#1 CHENG V.

GENATO (December 29, 1998)

FACTS:
Respondent Genato entered a contract to sell to spouses Da Jose pertaining to his property in Bulacan. The contract made
in public document states that the spouses shall pay the down payment and 30 days after verifying the authenticity of the
documents, they shall pay the remaining purchase price.

Da Jose spouses was not able to finish verifying the documents and as such asked for a 30 day extension. Pending the
extension and without notice to the spouses, Genato made a document for the annulment of the contract.

Petitioner Cheng expressed interest over the property and paid 50K check with the assurance that the contract between
Genato and the spouses Da Jose will be annulled. Da Jose spouses protested with the annulment and persuaded Genato to
continue the contract. Genato returned the check to Cheng and hence, this petition.

HELD:
The contract between Genato and spouses Da Jose was a contract to sell which is subject to a suspensive condition. Thus,
there will be no contract to speak of, if the obligor failed to perform the suspensive condition which enforces a juridical
relation. Obviously, the foregoing jurisprudence cannot be made to apply to the situation in the instant case because no
default can be ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since the 30-day extension period has not yet expired.

Even assuming that the spouses defaulted, the contract also cannot be validly rescinded because no notice was given to
them. Thus, Cheng's contention that the Contract to Sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses was rescinded or resolved
due to Genato's unilateral rescission finds no support in this case.

The contract between Genato and Cheng is a contract to sell not a contract of sale. But But even assuming that it should be
treated as a conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force since it was subject to a suspensive condition
that the earlier contract to sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be cancelled or rescinded.

Art.1544 should apply because for not only was the contract between herein respondents first in time; it was also registered
long before petitioner's intrusion as a second buyer (PRIMUS TEMPORE, PORTIOR JURE). (Spouses made annotation on
the title of Genato). Since Cheng was fully aware, or could have been if he had chosen to inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose
spouses under the Contract to Sell duly annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, it now becomes unnecessary
to further elaborate in detail the fact that he is indeed in bad faith in entering into such agreement.

#2 Republic vs Court of Appeals, Gr. No. L--‐43105, August 31, 1984

Facts:
The lot subject matter of this land registration case, with an area of 17,311 square meters, is situated near the shore of
Laguna de Bay, about 20 meters therefrom in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila Laguna. It was purchased by Benedicto del Rio
from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. When Benedicto died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicial partitioned his estate and the
subject parcel passed on his son, Santos del Rio, as the latter’s share in the inheritance.
Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santo to construct duck houses on the land in
question. Although there was no definite commitment as to rentals some of them had made voluntary payments to
Santos. In violation of the original agreement, private oppositors constructed residential houses on the land, which
prompted Santos to file an ejectment against the private oppositors. Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965, private
oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective sales application with the Bureau of Lands and was opposed by
Santos.
Issue:
W/N the applicant--‐private respondent has a registrable title to the land.
Held:
Private persons cannot reclaim land from public waters without prior permission by the government and, even if
reclamation is authorized, acquisition thereof for ownership is not automatic. The claim of private oppositors, that they
have reclaimed the land from the waters of Laguna de Bay and that they have possessed the same for more than 20 years
does not improve their position. In the first place, private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies
belonging to the public domain without proper permission from the government authorities. And even if such
reclamation had been authorized, the reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as
they may still be subject to the terms of the authority earlier granted. Private oppositors failed to show proper authority
for the alleged reclamation therefore; their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall.
#3 Legarda vs. Saleeby
G.R. No. 8936
October 2, 1915

FACTS: The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
There exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, March 2, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their
lot, which decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for
under the Torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot
now occupied by him. On March 25, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate
provided for under the Torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said
wall.

On December 13, 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had
also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of
each of said parties.

The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency
of the petition for the registration of the defendant’s land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot,
including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

ISSUE: Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

HELD: The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant
was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it

Granting that theory to be correct one , then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that
theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in
their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in
a petition for registration?

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) provides for the registration of titles under the Torrens
system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present.
There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two
different persons.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the
earliest certificate is the owner of the land. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such
certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to
an “innocent purchaser.” The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor;
that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would
be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that
the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The record
is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with
direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land
in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates
issued.

Legarda vs Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; GR No. 8936, October 2, 1915

(Land Titles and Deeds – Purpose of the Torrens System of Registration)
Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it
stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is
released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree
issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.

Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the name of two persons?

Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that
where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and
will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of t he
legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing his
land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.

#4 Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 115402. July 15, 1998
Arciaga, Ana Liza B.

FACTS: After his mother's death Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng filed a complaint against his father, Lee Tek Sheng to partition
the conjugal properties of his parents. Lee in his answer with counterclaim alleged that the four parcels of land registered
solely in petitioner's name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278 are conjugal properties. It was registered in
Leoncio’s name only as a trustee since he was then the only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly, Lee prayed for the
dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner — the conjugal regime.

To protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the case, Lee caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on TCT 8278. Leoncio moved for the cancellation of said annotation which was denied by the trial court ruling that
(a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power
of the court pending litigation. Leoncio appealed to CA, but to no avail.

Leoncio resort to the SC contending primarily that in the resolution of an incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of
lis pendens (a) it was improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed
upon in a partition case, otherwise, (b) it would amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago.
He argues that his sole ownership as shown in the TCT would be improperly assailed in a partition case and should be done
through a separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent posits that evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition
case as this is not a probate or land registration proceedings where the court's jurisdiction is limited.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278 would amount to a collateral attack to the Certificate of Title.
2. Whether the denial of motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens is valid.

HELD:
1. No. The court held petitioner's claim is not legally tenable. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title
cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to this case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens
does not in any case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for
a parcel of land. The concept of no collateral attack of title is based on Section 48 of P.D. 1529 which states that:

Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that
document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to
ownership which is represented by that document. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only
the best proof of ownership of a piece of land and cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.
Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a
trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To
 repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. In this case petitioner's
certificate of title is not being assailed by private respondent. What the latter disputes is the former's claim of sole
ownership. Thus, although petitioner's certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year after issuance,
yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private respondent from questioning his ownership.

2. Yes. The court held that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds, which are: (1) if the
annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or, (2) when the annotation is not
necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. Neither ground for cancellation of the notice
was convincingly shown to concur in this case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens is only for the purpose of
announcing "to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who
acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over
said property." The parties are still locked in a legal battle to settle their respective claims of ownership. The lower
court allowed the annotation pending litigation only for the purpose of giving information to the public that parcel
of land is involved in a suit and that those who deal with the property is forewarned of such fact.

#5 Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals, Patria Capay, et al G.R. No. 118862, Sept. 24, 1999 (315 SCRA
190)
"Torrens System"
"latches"

Facts:
A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was mortgage to and subsequently extrajudiciallyforeclosed by Traders Royal
Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in public auction, the Capays filed a petition for preliminary injunction alleging the
mortgage was void because they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. A notice of lis pendens (suit pending) was filed
before the Register of Deeds with the notice recorded in the Day Book. Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with the
TRB as the sole and winning bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and a new one was entered in TRB’s name without the
notice of lis pendens carried over the title. The Capays filed recovery of the property and damages. Court rendered a decision
declaring the mortgage was void for want of consideration and thus cancelled TRB’s title and issued a new cert. of title for
the Capays.

Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to Santiago who subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers who
were issued title to the land. Court ruled that the subsequent buyers cannot be considered purchasers for value and in good
faith since they purchase the land after it became a subject in a pending suit before the court. Although the lis pendens notice
was not carried over the titles, its recording in the Day Book constitutes registering of the land and notice to all persons with
adverse claim over the property. TRB was held to be in bad faith upon selling the property while knowing it is pending for
litigation. The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the land in dispute while TRB is to pay damages to Capays.

Issue:
1. Who has the better right over the land in dispute?
2. Whether or not TRB is liable for damages

Ruling:
The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose is to avoid conflicts of title to real properties.
When the subsequent buyers bought the property there was no lis pendens annotated on the title. Every person dealing with
a registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the title and is not obliged to interpret what is beyond the face of the
registered title. Hence the court ruled that the subsequent buyers obtained the property from a clean title in good faith and
for value. On one hand, the Capays are guilty of latches. After they filed the notice for lis pendens, the same was not
annotated in the TRB title. They did not take any action for 15 years to find out the status of the title upon knowing the
foreclosure of the property. In consideration to the declaration of the mortgage as null and void for want of consideration,
the foreclosure proceeding has no legal effect. However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the real owner of the property
it has already been passed to purchasers in good faith and for value. Therefore, the property cannot be taken away to their
prejudice. Thus, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time they sold it to Santiago.

#6 Avila v. Tapucar
August 27, 1991
Facts:

In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a 1.8340 hectares parcel of coconut land. Said
property was inherited in 1965 by private respondents, as successors-in-interest. In 1960, petitioner Avila bought a 4,371
square meter parcel of land which is part of the subject property inherited by the Bahans from their predecessor, under a
Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. On November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan filed Free Patent Application
for a lot which has a total area of 6.9027 hectares in its entirety. Sometime later, private respondent Julito Bahan and
company gathered coconuts from the land purchased by petitioner Magdalena Avila. They filed an action for quieting of
title and damages against the Avilas. In their answer, the petitioners Avilas raised the defense of having purchased the land
from a certain Luis Cabalan and from then on has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession
of the same. The Avilas filed a motion for a preliminary writ of injunction praying that the Bahans be enjoined and ordered
to refrain and desist from gathering or continue harvesting the fruits on the land in controversy until the termination of the
case. In the meantime, the Bahans' application for free patent was approved and the free patent was issued , and on the
same date an Original certificate of title was issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan.

Issue: W/N the subsequent approval of the application for free patent for 6.9027 hectares in favor of the Bahans (the land
which rightfully pertains to the Avilas being embraced and included therein), the issuance of free patent and original
certificate of title in favor of the Bahans during the pendency of the case for quieting of title is proper

Ruling: No.

The free patent that was issued to the Bahans is erroneous as it embraced and comprised in portions thereof lands
which belong to the Avilas. The subsequent registration of the portion of land belonging to the Avilas by the Bahans could
not make the latter owners thereof. A cadastral court has no authority to award a property in favor of persons who have
not put in any claims to it and have never asserted any right of ownership thereon, and the certificate of title issued under
the circumstances to such persons would be declared null and void subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value.

While land registration is a proceeding in rem and binds the whole world, the simple possession of a certificate of
title under the Torrens Systems does not necessarily make the holder a true owner of all the property described therein. If a
person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be
registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally
included.

Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of such title over a
particular property. It does not give the holder any better right than what he actually has, especially if the registration was
done in bad faith. The effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all. ##

MARIANO AVILA and MAGDALENA AVILA, petitioners, vs. HON. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, Presiding Judge,
Branch 1, Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, JULITO BAHAN, CRISTINA BAHAN PANIS,
LUCITA CARTERA, BOY CARTERA and CANDELARIA BAHAN MENDOZA, respondents. August
27, 1991

DOCTRINE:
It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that “while land registration is a proceeding in rem and binds the whole world,
the simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens Systems does not necessarily make the holder a true owner
of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title under the Torrens system which includes by mistake or
oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become
the owner of the lands illegally included.”
In registration proceedings, a cadastral court has no authority to award a property in favor of persons who have not
put in any claims to it and have never asserted any right of ownership thereon

FACTS:
In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a 1.8340 hectares parcel of coconut land. Said
property was inherited in 1965 by private respondents, as successors-in-interest.
In 1960, petitioner Avila bought a 4,371 square meter parcel of land which is part of the subject property inherited
by the Bahans from their predecessor, under a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land.
On November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan filed Free Patent Application for a lot which has a total area of
6.9027 hectares in its entirety. Sometime later, private respondent Julito Bahan and company gathered coconuts from the
land purchased by petitioner Magdalena Avila.
 They filed an action for quieting of title and damages against the Avilas. In their answer, the petitioners Avilas
raised the defense of having purchased the land from a certain Luis Cabalan and from then on has been in open, continuous,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the same.
The Avilas filed a motion for a preliminary writ of injunction praying that the Bahans be enjoined and ordered to
refrain and desist from gathering or continue harvesting the fruits on the land in controversy until the termination of the
case.
In the meantime, the Bahans' application for free patent was approved and the free patent was issued , and on the
same date an Original certificate of title was issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan.

ISSUE:
W/N the subsequent approval of the application for free patent for 6.9027 hectares in favor of the Bahans (the land
which rightfully pertains to the Avilas being embraced and included therein), the issuance of free patent and original
certificate of title in favor of the Bahans during the pendency of the case for quieting of title is proper

RULING:

No.
The free patent that was issued to the Bahans is erroneous as it embraced and comprised in portions thereof lands
which belong to the Avilas. The subsequent registration of the portion of land belonging to the Avilas by the Bahans could
not make the latter owners thereof.
A cadastral court has no authority to award a property in favor of persons who have not put in any claims to it and
have never asserted any right of ownership thereon, and the certificate of title issued under the circumstances to such
persons would be declared null and void subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value.
While land registration is a proceeding in rem and binds the whole world, the simple possession of a certificate of
title under the Torrens Systems does not necessarily make the holder a true owner of all the property described therein. If
a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which can
no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the
owner of the lands illegally included.
Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of such title over a
particular property. It does not give the holder any better right than what he actually has, especially if the registration was
done in bad faith. The effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all.

#7 Torbela vs. Spouses Rosario GR 140528 Dec. 07, 2011

FACTS:
The issue is over a parcel of land inherited by the Torbela siblings from their parents.
They executed a deed of absolute quitclaim over the property in favor of Dr. Rosario. Four days after, a TCT was issued in
Dr. Rosario’s name covering the property.

Another deed of absolute quitclaim was subsequently executed twelve days after by Dr. Rosario acknowledging that he only
borrowed the lot from the Torbela siblings and was already returning the same. This deed was notarized but not immediately
annotated.

Dr. Rosario used the land as mortgage for a loan he obtain through DBP for P70,000.00. He used the proceeds of the loan
to build a 4 storey building which was initially used as a hospital but later converted into a commercial space. Part was
leased to PT&T and the rest to Rosario ’s sister who operated the Rose Inn Hotel and Restaurant.

Dr. Rosario fully paid the loan from DBP and the mortgage was cancelled and ratified by a notary public. However, Dr.
Rosario took another loan from PNB. He later acquired a third loan from Banco Filipino and bought out the loan from PNB
cancelling the mortgage with PNB. Rosario failed to pay their loan in Banco Filipino and the property was extrajudicially
foreclosed.

Meanwhile, back in 1965, the Torbela siblings sought to register their ownership over the lot and to perfect their title but
couldn’t because the title was still with DBP. They showed as proof the deed of absolute quitclaim presented executed by
Rosario himself. In 1986, they filed a civil case for recovery of ownership and possession and damages. They tried to redeem
the lot from Banco Filipino but failed. TCT was issued to Banco FIilipino.

The Torbela’s claim they have right over the rents of the building through accession because they are the land owners.
ISSUE: Who has right over the improvements made on the lot and the rents thereof.

RULING: According to Art. 440, the accessory follows the principal. Ownership of property gives the right by accession to
everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.

However, in the case at bar, both Torbela siblings and Rosario are deemed in bad faith. The Torbelas knew Rosario built on
the land and even allowed him to use the land to obtain a loan from DBP. Rosario on the other hand consciously built on
land he knew was not his. They both had knowledge and did not oppose.

Art. 453 states that when both parties are in bad faith, the case shall be treated as though both were in good faith thus the
application of Art. 448.

448 allows the Land Owner 2 options in the case at bar. Either indemnify Rosario and appropriate the lot to himself or ask
Rosario to buy the lot or the rent rate. This case was remanded to the RTC for the Torbelas to make such decision.

Still following the rules of accession, civil fruits such as rent belong to the owner of the building. Rosario has rights over the
rent and improvements and shall continue until the Torbela siblings have chosen an option from 448.

#8 HERMOGENA SANTOS vs. MIGUEL ROBLEDO ET AL., 28 Phil. 245, October 22, 1914

FACTS:
On March 1, 1905, Santiago Herrera and his wife Basilia Tolentino, in an instrument ratified before a notary, donated to
plaintiff Hermogena Santos a building lot with three warehouses, the boundaries and area of the said land being described
in the complaint.
On the same date, the plaintiff entered into possession of this property and held the same without opposition or interruption
of any sort and collected the rents therefrom until January 28, 1913, when Miguel Robledo, who was found to be a creditor
of the said Santiago Herrera by a judgment rendered in case No. 9874 against the said Herrera, prayed for the execution of
the said judgment. At the instigation of Robledo, the sheriff proceeded to seize the said lot and, after the publication of
notice, sold the same at public auction on February 17, 1913.
Although the plaintiff had intervened and prayed for the recall of the writ for the reason that the lot levied upon was her
property, the sheriff, under security of the bond furnished by the creditor Robledo, sold the said lot, and Robledo himself
purchased it. The plaintiff was thus deprived of her property and of the rents accruing therefrom from the said January 28,
1913 up to the date of the complaint, and that she had suffered considerable damage because she had missed the opportunity
to sell the property for P1,200, the price she had been offered for it.

The plaintiff prayed that the defendants immediately return and deliver to her the said lot, together with the uncollected
rents therefrom, and to pay an indemnity of P1,200 and the costs. On the other hand, the defendants prayed that the
plaintiff’s petition be denied on the ground that they took possession of the property in good faith and was now peaceably
holding the same and that the conveyance made to the plaintiff by Herrera and his wife Tolentino was effected by them with
intent to defraud their creditors and could in no wise prevail as against the creditor Robledo, and that for this reason, the
latter had suffered losses and damages to the amount of P200.
The defendant also alleged that Santiago Herrera sold and conveyed to him on March 24, 1913, through a public instrument
and for the sum of 1*85, Herrera's right to redeem the property in litigation within the period of one year counting from
February 17, 1913, the date of the sale of the lot at public auction.
The trial court ruled against the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
WON the levy and sale of the lot and improvements in dispute, effected on petition of the creditor, Miguel Robledo, can
prevail against the right of ownership plaintiff acquired by virtue of the gift made in her favor by the spouses Santiago
Herrera and Basilia Tolentino
HELD:
Yes.
The gift was invalid and could have no effect whatever, for the Civil Code prescribes, in article 629, that a gift does not bind
the donor nor produce any effect until it has been formally accepted by the donee in accordance with law. The acceptance
of that gift by the plaintiff Santos does not appear in the instrument of conveyance and the record reveals no other
instrument that evidences such acceptance and notification to the donors thereof in an authentic manner. Because of this
essential defect, the gift was not perfected and the donee could not acquire any real and positive right in the warehouse
(land) and its improvements.
Furthermore, on March 1, 1905, when the said instrument was executed, Santiago Herrera had owed Miguel Robledo, from
March 12, 1903, the sum of 1*1,170, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. For the collection of this debt, the creditor
had to bring suit against the debtor. As the record does not show that the donors had reserved sufficient funds or property
to satisfy the debt, nor that they possessed property other than the lot given away by them, the Court held that the
conveyance or gift made to the plaintiff by the spouses Herrera and Tolentino was for the purpose of defrauding the creditor,
Miguel Robledo, by preventing him from collecting his credit.
It is therefore unquestionable that this gift is null and void in itself and can produce no effect whatever, since it fails to
comply with the requirements of article 633 of the Civil Code, and because the said gift was made without proper
consideration and for the purpose of defrauding the defendant creditor, whom it is to be presumed the donors intended
seriously to prejudice when bestowing the property upon the plaintiff (Arts. 643 and 1297, Civil Code). This intended injury
to the defendant would be iniquitously consummated, should the plaintiff obtain a decision contrary to the judgment
appealed from, which, moreover, is in accordance with the law and the merits of the case.
Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing reasons whereby the errors assigned to the lower court have been refuted, the
said judgment should be and is hereby affirmed, and the defendants are absolved from fhe complaint, with the costs against
the appellant.
# 9 Digest : REPUBLIC VS CA GR No. 113549

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Respondent: court of Appeals and Heir so Luis Ribaya

Short background:

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals Resolution which declared null and void the OCT issued pursuant to a
decree and decision in a land registration case decided on September 18, 1925.

Contention of the petitioner:

(1) the indefeasibility of title does not lie against the State in an action for reversion of land;

(2) the spouses-applicants failed to prove possession of the land for the period required by law, and the evidence shows that
their possession was not open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious under a bona fide claim of ownership;
(3) the amended survey plan was not published,
(4) the land covered by OCT No. 3947 was then part of the forest land, hence, inalienable; and
(5) the accuracy of the land survey was doubtful.

Private Respondents:

(1) allege that the petition merely raises factual matters and argue that OCT No. 3947 is absolutely incontestable,
considering that the land was no longer part of the public forest when it was decreed in favor of their parents.
(2) They further contend, invoking Benin, that the issue of republication is inapplicable since the publication of the original
survey plan was already had in compliance with law.

(3) Moreover, possession of the land by their parents, the spouses-applicants, was duly proven, i.e., donations of portions
thereof in favor of the government and the compensation they received from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
of the United States for damages sustained by the land during the war sufficiently proved that they were the legitimate
owners of the land.

(4) Finally, the original survey plan could no longer be questioned by the petitioner.

Issues and Ruling:

As the Court sees it, only two relevant issues need be resolved, to wit:
(1) Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to bring the action for annulment of
OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative certificates of title

- We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest and released only on
31 December 1930, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land, which was not yet alienable and
disposable. Hence, the State's action to annul the certificates of title issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land
is not barred by prescription.
- In Republic vs. Animas, we ruled:Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or
reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the state in
such cases for the Statute of Limitation does not run against the state. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state
is not barred by prescription.

2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the four parcels of land subject of the
amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and covered by the decree issued on 31 July 1926 by the General
Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the said court of 18 September 1925.

- The land registration court in LRC Case No. 52 never acquired jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original
plan or the amended plan for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total want of publication of the second
- As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the hearing of application
of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the original plan was published in the 17 March 1925
issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law
then, required two publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for want
of the required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the
registration court; it is a jurisdictional requisite. Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot
be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the Land through publication and service of notice.
- Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an alleged original survey plan. The fact remains,
however, that in November of that year that original plan was amended (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and the amended plan was
not published at all. There is no evidence that the court amended its decision to conform to the amended plan, neither is
there a showing that the parties even attempted publication thereof. However, the decree that was subsequently issued
was based on the amended plan insofar as the four lots were concerned.

- A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land.On the basis of the decree, OCT No. 3947 was
issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have amended its decision to conform to the amended plan
for the four lots which ultimately found their way into the decree issued by the General Land Registration Office, and
finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and the General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree
to conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of publication of the amended plan. As
such, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land embraced by the amended plan.

# 10 REPUBLIC vs. ENCISO

FACTS:
The respondent averred, inter alia, that he acquired title to the said lot by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of
estate and quitclaim on March 15, 1999; the said property is not tenanted or occupied by any person other than the
respondent and his family who are in actual physical possession of the same; and the respondent and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in continuous, peaceful, open, notorious, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept
of an owner for not less than 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, opposed the application. The trial court issued an Order of
Default against all persons with the exception of the government.
The respondent presented tax receipts to show that the property was declared for taxation purposes in his name.
He also testified that he acquired the property by inheritance from his deceased father, Vicente Enciso, who died on May 18,
1991. He then immediately took possession of the property and constructed a house thereon in 1991. On March 15, 1999, he
and his siblings executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate where the land was adjudicated in his favor.
The respondent further narrated that the property was originally owned by the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales.
 The trial court ruled in favor the respondents. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred on a question of law in granting respondent’s petition for registration sans any showing
that the subject property was previously declared alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
While it is the rule that findings of fact of appellate courts are conclusive upon this Court, among the recognized exceptions
is where the findings of fact are not supported by the record or are conspicuously erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse
of discretion. This is the situation in this case.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Applicants for registration of title must therefore prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial, or since June
12, 1945.
The evidence on record shows that a house was constructed on the subject property only in 1991.
Evidently, the respondent failed to prove that (1) Lot No. 2278-A was classified as part of the disposable and
alienable land of the public domain; and (2) he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners since time immemorial, or from June 12, 1945.

#11 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANESSA C. SANTOS, MICHELLE C.

SANTOS, all represented by DELFIN C. SANTOS, Attorney-in-fact
G.R. No. 180027, July 18, 2012, PEREZ, J.
All claims of private title to land, save those acquired from native title, must be traced from some grant, whether express or
implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing that land had been let into private ownership through the State’s imprimatur,
such land is presumed to belong to the State.
Facts: Respondents purchased three parcels of unregistered land formerly owned by Generosa Asuncion, Teresita
Sernal, and spouses Antona. The three parcels of land were consolidated into a single lot (Lot 3).Respondents filed
with the RTC an application for original registration over Lot 3. The RTC directed the DENR to report on the status of Lot 3.
DENR submitted a report saying that Lot 3 is an alienable and disposable land since March 15, 1982. Respondents
submitted a Certification by the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that Lot
3 is classified as alienable and disposable since March 15, 1982.During the trial, respondents presented the testimonies
of Generosa, Teresita, and spouses Antona all saying that they have been in possession of the lots for more than
30 years before the sale. The Government maintains that the land in question still forms part of the public domain.
Issue: Whether the respondents’ application for registration should be granted
Ruling:
No. Jura Regalia means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and the source of all private titles. Being an
unregistered land, Lot 3 is presumed to belong to the state. Those who seek the entry of such land into the Torrens
system of registration must first establish valid title thereto as against the state. Respondents failed to establish
valid title in this case. They anchored their claim on prescription provided under Section 14(2) of PD 1529; for
prescription to run against the state, the land must be proven to be patrimonial in character. To be patrimonial, there
must be an express declaration by the state that the land isno longer needed for public service or the development of
national wealth, or that the property has been converted to patrimonial. Until then, the period of prescription
against the state will not commence to run. The express declaration contemplated is separate and distinct from
mere classification that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondents were not able to prove that prescription
has begun to run against the state.