be removed from
employment/abandon your duties during this time
ii. Analysis: Was returning to work after his detour. No employer purpose was being
served. Acting consistent with employment directives because encouraged to ski
and given the ski pass. On his way back to return to his duties
iii. Holding: On the fourth run back down, he was not substantially abandoning the
work of the employer because it could be thought by the jury the chef was on his
way back to employment
f. Patterson v Blair (Intentional Tort):FACTS: Pf bought a car from Df's employer and there
was a term in the K saying it could be impounded if default on loan. Pf did not pay the
loan. Df shot both back tires of the truck and then impounded it
i. Analysis: The confrontation was during the time the DF’s employees were trying
to retrieve the car and the employees carried a gun outside of the office. The Df
had previously repossessed cars, so within business, and by shoting out the back
tires the Df’s employee was acting to further the business interests of DF and
was atleast incidental to the conduct that was authorized by Courtesy
ii. Holding: Although the act was criminal, it was not so outrageous to indicate that
the motive was a personal one. Thus, employee acted within the scope of
employment and thus Df was vicariously liable.
ii. Apparent Agency

❖ A claim of apparent agency arises in: (1) circumstances which led an injured third party to reasonably
believe that an agency or employment relationship existed between the principal or alleged principal and
the alleged agent-tortfeasor; and (2) those circumstances existed because of some action or inaction on the
part of the principal in creating or failing to dispel that belief. Some, but not all, courts require (3) a showing
that the third party's injury arose out of the third party’s justifiable reliance that an agency or employee
relationship existed.
iii. Butler v. McDonald’s Corporation: Pf entered a Mcdonald’s franchise restaurant and upon entry
the door shattered and resulted in injury. Pf alleged there was a spider crack in the glass portion of
the door for two weeks, which the Df knew or should have known about and should have been
prepared.
iv. Analysis: Apparent agency extends to torts, but not all torts. Example in a med mal case the pf
may rely on the representations/work of a Doctor of a hospital even if the doctor is an
independent contractor. Whereas, it is difficult for one to claim reliance on the fact the driver was
an agent of a vehicle who struck them. 1) Pf could reasonably conclude that the restaurant was
owned by Df becasue of the Advertisements, decor, and menu 2) it is difficult to determine if the
restaurant is actually a franchise from the outside/from a reasonable consumer because all
McDonalds look alike. Therefore, there was an apparent agency between the Franchise and Parent
company caused by the Parent’s controlling action of the franchise agreeemnt.
v. Holding: There could be an apparent agency and tort liability
D. Termination of the Agency Relationship-Actual Authority
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❖ Either the principal or the agent can terminate the agency relationship at any time, and for any reason by
communicating to the other that the relationship is at an end.
➢ Ways that an agency relationship can end
■ Death of the principal or agent (when the agent or third party has notice)
■ Loss of capacity of the principal (when the agent or third party has notice)
■ The expiration of a specified term or event, if there was one, for the agency relationship
● If not, then the agency continues until a reasonable time has passed based on a
reasonable, objective appraisal of the parties’ conduct (fact specific)
■ The occurrence of circumstances on the basis of which the agent should reasonably conclude that
the principal no longer would assent to the agent’s taking action on the principals behalf (i.e.,
accomplishment of a specified purpose of the agency relationship, facts constituting a supervening
frustration in the agent’s ability to accomplish the principal’s objectives)
1. Renunciation or revocation is effective when the other party has notice of it.
2. Some fid duties continue but some cease (continue confidentiality and disclosure)
3. If the parties have a contractual relationship as well as an agency it is possible that one of the parties could be in
breach, but that does not impinge upon each party’s unilateral power to terminate the agency relationship.
4. Ways an agency relationship may be terminated
a. •Agreement of parties:
i. –The contract between principal and agent states when it will end or upon the happening of a
specified event.
b. •By lapse of time:
i. –At end of specified time, or if none, then within a reasonable time period
c. •Any time by either party after notice:
i. –At common law, presumed “at will” relationship so either party may terminate (terminology is a
“revocation” by P or “renunciation” by A). Note this power exists even though the party exercising
the power may be in breach of the agency contract, if one.
ii. –Exception where “power given as security” then the relationship cannot be unilaterally
terminated because one party has a right to foreclose.
d. •By change of circumstances that should cause A to realize P would want to terminate authority:
i. –E.g., destruction of subject matter of the authority, drastic change in business conditions, change
in relevant laws.
e. •Fulfillment of the purpose of the agency relationship:
i. –i.e., completion of task
f. •By operation of law:
i. –Termination occurs automatically; e.g., upon death or loss of capacity of either A or P, such as
dissolution of a corporation or insanity of a person.
g. Security Agreement: It is possible when there is an exchange of consideration an agency relationship will
not terminate by virtue of notice to the other party. This can occur with a debt/collateral/security
agreement and the ability for a bank to foreclose on the underlying asset (that, in a sense, creates an
agency relationship)
E. Termination of the Agency Relationship-Apparent Authority

❖ Apparent authority does not end when actual authority ends. Apparent authority ends when it is no longer
reasonable for the third party to believe that the agent continues with authority
➢ Must provide reasonable notice to a third party that the agency ends, so that the third party no longer
reasonably believes that person has authority.
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Partnerships
❖ A partnership is the association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business
for a profit.
A. Partnership Formation (Definition and Distinction from Other Relationships; Partnership by

Estoppel)
❖ A partnership is formed when two or more persons voluntarily carry out as co-owners of a business for a
profit, whether or not they intended to form a partnership. This can be formed with no written agreement
or governmental action. The partnership can be formed without the knowledge or intent to form a
partnership
❖ Test for determining whether a partnership has formed RUPA §202 ©
➢ (1) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, joint property, common property,
or part ownership does not by itself establish a partnership, even if the co-owners share profits
made by the use of the property.
➢ (2) The sharing of gross returns (revenue) does not by itself establish a partnership, even if the
persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in property from which the returns
are derived.
➢ (3) A person who receives a share of the profits of a business is presumed to be a partner in the
business, unless the profits were received in payment:
■ (i) of a debt by installments or otherwise;
■ (ii) for services as an independent contractor or of wages or other compensation to an
employee;
■ (iii) of rent;
■ (iv) of an annuity or other retirement or health benefit to a beneficiary, representative, or
designee of a deceased or retired partner;
■ (v) of interest or other charge on a loan, even if the amount of payment varies with the
profits of the business, including a direct or indirect present or future ownership of the
collateral, or rights to income, proceeds, or increase in value derived from the collateral;
or
■ (vi) for the sale of the goodwill of a business or other property by installments or
otherwise
❖ Common Law factors
➢ Court cites UPA equivalents of RUPA § 202, and lists several factors that courts additionally use in
making the determination:
■ 1.Intention of Parties
■ 2.Profit Sharing
■ 3.Sharing of Losses (Risk)
■ 4.Management (Control)
■ 5.Ownership of Property (Control)
■ 6.Rights of Parties on Termination/Dissolution
■ 7.Conduct/Holding Out to Third Parties
➢ Burden is on party alleging the partnership
1. Relationship can be between humans and business entities.
2. Personal Liability: General partners do not have limited liability, so partner is jointly and severally
liable for the debts of the partnership
3. Pass through business structure
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4. When a partnership forms, the relationship between them and third parties is governed by
partnership law.
a) Default rules=RUPA (revised uniform partnership act) which codified with case law are the
default rules.
5. If the partnership decides to have a partnership agreement, that agreement on conduct controls
over the statutory provisions of RUPA except for some nonwaivable rights:
a) The partnership agreement may not (Nonwaivable rights)
(1) Unreasonably restrict a partner's right of access to partnership books and
records
(2) Alter or eliminate the duty of loyalty, although it is permissible to make specific
exceptions or carve outs provided they are not manifestly unreasonable. They
are not allowed to make broad exceptions.
(a) A partnership agreement may provide for the limitation or elimination
of any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach of duties
(including fiduciary duties) of a partner or other person to a partnership
or to another partner or to another person that is a party to or is
otherwise bound by a partnership agreement; provided, that a
partnership agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or
omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of the implied contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing
(3) Eliminate the contractual obligations of good faith and fair dealing (but the
partnership agreement may prescribe standards, if not manifestly unreasonable,
by which performance of the obligation is measured)
(4) VAry the power of a partner to dissociate
(5) Vary the grounds for a court to expel a partner under specific circumstances
(6) Vary the causes of dissolution upon a partner or transferee’s application to a
court under specific circumstances
(7) Vary the requirement to wind up the partnership business in certain
circumstances
(8) Restrict the right of third parties under RUPA
6. Joint Venture: a business endeavor undertaken by two or more parties, typically with a limited
scope and/or for a limited time. Typically a partnership, unless not for profit or formed as another
organization type
7. Fenwick v. Unemployment Compensation Commission:Pf opened up a beauty shop and
employed Chesire as a cashier and reception clerk, employed at a salary of $15/week. There was a
new K that was formed with additional benefits and it said partnership. Relationship was
terminated by Chesire
a) Analysis: Must look at the intention of the parties with the relationship. The Pf valued her
work and did not want to lose her so he provided her an increase in pay and she did the
exact same work. Although she got profits, she shared in neither the losses or provided
no capital or share for dissolution. The conduct of the parties does not support that they
were partners and they did not indicate to anyone else that they were partners. And
Chesire owned no right upon dissolution
b) Holding: Co-ownership was lacking because she had not control or authority in the
business, was not subject to losses and not held out as a partner. Not a partner, but an
employee.
(1) Sharing of profits is evidence of a partnership, except when they are received in
payment as wages as an employee
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c) Factors to determine Partnership;

(1) Court cites UPA equivalents of RUPA § 202, and lists several factors that courts
additionally use in making the determination:
(2) 1.Intention of Parties
(3) 2.Profit Sharing
(4) 3.Sharing of Losses (Risk)
(5) 4.Management (Control)
(6) 5.Ownership of Property (Control)
(7) 6.Rights of Parties on Termination/Dissolution
(8) 7.Conduct/Holding Out to Third Parties
(9) Burden is on party alleging the partnership
8. Martin v, Peyton: Respondents loaned KNK money to be returned, KNK were supposed to turn
over a large number of their own securities, in compensation respondents were supposed to
receive 40% of the profits until the return was made, not more than $500K or $100K. At all times
the management of the firm remained in the hands of Hall, a partner of the firm. •“Loan”: PPF
loaned securities valued at $2.5 million to KNK for use as collateral, not to be mingled with other
KNK securities
a) •Collateral: KNK put up its own speculative securities as collateral for loan from PPF
(riskier grade); partners’ assigned rights to profits to PPF Term: 2 yearsPPF continued to
collect the dividends on its loaned securities. Repayment: 40% of KNK profits; min. =
$100k, max. = $500k.
b) Protections Required by PPF [Lender]:Inspection/Information rights KNK could not loan $
to its partners Veto power over any business believed too speculative Hall to be
designated managing partner PPF had option to join the firm during the 2 years, or at
later date by buying 50% of interests at a stated price Resignation of KNK partners held by
Hall, with decision whether to accept held by PPF and Hall (“somewhat unusual”)
c) Held: Not a partnership but lender/creditor relationship
B. Partnership by Estoppel
❖ The third party plaintiff must establish that:
➢ 1.The person sought to be charged as a partner made a representation, either by words
or conduct, purporting to be a partner, or consented to being represented by another as a
partner; and
➢ 2.The third party relied on this representation in entering into a transaction with the
actual or purported partnership (= a change of position with consequent injury in reliance
on the representation).
A. (c) A person is not liable as a partner merely because the person is named by another as a partner
in a statement of partnership authority
B. Doctrine designed to protect creditors in situations where there is reliance on a purported partner
C. Young v. Jones: PwC Bahamas gave an unqualified opinion to a company and on the basis of the
opinion PF deposited money into that bank. F/S were falsified and Pf lost their money. Pf asserted
that PwC-Bahamas and PwC-US are a partnership or partnership by estoppel. DF’s contest that
they are partners because they have Ks under seal stating that they are separate organizations.
a. Held: No partnership between PwC-B and PwC-US because there had been no affirmative
representations or actions from PwC-US indicating a partnership between the entities and
PF did not detrimentally rely on any partnership indication when transacting.
b. Analysis: Pf provided a number of pieces of evidence that suggested the PWC is a global
partnership, however, not many or none were affirmatively seen or relied upon here, but
generally to determine information. There is no evidence in the record that Pf relied upon
a representation by PwC US or Bahamas about their transaction or that there was a
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partnership between the entities. There was no evidence that the US arm had anything to
do with the audit.
c. Rule: A person who represents himself, or permits another to represent him, to a third-
party as a partner in an existing partnership or with others not actual partners, is liable to
any such person to whom such a representation is made who has, on the faith of the
representation, given credit to the actual or apparent partnership.
D. Chavers v Epsco: FAther owned a business, his sons then joined and worked there,Pfs. Pfs stated
that it was a sole proprietorship and the sons just worked there. Df entered into a K with Pf to
provide payroll services. Df then extended Pf credit, based in part on their belief that it was a
partnership. PF became delinquent and Df sued the PFs as a partnership.
a. Rule: All persons who hold themselves out, or knowingly permit others to hold them out,
to the public as partners, although they are not in partnership, become bound as partners
to all who deal with them in their apparent relationship. Essentially, they are estopped in
denying liability as a partner to one who has extended credit in reliance thereon,
although no partnership has in fact existed.
b. Analysis: Fax credit references and cover sheet listed Father as the Owner and sons as the
partners that the Dfs received when asking for credit references. Additionally, on the Pf’s
credit application they marked that the type of business is a partnership. Checks written
to DF were in an account “GAry A. or Reggie J. Chavers” signed by either individual.
Business cards listed all them as owners. Dealership application lists both parties as
owners.
c. Holding: Despite PF contesting the facts the Appellate court did not care because the trial
court has deference. Therefore, they found that the Pf were holding themselves out as
partners, despite saying they were not, the Df relied on this to their detriment; therefore,
there is a partnership by estoppel.
E. HYPO: Suppose Sam Slick tells Big Bank that he is a partner with Rick Rich, and Big Bank extends
credit to Sam because of Rick’s good reputation and wealth. If Rick knew about Sam’s falsehood to
Big Bank but did nothing, then most courts would treat Rick as a partner for purposes of liability
for Sam’s dealings with Big Bank; Big Bank could go to purported-partner Rick for money owed.
C. The Fiduciary Duties of Partners

❖ Each partner owes their other partners a duty of care and loyalty, and to some degree a right to information about
the partnership.
1. Policy:To protect parties in a business enterprise to feel that their interests would be protected, legally, so that there
can be economic proliferations
a. If not, then people will be increasingly skeptical that someone will cheat them in their business together
and thus not enter into business with one another
2. These fiduciary duties help protect parties who cannot contract around all the possible scenarios that one may cheat
the other
a. Contracts are inherently incomplete by their nature
3. This is an adaptable doctrine that can help protect those who have been cheated. It is a Gap filler in a K to deal with
something that has not been specified but has been intended by the parties conduct
a. **if you put the incentives for the parties to do different things then it might create funny incentives that
will allow for misappropriation of the assets.
4. Meinhard v. Salmon: Gerry 1 leased Hotel Bristol to Df for a 20 year term to change the hotel building for use as
shops and offices costing $200,000. Df entered into a financing partnership with Pf, it was a Joint Venture. DF pay Pf
40% of profits for first 5 years and then 50% thereafter. Losses were born equally. Gerry 2, new owner, went to Df
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with four months left on the lease with a new lease covering the whol tract of land for an intial 20 year period and
then for successive renewable periods to a maximum of 80 years, at will. Pf personally guaranteed the lease. Lease
signed on 1/25/1922, three months before the end of the previous lease, and never told the DF about the plan. Pf
found out and began the proceeding.
a. Analysis: As an active manager, Df owed a greater fiduciary duty to PF than PF did to DF, because of the
active nature of his role. Nonetheless, they were in it “For better or for worse.” Joint adventurers, like
copartners, owe one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of finest loyalty—the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive , is the standard behavior. Gerry looked to the DF knowing he was the operator of
the business for a business opportunity, and to the objective eye it only looked like Df was the sole operator
—despite evidence to the contrary. Yet Df appropriated the opportunity in silence, not warning his partner
of the opportunity to get in or even compete. Court reasoned that due to the profitability of the business it
might seem that the silence was an indication of a re-signing of the lease, and nothing indicating that there
was an offer to extend the lease after the K expired that was offered to the partnership.
b. Holding: The fact that Df was in control of the business and through his power of direction it charged him
the duty to disclose, since only through disclosure could the opportunity be equalized. The subject matter
of the new lease was an extension of the old lease, therefore it was an opportunity for the partnership
while it lasted. Shares of the new lease and operation are allotted to the partnership 51 to DF and 49 to Pf.
c. Dissent: Andrews agrees that there is a duty of loyalty in a partnership, but the duty of loyaty in a JV only
extends as to the scope of the JV (i.e., here the duty of loyalty only last so far as the lease extended).
However, Cardozo thinks that the lease extension is tied to the same lease is operating because it was for
the same physical space and operations. Both justices agree about the law and the fiduciary duties, but
they disagree as to the application of the law to the facts here (I.e. the scope of the JV and whether the
new opportunity was owed to the partnership)
5. Meehan v. Shaughnessy: Meehan and Boyle were partners in the law firm but decided to leave. They then recruited
other partners and associates to join their new firm, secured a bank loan, and retained an attorney to advise them
on partnership formation. Boyle created a financial statement with a list of jobs they expected to take with them,
Boyle was in charge of reassigning cases from a departed partner, he assigned none to a requesting attorney and
assigned most of them to himself and Schafer (an associate he recruited to join the new firm with him). All attorneys
worked their normal hours and to the normal standard. When asked by other partners if they were leaving they said
they were not. But then later stated they were. Meehan and Boyle then sent clients letters on their own firms Letter
head asking them to come with them to their firm. Meehan and Boyle then sued their own firm for unfairly
withholding wages for work done. Former firm counter claimed on a number of claims: (1) Violated fiduciary duties
(2) Breached partnership agreement (3) Tortuously interfered with their advantageous business and contractual
relationships.
a. Rule: Partners owe their co-partners the utmost duty of good faith and loyalty and must consider their co-
partners’ welfare, and not merely their own. Fiduciaries may plan to compete with the entity they owe
allegiance to, provided that they do not breach a duty in that course of action (i.e., they don’t actually
compete). A partner has an obligation to render on demand true and full information of all things affecting
the partnership to any partner. Employee’s operating in a position of trust and confidence owe a duty of
loyalty to their employer and must protect the interest of their employer
b. Analysis: The court found that the partners did not perform any cases in a detrimental way while at their
previous firm and thus no breach. Additionally, merely signing a loan, finding a lease, and creating a
financial statement is nothing more than merely planning and nothing in breach of a fiduciary duty. On the
last point, there was a interference and secrecy to take the partnership’s clients due to the Df’s secrecy and
the way they obtained the consent was a breach. This was because the Df’s affirmatively denied they were
leaving three times, but during that period made plans for removal authorization of the clients, using their
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position of trust and confidence to the disadvantage of their old firm. Associates breached their duty
because they had confidential information (position of trust and confidence) and a substantial case load.
c. Holding: by engaging in preemptive tactics they breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing and
loyalty to their partners. The court looked to two facts 1) they lied to their partners about leaving and 2) did
not comply with ethics regulations about sending clients a letter and giving them a choice to stay. The
associated breached their duty too.
d. § Two things Ps did that violated their fiduciary duties – they lied to their partners about intentions to leave
(when Ps asked by other partners about whether they were leaving, they either evaded question or flat out
denied) and when they contacted clients in letter, what they said didn’t give clients a choice to stay with old
firm – should’ve clearly given client the choice as to whether they wanted to stay with firm or leave. Once
Ps decided to leave firm, they can prepare to compete without violating fiduciary duty (lease office space,
make new letterhead, prepare to contact clients), but they cannot compete; once partners take actions that
are construed as actually competing with partners while still at firm is when violate fiduciary duties .
e. Note: Look to relevant state law regarding fiduciary duties as well as ethics rules. Many firms explicitly
ban such behavior in partnership agreements and courts will enforce the terms of those contracts.
f. Once Meehan and Boyle left the firm, what could they do?
● There needs to be a distinction between preparing to compete and actually competing with the
partnership
● Facts that suggest you are already competing suggest a breach
○ Contacting the clients in a way that indicated they should come with them
● Clear you couldn’t lie, but it is not clear what you need to do when wanting to leave. Some courts
say that you need to give reasonable notice
What could have Parker Coulter done?
● Reached out to all the clients
● Told the partners to vacate the premises immediately
What is the reference to the ABA ruling in the opinion?
● It is relevant to the fiduciary duties to protect clients, and not meant to protect scope of fiduciary
duties, but it acts as guideposts as to how lawyers expect to treat their other lawyers in a law firm.
From an ethics stand point.
There are also contract issues when a partner in a law firm because there is a partnership agreement that you may
be breaching.
6.Fiduciary duties owed to Partners in a Partnership: RUPA § 409

❖ A partner owes to the partnership and the other partners the duties of loyalty and care, good faith and fair dealing
and the right to information
❖ (e) A partner does not violate a duty or obligation under the act or under the partnership agreement solely because
the partner’s conduct furthers the partner's own interest. (f) All partners may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure
of all material fact, a specific act or transaction by a partner that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.
➢ If, as permitted in subsection (f) or the partnership agreement, a partner enters into a transaction with the
partnership which otherwise would be prohibited by subsection (b)(2) (Duty of Loyalty), the partner’s rights
and obligations arising from the transaction are the same as those of a person that is not a partner.
❖ (f) It is a defense to a claim under subsection (b)(2)—loyalty to refrain from dealing—and any comparable claim in
equity or at common law that the transaction was fair to the partnership.
➢ Just because the partner is acting in their own personal interest is not a breach of the fiduciary duty. And
the person can show they were not breaching the duty if they show it was fair to the partnership
➢ § I.e., Partner contracted with the Pship to provide a loan and he received interest.
29
■ · That is not a prima facie breach of Fid. Duties especially if you look and see that the Int rate was
at or less than market value
7. Duty of Loyalty: § 409 (b)

❖ Non Rupa: A partnership can plan to compete with his partnership so long as they do not actually compete, further a
partner cannot take opportunities for himself that in all aspects/nature belong to the partnership.
❖ (b)The fiduciary duty of loyalty of a partner includes the duties:
➢ 1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit derived by the
partner
■ § (a) in the conduct or winding up of the partnership’s business
■ § (b) from a use by the partner of the partnership's property; OR
● Cannot use partnership property for their own profit
■ § (c) from the appropriation of a partnership opportunity;
● Cannot take a partnership opportunity or unnecessarily compete with the partnership
(see sub (2))
➢ (2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up of the partnership business as
or on behalf of a person having an interest adverse to the partnership; and
➢ (3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership’s business before the
dissolution of the partnership
8. Duty of Care: § 409(c)

❖ The Duty of Care of a partner in the conduct or winding up of the partnership business is to refrain from engaging in
grossly negligent or reckless conduct, willful or intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of the law
9. Good Faith and Fair Dealing: § 409(d)

❖ A partner shall discharge the duties and obligations under this act or under the partnership agreement and exercise
any rights consistently with the contractual obligations of good faith and fair dealing
10. Right to Information of Partners and Persons Dissociated as Partner: RUPA § 408
❖ (a) A partnership shall keep its books and records, if any, at its principal office.
❖ (b) On reasonable notice, a partner may inspect and copy during regular business hours, at a reasonable location
specified by the partnership, any record maintained by the partnership regarding the partnership’s business,
financial condition, and other circumstances, to the extent the information is material to the partner’s rights and
duties under the partnership agreement or this [act].
❖ c) The partnership shall furnish to each partner:
➢ (1) without demand, any information concerning the partnership’s business, financial condition, and other
circumstances which the partnership knows and is material to the proper exercise of the partner’s rights
and duties under the partnership agreement or this [act], except to the extent the partnership can establish
that it reasonably believes the partner already knows the information; and
➢ (2) on demand, any other information concerning the partnership’s business, financial condition, and other
circumstances, except to the extent the demand or the information demanded is unreasonable or
otherwise improper under the circumstances.
❖ (d) The duty to furnish information under subsection (c) also applies to each partner to the extent the partner
knows any of the information described in subsection (c).
❖ (e) Subject to subsection (j), on 10 days’ demand made in a record received by a partnership, a person dissociated as
a partner may have access to information to which the person was entitled while a partner if: (1) the information
pertains to the period during which the person was a partner; (2) the person seeks the information in good faith;
and (3) the person satisfies the requirements imposed on a partner by subsection (b).
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❖ (f) Not later than 10 days after receiving a demand under subsection (e), the partnership in a record shall inform the
person that made the demand of: (1) the information that the partnership will provide in response to the demand
and when and where the partnership will provide the information; and (2) the partnership’s reasons for declining, if
the partnership declines to provide any demanded information.
❖ (g) A partnership may charge a person that makes a demand under this section the reasonable costs of copying,
limited to the costs of labor and material.
❖ (h) A partner or person dissociated as a partner may exercise the rights under this section through an agent or, in
the case of an individual under legal disability, a legal representative. Any restriction or condition imposed by the
partnership agreement or under subsection (j) applies both to the agent or legal representative and to the partner
or person dissociated as a partner.
❖ (i) Subject to Section 505, the rights under this section do not extend to a person as transferee.
❖ (j) In addition to any restriction or condition stated in its partnership agreement, a partnership, as a matter within
the ordinary course of its business, may impose reasonable restrictions and conditions on access to and use of
information to be furnished under this section, including designating information confidential and imposing
nondisclosure and safeguarding obligations on the recipient. In a dispute concerning the reasonableness of a
restriction under this subsection, the partnership has the burden of proving reasonableness.
11. Nonwaivable Provisions – RUPA § 103:

(b) The partnership agreement may not:
❖ o (2) Unreasonably restrict the right of access to books and records under § 403(b);
❖ o (3) Eliminate the duty of loyalty, but:
➢ § (i) The partnership agreement may identify specific types of categories of activities that do not
violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable; or
■ · I.e. can make clear that certain types of activities or opportunities are not part of the
partnership so that a partner can still pursue that activity or opportunity without violating
duty of loyalty.
➢ § (ii) All of the partners or a number or percentage specified in the partnership agreement may
authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise
would violate the duty of loyalty; (KNOW THIS)
❖ o (4) Unreasonably reduce the duty of care (ex could not say there’s not fiduciary duty among partners);
❖ (5) Eliminate obligation of good faith and fair dealing, but the partnership agreement may prescribe the
standards by which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are not manifestly
unreasonable
- RUPA Analysis:
o (1) Was it a partnership opportunity? No specific test for determining answer; courts look at facts and ask
whether this was an opportunity in natural course that belonged to partnership (i.e. did it relate to subject of the
partnership business? Did parties seem to intend that something like this would’ve belonged to the partnership?).
§ If No: There is no breach of duty of loyalty even if partner takes for himself or herself – it didn’t belong to
the partnership in the first place.
§ If Yes: It was partnership opportunity and must do more analysis.
· RUPA: If it was a partnership opportunity, then ask whether partner who got that information about
partnership opportunity disclosed all the material facts about it and gets consent from the other partners.
o If they didn’t, and if they appropriated that opportunity (i.e. took it for their own purposes), then
breaching duty of loyalty.
o BUT if partners disclose and get consent, then there’s no breach of duty of loyalty.
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D. Rights of Partners in Management; Partnership Liability

❖ RUPA sets forth the default rules for partnership management and liability, which can be contracted
around.
1. Partner Management Rights and Duties: Rupa § 401 (Default)
a. Rights to conduct business: Partnership
❖ § 401(h): Each partner has equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership's business
➢ Default: Per Capita Equality=Meaning that each partner has an equal right/vote=1 partner/1 vote
➢ Hypo: Imagine partnership with A, B, C. Contribution, respectively, 70%, 20%, 10%. How would you
describe the rights of management?
■ Unless agree otherwise, the default rule is that each has an equal vote (1 vote each) in
the management.
➢ This is a default rule and can be altered by agreement.
■ For example the partners can agree that A gets 7 votes, B gets 2 votes, and C gets 1 vote,
in accordance with economic contribution.
b. Business Decisions: Inside and Outside the Course of Business (Default rules)
❖ §401 (k): A difference arising as to a matter in the ordinary course of business may be decided by a
majority of the partners
➢ Default rule, can be altered by agreement.
■ E.g., large Law firms have an executive committee that provide centralized law firm
administration where it would be unworkable to communicate with all the partners.
❖ § 401(k): An act outside the ordinary course of business of a partnership and an amendment to the
partnership agreement may be undertaken only with the affirmative vote or consent of all of the partners
➢ These are default rules and can be altered by agreement
➢ If partner’s act is not in the ordinary course of the partnership business or a partner desires to
amend the partnership agreement to act contrary to its provisions, then a unanimous vote is
required
C. Partnership and Agency in Contract: General Agency, Actual Authority, Apparent Authority
1. Actual Authority: Contract Liability
❖ RUPA §301(1): Each partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business.
Therefore, each has actual authority to enter into contracts, in the ordinary course of business, on
behalf of the partnership,
➢ See § 401(K): Any limit on the actual authority of a partner to act in the ordinary course
must be decided by a majority of partners.
■ In partnership with an even number, deadlock is a problem and when deadlock
occurs the measure is not passed.
a. By default a partner has actual authority to enter into contracts in the ordinary course of
the partnership’s business
b. Effect of § 301(1) is to characterize a partner as a general managerial agent having both
actual and apparent authority co-extensive in scope with the firm’s ordinary business, at
least in the absence of a contrary partnership agreement.
2. Apparent Authority: Contract Liability

❖ RUPA § 301(1): An act of a partner, including the signing of an instrument in the partnership name, for
apparently carrying on in the ordinary course of the partnership business, or business of the kind carried on
by the partnership, binds the partnership, UNLESS 1) the partner did not have authority to act for the
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partnership in the particular matter AND 2) the person with which the partner was dealing knew or had
received notice that the partner lacked authority
➢ A third party must show a reasonable belief regarding the partner’s authority.
➢ KNEW= subjective knowledge
■ What the third party actually knew
➢ RECEIVED NOTICE= 1) actually received it or 2) it was duly delivered
■ Duly delivered = if a notification of a partner’s authority is duly delivered to a third party
(e.g., a 3rd party’s place of business), the party cannot rely on apparent authority with
regard to the limitation even if the 3rd party has not actually read the notification.
a. Stems from agency law requirement of holding out by the principal is effectively satisfied
by the mere fact that the person is a partner
b. Extends to any transaction that would be apparent for carrying on the business of the
kind run by the partnership
c. HYPO: A, B, and C form a partnership to run a pet hospital. All agree that A shall have the
exclusive authority to order supplies, B shall have exclusive authority to handle
advertising, and C shall have exclusive authority to hire help. Could the partnership be
liable on an advertising contract that A entered into on behalf of the partnership?
i. A has no actual authority, but A would have apparent authority to enter into
contract because A is a partner and from a 3rd party’s perspective partners have
apparent authority to do those things. As long as TP does not have notice of
limited partnership authority.
D. Statement of Partnership Authority (RUPA § 303)

1. • This provision allows a partnership to centrally file, such as with the secretary of state (and, for real
property transfers, with the county recorder), a “statement of partnership authority” that states the
authority or limitations of authority, of some or all of the partners to enter into transactions on behalf of
the partnership.
2. • A grant of authority in a properly filed statement of partnership authority is conclusive evidence in favor
of a bona fide purchaser for value.
3. • The effect of a limitation of authority in a properly filed statement of partnership authority depends on
whether or not it concerns real estate transactions. A third party is not deemed to know of a limitation of a
partner merely because the limitation is contained in a filed statement, unless it concerns the limitation of
a partner to transfer real property. A properly filed limitation of authority to transfer real property is
deemed to give purchasers constructive knowledge of a lack of authority.
E. Partnership Liability for a Partner’s Conduct: Joint Liability for Tort (RUPA §305(a))
❖ RUPA § 305(a): A partnership is liable for loss or injury caused to a person, or for a penalty incurred, as a
result of 1) a wrong act or omission, or other actionable conduct, 2) of a partner acting in the ordinary
course of business of the partnership OR 3) with authority of the partnership.
➢ No respondeat superior analysis because each partner is a agent/principal of the partnership
1. Test to determine partnership liability:
a. Determine whether 1) the partner was acting in the ordinary course of business of the partnership
or 2) with authority/authorization
i. The partners course of conduct was within the scope of the partnership business or the
type broadly authorized for that type of business
ii. If the act was outside normal course of business or without authority, then the
partnership is not liable (but the individual partner may be liable)
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iii. For apparent authority, if it’s something regarding the ordinary course of the
partnership business, there’s apparent authority that would bind partnership to
liability on that unless partner had no authority to act for the partnership in a
particular manner and the person with whom the partner was dealing knew that or
received notice of that.
2. 305(b) provides that a partnership is liable in certain circumstances if a partner misapplies money or
property of a third person
F. Partner’s Liability: Joint and Several Liability (RUPA § 306)

❖ §306(a)All partners are jointly and severally liable for all debts, obligations, and other liability of the
partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law.
❖ §306 (b) A person that becomes a partner is not personally liable for a debt, obligation, or other liability of
the partnership incurred before the person became a partner
➢ After a partner leaves, she is liable only for obligations of the partnership incurred while she was
part of it
❖ An individual partner has unlimited personal liability for the obligations of the partnership, but between
the partners each partner is only responsible for his share of the partnership obligation
➢ If one partner pays off a partnership obligation, he is entitled to indemnification from the
partnership up to their contribution amount. If the partnership lacks the funds to indemnify the
partner, the partners are required to contribute according to their loss shares.
■ Not full indemnification, but equal proportion of the losses. Partners are co-equals so
they should share the burden of the loss.
1. Claimants/creditor may sue the partners jointly as a group or separately as individuals for the full amount
of the relevant obligation
2. So a partners has personal, unlimited liability for the entire amount of partnership liabilities
G. Exhaustion Rule: Actions By and Against Partnership and Partners (RUPA § 307(d)(1))
❖ A judgment creditor is required to seek to recover from partnership assets before proceeding against an
individual partner’s assets.
H. Miscellaneous Partnership Rules:

● •RUPA § 401(b): “A partnership shall reimburse a partner for any payment made by the partner in the course of the
partner’s activities on behalf of the partnership…”
● •RUPA § 401(c): “A partnership shall indemnify and hold harmless a person with respect to any claim or demand
against the person and any debt, obligation, or other liability incurred by the person by reason of the person’s
former or present capacity as a partner, if the claim, demand, debt, obligation does not arise from the person’s
breach [of this section, § 407 on improper distributions, or § 409 on standards of conduct for partners].”
● •RUPA § 401(g): A partner can make a loan to the partnership, “which accrues interest from the date of the
payment or advance.”
National Biscuit v. Stroud: Stroud and Freeman formed a general partnership to sell groceries. Partnership agreement did not
limit either partner’s authority to conduct ordinary business on behalf of partnership. Stroud told National Biscuit that he
would not be personally liable for any bread sold to partnership. Before the Partnership dissolved, Freeman ordered more
bread on behalf of partnership, and NB delivered bread to partnership. Stroud refused to pay for bread upon dissolution and
NB sued.
Holding: A third party can hold a partner jointly and severally liable, even though the partner affirmatively told Pf
they were not jointly or severally liable for the debts incurred. Here, Freeman had actual authority to buy bread/bind the
business and it was an act within the ordinary course of business. To change something in the ordinary course, requires a
34
majority agreement. The basis for the ruling was that Freeman had actual authority to bind the business and that change in
actual authority must be changed by a majority vote between the partners, which did not occur. Thus, Stroud’s notification to
Nat. Bis. Co. can only be relevant to apparent authority, so since Freeman had actual authority the notice by Stroud, does not
matter the debt was incurred before the Partnership dissolved and thus Stroud was responsible for that portion.
Rule: A partner cannot restrict a third-party's remedies against the partner or partnership, but the partners can
agree amongst themselves to indemnify
Summers v. Dooley: Summers and Dooley were co-partners in a trash collection business. Both partners operated business.
Partners agreed that when one partner was unable to work, he could hire a replacement at his own expense. Dooley became
unable to work and at his own expense hired an additional employee to take his place. Later, Summers asked Dooley if he
would agree to hire an additional employee. Dooley refused, but Summers hired the worker anyway and paid him out of his
own pocket. Dooley would not agree to pay new employee out of partnership funds. Summers sued Dooley, seeking
reimbursement for expenses incurred in hiring new employee.
Holding: In a partnership, decisions within the course of business are to be decided by a majority vote. In a two
person partnership, the dissent of one of the partners is a deadlock and the provision/request is effectively denied. Here,
Dooley initially objected to and continually objected to hiring the additional employee. “He did not sit idly by and acquiesce
in the actions of his partner.” Therefore, Summers was not entitled to pay the employee out of the partnership’s funds.
If "Smith" sued Dooley, that would be a different situation.
○ What reason would Smith have to sue Dooley?
■ Third-party may have contracted because Summer had apparent authority and thus the third party
could sue both Dooley, Summer, and the Partnership
■ However, the arrangement and liability between Dooley and Summer would be the same
How to Reconcile National Biscuit and Summers

1. National Biscuit: Suit was brought by a third party seeking to hold liable the partnership for acts of one of the
partners.
a. § All partners are agents of the partnership with power to bind partnership. As a partner, Freeman had
actual authority to conduct affairs in ordinary course of business. The partnership could have restricted that
authority, but not without a majority vote and Stroud did not control a majority and no vote occurred.
Therefore, the debt that took place while the partnership happened was binding on the partnership and
the parties could have contracted to indemnify one another.
2. o Summers: Suit was brought by one partner against the other for contribution towards an alleged partnership
expense.
a. § All partners have equal rights to participate in the management of the partnership, and it takes a
majority to change the status quo within the ordinary course of business. If Summers wants to be
reimbursed for an act changing the status quo, he needs a majority vote, even if the act would have bound
the partnership to a third party under the apparent authority principle.
3. Which partner is trying to change the status quo? In a deadlock, the partner proposing the change loses.
a. National Biscuit and Summers both involved 1 of 2 partners trying to change the previously-authorized
status quo without the agreement of the other partner.
E. Financial Aspects of a Partnership (Sharing of Profits and Losses; Partnership Property; Related
Topics)
1) Partnership Property
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1. Partnership property=everything that the partnership owns including both capital and property
that is subsequently acquired in partnership transactions and operations
2. Partnership Capital= the property or money contributed by each partner for the partnership’s
business.
3. Is it partnership Property? (RUPA rule § 203 & 204)

❖ Property acquired by a partnership is property of the partnership and not of the partners
individually
❖ Partnership property also includes property that is either:
➢ Acquired in the name of the partnership (“titled” in the partnership name)
➢ 1) Acquired by one or more partners 2) with a document transferring title that indicates
the partner was acting in his capacity as a partner or indicates the existence of a
partnership
❖ Property purchased with partnership funds is presumed to be partnership property
(1) By contrast, property acquired in the name of one or more of the partners, without an
indication of the person’s capacity as a partner or existence of a partnership, and without
use of partnership assets, is presumed to be separate property, even if used for
partnership purposes.
b) Wyatt v. Byrd: Wyatt and Byrd began cohabitating, then started R & J Remodeling and
both parties contributed to remodeling efforts and money from jobs deposited into joint
account and shared equally. R&J ceased operations and Byrd purchased mobile home and
property in his name alone. 1.5k was paid from money in parties’ joint account. Byrd
moved out of mobile home and filed unlawful detainer action to evict Wyatt. She filed
complaint alleging existence of a partnership and sought dissolution of partnership and
distribution of its assets, specifically of the mobile home.
c) Issue: (1) Was this a partnership/joint venture? (2) Whether property in question is an
asset of the partnership?
d) Held: An implied partnership/joint venture arose between them during life of remodeling
business because “for-profit”. To extent the remodeling profits were used towards
property’s purchase, partnership is presumed to have acquired an interest in the property
according to that proportion expended. There is no authority stating that simply because
a partnership ceased operations prior to the Purchased asset that the asset cannot be
become part of the partnership's property, if it were purchased with partnership money
(could lead to a negative policy outcome, allowing individuals to buy assets with a Pship $
after it stopped operating).
4. What does it mean for property to belong to the partnership? (RUPA § 501, §401)
a) §501: a partner is not a co-owner of partnership property and has no interest in
partnership property which can be transferred, either voluntarily or involuntarily.
(1) They have a financial interest in the property, but not a direct ownership interest
of the partnership property
b) §401: A partner may use or possess partnership property only on behalf of the
partnership
5. A partner’s Transferable interests

(1) RUPA § 502: A transferable interest is personal property
(2) RUPA § 102(23): transferable interest=the right, as initially owned by a person in the
person’s capacity as a partner, to receive distributions from a partnership, whether or not
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the person remains a partner or continues to own any party of the right. The term applies
to any fraction of the interest, whomever owned
(3) Transferable interest=personal property and can be transferred without dissociating the
partner or dissolving the partnership. Attachable to creditors.
(a) Absent a contrary provision in the partnership agreement or the consent of the
partners, a ‘transferable interest’ is the only interest in a partnership that can be
transferred to a person not already a partner.
(4) Individual who receives a partner's transferable interest, has no right in management of
the partnership or access to partnership records. They can only receive distributions.
(a) RUPA §401(k): A partner cannot transfer their status as partner or unilaterally
make someone else a partner w/o unanimous consent
(5) Charging order= a lien on a judgement debtor’s transferable interest, requiring the
partnership to pay over to the person with the charging order any distribution that would
otherwise be paid to the judgement debtor
2) Sharing in Profits and Losses

6. Contributions (Rupa 401(a),(b),(c))
a) As a matter of default, initial contributions are not required from partners. Some or all
partners may contribute only services. But if a partner does make a contribution, it
become partnership property and she gets credit for it in the partnership accounting.
(1) K&L Pship= Where one partner only contributes Labor and the other Only Capital
b) Each partner has a capital account equal to their contribution+share of profits-
(losses+liabilities)-distributions
c) A partnership must reimburse and indemnify partners w/ regard to payments made and
obligations incurred in carrying on ordinary partnership business
7. Right to be paid (RUPA 401(j))
a) Unless otherwise agreed, a partner has no right to be compensated for services rendered
to the partnership, except reasonable compensation for services performed in winding
up the partnership business.
8. Sharing of Profits and Losses: (RUPA 401(a))
a) DEFAULT RULE: Each partner is entitled to an equal share of the partnership distributions
and, except in the case of a limited liability partnership, is chargeable with a share of the
partnership losses in proportion to the partner’s share of the distribution
(1) Equal share of profits and losses regardless of contributions or amount worked
for the partnership
b) Default rule means that if a partnership agreement established a profit-sharing
percentage but neglected to specify an allocation for loss sharing, that the loss sharing
percentage would mirror the profit-sharing percentage.
(1) Agreed sharing profits 60/40 than losses will be shared 60/40.
c) Partners are jointly and severally liable for all third-party debts/obligations,but they can
agree amongst themselves how to allocate losses.
d) Hiro agrees to contribute to the Dos Commas Partnership a parcel of land valued at
$500k, in return for a 20% share of partnership profits. During the next few years, rental
from the land accounts for 25% of the partnership’s profits, and the land increases in
value to $1.5M. The benefits from the land, and increase in value, belong to the
partnership, not Hiro, whose remuneration as partner is the 20% share of profits.
(1) In addition to his respective right to share in distributions, if the partnership
were to dissolve, Hiro would have a right to a return of the $500k in capital he
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initially contributed(if it had not previously been returned), no matter how

valuable or worthless the land had become he does not get back the parcel of
land. That would go to settling the debts and obligations, after those are settled
the distribution from remaining assets commences.
9. Distributions (RUPA 401):
a) Absent an agreement to the contrary, a partner does not have a right to receive a current
distribution of the profits credited to his account, the interim distribution of profits being
a matter arising in the ordinary course of business to be decided by majority vote of the
partners.
10. Settlement of Account and Contributions in Winding up (RUPA 806)
a) (a) In winding up its business, a partnership shall apply its assets, including the
contributions required by this section, to discharge the partnership’s obligations to
creditors, including partners that are creditors.
b) (b) After a partnership complies with subsection (a), any surplus must be distributed in
the following order, subject to any charging order in effect under Section 504:
(1) (1) to each person owning a transferable interest that reflects contributions
made and not previously returned, an amount equal to the value of the
unreturned contributions; and
(2) (2) among persons owning transferable interests in proportion to their respective
rights to share in distributions immediately before the dissolution of the
partnership
c) (c) If a partnership’s assets are insufficient to satisfy all its obligations under subsection
(a), with respect to each unsatisfied obligation incurred when the partnership was not a
limited liability partnership, the following rules apply:
(1) (1) Each person that was a partner when the obligation was incurred and that
has not been released from the obligation under Section 703(c) and (d) shall
contribute to the partnership for the purpose of enabling the partnership to
satisfy the obligation. The contribution due from each of those persons is in
proportion to the right to receive distributions in the 169 capacity of a partner in
effect for each of those persons when the obligation was incurred.
(2) (2) If a person does not contribute the full amount required under paragraph (1)
with respect to an unsatisfied obligation of the partnership, the other persons
required to contribute by paragraph (1) on account of the obligation shall
contribute the additional amount necessary to discharge the obligation. The
additional contribution due from eachof those other persons is in proportion to
the right to receive distributions in the capacity of a partner in effect for each of
those other persons when the obligation was incurred.
(3) (3) If a person does not make the additional contribution required by paragraph
(2), further additional contributions are determined and due in the same manner
as provided in that paragraph.
d) (d) A person that makes an additional contribution under subsection (c)(2) or (3) may
recover from any person whose failure to contribute under subsection (c)(1) or (2)
necessitated the additional contribution. A person may not recover under this subsection
more than the amount additionally contributed. A person’s liability under this subsection
may not exceed the amount the person failed to contribute.
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e) (e) If a partnership does not have sufficient surplus to comply with subsection (b)(1), any
surplus must be distributed among the owners of transferable interests in proportion to
the value of the respective unreturned contributions.
f) (f) All distributions made under subsections (b) and (c) must be paid in money.
11. Kovacik v. Reed (K&L Pship, CA Rule-NOT RUPA, Pship Loss): FACTS: Pf contributed all the capital
to the business and Df contributed all labor, was the sole laborer. Profits divided equally, but Df
never compensated. Venture became unprofitable, Pf demanded contribution from Df. Df refused.
Venture Terminated. PF sought an accounting of the Df’s portion of the losses.
a) Holding: The party who contributed money in a K&L partnership is not entitled to recover
any part of it from the party who contributed only services, upon dissolution. This is
because each party values the other’s contribution equally.
b) Policy: capital contributor is in a better position to protect themselves and bear the loss.
and knows the laws/can K around.
c) **Court will usually only do this in a limited number of cases and do this when the service
partner was not compensated for their work and they made no capital contribution.
12. RUPA (MJRTY) § 401 cmt: Profit/Losses are shared equally regardless of capital contribution or K&L
structure. In entering a partnership with a K&L structure or with low $$, the partners should
foresee that application of the default rule and K around it.
HYPOS
1. Amos contributed $100,000 in capital and agreed to lend the partnership $25,000. He therefore has a status of
both partner and creditor.What are his rights as against other general creditors with respect to his loan if the
partnership goes under?
2. Carlos and Lily form a partnership to operate a goat cheese business, agreeing to share profits equally. Carlos
contributes a small farm worth $50k. Three years later the partnership comes to an end. Lily’s capital
contribution had already been returned by the partnership. By selling all of its assets other than the farm, the
partnership has enough cash to pay off its debts to creditors—exactly to the dollar. During the partnership land
values increased and so the partnership is now able to sell the farm for $100k.How will the proceeds of the sale of
the farm be handled? Do they go entirely to Carlos or are they divided in some other way?
3. •A, B, and C are in a partnership and it goes out of business. They have not contracted around the default RUPA
rules.A creditor of the partnership subsequently collects $21k from C on a debt owed by the partnership (while
each A, B, and C were a part of it). The partnership has no funds to reimburse C. Can C collect money from A and
B, and if so, how much?
4. Celia and Larry form a partnership to run a catering service. They do not make any agreements changing the
default RUPA rules. Celia provides $250k in start-up money and does not work in the business. Larry works full-
time in the business, but contributed no capital. The partnership ends after a year, paying off all creditors but with
nothing left over. The partnership has suffered at $250k loss (per Celia’s $250k capital contribution).For his year of
work, Larry received nothing. Per the RUPA rules, Larry must pay $125k to the partnership, which will then
distribute that amount to Celia. Both Larry and Celia will then have each lost $125k.
F. Partnership Dissociation and Dissolution
1. Dissociation
❖ A partner has the power at any time, rightfully or wrongfully, to dissociate from the partnership by express
will under §601(1)
❖ Dissociation= a change in the relationship of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in
the carrying on of the business. Partner leaves
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a. A dissociation does not necessarily cause a Pship to wind up

i. Windingup=the period before termination of the partnership, when the partnership
concludes its busienss, sells its assets, pays creditors, and settles its Pship accounts.
ii. Termination=winding up is done.
b. RUPA § 603 provides the analytical framework.:
i. Dissociation w/ Dissoultion: If the dissociating even is listed in RUPA §801(event causing
dissolution), then the dissociation constitutes a dissolution and winding up will occur
(unless dissolution is rescinded)
ii. W/o Dissolution: If event causing dissociation is not listed in RUPA §801(event causing
dissolution), then a buyout will occur pursuant to RUPA §701.
1. When partner leaves Pship they get a buyout reflecting their financial interest in
the pship
c. Dissociation without Dissolution
i. Partner leaves the Phsip and the Pship Continues, unless dissociating event is in § 801
ii. Event Causing Dissociation § 601:
1. o (1) The partnership’s having notice of partner’s express will to withdraw as a
partner or on a later date specified by the partner;
a. § If it’s an at-will partnership (not term partnership), and partner can
dissociate the partnership and force dissolution of the partnership.
2. o (2) An event specified in the partnership agreement as causing dissociation;
3. o (3) The partner’s expulsion as provided in the partnership agreement;
4. o (4) The partner’s expulsion by unanimous vote of the other partners if:
a. § (i) It is unlawful to carry on business with the to-be-expelled partner;
b. § (ii) The partner being expelled no longer has any economic stake in
the business because there has been a transfer of all or substantially all
of that partner’s transferable interest in the partnership;
c. § (iii) The partner being expelled is a corporation which has lost its right
to take on new business; or
d. § (iv) The partner being expelled is a partnership which has lost its right
to take on new business;
5. o (5) On application by the partnership or another partner, the partner’s
expulsion by judicial determination because:
a. § (i) The partner engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely and
materially affected the partnership business;
b. § (ii) The partner willfully or persistently committed a material breach
of the partnership agreement or of a duty owed to the partnership or
the other partners under Section 404; or
c. § (iii) The partner engaged in conduct relating to the partnership
business which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the
business in partnership with the partner;
6. o (6)–(10) [Paraphrase] The partner’s ability to participate in the partnership
affairs comes to an end, or the partner’s economic stake in the partnership
comes to an end, including:
7. o (6) The partner becoming a debtor in bankruptcy, or taking other, non-
bankruptcy actions which indicate insolvency;
8. o (7) If the partner is an individual, the individual’s ability to participate in the
partnership affairs coming to an end, either by:
a. § (i) The partner’s death;
b. § (ii) Mental incompetency, as indicated either by:
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i. (1) Appointment of a guardian or general conservator; or

ii. (2) A judicial determination that the partner has otherwise
become incapable of performing the partner’s duties under
the partnership agreement;
9. o (8)-(9) In the case of a partner that is a trust or estate, its economic stake in
the partnership coming to an end by the distribution (typically to the
beneficiaries) of the partner’s entire transferable interest in the partnership;
10. o 10) Termination of a partner who is not an individual, partnership,
corporation, trust, or estate.
iii. Non-Wrongful Dissociation: Amount Owed-BUYOUT
1. A dissociated partner is entitled to receive the “buyout price” which is defined in
§701(b) as the amount distributable to the partner if, on the date of dissociation,
the assets of the partnership were sold using the greater of either the “going
concern” value or the liquidation value of the partnership.
2. Interest accrues on the buyout price from the date of dissociation to the date of
payment.
3. If no K for buyout has been reached within 120 days after written demand for
payment, then the Pship must pay the default buyout amount.
iv. Wrongful Dissociation(RUPA 602): How and Amount Owed to Dissociating Partner
❖ If Partner wrongful dissociates they may be liable for damages and the buyout
payment can be deferred
1. Wrongful dissociation RUPA (§602): A partner wrongfully dissociates if:
a. The dissociation is in breach of an express term of the partnership
agreement; OR
b. The partnership is for a definite term or particular undertaking and
the partner withdraws, is expelled, or becomes bankrupt before the
end of the term or completion of the undertaking.
i. Definite term= partners explicitly or implicitly agreed to
remain partners for a definite time or for a particular
undertaking.
2. •A partner who wrongfully dissociates is liable to the partnership for any
damages caused by the dissociation, § 701(c), and is not entitled to payment of
the buyout price until the expiration of the term unless the person establishes to
a court that earlier payment will not cause undue hardship to the business of the
partnership, § 701(h).
v. Other Consequences of Dissociation:
RUPA §603(a)-SWITCHING PROVISION

If the event is listed in RUPA § 801, then dissolution and winding up will occur under Art 8.
If the event is not listed in RUPA § 801, then a buyout will occur pursuant to RUPA § 701.
o Analysis:
§ First, look at event causing dissociation. Then look to see whether event is listed under §
801.
· If yes, then dissolution occurs.
· If no, then partner is dissociated and a buyout occurs under RUPA article 7.
41
1. When a partner dissociates, she is no longer a partner in the partnership. The

dissociated partner has no further role in management, and the duties of care
and loyalty are generally also terminated, except for matters arising before
dissociation. Read § 603(b)
2. • A dissociated partner is still liable for partnership debts that arose before the
dissociation. § 703(a).
a. If the dissociated partner had already effectively paid the partnership
for this liability (i.e. his share of the liability had already been deducted
from any buyout payment to the dissociated partner), then the
dissociated partner could seek indemnification from the partnership for
any claims made against him by a third party for that liability. § 701(d).
3. • A dissociated partner generally is not liable for a partnership obligation
incurred after dissociation, but there is a significant exception because of the
dissociated partner’s lingering power to bind the partnership (specified in §§
702, 703(b), which you should read below). It concerns where a third party does
not have actual or constructive notice of the partner’s dissociation and enters
into a transaction with the partnership within two years after the dissociation
and in reliance on the reasonable belief that the dissociated partner is still a
partner.
4. • The dissociated partner or the partnership may file a statement of dissociation
with the Secretary of State that states the name of the partnership and the name
of the partner that dissociated. § 704. This statement has the effect of
eliminating the dissociated partner’s power to transfer partnership real property,
and as to other lingering power to bind or exposure to personal liability, “a
person not a partner is deemed to have notice of the dissociation 90 days after
the statement of dissociation is filed with the Secretary of State.” As noted, the
dissociated partner’s apparent authority can otherwise linger up to 2 years.
RUPA § 702(a).
vi. Power to Bind and be bound after Dissociation See RUPA 702-703
2. Dissociation w/ Dissolution
❖ Dissociation=the dissolution, winding up, and termination of a partnership
❖ DEFAULT §802: Once an event requiring dissolution occurs, the partnership must be wound up unless ALL of
the partners (including any dissociated partner other than a wrongfully dissociating partner) agree
otherwise
a. Partners can have an agreement otherwise and provide for a buy-out and continuation agreement
b. Events causing dissolution:
i. In an at-will partnership, any partner who dissociates by his express will may compel
dissolution and winding up;
ii. • In a term partnership, if all agree to dissolve or if the term expires;
iii. • In a term partnership if one partner dissociates wrongfully (or if a dissociation occurs
because of a partner’s death or otherwise under 601(6)-(10)), dissolution occurs if, within
90 days after the dissociation, one-half of the remaining partners agree to wind up the
partnership.
iv. • Upon application by a partner to a court for an order of judicial dissolution on the
grounds that the conduct of all or substantially all of the partnership’s business is
unlawful, the economic purpose of the partnership is likely to be unreasonably frustrated,
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another partner has engaged in conduct that makes it not reasonably practicable to carry
on business with that partner, or it is otherwise not reasonably practicable to carry on the
partnership business in conformity with the partnership agreement.
v. • The 2013 amendments to RUPA have added one more event causing dissolution: “the
passage of 90 consecutive days during which the partnership does not have at least two
partners,” revised section 801(6).
c. Dissolution, Winding Up, Termination
i. •Dissolution causes the partnership to “wind up,” § 802, absent an agreement to
continue (e.g., buy-out and continuation agreements), or by unanimous vote or consent
(including any dissociating partner other than a wrongfully dissolving partner). RUPA §
802(b) (1997 version) cf. § 803 (2013 version).
ii. •“Winding up” = Shutting down the business by selling off the assets (either as separate
assets or of the business as a going concern), paying the partnership liabilities, settling
partner accounts. Authority of partners to act on behalf of partnership terminated except
in connection with winding up of partnership business.
iii. •Once winding up is finished then the partnership is “terminated”; no filing or magic
words required. RUPA § 802(a) (1997 version).
iv. Power to Bind and Be Bound after dissolution See RUPA §804-805
3. McCormick v. Brevig: Brother and sister have a partnership (owning a ranch), owned 50/50; relationship
deteriorated, sister brought suit against brother and partnership alleging brother had converted assets for
his own personal use and requesting an accounting; argued brother did acts constituting expulsion, but in
the alternative, they were events requiring dissolution.
a. Held: RUPA requires liquidation of partnership assets when the dissolution entered by judicial
decree occurs, and distribution of net surplus of cash, absent an agreement to the contrary.
Additionally, every Partner is entitled to have an accounting of the partnership's affairs to
determine the rights and liabilities of the partners, and ascertain the value of the Pship interests.
Wrapping up General Partnerships

Reminder Re: Partnership Agreements
Can:
–Change governance rules (i.e., voting and mgmt rights)
–Define scope of fiduciary duties, so long as “not manifestly unreasonable”
–Establish financial rights between partners (during, at dissolution, or upon termination)
•E.g., can address a “buy-out,” valuation, continuation
Cannot:
–Completely eliminate fiduciary duties/right to accounting
–Alter third parties’ rights
–For full list, see RUPA § 105
G. Other Partnership Forms (LPs, LLPs, LLLPs)

1. Limited Partnership
a. •A type of partnership with 2 types of partners
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i. –General partners: General partners manage the business and have the power to bind
the partnership.
1. They are personally (and jointly and severally) liable for the partnership debts
ii. –Limited partners: Silent/passive partners without management rights.
1. Not personally liable unless they participate in management or control of the
LP/how the business is run (old “control rule”- Cal.--effectively exposing himself
to being a managing partner
2. current uniform act has modified to not personally liable except in extraordinary
circumstances.
b. Defining Characteristics:
i. Separation of ownership and management functions
ii. Limited Liability
c. •The partnership must have at least one general partner and one limited partner. The partnership
name must have a signifier – i.e., “LP”
d. •Default rule is that partners in a LP share profits and losses in proportion to their respective
capital contributions.
e. •Requires a formal filing (a “certificate of limited partnership”) to create a LP; each state has a LP
statute.
i. –Most states either have some version of RULPA or ULPA (2008) (aka Re-RULPA).
f. Few areas LPs are used
i. VC
ii. Real Estate
iii. Family Estate Planning Devices
2. Limited Liability Partnership
a. General partnership that have elected to be treated as limited liability partnerships and file a form
with the secretary of state.
b. Shield partners from personal liability for Pship debts that are not their own
i. remain liable for their own actions as partners, but not for their partner’s actions
c. Must have the Signifier LLP in the Name
3. Limited Liability Limited Partnership
a. •LLLP = the limited liability form of the limited partnership (the GPs get limited liability).
b. •Forming a LLLP requires filing a form with the secretary of state.
c. •The partnership name must have a signifier – i.e., “LLLP”
d. •California law does not allow for a LLLP to be formed in California. A LLLP that is formed under
the laws of another state must register with the California Secretary of State prior to conducting
business in the state.
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Corporations
H. General Background
1. Vocabulary
2. Organizational Choices/Characteristics of the Corporation
3. Internal Affairs Doctrine
4. Delaware Corporate Law
5. Incorporation Process
6. Ultra Vires Doctrine
7. Corporate Documents
8. Promoter Liability
9. Defective Formation (De Facto Corporations and Corporation by Estoppel)
10. Capital Structure (Basic Information on Stock and Dividends)
11. Limited Liability and Piercing the Corporate Veil
I. The Role of Directors and Officers (Managing the Business Affairs; Fiduciary Duties to Shareholders
1. Fiduciary Duties: The Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule
2. Corporate Purpose, Corporate Social Responsibility, Charitable Giving, and Corporate Political
Activity
3. Fiduciary Duties: The Duty of Loyalty
a) Conflicts and Self-Dealing
b) Corporate Opportunities
c) Good Faith and Oversight
4. Duties and Issues Involving Controlling Shareholders
a) Duties within Corporate Groups
b) Oppression in Closely Held Corporations
J. C. Role and Rights of Shareholders

1. Shareholder Voting
2. Shareholder Proposals
3. Shareholder Information Rights
4. Shareholder Litigation
a) Shareholder Derivative Actions
b) Demand Requirement
c) Special Litigation Committees (SLCs) & Independent Directors
d) Indemnification and Insurance
e) Plaintiffs
f) Policy Implications of Shareholder Litigation
45
II. General Background

A. Vocabulary
1. Corporation: A “Legal Person”--a legal construct to pool money and labor--typically possessing the
following characteristics:
a) Separate Entity: Every corporation is a legal entity that is separate from the investors who
provide it with money and the people who manage the business. Managers=directors or
officers
b) Perpetual Existence: Corporations have an unlimited life.
c) Limited liability: Corporation’s shareholder cannot lose more money than they invested.
The corporation, not the shareholders, own the assets.
d) Centralized Management: Shareholder’s elect a corporation’s directors, who have the
power to manage and oversee the corporation’s business. BOD can then elect officers to
take care of day-to-day tasks.
e) Divisible Ownership (shares of stock):
f) Transferable Shares and debt obligations (unless limitations imposed): Shares can be
transferred from one person to the other
2. •The founders of a corporation create the corporation (they “incorporate”) by filing certain
documents with the appropriate state agency and may choose to do so in any of the states.
3. •Corporate law primarily focuses on the relationship between:
a) –the stockholders, Del. (aka “shareholders” in Cal.)
(1) Delaware uses the term “stockholders.” California uses the term “shareholders.”
Shareholders and stockholders are otherwise interchangeable terms.
b) –the board of directors, and
(1) The “board of directors” is the collective body. Individuals who sit/serve on the
board of directors are referred to as “directors” or “members of the board” or
“board members.
c) –the officers (aka “managers” or “executives”)
(1) “Managers” is a (somewhat vague) term that can be used to referred to both the
directors and officers or sometimes it used just to refer to the officers/executives
4. •Stockholders/Shareholders are the equity investors
a) –Their ownership interests are reflected in the stock of the corporation.
b) –They elect a board of directors, who in turn select the officers who run the business.
c) –Shareholders have a few key rights, but they do not participate in managing the
corporation’s business or affairs. They cannot act on behalf of the corporation.
d) Shares=divided financial ownership stake in the corporation.
5. •The board of directors directs the affairs of the corporation
a) –Authority to act for (and to bind) the corporation originates in the board as a collective
body.
(1) o An individual director acting alone generally has no rights or powers. A board
of directors takes action on behalf of a corporation either at a meeting in which a
“quorum” is present or by written consent.
b) –Directors have fiduciary duties to the corporation and the body of shareholders.
c) o Board of Directors Key Functions:
(1) § (1) Monitor and oversight of the corporation (includes hiring and firing of the
officers);
(2) § (2) Strategic focus and vision of corporation (also includes giving advice to
officers and executives);
(3) § (3) Provides a network of contacts and resources for the company
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d) o MAnagement of the corporation is centralized in the board.

e) The business and affairs of every corporation shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided (DGCL § 141(a)).
f) By default, stockholders elect the members of the board (directors) at the annual
stockholder meeting.
g) Directors are not considered employees of the corp, but employees can serve as directors
(1) Insider Directors: Directors who are also employees Directors tend to be CEOs or
other high-level executives with full-time jobs and responsibilities at other
companies. Corporate officers such as the CEO may also be directors.
(2) Outside Directors: person who generally does not have any affiliation with the
corp besides being a director
h) o Directors have fiduciary duties.
i) o Subject to some limitations, the board has the power to delegate authority (e.g., it can
appoint officers to run the day-to-day operations, it can delegate certain authority to
committees of the board, etc.).
j) o The board of directors takes action on behalf of the corporation either at a meeting at
which a quorum is present or by written consent.
(1) § Quorum: Minimum number of members that must be present at the meeting
for meeting to be valid. Default= a majority of the board. By laws can amend this
but it cannot be less than ⅓ of the total board.
(2) Vote must be a majority of the quorum present
k) o Action at a Board Meeting – DGCL § 141(b): (READ DGCL 141 in SUPP for BOD
decisions)
(1) § A majority of the total number of directors shall constitute a quorum for the
transaction of business unless the certificate of incorporation (COI) or the bylaws
require a greater number. Unless the COI provides otherwise, the bylaws may
provide that a number less than a majority shall constitute a quorum, in no case
shall be less than 1/3 of the total number of directors.
(2) § The vote of the majority of the directors present at a meeting in which a
quorum is present shall be the act of the board of directors.
l) o Action by Written Consent – DGCL § 141(f):
(1) Authorizes a board to act without a meeting by means of written consent, but
requires unanimity
6. •The officers handle the day-to-day management of the corporation and are under the direction of
the board.
a) –The officers are appointed by the board. E.g., CEO, CFO, etc.
b) –They are agents of the corporation. And the scope of their power often comes down to
agency principles
c) BOD select most senior executives and Officers have power to hire more employees
d) Officers execute the firm’s strategy and often times recommend firm strategy
7. Stakeholders=those outside the corporations whom the corporation may owe a obligation to or
are generally involved with and depend on the corporation, but are not a shareholder, director, or
officer.
B. Organizational Choices/Characteristics of the Corporation
1. Sources of law:
a) Each state has its own corporation code (statutes), which sets out how to incorporate and
the laws governing corporations; courts interpret and apply the state corporation code
through case law.
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b) While there is no federal law of corporations per se, federal statues add a significant layer
of corporate regulation (e.g., securities laws, Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank).
2. Choice of law:
a) Once a firm is incorporated in a particular state, it is the law of that state that controls as
to the matters covered in the corporations code (this is known as the “internal affairs
doctrine”).
3. Public v. Private(Closely held)
a) Public=shares are traded publicly on an Exchange
(1) –The shareholders typically do not expect to participate actively in the operation
of the business; they are passive investors. (Many Americans also invest
indirectly through mutual funds, pension funds, etc.)
(2) –There is a large amount of federal law that applies to public corporations
(securities laws, etc.).
b) Private (Closely held)= Shares are not traded on a public exchange
(1) Closely held firms are usually owned and operated by the same persons. (owners
also operate), but they have less liquid stock because they are not publicly
available.
(2) Not subject to public reporting requirements under federal securities laws (Take
the Securities Regulation course to learn more!)
Typically, private corporations have a small number of shareholders who hold
stock that is not publicly traded. The stock is generally less “liquid” and may be
subject to shareholder agreements that limit its transferability.
(3) Generally (though not always) private corporations are of relatively modest
economic scope, and the people in the top managerial positions may also own a
substantial amount of the corporation’s stock.
4. For-Profit or Not-For-Profit
5. Tax Status (driven by Fed TAx Law)
a) C-Corp: Classic corp with 2x taxation
b) S-Corp: pass through Corporation but with a restriction on the number of shareholders
(1) It is only available to business entities that meet the following requirements: it
must be a domestic corporation or LLC with no more than 100 shareholders who
are individuals, estates, qualified trusts, or tax-exempt entities (such as charities
and pension plans). No shareholder can be a nonresident alien. All the
shareholders must consent to election of Subchapter S treatment. The
corporation can have only one class of stock, although shares with different
voting rights are treated as part of the same class if they are otherwise alike.
6. Other Statutory Corp Forms (Driven by state law)
a) Professional Corp
b) Benefit Corp
C. Internal Affairs Doctrine
❖ As a general matter, the “internal affairs” of the corporation are governed by the law of the state of
incorporation.
1. Internal affairs=matters peculiar to the relationships among the corporation and its officers,
directors, and shareholders.
2. Courts apply the law of the state of incorporation when adjudicating governance and fiduciary
duties that arise within the corporation, including the rights of and relations among stockholders,
the duties and obligations of the officers and directors, issuance of shares, acquisition procedures,
etc.
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a) Reason: it would be difficult to administer another state’s law when the corp conducts
business in multiple states
3. Hence, the act of incorporation also selects the law that will apply to the corporation’s internal
affairs. (E.g., “a Delaware corporation,” “a California corporation”)
4. A notable departure from the internal affairs doctrine is California Corporations Code § 2115
(sometimes referred to as a “long-arm statute” or the “pseudo-foreign corporation statute”).
a) With the exception of publicly traded corporations, it makes “foreign” corporations with
more than half of their taxable income, property, payroll, and outstanding voting shares
within California subject to certain provisions of the California Corporations Code.
b) This is controversial and has been the subject of recent debate (Delaware courts have
ruled it unconstitutional and there was a California legislative attempt to get rid of it).
5. Qualifications of “Foreign” Corporations To Do Business
a) A business incorporated in one state may conduct business in another if “qualified” to do
business in that state.
b) To “qualify” the corporation usually has to file a form and attach a certified copy of its
certificate and/or a certificate of good standing from its state of incorporation, pay a filing
fee, and appoint a local agent to receive service of process.
D. Delaware Corporate Law: Why Do we Study Del. Law?
1. The internal affairs doctrine has made it possible for a dominant body of corporate law principles
to exist—Delaware corporate law.
2. When incorporating a business, most people choose to incorporate in either their home state
where their principal place of business is or in Delaware.
3. Nearly 60% of publicly traded U.S. corporations are incorporated in Delaware. Nearly 90% of
public corporations that re-incorporate do so in Delaware.
4. Delaware corporate law is also very influential on other state’s corporate law.
5. Delaware has:
a) The largest body of precedent interpreting its corporation code – meaning it has the most
comprehensive body of corporate law in the U.S.
b) Relatively stable and modern corporate law. The DGCL is kept current and radical reform
of its corporation code is unlikely as Delaware’s constitution mandates a 2/3 vote of both
state legislative houses to change the corporation code. Delaware courts frequently issue
unanimous opinions.
c) A special court for business matters (the Chancery Court), which has a reputation for
excellence and experience in corporate law (as well as the Delaware Supreme Court,
which is similarly respected).
d) Procedures that facilitate timely decisions (which can be especially important for some
corporate issues like takeovers).
e) Many lawyers across the country are trained in Delaware corporate law, especially
business savvy lawyers.
E. Incorporation Process
1. Select state of incorporation.
2. Reserve the desired corporate name by application to the secretary of state or other designated
state office.
3. Arrange for a registered office and registered agent.
4. Draft, execute, and file the certificate of incorporation (aka “charter,” “articles of incorporation”)
with the relevant state agency, according to the requirements of state law (e.g., DGCL § 102).
a) Note: The role of incorporators can be purely mechanical. They sign the certificate and
arrange for the filing. If the certificate does not name directors, the incorporators select
49
them at the first organizational meeting (to serve until first shareholder meeting). After
incorporation, the incorporators can fade away and do not need any continuing interest
or role.
b) Filing the certificate is a straightforward task. The DGCL requires state officials to accept
certificates for filing if they meet the specifications. DGCL § 103(c). Certain filing or
organization fees and any franchise tax must be paid.
5. Properly filing the certificate brings the corporation into existence. (DGCL § 106) Next step is to
have an organizational meeting of the incorporators or of the subscribers for shares to elect the
directors, if not named in the certificate. (DGCL § 108) Also:
a) Appoint officers
b) Adopt bylaws (DGCL § 109)
c) Adopt pre-incorporation promoters’ contracts
d) Authorize issuance of shares, stock certificates, corporate seal, corporate account, etc.
(use a checklist to be meticulous)
6. Prepare board meeting minutes, open corporate books and records, issue shares, qualify to do
business in states where business will be conducted, obtain any needed permits, taxpayer ID
numbers, etc.
7. Plan for shareholder meeting as required.
F. Ultra Vires Doctrine
❖ If a transaction is beyond the corporation's purpose or powers, either party to the contract could disaffirm
it.
❖ The modern ultra vires doctrine is narrow; it applies only where the certificate of incorporation states a
limitation and there are 3 exclusive means of enforcement (DGCL § 124):
➢ in a proceeding by a stockholder against the corporation to enjoin a proposed ultra vires act;
➢ in a corporate suit against directors and officers for taking unauthorized action (the directors and
officers can be enjoined or held personally liable for damages);
➢ the state attorney general can seek involuntary judicial dissolution if the corporation has engaged
in unauthorized transactions.
1. At common law, a corporation was limited to the powers enumerated in the purpose clause of its
charter
a) The “purpose clause” is a statement describing the business the corporation is to conduct
b) The term “corporate powers” refers to methods the corporation may use to achieve its
purpose (e.g., power to contract and power to borrow money).
c) Historically, if a corporation engaged in conduct that was not authorized by its express or
implied powers, the conduct was deemed “ultra vires” and void. Whenever a transaction
was beyond the corporation’s limited purposes or powers, either party to the contract
could disaffirm it. That is what is known as the “ultra vires doctrine.”
2. Over time, courts began to interpret corporate powers more broadly. State legislatures began to
allow corporations to specify in their charter that they were formed to engage in “any lawful
purpose.” Corporations need not specify a single purpose, nor do they need to list their specific
powers.
3. Today, most modern corporation statutes expressly grant incidental/implied powers. Corporate
managers, in the absence of express restrictions, have discretionary authority to enter into
contracts and transactions reasonably incidental to its business purpose, which may be broadly
defined. (DGCL §§ 121, 122)
4. An ultra vires act will be enjoined only if equitable to do so; generally means that an act involving
an innocent third party (e.g., one who didn’t know the action was ultra vires) will not be enjoined.
5. Use of the ultra vires doctrine is very rare; many legal commentators view it as a historical relic.
50
6. HYPO: A and B incorporate a business called Island Foods, Inc. (“IF”) and both become
shareholders and officers in the corporation. IF’s certificate of incorporation includes a purpose
clause stating that the corporation was formed for the purpose of making and selling traditional
Hawaiian food. The business is successful, and later, in an attempt to expand the activities of the
business, A, on behalf of IF, enters into a contract with C to buy a tour boat. When A tells B about
the deal, B is angry and brings an action to enjoin the purchase. The court would generally grant
an injunction only if C knew that the transaction was beyond IF’s purpose clause (because ultra
vires is an equitable doctrine).
G. Corporate Documents
1. Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws:
a) Articles/Certificate of Incorporation:
(1) A legal document essentially like “constitution” of the corporation, giving a
number of provisions or articles establishing basic provisions such as the name
of the corp, agents, address for service or process, and number of authorized
shares. Filed with the Secretary of State, Corporations Division
(2) –Terminology:
(a) •Delaware uses the term “certificate of incorporation”
(b) •California uses the term “articles of incorporation”
(c) •Colloquial term is the “charter”
(3) –Filed with the state in order to incorporate, must meet statutory requirements
(4) •Typically include basic provisions required by the state, such as the corporate
name, agent address for service of process, number of authorized shares, etc.
b) Bylaws:
(1) Not filed with the state.
(2) Include the powers of directors and officers, procedures for electing directors,
and filling director vacancies, required notice periods and details for calling and
holding meetings of shareholders and directors, and internal governance issues
H. Promoter Liability
❖ A situation in which a person is attempting to contract for the benefit of a future, not yet formed,
corporation and both parties to the contract know the corporation does not exist yet. It is a
question of whether the promoter is and continues to be liable if and when the corporation is
formed.
1. Background/Definitions
a) Promoter=A person, who acting alone or with others, directly or indirectly takes initiative
in founding and organizing the business or enterprise of an issuer
(1) E.g., identify and solicit investors, arrange for space/facilities, hire employees for
the entity, enter into contracts.
(2) Often referred to as the “founder” or “organizer.”
(3) Promoter’s Fiduciary Duties
(a) Promoters of a yet-to-be-formed corporation have some fiduciary
duties to the entity, the other promoters, and investors:
(b) Promoters must deal with the entity in good faith. This requires
promoters to act fairly in transactions they enter into with the
corporation.
(c) Promoters must disclose relevant information, like opportunities and
conflicts vis-a-vis the entity, to other relevant parties. (e.g., no secret
profits)
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b) Contrast with an “incorporator” who has the limited, mechanical task of preparing the
incorporation documents and filing them with the state. Often Lawyers, paralegals, etc.,
(1) Incorporators are typically not liable for their pre-incorporation acts.
c) Typically arises when both parties KNOW the corporation has not been formed yet.
d) Novation= a three party arrangement in which a new party replaces an existing party to a
contract, discharging the previous actor’s obligations
e) Subscription Agreement= an offer to purchase shares from a corp. Subscriptions can be
made to existing corporations or corporations to be formed.
(1) A subscription does not become a contract until accepted by the corporation.
There can be concerns about the enforceability of subscription agreements
entered into before incorporation; DGCL § 165 provides the default that they are
irrevocable by the subscriber for 6 months from the date of subscription, unless
otherwise provided.
2. Pre-Incorporation
❖ When both parties know a corporation is defective or not yet formed, Promoters are liable for
contracts entered into on behalf of a future corporation, absent a contrary intent or agreement
otherwise.
➢ Factors for contrary intent
■ The form of signature--did the promoter sign as an agent of the corporation?
■ Actions of the third party--did the third party plan to look only to the corporation
for performance?
■ Partial Performance--did the promoter’s partial performance of the contract
indicate an intent to be held personally liable?
■ Novation--did the actions taken by the parties discharge the promoter’s liablity
a) Contrary Intent must be Clear
(1) More than signing for a corporation
(2) Look to evidence in the contract or surrounding circumstances to see if the K
would be personally liable
(3) Look to see if there is a non-recourse agent or best efforts agent language in the
K
(4) Must agree that there will be a novation or discharging of K once corp is formed
and formally accepts the K
b) RST 2d. §326: Unless otherwise agreed, a person who, in dealing with another, purports
to act as agent for a principal whom both know to be non-existent or wholly incompetent,
becomes a party to such contract. This is even if the corporation ultimately adopts the K.
3. Post-Incorporation
❖ After a corporation is formed, the corporation is not liable on the K until they adopt the K through
express (e.g., formal board resolution) or implied (e.g., if directors or officers knew of and
acquiesed in the K) conduct. However, a promoter remains liable unless 1) Corp is formed, 2) Corp
adopted the pre-incorporation K, AND 3) the parties agreed to release the promoter from liability
(either in the initial K or through subsequent novation
a) It’s possible for the corp and the promoter to both be liable on the K
b) Moneywatch Companies v. Wibers:• Dec 1992, Wilbers (df and appellant) negotiated
with Pf through property manager to lease commercial property. Df indicated he was
going to create a corp to use the land. Pf stated the Df would have to remain personally
liable on the lease if the corp was formed, but the Df stated he never intended to be
personally liable and was not advised he would have to be personally liable. Df provided
personal financial statements and a business plan to secure the lease. Lease executed on
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12/23/1995 with Jeff Wilbers DBA Golfing Adventures. 1/11/1993 Art of Incorporation
were signed with Pf as signatory" J&J Adventures". 2/3/1993 trade name registered
signed for "Golfing Adventures" to be used by J&J Adventures. Df sent a letter stating they
wanted the name of the tenant changed on the lease to J&J adventures DBA Golfing
Adventures. The Pf agreed. No indication or asking of release of personal liability. Df
claims never knew he was or would be personally liable on the lease. All checks were paid
from J&J Adventures and signed by Pf. In 1993 the corp defaulted on the lease and
vacated the premises.
(1) Analysis/Holding (Novation):Allows for a valid obligation to be extinguished by a
new valid contract and accomplished by substitution of the parties or of the
undertaking with 1) consent of all parties and 2) valid consideration. Original
parties to K must clearly and definitely intend the second agreement to be a
novation and intend to completely disregard the original contract obligation.
Merely replacing the name on the K does not release the original tenant or
promoter from liability from the K and the Promoter was not asked for a release
of liability. A promoter continues to be liable on the lease unless the parties
intend to make a substitution and they agree to the substitution. The
substitution was not a novation because there was no clear intent to create a
new K through novation, at the original formation of the K Df stated he was
personally liable, it was mailed to his home as an individual and not
representative of future business, at the time of the name change there was no
release or indication of release. In fact, his personal signature remained on the
lease, so no clear intent. Additionally there was no consideration transferred..
(2) Analysis/Holding(Corp Promoter): Corporate Promoter acting on behalf of the
future corporation. Promoter is not personally liable on contracts made before
incorporation in the name and solely for the benefit of the corporation but a
corp does not automatically assume the contract made on its behalf upon
incorporating. Promoter will not be liable on the K if there is a condition in the K
that the formation of the corp will happen and the corp is actually formed, and
the corporation formally adopts the K. Lease did not have a provision stating that
the promoter would no longer be liable when the corp is formed and listed as
the tenant. Pf was a promoter but did not contract on behalf and solely for the
future corporation, but was executed by the appellant, individually, on his own
credit, as evidenced by the submission of appellant's personal financial
statement during the negotiation and execution of the lease
(3) Why did the Pf require a personal financial statement and a business plan?
(a) New business, with no credit history
(b) Signing on personal capacity is because the Pf was relying on the
personal financials of the Df to make good on the lease when entering
into it
(c) The landlord understood that the person may be doing business as
something, but was the one personally signing the lease.
(4) If the lease was executed only in the name of the corporation and both parties
new it was for the corporation, would that change the liability calculus?
(a) Yes, Wilber would not be liable if the original lease was signed between
the corporation and the counterparty, knowing the corp had not been
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formed, the promoter would still be liable until 1) the corp was formed
and 2) the corp adopts the K
I. Defective Formation (De Facto Corporations and Corporation by Estoppel)

❖ When parties mistakenly deal with each other on the assumption a corporation exists, courts have
developed equitable doctrines that supply limited liability to the party purporting to act for the
(nonexistent) corporation. The two doctrines for such formation are 1) de facto Corporation and 2)
corporation by estoppel
1. De facto Corporation
❖ Under a de facto corporation doctrine, a court will infer limited liability if 1) statute for valid
incorporation is available 2) the promoters in the would-be corporation made a good faith effort to
incorporate; 3) the promoters were unaware that the incorporation had not happened; and 4) the
promoters used the corporation form in good faith in a transaction with a third party
2. Corporation by Estoppel
❖ Equitable doctrine applied where court determines it would be unjust to allow a party to escape
liability by denying corporate existence (i.e. because they have previously recognized or dealt with
the business as a corporation).
➢ Courts prevent third party from asserting the promoter’s personal liability when the 3rd-
party had dealt with the business on the assumption the only recourse would be against
the business assets
a) Southern Gulf v. Camcraft: Barrett entered into agreement with Camcaft to buy a vessel;
agreement signed by Barrett individually and on behalf of Southern Gulf (a company to be
formed). In the Vessel Construction Contract, Southern-Gulf stated that it was organized
in Texas, and that it was not barred from purchasing a ship by the Shipping Act of 1916. In
fact, Southern-Gulf had not been formed yet. Subsequently, Southern-Gulf revealed that
it had incorporated in the Cayman Islands, however it had taken steps to ensure that it
was bound by the agreement with Camcraft. In that Letter Mr. Bowman, Camcraft
President, signed and accepted Pf’s letter of agreement. Camcraft subsequently failed to
deliver the promised ship, and Southern-Gulf sued. Camcraft sought a declaration that
there was no cause of action because Southern-Gulf did not have a corporate existence at
the time the contract was entered into, and that the contract was thus a nullity. The trial
court ruled that Southern-Gulf could not sue Camcraft for breach because Southern-Gulf
was not in existence at the time of the contract. Southern-Gulf appealed.
(1) Issue: Whether Camcraft should be estopped from asserting that SGM’s lack of
corporate capacity at time construction contract was executed after dealing with
SGM as a corporation?
(2) Held: When a party contracts with an organization, it cannot later raise the legal
nature of that organization as a defense. Camcraft contracted with Southern-
Gulf, and Southern-Gulf upheld its end of the bargain. Camcraft, in fact, began
work on the ship it was to deliver. Nothing in the record suggests that Camcraft
was in any way harmed by Southern-Gulf’s foreign organization. Camcraft merely
thought it could get more for the ship than the contract provided for, and is
looking for an exit from a contract to which it no longer wishes to be a party.
Additionally, while Southern-Gulf stated specifically that it was a corporation
organized in the United States, this appears to have been intended to ensure
compliance with the Shipping Act of 1916. That act bars the sale of ships in times
of war or national emergency. Neither circumstance was actually present in
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1979, when the parties signed the contract. Camcraft likely cannot claim that this
was a meaningful provision in the contract, though the court remands the case
for a more full determination on that point.
(3) Barrett could have enforced the contract in his individual capacity.
(a) Under what legal theory could Barret have done this?
(i) Agency Law
(ii) When the promoter is liable on the K the promoter can also
enforce the K. Under agency, the agent is liable to a non-
existent principal can be held to the K and the agent can hold
the counter party liable on the K as well.
-Difference Between the 2 Doctrines (De-facto/Corp by Estoppel):

● If claim is a contract claim, both doctrines can easily be applied, but when it’s a tort claim use de facto
corporation, not corporation by estoppel because no reasonable reliance on it being a corporation.
J. Capital Structure (Basic Information on Stock and Dividends)

1. How Corporations Get Money to Run the Business:
a) o Corporations raise money (capital) to fund business by issuing debt and equity
securities (the capital formation process – means either issuing a loan to someone, or
finding investors to buy your stock).
(1) § These securities are long-term contingent claims on the corporation’s assets
and future earnings, issued pursuant to formal contractual instruments.
b) o Corporations with existing operations often fund their business retained earnings
(which just means income retained by the corporation instead of distributed as
dividends).
(1) § Corporation can keep the money it would issue in dividends to invest back into
business and grow it.
2. - Debt and Equity – Corporations have a capital structure, consisting of 2 basic types of
securities:
a) o (1) Debt – 3 Basic Forms: Bonds, debentures, and notes.
(1) § Holders of debt securities are creditors of the corporation.
(2) § Debt represents a fixed claim on corporation’s assets and earnings, usually
with a specific duration. Typically, debt holders get periodic interest payments
and ultimate repayment of the principal at maturity date. At liquidation, they
would get paid before stockholders (i.e. creditors have a senior claim on the
liquidation – creditors get paid first).
(3) § Relationship between corporation and its debt holders is essential contractual.
Directors and officers normally owe no fiduciary duties to debt security holders
because it’s a contractual relationship.
b) o (2) Equity:
(1) § A corporation issues equity in the form of shares of stock.
(2) § Equity security holders have the residual claim, which means at liquidation
they are entitled to whatever funds are left after all other claims on the
corporation have been satisfied – means if company is hugely successful, they
have a big upside, or if corporation is bad, equity holders are last in line – so
more risk, but bigger payoff.
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(3) § The law traditionally regards stockholders as “owners” of the corporation

(stock represents an economic interest in the corporation with particular rights).
3. Stock:
a) o Many corporations divide their equity securities into multiple classes of stock (and
there can be series within a class). They must be authorized and set forth in certificate of
incorporation (DGCL § 102(4)).
(1) § Classes of stock means that don’t have to issue as a corporation one type of
stock, can issue different types of stock, but these different classes of stock must
be listed.
b) o Most Basic Forms: Common stock and preferred stock.
c) o Unless otherwise agreed, corporate shares are by default common shares with [i.e.
common stock have] equal voting rights per share and equal rights per share to residual
claims of the corporation.
4. - Common Stock:
a) o The most basic of corporate securities [the default].
b) o All corporations have common shares. Some corporations issue no other kind of
security.
c) o Typically, common shareholders have power to vote to elect board of directors and to
vote on other matters that require shareholder approval (e.g., amending COI [certificate
of incorporation], mergers if structured in certain ways, etc.). Voting rights can be varied.
d) o Common stockholders have the residual claim on assets of the corporation (debt and
preferred stock would typically have a right to be paid first if corporation is liquidated).
e) o Corporations rarely liquidated, so common stock generally represents a permanent or
long-term commitment of capital to a corporation. If stockholders want out of their
investment they exit by selling their stock to someone else who buys it at a price that
reflects corporation’s then-current value.
5. - Preferred Stock:
a) o Different type of stock that not all corporations issue.
b) o Comes with certain contractual preferences such as senior economic rights, dividend
preferences, liquidation rights, etc.
(1) § Ex – Preferred stock with dividend preference: Would specify that they get
paid before common stock dividends get paid or paid dividends by higher
amount.
(2) § Ex – Liquidation Preference: Right to be paid a specific portion of corporation’s
assets before paid to common shareholders.
c) o Essentially contractual in nature. Rights must be in the COI.
d) o Preferred stock sometimes represents a permanent commitment of capital and
sometimes not – in the latter event, the shares will be redeemable for some specified
amount.
(1) § Right to redeem may be held by SH or by corporation or both.
e) o Deemed to have voting rights equal to common shares unless the COI provides
otherwise – voting rights can be varied.
6. Decisions about Capital Structure: Different capital structures reflect differing allocations of
control, risk, and claims on corporation’s income and assets.
a) o There is no one-size-fits-all optimal structure.
b) o Various considerations, e.g.:
(1) § Taxes (for example, interest paid on bonds is deductible but $ paid in dividends
is not).
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(2) § Leverage (Leverage can increase potential for additional gain or for bankruptcy
depending on corporation’s income and what it will do with borrowed money).
(3) § Market.
c) LEgal Capital:
(1) It is the cushion of capital designed to protect debt holders. The law generally
provided that the corporation could not “eat into” this cushion of legal capital by
paying out too much money to shareholder
(2) Legal Capital=outstanding shares x par value
7. - Potential Tension in Capital Structure:
a) o Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams: Company had 1 week’s money left in bank and
preferred shareholders had 30 million in liquidation preferences (they had 30 million in
getting paid out first). Preferred shareholders wanted to liquidate company and common
stockholders wanted to let company seek out this new technology which could make
company profitable (also, if company is liquidated, common shareholders would get
nothing). Company found investor to invest $3 million so company could continue
operations; common shareholders wanted this investment, but preferred shareholders
wanted to sell company, so preferred shareholders sued when company took $3 million
investment. Issue: Does the board of directors breach its duty, in exercising its business
judgment, to prefer interests of common stockholders to interests of preferred
stockholders, if there’s a conflict of the two interests?
(1) § Held: Board of directors does not breach its duty to prefer interests of
common stockholders to interests of preferred stockholders, if there’s a conflict
of the two interests. Directors who made decision about the loan transaction
were independent, acted in good faith, and were well informed of the available
business alternatives. Therefore, board breached no duty owed to corporation or
any stockholders in preferring the interests of common stock to the interests of
preferred stock.
8. - Issuing Stock:
a) o Much of the law governing the issuance of stock is federal and state securities laws.
(1) § At the most basic level, idea is that federal securities laws require issuers of
stock to register the issuance with SEC, unless there is an available exemption.
Liability can result from false statements in the registration statement.
b) o State Corporate Law: There is also state corporate law concerning the stock issuance
process.
(1) § To validly issue shares, the board must authorize the issuance of shares and
the corporation must receive appropriate consideration (DGCL § 152).
(a) · The corporation, acting through its board, must approve the particular
transaction in which the shares are sold (DGCL § 161).
(b) The appropriate number of shares must be authorized in the certificate
of incorporation.
(c) The directors determine price or consideration for newly issued shares.
Their judgment that it is adequate is considered conclusive, in the
absence of fraud (DGCL § 152, BJR).
9. Vocab – Subscription Agreement: An offer to purchase shares from a corporation. Subscriptions
can be made to existing corporations or corporations to be formed.
a) o A subscription does not become a contract until accepted by corporation. There can be
concerns about the enforceability of subscription agreements entered into before
incorporation.
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b) o DGCL § 165 provides the default that they are irrevocable by the subscriber for 6
months from the date of subscription, unless otherwise provided.
10. - Vocab – Par Value: Par value is the minimum price per share of the stock.
11. Vocab – Authorized, Outstanding and Treasury Stock (MUST KNOW THIS):
a) o Authorized Stock/Shares: The maximum number of shares that a corporation is legally
permitted to issue, as specified in the certificate of incorporation.
b) o Outstanding Stock/Shares: Shares are outstanding when they have been validly
authorized, issued, and are held by someone or some entity other than the corporation
itself (aka issued stock/shares).
(1) § These are the shares that are entitled to vote and receive dividends (DGCL §§
160(c), 170).
c) o Treasury Stock/Shares: Stock that has been repurchased by the corporation.
(1) § It was authorized and issued at one point but was bought back by the
corporation
12. - Options: An option is the right to buy or sell something in the future.
a) o They are Contingent Claims: Gives holder the contractual right to buy or sell, but not a
contractual obligation.
b) o Call Option: The right to buy shares (typically by a certain date at a certain price).
c) o Put Option: The right to sell shares (typically by a certain date at a certain price).
13. - Stock Options: A type of call option – giving holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy
shares of a company.
a) o Often issued as part of an incentive compensation package.
b) o Often subject to a vesting period in which a certain portion of the stock options vest
over time, giving the holder the right then to purchase a certain number of shares at the
strike price/ exercise price before the expiration date.
14. - How Stockholders Make Money from Their Investment in Corporation:
a) o (1) Dividends: A distribution of cash, stock, or property by the corporation to a class of
its shareholders, decided upon by the board of directors.
(1) § Most commonly it is a portion of the profits that is distributed as a dividend.
The dividend is often quoted in terms of dollar amount each share receives
(dividends per share).
(2) § E.g., a corporation with 1 million shares outstanding that decides to distribute
$2 million to its shareholders results in a dividend per share of $2 ($2 million
dollars divided by 1 million shares).
(3) § Board of directors may authorize the corporation to pay dividends (DGCL §
170(a)).
(4) § DGCL § 160: Constraints on the board’s discretion to declare a dividend;
concept of surplus (taking account of assets and liabilities). (LEGAL CAPITAL)
(a) Basically gets at whether corporation is solvent enough to issue a
dividend – as long as there’s surplus, then board has discretion to
declare a dividend (known as the legal capital test)
(5) The decision to declare a dividend is a business judgement and the courts will
look at the transaction within the scope of duty of care, BJR, or interested
director transactions
(6) § Litle v. Waters: Waters and Litle formed two corporations. For providing the
needed capital, Waters received two-third interest in both companies. Litle, for
managing companies, received one-third interest in both entities. Litle alleged he
agreed with Waters to convert one of companies to an S-corporation in exchange
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for Waters agreeing to always make available sufficient funds to cover any taxes
incurred from the company’s S-corp. election. Waters fired Litle from positions as
president and CEO and merged the two companies into one entity. Waters
refused to pay dividends so he could use entity’s profits to pay down debt, one
of companies owed to him, and refused to pay dividends to force Litle, who was
then unable to pay his significant tax liability, to sell his shares at a substantial
discount.
(a) Held: Although the decision to pay dividends lies in the discretion of the
BOD and BJR, here the court looked at the transaction/Decision and
determined that the decision to not pay dividends was an interested
party transaction, not merely a typical business decision, where the
person making the decision dominated the Company’s operations.
Therefore, the decision is looked at under the entire fairness standard.
Closely held private corporation and an interested director as to the
decision not to issue a dividend gets entire fairness review.
(7) § Kamin v. American Express: Amex authorized dividends to be paid out to
stockholders in form of shares of Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette, Inc. (DLJ). Ps,
minority stockholders in Amex, brought suit against directors alleging dividends
were a waste of corporate assets in that stocks of DLJ could have been sold on
the market, saving Amex about $8 million in taxes. Issue: Can a stockholder
maintain a claim against directors if stockholder alleges only that a particular
course of action would have been more advantageous than course of action
directors took?
(a) ·Held: Public corporation and board’s decision given business judgment
rule deference. Courts will not interfere with business decision made by
directors of business unless there’s a claim of fraud, bad faith, or self-
dealing. An error of judgment by directors, as long as business decision
was made in good faith, is not sufficient to maintain a claim against
them. Ps do not allege any bad faith on part of directors. Only
wrongdoing Ps claim is directors should have done something
differently with DLJ stock.
b) o (2) Stock Splits: A stock split is a division of the outstanding shares into more shares. It
divides the pie into more slices. It doesn’t change stockholders’ relative ownership
interests.
(1) § Why Board Might Decide to Split the Stock: To permit the transfer of smaller
percentages of each shareholder’s ownership or to reduce the price per share.
(2) § How Stock Splits Commonly Done: Through stock dividends of authorized but
unissued shares to the existing shareholders (i.e. board meets once they decide
to do a stock split, they need to check to make sure there’s enough authorized
stock in COI in order to do that, and as long as there’s enough of that, they can
go forward with deciding to do it). If have enough to do a stock split, all you do is
declare a dividend.
(3) § How Stock Splits Expressed/Referred to:
(a) Two-for-one: Someone who had one share, now has 2 shares.
(b) One-for-two: Opposite of above – doing this requires amending the COI.
c) o (3) Stock Repurchases: Company buying back its own stock.
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(1) § Possible Reasons Why a Corporation Would Repurchase its Own Stock:
Depends on context:
(a) Might be more tax advantageous for shareholders – left outstanding
shares are worth more and get taxed on dividends but not stock
repurchases.
(b) If sitting on giant mountain of cash, board of directors might say best
use of this cash is buying stock because might not have found
something better to use this cash on or think that the market does not
accurately portray how successful company is at the moment.
(c) ·Or do it to change the corporate capital structure.
(2) § Rules on Repurchases: DGCL § 160 says must have at least 1 outstanding share
to repurchase stock.
(3) Klang v. Smith’s Food: A corporation repurchased its shares in transaction with a
third party. Shareholder contended corporation's repurchase of shares violated
DGCL § 160, which prohibited impairment of capital.
(a) o Held: A corporation may not repurchase its shares if, in doing so, it
would cause an impairment of capital under 8 Del.c § 160. A repurchase
impairs capital if the funds used in the repurchase exceed the amount
of the corporation’s surplus, defined by 8 Del.C § 154 to mean the
excess of net assets over the par value of the corporation's issued stock
(i.e.,legal capital). In absence of bad faith or fraud on the part of board,
the court defers to board’s judgement in its determination of what the
surplus is and how it’s calculated.
(4) § Repurchased Stock = Treasury stock (authorized, issued, but not outstanding
stock that can be re-issued by default rule).
K. Limited Liability and Piercing the Corporate Veil

1. Limited Liability
a) General Default Rule: Corporations have limited liability, which means that shareholders
are not personally liable for corporate debts or torts. Shareholder losses are limited to
the amount they invested in the firm.
(1) This is a default rule. It is possible for a shareholder to voluntarily assume
liability through a personal guaranty.
b) POLICY: It is the tort or contract creditor, not the corporation’s shareholders, that bears
the loss whenever the corporation’s resources are insufficient to satisfy the claim.
c) Why do shareholders want limited liability? More generally, what are the rationales for
limited liability?
(1) As a society, we want to encourage capital formation to pool money and invest in
large projects
(2) If allow joint and several liability of the shareholders it would prevent
diversification of assets amongst investors to spread risk in the market to obtain
the return.
(3) Facilitates corporate risk taking that might be valuable (beneficial for society)
(4) Liquidity in the market allowing people to trade in and out of the stock quickly.
Keep company management accountable
d) Why would creditors accept limited liability?
(1) Voluntary creditors know the world they operate in and can ask for a personal
guarantee or negotiate a better deal (higher interest rates)
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(2) They are in the best position to K around the limited liability to protect
themselves
e) Concerns with Limited liability
(1) LL encourages corporations to engage in riskier or more damaging activities
because shareholders are allowed to externalize the corporation’s costs to third
parties
(2) Tort claimants may be particularly harmed because they may lack means to
spread the risk externalized onto them.
(a) They are not voluntary creditors to which they could have negotiated at
all – they don’t have time to pre-negotiate with corporation – they are
the innocent party who was injured by corporation’s action with no
opportunity to protect themselves beforehand.
(3) “[C]orporations are designed to externalize their costs.” The corporation is
“deliberately programmed, indeed legally compelled, to externalize costs
without regard for the harm it may cause to people, communities, and the
natural environment. Every cost it can unload onto someone else is a benefit to
itself, a direct route to profit.”
2. Piercing the Corporate Veil
❖ An equitable mechanism to hold the shareholders of the corporations personally liable for the
actions of the corporation or corporate group.
❖ CAL Test: “To invoke alter ego, two conditions must be met:
➢ 1) there must be such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its
equitable owner that the separate personalities of the corporation and the shareholder
do not in reality exist; AND
■ Factors:
● Failure to observe corporate formalities
● Commingling business and personal funds or assets
● Undercapitalization of the business
➢ 2) there must be an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the
corporation alone.
❖ Enterprise liability test (Horizontal PCV to get to an affiliated Co.): The corporate veil of a
corporation may be pierced if the second corp: (1) dominates and controls the subsidiary and (2)
abuses the privilege of incorporation by using the subsidiary to commit a fraud or injustice.
Essentially a blurring of the formal and substantive lines of the corporation.
a) General/Background
(1) Piercing the corporate veil (PCV) is an equitable doctrine created by courts to
“prevent fraud and achieve justice.” It is an exception to the general rule which
is limited liability.
(2) States vary in their PCV tests. No single test prevails.
(3) Fact-specific cases.
(4) Nearly all PCV cases involve closely-held corporations (apart from enterprise
liability, which we discuss below to have a parent corp be liable for the actions of
a subsidiary).
(5) PCV claim could arise where there is a parent-subsidiary situation or where there
is a corporate group with a parent and multiple subsidiaries that are affiliates of
each other (i.e. vertical or horizontal piercing).
b) Unity of interest and ownership /Control or domination (aka “alter ego”)
(1) Frequently discussed factors or considerations:
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(a) Failure to observe corporate formalities

(i) § Ex: Corporation form, but failure to hold board meeting,
failure to issue stock, failure to appoint board, or adopt
normal corporation docs like (COI or bylaws), or didn’t
follow things that supposed to do when you create a
corporation.
(b) Commingling business and personal funds or assets
(i) Whether the shareholder treated the Corp. as separate from
their own personal account/assets
(c) Undercapitalization of the business
(i) § Deliberate undercapitalization (hard to prove because it’s
difficult to distinguish from corporate debt) – Court looks at
whether wasn’t enough funds put in at outset of
corporation that would be reasonably expected to need to
run business.
(ii) § BUT need some other wrongful conduct beyond corporation
just not having enough money at time plaintiff is trying to go
after corporation –undercapitalization typically not dispositive .
c) Refusing to allow PCV would sanction fraud or promote injustice
(1) Deceit or other wrongdoing, some element of unfairness or wrong beyond a
creditor’s inability to collect
(a) This deceitful conduct or quasi fraudulent conduct would make it hard
for the Pf to have protected themselves
(2) Some courts expressly state the separate prong with sanctioning fraud or
promoting injustice; sometimes the analysis ends up being very similar anyway
and effectively collapses into analysis of the unity factors or a holistic appraisal.
(3) Courts state different factors, but it generally boils down to control (often
implicitly), lack of corporate formalities, intermingling funds or assets,
undercapitalization. To pierce, you generally need at least 2 of these.
(4) Courts sometimes also state that the control or wrongdoing must have
proximately caused the injury or loss to plaintiff.
d) PCV: Vertical Piercing
❖ CAL Test: “To invoke alter ego, two conditions must be met:
➢ 1) there must be such a unity of interest and ownership between the
corporation and its equitable owner that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist; AND
➢ 2) there must be an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those
of the corporation alone.”
(1) Vertical piercing: Where a pf succeeds with a Vertical PCV theory they can reach
the shareholder’s personal assets.
(2) Theberge v. Darbo: Theberge’s and warden group brought suit against Horton
street Associates Inc, which is corporation who’s veil plaintiffs are seeking to
pierce. Horton was a real estate company, and Theberge’s and warden group
were trying to recover an amount owed to them by Horton; they won default
judgment against Horton, but there was no money in Horton so they instituted a
second action and alleged they need to PCV of the company to get to the Smalls,
Horton Shareholders (individuals), and Darbro Corp, also controlled by the
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Smalls. The PCV claim alleged Horton was the alter ego of Darbro and the Smalls,
and the sale of the property to Horton was based on the representations that
Albert Small would stand behind the mortgage (so they were saying Small
personally guaranteed the mortgage).
(a) Held: In K, courts apply a more stringent standard because the party
seeking relief in a K case voluntarily and knowingly entered into the K.
Because these were more sophisticated parties, Ps could have protected
themselves better and so no PCV allowed. Ps knew what it looked like to
get a formal personal guarantee but they didn’t get that, so court said
not going to redo deal for them just because they didn’t get a personal
guarantee
e) PCV: Horizontal Piercing (aka Enterprise Liability)
(1) Enterprise liability holds the larger corporate entity financially responsible.
Depends on proof that the separate identities of the corporations were not
respected. If successful under this theory, the plaintiff could recover from the
other corporations but not from the shareholders.
(2) Walkovsky v. Carlton (NY 1966)(Tort);Carlton (defendant) owned 10
corporations (defendants), including, notably, Seon Cab Corporation. Each of the
corporations owned one or two cabs, and the minimum amount of automobile
insurance required by law. One of the cabs owned by Seon Cab was in an
accident with Walkovszky (plaintiff). Walkovszky sued the cab’s driver, as well as
Seon Cab (under a respondeat superior theory), Carlton (under a piercing the
corporate veil theory), and all of Carlton’s other cab companies. In the lower
court proceeding, Walkovszky claimed that the cab companies did not act as
separate organizations, but were set up separately to avoid liability. The lower
courts found that Carlton’s companies were set up to frustrate creditors, and
that a creditor could sue Carlton. Carlton and his companies appealed.
(a) Held: A plaintiff can pierce the corporate veil and hold a company’s
owners liable for the debts of the company if the company is a dummy
corporation, whose interests are not distinguishable from those of the
owner or owners. It is very relevant to the discussion of veil-piercing if a
business is undercapitalized, because this suggests that the business is a
fraud intended to rob creditors of the ability to fulfill their debts. It is
also relevant that the formal barriers between companies are not
respected. That said, a business enterprise may divide its assets,
liabilities, and labor between multiple corporate entities, without
impinging the limited liability of the shareholders. In this case, Seon Cab
Company was undercapitalized, and carried only the bare minimum
amount of insurance required by law. However, while this is relevant, it
is not enough to allow a plaintiff to pierce the veil, otherwise, owners
would be on the hook every time their corporation accrued liabilities
outstripping its assets, and limited liability would be meaningless.
Instead, there must be some evidence that the owners themselves were
merely using the company as a shell. While Walkovszky alleged that
each of Carlton’s companies was actually part of a much larger
corporate entity, he could offer no proof to that effect. The mere fact
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that Walkovszky might not have been fully able to recover his damages
was not enough to justify letting him pierce Seon Cab’s veil.
(b) Dissent: When the legislature passed the automobile insurance
minimum, it assumed that companies that could afford insurance above
the minimum would in fact purchase additional insurance. The goal of
the act was to ensure that there was a pot of money provided for
victims of automobile accidents. Seon Cab was profitable enough to
afford more than the minimum insurance coverage, but the company
was kept intentionally undercapitalized. The insurance minimum should
not be used here to prevent Walkovszky from the type of recovery that
the law was meant to provide for, and Carlton should not be allowed to
benefit from a corporate form he adopted merely to abuse it.
(3) Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp (8th Cir. 1922) (TORT):Radaszewski (plaintiff) was
injured in an automobile accident when the motorcycle he was driving was
struck by a truck driven by an employee of Contrux, Inc. Contrux, Inc. is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Telecom Corporation (defendant). When Telecom formed
Contrux, it contributed loans, not equity, and did not pay for all of the stock that
was issued. Telecom did provide Contrux with $1 million in basic liability
coverage, and $10 million in excess coverage. Contrux’s excess liability insurance
carrier became insolvent two years after Radaszewski’s accident. Telecom argued
that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. The question of
jurisdiction turned on whether Radaszewski could pierce the corporate veil and
hold Telecom liable for the conduct of its subsidiary, Contrux. Telecom argued
that the corporate veil could not be pierced on the basis of undercapitalization,
because of the insurance it had provided to Contrux. The district court rejected
Telecom’s argument that insurance could determine a subsidiary’s financial
responsibility. The district court nonetheless held that it lacked jurisdiction over
Telecom on other grounds.
(a) Held: A plaintiff may not pierce the corporate veil and bring a parent
corporation into a case against a subsidiary if the subsidiary was
undercapitalized in a traditional accounting sense, but was provided
with more than adequate liability insurance. A person injured by a
corporation or its employees may generally recover only from the assets
of the employee or the employer corporation, and not from the
shareholders of the corporation or its parent corporation. As found in
Collet v. American National Stores, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 273 (Mo.App. 1986),
to pierce the corporate veil and make corporate shareholders liable a
plaintiff must show: (1) complete domination and control over the
finances, policy, and business of the corporation, so that the
corporation at the time of the transaction had no separate mind, will, or
existence of its own; (2) the control was used by the defendant to
commit fraud, to violate a legal duty, or to act dishonestly or unjustly in
violation of the plaintiff’s legal rights; and (3) the control and breach of
duty proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. Undercapitalization a
subsidiary satisfies the second element of the Collet test, since creating
a business and operating it without sufficient funds to be able to pay
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bills or satisfy judgments against it implies a deliberate or reckless

disregard of the rights of others. In this case, the district court found
that Contrux was undercapitalized according to generally accepted
accounting principles. Telecom contributed loans, not equity, and did
not pay for all of the stock that was issued. However, Telecom argues
that Contrux was financially responsible because it was provided with
$11 million in liability insurance to pay judgments such as the one now
sought by Radaszewski. The district court rejected the argument that
insurance could determine a subsidiary’s financial responsibility. This
court disagrees. The policy behind the second element of the Collet test
is to ensure financial responsibility. Insurance meets this policy just as
well as other forms of capitalization. The purpose of the limited liability
doctrine is to protect a parent corporation when a subsidiary becomes
insolvent. This doctrine would be destroyed if a parent corporation
could be held liable for errors in business judgment. Something more
than an error in business judgment is required under Collet. The district
court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction is therefore
affirmed, but modified to be with prejudice.
(4) Garemal v. Westin Hotel Co.: Lisa Gardemal (plaintiff) and her husband, John,
travelled to Cabo San Lucas, Mexico to attend a seminar held at the Westin
Regina Resort Los Cabos (Westin Regina). Westin Regina is managed by Westin
Mexico (defendant). Westin Mexico is a Mexican corporation and a subsidiary of
Westin Hotel Company (Westin) (defendant), a Delaware corporation. Pf,
deceased, was directed by hotel staff to snorkel at an unbeknownst dangerous
beach. Pf died by drowning there. Gardemal brought wrongful death and
survival actions against Westin and Westin Mexico under Texas law, alleging that
her husband drowned because Westin Regina's doorman negligently directed
them to the beach and failed to warn them of the dangerous conditions.
Although Westin and Westin Mexico were closely related through stock
ownership, common officers, financing arrangements, etc., the two corporations
strictly adhered to their corporate formalities. Further, Westin Mexico was
sufficiently capitalized. Westin moved for summary judgment, claiming that it
was a separate corporate entity and thus should not be liable for acts committed
by its subsidiary. The district court granted Westin's motion for summary
judgment based on the magistrate judge's recommendation. The magistrate
judge rejected Gardemal's theory that the alter ego and single-business-
enterprise doctrines allowed the court to impute liability to Westin. Gardemal
appealed.
(a) Held: Westin Mexico still operated as a separate entity, and not the
alter-ego of the parent corp. ALthough they had similar operating
systems, brochures, and the like, those were in the normal interactions
of Parent-Subsidiary relations. The mere fact that Westin and Westin
Mexico are closely related through stock ownership, common officers,
financing arrangements, etc. is insufficient to apply the alter ego
doctrine. Evidence shows that Westin and Westin Mexico are
incorporated in two different countries and strictly adhere to their
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corporate formalities. Further, no evidence shows that Westin Mexico is

undercapitalized so that Gardemal could not recover directly from
Westin Mexico. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence that Westin
Mexico is Westin's alter ego. Similarly, there is insufficient evidence that
Westin and Westin Mexico are so integrated as to constitute a single
business enterprise. Not acting as a single enterprise.
(5) OTR Associates v. IBC Services, Inc.: OTR Associates (OTR) (plaintiff) owns a
shopping mall in New Jersey. It leased space to Samyrna, Inc. (the franchisee), a
franchisee of International Blimpie Corporation (Blimpie) (defendant). Blimpie
wholly owned a subsidiary named IBC Services, Inc. (IBC) (defendant). IBC was
created for the sole purpose of holding the lease for the space occupied by the
franchisee. IBC had no assets except the lease and no income except the rent
payments by the franchisee. IBC did not have its own business place and
employees, and Blimpie retained the right to approve and manage the lease. The
transaction happened in this way: IBC entered into the lease with OTR, and then
with OTR's consent, IBC subleased the space to the franchisee. OTR’s partners
believed that they were dealing with Blimpie instead of IBC and did not discover
the separate corporate entities until after the eviction. The persons who
approached OTR and asked to rent space in the mall were wearing Blimpie
uniforms, the tenant identified in the lease was “IBC Services, Inc. having an
address at c/o International Blimpie Corporation, 1414 Avenue of the Americas,
New York, New York,” and the letters sent to OTR bore the Blimpie logo. Later,
the lease was terminated due to continued late payment of rent. OTR sued
Blimpie for unpaid rent in the amount of $150,000. The trial court found for OTR.
Blimpie appealed.
(a) Held: In this case, Blimpie’s domination and control over IBC is obvious:
IBC was created for the sole purpose of holding the lease for the space
occupied by Blimpie’s franchisee, IBC had no assets except the lease and
no income except the rent payments by the franchisee, IBC did not have
its own business place and employees, and Blimpie retained the right to
approve and manage the lease. Further, Blimpie abused the privilege of
incorporation by using IBC to commit a fraud or injustice. OTR’s partners
believed that they were dealing with Blimpie instead of IBC and did not
discover the separate corporate entities until after the eviction. IBC
failed to explain its relationship with Blimpie and intentionally misled
OTR to believe that it was Blimpie: the persons who approached OTR
and asked to rent space in the mall were wearing Blimpie uniforms, the
tenant identified in the lease was IBC Services, Inc., and the letters sent
to OTR were headered by the Blimpie logo. These facts indicate that
Blimpie created IBC for the purpose of insulating Blimpie from liability
on the lease if the franchisee defaulted. Such purpose was fraudulent
and improper.
(i) Although they adhered to corporate formalities, every function
and operational sense indicated they operated as a single
entity.
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III. The Role of Directors and Officers (Managing the Business Affairs; Fiduciary Duties to
Shareholders
❖ Directors are fiduciaries that shall act in good faith and with conduct reasonably believed to be in the best interests
of the corporation.
❖ They owe a duty of care (DOC) and a duty of loyalty (DOL) (which includes a duty of good faith) to the corporation
and its shareholders.
❖ Stemming from these duties, directors also have a duty of disclosure (aka, a duty of candor) and disclose all material
relevant information
A. Fiduciary Duties: The Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule
1. Duty of Care
❖ Duty of care=a duty to act honestly, in good faith, and in an informed manner(oversight function).
In general, when BJR does not apply, the duty of care (DOC) requires directors to use the amount
of care and skill that a reasonably prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a
like position and under similar circumstances. (Same as agency duty of care).
a) Behaving unreasonably or in a grossly negligent manner violates duty of care
b) Directors should reasonably believe they were acting in the best interest of the corp
c) Not often that a BOD will be personally liable or pay out of pocket for breaching duty of
care because courts apply BJR, which is a big hurdle and Corps can include a 102(b)(7)
provision allowing for exculpation of monetary liability resulting from a directors breach
of duty of care.
d) Standard of Conduct v. Standard of Liability
(1) Stan of Conduct (Aspirational): MBCA § 8.30(b): “when becoming informed in
connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to their
oversight function, [directors] shall discharge their duties with the care that a
person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under the
circumstances.”
(2) Stand of Liability (Where legal liability may arise if the corporation suffers a loss
from their fiduciary duty): MBCA § 8.31: a director shall not be liable to the
corporation or its shareholders unless the challenging party establishes
(a) (1) a corporate charter indemnification (DGCL 127(b) provision) or
cleansing does not preclude liability; and
(b) (2) the conduct was the result of lack of good faith; lack of belief acting
in best interest of corporation; not being informed; lack of
independence (DOL); or failure to devote ongoing attention to
oversight, or devote timely attention when particular facts arise.
2. Business Judgement Rule
❖ Generally, for ordinary business decisions, the relevant fiduciary duty is the duty of care, but
directors are entitled to the protections of the business judgement rule. BJR presumes that the
directors’ decisions were made 1) on an informed basis, 2) in good faith and 3) on an honest belief
that the action is in the best interest of the corporation. However, if BJR does not apply courts will
scrutinize the decision as to its fairness to the corporation and its shareholders.
➢ This is a rebuttable presumption, but the plaintiff bears that burden to rebut it and then
show that the breach of care was the proximate cause for the harm. During the
rebuttable presumption, the courts will not look into the substance of the decision, but
the process in getting to the decision. The court will scrutinize the substance of the
decision when there is a waste claim.
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■ Procedural: Rebuttable presumption is that the directors exercised reasonable

diligence and acted in good faith. Thus, PF need to show that the decision was a
result of self dealing or bad faith, or the decision was not a proper exercise of
business judgement.
● The inquiry for the DOC is largely about whether the process that
generated the relevant business decision was unsound (e.g., were
directors grossly negligent in failing to inform themselves before making
a decision?).
■ Substantive: The standard is that the transaction was so one sided that no
reasonable person would think they were getting adequate consideration for
what they were doing (looked at in corporate waste claims and hard to win)
a) Background
(1) In addition, BJR protection is not available in non-feasance situations (failure to
perform minimal levels of oversight or making a decision at all). Because no
decision was made.
(2) Courts do not want there to be additional/second guessing of poor or
unfortunate business decisions if they were taken in good faith.
(a) Dont want to have the courts second guess BOD/Business decisions, but
will look at the process to determine if it is adequate.
(3) Policy reasons for BJR:
(a) A lot of shareholder litigation after the fact when a business decision
turned out poorly
(b) Don’t want to undermine the decisions of the BOD and burden them
with constant litigation brought by PF lawyers
(c) BOD is in the best position to make business decisions than are judges
and the Directors are elected by shareholders so if you do not like the
Board's decision then you can re-elect board members.
(d) Ex ante people would not want to sit on a board if they were going to
be constantly bogged down with litigation
(4) Two Views on BJR
(a) As an abstention doctrine– a judicial “hands off” philosophy or
presumption against judicial review of DOC claims. The court abstains
from reviewing the substantive merits of the directors’ conduct unless
the plaintiff can rebut the BJR.
(b) As a standard of review, essentially raising the bar (e.g., from negligence
to gross negligence or recklessness).
(5) Types of claims for BJR:
(a) Negligence: three factors--voluntariness, judicial expertise, and risk
(b) Reasonableness- focus on directors behavior and motivation
(c) Waste: claim is that a decision or transaction was a waste or spoliation
of corporate assets
(i) High bar
(ii) Delaware Supreme Ct: there is waste oly if "what the
corporation has received is so inadequate in value that no
person of ordinary, sound business judgement would deem it
worth that which the corporation has paid. *Grobow v. Perot
(1988)
(a) E.g., where transaction had no benefit to the corp.
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(6) Shlensky v Wrigley: PF are minority shareholders of Chicago Nat'l League Ball
Club (Inc.), Del Corp with PPB in Chic, Ill. Df owns and operates Cubs and
operates Wrigley Fields. Ind Df are the directors of Cubs and Mr. Wrigley who is
president of the corp and owner of 80% of the stock. Pf wanted to include lights
at Wrigley field so that night games could be played. This was to increase
attendance at the stadium and profitability. The team was losing money. If don't
put in lights they will continue to lose money. Pf alleged that the funds to put in
lights are readily attainable and cost of installation would be offset by the
increase in funds from night games. Pf alleged the Dfs refused to put in lights
because Wrigley's personal opinion about baseball to be played during the day
and putting in lights would have a deteriorating effect on the surrounding
neighborhood. Not financial reasons for ticket sales and attendance. Df directors
acquiesced to this demand even though they knew it would not favorably impact
the corporation's profits
(a) Holding/Analysis: Directors are elected for their business judgement
and capabilities, thus courts cannot force them to make decisions
because of other corps decisions may make those corps more money. If
a majority stockholders business decision is not in violation of corporate
charter or public law or it doesn’t constitute corruption or fraudulent
subversion of rights and interests of the corporation or shareholder,
then the majority's agents or shareholders have the right to act in that
capacity and direct the business even if there is a more successful
option. Generally the majority shareholders shall control the
corporation and govern the lawful exercise of its franchise and business,
which minority shareholders impliedly agree to when they purchase
securities in the corp. If a decision does not show fraud, illegality, or
conflict of interest, then the decision of the board is appropriate.
• Dfs' actions are not contrary to the best intersts of the corp
and there was no fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest. Effect on
surrounding area would affect the decision because it would affect the
property value of the stadium and if the stadium was in a poor area
who would go. Courts cannot reconsider the decisions of a director
without a showing of a "dereliction" of their duty
(7) Smith v. Van Gorkom: Trans Union was a rail car with an 11 person board, 5
inside, 5 outside, and CEO. Were unable to utilize Investment tax credits that
their competitors were doing to lower prices but still matched prices. But were
able to be used if a company bought them and used the ITC against their
operating income. Board and management looked to alternatives to gain value.
Knew of ITC and managers were thinking about a Management Buyout. LBO for
Manager s (i.e., Place Business assets as collateral to entirely fund the purchase
of the company) and hope funds pay back the debt. Publicly being traded at
$38/share. At the time of the Management buyout discussion CFO/controller did
Back of the Envelope $ and said easy at ~$50 and hard at ~$60, based on the
value of the corporate assets. Controller performed confidential calc of sale at
55. CEO was apart of Manager Buyout and unilaterally looked to find
alternatives, including LBO. CEO close to retirement. Said would be willing to sell
69
his own shares at $55 and then met with Pritzker. CEO, on his own, proposed
LBO sale at $55 and Pritzker said he would be willing. No one knew of the
meeting. CEO then met with two other BOD members and outside consultants
with knowledge of Pritzker's interest at $55/share if Pritzker could also have the
option to buy 1Mln shares of T/stock at $38/share (75¢ above current FMV)--
>acted as a lock-up so Pritzker could get something for the effort. Priztker asked
for a Lock-up in the Agreement. CEO met with management and did not like the
offer ($too low, lock-up not good). 9/20 CEO then met with BOD and told them
the details but failed to mention the specifics and the fact that the CEO was the
one who approached Pritzker (Pivotal Meeting). No notice of the subject of the
board meeting so didn’t know what to do or decided and no copy of the M&A
agreement to read only 2hr presentation of the Merger, and CEO did not read
the PPA, the CFO study said the price was too low but in the FMV range. Lawyer
advised that they could be sued for not taking the deal and although good
practice it is not required to get an outside fairness opinion. Meeting took 2
hours and decided to enter into the agreement with BOD. That night CEO signed
the agreement at the Opera without having read the agreement.
(a) Holding/Analysis: Directors have a duty to inform themselves of all
material information reasonably available to them before making a
decision. If a director breaches their duty of care they can take steps to
cure their breach and avoid liability.)Pf must show the Board did not
make an informed decision and was grossly negligent in the process of
deciding. Only CEO was aware of the offer and nature of the meeting,
there was no written report of the terms of the agreement at the 9/20
meeting and had to rely on CEO's 20 minute presentation, no
documentation to support $55 price (didn’t take into account
merger/majority premium) BOD and CEO did not actually read the K.
The Border never reasonably looked to see what the true intrinsic and
extrinsic value of the company was regardless of the current market
price and the premium being paid and the intelligence of the BOD and
Management. Even though the Management and BOD were smart
business people, they have to actually USE their expertise to make an
informed business decision. BOD breached their duty of care because
the Directors did not reach an informed decision on 9/20/1980 when
they voted on the deal to sell the company for $55 because they:
(i) Did not adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom's role
in forcing the "sale" of the Company and in establishing the per
share purchase price
(ii) Were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company
(iii) Given the circumstances, at a minimum, were grossly negligent
in approving the "sale" of the upon Company upon two hours
consideration, without prior notice, and without the exigency
of a crisis or emergency
(b) •September 20 Board Meeting Key facts: No notice of the subject
matter to most of the board; 20-minute oral presentation by Van
Gorkom; No written materials or deal outlines, etc.; Van Gorkom did not
70
explain how he got this $55 price; Announcement of CFO Romens of the
study – but this value was a study of what price could be a LBO but it
was not accurate price of the company; board didn’t ask any questions;
board approves deal in a 2-hour meeting.
(c) What Steps Directors Could’ve Taken to Inform Themselves:
(i) Circulate a report beforehand; inform board subject of meeting
beforehand; circulate materials before meeting; get a fairness
opinion of what share price should’ve been
b) On an Informed Basis
❖ Standard for an informed decision
➢ Looks to whether the BOD have informed themselves prior to making a business
decision of all material information reasonably available to them.
➢ No protection for BOD who have made an unintelligent or unadvised judgement
➢ Fulfillment requires more than absence of bad faith or fraud, because it is duty
to act on others behalf so have to act informed.
■ It is the nature of the duty of care
➢ As long as the board was not grossly negligent in informing themselves, prior to,
making a decision then there is no breach.
(1) Reliance on Experts
(a) In discharging the DOC, directors are encouraged to seek information
and advice from officers, employees, as well as outside experts, such as
investment bankers, attorneys, and accountants.
(b) Under DGCL § 141(e), directors are entitled to rely on opinions and
reports so long as such reliance is reasonable and in good faith.
(2) A shareholder Vote can cure a BOD lack of information, but the shareholders
must have all material facts when casting their vote.
(3) Shlensky v. Wrigley: N/a
(4) Smith v. Van Gorkom: Not informed because only the CEO knew all the material
facts and the BOD did not know. The shareholder vote did not cure the defect
because they did not know all the material facts
c) Good Faith
(1) Shlensky v. Wrigley: they made a decision in good faith because it was for the
benefit and not inspite of any shareholders
(2) SMith v. Van Gorkom: Not in good faith because they did not take all the
necessary steps to protect shareholders. In a M&A environment need a high
Duty of Care because that is the end of the corporation, so need to take extra
precautions. ONly listened to one 20 minute presentation adn received no
materials. 8 Del. C. § 251(b) Director has the duty to act in an informed and
deliberate manner in determining the appropriateness of a merger before
submitting the proposal to the shareholders. Cannot relinquish that duty by
leaving the shareholders alone in their decision
d) On An Honest Belief that the Action is in the Best Interest of the Co.
(1) Shlensky v. Wrigley: Court stated that it was not alleged the actions were
honestly believed that it was in the best interest of the company. In fact the
decision to not out lights may be because they do not want the neighborhood to
get bad and affect property value. It may not have been the right decision, but
jsut thaty they believed it was right.
e) How to Rebut the BJR Presumption
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(1) The BJR: When a board decision is challenged, burden is on the plaintiff to
overcome the BJR by proving either:
(a) Fraud, bad faith, illegality, or a conflict of interest (DOL – duty of
loyalty);
(b) Failure to become informed in decision making (focus on process;
liability generally based on gross negligence; e.g., Van Gorkom);
(c) Failure to establish a modicum of oversight of the corporation’s
activities (e.g., Francis; cf. recent good faith cases regarding oversight,
DOL); or
(d) The lack of a rational business purpose (or waste)
f) Board oversight
g) The directors oversee the corporation which is increasingly important with respect to
financial and regulatory risk and BJR is a counter balance to the decisions the board
makes because it is presumed the BOD will act in the company's best interest.
h) Since the role of a board member is essentially the power to manage the company on
behalf of the shareholders and then they delegate those roles to managers, the important
question is: how do directors fulfill their oversight responsibility?
i) Francis v. United States(nonfeasance/duty of care): Case was filed against the mother
claiming that she had been negligent in the conduct of her duties as director of the
corporation. A family ran business and family members were on the BOD. Father, before
he died, warned the mother that the sons would essentially gut the company if given the
opportunity. Father died and the three (mother and two sons) remained on the board and
sons ran the company. • The Sons took out "loans" from "profits," like their father did,
but their "loans" exceeded profits and the company went bankrupt. FS's reflected the
shareholder loans and although not prepared by an outside CPA firm from 1971-1975 the
statements reflected an increase in the Working Capital deficit, increase in Shareholder
loans and decrease in Brokerage income. The company went bankrupt. Creditors brought
this suit against the mother personally because the mother did not pay attention to the
business or corporate affairs, did not receive or review financial statements, did not know
the nature of the business, and was deemed competent to act but she didn’t know of the
wrongdoing was because she didn't make an effort to execute her responsibilities.
(1) Rules: Like a bank, when a company holds a creditor's or customer's funds in
trust, they owe a fiduciary duty to those customers. The BOD has the continuing
duty to be diligent and prudent in the dealings of the management of the
corporation and failing to be constitutes a breach. Directors are expected to get a
rudimentary understanding of the corporate affairs of the business and become
familiar with the fundamentals. BOD's cannot set up a defense of ignorance or
lack of knowledge needed to exercise a requisite degree of care. Directors have
the continuing duty to stay informed in the ops of the business. BOD may have a
duty to inquire further into matters involving financial statements when there
seems to be impropriety. BOD has the duty to take reasonable means to prevent
illegal actions of co-directors and object to illegal conduct of Management if
discovered and resign if the conduct persists. This duty includes a basic
understanding of what the company does; being informed on how the company
is performing; monitoring corporate affairs and policies; attending board
meetings regularly; and making inquiries into questionable matters. D had done
none of this and so breached her duty of care
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(2) Holding/Analysis: Directors cannot shut their eyes to corporate misconduct and
then claim that because they did not see the misconduct, they did not have a
duty to look. This does not require a detailed monitoring but a general
monitoring of the affairs such as 1) a regular attendance of BOD meetings 2)
inspection of books and records and the methods are up to date. Reinsurance
companies are like banks and thus owe a duty to their customers. DF had the
duty to oversee and act prudently in her duties of as a BOD. If she would have
taken reasonable steps to oversee the function of the company (like read and
understand the financial statements along with understanding the business and
questioning management) she would have realized the impropriety of
management. Would have only taken a brief, non-expert reading of financial
statements to know something was wrong and money was being
misappropriated. D’s failure to do so was proximate cause of misappropriations
of clients’ money not being discovered. BJR does NOT apply because no decision
was made.
j) This case illustrates: A duty of care (DOC) claim where BJR does not apply and how,
depending on the facts and strategy of the plaintiffs, non-feasance or a lack of oversight
can be plead as a DOC claim or lack of good faith (which would be a duty of loyalty issue).
(1) oNote: Court used a reasonable person standard in this case, and not BJR, even
though it was a duty of care claim because BJR only applies if there’s a business
judgment, and here there was no decision made – it was non-feasance.
k) BJR doesn’t apply if there’s a complete failure to do something. Because there wouldn’t
be any reason to apply reasons we have BJR to a situation where someone has failed to
act whatsoever – i.e. want to encourage people to make business decisions rather than
just fail to act,
3. Breach of Care
❖ One breaches their duty of care under BJR if they acted grossly negligent. If BJR does not
apply then a duty of care is breached when the individual did not act in a manner that a
reasonably prudent person would be expected to act in simlar circumstances with similar
skills.
a) Look to DGCL § 102(b)(7)
(1) Limited the personal liability of monetary damages of director by amending
certificate, all but for:
(a) Any breach of the directors duty of loyalty to the corp or its
stockholders
(b) Acts of omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation
(c) Improper personal benefit
(2) Only for directors, monetary damages and only protects of breach of duty of
care.
(a) If suit for breach of duty of care of director for damages and with 102
(b)(7) provision then will dismiss for failing to state a claim.
b) Summary: A company can include in its COI a provision that eliminates or limits liability of
a director for monetary damages (if have to pay money damages, but not if remedy being
sought is injunctive relief) for breach of a fiduciary duty as a director [i.e. breach of duty
of care], but cannot do this if it’s a duty of loyalty issue, a lack of good faith, or for any
transaction for which director derived an improper personal benefit.
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(1) •Example of Language Invoking 102(b)(7) in Corporation’s COI: “No director shall
be personally liable to the Corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages
for any breach of fiduciary duty by such director as a director. Notwithstanding
the foregoing sentence, a director shall be liable to the extent provided by
applicable law (i) for breach of the director’s duty of loyalty, (ii) for acts or
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law, or (iii) for any transaction from which the director derived an
improper personal benefit.”
(2) CA has a similar provision.
c) oHYPO: Bananas Corporation has been earning record revenues from its popular gadgets
and has accumulated an uncommonly large amount of retained earnings. The board of
directors of Bananas Corporation discusses what should be done with this money and
considers declaring a stock repurchase or a dividend. The board decides to do nothing for
now and to revisit the issue at the next board meeting. Is this protected by the BJR?
(1) Yes, board discussed this and made an informed decision – even though decided
to do nothing, that’s still a decision. No facts here to imply that the board’s
decision was not informed, in bad faith, or in a dishonest belief it would harm
the company
Duty of Care Summary:

Duty of care concerns the care in decision-making and also implicates collective action of the board as a whole because the
board came together to make a decision and they might all end up being defendants if there’s a question as to whether
they breached duty of care case.
● Board of directors given significant discretion in making a business decision – they must act on an informed basis
and in good faith without a conflict of interests and must actually take an action (not complete non-feasance).
● If these factual bases are shown, then plaintiff has burden to show that one of the factual prerequisites does not
exist (weren’t informed, were grossly negligent in informing themselves, or weren’t acting in good faith), then
director won’t get protection of BJR and if this happens, their action will get more closely scrutinized.
● If decision protected by BJR, all that’s left for P to claim is to try and show waste to win.
● If decision is not protected by BJR then P must show taht the DF did not act as a reasonably prudent person
ordinarily would in the situation and with the skills.
● Hypo: Banaas Corp earning record earnings and accumulating a record amount of RE. BOD reviews relevant
materials and decides to forgoe making a decision now. Is this protected under BJR?
○ YES it is protected under BJR because it is a business decision. It is unlike Francis, where nothing is done,
they consciously made an informed decision to not take any action, thus more like Shelensky or American
Express
B. Corporate Purpose, Corporate Social Responsibility, Charitable Giving, and Corporate Political
Activity
1. Corporate Purpose
❖ A business corporation is organized and carried out primarily for (not exclusively for) the profit of
the stockholders and the powers of directors are employed for that end. The BOD have the
discretion to act to pursue that end of profit maximization. Unless the BOD takes a blatant course
of business that sacrifices the interests of shareholders in favor of primarily benefiting others, then
they do not breach their duty. It is not within the lawful powers of the BOD to conduct business for
the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others
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a) Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.: Ford Co has been making a significant amount of money by
producing high quality Cars at consistently lower prices and paying their employees high
wages. Ford owns 58% of the business and is the dominant force in the business "No plan
of operations could be adopted unless he consented and no BOD can be elected whom he
does not favor. " Ford decided to expand the production line to make 1,000,000 cars per
year and thus would end the payment of the special dividend for that end. However, one
of his purposes for the expansion is to benefit the greatest possible number of people.
Ford has a ambivalent attitude toward shareholders and views that they have made
enough money and should be happy with what he gives them. Also, thinks Ford has made
too much money and needs to be shared with the public one of the reasons he is
reducing the price of the Cars. Court determined this altruistic and charitable reason were
what persuaded Ford to take his course of action. Dodge sued Ford to enjoin them to pay
the special dividend and stop building the factory.
(1) Holding: It is not within the lawful powers of the BOD to conduct business for
the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of
benefiting others. 1) The BODs did not breach their duty to shareholders by
pursuing their course of action to build the new plant and lower the price of
cars.. Judges are not expert decision makers and the car's price could be
increased at any time. Additionally these business plans are long term plans and
take into account the competitive landscape and potential changes in that
landscape in order to operate profitably through the future. AS long as the
businesses total conduct is not incidental to the shareholder's profit
maximization goal then it is ok. 2) The court required the BOD to pay the
special dividend. Basis: Courts will intervene when the decision was made in bad
faith. The court stepped in because they decided that the BOD decision to not
pay the dividend was not made in good-faith but for a "semi-eleemosynary"
decision. So it must be allowed in this decision. This is an aberration in the law
regarding dividends because it is ordinarily an BOD decision of the legal surplus.
Court didn't pursue how to scrutinize decisions, but WHETHER to pursue it. The
BOD must have the proper purpose in mind when making the decision
b) Constituency Statutes
(1) A majority of states have “constituency” statutes that expressly allow (but do not
require) a corporation to consider stakeholders’ and other constituencies’
interests alongside shareholders’ interests.
(2) DE and CA do not have constituency statutes.
2. Corporate Social Responsibility and Charitable Giving
❖ A corporation is allowed to furnish charitable donations and such gifts are valid as long as they are
reasonable. Reasonableness is weighed by looking at the internal revenue code's relevant
provisions regarding the limitations for charitable giving. This decision is given BJR presumption.
All 50 states have a provision allowing corporate charitable giving
❖ Test for A Contested Charitable Giving: 1) determine whether the donation/giving was reasonable
and then 2) apply BJR to determine whether the decision made was through a grossly
negligent/bad faith/illegal process.
a) Shareholders generally cannot challenge corporate gifts, given the discretion afforded
corporate directors under the business judgement rule, and shareholders have no formal
voice in how and in what amounts corporations engage in charitable giving
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b) Corporate Gifts as self dealing: See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) upholding
conclusion by chancery court that charitable donations approved by independent
directors are subject to review under business judgement rule.
c) Delaware Law and Charitable Giving
(1) DGCL § 122: “Every corporation created under this chapter shall have power
to: . . .”
(a) “(9) Make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or
educational purposes, and in time of war or other national emergency
in aid thereof;”
(b) Note the language of the DGCL doesn’t expressly dispense with the
requirement of a corporate benefit.
d) CA Law and Chartiable Giving
(1) California Corporations Code § 207:
(a) “Subject to any limitations contained in the articles and to compliance
with other provisions of this division and any other applicable laws, a
corporation shall have all of the powers of a natural person in carrying
out its business activities, including, without limitation, the power
to: . . .”
(b) “(e) Make donations, regardless of specific corporate benefit, for the
public welfare or for community fund, hospital, charitable, educational,
scientific, civic, or similar purposes.”
e) Theodra Holding Corp. v. Henderson: PF is a Holding company/stock holder inn
Alexander Dawson, Inc. Df is the corporation and has been providing charitable donations
to the Alexander Dawson Foundation for educational and other purposes to support
under-privileged children. Mr. Henderson, Corp Director, reduced the size of the board
from 8 to three after Theodora Ives (daughter of his ex wife) contested the stock gift
because they wanted it to go to another charity. Pf contested the Boards approval of a
$528K stock gift to the foundation to finance the camp
(1) Holding: Yes, corporations are allowed to give charitable gifts as long as they are
reasonable. Thus, the $528K stock gift to the Alexander Dawson Foundation,
being less than the IRC deduction limitation, was a reasonable gift. Additionally,
considering the social and philanthropic good that it would be providing, on
policy grounds, it is allowed to help sustain and further the social and economic
system.
(2) ANalysis: Since the $528K gift was less then teh 5% IRC deduction limitation,
would cost each shareholder 15¢ per dollar , and would reduce the Corps
unrealized capital gains tax. Thus, the benefit of providing social and
philanthropic good outweighs the loss of immediate income payable to Pf
(a) Looked to A.P. Smith Mfg. Co v. Barlow 13 N.J. 145 (1953) which allowed
a corporation to make a $1500 gift to charity for educational or
charitable institution. This gift was allowed largely for policy reasons
(wealth transfer and corporate giving for philanthropic reasons). Givings
also bolstered free enterprise system and the general social climate. As
long as they were within a reasonable limit re amount and purpose.
Gifts should be in the corporations broad interests but should not just
be pet projects of the directors. Was a firehydrant company and gave
money to Princeton, does that help?
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f) Two Views of Corp Soc. Resp.

(1) Shareholder Primacy Theory: In this view, there’s a purpose to corporation and
there’s a duty, which is to maximize shareholder wealth, and duties are owed to
shareholders. View that the objective of directors and officers is to put the
shareholder interest above all other constituent interests (creditors, employees,
etc.) – it’s to maximize shareholder profits and wealth.
(a) There is only one social responsibility of business, which is to use its
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits. Other
constituent interests have other laws to which they can rely on to
control certain aspects of the corporation (i.e. environmental laws,
etc.).
(b) o Benefit of this view is it makes it really clear for directors for
making decisions and who’s interests to consider when making
decisions.
(2) Stakeholder Theory: Sees corporation as owing duty to constituents in addition
to shareholders (employees, the planet, under privileged people).
3. Corporate Political Expenditures
a) Citizens United v. FEC: Ruled that Corporations have the right to unlimited amounts of
independent political expenditures. Argument against/for gov: to protect dissenting
shareholders. SCOTUS rejected it in Beloti and there is corporate democracy to address
their concerns. This says corp's have the power to make these decisions, but it does not
say anything about the application of the BJR with BOD decisions to make these political
decisions. It is just Business Judgement Rule decision because it is an ordinary business
decision to make a political expenditure.
C. Fiduciary Duties: The Duty of Loyalty

❖ RMBCA §8.30(a)(2): The duty of loyalty requires that directors and officers act in a manner they
reasonably believe to be in the best interest of the corporation. Meaning that they put the
corporation’s and shareholder’s interest ahead of their own. Where duty of care issues relate to
the decision -making/process of decision making of the entire board, duty of loyalty relates to a
conflict/interested transaction with a single/few directors or officers. DOL in the context of [i.e.
these are contexts in which a duty of loyalty claim could arise]: (1) Interested Director
Transactions (aka self-dealing, conflicts of interest); (2) Corporate Opportunities (taking an
opportunity for yourself that belonged to the corporation); (3) Good Faith (which Delaware courts
classified as a subset of duty of loyalty); (4) Controlling Shareholders.
1.Interested Director Transactions: Conflicts and Self-Dealing

❖ An interested director transaction is a transaction that would reasonably, in all material respects,
impair the director’s objective decision making for the sole benefit of the corporation because the
transaction would directly benefit them or someone they have a relationship with (i.e., family,
friends, another corp they have an interest in, etc.). However, an interested director decision
would not be automatically void or voidable if either 1) Approval by majority of the informed (BOD
are informed about the nature of the conflict and all material terms of the deal) disinterested
directors 2) Approval in good faith by fully informed shareholder 3) As long as the transaction is
fair to the corporation. DGCL § 144 (a) (also CAL). § (b) common or interested directors may be
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counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or of a

committee which authorizes the contract or transaction
➢ Common law states it is fine so long as it is fair, the statutes include the disinterested
voting requirements. Statute’s do not preempt Common Law, but overturns voidable per
se common law aproach by offering BOD to “cleanse” their decision.
❖ Burden: The initial burden is on the Pf to show that there is an interested director transaction.
Once that is shown, then the Df has the burden to show that the decision satisfied one of the
three prongs of DGCL. This is to ensure scrutinty of the decision and it was made in good
faith/loyalty. If the Df met their burden, the decision is then given BJR presumption and PF will
have to show waste (i.e., one sided transaction).
DGCL § 144: (a): An interested transaction shall not be void or voidable solely because of the conflict or solely because the
director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes the contract or
transaction, or solely because any such director’s or officer’s votes are counted for such purpose, provided at least 1 of 3
conditions are satisfied (i.e. the interested director transaction will not be void or voided solely because of the conflict so
long as there’s 1 of 3 things):
● (a)(1) Approval by a majority of disinterested directors provided there has been full disclosure of the material facts
relating to both the transaction and to the director’s conflict of interest;
○ I.e. won’t be voided solely because of the conflict if you get a majority vote of the informed disinterested
directors [provided there’s been full disclosure of the conflict].
○ Even if the disinterested directors are less than a quorum – it’s not majority of the directors there, just
majority of the disinterested directors.
○ Disinterested Directors: Those who don’t have an interest in the transaction and cannot be influenced by
those who are interested in the transaction.
○ The way to show 144(a)(1) met is have a board meeting and fully inform board of the conflict of interest
and all material terms of the transaction, and [ideally] get it documented in the board meeting minutes
(so goes in corporate record).
● (a)(2) Approval in good faith by vote of the [disinterested] shareholders, with full disclosure of the material facts
relating to both the transaction and to the director’s conflict of interest; OR
○ Similar to (a)(1) but for shareholders.
○ This doesn’t say shareholders must be disinterested like in (a)(1), but Fliegler v. Lawrence answers that
question and said that it must be a majority vote of the disinterested shareholders.
○ To show this was met, going to be looking at the actual disclosure that was made to the shareholders – if
a public company (might be a proxy statement – this would be a record of whether disclosing all material
terms).
● (a)(3) A transaction that is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the
board of directors, a committee or the shareholders.
○ This looks at whether it was fair to the corporation.
● **Note: Satisfying any one of the three bases enough to say transaction isn’t voidable solely because of the
conflict of interest
● Effect of DGCL 144(a)(1) or (2) if met: BJR applies. Burden will be on Ds to show (a)(1) or (2) was met in order to
get BJR and have burden shift to Ps to show waste (i.e. that the transaction was one-sided that no ordinary person
of rational business judgment would have approved it).
● Effect of § 144(a)(2): If have got an informed, uncoerced, disinterested shareholder ratification of transaction (in
which corporate directors have a material conflict of interest), it has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to
the party challenging the transaction to show that the terms were so unequal as to amount to waste.
○ If there’s a dispute about whether directors/shareholders were really disinterested (i.e. there was a flaw
in trying to meet (a)(1) or (2) standard), and Ds can’t show they really weren’t, Ds get stuck with just (a)
(3), which is the Bayer v. Beran situation and Ds have burden to show the transaction was fair to the
corporation (entire fairness standard)
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a) If there is a challenged corporate decision and the Pfs make a showing that there is a
conflict of interest/interested directors, the courts want to apply additional scrutinty to
the BOD/shareholder decision to ensure it is in fairness to the corp. However, if the Df
make a showing that they complied, then the court’s will not want to apply additional
scrutiny.
b) At early common law, all decisions with an interested director/conflict of interest could be
void regardless of the fairness.
(1) Downside is that the transaction could be beneficial to the corporation
c) Remedies for Interested Director Transaction:
(1) enjoining the transaction,
(2) setting aside the transaction,
(3) damages
d) 144(a)(1): Vote by Disinterested and Informed BOD
❖ A transaction involving an interested director is valid if the material facts as to the
director’s interest are disclosed or known to the board of directors and the board in good
faith authorizes the transaction by an affirmative vote of the disinterested directors.
(1) Interest v. Independence
(a) Interest= (A) when 1) a director personally receives a benefit(or sufferes
a detriment) 2) as a result of, or from, the challenged transaction, 3)
which is not generally shared with (or suffered by) the other
shareholders of his corporation, and 4) that benefit (or detriment) is of
subjective material significance to that particular director that it is
reasonable to question whether that director objectively consideredthe
advisability of the challenged transaction to the corporation and its
shareholders.
(i) OR (B) the director stands on both sides of the transaction.
Which usually means they satify all three of the first elements,
and the forth the director on both sides is deemed interested
and allegations of materiality have not been required.
(b) Independence=Two inquiries 1) into whether the director’s decision
resulted from that director being controlled by another. Control is if, in
fact, that director is dominated by that other party, through a close
personal or familial relationship or through force of will. 2) whether the
director is beholden to the controlling entity. A director may be
considered beholden to another when the allegedly controlling entity
has the unilateral power (direct or indirectly) to decide whether the
challenged director continues to receive a benefit, financially or
otherwise, upon which the challenged director is so dependent or is of
such subjective material importance to him that the threatened loss of
that benefit might create a reason to question whether the controlled
director is able to consider the corporate merits of the challenged
transaction objectively
(2) The key issue is whether the possibility of gaining some benefit or the fear of
losing a benefit is likely to be of such importance to that director that it is
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reasonable for the Court to question whether valid business judgement or selfish
considerations animated that director’s vote on the challenged transaction.
(3) Benihana of Tokyo v. Benihana, Inc: Many of Benihana’s (B) restaurants needed
renovation, but company did not have necessary funds. B hired Joseph to
analyze company’s financial needs and determine a plan of attack. Joseph
recommended B issue convertible preferred stock, which gave company funds
necessary for renovation. John Abdo, a B board member, told Joseph BFC
Financial Corp. (BFC) was interested in buying the convertible stock. Abdo was
also a director of BFC, and he negotiated with Joseph for sale of stock on behalf
of BFC. At a B board meeting, Abdo made a presentation on behalf of BFC
regarding its proposed purchase of the stock, then left the meeting. B board
knew that Abdo was a director of BFC and Joseph informed B board Abdo
approached him about sale on behalf of BFC. B board voted in favor of sale to
BFC. B of Tokyo (BOT)’s attorney sent a letter to B board, asking it to abandon
sale on account of concerns of conflicts of interests, the dilutive effect on voting
of the stock issuance, and sale’s questionable legality. The board nonetheless
again approved sale. BOT sued B board of directors, alleging breach of its
fiduciary duty of loyalty
(a) Holding/Analysis: A transaction involving an interested director is valid if
the material facts as to the director’s interest are disclosed or known to
the board of directors and the board in good faith authorizes the
transaction by an affirmative vote of the disinterested directors. In this
case, the court determines that the Benihana board knew enough
information about Abdo’s involvement in the transaction to validate the
sale. Although the board may not have known that Abdo was the one
who negotiated for BFC, by the time the board approved the sale, it
knew that Abdo was a director of BFC, that he was the proposed buyer,
and that he had made the initial contact about the purchase with
Joseph. Furthermore, the board knew that based on Abdo’s postion at
BFC he would likely be the one to review the proposal at some stage
and would need to provide his decision, therefore the negoitation
aspect did not matter. This is sufficient information to deem the board
knowledgeable on the material facts of Abdo’s interest. Therefore,
because the board approved the transaction (without Abdo’s vote), it is
valid. The court finds in favor of the Benihana board of directors.
e) 144(a)(2): Ratification by Majority of Informed, Disinterested Shareholders
❖ The BOD has the burden of showing that a majority of the informed, disinterested
shareholders ratified the transaction (i.e., satisfied 144(a)(2)) this is appropraite because
it is for the shareholders to prove they did not act unloyaly. If the BOD prove this then
they are given a BJR presumption, and the Pf only has a waste claim (which can only be
ratified by a unanimous vote)
(1) A director self-dealing transaction can be insulated from judical review if it is
approved or subsequently ratified by shareholders, provided that the material
facts as to the transaction and the directors’ interest were disclosed to the
shareholders.
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(a) At CL informed SH ratification presumed fair transaction, thus shifting

the burden to challenging party to show that the terms were so unequal
as to amount to waste. However, when interested directors owned
mjrtry of shares, shareholder ratif. Did not shift burden of proving
unfairness to the challenging party.
(2) Technical compliance with Statutory procedures will not immunize transaction
from scrutiny for fairness where interested directors are also majority
shareholder who voted in favor of the transaction.
(a) It is now common to obtain “majority of the minority” or majority of
indep./disinterested shareholder approval as a condition of transaction
when interested/non-indp. Directors own sub.(mjrty) % of shares.
(b) Cal. does not permit interested director to vote shares when
shareholders are asked to approve a director self-dealing transaction.
(3) Fliegler v. Lawrence:Court determined that in order for a corp to cleanse its
conflicted transaction with a shareholder vote, they must obtain an affirmative
vote from the majority of “disinterested” shareholders. Thus, even though
disinterested not in the statute, they will read it in.
(4) Lewis v. Vogelstein:In 1996, Mattel, Inc. (Mattel) adopted a compensation plan
for the company’s directors including an option grant (so clear interest in the
transactionn because it was for their benefit). Under the plan, outside directors
were entitled to a one-time option grant of 15,000 shares. In addition, the
directors were eligible for additional option grants on reelection. The plan was
then presented to the company’s shareholders at the annual meeting for a vote.
The shareholders approved the plan. Harry Lewis (plaintiff) brought a
shareholders’ suit in the Court of Chancery of Delaware against Mattel and its
directors (defendants). Lewis argued that the directors had violated the duty of
candor by failing to disclose the estimated value of the stock options. Lewis
further asserted that the directors breached the duty of loyalty, because the
option grants represented self-dealing and thus had to be proven entirely fair to
the corporation. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim.
(a) Holding: When an agent acts without authority, the agent’s principal
may retroactively approve that act through a process called ratification.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 82 (1958). The principal’s ratification
means nothing unless it is given after full disclosure of all significant
facts. In addition, the agent, as a fiduciary, still owes duties of candor
and loyalty to the principal. Thus, shareholder ratification is invalid if (1)
a majority of the shareholders have conflicts or (2) the act constitutes
corporate waste. Waste is effectively a disposal of corporate assets
without consideration, and a transaction amounting to waste can only
be ratified by unanimous approval. Initially, corporate directors could be
given option grants, so long as the company got “sufficient
consideration” and the grant was conditioned in a way “which may be
expected to insure” the company gets that consideration. Here,
informed, uncoerced, disinterested shareholder ratification of a
transaction in which cororate directors have a material conflict of
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interest has the effect of protecting the transaction from judicial review
except on the basis of waste. (court needed to look into waste
(5) Harbor Finance Partners v. Huizenga: Republic Industries, Inc. (Republic)
(defendant) acquired AutoNation Incorporated (AutoNation). Although
Republic's directors (defendants) owned a large amount of AutoNation shares,
the merger was approved by a majority of informed, uncoerced, and
disinterested Republic shareholders. The vote was not unanimous. Harbor
Finance Partners (Harbor) (plaintiff) was a dissenting shareholder of Republic.
Harbor alleged that the terms of the merger were unfair to Republic and its
public shareholders and that the shareholder approval was based on a
materially misleading proxy statement. The defendants moved to dismiss under
Chancery Court Rule 12(b)(6).
(a) Holding/Analysis: Under current Delaware law, a plaintiff still challenge
a transaction based on waste, even if a majority of fully informed,
uncoerced, and disinterested shareholders approved the transaction by
a non-unanimous vote. When a transaction is approved by a majority of
informed and disinterested shareholders, the business judgment rule
applies. The transaction may only be challenged based on waste. To
bring a waste claim, a shareholder plaintiff must plead facts showing
that "no reasonable person of ordinary business judgment" could view
the transaction as fair to the corporation. If informed and disinterested
shareholders have approved the transaction, they seem to have decided
that the transaction is fair. Courts will not know better than these
shareholders. Finally, to let the corporation bear huge litigation costs
just because a dissenter is unhappy about a transaction is not in the
best interests of the corporation or its shareholders. In this case, the
complaint fails to state a claim that the disclosures of the merger were
misleading or incomplete. Because the merger was approved by
informed, uncoerced, and disinterested shareholders, the business
judgment rule applies. The merger can only be challenged as wasteful.
Because the merger was approved by a non-unanimous vote, Harbor
can still bring a waste claim. However, the complaint "at best" alleges
that the merger was unfair; it fails to plead that "no reasonable person
of ordinary business judgment" could view the transaction as fair. Thus,
the test of waste is not met. Therefore, the defendants' motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is granted.
(b) **need unanimous disinterested shareholder vote to win a waste claim,
but even if can bring a waste claim it is extremely difficult to win that.
f) 144(a)(3): Entire Fairness to the Corp
❖ Entire fairness of the transactions means that the decision to enter the transaction was
both procedurally and substantively fair. FACTORS: 1) the terms of the transaction 2) the
benefit to the corporation, and 3) the process of decision making.
➢ Procedural fairness hinges on director and shareholder approval and focuses on
1) how th transaction was approved, the disclosure given to the decision makers,
the ability of directors to be objective, adn the effect of shareholder ratification.
➢ Substantive fairness is whether the proposition submitted would have
commended itself to an independent corporation. That is the transaction price
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was fair, as comparable to other FMV/arms-length transactions, and that the

terms/transaction as a whole was one that was reasonably likely to yeild
favorable business results.
(1) Statutory Safe harbor provisions have taken the view that approval by informed,
disinterested, and independent directors or shareholders may be a better gauge
of “fairness” to the corporation than a judicial inquiry. But absent such approval,
courts are still called on to reiew the “fairness” of director self-dealing
(2) Bayer v, Beran: Directors of Celanese Corporation of America (CCA) started a
radio advertising campaign for corporation. CCA had never advertised on the
radio before. In making its decision to start advertising on radio, directors
reviewed studies given to them by CCA’s advertising department, brought in a
radio consultant to help determine station and time to advertise, and hired an
advertising agency to produce ad. One of the singers on program CCA decided to
advertise was wife of one of CCA’s directors. P shareholders brought suit,
claiming the advertising campaign was started due to benefit to director’s wife to
further her career. Claimed directors failed to take due care (duty of care claim),
decision was uninformed; directors breached fiduciary duty of loyalty (said this is
an interested director transaction because had wife of director of company not
been involved, advertising COA would’ve been disposed of summarily).
(a) Holding: Directors have an obligation not to put their own interests
before the interests of the corporation. This duty of loyalty supersedes
the business judgment rule so that fraud may be avoided. The burden
of establishing that the duty of loyalty is not violated is on said
directors. However, that burden may be met if after “rigorous scrutiny”
it is determined that the transaction in question was made in good faith
and would have been made even in the absence of the personal
interests of the director. In the present case, the court finds that the
directors did not violate their duty of loyalty to CCA by advertising on
Mrs. Dreyfus’s program. The directors went through an involved process
to determine whether to advertise on the radio, and on what station
and channel to advertise. Although the advertising choice may have
enhanced Mrs. Dreyfus’s career, it also greatly benefited CCA and the
evidence supports a conclusion that the same decision on advertising
would have been made if Mrs. Dreyfus was not on the program.
Accordingly, the court finds in favor of the CCA directors.Defendants win
because the deal was fair to the corporation. The things court said went
to determination of fairness show both procedural and substantive
fairness – i.e. cost of what they paid president’s wife was industry
standard (substantive fairness); cost of advertising v. company
revenues; and form contract and negotiated through her agent (both
procedural fairness). This case is a good example of what demonstrates
fairness in a duty of loyalty claim.
(b) Standard: P has the duty to plead out that conflict, the burden shifts to
defendants and court will scrutinize board’s action. Burden is on the
defendant to show fairness of the transaction being challenged.
2. Corporate Opportunities
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❖ Corporate directors, officers, and managerial employees are forbidden from diverting any business
opportunities that “belong to” the corporation to themselves. If an opportunity is deemed to be a
corporate opportunity and the insider unlawfully took it for their own benefit (based on the
applicable test), then the corporate insider must disgorge their profits to the corporation.
However, if the corporation appropriately Rejects the opportunity, the insider is allowed to take
the opportunity for themself.
❖ DGCL 122(17): “Every corporation created under this chapter shall have the power to:…(17)
Renounce, in its certificate of incorporation or by action of its board of directors, any interest or
expectancy of the corporation in, or in being offered an opportunity to participate in, specified
business opportunities or specified classes or categories of business opportunities that are
presented to the corporation or one or more of its officers, directors or stockholders.”
a) General Background
(1) Corporate opp doctrine focuses on potential harm to the corp, not actual harm.
(2) Objective:
(a) To deter appropriations of new business prospects “belonging to” the
corporation
(3) Targets:
(a) Directors and officers of corporation
(b) Dominant shareholders who take active role in managing firm
(4) The answer to whether an opportunity should be turned over to the corporation
is an inquiry to balance competing interests. Corporate managers are expected
to further the corporation’s expansion potential, and should not be allowed to
advance their own economic interest at the expense fo the corporation. But,
corporate managers have their own entreprenurial interests, and society
benefits when persons are permitted to develop and exploit new business
possibilities
(5) • Additional Points:
(a) It is not a prerequisite that a finding of a corporate opportunity be
usurped to present it to the board, but it would be a good practice to
do. You want to have the perception that you are being loyal
(b) ALI draws a distinction between senior officers and outside directors.
Inside Directors should present all opportunities to the board. Outside
Directors only need to present corporate opportunities
(c) Why is it relevant if it is an inside director versus outside director in the
analysis?
(i) Inside Directors only work for the company and opportunities
presented to the inside director/manager are likely to be
presented the opportunity due to the work they do in the
corporation
(ii) Whereas, outside directors have other jobs so it may be likely
an opportunity was presented to them in their other capacity
(d) The director has no duty in respect to the prospective business
owner/acquirer of the company, until the deal goes through and
ownership changes hands. You measure who you have the duty to at
the time the opportunity was presented.
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b) Belongs To
❖ An opportunity belongs to a corporation if it is one that (Del. Factors) 1) the corporation
can financial undertake 2) is within the line of the corporation’s business and is
advantageous to the corporation; 3) is one in which the corporation has an interest or a
reasonable expectancy; AND 4) is one that may result in a conflict between the director’s
self-interest and that of the corporation Guth v. Loft. These are the Delaware Factors and
are balanced based on the circumstances.
(1) A corporation or board of directors can choose to identify "classes or categories
of business opportunities" by line of business, identity of originator, identify of
the party or parties to or having an interest in the business opportunity, identity
of the recipient of the business opportunity, periods of time, or geographical
location
(2) Guth v. Loft: Owner of Loft, a candy/bottling company, bought the formula of
Pepsi in bankruptcy and used assets from his Loft business and skills from there
to make it better. The two businesses were not operated together, so the
shareholders of Loft did not recieve the benefits, despite the assistance.
(a) Held: Found for Loft, since the BOD approval was dominated by Guth it
was irrelevant. The opportunity was only presented to him because of
his position at Loft, it was in the business line/interest of the Loft, and
any business line to be reasonably interest of the business they would
take. Thus, Guth was ordered to disgorge all profits
(3) Broz v. Cellular Information Systems: Robert Broz was the sole shareholder and
president of RFBC, who provided cellular telephone services in the Midwest. He
was also a director of CIS, a publicly traded Del. Corp. CIS was in financial
difficulty. An opportunity was presented to buy Mich-2, license, to Broz and
RFBC, from Mackinac. Mackinac did not offer the acquisition to CIS because
knew it was emerging from Bankruptcy and could not make acquisitions or take
on new debt. PreCellular came into the bidding, but Broz outbid by Nov. Broz did
not formally present this to the board, but mentioned it to some Board
Members and CEO who said they would not be interested. During the time of
the License Neg, PriCellular was trying to acquire CIS, but looking to Tender the
Shares at $2/share to PreCellular. It eventually closed through Tender in Nov. But
was not completed until 9 days after the RFBC Deal Closed for Michigan-2.
PriCellular then directed CIS to sue Broz
(a) Holding: No based on the four Del factors it was not a corporate
opportunity
(b) Four Factors;
(4) In Re eBay, Inc. Shareholders Litigation: eBay used Goldman Sachs as bankers
for IPO services--underwriting-- for M&A activities, and secondary offering. In
addition, Goldman rewarded eBay directors thousand of IPO shares of various
businesses at the IPO price, typically a discount. Thus the individual client, eBay
directors, were given a benefit for hiring Goldman Sachs in their role as an
Officer or Director of the Company (called "spinning").
(a) Held: Directors of a corporation are not permitted to personally accept
private stock allocations in an IPO of the corporation’s stock when the
corporation itself could have bought the stock. There was a clear
conflict of interest between the self-interest of the defendants in
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acquiring the valuable eBay stock and the interest of eBay, which could
have acquired the stock for itself. The opportunity to buy the IPO shares
was a corporate opportunity that belonged to eBay. Court pointed to
eBay’s form 10k, which showed that eBay had more than $ 500 million
invested equity and debt securities were held by eBay, and said this was
within the line of business for eBay to hold stock in other companies.
Court said eBay had an expectancy because investing was an integral
part of what eBay was doing. Court said this conduct placed them in a
position of conflict because these people who are sitting on the board
and are executive officers of eBay, are the people who are choosing to
continue to employ GS (and GS was giving them these shares for the
purpose that eBay continued to give them business).
(i) Note: This seems like an expansive interpretation of being a
corporate opportunity (holding stock in another company’s
stock), but it’s normal business for many companies and here,
it was an unusually high percentage that eBay held stock in
other companies.
(5) Financially Undertake/Economic Capacity:

❖ Whether the corporation has economic capacity to take the opportunity courts
look at the following factors: 1) Liquid assets available 2) Financial Solvency of
the Corp 3) Could it raise Money to pay for the opportunity.
➢ Guth v. Loft: Guth did not have the finacial wherewithall to take on the
business without Loft, and Loft helped with the financial/economic
assitance. Add., loft had the capcity to take on the opp
➢ Broz v. Cellular Information Systems: CIS was just out of bankruptcy so
financial position was poor. Also bank controlled the type of operations
and opportunities it could engage in. So not in a position to financially
take the opportunity. Typically even if the corp didn’t have the case,
they would be able to be financially able if they could get it.
➢ In Re eBay, Inc. Shareholders Litigation: eBay was financial able to
exploit the oppt because they had enough money and assets to invest.
(6) Line of Business Test:

❖ Where a corporation is engaged in a certain business and An opportunity is
presented to it and That opportunity is embracing an activity as to which it has
1) fundamental knowledge, 2) practical experience and 3) ability to pursue,
which logically and naturally is adaptable to its business having regard for its
financial position, and is one that is consonant with its reasonable aspirations
for expansion, may be said the opp is in line of the corporation's interest.
➢ If a business proposition would require a corp to modify its operating
infra beyond a certain threshold, the business opportunity would be
found to be outside the corporation's line of business.
(a) Related to or in the businesses line of activities or a type of business
they would reasonably get into in the future
(b) Courts recognize that corps are dynamic entities, that shareholders
reasonably expect a corp go beyond the status quo and take advantage
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of profitable (but safe) opportunities, therefore will extend opps outside

of normal/current operations.
(c) Guth v. Loft: It was in the line of interest because as a bottling/manu
company they had the assets, and knowledge to perform the tasks. In
fact Guth, used Loft employees, assets, and skills to operate the Co.
(d) Broz v. Cellular Information Systems: CIS was generally in the line of
business of procuring and operating cellular licenses. But they were to
divestmenting their licensinc assets at the time and they were regional
operations, and the license was in a different region.
(e) In Re eBay, Inc. Shareholders Litigation: It was in the corp's line of
business because they held a substantial amount of investments in debt
and equity securities. Although the opp was to buy stock in a business,
while the oper bus of eBay is auctions it invests a lot.
(7) Interest or Expectancy Test

(a) Interest: Is this something that the company already has a right in?
(i) Ex: If already have a right under a contract/interest in
something – ex: if officer bought land to which the corporation
had a contractual right, that would be clear that corporation
had an interest in the land.
(b) Expectancy: Takes something in which in the ordinary course of things
would normally go to the corporation (can grow out of an existing right
but it’s not necessarily already an existing right)
(i) Ex: If an officer took renewal rights to a lease the corporation
had, then the officer took corporation’s expectancy right –
might not have had a right in lease after it expired, but they
expected to get option to renew lease again after it expired.
(ii) Ex: Corporation had an existing contract with a customer
(ongoing relationship), if the officer took a contract with that
customer – company had an expectancy to continue working
with the customer.
(iii) Guth v. Loft: It was in the expectancy that the opp would be
the corp. Opp because the formula was presented to Guth
BECAUSE of his role at Loft and Loft’s operations. This is
despite the fact that Loft did not already operate that business
(iv) Broz v. Cellular Information Systems: No Interest or
Expectancy. CIS was actively divesting its cellular licensing and
looking to get out of that business. Additionally, the people
Broz did tell about said it was of no interest because they were
looking to get out of the business
(v) In Re eBay, Inc. Shareholders Litigation: It is expected that
they would want to continue to invest further. Df claim that
there is risk to investing in IPOs does not change the
conclusion that eBay had an interest or expectancy because
they werent able to turn it down
(8) Fairness Test/Conflict Scenario
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❖ Whether taking that opportunity would place the director in a position that
would conflict with her duties to the corporation
(a) Broz v. Cellular Information Systems: It could have been a scenario for
a conflict, but CIS was aware that Broz was the sole shareholder of
RFBC, that he would try and take it for that company, and that the
bidding was taking place, so no conflict
(b) In Re eBay, Inc. Shareholders Litigation: "Nor can one seriously argue
that this conduct did not place the insider Df in a position of with their
duties to the corp." Because they are the ones who hire the Bank and
would be in conflict by these gifts. IPO allocations are a form of
commercial discount to steer insider director transactions. MAYBE the
bonus is a discount or rebate to the services, being received by the
executive, but eBay is the one that is paying the bank the huge price for
the services
c) Corporate Rejection
❖ A proper corporate rejection requires that 1) The interested director/insider presented
the opportunity to the board AND 2) the Board Rejected it AFTER
➢ a) Full Disclosure of the Opportunity was Given AND
➢ b)There was a decision made by i) Disinterested AND ii) Independent Decision
Makers
❖ Proper rejection precludes the corporation from later claiming the corporate opportunity.
d) Remedy
(1) Remedy for a breach of fiduciary duty is the award of damages in the amount of
harm the corporation suffered from the breach
(2) Possible Remedies
(a) Assess damages according to the potential profits lost by the corp
(i) Calculated on the estimated value of the opportunity at the
time of the taking given its likely returns and risk
(b) Assess the actual profits realized by the usurping manager on the
theory of unjust enrichment
(3) The offending manager is entitled to expenditures they may have made in
pursuing and developing the opportunity, including their reasonable
compensation.
1. Hypos: Supposed RFBC had shareholders other than Broz and that CIS had a potential interest in Mich-2, unknown
to Rhodes (the seller's broker), and the ability to finance a purchase. What should Broz have done?
a. • Broz has to act in the best interest of both CIS and RFBC. Here the corporate opportunity is to both
companies. He should inform both Boards and then remove himself from the situation for them to
decide. At risk is that Broz may have to resign from one of the boards.
i. ○ Want to make it clear that you are being loyal to both boards and inform them of the
opportunity
2. Hypo: Suppose Broz had been an officer director as CIS, in addition to being a director of RFBC. Assuming all other
facts remain the same, might that change the analysis or result? Supppose we change the fact that Rhodes, in
bringing the opportunity to Broz, didn't distinguish between Broz's role in CIS and his role in RFBC? Might that
affect the analysis or result?
a. Potentially
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3. Good Faith and Oversight

“The failure to act in good faith may result in liability because the requirement to act in good faith ‘is a
subsidiary element,’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’
a) Good Faith
❖ The Duty to Act in Good faith is not a separate fiduciary duty but a subset duty within the
duty of loyalty. Bad faith is more than gross negligence, there needs to be a culpable
mind.
❖ There is a spectrum of potential bad faith
➢ Conduct motivated by subjective bad faith (i.e., an actual intent to do harm)
➢ "Intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one's responsibilities"
(bad faith)
➢ Gross negligence is not bad faith
❖ Courts examples of bad faith
➢ Intentionally acting with a purpose other than advancing the best interests of
the corp
➢ Intent to violate the law
➢ Intentionally failing to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating
conscious disregard for duties.
(1) Despite the pervasiveness of the concept, it had been essentially undefined until
recently. In addition, whether it is an independent fiduciary duty or subsumed in
the DOC or DOL had been unclear.
(2) In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Del. 1993), the Delaware Supreme Court
stated:
(a) “To rebut the rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of
providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision,
breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty—good faith,
loyalty or due care.”
(3) Since Cede, the Court has further clarified the meaning and status of good faith
in Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig. (2006) and Stone v. Ritter (2006)
(4) In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation (Good Faith in Context of
Executive Compensation): From concerns regarding the succession of CEO,
Michael Eisner, because of concerns of management of the company. This
resulted in negotiations with Michael Ovitz to lure him away form CAA, which he
founded, into a position of a President at Disney. But Ovitz had a very lucrative
deal at CAA and was earning between $20-25Mln/year and was reluctant to
leave, without downside protection. So, Disney and Ovtiz negotiated a salary
plus stock option, wage structure valued at ~$24mln/year, with a golden
parachute option of a non-fault termination payment (NFT)--options vest, 10Mln
termination payment, $7.5Mln for each year remaining on the term, remaining
salary through ~5-yr term. Upon hiring, the stock soared because of favorable
view Ovitz left Disney and received non-fault termination after unsatisfying job
performance. Non-fault termination triggered large amount of severance pay
($130 mil). Ps alleged Ovitz's employment contract incentivized Ovitz to leave
Disney as soon as possible and receive non-fault termination, rather than
complete term of the contract. Ps argued this amounted to waste. The executive
committee reviewed the compensation plan (which did not have detailed
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numbers) they met and approved the plan and the BOD subsequently approved
it. Ovitz was a friend of Eisner, and the two negotiated the contract.
(a) Holding: (Duty of Care) Directors not liable for breach of duty of care.
There was a big difference between what would’ve been best
practices and what compensation committee actually did, but it was
not a breach of duty of care because it was not gross negligence –
they still informed themselves of potential magnitude of severance
package as a whole in event of an early no-fault termination; knew
of their need to have a CEO succession plan; and they had meetings,
had reports, asked questions at the meetings. To prove breach of
duty of care, Ps needed to show gross negligence – i.e. board was
grossly negligent in failing to inform themselves of all the material
information reasonably available to it. Best case scenario, all
compensation committee members would’ve received before or at
the first meeting a spreadsheet prepared by or with assistance of a
compensation expert, and spreadsheets would state amount Ovtiz
would receive under agreement in each foreseeable circumstance;
contents of spreadsheet would be explained to compensation
committee members and that would be basis of committee’s
decision; spreadsheets would be attached as exhibits to meeting
minutes.What Actually Happened: Compensation committee met
twice, approved terms of draft agreement and considered just a term
sheet; had basic understanding that in instance of a no-fault
termination, severance payment could be $40 mil alone plus value of
accelerated options; no exhibits to the mins.
(b) (Good faith/Duty of Loyalty): The board did enough to inform
themselves, deliberated, and had a meeting, therefore there was no
bad faith. But court declined to decide whether there is a distinct
fiduciary duty to act in good faith. In terms of the bad faith claim,
there are at least three categories of fiduciary bad faith. The first
two are clearer: subjective bad faith, meaning intent to harm, and
the lack of due care, meaning gross negligence. However, there is a
form of fiduciary bad faith that is not intentional, but “is
qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence.” This category is
appropriately captured by the concept of intentional dereliction of
duty and a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities. Therefore,
although it is not the exclusive definition of fiduciary bad faith, that
concept is an appropriate standard for determining whether
fiduciaries have acted in good faith. The court determines that
because the Disney compensation committee and directors were
fully informed about the total potential payout, and because of the
well known skills and qualifications of Ovitz, the Delaware Court of
Chancery properly held that the directors’ actions, although not in
line with corporate best practices, did not violate a duty to act in
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good faith. Finally, the court finds that the directors did not violate
any fiduciary duties by actually making the severance payout to
Ovitz because the directors were entitled, under the business
judgment rule, to rely on advice from Disney’s CEO and attorneys
that there were no grounds for Ovitz to be fired for cause. They
were thus entitled to fire him without cause.
(c) (WASTE): After a court determined BJR applies and the process was
not grossly negligent, the only remedy they have to show is that the
agreement was waste. This means they would have to show either
1) No reasonable business person would think there was adequate
consideration to the corporation OR 2) The decision was irrational.
However, here When the NFT was negotiated into it wasn’t waste
because they needed to negotiate a way to get Ovitz to Disney AND
When the NFT was paid out it was Not waste either because there
was a contract in place and not paying the NFT would lead to a
breach of contract
(5) Disney v. Van Gorkom: In Disney, compensation committee had done things
to try and inform themselves – they hired an outside expert who really was an
expert at hand; they reviewed the report and had a committee report it too. In
Van Gorkom, they had wholly abdicated its role and duty; board here still
discussed analysis and asked questions; and decision in Van Gorkom was to sell
entire company (final period decision and a dramatic event for shareholders),
here, it involved a much smaller magnitude of dollar amount involved with
Disney and less of a magnitude of a decision.
(6) What the board or compensation committee should have done, per the Supreme
Court decision:
(a) All committee members should receive, before or at the committee’s
first meeting, a spreadsheet or similar document prepared by (or with
the assistance of) a compensation expert. The spreadsheet should
disclose the amounts that the officer would receive under the
employment agreement in each foreseeable circumstance.
(b) The spreadsheet should be explained to the committee members,
either by the expert who prepared it or by a fellow committee member
similarly knowledgeable about the subject. The spreadsheet should
form the basis of the committee’s deliberations and decision, and
become an exhibit to the minutes of the compensation committee
meeting.
(c) Make sure the minutes and other documentation shows a deliberative,
good faith process. Carefully memorialize all conferences, deliberations
and other actions taken in furtherance of a decision.
b) Oversight
❖ Caremark Claim: There is a cause of action against boards for failing to take minimal steps
to achieve legal compliance and provide information to monitor the business.
➢ Stone v. Ritter: “We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions
predicate for director oversight liability:
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■ (a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or

information system or controls; or
■ (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.
■ In either case, imposition of liability requires a showing that the
directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary
obligations. Where directors fial to act in the face of a known duty to
act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their
responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge
that fiduciary obligation in good faith. ”
❖ In the absence of red flags--facts showing that the board ever was aware that the internal
controls were inadequate, that these inadequacies would result in illegal activity, and that
the board chose to do nothing about the problem it knew existed--good faith in the
context of oversight must be measured by the directors’ actions “to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists” and not by second guessing after the occurrence
of employee conduct that results in an unintended adverse outcome. Stone v. Ritter--
>this goes to the second prong of (consciously failing to monitor)
(1) In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig: In dicta, the court stated that as part of its
duty to monitor, the Board must make good faith efforts to ensure that a
corporation has adequate reporting and information systems:
(a) “A director’s obligation includes a duty … to attempt in good faith to
assure that a corporate information and reporting systems … exists, and
that failure to do so …may, in theory at least, render a director liable for
losses caused by non-compliance with legal standards.”
(b) The opinion described this claim as difficult to win, with liability
attaching only for “a sustained or systematic failure to exercise
oversight” or “[a]n utter failure to attempt to ensure a reporting and
information system.”
(2) § What an Adequate Law Compliance Program Might Include:
(a) Policy manual
(b) Training of employees
(c) Compliance audits
(d) Sanctions for violation
(e) Provisions for self-reporting of violations to regulators
(f) Other controls to verify compliance with laws and to give board the
ability to monitor business
(3) Stone v. Ritter: AmSouth settled with Gov and Civil actions for failing to comply
with federal money laundering statutes (i.e., Suspicious Activity Reports).
Shareholders then filed a derivative suit under the Caremark Claim, for failing to
set up a compliance and information structure for oversight duties
(a) Holding: The Pf failed to sufficiently allege that the Board failed in their
oversight role, because the directors had a reasonable reporting system
(department, committees, and employees dedicated for compliance)
whereby there was a mechanism would be reported up to the Board.
The Board also had an audit committee, which was tasked with
compliance with laws and to watch over it. They had implemented a
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reasonable reporting system designed to funnel information to the

board, thereby they took the necessary steps to implement a control
system and oversee the company. “Although there ultimately may have
been failures by employees to report deficiencies, there is no basis for
an oversight claim seeking to hold the directors personally liable for
such” employee failures. Thus, having implemented a system:
(i) Court also said: that in the absence in red flags, good faith in
the context of oversight must be measured by the director's
actions to assure a reasonable information and reporting
system exists and not by second-guessing after the occurrence
of employee conduct that results in an unintended adverse
outcome
(4) -The court reshaped what had previously been considered a good faith claim into
a duty of loyalty claim.
(a) What many had previously thought was a duty of care claim (Caremark
claim) to oversee corporation to make sure it was in legal compliance,
Stone v. Ritter court turned it into a duty of loyalty claim – how it did
this is that it shifted the elements of a Caremark claim to include the
requirement that the defendants had to know that they were not
fulfilling their obligation.
(b) Said there’s duty of care and duty of loyalty claims and loyalty includes
this subset of good faith issues. So Caremark claims are now
characterized as good faith claims and now duty of loyalty claims.
(c) Arguably now anything where directors know they’re discharging their
fiduciary obligations (conscious disregard of their obligations) would be
a duty of loyalty claim OR if board acts with intent to violate the law,
this would also be duty of loyalty claim.
(d) Caremark: A sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
oversight–such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists will establish the lack of good
faith that is a necessary condition to liability.
(e) Stone: Caremark standard draws heavily upon concept of director
failure to act in good faith. That is consistent with the definition(s) of
bad faith recently approved by this Court in Disney, where we held that
a failure to act in good faith requires conduct that is more culpable than
the conduct giving rise to a violation of the [DOC] (i.e., gross
negligence). Imposition of oversight liability requires a showing that the
directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary
obligations. Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to
act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their
responsibilities, they breach their fiduciary duty of loyalty by failing to
discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith.
(i) The failure to act in good faith may result in liability because
the requirement to act in good faith is a subsidiary element,
i.e., a condition, of the fundamental duty of loyalty. Because a
showing of bad faith conduct is essential to establish director
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oversight liability, the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is

duty of loyalty.
(ii) Although good faith may be described colloquially as part of a
‘triad’ of fiduciary duties, the obligation to act in good faith
does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands
on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty. Only the
latter two duties, where violated, may directly result in liability,
whereas a failure to act in good faith may do so, but indirectly.
The second doctrinal consequence is that the fiduciary duty of
loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or other
cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest – it also encompasses
cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.
● If Caremark claims are now characterized as good faith and therefore duty of loyalty claims what other claims
should be characterized as violations of the DOL? (hint: examples of bad faith in Disney)
○ Intentionally acting with a purpose other than advancing the best interests of the corp
○ Intent to violate the law
○ Intentionally failing to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating conscious disregard for
duties.
● After Disney and Stone, how would you analyze the decision of a board authorizing corporate employees to break
a traffic regulation? (Assume the board informed itself and considered the issue and determined it was cost-
effective to violate the law and pay the fines)
○ This does not alter Duty of Care because it is a business decision and BJR applies and no gross negligence
○ It would seem, per Stone there is a breach of a duty of good faith, because according to Disney that was a
method of bad faith claims. So there would be a breach, but what would the remedy be if the
Shareholders sued?
■ There was a cost-benefit analysis done and the directors were acting to help the business profit,
so if the Benefit outweighed the cost it would be loyal. See DGCL 101(b), the corporation can
only be charted to engage in lawful conduct, so it makes sense that an intent to violate law is an
act to engage in bad faith
○ Disney said intent to violate the law is a good faith issue, and Ritter says good faith is party of loyalty
issue. Therefore, BJR doesn’t apply
■ There is no Dm for suing on duty of loyalty
○ This is also a potential ultra vires issue (acting outside the scope of their charter)
○ It is not exculpated under 102(b)(7) or indemnified under 104
● HYPO: Supposed that the AmSouth board had considered the issue and affirmatively decided not to adopt any law
compliance program. Would it be liable if that decision resulted in corporate losses?
● Disney said the intent to violate law or Intentionally failing to act in the face of a known duty to act,
demonstrating conscious disregard for duties, is under Dutyof Loyalty so although this is a business
decision, it is not a duty of care argument because it is a disregard of a duty to act in the face of a duty to
under the law. Characterize as a Duty of Loyalty
● Then looks to Ritter, and the knowledge to act and failure to do so.
4. Fiduciary Duties of Officers

a) Del. Supreme Court clarified that officers have the same fiduciary duties as directors, but
uncertainty about whether the standards are the same (i.e., BJR protection)
b) DGCL 102(b)(7) and 141(e) apply only to directors
c) CA Corp Law codified BJR only to directors and Mjr. Ca Courts have held that Cal BJR does
not apply to corporate officers
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d) Why does BJR apply to BOD and not Officers?

(1) Officers are not disincentives to be an officer because you get paid a lot to be an
officer
(2) Risk taking does not take the same course of action as BOD
(3) BOD are elected by shareholders, and officers are hired by the Board.
D. Duties and Issues Involving Controlling Shareholders

❖ General RULE: As a general matter, shareholders have no obligations or duties to each other. They are
allowed to act in their own interest in deciding how to vote/trade their shares because they act in their own
interests to, generally, make money from their investments.
➢ However, there are situations when shareholders have control of the company. In these situations
the shareholder may control the Board and so the Board is not able to act in any way but for the
MJRTY shareholder, i.e., not independent of the shareholder, so the court will impose the same
duties of the Board to the Majority Shareholder
1. Background on Controlling Shareholders

a) Although there is no provision analogous to DGCL § 144, the standard of review for
corporate transactions with the controlling SH has generally been fairness. (casebook
pages 695-696)
b) The defendant-controlling SH bears the burden of proving the transaction was fair to the
corporation. If there was approval by the informed, disinterested shareholders (a.k.a.,
majority of minority), the burden may shift onto the plaintiff to show that the transaction
was unfair to the corporation. (See, e.g., In re Wheelabrator)
c) One area in which these issues come up is freeze-outs or cash-out mergers in which the
minority SHs are eliminated. Depending on the process, there may be an entire fairness
standard or burden shifting and the standard may be lowered….dissenting SHs may also
have an appraisal remedy…these are topics covered in the M&A course.
d) General rule: A controlling SH is free to dispose of her stock as she sees fit and on such
terms as a willing buyer offers (including a control premium).
(1) Exceptions: a sale of control under circumstances indicating that the buyer
intends to loot or mismanage the corporation, the sale involves fraud or misuse
of confidential information, the sale is a wrongful appropriation of corporate
assets, or the sale is for corporate office (e.g., selling less than majority of the
voting stock and receiving portion of $ to put in place a sequential resignation
plan for directors)
e) Control is not a bright line rule:
(1) De jure control: If a shareholder owns more than 50% of the voting stock, then
the shareholder has de jure control
(2) De facto control: A shareholder owning less than 50% of the voting stock has de
facto control if a majority of the board lacks independence from the shareholder.
(Pf bears burden to prove de facto control)
(a) Fact specific determination
2. Duties within Corporate Groups
❖ If a shareholder dominates or controls the corporation, and the controlling shareholder receives a
benefit to the exclusion and at the expense of the minority shareholders (i.e., self-dealing), then
the burden is on the controlling shareholder to prove intrinsic fairness of transaction. Otherwise
BJR applies.
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➢ Intrinsic fairness only looks at the substance of the transaction. That is whether the terms
and price are one that an individual would expect in an arm’s length, third-party
transaction. (i.e., objectively the substance of the transaction is fair)
■ Compared to entire fairness which is both the process and substance
a) Parent-Subsidiary Transactions: Whether controlling shareholders have fiduciary duties is
context specific.
(1) Corporation Groups: One of the contexts court has recognized controlling
shareholders have a fiduciary duty.
(2) Parent and Wholly-Owned Subsidiary: Scenario very rarely gives rise to any
issues as a matter of corporate law.
(3) Parent and Minority-Owned Subsidiary: Issues often arise because minority
shareholders will question whether a parent company is using its control of the
subsidiary to benefit itself at subsidiary’s expense. In cases like this, minority will
assert that parent owns a duty of loyalty
b) The defendant-controlling SH bears the burden of proving the transaction was fair to the
corporation. If there was approval by the informed, disinterested shareholders (a.k.a.,
majority of minority), the burden may shift onto the plaintiff to show that the transaction
was unfair to the corporation. (See, e.g., In re Wheelabrator)
c) Sinclair Oil Corp. V Levien: Sinclair Oil Corp sued by minority shareholders of their
Venezuelan subsidiary. Sub was made for the purpose of operating in Venezuela, but
parent sued for 1) Payment of Excessive Dividends 2) Usurpation of Opportunities in
Paraguay And 3) Breach of Contract between Sinclair Int'l and breach of Fid Duties. Parent
owned 97% stock and elected all members of the sub’s board, whom were found to not
be independent.
(1) Held: When a situation involves a parent and subsidiary where the parent
controls the transaction and receives a benefit to the exclusion and expense of
the subsidiary, the test of intrinsic fairness is applied. Essentially a self-dealing
scenario where the parent causes the sub to act in a way it would not typically
and harms the minority shareholders at the majorities benefit. The court went
on to rule on the three challenged transactions
(a) Dividend payment: BJR does not automatically apply when the payment
of dividends, you need to see the structure of the dividend declared
and the Stock Structure. Here because there was 1 class of stock each
shareholder received their pro-rata amount of dividends distributed, so
all parties were benefited. In a case where there were two classes of
stock dividends were declared then you would need to show intrinsic
fairness of the dividend payment. Can rebut fairness and go to BJR if
there is something in the Corp Docs saying that the dividends will be
distributed and calculated in a certain way. Background: There was a
reason for the huge dividends because Sinven feared being nationalized
so they wanted to get money out. Therefore, since the dividend was
proportionate to the ownership right BJR applied.
(b) Expansion Policies of Sinclair Oil Conglomerate: Usurpation of
Opportunities: In other countries Sinclair Oil was buying and developing
properties in other nations with other Subsidiaries. Court said BJR
applied because Sinven was developed to discover and exploit
opportunities within Venezuela and the oil opps were outside the scope
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of the Corp. Purpose. Therefore no breach of Fid duty because the

opportunities did not belong to Sinven to begin with
(c) Breach of K with Sinclair Int'l: Sinvent and Sinclair Int'l had a K (caused
by Sinclair) to sell all Sinven's oil to Int'l for a specified rate, and Min and
Max. Int'l was late on their payments and was deficient in complying
with their Minimum amounts. However, Sinclair did not enforce the K.
Court found Sinclair Benefited from the K to the detriment of the Sub,
this is because Sinclair received the product without paying Sinven for
their services, per the K. Therefore the Minority Shareholders were not
able to receive in the benefit of the K.. Applied intrinsic fairness and
under the Intrinsic Fairness standard needed to prove that the breach of
the K was intrinsically fair to the Minority Shareholders.
3. Oppression in Closely Held Corporations

❖ Some courts have responded to SH oppression by imposing special or heightened fiduciary duties
in closely held corporations, but they differ about when and to whom the duties are owed.
❖ Many courts have held that controlling SHs have fiduciary duties to deal fairly with and not
oppress the rights of minority SHs…
➢ This includes California. E.g., Neubauer v. Goldfarb, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003); Stephenson v. Drever, 947 P.2d 1301 (Cal. 1997); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460
P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969) (controlling SHs cannot use their control to benefit themselves to the
detriment of the minority without a compelling business purpose).
a) Background/Definitions
(1) Definitions of “closely held corporation” vary, but includes the fact the
company’s stock is not traded on a public securities market, and typically they
have only a small number of shareholders, who may participate actively and
substantially in managing the enterprise.
(a) Note that many states have statutes that allow corporations to elect
“close” corporation status, and have special provisions that apply to
close corporations. It is, however, uncommon for corporations to
statutorily elect to become a close corporation.
(b) For that reason, in this class, we will discuss closely held corporations
(privately held companies that have not elected statutory close status).
(2) Closely held corporation investors are often connected by family or other
personal relationships, and often expect employment by the corporation and a
meaningful role in management, as well as financial return on their investments
(3) Absent a contractual arrangement, the minority shareholder in a closely held
corporation is generally locked into her investment (it is “illiquid”).
(4) And, unlike an investor in a general partnership, she cannot readily liquidate her
investment by exercising a statutory right to dissolve the business.
(5) By contrast, investors in public corporations typically are not employees and play
no management role. They can readily liquidate their investments by selling
shares in a public securities market.
(6) Planning in the Closely Held Corporation: Because shareholders in closely held
corporations generally cannot exit by selling their shares, they commonly seek to
use contracts or internal governance mechanisms to plan for these issues or
provide for a voice in the corporation, e.g., shareholder voting trusts,
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shareholder voting agreements, shareholder management agreements,

restrictions on share transfers, buy-sell agreements, employment contracts,
supermajority provisions, etc.
b) Squeeze-Outs, Freeze-Outs, and Other Forms of Oppression in Closely Held Corporations:
(1) Without a market into which to sell their shares, minority SHs are vulnerable to
board decisions about management, employment, compensation, dividends, etc.
(2) Controlling SHs have at times used various techniques to squeeze out, freeze
out, or otherwise oppress the minority, e.g., buy or sell at unfair price to
minority SHs.
(a) Cut Off Minority SHs from Financial Returns: Improperly withhold
dividends, improperly terminate employment, management positions,
and related benefits.
(b) Siphon off disproportionate shares of corporate profits by paying
themselves excessive salaries, bonuses, benefits, and perquisites.
(c) Self-dealing (i.e., commit the corporation to generous contracts with
themselves or aligned parties made at less than arm’s length such as
with a license to use real or intellectual property, a contract to obtain
services from a closely affiliated person or entity, or a loan at
nonmarket rates).
c) Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home (MINN): 4 partners who bought a building to operate
it as a nursing home. Each agreed to be a director of the company and agreed that each
was entitled to equal cash payments as long as they are active managers of the business.
The other 3 shareholders began to freeze Wilkes out of active participation of the
business--removing him from the board, firing him as a manager, and eliminating his
salary--therefore he would no longer be entitled equal cash payments
(1) Test: 1) the controlling group must show that there was a legitimate business
purpose for its actions 2) the minority stockholders must then demonstrate that
the same legitimate business purpose could have been achieved through an
alternative course of action less harmful to the minority’s interest, and then 3)
the court must weigh the legitimate business purpose against the practicability
of a less harmful alternative
(2) Holding: There was no legitimate business purpose for the actions taken against
Wilkes besides personal animosity against the person. The majority SHs did not
even accomplish their task of proving they had a legit business purpose for the
freeze-out – unable to justify why they took Wilkes off the payroll and off the
board of directors – there had been no showing of misconduct or poor
performance in Wilkes’s role as director, it was merely a personal desire of Ds to
remove Wilkes from office and deny him salary. At a minimum, the duty of
utmost good faith and loyalty would demand that the mjrty consider that their
action was in disregard of a long-standing policy of the stockholders that each
would be a director of the corp and employment with corp would be a condition
with stock ownership; wilkes was original shareholder; wilkes put a great deal of
effort into the co.; cutting off salary with never delcaring a div assured Wilkes
would receive no return from the co.
(a) Note: Important variations occur from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and
from case to case. Reported decisions differ concerning the scope and
limits of the enhanced fiduciary duties, including whether they apply to
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all shareholders or only to those in control, whether they apply to all

actions or only to those taken in a corporate capacity, and whether they
apply to all closely held corporations or only to statutory close
corporations.
(3) Delaware and some other courts have rejected the principle espoused in Wilkes,
that some kind of different rules should apply in closely-held corporations, or
that all shareholders in closely help corporations should have some kind of
partnership-type fiduciary duty to each other. Delaware has said it’s just like
other corporate contexts, and as with publicly traded corporations, controlling
shareholders owe fiduciary duties only if they’re acting in their corporate
capacity (like if have an interested transaction).
(a) Under those authorities, controlling shareholders’ duties only require
them to act in the best interest of the corporation, not in the best
interest of other shareholders and identifies no special duties in the
context of closely held corporations.
(4) Nixon v. Blackwell: o There was a closely-held company called EC Barton; when
Barton (founder) died, there were several classes of stock – all of the class A
stock passed to employees, and all of the class B stocks (which had no voting
rights) went to Barton’s family. There was an Employee Stock Ownership Plan
(ESOP) that allowed employees to cash out or receive Class B stock on
termination or retirement. The non-employee shareholders, held a lot of the
economic value of the company, but had no voting rights – so they didn’t have
any benefit of shares in the ESOP that gave them liquidity. Class B stockholders
sued the Corporation and directors alleging Ds (1) tried to force minority
stakeholders to sell shares by paying only minimal dividends, (2) breached
fiduciary duties by approving undue compensation, and (3) breached fiduciary
duties by discriminating against non-employee stockholders.
(a) Test Applied: Entire fairness test (because court said Ds were effectively
on both sides of the transaction because they’re running the
corporation and choosing how to run that ESOP and they’re the
beneficiary of it, so effectively on both sides of that deal).
(b) Held: Ds had met their burden of establishing the entire fairness of their
dealings with the non-employee class B stockholders. These class B
shareholders did not need to get equal treatment, just needed fair
treatment, and it was fair to the corporation to have stocks set up like
this because ESOP is generally a corporate benefit; there was support in
the record for fact that with an ESOP, those plans are typically for a
corporate benefit for employees to incentivize them to work for
corporation and it was established at least in part to benefit corporation
with that idea when put in place, so Ds didn’t breach any fiduciary duty
by just implementing that which was a benefit to the corporation. Court
said going to honor the arrangements that were made, and this is
exactly what Barton (the founder) had set it out to be, and that was
effectively what was contracted for.
(c) “A stockholder who bargains for stock in a closely-held corporation and
who pays for those shares…can make a business judgment whether to
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buy into such a minority position, and if so, on what terms....Moreover,

in addition to such mechanisms [in Delaware Corporate Law], a
stockholder intending to buy into a minority position in a Delaware
corporation may enter into definitive stockholder agreements, and such
agreements may provide for elaborate earnings tests, buy-out
provisions, voting trusts, or other voting agreements....The tools of
good corporate practice are designed to give a purchasing minority
stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection before parting
with consideration. It would do violence to normal corporate practice
and our corporation law to fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result
in a court-imposed stockholder buy-out for which the parties had not
contracted . . .”
(d) “... the minority stockholders were not (a) employees of the
Corporation, (b) entitled to share in the ESOP, (c) qualified for key man
insurance, or (d) protected by specific provisions in a stockholders'
agreement.”
(e) “The directors’ actions following Mr. Barton’s death are consistent with
his plan. An ESOP is normally established for employees”
d) Note: Delaware took a different approach than Massachusetts in Wilkes – Delaware said
not going to read into any specially judicially created duties in a closely-held context that
don’t already exist as a matter of general principles of corporate law to fashion some kind
of ad hoc ruling, which would be what parties effectively were not expecting here – they
should be expecting what they contracted for and what is in the corporate documents.
e) Reconciling the Approaches: Both approaches seek to enforce what the court assumes to
be the parties’ expectations. The difference is in courts’ willingness to look beyond the
formal corporate documents.
4. Various Options and Remedies:
a) Some states have allowed for equitable remedies including court-ordered buyout of the
minority SH at a fair price, dissolution where necessary to protect the interests of the
complaining SHs, etc.
b) Some states also have involuntary dissolution statutes. For ex., California’s involuntary
dissolution statute authorizes a court to dissolve a corporation where those in control
have been guilty of persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement, or abuse of
authority or persistent unfairness toward any shareholders. Cal. Corp. Code § 1800.
Majority SHs can avoid involuntary dissolution through a buyout at fair value.
IV. Role and Rights of Shareholders

A. Shareholder Voting
1. Duties to other Shareholders:
a) Shareholders do not owe a duty to one another, except in limited circumstances with
controlling shareholders.
2. Vocab:
a) • Agent is called the “proxy holder,” “proxy agent,” or “proxy”
(1) The person who was given the mechanical power to vote on someone’s behalf
b) “proxy card” or “proxy”: Document for appointing the agent and voting
c) “proxy statement”: The information disclosure
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(1) This is the disclosure that is provided from the company to solicit the
shareholder's voting rights
3. Shareholders Rights/Roles:
a) Shareholders are often called the owners of the corporation. But their governance role is
limited by corporate laws tenet of centralized management. The BOD, not the
shareholders, have authority to manage the and direct the business and affairs of the
corp.
b) If shareholders not happy with way company is being run, these are their options:
(1) Sell the Stock [if have a public market to sell onto; in a private company, they
have to find someone who’s willing to buy it and have to look at whether there’s
any restrictions on transfer].
(a) If don’t like how the company is being managed, you are able to sell
your stock.
(b) However, really big institutional investors may find difficulty in selling
because it could affect the price
(c) SEC and Sec regs for private corporations
(d) There may be transfer restrictions on the stock
(e) Wrigley case: selling price refelects the current price of the
management of the company
(2) Vote: To change direction of the corporation or who gets to manage corporation
(& can make proposals).
(3) Sue.
(4) Shareholders also have inspection/information rights.
c) Note: Voting and suing are both mechanisms in which shareholders can monitor and
discipline and/or remove inadequate directors – i.e. mechanisms by which they can hold
some of these directors accountable and to deter misfeasance and malfeasance and hold
directors and officer through suing for breach of fiduciary duty accountable
4. Shareholder Voting: The Landscape
a) o State Corporation Law:
(1) § Shareholders have right to vote for:
(a) Directors;
(b) On major transactions (mergers and acquisitions); and
(c) Amendment of certificate of incorporation and bylaws.
b) Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure (or duty of candor): Directors have obligation to honestly
disclose the material info whenever seeking shareholder voting and approval on a matter.
c) 1930’s federal securities laws that apply to Shareholder Voting
(1) Up until 1930s states regulated securities laws and then Congress Stepped in
(2) Regulates disclosure of information in connection with shareholder voting
(3) Provides for shareholder proposals (public companies)
(4) Requires detailed disclosures on what, how, and when regarding the vote.
d) Recent few years—trend toward activism and increasing shareholder power
(1) Shareholder activism=shareholders ways of using the tools available to them to
be more active in the corp
(2) Some of the tools being used
(a) Shareholder proposals on majority voting (vs. plurality default)
(b) Shareholder proposals on proxy access (after D.C. Cir. struck down the
SEC’s mandatory rule for this)
(c) Dodd-Frank’s non-binding “say on pay” voting regarding executive
compensation (for public companies)
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(i) Voting up or down on Executive Compensation

(d) Rising importance of institutional investors and influence of proxy
advisors (e.g., ISS, Glass Lewis--advise mutual funds on the tools
available to them)
(i) More Americans are holding equity indirectly through
institutional investors (mutual and Pension funds)
(ii) Very different than it used to be where there was more
fractured retail investors
(3) Shareholder activism
5. - Who Votes:
a) oShareholders of Record—the holders on the “record date” get to vote.
(1) § DGCL § 213: Holders on the record date – means if you held stock on that
date, you can vote; can vote either in person or by proxy (have someone else
place your vote)
(a) Need to decide who has the power to vote. Shareholder of record is the
timing mechanism to determine which shareholders as of a certain date
have this power
(b) The company can choose the record date, but it needs to be between
10 and 60 days before the upcoming shareholder meeting
(2) § DGCL § 212(b): That person can vote in person or by proxy.
b) Default Rule: One share, one vote, unless otherwise provided in the certificate (DGCL §
212(a) – says when alter the one share one vote rule, must provide for in COI).
(1) Corporation could have classes of stock with different voting rights—e.g., a class
could have 10 votes per share—but that must be provided for in the certificate
(vocab: dual class stock).
(2) You are not talking about the people who are entitled to a vote but the actual
shares
6. Quorum for Shareholder Voting: For the shareholders to take action on behalf of the corporation,
must have a quorum.
a) Default Rule – DGCL § 216(1): A majority of shares entitled to vote (this would typically be
a majority of the outstanding stock) must be present in person or represented by proxy in
order for a valid shareholders meeting.
b) Certificate or bylaws can opt out of default, but never less than ⅓ of shares entitled to
vote (DGCL § 216).
7. What do shareholders vote on? And what is the vote required to elect/approve?
a) Directors
(1) Voting standard/amount:
(a) Default is a plurality of votes present or represented by proxy and
entitled to vote* (DGCL § 216(3))
(b) Majority voting on opt-in basis, if in certificate or bylaws (DGCL §§
141(b), 216)
(2) Voting method:
(a) DE has a default of “straight voting” and “cumulative voting” available
on opt-in basis, only if certificate provides) (DGCL § 214)
(b) Contrast CA, which has a default of cumulative voting
(3) Board structure:
(a) Classified (“staggered”) board on opt-in basis, if in certificate or sh-
approved bylaws (DGCL § 141(d))
b) Bylaw amendments, shareholder proposals, non-binding “say on pay”
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(1) Majority of shares present or represented by proxy and entitled to vote* (DGCL §
216(2))
(2) Remember to first look at what constitutes a quorum and then consider what is
the vote required to elect/approve. Also note jurisdictions vary on these rules).
(a) Assuming you have a quorum, you need a majority of that quorum to
move forward.
c) Certificate amendment--(know the voting requirements for this)
(1) Directors first have to adopt a resolution and then 2) holders of a majority of
outstanding shares entitled to vote must vote in favor of amendment (and by
classes if applicable) (DGCL § 242(b)(1))
(2) For a certificate amendment you need an absolute majority of the outstanding
shares vote
(a) If stock has been separated into classes, need a majority of
shareholders of each class of stock.
d) Major transactions (e.g., mergers)
(1) Per applicable statutory provision, generally majority of outstanding shares
entitled to vote
(2) Look to the rules that require shareholder approval
e) *Note: Remember to first look at what constitutes a quorum and then consider what is
the vote required to elect/approve. Also note jurisdictions vary on these rules.
8. Cumulative and Straight Voting
a) • Delaware: Straight voting by default. To allow for board representation of minority
shareholders, corporations may adopt cumulative voting for director elections (= opt in).
Must be in the certificate. (DGCL § 214)
b) • California: By default, cumulative voting is available to shareholder elections of
directors. Cumulative voting cannot be denied in the articles or bylaws, Cal. Corp. Code §
708(a); only publicly traded corporations may opt out of the requirement, Cal. Corp. Code
§ 301.5(a).
(1) Private Companies cannot opt out of cumulative voting
c) “straight” voting: when a shareholder votes, the # of votes the shareholder has is
accorded to each slot that is up for election/being voted upon.
(1) All shares go to voting as to each seat. So with 100 shares you can only vote your
shares for each seat
d) “cumulative” voting: each shareholder’s # of votes is multiplied by the number of
director positions up for election and the shareholder can split their votes any way they
like between the nominees or vote all for one single nominee.
(1) Cumulative voting allows the shareholder to cumulate the vote. So if you have 8
seats and the shareholder has 100 shares they have 800 total votes they can
allocate any way you want
e) The nominees with the highest number of votes are elected.
f) Plurality(Default in DEL): The nominee/decision with the most number of votes win,
despite not getting a majority. Typical governance
g) - Cumulative Voting Example:
(1) o ABC Corp. has 3 shareholders: A who owns 250 shares; B who owns 300
shares; C who owns 650 shares. Bylaws specify 4-member board.
(a) § Delaware default voting rule is plurality and straight voting, which
would mean C would elect the entire board of directors (650 votes for
each seat).
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(2) o But if ABC Corp. provided for cumulative voting in its certificate, A: 250 x 4 =
1,000 votes to use anyway chooses; B: 300 x 4 = 1,200 votes to use anyway
chooses; C: 650 x 4 = 2,600 votes to use anyway chooses.
(a) § A & B nominate themselves and cast all of their votes on themselves,
respectively. C nominates herself and 3 other friends, but C can’t cast
her votes in a way so as to elect all 4 of her nominees.
(b) § C might, for example, cast 1,201 for herself and 1,001 for friend #1,
but that would not leave C enough to elect friend #2 and 3.
(c) o Notice that even if B and C cumulated votes together, they could not
prevent A from electing at least one director.
(3) o Reason why would want cumulative voting is that it can give more voice to
minority shareholders.
9. Director Elections (Plurality Examples):
a) Example 1: more nominees than available seats
(1) One board seat open for election and 3 nominees: Al, Beth & Carol
(2) At shareholder meeting, Al receives 35% of votes, Beth 40%, Carol 25%
(3) Who wins?
(a) Beth wins because she gets the most votes
b) Example 2: single nominee for the seat
(1) One board seat open for election and 1 nominee.
(2) At the shareholder meeting, 955M votes against him, 512M votes in favor.
(3) Does the nominee win the seat?
(a) Yes, as long as there is a quorum and he gets one vote then he wins
because he is the only one to get a vote and therefore that person gets
the plurality
10. Majority Voting
a) The default rule is that directors win an election by obtaining a plurality of votes. This
means that in an uncontested election, a director is elected as long as there is a quorum
and she receives 1 vote.
b) However, many corporations have varied from the default rule and instead require
majority voting because of their dissatisfaction with the plurality requirement when there
is no contested seat
c) Majority voting gives SHs (somewhat) more power to control the composition of the
board, even without an alternative slate.
d) Shareholders don’t get the ability to nominate whats up, it just changes the standard that
if the person up doesn’t get a majority they must resign their seat
e) The specific procedures for what happens when a director fails to receive a majority vote
vary, for example:
(1) a strict rule under which the candidate is refused the seat;
(2) the candidate is required to submit a letter of resignation and the board has
discretion over whether to accept it;
(3) the candidate is required to submit a letter of resignation but only after a
replacement director is appointed.
f) More than 2/3 of the S&P 500 has adopted majority voting – an increasing trend.
g) HYPO: Acme’s directors are A, S, and T (who each own 1 of Acme’s 100 shares). D, who
owns 1 share, disagrees with the way A, S, and T manage Acme & wants to replace them.
D launches a PR campaign against A, S, and T urging shareholders to vote against them. D
is persuasive: All other shareholders send their proxy cards, voting against A, S, and T.
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(1) A, S, and T each get 3 votes in favor, 97 votes against. The default plurality voting
rule applies. What result?
(a) A, S, and T all stay on the board so long as they have won the vote in a
quorum.
(2) What result if Acme instead has a majority voting rule for director elections?
(a) In a majority voting situation then they would not win. But, this allows
for a corporate governance situation
11. When do Shareholders Vote (Three Occasion):
a) Annual shareholder meeting
(1) Can be held anywhere, as designated in the certificate or bylaws
(2) Unless directors are elected by written consent, an annual meeting shall be held
for the election of directors on a date and at a time designated by or in the
manner provided by the bylaws
(a) Any other proper business may also be transacted at annual meetings
(3) Court can call a shareholder meeting if no meeting was called for 13 months
b) Special meetings
(1) May be called by board, or by shareholders if certificate or bylaws allow it
(a) Shareholders do not have the ability to unilaterally call a meeting on
there own without the power in the Certificate or bylaws (which can be
important with bad acting boards
(2) Advance notice of meetings required (DGCL § 222)
(a) You have to have notice of the meetings
(b) Look to the statute to remind yourself of what the rules are and the
corporate documents/bylaws
c) Written Consent
(1) Two provisions that are relevant
(a) § 228(a) provides shareholders may take action without a meeting,
unless certificate provides otherwise
(i) “shall be signed by the holders of outstanding stock having not
less than the minimum number of votes that would be
necessary to authorize or take such action at a meeting at
which all shares entitled to vote thereon were present and
voted…”
(b) § 211(b) -- provides that shareholders may take action by written
consent to elect directors in writing
(i) provides that shareholders may act by written consent to elect
directors in lieu of an annual meeting only if (i) the action is by
unanimous written consent or (ii) the action by non-
unanimous consent is exclusively to fill director vacancies
(a) Specific to fill director vacancies or elect directors
d) Shareholder meetings are prescribed when they will vote (annual shareholder meeting)
or there are special meetings that can be followed for the shareholders to call but these
are very tricky and much more difficult than BOD meetings can be called.
e) These Governance rules are important in Hostile Takeover situtations
12. How do shareholders Vote:
a) DGCL 212 (b): Can vote in person or in proxy (i.e., proxy agent)
(1) Appointment effected by means of a proxy (a.k.a. proxy card).
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b) When voting in proxy you still specific how you want to vote and the proxy is the one who
administers the vote
(1) The agent could have the power to decide for you but that is revocable
c) Proxy vote is revocable and the one issued last in time is controlling.
d) Depending on what is being voting on, the proxy card or voting instruction form gives a
choice of voting for, against, or abstain; or for or withhold.
13. Shareholder Power to Initiate a Vote
a) Amend the certificate? No
(1) DGCL 242: Amendment of Cert of Incorp.
(a) The BOD has to first adopt a resolution setting forth the amendment
proposed
(i) Two ways to adopt a resolution
(a) Unanimous Written Consent of the Majority
(b) Meeting of a quorum and the majority of the quorum
after a proper vote
(b) The BOD must declare its advisability
(c) Then the Board will have to call a special meeting of the stockholders
or have it be considered at the next annual shareholder meeting
(2) The board should adopt a resolution and only the board can put it for the
shareholders approval
(3) A vote of the absolute majority of all of the outstanding shares have to adopt the
resolution
b) Amend bylaws? Yes, can initiate action
(1) DGCL §109 provides that the shareholders have the default power to adopt,
amend, or repeal the Bylaws of the Corporation
(a) Do this through a shareholder proposal to amend the bylaws
(2) The board can amend the Bylaws only if that power is given to them in the
Certificate
c) Nominate directors? No
(1) Default: Shareholders do not have the power to nominate directors, only the
board itself has the power to nominate other Directors. It is part of the role of
the Board to manage the affairs of the corporation
d) Remove directors?
(1) Shareholders have the inherent power to remove the directors for cause or no
cause because there must be a mechanism for this
(a) Pg 368 Campbell: "Whi
(2) What is required? (Auer v. Dressel; Campbell v. Loew’s)
(a) If the shareholders are trying to remove the director for cause they
must disclose to the director the cause and provide him/her a
reasonable opportunity for a defense
(i) Cause: directors had been engaging in calculated behavior to
harass other directors or officers at the detriment of the corp.
is justification for for cause removal (also a breach of fid
Duties). Campbell pg 370
(a) It is not cause to mereley disagree with
mamangement or seek to take control
(b) This reasonable opportunity must occur either before or at the same
time the proxy statements are being offered
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(i) This is because if not then the you will only get info from
potentially one side
(3) •Removal of Directors – DGCL § 141(k): Can remove with or without cause. If
going to do it for cause, required to give notice, notice of what charges are, and
opportunity to be heard.
(a) Basic Rule: Majority of shares then entitled can vote to remove
directors.
(b) Classified [or Staggered Board: If have a classified board, can only
remove for cause (this is one of the reasons why to get rid of classified
or staggered board).
(4) Vacancies and Newly Created Directorships – DGCL § 223: (a) Vacancies can be
filled by majority of remaining directors [then in office].
(a) Director could resign, die, or removed under 141(k).
(b) Then have a vacancy in board, no statute that requires all seats on
board to be filled but § 223 says how vacancies get filled.
e) HYPO: Say you have a majority of the shares of ACME and they want to appoint E to fill
the vacancy. The Certificate allows the shareholders to fill the vacancy. How would the
shareholders go about getting this done?
(1) Under 223 shareholders have the power to do something because the provision
allows it. They can do this by initiating shareholder action through 1) annual
meeting 2) special meeting (if the shareholders have this power to do so) or 3)
take action by wrtten consent. §211 (b) tells us the electionn of directors has to
be unanimous for written consent unless it is to fill vacancies
14. Uncontested v. Contested Director Elections
a) In the ordinary course, board elections are uncontested.
(1) The company puts up a slate of directors for election and the SHs are expected
to elect that slate.
b) Contested elections (Proxy fight/Contest) typically occur in 2 situations:
(1) In the case of a hostile takeover, the bidding company puts up a full slate of
directors that is sympathetic to the acquisition. If the target SHs elect the
bidder’s slate, those directors will remove impediments to the takeover (e.g., a
poison pill) and vote in favor of the deal.
(2) Where there is an activist investor who is dissatisfied with management and
wants to gain influence over the company. The activist investor might put up a
“short slate” of directors, a minority of the board if elected.
15. Who Pays for Shareholder Voting and Proxy Contests:
a) Board has power to nominate who is up for reelection on board. Shareholders by default
do not have access to nominate.
b) Proxy Contest: Occurs when have a dissident shareholder or group of shareholders that
are opposing some matter for which the management is soliciting proxies – i.e. the
company management is sending out proxies for shareholders to vote on, but there are
some shareholders that do not like that, so might launch a proxy contest.
(1) § Could be over matters such as:
(a) · Change in corporate control – want to get majority of their own board
members on the board.
(b) · Hedge fund shareholder who wants a couple seats on the board.
(c) Opposition to some kind of conduct that company is proposing
c) Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp
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(1) Who pays for the uncontested vote?

(a) The corporation will have to pay for the expense of the vote.
(2) Contested vote?
(a) Who pays for incumbents (BOD who are already sitting on the board
and are being nominated by the board)?
(i) The corporation pays for incumbents expenses as long as they
are reasonable expenses incurred in good faith in a contest
over policy (not personal), they have the right to incur
reasonable and proper expenses for solicitation of proxies and
in defense of their corporate policies
(ii) Reasonable Expenses: must be for corporate policy and not
purely for personal matters
(b) Who pays for insurgents?
(i) This depends on whether the insurgent wins or loses
(ii) Win: If the insurgents win then the corporation will pay for the
reasonable and good faith expenses of the insurgents so long
as shareholders ratify the expenses by an affirmative vote
(a) This is because you want to prevent self-dealing when
they are elected they just approve their own
expenses, so need shareholder ratification
(iii) Lose: If the insurgents lose then they are responsible for
paying their own expenses
(a) This is important because these are expensive fights
to take
(c) ·See also DGCL §§ 112, 113 (providing for bylaws opt-in of proxy access
and reimbursement) – allows a company to put into bylaws a provision
that would allow certain shareholders to be able to nominate someone
to proxy card.
(i) If company doesn’t have this, shareholders’ only other option
is a proxy contest.
B. Shareholder Proposals
1. SEC Statutory Authority
a) o Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a): It shall be unlawful for any person to
solicit a proxy in contravention of such rules and regulations as the SEC may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
(1) The proxy regulations kick in for publicly traded companies to protect
shareholders from being taken advantage of
(2) § Government here was trying to prevent shareholders from being taken
advantage of.
(3) Congressional authority bestowed to SEC to regulate Proxies
b) o Exchange Act Rule 14a: The SEC promulgated proxy solicitation rules under this
authority, applicable to registered securities (public companies):
(1) § Specifies required proxy disclosures and the manner in which the material
must be presented.
(2) § Prohibits false or misleading statements as to any material fact or the
misleading omission of a material fact.
(3) § Requires a corporation to provide specified proxy assistance to requesting
shareholders and allows shareholders to submit shareholder proposals.
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(4) Either the SEC or the Shareholders have the power to go after a company for
materially misleading statements or admissions
c) Enforcement of § 14(a):
(1) o Public Enforcement: SEC can sue for violations of § 14(a) – i.e. if company
has something false or misleading or omits anything in proxy, SEC can sue.
(2) o Private Enforcement (J.I. Case Co. v. Borak (U.S. 1964)): Private parties have a
cause of action for § 14(a) violations.
(a) § Suit can be derivative (e.g., corporation harmed by misinformed
vote) or direct (e.g., shareholder’s voting rights infringed by
misrepresentation).
(3) o Elements of a § 14(a) Action: (1) Violation, (2) injury, (3) causation.
(4) Rule 14a-9 prohibits false or misleading statements or omissions as to a
material fact in connection with soliciting proxies
2. Shareholder Proposals: Rule 14a-8 (ONLY APPLIES TO PUBLIC CO’S)
a) • SEC 14(a)-8 governs how and which shareholders can submit proposals for the board
b) Typically non-binding proposals that shareholders can submit for vote, to be included
in corporation’s proxy card; they state a course of action that shareholder proposes
that corporation should follow.
(1) §Understood as vehicles for political statements or recommendations that
corporation should follow.
(2) § Generally, non-binding because the decision will then go to the board to
decide whether they want to implement it or not (BJR protection), but can
send a strong message to board regarding shareholder view.
(3) § If proposal is to amend bylaws, then would be binding.
c) How to satisfy a shareholder proposal requirements & who submits them
❖ RULE: Must be a qualifying shareholder and submit the written proposal within the time
constraints and within 500 words, additionally the shareholder must appear at the
shareholder meeting to present the proposal.
(1) Qualifying Shareholder[what’s required for shareholder to submit proposal
under 14a-8]:
(a) (1) Own at least $2K or 1% of shares;
(b) (2) Owned shares for at least 1 year and hold the shares through the
date of the meeting; and
(c) (3) Submitted no more than 1 proposal per meeting
(2) • Shareholder or her agent must submit within timing constraints and then
appear at meeting to present the proposal.
(3) Proposal (including supporting statement) may not exceed 500 words.
(a) Shareholders can refer to a website to support its proposal
(b) But may be subject to exclusion if anything on the website is materially
misleading, in contravention of the proxy rules, or is irrelevant to the
proposal
(4) Who Submits Shareholder Proposals?
(a) Hedge and private equity funds
(b) Pension funds or other institutional investors
(i) Union (e.g., AFSCME)
(ii) State and local employees (e.g., CALPERs)
(c) Individual activists
(d) Charities/nonprofits
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(5) Trends in Shareholder Activism

(a) 70s and 80s: divestment from South Africa (apartheid), environment,
equal employment and affirmative action plans
(b) 90s and current: human rights, animal rights, climate change,
renewable energy sources, global codes of conduct, sweatshop labor,
unsafe products, sexual orientation non-discrimination
(c) Also governance: eliminating takeover defenses (e.g., de-classifying
board), majority voting, proxy access, board diversity and
independence, disclosure of political spending, separate CEO and chair
(i) The proxy mechanism is the way that shareholders are able to
change the governance of the corporation
3. - Corporate Responses to Shareholder Proposals:
a) o Shareholder makes proposal and sends it to company, company receives it and has a
few options. They could:
b) § (1) Attempt to exclude on procedural or substantive grounds: Corporation is required
to include the proposal unless can prove to the SEC that it may be excluded under Rule
14a-8.
c) § (2) Include with opposing statement: Its own statement for why it opposes the
proposal.
(1) Corporation may write in proxy statement an objection to the SH proposal (not
limited to 500 words).
(a) Corp is not limited to 500 words and can write a detailed pamphlet
(b) The BOD will express an opinion whether they are for or against a
certain proposal and in the Proxy Statement they will give detailed info
on why they are for or against the proposal
d) § (3) Negotiate with proponent.
e) § (4) Adopt proposal as submitted.
4. Procedure for Excluding a Shareholder Proposal
a) Shareholder submits a proposal and asks the corporation to send it out in the proxy
b) Rule 14a-8(i) allows the corporation to exclude certain proposals
(1) If it intends to exclude, it must inform the shareholder of remediable deficiencies
and give an opportunity for them to be cured
(2) It also must file a statement of reasons for exclusion with the SEC (plus an
opinion of counsel if any of the stated reasons rely on legal issues)
(3) When the company notifies the SEC, it usually requests a “no action letter”
(4) The SEC staff may issue the requested no-action letter or determine it should be
included or take an intermediate position (not includible in present form, but can
be cured)
(5) Shareholder can try to remedy the defect or could appeal to SEC commissioners
or seek injunction in court
(a) Injunction is the equitable remedy trying to put the proposal on the
proxy card
c) When the company notifies the SEC it asks for a no-action letter.
(1) It is staff level guidance that the company is asking the SEC to not take an action
against the company
(2) Statement from the attorney that they do not intend to elevate the action to the
commissioner
5. 14a-8(i) Grounds for excluding a Shareholder Proposal
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❖ To exclude the proxy statement they must disclose that they will be excluding it to the SEC and
then need to give the exclusion and the grounds to exclude the proposal. The company can
provide any number of reason
a) Improper subject of action for shareholders under state corporate law (e.g., draft as a
nonbinding recommendation (“precatory”))
b) Violation of law
(1) If the proposal will cause the corporation to violate the law
c) Violation of proxy rules
(1) The proxy has any false or misleading statements
d) Personal grievance or special interest
(1) If the shareholder is making a proposal for a personal complaint then can
exclude it. Such an action will cost all of the shareholders money so it will be
excluded
e) Relevance: Relates to operations accounting for less than 5% of assets or net
earnings/gross sales, and is not otherwise significantly related to the company’s business
(see Lovenheim)
(1) Lovenheim v. Iriquois Brands: Pf submitted a proposal a request to get a study of
how their supplier of Patte de Foie Gras produces the food item and if it causes
undue stress and hardship to the animals. The company sought to exclude it on
relevance grounds 14a-8(i)(5) and the SEC granted it, but the Pf sought an
injunction to get it on the proxy card. 8(i)(5) has an economic test of >5% of net
assets or >5% of operating profit. Need to see how significant the proposal is
compared to the company's operations. Therefore the company was saying this
is irrelevant because they do not even make enough money. PF said it cannot be
excluded under language of the 5th exclusion because you would need to argue
that it needs to meet the economic threshold AND by not otherwise significantly
related to the businesses operations
(a) Holding: It is not limited to purely economic issues the term "not
otherwise significantly related" is not purely an economic standard,
ethical, human rights, and other moral issues are read into that
operation
(i) Analysis: Looking at the SEC statements, interpreting the
agency's rule of 14a-8, they wanted to see what the drafters of
the SEC rule intended that other non-economic tests be used.
There is also a history of how the SEC has interpreted that and
the SEC has given readings that the significantly related
language is not purely economic threshold. That "is not
otherwise significantly related" needs to be related to the
company's operations but it could be public policy or ethical
concerns relevant to that company. Here the company is
operating of Foie Gras so the public policy concerns are
relevant
(a) FN 8 on pg 463: you need to have additional support
that there is a true social, ethical, moral, or public
policy concern related to the issue you are putting
forth, not merely your own belief about what is
ethical in the world
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f) Company would lack power or authority to implement the proposal

(1) Complete possibility or moonshot, e.g., world peace
g) Relates to ordinary business operations
(1) If the shareholders are trying to stick their nose into the ordinary business
functions then the proposal will not be allowed. This is why the BOD is there
(2) Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: Trinity is a church and was alarmed
by amount of mass shootings, and reviewed Walmart’s merchandising practices,
and found a major inconsistency since Walmart sells guns but not (for ex) explicit
music and NC-17 movies. It believed this to be a corporate oversight, so Trinity
wrote to them saying this was a problem, and Walmart basically said wasn’t
going to do anything about it, so Trinity submitted a shareholder proposal, asking
for a non-binding proposal requesting the board provide oversight concerning
implementation of a policy to decide whether company sell products that are
harmful to safety, etc. (narrative part of proposal made clear proposal was
intended to apply to guns).
(a) Issue: “The principal issue we address is whether Trinity’s proposal was
excludable because it related to Wal–Mart’s ordinary business
operations.”
(i) Company is relying on the 7 exclusion
(b) -Walmart Test:
(i) Step 1: What is proposal about?
(a) Court says what looking at for subject matter is the
ultimate consequence of the proposal. Courts says
what really matter is whether talking about a subject
matter that’s company oversight in governance and
management, or whether about an ordinary business
matter.
(ii) Step 2: Does this proposal relate to ordinary business
operations?
(iii) Step 3: If yes to step 2, then Company must show that the
shareholder’s proposal does not raise a significant policy issue
that transcends the nuts and bolts of the retailer’s business.
(a) Walmart Court’s Examples of What Transcends or is
Within Zones of Day-to-Day Operations:
(b) Excludable: Shareholder proposal about sugary sodas
and social issue is childhood obesity, that wouldn’t be
enough (i.e. will still be excluded as ordinary
business), because it’s too enmeshed/doesn’t
transcend business – it’s just about what a retailer
sells.
(c) Not Excludable: If proposal related to an impropriety
about a supermarket’s discrimination practice =
generally be not excludable. Same for proposals about
environmental effects of constructing stores near
environmentally sensitive areas = not excludable.
(iv) Also contrasts where company sells narrow things versus a
company that sells broad array of products: ex – grocery store
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versus tobacco or gun manufacturer. A shareholder proposal

on a gun manufacturer that asked about reducing gun violence
cannot be excludable because this relates to the company’s
very existence.
(c) Holding:
(i) Part 1: the proposal does concern the subject matter of the
business, it goes to the heart of what the business does
(a) Court looked to at the core what product the
company is selling and that is more about business
operations and not governance
(ii) Part 2: Does raise a significant policy issue but it doesn't raise
to the level that it transcends normal, nuts and bolts, of the
business operations.
(a) EX given by the court that are excludible under 7:
looked at supermarket decision to sell soda because it
contributes to childhood obesity goes to the heart of
the business operations and not to a significant policy
issue.
(b) Not excludible: hiring functions and discriminatory
hiring practices
(c) Look to difference for when a company sells one type
of product vs a company that sells a number of
different products
h) Relates to director elections (enumerated issues or related to upcoming election)
(1) Has to do with enumerated issues that are related to upcoming election (if
proposal related to someone specific, then company can exclude
i) Conflicts with company's proposal
(1) If the proposal directly conflicts with the own proposal than can exclude it
j) Company has already substantially implemented the proposal
(1) Proposal is already implemented so don’t need to issue an additional proposal
(2) Must directly conflict with the company's own proposal or has been
substantially implemented
k) Duplication
l) Resubmissions
(1) May not be a re-submission if the shareholder support is not past a small
threshold
(2) Need to increase the percent of shareholder participation or voting for the
proposal to see it is gaining support
m) Relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends
HYPO: Two years ago, Dany Targaryen bought $2,000 worth of stock in Crate & Box, a publicly traded company that sells
home furnishings. Which of the following proposals from Targaryen would be excludable under the shareholder proposal
rule (Rule 14a-8)?
● (a) A proposal that shareholders elect Targaryen.
○ 14a-8(i)(8)(iv) relating to the director elections
● (b) A resolution stating that the shareholders desire that the board consider nominating women directors for the
board.
○ Probably includible because it is phrased in a precatory way so not excludable under 1, the SEC staff
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about a proposal to
○ This is general activism and relates to corporate governance
○ May need to look at the phrasing, but here it is arguable that the statement will not affect the upcoming
BOD election
○ HYPO: if it said "must elect women" then it would be excludable under 1, non-binding under state law
● (c) A proposal to amend the bylaws to permit shareholders holding more than 5% of the company’s shares for two
years to nominate up to 2 directors to the company’s 9-person board.
○ Shareholders have the power to amend By-Laws and can put it to a vote, as long as it is phrased
appropriately, then it will be includible.
○ Rule in Dodd-Frank relating to shareholder/proxy access but the DC cir. Struck it down. SEC and courts
recognize there is no mandatory proxy access provision, but that Shareholders can use the proxy
mechanism to get that
● (d) A proposal that the board sell a particular division of Crate & Box and distribute the proceeds as a dividend.
○ Can exclude that one on 13 because it is a specific amount of dividends because all of the amount for the
sale will go to the shareholders
○ The specific amount of div to the ordinary operation of a business
● (e) A proposal that the board form a committee to study whether the suppliers of kitchen linens sold by Crate &
Box use child labor in their manufacturing processes.
○ Similar to Lovenheim--the company cannot rely on 5 it is is otherwise significantly related to the
company's business
○ Includible because the study about child labor is related to the company's business so wont be able to
exclude it under 5
○ Could be excludible under 7 because it may relate to the ordinary business operations to determine
which suppliers to use, this is because there is friction between the BOD actions and ability to govern the
company's operations
C. Shareholder Information Rights

❖ DGCL § 219 Shareholders List: Available to shareholders for purposes germane to meeting
➢ Usually shareholders have a right to the shareholder list, but only available to shareholders for
purposes germane to the meeting
➢ Usually only available 10 days before the meeting
❖ DGCL § 220 Books and Records: Upon written demand, under oath, stating the purpose thereof, any
stockholder may “inspect for any proper purpose” the 1)“corporation’s stock ledger, a list of its
stockholders and its other books and records AND 2) A subsidiary’s books and records (subject to certain
conditions) . . A proper purpose shall mean a purpose reasonably related to such person’s interest as a
stockholder. . .”
➢ Recall Disney—“tools at hand”
➢ If the list they are seeking is the stock ledger and shareholder list then the burden is on the
corporation to prove that the shareholders purpose to get the list is improper
➢ For other information, It is on the shareholders to prove they are seeking the information for a
proper purpose
1. To exercise their right to vote, and especially their right to initiate corporate reforms, shareholders
must often obtain information from the corporation
2. State law allows shareholder to inspect corporate books and records if they have a proper
purpose. Federal law requires that shareholders in Public corps receive a formal disclosure
document, proxy statement, when vote is solicited and that the communication soliciting
shareholder votes be honest and complete
3. Why would a shareholder want to inspect?
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a) For potential shareholder litigation and obtain facts to plead a complaint

(1) If you think that there are misdoings in the corporation, you have publicly
available info along with books and records rights
(2) A stockholder filing a derivative suit must allege either that the board rejected
his pre-suit demand that the board assert the corporation's claim or allege with
particularity why the stockholder was justified in not having made the effort to
obtain board action. … If the stockholder cannot plead such assertions consistent
with Chancery Rule 11, after using the “tools at hand” to obtain the necessary
information before filing a derivative action, then the stockholder must make a
pre-suit demand on the board. (Grimes v. Donald)
b) For a proxy contests
(1) Need the shareholder list for a proxy contest so that you can send them the
appropriate proxy statement and also solicit the appropriate shareholders to get
a vote
c) For a private company you want info to value the stock or understand the corporation's
dealings
4. Books and Records
❖ MBCA states that ready inspection is available for the articles of incorporation, bylaws, minutes of
shareholder meetings, the names of directors and officers. However, inspection of board minutes,
accounting records, and shareholder lists require the showing of a proper purpose. A stockholder
can only obtain those books and records that are necessary and essential to their proper purpose.
a) Articles of incorporation
b) Bylaws
c) Minutes of board and shareholder meetings
d) Board or SH actions by written consent
e) What about contracts, correspondence, and the like?
(1) The Delaware Supreme Court has held that a request to access such records
must be very narrowly tailored: “A Section 220 proceeding should result in an
order circumscribed with rifled precision."
5. Procedure/Demand Requirement
❖ MBCA: Shareholders must describe ‘with reasonable particularity’ the purpose and the records to
be inspected. The purpose must be “proper” and the records mst be “directly connected” with
that purpose
a) Note: If what shareholder is seeking is asking to see the shareholder list, then burden
is on the corporation to show the shareholder is doing so for an improper purpose.
But if shareholder is seeking access to other corporate records, burden is on the
shareholder themselves to prove a requisite proper purpose by preponderance of the
evidence for each item that they are seeking.
6. Proper Purpose
❖ DGCL 220: A proper purpose shall mean a purpose reasonably related to such person’s interest as
a stockholder.
➢ A stockholder who demands inspection for a proper purpose should be given access to all
of the documents in the corporation’s possession, custody or control, that are necessary
to satisfy that proper purpose. However, the scope of the stockholder’s inspection is
limited to those books and records that are necessary and essential to accomplish the
state, proper purpose. Saito v. Mckesson
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➢ Once a stockholder establishes a proper purpose under § 220, the right to relief will not
be defeated by the fact that the stockholder may have secondary purposes that are
improper.
a) Where a § 220 claim is based on alleged corporate wrongdoing, and assuming the
allegation is meritorious, the stockholder should be given enough information to
effectively address the problem, either through derivative litigation or through direct
contract with the corporation’s directors and or stockholders. Saito v. McKesson
b) o Proper Purpose Examples:
(1) § Investigating alleged corporate mismanagement.
(2) § Seeking information relevant to valuing your shares (come up a lot in
private company context).
(3) § Communicating with fellow shareholders in connection with a planned
proxy contest.
c) o Improper Purpose Examples:
(1) § Trying to get proprietary business information for the benefit of a
competitor.
(2) § To secure prospects for your own personal business (i.e. if trying to get a
client list or something).
(3) § Trying to institute a strike suit (i.e. claim breach of fiduciary duty but
there’s no basis for it).
(4) § Pursuing your own personal political goals.
d) State ex re Pillsbury v. Honeywell: Pf bought Honeywell stock after he discovered they
produced fragmentation bombs. Court found that when he bought the stock it was not
for the purpose of a sound investment or economic benefit, but to obtain a shareholder
list and seek to get the company to change their business model based on his social and
political ideals. Pf sought SH list to get a BOD member with his view, Df (corp) refused the
request stating it was not a proper purpose
(1) Test: A proper purpose is one that is germane to the shareholder’s or
Corporations economic interest in the company
(2) Holding: Court found for Honeywell, the Pf did not state a proper purpose
because he did not have an interest in the company itself, economically, but
instead only for his social/political ideals. This purpose was not germane to his
economic interest in the company, because it would not affect the corporation's
economic situation and his point of view was not for an economic incentive but a
political incentive.
(a) “While a plan to elect one or more directors is specific and the election
of directors normally would be a proper purpose, here the purpose was
not germane to petitioner’s or Honeywell’s economic interest. Instead
the plan was designed to further petitioner’s political and social beliefs.”
Thus not a proper purpose and insufficient to compel inspection’
(3) “In terms of the corporate norm, inspection is merely the act of the concerned
owner checking on what is in part his property...Because the power to inspect
may be the power to destroy, it is important that only those with a bona fide
interest in the corporation enjoy that power.”
e) Saito v. Mckesson HBOC: McKesson bought HBOC on 10/17/1998. Pf bought Mckesson
Stock on 10/20/1998. After the deal closed, they found that HBOC had accounting
irregularities which caused McKesson to restate prior financial statements (i.e., the
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accounting was wrong). As a result, Saito sued to seek info regarding the merger and how
the board inspected/consumated the transaction because it sounded like they did not act
appropriately and thus breached their fiduciary duties. Shareholder was seeking info from
both before and after the time the shareholder owned stock. The materials were both
HBOC, McKesson, and third party advisor materials that were provided to McKesson and
in their possession.
(1) TEST: Proper purpose test (220), but the shareholder bears the burden to show
that each document they are seeking has a proper purpose (outside of
shareholder ledgers). Scope of the documents must be only for the ones they
have a primary proper purpose, it does not matter that they have a secondary
purpose
(2) Holding: Found that it was a proper purpose for all three things. First, The date
which the shareholder purchased the stock is not an automatic cutoff for
information the shareholder can seek. Second, the item the SH was seeking were
documents provided by financial advisors, in the possession of Mckesson, and
were used for financial valuation; that was a proper purpose to see what the
advisors told Mckesson and if McKesson breached their duty when they relied
on those advisor’s reports. Second, documents regarding subsidiaries, there is a
settled principle is that the shareholders of the parent are not direct
shareholders of the subsidiary, therefore the SH of the parent are not able to
obtain records of the subsidiary--absent of evidence of fraud or the fact the
subsidiary acts as an alter ego of the parent corp--here the info was still in the
hands of McKesson and was used for the purposes of transacting business,
therefore it was allowed to be obtained.
(3) Note: shareholders have a legitimate interest to getting information in order to
hold boards and management accountable
(a) § 220 balances the shareholder interests, by requiring the request to be
in writing and to force shareholder to have a proper purpose relevant to
their interest as a shareholder
(b) Not proper purpose: securing prospects for your own personal business,
securing proprietary information, Strike suits (frivolous shareholder lit),
that would not benefit the corporation
7. Books and Records of Subsidiaries
❖ Del § 220: Shareholders of a parent company are allowed to obtain, for inspection, the books and
reocrds of a Delaware corporation’s subsidiaries, provided the corporation could obtain such
documents through the exercise of control over the subsidiary. However, such inspection can be
denied if it would violate an agreement between the corporation and the subsidiary or if the
subsidiary has a legal right under applicable law (such as that of the jurisdiction of its
incorporation) to deny inspection.
8. Shareholder Lists in Public Corporations: Levels of different detail regarding what shareholder lists
you’re getting (probably won’t be tested on).
a) o Depository Trust (CEDE); Brokerage Firms (held in “street name”); Beneficial Owner.
b) o Note: It’s a matter of state corporate as to what shareholder is entitled to
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c) o Types of shareholder lists: CEDE list: Stops at the street names; NOBO list: Specifies non-
objecting beneficial owners – typically, rule is only entitled to NOBO list if company has it
on-hand.
d) o States vary on which type of list they require; Delaware law grants access to pre-
existing lists of both types but doesn’t require the corporation to compile a NOBO list.
9. Duty of Disclosure
a) There is a duty of complete candor for Delaware corps
b) Shareholders in Del Corps have used the duty of candor (duty of disclosure) to
successfully challenge mergers, reorgs, and charter amendments accomplished through
false or misleading proxy statements.
D. Shareholder Litigation
❖ Shareholders can sue a corporation or its directors through either a direct or derivative action,
depending on the type of injury that the corporation caused. To determine whether the action
should be a direct or derivative suit ask:
➢ 1) Who suffered the alleged harm, the corporation or the suing shareholders individually?
➢ 2) Who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy, the corporation or the
shareholders individually?
1. Direct Action
❖ Shareholders can sue directly on their own behalf to vindicate their individual , not their
corporate, rights due to an injury directly caused to them
a) Beneficial because they do not have the procedural hurdles for derivative suit--demand
on the board and the board’s power to seek dismissal of the derivative suit before trial.
b) Examples of general Direct actions:
(1) Protection of financial rights
(a) Compel dividends or protect accrued dividend arrearages, compel
dissolution, appoint a receiver, or obtain similar equitable relief
(2) Protection of voting rights
(a) Enforce the right to vote, prevent the improper dilution of voting rights,
protect preemptive rights, or enjoin the improper voting of shares
(3) Protection of governance rights
(a) Enjoin an ultra vires or unauthorized act, challenge the use of corporate
machinery, or the issuance of stock for a wrongful purpose (such as to
perpetuate management in control), require notice or holding of a
shareholders’ meeting
(4) Protection of minority rights
(a) Challenge the improper expulsion of shareholders through mergers,
redemptions, or other means, prevent oppression of, or fraud against,
minority shareholders, or hold controlling shareholders liable for their
acts that depress minority share value
(5) Protection of information rights
(a) Inspect corporate books and records
(6) Proper disclosure requirements and securities fraud claims
(a) Claims based on disclosure req’ts of securities laws
(7) Seeking more $ for sale of the corporation
c) In Closely held corps, some courts will allow shareholders to bring a direct action when
that cause of action is typically derivative.
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2.Shareholder Derivative Actions

❖ Shareholders bring a suit initially against the corporation to compel them to sue an individual or
another entity whom have directly harmed the corporation, not the individual, through their
actions. As a result, a derivative action is one where the corporation was the one principally
harmed, shareholders indirectly harmed, and the relief would be afforded to the corporation.
a) Tooley Holding: Not a derivative action (claim in this case was that the delay in closing the
proposed merger harmed the shareholders because they lost the time value of the cash
paid for their shares) because not claiming any injury to the corporation and there’s no
relief that would go to the corporation, instead the claim purported to set forth a direct
claim, but the court said didn’t succeed in stating a claim at all, because on these facts,
the plaintiffs hadn’t been injured yet since the merger hadn’t been completed, i.e. claim
wasn’t ripe.
b) An action brought by a shareholder on behalf of the corporation in which she holds stock.
Derivative suit, and the recovery, are typically ones that belong to the corp itself.
(1) Can bring a derivative action against any party who has harmed the corporation.
(2) Typically they are brought against directors or controlling shareholders who have
breached duties to the corporation.
c) The shareholder asserts rights belonging to the corporation because the board of
directors has failed to do so. Corp is a nominal Df.
(1) Sh-Pf who brings a derivative action represents the corporation to vindicate the
interests of all shareholders.
d) Amounts recovered belong to the corporation
e) Derivative actions typically are based on the law of the state of incorporate
f) Brought by a shareholder on corporation’s behalf
(1) This is because the shareholder was provided a loss derivatively through loss to
the corporation
(2) When a BOD violates a duty and harms the corporation then the right to sue
belongs to the corporation itself. However, the people who are harming the
company may be the ones managing the affairs of the corp so are thus not
willing to sue themselves. Therefore, bring the derivative suit
(3) It is a suit in equity to get the corporation to sue a manager or director directly. 2
suits in one
(a) In Equity to compel the corp to sue those who harm
(b) Corp then sues those individuals
g) Arises out of an injury done to the corporation as an entity
(1) The recovery of any damages goes back to the corporation itself
h) Examples of Derivative suit:
(1) Breach of Duty of Care
(2) Breach of Duty of Loyalty
i) Derivative Action Procedural Requirements
(1) oFRCP 23.1/Ct. of Chancery Rule 23.1 Procedural rule for derivative actions
by shareholders:
(a) § Requires that the shareholder:
(i) (1) Retain ownership of the shares throughout the litigation;
(ii) (2) Make pre-suit demand on the board or allege with
particularity the reasons why demand should be excused;
(a) Demand Requirement: Most states require
shareholders to first make demand that the board
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pursue legal action unless demand is excused as

futile. The demand requirement is a recognition of
the fundamental precept that directors manage the
business and affairs of the corporation.
(iii) (3) Obtain court approval of any settlement.
(2) § Note that there are adequacy and standing rules for plaintiffs.
(3) Bonding Requirement: In some states (not Delaware), a derivative claimant
with low stakes must post security for the corporation’s legal expenses.
j) Policy Rationales for Derivative Suits:
(1) § Enforce Management Accountability: Ideally promoting the ongoing
monitoring of management (management = directors and officers) and deterring
them from behaving badly because they know they can be sued for bad
behavior, or being grossly negligent in making business decision.
(2) § Response to Collective Action Problem that shareholders face in trying to hold
directors and officers accountable because individually, shareholders don’t have
adequate incentives to mount direct suits against management because the cost
to mount a derivative suit might be more than the damages that they would
receive if they were successful.
(3) § Logistical Difficulties in Coordinating Large Number of Shareholders: The
derivative suit aggregates the interests of shareholders and pooling the cost of
suits solves those problems with many people bringing separate suits.
(4) Competing Policy Concerns:
(a) § On the one hand, Derivative suits are a mechanism of managerial
accountability.
(i) Potential for bias: Directors cannot be expected to sue
themselves
(b) § On the other hand, maybe board should control the suit/have some
say in the litigation because:
(i) Cause of action belongs to the corporation (litigation is under
control of the board).
(ii) Shareholder may have interests diverse from those of the
corporation (shareholders lawyers are often the real party in
interest).
(iii) Therefore the board should have some say.
k) Why didn’t the corporation sue in the first place?
(1) Might be a good business reason not to sue, board did the thing that was wrong
in the first place (wouldn’t sue themselves) so possible conflicts of interests.
l) Who is really in control of the lawsuit?
(1) You need a named shareholder to be on the suit, but they do not control the
lawsuit
(2) The Pf's lawyer is usually the one who drives the lawsuit
(a) The corporation pays the costs if the suit settles or the Pf's win
(b) Attorney's fee calculations
(i) Load Star Method: multiply the number of hours the firm billed
by the multiplier that reflects the risk of the suit
(ii) Contingency fee
(c) PF lawyers usually have a motivation to settle, because they get paid
their fee and don’t have to deal with uncertainty of trial
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m) What are the incentives of the relevant parties:

(1) In bringing a suit?
(2) In settling one?
(a) PF has an incentive to settle because the lawyer has the ability to
recover their fees
(b) DF: if a strike suit the management has an incentive to settle, because
they get rid of it quickly. If it is a meritorious suit, they are trying to
ensure that they are indemnified or insurance pays.
n) Note the problem:
(1) Who is protecting shareholder interests in (a) bringing a suit, or (b) deciding to
settle the suit or go to trial?
(2) Two potentially unfaithful “agents,” on both sides:
(a) the lawyer, who effectively controls the lawsuit and are incentivized to
settle and get their attorney's fees
(b) the defendant directors, who control the corporation and are not
incentivized to sue themselves
(3) Need mechanisms to protect shareholders from “agents” on both sides.
(a) Screening mechanism=procedures of derivative mechanisms
ALI Direct v. Derivative Actions Distinguished

1) Derivative action distributes the recovery more broadly and evenly than a direct action, because the
recovery goes to the corp and then indirectly distributed to all stakeholders (creditors and shareholders
alike). While injured shareholders other than the Pf will share in the recovery from a direct action only if
the action is a class action brought on behalf of all shareholders
2) Once concluded a derivative action will have preclusive effect on additional suits. So Df not exposed to
multiplicity of actions
3) A successful Pf is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees directly from the corp in derivative suit. In direct
action Pf must look to the fun, if any, created by the action.
4) If derivative then the BOD can take over the action or seek to dismiss it. Accordingly, in some
circumstances the characterization of the action will determine the available defenses
Derivative v. Direct Suit Hypos

1. ABC Corp entered into a contract with Jane Jones. Jones breached the contract, but ABC Corp has not sued
her for that breach. May a shareholder of ABC Corp sue Jones directly?
○ No, because the contract was between ABC Corp and jones and the individual was not injured
directly. Thus, need to bring a derivative suit to compel the Corporation in equity to go after the
individual and then the corp go after the person who breached
2. ABC Corp’s treasurer embezzles all its money and absconds. Shareholders’ stock is now worthless. May a
shareholder of ABC Corp sue the treasurer directly?
○ Treasurer breached a duty of loyalty by stealing the corporation's assets.
○ Since the corporation was interested as a whole it is the corporation who has the standing to sue.
Also, the Corp holds the right to sue when there is a breach of fiduciary duty. The injury is at the
corporation level and the shareholder is indirectly injured through the devaluation of the
corporation
3. The board of XYZ Inc. agrees to sell 80 percent of its assets to an unaffiliated purchaser. Although a vote is
required by state law for the sale of “substantially all” of a corporation’s assets, no shareholder vote is
scheduled, because the board disputes the plaintiff’s claim that the sale amounts to a disposition of
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substantially all of XYZ’s assets. May a shareholder sue the board directly?
○ Yes, the shareholder has the ability to sue the corporation directly because it involves the
shareholders voting rights directly being impinged upon.
○ In a direct suit the remedy goes to the shareholder directly. In a derivative suit it goes to the
corporation.
3. Demand Requirement
❖ Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23.1 requires, for an adequate complaint of a Derivative (not direct) suit, that the
suit shall “allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the Pf to obtain the action Pf desires
from the directors and the reasons for the Pfs failure to obtain the action or for not making the
effort .
➢ Essentially, the rules require that before a shareholder brings a derivative suit, they seek
demand from the BOD to pursue legal action and if they have not sought such demand
state that the demand is excused because it would be futile.
a) Demand requirement is a way for judges to filter those derivative suits that appear to
have merit from those that don’t
b) Premise of demand requirement arises from the general rule that the board, not
shareholders, manage the corporation. And the board would normally have the
power/responsibility for deciding whether to sue
(1) Demand requirement is an exception to general rule and allows shareholders to
step in
(2) It is a way for judges to balance the board’s managerial prerogatives and
desirability of allowing shareholder to litigate on behalf of the corp
(3) “The demand requirement is a recognition of the fundamental precept that
directors manage the business and affairs of the corporation.” Aronson v. Lewis.
c) What is the demand?
(1) Typically a letter from shareholder to the board of directors.
(a) Must request that the board bring suit on the alleged cause of action.
(b) Must be sufficiently specific as to apprise the board of the nature of the
alleged cause of action and to evaluate its merits.
(2) The demand must at a minimum allege the wrongdoing, Id the wrongdoer, and
describe the factual basis for the cause of action
(a) The PF shareholder can have their demand be excused if it is futile for
the BOD to handle
(b) If the PF sends the demand they waive the right to claim the demand is
futile
d) If Demand is Made:
(1) If demand is made, the plaintiff-shareholder is deemed to have waived or
conceded the right to contest board independence and can no longer argue
demand is excused.
(2) The board may accept or reject the demand—either way, the shareholder-
plaintiff loses control of the dispute.
(3) BJR applies to the board’s decision about the demand/litigation.
(4) All that is left for the shareholder-plaintiff is a potential argument that demand
was wrongfully refused (and they would have to rebut the BJR).
(a) Essentially the BOD decided based on the fact there was wrong or that
there was an interest the BOD did not do
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e) Demand Futility: Demand Excused when Futile

❖ Demand is excused only if it is deemed futile. If the standard for futility is not met then
the suit will be dismissed or stayed (either having to show futlitiy or then make demand
on BOD). Demand is futile if (two tests Aronson or Rales tests):
➢ Aronson Test: In cases where the BOD would assess the Demand to sue the
individual/director for the challenged decision they made, demand is excused as
futile if, with particularized allegations, the plaintiff creates reasonable doubt
that either:
■ (a) A majority of the directors are disinterested and independent; OR
● It is not enough just to show that the majority of the BOD
approved or were apart of the transaction
● It is whether the directors can base their judgement on the
merits
● If can show a majority of board has a material financial or
familial interest at stake, that’s enough.
● Or if show the majority of the board lacks independence
because they’re dominated or controlled by the wrongdoer or
someone with the interest, that’s enough.
◆ If show dominated or controlled, need to show that
the directors are beholden to the interest.
■ (b) The underlying transaction is the product of valid exercise of
business judgment rule.
● Try to show facts that suggest the transaction is not the
product of the valid exercise of business judgement
● Trying to show facts that would suggest the board trying to
require plaintiff to make demand on was the same board that
was grossly negligent in making some other decision.
➢ Rales Standard: When there are cases 1) not involving a business decision (e.g.,
failure to exercise oversight claim SUCH As a CAREMARK claim), 2) where a
majority of the board has been replaced since the challenged transaction with
disinterested and independent members, or 3) Where the challenged decision
was made by the board of a different corporation or a third party, demand is
futile if:
■ Test: The derivative stockholder’s complaint creates a reasonable doubt
that, as of the time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could
have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business
judgment in responding to a demand.
(1) Cannot make a demand and then say the demand is futile. If the demand is
made, you waive your claim of futility
(2) If the demand is made and not awarded there is a claim of wrongful dismissal of
the demand which is given the BJR presumption
(3) Just because directors are being sued does not mean that there is then demand
futility
(4) Discovery to make out the particularized facts, besides the fact the main Df are
sitting on the board, you have the § 220 rights to inspect the books and records
(5) What the court is saying is that to show the demand is futile you must show that
the BOD you are seeking demand would not make the proper, fair decision. They
lack independence from the underlying subject matter of the claim.
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(6) Aronson v. Lewis: P shareholder filed derivative action without first making a
demand. Paragraph 13 of the complaint said demand was futile because: (a) All
of the directors in office are named as defendants and they have participated in
all of those decisions, expressly approved and/or acquiesced in the wrongs
complained of; (b) Defendant Fink selected each of these directors and controls
and dominated every member of the Board and every officer of Meyers; (c)
Institution of this action by present directors would require the defendant
directors to sue themselves, thereby placing the conduct of this action in hostile
hands and preventing its effective prosecution. Ds argued Ps attempt to
implicate rest of the board is just relying on conclusory self-manufactured claims
without specific facts alleged (except that all board members were selected by
Fink).
(a) Held/Analysis: The PF's did not do enough to plead demand futility, they
did not plead any particularized facts and had no evidence that the BOD
were actually controlled by Fink.
(b) A court may dismiss a shareholder’s derivative action if the shareholder
has failed to make a demand on the board or allege facts sufficient to
demonstrate that such a demand would be futile. Where a company’s
directors refuse to assert a claim belonging to the company,
stockholders wishing to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the
corporation must first make a demand for redress to the board of
directors, unless such a demand would be futile. Absent an abuse of
discretion, courts will presume that directors, in making a business
decision, acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and with the honest
belief that the action was in the company’s best interests. This business
judgment rule applies to a board’s response to a demand, the
determination of whether a demand is futile, and to disinterested
directors’ attempts to dismiss an action that has been filed. While the
business judgment rule applies to director action, it may also apply to a
conscious decision to refrain from acting. This court finds that the
proper test for demand futility is whether, under the facts alleged, there
is a reasonable doubt as to whether (1) the directors making the
decision were disinterested and independent, or (2) the transaction at
issue was otherwise the product of valid business judgment. If there is a
reasonable doubt as to either factor, the demand requirement will be
excused. To show that demand would be futile, a plaintiff alleging
domination and control over the directors must allege facts
demonstrating that the directors are beholden to the controlling
person, either through personal or other relationships. In this case,
Lewis’s allegation that Fink personally selected the directors, even given
his 47 percent stock ownership, is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of board independence. The complaint therefore fails to
render demand futile on the charge of lack of independence. Lewis also
alleges that, since any suit would be against the directors themselves as
the parties who approved the wasteful transactions, a demand for suit
would have been futile because the directors would have been
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motivated to avoid personal liability. Not only does the complaint fail to
show that the transactions were wasteful, but directors have broad
corporate power to fix officer compensation and make loans. The
complaint fails to create a reasonable doubt that the board’s actions are
protected by the business judgment rule, and thus fails to allege facts
sufficient to render demand futile on the charge of corporate waste.
Finally, Lewis alleges that demand would be futile because, if a suit
were approved, the directors would need to bring the suit against
themselves, which would prevent effective prosecution. Without any
facts to allege a lack of independence or a failure to properly exercise
business judgment, under which the directors could not be expected to
sue themselves, this argument is insufficient. Lewis has failed to allege
particularized facts indicating that the Meyers directors were interested,
lacked independence, or acted contrary to the company’s best interests,
and has therefore failed to raise a reasonable doubt as to the business
judgment rule’s applicability. Because Lewis has thus failed to show that
a demand on the board would have been futile, the Court of Chancery’s
denial of the motion to dismiss is reversed, and the matter remanded
with leave for Lewis to amend the complaint.
f) oAlternative Approach of ALI and RMBCA – Universal Demand:
(1) Adopted in some states.
(2) No demand futility test; Demand must be made in all cases.
(a) No shareholder may commence a derivative suit until 90 days after the
demand, unless (i) the shareholder has earlier been notified that the
corporation has rejected the demand; or (ii) irreparable injury would
result to the corporation by waiting.
(3) Somewhat strict judicial review of wrongful rejection.
(4) Functionally ends up being more or less the same as the demand futility
approach – ideally filter bad cases out and good ones in.
4. Special Litigation Committees (SLCs) & Independent Directors

❖ A SLC is an independent committee of directors and advisors whom review the Shareholder’s
complaint and perform an investigation into the merits. This investigation concludes with a
recommendation to the corporation. The judicial review of this decision depends on the Corp.s
Jxd, but is either given BJR presumption (Auerbach) or a two-step analysis is performed (Zapata).
a) Background
(1) In response to a derivative action, a corporation often will form a Special
Litigation Committee.
(2) Central Premise of SLC is that it will be independent; its members typically are
independent directors, who are not defendants in the derivative action, and the
SLC typically hires independent lawyers and advisors.
(3) SLC investigates the claims in the complaint, and then acts for the corporation to
recommend to the court whether to allow the litigation to proceed. But almost
always recommend against the litigation
(4) § Special Litigation Committees: Board can make SLCs. Board would appoint
SLC committees from boards of whichever board members were
disinterested and they would give committee full authority to make a
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decision for how to handle litigation – so would be on SLC to decide whether

derivative should go for – then that SLC will hire outside counsel, conduct an
investigation, then make a decision.
b) Standard of Review/Test
❖ Auerbach/NY applies a BJR style analysis to SLCs and defers to their judgement.
Zapata scrutinizes the SLC more carefully in a two-part test (Procedural and
Substantive)
(1) BJR: Auerbach v. Bennett (NY/CAL approach)

❖ The court in making this inquiry, can look into the disinterested independence of
the members of the SLC in its process for investigation, but it doesn’t look at
SLC’s substantive decision about whether/not litigation should be pursued, that’s
shielded by BJR. Court put burden on P to show directors on the SLC were grossly
negligent in informing themselves before making that decision or did not act in
good faith in making that decision.
(a) Auerbach v. Bennett: GTE had bad publicity and set up an Audit
committee to study if bribery had occurred, as alleged. The Audit
committee self-reported to the SEC the wrongdoing and found there
was $11Mln in bribes and kickbacks and some of the BOD had been
personally involved. Auerbach then filed a derivative suit claiming that
the wrongdoers should be made to account for those illicit payments.
The Board formed a SLC and found that 3 BOD members were
disinterested and independent, since they were placed on the board
after the challenged transactions, so were placed on the SLC. The SLC
found that they should not sue the challenged directors, citing that
none of the Dfs benefited, the litigations charges were high, and
potentially more bad publicity.
(i) Holding:Burden is on the Pfs, but the court held that BJR
applied as to the SLC's decision. The court will review whether
the SLC members were disinterested/independent and look to
the process and procedure/methodolgies used to come to a
decision, but if found disinterested and the SLC was informed,
then BJR will apply. They will not look into the substance of the
decision.
(2) Two-Step: Zapata (Del)
❖ Del. Applies a two-part test to assess an SLC’s decision to dismiss a derivative suit
➢ 1) Structural bias
■ The court should inquire into the independence and good faith
of the committee and the bases supporting its conclusion.
Limited discovery may be ordered to facilitate the inquiries and
the Burden is on the Corp to show independence, and
reasonable process of good faith
■ Look to In Re Oracle.
➢ 2) Substantive Inquiry
■ The court should determine, applying its own business
judgement, whether the motion should be granted.
● Factors to consider in exercising it's own BJR:
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◆ Public relations, legal, ethical, public policy

◆ Merit of the suit;
◆ Cost (how much it will cost to continue the
litigation);
◆ Reputation (how bad this suit will be for PR);
◆ Ethical;
◆ Commercial;
◆ Employee relations.
● This means that instances could arise where a
committee can establish its independence and sound
bases for its good faith decisions and still have the
corporation’s motion denied
● Prevents situations where the first step is met, but
result does not appear to satisfy its spirit
(a) Step two shares the same spirit and philosophy of the Vice Chancellor:
“Under our system of law, courts and not litigants should decide the
merits of litigation.”
(b) Zapata: Pf brought a derivative suit on behalf of corp against 10 ind
BOD for excessive compensation. Demand was not made and Pf
claimed it should be dismissed as futile. But 4 years after the suit was
filed, the BOD elected two new Board members who were not apart of
the transaction and put them on the SLC. The SLC then recommended
the motion to dismiss not to pursue it.
(i) Holding: BJR should not apply at this stage of the suit and then
created a two part test
(a) Structural bias (procedural in nature)
(i) To see if the SLC will be biased in treating
their fellow directors, since they were
appointed by those directors themseleve.
(ii) Given the strucutral bias, it is not enough to
only look at BJR
(iii) Test: inquire into the independence and good
faith of the committee and the bases
supporting its conclusion. Limited discovery
may be ordered to facilitate the inquiries and
the Burden is on the Corp to show
independence, and reasonable process of
good faith
(b) Substantive--even if satisfied in step one can go here
(i) The court can use its "own business
judgement" to determine whether they
should grant the motion to dismiss from the
court's point of view
(ii) Factors to consider in exercising it's own BJR:
(iii) Public relations, legal, ethical, public policy
(ii) Policy: Circumstances may arise when litigation is not in the
best interest of the company and the BOD should be in charge
of dismissing a detrimental investigation/litigation. Otherwise a
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single stockholder could hold the destiny of the corp in its

hands, by forcing strike suits, but the right may not be
trampled on by the BOD to abuse its power to get rid of suits
that would hold them accountable.
c) Independence/ Independence of SLC Members
❖ Independence Test: If the director is, unable to make a decision with the best interests of
the corporation in mind, for any substantial reason, then they lack independence. If there
is a lack of independence then the court can grant the Shareholder’s motion to permit the
suit to proceed.
➢ Substantial reason looks to impartiality and objectivity. IF THE relationship
causes them to ponder their affiliation then they are not independent.
➢ Social circle ties is enough to show that there may be lack of independence.
Although they could be tougher or laxer when doing the investigation, but they
will be pondering their affiliation with the BOD which is enough to say that there
is lack of independence because it will be affecting their decision. Therefore, step
1 is not found
❖ Burden of Persuasion and Standard: The Corporation or SLC members, have the burden of
persuasion on a motion and must convince the court there is no material issue of fact
calling into question its independence. Namely the SLC must prove to the Court that 1) its
members were independent 2) they acted in good faith and 3) reasonable basis for
recommendation
(1) Policy: SLC are permitted as a last chance for a corporation to control a derivative
claim in circumstances when a majority of its directors cannot impartially
consider a demand
(2) In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation: Shareholder Allegations: Oracle directors
engaged in insider trading while in possession of material, non-public
information showing that Oracle would not meet the earnings guidance it gave
to the market for the third quarter of Oracle's fiscal year 2001: 1) Trading Df
breached duty of loyalty by misappropriating inside info and using it as the basis
for trading, 2) Allege a Caremark violation for the non-trading BOD because of
BOD indifference between guidance provided in December and reality. Therefore
Bad faith.
(a) Issue: Did the members of Oracle's SLC properly show they dont lack
independence from the directors they are investigating?
(b) Facts: The SLC members are Standford university professors and are
being asked to investigate 3 inividuals; 1) was their Phd professor and
someone they work with at the SIERP instutite 2) an individual who
donates to Stanford and is the chair of the SIERP institute Advisory
Board; 3) the CEO of Oracle who donates to Stanford and was thinking
of making $270Mln in donations to Stanford around the time the SLC
started it's investigation. 4 persons of the Oracle board and
management team were accused of insider trading: 1) CEO 2) CFO 3)
Chair of Exec. Comp, Finance, and Audit Committee and 4) Chair of
Compensation Committee, Finance and Audit Committee. All had access
to material non-public information regarding the finances and
projections of Oracle. CFO stated that Prospective EPS for 3Q FY 2001
(Dec-Feb) would be $0.12/share with 25% growth in licensing fee.
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However, in March (a day after Q3 ended in Feb) they announced a

downward revision to estimates of EPS $0.10/share and licensing
growth of 6%. Stock dropped 21% on the news in March. The Trading
defendants sold their stock in January at $30/share-->potential
impropriety. SLC formed on Feb 1, 2002. Two members of the Board
were on the SLC and they joined the board in Oct 2001. Were only paid
$250/hr, a rate below which they could command in other consulting
activities. Telxon v. Meyerson: caused the SLC members to be afraid of
impartiality and stated they would relinquish compensation if court said
it could impair impartiality. Recruited to the BOD by Df. Lucas and
Bosking--Df trading partners. SLC members produced a 1,110 page
report that concluded Oracle should not pursue lawsuit and that even
those with the weekly financial position update did not possess the
requisite insight at the time of the trading to know the substantial
weakness in the earnings to merit insider trading. Oracle is a Del
Corp(Zapata two step would apply).
(c) Rule:
(i) Independence Test:
(a) If the director is, unable to make a decision with the
best interests of the corporation in mind, for any
substantial reason, then they lack independence
(b) Substantial reason looks to impartiality and objectivity
(ii) Procedural rule--2 step Zapata test
(a) The SLC has the burden of showing that there is no
issue of material fact regarding the Pf shareholder's
claims and thus should be dismissed
(b) If that is the case the judge has the ability to grant the
SLC's motion or in the court's discretion after
reviewing the material permit the suit to proceed (if it
is in the best interst of the business
(iii) A corporation can terminate a derivative suit if the board can
impartially determine a decision or consider a demand
(d) Holding: No, The members of the SLC failed to prove that they are
independent from the directors they are investigating. In the analysis
the court looked skeptically at the SLC's omission of the Df's ties to
Stanford, the institution that two main members of the SLC, and board,
are current faculty. These ties were very substantial including not only
million's of dollars in donations, but also substantial activity in many
Stanford educational activities. Around the same time of the suspicious
trades the upcoming investigation Ellison proposed a $170Mln
scholarship fund and SIERP was at the center of the negotiations(what
the SLC members were apart of). Need to think of other types of
behavior besides just domination and control that could influence the
independence of decision making, like love, friendship, and collegiality
that can direct certain types of behavior. Some institutions have norms
and expectations that implicitly or explicitly influence behavior. "Our
law cannot assume-absent some proof of the point-that corporate
129
directors are, as a general matter, persons of unusual social bravery,

who operate heedless to the inhibitions that social norms generate for
ordinary folks." at 248.
(i) Facts that weighed in favor of independence of the SLC
directors. They were not on the board at the time of the
alleged wrongdoing, they did not receive compensation from
Oracle other than outside compensation. Absent of material
ties between oracle, Trading Df
5. Indemnification and Insurance
a) When the corporation will pay back the director or officers for expenses that they incur in
a shareholder litigation, there are specific rules as derived from common law agency, BUT
corporate directors are not agents. They are members of the board that as a whole can
act on behalf of the corporation, however individually they have no ability to act on
behalf of the corp and are thus not agents
b) Policy for indemnifying directors is to encourage qualified directors to serve on boards
and not worry about liability
c) Policy: directors should be encouraged to defend themselves against groundless claims,
but don’t want it to be over inclusive because it will then allow bad actor BOD to get away
with wrongful acts
d) The Corporate law statute describes the indemnification allowed under corporate law
(Del § 145)
(1) Mandatory
(a) Corporations must indemnify those individuals who satisfy certain
statutory prerequisites
(i) DGCL 145(c ): where a D or O “has been successful on the
merits or otherwise in defense of any action…such person shall
be indemnified against expenses (including attorneys’ fees)
actually and reasonably incurred…”)
(2) Permissive (the corp has the discretion to indemnify) AND
(a) Grant corporate boards the discretion in determining who to indemnify
and typically requires that a specific standard be met
(b) DGCL 145(a): describes the indemnification of officers for direct actions
(i) Protected: Director, officer, employee, or agent of another
corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other
enterprise
(ii) What is indemnified: Expenses, judgements, fines, and
amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred
by the person in connection with such action suit or
proceeding
(iii) Standard:
(a) Civil: If the person acted in good faith and in a manner
the person reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation
(b) Criminal: the person had no reasonable cause to
believe the person's conduct was unlawful
(c) DGCL 145(b): indemnification of derivative actions
130
(i) Protected: Director, officer, employee, or agent of another

corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other
enterprise
(ii) What is indemnified: Against expenses (including attorney's
fees) actually and reasonably incurred by the person in
connection with the defense or settlement of such action
(a) Why are only attorney's fees covered? Because any
recovery would go back into the corporation because
the directors would have to pay the company for the
breach of their duty of care or loyalty, out of their
pocket. If the company would reimburse them, then
the money would just go full circle where the director
would pay the fine/settlement and then get repaid--
essentially no harm
(iii) What is the standard for permissive indemnification for
derivative claims?
(a) If the person acted in good faith and in a manner the
person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to
the best interests of the corporation
(b) However, if they are judged to be liable then they are
not allowed to be indemnified by the corporation,
unless the court rules that such person is fairly and
reasonably entitle to indemnity
(d) DGCL 145(d): Standard for how the corporation determines when a
person is allowed to be indemnified under 145(a) or 145(b)
(i) The permissive indemnification may be decided by:
(a) By majority vote of the directors who are not parties
to such action, suit or proceeding, even though less
than a quorum, or
(b) By committee of such directors designated by
majority vote of such directors, even though less than
a quorum, or
(c) If there are no such directors, or if such directors so
direct, by independent legal counsel in a written
opinion, or
(d) By the stockholders
(e) DGCL 145(e): expenses, including attorney's fees, may be advanced by
the corporation to the officer or director of the corporation before final
disposition so long as there is a receipt of an undertaking that if the
director is found liable or unable to be legally indemnified then they will
repay the expenses back to the corporation
(f) §145(f): Statute is not exclusive and does not bar other rights to
indemnification through bylaws, agreement, vote of stockholders or
disinterested directors or otherwise (courts have used public policy
considerations to set outer bounds though).
(i) This is allowed so that directors can by K to ensure to be
indemnified. Is helpful in case the corporation goes under
131
during litigation so that you then have standing in Bankruptcy

court
(g) §145(g): A corporation may buy insurance with coverage broader than
permissible indemnification. (D&O insurance)
(i) Make sense?
(a) YES, this allows the corporation to insure for
payments out of a derivative or direct claim so that
they can lessen their risk
(ii) D&O Insurance
(a) All or nearly all public corporations carry D&O
insurance, and a large % of private companies do
(b) There are typically exclusion, such as violations of
certain laws, intentional torts, reckless conduct
(c) Commonly has different parts:
(i) An executive liability part (“Side A”), which
pays directors and officers directly for loss
(including defense costs) when corporate
indemnification is unavailable;
(ii) Side A is about directors and officers getting
coverage
(iii) A corporate reimbursement part (“Side B”),
which pays the corporation for any money it
has paid as indemnification to the insured
directors and officers.
(iv) Side B
(v) Corporate entity coverage for securities
claims (“Side C”).
(vi) Side C: ensuring Corp. is covered for
securities fraud claims
(h) § To extent insurance covers a director’s payment to corporation, funds
make a round trip from the corporation (in the aggregate over time) to
the insurance company, and from insurance company back to the
corporation.
6. Plaintiffs
a) o Attorneys’ Fees in Derivative Actions:
b) Plaintiffs’ attorneys in derivative actions seek payment of their fees from the
corporation using 1 of 2 rationales:
c) • (1) Common Fund Theory: Where the action produces monetary recovery – says
it benefitted all of the shareholders that corporation got back that money, so all
shareholders should pay the attorney’s fees and not just the shareholders names in a suit.
d) • (2) Substantial Benefit/Common Benefit: A case outcome that confers a
substantial benefit on the corporation – this is standard to show entitled to attorney’s
fees in a suit (e.g., injunction resulting in improved disclosure, amendment to bylaws,
adoption of a code of conduct or of a policy statement governing management, etc.).
e) oCourts liberally construe
(1) Computation based on either lodestar or percentage of recovery methods.
(a) Lodestar: The prevailing method for determining reasonable attorney’s
fees, usually calculated by multiplying a reasonable number of hours
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worked by reasonable hourly rates comparable to prevailing market

rates in the community, with upward or downward adjustments
available in exceptional cases.
(b) Percentage of Recovery: A percentage of fund methodology that relies
on market-based information is the appropriate method to calculate
reasonable fees for class action counsel where the fee has not been set
at the outset of the cas. Involves awarding a fee calculated as a % of the
value of whatever the suit has produced
7. Policy Implications of Shareholder Litigation
a) Agency costs of litigation
(1) The shareholder does not necessarily benefit substantially from any shareholder
suit as much as a Pf's attorney does if they win
(a) This provides substantial agency costs relating to the shareholder and
the attorney
(2) Attorney's constantly look for evidence of a lawsuit
(a) Is there sufficient evidence of liablity so that they can survive the
pleading stage?
(i) Mostly look t publicly filed information
(b) Is whether there is sufficient evidence of damages so that the Pf's
lawyers can obtain an attractive settlement
(3) Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLSRA)
(a) Congress mandated in appointing a lead Pf "the court shall adopt a
presumption that the most adequate Pf…is the person or group of
persons that…has the largest financial interest in relief sought by the
class."
(b) Mechanical test to see who has the most to gain from the litigation or
the greatest relative incentive
b) Challenges of Settlements
(1) The key safeguard against opportunism in shareholder litigation is FRCP 23 and
23.1 (with comp. req. in most states' statutes or rules) that a court both approve
any settlement, compomise, discontinuance or dismissal of a derivative suit or
shareholder class action and also determine what fee should be awarded to Pf's
attorney(s)
(2) It is up to the court to decide whether to approve a settlement that typically has
been negotiated by Pf's attorney's without input from many of the "clients" they
represent.
(a) Proponents of a settlement have the burden of convincing the court
that it is fair
(i) Fair= the amount being recovered when compared to the
potential recovery were Pf to succeed at trial (which is
discounted by the potential recovery at trial by the risk factors
inherent in any litigation and the time value of money over the
period during which recovery will be delayed)
c) Attorney's Fees
(1) American rule (in US)=the successful party is not entitled to recover attorney's
fees from the losing party. But if the Df wins is a Derivative suit, the American
rule applies, but if the PF wins on the merits or obtains a settlement, her
attorneys can apply to the court for a fee award
133
d) Incentives to Settle v. Rationale to sue

(1) Mutually agreeable settlement territory because the Df don’t want to go through
the suit, attorney fees are paid, and directors are indemnified
(2) Incentives to Settle:
(a) Mutually agreeable settlement territory:
(i) •I’ll be good from now on.
(ii) •Governance changes (cosmetic?).
(iii) •Perhaps a payment (from whom?).
(b) Recitation that suit conferred substantial benefit.
(c) Recitation that directors acted in good faith.
(i) Plaintiffs’ lawyer gets paid, directors covered by
indemnification and insurance.
(3) Nonethless, there must be judicial approval of the derivative suit's settlement
(9 factors)
(a) (1) the maximum and likely recovery;
(b) (2) the complexity, expense, and duration of continued litigation;
(c) (3) the probability of success;
(d) (4) the stage of the proceedings;
(e) (5) the ability of the defendants to pay a larger judgment;
(f) (6) the adequacy of the settlement terms;
(g) (7) whether the settlement vindicates important public policies;
(h) (8) whether the settlement was approved by disinterested directors;
and
(i) (9) whether other shareholders have objected.
Fundamental Changes:
- Fundamental Changes: When there’s a fundamental change such as sale of company, or a sale of substantially all of
assets of company (more than 70% of assets), then typically have to follow some type of procedure to account for that.
o Procedure Typically Looks Like: Board decides to adopt resolution, written notice given to shareholders, who need to
approve it, and typically that requires some type of change to COI, and that’s filed with the state).
o May or not may need shareholder approval depending on how you structure the M&A deal.
o (1) Appraisal Right: When there’s an M&A deal, and shareholder vote is required, this is a mechanism to protect
dissenting shareholders.
§ Appraisal: Requires shareholder to dissent before vote it taken, and then you demand fair value of their shares .
o (2) Fiduciary Duties: Whether/not there’s a breach of fiduciary duties by directors either by not agreeing to a merger, by
not trying to get best price for the shareholders – these cases all about how a board can respond to takeover efforts .
o (3) Tender Offers: If an acquirer is trying to accomplish the takeover of another company by doing a tender offer, federal
law Williams Act regulates tender offers where bidder is getting more than 5% of the shares of the target public company –
people were doing really coercive things to be able to acquire a company and do a hostile takeover .
§ Once where getting 5% of shares of the target company, they have to disclose their identity and financials and have
to state what their plan is concerning the target company.
§ Williams Act says that if an entity or person is doing a tender offer (making an offer to buy shares of a company for a
certain price within a certain amount of time).
134
§ And must do tender offer in a way that leaves it open for at least 20 days.
§ Issue spot here is just if there’s a coercive tender offer.
135
IV. Securities Fraud and Insider Trading
1. Securities Fraud and Rule 10b-5

a. Background: Securities Laws
i. Market Efficiency
1. Policy rationale is that for efficient markets there needs to be efficient, true, and timely
information
2. If information was purely efficient there would be no insider trading or securities fraud
that affects the price of the stock.However, there is
3. Policy Rationale: to uphold market integrity and full disclosures
ii. Up until 1929 crash there were only Blue Sky, state laws, that regulated securities laws. So
Congress stepped in and passed two securities laws
1. Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933, a federal securities law aimed at restoring
public confidence in corporate securities and the stock market in general. This came after
the 1929 market crash and the following discoveries of massive corporate and securities
fraud.
2. Securities Act of 1933 requires issuers of securities to provide investors with detailed
information about the company, its management, its plan and finances, and the securities
being offered
3. In 1934 Congress enacted the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 which created the SEC
to administer the Securities Act of 1933 and to regulate the buying and selling of
securities by investors in securities trading markets
4. Original 1933 Securities and Exchange act preserved state securities laws (blue sky laws)
that generally prohibited fraudulent statements in connection with the sales of securities
and required registration of securities before they could be sold or traded. However, this
required lawyers to "blue sky" the underwritten provisions to ensure they complied with
all state laws that the securities were being offered.
5. In 1996 amended the 1933 Securities and Exchange act to preempt state law because it
imposed costs on capital formation
6. But the amendment did not preempt States from bringing antifraud proceedings
iii. Securities Act of 1933--principally concerned with the primary market
1. Regulates the sale of new securities
2. Disclosure at the time of the public offering, to protect investors
3. Definition of "Security" (know that this is a broad concept)
a. Includes specific instruments, stocks, notes, bonds, investment instruments,
b. Many things are considered a security under the securities act of 1933
iv. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
1. Regulates secondary trading activity
2. Requires periodic disclosures by public companies, so that the company continues to
disclose information about the standing of the company
3. Created the SEC and gave it its power
a. Three primary functions
i. Provide interpretative guidance
ii. Creates new rules and revisions to existing rules
1. E.g., Dodd Frank
iii. Enforcement function
1. Investigates and prosecutes securities fraud actions
4. Notable Sections
136
a. §10(b) Anti-Fraud
b. §14(a): proxy solicitations and shareholder proposals
c. §14(e): Tender Offers
d. §16: Short-swing trading by insiders
v. Primary Market vs. Secondary Market
1. Primary Market: buying it straight from the corporation
2. Secondary Market: buying it from a second person who already holds it, i.e., NYSE,
Nasdaq
b. Sec. and Exch. Act 1934 § 10(b)-Manipulative and Deceptive Devices

❖ § 10(b): It shall be unlawful for any person…B) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe
i. This provision, above, of the SEC act of 1934 is the heart and sole of shareholder protection
against management opportunism and fraud
ii. Management decision making and oversight is governed by state fiduciary norms, the information
that management provides shareholders is regulated mostly by federal disclosure law
iii. Applies to both public and private company stocks/securities, the fraud can be written or oral
iv. The SEC has the power to make a rule for section 10(b), which it did in 10b-5
v. 10(b) is the congressional authority and 10b-5 is the rule, so when sue you state both.
c. Rule 10b-5: The Rule, Elements, and Background

❖ Rule 10b-5: It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange:
➢ (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
➢ (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
➢ (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person,
➢ (d) in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
i. Conduct that Violates Rule 10b-5

1. Securities Fraud or Deception
a. Material misrepresentation or omission
2. Insider Trading
a. Classic
b. Tipper-Tippee
c. Misappropriation Theory
ii. Public Right of Action: SEC and DOJ

1. DOJ: for criminal action where there is a willful violation
2. SEC: Can bring a civil action and can recommend that the DOJ bring a criminal action
iii. Private Right of Action: Rule/Elements

❖ For a private individual to bring an action under § 10b or Rule 10b-5 they must follow the judge
made and statutory elements of a claim. As long as the claim can satisfy the necessary pre-
elements, the elements can be broken down as follows:
137
➢ Pre-Elements
■ Jurisdiction
■ Standing/Transactional Nexus
➢ Test/Elements
■ Test: Any purchaser or seller of a security can sue any person (including a
corporation) that:
● Makes materially false or misleading statements
● With an intent to deceive
● Upon which the Pf relies
● Causing losses to the Pf
➢ SOL= 5 years after the fraud or within two years after the Pf has notice of fraud
1. Press releases, disclosure documents filed by public companies, and information in
private securities transactions, proposals for corporate mergers, and communications by
broker-dealers to their customers are all subject to the rules prohibiting false and
misleading statements.
2. 1934 Act was designed to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices. The
disclosure requirement was based in a philosophy that "there cannot be honest markets
without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive
upon mystery and secrecy."
3. Actions claiming 10b-5 violations must be brought in federal district court
a. State claims can be added under pendent jxd
b. Delaware Carve-out (exception)
i. Class actions that also allege breach of fiduciary duty under state
corporate law, can be brought in state court
4. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995 requires
a. Class representative to be the most adequate Pf (presumably the one with the
largest $ stake)
b. Imposes a heightened pleading requirement and other burdens
5. Jurisdiction
❖ There is jxd under Rule 10b and 10b-5 if the deception came by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce
a. 10(b) and 10b-5: By the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange
i. There needs to be a use or means of instrumentality of interstate
commerce
1. E.g., buying stock on a national Stock exchange, using a phone
call to make the misrepresentation
ii. The Exchange Act treats intrastate phone calls as using an
instrumentality of interstate commerce.
1. (Just beware of tricky fact patterns that somehow don’t involve
any instrumentality of interstate commerce…)
iii. Jurisdictional requirement, because Congress only has authority under
Sect. 5 to govern interstate commerce, so SEC only has autority for
interstate commerce
6. Standing/Transaction Nexus: Pf
❖ The deception of fraud must come in connection with a purchase or sale of a security.
Therefore only Pf’s whom have actually transacted have standing to sue.
138
a. 10b-5: in connection with the purchase or sale of any security

b. Deception/fraud must be in connection with a securities transaction
i. It needs to only touch and concern the purchase or sale,
1. There needs to be a nexus between the material
misrepresentation and the purchase and sale
ii. Yet there is no requirement of privity
1. The person buying on the secondary market, where the corp is
not privity to the transaction, can sue
c. Only purchasers or sellers have standing to sue (Birnbaum doctrine)
i. SCOTUS affirmed the purchaser-seller requirement in Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores
1. Blue Chip Pfs decided not to buy due to a corporations
fraudulent overly pessimistic statements. They had no standing
to sue for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 because the
language states "in connection with the purchase and sale of a
security"
2. It is a bright line rule, but it is administratively efficient because
you would have a lot of litigation about "I would have bought"
or "I would have sold"
d. Transaction Nexus
i. The fraud or misrep needs to have been the cause of the buying or
selling
7. Defendant
a. Rule 10b-5 has no privity requirement.
i. Corporate officers or directors who make materially false or misleading
statements about the corporation or its stock expose the corporation to
10b-5 liability, even though the corporation does not trade in the stock
or it is on the secondary market
b. Aiding and abetting liability for giving “substantial assistance” to the primary
violator is only available in SEC enforcement actions, not private actions.
Exchange Act § 20(e). In private actions, the defendant must be a “primary
violator” whose statements or omissions induced investors to trade.
8. Material Misrepresentation or Omission: Materially False or Misleading Statement

❖ Generally, silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not a misleading statement under 10b or
§10b-5. However once a company begins to speak it has a duty of candor and not be
misleading. The materiality of a misstatement or omission depends, in part, on the
underlying event that is being reported on. As such, there is a general rule and a rule for
contingent/speculative events
➢ General Rule for Both Misrep and Omission: If there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in making a decision
regarding its stock (voting , selling, purchasing, etc.)then the statement or
omitted fact is material.
■ For omitted Facts: To fullfill materiality requirement there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
the 'total mix' of information available
➢ Materiality with respect to contingent or speculative information or events
139
■ Materiality depends on balancing both:

● The Indicated probability that the event will occur AND
◆ To determine the probability the factfinder will need
to look at all relevant corporate information that
indicate the interest in the transaction at the highest
corporate levels
◆ Sources of information: board resolutions,
instructions to investment bankers, and actual
negotiations between principals or their
intermediaries
● The anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality
of the company activity (rephrased as "the magnitude of the
transaction to the issuer of the securities allegedly
manipulated")
◆ Factfinder must determine the size of the two
corporate entities and the potential premiums over
the market value
◆ How important the event is to the corporation and its
impact on the corporation
■ The inquiry depends on the facts of any given case
a. Basic Inc. v. Levinson (pg 741): • Basic Inc. was a publicly traded company.
Mfg chemicals. Combustion Engineering produced alumina-based refractories,
and had considered buying Basic since 1965, but hadnt pursued it due to anti-
trust concerns. Beginning in Sept 1976 Combustion representatives met with
Basic Officers and directors concerning a merger. However, during 1977 and 1978
Basic made three public statement affirmatively denying it was engaged in
merger negotiations. The last statement came from Basic's "Nine Months Report
1978" published in November 1978, in December 1978 Basic halted trading in its
shares and issued a statement that it had been "approached" for a merger. The
next day the BOD endorsed Combustion's tender offer of $46/share and
announced the approval the day after that. Pfs were former Basic shareholders
who sold their stock after Basic's first public statement on Oct 21, 1977 and
before suspension of trading in December 1978. Alleged that there were three
materially false or misleading public statement and alleged they were injured by
selling Basic shares at artificially depressed prices in a market affected by
petitioner's misleading statements and in reliance thereon
i. Issue: Were Basic's statements denying that preliminary merger
agreement was being discussed, when they were, a material
misrepresentation?
ii. Holding: Yes, materiality depends on the significance a reasonable
investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information.
There is no justification for excluding from the definition of materiality
information regarding merger discussions, which would be material
information to the trading decisions of a reasonable investor because
the price and structure has not yet been reached. • In rejecting the
petitioner's first rationale for their "agreement-in-principle" test, the
court stated that Congress's chosen policy for the Act is disclosure, not
140
paternalistic withholding of accurate information, this is to promote a

high standard of business ethics in the securities industry. In rejecting
the petitioner's second rationale, the court analyzed that the secrecy of
the preliminary discussions is not relevant, the disclosure requirements
only concern the accuracy and completeness of the information they
provide.
b. Absent a duty to disclose in an SEC filing or to update forward looking
statements that are “still alive” a company need not disclose material
information
i. Duty to speak/full disclosures arises when
1. This arises when the Df have a relationship of trust and
confidence with the PF
2. An actual filing obligation
3. The Company itself is trading its own stock
4. However, once the company begins to speak about rumors it
has no duty to disclose, it must then not be materially
misleading
9. Scienter: Intent to Deceive
❖ Under PSLRA, a Pf must plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the Df acted with the required state of mind--the intent to deceive manipulate or
defraud. Meaning that the Df was aware of the true state of affairs and appreciated the
propensity of her misstatement or omission to mislead. After taking all the factual
allegations as true, A complaint will survive only if a reasonable person would deem the
inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one
could draw from the entirety of the facts alleged, not merely in isolation.
a. State of mind required = intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud
b. This means the defendant was aware of the true state of affairs and appreciated
the propensity of her misstatement or omission to mislead.
c. Supreme Court left open whether recklessness suffices for scienter.
i. Circuit courts have recognized that reckless disregard of the falsity of a
statement suffices for scienter.
ii. Circuits define recklessness differently; e.g., where the
misrepresentations were so obvious that the defendant must have been
aware of them.
d. Test applied to the complaint.
i. When faced with a 12(b) (6) for a § 10(b) complaint, the court should
take all factual allegations in the complaint as true
ii. Do all the facts alleged, collectively, give rise to a strong inference of
scienter, not whether any allegation individually scrutinized in isolation,
meets the standard
1. Consider the complaint in its entirety along with other sources
ordinarily examined when ruling on a 12(b)(6) , including
documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and
matters of which a court may take judicial notice
iii. The court must take into account plausible opposing inferences in
determining whether the pleading gives rise to a strong inference of
scienter
141
1. Congress required Pf to plead with particularity facts giving rise

to a strong--powerful or cogent--inference
2. Take into consideration plausible, nonculpable explanations for
the Df's conduct, as well as inferences favoring the Pf, but the
inference of scienter must be cogent and compelling
3. The absence of motive allegation is not fatal
4. Omissions and ambiguities count against inferring scienter, but
the court must assess all the allegations holistically
5. Test: at least as likely as any plausible opposing inferences.
e. PSLRA was designed “to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving
investors’ ability to recover on meritorious claims.”
f. Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights: Pfs filed an intial complain in DC of Ill. There
the DC ruled that the Pf's did not sufficiently plead the DF's state of mind with
particularity, but gave leave to amend. The Pf's amended their complaint and
added significantly more details, however the DC dismissed the complaint with
prejudice this time stating they did not sufficiently plead Df's state of mind with
particularity under PLSRA. The 6th Cir. Overruled the DC stating it was sufficient.
SCOTUS granted cert and is seeking to address the issue whether a court must
consider competing inferences in determining whether securities fraud
complaint gives rise to a "strong inference" of scienter. Pfs are persons who
purchased Tellabs stock between December 11, 2000 and June 19, 2001. They
accuse Tellabs and Notebaert (CEO and president of Tellabs) of engaging in a
scheme to deceive the investing public about the true value of Tellabs stock. Pf's
allege that the CEO/President made a series of 4 statements about the status of
the company and its projections for FY 2001, based on which the market analysts
attributed a Buy rating and the Pfs purchased the stock. On an amended
complaint the Pfs added references to 27 confidential sources and making
further, more specific allegations concerning Notebaert's mental state.
i. CEO of the company provided statements about the state of the
demand of the products and how development was going. But it later
found out that both were bad. It is at least as likely that a CEO knew
what he was saying regarding their most popular products and that
what he was doing was deceitful
ii. Issue: Did the Pf's adequately plead the Df's state of mind with
particularity? Does this standard require the court and Pf to take into
consideration competing inferences in determining wheter an inference
of scienter is strong?
iii. Holding 1) Not sure this is a new test 2) Yes, A Pf alleging fraud in a § 10
(b) action must plead facts rendering an inference of scienter at least as
likely (50/50) as any plausible opposing inferences. However, they are
not to plead more facts than they would at trial, i.e., more likely than
not=preponderance of the evidence.
iv. Concurrence the test should be whether the inference of scienter (if
any) is more plausible than the inference of innocence
10. Reasonable Reliance
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❖ Reliance must be reasonable and is presumed in ommission cases if the undisclosed facts
were material. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States (1972). However, in
affirmative misrepresentation cases, reliance is not presumed but can be proven through
the rebuttable “fraud on the market” theory.
❖ Fraud on the Market Theory (Basic Inc. v. Levinson):
➢ A rebuttable presumption that the investor relied on the integrity of public
trading market price when making investment decision--so investor need not
have seen misrepresentation
➢ Does not require that each Pf saw the misrepresentation
➢ Based on the semi-strong efficient market theory that in an open and developed
market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the available, public
material information regarding the company and its business.
■ Efficient market hypo=price reflects all info, public or non-public
■ “The private of a company’s stock is determined by the available
material information regarding the company and its
business...Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of
stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.
➢ Invoked when
■ Material and public misrepresentation
■ The stock traded in an efficient market (not a true efficient market, but
a semi-strong efficient market and the price reflects all publicly available
info)
■ Pf traded the stock between when the misrepresentations were made
and when the truth was revealed.
➢ So a Pf can plead this reliance when they have not directly seen the
misrepresentation
❖ How Df Can Rebut Fraud on Market Theory:
➢ Any showing that severs the link between he alleged misrepresentation and
either the price received (or paid) by the Pf, or his decision to trade at fair
market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance
➢ EXAMPLES
■ Can show the Pf would have traded anyways
■ The market makers actually knew the actual truth and the price of the
stock did not reflect the misrepresentation
● Essentially the information regarding the misrepresentation
was leaked or known to the market and that information
corrects the misrepresentations market effect, therefore there
can not be a market reliance
■ Pf knew the truth/the truth was subsequently revealed.
a. Reliance requirement tests whether the Pf’s trading was linked to the alleged
misrepresentations--it weeds out claims where the misrepresentation had little
or no impact on the Pfs investment decision
11. Causation (Two Types)
a. Transaction Causation
i. But for causation
1. "But for the fraud, the Pf would not have entered the
transaction or would have entered under different terms"
ii. Typically presumed by the court because it is so close to reliance
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iii.Some courts treat transaction causation as equivalent to reliance. In

particular, where reliance is presumed, courts will also assume
transaction causation is met.
1. Omission cases
2. Where there is a presumption of fraud on the market
b. Loss causation
i. Similar to proximate cause
ii. The Fraud caused the Pf's loss
iii. Usually battle of the experts
1. Statistical studies by experts, and do an event study to see if
there were cumulative abnormal returns as a result of the
event
2. The expert will have to prove that a material misrepresentation
or omission is what caused the harm to the Pfs
a. Typically pick a time frame, and calculate a normal
return in that time frame when the time period of
interest then compare that normal return to the
abnormal returns, to see if there is a statistically
significant difference. If that is true then there is harm
to the Pf caused by the material misrepresentation
iv. Loss causation is not presumed
v. Plaintiff must show that he suffered losses as a result of his reliance
12. Economic Loss
a. Measuring the difference between the price the stock was actually traded at and
the price it should have traded at
b. Possible Remedies and Damages
i. Recession
ii. Disgorgement
iii. Out-of-Pocket damages (typically)
iv. PSLRA caps damages at the difference between the transacted price
and the average of the daily prices during the 90-day period after
corrective disclosure
1. On behalf of Mining Co., a public corporation, the CEO issued a statement that the corporation was experiencing
average or below average productivity levels. The CEO knew that the situation was in fact significantly better
because of a recent major mineral discovery on the edge of its land, that it had begun to exploit. The CEO had a
legitimate desire, however, to acquire additional nearby leases for Mining Co. before it revealed its mineral
discovery.
○ Assuming the plaintiffs can show the above, is there sufficient scienter to support a Rule 10b-5 claim?
○ Yes there was scienter, becaue the CEO made a statement that was false/misleading and the producitivity
is a material item. He had knowledge and intent to decieve, with an awareness of the propensity of what
he is doing
○ The wanting to help the corporation is not a mitigating circumstance in a litigation. The Df was acting on
behalf of the corp.
1. Relying on the Mining Co. statement, Ivana Enveste decides not to buy Mining Co. stock. Mining Co. stock
increases from $20 to $30/share after the CEO discloses its major mineral discovery. How likely is it that Ivana will
succeed with a Rule 10b-5 claim for securities fraud against Mining Co.?
○ No standing to sue because Ivana did not actually buy or sell and Blue Chip made this a bright line rul
144
Issue/Element Judge Made Element/Decision Statutory Element Class Notes
Jurisdiction By the use of any means or

instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national
securities exchange.
FED courts.
Who is the Pf? Only actual “purchasers and sellers” Lead Pf in SFCA must be “most
(Standing/Transaction have standing, even if the alleged adequate Pf” defined as investor
al Nexus) fraud induced an investory no to with largest financial stake in the
trade. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor action
Drug Store (1975)
Who is the Df? 1) Df must be a “primary 1) SEC can bring enforcement

violator” whose statements actions that impose aiding
induced investors to trade and abetting liability
(merely aiding and abetting (implicitly private Pf
does not create private cannot)
liability) Central Bank of 2) Complaint alleging
Denver v. First Interstate securities fraud must
Bank of Denver (1994) “state with particularity
2) There is no scheme liability facts giving rise to a strong
for those who helped inference that the Df acted
perpetuate a fraud. If they with the required state of
were invisible to investors mind”
1) When is 1) Information is material “ if Forward-looking statements that

Information there is a substantial are identified as such and
Material? likelihood that a reasonable “accompanied by meaningful
(Materiality) investor would consider it cautionary statements” are not
important in deciding actionable”
whether to buy or sell
securities.” TSC Industries v.
Northway (1976)
2) Information about future
(speculative) events is
material by “balancing the
probability the event will
occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event” to
the affected company.
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson
(1988)
2) What constitutes a Rule 10b-5 only regulates deception, Complaint that alleges statements
false or deceptive not unfair corporate transactions or that omit material information
statement? breaches of fiduciary duties; claims must specify which statements
(deception) of unfair merger price are not were misleading and why
actionable
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3) What level of 1) Negligence is not 1) PF must, for every false or

culpability must be actionable; the Df must misleading statement,
shown? (Scienter) have had a “mental state “state with particularity
embracing intent to facts giving rise to a strong
deceive, defraud, or inference that the Df acted
manipulate. Ernst & Ernst v. with the required state of
Hochfelder (1976) mind”
2) Pleading Standard met 2) “Knowing” Df are subject
when the alleged “inference to join and several liability;
of sicneter is at least as “unknowing” Df
strong as any opposing (presumably those who
inference.” Tellabs, Inc. v. were only reckless) are
Makor Issues & Rights subject to proportionate
(2008) liability
4) How do plaintiffs Reliance by investors in developed

show reliance? securities markets is presumed when
(Reliance) publicly available information is
reflected in market price. Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson (1988).
5) How do Pfs show Actual economic loss proximately 1) PF has burden to prove the
causation? (Causation) caused by the fraud must be alleged false or misleading
and proved--such as by showing statement caused the Pf’s
drop in price when truth was loss
revealed. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 2) Damages are capped at
v. Broudo (2005) the difference between
the trading price adn the
average dailty price during
the 90-day period after
corrective disclosure
What is the SOL? Uniform federal limitations period Priate securities fraud actions must
applies to 10b-5 actions, rather than be brought within two-years after
borrowed state limitations period. the discovery of faacts constituting
Lampf v. Gilberston (1991) the violation, but no later than five
years after such violation
Must action be Shareholder who were induced by All SFCAs alleging fraud “in
brought in federal fraud not to sell cannot sue in state connection with the purchase or
court? court (nor do such holders have sale” of securities must be brought
standing in federal court) in federal court
2. Insider Trading
❖ TheSupreme court has found that there are three situations where an individual is in violation of §10b or Rule 10b-5
when trading on material nonpublic information. The three situations/famous cases labeling 1) classical insider
trading 2) tipper-tippee liability and 3) misapropriation theory.
➢ Three major SCOTUS cases--Chiarella, Dirks, and O'Hagan--are the core for determining when a person
violates §10(b) and rule 10b-5 by trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information
➢ Chiarella: Classic theory of insider trading
146
■ Violation occurs when there is a duty to disclose arising from a fiduciary duty or relationship of
trust and confidence between the parties to the transaction,
■ Theory is that insiders have a duty of "trust and confidence" to the company and its shareholders.
➢ Dirks: a "tipper-tippee" case
■ Tipping can be a breach of fiduciary duty
■ SCOTUS held, tipping can be a breach of fiduciary duty if "the insider will benefit, directly or
indirectly, from his disclosure" and that a "tippee" violates Rule 10b-5 if she "knows or should
know that there has been a breach
■ FN 14: an outsider, such as an underwriter, accountant, attorney, or consultant who receives
nonpublic corporate information with the expectation that it will be kept confidential is considered
a "temporary insider" and must abstain from trading on the basis of that information
➢ O'Hagan: Misappropriation theory
■ Trading on the basis of material nonpublic information obtained in any position of trust and
confidence can constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5, even though the misappropriator owes no
duty to the person with whom she trades
● General Rule: Stock trading by insiders is illegal only when they are aware or price-sensitive information not
available to others--they have material nonpublic information.
● Insider trading is brought under 10b-5
● There is no federal statute, besides the one that talks about legislators, that talks about insider trading
● 1960s In re Cady Roberts ruled that the SEC admin ruling that insider trading violates Rule 10b-5
○ Not until 1980s were there any SCOTUS rulings on insider trading
● Fitting insider trading into §10(b)
● DOJ and SEC are aggressive in targeting insider trading, in the belief that it is crucial to deter such trading in order to
maintain healthy financial markets.
● Insider Trading Policy
○ Arguments in Favor of Insider Trading
■ Insider Trading signals information to stock market
● Some argue that insider trading transmits critical and difficult-to-communicate
information to the stock markets, permitting smoother price changes before inside
information is ultimately disclosed
● Studies show that markets react quickly when insiders buy but only slightly when insiders
sell.
■ Insider Trading compensates management
● Some defend insider trading as a form of executive compensation that creates incentives
for managers to take risks that benefit investors
○ Arguments Against Insider Trading
■ Insider trading is unfair
● Insider trading should not be allowed because insiders should not be allowed to benefit
from information generated for a corporate purpose. Insiders who trade on inside
information unfairly exploit shareholders in the company(or investors about to become
shareholders) who trusted the insiders to be working for the company's best interest, not
their own
■ Insider Trading distorts company disclosures
● Insider trading, if permitted, would interfere with informational efficiency in stock
markets. Insiders would be encouraged to manipulate corporate disclosures or time
truthful disclosure to the markets so they could exploit their informational advantage
● Many securities fraud class actions involve the release by corporate executives of false or
misleading information aimed at making more profitable their trading in the company's
stock
147
■ Insider trading is theft of company information

● Insider trading is essentially the use of private information, as such, prohibitions against
insider trading can be seen as protection of intellectual property
● Inside information is protected to encourage companies to create it
● The prohibition against insider trading is a way of protecting company information. Not
only does treating insider information as company property encourage its production
(good news) but protecting adverse information from insider exploitation (bad news)
reduces the company's cost of capital and increases its reputation for integrity
● But then why don’t private companies regulate the enforcement of insider trading laws?
■ Insider Trading increases firm's cost of capital
● It undermines investor confidence in stock markets and therefor investors would discount
the stock price, thereby raising the company's cost of capital
● When investors in a stock market can't figure out whether firms have material nonpublic
information and insiders are trading on that information, they will assume the worst.
They will either not invest in the market or discount the stock of all companies by the risk
of insider trading.
○ For insider trading SCOTUS's rules are how they are fitting the trading/wrongdoing into the 10b-5 claim
○ If a private Pf brought an insider trading claim, they would have to show standing, reliance, and damages
■ Standing/Transactional nexus=trading the stock contemporaneously
■ Reliance=fraud on the market
■ Damages
a. Rule 10b-5 and Classic Insider Trading

❖ Silence of MNPI (info known to them and not the other party or market that would affect their investment
decision) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as fraud actionable under 10b
or rule 10b-5 when there is a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between
the parties to a transaction. Insiders and constructive/temporary insiders are imposed with this duty
because of their position within the company and their duty to the shareholders (re candor, loyalty). Simply
holding MNPI does not create such a duty.
➢ The fraudulent or deceptive device is due to the fact that the insider has material nonpublic
information and does not disclose it to their other shareholders when trading their own
companies shares
i. Classic insider trading is when an insider trades in their own company’s stock with MNPI.
1. Classic insider trading is when there is a person who holds material, nonpublic
information and owes a duty to disclose because he/she is in a position of trust or
fiduciary relationship with that company. There is a classic insider trading if the person
trades with that information in respect to their principal.
ii. Theory is that insiders have a duty of “trust and confidence” to the company and its shareholders
and must disclose MNPI before trading with another shareholder in their own companies stock.
iii. Chiarella v. United States: Pf worked at a financial printing shop that word processed financial
statements for companies that hired them. Pf worked on these disclosures for Co A and obtained
private information about a secret takeover bid and even though there were code names, he
figured out who it was being acquired and went and bought the shares on that information.
Immediately after the takeover attempts were made public Pf sold his shares and made a profit.
1. Issue: Is it a violation of §10b, under classical theory of insider trading, when a person in a
position of trust and confidence to Co A learns of confidential information that Co A is
planning to acquire Co B and from that information trades in the stock of Co B?
148
2. Principle: At common law, misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance
upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to disclose material information
prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty
to do so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has information “that the other
party is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence
between them,”
3. Duty to Disclose: The obligation to disclose material information is typically imposed on
corporate insiders (officers, directors or controlling stockholders, along with constructive
insiders) because they have an obligation to place the shareholder’s welfare before their
own, and this duty of disclosure ensures they will not benefit personally through
fraudulent use of material nonpublic information. (they have a duty of candor and
loyalty).
a. We and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material
facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not
known to persons with whom they deal and whic, if known, would affect their
investment judgement.
4. Holding: No, Chiarella did not violate insider trading laws under §10b or 10b-5. Chiarella
only owed a duty of candor and loyalty to his employer and his client CO A, acquiring
company. Therefore he could have been found liable if he traded in Co A’s stock, due to
his duty to disclose. Here, court did not find whether there was such a duty owed to the
shareholders of CO B (since it was not presented to the jury), but traditionally there has
not been any because they are not, in a position of trust or confidence, they had no prior
dealings, not an agent, or fiduciary, he was a complete stranger. Additionally, here PF did
not find out information regarding earnings or operations, but only an Acquisition and use
of that information absent a duty is not fraudulent under 10b or 10b-5.
iv. Julia is an employee of Hooli Corporation who learns through her work that Hooli is going to be
acquired by an even bigger company. This information is not public and it means that the stock
price of Hooli will likely go up when it is announced. Julia buys stock in Hooli. Has Julia violated
Rule 10b-5 by insider trading?
1. Yes, Julia is a fiduciary and traded her own company's stock with that material non-public
information
2. What if Julia instead told the information to her sister Priscilla and it was Priscilla who
traded?
a. This was left open after Chirallea, but is answered in Dirks
v. Rule 10b5-1 Plan: Affirmative Defense to insider trading
1. If you are an individual concerned about trading in your own company's stock, you can ex
ante set up a trading plan so that there is no way you can trade on material non-public
information
2. Here you would set it up to know, when, how much, the price you want it to be executed
and the date of the transactions. You can make this explicit or you can create a formula
that can determine all of this
a. However, you must show that the person did not override the 10b5-1 plan. If you
do the latter then you lose the affirmative defense
b. Tipper/Tippee Liability
❖ The tipper will be liable if she discloses material nonpublic info in breach of a duty, which occurs when she
discloses MNPI for a direct or indirect personal benefit
➢ Must disclose the material non-public information for a personal benefit
149
➢ The person with the fiduciary duty must be acting loyally and by disclosing the information they
are breaching that loyalty.
❖ The Tippee acquires the tipper's duty to disclose or abstain from trading if the tippee knows or reasonably
should know that there has been a breach, and the tippee trades or causes others to trade in disregard of
that knowledge.
➢ Put in place so people who do not trade on that info but gives that info to other people.
➢ Tippee cannot be liable unless the tipper is liable under the same action. The tippee's liability is
derivative on the Tipper's liability
i. Tipper=person who discloses MNPI
ii. Tippee=person who receives MNPI from the tipper
iii. Subtippee= a person the Tippee discloses MNPI to (tippee then become the tipper)
iv. Who actually trades on the information can vary, but the permutation may matter
v. Initial Inquiry: Personal Benefit (Objective Criteria)
1. [T]he initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider.
2. Whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure such
as
a. A pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.
..
i. The theory is that the insider, by giving the information out selectively,
is in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal
information, or other things of value for himself. . .
b. A quid pro quo. . .
c. An intention to benefit the particular recipient . . .
d. Also . . . when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading
relative or friend
3. Dirks v, Securities and Exchange Commission: Dirks was an officer of a broker-dealer
specializing in providing investment analysis of insurance companies. Dirks was provided
information about massive fraud at Equity Funding, Life insurance and mutual fund
company, from a former officer, Secrist. Dirks investigated the claims and interviewed
senior managment and found that there was wrongdoing. He told the WSJ about what he
found and urged them to run a story, the did not. Dirks also told his clients about what
happened, who traded on that information. March 27 trading in the Co was halted, and
Dirks voluntarily presented his info to the SEC, after the other events. SEC charged him
with violating § 17, § 10b, and Rule 10b-5 because a tippee, regardless of how they got
their information or their motiviation/occupation they must publicly disclose MNPI they
know is confidential or refrain from trading.
a. Principle: There must be manipulation or deception for a violation of 10b-5. In an
inside-trading case this fraud derives from the inherent unfairness involved
where one takes advantage of information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone. Thus an indsider
will be liable under 10b-5 only where he fails to disclose MNPI before trading on
it and makes a secret profit. There must be a duty that the initial person
breached in not disclosing that information publicly to their shareholders.
b. Holding: Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties to bot the
corporation and its shareholders, the typical tippee has no such relationship.
However there are certain circumstances where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an outsider working for the corporation and this
information is revealed in a special confidential relationship for the person to
150
conduct business for the enterprise and are given info solely for that business
purpose (thus they are a constructive/temporary insider and expected to keep
the disclosed nonpublic info confidential and thus a duty implied). Yet, there
must be a specific duty to disclose to another party based on some relationship.
Imposing a duty on a tippee for obtaining MNPI from an insider could inhibit
market analysts, whcih are necessary to preservation of healthy market. In fact
those analysts find information from insiders or other means and then make that
information available through market letters or letters to specific clients. Insiders
cannot trade or disclose inside information and it is a breach when they do it for
their own benefit, similarly transactions of those who knowingly participate with
fiduciary who breached a duty is forbidden as transaction on behalf of trustee.
Thus, a tippee assumes a fid duty to shareholders of a corp not to trade on MNPI
only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by
disclosing the information to the tippee for a personal benefit/gain and the
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.
c. Analysis: Must look at the purpose of the initial disclosure and see if the insider
was trying to obtain a direct or indirect personal gain. Here there was no
actionable violation by Dirks because he owed no duty to the shareholders of
Equity funding and he did not induce to repose trust or confidence in him
therefore there was no breach for passing the tip to WSJ or his clients to trade
on. Additionally, Dirks did not obtain derivative liability because Secrist did not
breach his Fid Duty for a personal gain, he was trying to expose a fraud being
covered up by management (no gift or personal gain)
vi. Review questions:
a. Had Secrist disclosed the info to Dirks for a personal benefit?
b. What if Secrist had routinely exchanged stock tips with Dirks?
i. Yes, that would be enough because it is a quid pro quo, or for reciprocal
information
c. What if Secrist had disclosed the Equity Funding fraud in part because he had
been fired over an unrelated matter?
i. The court would need to decide whether the revenge constitutes a
personal benefit. It could be of value to the tipper by getting back at the
company and it motivated the persons to do it
ii. Against: there was no monetary benefit, there is no benefit to him
personally because the reputational benefit would have to somehow
translate into future earnings. Revenge is too amorphous to constitute
something of value
iii. It matters why someone discloses that type of information
d. Suppose Secrist had disclosed inside information to Dirks because of a bribe
from Dirks. Dirks then advised his clients to sell their Equity Funding stock. Dirks
would have violated Rule 10b-5. Would his clients also have violated the rule?
i. Dirks would have violated rule 10b-5 and so would have Secrist because
they are both receiving direct or indirect benefit from the transaction
ii. The client's liability would depend. They would have to know where the
information came from, if the Client's know that Dirks had obtained the
information from a breach of fiduciary duty for a personal benefit, then
they would be liable as well.
151
1. But need to show that the remote tippee knew about the
breach and the personal benefit
vii. SEC Role of Financial Advisors and their Response to Dirks
1. Securities analysts play an important role in the market because they publish
recommendations and disseminate information to the public. This is useful because there
are better priced securities and more informational efficient information
2. Regulation FD=restricts the selective disclosure of MNPI by someone acting on behalf of a
public corporation (this is just a rule, that the SEC can enforce even if no benefit to the
corporation)
a. If a corp discloses MNPI to securities market pros or shareholders who may trade
on that info, then the corp must disclose the information to the public to widely
disseminate the news
b. Intentional disclosures must be disseminated simultaneously
c. Unintentional disclosures within 24hr or start of the next trading day on NYSE
d. SEC concluded that selective disclosure to analysts undermined public
confidence in the integrity of the stock markets
e. SEC concluded the Dirks tipping regime inadequately constrained tipping
because of difficulty proving the tipper received a personal benefit from the
disclosure
f. “Reg FD” restricts selective disclosure of MNPI by someone acting on behalf of a
public corporation
3.
viii. (SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984)): Barry Switzer claimed that when he was sitting
in the bleachers at his daughter’s track meet, he overheard a CEO telling his wife that he would be
out of town the following week because the CEO’s company might be liquidated. Switzer and
his pals traded on the information.
1. Insider trading liability?
a. Court held Platt did not breach his fid duty to shareholders by disclosing info
since he did not personally benefit, directly or indirectly, from the disclosure.
Therefore switzer and his friends were not liable as tippees.
b. It is not classical insider trading because he is not a manager or director of the
corporation
c. Next Tipper-tippee
i. Here Switzer is the tippee and the tippee's liability is derivative from the
tipper's liability. Looking that the purpose of theCEOs breach he was
disclosing that information to his wife to arrange child care. The tipper
was not providing the information for a personal benefit, he was telling
the wife not to get a benefit in exchange for that information
ii. Therefore, the tippee who overheard the information is not liable
because the tipper is not liable under the rule.
ix. Tippee and Subtippee Liability
1. Salman v. United States (S. Ct . 2016): Two Brother, Michael (tippee) and Maher (tipper).
Maher worked at an IBank and began telling his brother MNPI on deals he/his bank was
working on. At first Maher was unaware of Michael’s trading, but then it became
known/apparent. For example, instead of a gift Michael asked Maher for information
regarding deals/MNPI. Maher began providing Michael these information gifts to appease
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Michael and help him. Michael then began giving this information to his “trading friends,”
one of whom was Salman (sub-tippee), Maher’s brother-in-law. Michael told Salman that
he was getting the info from Maher (tipper), but Maher never gave any information to
Salaman. Maher-->Michael-->Salman
a. Principle: Tippee’s liability is derivative of a tipper’s liability. A tippee is liable
when they provide MNPI in breach of a fid duty, which is for a personal gain or
benefit. This includes providing information to trading friends or relatives
because the tip and trade resemble a situation where a insider trades on the
information himself, receives the cash and then gifts those profits to the
recipient. Therefore, when a tippee is given MNPI as a gift in knowing breach of a
duty by the insider, they are liable for trading or causing others to trade in the
face of that knowledge.
b. Holding/Analysis: Here a gift of MNPI to a family relative or trading friend is a
gift of personal gain because it is like the insider giving them money from an
original trade themselves. Maher testified that he gave the MNPI to Michael,
with knowledge he was going to trade on it and to help his brother. Michael
testified that Salman knew the MNPI was coming from Maher. Despite that
knowledge, Salman still traded on that information. Thus, liable because when a
sub-tippee knows that the MNPI comes from an insider that has breached a duty
and has traded or caused others to trade on that information then they are
liable.
i. Breach of duty of insider=disclosing info for a personal benefit, a
personal benefit can be obtained from conferring a gift of a trading
relative
c. Misappropriation Theory
❖ It is unlawful for a corporate outsider to trade on the basis of MNPI in breach of a duty owed to the source
of the information.
➢ O’hagan: the misappropriation theory holds that a person commits fraud in connection with a
securities transaction and violated §10b and Rule 10b-5 when he misappropriate confidential
information for securities trading purposes in breach ofa duty owed to the source of that
information. Under this theory a fid’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to
purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal
of the exclusive use of that information.
i. Misappropriation theory: it is unlawful even for a person who had no connection to a corporation
to trade in corporation's securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information if that person
had misappropriated inside information from some third party.
ii. SCOTUS had made it clear that §10(b) addressed only deception, not trading that was financially
unfair
iii. Misappropriation theory is designed to protect the integrity of the securities markets against
abuses by outsiders to a corporation who have access to confidential information that will affect
the corporation’s security price when revealed, but who owe no fid or other duty to that corp’s
shareholders.
iv. Rule 10b5-2 provides a non-exclusive list of three situations in which a person has a duty of trust
or confidence for the purpose of the misappropriation theory:
1. Whenever a person agrees to maintain info in confidence;
2. Whenever the person communicating info and the person to whom it is communicated
have a history, pattern or practice of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the
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info knows or reasonably should know that the person communicating the info expects
the recipient to maintain confidentiality; or
3. Whenever the info is obtained from a spouse, parent, child or sibling, unless recipient
shows that history, pattern or practice indicates no expectation of confidentiality.
v. Tipping in misappropriation cases
1. Courts have applied the same "benefit to tipper" analysis in cases involving
misappropriated information as is used when insiders disclose company secrets
2. A tipper could be liable even if the tipper did not know that the tippee would trade on
the basis of the information
a. This is so because it may be presumed that the tippees interest in the
information is, in contemporary jargon, not for nothing. To allow a tippee to
escape liability because the government cannot prove to a jury's satisfaction that
the tipper knew exactly what misuse would result from the tipper's wrongdoing
would not fulfill the purpose of the misappropriation theory which is to protect
property rights to information."
vi. Rule 14e-3:
1. Prohibits insider trading during a tender offer and thus supplements Rule 10b-5.
2. Once substantial steps towards a tender offer have been taken, Rule 14e-3(a) prohibits
anyone, except the bidder, who possesses material, nonpublic information about the offer
from trading in the target’s securities.
3. Rule 14e-3(d) prohibits anyone connected with the tender offer from tipping material,
nonpublic information about it.
4. Rule 14e-3 is not premised on breach of a fiduciary duty.
a. O’Hagan upholds it anyway.
vii. U.S. v. O'hagan (S.Ct. 1997): O’Hagan was a partner at a law firm. Grand Met. retained his law firm
to represent them for a potential tender offer for C/S of Pillsbury Co. Both Co and Law Firm took
precautions to protect info as confidential. O’hagan did not work on the matter. Sept 8 firm
withdrew from representation adn Tender offer was announced on Oct 4. However, while firm was
representing Grand Met. O’hagan began buying call options for Pillsbury stock, when the TO was
announced he sold all of his stock and call options.
1. Principle: Section 10(b) proscribes 1) using any deceptive device 2) in connection with the
purchase or sale fo securities in contravention of rules prescribed by the Commision. The
classical theory stems from a special relationship with shareholders that prevents them
from trading in their own stock based on MNPI. A fiduciary who pretends loyalty to the
principal while secretly converting the principal’s information for personal gain, dupes, or
defrauds the principal.
a. A principal’s property is for their exclusive use. Undisclosed misappropriation of
that info is a violation of a fid duty and a fraud akin to embezzlement
2. Holding: By not disclosing the trading of stock to his firm and client on MNPI was the
fraudulent or deceptive device in violation of 10b and 10b-5, because he is deceiving his
principal to obtain an unfair market advantage for himself and complies with the “in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security” (not deception of an identifiable
purchaser or seller)
a. Misappropriation Theory
i. Fraudulent or deceptive device
1. Taking the MNPI from the source of information whom you
owe a duty and using that for your own personal benefit
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without disclosing that information. Essentially feigning loyalty

for your own benefit
ii. Who owes the duty to the source of information
1. Rule 10b5-2 provides a non-exclusive list of three situations a
person has a duty of trust or confidence
a. Person agrees to maintain info in confidence
b. History pattern or practice of reasonably keeping
information in expectation of confidentiality
c. Info obtained from a spouse, parent, child,
b. If O'Hagan disclosed the fact that he is trading on the info, to BOTH his firm
(dorsey and whitney)and the Client (Grand Met), then there is no insider trading
because there is then no deceptive device, since they were told. So no 10b-5
liability under the misappropriation theory, but it is possible they did something
wrong. For example a state fiduciary duty violation a 14e-3 liability.
d. 10b-5 Plans: Defense to Insider Trading

i. Rule 10b5-1 specifies that a purchase or sale constitutes trading “on the basis of” MNPI where the
person making the purchase or sale was aware of MNPI at the time the purchase or sale was
made.
ii. Rule 10b5-1 Plan
1. = A written plan for trading securities that is designed in accordance with Rule 10b5-1(c).
2. Any person executing pre-planned transactions pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 plan that was
established in good faith at a time when that person was unaware of MNPI has an
affirmative defense against accusations of insider trading, even if actual trades made
pursuant to the plan are executed at a time when the individual may be aware of MNPI
that would otherwise subject that person to liability under Exchange Act § 10(b) or Rule
10b-5.
3. 10b5-1 plans are especially useful for people presumed to have inside information, such
as officers and directors.
4. Exchange Act § 16(b) still applies to trades made pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 plan.
5. If you are an individual concerned about trading in your own company's stock, you can ex
ante set up a trading plan so that there is no way you can trade on material non-public
information
6. Here you would set it up to know, when, how much, the price you want it to be executed
and the date of the transactions. You can make this explicit or you can create a formula
that can determine all of this
a. However, you must show that the person did not override the 10b5-1 plan. If you
do the latter then you lose the affirmative defense
e. Trading By Members of Congress

i. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (Stock) specified that congressional persons owe
duties to the United States, as well as Congress and the US citizens, with respect to material
nonpublic information derived from their position or gained from performing their official
responsibilities
ii. Members of Congress and their aides can be liable for insider trading under a misappropriation
theory--as well as any recipients who trade on congressionally sourced information
iii. Congress members and their aides must report their stock trades above $1000 within 30 to 45
days of the trade.
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iv. A issue with the STOCK ACT is how it will be enforced because there are evidentiary barriers
created be the Constitution's "Speech or Debate" clause that immunizes lawmakers for their
official legislative activities.
f. Damages/Penalties for Insider Trading

i. Civil:
1. Pursuant to 21A of the Exchange Act the SEC is authorized to seek judicially imposed civil
penalties against insiders, contructive insiders, tippers, and tippees of up to three times
the profits gained or the losses avoided in unlawful insider trading
2. Injunction
3. SEC can seek Disgorgement of profits and treble money sanctions, up to 3x profits
realized or losses avoided
4. Because the SEC can seek disgorgement and treble damages, an inside trader thus faces
potential civil liability up to 4 times profit gained.
a. 21A also permits imposition of civil penalties on controlling persons, such as
employees, of up to $1mil or three times the insider's profits (whichever is
greater) if the controlling person knowingly or recklessly disregards the insider
trading by persons under its control.
5. Administrative proceedings for regulated market professionals (censure, suspension or
revocation of broker/dealer licenses, etc.)
6. Section 20A of the Exchange Act creates a private right of action on behalf of
contemporaneous traders against insiders, constructive insiders, tippers, and tippees (as
well as their controlling persons) who trade while in possession of material, nonpublic
information
a. Liability is limited to the actual profits realized or losses avoided reduced by the
amount of any disgorgement obtained by the SEC under its broad authority to
seek injunctive relief
ii. Criminal:
1. Prison up to 20 years
2. Fines up to $5 million fine for individuals; $25 million for corporate defendants
3. Section 16(b) Liability for Short Swing Trading

a. Short swing trading=the purchase and resale by insiders of company stock within a relatively short period of
time
b. §16(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act provides that any profits realized by an insider on a purchase followed by a
sale, or a sale followed by a purchase, within a six-month period, "shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer."
c. There is no need to show any "unfiar use". All that is necessary is offsetting trades within six months by
someone with the necessary relationship to the corporation
d. Applies to directors and officers, any person who is the beneficial owner of more than 10% of a class of
equity securities, and any corporation registered under §12 of the 1934 Exchange Act
e. Those covered by the statute are required to file reports with the SEC disclosing the ownership of their
equity securities as well as any changes in that ownership. Reports must be filed 10 days after a person
becomes an insider, and updated reports must be filed electronically 2 days after any changes in the
insider's holding. These reports must now be posted on the company's website within 1 day after filing
f. Section 16(b) procedure
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i. Security holder, who need not be contemporaneous owner, must make a demand on the directors
unless demand would be futile.
ii. The corp has 60 days to decide whether to institute suit.
iii. If not, the action may be maintained by the holder, who must hold at suit and through trial.
iv. Any Profit that is recovered, which courts compute from a series of several purchases and sales
within six months so as to produce the maximum damages goes to the corporation
A. - Short Swing Profits:
a. o Exchange Act § 16:
i. § (a): Reporting obligations.
ii. § (b): Bright-line short-swing trading rule (over- and under- inclusive for insider trading).
b. o Section 16 applies only to publicly traded corporations.
B. - Exchange Act § 16(a): Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10%
of any class of any equity security or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security shall file
with the Commission a statement disclosing trades within a certain period of time following the
transaction.
a. o Talking about 3 types of people:
i. § (1) Owner of more than 10% of any class of any equity security (hold more than 10% of
any class of any stock);
ii. § (2) Director;
iii. § (3) Officer.
b. § Any of these 3 have to file with the SEC a statement disclosing their trades within a certain
period of time following the transaction
C. o SOX Accelerated Deadlines for Reporting Insider Transactions:
a. § If you fall into one of above 3 categories, and this is with a public corporation, then have to file
something within 2 business days with SEC and report trade.
b. § Specific form you file.
c. § Matchable = It has to be theoretically possible that by matching the 2 transactions, she made a
profit.
D. - Exchange Act § 16(b): Basic bright-line rule against short-swing trading.
a. o Any profit realized by such beneficial owner, director, or officer from any purchase and sale, or
any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer [the company] within any period of
less than six months shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer – i.e. any profit realized by a
director, officer, or beneficial owner, within 6 months of any public company’s stock, has to pay
that profit back to the company.
i. § Note: Congress being over and under-inclusive with this rule, because not looking at
whether you had MNPI and traded on that basis, it’s acting like a robot – looking to see if
there’s any profit realized from any purchase and sale or sale and purchase for one of the
3 people within 6 months, then it’s due back to the company.
E. o Policy Behind § 16(b): Congress was imagining directors and officers have access to MNPI in the
company, and people who hold more than 10% of company’s stock has access to inside information, so
assume if these people make any profits on trading stock within 6 months, then they’re trading on the basis
of insider information.
F. - Exchange Act Rule § 16 Highlights:
a. o Strict liability that requires disgorgement to public corporation of profits made:
i. § (1) Within a 6-month period (This is the short-swing trading);
ii. § (2) By certain insiders [directors and officers] & beneficial owners.
b. o Intent is irrelevant – it’s strict liability.
c. o § 16 applies only to officers, directors, or shareholders with more than 10% of the stock.
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i. § Officer: SEC definition includes president, CFO, CEO, CFO, COO, chief accounting
officers, VPs of principal business units (ex: VP of products) and any person with
significant policymaking function.
d. o Stock Classes Considered Separately: It’s short-swing trading only if it’s trading within that class
of stock (i.e. buy common stock and sell common stock, buy preferred, sell preferred).
e. o Deputization: If Corp X authorizes one of its employees to serve on the board of Corp Y, and
Corp X profits on Y stock within a 6-month period, Corp X may be liable under § 16(b) for short-
swing trading and would have to pay that money over to Company Y.
f. o Profits Determined Under § 16: Need to have a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, within
6-months, by a director, officer or beneficial owner
i. § Note: When looking at these problems when have a trade, need to see if can match a
sale and a purchase or purchase and sale in a way that would give rise to profits that
would have to be disgorged to the company.
g. o Directors and Officers:
i. § Cannot match a transaction made prior to appointment to one made after
appointment (law assumes that before holding that office, they don’t have access to that
information – any trades before they did as director or officer are not subject to this short
swing trading rule).
ii. § Can match transactions that occur after he or she ceases to be an officer or director
with those made while still in office (because for a period of time after they leave, the law
assumes they might still have that information as long as still within that 6-month period).
G. o Beneficial Owner: § 16(b) liability only if owned more than 10% both at the time of the purchase and of
the sale.
H. - Example – Foremost-McKesson v. Provident Securities:
I. o Oct 20: Provident acquires debentures convertible into more than 10% of Foremost stock.
J. o Oct 24: Provident distributes some debentures to shareholders, reducing convertible debt holdings to
less than 10%.
K. o Oct 28: Provident sells remaining debentures, then distributed cash proceeds to shareholders and
dissolved.
L. o Issue: Can we match the Oct. 20 acquisition with the Oct. 24 disposition?
M. o Held: No. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner
was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved.
For beneficial owner to be subject to 16b liability, must be beneficial owner at both time of sale and
purchase. So, October 20th transaction isn’t matchable because wasn’t a beneficial owner at time of
October 20 acquisition. In a purchase-sale sequence, the transaction by which the shareholder crosses the
10%+ threshold is not a matchable purchase. Regarding beneficial owners, only transactions effected when
one is a more than 10% shareholder are matchable.
N. - Exchange Act Rule § 16 Highlights:
a. o § 16 applies only to companies that must register under the Exchange Act = public companies.
i. § (1) Companies with shares traded on a national exchange (e.g., on NASDAQ or NYSE);
OR
ii. § (2) Companies that are forced to go public under the § 12(g) threshold.
1. · § 12(g) threshold (post-JOBS Act): Companies with $10 million in assets and
more than 2,000 shareholders (excluding people who became holders via stock
options, and only up to 499 can be unaccredited investors).
b. § If exam says company’s stock is registered under the 1934 Act = stock is publicly traded stock.
O. o Compare Rule 10b-5, which applies to all issuers (regardless whether public or private).
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i. § Rule 10b-5 is not specific to public companies, it applies regardless of whether public or
private company.
ii. § Rule 16(b) liability for short-swing trading must be trades in public company’s stock.
P. o Equity Securities: § 16 applies to stocks, convertible debt, and options to buy or sell (a call option or put
option).
a. § Compare Rule 10b-5, which applies to all securities (which is a very broad meaning) [which
could mean investment securities in an orange grove or worm farm, etc. – a lot of different things
can be ruled to be securities), but § 16 applies very clearly only to those things (Pollman would
usually just refer to stocks).
Q. o Sale and Purchase: § 16(b) applies whether the sale follows the purchase or vice versa.
a. § Courts interpret the statute in order to maximize the gains the company recovers. Hence, shares
are fungible for purposes of § 16(b).
i. · If the trader [director, officer or beneficial owner] sells 10 shares of stock and then
within six months buys 10 different shares of stock in the same company at a cheaper
price, he or she is still liable.
ii. · If beneficial owner buys and then sells 10% of common stock, and then buys 10% of
preferred stock (i.e. different type of stock), then not liable because wouldn’t be
matchable – only looking at buying and selling of same type of stock within 6-months.
b. § The sale and purchase must occur within six months of each other.
R. o Recovery:
a. § Any recovery goes to the company.
b. § § 16(b) profits can be discovered through SEC filings.
c. § Shareholders can sue derivatively, and a shareholder’s lawyer can get a contingent fee out of any
recovery or settlement.
d. § Statute of limitations = 2 years.
How to Approach a § 16(b) Issue

1. Is the company public?
2. Is the defendant a director, officer, or beneficial owner of the company?
a. D and Os - you can match any transactions within 6 months while in position; and transactions
that occur after he or she ceases to be an officer or director are matchable with those made
while still in office, within 6 month period.
b. Beneficial owner - only if she owned more than 10% both at the time of the purchase and of the
sale, and within 6 months.
3. Can you match any purchase and sale within a 6 month period that yields profits?
a. Buy low and sell high
b. Sell high and buy low
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V. Limited Liability Companies (LLCs)
1. - Limited Liability Companies (LLCs):

a. o LLCs are their own unique form of business organization. They are not partnerships nor corporations.
But have aspects of both, they are a COMPANY
i. § LLCs are not subject to the restrictions applicable to S corporations (e.g., 100 shareholders, U.S.
citizens or residents).
b. o Nomenclatures: LLCs have members, members have membership interests.
c. o LLCs tend to be smaller privately held companies.
d. o When people start an LLC, typically choosing to file in the state where LLC located or Delaware.
e. o LLCs typically have characteristics of both partnerships and corporations.
i. § Tax advantages (can choose to be taxed like a partnership (pass through) or a corporation;
partnership = pass-through tax).
1. Passthrough is advantageous because it allows for losses to pass to members(deductions)
and no double taxation
ii. § Limited liability like corporations.
f. o A hallmark characteristic of LLCs is flexibility and focus on Contractual Freedom
i. § They are premised on a notion of private ordering (i.e. contracting, ordering their private affairs
by contract). A LLC is as much a creature of contract as of statute.
1. Individuals can structure governance based on contract
ii. § Except as expressly limited by statute, the operating agreement sets the rules for the LLC.
g. o California Adopted the Modified Revised Uniform LLC Act (RULLCA) in 2012, effective 2014.
h. Before LLCs individuals had to operate LPs with a limited and general partnership, or S corps. But both had
limitations
2. - Notes on California LLCs:
a. o Licensed professionals [lawyers] cannot operate through LLCs in California (so, many law firms are LLPs).
b. o In choosing between form of business, consider tax and fee issues.
i. § E.g., California has a gross receipts fee that apply to LLCs (but not corporations); depreciation
deductions; etc.
3. - LLC Basics:
a. o State LLC laws vary widely.
i. § Each state has its own LLC statute.
ii. § There is a uniform statute, RULLCA, adopted by over a dozen states (including California).
iii. § LLC case law is developing, but is generally much less extensive than partnership and corporate
case law because LLCs are relatively new.
b. o The operating agreement is the key document for an LLC; courts have drawn on contract principles as
well as partnership and corporate law principles in resolving disputes.
i. § If looking at a legal issue, looking at the statute and any relevant case law (i.e. what’s the
answer to some issue under RULLCA), but if dealing with an issue concerning an LLC, want to look
at the LLC operating agreement to understand the issue and what the rules are for the LLC.
c. Internal affairs doctrine applies so choosing the state of formation is a choice of law
4. - Formation:
a. o à Choose state of organization and reserve the LLC name.
b. o à Draft articles/certificate of organization consistent with statutory requirements and file with the
Secretary of State, paying filing fees and the franchise tax.
i. Most states require a minimal amount in the Articles. Typically the name of the LLC, indicating it is
an LLC, the addresss of its PPB or registered office, and the name and address of its agent for
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service of process. Some require name or members of managers, purpose of LLC and whether
member-managed or manager-managed
c. o à Tax arrangements (state and federal).
d. o à Designate office and agent for service of process.
e. o à Draft and enter into an operating agreement.
f. o à In California, file a “Statement of Information” with the Secretary of State, within 90 days after filing
the articles of organization (and update as required).
5. - Articles of Organization: Check the statutory requirements of what is required and file with Secretary of State’s
Office. Typically bare bones
a. o E.g.:
i. § The LLC’s name;
ii. § The LLC’s purpose;
iii. § The agent for service of process;
iv. § A description of the type of business that constitutes the principal business activity of the LLC;
v. § If the LLC is to be managed by 1 or more managers and not by all its members, the articles shall
contain a statement to that effect.
6. - Operating Agreement: The basic contract governing affairs of a LLC and stating the various rights and duties of
the members. This is the important agreement because it details how the LLC will be governed. This is most
important because want to uphold principles of freedom of contract between members/managers
a. o E.g.:
i. § Each member’s units/interests in the company;
ii. § Rights and duties of the members (including management structure and rights, voting rights and
requirements);
iii. § The manner in which profits and losses are divided, and distributions are made;
iv. § Amendment of operating agreement (default is unanimous consent);
v. § Remedies in the event that the members disagree on the direction of the company;
vi. § Exit provisions (e.g., withdrawal, dissociation, admission) and dissolution.
b. Under RULLCA the operating agreement may not:
i. • vary the choice of law that applies under the internal affairs doctrine;
ii. • vary the LLC’s capacity to sue and be sued;
iii. • vary any statutory provision pertaining to registered agents or records authorized or required to
be filed with the Secretary of State;
iv. • alter or eliminate the duty of loyalty or the duty of care, except as provided (and discussed
below in the section on fiduciary duties);
v. • eliminate the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing, but the operating agreement
may prescribe the standards, if not manifestly unreasonable, by which the performance of the
obligation is to be measured;
vi. • relieve or exonerate a person from liability for conduct involving bad faith, willful or intentional
misconduct, or knowing violation of law;
vii. • unreasonably restrict the rights to information of members and managers provided for under the
statute, but the operating agreement may impose reasonable restrictions and may define
appropriate remedies, including liquidated damages, for a breach of any reasonable restriction on
use;
viii. • vary certain statutory provisions concerning dissolution and winding up of the company
unreasonably restrict the statutory rights of a member to maintain a direct or derivative action;
ix. • vary the statutory provisions concerning a special litigation committee, but the operating
agreement may provide that the company may not have a special litigation committee;
x. • vary certain rights and requirements pertaining to mergers;
xi. • restrict the rights of a person other than a member or manager.
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c. o In California all LLCs are required to have a LLC Operating Agreement.

7. - Limited Liability and Veil Piercing Exception:
a. o General Rule: No member or manager of a limited liability company is obligated personally for any debt,
obligation, or liability of the LLC solely by reason of being a member or acting as a manager of the limited
liability company.
b. o Exception: Courts have imported veil piercing concepts into LLC law.
i. § Courts have pierced the LLC veil of limited liability to reach the personal assets of members
under circumstances similar to those under which courts would pierce the veil of a corporation
(alter-ego theory)
ii. § Proponents of PCV: Import as an exception but wouldn’t be same test as veil piercing for
corporations because some of factors for the corporations PCV test wouldn’t make sense for LLCs.
iii. § Opponents of PCV: Corporation veil piercing already big enough mess, should not be doing the
same for LLCs.
8. - Management Rights:
a. o Variable Management Structure: Can choose member-managed [kind of like partnership – decentralized
management] or manager-managed and can customize governance.
i. § Members: Investors in the LLC.
b. o Default is Member-Managed (e.g., RULLCA§407):
i. Members act as agents of the LLC in the ordinary course of business
ii. Most matters (ordinary course of business) are decided by majority vote.
iii. § States vary regarding whether the default allocation is one-person/one-vote or by ownership
interests in the company (percentage or units). RUCLA defaults for one vote per member
iv. § Significant matters require unanimous consent.
1. · E.g., merger, admission of new member, amending the operating agreement, etc.
v. Voting rules can be customized in operating agreement
c. o Manager-Managed LLC Option Available:
i. § Can be structured as a committee, “board of managers,” a CEO, etc.
ii. § Some statutes require that the choice be specified in the articles/certificate of organization
(California requires both the articles and operating agreement explicitly state manager-managed if
want to establish that structure).
9. - Finance:
a. o Contributions:
i. § LLC statutes do not require any minimum amount of capital to be contributed to an LLC, nor do
all members need to make capital contributions.
ii. § Members are free to decide among themselves how much cash, property, or services, if any,
each member will contribute.
b. o Allocation of Profits and Losses:
i. § Typically provided in the operating agreement.
ii. § Profits and losses may be allocated differently (re not according to contributions, but must agree
to it in operating agreement)
iii. § Delaware Default: Allocate profits and losses on a pro rata basis per the ownership interests in
the company (percentage or units) (DLLCA § 18-503).
iv. § RULLCA does not provide a default (it only provides a default rule for rights to share in
distributions)
c. o Distributions:
i. § Refers to the transfer of LLC property (e.g., cash) to members.
ii. § Members have no statutory right to compel a distribution – go by rules in the operating
agreement.
iii. § When there is a distribution declared, statutes usually have 1 of 2 default rules:
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1. ·(1) Distributions on a pro rata basis per the ownership interests/contributions in the
company (percentage or units) (e.g., CA § 18-504); or
2. ·(2) Equal share rules (per capita) like partnership (e.g., RULLCA § 404).
iv. Most LLC statutes prohibit distributions that would render the company unable to pay its bills as
they come due or that would render the company insolvent
d. o Transferability:
i. § Unless otherwise provided in the LLC’s operating agreement, a member may assign her financial
interest in the LLC.
ii. § Such a transfer typically transfers only the member’s right to receive distributions and does not
confer governance rights or rights to participate in management. (similar to General Partnership)
1. So can only get the management and governance rights if you are actually admitted as a
member, which by default would require unanimous consent.
iii. § An assignee of a financial interest in an LLC may acquire other rights only by being admitted as a
member of the company if all the remaining members consent or the operating agreement so
provides.
iv. § Analogous to partnership rules.
10. Information Rights
a. LLC statutes generally provdie members with a default right to access the LLCs books and records, upon
demand describing the particular information sought and a proper purpose related to the member’s
interest.
b. This can be provided for in the operating agreement or the manager can set forth reasonable standards to
obtain info reasonably related to member’s interest as a member
c. Manager-managed LLC, the managers also have rights to information to exercise their duties
11. Fiduciary Duties:
Section 409 provides that members in a member-managed LLC, and managers in a managermanaged
LLC, owe the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, including the duties:
● (1) to account to the company and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit
● Derived:
○ (A) in the conduct or winding up of the company’s activities and affairs;
○ (B) from a use of the company’s property; or

○ (C) from the appropriation of a company opportunity;
● (2) to refrain from dealing with the company in the conduct or winding up of
● (3) to refrain from competing with the company in the conduct of the company’s activities and affairs
before the dissolution of the company.
● The duty of care requires the members in a member-managed LLC, and managers in a manager-
managed LLC, to refrain from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, willful or intentional
misconduct, or knowing violation of law.
● Furthermore, members (and managers in a manager-managed LLC) shall discharge their duties and
obligations under the statute or under their operating agreement consistently with the contractual
obligation of good faith and fair dealing
a. o Manager-Managed LLCs: The managers of a manager-managed LLC have a default duty of care and
loyalty.
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i. § This is the general rule under most states’ LLC laws (including California which has adopted
RULLCA, and Delaware), but possibly not the rule under all states’ laws.
ii. § Usually, members of a manager-managed LLC have no duties to the LLC or its members by
reason of being members.
b. o Member-Managed LLCs: All members of a member-managed LLC have a default duty of care and loyalty.
c. o Standard of Care Varies by Statute: Some state ordinary care standard, some state gross negligence
(e.g., RULLCA).
d. o Derivative Actions: Member may bring an action on behalf of the LLC to recover a judgment in its favor
if the members with authority to bring the action refuse to do so.
e. o Freedom of Contract:
i. § RULLCA permits modification, but not elimination, of fiduciary duties (manifestly unreasonable
standard).
1. Specifically, the statute provides that, if not manifestly unreasonable, the operating
agreement may: (A) alter or eliminate aspects of the duty of loyalty; (B) identify specific
types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty; and (C) alter the
duty of care, but it may not authorize conduct involving bad faith, willful or intentional
misconduct, or knowing violation of law. In addition, the contractual obligation of good
faith and fair dealing cannot be eliminated, but the operating agreement may prescribe
the standards, if not manifestly unreasonable, by which the performance of the obligation
is to be measured.
ii. § Some states (like Delaware) have allowed for elimination of fiduciary duties if clearly and
expressly provided in the operating agreement.
iii. § The implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing is non-waivable (RULLCA allows
the operating agreement to prescribe standards, if not manifestly unreasonable, by which the
performance of the obligation is to be measured).
12. Direct Litigation-
a. A member who has been injure personally may maintain a direct action against another member, manager,
or the LLC to enforce and protect their rights and interests.
b. To maintain a direct action, the member must “plead and prove an actual threatened injury that is not
solely the result of an injury suffered or threatened to be suffered by the limited liability company
13. Derivative Claims
a. Can bring derivative claims, eg. breach of fiduciary duty
b. Many LLC statutes require a demand requirement like corporate law
c. DEL: Complaint must set forth with particularity the effort, if any, of the Pf to secure initiation of the action
by a manager or member or the reasons for not making the effort
d. RUCLA: RULLCA provides that a member may maintain a derivative action to enforce a right of a LLC if: (1)
the member first makes a demand on the other members in a member-managed LLC, or the managers of a
manager-managed LLC, requesting that they cause the company to bring an action to enforce the right, and
the managers or other members do not bring the action within a reasonable time; or (2) a demand would
be futile
14. Dissociation and Dissolution (RULLCA):
a. A person has the power to dissociate as a member at any time, rightfully or wrongfully, by withdrawing as a
member by express will
b. RULLCA provides for dissociation and dissolution default rules generally similar to RUPA with some big
differences:
i. § (1) The unilateral withdrawal of a member by express will does not result in a dissolution;
ii. § (2) There is no default provision for a buyout upon dissociation (instead the dissociated member
holds interest as a transferee) but they can contract for that ;
164
iii. § (3) Provides different events by which a member can dissociate and also means of expelling a
member (including where a member transfers all her interest).
c. o RULLCA thus creates more stability (like a corporation) by making it far harder for a member to force a
dissolution and winding up than in a partnership.
d. RULLCA provides for a means of expelling a member if they transfered all of their transferable interest and
there is unanimous consent of all other members; or pursuant to a judicial order because of wrognful
conduct adverse and materially affecting the company, willfully committed a material breach of oper.
Agreement, or engaged in conduct makes it not reasonably practicalbe to carry on the comany business
with the person as member
e. Dissociation is terminating member’s right t participate in management and conduct of co, as well as
fiduciary duties, but they continue to own their transferable right. Debt, obligation, or other liability to the
LLC or other members incurred while a member is not discharged
f. o Remember: Importance of customized rules in an operating agreement.
g. Dissolution:
i. A court may grant an application for judicial dissolution of the LLC if:
1. • The conduct of all or substantially all of the LLC’s activities is unlawful;
2. • It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s activities in conformity with
the articles of organization and the operating agreement; or
3. • The managers or members in control of the company have acted, are acting, or will act
in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent; or in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or
will be directly harmful to the applicant for dissolution.
ii. Absent a rescission of the LLC dissolution, the company continues after dissolution only for the
purpose of winding up. After its debts to creditors are paid, the surplus is distributed “(1) to each
person owning a transferable interest that reflects contributions made and not previously
returned, an amount equal to the value of the unreturned contributions; and (2) among persons
owning transferable interests in proportion to their respective rights to share in distributions
immediately before the dissolution of the company
15. - Dissociation and Dissolution (Delaware):
a. o Provides default rules for dissolution upon any of the following:
i. § (1) At the time, or upon the happening of events, specified in the operating agreement;
ii. § (2) Unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, upon the vote or consent of
members who own more than 2/3 of the then-current percentage interests in the LLC;
iii. § (3) Within 90 days of an event that terminated the membership of the last remaining member
(with limited exceptions); or
iv. § (4) Upon the entry of a decree of judicial dissolution.
b. o Unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, a member cannot unilaterally resign or withdraw
until the LLC has been dissolved and wound up.
16. - Legal Characteristics:
a. o Partnership:
i. § Informal: Advisable to have partnership agreement though.
ii. § Decentralized: Owner-managed (can alter by contract (e.g., law firms)).
iii. § Unlimited liability: Partnership agreement can have indemnity provisions (get insurance).
iv. § Full partnership interest not freely transferable (can alter by contract).
v. § No continuity (at will) (can alter by creating a term).
vi. § Cost: Low (deceptive).
vii. § Client Perception: Low prestige. Can be conceptually challenging.
viii. § Default Rules: Extensive.
ix. § Flexibility: Great.
x. § Tax: Pass-through: Avoid double-tax on profits. Use losses to offset other tax liability.
165
b. o Corporation:
i. § State filing and corporate formalities required.
ii. § Centralized: Manager-managed.
1. Separation of ownership and control.
2. Can alter by contract/statute (closely held corporations).
iii. § Limited Liability:
1. Creditors seek guarantees (closely held).
2. May not be an option for certain professions
iv. § Free Transferability of Interest:
1. Not realistic option in closely held.
2. Can restrict transfers.
v. § Continuity/Perpetual: Can limit to a definite term.
vi. § Cost: Filing fees; lawyers are critical.
vii. § Client Perception: High prestige; seems easier to understand.
viii. § Default Rules: Much more extensive.
ix. § Flexibility: Not as great; may require special skill to do correctly.
x. § Tax: Double-taxation: Tax on corporation profits and on distributions to SHs; losses usable only
by corporation.
17. - Issues to Consider in Choosing a Business Form:
a. o Formality:
i. § How formal do the parties want the relationship to be?
b. o Ability to Raise Capital:
i. § Will the business want to raise capital by selling securities in the near future?
ii. § What business forms are investors comfortable with?
c. o Which Default Rules do the Parties Prefer?
i. § Which “off the rack” form would require the least customization for the governance the parties
want? Can the parties achieve the rules they want with that form?
ii. § Is limited liability important?
iii. § How will the business be managed? How will control be allocated?
iv. § How long do the parties expect to stay in business together?
v. § Do the parties want their interests to be freely transferable?
d. o Taxation and Fees:
i. § Which form of taxation do each of the parties prefer (based on their own income, goals,
expectations about future revenue/assets)?
ii. § Filing fees, franchise fees, gross receipt fees?
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VI. Social Enterprise (e.g., Benefit Corporations)

- Social Enterprise:
o As a topic, asking the question: Should the law encourage corporations or other business entities to act in a socially
responsible way?
o New for-profit business entity forms have emerged in the last several years that clearly enable and mandate the pursuit of
social and environmental goals: L3Cs, flexible purpose corporations, benefit corporations.
o Social mission is central; pursuing social and financial returns (this is what has motivated this development).
o Many states (not Delaware or CA) have constituency statutes that allow directors to take into consideration various
stakeholders/interests other than that of shareholders.
- L3Cs:
o New form of for-profit business entity (low profit LLCs with a charitable or educational purpose) – this is a variance of the
LLC form.
o In 2008, Vermont was the first state to allow a company to register as a L3C, built on the LLC framework with the aim of
giving for-profit companies with social missions the ability to raise philanthropic funds.
o L3C form was passed by 9 states (i.e. only 9 states offer this business form), but has slowed and even regressed.
- Benefit Corporations:
o New form of for-profit business entity (note: these are not non-profit).
o Legislation varies by jurisdiction; is available in California, Delaware, and some other states; is on the rise.
o Most statutes are based on a model statute proposed by B Lab, a nonprofit corporation that awards certification.
o Benefit Corporation vs. B Corp:
§ Benefit Corporation: Specific legal corporate structure (referring to the form of business entity).
§ B Corp: A certification by a third-party certifying company (it’s not the form of the business entity itself).
o In making business judgments [in a benefit corporation], the directors must consider the impact of their decisions on non-
shareholder interests (e.g., the environment, society).
§ Ex: Under benefic corporation law, the directors are instructed that in making decisions, they need to consider
non-shareholder interests such as the environment and the corporation’s impact on society.
- Benefit Purpose:
o A benefit corporation must:
§ (1) Have a corporate purpose that involves creating or pursuing a general public benefit (B Lab model statute
defines general public benefit as a material positive impact on society and the environment); can also have a specific
benefit purpose.
§ (2) Produce, file with the state, and make publicly available an annual benefit report that describes how it pursued
the general public benefit and the success of that pursuit [this is an attempt to make benefit corporations
accountable].
Assessment must be done by reference to a comprehensive, credible, and transparent third-party standard
– trying to get at idea of accountability and transparency in the corporation’s effort to pursue a general public
benefit and what it has actually achieved in that regard.
§ (3) Must have a benefit director, independent of the corporation, who prepares an opinion to be included in
annual benefit report about whether corporation acted in accordance with its public benefit purpose and if not how it failed
to comply.
Idea is that baked into the structure of the benefit corporation is a person then who wears the hat of
benefit director who’s supposed to be independent person monitoring and preparing an opinion to explain
whether/not this independent benefit director thinks that the corporation was acting in accordance with this public
benefit purpose.
167
§ (4) Mechanism built into benefit corporate law called benefit enforcement proceeding that’s an attempt to add an
accountability mechanism.
Rule: The benefit enforcement proceeding may be brought by the corporation or derivatively by a shareholder,
director or others specified for failing to pursue or create a general public benefit.
No case law on how courts should analyze these proceedings or how the fiduciary obligations should be assessed
[because this is a new development in the law].
- B Lab:
o A non-profit that tries to promotes and push states to adopt benefit corporation statutes.
o Promotes model legislation for benefit corporation statutes to be adopted by state legislatures.
o Certifies a qualifying corporation as a “Certified B Corporation”: Meaning company has met B Lab’s standards as a socially
responsible corporation; this is a private standard (similar to idea fair trade coffee certification).
o Example B Corps: Ben & Jerry’s, Honest Company, Etsy, Patagonia, Warby Parker.
- Some Critiques:
o Benefit corporations are unnecessary or will have unintended consequences:
§ Can already customize a regular “C” corporation’s charter – don’t need benefit corporations because someone
who wants to can already customize a C corporation’s charter by putting provisions into that certification or articles
that specify how those people want company to be run.
§ Directors already have leeway under traditional corporate law to consider non-shareholder stakeholders and the
environment (e.g., BJR, constituency statutes in some states).
§ Benefit corporation status will only matter (in terms of the law) in very limited circumstances when there is clear
tension between shareholder value maximization and social performance.
§ The development of benefit corporations might unfortunately make “C” corporation managers think they should
not consider the impact of the corporation on non-shareholder stakeholders (viewpoint: Idea that all corporations
should already understand the imperative to act in socially responsible manner and there’s a concern that if make a
new category of corporations and suggest that category that it’s supposed to consider acting in socially responsible
manner, that by contra-distinctions it would suggest that other corporations don’t have to and that this really
shouldn’t be the case).
o Benefit corporations will be ineffectual or won’t work as intended:
§ [These tend to be criticisms that go to the various terms of benefit corporation’s statutes].
§ If a benefit corporation were to go public, stock price and the threat of corporate takeover could put pressure on
directors and managers to increase profits (in other words, there are forces outside of law that push companies to
try to maximize profits).
§ Accountability:
· Social performance is difficult to measure and evaluate.
· Difficulties implementing assessments, benefit director opinion, etc.
Directors and managers have wide discretion – personal choices
168

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What are the key elements of an agency relationship?

What are the key elements of an agency relationship?

What are some critiques of benefit corporations?

What are some critiques of benefit corporations?

Business Association Outline

I. Definition and Creation of the Agency Relationship

● If all of the elements are met then there is an agency relationship.

● •Warren was shipping to Cargill ~ 90% of its cash grain

● •Cargill refused to provide Warren additional financing.

1. Mutual Assent by Both Principal and Agent

b. Subject To the Principal’s Control

Quick Summary: Formation of Agency

II. Rights and Duties Between Principal and Agent

1. Principal’s Obligations to Agent

2. Agent’s fiduciary Duties to Principal

e. Duty of Care, Competence, and Dilligence

g. Duty of Information and Confidentiality

III. Consequences of Creating an Agency Relationship: Contract and Tort Liability

1. Principal’s Contract Liability to Third Party

TIP: Implied v. Apparent Authority (Mill St Church v. Hogan):

vi. Manifestation traceable to the principal or apparent principal

3. Jackson et al. v. Odenat et al v. Mondesir, 3rd party Df: No manifestation to the

c. Undisclosed Principal Liability

2. An undisclosed principal can’t rely on narrowing an agent’s authority to less than

➢ Scope: Ratification is all or nothing--there is no partial ratification. It is ineffective unless it

2. Agents Contract Liability to the Third Party

Summary of Liability on Contract

Principal Bound/liable if one (or more) of the following is present:

Can also be liable for breach of the implied warranty of authority

Some exceptions when the principal is undisclosed or unidentified (where the

4. Tort Liability: Agent Liability

5. Tort Liability: Principal Liability for Agent’s Action

i. 1) Pf needs to come forward with evidence they provided

Relationship type Employee Non-employee agent Non Agent (service

Description Agent has the • Agent has the • No agency relationship

2. Within the scope of employment

e. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort (Negligence-Motive and Purpose): FACTS:Chef manager

b. 2) Did the conduct occur substantially within the authorized

ii. Apparent Agency

D. Termination of the Agency Relationship-Actual Authority

E. Termination of the Agency Relationship-Apparent Authority

A. Partnership Formation (Definition and Distinction from Other Relationships; Partnership by

c) Factors to determine Partnership;

C. The Fiduciary Duties of Partners

6.Fiduciary duties owed to Partners in a Partnership: RUPA § 409

7. Duty of Loyalty: § 409 (b)

8. Duty of Care: § 409(c)

9. Good Faith and Fair Dealing: § 409(d)

11. Nonwaivable Provisions – RUPA § 103:

D. Rights of Partners in Management; Partnership Liability

2. Apparent Authority: Contract Liability

D. Statement of Partnership Authority (RUPA § 303)

F. Partner’s Liability: Joint and Several Liability (RUPA § 306)

H. Miscellaneous Partnership Rules:

How to Reconcile National Biscuit and Summers

3. Is it partnership Property? (RUPA rule § 203 & 204)

5. A partner’s Transferable interests

2) Sharing in Profits and Losses