Crown Family Director

Professor of Politics
Shai Feldman

Senior Executive Director

Professor of the Practice in Politics
Trump’s Peace Plan: Engagement or Swift
Gary Samore
Rejection?
Associate Director
Kristina Cherniahivsky

Charles (Corky) Goodman Professor

Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki
of Middle East History
Associate Director for Research

T
Naghmeh Sohrabi
he Trump administration seems intent on launching its
Myra and Robert Kraft Professor
of Arab Politics long anticipated “ultimate deal” or “deal of the century”—
Eva Bellin
its proposal for peace between Israel and the Palestinians—
Henry J. Leir Professor of the
Economics of the Middle East sometime after the April 9 Israeli elections. This invites
Nader Habibi
the following inter-related and important questions: What
Renée and Lester Crown Professor
of Modern Middle East Studies
factors will determine whether Trump’s initiative will
Pascal Menoret succeed or fail? Given current political circumstances,
Senior Fellows what are the odds that the initiative will succeed? Finally,
Abdel Monem Said Aly, PhD
Kanan Makiya, Professor Emeritus with what degree of confidence can estimates about these
Goldman Senior Fellow odds be made? This Brief aims to address these questions,
Khalil Shikaki, PhD
with a particular emphasis on the impact of the Israeli and
Research Fellow
David Siddhartha Patel, PhD Palestinian domestic political environments on the odds that
Sabbatical Fellows
Trump’s “ultimate deal” will succeed or fail.
Hanan Hammad, PhD
Daniel Neep, PhD Addressing these important questions, however, requires that we first define
Harold Grinspoon Junior Research Fellow what we mean by the terms “success” and “failure.” The criteria we use here to
Hind Ahmed Zaki, PhD define these terms are very modest. “Failure” would mean a swift rejection of
Neubauer Junior Research Fellow the initiative by the Palestinian Authority (PA) or Israel or both. Conversely,
Yazan Doughan, PhD the initiative would be considered successful if the two protagonists decide to
Junior Research Fellows re-engage the United States and one another in serious negotiations regarding
Hayal Akarsu, PhD the plan’s details and the terms and conditions for its possible implementation.
Maryam Alemzadeh, PhD

April 2019
No. 126
 The Fate of the “Ultimate Deal”
The Trump team has made it clear that its peace plan will address all permanent
status issues, including borders, settlements, security arrangements, Jerusalem,
and refugees.1 It has also affirmed that the plan is extensive and detailed,
extending to some fifty pages or more. The administration’s peace experts expect
that when the proposal is submitted to Israel and the Palestinians, both will find
“enough in it” to serve as a basis for further negotiations, even if they dislike some
of its components. According to one member of the Trump peace team, rejection
of the plan “will have consequences”—indicating that the administration will not
kindly take “no” for an answer.

Whether the PA or Israel or both will in fact dismiss the proposed “ultimate
deal” or, alternatively, express willingness to discuss its details and negotiate its
possible implementation will likely be determined by four factors:

1. whether the plan presented meets the two protagonists’ minimal

requirements;
2. whether key Arab leaders are willing to support U.S. efforts to gain Israeli
and Palestinian acceptance of the plan, at least as a basis for further detailed
negotiations;
3. whether the Trump administration is viewed as willing to exercise leverage
on both sides in order to garner Israeli and Palestinian acceptance of the
Shai Feldman is the proposed deal; and, finally,
Crown Family Director 4. the degree to which the Israeli and Palestinian domestic environments allow
of the Crown Center and receptivity to the initiative.
Professor of Politics at
If they are to refrain from swiftly rejecting the Trump administration’s long-
Brandeis University. anticipated peace initiative, Israel and the PA would both need to see it as
addressing at least their minimal requirements. For the Palestinians, the plan
Khalil Shikaki is the would need to include important elements of the so-called 2000 Clinton
Goldman Senior Fellow Parameters and President George W. Bush’s 2002 commitment to Palestinian
statehood, as well as key elements of the Arab League’s 2002 Arab Peace
at the Crown Center and
Initiative. Within this framework, the deal would need to: a) promise Palestinian
Director of the Palestinian independent statehood; b) provide that the boundaries between Israel and the
Center for Policy and Survey new Palestinian state would be based on the 1967 lines, with mutually acceptable
Research (PCPSR) in changes made through territorial swaps so as to grant the new state maximum
Ramallah. territorial contiguity; and c) commit to locating the capital of the new Palestinian
state in the area of East Jerusalem that will be under its sovereignty.

From Israel’s perspective, the proposed deal would need to: a) address Israel’s
security concerns, so that its population’s safety is not compromised; b) ensure
Israel’s future as a Jewish state by addressing the plight of Palestinian refugees
in a way that does not jeopardize Israel’s demographic composition; c) stipulate
that the boundaries negotiated would include the large settlement blocs; and d)
provide that Jerusalem will remain united and guarantee unhindered access to its
various quarters, neighborhoods, and holy sites.
The opinions and findings expressed
in this Brief belong to the authors A second determinant of the plan’s success or failure will be whether or not key
exclusively and do not reflect those of the Arab leaders—primarily King Abdullah of Jordan, Egyptian President Abdel
Crown Center or Brandeis University.
Fattah el-Sisi, and Saudi Arabia’s King Salman—are willing to support U.S. efforts

2
to gain Palestinian acceptance of the plan, at least as a of which was the administration’s recognition of Israel’s
basis for further detailed negotiations. Indeed, garnering sovereignty over the Golan Heights on March 25—by
such support has been at the heart of the Trump rejecting the administration’s peace initiative. While
administration’s preparation of the “ultimate deal” over he has been generous in providing such gains, America’s
the past two years, in sharp contrast to all previous U.S. mercurial president has already shown that, once crossed,
administrations’ attempts to secure Palestinian-Israeli he is willing to use his Twitter account as a weapon of
peace. Yet such support will likely not be forthcoming mass destruction and to unleash his wrath even against
unless the Palestinians’ aforementioned minimal traditional U.S. allies, such as Canada, France, and
requirements are satisfactorily addressed. Otherwise, Germany.
Arab leaders will have no defense against the predictable
accusation that, by pressing for Palestinian acceptance of Exercising such U.S. leverage on Israel would not be
the plan, they have betrayed the Palestinian cause. unprecedented. In 1974, U.S. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger announced a “reassessment” of U.S.-Israeli
A third important determinant of the plan’s prospects relations when then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
for success would be the extent to which the Trump refused at first to make the concessions necessary for
administration is willing to exercise leverage on both reaching a second disengagement agreement with Egypt
sides, by offering incentives for its acceptance and in the aftermath of the 1973 War. Similarly, under the
presenting costs for its rejection out-of-hand. Trump’s presidency of George H. W. Bush, the U.S. withheld
capacity to punish the PA has already been demonstrated 10 billion dollars of U.S. government loan guarantees
by the one-sided U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s necessary for absorbing a million Soviet refugees in order
capital, by the decisions to move the U.S. Embassy from to compel Israel to halt settlement construction.
Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and to end the special status of
the U.S. Consulate in East Jerusalem as the de facto U.S. The U.S. also exercised leverage in 1999–2000 to compel
Embassy to the Palestinians, and by ending U.S. funding Israel to avoid exporting sensitive military technology—
of UNWRA, the UN agency supporting Palestinian especially the Phalcon Airborne Warning and Command
refugees. Yet these punishments can now also provide the System—to China. And in recent weeks, even the Trump
U.S. with an opportunity to present the Palestinians with administration began to threaten sanctioning Israel over
new incentives, such as orchestrating an international this same issue. Thus, visiting Israel on March 21, U.S.
project, with strong regional participation, to settle Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a stark warning
Palestinian refugees or formally promising that once its that the close security ties between the two countries—
proposal for the future of Jerusalem is implemented, the especially in the realm of intelligence sharing and co-
new U.S. Embassy to Palestine will be located there. location of security facilities—could be reduced over
Israel’s growing cooperation with China. “If certain
At the same time, the PA will also have to assume that systems go in certain places,” Pompeo remarked to Israeli
its swift rejection of the Trump proposal would lead television, “then America’s efforts to work alongside you
to considerable additional punishment. The financial will be more difficult, and in some cases, we won’t be able
consequences of further punitive measures would to do so.”3
likely include significant economic deterioration in the
West Bank and a gradual destabilization of the PA.
Major public outrage might also turn against the PA, Palestinian Domestic Conditions
just as deteriorating economic conditions have recently
resulted in mass demonstrations against Hamas in Gaza.2 How would the current Palestinian domestic
The departure of Abbas from the scene under these environment affect the odds that the Trump initiative
circumstances could destabilize conditions even more, would succeed or fail? For more than a year now, the
perhaps bringing the PA to collapse. And any further PA and all other Palestinian factions have waged a
worsening of U.S.-Palestinian ties would provide ideal pre-emptive political campaign against the Trump
conditions for the pro-annexation elements in Israeli administration and its efforts to present a peace plan.
politics to advance their case even more effectively than This campaign has been largely propelled by the
before, which could generate an abrupt termination of perception of most, if not all, Palestinians that the U.S. is
PA-Israeli security coordination. siding fully with the Netanyahu government and that it
has taken the Jerusalem and refugees issues off the table.
On Israel’s side, having benefited so far from Trump’s Thus, a March 2019 poll conducted by the Palestinian
unilateral steps, the country’s leaders would likely be Center for Policy and Survey Research shows that up
wary of risking a reversal of their gains—the most recent to 80 percent or more of Palestinians do not expect the

3
Trump plan to meet any of the top vital Palestinian needs to change the Judiciary Law in order to deprive it of
in any peace agreement.4 This has led to the “ultimate its independence; interfering in judicial decisions; and
deal” (touted by Trump as the “deal of the century”) creating a political court, dubbed a Constitutional Court,
being referred to by Palestinians as a curse—and it is with powers exceeding those of the High Court—which
so referred to by various Palestinian players as a way of had served in the past as a constitutional court. Abbas
discrediting their opponents, regardless of who they are. has also attacked freedom of the press (via the Cyber
Crime Law) and arrested journalists and activists for
One of the consequences of this environment is the negative media reports or negative posts on social media.
unavoidable negative framing that will accompany the He has also weakened civil society and destroyed its
release of the plan: Even if it includes many positive independence and pluralism by requiring NGOs to seek
elements for the Palestinians, its release will be met with permission before receiving funding for research or other
great suspicion if not its out-of-hand rejection. Indeed, purposes.9
the same recent PSR poll indicates that more than 50
percent of Palestinians would reject a Trump peace plan The effects of these negative developments have been
even if it meets their top vital needs.5 compounded by a significant hardening of Palestinian
public attitudes on issues related to peacemaking. This
The domestic Palestinian environment is indeed a can be seen most clearly in sharply decreased support
substantially negative one with respect to any possible for the two-state solution and increased support for a
peace proposal. To begin with, there is considerable one-state solution; decreased willingness to support
public distrust in Abbas’s leadership, with 61 to 70 the compromises that would be necessary in any
percent of the public wanting him to resign and only resolution of the various issues subject to permanent
about a quarter of respondents in recent surveys status negotiations; and greater support for violence,
viewing him as a credible leader who keeps his word.6 particularly on the part of youth.10
Up to 80 percent of respondents fully disagree with his
entire Gaza policy (sanctions; demand for immediate Several developments have contributed to this negative
and full, rather than gradual and partial, transfer of trajectory. First, the viability of the two-state solution is
control; demand to disarm Hamas).7 The PA’s and seen as having declined as a result of Israeli settlement
Abbas’s legitimacy are also questioned on account of the expansion and other factors. Today, about 60 percent of
expiration of Abbas’s electoral mandate and that of the Palestinians believe that Israeli settlement expansion in
Palestinian Legislative Council some years ago. In turn, the West Bank has made it impossible to separate the
this lack of legitimacy reduces the willingness of non- two peoples into two states. Developments in Israel, such
Fatah factions and the public at large to defer to the PA as the outcomes of national elections during the past
leadership. decade, are seen as having further strengthened right-
wing and hardline tendencies that deny the legitimacy
The split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of Palestinian aspirations to independence and self-
along with the measures imposed by Abbas in early determination. Perceptions that the Arab world no longer
2018 against Gaza,8 are widely seen as having damaged cares about the Palestinian cause and that the Trump
national unity, thereby making it difficult for Palestinians administration is wholly committed to Israel’s right-
to develop more coherent responses to possible peace wing agenda have contributed to growing Palestinian
proposals. Thus, Hamas will surely frame the expected despair. As a result, some 75 percent of Palestinians now
Trump initiative in the most negative possible terms believe that the chances for a Palestinian state emerging
and might even resort to violence to impede its possible alongside the state of Israel are slim or non-existent.11
acceptance or implementation. And the split will make
it even more difficult to conduct elections that would A second driver of the hardening of Palestinian
either produce a new leadership or grant legitimacy and a attitudes is public distrust of the Israeli Jewish side.
renewed mandate to the existing one. An overwhelming majority view what it sees as Israel’s
long-term aspirations—annexing the West Bank and
Palestinian civil society and the public at large are very expelling its population or denying them their civil and
critical of Abbas, seeing him as having dissolved the political rights—as existential threats. Most Palestinians
Palestinian Legislative Council in clear violation of the believe that most Israelis do not want peace and do not
Basic Law and as having weakened the judiciary by support a two-state solution.
dismissing the Chief Justice and appointing a new one
without any basis in law. Other controversial steps Finally, the Palestinian public’s questioning of the
that Abbas has taken include proposing amendments legitimacy of their own political system—concerns

4
about the status of their governance and the future of Israelis has declined considerably: from 68 percent in
a Palestinian transition to democracy—are on the rise. 2006 to 49 percent in June 2018.14 This is the lowest level
This is important because public opinion data show a of support for this concept among Israelis in more than a
correlation between Palestinians’ negative evaluation of decade—when a steady decline in support began—and
the status of democracy in the PA and reduced support the lowest in almost two decades of joint Palestinian-
for the two-state solution.12 Israeli survey research.

Nevertheless, the domestic Palestinian environment The most troubling aspect of the decline in the level of
is not entirely negative. On the positive side, Abbas’s support for the two-state solution among Israeli Jews is
own positions on three main sets of issues—the terms that young people—between the ages of 18 and 24—are
of a peace agreement, violence against Israelis, and the least supportive of the idea. Thus, only 27 percent
normalization and reconciliation with Israel and the of Israeli youth, compared with 51 percent of those who
Israeli public—remain moderate. And though there are are 55 years or older, are currently supportive of this
various rumors and claims with respect to his health, no approach.15 And the future may bring even lower levels of
evidence exists pointing to any serious illness. Finally, support for this solution.
despite suffering a significant loss of public trust,
Abbas remains quite popular and trusted within Fatah Another facet of this decline in support for a two-state
ranks, and his control and influence vis-à-vis the Fatah solution, from a solid majority to a mere plurality, is the
leadership remain highly effective. growing gap between the supporters and opponents of a
peace deal with respect to the intensity with which their
For its part, Fatah is still the Palestinian party pushing opposing opinions are held. One of the most important
for negotiating peace and reconciliation with Israel. It consequences of the failed peace efforts and recurring
remains relatively strong, with approximately 35–40 eruptions of violence since the signing of the 1993 Oslo
percent of the Palestinian public supporting it. More Accords has been a decline in the confidence among
broadly, the balance of power within the Palestinian supporters of a two-state solution in the viability of their
domestic scene continues to favor nationalist secularist still preferred policy option. Not surprisingly, opponents
forces, comprised of Fatah and leftist factions (some of a two-state solution have repeatedly demonstrated
50 percent), as opposed to Hamas and other Islamists greater commitment, superior mobilization, and better
(totaling some 30 percent), with a minority of some 20 organization than have the proponents of this solution.
percent remaining “undecided.”13 This also explains why those opposed to a two-state
framework—especially the Israeli settler community—
For this reason, it is so important that Fatah’s elite seem to have succeeded in setting the country’s agenda,
remains strongly behind Abbas on matters dealing with even as their views have never been held by the majority
Israel, the U.S., and the peace process, despite some of Israelis.
disagreement with him on details. Consequentially,
should Abbas decide to return to negotiations based on This points to a broader proposition: namely, that
the Trump plan, he will be supported by the entire Fatah changes in policy preferences can be affected by
leadership and base. assessments of feasibility and viability even when no
discernible change in public opinion regarding basic
A final positive aspect of the Palestinian internal relevant values has taken place. This is reflected in a
environment is the strong and effective security sector, recent survey conducted by the Van Leer Institute in
which has achieved a notable level of professionalism. cooperation with the Citizens Accord Forum and the
This allows it not only to continue to enforce order and Shaharit Institute. Seventy-one percent of Jewish Israeli
to secure and protect Abbas, but also to continue security respondents opined that “there is a moral problem
cooperation with the Israeli defense and intelligence with Israel’s control over the Palestinians”; when the
establishments so long as Abbas continues to instruct question invoked biblical terms (for the West Bank), an
them to do so. even higher number—78 percent—believe that “control
over the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria is not good
for Israel.” So why do those large majorities not support
The Israeli Domestic Environment changing what they perceive to be a negative reality? The
answer is that fully 66 percent of the same respondents
The receptivity on the Israeli domestic side to renewed think that, as the Jerusalem Post puts it, “there is no
peace efforts looks equally troubling. As is the case with alternative at present.”16
Palestinians, support for a two-state solution among

5
This hardening of views among Israelis about the constituting a “veto bloc” that could win repeated “no
prospects of peace with their Palestinian neighbors confidence” votes in the Knesset. It would not be able to
seems to currently guide Israel’s political elite as it form a governing coalition, as its majority would rest on
navigates the turbulent waters of the 2019 elections. non-Zionist Arab parties that Blue-White has excluded as
Long gone are the days in 1996-99 when, in his first term potential partners.
as prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu negotiated with
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat at least two important A second reason why seeing the two blocs as enjoying
implementation agreements within the framework of the roughly equal size may be misleading is that at least
Oslo Accords: the 1997 Hebron Agreement and the 1998 one faction within the Blue-White alliance—Telem,
Wye River Accords. Also gone are Netanyahu’s pledges headed by former IDF Chief of Staff and former Minister
to a two-state solution, such as the much-touted speech of Defense Moshe (Bogi) Yaalon—might just as well be
he delivered on June 14, 2009, at Bar Ilan University, in counted as belonging to the Likud-led Right and Ultra-
which he expressed his support for and commitment to Right camp. This faction includes not only individuals
this solution. All such references are absent from Likud’s who, like Yaalon, believe that Israel currently lacks a
Netanyahu-controlled 2019 election campaign. Palestinian partner able to conclude and implement a
two-state deal, but also some—like former journalist
Equally indicative of this negative change in support Yoaz Hendel—who are firmly opposed to such a deal
for a two-state solution is that references to a two- on ideological grounds. Telem is amply represented in
state solution are equally absent from the rhetoric of the Blue-White list of candidates to the Knesset, so its
the leaders of the centrist challenge to Likud in these possible defection in response to a Trump-proposed peace
elections: the Blue-White alliance headed by former IDF deal would deprive any potential Center-Left and Left
Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. (ret.) Benny Gantz. Indeed, so far coalition of its numerical majority.
Gantz has shown remarkable discipline in avoiding any
expression of support for this solution, an omission that And a third reason why the assessment that popular
was especially noteworthy in his recent meeting with support for the Likud-led and Blue-White-led blocs is
Ambassadors representing European Union member roughly equal may be misleading is that it ignores an
states.17 Not surprisingly, the Blue-White alliance’s important aspect of current Israeli political reality: the
platform published in early March has engaged in verbal much greater commitment of Likud followers as opposed
acrobatics, stating the need to preserve Israel’s character to those who say they intend to vote for Blue-White. In a
as a Jewish state by “separating from the Palestinians” recent opinion poll, almost 70 percent of those who stated
while “avoiding disengagement” from the areas where their intention to vote for Likud said they are certain
those same Palestinians reside.18 that they would do so; in sharp contrast, only 38 percent
of respondents who said they intended to vote for Blue-
Such verbal gymnastics demonstrate two things: first, White expressed similar certainty.19 This is a reflection
that even Likud’s centrist opponents are not fully of the broader phenomenon noted earlier: namely, the
committed to a deal based on a two-state framework. asymmetry in the intensity with which views are held
And second, that those who have crafted the Blue-White about the Center-Right and the Center-Left. On Election
alliance’s campaign strategy assess support for a two- Day, this disparity may translate to a gap in turnout
state solution as weak even among their target audience between those currently expressing their support for each
and constituency—the center of Israel’s political map— of the two camps.
and hence as of insufficient size to merit the adoption of
such a goal as a core aspiration. Finally, predictions based on these aspects of the
Israeli domestic scene as to how Israel might react to
The aforementioned characteristics of the current Israeli a Trump peace initiative understate the uncertainty
domestic political reality are likely to be reflected in the regarding what this scene might look like through the
composition and leanings of the next Israeli Knesset. rest of 2019. Much of this uncertainty is associated
For the moment, the two blocs—the Likud-led Right with Netanyahu’s legal predicaments and their possible
and Ultra-Right and the Blue-White-led Center-Left political ramifications. Thus, while public support for
and Left—seem destined to divide the Knesset roughly Netanyahu is currently roughly equal to that of Gantz, in
equally. But dividing the expected post-April 9 Knesset a recent survey, more than two-thirds of Israelis opined
composition this way ignores the fact that even if the that Netanyahu should leave office either now or if he is
Center-Left and Left bloc wins a small post-election actually indicted.20 As of this writing, an indictment is
majority, it would only be able to prevent the Center- quite likely to materialize following a hearing now set
Right and Right camp from governing by essentially by Israel’s attorney general for July. Even if Netanyahu’s

6
continued tenure were legally possible—his ardent Similarly, Israeli public support could be increased by
supporters will surely argue that he should be considered associating the core deal with Palestinians changing
innocent until proven guilty—it would prove politically textbooks to remove incitement against Jews, by the
impossible, as a growing number of Likud leaders who for U.S. offering a defense treaty with Israel, and by Arab
now continue to “circle the wagons” will increasingly see countries agreeing to provide some compensation
his leadership as a political liability. to Israeli Jews who left property behind when they
immigrated to Israel after 1948. Indeed, research shows
Yet the political ramifications of Netanyahu’s possible that a combination of any two such incentives could
departure from the Israeli political scene are far from increase support for a deal among Israeli Jews to
certain. The loss of a charismatic leader may well lead more than 60 percent.23 Intangible incentives, such as
to a weakening of the Center-Right and Right bloc. But Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and an
Netanyahu’s departure would just as likely reopen a acknowledgment of the Jewish historic and religious ties
competition within that bloc with respect to who would to the land, might also have a significant impact.
represent a more “authentic Right” leader—and such a
competition might well produce a further hardening of A second set of steps that the Trump administration
views among the bloc’s supporters, as leaders who have could take to significantly increase support for the
situated themselves to the right of Netanyahu make proposed deal is to mobilize key Sunni Arab states to
possibly compelling cases for their positions. Moreover, present Israel and the Palestinians with a linked, regional
Netanyahu’s replacement by a Likud leader like Gideon economic development and integration plan. The plan
Sa’ar, who is seen as clean of corruption, might actually should be rolled out with great drama while making it
strengthen the Right. All of this may make Israel’s Center- clear that its implementation and expected benefits,
Right even less open to the compromises that would have including regional prosperity, would remain contingent
to be made in the framework of a Trump-proposed peace on Palestinian and Israeli acceptance of the “ultimate
initiative. deal,” at least as a basis for detailed negotiations.

Adding Incentives? Closing Remarks

While these portraits of the Palestinian and Israeli The Trump administration’s “ultimate deal” will be dead
domestic scenes do not justify optimistic assessments on arrival unless its core content meets the minimum
of the odds that the “ultimate deal” can succeed, there requirements of both sides. Yet any assessment of
are some measures that the Trump administration the administration’s conduct toward Israel and the
could take to decrease the odds of a swift rejection Palestinians over the past two years cannot avoid the
by Palestinians or Israelis or both. The first, assuming prediction that the proposed deal will most likely fail
that the proposed deal does indeed meet the minimum to meet the Palestinians’ minimal requirements. What
requirements of both sides, is to accompany the deal remains to be seen is whether or not it will also fail to
with a set of incentives that will address associated meet the Israelis’ minimal requirements.
issues about which Israelis and Palestinians care. On
the Palestinian side, surveys show that gaining the It is more difficult to assess how the plan will fare
Palestinians’ support for a deal to a level that exceeds regarding the second determinant of the odds that it
two-thirds could be achieved by suggesting that its will succeed or fail: the reaction of key Arab leaders.
implementation would be associated with a total release This is because it seems that, as of this writing, the plan
of Palestinian prisoners. This incentive alone is likely to has yet to be shared with these U.S. allies. Under these
cause over half of the opposition to change their minds conditions, no Arab leader will be willing to lend support
and support an agreement, thereby increasing support for for the plan should Abbas reject and dismiss it out of
a comprehensive deal to some 70 percent.21 hand. Furthermore, given the track record of the Trump
administration’s imbalanced treatment of Israel and the
A similar effect might be achieved by associating the deal Palestinians, it is likely that any U.S. leverage will target
with Palestinian access to the Israeli labor market and by the Palestinians but not Israel. Yet imposing additional
promising free movement for the two peoples between sanctions against the Palestinians will bring the PA to the
the two states. Intangible incentives, such as an Israeli verge of collapse.
acknowledgment of the historic and religious roots of the
Palestinians in historic Palestine and recognition of the Any attempt to assess the likely reactions among Israelis
Arab and Islamic character of the Palestinian state, might and Palestinians to Trump’s much-anticipated “ultimate
have a comparable impact.22
7
deal” to resolve their conflict must take the full array 12 For example, analysis of PSR’s March 2018 poll shows a
of considerations presented here into account. Yet the correlation between positive assessment of Palestinian
multiplicity of these different considerations, combined democracy and a higher level of support for the two-
with uncertainty as to their relative weight, will make state solution: Among those who assessed Palestinian
democracy as good or very good, support for that solution
any such assessment speculative at best. On the one
stood at 63%, while among those who assessed Palestinian
hand, especially within both the Palestinian and Israeli democracy as bad or very bad, support dropped to 41%.
domestic arenas, there has been a considerable hardening See Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research,
of views about the conflict, making the two publics deeply Public Opinion Poll No (67), March 27, 2018.
and increasingly skeptical of a deal, even if they are not 13 For the most recent data on the domestic Palestinian
ideologically opposed to one. At the same time, research balance of power, see Palestinian Center for Policy and
has shown that such skepticism might be overcome by Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No (71).
adding incentives to the proposed deal that address what 14 Shikaki and Scheindlin, “Role of Public Opinion in the
Israelis and Palestinians respectively care about most. Resilience/Resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict,”
p. 2.
15 Ibid.
Moreover, as we have pointed out, much of the hardening
16 Maariv Online, “71% of Israeli Jews Find Israeli Control
of views in both camps in recent years has stemmed not over the Palestinians Immoral,” Jerusalem Post, March 15,
from changes in ideological predispositions but rather 2019.
from the cumulative effect of political and military 17 Yisrael Price, “Gantz Sidesteps Two-State Solution in
developments on both peoples’ assessments of the viability E.U. Meeting,” Hamodia, March 12, 2019.
of peace proposals. But, if this is the case, would not a 18 Yuval Karni, “Without a Palestinian State and with
peace plan dramatically presented by the president of the Transportation on Shabbat: Blue-White’s Platform
United States and supported by key Arab state leaders Uncovered” (Bli medina palestinit ve’im tachbura
change Israelis’ and Palestinians’ assessments regarding the beshabat: matza’a kahol levan nechsaf) Ynet, March 6,
feasibility of an alternative to current policies? 2019, [in Hebrew].
19 Yossi Verter, “Haaretz Election Poll: Support for Gantz
Drops Dramatically, Right-wing Bloc in the Lead,” Haaretz,
March 11, 2019.
20 “Poll Shows Two-Thirds of Israelis Think Netanyahu
Endnotes Should Resign if Indicted,” Times of Israel, March 1, 2019.
21 Shikaki and Scheindlin, “Role of Public Opinion in the
1 See the full transcript of Jared Kushner’s interview with Sky
Resilience/Resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict,”
News Arabia TV on February 25, 2019.
p. 8.
2 Fares Akram, “Rare Protests Erupt against Hamas’ 12-Year
22 Ibid.
Rule over Gaza,” Associated Press, March 19, 2019.
23 Ibid., p. 9.
3 Joel Gehrke, “Pompeo: China Threatens US-Israel
Intelligence Sharing,” Washington Examiner, March 21, 2019.
4 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public
Opinion Poll No (71), March 19, 2019, (See “6) Trump’s Peace
Plan.”).
5 Ibid.
6 Between December 2017 and December 2018, public demand
for Abbas’s resignation ranged between 61% and 70%. For
Palestinian polls during this period, see “Index PSR Polls.”
7 Ibid.
8 See Israel Hayom, “Abbas Planning to Impose Additional
Sanctions on Gaza,” The Algemeiner, September 28, 2018.
9 Khalil Shikaki, “The PA in 2019: Challenges and Sources of
Threat” (Ramallah: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey
Research, Strategic Analysis Unit, Critical Policy Brief,
Number 1, February 2019).
10 Khalil Shikaki and Dahlia Scheindlin, “Role of Public
Opinion in the Resilience/Resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli
Conflict” (Ramallah: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey
Research, Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll (2016–2018):
Final Report, December 2018), pp. 2–3.
11 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public
Opinion Poll No (71), March 19, 2019, (See “5) The peace
process.”).

8
Trump’s Peace Plan: Engagement or Swift
Rejection?
Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki

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