Environmental Impact Statement

PNG LNG Project

Attachment 1. LNG Safety

Commercial liquefied natural gas (LNG) has been produced, transported and used around the world for
45 years. At January 2007, 23 LNG export (liquefaction) terminals, 58 import (re-gasification) terminals,
and 224 LNG ships were in operation, altogether handling approximately 168 million metric tons of LNG
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every year (Foss et al., 2007). An additional 21 LNG carriers, all but one above 140,000 m capacity,
were delivered in 2007 (BS Energy Services, 2007).

1. Properties and Hazards of LNG

LNG is composed mostly of methane. Foss et al. (2003) summarise the properties of LNG thus:

LNG itself poses little danger as long as it is contained within storage tanks, piping, and equipment designed
for use at LNG cryogenic conditions. However, vapours resulting from LNG as a result of an uncontrolled
release can be hazardous, within the constraints of the key properties of LNG and LNG vapours –
flammability range and in contact with a source of ignition.

LNG has a higher flammability range in air (Table 1.1) and a higher auto-ignition temperature than other
liquid fuels (Table 1.2). The upper flammability limit and lower flammability limit of methane, the
dominant component of LNG vapour, are 5% and 15% by volume, respectively. When fuel
concentration exceeds its upper flammability limit, it cannot burn because too little oxygen is present.
This situation exists, for example, in a closed, secure storage tank where the vapour concentration is
approximately 100% methane. When fuel concentration is below the lower flammability limit, it cannot
burn because too little methane is present. An example is a leak of a small quantity of LNG in a well-
ventilated area. In this situation, the LNG vapour will rapidly mix with air and dissipate to a
concentration of less than 5%.

Table 1.1 Comparison of properties of liquid fuels

Properties LNG LPG Petrol Fuel Oil
Toxic No No Yes Yes
Carcinogenic No No Yes Yes
Flammable Yes Yes Yes Yes
vapour
Forms vapour Yes Yes Yes No
clouds
Asphyxiant Yes, but in a Same as LNG Yes Yes
vapour cloud
Extreme cold Yes Yes, if refrigerated No No
temperature
Other health None None Eye irritant, Same as petrol
hazards narcosis, nausea,
others
Flash point* -188 (-306) -144 (-156) 10 (-50) 60 (140)
°Celsius (°F)
Boiling point -160 (-256) -42 (-44) 32 (90) 214 (400)
°Celsius (°F)

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 Environmental Impact Statement
PNG LNG Project

Table 1.1 (cont’d) Comparison of properties of liquid fuels

Properties LNG LPG Petrol Fuel Oil
Flammability 5 to 15 2.1 to 9.5 1.3 to 6 N/A
range in air, %
Stored Atmospheric Pressurised Atmospheric Atmospheric
pressure (atmospheric if
refrigerated)
Behaviour if Evaporates as Evaporates, as Evaporates, forms Same as petrol
spilled visible clouds, vapour clouds flammable pool;
parts of which which could be environmental
could be flammable or clean up required.
flammable or explosive under
explosive (if certain conditions.
contained) under
certain conditions.
Source: after Foss et al. (2003)
* ‘Flash point’ means the minimum temperature at which a liquid gives off a vapour within a test vessel in sufficient concentration
to form an ignitable mixture with air near the surface of the liquid (OSHA, 2008).

Table 1.2 Auto-ignition temperature of liquid fuels

Fuel Auto-ignition Temperature, °Celsius (°F)
LNG (primarily methane) 540 (1,004)
LPG 454 to 510 (850 to 950)
Ethanol 523 (793)
Methanol 464 (867)
Gasoline 257 (495)
Diesel 316 (Approx. 600)
Source: after Foss et al. (2003)

LNG is also intrinsically less explosive than other liquid fuels:

• Methane has a narrow flammability range outside which it cannot burn (Figure 1.1).

• LNG is stored and transported at atmospheric pressure, so unless LNG is under pressure (for
example, being pumped through a pipe), it will flow and evaporate if the containing vessel leaks,
rather than escape as a rapidly expanding vapour cloud. LNG spilled in the open is therefore slow to
mix with air into a combustible concentration. If ignited, therefore, spilled LNG will tend to burn only
at the evaporating edges of the pool. The spilled LNG itself cannot burn.

Specific conditions are required for the presence of LNG to lead to an explosion:

• An ignition source.

• Vapour within the flammability range (a methane concentration in air of between 5% and 15%; see
Table 1.1).

• Containment of the vapour cloud in a confined space, such as a building or vessel.

If only the first two of these three conditions are fulfilled (for example, if LNG ignites after escaping into
the open air as a gas, spill or pressurised stream), the released gas will only ignite at the edges of the
spill (where the methane concentration in air is within the 5% to 15% flammability range).

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 Environmental Impact Statement
PNG LNG Project

Table 2.1 Fatal LNG Incidents 1944 to present*

Year Facility Fatalities Damage Notes
1944 East Ohio Gas 128 (50 NA Tank made from low-nickel steel failed under cryogenic temperatures; no bund around tank.
LNG Tank, employees, Vapour cloud formed and was blown by the wind into the surrounding streets and stormwater
Cleveland, 78 residents) system. Natural gas in the vaporising LNG pool ignited.
USA
1977 Arzew, Algeria 1 employee NA Aluminium valve failure on contact with cryogenic temperatures. Wrong aluminum alloy on
frozen to replacement valve. LNG released, but no vapour ignition.
death
1979 Columbia Gas 1 employee Yes Explosion within an electrical substation.
LNG Terminal, LNG leaked through LNG pump electrical penetration seal, vaporised, passed through 60 m of
Cove Point, underground electrical conduit, and entered the substation. No gas detectors in the substation
Maryland, USA building as natural gas was never expected. The normal arcing contacts of a circuit breaker
ignited the natural gas and air mixture, resulting in an explosion.
1983 Bontang, 3 employees Yes LNG Train B ruptured when a blind flange left in a flare line during start-up caused an
Indonesia overpressurisation three times greater than the design pressure. All the pressure-protection
systems were connected to this flare line. Debris was projected some 50 m and killed three
workers. The ensuing fire was extinguished in about 30 minutes. This incident occurred during
dry-out and purging of an exchanger with warm natural gas prior to introducing LNG into the
system (no LNG was involved or released).
2004 Skikda LNG 27 Explosions and fire Hydrocarbon refrigerant vapour leaked into a steam boiler inlet. The boiler overheated and
Facility, Algeria employees destroyed part of the ruptured close enough to the gas leak to ignite the vapour cloud in a confined space and
LNG facility. Storage hence cause an explosion. A U.S. government report found local ignition sources, a lack of
tanks not damaged. ʻtypicalʼ automatic equipment shutdown devices, and a lack of hazard detection devices
contributed to the incident.
Source: after Foss et al. (2003).

* Excludes industrial accidents unrelated to the presence of LNG, such as Texas Eastern Transmission LNG Tank, Staten Island, NY, USA, 1973 (empty tank repair accident, 40 fatalities).

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 Environmental Impact Statement
PNG LNG Project

Improvements in the planning, design and operations of LNG facilities reflect lessons learned from
past mistakes. More recently; however, a lower public tolerance to risk (and concerns about what
has not happened but some believe could happen) has maintained pressure for ever-stricter
safety criteria. Much of the concern arises from scenarios that have a low probability of occurring
but high consequences if they should occur (Box 2.1). Since the accident rate in the industry has
remained low, the recent strengthening of safety criteria has necessarily been based on modelling
of possible hazards.

Box 2.1 Note on extreme LNG accident scenarios

Although the LNG industry has a strong safety An LNG vapour cloud needs both some degree
record, the public's lack of familiarity with LNG and of confinement and a strong ignition source to
the many design and safety precautions that are in create an explosion. LNG releases that
place for its storage and use has contributed to the encounter strong ignition sources are far more
general concern many feel about LNG siting. Many likely to result in vapour cloud fires than they are
individuals are unaware of the large improvements in in explosions.
engineering design and best practices that help Nevertheless, there are hazards with the transport or
ensure the safe handling of LNG, which makes it storage of large quantities of any flammable
easier for them to believe extreme scenarios that are material, and terrorists unfortunately have
unlikely given today's design and practices. demonstrated that even a small quantity of
Opponents often put forth two types of scenarios: flammable material can lead to major consequences.
• Scenario 1: An LNG tanker releases its LNG all It is important to ensure that facilities handling large
at once in a cataclysmic failure (accidental or by quantities of any hazardous substance follow the
terrorist action). best practices and regulations to minimise risks and
promote safety.
In fact, LNG tankers use multiple tanks to limit
the amount of LNG that can be released at one The Sandia study made two compelling conclusions:
time. The detailed analysis recently completed • Risks from accidental LNG spills, such as from
as a part of the Sandia report provides further collisions and groundings, are small and
evidence that, while it is possible for multiple manageable within current safety policies and
tanks to fail as a result of terrorist attacks or practices.
some very unlikely accidental cause, the • Risks from intentional events, such as terrorist
simultaneous failure of all the tanks on a tanker acts, can be significantly reduced with appropriate
is not considered credible. security, planning, prevention, and mitigation.
• Scenario 2: A vapour cloud from released LNG
envelopes a populated area, ignites, and then
explodes. Source: after IFC (2005), citing Sandia (2004).

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