Positioning The Global Imaginary: Arata Isozaki, 1970: Mark Jarzombek
Positioning The Global Imaginary: Arata Isozaki, 1970: Mark Jarzombek
Positioning The Global Imaginary: Arata Isozaki, 1970: Mark Jarzombek
One day I noticed two books . . . sitting side by side on a bookshelf, and realised
it is possible that two types of architecture from two different places (spatiality)
and times (temporality) can be equidistant from my position, not to mention simi-
lar to my methodological preferences.
—Arata Isozaki1
I would like to thank Norihiko Tsuneishi and Jordan Kaufman for their assistance with
the images and for Sebastian Schmidt and Hiromu Nagahara for their helpful comments. Un-
less otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
1. Arata Isozaki, The Island Nation Aesthetic (London, 1996), p. 7; hereafter abbreviated
INA.
2. A native of Osaka, Futagawa studied architecture at a technical school there and then
entered Waseda University in Tokyo. He took up photography, developing an interest in
498
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2018 499
major architects of the twentieth century like Frank Lloyd Wright, Le
Corbusier, Louis Kahn, James Stirling, and Alvar Aalto. Articles featured
large glossy photos augmented by plans and accompanied by explanatory
text. The aim, on the surface at least, was to make established foreign ar-
chitects accessible to a Japanese audience and to tap into the English-
speaking publishing market. The journal did not address the use of the
word global in the title, and this might therefore throw us off the scent.
But even at a superficial level there is no doubt that it broke ground se-
mantically, given that the then-standard uses of the adjective were still
restricted to phraseologies like global war, global peace, and global epi-
demics. Even Marshall McLuhan’s famous “global village” did not break
from these all-encompassing imaginaries, almost all of which were gener-
ated from within a North American, English-speaking orbit.3 Global Ar-
chitecture, if only because it was printed in Japanese and English, pointed
to something different, to the opening of a translation across languages,
continents, time, and even history.
First of all, the rarity of the word needs to be understood. Pan Am re-
ferred to the world in its promotions well through the 1980s. It was only
in the late 1980s that the word global became attached to the word history.
The New Global History Initiative was launched in 1991.4 The use of the
term the global era began in the mid-1990s—mainly in the wake of the de-
minka (“folk houses”). Minka 1955: Traditional Japanese Houses was published in 1957; see
Yukio Futagawa, Minka 1955: Traditional Japanese Houses (Tokyo, 2012). Subsequent
publications include: Futagawa and Teiji Itoh, The Roots of Japanese Architecture (1963);
Futagawa, Forms in Japan (1963) and Folk Arts in Okinawa (1964). In 1970, he established the
Edita Tokyo Company that launched the GA (Global Architecture) series, which later ex-
panded into GA Houses, GA Document, and GA Architect.
3. See Marshall McLuhan and Bruce R. Powers, The Global Village: Transformations in
World Life and Media in the Twenty-First Century (New York, 1989).
4. One could mention also Global Tools (1973–1975) that proclaimed itself a multidisci-
plinary experimental program of design education in Italy conceived as a diffuse system of
laboratories (first in Florence, Milan, and Naples) to promote the “study and use of natural
materials and their behavioural characteristics” with the support of media and aimed to es-
tablish an alternative relation with Italian industry. Needless to say, apart from the word
global in the title, there is little here that tries to engage the global as a frictional/theoretical
project.
5. Ken Oshima points out that several young architects in pre-WWII Japan strove to cre-
ate an “international architecture” (kokusai kenchiku) as an expression of increasing inter-
national travel and communication. There were many interconnections among Japanese,
European, and American architects in the interwar years. Yamada Mamoru (1894–1966),
Horiguchi Sutemi (1895–1984), and Antonin Raymond (1888–1976) each espoused an architec-
ture that encompassed modern forms and new materials, while attempting to synthesize the
novel with the old in distinctive ways. See Ken Tadashi Oshima, International Architecture in
Interwar Japan: Constructing “Kokusai Kenchiku” (Seattle, 2009).
6. I want to thank Norihiko Tsuneishi for the specifics about the founding of this maga-
zine. I also want to thank Sebastian Schmidt for his assistance.
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2018 501
Instead it was a way to see past the East/West issue that had so defined, per-
plexed, and even haunted Japanese self-theorizations.7
Since the young architect Arata Isozaki (born in 1931), who wrote the first
essay in volume 1 of Global Architecture, would reference Alexandre Kojève
as a type of Archimedean point, it is worthwhile to recall that Kojève, having
visited Japan in the late 1950s, wrote these words in 1968:
Consider Japan: there’s a country that deliberately protected itself
from history during three centuries; it put a barrier between history
and itself, so well that it perhaps permits us to foresee our own future.8
Kojève argued that the Japanese valorization of their national history
blocked them from participating in the dynamics of world history, a his-
tory with a capital H. In this, Kojève was relying on G. W. F. Hegel, whom
he admired and who saw History as the animating principle of civilization,
with the Eastern civilizations living in perpetual stasis. Kojève agreed; Ja-
pan had a culture immobilized by tradition, living blissfully in state of
“snobism,” which he identifies as “a state of living within the function of
totally formalised values, that is to say, empty of any human content in
a historical sense.”9 Kojève, known for his dry wit, was implying half in jest
and half as a provocation that pretty soon history would slow down and we
would all, globally, retreat to a condition of mental localism. In the near
future, we would all be like the Japanese.
Leaving aside this rather uncanny prediction, his view of Japan does
carry some weight since it was widely known in the circles of the Japanese
intelligentsia. It thus helps us see just how contrarian the use of the word
global was, especially since 1970 was not yet the Japan of the 1980s, when
Japan’s prosperity and hypermodernity would transfix the West. There
can be no doubt, however, that this transformation was in the air. The
1970s saw the end of the dominance of the architects associated with the
metabolist movement, as led and influenced by Kenzo Tange, who had risen
to become Japan’s most famous architect.10 The metabolists, named after
7. For an excellent article that discusses early Japanese critiques of East-West dualism, see
Miriam Silverberg, “Constructing the Japanese Ethnography of Modernity,” The Journal of
Asian Studies 51 (Feb. 1992): pp. 30–54.
8. Quoted in James H. Nichols, Jr., Alexander Kojève: Wisdom at the End of History (New
York, 2007), p. 85. Kojève travelled the world after World War II as one of the chief planners
of the European Common Market, working for the French Ministry of Economic Affairs.
9. Alexander Kojève, Introduction a la Lecture de Hegel (Paris, 1947), p. 437.
10. The metabolist movement was launched in 1960, when a group of young architects
and designers published a manifesto entitled Metabolism: Proposals for New Urbanism on the
occasion of the World Design Conference in Tokyo. Though Kenzo Tange never became a
formal member of the group, he was actively involved in the movement because he served as
502 Mark Jarzombek / Positioning the Global Imaginary
FIGURE 1. Kenzo Tange, Tokyo Bay Project, Tokyo (1960). ©Akio Kawasaki.
their fascination with biology and growth, were not shy about thinking big,
and indeed Tange’s 1960 grand plan for a vast city elevated over Tokyo Bay
epitomized their ambition (fig. 1). It featured a system of causeways and res-
idential towers the sheer scale of which suggested the presence of massive
technical, bureaucratic, and institutional infrastructures. Expo ’70 in Osaka,
with a masterplan designed by Tange, brought these ideas to a world stage.
The economic downturn of the early 1970s, however, dampened enthu-
siasm for schemes that by then seemed hollow and bombastic. Even in its
own day, Expo ’70 was seen as the great last hurrah of the metabolist gen-
eration. Global Architecture, obviously, implied a different type of openness
to Western modernism, as paradoxical as that might sound. 1970, as it
turns out, was the very year in which the 747 made Japan accessible to in-
ternational flights from the US directly from San Francisco. It was a pro-
foundly symbolic moment for a country to ally itself with an emerging cul-
ture of post-Olympic pride in connectivity, even if such alliance meant
Japan’s tying itself even closer to the US.
the leading mentor for the younger architects. See Kisho Kurokawa, Metabolism in Architec-
ture (Boulder, Colo., 1977), and Zhongjie Lin, Kenzo Tange and the Metabolist Movement: Ur-
ban Utopias of Modern Japan (New York, 2010).
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2018 503
More importantly, the word global brought into play a set of vectors
operating in the context of the breakdown and rebuilding of cultural cer-
tainties. In other words, global was not evoked as some zeitgeist phenom-
enon nor was it intended as a token of internationalist relevancy. It was
used as a frictional device within a Japanese context, even if the friction
was more implied than real. It was a pronouncement without a practice
that nonetheless indexed a new type of geopolitical speculation, with Ja-
pan identifying itself as the front line of that problem. But if the clichés of
East/West were now exposed as tired, what did this new global have to
offer? It was the elliptically placed starting point of what might be called
a new global imago.
The use of the word in 1970 in Japan—as unexpected as it might seem
from a US perspective—did have a backstory, one that begins with the first
use of the adjective global in a book title in 1942 just after the declaration of
war on Japan in 1941. Global War: An Atlas of World Strategy was a hastily
published book by the noted journalist Edgar Ansel Mowrer.11 For
Mowrer, global represented the precise moment when the US turned to
Asia, and to Japan in particular, not as a culture frozen in time as the He-
gelians had thought, but as just the opposite: a crafty and superior enemy.
And it was not just Mowrer who envisioned this global turn. Life magazine
ran the article “Global War Teaches Global Cartography” in August 1942,
featuring maps by Richard Edes Harrison, the house cartographer for For-
tune and a consultant for Life (fig. 2). Explaining the difference between the
Mercator map used by the Germans, which it identified as old-fashioned,
the authors of the article argued for a new mapping strategy. They made
the following astonishing assertion: “Until the fifth decade of the 20th Cen-
tury, knowledge that the world is round was of little immediate impor-
tance to most of the inhabitants of this planet. . . . For most people, once
they learned the lesson in school, the earth for all practical purposes was
flat. . . . Today, however, the round world is the prize of global war.”12
The phrase “round world” emphasizes that the roundness of the world
was not naturally associated with the world.
The article goes on to discuss the issues of projecting the globe on a flat
surface, arriving at a map that shows the great circle route, from San Fran-
cisco to Tokyo—a flight route that was still far off in the future, but one that
the Japanese could potentially use to bomb the US. The article ends with a
11. See Edgar Ansel Mowrer and Marthe Rajchman, Global War: an Atlas of World Strategy
(New York, 1942).
12. “Maps: Global War Teaches Global Cartography,” Life, 3 Aug. 1942, p. 57. See also
Global Politics, ed. Russell H. Fitzgibbon (Berkeley, 1944).
504 Mark Jarzombek / Positioning the Global Imaginary
claim that the best way to view the world was from the North Pole. This
global axis—aligned, so the article claimed, to the principles of the United
Nations—is set against the false axis of the enemy: two axes, a political
one (of Germany and Japan bracketing the US) and a planetary one that
speaks to the future. A true global versus a false global. This was a global that
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2018 505
posited itself dialectically, an important fact that is missing from most dis-
cussions today.
So the birth of the modern global is astonishingly precise.
Harrison—who called himself an artist, not a mapmaker—blossomed
into a minor celebrity. He made popular, startlingly oblique satellite-style
views of the globe such as one that looked at Japan from high above Alaska.13
Harrison was called in to help design the maps for the exhibition at the Mu-
seum of Modern Art in New York for which the Life article was the teaser.
The exhibition, “Airways to Peace: Sequence of Exhibitions for Section II,
How Man Has Drawn His World” (1943), featured a five-foot layered relief
model of Europe by Norman Bel Geddes, as well as a large, suspended par-
tial globe into which viewers could walk from below to see the earth and its
continent from an inside-out perspective.
The new view of the global—implying a spherical “inside-out-ness”—
was popularized even further by Alexander de Seversky, a famous airman
who coined the phrase “airman’s global view.” He was no esoteric pun-
dit.14 Walt Disney made a movie, Victory through Air Power (1943), that
was based on Seversky’s book and that even featured an interview with
him interspersed with cartoon animations of historical events and news
clippings. Halfway through the movie, the word global is spoken for the
first time; fittingly, it is just after the dramatic cartoon portrayal of the
Pearl Harbor disaster. At a certain moment in the film the earthly globe
is shown from outer space, a blue planet hovering in a strangely foggy
ether, a vision of the planet still far in the future, if we assume that the
famous photo of Earth—The Blue Marble—made by Apollo 17 in 1972
stands as a certain type of historical datum.15
Yet another early theorist of the global was Nickolaus Louis Engelhardt,
Acting Director of Research for the Board of Education in Newark, New
Jersey, who created a pedagogical program for high school students in
New Jersey known as “Education for the Air Age.” It is worth quoting this
remarkable passage from the opening of the book.
13. See Alan K. Henrikson, “Maps, Globes, and the ‘Cold War’,” Special Libraries 65
(Oct./Nov. 1974), pp. 445–54; “America’s Changing Place in the World: From ‘Periphery’ to
‘Centre’?” in Centre and Periphery: Spatial Variation in Politics, ed. Jean Gottmann (Beverly
Hills, Calif., 1980), pp. 73–100; and “The Map as an ‘Idea’: The Role of Cartographic Imagery
During the Second World War,” American Cartographer 2 (1975), pp. 19–53.
14. See Stephen B. Jones, “The Power Inventory and National Strategy,” World Politics 6
(Jul. 1954): 421–52, and Alexander P. de Seversky, Air Power: Key to Survival (New York,
1950), p. 11.
15. The image of the earth begins around minute 37 of Victory through Air Power, dir.
H. C. Potter (1947); see www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1iPBvwaIkI
506 Mark Jarzombek / Positioning the Global Imaginary
Wide seas, dangerous reefs, precipitous mountains, frozen wastes,
and jungle depths, all barriers to earthbound generations, have be-
come features of the landscape below the global sweep of the air-
plane travelers in the ocean of air which is now the third dimension
for an air-free people. No aspect of human ecology will remain un-
altered by this new instrumentality which not only abolishes dis-
tances but also reshapes basic human geography and remolds the
internal and external relationships of national and continental popu-
lation groups. City, state, national, and even continental boundaries
vanish or become curious anachronisms to the stratospheric travel-
ers on great-circle routes which wheel around a planet bereft of to-
pographical restrictions.16
It is an impressive insight for 1942. Engelhardt even notes—once again
quite precisely and paradoxically if one remembers the air campaigns in
Europe—that “the American people became air-minded on December 7,
1941.” Engelhardt was no naïf. “Airpower,” he states, “has wrecked homes:
maimed and killed men, women and children.” But it is here to stay; soon
“space will be measured in time rather than miles.”17 Further hints of how
this new globality of the globe envisioned itself are to be found in
Engelhardt’s Toward New Frontiers of Our Global World (1943) a title that
itself astonishes because by 1943 one would have thought that the world’s
frontiers had long since been discovered (fig. 3). Engelhardt was clearly try-
ing to define a new American ethos. The globe was the new frontier. The
first illustration is telling. Showing a small globe resting in a man’s palm, its
caption reads:
You are used to looking at the side of the globe—and probably have
turned it on its axis from East to West to study the continents that
lie across the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans from us. From now
on, you will study the globe in the modern manner. Take it up in
your hands and turn it from North to South. This will change your
ideas of our Global World when you realize the nearness to us of
Europe and Asia across the Arctic Ocean.
His point rests on “and Asia,” for it was “and Asia” on which the very con-
cept of global turns. He goes on to state, “we all know about land and wa-
ter. We have maps that show us the shore lines of the oceans and the bound-
ary lines of the different countries. There are uncounted millions of
16. Nickolaus Louis Engelhardt, Jr., Education for the Air Age (A Guide for Teachers and
Administrators) (New York, 1942), p. v.
17. Ibid., p. 34.
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2018 507
FIGURE 3. Book cover for Nickolaus Louis Engelhardt, Jr., Toward New Frontiers of Our
Global World (New York, 1943).
boundary lines on the surface of the globe—but there is not one boundary
line in the air.”18 The new frontiers are identified as “World Markets at our
Door” and “Industrial Centers on the Move.”19 It was this sudden turn from
18. Engelhardt, Toward New Frontiers of Our Global World (New York, 1943), pp. 9, 9–10.
19. Ibid., pp. 47, 55.
508 Mark Jarzombek / Positioning the Global Imaginary
Europe, and from what would then have been understood as the world—a
world suddenly revealed as flat—and toward an air- and ocean-based im-
age of planetary dynamics that produced the adjectival global, a word that
still today is marked to some degree by this fundamental condition. If the
world was dominated by empires, capitals and ports, global—as launched
after 1941—evoked visions of Asia, stratospheric aircraft, great circles, and
disappearing boundaries. This global was no jocular, Euro-colonialist
Around the World in Eighty Days. This global was a geopolitical global—a
US global—its next frontier. It evoked visions of war and peace. Forced into
reality on 7 December 1941, it cemented itself into history with the bombing
of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945.
It might be assumed that a discussion about global would want to build
on the premise of this newly emerging perspective. After all, the standard
argument about globalization points to the condition of speed, connectiv-
ity, and commerce; to the rise of postwar US imperialism, and to the parallel
denouement of the superiority of the West. I will leave that argument to
the political scientists. My discourse is not to add yet more historical weight
to the obvious (or what is assumed to be the obvious). Instead, the global,
as I am framing it—the global before the era of globalization—is less open
in its signification. My point is that global did not just piggyback acciden-
tally on the presumed globalization of capital in the 1980s, nor did it appear
as the natural consequence of technology, finance, and power. Airplanes ex-
isted well before WWII. For centuries emperors, colonialists, churchmen
had all imagined something that was global in nature. The new US global,
as I define it, had little to do with the old conventions of imperial might
or colonial reach. It was the semantic signifier of a shock, appearing as a
word that, once deployed, preceded by far its actualization in history—an
actualization that is still most certainly incomplete. In the mid-1940s, it
was clearly an open signifier, and yet its US/Pacific orientation was unmis-
takable—a reorientation—the orient seen in reverse, from a Western gaze.
Reoriented and, perplexingly, simultaneously de-oriented. The title of one
of Harrison’s globe drawings states it clearly: “The World Centrifuged.”20
This type of global applied itself to the world without question and mag-
nified its optics into ever-widening ranges of disciplinary formations. It
assumed that there is no turning back from the constant churning of con-
flict and resolution. In 1962, for example, Leften S. Stavrianos authored
20. Richard Edes Harrison, “The World Centrifuged,” Visual Telling of Stories,
www.fulltable.com/vts/f/fortune/reh/SH512.jpg. For a general discussion of his innovations,
see Susan Schulten, “Richard Edes Harrison and the Challenge to American Cartography,”
Imago Mundi 50 (1998): 174–88.
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2018 509
the textbook A Global History of Man. Still today it reads with astonishing
freshness, with chapter titles using words like crossroads, surge, spiral, circle,
challenges, variation, and struggle. The book culminates with a plea for
the United Nations, following chapters entitled “Forces That Unite the
World,” and “Forces That Divide the World.”21 But in that same year,
twenty-five years after Hiroshima, we see a different adjectival global that
for the first time returned that gaze, completed it, and even, one can say,
internalized it, adding a neo-orientationalization to the rotation of signifi-
ers. The US was after all now in the East. And so it is here—in the field of
architecture, no less—that we see the beginning of a difference that will
play itself out between the old East and the new East and between a global
as imagined in Japan and globalization as imagined from the perspective of
US shores.
This narrowing of the Pacific still had astonishingly little resonance in
the US, which, in art and architectural circles at least, reveled in a type of
post-WWII neo-Europeanism. Stuart Hughes’s book The Sea Change:
The Migration of Social Thought, 1930–1965 (1975) documented the nar-
rowing of the Atlantic due to the wartime migration into the US of in-
tellectuals from Europe. In art-historical circles, Irwin Panofsky’s Re-
naissance and Renascences in Western Art (1960) reinforced Eurocentric
perspectives. So strong was the emergence of Eurocentrism that Horst
Waldemar Janson’s History of Art (1977) had only a few oblique refer-
ences to Japan’s art, premodern of course, and Frederick Hartt’s Art, A
History of Painting, Sculpture, Architecture (1985) had not even a single
reference to Japan, even though by then Japan had made an impressive
array of contributions to post-WWII art and architecture. Yes, the Japa-
nese Art Society of America began to take shape in 1973, but it certainly
was of a different category of awareness than a journal in Japan with the
word global in the title.
Once again, is it possible that some of the leading intellectuals in Japan
were more global in orientation than their self-occidentalizing American
counterparts? They were clearly trying to force the issue, as evidenced by
Global Architecture, which along with A+U (launched in 1971) was sitting
on the desks of architects in the US written, mysteriously, in Japanese.22
21. Leften S. Stavrianos et al., A Global History of Man (Boston, 1962), pp. 734, 741; for the
final chapter “The United Nations,” see pp. 766–74. A similar book is Harris B. Stewart, Jr.,
The Global Sea (Princeton, N.J., 1963), whose author was the Chief Oceanographer of the US
Coast and Geodetic Survey; the last chapter is entitled “The International Waters” (p. 118).
22. In 1974 the Museum of Modern Art hosted the exhibition New Japanese Photography.
It was codirected by John Szarkowski, director of the museum’s department of photography,
and Shoji Yamagishi, Japanese critic and editor of Camera Mainichi. The exhibition consisted
510 Mark Jarzombek / Positioning the Global Imaginary
FIGURE 4. Arata Isozaki, “Demonstration Robot” at Expo ’70 (1970). Arata Isozaki and
Associates.
of 187 photographs, dating from 1940 to 1973, presented as a series of one-man shows that
identify the central concerns of fifteen photographers.
23. The reader should understand that this short article can in no way fully explicate the
complex thinking and design work of Isozaki. I recommend Ken Tadashi Oshima’s excellent
analysis; see Ken Tadashi Oshima, Arata Isozaki (New York, 2009).
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2018 511
The incomparably individual process of Wright’s work is the un-
prejudiced incorporation of the legacy of every civilization, of Whit-
man and Lao-tzu, of Aztec and Momoyama Japanese. Of the many
works born of this creative process, the Johnson Wax Building rep-
resents a pinnacle of qualitative maturity. Here is space to which no
civilization can lay claim.24
The genius of Wright, for Isozaki, was not just the cosmopolitan fluidity by
which he navigated through civilizations. Wright brought culture to a place
where ownership with all the evil that it could possibly entail is tran-
scended. If Japan was identified as a place where the land and a people
owned each other, Wright stood out—in Isozaki’s interpretation—as a
person freed from such constraints. Isozaki saw in Wright not the great
American architect of old and not the designer of the famous Imperial
Hotel in Tokyo but something that even American commentators missed;
Wright was a traveler between civilizations. In that sense, Wright was not
even an American architect but, shall one say, a global one.25
I am getting ahead of myself, for there lurks hidden in Isozaki’s argu-
ment a deep, obliquely positioned interrogation of the Japanese situation,
one that would eventually lead to his book Japan-ness in Architecture
(2006).26 Celebrating the hybridity and openendedness of history as nar-
rated by both Japanese and non-Japanese, the book stands as a project
in tune with the sensibilities of this—our—day and age, when such view-
points are more or less taken for granted in intellectual circles. Back in the
1960s, when the thirty-year-old Isozaki was first formulating his ideas, the
situation was far different. In fact, the arrows were pointing in the exact
opposite direction. Tange had come out with Katsura: Tradition and Cre-
ation in Japanese Architecture (1960), which he wrote in collaboration with
24. Isozaki et al., “Johnson and Son, Administration Building and Research Tower, Ra-
cine, Wisconsin, 1936–9,” Global Architecture 1 (1970), pp. [2–3].
25. That Wright’s Imperial Hotel was demolished in 1968 added, perhaps, to the new rele-
vance of Japan.
26. See Isozaki, Japan-ness in Architecture, trans. Sabu Kohso, ed. David B. Stewart (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 2006). Among the various points that Isozaki makes in this book is that the
history of architecture is eo ipso historiographic, as it has to deal with the often contradictory
locations of history’s construction. The discussion of “Japan-ness,” for Isozaki, is, therefore,
not a question about authenticity, nor is it a rehearsal of a linear archaeological narrative, but
about different histories in different historical moments, with Japan the best example. A
country that internally and externally is often portrayed as having a particularly deep history
is in actuality a country where, in Isozaki’s eyes, its history in the context of the practice and
theory of architecture can be shown to be a shifting signifier. It is this never-to-be-fullfilled
searching for Japanness that defines the “Japan-ness”; see Isozaki “Yayoi and Jōmon,” in
Japan-ness in Architecture, pp. 33–46.
512 Mark Jarzombek / Positioning the Global Imaginary
the young Japanese-American photographer Yasuhiro Ishimoto.27 Though
there had been previous publications on the villa, this book, in its separate
Japanese and English editions, was something of a hit and went into seven
printings. The photographs effectively married Katsura’s architecture to a
twentieth-century Bauhaus-inspired aesthetic, as has been pointed out in
the scholarly literature. The book even had an introduction by none other
than Walter Gropius, who extolled the anticipated fusion of technology
and tradition.
Tange’s text in the book said something different. It was not about
East/West, much less about modernism and the Bauhaus. He presented
the case that the villa has to be seen as a fusion of a tough, simple farm aes-
thetic rooted in the world of the ancient Jomon (Japan’s original hunter-
gatherer culture from circa 14,000 BCE–500 BCE) and the abstract and
elegant aesthetic of detachment that came from Japan’s aristocratic tradi-
tion.28 It was a creative argument because the seventeenth-century design-
ers of Katsura had no idea that there was such a thing as the Jomon, the
Jomon only having been discovered in the late nineteenth century and even
then their significance really only acknowledged in the 1930s and 1940s dur-
ing WWII; even Tange, it seems, only came to know of the Jomon in the
1950s. After Japan’s defeat in 1945, Marxist-oriented intellectuals argued
that archaeology could play an important role in refashioning Japanese
identity now that the emperor was no longer the national focus. The phrase
“imperial Japan” was replaced with the phrase “cultural Japan.”29 In fact,
the term bunka (culture) emerged in the immediate aftermath of the war
as a prominent element in rhetoric about rebuilding the nation, and the
Jomon were celebrated as a way to highlight the common people.30
By reaching back to an imagined Jomon and tracing Japanese subse-
quent rice farming history, Tange was hyper-nativising the idea of a pop-
ulist tradition. Nonetheless, Tange’s argument was focused on the dynamic
27. See Kenzo Tange and Yasuhiro Ishimoto, Katsura: Tradition and Creation in Japanese
Architecture, trans. Charles S. Terry (New Haven, Conn., 1960).
28. See ibid., p. vi. Reaching back to the Jomon was rather unexpected as it was still a
sparsely researched field, not yet associated with Japanese nationalism and probably unknown
to most Western readers. The first Jomon sites to be designated as protected were Kamegoaka
(1944), Korekawa (1957), and Oyu (1956). See also Dana Buntrock, “Katsura Imperial Villa: A
Brief Descriptive Bibliography, with Illustrations,” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture
Review 1 (Nov. 2012), cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-3/katsura-imperial-villa.
29. Walter Edwards, “Buried Discourse: the Toro Archaeological Site and Japanese Na-
tional Identity in the Early Postwar Period,” Journal of Japanese Studies 17 (Winter 1991): 2, 3.
30. See Junko Habu and Clare Fawcett, “Jomon Archaeology and the Representation of
Japanese Origins,” Antiquity 73 (Sept. 1999): 587–93; see also Bert Winther-Tamaki, Art in the
Encounter of Nations: Japanese and American Artists in the Early Postwar Years (Honolulu,
2001).
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2018 513
and productive synthesis of opposing forces—a type of body and soul argu-
ment—that he felt would translate for the contemporary situation. “The cul-
tural energy which budded at Katsura can, I think, be brought to full bloom
in this new period.” He then adds, “In this sense I stand on the Katsura tra-
dition.”31 The book did not hide the fact that Japan’s aristocratic sensibilities,
unlike those of Europe, were not alienated, so he elegantly assumed, from
the world of the primitive Jomon. No revolution of egalitarianism was nec-
essary here. Japan could leap from the Jomon into the modern without un-
dergoing the messy processes of democratization. Stated differently, the new
post-WWII democracy did not really impinge upon the old Japan.
Tange reinforced his position with yet another blockbuster book, Ise:
Prototype of Japanese Architecture (1965). Its aerial photographs, granted
by special permission from the government (since the building was techni-
cally not supposed to be seen by anyone except the emperor and the
priests), show the shrine floating like an island of tranquility in a sea of sa-
cred trees, the message reinforced by Tange’s moving tribute to the deep
spirituality of the site. The title says it all. This was nothing less than the
starting point, the new starting point, of the Japanese architectural tradi-
tion.32
Tange did not have to spell out the geopolitical argument. It was clearly
about survival, revival, and the proud silencing of trauma; yet the choice of
the two buildings disguised a particular cunning. Ise Shrine was not dam-
aged by war. In fact, its rhythms of rebuilding—in 1932 and 1952—had, by
sheer accident of history, framed the war and thus allowed the war to be
easily ignored in the context of the building. As to the Katsura Villa, it
was not a castle but indeed an aristocratic retreat. As any historian of Japan
would know, the aristocratic tradition represented by the creators of
Katsura stood in opposition to the military shugunate that had stripped
the elites from their position of power, giving them little to do except, quite
literally, to drink tea. Katsura was thus a safe place to be in the post-WWII
interrogations of Japanese history because it could be seen as untouched
by militaristic contaminations. The topic of architecture’s central role in
the Japanese geopolitical imaginary was taken up by others. The Roots of
33. Yukio Futagawa and Teiji Itoh, The Roots of Japanese Architecture (New York, 1963),
pp. 9, 10.
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2018 515
The path by which Isozaki found his alternative interpretation of mod-
ernism’s history came with a twist. When Isozaki left the office of Tange in
1962 to start his own career, he published a tongue-in-cheek article, “City
Demolition Industry, Inc.” about a “discussion” he had with a murderous
urban planner:
The city . . . was the killer of all killers and, worse still, being anon-
ymous, it was a curious enterprise to which no responsibilities were
attached. And he felt that in order to create an age in which the
killing profession would again be an art, and in which this human
act could be performed with pleasure, there was nothing more ur-
gent than to destroy these inhuman cities.
To which he adds,
When I think of the hollow sound of the slogans for building, re-
newing and improving cities—in reality the political propping-up of
the metropolis—I come to think in terms of destruction as the only
reality.34
And it was not just cities that were under attack, physically and metaphor-
ically; there was also discussion about “annihilating all the editors of mag-
azines in our country who are too timid to challenge the status quo in city
planning and architecture.” The text was seen as so bizarre by the editors of
Japan Architect, where it was published as a concession to the brilliant
young architect who at the time was still in the employ of Tange, that they
ran it not as an article but as an advertisement for a real company. It was
one of the greatest architectural parodies of the age, some ten years before
the famous destruction of the Pruitt-Igo housing complex in St. Louis in
1972. It pointed to the rebuilding of Japan’s bombed-out cities not as state-
ments of heroic progress but as a different type of destruction.35
It was an argument that resonated with box office successes like King
Kong vs. Godzilla (1962), and Mothra vs. Godzilla (1964), the latter of which
had the tagline “How much terror can you stand?” The plot features a
greedy developer, Kumayama, president of Happy Enterprises, who has
placed huge machines to suck dry a part of the ocean near Tokyo so he
34. Isozaki, “City Demolition Industry, Inc.,” in Isozaki, Hankenshikuchi [Unbuilt] (Tokyo,
2001), pp. 18, 25.
35. During this time, Japan was undergoing upheavals with respect to a budding New Left
protest movement toward which Isozaki later admitted he was sympathetic, as it forced him
to reevaluate the core principles of his professional identity as an urban planner. See also
Claudia Derichs, “Japan: ‘1968’—History of a Decade,” in 1968: Memories and Legacies of a
Global Revolt, ed. Richard F. Wetzell (Washington, D.C., 2009), pp. 89–94.
516 Mark Jarzombek / Positioning the Global Imaginary
can put luxury condos there. When a giant egg washes up on shore, it is
purchased by Kumayama, who plans to make it a tourist attraction. The
investigative reporter Ichiro Sakai, played by the famous actor Akira
Takarada, argues to no avail that “This egg should belong to everyone.”
And indeed, the egg hatches two giant larva that ultimately defeat Godzilla
to save humanity. The moral tone about war is obvious from views of a
nearby island devastated by nuclear testing and a vast, bulldozed field
primed for real estate development. It is from beneath this soil, a now-
dry sea bed, that Godzilla arises, emerging from the muck as every real-
estate tycoon’s worst nightmare.36
The pop-cultural interrogations in Japan of nuclear holocaust and cap-
italism are both obvious and well-studied, but less noticed is the question
of how Japanese history itself is portrayed. One of the culminating mo-
ments of Mothra vs. Godzilla depicts Godzilla tearing down a building that
had been destroyed in the war and just laboriously rebuilt in 1959. The
trailer portrays Godzilla pawing away at the Nagoya Castle, leaving it as
a pile of rubble. Huge letters spelling out “a shattering, soul-searching ex-
perience” are written over the building—as indeed such an event would
have been. In the posthistory world of pop culture, nothing is sacred,
which brings us back to Katsura, a book that indeed points backward as
if the problems of contemporary Japan might be solved with a good dose
of aristocratic cleanliness. From my point of view, scholarly interpretation
of that text should focus less on the Bauhausification of the villa than on
the attempt by Tange to stand modernism on the legs of tradition to pro-
duce a reactionary agenda. In comparison, Isozaki’s “City Demolition In-
dustry, Inc.” and Mothra vs. Godzilla made a significantly more impressive
and complex argument.
Isozaki carried this pretend design of urban destruction out into the
world of architecture with his City in the Air (1962), a project that could
be easily misunderstood as futuristic or as having something to do with
trees and branches and thus as conforming to Tange’s metabolist doc-
trine (fig. 5).37 In reality, the project of clustered capsules suspended in
the air on giant cylinders rising from the ground references not just
the timber bracketing system found in Japanese temples but also bomber
36. See Mothra vs. Godzilla (originally released in the US as Godzilla vs. the Thing), dir.
Ishiro Honda (1964).
37. See Richard Koshalek, David Stewart, and Hajime Yatsuka, Arata Isozaki: Architecture
1960–1990, ed. Kate Norment (New York, 1991), p. 34. Isozaki reinforced the idea when he
later wrote of the project as a forest. But since urban destruction is such a key part of his
thinking, I am loath to ascribe this as the only possible interpretation; see Isozaki, Hanken-
shikuchi, p. 76.
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2018 517
FIGURE 5. Isozaki, model of “City in the Air” (1962). Photo by Yukio Futagawa. Yoshio
Futagawa/GA Photographers.
38. See Philip Drew, The Architecture of Arata Isozaki (New York, 1982), p. 6. Philip Drew
points to the similarity of the design to the brackets that can be found on the South Gate of
the Todaji Temple.
39. Isozaki, Hankenshikuchi, p. 47.
518 Mark Jarzombek / Positioning the Global Imaginary
40. Isozaki, “Space of Darkness,” in Oshima, Arata Isozaki, pp. 150–55. In this essay,
Isozaki describes his fascination with spaces that distort and alter our perceptions. In 1974,
Isozaki wrote an article on Cedric Price (1934–2003), an eccentric English designer well-
known in architectural circles for his design of a Fun Palace. It consisted of a large factory-
scaled building, serviced by travelling gantry cranes that could move walls, platforms, floors,
stairs, and ceiling modules to create space for theatres, cinemas, restaurants and workshops.
Isozaki’s article is more than a sympathetic reading of Price’s design. Isozaki clearly wants the
reader to se in the person of Price a figure close to his own sensibilities. His description of
Price reads as if Isozaki is describing himself. “His chief aim is to provoke and challenge by
means of injecting systematised ideas that break clean away from existing notions” (Isozaki,
“Erasing Architecture into the System,” in Cedric Price et al., Re: CP, trans. Alfred Birnbaum,
ed. Hans Ulrich Obrist [Basel, 2003], p. 25). The article was originally part of Isozaki,
Kenchiku no Kaitai [Dismantling Architecture] (Tokyo, 1975).
41. See Lisa Hix, “Attack of the Vintage Toy Robots! Justin Pinchot on Japan’s Coolest
Postwar Export,” Collectors Weekly, 18 Nov. 2010, www.collectorsweekly.com/articles/attack
-of-the-vintage-toy-robots-justin-pinchot-on-japans-coolest-postwar-export/
520 Mark Jarzombek / Positioning the Global Imaginary
FIGURE 7. Isozaki, exterior of Oita Branch of Fukuoka Mutual Bank, Oita (1966–1967).
Photo by Yukio Futagawa. Yoshio Futagawa/GA Photographers.
FIGURE 8. Isozaki, interior of Oita Branch of Fukuoka Mutual Bank, Oita (1966–1967).
Photo by Yukio Futagawa. Yoshio Futagawa/GA Photographers
it strange, unwalled structures of twisted metal that look like the col-
lapsed superstructures from a world’s fair, or from some Godzilla movie.
The whole was augmented by synchronized sound and light, with an in-
frared beam controlling the movement of the panels.42 It was, to say the
least, about as strange an installation as one could possibly expect. Elec-
tric Labyrinth may have drawn on the destabilizing experientialism of a
42. See Emmanuel Petit, “Incubation and Decay: Arata Isozaki’s Architectural Poetics—
Metabolism’s Dialogical ‘Other,’ ” Perspecta 40 (2008): 152–63.
522 Mark Jarzombek / Positioning the Global Imaginary
Fun House, but the message of its mechanized Medusa was of a different
order. In clear antithesis to the heroic narratives of the metabolists, the
installation with its spinning blades of history/death/horror represented
for Isozaki a return to ground zero, a cri de coeur to start over.
Needless to say, the exhibition was not shown in Japan—which brings
us back to Expo ’70. After eight years of inner torment, Isozaki’s repressed
disillusionment with metabolism and architecture itself finally caught up
to him. Isozaki saw Expo ’70 as little more than the culmination of the
world view of the nation-state as first formulated under the Meiji Resto-
ration. It produced a world that tried so hard to be modern and Japanese
that it produced in his view only kitsch and bombast.43 Having in essence
inherited this project from an older mindset, it was all he could do to bring
it to fruition. Reviewing the events, Isozaki wrote that after it was all done,
“when everything was as I had wished, it was impossible for me to cry out
that everything was wrong—but it was wrong.”44 The night before the open-
ing he writes that he “was felled by total fatigue both physical and psycho-
logical . . . [a psychosomatic] crisis.”45 It landed him in the hospital.
The plot thickens, for it was in the context of this turbulence in 1969 (a
turbulence far different from what was happening in the US and Europe)46
that Isozaki—not seeing any direct way out of the torturous problem of
Japanness—wrote his piece on the Johnson and Son Administration Build-
ing for the first edition of Global Architecture.
To see the article as just another interpretation of a Wright building is to
miss the drama that is at play. The building was for him a utopian project,
though utopian might be too strong a concept. It showed the possibility of
an architecture before the war, a possibility of something that would have
to be won in a very hard way all over again, not just in a foreign country but
in a country foreign to the very idea of the nonownership of culture. It was
a hallucinatory object—a hallucinatory global.
Isozaki, more by intuition than theoretical expression, understood the
dialectical nature of the word global as an adjectival noun. No global with-
49. Isozaki, “An Architecture of Quotation and Metaphor,” in Drew, The Architecture of
Arata Isozaki (New York, 1982), p. 189.
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2018 525
quence of Western influence his buildings began to take on a classicizing
look. One scholar related him to the great German Enlightenment archi-
tect Karl Friedrich Schinkel and to the Austrian modernist Adolf Loos.50
Another saw connections to the Italian baroque.51 The general presump-
tion was that Isozaki was an open and erudite person, who had read a
lot and who, taking on the pose of self-conscious individualism, moved
with little angst in the general current of US postmodernism. The architec-
tural historian Udo Kulterman celebrated the “radical dimensions” of his
designs, but attributed them to “eclecticism.”52 What I see as a geopoliti-
cally scaled—and self-targeted—ontology in crisis was seen by Kulterman
as a bland cultural fluidity that ultimately did not sit well with most critics
who—still living in a preglobal imaginary—generally favored the line that
Japanese architecture should look clean and severe and thus embody a
happy fusion of the modern with the traditional. In 1991, a large, celebra-
tory monograph on Isozaki appeared through GA with an introduction by
Kenneth Frampton, one of the leading architectural historians in the US.
In framing the unusualness of Isozaki’s architecture, he argued that in
the process of moving past the metabolists and toward a position of “neu-
trality” Isozaki, influenced by Cedric Price’s Fun Palace (an unbuilt,
industrially-scaled multimedia building, 1964) and by Archigram and Stir-
ling, produced out of his “paranoid male fantasy” a “technological Dadaism”
and a “maniera of dematerialization.” It was all made possible because
Isozaki possessed a “sensitive mind in an apocalyptic age.”53
Insightful for sure, but the point of my paper is to separate the attempt
to understand Isozaki as a practicing architect from an attempt to position
and theorize the provocation that the word global implied in that particu-
lar moment in 1970. Global Architecture pointed to a cultural and pedagog-
ical practice aimed at the broader profession, with Isozaki seeing himself
as just one particular flavor. It pointed to the growing asymmetry between
the global as developed and instrumentalized by the US, a post-WWII
global—a global of airplanes, the Pacific Ocean, Pan Am, great circles,
emerging markets, urban planning, and the more difficult, experimental,
unspeakable yet learnable global of a deterritorialized, psycho-civilizational
ethos—violated and necessarily self-violating, both ontologically and epis-
50. See David B. Stewart, “Gods and Men,” in Arata Isozaki: Architecture 1960–1990, p. 17.
51. See Hajime Yatsuka, “Arata Isozaki after 1980: From Mannerism to the Picturesque,”
Arata Isozaki: Architecture 1960–1990, p. 23.
52. Udo Kultermann, “Arata Isozaki,” Contemporary Architects, ed. Muriel Emanuel (New
York, 1980), p. 385.
53. Kenneth Frampton, “Post-Metabolism and the Dissolution of Architecture: Amplifica-
tion and Neutrality 1960–75,” in GA Architect 6, p. 108.
526 Mark Jarzombek / Positioning the Global Imaginary
temologically. One was created and affirmed in the aftermath of Pearl Har-
bor; the other in the aftermath of Hiroshima; the one was the language of
the victor, the other the language of the loser, both shocked into awareness.
One speaks of a culture of anxious mastery; the other is haunted by uncer-
tainty. One produced a new and powerful way to comprehend the world
(from Global War to Global Village); the other produced a conjecture aris-
ing from a reversal of expectations. One circled back toward a monotheis-
tic singularity; the other circled outwards toward a polyvalent future, but
both were dialectically haunted by internal antiglobal presences. One put
that antiglobal at the troubled periphery; the other at the center.
The first global drifts toward the geopolitical real of economy and trade,
while the second stays within the orbit of an imaginary—perhaps even
something that could be called an aesthetics. But the irony is that the
two are mutually interdependent in that if the first is a global conscious-
ness, the second has all the beginnings of a global conscience, staying afloat
only on the thinness of surfaces in the realm of post-Holocaust humanism.
For a brief moment in time, these two globals were balanced against each
other, almost touching.
For sure, Isozaki’s global is the more complex. It emerged as an afteref-
fect of the war when its events could start to be represented/representable
(in Milan) and simultaneously—especially in architecture—not represented/
not representable (in Japan), requiring a compensatory prosthetic/dis-
guise (Wright), the healthy flesh and blood of a modern architecture and
its history in distinction to Japanese history. The global was being pulled
into the problem of something that one can call the future, the future of
modernity, but it was also pulled past the present. Needless to say, these
nuanced, strategic imaginaries were steamrolled into oblivion with the rise
of what we now call globalization.
At stake in the history that I have outlined is, therefore, not the history
of global self-envisioning, but rather the recuperation of the historicity of a
new formation, even though one cannot say that it has yet even been
formed, or can ever be formed. This global was not stationary, either in
space or time, nor was it a simple critique of technology and power. Instead
it circled around much softer substances, namely geography and history,
to ask the question: Where is creativity—architectural creativity, more spe-
cifically—to locate itself in the postnuclear, post-Holocaust world? My
aim was to bring that effort and that problem to light; it is a problem that
needs to still be both thought and thought through.
What I aimed for here was to separate out, but also to interlink, the his-
tory of global as a proliferated adjectival modifier with a history of its imag-
inary. My fear is that because the former ends, so to speak, in globalization,
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2018 527
the latter disappears from view or returns only as a liberal project of toler-
ance and inclusion. Yes, Isozaki’s global is built on tolerance, but it goes
beyond to create a postnationalistic epistemology. Better stated, it is an
epistemology created out of the maw of nationalism and so can only re-
main, at its best, an inherently tragic claim.