1969 Report of Jeevan Lal Kapur Commission of 2 PDF

REPORT
OF
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
IN TO
CONSPIRACY TO MURDER
MAHATMA GANDHI
PART I
[digitised by sacw.net]
CONTENTS
PART I
VOLUME I
Chapter I_lntxoducti
Chapter II_Facts
Cbaptcr III_Inquiries-Delhi
Chapter IV-Inquiries-Bombay
Chapter V_Scope of the InquirY
Chapter VI_Background of the Accused
Chlpter V[[_JurisJiction of the
C'upter of a Vii ister 1:'1:1 .\{i edat respoDlii 9S-II4
Chapter IX-Pand!gani incident . uS-IZ4
Chapter X_Wardha incident
Chapter XI-Accident to Gandbiji's special train 127-128
VOLUME II
Cbapter XII-Conditions in Delhi
A--Partition of India, the events leadi it aod the aftermath
of the partition
B- What was luppeaing in Delhi after the bomb was thtOwn 154-159
C--l'oliti 1 co.lJitLO.lS in Delhi 159-166
D-Stateru!nts of officers of tile Hone Mi 161'""""182
E_The state of the Administration 182-190
P-Conditions at I1ida precautions me Gandhi
ashramites took 190""""207
G_Measures taken to protect Mahatma GanJhi VJt-217
H_Adequacy of Measures. 21.,-226
of Muder of Manu 226--231
Chapter XIII_Atwar AffairS 233-246
Chapter XIV.-Gwa.lior AffairS 247-250
VOLUME III
Chapter XV-Poona 253-312
Chapter XVI-Ahmednagar 313-352
Olal)t.cr XVII-Razakar Movement 353-354
Vol. I
1-259 HA. [digitised by sacw.net]

Introduction
1.1 This Commission was appointed by notification dated March
22, 1965, S.O. 992. Mr. Gopal Swarup Pathak, M.P., was appointed
to make the Inquiry. On his being appointed a Minister, I was
appointed to conduct the Inquiry on November 21, 1966. The terms
of reference were:-
(a)
conspiracy of Nathuram Vinayak Godse and others to
assassinate Mahatma Gandhi;
(b) whether any of such persons had communicated the said
information to any authorities of the Government of
Bombay or of the Government of India; in particular,
whether the aforesaid Shri Ketkar had conveyed the
said information to the late Bal Gangadhar Kher, the
then Premier of Bombay, through the late Balukaka
Kanetkar;
(c) if so, what action was taken by the Government of
Bombay, in particular by the late Bal Gangadhar Kher,
and the Government of India on the basis of the said in-
formation.
This notification was amended by notification No. 31/28/68-Poll.! (A)
dated October 28, 1968, making clause (c) to read as follows:-
(c) if so, what action was taken by the Government of
and the Government of India and by the officers of the
said Governments on the basis of the said information.
1.2 To assist this Commission, Mr. G. N. Vaidya was engaged by
the Government of Maharashtra and Mr. K. S. Chawla, Barrister-at-
Law was appointed for the Government of India. The Government
of India then replaced their counsel and engaged Mr. B. B. Lall,
Advocate, who appeared before the Commission as from February
10, 1968. Mr. G. N. Vaidya having been raised to the Bench, Mr.
R. B. Kotwal took his place.
1.3 After I was appointed to conduct the Inquiry, notices were
issued under rule 2 (1) (a) of the rules under the Commissions of
Inquiry Act (Act LX of 1952).
1.4 The Commission examined 101 witnesses and 407 documents
were produced by the two Governments and witnesses who appear-
ed before the Commission. The examination of the witnesses took
162 days at various places where the Commission had to sit for the
convenience of the witnesses---Bombay, New Delhi, Dharwal',
Nagpur, Poona, Baroda and Chandigarh.
1.5 As the matter under inquiry was of great importance to the
two Governments, the Commission allowed them full opportunity
to produce evidence and to cross-examine witnesses whom the Com-
mission called and the Commission is glad to say that the witnesses
who were summoned appeared most willingly and without demur
suffered the strain and embarrassment if not the discomfort of
searching cross-examination. Counsel argued their respective cases
for 50 days out of which Mr. R. B. Kotwal took 37 days and Mr. B. B.
LaH 13. Commission thought it fit to give full latitude to Counsel
to put their respective cases before the ('()mmission. A list of the
sittings on different dates and the number of witoE'sses examined
and their names are set out in the appendix L
1.6 The Commission is glad to say that it got full co-operaticn
from witnesses as wen as from Counsel but for which it might have
been difficult to make the Inquiry.
1.7 The Report is in six volumes. The evidence recorded by the
Conunission is contained in five volumes and the documents pro-
duced before it are contained in <mother five volumes. Besides this,
the record of the proceedings before Judge Atma Charan had also to
be perused as some of the statements were made parts of the evi-
dence before the Commission. The case diaries of the Delhi Police
investigation into the bomb case and the murder case and the Crime
Report of the Bombay Police as also some of the files produced by
the Government of India, Director, Intelligence Bureau and by the
Inspector-Gener,al of Police, Delhi, have been made parts of the
record.
1.8 The Commission wishes to thank all those officers who
throughout assisted the Commission in its Inquiry and also those
officers of the Government of India as well as of the Go\'ernment of
Maharashtra who have produced the documentar). evidence re-
quired by the Commission or were necessary to subserve the smooth
working of the Commission. In this matter, the Government of
Maharashtra has been particularly helpful and they placed all the
relevant records which were in their possession. The Government
of India have also placed such documents which were in their
possession and the Director, Intelligence Bureau has also done the
same. But for their willing co-operation it might not have been easy
to conduct this Inquiry or to bring it to a successful end.
1.9 Commission wishes to thank counsel who have conducted
their respective cases with diligence and Elbility. But for their
assistance it might not have been possible to unravel the skein of
tangled facts submitted before the Commission.
1.10 The scheme which the CommiSSion has followed is this thaf
in every chapter where facts had to be discussed the Commission
has set out a narration of facts giving its opinions on questions of
facts wherever necessary but as the Commission is a fact-finding
body and the conduct of several officers 'Of Government and the
action and inactions of Ministers has had to be inquired into and
commented upon, the Commission thought it expedient in the
interest of justice to give wherever it was necessary a resume of the
evidence of each of the important witnesses. This has, in many
cases, led to repetition and duplication but bec<luse the question of
the responsibility of OffiCC"TS <1nd Minislers was involvcd the Com-
mission hns had In ;ulopl lhi!> p;lllpl'll in :.;pil(' of Ih(' d:mr:f'r of I'CpC-
tHinn:.;.
1.11 During the course of the Inquiry the official acts of persons
u:ho are unfortunately dead have also had to be inquired into and
1'001llnented upon but in such cases the Commission has been careful
10 refer to all the documentary and other evidence which have
llt.'en placed before the Commission, In most cases the authors of
these documents were the deceased persons themselves or they were
o.:onlpiled under their directions. It is unfortunate that the actions 01
l,lt'rsons who are dead have had to be inquired into and sometimes
lldvcrsely comment-ed upon but that was inevitable in view of the
n:liure of the inquiry.
1.12 Some witnesses have made statements in regard to certain
"Inillcnt persons, who could not be examined either because they are
<lIlt of India or due to reasons of health and memoriae due to
Llpse of time. Commission has avoided, as far as it was possible and
('Ollsistent with its duty, which the Commission had in regard to fact-
lilllling, commenting upon the actions of such persons but wherever
II was absolutely unavoidable the CommiSSion has not hesitated to
:LI,lkc its comments.
1.13 The Report of the COlrunission hLos been divided into chapters
and sub-chapters. In Chapter II are set out the facts preceding and
kaJing to the setting up of this Commission. In Chapters III and
IV the Commission has discussed what it has called 'Inquiries' held
aftt't' the murder of Mahatma Gandhi. They include the inquiry made
Oil :3lst January after the funeral of Mahatma Gandhi, the interpella-
lions in the Constituent Assembly, the trial of the Murder case, and
the explanations given by the police officers of Delhi and Bombay
ill'It'!' certain adverse remarks were made by Judge Atma Charan in
his judgment and the action taken by the Government of India
IIH'rellpon. At Bombay also there were similar Inquiries. They in-
dude the interpellation in the Bombay Legislative Assembly, a
qllasi inquiry by the Inspector General of Police, Bombay, the debate
ill the Bombay Legislative Assembly in 1949, and the explanation
I:lven by the Bombay police after the adverse remarks. In Chapter V
Ill(' scope of the present Inquiry and the interpretation put on the
Lll\i(uage used in the Notification constituting the Inquiry have been
Chapter VI deals with the background of the accused in
tIl(' Murder case and Chapter VII with the jurisdiction of the Com-
11Iission. In Chapter VIII the constitutional responsibility of Ministers
11:1:-; UL'\.'n dealt with. -
1.14 The Commission has next taken up and discussed the general
1"lllditions in the country at the time when the murder took place.
Thn·e incidents which happened previous to the murder in 1944 and'
I n,lii are dealt with in Chapters IX to XI. They are the alleged attack
'Ill ,uhatma Gandhi at Panchgani and Wardha and the attempted
of t.hf! Gandhi Special on Kalyan-Poona section.
I.IS Tn Chapter XII the conditions in Delhi just before and after
murder have been discussed at some length in 9 sub-chapters
X If-A to XII-I. In Chapters XIII and XIV the conditions at Alwar
Ulld (:wtlliol' haVe! been discussed.
('ll1Ipll'r XVII' dl'als wlih ('01H1i!lulls in nOlllhnv
1.17 As the murder of Mahatma Gandhi had a communal origin,
three communal organisations the Hindu Mahasabha, the RS.S., and
the Rashtra Dal have been discussed in Chapter XIX.
1.18 The terms of reference (a) and (b) are discussed ·in Chapters
XX and XXI, the latter has been divided into two parts 'A', and 'B'.
'A' with prior kriowledge at Delhi and 'B' with Bombay.
1.19 Chapter XXII deals with term of reference (c). Under this
head fall the investigation at Delhi and Bombay and these have been
divided into three chapters XXIII, XXIV and XXV.
1.20 Findings have been given in Chapter XXVI.

1.21 In the matter of Waters Inquiry protest was raised in the
British Parliament about the injustice done by inquiries held under
the Tribunals of Inquiries Act of 1921 corresponding to the Commis-
sions of Inquiry Act and the defect has been referred to by Lord
Devlin in his broadcast on the B.B.C. which is reported in the Lis-
tener dated 12th December, 1968. This i::. what Lord Devlin has
said:-
"Under our system it's the responsiJ)ility of the advocate on
each side-I use that term to cover both barrister and soli-
citor-to see that all the relevant facts are brought before
the judge. This is what is known as the adversary system
as opposed to the inquisitorial. When, for example, a gov-
ernment inquiry is set up to investigate, let's say, the
causes of a national disaster, there is no opposition of
adversary system it's presumed that if each side produces

the evidence in its own favour, the judge will at the end
of the day have the whole picture in front of him. Indeed,
I think myself that he will get a better picture that way
than if he does the job himself."
In judging the results of an Inquiry this onesidedness has always to
be kept in view. But there is no other method devisable.
1.22 The Commission has been subjected to criticism sometimes
complimentary and sometimes adverse. Those who have held high
judicial office may be impervious to and may not be affected by such
criticism'); but such criticisms are likely to affect the public mind and
it is lUlfortlUlate that unlike in England such criticisms cannot be
taken notice ot by superior courts and there may be some constitu-
tional difficulty about it.
1.23 The Commission has not examined the then Governor
General, Earl Mountbatten, because he was not in India but he has
been mentioned in the statements of certain witnesses from which
certain deductions may have lUlwittingly been made. Commission
would to say tho.t' it expresses no opinion on the correctness or
of the s1.al('mcnt:-; mnde by witnesses in regard to matters
wllh whlC'h his Lordsil!p was eonn('ctcd.
CHAPTER II-FACTS
Index of Paragraphs
2.2 Jinnah's suggested exchange of population
2.3 . Mountbatten plan
2.4 Direct Action Day and consequences thereof
2.6 REfusal to pay cash balances
2.7 Maulana's complaint
2.8 Pressure on Mahatma for getting moneys paid
2.9 Mahatma's fast
2.B Conspiracy at Poona
2.15 & 19 Bomb explosion
2.16 Movements of conspirators
2.21 Investigation at Bombay and Delhi
2.30 Murder of Mahatma Gandhi
2.34 Bombay Inquiry
CHAPTER II
Facts
2.1 Facts which have preceded and given rise to this reference are
these:
2.2 On December 10, 1945 Mr. Jinnah first suggested the possibility
of the exchange of population "if it could be done purely on a volun-
tary basis", which the Hindus and Sikhs and other non-Muslims of
the Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sindh and Bengal re-
jected most vehemently. On November 24, 1946 Mr. Jinnah at a
press conference at Karachi said that the questio'n of exchange should
be taken up immediately to which the reaction of non-Muslims
throughout India was most unfavourable though it was supported
by the Muslim League but in the Punjab only one League leader
supported it e.g. ,the Nawab of Mamdot.
2.3 On 2nd June 1947 Lord Mountbatten announced a three-fold
plan for solution of the Indian problem, one of which was the parti-
tion of the country-Pakistan to have Muslim majority areas of the
Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and Bengal. There was to be a plebiscite
in N.W.F.P. but that also went in favour of Pakistan. A fOTtiori the
rest of territories of the country were to form India. •
2.4 In pursuance of their demand for Pakistan the Muslim League
in about March 1947 observed what was the Direct Action Day the
consequence of which was that Hindus and Sikhs in the western dis-
tricts of the Punjab particularly in rural areas were subjected to
indescribable atrocities which in one of the northern districts of the
Punjab was termed the 'Rape of Rawalpindi'. Consequent upon this
and particularly after the announcement of the Partition plan the
Hindus and Sikhs of the western districts of Western Punjab started
leaving their hearths and homes and migrated into eastern districts
of the Punjab, Delhi and into western U.P. which inter aria created
a law and order problem in those parts. There had been in 1946 what
were euphemistically called Hindu-Muslim riots in Noakhali and
Tipperah districts of East Bengal which had resulted in forcible con-
versions, murder, rape, abduction, etc., of which the victims were
solely Hindus. Mahatma Gandhi thereupon with a party of his
ashramites went on a peace mission to Chaumuhani in Noakhali dis-
trict on November 7, 1946 and remained in that district till March 3,
1947. After leaving Noakhali the Mahatma came to Bihar and from
there came back to Calcutta and after viSiting Kashmir and again
visiting Patna and Calcutta returned to Delhi on September 9,
1947 and stayed at Birla House instead of at Bhangi Colony.
2.5 From Noakhali he came to Patna via Sodepur near Calcutta.
He returned to Delhi but went back to Patna and returned to Delhi
on May 25, 1947. From there he went to Srinagar and Jammu and
10
Wah and again went to Calcutta on August 7, 1947. He finally re-
turned to Delhi on September 9, 1947, after having stayed in a Muslim
locality in Calcutta (J3eli ..ghata) and when he arrived in Delhi he
was shocked to hear about the riots in the capital-see 'Mahatma
Gandhi' by Tendulkar, Vol. VIII, page 134.
2.6 Sometimes in the end of December, 1947 °the Government of
India decided to postpone the payment of 55 crores'Pakistan's share
of cash balances. It was a freeze and the payment was to await an
overall settlement.
2.7 On January 4, 1948 the Delhi Maulanas complained to
Mahatma Gandhi about their safety putting moral pressure upon
him, which from all accounts greatly disturbed the Mahatma.
2.8 According to some witnesses Lord Mountbatten also was
putting moral pressure on the Mahatma in r,egard to the payment of
55 crores, the non-payment of wh1ch, according to him, would have
tarnished the fair name and honour of India. Pyarelal in his book
at page 700 has given a slightly different version and has called it
invited advice. He also impressed upon Mahatma Gandhi the
necessity of exerting his influence to prevent the exodus of Muslims
from Delhi to Pakistan. The Commission has not examined Lord
Mountbatten and it expresses no opinion on the correctness or other-
wise of statement regarding moral pressure.
2.9 On January 13, 1948 at 11.55 A.M. the Mahatma undertook
a fast with two objectives (i) to undo the decision regarding the
payment of the cash balances to Pakistan, and (ii) to produce an
atmosphere of' proper Hindu-Muslim amity in Delhi. A fuller
account of this will be given later. On January 15, 1948, i.e., on the
third day of the fast the Government of India announced that it had
decided to pay the 55 crores cash balances to Pakistan immediately.
This greatly incensed militant sections of the Hindus, particularly
the Hindu Mahasabha. The Mahatma in his post-prayer speeches
had been insisting that the Muslims should not be disturbed from
their habitations and that the Hindu refugees who had come should
not indulge in violence so as to create a situation which would force
the Muslims to leave their homes.
2.10 During Mahatma's fast there were processions taken to Birla
House to protest against Mahatma's fasting in order to coerce Gov-
ernment of India to pay 55 crores and to prevent the rehabilitation
of Hindu refugees into houses left vacant by the Muslims who had
taken refuge in Purana Quila, Humayun's Tomb, etc. Some of the
refugees were so incensed that they took out processions and slogans
were shouted 'MARTA HAI TO MARNE DO' (If Gandhi wants to
die, let him die). However, as a result of the fast an atmosphere
was created which according to Pyarelal's book'" softened the hearts
of a large section of the Hindus and the leaders of the Hindus and
the Muslims agreed to sign a four-point pledge to keep peace and'
harmony.
• n
2.11 Qn the morning of January 18, 1948 the Peace Committee:
which had been formed after the Mahatma's undertaking the fast gave
a pledge assuring Gandhiji (i) that the annual fair at Khawaja
Qutabuddin's Mausoleum at Mehrauli will be held as usual, (ii)
Muslims will be able to move about in Delhi, (iii) Mosques left by
the Muslims and taken possession of by Hindus and Sikhs will be
vacated, Muslim areas will not be forcibly occupied, and (iv) the
Hindus will not object to the return of Muslim'!> who had migrated,
,,,,'hereupon Mahatma gave up his fast taking orange juice from
the hands of Maulana Azad at 12.45 P.M.
2.12 Qn January, 1948 a meeting under the auspices of the Hindu

Mahasabha was held in which they expressed indignation over the
payment of 55 crores, described Mahatma's fast as being helpful to
Pakistan, a boost to the value of property of Muslims in Delhi and
it was ridiculing the Hindus and Sikhs all the world over. Some
derogatory remarks were made against Mahatma Gandhi calling him
a dictator who would soon meet the fate of Hitler. 0.n the 19th
January 1948 the Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha Mr. Ashutosh
Lahiri issued:! pamphlet Ex. P-25 in which he repudiated the Hindus
being any party to the four-point pledge and repudiated those Hindus
who were parties to it.
2.13 Police reports show that the SHms were also unhappy about
the fast which was for the protection of Muslim rights and did not
do anything for the Hindus and Sikhs. Police reports also show that
the Mohammedans passed resolutions at two meetings on the 19th
and 23rd January 1948 recognizing the selfless services of Mahatma
Gandhi.
2.14 We might go back a few days; a conspiracy was formed in
Poona, Bombay etc. to murder Mahatma Gandhi in which some
Maharashtrians and one Punjabi, Madanlal by name, were the parti-
cipants. GopaJ Godse's evidence discloses that the conspirators were
many more though he does not say so in so many words. In pur-
suance of the objects of the conspiracy the conspirators came to Delhi
by air and rail between the 17th and 19th January and took up
residence at hotels and the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. Qn the 18th
January 1948 some of the conspirators attended Mahatmaji's prayer
meeting at Birla HOuse at 5 P.M. That was to reconnoitre the place
and the crowds. On the morning of 19th January 1948 some of them
got accommodation at the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. The Police'
case was that this they got by getting a chit from Nathuram Godse
in the name of his friend the Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha
Bhawan, but this fact was not established. On 19th morning the
conspirators met in the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan and in the after-
noon chalked out a programme to kill Mahatma Gandhi. On the 19th
January 1948 three of the conspirators Godse, Karkare and Apte went
to the Birla House, took note of the Police arrangements there and
surveyed the prayer ground. At 4 P.M. the same day i.e.
January 1948 they again came to the prayer ground at 10 P.M. five
of them met at the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan and held confabula-
tions.
(lit ,!,IIIUury 20, HJ4U NaLhuram God::;c wa!j ill and foul' of
t em again went to the Birla House to survey the place. They
.n;otmned to the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan at 10.30 A.M. Somewhere
at about mid-day tested their revolvers in the jungle behind Hindu
Mahasabha Bhawan. In the afternoon they met at Marina Hotel
and chalked out their final plan of action.
2.16 At 4.45 P.M. they came to the Birla House and there on the
back wall Madanlal ignited a gun-cotton slab which has been called a
bomb. Madanlal was arrested at the spot and on search of his person
a handgrenade was recovered amongst other things. Three of them
who were with Madanlal escaped in the taxi in which they had come
and returned to Connaught Place. Three others who were in the
prayer meeting itself also escaped after mixing with the crowd. At
this stage their names and details of escape are not necessary. Their
movements will be given in detail later.
2.17 The two principal conspirators N. V. Godse and Apte left
the same evening by train from Delhi main station and returned to
Bombay via Kanpur and Allahabad on the evening of 23rd January
1948.
2.18 The third Gopal Godse stayed the night at the Frontier Hindu
Hotel and left for Bombay the next morning by the Frontier Mail i,e.
on 21st January 1948. The fourth Karkare stayed in Delhi upto the
afternoon of the 23rd and left Delhi on the 23rd January 1948 and
by taking short distance trains and bus journeys and by breaking
'his journey en route reached Kalyan on the morning of 26th January
1948. The remaining two Badge and Shankar took the Bombay
Express from Delhi Main Railway Station on the 20th January 1948
reaching Kalyan on the 22nd morning and then proceeded to Poona
and reached there the same day. In this manner all the. conspirators
escaped from Delhi unnoticed and untraced and went back to
Bombay as shown above.
2.19 On January 20, the bomb was thrown and on the 21st January
morning newspapers came out with news about the bomb incident.
'Peculiarly enough, The Times of India, Ex. 106, The Statesman,
Delhi, Ex. 106-A, The Bombay Chronicle of Bombay, Ex. 107 came out
with prominent banner lines but The Hindustan Times, Ex. lOB-B,
'gavE' a more prominent place and caption about Kashmir-AGREED
FORMULA ON KASHMIR-and then in column Nos. 4 and 5 another
caption also fairly prominet "GANDHIJI EAGER TO GO TO
PAKISTAN" but in column 5 it just gave the caption in comparatively
smaller letters "Bomb goes up near prayer grounds" and then instill
small letters "Gandhiji did not even turn his head".
2.20 The Times oj India gave an account of what its Special
Jtepresentative learnt in regard to the incident. The Statesman,
Delhi gave out the story that there was a formidable plot on the life
of the Mahatma. A Police Inspector said, "The bomb was intended
1:0 creale confusion even though it was powerful enough to kill many
people. The handgrenade was apparently to be used against the
'Mahatuta himself". The story given in the Bombay Chronicle of
13
Bombay was that the person who threw the bomb confessed that he
had done so because he did not like the peace campaign of Mahatma
Gandhi.
2.21 Two sets of investigations, independent of each other, were'

started-one at Delhi under Ch. XlIV of Cr.P.C. and the other at
Bombay. It is a matter of contrwersy under what law the latter
was undertaken and whether it was an investigation at all. But
without here deciding the question the Commission will call it an
investigation as did Mr. Nagarvala himself in his letter Ex. 8. The
course of Delhi investigation was as follows.
2.22 The First Information Report under sections 4 and 5 of

Explosive Substances Act was lodged by Mr. K. N. Sahney, Magis-
trate, 1st Class, Kamal, wit. 25 which was recorded at the Tughlaq
Road Police Station at 6-30 P.M. and the investigation started there-
after by the S.H.D. Sub-Inspector Dasondha Singh, wit. 14.
2.23 Before the First Information Report was actually recorded

'Madanlal was searched and a handgrenade was found on him show-
ing his real intent'ion as anything but innocent. He was questioned
at the Birla House and was then taken to the Parliament Street Police
Station where some high ranking police officers interrogated him and
he is alleged to have made a statement, Ex. 6, which has given rise
to a sharp controversy. But this much is uncontroversial that he
gave the name of Karkare and also disclosed where he and his com-
panions had stayed. The two places mentioned by him, i.e., Marina
Hotel and the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan were raided and in the
formeI it was discovered that two of the conspirators stayed under
assumed names of'S' and 'M' Deshpande and they had hurriedly
left. In the room where they stayed a document Ex. P-25 was found,
::;howing their close connection with the Hindu Mahasabha which is
noted in paragraph 17 of the first casE" diary.
2.24 On the 21st January a remand of 15 days was obtained,

Madanlal was taken to the Civil Lines Police Station where he was
interrogated and this interrogation continued upto the 24th January
when he made a fuller statement, Ex. 1, wherein he mentioned the
propr'ietor of the 'Hindu Rashtriya" paper as a co-conspirator but
did not mentio'!1 the HAgrani" or the editor.
2.25 On further enquiry it was discovered that the number of the

taxi by which the culprits had arrived at Birla House and which was
noted down by the witnesses was a wrong number as that was the
number of a G.NI.T. bus.
2.26 On the same day two police officers were flown to Bombay
but the case diary No. 2A of their departure does not show what
documents, if any, were taken by them and what exactly they were'
required to do in Bombay and there was no mention of a requisition
required un1er section 54 (Ninthly) Cr,PC.
14
2.27 On 23rd January. Kali Ram, a bearer of the Marina Hotel
produced some clothes three of which had the marking 'N.V.G.' but
it does not appear that either the Delhi Police or the Bombay Police
made any use of this discovery. There is no evidence that it was
ever conveyed to Bombay Police.
2.28 Interrogation continued on the following day and with the
permission of the District Magistrate, one Mehta Puran Chand,
Advocate, interviewed Madanlal while his interrogation was going
on which naturally had to be interrupted. A copy of the full
ment of Madanlal was given to Mr. U. H. Rana, D.I.G., C.I.D., Bombay
on January 25, 1948, and he proceeded to Bombay the same night
via Allahabad because flying did not suit him but surely he did not
need to go via the Triveni, unless no accommodation in the direct
train could be arranged for him. Meanwhile on the 24th the Delhi
policemen who had gone to Bombay returned and on 25th they made
a complaint of the treatment or mistreatment that they had received
at the hands of Mr. Nagal'vala and of the Bombay Police.
2.29 It is stated that special policemen were posted at important
places in order to trace the culprits. The interrogation of Madanlal
continu::d but nothing useful was discovered. On the 29th January
1948 the police discovered the taxi used for the conunission of the
ofIe nee and also who its driver was.
2.30 On 30th January, 1948, while the Mahatma was proceeding
to the prayer meeting and had just stepped on to the prayer ground,
he was shot at by Nathuram Godse who was arrested there and then
and his name given then was 'Narayan Vinayak Godse'. The diary
shows that he was the accomplice in the Bomb Case who was describ-
ed by Madanlal as the editor of the "Rashtriya" newspaper Poona.
A photograph of the assassin's pistol is attached herewith. (See next
page).
2.31 The other culprits who had accompanied Nathuram Godse
escaped from Delhi and subsequent investigation was carried on in
Bombay under the direction of Mr. U. H. Rana by Mr. J. D. Nagarvala
as the Special Additional Superintendent of Police, Delhi.
2.32 It is not necessary at this stage to trace the movements of the
conspirators who escaped after the bomb was thrown. Godse and
Apte the two principal conspirators had escaped to Bombay reaching
there on the 23rd. They went via Kaupur and Allahabad. They
flew back to Delhi on January 27, 1948 under assumed names and
a train to Gwalior where they stayed for the night at Dr.
Parc}lUre't; house. The next day they purchased a pistol from one
Gael <;Iud retumed to Delhi on the morning of the 29th and stayed
at the Delhi Main Hailway Station in a retiring room where they
mc-t. by K<1l"k:.re. On the 30th they first practised in a jungle
behind 13irb Mandit· " isLoi shooting", reconnoitred the Bil'la House
whkh tiH'Y had a mal.t('l' or fad done the previous day also and
,Jtlllll·'llil (;od:;(· (·'oJ1l11lilll·d Ill!· IlfTl"IU·p Oil tlw 30th at 5.00 p.m. after
h,ld p:oid 111:; u\lI"i:::III(·P Iii Ill·, ':I,IIIl[(':> or Shivnji Mah;ll"nj;1 and
"11',··.111\·:1
15
2.33 Nathuram Godse was arrested at the spot as above stated but
Apte and Karkare again escaped from Delhi and went ba.::k to
Bombay where they were arrested on 14th February 1948 Wl.der
circumstances which would indeed be romantic had the matter been
not so tragic.
Bombay Inquiry
2.34 The scene now shifts to Bombay where on an information
given by Prof. J-jl investigation was carried on between 21st
J,:muary and 30th January. This is an unfortunate chapter of oppor-
tunities missed, errors committed and of asswning exaggerated
notions about oneself. After the explosion of the bomb Prof. J. C.
Jain of the Ruia College got a little unnerved because Madanlal had
disclosed to him before going to Delhi that he and his companions
were going to murder Mahatma Gandhi which he had considered to
be a mere boast though in fact he did not take the matter so light-
ly. But he was hesitant, dithering and failed to give this
Hon to any authority.
2.35 On the 21st he met the Premier and the Home of
Do;n:)ay and made them the recipients of this vital information with
a reCluest to Mr. Morarji Desai not to disclose his name to anyone.
l\-1r. Morarj i Desai in his turn called the D.eputy Commissioner of
Police Mr. Nagarvala, but as he could not come at once he asked
hiIT'. to come to the Central Station of the B.B. & C.I. Railway frsm
where he was leaving for Ahmedabad to give this vital information
to Sll"dar Patel. Mr. Morarji Desai conveyed to Nagarvala the
information that he had received and directed him to arrest Karkare
and his associates and to watch the house of Savarkar because both
these persons were mentioned by Prof. Jain to him.
2.36 Nagarvala promptly got into touch with his contacts and his
informers, instructing them to locate Karkare and his associates.
ITo learnt from Ahmednagar that Karkare was not there.
2.37 It is not necessary at this stage to give a resume of what Mr.
Nagarvala did or what steps he took. But briefly stated, he learnt
that one Balraj Mehta and Autar Singh of the Sher-i-Punjab Hotel
'wore in the conspiracy. Information from Ahmednagar was that
Badge of Poona .. a dealer in illicit arms, was a close associate of
Knrkare; and his contacts informed him that Savarkar was the real
insligator of the conspiracy and his illness was feigned. Savarkar's
hlluse was k"=!pt under watch. NagarvaIa's informants also told him
fhat there were many other conspirators, about 20 Punjabis and
MaharashtriRlls, with a large following. Efforts were made to find
Iluf the haunts of those persons. From 22nd onwards the police tried
In lind out the whereabouts of Karkare and Badge, particularly in
i1mdu Mahasabha Bhawan at Parel. Watch was kept on the Arya
f'nlhik Ashr.:l.m where two suspicious looking Punjabis were staying.
TIJ('Y we're suspccted to be associates of Balraj Mehta.
2.:W MI". ROllO the D.T.G. (C.I.D) arrived in Bombay on the 27th
with M1·. Nagarvala who told him o[ til(' st<'ps he had
16
taken upto then and both of them had a long distance talk with
Sanjevi, the DJI.B. and then gave him full details of what had been.
done uptil tl">en. Rana had taken with him the statement of Madan-
Ial which hI" showed to Nagarvala who read one or two pages but.
took it back from him saying it was too long and promised to send
him a copy from Poona which he never did.
2.39 After the murder when Nagarvala learnt the name of
Nathuram Godse. he <lrrested the various suspects and interrogated
Savarkar's Secretary Damle and his Bodyguard Kasar. Limaye who
had been detained told the police that if Nathuram Godse was the
murderer, Apte must have been with him and that they must have
consulted Savarkar.
2.40 The murder of Mahatma Gandhi, who was acknowledged to·

be the Father of the Nation and who had not only preached but
practise:l non-violence for four decades and who had led India to
independence, produced anguish and even consternation not only
amongst the leaders of public opinion and the Government of the·
day, but also amongst the millions who constituted the newly emerg-
ed independent hdian nation.
2.41 Everyone was anxious to know how the apostle of peace and
non-violence could meet such a tragic end. And, therefore, what one
may conveniently call inquiries were started both in Delhi and in
Bombay which were the two places principally concerned with the
tragic events culminating ill' the murd";!r of the Mahatma.
2.42 In Delhi there were four inquiries: (1) an informal one on
the 31st January, 1948, (2) interpellation in the Constituent Assembly·
on February 6, 1948, (3) trial of the accused in the Court of Judge
Atma Charan, Special Judge, and (4) explanation called from the
police officers who had been in charge of Mahatma Gandhi's protec-
tive measures and of the investigation after the bomb was exploded.
2.43 In Bombay si ilarly there were what may, for the want of
a better word, be called inquiries. Including the court case which
was in·!lelhi, there were five inquiries in Bombay: (1) interpellation
in the Bombay Legislative Assembly; (2) explanation called by Mr.
Kamte, Inspector General of Police, from Mr. U. H. Rana, Deputy
Inspector General of Police and his explanation; (3) the trial in the
Court at Delhi of Judge Atma Charan; (4) Cut Motion in the Bombay
Legislative Assembly in March 1949; and (5) the expla"!1ation of Mr.
J. D. Nagarvala, Deputy Commissioner of Police and what followed
thereupon. These will be briefly dealt with in the following
chapters.
CHAPTER III-INQUIRIES-DELHI
Index of Paragraphs
Meeting at Sardar Patel's house on 31-1-1948-
1st Inr.'lIjrY
Interpellations in the Constituent Assembly
Third Inquiry
Fourth Inquiry
Ex. 7, note of Mr. Sanjevi as explanation
Mr. Rana summoned by Mr. Sanjevi, Ex. 7 contd.
Ex. 7 contd. Ex. 9 attached
Nate, Ex. 7. summed up
Mr. Iengar's remarks
Letters of Mr. Nagarvala, Exs. 8 and 9.
CHAPTER III
Inquiries-Delhi
First Inquiry
3.1 The shock of M:hatma's murder and the fact that it could be
mmmitted openly in the prayer grounds in spite of the precautions
laken led to an inqujry at the earliest opportunity as to where the
things went wrong. This was by way of an meeting where
lhe matter was discussed.
3.2 The object of this meeting, according to Mr. R. N. Bannerjee

(wit. 19)" was to devise measures to protect the living i.e. the
Ministers and other high dignitaries. It also appears that the
meeting reviewed the circumstances which led to the assassination
or Gandhiji despite previous warnings aAd the facts disclosed by
M:lfianlal's statement.
:1.3 After the funeral, a meeting was called at a very short notice
nl tl1(' house of the Home Minister in the evening of 31st January,
H)·Ia. According to Mr. Bannerjee's statement before Mr. Pathak as
wilness No. 17, the following were present: Prime Minister Nehru,
r ll'puty Prime Minister Sardar Patel, Mr. B. G. Kher, Premier of
l\ombay, Mr. Rajagopalachari, Governor of West Bengal, and Mr.
lI:mncrjee and Mr. Sanjevi, Mr.. D. W. Mehra's note Ex. lO-A dated
1, 1948, besides these names, gave the names of Rajkumari
"'rnril Kaur, Mr. Morarji Desai, the Chief Commissioner and him-
11(·1(. A copy of this note is Ex. 10-A produced by Mr. D. W. Mehra
lH'fnrc this Commission.
:l.4 The confessional statement of Madanlal was read by Mr.

:;:llIjcvi, who also said that he had sent a copy of that statement
wilh two police officers, who flown to Bombay on 21st Janu-
III • 1948. but the two police officers returned after two or three
and that the Bombay police did not take any
11111.:('(' of them and had asked them to return to Delhi and that they
would themselves look into the matter. The confessional statement
qf M:ldanlal was then read which disclosed a conspiracy to murder
r.,'1nh:ltma Gandhi which had been in existence for some time. In
!lll' !>I.atement, Madanlal had given names and particulars of the
O"rlll:;pimlors, two or three haunts in Bombay which were men-
Ilnlll'd as meeting places of conspirators and Madanlal told the
1'"li('l'. "PHIR AYEGA". From this Mr. Bannerjee understood that
IIlI' ('onspirators would return to Delhi to kill Mahatma Gandhi. At
ill(' disclission it came out that Godse had reconnoitred the prayer
:It Bil'lrr House on the evening of the 29th, i.e., a day before
,ht' !l1l1l'l1('1'. It also came out at the meeting that Mr. Srrnjevi gave
10
20
information to either the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi or to Mrp
ltO
Bannerjee. Mr. Bannerjee said:-
"I will put it to gross incompetency and lethargy on the part.
of Mr. Sanjevi that he did not care to inform either me or to-
remind the Bombay police as to what action they had been
taking."
Mr. Sanjevi said at that meeting that he had not reminded the
Bombay police after the return of the Delhi police officers sent by
him. This emerged in the course of the meeting. Everyone present
was in great anguish and Mr. Sanjevi admitted that he had not re-
minded the Bombay police.
3.5 Mr. Bannerjee was recalled before this Commission. He
added that besides the gentlemen he had named before, Mr. Shan-
karrao Deo was also present at that meeting. The account that he
gave at this hearing was that the confessional statement of Madan-
lal which had been recorded earlier was read out. He said:-
"This was the first intimation that we from Pandit Nehru
downward got that there was a confessional statement and
certain information was contained in it which if properly
utilised would have resulted in the arrest of those persons
who were participants in the murder of Mahatma Gandhi.
In the statement, the particulars and the haunts of some of
the persons who were subsequently accused and convicted of
murder were given. If the police had been vigilant, it should
have been possible for them to have arrested those persons."
3.6 Mr. Bannerjee added:-
"None of us knew about the particulars of this conspiracy. Mr.
Sanjevi never gave us any information about it. When he was
aske,d why he had not done so, he just said, 'he was sorry he
just did not do it'. I put this due to the incompetency and
lethargy of Mr. Sanjevi not to have informed or to have
ordered the Bombay police to send their men here or to have
reminded the Bombay police in regard to the information
which was sent to them."
3.7 Mr. Bannerjee was asked by the Commission as to whether
Ex. 6 or Ex. 36 the first alleged statement of Madanlal was read out
or some other statement. His reply was that he could not recollect
what was read out b1!l.t what was read out gave more particulars
about Bombay haunts and about 'PHIR AYEGA'. Commission then
showed him Ex. 5, the original of which is Ex. 5-A, and he was
asked if that statement was ever shown to him. He replied:-
"We never saw any papers. Some papers were in the hands of
Mr. Sanjevi and he read out extracts therefrom."
He added that he understood from Mr. Sanjevi's statement that full
confessional !'tatement of Madanlal was sent to Bombay, the subs-
tance of which was that Aptc Dnd Godse must have gone back to
one or Uwil" illHlIlI:, in Bomh'IY. nut no sHch slnl{'l11cnt hns heen pro-
dUc('\I iu,rlll"!' !he' ('ullemi::::ioll.
3.8 In cross-examination by Mr. Vaidya, Mr. Bannerjee said that
when they came back from the cremation of Mahatma Gandhi, a
meeting was called at a very short notice where everybody was in a
mournful mood, and "the Sardar asked Sanjevi what had happened
[lnd he came out with the allegation that the names had been sent to
Bombay police and nothing was done there. It was that part which
was emphasised by Mr. Sanjevi there". Mr. Bannerjee added that
Sardar Patel was in great anguish and so were "we all but I told
Sardar Patel that he could not have done anything more than to ask
his police to be Further, he said:-
"I feel it very difficult to be able to reconcile this statement of
the Superintendent of Police, C.lD., with the scene I recall
of the meeting of the 31st January, 1948. at which everybody
was in extreme anguish and was surprised to hear that there
was a conspiracy and the names of the conspirators were dis-
closed in the statement of Madanlal."
Mr. Bannerjee again repeated that the words, "PHIR AYEGA",

were mentioned at the meeting on the 31st January by Mr. Sanjevi.
lIe thought it was Mr. Sanjevi but he could not say exactly who
said these words. Those words did come at the meeting but he could
not say for certain by whom they were said. He then added that he
might have heard these words later after the meeting.
3.9 Mr. Bannerjee also said that after the 30th January, Govern-
ment felt rather guilty about not having taken preventive or puni-
tive action against the R.S.S., although in Mr. Bannerjee's opinion
those who conspired to murder Mahatma Gandhi did not do so as
members of the R.S.S. "An informal dedsion at the post-funeral
meeting was that the R.S.S. should be banned immediately and
secret instructions should issue to Provincial Governments the same
night", but somehow or the other the news of banning leaked out
and the leaders of the movement went underground. Mr. Banner-
jce categorically stated that at that meeting nobody from top to
.
the bottom knew that a statement had been made by Madanlal or
what the contents of the statement were.
' 3.10 There is some documentary evidence to show as to when the
meeting was held and what was stated by Mr. Sanjevi there, but
the dates do not accord. There is a difference of a day.
3.11 In his letter, Ex. 7-A, dated February 20, 1949 to Mr. H. V. R.
Icngar, Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Mr. Sanjevi said
in paragraph 3 as follows:-
"I mentioned these facts briefly to H.M. and the P.M. on the
night of the 1st February, 1948 at H.M.'s residence, when
His Excellency the Governor-General (then Governor of West
Bengal), the Premiers of U.P. and Bombay and Mr. Shankar-
rao Deo were also present."
22
3.12 According to the personal diary of Miss Maniben Patel,
273, there was a meeting after the cremation on 31st January 1948",
at 7-30 P.M. Those present were Rajaji, Pantji, Ealasahib Kher,
Mehta, Bannerjee, Shankarrao Dec, Shankar and Mr.
Daulatram. Balasahib Kher talked on the phone to Mr. MorarJl
Desai at Bombay and Raja Maharaj Singh also talked from Bombay
to Mr. Nehru on the phone.
3.13 In the note Ex. 7-B in paragraphs 2 and 3 are given the steps
taken in regard to augmenting the police personnel. Besides the
uniformed police, one Sub-Inspector, four Head Constables, and two
Constables in plain clothes, armed with revolvers were deputed for
the personal security of the Mahatma. Three were stationed on the
pathway which led to the prayer meeting and their duty was to spot
possible offenders. Uniformed police at the gate had instructions to
stop all persons about whom they had any doubt.
3.14 The police officers on duty were given the descriptions of
the men who were with Madanlal when the bomb had exploded and
they were told to keep a sharp lookout for them. There is, how-
ever, no evidence of these officers having been of any utility what-
soever or to have done anything to prevent Godse and others like
him getting near Gandhiji.
3.15 An account of this meeting is alsQ given by Mr. M. K. Sinha,
wit. 44. His statement is mere hearsay because he was not present.
What he stated was that after the funeral, there was a meeting at
the Home Minister's house and among those present were the Prime
Minister, the Chief Minister of U.P, and several others including Mr,
R. N. Bannerjee. Mr. Sinha said, "I was also told that Madanlal's
confessional statement was read by Pantji and he asked Sanjevi as
to why he did not arrest or arrange to get these persons who were
named by Madanlal arrested", His reply was that no names had
been men,tioned in the statement but Pantji told him that descriptions
and some addresses were mentioned and he could easily have had
them arrested only if he had taken the trouble to do so,
3.16 Even though the Evidence Act does not strictly apply to pro-
ceedings before the Commission, yet the Commission does not think
it right to take into account this hearsay evidence even though it
may be corroborative in nature.
3.17 So this was the first inquiry, an informal one no doubt, where
Sanjevi was asked as to what had happened. He produced a confes-
sional statement of Madanlal which, according to Mr, Bannerjee,
contained the names and haunts of some of the accused. According
to Miss Maniben Patel, wit. 79, Sanjevi had said that he had sent a
copy of the full statement made by Madanlal the substance of which
was (1) that Apte and Godse must have gone back to Bombay.
(2) there were two or three hanuts at Bombay. That is what Mr.
has also stated, Thus, it appears from this evidence that
the question of conspiracy was first discIosrd at this 'meeting.
Sanjcvi read Ollt from till' COtlr('ssional statcmC'nt of Mlldanllll but
what or whkh thnt ('onf(':-lsiOlllll staipmcnt wa:-l, is lIot quit!' dl';u-
from the produced before this Commission. No state-
ment of Madanlal has been produced before the Commission which
comprises all that Mr. Bannerjee says was said at the meeting.
3.18 Mr. D. W. Mehra has produced before the Commission a
copy of the note which was prepared by him and was presented
before the high-powered meeting, Ex. lO-A. It is a copy of Ex. 10
with the note of Mr. Sanjevi Ex. 7. It sets out the increase in the
number and deployment of police at the Birla House after the Bomb
incident. It mentions that screening of visitors was suggested by
Superintendent to Mr. Brij Krishan Chandiwala which he
would not agree to and then a similar suggestion by Mr. Mehra him-
self to Gandhiji was also rejected. It then gives an aCCOlmt of the
murder and arrest of N athuram Godse and also what statement
Madanlal made on 20th January, wherein he gave only one name
and there is no mention of the editor of the 'Agrani'.
3.19·Amongst what may be termed non-officials who were
present at this meeting were Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, Mr. Jairamdas
Daulatram, and Mr. Shankarrao Deo, who fortunately are alive but
the efforts of the Commission to get them to appear before it proved
fruitless because for one reason or another they did not appear and
they pleaded complete forgetfulness about the incident. Thus,
very valuable evidence about what explanations were given by Mr.
Sanjevi remained unavailable to the Commission. But Commission
well lmderstands the position of these eminent citizens of India,
who due to age and lapse of over two decades, might well have for-
gotten the details of what took place at that very sad and unhappy
occasion. '
Second Inquiry
3.20 The Members of the Constituent Assembly took the earliest
opportunity to interpellate the Home Minister to elicit infonnation
as to the circumstances leading to the assassination of Mahatma
Gandhi, which is shown by Ex. 142 dated February 6, 1948. In reply
lo Mr. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, Sardar Patel gave details of
lhc precautions taken prior to the bomb incident and also what was
III done after it. He gave the details of increase in the strength of the
Police stationed at Birla House and also the number of plain clothes
policemen deployed there and the instructions given to the Police.
The Police, he said, considered that they should be allowed to
every stranger attending the prayer meetings but to this
(:andhiji did not agree, Sardar Patel stated that he had himself
pleaded with Gandhiji for allowing the Police to do their duty in
n'gard to his protection but he was unsuccessful and that as the
I 'olice apprehended, this weak spot was successfully taken advant-
Ige of, by the assassins and Gandhiji was murdered.
3,21 In supplementary questions the Home Minister was asked
us to the precautions taken to prevent the repetition of the incident,
what these precautions were and whether suffiCient steps were
lnkf'1l to pl'Otrci the life of the Mi isLcl's of Govemment. The Home
";11'1' I'('plil'd thnL ('nnsistl'nt with 111(' wishf's Imrl im'lin:llioTls of
24
Minlsters sufficient precautionary measures had been taken. There
were supplementary questions by another Hon'ble Member about
N athuram Godse and whether the Police had lost track of him. In
reply the Home Minister said that after the arrest of Madanlal a
copy of the statement of Madanlal was taken to Bombay C.LD.
Arrests were not made because it was considered inexpedient to
do so as by so doing the other conspirators would have gone under-
groWld. Therefore, after consultation between the Bombay and the
Delhi Police it was decided that for the moment no arrests should
be made. The Bombay Police was on the track of the conspirators
but they were not all in Bombay,
3.22 Asked whether photographs could have been procured of
those persons, the reply was that all of them were not at one place
and it was not possible to have photographs of people like that.
3.23 The Home Minister also stated that it was not possible for
the police to take any precautions without consultating Mahatma
Gandhi.
3.24 So this interpellation shows that-
(1) The police considered the search of visitors to Birla House
the most efficacious form of protection to which the Mahatma' was
not agreeable.
(2) There was after the bomb an increase in the number of
policemen stationed to guard Birla House and a detachment of
troops was also stationed to guard and prevent trespassers.
(3) After the arrest of Madanlal a copy of his statement was
taken by Delhi Police to Bombay C.I.D,
(4) After consultations between the Bombay Police and Delhi
Police it was, decided not to make arrests for the moment, in order
to prevent the conspirators going underground.
(5) Bombay were on the track of the conspirators.
(6) All the conspirators were not at one place and, therefore, it
was not possible to get their photographs.
3.25 Now there are inaccuracies in these answers and in one parti-
cular it is a question for determination as to what document was
taken by the Delhi Police officers to the Bombay C.LD, The Com-
mission has little or no evidence to show that the Police knew that
the group of conspirators was at one place or different places or
where they individually or collectively were. As a matter of fact
the police had not been able to establish the identity of the conspira-
tors till after the murder.
Third Inquiry
3.26 Then there was the trial of the accused for conspiracy to
murder Mahatma Gandhi in the Court of Judge Atma Charan,
Special Judge. An appeal against this judgment was taken to the
Ellst Punjob IIigh ('Olll't whpl'(, it was heard hy n Ji'u1i ncnch who
25
upheld the juq.gment except that two of the p,ersons i,e.
Dr. Parchure and Shankar Kistayya were acqwtted. This has been
dealt with in the Chapter "Scope of the Inquiry".
3.27 The trial judge passed adverse remarks against the Police
with which the Appeal Court disagreed and exonerated the Police
of all blame.
Fourth Inquiry
3.28 After the adv:rse remarks made against the police by Judge
Atma Charan, the Government of Lndia called for what may for the
lack of a better word, be called explanation of the Investigating
Police officers regarding those remarks. The replies show the
course of investigation of the Bomb Case both in Delhi and in
Bombay and what the police had to say in reply to the !earned
judge's adverse comments. Commission will first deal with Mr.
Sanjevi'g explanation and then with what Mr. Nagarvala had to say
as to the investigational processes in Bombay.
3.29 A document of some importance produced before the Com-
mission is Ex. 7 which is a note by the then Director of Intelligence
Bureau, the late Mr. Sanjevi, dated February 20, 1949. It was sub-
mitted to Government of India for the information of the Home
Minister and was intended to be Mr. Sanjevi's explanation in reply
to Judge Atma Charan's strictures against the Police. It contains
some useful information and is more or less a contemporary record
of events but because of its exculpatory trends in favour of the
Delhi Police and opprobrious slant against the Bombay Police, it
requires a more careful scrutiny and critical analysis than the
opinion of so highly placed a police official as the D.I.B. would have
merited.
3.30 A short resume of the document would show how Mr.
Sanjevi viewed the investigation into the Bida House Bomb Case
and what, according to him, the police at Delhi and Bombay had
respectively done, what investigation they carried out, and also
what information was conveyed to him by the officers of the two
forces.
3.31 Ex. 7 is divided into 11 paragraphs each one of which
is important.
3.32 lIn the first paragraph Mr. Sanjevi has set out the facts of
(he occurrence on the evening of January 20, 1948; and expiosion
of the bomb by Madanlal Pahwa and his arr:est at the spot and
l'scape of his companions; recovery of the handgrenade from his
possession; his interrogation and his statement on the 20th January
mentioning Karkare and editor of the Agrani and giving description
of others; formatior: of the conspiracy at Bombay; how the conspi-
!'fltorS came to DelhI, where they stayed and what they did. There-
forC', thl! Delhi Police had a fair idea of the formation of the
"Ol1Splnlry, of the prindpnl oITf'nders nnd sl1fficient mnlC'rinl to
11,·0('(.'£'<1 th(> (',lito!' of tht' Agrant nnd lhull. lu 1.!1'oIUlk_t.ba
26
conspiracy and apprehend the conspirators. And if the Bombay
Police was informed, it should have been easier still for them.
3.33 The course of investigation at Delhi is then given and also
their making inquiri2s at Jullundur where they drew a blank.
3.34 It then states that Mr. Sanjevi himself visited the scene of
occurrence and made inquiries from the Police Superintendent of
New Delhi. The next day he ordered 2 Police officers to fly to
Bombay "to contact Mr. Nagarvala, Deputy Commissioner of Police
Bombay, and Rao Sahib Gurtu, A.D.I.G. (C.I.D.) Poona", They took
with them Ex. 5-A which officers of the Law Commission, after some
effort, found with the original case diary of the Bomb Case lying
somewher,2 in the Delhi District Record Room.
3.35 The Delhi Police continued with its investigation and ordered
its C.I.D. to be on the look-out for the conspirators whose descrip-
tions were given in a. document Ex. 244 which is a bundle of correc-
tions, contradictory descriptions and a mere look at it will show
its worthlessness.
3.36 Paragraph 4 sets out the protective measures taken at Birla

House. It shows that the previous strength of the guard consisting
of a Head Constable and 4 Constables which w:ere placed at Birla
House in September, 1947, was increased after the throwing of the
Bomb to 1 Assistant Sub-Inspector, 2 Head Constables and 16 Foot
Constables. In addition, a plain clothes staff of 1 Sub-Inspector,
4 Head Constables and 2 Constables, all armed with revolvers, were
also detailed for protective duty. The note then mentions the pre-
cautions in the nature of search of persons attending the pray;er
meetings which were sought to be taken, but could not be taken
because of the objection of Mahatma Gandhi and by those who were
round about him in his party. A copy of the note showing the pro-
tective measures> which had been taken at Birla House was attached,
annexure VI, Ex. 7-B.
3.37 The note then proceeds to state the steps taken at Bombay.
It mentions that the two officers with all the information furnished
to the Delhi Police by Madanlal Hew to Bombay and stayed at the
U':1iversal National Restaurant and met Mr. Nagarvala the next day
and gave him all the information that they possessed. Mr. Nagar-
vala told them that he also had receive:i information about the case
and had deputed special men to locate the wanted persons. He
warned them that nobody should know about their presence in
Bombay and so they should not stay in the city because if the
suspected persons came to know of their arrival the whole plan of
their arrests would be "ruined". He ordered the police officers to
go about in mufti. The two officers again met Mr. Nagarvala at his
office. They gave him the facts of the case and also showed him
the note on Madanlal's statement from which Mr. Nagarvala took
f'xtracts. "The Delhi Police officers told him that one of the accused
W:l'; IIH' C'.dil.or or the 'Agl'ani' or tllC 'Hindu Rashtl'iya' newspaper.
The' d('SlTlp!lOll or nIl tIl!' I\('(·u:-;('(I 1)('l"sons ns diSI']nsed hy MndnnlttI.
27
was communicated to him". The Police officers again met Mr.
Nagarvala and he told them, "his information was that there were
more persons in this conspiracy. He said that there
were about 20 persons, He added that he had made special
arrangements for Karkare in Bombay, Poona and Ahmednagar.
About the other persons connected with this case, he 5.'lid
that he had located three or four". He also disclosed to them the
scheme to locate all the offenders and to carry out their simulta-
mOllS arrests, his reason being that if only a few were arrested, the
others would go underground. He also told them that he would
accompany them to Ahmednagar as soon as he got the necessary
information and asked one of his Inspectors to arrange for their
lodging so that nobody should know aboul their presence. He also
told them not to give their Delhi address at the hotel, and that he
would consult his Home Minister and will take further action
against the accused. The same day again they went to the Bombay
C.T.D. office where they told by an Inspector that their presence
was no longer require:l. The Inspector also told them that Bombay
officers had been deputed to arrest the other suspects who had not
till then been located. In regard to Karkare and. the editor of the
'Agrani' or 'Hindu Rashtriya', he told them that an Inspector from
Ahmednagar was arriving the next day at Bombay, and they would
then arrange for their arr,est".
3.38 This portion of the note thus shows that-
(a) Nagarvala had specially arranged for the arrest
Karkare in Bombay, Ahmednagar and Poona.
(b) The information of locating 3 or 4 other persons connect-
ed with the case seems puzzling because there were 6"
persons mentioned by MacIanlal and location of 3 or 4-
would be solving the mystery of the conspiracy complete-
ly.
(c) The statement, that an Inspector was coming the next day-
from Ahmednagar and they would arrange to arrest Karkare
and editor of the 'Agrani', appears to be erroneous. Why
should there have been an Inspector from Ahmednagar
to arrest the editor of the 'Agrani' which was a Poona
paper.
3.39 The next day, i.e.• 23rd January, 1948, so the note says, the
Delhi Police officers went to the Deputy Commissioner's office but
could not meet him. A C.I.D. Inspector told them that the Inspec-
tor from Ahmednagar had arrived and he had been told to search
for the editor of the 'Agrani' or the 'Hindu Rashtriya', which again-
nppears to be a wrong statement or misunderstanding by the Delhi
officers. Deputy Superintendent Jaswant Singh then asked for
information regarding Karkare and his associates and the Bombay
C.J.D. Inspector gave him the following names as being Karkare's
nssoci<1tcs:-
(I) Dmlgl' or Poonn.
(il) 1\1I1n.. 'illgh. PIIIl.lnhl Sll(h
(W) Tal_r of Kaz:aehi. tben III Bombay.
(Iv) BlIlro,j MehLa of Lllbon=, then in Shlvajl Park In Bomba,J'.
evidence lOOlept lhls crypl1c reference. 0 questiOns weI'e put to

r.Nagarval.althO\ltlhhewasqueslionedatlenJthandwascf05S0
cnmlned for a good few days. In a Bllbiequ""l did,vil In roply
10 Commission's Quellionneire, Mr. Nasarvala denied lIDy such
liacumenL having been given to hiaof\!ce ....
304.1 The two Deihl Police DMcetlI returned to Deihl on the 24th
and saw the Superln(ern:\enl of Police, New Delhi, and the SuperID-
lendent of Police, C.!.D., and gave them on aceount of all that had
bappened in Bombay. Copies Df the diaries of the 21at, 2200 and
23rd January. UM8. are allathed w this note. They are marked
8S pnnexure VIII and Ex. 2. 3 and 4. eo_ of documents were
senl to r. V. Shankar, Private Secretary of the Home MiJll.ler.
T
wascira\\'n
.....""
A_oJ
th
,lbOD
and
OIII!
een' by air
stalemellt to NagarvalL He left by train vf4 Allaha.
to de ill<!r the [digitised by sacw.net]
bid and reached Bombay on thIt :mh IW1!DIOL
In accDftI.cm the slepe: taken and on
tomakea1rnwtaneoularreststopreveut
IOmI! of the aC<lllBed pin, underaroumi.
The nole then p i on to say lhIt Napl'Vllla did not write
10 Mr. Sanjcvi. On the 30th hI! sent a letterwhiehreaehed
whleh is annexure I, Ex. 8. Bu.t these letters make no JReDticm of
/lSkcd Mr. NaprvalL
t:..:eh
thllt Ihere was 0 gong 00.11 10 kldnnp Maha1ma G{andhi and of the
[digitised
111101110' whf<oh Wrro' bywith
..10m eDII''''rllO'(l sacw.net]
IIlmo'S mo'ntiOlwd In thnt leUrr thPl'(! lI'cr" of Karkar .. N.d
tim Itolemenl "r
Nagal"Yala's letln' waLIi clear proof that the Delhi poUlle wen
not Iold of the exact identity of the edlt.Ol' of the 'Hlndu:e.shtriya'
paper or of hill as80ciates excepting Badge. But at thIot stage Mr.
wholly dunned to think of giving much atlentlcm to Nqarvala's

letter or Itsc:ontenls whelhef,they were omIssI.0JI8 or c:ommillllONl.
3.49 Mr. Sanjevl allloattaehed to h'-note a copy of a demt-oJ'ftc:bl
[digitised
n, Ex. D. by
Thesacw.net]
letter dated the 3bt January whleh was the day after the 1_lna_
tlon. This Is annexure note then sets out the
Delhi Police had been woo over by idnappera. But
there Is nothing to show th., Yr, Senjevt .t an,y stqe told the
Bombay PoUce about their letharty, Inattentiveness or carelesmesB
or pvethem a bit of his rnlndaboul.theabsurdI1J'of tbekidDappJng
""'Yo
3.50 The notellAally AId-
.1
i.e. and 4-A. which fonned the basis of
If not 115 sole IMpiratkID. The nole mly be summed up II
(I) After the anal of Yadaolal, a statement, Ex. 8, anrJHUnI
m. W8S made by Mlldanlal em the mgbt between 20th and
[digitised by
21ltJanulry,..hleh
Mahatma Gandhi.
sacw.net]
dlselotala conspb-acyto murder
(U) lin the $latement of Madanlal the netne of Katkare, pro-
youth were mentioned.

(III) Tl)e statement dielased the places where Madanlal pd
hllaBBOelateshadbeenatayinsanclas.eorosequenceof
this disclosure vigorous combing of the city was carried
out but it wasfOUlld that 1.he auoc:Iatea had already left.
(Iv) A <iK<:ripliOll of the abseonders WIS also furnishecl loth.
police at JuUUlIdlll'.
(v) Two omcers of the Delhi Poli WI"l1! HowII to Bombay who
m.dfulllT'.a1.nmlionsQldabriefnote<:ODtalln,thelacts
of the case ucert.eined upto that time.
(vI) TM deseriptlon of these menti..)Md by MlldenJal
wa$ drculal!d to the Delhi C.1.)J.
(vii) ProtectiVllmessurestakenetBiri.HousewerestreDgiheD-
;/"1Ii':i of uniIormed policmen end
(viii) The proposal to seuclI p8IWIIs goIDf; to the prayer meet-

Ings were not agreed to by Mahatma Gandhi and thoae
round ebout hbn. i.e., hls Seeretaries,ete.,
(ix)
(x) NagarvDID told them tbat he had 10000ted 3or4 perIOIIlend

tlwt he was not milking any arrests leat the others might
go underground.
(xl) NlIgnrvalu told those pollC<mlen not to stay at the Hotel
wbere they were stayin,butlo.!lhltt to aDOtber place ancI
they should move about In MlI.fI.i. An Inspector qteed
to put the two ofIIcers up.
(xii)
toDeiblasllOOJluposalble.
{xiv) The Delhi Police officers handed over to the C.I.D.
tor a briel note on the ease. a matter on whieh 'KIquea-
tions were put by the Delhi Poliee to any of the Bombay
Police witnesses.
(xv)
Bombay. IUId copies of their Police diaries were _ , to
Mr. Shankar on 18th Februuy, 1MB..
..
i) On the 25th morning IIIe two Superinlel1denb of Police of
Delhi reported the matter to Mr. Senjeyl whose reaedoza
was thtollhe police oIfteers sbould havobeen kepLoniD
Bombay to aWl the Bombay Police In the InveaUJatioD.
(xvii)
10 the Deihl Policeoftieers.
( HI) A copy of the fuller alat!meDl of MadPllaI _ liven 10
Rana. He_alkedlofty 10 Bombay but be could IlOI:
do 110, and therefore he went by train and ardved. at
Bombay on the 2'7th after:aoon.
(xix) Paragraph 8 sets out .n _ntollhe telephonk _ _ _
tton which took place betW8811. Rana and Nagarvala on tIM
one side and Mr. SaDjevi. on lheoibel".
(.",
(lCxI)
Police In regard to the I'ditor of Ihe 'HIndu Raahtrly.l' and
the olhe1' mcnllonc>d bv Mrldllnlal.
34
(xxii) The Bombay police had no other information but that
there was a conspiracy to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi and
that was in spite of their having worked on the case for
10 days,
(xxiii) The note emphasises that the Delhi police had conveyed
to the Bombay police that there was a conspiracy to
murder Mahatma Gandhi and also had conveyed the
identity of the accused to them. and that Nagarvala did not
convey to the Delhi police the exact identity of the editor
of the 'Hindu Rashtriya' paper or of his associates except
Badge.
(xxiv) Lastly, Godse was in Bombay between 231'd January and
28th January. He flew from there on the 28th (which is
wrong; he flew on the 27th). The Bombay police should
have discovered by then who the editor of the fAgrani' or
the 'Hindu Rashtriya' was and should have taken vigorous
measures to apprehend him. The Delhi police were not
in a position to arrest anyone of them as they did not have
his identity or the correct description and when he com-
mitted the murder he had changed his dress.
3.52 In short the note unhesitatingly the version given to
Mr. Sanjevi by the Delhi police the most important parts of whieh
are- !' ...
(1) Madanlal made a statement on the 20th January giving full
descriptions of his associates, the name o:f Karkare and
mentioned the editor of the 'Hindu Rashtriya' or the
'Agraru',
(2) This information was sent to Bombay police who did
nothing in the matter and instead embarked. on a fantastic
theory of a conspiracy to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi.
(3) The Delhi Police had the descriptions of the conspirators
given by Madanlal which had been relayed to Jullundur
police and had also been given to the Bombay police but
the latter did absolutely nothing in the matter.
(4) Rana bad been emphatically told not to sleep over the
matter but he also did nothing.
(5) Although Godse and Apte were in Bombay between the
23rd and "28th January" no attempt was made to locate
or arrest him or his other co-conspirators.
(6) Mr. Sanjevi threw all the blame on the Bombay police.
Mr. Sanjevi is unfortunately dead and this is the only record of
what he did or did not do in regard to Mahatma Gandhi's life and
safety. '.
3.53 Out of the remarks of Mr. H. V. R. IenRar, Secretary of the
Mi istry of Home AtTairR flfter the receipt of the explanatfon from.
35
h.1r. Sanjevi, Ex. 7, and of Mr. Nagarvala, Ex. 14, paragraphs 3, 4 and
5 are important and they are as follows:-
"3, Secondly, while it is clear that the Bombay Police took all
possible steps to arrest Karkare and Badge, they do not appear
to have taken any notice of Godse. Admittedly. his name was
not mentioned in MRdanlal's statement but there was a descnp-
tion of him as the editor of the 'Hindu Rashtriya' or the
'Agrani'. According to D.1.B.'s report the investigating officers
from Dc:1hi took with them to Bombay on the 21st January a
statement (Annexure V to D.1.B.'s report-Slip "T") which
mentioned the editor of this paper. Mr. Nagarvala says that
these officers did not give him any information other than that
they wanted Karkare. Here is a discrepancy which cannut
be reconciled without further examination.
4. I have put to the D.LB. the view that as soon as it became
clear that there was a conspiracy among ,certain Maharashtra
Brahmins from Poona, Ahmednagar and the "neighbourhood
to commit assassination, plain clothesmen from that part of the
Bombay Province should have be"en summoned to Delhi, on the
chance that they might have been able to identify these per-
'sons if they came to Birla House. Mr. Sanjevi says that as the
Bombay Police did not take the idea of a conspiracy to
nate very seriously, the responsibility was really theirs. Per-
sonally I do not accept this view and that that there was a
failure in Delhi to insist on this precaution. ITt may not have
been successful "in preventing the assassination, but it
certainly worth trying.
5. I think th" Bombay Police are to blame more seriously
because they refused to take the idea of a conspiracy to assas-
sinate seriously, although every rule of commonsense pointed
in that direction.".
Two lette7'S of Mr. J. D. Nagaroola

3.54. The two letters of Mr. Nagarvala mentioned in the note,
Ex. 7, are, annexures 1 and 2, Exs. 8 and 9, dated January 30, 1943 and
January :n, 1948. respectively-one on the day when Mahatma
Gandhi was murdered, and the other on the day following.
3.55 The first letter shows that Madanlal's statement in the Press
sho\lling that j'he had come from Bombay" led to the initiation of
inv"estigations in Bombay. In the course of preliminary investiga.
tions names of Balraj Mehta, Karkare, Talwar. Badge, Autar Singh
Chava'!l, and Somnath Kapoor transpired of whom Autar Singh and
Chavan were under detention. Balraj had been identified and a trial
put on him. Karkare and Badge were the two Maharashtrian com-
panions of Balraj and Somnath Kapoor who were both Punjabis
Badge had been seen in Ahmednagar three days earlier i.e., on thE
27th, and arrangements had been made to bring informants from
Knl'lt:1I'(,'s ]'('ndp7,vous in Bombay was known to the Police
36
and if he came to Bombay he would be arrested but Talwar had not
been identified and inquiries were going on,
3.56 From the investigation it appeared that there were 21 ..i:hmja-
bis and in the conspiracy and they had 20 Norkers
under each onc of them. The object of the gang was to drive out
Muslims from the Indian Dominion. With that object they had
collecled arms and ammunition and it was also learnt that Col. Mohan
Singh of the LN.A. had organised the gang and he had the ::i.upport
of the Akali leader, Master Tara Singh. But the information had not
yet been corroborated. There was also a suggestion that one of the
Sikh refugees had been sent by the gang to the Speaker of Lhe Laat
PradeSh Assembly for further consultations as to their plan. The
opinion amongst the members of the gang was that it was easy to
win ()V2r the Delhi Police and their object was to kidnap Gandhiji.
But tht.: letter made it clear that this was only an information which
have been collected but they had yet to see if it was correct. Nobody
had been arrested but a fair amount of progress had been made m
the investigation.
3.57 The general policy which Nagarvala proposed to follow was
(and Mr. Rana agreed with him) that they might arrest Karkare and
Badge which was not likely to any suspicion because Karkare
had been named by Madanlal and Badge was always with Karkare
and they were known by the police to be good friends. Mr. Rana
agreed with Nagarvala that arrests of others should wait till the
Information collected by the Delhi Police, Poona Provincial C.LD.
and the Bombay City C.I.D. was pooled together. The Home Minister
of Bombny and Mr. Rana had. entrusted the investigation of the case
to him (Nagarvala) for the Province of Bombay and Nagarvala was
hoping to produce concrete results.
3.58 The letter' of the 31st said that Nllgarvala had arrested Balraj
Mehta, Somnath Kapoor, Kasar-the bodyguard of Savarkar-and·
Damle, his Secrebr}'. It had also transpired that Godse had seen
Savarkar along with one Apte on the eve of their departure to Delhi.
Kasar and Damle had '!lot stated what conversation these two had
with Savarkar during their 40 minutes interview but they had admit-
ted that these two had access to the house of Savarkar without any
restriction. If lVIadanlal was brought to Bombay, they would be able
to "drag out Madanlal and get all facts and details out of him". He
had also consulted the Hom':! Minister and the Commissioner of
Police and they agreed that Madanlal should be brought to Bombay
and that would help the investigation in Bombay.
3.59 Badge had been arrested by the Poona Police. The letter
then mentions the tense 24 hours through which Bombay had passed.
3avarkar's house and other houses of Hindu Mahasabha leaders were
attacked by mobs with terrific fury and the only safe place for those
leaders was the police lock-up. Savarkar's house had been searched
and all available records of Hindu Mahasabha had been attached and
inquiries were h progress. As the copy of the previous letter sent
by Nagarvflb hnn not hC'C"!n recPivcd by MI'. Sanjevi, he enclosed a
('(mv of lh:"d lC'ttC'l' wilh lhi.'! nnC'
37
3.60 The first letter requires a careful analysis and scrutiny.
(1) It shows that it was written in pursuance of the conver-
sation which Nagarvala had with Mr. Sanjevi on January
27, 1948.
(2) That after the statement of ,Madanlal appeared it. the
Press about his being from Bombay, investigations v.'ere
taken up. There is no mention of either the orders of
Mr. Morarji Desai or of what Jain had told Mr. :Ccsai.
{3) It does not specifically m'O'!ntion any information having
been given to Nagarvala by the Delhi Police ofiicers.
(4) It does mention Madanlal's statement wherein Karkare
was named.
·(5) It mentions that Karkare and Badge were two Maharash-
trian companions of Balraj and Somnath Kapoor, and the
former two were good friends.
{6) I: then states that Badge was seen at Ahmednagar ahcut
:27th January but he had left that place and that two in-
formants had been called from Ahmednagar who ""ould
identify and help in the arrest of Karkare and Badge.
Now if badge belonged to Poona and Karkare to Ahmed-
nagar, even if they were friends. one would have expected
that informants would be called from Poona also.
(7, The letter mentions a large number of Punjabis and
Maharashtrians being in the conspiracy which v.as being
organised by CoL Mohan Singh of the LN.A.
'This gentleman was examined by the Commission (wit .. 86)
and he denied any knowledge of this gang and it is diffi-
cult to imagine that Col. Mohan Singh would be a party
to encouraging either the assassination or the kidnapping
of Mahatma Gandhi and it would be still more astonish-
ing if the then Speaker of the Uttar Pradesh Assembly
could be persuaded to join the plan. Even if the objec-
tive was eviction of Mohammedans, the Speaker was un-
likely to give his bleassings to any such action.
(8) Although the letter mentions that the plan was to arrest
Karkare and Badge, there is no indication as to what tan-
gible steps had been taken to carry out the plan .
.(9) The most important omission is. the non-mention of
either the editor or the proprietor of the 'Agrani' or the
'Hindu Rashtra' because that seems to have been empha-
sised again and again in the note of Mr. Sanjevi. This
would show that either these persons were never men-
tioned till then or Nagarvala was deliberately omitting
them. The latter possibility appears unlikely in the cir-
cumstances.
{lO)
two p('l"sons. All he !-lays in the note is, "1 him
38
about the absconding accused whose names 01' dl'scrip-
tions were given to the Delhi Police by Madanlal and
Nagarvala promised to send a detailed note". One should
have imagined that if the editor of this newspaper had
been mentioned, Mr. Sanjevi would have made pointed
inquiries about the editor and/or the proprietor.
(11) Further, there is nothing to indicate in this 00te, Ex. 7,
that when Nagarvala mentioned the conspiracy to kidnap
Mahatma Gandhi, Mr. Sanjevi ticked him off or told him
that the very theory 01' idea was absurd.
Commission has been unable to discover any reason \.'.'hy Mr.
Nagarvala in his letter made the Press report of Madan-
lal's statement the basis of his investigation rather than
the information or the order given to him by Ilk Morarji
Desai, the factum of which is not denied and VlaS aC"!cept-
ed both by the trial court as well as by the High Court
in the Conspiracy Case. Unfortunately, this matter was
not put to Mr. Nagarvala before the Commiss:on.
(12) The omission of referenCe to names, descriptions, avoca-
tions or places of residence of Madanlal's co-conspirntors
has remained unexplained.
(13) The letter of the 30th by Nagarvala to Mr. Sanjevi was
top secret and there could not have been any inherent
danger in diclosing to Mr. Sanjevi the factum of informa-
tion given by Mr. Morarji Desai or the order he passed.
CHAPTER IV-INQUIRIES-BOMBAY
Index of Paragraphs
\.8 First ilnquiry
Assembly Interpellations.
4.10-23 Second Inquiry-
Mr. Kamte's letters and
Mr. Rana's replies
Fourth Inquiry-
Assembly debate
Mr. Nagarvala's explanation
CHAPTER IV
Inquiries-Bombay
4.1 In Bombay there were four inquiries into the ('3uses of
Gandhi murder and what steps \wre taken by the Government of
Bomb.;:ty to prevent the catastrophe.
4.2 (1) Soon after the murder of Mahatma Gandhi, there was
interpellation in the Bombay Legislative Assembly in \vhith certain
question;:; were given notice of but actually they were withdrawn
hut there is some material to show as to what was the position of
the Government at that time.
4.3 (2) Mr. Kamte, who was Inspector General of PQlice in Bom-
bay Province, started an inquiry by writing to Mr. U. H. Rana, D.I.G.,
C.LD., PODna, and that correspondence shows what Mr. Kamte
wanted to know; what enquiries he made from Mr. Rana; and what
replies Mr. Rana gave.
4.4 (3) In the Bombay Legislative Assembly, there was a Cut
Motion and the matter of Mahatma Gandhi's murder was discussed.
Mr. Morarji Desai there made a statement which may bE' taken to
be the position of the Government of Bombay at that timc.
4.5 (4) After strictures were passed by the trial judge, Judge
Atma Charan in his judgment, the Government of India through the
Government of Bombay asked for the explanation of the Bombay
Police officers in regard to those strictures. Mr. Nagarvalft gave his
explanation (Ex. 14) on which there were certain nolings in the
Bombay Secretariat, Ex. 168. That explanation came without any
remarks from the Bombay Government to the Governm('nt of India
and was considered by the Government of India upon which ,and
upon the explanation of the Delhi Police there were not-
ings by Mr. H. V. R. Iengar, Home Secretary-Ex. 7-C i.e. ('n the
explanation of Mr. Sanjevi, Ex 7, and on the explanation of Mr.
Nagarvala, Ex. 14. The views of the G<lvernment of lndia were
lhese which may briefly be stated.
4.6 Mr. Iengar made two points:
(1)
Bombay Police should have hesitated to' accept the theory
of conspiracy to murder and should have given credence
to the theory of a conspiracy to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi.
(2) That the Bombay Police took all possible steps to arrest
Karkare and Badge but took no notice of Godse whose
description as editor had been given in Madanlal's state-
ment as shown by Annexure 5 (which is Ex. 5-A). He
41
42
noticed the deni,l[ u[ MI. ;d1rlut ;IIIY :nfol'D1C\-
tion othcl' than that about Karkare. lie ais(, that
as the ('onspil'acors were Maharashtrians pbin clothes
policemen from that part of Bombay Province :should have
been summoned to Delhi. He did not accept the view that
the res!Jonsibility was of the Bombay Foli:".! because of
their failure to take notice of the theory tl: mlli'der but
the Bombay Police were more to blame for not taking a
commonsense view of murder being the of the con-
spiracy. He also noticed the most cont,oversial j::'art as
to the identity of editor of the Agrani and again
blamed the Bombay Police for not taking the COli;;piracy
to murder seriously.
4.1 Sardar Patel agreed (Ex. 7-E) that plain clothe'> policemt'a
from Bombay should have been summoned and that it was a mis-
take to send a Deputy Superintendent of Police to Bombay. The
mattcr was sent to the Prime Minister and his endorseme:J.t is dated
April 4, 1949. The notings in the Government of India Secretariat
and in the Bombay Government Secretariat will bE' discussed at
greater length under the heading Ex. 5-A.
Fi,,, 11IqUi'll
4.8 The first inquiry which was held in Bombay was by way of
notice of a starred question No. 864 by Mr. A. J. Doddamcti in the
Bombay Legislative Assembly. This was on 20th February 1948.
The questions and the proposed answers are as follows as shown in
Ex. 167 (See the attached photostat copy.)
Short notice question No. 8'64

put by Mr. A. J. Doddameti.
Will the Hon'ble Min ister for
Home and Revenue be pleased
to state--
(l) whether it is a fact that (1) As the investigation into
the plot for the assassi- the alleged conspiraCy is
nation of Mahatma Gan- still not complete. It is too
dhi and pJans for the early to give any infor-
assassination of other mation on the question
high-ranking Indian lea- asked in this clause.
ders were hatched in
the Bombay Province:
(2) whether reports regard- (2) A private report reached
ing the existence of Government on 21st Jan-
such a plot had reached uary regarding such a
Government, prior to plot. (In the original this
the assassination of is handwritten.)
Mahatma Gandhi;
(-3) if so. what precaution- (3) The Home Ministry 'was
ary measures Were informed about this on
taken by Government 22nd morning and the
C.LD. Bombay took steps
to watch the movements
of suspected persons.
(This is also handwd-
ten.)
(4) what is the number (dis- (4) Some persons have been
trict-wise) of the mem- arrested in c::mnection
bers of the KS.S. so with the assassination of
far arrested in the Pro- Mahatma Gandhi. It is
vince in connection not possible to say at this
with the assassination stage how many of them
of Mahatma Gandhi? are members of the KS.S.
Sangh.
This shows that in the proposed answers it was stated in reply to
question No. 1-(1) that the investigation into the conspiracy was not
complete till then and it was too early to give any information, (2)
in answer to second question whether information existence of
:-,uch a plot had reached the Government prior to the assassinotion
or not, the answer proposed by the office was "No", but IHr. l\1orarji
Desai made corrections in his own hand showing that a report had
reached Government on 21st January, 1948. (3) in reply to question
No.3 whether any precautionary measures were taken, the reply
proposed by office was "does not arise" but the correction made in
his own hand by Mr. Morarji Desai is "The Home Ministry was
informed about this on 22nd morning and the C.LD. £3ombay took
steps to watch the movements of suspected persons", and (4)'in the
fourth question it was asked how many members of the R.S.S. had
been arrested in connection with the murder of Mahatma Gandhi,
and the answer was that some persons had been arrested but it was
not possible to say how many of them were KS.S. members. A
photostat copy of the questions and the answers as in Ex. 167
IS attached hereto. (See next page).
4.9 The Bombay Government has also placed on record the
noting on these questions which were to be asked. The noting is
Ex, 167-A. On this document the final note is by Mr. Morarji Desai
dated 4th March 1948 in which he has said that the Honourable
Member should be persuaded to withdraw the question as this matter
is sub judice and the replies would create complications and con-
sequently the question was withdrawn.
Kamte's Letters and Rana's replies

4.10 Correspondence which passed between the Inspector General
of Bombay, Mr. N. M. Kamte, and the D.I.G., elI.D., Mr. U. H.
Rana, constitutes evidence of some importance concerning the in-
vestigation into the bomb case, its defects, omissions and as
discernible. On February 6, 1948, Mr. Kamte wrote a letter to his
D.lG., C.lD., Mr. Rana, Ex. 31-A saying that he had carefully gone
through the statement of Madanlal which had been sent to him and
which showed that there \vas sufficient indication to make out that
44
there was a plot to kill Gandhiji by certain Pocna men and he
wanted information on two malters from Mr.
(1) What steps were taken by him to arrest them i
tely; and
(2) what steps were taken to send men to De1
Delhi and arrest them there.
These were two specific questions to Mr. Rana asking ;:thout "teps
taken by Mr. Rana. To this Mr. Rana's reply is Ex. :n d"tcd Feb-
ruary 24, 1948. In this letter he has set out the facts and sl'quer,ce
of events and of the action taken by the Delhi Police and BGlmhay
Special Branch and Poena C.LD. It says that on the 21st ,,)orning
when two Delhi Police officers met him aod presumably (although
it is not so stated) gave him the information they hud upto :hen,
he (Raoa) told them at once that the gang must be io1l0wcr:-; cf Dr.
Savarkar and suggested the sending of two police o!1lCE'rs to con-
tact Mr. Nagarvala at Bombay and Rao Sahib Gurtu at Poona and
accordingly two officers were flown to Bombay. By that time, the
Bombay Police had also come to know about Karkare and some
enquiries had been made or as he put it this information had al-
ready been worked out by the Bombay City Police. The Delhi PCJlice
officers went and stayed at the National Hotel ","hich \\'as in the
locality of the Sher-e-Punjab Hotel whose proprietor. Avtar Singh,
had been detained by the Bombay City Police and whoso:! name had
transpired as one of the conspirators to kill Mahatma Gandhi
4.11 The Delhi officers were in their uniforms with their revolvers
and were going about Bombay, trying to locate "KIRKAREE" and
not Karkare. They themselves knew nothing about Bombay. When
they met Nagarvala, he asked them to change their place of r'f'si-
dence but as they expressed their inability to go one of
the Inspectors of the Bombay C.LD. volunteered to put them ll:)
4.12 Mr. Nagarvala also told them that if they to m
about, they must do so in mufti.
4.13 The movements of the officers were never restricted but it
was explained to them that it was futile to make open street en-
quiries about Karkare who did not belong to Bombay and !('gard_
ing whom enquiries were already afoot. They were usked to ques-
tion Avtar Singh but they expressed their unwillingness to do so
and decided to return immediately. Nagarvala had received no
structions through these police officers and he had no authority to
detain them further and they left.
4.14 The letter then says that Madanlal did not make a
ment making a clean breast till about the 23rd or 24th. The I,alice
officers returned to Delhi by train on the 24th and they saw him
(Rana) on the 25th. Thereafter the D.LB. called Rana and Qsked
him why the officers ,':ere not allowed to move about and Rana t{lld
him that Nagarvala must have done it for sound reason:::. Madan-
lal's statement was made available to Mr. Rana on the 25th anu he
left lbe :;ame night by train via Allahabad reaching Bombay on the
2'/ih afternoon and hI' fonnd that of Nn,a:nrvnla was
on the right lines. The whole case was discussed with Nagarvala
who gave him an idea of the investigation that had already been
done and that he had learnt the names of Madanlal's bssociates
through a source,
4.15 Thereupon the D.LB. was contacted on the telcphcme and
he was told of the ·'extreme necessity of every possible precaution
for the protection of Mahatma Gandhi" The D.LE. was !old "to
tuke every possible precaution for the protection of Mahatma
Gandhi. This in itself will prove that both the Delhi and Bombay
l'oiice have done all they could". Nagarvala was in touch w:th
in Ahmednagar and every attempt \\1as made to locate Kar-
iWl"c in Ahmednagar and Bombay but Karkare never wcnt back
1.0 Ahmednagar. He returned to Bombay after a tour around Ma-
thura and Agra and returned to Delhi on the 27th. Delhi Police
hod asked Nagarvala for no other person than Karkare and every
,Ittempt was made to locate him. Nagarvala asked him (Rana) to
send somebody who would be able to identify the associates of Kar-
karl' from Poona and Ahmednagar. Rana left for Poona on the
and asked the D.S.P. Poona to spare his L.l.B. Inspector An..
garkar. This was on the 29th. But that gentleman was down with
fever. He sent a wireless message to recall Dy. S. P. Deulkar, who
wns in Colaba district at the time and he returned on the 30th night.
Immediately thereafter officers were sent by plane as there was a
'vhich were revealed later, the culprits h<1d out on the

Illorning of 28th from Bombay. -
4.16 To this letter Mr. Kamte replied by his letter, Ex. 32 dated
March 6, 1948. He restated the two questions he had asked to which,
Recording to him, Rana's reply appeared to be in the negative. He
Ihen asked Rana to give his remarks on certain specific matters
",hich were-
(1) What did the two police officers tell him (Rana) on the
21st which was not quite clear from the letter?
(2) Why did he not ask his own C.I.D. to make inquiries
because -two officers from Delhi were not going to make
much headway in Bombay or Poona?
(3) The object of contacting Nagarvala by these police officers
was not stated.
(4) The statement of Madanlal was given to him (Rana) on
the 25th. What action did he take till the evening of
27th?
(5) The information that Nagarvala came to know through a
source of associates of Madanlal was not correct because
all he had ltnown by then was Karkare's name and the
other information was very vague. But in Madanlal's
stntemcnt, pp. 7, 16, 18, ele., the description given therein
show"iI thnl the nthf'l' ncem;cd werc Godse, Aptc, Bndge,
etc. Why was there no attempt made to arrest them as
from the 25th evening.
(6) Although on the 27th he had telephoned to the. D.l.R
about talting precautions for the protection of ::vIahatma-
ji, he could very well have deputed his own C.I.D. men
to Delhi because Madanlal's statement showed that there
was a plan to kill Mahatma Gandhi by men __ Bombay
Province.
(7) Mr. Kmnte could not subscribe to the proposition that the
Bombay Police had done all that they could in thQ matter
of precautions to be taken about Mahatma Gandhi and the
best thing which Rana could have done on the 29th was to
have sent for Rao Sahib Gurtu and get that officer on the
move.
(8) Sending of men by plane to Bombay was dOl1rc. at the
suggestion of Mr. Karote and not at Mr. Rana's for which
Mr. Rana could not take any credit.
4.17 This letter makes some telling points of criticism-(a) why
Rana did not send his own C.LD. to make enquiries rather than send
Delhi Police officers; (b) why he did not send his own C.I.D. to
Delhi to prO-tect the Mahatma; and (c) why he did not get hold of
Gurtu even on 29th January.
4.18 The next letter of importance is Mr. Rana's reply to Mr.
Kamte, Ex. 30, dated April 15·, 1948. The following are the salient
.points from this letter:-
(1) It was wrong assumption to make that Madanlal straight-
away gave the names of his accomplices. His statement
was made available to him (Rana) on the afternoon of
25th January, 1948. It was on that day that he first came
to know about what Madanlal had said. In this statement,
Madanlal had mentioned. the editor of Hindu Rashtriya
daily and the proprietor of Shastra Bhandar of Poona
and Karkare of Ahmednagar.
l2) The two officers who came to see him (Rana) were
Rikhikesh and Bhatia and not the two who had been sent
to Bombay and from their talks he (Rana) concluded that
the exploding of the brick was the work of Savarkarvadi
group of the Hindu Mahasabha. Thus Rana told these
two officers on the 21st before Madanlal made any state-
ment which is rather important because one of the points
in controversy is when did Madanlal disclose the names
and give description of his associates. The officers who
went to Bombay were not the to whom Rana had
talked and they did not see Rana on their return. "My
suspicion of Savarkarvadi group's role in the conspiracy
was also confirmed by the D.LE." who had been in-
formed by the Home Minister that Madanlal had met
Sflv<lrknr i>efol'(, he {'rime to Delhi ann this suspicion was
47
further confirmed by the fact that the two officers werE'
sent back from Bombay_
(3) Rana did not think it necessary to take any further action
because he presumed that the gang must have been
located in Bombay and he had one C.I.D. Head Constable
Yadav in Delhi who was directed to move about in
Delhi and visit railway stations and try to locate Karkare
whom the Head Constable knew "as a Communist from
Ahmednagar". Rana did not think it necessary to send a
special man from Bombay to Delhi. Rana's explanation
for not doing anything further was that he had g:ven
instructions to the Delhi Police officers in regard to what
was to be done in Bombay and Poona.
(4) En 1'oute from Delhi to Bombay, Rana got fever. He went
straight to Nagarvala who showed him what investigation
had been done and R:ma showed the statement of Madan-
lal which tallied with the information of Savarkarvadi
group. Rana told him that he would send him a copy of
Madanlal's statement immediately after reaching Poona
to enable him to start further investigation in Bombay
and N agarvala asked him to send Poona Police officers to
help him to identify those people and he specially asked
for Angarkar. But Rana could not go to Poona as he had
ci.eveloped fever.
(5) Rana talked to the D.I.B. and told him that Nagarvala was
on the right lines and requested him to tighten up the
arrangements at Bida House which showed that Rana
took the necessary action in the matter.
(6) Next morning he told the Home Mi ister, Bombay, of the
lines of investigation.
(7) He reached Poona at 4 p.m. and tried to get Angarkar but
he was ill and then he tried to contact Deulkar but he
was away to Colaba and therefore a wireless message was
sent on the 29th.
(8) The officers who flew to Bombay were not the ones who
came to see him on the 21st Januarv. And Rana did not
make use of the telephone because the Delhi Police officers
had gone with instructions from their own officers. More-
over, there was no secrecy in the telephone communica-
tion which would be supported by the D.LE. and was
clear from the fact. that the telephone operators were
chuckling when he and Rana were talking soon after the
tragedy of 30th showing that there was a leak in the
telephone operations.
(9) That in the llote book which Nagarvala had, there were
seven 01' eight names and one of them was of Badge and
therefore it was not correct that the only name that
Nagarvala kn(>\V then was Karkare's.
48
(10) Attempts to arrest Karkare and Badge were started long.
before 25th January 1948 and Nagarvala was doing his
best in that connection.
(11) It was incorrect that Rana knew about the names of
Godse, Apte and Badge and that that iact was also known
to Nagarvala. "The fact is, as far as I am concerned, I did
not know till I reached Poona who the editor and pro-
prietor of Hindu Rashtriya was".
As far as the Commission has been able to see, Mr. Rana made
no effort to find out their identity or to take action to get
them 2pprehended.
(12) Moreover the impression Rana had was that the gang
would be hiding in Bombay or roundabout Bombay and
that he (Rana) met the Home Minister at Bombay on the
28th and he told him that Nagarvala was on the right
track.
(3) He (Rana) had got his officers on the move on 29th Janu-
ary 1948 within a short time that he had at his disposal.
"However, I will make it more clear. Rao Sahib Gurtu
was there when D.S.P. Poona was called and the names
of Apte, Godse and Badge were known from Rao Sahib
Gurtu. I also asked him if Angarkar knows all three to-
which his reply was.in the affirmative". There was no
question of getting Gurtu and others in Poona on the
move because the culprits were hiding in Bombay and
the Bombay Special Branch were on their watch. The
letter ended by saying "It is really disgraceful in that
we have not been able to prevent this, and now I wonder
if really we can justify our existence as C.LDs".
4.19 Ex. 33 contains the opinion of Mr. Kamte on Mr. Rana's
letter, Ex. 30, of April 15, 1948. Ex. 33 has got no date but it only
shows the reaction of Mr. Karote. He there points out what should
have been done. In the opinion of the Commission it is a document
of some importance. In paragraph (1) Mr. Kamte has said that
when the D.I.G. got Madanlal's statement on the 25th January, he
should have taken action himself and not depellded on Delhi officers.
,
(2) The D.I.G. cannot be absolved of his failure to contact the
Poona C.I.D. giving to arrest the persons whose names
or descriptions were known from Madanlal's statement and it was
no use finding fault with Delhi Police The D.I.G. should
have immediately informed Rao Sahib Gurtu. Even if the D.I.G.
had fever, he could have sent a code telegram to Rao Sahib Gurtu
and his telephoning to the D.I.B. was not the point at issue. The
"only fact" was that he failed to take action immediately after re-
ceiving the statement of Madanlal. When he reached Poona, Rana
should have asked the A.D.I.G. to arrest the persons whose names
and descriptions had been disclosed in Madanlal's statement.
(3) If telephone conversation were considered undesirable, the
nT.G. ShOll1d have scnt 0 t"ivil cipher code teleg-rom.
49
(4) The names that the DJ.G. saw in Nagarvala's note book were
.10t the names which Madanlal's statement disclosed and he wanted
to know "why the Poona C.l.D. did not go to arrest rn:.;n Lom
Maharashtra" .
(5) It may be true that the D.I.G. did not know the editor and
proprietor of the Hindu Rashtra till he reached Poona. Th,-,refore,
it would have been better if he had informed Raa Sahib Gurtu by
dpher telegram.
(6) Merely telling the D.I.B. to take preventive measures was
not enough. The D.I.G. should have sent his own men from Poona
for the purpose. .
(7) The D.I.G. has that Rao Sahib Gurtu was present when
the D.S.P. Poi:ma was called and the names of Apte, Godse and
Badge were known from Rao Sahib Gurtu. That is exactly what
Mr. Kamte had been saying all these days.
(8) If Rao Sahib Gurtu had been informed by the D.l.G.,
would have taken necessary action.
(9) The culprits might have been in Bombay or Flear Bombay
hut if the Poona C.LD. had information they would have made in-
quiries in Poona and if they thought that the culprits belonged to
S<lvarkar group, they would have gone to Bombay.
(10) It was unfortunate that the D.l.G. did not realise the neces-
sity of sending a man to Delhi immediately.
4.20 But what follows takes away the force of the criticism be-
it says, "he was being corrected for not realising th's so that
in futUre he may not commit these mistakes again". Unfortunatt'ly,
there calUlot be Gandhis over and over again, at least not ill the
very near future, and therefore this admonishing was wholly
fatuous.
4.21 This correspondence to which the Commission has attached
great importance shows this:
(1) That Mr. Rana should have contacted his men at Poona:
rather than sending Delhi Police officers there.
(2) After getting the statement of Madanlal on the 25th, he
should immediati!ly have got into touch with Rao Sahib
Gurtu and asked him to get on the move.
(3) The D.I.G. had failed in taking proper measures.
4.22 The correspondence also shows that the statement of
which was first made, did not particularise any person'
excepting Karkare and the names or avocations of others were not
given. Whether the descriptions were there or not is not easily dis-
cernible.
1-259 ITA.
50
4.23 In the opinion of the Commission the assessment of Mr.
Kamte was correct and had the D.I.G. taken only the most element-
ary step of asking his C.LD. Poona about the identity of the asso-
ciates of Karkare or Madanlal he would most probably have found
out who they were. At any rate if officers could be flown from
Poona after the murder to protect the Ministers in the Central Cabi-
net, the same course could have fruitfully been adopted after the
'bomb was thrown and Madanlal's statement of the 24th or 25th
January had become available.
Fourth Inquiry
4.24 The fourth inquiry in Bombay was by way of a Cut Motion
in the Bombay Legislative Assembly dated 12-3-1949 Ex. 232
where Mr. Morarji Desai gave his version of the Government that
Prof. Jain had seen him on 21st January 1948 and had given him
certain information but Jain had not told him that he had also
seen Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan, and Jain's name was not disclosed
to the police before the 30th because Jain did not want his name to
be disclosed. He then said that whatever information he had re-
ceived he conveyed to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel at Ahmedabad
where he. Mr. Desai, specially went to give that information to him.
He also said that not only he informed Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel,
but he also informed Mahatma Gandhi himself and told him that
there was a real danger to his life and he implored him to be more
careful and the only effective way that the danger could be checked
was to search every person who was going to his residence or to his
prayer meeting. But it was not possible to search these people
without Mahatma Gandhi's knowledge and Mahatma Gandhi did
not agree to any such thing. Mahatma Gandhi said that he would
stop his prayers and go away from Delhi rather than reconcile him-
self to the people being subjected to searches. That is why it was
not possible for the DeIhl Police to take better steps and the
Bombay Police could do nothing in the matter. He said:
"I told the police officer to take action against everybody who
came und8r suspicion. Mr. Jain has not said that he gave me
names of two other persons who ultimately were found to be
in the conspiracy and who had nothing to do with the
offence .......... I have stated what steps were taken by the
police force. I know all that because I was inquiring of the
police officer constantly as to 'Nhat was being done not only
before the incident, but even afterwards when the offence
was being investigated, because I wanted to give him the
benefit, if any of my views and knowledge. I found that
they were constantly on the move. Even at midnight I found
that they were on duty. I found that the Police were not
even caring for their meals. They had so much concentrated
on the work. That is why I cannot say that they failed in
their duty."
4.25 The Minister then denied the complaint of Prof. Jain that
he was insulted or shouted down when he went the ncxt time after
the murder to see the Ministers.
Nagarvala's explanation
4.26 Mr. Nagarvala was asked to give his explanation which he
did and is marked Ex. 14. It was sent to Government of India by
Mr. Dehejia with his letter, Ex. 170 dated 25th March, 1949. Ex. 14
sets out the steps taken by him in the investigation, if one may so
call it, which he conducted in Bombay after Mr. Morarji Desai gave
him information about Karkare, etc. It is really a copy of the CL;T.\C
Report from January 21, 1948 to January 30, 1948. It is not neces-
sary to repeat the contents here because they are contained in the
chapter dealing with the investigation at Bombay. To this he at-
tached his letter to Mr. Sanjevi, Appendix A dated January 30,
1948 which is really Ex. 8. He also attached to his explanation cer-
tain other appendices-Appendix B, a list of places watched and
names of persons watched during that period; Appendix C, his
statement in court, portion of statement of Inspector Pinto and
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Jaswant Singh.
4.27 When this explanation, Ex. 14, was received in the Secreta-
riat, there was certain noting on it (Ex. 168) which was adverse to
what Nagarvala had done. The office pointed out the various in-
firmities in the investigation which are worth mentioning.
(1) Badge was well-known to D.S.P. Poona. Why was he not
contacted and why was Karkare made the central figure and the case
started with Madanlal.
(2) Why did the Delhi Police not bring Madanlal's statement on
January 22, 1948.
(3) What efforts were made to establish contact with Delhi and
what action did Rana take on Madanlal's statement.
(4) Did Nag<lrvala spot an editor with initials N.V.G. from
Poona who was Madanlal's companion.
(5) Did Nagarvala go to Ahmednagar to look for links of Madan-
lal there. Who was handling the investigation at Ahmednagar and
Poona. If Badge was seen in Ahmednagar three days before and he
was suspected, why was no action taken.
4.28 When this note went to Mr. Morarji Desai, he held a dis-
cussion with his Secretary and finally it was decided that Ex. 14 with
the appendices should be sent on to the Government of India.
4.29 On the receipt of this explanation and explanation of Mr.
Sanjevi, Ex. 7 with the annexures, Mr. Iengar made his remarks
which have already been set out and Hon'ble the Home Minister,
Sardar Patel, gave his remarks. The file was finally sent to
Hon'hle the Prime Minister who just signed it.
CHAPTER' V-SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY
Index of Paragraphs
5.3 Movements of conspirators as shown by judgments.
5.9 Prosecution story
5.17 Courts' findings
5.19 Meeting after release of convicted prisoners,
5.21 News in Indian Express
5.22 Times of India
5.27 Ketkar detained
5.29 Interpellation in State Legislative
5.30 Assembly and Parliament's interest
5.34 Commission appointed and terms
5.42 Trial Court and High Court findings and discU!sioD
of terms of reference
5.49 Scope discussed
.5.63 Construction by Commission
CHAPTER V
Scope of the Inquiry
5.1 The circumstances under which this Commission was ap-
pointed are these: On January 30, 1948, Mahatma Gandhi was shot
dead. He was the topmost leader of India whose position was
higher than that of anyone else; he was the architect of a new in-
dependence movement, i.e.. the achievement of freedom by non-
violence, a noval concept in a world riven by strife and abounding
in violence, waf and aggression. He was both a saint and a poli-
tician. He was assassinated on January 30, 1948 while he was going
to his daily prayer meeting at about 5 p.m. in the groWlds of the
Birla House by revolver shots fired by Nathuram Godse who was
arrested at the spot. Previous to the murder, a young Punjabi re-
fugee, Madanlal Pahwa, had burst a bomb at the back of Bula
House damaging a wall and was arrested. In connection with that
the Delhi Police ....-ere carrying on investigation, and that offence
was found to be in pursuance of the conspiracy to murder Gandhiji.
5.2 In connection with both these offences, eight persons were
arrested and put on trial, and the facts of the conspiracy with its
object of murdering Mahatma Gandhi are clearly set out in the
dated June 21, 1949. It is not necessary to repeat them here ex-
cept to give a short resume of the story preceding the murder.
COnspirators-movements of
Story unfolded in the judgments of courts
5.3 The story which the prosecution unfolded at the trial of the-
accused in the Gandhi Murder Conspiracy caSe sufficiently sets out
the inc.ident!; which happened before the two occurrences, i.e., the
cxplodmg of a gun cotton slab and the assassination of Gandbiji
which formed the bases of accusation against the accused in that
('ase. The accused in that case were:-
(1) Nathuram Godse, aged about 37.
(2) Narain Apte, aged about 34.
(3) Vishnu Karkare, aged about 38.
(4) Madanlal Pahwa, aged about 20.
(5) Shankar Kishtayya, aged about 20.
(6) Gopal Godse, aged about 27.
(7) V D. Savarkar, aged about 66.
:8) D. S. Parch\,lre. aged about 47.
55
56
10f these, Nathuram Godse and N. D. Apte were edit?r
·and manager of the newspaper, the Hindu Rashtra pubhsheg.
"Poona, Previously it was published under the name of the Agram
but when action was taken against it under the Press Emergency
Powers Act, it ceased publication and restarted under its new name.
According to the judgment of the trial court, they were close as-
sodo.tes <:ond mem'!:le!'s of the Hindu Mahasabha with identical views
and the evidence before the Commission is to the same effect. They
were both sentenced to death and their sentences were upheld by
the High Court and they were ultimately executed on November
15, 1949.
:>.4 V. R. Karkare belonged to Ahmednagar. He owned a hotel, the

Deccan Guest House, there. He was also a Hindu Mahasabhaite and
both Nathuram Godse and Apte had known him for a considera'ble
time. He also had identical political leanings. Madanlal Pahwa was
a young Punjabi refugee who had come into contact with and under
the influence of V. R. Karkare and through him he came into con-
tact with Nathuram Godse and Apte. Badge was a man of ordi-
nary status. He belonged to Gondhali caste of bards who specialise
in devotional music. He was running a shastra bhandar (an arms
shop) in Poona and was trafficking in arms, ammunitions and ex-
plosives. He was also a Hindu Mahasabhaite. He had been helped
in starting his business by many persons, including Mr. G. V. Kat.
kar, witness No. 1. Shankar Kishtayya was a servant of Badge.
Gopal Godse was the brother of Nathuram Godse and V. D. Savar-
kar was a well-known revolutionary leader who had distinguished
himself in his violent anti-British activities and had come into pro-
minence after his escape from a British ship in a French port. He
later became a Hindu Mahasabhaite-its President-and was a
leader of the militant group of that party. Parchure was a Hindu
Sabha leader at Gwalior; he was a medical practitioner and resided
in that to\';"Il.
5.5 Of the accused, Madanlal threw a bomb or ignited a gun·

<cotton slab at Birla House on January 20, 1948. He was arrested at
the spot. And 10 days later, Le., on January 30, 1948, Nathuram
Godse fired three shots at Mahatma Gandhi from a close range and
was thus the actual murderer of the Mahatma. He also was arrest-
ed at the spot. The accused were prosecuted for murder and con-
spiracy to mur.der under sections 120-B and 302 and s. 307, Indian
Penal Code and of various other offences under the Arms Act and
the Explosive Substances Act.
5.6 According to the judgment of the trial court the investiga-

tion into the gun-cotton explosion started on January 20, 1948 and
into the murder on January 30, 1948, Mr. J. D. Nagarvala IP. Deputy
of Bombay, was on Jam.iary'31, 1948,
an Additional Supenntendent of Pollee, Delhi, in addition to his
own duties and investigation into both the incidents was takC:1 up
by him. As a matter of fact, his appointment \\.:as ga7.cttpd later
with retrospective effect.
57
5.7 D. R. Badge who turned an approver v. as arrested at Poor,a
<In January 31, 1948, D. S. Parchure was first ordered to be detain-
ed and kept as a detmu at Gwalior as (rorrl Fcbmary" 3, ]948 and
was put under arrest for the offence of etc. on
17, 1948. Gapal Godse was arrested while on hIS way to hIS native
village Uksan in Poona on February 5, 1948,. Sav&rkar was
laken into custody and detaIned as from February 0, 1948 and was
put under arrest in the case on March 11, 1948. Shankar Kishtayya
was arrested at Bhuleshehar near the residence of Dikshitji Maharaj
and Dadaji Maharaj in Bombay on February 6, 1943. N. D. Apte
;md Karkare were arrested at Pyrkes Apollo Hotel at Bombay on
February 14, 1948. Nathuram Godse was arrested at the spot and
Madanial had already been arrested on January 20, 1948, soon rlfter
he exploded the "bomb". There were three other persons who
were alleged to be in the conspiracy-Gangadhar Dandwade,
gadhar Yadav and Suryadeo Sharma -but they were absconding and
successfully evaded arrest.
5.8 Vishnu R. Karkare was a kind of a hotelier at Ahmednagar.
IvIadanial was a refugee from Pakpattan Tehsil of Montgomery Dis-
trict and was residing after the Partition at the refugee camp a1
Visapur about 20 miles away from Ahmednagar. Gopal Godse is
the brother of Nathuram Godse and was a Government servant and
ut the time of his arrest was employed in the Motor Transport
Spares Depot at Kirkee. Shankar was the servant of Badge and
used to prepare handles for daggers manufactured by Badge. D. S.
Parchure was a medical practitioner in Gwalior. Badge, the ap-
prover, who was of Gondhli caste, belonged to Chalisgaon but had
in Poona and was at one time associated with one Mr. Atre,
the leader of the Congress Party, and was employed in the local
municipality. After he was discharged from there, he was em·
ployed by Mr. G. V. Ketkar, witness No.1, for collecting funds fpT
the Hindu Anath Ashram and Hindu Sangathan Samiti with which
Mr. Ketkar was intimately connected.
5.9 The story of the prosecution was that a conspiracy to murder

Mahatma Gandhi was entered into sometime in December 1947 and
Parchure, it was alleged, joined the conspiracy on January 27, 1948.
In furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, Badge and Shankar
brought two gun·cotton slabs and five with primers
,mel detonators to Bombay on the evening of January 14, 1948 which
were kept at the residence of Dikshitji Maharaj with a servant of
his. Apte and Nathuram Godse arrived at Bombay the same
Ill):!, and went to the house of Dikshitji Maharaj with Badge to
procure a revolver from him but could not get one. Karkare and
l\ladanlal had arrived in Bombay sometime earlier and were
Ill'£: in Hindu' Mahasabha Bhawan where Badge and Shankar also
layed. On the 15th the explosives kept at the house of Dikshitji
were taken over by Karkare and Madanlal and were
IIl'ought to Delhi the same evening tied up in a bedding. Badge and
N;lthuram Godse returned to Poona-Badge in orda to mak2
mngcments about his bltanda.r and Nathuram to fetch his hrothf'f
(:opul Godse who had promised to provide hlm with a re.vO!Vf'T.
and Shnnknr returned to Bombay reaching there early (J.l1 the
IIlOrninn of th(' 17th. EvidC'ntiy, Api{' and Nathul'am GodsI' \v("rr-
also in Bombay and they collected some money for expenses re-
quired to carry out their plot. Nathuram Godse and Apte left by
plane on the afternoon of the 17th arriving at Delhi in the evening
and stayed at the Marina Hotel, then a fairly posh European style
hotel in Connaught Circus. Madanlal and Karkare had arrived the
same day at about 12.30 P.M. and not being able to get
tion at the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan stayed at the Shariff Hotel.
Badge and Shankar arrived at Delhi on the evening of the 19th and
stayed at the Hindu Mahasabha Shawano Gopal Godse arrived at
Delhi sometime after 17th January. One account was that he arriv-
ed on the evening of 18th January and met the others on 19th Jan-
uary. He also stayed at Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. Thus, Badg0,
Shankar, Gapal Godse and Madanlal stayed at the Hindu Maha-
sabha Bhawan for the night. Apte and Badge and Shankar went
to the Birla House on the morning of the 20th and made a survey
of the prayer ground and the back of the servants quarters and
then returned to Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. In the jungle behind
the Bhawan they tried out the two revolvers that they had brought
but they were found to be unserviceable.
5.10 Thereafter they all met at the Marina Hotel in Na.thuram's
room and the plan for the evening was finalised which \Vas that
Madanlal should explode the gun-cotton slab .at the back of the
Birla House in order to create a commotion and taking advantage
of the panic thus caused, Badge and Shankar would fire at Mahatma
Gandhi with the two revolvers and would also throw at him a hand-
grenade each. Badge was to fire the revolver and throw a hand_
grenade from the trellis work of the window of the room in the
servants quarter immediately behind where Mahatmaji used to sit
at the time of the prayers. He was to enter the room posing as a
photographer with the object of taking a photograph of the prayer
meetin.,(". Gopal Godse, Madanlal and Karkare were to throw the
remaining hand-grenades on Mahatmaji at the same time. Apte
and Nathuram were to give signals for the various participants to
carry out their respective and assigned parts. In pursuance of this
plan, the gun-cotton slab and a hand-grenade were given to Madan-
lal, one hand-grenade and revolver to Badge. one hand-grenade
each to Gopal Godse and Karkare. The conspirators then left the
Marina Hotel for Sirla House. Madanlal and Karkare first, all the
others excepting Nathuram Godse a little later in a taxi. Nathu-
ram was to follow them. It is not necessary to give the rest of the
carry out their respective assigned parts and Nathuram Gocl!;:e. Apte
and Gopal Godse left immediately in the taxi by which they had
come. Madanlal was arrested at the spot; Karka:r.e, Badge and
Shankar managed to escape.
5.11 While Nathuram Godse and Apte were in Bombay had
unsuccessfully tried to get a pistol from Dadaji Maharaj and Dixit·
ji Maharaj. From Delhi they went to Gwalior arriving at 10.30 P.M.
on 27th Januarv and staved the niJ!ht and thf' day followio.!! 'with
Dr. Parchure to whom they disclosed their plan and with his help
and with of DandwatC' th(' flbsconding nccuscd they Wf'rc ablr' to
r,ct [\ pi::;to\ from ooc' r,()('l. Lr;wiol! G\vnlior til(' S<1lnl' thry
(i) Ex 270 A-Pistol used by assassin Nathur;l
No . .1.11]
2711 C-Anothcl" picture of the pislol

rPrrnl. No . .'i. 11 1
59
lIl'rived at Delhi the next morning where they were joined by Kar-
Imie and three of them spent the night in the retiring room at the
Delhi Main Railway Station. The next evening, Le., on the 30th
,January Nathuram Godse shot Mahatmaji dead and was arrested
at the ;pot. Two photographs of the assassin's pistol (Court Ex.
:m are attched herewith. (See next page).
5.12 The Commission has got two documents prepare.d which
(See Exhibit 276 and Exhibit 276-A).

5.13 It thus shows that the conspirators moved about from place
Lo place. The principal ones amongst them were staying at betler
class and beller known hotels like the Marina Hotel, New Delhi and
the Elphinstone Annexe Hotel, Bombay and after the incident of the
:::Oth they managed to escape by train-two to Poona and the prin-
cipal accused, i.e., Nathuram Godse and Apte to Kanpur en route
to Bombay. Karkare and Gopal Godse stayed the night in Delhi
<It the Frontier Hotel in Chandni Chowk and one left the following
day and the other later. As far as the court record goes, it does
not show that the conspirators were hidding themselves anywhere
and beyond adopting pseudonyms they do not seem to have attempt-
cd to hide themselves.
5.14 On return to Bombay on January 23, Apte stayed at the

Arya Pathik Ashram, Bombay, under an assumed name of D. Nara-
yan and so did Nathuram Godse. Thereafter Nathuram Godse and
Apte stayed in the Elphinstone Annexe Hotel from January 24,
1948-Nathuram Godse stayed under an assumed name of Vina-
yakrao. Apte spent the night between the 24th and 25th January
1943 with a woman in the Arya Pathik Ashram and then shifted
to Elphinstone Annexe Hotel where they (Apte and Gedse) stayed
upto January 2:1, 1948. On the morning of January :5, Nathuram
Godse and Apte went to the Air India office and got two seats
served in the names of Narayanrao and Vinayakrao by the plane
leaving on the 27th January. The four of them-Nathuram Godse,
Gopal Godse, Apte and Karkare-met at the house of G. M. Jo£hi
of the Shivaji Printing Press at Thana and conferred together .. here
which really meant that they discussed their future plan to carry
out the object of the conspiracy.
5.15 On January 26, 1948, in the morning, Nathuram Godse and
Apte met Dadaji Maharaj and Dixitji Maharaj and asked their help
to get a revolver but they did not succeed in getting one. On Jan-
uary 27, 1948, both of them left J?ombay for Delhi by air. It is
t'd on the eve of their departure for Delhi the two principal
conspIrators, Godse and Apte, saw Savarkar but that is controver-
sial.. The rest o.f their !Dovements, i.e., their reaching Delhi, pro.
ceedmg to GwallOr, staymg there with Dr. Parchure and getting a
revolver through him and returning to Delhi on the 29th January
1948 Dnd staying in' a retiring room at the Delhi Railway Station
havc already been set out ab-ove. On January 30, 1948, at 5 P.M.,
N:lthuram 9"0dsc carried out the of the conspiracy, firing three
:.l1ols ,Il pOint blnnk rang<' aWI·thus bllil1'; Mahatma Gandhi.
tiO
5.16 The Commission thus has a complete picture of the
ments of the conspirators from the time they left Poona on January
15, 1948, right upto the time they were arrested on various dates.
It is not neccssdry to pursue the course of the trial before the Special
Judge, Delhi and the app.eal before the East Punjab High COUrt, but
the fact remains that these persons after the arrest of and
after the which had been given by Professor Jain wen::
moving about in Bombay and in Delhi and other places and neither
their names nor their identities could be discovered. The High
Court ha&,. exonerated the police of all blame and held that this was
in spite of strenuous efforts of the police through the trial judge
had held the police lacking in diligence and thus blameworthy,
5.17 The Special Judge found seven of them guilty and sentenc-
ed two, Nathuram Godse and Apte, to be hanged; and the rest ex-
cept Savarkar who was acquitted, were ordered to be transported
for life. On appeal to the High Court, two more were acquitted,
i.e., Parchure and Shankar Kishtayya. The appeal of the rest of
the accused persons was dismissed; the sentences of death on Nathu-
ram Godse and Apte were confirmed under s. 374 Cr. P.C, the
sentences passed on the other three were upheld.
5.18 Nathuram Godse and Apte were hanged in Ambala Jail on
November 15, 1949. The rest were kept in Punjab Jails and then
in Bombay jails. After they had served a certain number of years
they unsuccessfully moved, on more occasions than one, the Sup·
reme Court for writs of Habeas Corpus on the ground that they were
entitled to claim remission for conduct. Ultimately, on Octo-
ber 12, 1964, Gopal Godse, Karkare and Madanlal were released from
jail by the Government of India although the Government of Maha-
rashtra were not in favour and had so advised the Government of
India. It is not for the Commission to say whether they were right
or wrong. As a matter of fact, the Government of India were un-
willing to disclose the reason for their going against the advice of
the Government of Bombay. The fact remains that these persons
were released.
5.19 The release of these person!> was made the occasion of Satya-
vinayak Pooja at Udyan Karyalaya at Poona. For this ceremony
invitations were sent out on a post card, Ex. 23, under the name of
one M. G. Ghaisas. The invitation was in JViarathi and its English
translation supplied by the Government of is as follows :-
SHRI GAJANAN PRASANNA
(i.e., May Lord Ganpati bless)
With respect of love-
To l'ejoice the release from jail of Gopalrao Godse-tI-
brother of Patriot (deshbhakt) (Italics are by the Commission) the
late Nathuram V. Godse, Shri Vishnupant Karkarc and Shri Madan-
lal Pahwa, we (their friends) are going to perform Shri S<1tya Vina-
yak Puja and Congr:tlll]ah' tilf'm by inviting (lll'lTI lwl'\': YOIl ,If('
61
therefore requestt:d to remain present for this ceremony along with.
your friends.
Yours,
M. G. GHAISAS.
Time-Thursday lZ-1l-1964 5'30 P.M. to TP P.M. Place Udysn KSljalaya, 619
Shaniwar Path, Pooua - 2.
5.20 It is significant to note that in this invitation Nathuram
Godse was described as 'Deshbhakt', i.e., a patriot which is demons-
trative of the mentality ot the organisers of the function anj it
may not be too remote an inference that the invitees would be sym-
pathetic if not holding the same or similar views. The affidavit
Iiled in the Bombay High Court by M. C. Ghaisas, who was also
detained as a consequence of the function, shows that about 50 in-
vitations were sent. Actually the attendance was about 3 or 4 times
that number. It has variously been described as 125 to 200,
5.21 In the issue of the Indian Express dated the 14th November,
191.i4, Ex. 26, under the caption "POONA EDITOR KNEW OF THE
PLAN TO MURDER MAHATMA GANDHI", there was a report of
the proceedings of this function by its Poona Correspondent to the
diect that Mr. G. V. Ketkar, former editor of the Kesari and at that
time editor of the Tarun Bhal'at presided at the 'function and the
occasion was described as a reception in the newspaper which in-
deed it was and was given in honour of Gopal Godse and Vishnu
Karkare. Mr. G. V. Ketkar there made a speech in which he said
that he knew from Nathuram Godse assassin of Gandhiji, of the
"plan" to murder Gandhiji quite 3. "few weeks carHer" but he \';as
opposed to Nathuram's idea. The proceedings of the funcLon which
may be term2d a pUjCL or a meeting shows that GO,tlal Godse .md
Karkare narrated their jail experiences. The followin"{ exiract
from the newspaper, The IndiCLn Express, Bombay, shows' what ex-
actly Mr. Ketkar said:-
"Mr. Ketkar presided over the function, which was held in
Udya"!l Mangal Karyalaya. It was attended by about 100 men
and women.
"Mr. Ketkar disclosed that for about three months prior to
Gandhiji's mu.rder, Nathuram 'used to discuss with me the pros
and cons' of his idea to kill Gandhiji. He was opposed to
the idea and 'used to tell Nathuram to consider the canse-·
quences, both social and political',
"Mr, Ketkar said that after the first incident (Madan Lal
had exploded a bomb at prayer meeting a few days
before the murder), Badge (who turned approver) had come
to Poona and told him (Mr. Ketkar) of 'their future plans'.
to added that he thus knew that they were going
him
'they will not arrest me now for that'." .
62
5.22 Ex. 27B is a report of the proceedings as given in the Times
oj India dated 16th. November 1964 which is a little more mformative.
Therein it is said that Mr. Ketkar recently asserted that he had
advance information "bout Nathuram Godse's intention to assassinate
Mah2!ma Gandhi, and told the Times of India News Service, that he
had informed the late Balukaka Kanitkar about Godse's intention
to .11urder Mahatma Gandhi and that Kanitkar had written to
Iv1r. Kher but the State Government did not act On the information
received. Ketkar also said that he tried to dissuade Nathuram
Godse from doing bodily harm to Gandhiji. Mr. Ketkar further
disclosed that Nathuram Godse, had in a pUblic speech, said that he
would like to see how Mahatma Gandhi would realise his wish of
living upto 125 years. This disclosure about the advance
tion was condemned by the Poona City District Congress Committee
as a dangerous trend which was harmful to the State. The President
of the D.C.C., Mr. B. N. Sanas, drew the attention of State Gov-
ernment to Mr. Ketkar's statement and he alsQ wanted the Govern-
ment to take note of the fact that those who had been sentenced in
the 11,1.ahatma Gandhi Murder case were felicitated by certain persons
in Poona on their release from prison.
5.23 When the Indian Express report appeared in its issue dated
November 14, 1964, Mr. G. V. Ketkar issued a clarification which is
as revealing as his previous speech. This is Ex. 27A, and appeared in
the Indian Express of November 17, 1964. He confirmed the news
being given to the then Premier Mr. B. G. Kher through the late
Balukaka Kanitkar to whom Mr. Ketkar had conveyed Nathuram's
intention to kill Gandhiji. He further said that the report is the
previous issue of the Indian Express was "generally correct" but the
obje'ction that Ketkar took to the report was in regard to 1he U8e of
the words "plan to kill Gandhiji". The clarification was in the
{ollov,ring words:-
"In his 'clal'ification'. Mr. Ketkar said that what N&thuram
had told him was his 'intention' to kill Gandhiji and not his
'plan' to murder Gandhiji."
'" '" '" '"
"I stated in my closing remarks that after Nathuram Godse
h!'ld. discl?sed to me some months before (Gandhiji's murder)
Ius mtentIon of murdering Gandhiji 1 had tried to dissuade him
on political, social and moral grounds.
"Published reports of that speech are generally correct. I
had spoken about it (Nathuram's intention) to the late Balu-
He (Kanitk!'lr) had then written to the then
B. G. Kher, mforming him Nathuram's inten-
tIon. Kamtkar had shown me a copy of that lette, (to Kher).
"Since I expressed opposition to Nathuram Godse he did
Hence I had not ::ollle to
5.24 In the same issue, the Indian Express adversely commented
upon Mr ..Ket.kar's conduct. It said that Ketkar's forckn(Jwl<Jdge of
the assaSSInatIon of Mahatma Gandhi only added to tIle' n:.ystC'fY of
63
the circumstances preceding the crime. In other words, ..
had information from Godse himself of the assasSln S
lion' and not of his 'plan'. This subtle difference. does. greatly
alter the patent fact that Mr. Ketkar, a. respoDSlble •.hoad.8
cbllr obligation to prevent the assassmahon as far as It lay m hIs
I){lwer. It also said that it was the duty of the Gov,,:rnment to come
nut with the facts in fairness to the Poona editor. Toe paper
added-
"But the story would not end there. Even if Mr. K€:tkar
is cleared by an official confirmation of his claim, a further
explanation would still be required of those who last week
made such a. show of Godse's 'martyrdom', The Poona 'recep-
tion' for the assassin's two accomplices was a sordid reminder
of the ugly spirit which still moves some people in this country.
Have we really fallen so low that not only the murderer of the
Father of the Nation but also those who. in the eyes of the
law, helped him in his heinous act are to be regarded as
national heroes? The Poona 'reception' was a shame beyond
description. There can be no two opinions about it."'
5.25 The Poona. Daily News also published a report of Ketkar's
ciarification in its issue of 16th November, 1964. Ex. 28. There the
clarification is different. A l-eference is made by Mr. Ketkar to the
:;pcech of Nathuram Godse at a meeting mentioning about Gandhiji's
Godse and it was Balukaka Kanitkar who had "relayed" the lact to
Mr. B. G. Kher. Further, it is asserted that everything to avoid this
('alamity was thus done "when I told Nathuram that it is wrong way
to behave in the politics and it would have grave and
rcperc1.1ssions."
!i.26 Ex. l82 dated November 24. 1964. is a letter from the District
Magistrate to the Government of Bombay regarding reaction to the
disclosure made by G. V. Ketkar. Poona City, it said. was sUrred
hy Ketkar's statement and the subsequent functions to celebrate the
dc,lth anniversary of Nathuram and the situation had become tC'nse
hut because of the intervention of the leaders of political parties. l"0
Illisha;p took place.
5.27 By an order dated November 24. 1964. the District
!looM, ordered the detention amongst others of G. V. Ketkar. It will
hr relevant to note at this stage that after the comments in the
hutian Express and before th passin/! of the orde-r of detemion. on
Nu\·ember 23, 1964, Mr. Ketkar left Poona and fled to Madras on
:!·lth November. On November 25. 1964, he surrendered himself
Iwfore the Commissioner of Police at Madras. He was then brought
h:1CK to ·Poona and on the way when the train was within the
hnundaries of the Maharashtra State, the order of detention was
on him at midnight and he was first detained in Poona
Yt'.'vada Jail and then in hAkola District Prison".
5.28 AftE'r his detention he put in a petition, Ex. 18. to the Review-
i.lg ul.hol'ity undC'l' the D.'[C'nca or'Indin Rules. wherein he denied
64
the allegations which had been made him the Indian
Express report and he tried to meet the mference the com-
ment'S in that newspapers had drawn. He stated therem that he-
met Balukaka Kanitkar and conveyed to him Nathuram's public
speech and his corroborative private talk with him (Ketkar) and he
urged on Balukaka to communicate the fact to the authol"itics and
that Balukaka had done so. He also stated therein that "shocking
confession" was nothing new and that he had disclosed it earlier to·
Mr. R. K. Khadilkar who is now the Deputy Speaker of the Lower
House, who was also examined before this Commission at witness
No. 97 but he had no recollection of any such talk. It is difficult t(}
imagjne that if there had been any such talk, it could have been
forgotten.
5.29 Evidently there were interpellations in the Maharashtra Legis-
lative Assembly on February 25, 1965 in regard to the reception in
honour of Gopal Godse and Karkare who had been convicted in the
Mur.atma Gandhi Murder case. According to Mr. Ketkar himself
there was a furore in the public press and as a consequence he,
Kelkar, was ordered to be detained. There was also an uproar in
both Houses of ParHament and indignant speeches were made there.
In the Council of States there was a Calling Attention Motion in
regard to the made by Mr. G. V. Ketkar regardin::! the
"plan" of Nathuram Godse to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi. .The
Home Minister, Mr. Gulzari Lal Nanda, in his speech said that at a
meeting to felicitate Gopal Godse and Vishnu Karkart>, Mr. Kf·tkar
had claimed that he had known of the intention of Nathuram Godse
to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi and had conveyed this lnformation'
to the late Mr. B. G. Kher through Balukaka Kanitkar; that as both
Bal ukaka and Mr. Kher were dead, Government was a
thorough inquiry into the matter with the help of old records in
consultation with the Government of Maharashtra.
5.30 Mr. A. D. Mani asked the Home Minister whether he had
received a detailed report as to what happened at meeting alid
referred to what had been published in the newspapers. He asked
further whether any attempt had been made by Government of India
to ask Mr. Ketkar to give all those details which he knew. Mr. Nanda
in l'Cply said that it should be possible to take action against a person
who was an "accessory before the act".
. 5.31 Mr. Bhup.esh Gupta, another M.P., made a spirited f:peech and
said two things had clearly emerged from the proceedings:
(1) disclosures a.bout the plan to murder Mahatma Gandhi were made
by Mr. Ketkar, and (2) the organisation of the reception itself. He
further said that at the time of assassination of Mahatma Gandhi
people had a feeling that there had been some dereliction of duty
somewhere and that he had not been given the protection which he
should have been given. He said:-
"Is it not a case for a enquiry into
the whole that had been made in order to fir.d out
whether and 10 what manner the information was rer.eive-d
the communication about the intention was received bY.
Mr. Ketkar, what he did later on, to whom he sent, and so on?
I think that if it had been so much talked about at that time,
the would-be murderer coming and talking to Mr. Ketkar, it is
tantamount to an admission that the matter had been discussed
in a conspiratorial manner amongst others also. What was the
Bomba.y Government doing at that time? We would like to
know whether the Bombay Government and the Central Gov-
ernment and the Central Intelligence had any inkling or indi-
cation with regard to such things. This is very very
important."
Ill' added that he would suggest that because there was a deliberate
!It'reliction of duty o.n the part of some people in high authority who
hud got information through Mr. G. V. Ketkar directly or indirectly,
11(' would suggest that a high-powered enquiry be held into the whole
matter. He ended his speech by saying:-
"I should like to know whether they, after failed
to protect Mahatma Gandhi's "life, are today going to
these kinds of things. All these things have to be explai"!1ed."
5.32 Another Member, Mr. Thengari, wanted to know whether the
(:overnment were forewarned by Mr. Balukaka Kanitkar who had
ul".r.;cd it to take precautions.
;3.33 Professor M. B. Lal said the fact that Ketkar presided ovt:r
!lw meeting indicates that he was not so innocent as he tried to show
IllmsdI Lo be and that he had written a number of articles inciting
Ii;,:red against Mahatma Gandhi. Many other Members ('xpr,:ssed
I])('ir feeling of disgust at the hideous glorification of such murders
Id,,· the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. It was under these cir-
",Jllsiances that this Commission of Inquiry was set up by the
(','ntral Government.
:;.34 The Commission has appended to this portion a COpy cf the

I':" jinmentary Debates which show how the Members of Parli3ment
to the revelations made by Mr. Ketkar. Appendix II.
5.: 5 pursuance of these debates the Central Government by a
'l<,tlflcatLOn dated March 1965, a Commission of Inquiry
I",. the purposes of makmg an mquIrY mto the matters of publIC
III1]>ort<lnce therein speCified and the terms of reference were:-
(a) Whether any persons, in particular Shri Gajanan Viswanath
Ketkar, of Poon.a. had prior information of the
of Nathuram Vmayak Godse and others to assassinate
Mahatma Gandhi:
(b) whether any of such persons had communicated the said
information to any authorities of the Government of Bom-
bay or of of India; in particular, whether
the aforesatd Shn Ketkar had conveyed the said irdorma-
lion to the latc Bal Gangadhar Khcr. the then Premier of
Bombay, throu):!h the In-tc Baluknlm Kanftkar;
titi
(c) if so, what action was taken by the Government of Bombay.
in particular by the late Bal Gangadhar and. the
Government of India on the basis of the said mformahon.
Mr. Gopal Swarup Pathak, M.P.• a of, the
Court was appointed to make the mqUlry. On hls bemg appomte.d
a Central Minister and then Governor of the State of Mysore, this
Commission was reconstituted and I was appointed to conduct the
inquiry. That is how this Commission of Inquiry came to be
constituted.
5.36 The terms of reference were amended by notification No.
31/28/68-PolI(A) dated Odober 28, 1968, and in clause (c) the words
"and by the officers of the said Governments" were added with
retrospective effect so that the third clause now reads as under:-
(c) If so, what a.ction was taken by the Government of
and the Government of India and by the officers of the
said Governments on the basis of the said information.
5.37 The first term, i.e .. (a), refers particularly to Mr. Ketkar of
.t'oona and whether he or any other person had prior information of
the conspincy of Nathuram Godse and others to assassinate Mahatma
Gandhi.
5.38 The second term refers to any communication by such per-

sons, as are mentioned in the first term, of the information to the
Government of Bombay or the Governml?nt of India and in particu-
lar whether Mr. Ketkar had conveyed this information through
Balukaka Kanitkar to the late Balasahib Kher.
5.39 And the third term refers to the action taken by one or the
other or both the Governments or any of the officers of the said two
Governments.
5.40 Clause (b) is wide enough to cover not only the Government
of Bombay and the Government of India but also any of the autho-
rities of those Governments which would include vQ.rious officers
under the Governments including those belonging to the police and
civil administration.
5.41 Now the first term uses the words "had prior information of
the conspiracy of Nathuram Vinayak Godse and others to assassinate
Gandh( and the use of the word "conspiracy" in the con-
Ii IS submItted, not unjustifiably, is significant and
Important. Is the CommISSIOn confined to the prior k.nowledge of
"conspiracy" as it is defined under section 120A of the Indian P€"nal
or does it refer to the general danger to Mahatma G<tndhi's
hfe a group of persons which would Nathuram Godse
as theIr mentor. The danger could have been from other pN'S(,n::;
also as. w.as SUf!gestcd by MI'. MOl'al'ji D('sai in his ('viuC'Il('(' h(·rol'{' (he
CommwslOn ()1' was liin!l'd at by Gop:!l Gor\S(', witl)('s.-.; No. :l:!.
67
5.42 Both the trial court which tried the Gandhi Murder Con-
spiracy case and the High Court to which the appeal was taken .after
the conviction, have given their findings as to when the consplra.Cy
('arne into existence. According to the judgment of the Speclal
Judge Mr. Atma Cha.ran, existence of the conspiracy co.uld he deduced
.at least on January 9, 1948. The learned judge has sald:-
"There is no evidence forthcoming on behalf of the prose-
cution as to when the 'conspiracy' was first entered into and
by whom and where. However, it may safely be inferred from
the "movements of the accused and their conduct that the
'conspiracy' was in .existence at least on 9th January 1948 when
Narayan D. Apte sent Vishnu R. Karkare aod Madanlal K.
Pahwa along with two more individuals to examine the :stuff'
at the house of Digambar R. Badge. Narayan D. Apte, Vlshnu
R. Karkare and Madanlal K. Pahwa must have been in the
'conspira.cy' at that time. Nathuram V. Godse comes in the
picture fhst on 10th January 1948 when he along with Narayan
D. Apte asked Digambar R. Badge to be supplied with two
gun-catton-slabs and five hand-grenades. Nathuram V. Godse
must have bi;:en in the at that time. Digambar R.
Badge joined the 'conspiracy' on 15th January 1948 "",hen he
<lgreed to accompany Nathuram V. Godse and Narayan D. Apte
to Delhi. Gopal V. Godse must have been in the 'conspiracy'
on Jahuary 1948 when' he put in an application for seven
dJYs' casual leave. Shankar Kistayyaa joined the 'conspiracy'
on 20th January 1948 when he was told by Digambar R. Badge
the purpose of their visit to the Birla House. Dattatraya S.
Parchure joined the 'conspiracy' on 27th January 1948 when
he agreed to get a pistol procured for Nathuram V. Godse and
Narayan D. Apte."
5.43 The East Punjab High Court accepted this finding regarding
[lIP coming into existence of the conspiracy_ There is also the evi-
of Gopal Godse, witness No. 33. He stated that Nathuram
made up his mind to finish Gandhiji when Gandhiji justified on
,January 13, 1948, his resolve to g6 on fast.
5.44 If the scope of the Commission is only to be circumscribed

to prior knowledge regarding "conspi·racy" then any i.nforma,tion
Ilw.t anybody might have had in regard to the danger to the life of
:lnatma Gandhi from individual persons in Poona or wherever they
IllJ/!ht be would be excluded from the scope of the Inquiry unless
!Ill is proof "of their agreeing to do an illegal act" or they had
II:uHled together or formed a plot to do so. In S. 120A the word
'('1"1 ,inal conspiracy' is defined as follows: _ '
"S. 120A. When two or more persons agree to do. or Cau:;e to
b2 done.- •
(1) an illegal act. or
"(2) an aet whidl is not by m('gal m('ans,
"\wll :11\ (li:l:Il'l\atl'd 1\ _
68
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to
conunit an offence shall amount to a criminal cnnspiracy
unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or
more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.
Explanation.-Tt is immaterial whether the illegal act
is the ultimate object of such agreement. or is merely
incidental to that object."
15.45 Conspiracy according to the Shorter Oxford English Diction-
I
ary, means a combination of persons for an evil or unlawful purpose;

an agreement between two or more to do something criminal,
or reprehensible; a plot.
5.46 In Webster's Third International ictionary the meaning is
as follows:-
Conspiracy: 1. (a) an illegal, treasonable, or trecherous plan
to harm or destory another person, group, or entity;
(b) an agreement manifesting itself in words or deeds and
made by two or more persons confederating to do an
unlawful act or use unlawful means to do an act which is
lawful: Confederacy 2. a combination of persons banded
secretly together and resolved to accomplish an evil or
unlawful end: 3. a striking concurrence of t.endencies,
circumstances, or phenomena as though in planned accord.
5.4:7 In the notification, the word used in clause (a) is 'conspiracy'

which is a term of art and when used in legal documents must
ordinarily corunote the meaning given to it in the law relating to
conspiracies as contained in the Indian Penal Code. And in this
case, the conspiracy is specified as being a conspiracy of Nathuram I
Godse and others to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi. Even according I

to its dictionary meaning, cOl?spiracy is a' combination for unlawful
purposes; a plot, and is connected with something illegal.
5.48 So viewed and so considered, anything disclosed in July
1947 by Balukaka Kanitkar or Mr. Ketkar or both of them indivi-
dually. or collectively, even if it was of a definite kind, would be
excluded as there was no conspiracy of Nathuram Godse then.
5.49 If the scope of the Inquiry is confined to the know ledge of
conspiracy technically so caned, in the Penal Code or its meaning
as given in dictionaries and if the conspiracy came into existence
sometime on the 9th of January 1948 or thereabout or even in Nov-
ember 1947, then any inquiry into any knowledge or information in
possession of Mr. G. V. Ketkar or anyone else before that date would
be dehorB the terms of reference in the. notification and any inquiry
by this Commission constituted under that notification with that
limited mandate would be barred. '
f).50 In both its legal and in non-10gal s('n5f' th0 worn
'conspirncy' hm; l'C'rC'l"f'l1(,f' to 01' hamlinl! A'11d
th('rdol'p if OIW WI'''!' In to word the' mf'nnil1r.! or
s, 120A IIHliull l'I'lllli (,od,' Ill" lhe orllllllLl"Y
69
l'IHl'luer then unless G. V. Ketkar's or other evidence refers to
1,Iulting of which the architect was Nathuram Godse, the scope of
IluI Commission's Inquiry will be extremely constricted and narrow.
:J,Gl If on the other hand the word is not given its
"'I'IIJlic<l1 meaning then anything knOW'll or coming to the knowledge
"I IYiessrs. Ketkar or Balukaka Kanitkar individually or to both of
11,1'111 together or to any other individual relating to the intention
.,' plan to murder Mahatma Gandhi or relating to a threat or danger
1<1 lIis life would be within the scope of the Inquiry by this COrn-
11I1:;sion. A plan or intention may be of one person or more than
"II<' person acting together but conspiracy can only be between two
'" Illore than two persons. It is not even alleged that information
1:1\11'1l by Mr. Ketkar to Balukaka Kanitkar, assuming that it was
was rgearding a conspiracy or banding together of two persons
,," more and therefore if the Commission were to attach to the word
"'<lllspiracy' its technical meaning that information would not be
I'ililin the boundaries of the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry
",I up by the notification. And that would hardly be in conformity
1'1111 what the Parliamentary debates disclose or what clearly
'PI'('ars to be the matter which was the minds of the public
II'; rcflected in the speeches of the various Honourable Members of
1':11'1 iament, in the Council of States or in the Rousse of the People.
:).52 If the Commission were to take a technical view of the word-
Illf: of the notification then prior.to 20th January 1948 the only person
"ul:;ide the accused persons who had prior knowledge of the con-
"piracy was Professor Jain and his two friends with whom he held
!.i1ks about Madanlal's disclosures; and Mr. G. V. Ketkar to whom
11I1('h a plan was disclosed by D. R. .Badge on or about the 23rd
.Il1lluary 1948. Nobody has even alleged that before January 20, 1948
J'rofcssor Jain informed anyone in authority of the existence of
III!' or even of the danger to Mahatma Gandhi's life; of
,")ul":o.c, after January 20, 1948, when Madanlal was arrested and he
IlliIde a "confessional" statement, the Delhi Police also came to know
"r Ihe existence of the conspiracy but as to when they came to
hllow about the identity of the conspirators or the participants in
IIII' oftence may not be so easy to say or even relevant at this stage.
Professor Jain's knowledge of the conspiracy to put it in
:; own words was this:-
"Then he (Madanlal) said that there was a conspiracy to
murder. I asked, whom. do you want to murder. Do you
want to murder me. He said that he did not know who
was to be murdered. I asked him: "do you want to
murder Jinnah." He said: "no, because Jinnah was too
well guarded and nothing could be done about him." :r
named Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Then I mentioned
Sardar Patel. He said: "no". From my house I took him
to the sea shore. I tried to draw him. out by talking nicely.
Even then he would not give the name. So I put a direct
qucRtion as to who the person was that was going to be
murdered. He named Mahatma Gandhi."
10
!i.54 It may be added that on the 21st January Professor Jain:
gave this information of the conspiracy to -Premier B. G. Kher and
Mr. Morarji Desai and reference may be made to Mr. Morarji Desai's.
statement as P.W. 78 in the court of the Special Judge at page 166
of the High Court record. Even there the word used is not con-
spiracy but what is said is "He (Jain) then said that Madanlal his
(riends had decided to take the life of a great leader ...... Madanlal
then gave the name of Mahatma Gandhi."
5.55 In his statement before the Commission in answer to a

question regarding conspiracy, Mr. Morarji Desai said:-
"There were rumours that there was a conspiracy going on
against Gandhiji because of the Partition and of the 55
crares. I did not hear people saying that there was no
escape for him and his life was in da'!lger. This was about
the time when he undertook the fast."
So that this also puts the matter in January 1948.
5.56 A Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry
Act is, it has been so held by the Supreme Court, a fact-finding body
and is not a judicial tribunal in the sense that that word is used. If
the word 'conspiracy' and the language of the terms of the notifica-·
Uon constituting this Commission of [nquiry were to be interpreted
as statutes, statutory orders or legal documents are interpreted,
according to the rules of interpretation by courts and other judicial
or qua:;i judicial tribunals, then whatever was said and debated in
Parliament previous to the notification constituting this Commission
may not be relevant for its interpretation and if the word 'conspiracy"
were to be strictly and legally construed, the mandate of Parliament
and its direction for or requirement of collection of facts connected
with Mr. Ketkar or Balukaka Kanitkar and what they said or did
and what information they gave would not be carried out and the'
wishes of Parliament would be thwarted, frustrated and remain
unfulfilled and the debate would become sterile. That' would be'
stultifying the Commission itself and make its setting up thoroughly
futile, useless and inutile if not facetious. 'That should be prevented,
and avoide:i as far as it is reasonably possible.
5.57 Now two persons are mentioned by name in clauses (a) and
(b) of the notification-G. V. Ketkar and Balukaka Kanitkar. So·
it will be fruitful to discuss at this stage what they disclosed to the
authorities if they did disclose anything at all or anything definite.
5.58 The evidence of Mr. G. V. Ketkar does not disclose his know-
ledge of conspiracy 'Prior to January 20, and in this word
"evidence" would include his statement as a Wltness before the Com-
mission; his petition and affidavit to the BQmbay High Court; petition
to the Dete':lus Reviewing Board or any other document wmch he
has chosen to place before this Commission. " As a matter of fact,
before January 20, 1948, the only person who had prior information
of the conspiracy as such was, as has been said above, Pl'1ofessor
Jain, but h(', to put it mildly and ('vcn charitnbly, wns
'!>itant and even dubitant. He was examined by the Commission
ore than once and was readily available whenever summoned to
uppear and was always ready and anxious to give whatever infor-
ma tion he possessed.
ii.59 Professor Jain has deposed with regard to the conspiracy

lhat in early January Madanlal met him while he (Jain)
wasreturning from the college and he told him (Jain) that he wanted
lo talk to him and accompanied Jai'Il to his house. Karkare was also
lhcre, watching from a little distance. The same night Madanlal
this time alone, came to Jain and started talking "at random"
IIbout diverse matters. Then he disclosed to Jain that there was a
('onspiracy to murder somebody and when Jain mentioned various
Hames to Ma·danlal, he got, perhaps extracted, the name of Mahatma.
Aftcr getting information of this sinister design, the Professor took
lin serious action except preaching to Madanlal and then imagi:1ed,
Ilnrortunately and quite mistakenly if not vaingloriously, that he
had succeeded in dissuading him from his nefarious design and in
pmsuadi-ng or talking Madanlal out of his murderous intentions.
Why he thought so is difficult to' discover. But this is what he says
nnd for the present if may be left at that. This talk about the
Plurder of Mahatma Gandhi took place somewhere in January and
'Ioon after Professor Jajn tried to see Mr. Jayaprakash Narain, a
Ilodalist leader of some eminence, but he could not tell him (Mr.
J:lyaprakash Narain) anything as the latter was so busy, Then he
it to two of his colleagues and friends, Mr. Angad Singh,
wilness No. 28 and Professor Yagnik, witness No. 29, and Mr.
:;Ingh disclosed the matter to Mr. Ashoka Mehta and Mr. Harris who
both leaders of the socialists at that time. But both of them
IInvc no recollection of these talks. Mr. Angad Singh has also stated
IlInt he disclosed this information to Mr, Jayaprakash Narain but the
lliticr has no such recollection, nor does he remember this
lIIan himse1f. So, thus far, it was only the future conspirators
:w[ves and Professor Jain and his colleagues who knew anything
IIIIOllt the conspiracy. Professor Jain's two coUeagues and friends
I\','rc equally undecided and sceptical about what Jain told them,
!i fiO Itwould be relevant to mention that what Professor Jain

H" his friends say they knew about the conspiracy, must have been
known to Parliament when they debatecl the statements of Mr. G.
V Kc-tkar because they had appeared as prosecution witnesses at
Ill!' trial and the propriety or otherwise of their behaviour and
rUl"immcc was not the basis or the reason or the cause of Parlia-
Irlt'ntary debate.
!i,lll The debate in Parliament and the story disclosed by Mr

!·:,·tknl' which Jed to the matter being taken up by Parliament and
1",iritNll:v there does not point to exclusion of Ketkar's
dl':!'lmllu'('S rrom-thC' of the Inquiry, rather it is a pointer the
,dlll'l' W:ly. And lllp Commission Lo.; of 111(' opinion fhnt its m<lndate
1'1"hl(ll':I IIl1d 11 l:I rc'qldn'd 10 no il1[O Ihl' wholt, 1I1.,U.C'1· nnd
72
the evidence produced before it. It does not propose to circum-
scribe the Inquiry within the narrow limits of the legal connotation
of or its dictionary meaning which was the matter in
issue at the Gandhi Murder trial.
5.62 The rule of construction of statutes which has been adopted
by courts ever since the Lin.coln CoHege Case,l and which has uni-
formly been accepted as the proper rule of construction is Exposition
Ex \'isceribus Actus, i.e., language of the whole Act has to be looked
at. And the court has to consider any other part of the Act which
throws light on the intention of the Legislature and which may
serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be constru-
ed as it would be- alone and apart from the rest of the Act; in other
words, every clause of a statute should be construed with reference
to the context and other clauses the Act to make a consistent
enactment of the whole statute.ll
Thus construed, we have to look at the three terms of refer-
ence, (a), (b) and (c), together and to construe them together. This
rule of construction requires that in order to effectuate the parti-
cularised portion in terms (b) referring to the information given
through Balukaka Ka'l1itkar, we have to add to the words, "con-
spiracy of Nathuram Vinayak Godse and others to assassinate
Mahatma Gandhi", the words "plan or intention to assassinate
Gandhi or danger to the life of Mahatma Gandhi or the
threats to his life" as in cases of casus omissus. This ls so b_ecause
the conspiracy came into existence, according to the findings of the
court, at least all January 9, 1948, and according to the case of the
prosecution in December, 1947. As the letter of Balukaka Kanitkar
was written in July 1947, it could possibly not have referred t,o any
conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi as technically understood.
It m:.J.::;t have reference to intention or pJan to assassinate or to any
threat given to the life of Mahatma Gandhi or any danger sensed
against his life. As a matter of fact, Balukaka Kanitkar's letter, so
far as the Commission has been able to see, referred to the life of
Congress leaders, including Mahatma Gandhi.
5.64 In any case, to carry out the intention of Parliament and
to subserve its directions and to give a harmonious interpretation,
it is necessary to construe the words "cO'!lSpiracy to assassinate" to
include at it were plan or intention to assassinate or danger to the
life of Mahatma Gandhi or threats to his life.
5.65 The Commission, therefore, holds that it is within the scope
of this Inquiry not only to inquire about the knowledge of persons
mentioned in the terms of reference about the conspiracy of
ram Godse and others to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi but also to
enquire into any knowledge of plan or intention to kill or threat or
danger to his life.
5.66 The story as disclosed by the evidence before the Commis-
sion is that sometime in July 1947 Balukaka Kanitkar got some
infonnation in regard to danger to the life of top Congress leaders
1. (159:;:) 3 Co. Rep. :;:ab.
See LOrd Davey in Gal/ada Sligar Refit/it/gGo. V. R. (898) A. C. 735, 741.
73
which included Mahatma Gandhi and sent a registered lelter to Mr.
II G. Kher at Delhi. So, if the first term is read in its literal sense,
what is contained in the second would be excluded. If. in any case,
to the expression "conspiracy of Nathuram Godse and others to
assassinate Mahatma Gandhi" the technical meaning as contained
In the Indian Penal Code is given, then the object of this Inquiry
will be absolutely frustrated: and the Commission will be left more
or less in the position that the was wh.en it; tried Godse, Apte,
.Karkare and others for the conspiracy to murder and for the murder
of Mahatma Gandhi. It could not have been the intention of
ment, nor would this interpretation subserve the directions of
Parliament as contained in the Parliamentary debates which have
been attached as appendix II to this Report.
5.67 In the opinion of the Commission, this interpretation is much
too narrow and militates against the object of setting up of the Com-
mission. It is for that r-eason that the Commission has adopted the
interpretation of the words prior knowledge of "conspiracy to
assassinate" to include prior knowledge of danger to Mahatma
Gandhi's life or threats to his life rather than giving it the technical
meaning as contained in the Indian Penal Code. It is by adopting
this track of construction that the intention of Parliament can be
complied with.
5.68 1\s said above, the scope of the Inquiry is not limited to the
conspiracy of Nathuram God$e and others and, therefore, any
evidence l'2d before the Commission regarding the knowledge which
any person possessed not only as to the conspiracy but also as to the
intention or plan to assassinate or to the danger and threats to the
life of Mahatma Gandhi by one person or more is relevant and,
therefore, evidence regarding the knowledge of Mr. G. V.
Balukaka Kanitkar, Mr. S. R. Bhagwat, Mr. Keshavrao Jedhe, Mr.
R. K. Khadilkar, and Mr. N. V. Gadgil will be relevant. The docu-
mentary evidence dealing with the know ledge of Balukaka Kanitkar
or of any other person will also be relevant and would fall within
the terms of reference a·nd, therefore, within the scope of the Inquiry.
5.69 The first term of reference, (a), was as follows:-
(a) Whether any persons,_ in particular Shri Gajanan Viswa-
nath Ketkar, of Poona, had prior information of the cons-
piracy of Nathuram Vinayak Godse and others to assassi-
nate Mahatma Gandhi.
When analysed, this term reqUires finding out-
(i) whether any persons had prior information of the cons-
piracy;
(ii) in particular whether Mr. G. V. Ketkar of Poona had this
infonnation;
(iii) the conspiracy which is indicated in the terms of refer.
ence is the one in which the participants were Nathuram
Godse as the principal and also others; and
(iv) the object of the conspiracy mentioned was to
Mahatma Gandhi.
5.70 In order to decide the first point, it is necessary to deal with
the statement of Mr. Ketkar himself. He is witness No.1. It will
next have to be seen whether his statement receives corroboration
from documentary, oral or circumstantial evidence. The Commis-
sion will first discuss the statement of Mr. Ketkar and see how far
his own statement supports the claim that he had prior informa-
tion. (See Chapter XX).
CHAPTER VI-BACKGROUND OF THF, AC('llSgJ)
Index of Paragraphs
6.2
6.10
6.14
6.25
6.27
CHAPTER VI
Background of the accused
6.1 It will be helpful if the background of the various accused

persons C40d their movements after the conspiracy was formed are
set out at this stage. These are based on Exhibits 276 and 276-A.
God..se
6.2 He was one of the originators of the Rashtra Dal which held
its first camp in Poona in May, 1942. On January 16, 1944, he with
Apte decided to start a newspaper and they did start "the Agrani"
on March 1, 1944.
6.3 au January 2 or 3, 1948, Godse and Apte went to Ahmed-

nagar and met Karkare. On January 10 Godse and Apte were pro-
mised by Badge that he would supply them with ammunition,
termed the stuff, at the Hindu Mahasabha office at Bombay. On
January 14, 1948 Godse and Apte met Savarkar. Badge brought the
promised ammunition, Godse, Apte, Badge, and Shankar, went to
the Dixitji Maharaj and left the ammunition there either with him
or with his servant. It is not quite clear which it was.
6.4 On January 15, 1948, Godse, Apte, Badge, Karkare, and
Madanlal, held a meeting at the Hindu Mahasabha office and then
went to Dixitji Maharaj and took from there the ammunition that
they had left there. Karkare and Madanlal were then asked to leave
for Delhi. Godse evidently returned to Poona. Badge also promised
to go to Delhi.
6.5 On January 17, 1948, Godse, Apte, Badge and Shankar saw
Savarkar at his house. Godse and Apte left Bombay for Delhi by
2·00 P.M. plane and arrived at Delhi at 7·30 P.M.
and stayed at the Marina Hotel from the 17th till the
20th January, 1948. On 19th January they saw Badge at the Hindu
Mahasabha office. They also met Ashutosh Lahiri and Dr. Satya
Prakash at the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. On 20th January,
ram Godse, Apte, Karkare, Madanlal, Shankar, Gopal Godse and
Badge met at the Marina Hotel. The same day in the evening,
Madanlal exploded the gun cotton slab at the prayer meeting in the
presence of Nathuram Godse. Godse and Apte fled from there and
hurriedly left the hotel and then left for Kanpur by the night train
where they reached the next morning.
6.6 On the following day, they both stayed at the retiring room
at the Kanpur Railway Station. On 22nd January they left Kanpur
(or Bombay by Punjab Mail and arrived at Bombay on 23rd Janu-
fll"y. They stayed a day and a night at the Arya Pathik Ashram ancJ
7B
shifted to Elphinstone Hotel Annexe on 24th January. On January
25, Godse and Apte met Karkare and Gapal Godse at Ville Parle.
The same day they booked seats for Delhi in the Air India plane for
27th January under assumed names. On the same day, i.e., 25th,
Godse and Apte obtained a loan of ten thousand rupees from one
Pranjoe. really Bank Silver Company in Bombay, The money was
paid by Pranjpe the next day partly (Rs. 8000-00) by cheque and
partly in cash (Rs. 2000-00) which was supposed to be meant for
the 'Hindu Rashtra', On January 27, Godse and Apte came to Delhi
by Air and the same afternoon went to Gwalior by the Grand Trunk
Express and stayed with Dr. Parchure. The next day Gael brought
them a revolver which was defective. Then Dandwate brought an-
other revolver which was purchased by Godse for Rs. 300·00. Leav-
ing Gwalior that evening they reached Delhi the next morning, i.e.,
29th January, and stayed at the Delhi Main Railway Station in a
retiring room (No.6). Karkare also stayed there with them.
6.7 On 17th January, 1948, Godse had got from one Kale one
thousand rupees and at Lalbaug he met Charandas and got a dona-
tion of five thousand rupees, showing that they were well pw\'ided
wHh money. '
6,8 Their movements of the 29th and 30th are important and,
therefore, they may be given at some length, Karkare had gone to
Birla Dharmshala in the morning. Godse and Apte met him there.
At about 1·00 P.M. Apte, Godse and Karkare went to the Old Delhi
Railway Station and engaged retiring room No.6. Godse gave his
name as N. Vinayak Rao. Thereafter Apte, Godse and Karkare
went to the maidan and took some decisions there. At 4·00 P.M.
all three of them-Apte, Godse and Karkare-went to Birla House
and found about 400 persons attending the prayer meeting. They
then returned to Old Delhi Railway Station. Apte and Karkare went
to the pictures at New Delhi. It should have been added that Apte,
Godse, and Karkare went some time in the afternoon to the jungle
behind Birla Mandir and Godse fired three or four rounds with the
pistol and buried handgrenades there. Apte and Karkare returned
from the cinema some time after midnight.
6.9 Now we come to the 30th January, the fateful day. On that
day Apte, Karkare and Godse after having their breakfast at the
Railway Station Restaurant went to Birla Mandir. Godse fired three
or four rounds in the jungle behind Birla Mandir. At 11·30 A.M.
Godse returned to the Old Delhi Railway Station and Karkare went
to the Madras Hotel. Karkare went to Old Delhi Railway Station
and there met Apte and Godse at about 2·00 P.M. At 4·30 P.M. Apte,
Godse and Karkare left Delhi Railway Station by tonga and reached
Birla Mandir. Godse went to Birla Mandir to have darshan of the
deity there. Apte and Karkare then went to Birla House. Godse at
about 5·00 P.M. shot at Mahatma GandhI and was arrested there.
At about 6· 00 P.M. Apte and Karkare left by tonga and returned to
Old Delhi Railway Station.
11.10 Apte was eVIdently a better educated person. He did his RT.
III I!l41-42 and then became a member of the Hindu Rashtra Dal
\\'liwh at that time had about 50 or 60 members in Poona and of
\\'Ilich Godse was a prominent worker. In 1943 he returned to
Allillednagar and was selected for LA.F. but he obtained his dis-
,'hllt"g-c after about four months and joined Godse in starting the
'Af:rani' in 1944. He was the person who had arranged the black
Ilug demonstration at Panchgani against Mahatma Gandhi's
HI'nting to C.R. Fonnula.
6.11 It is not necessary to go further back than January 1948.

On 2nd or 3rd January 1948, Apte and Godse went to Ahmccinagar
lind met Karkare there. On the 13th January, 1948, Apte and Godse
Lllkl Badge to deliver the arms and ammunition, called the stuff, at
Lhe Hindu Mahasabha offiee in Bombay. On 14th January, 1948,
Aptc and Godse went to Bombay by evening train and were dropped
ilL Savarkar Sadan by one Miss Shanta Modak, a film actress, and
they met Savarkar at 7·30 P.M. Apte, Godse, Badge, Karkare,
ndanlal and Shankar went to Dixitji Maharaj and left the stuff,
I.e., arms and ammunition there and they stayed the night at Sea
(;I'cen Hotel. Apte asked Badge to meet him at the V.T. Railway
on the morning of January 17, 1948. On 15th January, 1948,
fl.pte went to Kirkee to persuade Gopal Godse to accompany them
In Delhi. On 17th January, 1948, Apte and Godse met Badge at V. T.
[{ailway Station. All three of them went to the Bombay Dyeing
Mill for collection of money. Apte, Godse, Badge, Karkare and
Shankar saw Savarkar. Apte and Godse went to the Air India Office
nnd arranged their air passages to Delhi. Apte and Badge met
Dixitji Maharaj for a pistol but did not get one. Apte and Godse
went to Delhi by plane, reaching there at 7·30 P.M. on the 17th
January and stayed at Marina Hotel from 17th January, 1948, to the
C'vening of 20th January, 1948.
6.12 On the 18th January, 1948, Karkare met Apte near Birla House
and in evening they surveyed Birla House. On 19th January,
1948. Apte and Godse met Ashutosh Lahiri and Dr. Satya Prakash
ot the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. They also met Badge there some
time late in the evening. On the 20th January, 1948, Apte, Badge,
ShWlkar "inspected" Birla House and surveyed the locality round
it and Apte, Badge, Shankar and Gopal went to the jungle to try
out the firearms and plans were finalised. The gun cotton 5lab was
to be burst by Madanlal. As stated in the case of Godse, Apte and
Godse left for Kanpur by the night train after fleeing the Birla
House, reaching Kanpur on the 21st January, 1948, and stayed in
the retiring room. On the 22nd January, 1948, they left for Bombay
by Punjab Mail and reached Bombay on 23rd evening.
6.13 On 31st January, 1948, Apte and Karkare left Delhi by

Allahabad Express at 3·30 "p.M.; the former travelled 2nd Class and
the latter 3rd Class. On 2nd February, 1948 Apte and Karkare
arrived in Bombay a.nd stayed at Sea Green Hotel. On 3rd February,
1948, Apte and Karkare went to Elphinstollc Annex\:: Hotel ana
Apte contacted Miss Manorama Salvi. On 5th February, 1946, they
went with G. M. Joshi to Thana. Apte and Karkare went to stay in
Apollo Hotel on 13th February, 1948, and Apte was arrested at
Pyrkes Apollo Hotel at Bombay on 14th February, 1948.
Karkare
6.14 Karkare was a hotel keeper of Ahmednagar and was a
minent member of the Hindu Mahasabha there. He used his
moneys in furtherance of the cause of the Hindu Mahasabha and
in that process he worked amongst the refugees and managed to
attract to himself Madanlal, who made himself notorious in
Ahmednagar by his violent activities against Muslims and against
some Congress leaders like Raosahib Patwardhan. There is evi-
dence to show that in starting his business Karkare got some assist-
ance from N. D. Apte who was a school master in Ahmednagar at
the time.
6.15 He was mentioned by S. V. Ketkar as the person who had

given him arms and ammunition which were found with Ketkar and,
therefore, the hotel and house of Karkare were also searched.
Godse and Apte met him at his hotel on January 2 or 3, 1948. He
left Ahmednagar on January 6, 19"48. On the 7th he met Apte at
the 'Agrani' office. On 9th January he introduced Madanlal to
Apte and in the afternoon took Madanial to Badge's house to see
the 'stuff' meaning arms and ammunition. On the 10th he went to
Bombay and then to Thana to G. M. Joshi's house. On the 11th
he met Madanlal at the Hindu Mahasabha office, Bombay, and then
went to Chembur Camp with him. On 13th he went to see Savarkar
but could not meet him and met him on the following day and intro-
duced Madanlal to him. He then went with Madanlal to Professor
Jain at about 6·00 P.M. On the 15th Apte, Badge and Karkare with
Godse and Madanlal went to Bhuleshwar and met Dixitji Maharaj
and took the 'stuff' (arms and ammunition) from Dixitji Maharaj.
Both Madanlal and Karkare left fur Delhi by Peshawar Express
and reached Delhi on January 17 along with one Angchekar and
stayed at the Hindu Sharif Hotel. That evening Badge came to
Birla Dharmshala where Karkare met him and 1hey decided to meet
the next morning, i.e., 18th. Karkare met Apte and Godse at -the
Marina Hotel on the morning of the 18th and after having breakfast
he along with Apte and Godse went to New Delhi Railway Station
to meet Gopal Godse but Gopal Godse did not arrive. They then
returned to Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. At 11·30 A.M. on that day
Godse gave a chit to Karkare for the Secretary, Hindu Mahasabha,
for allotment of a room to him, and, as a consequence, room No. 3
was allotted to him. At 3·30 P.M. Apte, Godse and Karkare went
to Birla House and then returned to Marina Hotel. Karkare had his
dinner with Godse and Apte at the Marina Hotel and then went to
New Delhi Railway Station to see if Gopal had arrived, but they did
not find Gopal and they returned to the Marina Hotel for the night.
As a matter of fact, Gopal Godse arrived that evening and slept at
the platform.
8I
11.16 Next morning (on 19th) all three of them visited Biria House
nlll\ surveyed the prayer ground. Gapal arrived tllat day at the
Illndu Mahasabha Bhawan at 11·30 A.M. Karkare and Madanlal re-
Imncd to Sharif Hotel and in the evening they along with Gapal
i'!.hlrned to Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan at abou.. 8·00 P.M. At 9·00
I',M Madanlal and Karkare went to Gole Market and had their
there. The same evening, Apte, Badge, Karkare and Gapal dis-
('us:o;cd the plan for shooting at a meeting in the forest near Hindu
nhasabha Bhawan. Apte and Karkare then returned to Marina
lintel and slept there. Others went to the Hindu Mahasabha
IIhawan. '
6.17 On the 20th. Karkal'e came to the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan
in the morning. At 12·30 P.M. Karkare and Madanlal left Hindu
Mahasabha Bhawan and went to Birla House and then to Marina
Irotel. Apte had his lunch there and others at the Madras Hotel. All
snbsequently met at Marina Hotel and armed themselves with
various weapons. At 4·00 P.M. Madanlal and Karkare went to
TIir]a House. Karkare and Gopal went and mixed with the congre-
t!iltion. At 4·45- P.M. the bomb was exploded. After the explosion,
Karkare went to Frontier Hindu Hotel and stayed in room No.2.
Gonal Godse also went to the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan and then
to the Frontier Hindu Hotel and stayed there in room No.4 under
the name Gopalan. '
6.18 On 21st, Karkare visited Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan and Old
Delhi Railway Station. At 9·30 A.M. Gopal1eft from Old Delhi Rail-
way Station for Bombay. Karkare left Frontier Hindu Hotel and
shifted to the Railway Station at Old Delhi.
6.19 On 22nd January 1948 Karkare was in Delhi and spent the
night in the waiting room at Delhi Railway Station. Next day, i.e.,
23rd, Karkare left Delhi for Mathura at 3·00 P.M. and stayed in
Mohan Gujarat Hotel as V. M. Vyas. Next day at 4·00 P.M. Karkare
went to A.l!J'a by bus and left Agra Cantt. for !tarsi by Madras
press at 8·30 P.M.
6.20 On 25th January, Karkare took the Allahabad Express and
went to Kalyan and from there to Thana and stayed with G. M.
Joshi. On the 26th January he and Gopa! met Apte and Godse at
the Thana Railway Station at 9·30 P.M. and that night Apte, Godse
and Karkare met at Thana Railway Station and took decisions about
Delhi. Apte paid three hundred rupees to Karkare for expenses.
6.21 On 27th January, 1948, Karkare had his morning meals with
Joshi. At 12·30 P.M. he left Thana for Dadar and posted some letters
at L. J. Road Mahim. At 3 ·00 P.M. Karkare bought his ticket at the
Bombay Central Railway Station for Delhi and left Bombay by
Frontier Mail at 5 ·45 P.M. reaching Delhi at 8 ·30 P.M. on 28th.
stayed in the retiring room. I
6.22 On 29th January, Karkare went to Birla Dharmshala and

kept his bedding there where' Godse and Apte met him. At 1·00 P.M.
Apte, Godse and Karkare went to Old Delhi Railway Station and
tl-259 HA.
stayed at retiring room No.6. At 4·00 P.M. Karkare went to Birla
House with Apte and Godse where about 400 persons had collected.
They then returned to Old Delhi. Railway Station.
6.23 On the 30th, after breakfast at the railway station restau-
rant, Apte, Karkare and Godse went to Birla Mandir and Godse
practised shooting in the jungle behind. At 11·30 A.M. Karkare
\.Vent Madras Hotel and met Apte and Godse at the Delhi Railway
Station retiring room at 2·00 P.M. At 3·30 P.M. Apte, Godse and
Karkare left New Delhi Railway Station and went to Birla Mandir
and from there Apte and Karkare went to Elrla House and, as
already stated. Godse shot at Mahatma Gandhi. Apte and Karkare
then fled to the Old Delhi Railway Station at 6·00 P.M. and stayed
the night on the platform along with the refugees.
6.24 On 31st January 1948, both Apte and Karkare left Delk
Railway Station for Itarsi and there Karkare got the Allahabad Ex-
press and reached Kalyan on 2nd February, 1948, and then went to
stay at Sea Green Hotel at Bombay. On 4th February 1948 he and
Apte met Joshi and on the 5th February they went to stay with him.
On the 7th February also he was with Joshi. On 9th February 1948
be went to Poona reaching there in the mornine: of 10th February.
On that day he slept at the platform among the refugees. On 11th
February he went to Dhond by Madras Express and returned to
Poona at 9·30 P.M. and went to Lonavala and from there to Thana.
He met Joshi on the 13th February and then stayed at the Apollo
Hotel. He was arrested from there on 14th February, 1948.
Gopal Godse
6.25 On the 14th January, 1948, Nathuram gave him two hundred
rupees to get a revolver and at the instance of his brother, Gopal
left Bombay and went by Punjab Mail to Delhi reaching there on
the 18th January and slept at the platform at night. Next morning
he went to Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan and met Karkare, Nathuram
Godse and Apte and then went to Bida House to survey the sur-
roundings. Thereafter he went to Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan.
6.26 After the explosion on the 20th he stayed at the Frontier

Hotel and left it on the 21st January and left Delhi at 9.30 A.M.
and reached Bombay at 11·00 A.M. on the 22nd and from there went
to Kirkee reaching there at 5·00 P.M. On 24th January Apte went
to see him to inquire about the revolver and also asked him to
Karkare and then returned to Poona.
Badge
6.27 Badge's movements might also be given. He reached Delhi
at 10·00 P.M. an 1!)th January, 1948 and went to the Hindu Maha-
h:eemhI:adanlal and Gopal. Later, Apte, Karkare
20th January he went to Birla House for surveying the
1I,:1II On
etc" and then returned to the Hindu Mahasabha office. At
.;111 I',M, he again went to Birla House with others and after the
I.. nllb explosion he fled from there and with Shankar caught the
I','uhllwar Express at 10·00 P.M. at the Delhi Railway Station and
lI'udLl'd Kalyan on 22nd January and from there proceeded to Poona
uHlving there at 4'00 P,M, He went for Devi yatra in the jungles of
l'tlOIIU on the 30th and returned to Poona on the 31st when he was
'
(1,29 It is not necessary to set out Shankar's movements because

ho stated to have been with Badge.
,CW\Pl'E;R Vll----J1!1USDICTION OF THE COMMISSION
.I.n.de.x. Qf .Paragraphs
1.3 Samb,asiyam Ca$e (P,C.) and Supreme .Court's case,
7.9 Mr. Justice tiQ.dings.
'.13 Res Judicata.
:1l6 .an.d Timothy's cases.
CHAPTER VII
Jurisdiction of the Commission
7.1 The main objection to the jurisdiction of the Commission to
make an Inquiry" into the conduct of the police, i.e., its shortcomings,
Its inaction or Its acts of commission or omission, its negligence in
the matter of investigation of the bomb case, was raised in an ap-
plication by Mr. J. D. Nagarvala, wit. 83. His main contention
against the jurisdiction of this Commission was based on the ground
that after the strictures passed by the learned trial judge, Judge
Atma Charan, the High Court came to a different conclusion; and
that once a court or a competent tribunal has come to the conclusion
till a point in controversy in a criminal matter that becomes res
judicata and cannot be reopened and the decision is binding and
conc:usive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the
adjudication.
7.2 Although no judgment was relied upon, the law on the
jcct is well settled; i.e., if in a criminal court a verdict is given on
a matter which is in controversy, then the matter must be treated
as res judicata and cannot be reopened by any court or tribunal.
7.3 The matter was so decided by the Privy Council in Sambasi-
vam v. Pu.blic Prosecu.tor, Federal of Malaya l , and the Supreme
Court of India stated the law under section 403 of the Criminal
Procedure Code in terms similar to that stated by the Privy Council
in Pl-itam Singh v. State of Punjab 2 • In Sambasivam v. Public
Prosecutor the Privy Council laid down the following proposition:-
"The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a
petent court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial
is not completely stated by saying that the person
ted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that
it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclu-
sive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties
to the adjudication.
The maxim 'res judicata prO veri-tate accipitur' is no less ap-
plicable to criminal than to civil proceedings. Here, the
appellant having been acquitted at the first trial on the
charge of having ammunition in his pm;session. the pro-
secution was bound to accept the correctness of that ver-
dict and was precluded from taking any steps to challenge
it at th,e second trial."
Therefore, it was contended that if in the Gandhi Murder Case,
which comprised the offence of bomb throwing, attempt to murder,
/lnd murder, the conduct of the police or the quality of their inves-
ligation of the Bomb Case, i.e., whether they investigated any par-
I. (1950) A.C. 548.
2. (1956)A.SC. 415.
IJ7
66
ticular matter carefully or correctly or not, was in controversy and
it was found in favour of the police, it is not open to this Commis-
sion to go into the matter again. But this would still depend upon
the question whether that matter was a Us inter partes.
7.4 In a. criminal case, the matter substantially and materially

in issue is whether a person brought before the court is guilty of
the offence of which he is charged; but in deciding tbis material
issue if certain matters become rna terial then any decision on those
matters also becomes res judicata. In Pritam Singh's Case, one of
the questions raised before the High Court was whether one of the
accused had a pistol in his possession. That accused person had in
a different proceeding been acquitted of the possession of that pistol
by the court of an erstwhile Indian State-Faridkot State-and it
was argued before the High Court that having been acquitted of
being in possession of that pistol, he could not again be tried for
having that pistol and using it in the commission of murder. The
High Court accepted that plea and that piece of evidenc(>: was ex-
cluded from consideration against that particular accused. In the
opinion of the Commission it is matters of this kind which can be
termed matters materially and substantially in issue.
7.5 In the trial of the Gandhi Murder Case, or at the appellate

whether the police investigated a matter properly or not could
not be a matter materially and substantially in issue because on the
efficiency of the investigation of a case does not depend the acquittal
or otherwise of an accused person, although it has been ruled in cer-
tain jurisdictions that evidence improperly collected or illegally
obtained cannot sustain a conviction. In the Inquiry before this Com-
mlssion, the matters in controversy are (1) whether the investigation
in the Bomb Case was proper or improper; (2) whether as a conse-
quence of it or even without that matter being taken into considera-
tion, the police had given proper protection to Mahatma Gandhi; (3)
whether by improper or negligent investigation the accused were
allowed to return to Delhi and commit the murder; and (4) whether
murder could, by adequate measures being taken by the police, have
been prevented. This may depend upon whether the investigation
which was carried on from the time that the bomb was thrown at
4.15 P.M. on the 20th January to the 30th January, 1948, was efficient
or not; and upon the question whether the police by its inaction, im-
proper investigation, allowed the persons in the conspiracy to escape
and remain undetected and thus they were enable to carry out the
object of their conspiracy to wit to murder Mahatma Gandhi. In
the opinion of the Commission that matter was not before the High
Court and any decision given by the High Court is not res judicata
wtihin the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Pritam Singh's
Case. Besides, there is no lis before a Commission of Inquiry.
7.6 Investigation by the police and the conduct of the inquiry or
trial in a case are two separate compartments separately treated in
the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Courts except to the extent
so provided in the Code have no jurisdiction on police investigations
which was pointed out by the Privy Council and Khawaja Nazir
Ahmad's Case. 71 I.A. 203; A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 18.
89
'/ 'f .Judge Atma Chanm had found the police guilty of inaction a,nd,
illI'l dllre, guilty of Dot having prevented the death of Mahatma
t ;"ll(lhL The High Court held that those remarks were not justified
,01 Ihough no petition had been filed before the High Court for the ex-
1"lIldion of those remarks.
'Ul It may be remarked that res judica.ta in Criminal cases has

IIII' ('/l'eet of preventing double jeopardy, i.e., the person acquitted
'1I1I1l0l be again tried for the same offence and a person convicted
, nUllot again be tried for the same offence. But there is nothing to
l'I('vpnt the sovereign from satisfying himself by collateral proceed-
that the conviction was not improperly obtained, in order to
, \I'rcise its powers of mercy or paying compensation to the wrong
Uilitl. Similarly, jf an accused has been acquitted by improper means,
1110' sovereign may try to find out the illegality though perhaps the
\'Ndict of not guilty cannot be disturbed to punish even a guilty
I"'rson who has obtained an acquittal. Hut double jeopardy is not
1111" question involved in this case.
7.9 In the High Court after dealing with the question of negli.
1:I'nce or otherwise of the Police, Mr. Justice Bhandari said:
"The evidence on record satisfies me (a) that no opportunity
was afforded to the police to explain the circumstances
which prevented them from apprehending Nathuram
before the 30th January and thereby saving the life of
Mahatma Gandhi; (b) that l\.1I.adanlal failed to supply the
names of the conspirators to the police; (c) that even if
those names were supplied it was extremely difficult, if
not impossible, for the police to arrest Nathuram who was
going about from place to place under assumed names and
who was determined to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi even
at the risk of losing his o,,\"n life."
Mr. Justice Achhru Ram said:
"Before concluding 1 want to advert to some remarks made by
the learned Special Judge as to the slackness shown in the
investigation during the period between the 20th and the
30th January 1948 but for which. in the view of the learn·
ed Judge, the tragedy could have been prevented.
I must say that I have not been able to discover any
justification at all for these remarks which in my judgment
were wholly uncalled for."
Mr. Justice Khosla said:
"I concur with the conclusions arrived at by my learned
brothers Bhandari and Achhru Ram JJ."
7.10 In coming to the conclusion at which he arrived, Mr. Justice
Bhandari has analysed the evidence and relied on the following
facts :.-
(1) That the authorities knew nothing about the conspiracy
before the 20th January and that they came to know about
it at 4 o'cloct on the 20th January when Professor Jain
90
informed Mr. Kher and Mr. Morarji Desai. (There]lI
evidently some mistake with regard to the date. PIO!.
Jain gave the information on the 21st January.)
(2) On receipt of Professor Jain's information Mr. Morarji
Desai, acted with "commendable promptitude" in relaying
the information to Mr. J. D. Nagarvala at the Central Rail-
way Station on the same day at 8.15 P.M.
(3) Mr. Nagarvala organised a look-out for the accused and a
watch on the house of Savarkar from 9.30 P.M. on the
same day.
(4) Madanlal was interrogated "but the inquiries do not ap-
pear to have revealed any useful information except in
regard to Karkare".
(5) In a statement before the Court Madanlal stated "the police
asked me the names of co-workers of Badge who were
putting up in the Marina Hotel. I told them that I did
not know their names". (There is some mistake here also,
because no one knew the name of Badge at Delhi.)
(6) Police rushed to the WLarina Hotel but on arrival there they
found that the co·conspirators had escaped and inquiries in
the hotel only disclosed that two persons were staying
under the names of M. Deshpande and S. Deshpande, who
after paying their bills had hurriedly left the hotel.
(7) Police then visited the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan and
found the room where Badge, Shankar, Madanial and
Gopal Godse had stayed, vacant.
(8) Inquiries were made at Sharif Hotel but no information
could be obtained from there. (These inquiries, it may be
pointed out, were on the 24th January, and not on the
20th.)
(9) In this way Badge, Shankar and Gapal Godse had made
themselves scarce from Delhi after the explosion and they
did not go back to the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan.
(10) On the 21st January, the position was that although the
police were aware of the existence of a conspiracy to as-
sassinate, the only conspirators who were known to them
were Badge, Karkare, Madanlal. (It appears there is a
mistake in regard to Badge because his name was not
known on the 21st and not till after the murder was his
name known at Delhi.)
(11) A Deputy Superintendent and an Inspector of Police were
flown to Bombay and they reached Bombay on the 22nd.
"Left Delhi by air and reached Bombay on the 22nd." (It
appears there is some mistake here because they reached
Bombay on the 21st.)
(12) They desired the arrest of Karkare and his associates in
connection with the Bomb explosion. They stayed in BOlIr
bay till 23rd.
(13) Alter their dppartul'{" Mr. Nagarvala continued the search
for Kal'karc and his associates "if any". Karkare was not
known to the Bombay Police.
·(14) On the 24th January Mr. Nagarvala issued instructions for
the arrest of Badge.
(15) Mr. Rana, D.I.G., C.I.D., reached Bombay on the 27th "and
(Nagarvala?) reported developments to him".
(16) On the same day. Mr. Nagarvala had a telephonic conver-
sation with the D.l.B., Delhi, to whom he reported deve-
lopments.
(17) Badge could not be traced till the 31st.
(18) The fatal shots were not fired either by Badge or by Kar-
kare or by Madanlal, and even if they had been arre5ted
immediately after the explosion, the tragedy could not
be avoided.
(19) Evidence did not disclose that the names of any other
conspirators were known. If they had been known, the
police could have put them under arrest.
(20) The movements of Karkare. Badge and Shankar were not
known during the period 20th January t9 30th January,
Badge and Shankar were arrested at a place where they
were not expected to be.
(21) The only person who could have been arrested if they
wanted to arrest him, was Gopal Godse. But the police
could not have known that he was concerned in the
crime.
(22) The police could not have traced the movements of Nathu-
ram Godse and Apte who, according to the learned judge,
were moving from place to place under assumed names.
(23) "It was impossible for any police officer, however capable
and efficient he might have been, to have prevented Nathu-
ram from committing the crime on which he had set his
heart."
(24) Even if the police were aware on the night of the 20th
that Nathuram and Apte were concerned in the conspi-
racy, it is extremely "doubtful if they could have stopped
them from achieving their end".
(25) Immediately after the explosion, the police sent a num_
ber of persons to various railway stations in order to pre-
vent the suspects from escaping by train.
(26) Madanlal did not know the names of the accused and did
not give them to the police. Therefore, "it is idle to
contend that the police could have prevented the trafledy
notwithstanding the reticence of Madanlal"
(27) Nathuram Godse was desparate and the police could not
have stopped him from achieving his object.
92
• These were the reasons on which Mr. Justice Bhandari came to the
,_conclusion that under the circumstances it was impossible for the
police to have stopped the happening of the tragedy even if they
'knew of Godse and Apte being in the conspiracy and it was unfair
to blame them without giving them an opportunity of giving their
, explanations.
7.11 Mr. Justice Achhru Ram has not given any reasons other
· than what have already been stated.
7.12 This Commission is not sitting as a Court of Appeal against

the High Court nor is it open to it to find fault with the findings
of the High Court, still less to readjudicate on matters already
dealt with by it. But this principle applies to matters which deal
with the guilt or innocence of the accused or matters Sill connected
with the decision of that question as to be part of it, but not to
· matters wholly subsidiary which do not affect the merits of the case
e.g. the commission of the offence and those who committed it.
Therefore, it is open to the or the State to find out through
the agency of a Commission whether its protective and investiga-
tional machinery was properly geared to the protection of the
Mahatma. In the opinion of the Commission the finding of the
High Court about the quality of the investigation is not binding on
it, because it was not a matter materially and substantially or even
collaterally in issue at the trial which falls within the rule of 1'es
judicata as stated in Sambasivam's case Quoted above. The Com-
mission is not prevented from going into the matters set before it.
Commission must, therefore, proceed to find out as to whether on
the facts which have been placed before it, Mahatma Gandhi could
or could not be protected and whether any authority is guilty of
remissness in the discharge of its duty.
7.13 As has been said. the rule of res judicata is inapplicable

and there is no rule of propriety or fairness which would bar such
an inquiry.
7.14 The objection on ihe ground of want of jurisdiction is, there-

fore, overruled.
7.15 In England, inquiries have been set up after the decision of

criminal courts even to inquire into the correctness of convictions
'for murder, i.e., whether the accused was rightly convicted or othel'-
.wise. That was the case of Timothy John Evans. After Dr. Ward's
case the revelations in regard to Miss Christie Keeler,
an InqUiry was set up preSided over by Lord Denning to inquire
into the adequacy or otherwise and defects, if any, in the police
security arrangements of the United Kingdom. An Inquiry was
,-also set up under the chairmanship of Lord Radcliffe in regard to
the intelligence services of foreign. countries and subversive orga-
nisations in the country. Thus, setting up of an inquiry after deci-
'sions of cases in regard to matters which may be subsidiary to the
issues at the judicial trial, are nat .8 matter of uncommon occurr-
cence in the United Kingdom.
D3
7.16 The case of Timothy John Evans and John Ch,'istie was'
this:
In November, 1949, Evans, a young labourer resident in North
Kensington, went to the police and made a confession that he had
'disposed of' of his wife down a drain in his house in Rillington
Place in North Kensington. His .....ife's body along with tha.!, of his.
little child was found not down the drain but concealed in a wash-
house in their home. Evans afterwards tried to withdraw his con-
fession, but there did not appear at the time anybody else who had
the remotest motive for committing, or against whom there was;
the least suspicion that he had committed, the murders. Evans was y
therefore, convicted of the murder of his childl , He was sentenced

to death, and executed in 1950 for the murder of the child.
Evans was convicted largely on the evidence of his house-mate
Christie, whose evidence was accepted by the judge as that of a
reliable witness. At that time no controversy arose.
As Lord Birkett stated in the Observer2-
"The case against Evans, at his trial on the facts as they were
then known, was qUite overwhelming. There was no·
failure in the administrative machinery of the criminal.
law. No human skill could have prevented the conviction,.
and no human judicial system, whatever its checks and
safeguards, can ever provide complete security against
the exceedingly rare and utterly exceptional case such
as that of Evans".
Certain developments, however, took place after 3 years, which
created doubt as to whether Evans was guilty or whether he was
the only person guilty. In the spring of 1953, the police found the
remains of human bodies at Rillington Place (i.e., at the same place).
All the bodies had been strangled-some (;I.S long ago as 1943. Chris-·
tic, a previous tenant of the house, was charged with murder. It
was discovered that Christie, far from being the respectable citizen
that he appeared, was in fact a homicidal strangler. The bodies of
his wife and five other victims were found about the house. Christie-
readily confessed to his murdering them, and confessed also that
he was the murderer of Mrs. Evans.
This discovery changed the whole nature of the probabilities of
Evans' guilt. Previously it was believed that Mrs. Evans and their
child were murdered and there did not seem to be anyone other
than Evans who had any sort of the motive for murdering them.
Now, a very material factor emerged,-that there was living in the
house a homicidal maniac who took pleasure in strangling women
:(Mrs. Evans had been murdered in substantially the same way as
that in which Christie murdered his victims).
When' Christie's story came to light, there was a large outcry.
The Home Secretary (Sir David Maxwell Fyfe) had to appoint Mr.
I. Since e. person could be tried for only one murdef1 as the law then stood, the
prosecutiOn chose to get him tried on the charge of murdering the child.
2. Observer. LondOn (15th JanUary 1961).
94·
·Scott Henderson Q.C. to inquire into and report on the Evans case.
Mr. Scott Henderson reported, that there had been no miscarriage
of justice at the trial of Evans. He found that there was no doubt
that Evans had killed his wife as well as his baby, and that Christie's
confession to the murder of Mrs. Evans was untrue. The enquiry
was held in private. The Home Secretary hi,!; findings.
These findings were, however, fiercely attacked in the House of
Commons at the time. Later, there was an impressive amount of
hostile comment in books and pamphletsl, Unltimately, another
inquiry was held by Mr. Justice Brabin 2 • (His findings are too leng-
of
"the probability is that both these men killed and that both
killed l?y strangulation using a ligature".
I. See Ludovic Kennedy's Ten Rellington PllIce, (196I).

'. "The Cas.: orTirn"thy In'ln Evans", Report or Rr'l TnquirY by the Hon. r. Justice
Brahin, Cmd. 3IOI (1966). PublisheJ by Her StatiOnery O[f:.:e, IondOD.
Price I2 Shilling and 6 d.
,'II,IPTER VIII-POWERS OF A MINISTER AND MINISTERIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Index of Paragraphs
8.2 Why it arises.
8.9 Government of India Act, 1935.
11.14 Mr. Munshi's and Mr. R. N. Bannerjee's opinion.
3.21 l\1!r. Morarji Desai.
8.24 History of Home Secretary's powers.
8.26 Crimip.al Procedure Code.
2.28 Government of India reply.
8.30 Mr. Nagarvala's reply .
.8.35-39 Decided cases.
8,40 Patrick. Hasting's case: Lord McDermott.
8.41 Lord Shawcross.
8.45 Minister's responsibility.
8.49 Lord Kilmuir.
8.52 Ivar Jennings.
.8.55 Conclusions.
CHAPTER VIII
Puwers of a Minister and Ministerial Responsibility
II I question of the powers and responsibility of a Minister in;
I I>1I1l!'dlOn with offences committed or threatened to be committed
,lrisen in this inquiry thus:
It is alleged that on three occasions the Government of India

rilid the Government of Bombay were informed of threats to
!\I:illatma Gandhi's life, and of intention to murder him, (i) in July
1'117 when Mr. G. V. Ketkar acting through Balukaka Kanitkar
\\';It'llC'd the Government of Bombay through Mr. B. G. Kher against
N'ILhuram Godse, (ii) after the bomb was exploded at Birla House,
Madanlal, who exploded it, was arrested and made a statement to
IllI' Delhi Police disclosing ,:"..-ho his were, which in-
!,nl'mation was conveyed to the Bombay Police, and (iii) when Prof.
lllrr)\'m :r..r.r. B. G. Kher and then Mr. Morarji Desai about the con-
.piracy to murder, in which V. D. Savarkar, the well-known Hindu
I\hh<!.sabha leader and V. B:. Karkare wer('- named.
8.3 It is further alleged that the police acted inefficiently, in-
"pt!y and unsitil£ully and the Home Minister of Bombay was com-
pbcent and even if he did convey the information given by Prof.
.Jam to the Police, he was bound and required to supervise the in-
vestigation and keep a watchful eye on it and that the ineptitude
of the police in the matter of investigation made the Minister res-
ponsible, and further that the Minister should have ordered the
arrest of the persons named by Madan!al and by Prof. Jain and
seen to it that they were arrested and their associates were quickly
found and arrested. And if the police bungled, the responsibility
of the Minister, at least the failure of the police falls ut"1der what
is called the "ministerial responsibility to the Legislature", It may
be observed that the story in court as also the evidence before this
Commission is that Mr. Morarji Desai did order the arrest of V. R.
Karkare and also ordered the house of Savarkar to be watched; but
the question remains, did he have the power to order arrest of any
person or to get a watch put on his house.
8.4 Taking the first allegation, i..e,. giving the informa-

tion through Balukaka Kanitkar, at this stage the Commission would
like to remark, that it has dealt with the matter in a separate Chapter
under the first term of reference under which the decision o! this
matter properly falls. That Chapter has been put at a later place
in this report. But it can be said ho:!re that the Commission, for
reasons there stated, has not accepted Mr. Ketkar's claim that he
got any letter sent by Balukaka Kanitkar. The Commission has,
however, accepted the story that Balukaka Kanitkar did in July
1947 give a warning to Mr. B. G. Kher by a registered letter but
va
that warning was in regard to all the top ranking Congress lead"1'1i
and Mahatma Gandhi was not particularised nor were any
given. As said above, this will be fully dealt with under ot
Reference (a).
8.5 In regard to the conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi, till'

only persons who had any previous knowledge (i.e. prior to tlw
bomb incident) about it were Prof. Jain, witness No. 27, and hi:1
two friends, Mr. Angad Singh, witness No. 28, and Prof. Yagnil{,
witne3S No. 29, with \.... hom he had shared the information given [0
him by MadanlaL Unfortunately, Prof. Jain did not inform ally
police official or a Magistrate as he was, under section 144 of the Cr.
P,C. bound to do. But after the bomb was thrown he did inform
first 1-.Ifr. B. G. Kher, the Premier of Bombay, and then Mr. Morarjl
Desai, the Home Minister, to whom he was intrcduced by Mr. Kher.
What information Prof. Jain gave and what Mr. Morarji Desai did
with this iniormation has been dealt with in the chapter dealing
with "Prior Knowledge in Bombay" and in the chapter dealing wilh
"Investiga.tion at Bombay", ann those chapters also have been pUl
later. The Commission has found that the information was wilh
"commendable promptitude" passed on to Mr, Nagarvala.
discussion is in the chapters "Investigation at Delhi", "Exhibit 5-A"

and "Investigation in Bombay". These questions of fact are ful!y
discussed in these chapters and need not be discussed here, except
to remark that the court which tried the Murder case accepted thc
statement of Mr, Morarji Desai that he did convey the information
to Mr. Nagarvala, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay.
Before the Commission also, the same evidence was led and the
Commission has also come to the same conclusion that the informa-
tion was conveyed to Mr. Nagarvala and. thereafter. he started his
investigation, although Counsel for the State of Maharashtra has
argued that it W3S not an investigation but only an inquiry to work
<lut the information given by Mr. Morarji Desai and that matter
also will be dealt with later at the relevant places. It may here
be remarked that there is no statutory authority for merely this
"working out theory"; but the police could, in cases falling within
these chapters, act under Chapters XIII and XIV of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and even Chapters IV and V of the Bombay
City Police Act. But Mr. Kotwal contends that the scope and autho-
rity of the latter Act is confined to the city of Bombay and is, there-
fore, limited.
8,7 The question which arises at this stage is, what were the
powers of the Ministers in regard to the information given to them
and what was their duty in regard to it, or what was the respon-
sibility of a minister if anything went wrong. In other words, what
has to be inouired into is what can and should a minister do if in-
a
formation of threat to the life of an important citizen like Mahatma
Gandhi is given to him, and what is his responsibility if the action
taken thereupon is either inappropriate or insufficient, or is not
proper and is deficient or futile,
99
ItII 'J'he Commission will lirst take up the question of the powers
"H.l uLlthority of a minister in regard to !:natters which fall under
II ... Inw relating to commission of offences and the action which is
"'IIIII"t'd to be taken thereupon.
1t!1 In the Government of India Act of 1935 and even in the Indian
• '"u::tilution of 1150, it has been provided that the executive autho-
,II \' ul the Governor of a Province does not extend to any existing
1110111111 law, and both the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal
l'IIIPi,dure wer(" existing Indian laws, both when the Government
"f !mlia Act was enacted and the Indian Constitution was adopted.
I'll<' provision in the Government of India Act is in section 49 and
'II rhe Constitution of India in Art. 154 which are as follows:-
"49. (1) The executive authority ot a Province shan be ex-

ercised on be-half nf His Majestl" by the Governor, either
directly or through officers to him, but noth-
ing in this section shall prevent the Federal or the Pro-
vincial Legislature from conferring functions upon sub-
ordinate authorities, or be deemed to transfer to the Gov-
·ernor any fUnctions conferred by any existing Indian law
court, judge, or ·officer Ol' any local or other autho-
'(2) Subject to the provisions of thi!li Act, the executive autho-

rity of each Province extends to the matters with respect
to which the Legislature of the Province has pO\\""er to
make laws."
"'154. (1) The executive power of the State shall be vested in
the Governor and shall be by him either directly
or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with
this Constitution.
·"(2) Nothing in this article shalI_
(a) be deemed to transfer to the Governor any functions
conferred by any existing law on any other authority; or
(b) prevent Parliament or the of the State from
on any authority subordi-
8.10 Similar powers of the Union dealt with under Art.

-o[ the Constitution.
8.11 These two provisions-it was Government of India Act
which applied at the relevant time-make it clear that a function
("elating to any matter which falls withill the ambit of the Criminal
Procedure Code or the Indian Penal Code are not transferred to
Government. In other words, the Executive authority of the Gov-
ernment does not extend to functions contained in these two statu-
tes. The alleged information before the bomb was thrown was one
of threat to cause death and, would fall under section
506 of the Indian Penal Code which is a non-cognizable offence, but
still its investigation is a matter, which is covered by the Code of
Criminal Procedure and, therefore, solely within the power of the
100
police to deal with. If and when any Minister gets information
about a threat or danger to the life of any person, he must inform
the proper police authorities which will deal with the matter under
appropriate provisions of the Law-Chapter XIII Preventive Action
of the Police, Sections 149 to 151 of the Code, and Chapter XIV of
the Criminal Procedure Code which deals with information to the
Police and their Powers to Investigate.
8.12 Similarly in the case of the Bombay City Police, the matter
was governed by the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902 which was
also an existing law, and therefore, threats to murder would fall
under Chapter IV of that Act, and if any investigation had to be
done it would be under Chapter V. And any information coming
to the Minister in regard to the threat to the life of a person like
Mahatma Gandhi would have to be reported to the police in the
manner provided in these various Acts. The Minister himself has
neither the power nor the authority to pass any orders or to take
any action in regard to such matters.
8.13 Similarly, in the case of information given by Prof. Jain to-

the late Mr. B. G. Kher and to Mr. Morarji Desai, the then Home
Minister, the law is the ::;ame. All that the Minister could do was
to pass on that information to a proper police officer, may be a
person in whom he had confidence to be able to take proper action
in regard to the information.
8.14 In this connection, Commissi.on would refer to the opinion

of two witnesses, one Mr. K. M. MU'1shi, witness No. 82, an eminent
-constitutional lawyer, an experienced Adrpinistrator and a well-
known politician who has held various offices as Minister and
Governor both in the Centre as well as in the States; t.he other,
Mr. R. N. Banerjee, I.C.S., witness No. 19. who was Home Secretary
to the Government of India at the time when the bomb was
and later when the Mahatma was shot dead, and who had a vast
admi istrative experience.
8.15 The opinion of Mr. K. ¥. Munshi may be quoted in verbatim:

flIf, as a Minister, I get a report about somebody's life being in
danger, the first thing that I would do would be to pass on
the report to the Inspector-General of Police to look into
its trustworthiness and ask him to take such steps as the
law allows. If, on enquiry, he finds that the report is base-
less, he can do nothing. If he finds that there is something
in the report, then ;he can take action and keep the Minister
informed.
If the Minister ordered arrests of persons on reports, that would'

be the end of law and order in the country. I would not
do it. The Home Minister can only put his police in charge
of the case; he cannot do anything more' except to use the
instrument of the police machinery to verify and take-
action."
JUG Mr. H. N. Bunerjee's opiniun is as follows:-
"II any information had been given as it is now stated that it
was given by Jain, then proper directions should have'
been given to tne Secretary or to the Head of the police
and he should have been asked to submit his report within
a short but specified time and the progress of the investi-.
gation should have been watched and more interest taken
as to what the police was doing.
As far as I can see, Bombay Government had great faith in
the ability of Mr. Nagarvala. If the Home Minister had
given him instructions then it would be right in saying that
he had done what he should have done i.e. in leaving the
matter in the competent hands of an officer of the ability
of Mr. Nagarvala".
8.17 He was asked by the Commission jf be did not think it
necessary to call up the police officers to whom the information had
heen given in Madanlal's case and ask them what they were doing,
his answer was:
"Those were the days the Ministers had just come. To
the best of my recullection I must have prepared a note
suggesting close a"tention to the matter. I have not the
record with me and therefore I cannot say what exactly I
wrote. But it is correct that we relied upon the efficiency
of the police which proved wrong".
8.18 Mr. Banerjee also stated that after the meeting of 31st Janu-
ary, 1948 when Sardar Patel was in anguish, he told the Sardar that it
was no fault of his. He could not have done anything more than to
have asked the police to be vigilant.
8.19 Mr. Banerjee further said:
"The offices of the Inspector-General of Police and the Direc-
tor of Intelligence Bureau held by specially selected
members of the Indian Police .... I should, therefore, say
that ordinarily it cannot be said to be part of the functions
of the Secretariat or the Police Administration, it being
understood all the time that the Head of the Police and
the Intelligence Bureau with the help of his departmental
aides should come to interim findings about the progress of
an investigation and keep Government informed of
them."
8.20 In reply to another question as to why sufficient interest W3li
not taken in finding out the progress of the Bomb Case as it was doIl(.'
after the Murder Case, Mr. Banerjee replied:
"My assessment Of that is that they did not take the case so
seriously then and they trusted the high police officials who
were in-charge of the investigation and they were under
the impression that such high police officials would do their
duty".
102
8.21 Mr. Moral'ji Desai was not prepared to accept the English
constitutional practice in regard to corrunencing of or withdrawing.
from prosecutions as in that country the responsibility is exclusively
of the Attorney General. The question as to whether that constitu-
tional practice is accepted in India does not really arise here because
there is no question of starting a prosecution or withdrawing from a
prosecution. The question before the Commission is the power of
the Minister to arrest or to order the arrest of an alleged offender.
The Commission would like to add that the position taken by
Mr. Morarji Desai is not in all cases untenable because under the
Indian law the Government has been given power of giving or not
giving sanctions to prosecute under various statutes and the discretion
is entirely of the Government and the Attorney General does not
come in except where it is specifically so stated. Of course, under
the Criminal Procedure Code also there are certain powers which are
vested in the Advocate General e.g. of entering Nolle Prosequi which..
is entirely his discretion and similarly the public prosecutor had
Wlder section 494, Cr. P.C. the power to apply to the court for with-
drawal, but the final power of allowing the withdrawal in the latter:
case is in the court. It has not yet been decided in India whether
the power the public prosecutor exercises is his own dis-
cretion or he acts under the direction of the Government or the-
District Magistrate as the case may be. In actual practice as far as
the Commission knows, no Public Prosecutor would exercise this
power except with the approval at least of the District Magistrate.
8.22 Mr. Kotwal addressed an elaborate argument on the powers.
of the Minister as to arrests and the ordering of the arrests of
persons guilty of offences under the Indian Penal Code. He refer-
red to the History of English Law by Sir Williams Holdsworth '.
8.23 In VoL 141, the duties of the Home Secretary are set out at
page 113. It is stated that the Home Secretary took over what may
be called the domestic duties of the Secretary of States-the duty of
advising on petitions to the King as to the exercise .... of the prero-
gative of mercy.
8.24 Alone time the Home Secretary in England claimed the right
to issue warrants for arrest and for search. This power the Courts
in England held, the Home Secretary did not have. The follOwing
passage in Holdsworth's History of English Law" shows that the
Home Secretary has no power of issuing warrants for the arrest of
persons or search of persons:-
"The four principal cases which arose out of the publication
of No. 45 of the North Briton were Wibkes v. Wood, heard-
in Michaelmas Term 1763; Leach v. Money, Watson, and
Blackmore, heard in Easter Term 1765; Entick v. Carring-
ton, heard in Michaelmas Term 1765; and Wilkes v. Lord
Mali/ax, heard in Michaelmas Term 1769. In the case of
Wi1?:es Y. Wood! Wilkes brought an action of trespass in
the court of Common Pleas against Wood, a secretary of
t:. of English Law by Sir Williams Holdsworth, Vol. 10 and Vo\. t4·
1>.. History of English Law by Sir Williams Holdsworth. Vol. to.
Lord llalifux, the of to recover damages
for entering hou::;e seizing his papers. The defcn-
dent justilied under a wanant issued by the secretary of
state to arrest the authors, printers, and publishers of
No. 45 of the North Briton. The court of Common Pleas
directed the jury that such a warrant was illegal, and
Wilkes was awarded .£ 1,000 damages. In the case of
Leach v. Money, Wat.s-on, and Blackmore, the plaintiff
brought an action of trespass in the court of Common
Pleas against the three defendants, who were King's
messangers, for breaking and entering his house and im-
prisoning him. The defendants pleaded as their jus'linea-
tion a warrant issued by the secretary of state to search
for and arrest the authors, printers, and publishers of
No. 45 of the North Briton. The jury found for the plain-
tiff and awarded him £ 400 damages. The case was
brought before the Court of King's Bench on a bill of
exceptions."
8.25 Lord Camden in Entick v. Ca1"rington l held as long ago as

1765-
"It settled that the only power to arrest which he possessed

was a power, a privy councillor, to arrest in cases of high
treason. In all other cases he must act through the ins-
trumentality of judicial officers, who were obliged to
observe the formalities which the common law, enacted
and unenacted, had devised to protect the liberty of the
subject."
Effect of this judgment is comparable to the effect of the Habeas

Cl)rpus Act 6£ 1679 "because, in all cases, except the case of high
treason, it prevented arrests from being made at the discretion of
the executive, and so gave abundant security that, if an arrest \vas
made, it could only be made by regular judicial officers acting in
accordance with known rules of law." It shows therefore that in
England the law is well settled that if an arrest is to be made or any
search warrant is to be issued it can be done by judicial authorities
acccrding to rules of law, the Secretary of State has no such power.
8.26 In India the matter is simple because the power of search,

arrest etc. have been given a statutory shape and are embodied in
the Code of Criminal Procedure and in the case of City of Bombay
in 1948 they were incorporated in what was called the City of
Bombay Police Act where the powers of arrest and search were
almost the same as they are in the case of Criminal Procedure Code.
In section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code, powers of aITest which
are vested in the Police are set out in nine clauses and the powers
of arrest in the City of Bombay Police Act are the same excepting
clause ninthly of Section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code
Lion 54 is as follows: _.-
"54. (1) Any police-officer may, without an order from
Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest-
first, any person who has been concerned in any cognizable
offence or against whom a reasonable complaint has
been made, or credible information has been received,
or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been
concerned;
[Claus:?s secondly to eighthly are not relevant
inquiry.]
"ninthly, any person for whose arrest a requisition has been
received from another police-officer, provided that the re-
quisition specifies the person to be arrested and the offence
or other cause for which the arrest is to be made and it
appears therefrom that the person might lawfully be
arrested without a warrant by the officer who issued the
requisition.
(2) This section applies also to the police
Calcutta."
But it may be added that it did not apply to the City of Bombay.
8.27 As this power of arrest is one of the statutory powers vested
in the Police and gives a discretion to the police to arrest in accord-
ance with the power thereby conferred they were expressly exclud-
ed from the executive functions of the Provincial Governments of
the pre-Constitution days and they are now excluded from the exe-
cutive functions of the State Government.
8.28 As a matter of fact in its replies to the interrogative ques-
tionnaire issued to the Government of India this position has been
accepted that for making an arrest a Minister will have to communi-
cate to the police. The relevant questions are Questions 10-12 and
the answers thereto, but we may quote here question No. 11 and its
answer by the Government of India:-
"Q. 11. What is the constitutional position of the Minister of
Home Affairs to whom information is given about the
commission of a serious offence like murder and of a per-
son like Mahatma Gandhi or a conspiracy to commit the
same or of the danger of that being done?
Ans. The Minister of Home Affairs would have such informa-
tion communicated to the authorities concerned under the
law, and ensure that necessary action is taken. In such
important cases he would, in addition, write or 'get in per-
sonal touch with the Chief Minister of the concerned
State of the Administrator of the concerned Union
tory if the relevant intelligence relates to any person
residing within that State or Union Territory."
II 12 I:; uls() ..
1,lVi'l' arc a1nU quoted:
12. Arc there any rules of business framed under article 77
or the corresponding section 17 of the Government of Indi8
Act, 1935 which deal with this matter, i.e., of the responsi-
bility of the Home Minister or Ministry and their powers
in regard to matters like conspiracies to assassinate pro-
minent persons like, say, Mahatma Gandhi or in regard to
danger to their lives?
Ans. In the Rules of Business framed under section 17 of the
Government of India Act, 1935, there is no specific men-
tion about the responsibility of Home Minister or Ministry
and their powers in regard to matters like conspiracies to
assassinate prominent persons like Gandhiji. Attention is,
however, invited to para. 5 of the rules, a copy of which
is attached (Annexure-II)."
'l'hl' rules are 'given in Annexure to the answer to the questionnaire
IIlltl paragraph 5 therein being relevant is quoted:-
"5. Cases Of major importance.- (1) Any case which is, in the
opinion of the Member in charge of the Department to
which the subject belongs, of major importance, shall be
submitted, with the orders proposed by that Member, to
the Governor-General for opinion.
"(2) When a resolution has been passed by a chamber of the
Legislature and has been forwarded to the Department
concerned W1der rule 24 of the Indian Legislative Rules it
shall be submitted as soon as possible by the Secretary in
the Department with the orders proposed by the Member
in charge of that Department to the Governor General.
(3) [Deleted vide Ministry of Home Affairs O.M. No. 18/6/46-
Public],"
8.30 The officers of the Bombay Police have rightly understood

that the power to arrest is in their discretion. This is contained in
the statement of Mr. J. D. Nagarvala. In answer to a question as
to the power of a Minister to order arrest Mr. Nagarvala said as
follows:-
"Q. What power has the Minister to order the arrest of any
one?
Ans. 1£ a Ilfinister gave me an order for arresting any parti-
cular person and I on considering the matter thought that
it was a reasonable order under the circumstances I would
unhesitatingly carry it out."
And he has given an instance of how he acted when one of the Minis-
ters ordered him to make an arrest; Mr. Nagarvala stated:-
uThe Minister for Labour in those days was Mr. Nanda who
asked me to arrest certain labour leaders. I was not
agreeable and thererorelOOI approached the Home Ministpi "1
and told him that I was not prepared to arrest them, ,lilt!
therefore they were not arrested bec<lu.se the Home Milll,'I'·
tel' backed me."
8.31 The question of the power of Minister to order an arrest lla:i

assumed importance because one of the questions raised is whal
action if any, was taken by the Government of Bombay and in partl-
cular by late Mr. Bal Gangadhar Kher and by the Government uj
India, on the basis of information received by them as to the exist.
ence of a conspiracy for the murder of Mahatma Gandhi or as to a
plan or intention of certain person or persons to murder him or oj
threat or danger to his life.
8.32. What action should the Minister have taken? Could 11.
arrest or order the arrest of these persons if he knew their l10mes or
order an inquiry to be conducted by the police if their n&mes were
not known?
'8.33 It is in order to decide this issue that the Commission has
had to go into the Constitution Act, the Indian Constitution, the
Criminal Procedure Code dealing with the statutory powers of n.c
Police and the history of the powers of the Secretary of Stale to
make arrest as given in the History of English Law. Under sec-
tion 3 of the Police Act of 1861 the Superintendence over the Police
is vested in and shall be exercised by the State Government and
before the Constitution, it was by the Provincial Government. The
distribution of duties according to the Rules of Business is not clear
from the answers of the Government of India, but there is no speci-
fic evidence or rule to show that the Police in Bombay or Delhi was
not under the Executive Control of the respective Home Ministers
of the two Governments. As a matter of fact throughout the course
of this inquiry, it was understood to he so and the inquiry has pro-
ceeded on that basis. The proceedings in the Constituent Assembly
and in the Bombay Legislative Assembly in 1948 and 1949
tively also support this view.
8.34 In the opinion of the Commission although a Home Ministel'

is in charge of the Police and Police administration and answerable
to Parliament ahout it, still he has no power to direct the pOllce
how they should exercise their statutory powers, duties or discre-
tion. Both under the Criminal Procedure Code and under the
Bombay City Police Act the statutory duty is of the Police both to
prevent crime and bring criminals to justice. Therefore the minis·
tel' can and could only pass on the information of the commission of
an offence to the police to investigate, so also in re'gard to the
threats of the commission of an offence. If the Minister were to
give orders ahout arrests, to arrest or not to arrest, that would be
an end of the rule of law as waS said by Mr. K. M. Munshi. 'Thi:-;
view of tll:-: law has receh'E'd recognition by Ol1r Courts in CflS0S
where a distinction is drawn between adrnillistrntiye control of Gm·-
emment <md its powers of interfering with statt\tory powers of
VDriOUS statutory authorities.
1I.:!5 The powers of the Government respecting the exercise of
l'''WCI'S by the Pulice under the Criminal Procedure Code was decid-
.·d by the Calcutta High Cow·t in Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v.
:'(U/I! of West Bfcngall. There the validity of the circulars issued
I,y lhe West Bengal Government instructing the Police not to inter-
1"1',· with gheraoes and strikes of workers without direction of the
I.llhour Minister was considered, and the law was thus stated by the
I.,·urned Chief Justice at page 493.
"The Labour Minister has no power or authority under the
law to give directions to the Police before taking action,
where such an offence has been committed or is said to
have been committed. The action that the Police or
Magistrate shall take under such circumstances is pro-
vided in the Criminal Procedure Code and the relative
Police Acts. By executive fiat, such procedure cannot be
altered or supplemented or varied."
"The preCise moment when the Police or the Magistracy should·
act, the way they should act, the procedure they should
follow when an offence has been committed or is said to
have been committed Or is apprehended, is laid down by
law. The executive Government, in the absence of a legal
provision has no jurisdiction to add to or detract from the-
same or direct Elny variation thereof or inhibit or delay
the implementation of the same, in accordance with law.
Where there is any attempt to do so, the Court will strike
it down,"
8.36 Mr. Justice B. C. Mitra put the position thus at page 587:
"The authority and the jurisdiction of the State Government
to issue administrative directives are limitcd, firstly, by
the Constitution, and secondly. by the laws of the land.
There is no law which authorises the State Government to
issue directives to officers in charge of maintenance of
law and order, not to enforce the law of the land nor to
direct them to enforce the law of the land upon certain
conditions being fulfilled and complied with.... In my
view, the Council of Ministers of the State of West Bengal
in issuing the directives in the impugned circulars had
clearly violated article 256 of the Constitution and it
must, therefore, be held that they had no jurisdiction or
authority to issue the two impugned circulars, which must,
therefore, be struck down."
8.37 It will thus be seen that there is a distinction between the
constitutional responsibility of the Minister for the exercise of exe-
cutive power in respect of public order, police and enforcement
of Criminal law on the one hand and statutory duties of the Police
and Magistrate to exercise powers vested in them by the Police
Acts and Code of Criminal Procedure. It is the constitutional duty
I. J..y Etlgineering Work.\' Ud. V. Stare of West nf"gal, 72 C. W. N. 44I.

lOB
_of the Minister, as head of the Department in charge of the police,
who are instruments of maintenance of public order and enforcement
of criminal law to ensure that the Police discharge their functions
and exercise their powers properly and diligently. But beyond that
the Minister cannot go and issue specific instructions as to the
manner of exercise of their statutory powers. That would amount
to interference. The distinction between administrative supervision
ends and direct interference begins with statutory powers, a well
recognised principle of Rule of Law 1•
8.38 In the of Bombay v. Mulji Jetha 2 , a distinction was

drawn between Goverrunent and a Collector. The question in that
case was whether the powers which under the Bombay Land Reve-
nue Act the Government could exercise could also be exercised by
the Collector and it was held that Collector was not the same thing
as Government; no doubt Government appointed a Collector under
section 8 of that Act but the Collector could exercise all the powers
and discharge aU the duties of a Collector under the Act. This
judgment Mr. Kotwal quoted to support his contention that when a
power is given to a Police Officer to discharge that power, it cannot
be discharged by Government because the two are distinct entities
and when powers are conferred on one authority that authority and.
that authority alone can exercise that power and nobody else.
8.39 The Supreme Court in the Commissioner of PoLice, Bombay

v. Gordhanda.s Bhanji\ have held in a case of cinema where under
the licensing rules the discretion was of the Commissioner of Police
to give or refuse to give or to rescind a license and he did give a
license, that the subsequent delicensing done under the orders of
the Government was not within the law as it was not a discretion
exercised by the Commissioner of Police who alone had the power
of giving, refusing or withdrawing a license.
8.40 Sir Patrick Hastings' case emphasises the Constitutional

position powers of the Minister with respect to arrests,
investigation and withdrawal of cases. In that case Sir Patrick
Hastings who was Attorney General in the Labour Government was
of having exercised the power of withdrawal of prosecution
of the editor of the Workers Weekly under the political influence of
his Cabinet colleagues. The matter was debated in the House of
Commons". The position is summarised by Lord Mac Dermott as
"With some, relatively minor exceptions the executive must

leave the initiation of criminal proceedin'gs by the Crown
t. Rli'<!J'P1l ,\[Jia'J V. Slate Trib'mal, >\.l.R. 1964 S.C. 1573·

Z. 'Jf R'<lIhv V. :'yh'ji 7tth'l. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 325.
3. (', tlll:Slil1'ur of v. R1ltl'lji. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 16.
4 CHl pages 511, S1l2-r,94.
5. PNlection fro poW('r. Pl'. )1"12.
109
to the Attorney-General and those for whom he is res-
ponsible. The days are gone when a subservient Attorney
could be told whom to lay by the heels or whom to
spare. He must now maintain a complete independence
in this difficult and sometimes delicate sphere, and if he
fails to do so, the remedy lies in his dismissal or that of
the Administration."
8.41 The same principle is stated by Sir Hartley (now Lord)

Shawcross, ex Attorney-General thus1 : -
"It remains the clearest rule that in the discharge of his legal
and discretionary duties the Attorney-General is com-
pletely divorced from party political considerations and
from any kind of political control."
8.42 This reiterates the that the statutory powers of

lnitinting or withdrawing prosecution, making arrest, starting in-
vesti'gation. etc. must be exercised by the authorities according to
1hc procedure and principles laid down by statute and the Ministers
II'· any other outside authority cannot interfere with the exercise
Io;;ci Jiscretions of statutory authorities.
8.43 It may be added that although there is no statutory res-

ponsibility of the Minister in regard to matters of arrests and pre-
\'(mtion of offences and of bringing offenders to justice, yet the
question of responsibility of the Minister to Parliament Dr what is
('nllt!d ministerial responsibility to Parliament for the acts of the
Civil Servants may arise in certain cases. It would indeed be
ub:mrd to suggest that if in the exercisF! of their powers of investi-
!!:1tion or protection of citizens' lives the Police goes wrong or
roceeds O!1 a wrong track or bungles and thereby there is a failure
Oil their part. the Minister would in every case be held responsible
/t'; the constitutional and superintending head of the Department.
8.44 But when it comes to cases of gross negligence or general

failure or neglect to perform its statutory functions by the police
III preventing the commission of offences or of bringing offenders
to justice or there is a general failure to maintain law and or
III the matter of protection Df a man like Mahatma Gandhi it may be
,IiITerent and should, in the opinion of the Commission. fall under
Ihe constitutional ministerial responsibility, although it is a matter
"nlir0Iv for Parliament to decide. There are thousands of cases of
Violence in the cDuntry every year. Hundreds of murders are com-
udtted. some of them may be preventable but in everyone of these
('IISC"S where the Police pither fails to do its duty diligently or does
II badly the constitutional head of the Department would not be
I(('ld responsible in Parliament. But then there are cases and cases
IIlId the Pl"Otcction of Mahatma Gandhi or a proper investigation into-
IIII' altr'mpl to mtlrd('r him would be an exception to the ordinary
rill!'
110
8.45 On this question it will be fruitful to refer to the English
:practice. In an English book "Government and Parliament-A
Survey from the Inside" by the Rt. Hon'ble Herbert Morrison, who
was the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security in the
Was Cabinet, it is said 1
"Occasionally. however, something may go wrong or the

Minister may be badly served. If a mistake is made in a
Government Department the Minister is responsible even
if he knew nothing about it until, for example, a letter of
complaint IS received from an M.P., or there is criticism
in the Press, or a Question is put down for answer in the
House; even if he has no real personal responsibility
whatever, the Minister is still held responsible. He will
no doubt criticize whoever is responsible in the Depart-
ment in mild terms if it is a small mistake and in strong
terms if it is a bad one, but publicly he must accept
responsibility as if the act were his own. It is, however,
legitimate for him to explain that something went wrong
in the Department, that he accepts responsibility and
apologizes for it, and that he has taken steps to see that
such a thing will not happen again."
"'''All this may appear harsh on a Minister, but it is right some-

body must be held responsible to the Parliament and the
public. It has to bE' the Minister, for it is he, neither the
Parliament nor the public, who has official control over
his Civil Servants. One of the fundamentals of the
English system of Government is that some Minister of
the Crown is responsible to the Parliament and throug;'
the Parliament to the public for ever)' act of the execu-
tive. This is the corner stone of the English system of
Parliamentary Government. The proper answer of tbe
Minister is that if the House wants somebody's head it
must be his head as the responsible Minister and it must
leave him to deal with the officer concerned in the
department. "
8.46 In 1917, Mr. Aust.en Chamberlain resigned becal\::;e he con-

'sidered himself to be ministerially responsible, as Secretary of the
·State. for the inefficiency of the Government of India disclosed by
'the Royal Commission on Mesopotamia. In that case, the Secretary
of State had proceeded on the advice of his military experts-the
Generals etc. But their advice turned out to be wrong with disastl'-
'ous
J. "Government and cnl- A

Herbert Morrisoll, 3rJ (. I' HI!<' 1;12.
8,47 Wade anu Phillips in their CONSTITUTIONAL LAW have
the same principle in following terms1 : -
"While collective responsibility ensures that the Queen's Gov-
ernment presents a Wlited front to Parliament, individual
responsibility in its political meaning ensures that for
every act or neglect of his department a Minister must
answer, ... For what an unnamed official does, or does
not do, his Minister alone must answer in Parliament and
the official, who cannot be heard in his own defence, is
therefore protected from attack. This positive liability
of a Minister is' essential to the performance by Parlia-
ment, and more particularly by the House of Commons,
of its role of critic of the Executive. No Minister can
shield himself by blaming his official"
8.48 In this connection reference may be made to what is known
ns the 'Crichel Down Affairs' where the Minister, Sir Thomas Dug-
dale, had to resign for the mistakes and negligence of departmental
officers in dealing with acquisition of land and its release in favour
of another person.
8,49 In that case there was an adjournment debate in the course
of which the then Home Secretary Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, later
Lord Kilmuir, L. C. stated certain views of constitutional relation-
ship between Ministers and civil servants. The four positions were:-
ti) In the case where there is an explicit order by a Minister,
the Minister must protect the civil servant who has carried
out his order.
(ii) Equally, where the civil servant acts properly in accord-
ance with the policy laid down by the Minister, the Minis-
ter must protect and defend him.
To put it in different language-
0) where a civil servant carrie:s out explicit orders by a
Minister;
(U) where he acts properly in accordance with the policy lai
down by the Minister;
Ill(' Minister must protect the civil servant.
I \':O;l)o)l-,:jbillty is directly of the Ministe!'.
(iii) Where an official makes a mistake or causes some de:ay

but not on an important issue of policy and not where a
claim to individual rights is seriously involved.
!I.50 It is the fourth category which is of importance and is there-
flirt', quoted here in c;t"tenso:-
... where action has been taken by a civil servant of which
th(' Min::;\f'1' ni3apprOYf'3 ann no prior knowledge, and
lll(' c'onr\uet or Ow omcial i3 l'C'pl'ci1cmsible, then there is
nil on Ill(> Plll't of thp Mini:-;tC'1' to C"ndnr:-;(' what
he beJ",ves to be wrong, or to defend what arc c1cllrly
shown to be errors of his officers. The MInister IS 'Wi
bound to approve of ru:tio;ln d which he did not know, or
of which he disapproves. But, of coursc, he Nma,ns con
sututionaUy responsible to Parliament for the fact th,,!
someU,ing has gone wrong, and he II10ne Clln teU Parlia-
ment what lou DCeWTe<l.lInd render an account of hi.
stewardship'."
8.51 The most essential charru:teristic of the Civil Service is Ihe

responsibihty of the Minister for every IICt done in his department.
InpI'actiee he can hardty avoid saying that the mistake wasthllt of
II subordinate'.
6.52 In this connection it would be legitimate losay thatordi_
narilyaMi i$!er is II layman and may have Iittie Or no knowlcdge
of the mtncacie" of the Criminal Procedure and of the investiga_
tional powers of the Police and therefore it will be unfair to expect
hIm to be able 10 direct the Pollee as to how investigation should be
done orplotedion given. He must aetODtbeadvioo Of the Police
e"perl'. If theh' leads to disaster the constitutional respon_
sibihtymay belhere, thedcgreeofwhich must depend upon the
circumstances of each casco The position of lay mInisters has
discu ....... by Sir IvorJennings in ''Cabinet Govel"nment'" lind 1!1LS
iswhatheSllYs:-
"The result i< that a lay minister, a 'tra".ient bird of passage',

tak"" decisions on ,mpoJ1l1nl qucslions of policy, subject \0
Cabinet control, upon which e"perls may be divided. If
hehashadexperlcnCP.Manofficial,tlsbytheaccidentof
his career and it will ha,'" been almost certainly, in a
subordinate Thus, Mr. Sidney Webb, who had
been -II se<:ond division clerk in Ihe Colonhl Office, became
in cout"S(' o! time Secretary of Stale for the Colonies. S,r
Bolton Eyres-MonscU, who had b""n a com;lILralively
junior naval officer. became First Lord of the Admlrally.
Such experience is morelikel\" to be tI. handic8p than II.
benefit. It is somewhat difflcu!t to JmsJO!ine a former
lIeutenant.commander politely !elli"g II First Sea Lord
lhat he Is talking nonsense."
8.53 The Commission has set out the inshnces which 8rc con-
In the matter
of Police investigations the discretion is s<>lely of the Police as to
what, if any, action they should take. ThishasbeendiscuSl'edabove
pnd is supported by section 49 of the GovernmPTIt M India Act. 1935
and by the various J>rovisions of Ihe Code of Criminal Prnc<'d.ureand"
of the City of Bombay PoUce Act which htl."" been .el out above.
,. 1I.>btrt MOfrl"",: &I'.,II,m:n''', lTJ r"-'n.l'p.

2. 51,No, Jennl",.: .... n'''(lTJFdn.l. 1'118"4
3. 81.1\'(I'J.m'lln.. ...
Dr
lIIt·s;
(l) Under the ConstltuUcm Ad. Dr 111135 the Criminal Statutes-
II'll! Code of Criminal Procedure and the Incfiaa Penal Code being
O"II"isling Laws were In 19M nol fulU!liDJIS tl1ln,rerred to the Governor
Dr the MlnlB1.ly.
in the investigation, But according Mr, &nnerjee, the Home
,.,tary, the police must keep the mmister mfonned of what he 15
doing,
(v) The Minister has no responsibility, if in any partieula,r
the police bungles or is unsuccessful; but m c.!)ses general IneptI-
tude, inefficiency, want of o:r honesty, the, MiDlster be sub-
ject to what is ealled minIsterIal responsibIlity ,to ID
regard In acts of a Civ.il Servant. But the ""Ie Judge "r IllLs an,.
of it. exlcnt is the Parhament
(vi) It would be absurd if the Minister were 10 he res nsible and
decide, It is not a matter on whieh this Commission would like 10

gh-p a categor'ical opinion,
(viii) In the prese.nt case the qI,Lestion of responsibility may be-
i
COme difficult to in view of the decision of the High Court
exoneratinJil the Police of any blame and the delllY in holding this I
Jnq .. iry. ,
(Ix) Under the Constitution Act, 1935, functions perfonnable by
the police under Cr'iminal Procedure Code are not functions trans-
ferred 10 t,he Governor and, therefore, any question of minislprial
along with Ihp pTo,-isionf,
CHAPTER IX
P_hpaiJaddmt
U In the PoOIl<l HO!TtIld dated Oclober 2, 19G6. there was a m:w&
MMJATM ..... GANDHI'

-A. David.
Th"'lueslion posed in this story u; Could Gandhijfs life be ....sed
limn the assaBSiD's bullet? It was stated in that story LhatinJuly
"I tho.' yea" 19+1 III Pllnchgani where the MahatrtUI ,,"ed 10 II
ruupi<.- of month$ every ye.arlln unsuccessIulaUernpt WILl ...... on
Ill. lile 01 Gandhiji. The story 01 Lhlsincldent was to the
wbohas
a>nlrll\
9.3 The incident is described. thus:

About 18 or 20 young men
"'\l1ed down in Anand DhllVan
seat'! Two rather ''''ong young men-one of them w,,' M.""
sha..1kar Purohit-who does look quite stout and strong and mtbl
assailant was Nathuram Godse. His other companions who \Wl'(-

with him at the time fled from the place of the meeting.
9.4 Naturally this incident caused panic and consternation among
the gathering. But Gandhiji was cool and calm and "chided" tIll'
people and told them that he would leave the place if they created
"gadbad" (disturbance). The prayer meeting thereafter went on us
usual but on returning to his place Gandhiji sent word to Godse ask-
ing him to come and stay with him for about eight days so .hat hv
could get an idea of his (Godse's) views.
9.5 This murderous attempt caused sensation in Panchgani. Con-

gress guards were strengthened at Dilkhush Bungalow where thl'
Mahatma was staying and policemen in plain clothes were 8,lso
posted for his security, but this was resented by the Mahatma who
did not want any precaution for his life. Godse and his companion:;;
were arrested but on Mahatma's "advice and insistence" they were all
let off.
9.6 There is no evidence of this incident as given in the POOna

Herald being reported in the Bombay Press. Only one newspaper
report of the incident has been produced, that is in The Times of
India of July 23, 1944, Ex. 51, where it was said that some RS.S.
men had tried to create trouble at Gandhiji's prayer meeting, but
there was no mention of the attempt on the Mahatma's life. The
report is this::
"MR. GANDHI HECKLED

"The. hostility of a militant section of the Hindu Cnmmu-
nity to Mr. Gandhi's blessing of Mr. Rajagopai.achari's
communal formula was reflected immediately after the tt--rmi-
nation of prayers on Saturday when the spokesman of a group
of a dozen Hindu youths rose suddenly and asked Mr. Gandhi
questions and expressed "resentment".
"Mr. Gandhi in a low tone replied, but the Hindu yomhs

were not satisfied. They waved black flags for five minutes
outside the hall and then left. Mr. Gandhi remained calm and
drove away to his residence. There were at least four a,'med
police officials in "mufti" close to Mr. Gandhi, but they WE·re
unnoticed by the crowd, Mr. Gandhi and his close Eo.ssociates.
"The youth who asked the questions is understood to be a
Poona journalist, named Mr. N. D. Apte, while his companions
are als.o from Poc:ma.. They are said to belong to a fairly mili-
tant Hmdu organiSatIOn. He asked Mr. Gandhi who was seated
on the "dais" whether it was true as reported in the press, ibat
he had approved of the communal-Pakistan forlTlIlh.
117
Mr. Gandhi replied thal that was go. The youth they
were there to express their resentment against hIS blessmg of
the Pakistan scheme. Mr. Gandhi asked him he had
emy wnttcn statement to give him. The r2ply tne
marked that it could hardly be the time or place tor a

course."
!).'i The place, as the Poona Herald, story goes, became grE::at
"'lIlc{' for the activities of Godse and hIS who campea regu-
1.11'1\' at Anand Bhavan and Sanjivan Vidyalaya. So much so that
'''U;' days prior to the actual assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, Godse,
j,lory as was given in the po-ona Herakl published in the issue of

(klober 2, 1960.
D.8 In suppo!"t of the story, Mr. David has put in an affidavit,
1'::-: 124, in which he has stated that from the investigaLons n'<.:de
ill" him he came to the conclusion that there was a plot to
I(ill Mahatma Gandhi as early as July 1944, and that the parties
lu·hind the plot were led by Nathuram Godse and that not only
did the police know about the whole incident but actually arre5ted
Nathuram Godse and his companions-though at the instance of
Mahatma Gandhi, Godse and his associates were let off, He has then
that he contacted Purohit and got the story from him. He
IIlso got corroboration of this story from some other ci.tizens, who
lire not named in the affidavit. which generally supported the ot.her
1hings mentioned in Poona Herald· story. But in his statement
Mr. David has mentioned the names of Gadekar Baburao Ombale,
Presi.dent of Taluka Committee and Dr. Savant.
9.9 After this news item was published in the newspaper, the
trustees of the edUcational institution-Sanjivan Vidyalaya-gave a
luwyer's notice to the POOna Herald and its editor and its publishers.
It is dated October 7, 1966, and is marked Ex. 125. ln the notice
(lbjection was taken to the statement made with regard to the inci-
dt'nt that Nathuram Godse and his companions settled down in Anand
llhavan High School, that there was no such building belonging to
Ih\" trustees and that in fact various Congress leaders like B. G. Kher,
Jivraj Mehta, Dr. Sushila Nayar and her brother Pyarelal \,'ere the
I;uests at the school and that the whole story was false and defama-
lory. It was admitted that the school building was burnt down after
lhe assassination of Mahatma Gandhi because of the erroneous belief
lhat Nathuram Godse and his friends had stayed there. The notice
raIled upon the newspaper to make the necessary correction.
D.10 Gopal Godse, Nathuram's brother and a co-accused in the

lTlurder conspiracy, issued a disclaimer published in the Poona Herald
of October 9, 1966, Ex. 127, wherein he denied that Nathuram Gadse
ever went to Panchgani during the period mentioned in the news-
paper report or made any attempt on the life of Mahatma Gandhi.
He also said that the true story was contained in his articles in the
Painjan. a Marathi weekly. Ex. 128 is the c1arilic",tion issue ill 1111
POona Herald of October 23, 1966, on the basis of .Bx. 125 wherein Ih.
Lawyer's notice issued to the Poona HeraLd is published.
9.11 Gopal Godse appeared as witness No. 33. b.efore the COlli
mission and supported his story given in the Pa;n1an. He
that Nathuram Godse did not go to Panchgani and the report in llll'
.Poona Herald as to the incident was incorrect. It was Apte and parly
who went to demonstrate against the C.R. formula.
9.12 In support of the story as given out by the poona HeraLd,
Manishankar Purohit has appeared before the Commission as
"No. 30, and also Mr. Abel David, the editor, witness No. 70. Purohll
is the proprietor of a lodging house called the "SurU Lodge". B('
deposed that the Panchgani incident, with which we are concerned,
happened in July 1947 and not 1944. When his attention was arawli
to t.he discrepancy in the 9.ates, his answer was "the incident I am
going to depose about was in the month of July 1947". Continuing
he said that there were about 400 to 500 people at the prayer meet-
ing. After the meeting, Mahatma Gandhi asked for subscription t.o
the Harijan Fund. At that time, about 20 persons with Natburam
Gadse came to Panchgani from Poona by a bus. The !eader of the
group was a man called Thate and Godse was also amongst them.
'rhey got up in the meeting and started shouting. They protested
against the division of the country shouting "Gandhi Murdabad".
Amongst those present at the time were Dr. Jivraj Mehta, Dr. Sushi!a
Nayar, Amrit Kaur, pyarelal and Dr. Dinshaw Mehta. The crowd
with Godse started moving forward with black flags. The "olunteers
lried to prevent their going further and Godse and others were sur-
l'ounded, and were taken to one side and from the pocket of Nathuram
Godse a knife was found on search. As a matter of fact, the police
arrived after the knife was taken out from the pocket of Godse. The
police was told about this when it arrived. The police took
of Nathuram and his companions and took them to the police station
but the witness did not R"O with them. He thereafter fell ill and
was taken to a hospital. He further stated that some people of the
"Poona Herald" came to see :tJ.im in 1966 and he (Purohit) insisted
that he gave the date as 1947 and that no incident took place in 1944.
When the Poana Herald news was read out to the witness, he stated
that N athuram Godse did not go to Panchgani in 1944 but Thate did.
The date mentioned was not correct in the story published in the
Poona Herald. As far as he was concerned, the date was definite.
He also denied that Nathuram Godse took out a knife and wanted
to attack Mahatma Gandhi and that he got hald of them. He repeated
that the correct story was what he had stated before the Commission.
On that occasion. Mahatma Gandhi did not ask Godse to come and
stay with him. He further stated that Gandhiji was not stayin"" in
Dilkhush Bungalow in 1947 but in Eden House. In 1944, he in
Dilkhush Bungalow.
9.13 In cross-examination by Mr. Chawla. Counsel for the Govern-
ment of India. he again reiterated that the person in 1944 was Tha,te
and. also stated that he did not know Nathuram Godse. The
testimony of Purollit does not support the story as given out in the
it. contradicts it showing Lh3t
At \ew;l the two dales do not
9.14 The other witnesses who deposed in regard to this incidenl

,I"(' Dr. Sushila Nayar, witness No. 53, G. S. Chaubal, who retired as
/\ssistant to D.LG., C.LD., Poona and was C.LD. Inspector in Panch-
"ani. witness No. 31, and Superintendent Del..llkar, a rctireu District
of Police, witness No.6.
lJ.15 Dr. Su::;hila Nayar was a member of the Mahatma's party at
I 'anchgani and was one of his important followers and was also his
IJH·dical adviser. She was unable to recollect any person by the flame
or Purohit in Panchgani. She stated that some people did come and
\Teated troubie at one of the prayer meetings of Mahatma Gandhi
in July 1944, but she could not say if Nathuram Godse was one of
them. She said that she thought that it was the same group of
Hindu Mahasabha workers who were subsequently responsible for
the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. They might be the same peo-
pic Further, she had no recollection of any person coming fr,rward
and shouting "Mahatma Gandhi Murdabad", except that there was a
black flag demonstration. The demonstrators hied to push forward
where the meeting was being held but they were stopped by local
mlunteers. She did not know what happened later as she .md the
party were taken away after the trouble started. She was unable to
,;ay whether Nathuram Godse was one of them or that a knife \las
found on his person. She added that in 1946 when talks with
:'11' Jinnah were going on, SOme young men of whom one was
Nathuram Godse and the other Thate came to Sevagram, w€'nt to
the Mahatma's hut and when he was coming out, stopped him. The
Ashl·am volunteers removed them. Subsequently she learnt that one
.of them had a long knife. B.ut no one believed that there could be
.a deliberate attack on Mahatma's life.
9.Hi If an incident like an attack on Mahatma Gandhi, which is
published in the Poona Herald, had taken place, she would, the
.commission is sure, have known of it even if she was not actually
present at the time because as it has been said above she was tbken
away when the trouble started.
9.17 Then there are two police officers who are witnesses:
9.18 Superintendent Deulkar was Dy. S. P., Poona in 1946 and
Asstt. Central Intelligence Officer. He made a to the
p:)lke on April 4, 1948, in the investigation of Gandhi murder case.
at Bombay. It is marked Ex. 129. Therein he stated that he was
stationed at Panchgani in July 1944, during the Mahatma's stay t.here
:'<5 Intelligence Officer and he attended Mahatma's prayer meetings.
On July 22, 1944, Apte and about 20 other Hindu young men came
to Panchgani and attended the prayer meeting in the hall of the
Parsi School. After the prayer, Apte suddenly /lot up and accosted
Mahatma Gandhi in a challenging mood and asked if he had con-
sented to the Rajaji Formula and if that was so they .(Apte and
others) had come to protest against it. Mahatma Gandhi replied that
he had consented to the formula (Inti if Aptc wanted to have any
further discussion with him he shQuld meet him (Mahatma Gandhi)
at his residence. Apte said that he did not want any further'
sion and condemned Mahatma Gandhi's action. His other
nions then stood up in their seats, took out black flag and waved
them against Mahatma Gandhi and shouted anti-Gandhi and anti-
Pakistan slogans. Attempts were made to calm them down but the
demonstrators continued shouting slogans. People gathered at the
prayer me-:ting resented this intrusion and then the demonstrators
were bodily pushed out of the compound of the school. They left
shouting slogans and also left Panchgani "by the same bus by which
they had come.
9.19 There is no mention in this statement of any attempted attack

on Mahatma Gandhi by Nathuram Godse with a knife.
9.20 In Ex. 130 which is a part of the police diary written by this
witness in his investigation of the Bomb and Gandhi Murder cases,
he has stated about the 1944 incident at Panchgani. He says that he
was present at the prayer meeting of Mahatma Gandhi on July 22,
1944 when Apte and 20 others made a black flag demonstration
against the Mahatma's consenting to C. R. formula. This document
is a part of the Police Diaries of those cases.
9.21 Another policeman whose evidence is very relevant on this

point is wit. No. 31 G. S. Chaubal. He is a retired Assistant to the
D.I.G., C.I.D. In 1944 he was Inspector, C.LD. at poona and been
sent to Panchgani for intelligence purposes during Mahatma's stay
there. He also has deposed regarding the incident of about 15 persons
led by Apte disturbing the prayer meeting of Mahatma Gandhi. His
version in regard t? the Gandhi-Rajaji formula is the same as that
given by wit. No.6, Deulkar. He made a police report describing
what happened of which a copy was produced. Ex. 48 is a copy of
that report. In this document, the witness had reported that
there was mild sensation created when 20 Hindu Mahasabha youth
came by special bus from Poona, shouted slogans at the prayer meet-
ing and waved black flags. According to this witness as indeed
according to other witnesses, Mahatma Gandhi was undisturbed
throughout while his followers tried mainly to calm down the
demonstrators and the demonstrators were then pushed out of the
hall.
9.22 Evidently, Mahatma Gandhi's Secretary, Pyarelal, was not in

Panchgani at that time.
9.23 Ex. 49 is Chaubal's statement dated February 26, 1948 at

Poona. This was in Gandhi Murder case. This statement of his is
the same as his deposition and his report Ex. 48 which ·was Report
No. 17 dated 7-1944 to the D.I.G., C.I.D. Here also there is no
reference· to the murderous attempt on Gandhiji's life.
11,24 Another important picce of evidence is Ex. 51 which is a
'" Item in The Times of India, dated July 24, 1944. This news
11"111 .shows that Mahatma Gandhi was heckled by a militant section
"f 1he Hindu Mahasabha for blessing Rajagopalachari's communal
1", 11111\.). This report also shows that there was a demonstration
'.I,l'e.s.sing resentment. The demonstration was led by Apte, and his
''''llpanions, who like him were from Poona. They are stated to
1.<'Iong to the militant Hindu organisation and the report given in
III" tlewspaper is substantially in accord with what has been stated
"1" witnesses No.6, Deulkar, and No. 31, Chaubal, whose testimony
lill' Commission has discussed above.
9.25 Wit. No. 70, Mr. Abel David, is the present editor of the
I '(Jona Herald. He put out the story which is being scrutinised by
1he Commission in this part. He admitted his authorship of the
::I()l'Y in the Poona Herald on October 2, 1966. He had stated that
there was an earlier attempt on Mahatma's life, i.e., earlier than 1944.
The Mahatma was fired upon during the agitation against untouch-
,',"J:!:ty. The date of that incident he did not give but that is an
incident which would not be wholly relevant to the inquiry because
untouchability was a different topic al1pgether. But if the culprits
then also were the Poona Hindu Mahasabha people that would be
quite relevant. But we do not know who those people were. He
nlso admitted the correctness of his affidavit about the incident in
Panchgani.
9.26 The source of information of this witness was Manishankar

Purohit, wit. No. 30, and others whose names he has given and they
have been mentioned before Mr. David's explanation in regard to
Purohit is that Purohit was threatened by Anand Hindu High School
people, which is corroborated by the notice which was given to the
Poona Herald, and that is the reason why Purohit shifted the scene
from July 1944 to July 1947, and the people who were in-charge of
the School were .rather important personages. Mr. David was
emphatic that the dates that he has given in the newspaper report
were correct as given to him by Purohit and others. He was cross-
examined by Mr. Vaidya and he reiterated that his report was made
on statements made to him by Purohit, Gadekar. Dr. Savant and
others. The object, he said in cross-examination, of his putting the
story out h the paper was that he wanted to show that
the motive for murder was not tho:! giving of 55 crores but it
had been in the air even in 1944 and even before which should have
made the authorities vigilant and extra careful and should have
put them on guard qua the lives of Mahatma and other leaders.
9.27 Another witness in regard to this incident is Gopal Godse,

wit. No. 33. He has denied that any such incident, as was published
in the Poona Herald of October 2, 1966, took place. He says "That
is all false. The thing never happened. It is incorrect that
Nathuram Godse went to Panchgani", but he admits that "Apte did
go there with about 20 persons for the purpose of demonstration only
against the C. R formula", He sent a contradiction of the Poon.a
Herald report to that newspaper which wus publbhe
that paPer dated October 9, 1966, Hnd is nUll'ked
1)1'
the following effect:
"Nathuram never went to Panchgani during the said pcriu:
There was no &ttempt on Gandhiji's life by Nathuram or hi:,
associates while Gandhiji stayed at PanchganL I am surprised
to find that you, a responsible Editor, relied on hearsay and did
not verify the truth."
9.28 In 1966 when the conspirators or the principal ones amongst
them had paid the penalty for their crimes, Gopal Godse could havt'
had no motive to falsely deny the alleged incident of 1944. It do:::,s
not hurt him and his party. And the way these people have been
behaving including their holding Satya Vinllyak Puja.s and martys'
days f1ey would have relished to boast about one more anti-Gandhi
exploil rather than deny it.
9.29 Ex. 52 is an extract from the Agrani of July 23, 1944 of
which the editor was Nathuram Godse. There also the incident
given is that of demonstration organised by the Hindus against
Rajaji's "unpious formula of Pakistan in this land of Shivaji". It
is striking to note that this newspaper has stated that there were 4
armed policemen near the Mahatma for his protection. Apte is
stated to have made a speech which is published in this issue of
Agmni in which he said:
"Gandhiji! you have committed an offence of stabbing the
nation, by giving your consent to Pakistan formula. You
have already confessed that you have no right to speak on
behalf of Hindus. Today we are demonstrating peacefully
our protest on behalf of Hindu youths. You bear in mind that
if you do not change your behaviour more difficult situations
and ill fame are awaiting you. We will treat them as traitors
who will try to vivisect our motherland. We, by this state-
ment call on national minded people to treat Gandhi-Rajaji
formula in this manner."
9.30 It is significant that alth?ugh has publis?ed this

speech of Apte there is no mentIon of It eIther by Dr. SushIla Nayar
or bv policemen, who made contemporaneous reports of the
'happe":1"ing at that meeting nor is any other to support
it. Even the affidavit of Mr. DaVld does not contam any reference
t.o this and therefore it is fair to conclude that no one
could have informed Mr. David about it. The Commission has no
doubt if such a statement was made it would have been reported
by the police because the question of Pakistan was importan:t from
the point of view of the then British rulers also. Nor would It have
been left out bv newspaper reporters. It is difficult to believe that
Dr. Sush:la Nayar would not have known about it.
9.31 One not lose sight of the fact that himself the
editor of the paper, Nathuram Godse could and would not, in ordi·
nary circumstances, ha\re admitted making a murderous attack on
11)1' Mahultna but knuwing him a::; the Cuml11i:::ision now does, he
'I'"lilt! nol have hesitated tu make some reference to the attempted
\'Iull'ncc. Anyhow, even if this piece of evidence were ignored, there
1;1 evidence upon which the Commission can base its deci-
-.jOIi on this point.
!J.32 As far as documents dealing with this incident are concern-

"Ii, Lhere are the statements of Deulkar made to the police. Ex. 129
In Lhe Gandhi Murder investigation, and then his "statement", Ex.
l:lO, really Police Diary. There is also Chaubal's statement, Ex. 48
his statement to the police, Ex. 49. The Times of India report
July 23, 1944, Ex, 51, and the Agrani report, Ex. 52, contradict
thc story of the attack There is one other circumstance which con-
[radicts the very existence of the incident and that is the notice
which the Trustees of the School gave to the Poona. Hemld, Ex. 125,
and the clarification which was published in the Poona Herald, Ex.
J 28. Of course, these are the later documents but they show that
persons who were likely to know about this fact were not prepared
Lo accept its veracity and considered the story of the Poona Herald
as highly defamatory and took an early opportW1ity to record their
dissent and protest.
9.33 The Commission, therefore, has in support of the news item
in the Poona Herald a statement of its editor, Mr. David who made
enquiries at Panchgani from various persons the principal one
amongst whom was Manishankar Purohit who has not only changed
the year of the incident but also the very details of the incident.
All he says is that a knife was fOW1d on Nathuram Godse when he
was searched. Unfortunately, Mr. David's principal informant has
not $upported the story. It may be for puerile reasons: but persons
like him who do not hesitate to change their stories, scenes and
even years cannot inspire confidence and can hardly be relied upon
in the absence of corroboration which may be oral evidence or
circumstances. And they are lacking in this case.
9.34 The evidence against this, and against the very existence
of the incident, is that of wit. No, 31, Police Inspector Chaubal, and
wit. No.6, Dy. S. P. Deulkar, as they then were. Of course, Gopal
Godse also denied it and Dr. Sushila Nayar has no knowledge of it.
9.35 In the opinion of the Commission, the correctness of the
incident of July 1944 and even its existence is unproven. The only
evidence in support of it is a 1966 investigation by the correspondent
of a newspaper who. one need not doubt must have made enquiries
from the best of motives-the Commission can have no reason to
think otherwise-and having convinced himself of the correctness
he published it. The reasons are these:
If such an incident as a murderous attempt on the life of Mahatma
Gandhi had happened there is no doubt that Dr, Sushila Nayar
would have known about it and even though she was whisked away
from the meeting when the trouble started, she was too important
a member of the Mahatma's immediate followers to have remained
iJ;morant of it.
124
Secondly. an incident like an attack on the Mahatma's life would
not and could not have been suppressed or remained unknown.
There is no reason why the newspaper correspondents of other
papers did not send that story to their newspapers. Such a story
newsmen who are watching for news like this would have dared not
to report it. And Mahatma was a world figure.
Thirdly, there is no corroboration of the story. Not even Purohit
has supported it and he does not seem to be the kind of a witness
who would not have liked to become a hero or the cynosure of all
eyes by repeating the story of his bravery in saving the great
Mahatma. There is a suggestion that he has been threatened by the
Trustees whose institutions have been defamed in Poona Herald
story. That may be so. But people who can changes their statements
in this manner can hardly inspire confidence or be relied upon. Be-
sides the other facts militate against the correctness of the story.
Fourthly, there is contemporaneous evidence consisting of police
reports made by C.LD. officers sent to Panchgani to report about the
happenings there. In the discharge of their duties they sent their
reports, which, if they were doing their duty properly, and there is
no reason to think that they were deliberately suppressing facts or
making faked reports, are of considerable evidentiary value. There-
fore, their evidence has been discussed at some length.
9.36 Although on this evidence the alleged incident of the attack
and its alleged details cannot be held to be proved, the important
fact which emerges is that there was in existence an organisation
which was extremely anti-Gandhi and its members persisted in pur-
suing Mahatma Gandhi by creating disturbances at his meetings and
their attitude was no non-violent.
9.37 At Panchgani in 1944 the persons who disturbed the meeting
were Poona people led by N. D. Apte who was later sentenced to
death for the murder of the Mahatma. The factum of disturbance
led by N. D. Apte is also supported by Ex. 34 dated August 1, 1944
which also shows that it was organised by the Hindu Rashtra Dal,
which is a militant Hindu organisation in Poona.
9.38 At Sevagram a party led by L. G. Thatte, who was subse-
quently in the Gandhi Murder Case, according to Dr.
Sushila Nayar. stopped the Mahatma and might have used violence
against him if protection had not come from the Ashramites. This
Thatte had a freshly sharpened dagger with 7" blade on him and
according to the Police, Ex. 256, they threatened to damage the car
of the Mahatma. All this is discussed in the next chapter.
9.39 These facts are indicative of the design of the Poona crowd
belonging to the Rashtra Dal, which with proper harnessing might
have helped the police in unearthing the identity of the conspirators
after Madanlal t.hrew a bomb. v:hl) was OlJ'l'('StC(l' . li. 111(' spot and
m:H10 ,1 !'t"lf'mpnt to 11)(' ]1oli('(' smn(' d('!nil:: :d)l)II1 Ill(' idl'nlHv
or his ('()-(·ollspil'lll()I'.1.
CHAPTER X
Wardha Incident
10.1 There was another incident which is relevant because H i.!
one of the stries of demonstrations against Mahatma G ... ndhi ill
I"pgard to his policy towards the Muslims in which the
were Maharashtrians and they became aggressive when they were
joined by demon::;trators from Bengal. Dr. Sushila Nayar, witness
"No. 53, stated that in 1946, probably under a mistake, when talks
with Mr. Jinnah were going on, some young men of whom one was
Nathuram Godse and the other Thate came to Sevagram and objected
to Mahatma's talks with Mr. Jinnah. When Mahatma was coming
out of the compound of his hut and was going out for a walk, those
people came in his way and stopped his going out. The ashramites
removed th2m from his path. Subsequently she learnt that one of
them, Godse or Thatte, had a sharp knife in his pocket. The
ashramites including Mahatma Gandhi never imagined that anybody
could really do Mahatma Gandhi harm. This was a kind of a
fatalistic attitude of every ODe.
10.2 Another witness on thjs point is Pyarelal, witness No. 54.
His version is that Godse and Thate and some other persons Clime to
Sevagram and wanted to prevent Mahatma Gandhi from going to
Bombay to meet Mr. Jinnah. Those people were subsequently
ed and the police found a knife on the person of one of them. The
conversation of those people with the police is recorded in the first
volume of his book, 'Mahatma Gandhi-the Last Phase.' On that
occasion the leader of the party said that he would become a martyr
when he would a!:;sassinate Mahatma Gandhi. When the poliCe said
to them that it would be left to the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha,
that person replied that that would be too great an honour for
Mahatma Gandhi and that a Jamandar could be quite E'nough and
that Jamandar referred to was Nathuram Godse.
10.3 The Mahal'ashtra Government has produced before the Com-

mission a Special Report by the District Superintendent of Police
dated September 8, 1944, Ex. 256. The report said that there was
anti-Pakistan picketing by nine volunteers whose names are given in
the report of whom one was Thate: seven belonged to Bengal and
one was a Madl'asi Brahmin.
10.4 The report says that picketing was peaceful till they ",;ere
joined by a batch of seven Bengalis and then they became extremely
aggressive. They threatened to damage the car which was to carry
Mahatma Gandhi to the railway station. He deCided to walk alone
with the picketers all along from Sevagram to the Railway Station.
Distance to be covered was five miles. The news created a commo-
tion in the> J.own and jf the Mahatma had walked all that dir!ance,
12!i
126
c\large crowd would have been attacted and the likely consequences
could be serious. The picketers were warned and then arrested ur-der
the D.loR.
10.5 In their conversation with the police, the picketers were

extremely hitter against Mahatma Gandhi and L. G. Thatte said that
he who would shoot Gandhi would be a martyr and when he was
searched, a sharp knife, 7l" long, was found concealed on his person.
Thatte was subsequently interrogated by Bombay Police in the
Murder Case.
10.6 When Mahatma Gandhi came to know about it, he gn\'e up
the idea of walking to the railway station and went in the CUf. No
untoward incident occurred and Gandhiji left by Mail for Bor.1bay.
The arre"t had the approval of all sections of the community and it
also became clear that the Government meant business <.:r.d would
not tolerate a flagrant breach of the peace. Thatte was prosecuted
under the Arms Act and the others were let off and left for their
respective homes
10.7 It appears that Dr. Sushila Nayar seems to be under some
misapprehension and what has been given by Mr. Pyarelal Dnd that
given in the police report seems to be tallying on the whole and
that is what have happened. Godse's name is not mentioned
in :he report and he may not have been there but the bct
remains that Thatte did take a threatening attitude and also that
there were a class of persons tram Poona who would not have hesi-
tated to inflict mortal injury on Mahatma Gandhi and were proud
to say so.
10.8 This incidf'nt was only a pointer to the existence of the class
Df pec1ple and is corroborative of what was stated by Mr. Munshi
about this schaal of thought in Poona which was extremely anti-
Gandhi and which did not hesitate to resort to political assassination
CHAPTER Xl
Accident to Gandhiji's Special Train
11.1 In the Bhavan's dated January 26, 1969, Ex. 252,

there was an article by its editor. M.r. S. Ramakrishnan, that there
was an attemtJt tJ derail the train by which Mahatma Gandhi wa!":
Iravdlin,E( on June 30. 1946 from Bombay to Poona and the incident
happened between the railway stations of Neral and Karjat. BouId··
ers were placed on the railway track. It was the remarkable presencE
of mind of the driver which everted a disastrous accident even
though the dynamo of the rear of a bogie was wrecked and the
('ngine itself was damaged. Mr. Ramakrishnan was called as a wit-
ness (No. 100) and he stated that it was felt that it was an aitf:mpt
on Gandhiji's life by his political ,opponents but he could rJOt say
who th€'y were. But the most vocal people against Gandhiji 'werf'
('xtreme Hindu elements.
11.2 Ar. article also appeared in the Sunday Standard of March

9, 1969 by Mr. Pyarelal, Ex. 249, and he has also given the same
Soon after this incident Mr. Pyarelal wrote in the Ha:.ijan
of July 7, 1946. Ex. 250. In Tendulkar's book 'Mahatm.:l Gar!dhi'
(Vol. Vii. page 171) a similar account is given and has been marked
Ex. 2.51.
11.3 Maharashtra Government have submitted bdore the

Commission some Police Reports and the last one dealing with the
mishap Mahatma Gandhi's train is dated July 20,.1946 Bombay
Weekly Letter No. 29 in which it was emphasised that the bcidenl
was one of the series of attempts by train thieves to hold up goods
train an-j it hi:ld no political implication. There is another extract
rrom a letter of the D.I.G .. C.LD .. Poona dated July 11, 1946 where
it is stated that four persons had admitted that they Were respon·
sible and there was no political motive behind it; they belonged
to a gang of thieves. These Police papers have been as
Ex. 255. There is also a news item from The Times of Ind.ia. dated
.Tuly 20, 1946 in which it was given that it was not an attempt to
derail Mahatma Gandhi's train and it also gave the result. of Police
investigation.
11.4 The Railway Board has submitted before the Commission

some papers but they do not take the matter any further than the
account by the driver of the train ·Mr. L. M. Pereira. He
describes what happened. There are copies of Press cuttings from
the FrE'e Press Journal dated July 3. 1946 which also shows that it
was no deliberate design on Gandhiji's life. The Whole evidence
before the Commission is inconclusive in showing what E'xactly was
Lh'.' moliv(' of till' pC'n;ons who pl<\ccd thf' boulders on the tlaC'k. The>
12B
.tlolice theory was that this was one of the series of attempts by
thieves to stop a goods train to commit theft, and that it was no
attempt on Mahatma Gandhi's life. From the evidence which has
been placed befm'c the Commission it will be difficult to say what
exactly was the motive of the persons who put the boulders or who
they were. There is positive assertion by two prominent gentlemen
who wefe on the train that it was an attempt on the life of Mahatma
Gandhi but contemporaneous accounts given in the Free Press Journal
and The 'l'imes of India give the Police version. On the evidence
it will be unsafe to come to a conclusion that it was a ueliberate
attempt to derail Mahatma Gandhi's train, which the driver has
termed in his report as the "Mahatma's special". The only impor-
tance of this incident is the area, particularly. hostile to Mahatma
Gandhi, where this attempt at derailing took place.
Vol. II
CHAPTER XII-CONDITIONS IN DELHI
Inde:.: of Paragrapll,
IzA·79 M.ahatma's service

Hindus in Punjab.
Differences between
Patel and Azad.
Coup d'etat feared.
Il!\.q Parachinar Tragedy.
Master Tara Singh.
111\.15-22 Aftermath cOntd.
B. After tile Bomb.
IJI\.23 Conditions:11 Delhi
the bomb explosion Weekly I'ltclligence.
Mood of POpulace-Rs. 55 Explanation of police
crores-payment of and about pohibitorr
fast. meeting.
Mr. Randhawa. Government'S
and action.
Dr. Sushila Nayar.
C. Pofilical com/itio/lS
Pyare Lal. Delhi.
Brij Kishan Chandiwala. Relations between Nehru
and Patel-Azad and
Vishwnnath Shah. Patel.
Fast-effect of. 12C.2 Maniben Patel's diary.
C.J.D. Report on fast. l2C·3 Sardar has heart attack.
K. M. Munshi. l2C.4-13 J. P. Narayan's speeches.
Mahatma's mood on his 12C.14 Maniben's charge.
birthday.
l2C.I? Seeurity arrangements.
Muslim refugees at
Purana Qila. 12C.21 Delhi Administration-
state of.
Mr. Purshottam's ac_
count 0[ the Mahauna. Rafi Sahib's differences.
Resentment SOcia/isIs disliked Patel.
Mahatma.
Nehru not agai
ObjectiOnable slo fugees.
J. I;J. Sahni. D. SUJlements of o/ficers
of Ike HOllie MinIStry.
G. K. Handoo
Jetley. Mr. V. Shankar, wit.
About stopping of Mr. R. N. Bannerjee.
rugees. wit. 19.
Sahni iss Maniben Patel.
E. State oj Delhi Admn. Mr. Hooja.
Mr. R. N. Bannerjee. Pyare Lal's book.
Mr. Bannerjee's Dr. Sushila Nayar.
about R.S.S.
Mr. M.K. Sinha.
Mr. Morarii Desai
R.S.S. Mcdus operandi Of Sa r'
dar.
uE·7-II Other witnesses.
I2G.27 R.N. Bannerjee.
12E.J2 Rajaji's book-Gandhi's
Teachings and Philo- H. Adequacy ttf measures
sophy.
12H.2 Mr. D.W. Mehra•
. 1I-f3 J. P. Narayan.
IzH·4 Mr. G.K. Handoo.
POst Funeral
31St January. I2H·5 Miss Maniben Patel.
12E.I6-27 Mr. M. S. Randhawa. 12H.6 Mr. MOrarji Desai.
F. Condir.iolls at Bir/a House 12H·7 Mr. PUrshouam.
IzF.I,26,31 Brij Kishan Chandi\\ IzH.3 Mr. J.P.
wit. 11
lzH.lO Mr. M.S. Randhawa.
Vishval1ath
3(P). 12H.II Mr. A.N. Bhatia.
Dr. Sushi]a Naysr, wit. S3. I2H.I2 Constituent
Questions.
Miss Manuben Gandhi IzH.17 Mr. J.N. Sahni.
Mr. l'yare Lal, wit. 54 I2H.19 Mr. G.K. HandoJ.
Conclusion. 12H.zS Mr. G.K. Handoo>s nOtG,
IIres token to prottel Galldlliji IzH.z6 Commission's opinion.

BefOre the bOmb. 1. Causes of II/lJrd" of Mahatma Gall.J1r1
After the bomb, EX.lo 121.1-16
der.
Congress volunteers
Adequacy
Steps taken-I.G.P., Delhi. menu.
CHAPTER XII
Conditions in Delhi
,., -Partition Of India, The Events Leading Up To It AwL The
Aftermath Of the Partition*
12A.l In an inlerview to the Special Correspondent of the A.P.I.
'II December 10, 1945 published in the Dawn of December 12, 1945.
Tinnah threw out a feeler to watch its reaction. He said thETein
II possible that there will have to be an exchange of population
If it can be done on a purely voluntary basis" The idea was not
01 as it offered a complete answer to the opponents of Paldstan.

I'll!' neri-Muslims of the Punjab, N.W.F.P., Sind and Bengal ('ould
',<'\"0]' consent to leave their lands, the industry and cowmercp- that
I",y had built up with their money and labour to "become bE'ggars
11,,1 nomads to satisfy a whim of Mr. Jinnah; nor ,,-auld the l\T.us-
,1111, of U.P., Bo·mbay, Madras, Bihar and C.P. be willirlg to ab.'ndon
'11I"il" native soil, g:ve up everything they owned and madE' life worth
,.,·lIlg and migrate to distant lands" The dream of (:xchanging
I'Llpulation on voluntary basis was not possible of and
:'i';lim League had to find another way of resolving the difficulty.
1-.\.2 The Calcutta experiment, the Great Killing, though not
11'·(\'ssful intimidated a number of non-Muslims into leaving their
"'IlICS. The experience there gained proved useful in Noakhali and
l'<l'pera (a district on borders of the State of Tripura). VJith better
"'l(nnisation Muslim League was able to strike terror into the hearts
"I non-Muslims, destroy their property, their self-respect and the
1,,,n()llr of their women and converted them wholesale to Islam. This
\ :1:; found to be a more effective way of dealing with the minority
'lid obviated the djfficulties involved in exchange of population.
was retaliation in Bihar; the Muslims had to leave the pro-
IIlI'e to seek shelter in Sind. The question of exchange arose once
'!:'lin to be put forward more seriously and vehemently: On Noy:om-
1... 1' 1946 Mr. Jinnah at a Press Conference at Karachi re-Dorted
"I Ihe Dawn of November 26,1946 said that the question of exchange
dlillild be taken up immediately. The non-Muslims all over India
1I',I"\('d most unfavourably but it was wholeheartedly supported by
Ih,' Muslim League and a Punjab Muslim leader none other than the
nwab of Mamdot threatened that they were going to enforce it.
1 Experienced and discerning administrators like Sir Evan
kllldns, the Governor of the Punjab characterised this mOve as
r"""lbly av,;ay of Hindus from the Punjab. Against this the
1'llIljab Muslim League leaders protested but at the time they
pOinted out the dangers of small minorities likely to be at the 111.'1'
of the majority community in the Punjab.
12A.4 Sir Feroze Khan Noon had already threatened re-enm'HI"
of the atrocities of Changez Khan and Halaqu Khan, of cours(" I...
getting that neither of them were Muslims. In the month of Jail!'
ary 1947 the Muslims started an agitation and rehearsed "the gl< "I
putsch." which would solve the question of minorities, This re:.ull, Ii
in the composite unionist coalition Ministry going out of office ill III
Punjab.
12A.5 The unfounded allegation of the use of intemperate langwll!'
by some non-Muslim Punjab leaders particularly Master Tara SII'HII
became an excuse for a bloody assault on non-Muslim life and I"'
perty particularly in the districts where non-Muslims were in a hup,
less minOrity. e.q., Rawalpindi. This attack has been described I'
"the Rape of Rawalpindi" where in order to save their lives IlUll
Muslims accepted Islam and in order to save their honour a huw
of Hindu and Sikh women committed ;ohar (sel£ inllnt,lll
tion); they threw themselves into wells and committed suicide al'l,'1
killing their female children which was the only method by whil'lI
they could save their honour,
The demand of the Sikhs was that the boundary of pUt II
tion should be Chenab. Fearing thereby they may lose Lahore, t h"
Muslims in May 1947 started stabbing and arson in the walled nly
of Lahore. Thus began the exodus from that ancient city which hnol
once been the centre of the Sikh power in the Punjab, It WU"'
pathetic to see the great families and small families who had bl·,'11
the backbone of the Sikh-raj which was replaced by the might c!f Ih ..
British Empire leaving the city of Lahore destitute, deprived oC ull
their belongings and their properties, which for generations tiw.\',
with hard work had collected and cherished, with fear in their <-'.vI'1I
in an indescribable state of destitution.
12A.7 When these tales of misery. anguish and horror reachl'.1
Amritsar, the Sikh community particularly and the Hindus also WI'II
roused in inaignation and resentment and revenge and retaliatioll
rose in their hearts. The rural areas of Amritsar distdct and LJII
walled part of that sacred city became the scene of cOlllilmnal rhi'!,
In Lahore also the defence of the Hindus was taken up by the RS.:-;
volunt-eers who succeeded in saving many lives and honour of tholl
sands of women lind hit back where they could but it was a losil"!
battle because the Muslim League volunteers had the assistanc'. "I
the autl;-0rities the Hindu Police and Hindu offiCials had all oph'd
for IndIa. But the most unexpected and astounding part of til"
tragedy was the failure of the Great Khalsa of Majha area of Lahul"
12A.8 When this retaliation gathered strength a two-way III
men, women and ·cJlildren "hounded out of their homes and
135
npending death which they faced until they got across what became
Ie West Punjab-East Punjab border
12A.9 One had only to see the trains which came in with these
ar-5tricken hounded mass of hwnanity, the trains were full to
u:lucation, people travelled on the roofs of the trains. But the
'!'ople who had insisted on the exchange of population in West
'linjab were not going to let this hounded humanity to leave
or without getting a taste of the horrors, atrucities,
1l1lUman tl'eatmem and degradation which was forced upon them.
121\.10. For hours trains· were stopped at railway stations for no
·:,:plainal:lle reasons. Water taps were closed. In the sweltering
It of the Punjab summer non-Muslims leaving by trains were
Iioprived of food ana water, small children and infants died of thirst
'IILI starvation. According to one authentic account, lathers and
lIothers gavE' their own urine whatever little there was to their own
,;Ibies to drink. Trains carrying refugees were attacked. Motor-
lorries and truck3 were stopped, young-girls abducted, grown up
\'/Omen were raped or abducted and others were killed. Those whose
lives were spared were only too happy to escape with their bare life.
12All The caravans that moved left decrepit old men and women
Ly the road-side to die and nobody looked at them. The routes were
littered with dead bodies, putrefying, bloated, smelling which were
111l'prey for birds and animals of prey. It was a defeated, dis-
IWllrtened, grieviug despoiled mass that moved out in caravans.
12A.l2 When it was deliberate policy of the Muslim League and
"I all those who sponsored the idea of Pakistan, to drive out the
"1I'lorities it would have been a little too much to expect any succour,
old or comfort from that quarter_ Unfortunately the military and
"ire in most cases was Muslim who hardly inspired any
Ilidence in the refugees, who instead of protecting those who were
1:111 in their charge, could not resist the temptation of _,articipating
III Ihe looting by its coreligionists,
121\.13 There had been several attacks on the trains carrying

in-We:';t Punjab but particularly savage was the treatment
I" out to these trains after the 15th August, 1947. In September
'I!,"j
1 rain5 from Pind Dadan Khan in Jhelum district was attacked at
places. 200 women were killed 01" carried away, The refugee
! I':lill from Wah was attacked near Wazirabad and instead of its going
to was diverted to ,Sialkot. This was in September.
! II October the same thing happened to a train coming from Si8.lkot
ii'll !Jarticlllarly horrible was the train from Bannu which
a!.I::)ched at Gujrat railway station in January 1948 resulting
ill m(!ssaCl'e of non-Muslims. The same train had been attacked at
I(llll<;hab and instead of being brought to Lahore via Sargodha and
I.nlll)!l1' Ih" 11smil £md the direct route or Mari-Indus. Khushab.
T.v::lllnlll". Sangla Hill, Lahore was brought by a longer
r}f Khll·;1l:lh, 1\1alakw:t1. Lalnm'lsfl and Gujrat. Wazirabad.
it W:lS ('s("nr\('(\ hv tI continf!0nt of Rihar Re!!i-
:I,';·/·Iwd h'l 111"111··,1 P:lt!r:lll'; fll'ptl nl. ill{' mi1ititl'V
136
replied and the firing went on till the ammunition of the military
was exhausted. The mob consisting of about 3,000 armed Pathans
then attacked the train. 500 people were killed. The passE:ngers
were from Bannu and belonged to a comparatively affluent class.
They we::e ]ooted to the last penny. This was in January 1948.
Parachinar Tragedy was result of Pakistan in
'Tt1!les·-- 28-1-1948).
12A.14 Because the non-Muslims in Parachinar were attacked by

the neighbourmg tribes and their houses and shops were looled, it
was decided to move them to Kohat and from there to take them to
India by train. It was also decided to keep them in a camp in tents
under proper guard till necessary arrangements could be made to
move them.
12A.15 The non-Muslims were evacuated and kept under ter:ts but
they were not given any free rations nor rations on controlled prices.
Their houses broken into and looted. When the snow began to
tall the Government of India took the matter up. The Governor of
N.W.F.P. ordered the breaking up of camp but the inmates refused
to return to their homes and preferred to stay in tents in inhospitable
weather which showed how unsafe they felt. On the night of 22nd
January Parachinar camp was attacked by the tribesmen. l3C non-
Muslims were killed. 50 wounded and 50 abducted. Thereafter 1.100
refugees from Parachinar were sent by train from Kohat.
lZA.16 Kidnapping of young women and the treatment to which
they were stl1>jecteci was a sordid chapter in the history of human
relatiDns. They were taken, molested, raped, passed on hom
to m:l:n, bartered, sold like cattle and those who were thf..'n subse-
quently rescued gave an account which would be, to put it mildly,
hair-raising.
l2A.17 When news of this kind of raping, abduction, looting, arson,
murder and massacre reached the people of East Punjab it led to
retaliation which cannot be described as a proud performance of the
East Punjabis. The public in general had no faith in the boundary
forces or any authority or the local authorities and the oppressed
pe0ple had confidence in no one and if it was in anyone at all it
was an!y in the topmost echelon of leaders. And thus personal
letters started being sent to both the Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru and Sardar Patel. Some letters were to say the least
importunating for the rescue of a wife or a father or other relatives.
"There were Jetter::: complaining of the indecision of the Government
of Inelia accusing the Prime Minister of India of lack of for
the non-Muslims, letters charging him with enjoying the fruits of
victory at the expense of Hindus of West Punjab.. ", letters
about relatives who were untraced.
12A.18 "Day after day. week after week, non-Mu::;lims f,'om W12::;t.
Punjab continued tc pour acros::; the border in train!'!, lorries, a(':'o·
planes. bullock·cartE and on foot, till, by Ih" ('nr! of D('cC'mhel· 1!147,
137
rour millions of them had come to India. All of them
th" ir property and valuables, the majority of. them bad, suffe:.e
lcreaven:ent; their bodies sick and wounded, then souls with
lhe shock of hor1'01', they came to a new home. There dlscc-mfort
In the refugee camps and the future held out uncertam hopes bU,t:
lit last their lives were free from danger and the honour of then
was As they crossed the boundal:Y and entered
Dominion of India, a cry of joy arose from theIr tll:ed and almost
voiceless throats with the spontaneity of a reflex acbon.
them wept with she!.::r relief as they uttered the salutatIon, Jal
llir:d."
12A.19 A song which was recited at the Muslim League conference
supporters
'Let th"'fe bE' in Pakistan, the separate
centre- of Islam.
We shall not in Pakistan have to look at
faces of non-Muslims,
The abodt's of the Muslim Nation will
brighten up only,
-\t'lhen in PaId stan there remain
idolatrous thorns.
They (Hindus) who5e function is to be
slaves have no right to participate
in Government,
Nowh::l'e hav(, they succeeded in governi
lZA.20 were s,::veral attacks on trains between JullunduT
;I:,j I,udhiana and bztween Ludhiana and Rajpura. Sikh jathas
1:'0:11 Patiala said to be responsible for these attacks, The
uuthorities, at this time, were dismayed to see that there was "very
little evidence <:If wilHngness on the part of the Sikhs to cry a halt."
11 will be l':.-::nembered that, by this time, the Sikhs had become spe-
('i"l targets of Ml:lslim fury in West Punjab. A Sikh was not safe
;mywhere and \\'0$ killed at sight."
12A.21 Even in Sind there were similar incidents and one such
is recorded in a document dated 11th January, 1948 (Ex, 260)
in whL:h it is stated that a batch of 850 Hindu refugees landed at
()kha on 9th January 1948. They were trom among those \\'ho arrived
Karachi from Quetta by Quetta Mail and they were looted and the
massacre, dc. followed, The document also shows the brutal
lll;;',mer in which the Sindhis including Sikhs were massacred, Their
wnmcn were :-obbed even of ornaments which they were wearing on
their persons, like nose rings, etc.
12A,22 Anothl,:: document dated 15th January. 1948 (Ex. 260-A)

t'l"'lm the Dy, General of Police, C,LD., Bombay, to the
District Deputy Inspectors General of other Ranges
138
shows that on 61b January 1948 there was ri?ting in
Karacni wperein terrible atrocities were commItted by Mushms on
Hindus Sikhs <md others and the first batch of these refugees con-
sisting 'of '350 Hindus landed at port Okha in. Kathiawar and others
were likely to follow. These refugees of all classe:s of
])l'ople from of in It;ldia, like Maharashtnans,
were asked to watch the activities of these refugees.

Cumlitions in Dethi before the bomb explosion
12A.23 In order to determine the adequacy of the
to protect the: life of Mahatma Gandhi, two facts reqUIre
,crutiny.
(i) what were the conditions in Delhi at the time; and
(ii) what was the information which the authorities had
regarding danger to the Mahatma's life.
The former deals with environmental conditions and the latter
with the knowledge of the Government of India and the Delhi
Administration
The mood of the populace

12A.24 Quite a large number of refugees had come to Delhi.
I"rom the 10th January, 1948 the influx of refugees was very large
and they were not very happy with what Mahatma Gandhi was say-
il1J..( regarding:' their rehabilitation. On January 13, after the refusal
or the Central Government to pay 55 crores to Pakistan, he started
I"lst with the twin object to force the Government for the pay-
II}('IIL I)f 55 crores to Pakistan and for promoting better Hindu and
l\,lllsl inl relations, When the payment was made and If:'aders of
('I'llll)1lmitie.s had signed the multipoint pledge of Mahatma Gandhi,
h,' broke his fast on January 18. On January 19, 1948 there was a
I"'I'SS statement of Ashutosh Lahiri. General Secretary f.Jf the Hindu
(Ex, P.25 in the trial court) in which the attitude of
II,'l:.h:llma was strongly criticised and the Hindu Mahasabha disowned
',III,,' in or agreement with the multipoint pledge which
I\hh;lllll.a Gandhl hadyut as a pre-condition for his giving
"I' IllI' ,lasl and Lo WhlCh both Hmdu and Mohammedan leaders had
1,"1 t!\('ll' signatures: before the fast was given up. It has been stated
I )(,,1 I,I)rd Mountbatten at 'that time was putting mental pressure on
1\I:,h:I\Jll:1 Gandhi and Pandit Nehru to create an atmosphere for
I,lldllll:i 0l'l: and not migrate to This was stated by
J. N. ,Iahl)l. wltness No. 95. He also saId that they as journalists
'I'
"\".'}" onc may s.ay of the former the latter was a laudable object.
I PY,1It'('l;.ll, WItness No. 54, stated in this connection that
{,:ttldlli unclcl'tooi{ the fnst to create an atmospiH'r(' [or payment of
for. nn of cordiality nllci 11<'ac(' bctwCt'/l
:tllr] ;'1..1 ll,:hlll',. C::'lld)lljl did !lot tIC'{'I'pl Ih(, vlIlidily of 11w
139
claim of 55 crores but he based his insistence on its being morally
binding. All this caused resentment among the Hindus, particularly
lhe refugee. As Lord Mountbatten was not examined by the Com-
mission, it expresses no opinion regarding his part.
12A.25 Pyarelal in his book "Mahatma Gandhi-The Last Phase",
page 700, vol. II discusses the question of withholding of the 55 crares
thus:-
12A.26 On 6th January the Mahatma discussed the question with
LOLd Mount.batten and asked his "frank and candid" opinion about the
Gonrnment of India's decision. Lord Mountbatten said that this
ment was withheld. .t
would be the "first dishonourable act" by the Indian Union if pay-
set Mahatma Gandhi thinking. "For that he
would have to transform the .overall situation and to create a new
moral climate which would make it possible for the Indian Govern-
ment to go beyond the strict letter of the law." Another factor,
according bJ Pyarelal, which weighed on the mind of the Mahatma
Was what the Maulanas of Delhi told him on the 1lth January.
They said. that they claim India as their motherland and they had
continued to stay in Delhi even in the worst of times but their
patience was exhausted and if the Congress could not guarantee their
protection let them plainly say so and the Muslims would then go
away and be at least spared the daily insults and possible physical
violence. They could not even go to Pakistan as they had opposed
the formation of Pakistan. They asked Mahatmaji. "Why not arrange
a passage for us and send us to England if you cannot guarantee our
safety and self-respect here."
12A.27 On the 12th January Mahatmaji made up his mind to go
on fast unless the madness in Delhi ceased. The fast began ffom the
next day.
:',1. S. Randhawa, Witness 18

Mr. M. S. witness No. 18, who was the Deputy
CommissIOner of DelhI saId that the refugees WE're in an angry mood
because of the fast. To quote Mr. Randhawa:
. "The at that time was very tense. The whole
thmg was In a flux. The refugees were in a. very angry mood.
Mahatma Gandhi had undertaken a fast. A large number of
ref 1.lgees used to gather outside Birla House and shouted
slogans ko marne do" (Let Mahatma Gandhi Die).
It was partly due to the fact that he insisted that Government
of India should pay over to Pakistan a sum of rupees fifty-five
crores. The refugees were also angry with him because they
thought that Gandhi instead of giving help to the
refugees was trymg to help the Muslim community I w
lInd:,r the that bomb had been as a:
proLst agam!>t hIS pro-MusInn or anti-refugee policy It '
at. the time that the KS.S. and the ...
(·x!r['ll1lst Hmdus were at the bEick of this bomb inc·d" t d
,:vhich the rt>-fugecs sho\:oci n
Dr. Nayar, Witness 53
12A.29 Dr. SusbUa Naysr, Personal
No. 53) has described the condItions before and fast
Mahatma Gandhi blamed persons who were gUllty of VIolence anti
advised the majurity to behave P!operly towards tll('
minority which caused a certam amount of among til('
refugees who shouted slogans outside the Bula House. Me.halma
Gandhi undertook a fast because the atmosphere became too Oppl'C's-
sive on account of both sides exaggerating matters and the
was anxious that proper protection should be accorded to
here so that in Pakistan also the minorities could feel safe. He saId
that he could not ask Pakistan to behave until India herself beha';ed
in a proper manner. "Evil is not wc!ghed in golden scales." C(»
tinuing, she said:
"When Mahatmaji undertook the fast, for the first two or
three days the refugees were not affected thereby. On the
other hand they began shouting "Gandhiji ko marne do, ham
ko ghar do". But after four or five days when
health deteriorated there was a 90mplete change in the men-
tality of both the Hindus and the Muslims of Delhi. Long lines
of persons used to come and ask Gandhiji to give up his fast;
they had tears running down their cheeks. There were men,
Hindus, Muslims, Muslim women in bUTqas, l'du,.;e':!s
and non-refugees. It made a tremendous impression on the
whole of the Delhi populace."
,
12A.30 She added that the refugees were in an angry mood when
the Mahatma undertook the fast. About the preca,utions taken she
said that after the bomb there were more plain-clothes policemen
round about the Birla House but she did not know if they also
ed the prayer meetings. There was one policeman who said "What
difference does it rr:ake if an old man dies. Why make a fuss." She
added that she was told about it. She said she was not consulted
about the security arrangements.
12A.31 Further. S3f'- couId not say if any other Drecaution bc:\·ond
the increase of a number of plain clothes policemen was taken.. The
police wanted additional of screening, i.e., to search
the people commg to the prayer meetmg. Of course this request was
not accepted by the Mahatma.
54
12A.32 Witness No. 54, Mr. pyarelal, also has stated that after the
fast had been going on for a few days there wa:s a general demand
by the people of Delhi that the Mahatma should give up his fast.
Brij l(ishan Chandiwala, Witness 11
12A.33 Mr. Brij Kishan Chandiwala, witness No. 11 before
Mr. Pathak said that in September, 1947, Hindu-MusUm riots were
M:illalll1a Gandhi. As a mattet' of fact, it who
.. dt.-d back the Mahatma from Calcutta and, In hIS opmLOn, If tl?e
:\1:Ih<1lma had not come there would have been a slaught..er In
ill(' streets of Delhi. On his coming, peace was restored.. the
! \ indu refugees from Pakistan were angry. On one they
.llIlIroaehed Gandhiji and used hot wortJs when. Gandhl)l went to
1\ Illgsway Camp. The opposition steadily grew In volume and the
II : [ers, which Mahatma received and which used be read by
('handiwala. were full of abuses and threats. Chandlwala arranged
;111 interview of the refugees with the Ma,hatma they
:Illt thin"s to him to his face. On another day a bIg procgsslOn came
Ifl Bida 'House and the processionists raised the slogan "Blood for
I :J.,oj" They were opposed to Gandhiji's pressure for the
,,[ .15 Cl'Ores. A large police force was there to stop the procesSlOn at
1-:1' 3da House. But at that time Pandit Nehru came out of: the
Hida House \\-hC¥'e he was holding a meeting with Gandhiji and
::l'1d he "checked the procession" Had he not done so, the
Mahatma might have been assaulted.
12A.34 The Times of India dated January 15, 1948, Ex. 248, carried
t.he that on January 14 some people had gathered outside the
gale of Birla Heuse and said "Let Gandhi Die" and Pandit Nehru
\\'as coming out from a meeting wherein Mahatma Gandhi, Par,dit
Nehru, Sardar Patel and Maulana And took part and when he heard
1',is hE' got out of his car and shouted "How dare you say those
::urds? Come and kill me first." The demonstrators then went
il\Vay._
12A.35 This report sUpports what Mr. Brij Kishan Chandiwala has
said about the shouting of slogans by the refugees. But it does not
support him when he says that if Pandit Nehru had not come they
would have assaulted Mahatma Gandhi. According to lhe Press
Report the prutestors were not many. There was a large r.umber of
:01j('<"men to stO!) the procession and it is difficult to believe that
the people could have gone into the Birla House to assault Mahatma
Gandh.i in the presence of the strong posse of Police. It is possible
:hat ]\.1 Brij Kishan Chandiwala was greatly perturbed and appre-
hensive because of the slogans raised that those people would assault
Mahatma Gandhi and be must have felt a sigh of relief when a few
\vords fr'lm Pandit Nehru just drove those 30 people away.
12A.36 Another witness, Vishwanath Shah, witness No. 3 before
Pathak, stated that when rupees 55 crores were given to Pakistan
-on the insist-enc:. of Mahatma Gandhi, there were processions and
propaganda agamst the Mahatma in Delhi. A very hostile atmo-
sphere was created against Gandhiji which "encoura.ged" young
people of which the Government was aware. There l1sed to be
demonstrations outside .against Gandhiji and people even threw
12A.37 PyareloJ in his book "Mahatma Gandhi-The Last Phase"

at page 711. Vol. II, has said:
"Within twenty-four hours of the Commencement of the
fast, the Cabinet of the Indian Union met on the lawn of Birla
oU5e :'ound Gandhiji's fasting bed to consider aire"h the
of share of the cash balances. But it made thos.{·
who \.... already angry with Gandhiji what. thr:y. consI-
dered as hi.;; partial.ity towards. the angnel', sld!.
fan.?!.I.::al gr0up among them began to orgamse a darn: conspI-
t:
racy 10 compass his death.
"\Ve \vant revenge". "Let Gandhi die". Pandit Nehru had just
b:lardzd his car to leave Bida House after meeting Gandhiji.
On hearing the shouts he got down from his car and l'Ushed out.
"Who t::J shout ''Let Gandhi die'? he roared. "Let him
who dares repeat these words in my presence. He will have to
kill me fLst" The demonstrators scurried away hdter-
skelter."
;.s aj::,Jears to b2 a more correct and balanced VifW of

th" i;1ci . DUi'mg his Calcutta fast Mahatma was cheerful but.:
not durinA bis Delhi. That was "it was comparfltively
easy-going in Calcutta. The task here is far more difficult. There was
no refugee pr<Jblem there to complicate the issue." According to
Pya,elaJ's book, the fast had a tremendous effect on the populace,
"It steadied the waverers and lent courage and strength to those.
who :lad ,1ith-2rto indecisively hung back. "
12 -\.39 He abo mentioned that there were a number of tdegrams

of "ympaihy and support from Muslim leaders and Muslim organisa-
all ove:' India a.nd even abroad. A Muslim divine fro:n Bareilly
a fatwa (injunction) to his Muslim followers said:
"There is no greater friend of Musalmans than yOll,
ther In Pakistan or Hindustan, . My heart bleeds with
yOul'S recent Karachi and Gujrat (Pakistan) atrocities, the
massa.::re of inno:ent men. women and children, fu"cible ('on-
versiU;l and the abduction of women. These are crimes against
Allah for which there is no pardon."
It cndt!d with injunction to the Pakistan Muslims and to

his io!lowers in Hindustan that they must condemn the misdeed5 of
thei cl-religionists in Pakistan in unambiguous and emphatic terms.
En;'l Ghaznofar Ali Khan, a Pakistan Minister, in :m
M<lhatma Gandhi's efforts and references were made ,m the
floot of the Punjab Assembly (Pakistan) saying that. no greater
than Mahatma Gandhi had been born in the worI i anc both
Malik Feroz Khan Noon and Mian Mumtaz Khan said that
"his feelings for the protection of minorities are fully shared by us".
12AAI At Pyarelal says that people woke up to their full

sense, of respollslblhty and set out orQ'anising an all out campaign
to brmg about a real change of heart. Even a deputation of refugees
from,rhe Frontier Province told him that they would bear no ill-will
against the Muslims.
143
Lord Mountbatten's Press Attache wrote in his (Hary:

y,,\1 hav(' to live in the vicinity o[ a Gandhi fast to understand its
Idlillll.C! power. The whole of Gandhi's life is a fascina.U.!1g study in
IIII' art of lnrlu!.:'r.cing the masses, and judging by the success he has
hw\'cd in this mysterious domain, he must be accounted (,ne of the
1'1 ";Itl'st artists in leadership, of all time. He has a genius for acting
IllIIlllgh symb,)ls which all can understand." (P. 190).
12A.42 At page 716, he says, "Gandhi was equally -,:i

Iii >SC' who we!"e trying to make capital OUt of his fast to :run dow
" I'dar Patel."
12A.43 Says pyarclal, "Unlike Gandhiji he did not suffer fools or

11I11<ltic5 gladb. anci as an administrator he never forgot, thcugh he
W;lS ever ready io forgi¥e if there was genuine repentance. ..
12A.44 A leaflet Ex. 105 which is hand-written and 1S alleged to

tlOlve b2cn published at Amritsar and distributed at Alwfil' also is an
ultack on the anti-Hindu policy of Mahatma Gandhi. But the Com-
llIissi'Jn is no, satisfied with the authenticity of this document and
not con:;;ide.r it safe to rely upon it.
12A.45 Bombay Weekly Newspaper. the National Gum'diun, in its

issue of January 17, 1948, under the heading ('Nehru Government's
Great Betrayal of India-Gandhiji's Coercion tells where
Blackmail Fails" said "with all tall talk of not paying money to
into paying crores of rupees to Pakistan by the fast of the Mahatma".

All this ;,vas derllonstrative of peoples resentment over lhe payment
of Rs. 55 cnwes
12A.46 The opinion of Sardar Patel about the payment of the cash
balances is shown by his speech at Bombay, on 16th .h.nuary 1948
(reported in "Hindustan Times" of 17th January). He said th8,t they
had ovec 55 crores in a spirit of generosity and goodwill which
was admitted by the Financial Adviser of Pakistan Government
and the London Economist and that they had decided to pay this
money in order to relieve Gandhiji of his mental agony.
12A.47 He also referred to the plight of the refugees who were

coming to India deprived of everything that they possessed
rules the-ir hearts and turns their minds completely. We have to
tolerate all this."
12A.48 The Delhi daily C.I.D. Report dated January Hi, 1948,
shows that some people thought Mahatma Gandhi's fast to be merely
a political stunt In order to get India's complaint before the U.N.D.
decided qUickly and to get a majority in favour of India. The Gov-
ernment servants who had come from Pakistan were complaining that
they were not able to get living accommodation in Delhi nor allOwed
to agitate in order to get their grievances redressed.
144
12A.49 Feeling against the Governmf'nt was running high III!
3Ccolmt of the ordeI of directing the payment of 55 crores to P,II,111
tan. It was being said that the Government had surrend01Td 1"
Pakistan and evt:n the Congress had started 5hl)\','IIII'.
12A.50 C.LD. Report dated January 19, 1948, shows that lht' peoloil'
were grc<ltly agitated and resented the attitude of the "yest PUIlJo'\'
Governme:lt in refusing to honour the agreement regardmg reSCUIIII:
o[ abducted women and not allowing the Liaison Officers to go inlo
Gujrat district which was adding insult to injury, i.e., a,Her givinl\
of 55 crares. It was also stated that the Hindu Sabha. was \lO!
\villing to be a party to the Seven Point pledge given to Mahatlll.l
Gandhi. Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan said at Socialist workers' meet·
ing the Sociolists did not want to quarrel with the Governmen1
for the time· being and advised them to remain in the Congress.
12A.51 Posters were issued by Muslims where the Deputy
miss:oner and the Police were accused of disturbing the communal
peace of the City and the Government was asked to replace them.
M. l"IHllshi, Witness 82
12A.52 The evidence of Mr. K. M. Munshi, witness No. 82, is '!ery
relevant in regard to this topiC. He stated that about the end of
19-1'i' and beginning of 1948, Gandhiji became very unpopular
of his insistence upon giving of 55 crores to Pakistan. There were,
besides it, other grievances arising from Partition and Hindus in
general and particularly Hindus of Northern India laid the
sibility for thE' Partition on Mahatma Gandhi and there was a sl:'ong
feo ling. though unjustlfied, amongst the Hindus that if Mahatma
Gandhi had not appeased the Muslims by conceding Pakistan the
Hindus would not hay;:! had to undergo those terrible miseries to
which they were subjected.
12A.53 Mr. Munshi had come to Delhi from Hyderabad two or
days before 30th January, 1948, and discussed the danger to
Gandhiji with some of the members of Gandhiji's party anci. they
were feeling very unhappy at Gandhiji's objection to the taking of
necessary !Jl'ecautionary measures. At that time, there was a general
fear that another attempt would be made on Gandhiji's life but
Gandhiji had strictly forbidden any policemen being stationed at
his prayer meeting so as to restrict or prevent the coming of anybody
to the prayer meeting.
12A.54 The witness has given an account of Gandhiji's murder and
the events of last two or .three days in his book 'The End of An Era'
Chapter XIV which has been marked as Ex. 15l.
12A.55 Pyarelal in his book "Mahatma Gandhi-The Last Phase"
Vol. II at page 457 records the state of mind of Mahatma on his birth-
day in 1947 which became the last. He writes:
"The occasion burnt itself on the memories of the visitors
as one of the saddest in Gandhiji's life. 'What sin must I
145
have committed', he remarked to the Sardar, 'that he should
have kept me alive to witness ali these horrors?'
"He seemed to be consumed by the feeling of

in the fac(, of the surrounding conflagration. Recorded the
Sardar's daughter, Maniben, mournfully that day in
journal: "His anguish was We had gone to hIm
in elation; we returned home with a heavy heart'
"After the visitors had left, he had another spasm of

coughing. 'I would prefer to quit this frame unless the a11-
healing efficacy of His name fills me', he murmured. 'The
desire to livE' for 125 years has completely vanished .as a result
cf this continued fratricide. I do not want to be> helpless
w"itness of it'." •
12A.5G At pages 685-686 of the same book, Pyarelal has 5aid that
Ihe Mahatma had become irritable and that he was trying to keep
II dow).. Suddenly he used to say, "Don't you see, I am mounted on
Illy funeral pyre?" Sometimes he would say, "You should know it is
II corpse that is telling you this". He was literally praying that God
'.hould gather him into His bosom and deliver him from the agony
Ihat the life had become. Sometimes he would say that he has
become a dead weight on his colleagues and on the country and an
:machronism and a mis-fit in the new era that was shaping around
him and which he had done more than anyone else to shape. After
Independence "we are bidding fair to say good-bye to non-
\'iolencc. . .. If India has no further Llse for Ahimsa, can she bave
IIny for me? I would not in the least be surprised if in spite of all
the homage thGt the national leaders pay to me, they were one day
to say: 'We have had enough of this old man; why does he not leave
us alone?'
12A.57 At page 443 of his book, Pyarelal has deSCribed the mood of
Muslim refugees who were in the Purana Qila. On the 13th Septem-
ber, Gandhiji visited this camp where some Muslim Leaguers, after
doing all the mischief that they could, had established themselves as
leaders of the refugees and were engaging, among other things, in
defrauding their brethren of the rations that were being sent to feed
them.
"The refugees were in a very ugly mood. As soon as
Gandhiji's car entered the gate, crowds of them rushed :1ut of
their tents and surrounded it. Anti-Gandhi slogans were
shouted. Someone from among the crowd violently opened the
door of Gandhiji's car. One of the friends who had· taken
Gandhiji to the camp asked the drivel' to take the car out of
the camp by the nearest gate. The driver pressed the pedal
and the car shot forward. But Gandhiji ordered him to stop_
He wanted to face the angry crowd, he said. Immediately the
refugees came running up and again surrounded the ('3r. While
his companion helplessly looked on, he stepped out. The
crowd closed in upon him. He asked them to assemble on the
10-259 HA.
lawn. Some sat down. Those on the fringes kept standing OUtI,
full of anger, gesticulated menacingly. Some Muslim VUhll1
te(:rs tried to pacify them."
12A.58 Refugees narrated to him the tales of their sufferinw,

which Gandhiji heard with sympathy and promised to do all he could
Those thirsting for his blood a few moments before were nCJw hh
frienjs and respectfully escorted him to his car and bade hilll
good-bye with folded hands.
"When the Sardar learnt of the incident he fumed. A-
Home Minister, it was his duty to ensure Gandhiji's safety
Why was he not informed in time to take security measureH'!
He gave strict instructions to Gandhiji's staff that in future hi>
Wi)S not to be taken out anywhere without prior notice to him."
12A.59 Mr. PUl'ushottam Trikamdas, witness No. 15, has alHo stated
that when he went to see Mahatmaji on or about the 4th or 5th
January, 1948, he was in a very depressed mood. He said that
"Sardar calls himself my 'chela', Jawaharlal calls himself by 'beta',
but both of them seem to think that I am crazy and nobody listenH
to me" (MERl KOI SUNTA NAHIN HAl).
12A.60 The Mahatma's opposition to retaliation was expressed

even on the 27th January when hE! in his pOf-t-prayer address, refer-
red to the attack on Parachinar refugees and asked those assembled
not to think of retaliation ("Hindustan Times" 28th January 1948).
12A.61 Ex. 135 dated 24th January, 1948, Police Intelligence Report
shows that there was resentment against Gandhiji. There was a
meeting of the ProvinCial Hindu Mahasabha in Delhi on the 18th in
which one Kesho Ram made a speech and characterised Mahatma
as a dictator ar:.d said that he might meet the fate of Hitler soon.
Were the words meant to be prophetic?
12A.62 On January 27, 1948 (Ex. 136) another meeting of tl].e
Hindu Mahasabha Delhi was held in Connaught Place in spite of the
ban wherein anti-Gandhi speeches were made. Prof. Ram Singh
criticised the Government of India and Gandhiji for pro-Muslim
policy; so did Mr. V. G. Deshpande who was an office bearer of the
Hindu Mahasabha. According to him, the Mahatma's fast was in-
tended to coerce the Cabinet to payout 55 crores to Pakistan which,
he said. will be used to shed Hindu blood. Nehru Government. he
said, had lost public confidence and it had no right to remain in
office. Speeches were made in that strain and it was even said that
the best course for the Hindus was that they should turn out the
Mahatma and othel" anti-Hindu forces to Pakistan so that they might
not endanger peace of the country, and accused Maulana Azad of
being a rabid Muslim. A resolution was passed rejecting the seven-
point peace pledge which was Mahatma Gandhi's pre-condition for
giving up his fast, condemned the payment of 55 crores to Pakistan
and there were cries of 'May Madanlal Live Long', 'Long Live Hindu
Nation', 'Turn Out Muslims' and 'Long Live Hindu Sangathan'.
147
12A.63 The most disconcerting and upsetting of this meet-
uution if not commendation, of the offences of bomb throwmg and of
Police did little to stop this meeting. Notwithsta.nding the exculpa-

lory explanations offered by Inspector Ram Chand Bhatia, S.RO.,
Pui'Uament Street Police Station, by Deputy Superintendent
punitive mea:;;ures could not be taken against those who: had trans-
J.!rcssed the law in that brazen manner. These explanatIons are set
out in a later pari of this chapter.
N. Sahni, Witness· 95
12A.64 There 1S another informative piece of evidence giving the
':onditions prevailing in and about Delhi and about the mood of the
refugees. Mr. J. N. Sahni, witness No. 95, a well known journalist,
who was workinp, for the refugees also. has given a fair account of
the condi,jrms in Delhi the refugees. He has deposed firstly
in regard to the refugees from West Punjab and North West Frontier
Province. He said that even before the Partition, refugees had
started coming into Delhi. They were sullen and desperate. A larger
number came after the Partition. They had terrible tales to tell.
Unfortunately the relief was inadequate and the camps in East
Punjab, e.g., Kurukshetra Camp, were poorly equipped.
12A.65 The refugees, said Mr. Sahni. were in a very angry mood
because the response to their needs and to their amenities of life was
poor and what infuriated them more was tliat India was making
terrific eHerts to back the Muslims and not doing anything for
the rehabilitation of those Hindus and Sikhs who were forced to
Jea?e their hon:ts in Pakistan.
liA.ti6 The inhabitants of Delhi, Mr. Sahni said, were "quiescent"
but when the refugees came, communal rioting started. The MuslimS
in certain localities had well provided themselves with arms and am-
munition, of which there were dumps in certain shops and houses.
Mr. Justice G. D. in his report about the Partition matters
published sub "Stern Reckoning" has mentioned the coJlec-
tion of arms in certain Muslim localities since November 1946 and
also that rioting started in August 1947 and continued UH September
1947 and has set out details of rioting and other disturbances
in Delhi at pages 282-285.
12A.67 AH this worried Mohammedan leaders particularly those
who were in the Congress as also the Congress Hindus in the Cabinet.
At that time Mahatma Gandhi sent a secret mission to Mr. Jinnah
offering to serve th(> Muslim refugees in Pakistan and he had been
writing to them earlier also but they were not prepared to accept his
Gandhi's idea was and he genuinely believed that
if he served the Muslims in India. it would be possible for Hindus
WH:t
safeguarding the Hindus in Noakhali. .
148
12A6B During all this time, said Mr. Sahni, Lord MountbaW'n
tion by making rt safe for the Mohammedans to stay in India and

that would be a great gesture for Pakistan to act in the same way.
12A.69 Most of the Chief Ministers. said Mr. Sahni, roundabouL
Delhi for some mysterious reason adopted a very unfriendly attitude
and they were not prepared to take the refugees into their respec-
tive Provinces. In fact, the refugees were stopped so that they could
not go even to their close relatives living in those Provinces unless
they went very quietly and clandestinely. This added to the ire of
the refugees and to their frustration.
12A.7C Support for this attitude is found in the testimony of
two witnesses.
12A.71 Mr. G. K. Handoo, witness No. 48, has in his statement
also given an instance where people were stopped at the Jamuna
Bridge near Jagadhari on the opposite side of Saharanpur and the
Prime Minister's intervention had to be sought to allow them to.
go to the D.P.
12A.72 Mr. B. B. S. Jetley, witness No. 55, when recalJed said
that entry of the refugees had been stopped into U.P. because four
lakhs of them had already entered and dispersed themselves in two
or three districts and created conditions of law and order and of
sanitation, and there were large chunks of land in East Punjab
which were available for the refugees which could be made available
for them if their entry was prohibited. He forgot that all refugees
were not agriculturists living on agriculture but they were largely
gW.
144 Cr. P.C. and that had the support of the Premier Mr. G. J3. Pant.
When Mr. Pant went to explain this matter to the :M'ahatma Mr.
Jetley went with him. But he did not say what the Mahatma's re-
action was.
12A.73 Mr. Sahni also said that Mahatma Gandhi did a great
deal for the Hindus also but he did not realise the enormity of the
task of rehabilitation of refugees. The resources required for the
rehabilitation of such a large number of people were colossal.
Mahatma asked for charity and charity did come but that was
wholly inadequate. The refugees, both Hindus and Sikhs, still had
faith in Mahatma Gandhi and almost worshipped him but this feel-
ing of confidence and affection for Mahatma was marred by certain
events and incidents. They were:
(1) The blatant wooing of the Muslims by the entire Govern-
ment not to leave India and to ask the people who had
left India to return. The policy, according to Mr. Sahni,
might have been right but the effect on the refugees was
in the houses left by them.
140
Th(' st'C'ond maLit'r was the giving of the 55 crores for
which prcssm-e was being put on Mahatma Gandhi by Lord
Mountbatten about the honour of India which was one
or the reasons why Mahatma Gandhi went on fast and
made Indian Cabinet reverse its previous decision in reo
gard to that sum.
(3) The attitude of Muslims throughout India had been such
that it led to the creation of Pakistan and the feeling
among the Hindus and Sikhs was and a movement had
taken shape amongst them that the time had come to join
together' to protest their rights and liberties and it was
CI land of the Hindus just as the Pakistan was a land of

the Muslims. This movement was quite ,strong in Delhi
and also in the Punjab, Rajasthan (Rajputana States)
and in the Maharashtrian regions of the Bombay Province.
It was also strong in Central India, Bengal and certain
areas of U.P. Their idea was that just as Hindus had been
forced out of the western part of Pakistan, so the Muslims
should also go leaving India as a land of Hindus. This
idea according to Mr. Sahni was creating an anti-MUslim
feeling and a pro-Hindu Rashtriya movement.
12A.74 The result of all this, according to Mr. Sahni, was that
the Hindus considered Mahatma Gandhi an. impediment. This be-
came very prominent in the end of 1947 and some sections of the
press also became vocal in expressing dissatisfaction and decrying
the Muslims in India the more secure would the Hindus be in

Pakistan and greater would be the harmony between the two coun-
tries. But the idea of those Hindu extremists was just the opposite
and they believed in tit for tat and ·held the opinion that the Hindus
could not be safe in Pakistan which opinion the refugees fully
shared.
12A.75 Mr. Sahni also said that as a consequence of these feel-

ings, both Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru became targets of
the fury of all those who thought that they were going too far in
their policy of appeasement of Muslims in India and of the authori-
of the were nO.t t0C! rigid and according to Mr. Sahni

took a practical view of the situatIOn as it existed. There was loose
talk of assault on Mahatma and Pandit Nehru but not on
Lord Mountbatten. Even those who were intimately connected with
Pandlt .Nehru had. some concern .that proper security measures were
not bemg .regard to hun. Speeches were being repartee}
Hmdu that Gandhiji was a kind of at
ImpedIment and sooner he died the better it would be for thE:
country.
Mr. Sahni reiterated that Mahatma Gandhi had under-

[digitised
taken the fast with two by sacw.net]
objectives-(I) to see that 55 crores were
150
paid to Pakistan and (2) Hindu-Muslim peace was restored ;wd
assured. The former was considered by the extremist elements ''''
an unworthy interference in the administration. Said Mr. Sahlll
"What we felt was that if we were paying Rs. 55 crores Wet
should at least get some from Pakistan of ful·
filment and implementatIon of other things under tl1l'
common agreement. It appeared even to us that this wu:,
an unfair deal because it was being done without gettinl(
any such guarantee from Pakistan."
12A.77 Mr. Sahni further stated that he did hear that people Uk.-
Dr. N. B. Khare made provocative speeches likely to incite people to
violence and other people from Poona also were making similar kind
of speeches. He also had a recollection that newspapers in Poona
were reporting speeches which were exciting and inciting. Most of
them were Marathi newspapers. He learnt this as a member of the
Editors Conference. There were, he said, some Punjab papers also
which were writing in the same strain and those matters were also
reported to the Conference. It was being openly discussed in those
days that there were about six lakhs of volunteers forming a part
of a secret organisation to stage a coup d'etat. This organisation
had secret cells in different parts of India-Punjab, Southern India,
Maharashtra, etc.
12A."/8 Mr. Sahni said that Mahatma Gandhi was misled by his
followers who were trying to build up a persecution complex on
behalf of Moslems and were giving Mahatma Gandhi a false idea
of the affluence of the refugees, their misbehaviour and their living
in an extravagant maImer and so on. This produced in the minds
of the refugees an absolute disgust and made them desperate be-
cause it was a false propaganda, and it increased their disappoint-
ment and disgust when they found that some Congress leaders were
working hard to appease the Muslims absolutely ignoring the essen-
tial needs of the vast popUlation of Hindus who had to leave their
hearths and homes in West Punjab and other places and were des-
titute and helpless.
12A.79 In spite of aU this, said Mr. Sahni, "the attitude of minds
of the Hindus and the Sikhs from the Punjab .... could not forget
the services· which had been rendered to them whenever Hindus
and Sikhs were in trouble in the Punjab-Jallianwala Bagh and
Guru ka Bagh are examples-and they would rather like to convert
Gandhiji and use his influence rather than kill him."
12A.80 Mr. Sahni stated that he never found any anti-refugee
feeling in Pandit Nehru, neither in private talks nor otherwise, but
the Hindu and Sikh refugees were impressed by the sympathetic
efforts which were being made by Sardar Patel, Mr. Gadgil, Sardar
Baldev Singh and people of their point of view. Pandit Nehru.also
was quite sympathetic towards the Hindu refugees but "the fact
that along with Maulana Azad, Raft Ahmed Kidwai and other Muslim
colleagues he worked very hard and spared neither money nor time
in discouraging Muslim refugees from leaving for Pakistan pre-
serving their rights to their properties and so forth, created a 'sense
"I hostility among refugees tow81'df; him since the fcfuUel's
'1111I'1y felt that if they had been thrown out of Pakistan, it should
hi' nutural for at least an equal number of Muslims to be allowed
til lIIigrate, even though there no between the mil-
"IJI'dal police was appointed to preserve their rights even for this
Ih .. sense of resentment became almost blind."

12A 81 Mahatma Gandhi, said Mr. Sahni, lIoutcongressed the Con·
"lIming to their homeland. But they were treated as unwanted

Jleople because the idea of Mahatma Gandhi was that they should
rr.tum to their original homes. Unfortunately this idea was echoed
hy lesser leaders who took their cue from the Mahatma and this
made the Government very unpopular among the refugees.
12A.B2 Mr. Sahni's evidence that Gandhiji sent a secret message
Indicating that he wanted to go to Pakistan is supported by Pyarelal
In his book "Mahatma Gandhi-The Last Phase", Vol. II at page 732.
where he bas stated that Gandhiji asked him (Pyarelal) to Ito to
Zahid Hussain and ask him whether they would like him to go to
Pakistan. But Pakistan was not quite satisfied as to the conduct
of the authorities on the Indian side and so reply of Zahid Hussain
was, l'No, not yet ...... but I hope that conditions will change foJ,'
the better sufficiently before long",
12A.S3 The witness's attention was drawn to Pyarelal's liThe
Last Phase" second volume at page 431 in paragraph 4 but Mr.
Sahni's reply was that.at no time were the streets of Delhi littered
with dead bodies of Hindus or Muslims but there was lot of rioting
and killing in certain areas of the old city and the victims were not
only Muslims but also Hindus. Continuing Mr. Sahni said that kill-
ing in East Punjab was retaliatory in its concept and was not started
there.
12A.84 He said that serious differences between Maulana Azad
and Sardar Patel existed since 1940. Sardar Patel incurred unpopu-
larity amongst Muslims which started quite early and the matter
became worse when Mr. Jinnah came into the limelight. There was
talk all the time in the Government for banning communal bodies
like R.S.S.• Muslim League and the Razakars. There were t.wo
groups. in the Cabinet, pne led Pandit Nehru and the other by
Sardar Patel. Sardar Patel wanted to exploit the as.s. in order
to get the support of the Hindus just as Maulana Azad, Rajaji and
Pandit Nehru wanted to get the support of the Muslims. Due to
these differences Sardar Patel threatened to resign not only when
the Mahatma undertook the fast but before also. Said Mr.' Sahni :
"Sardar Patel was very loyal to Mahatma Gandhi and his resigna-
tion was not because he had any differences with him (Mahatma
Gandhi) but because the Sardar had said 'lt if he had lost
Gandhiji's confidence he would resign." Mr. K)rl:,"al drew the atten·
tion of Mr. Sahni to page 221 of MuJana Azal 'book "India Wins
Freedom" where there is a portion that "Gandhiji should be neutr;"
Used." Mr. Sahni said that "appears to be a pure concoction" umJ
that the manner in which the whole paragraph 1 at page 221 hud
been written in regard to the Sardar was tendentious.
12A.85 Mr. Sahni's attention was then drawn to page 223 of lhl'
book as follows:
"Q. Now I draw your attention to Maulana Azad's book, 'Indin
Wins Freedom'-page 223-wherein he has said that JaYII'
prakash Narayan had accused Sardar Patel that the Hom!'
Minister of the Government of India could not escape thl'
responsibility of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi.
A. I do not remember exactly these words. But I do re-
member that there '.vas qUite a feeling in responsible
cles that Government could not escape the responsibility
avert this t1'a-
12.A.86 Mr, Sahni's statement has analysed at length

cause it throws a flood of light on the conditions prevailing 3bout
the time Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated. He has given a very
clear view of the arrival of the refugees, their hopes and
tions, their frustrations and disappointment at the reception they
got in what they thought was their "homeland". They had respect
and affection for Mahatma Gandhi but this was marrep. by the
tude of the Congress and Gandhiji's attitude towards the Muslims
and their neglect of the needs and aspirations of the Hindus who
blood, slaughter, repine, rapings
12A.87 He has also deposed to the moral pressure of the Gover-

nor General that Indian Government should prevent Muslims
ing to Pakistan and that 55 crores should be paid to Pakistan as
would tarnish the honour of India, He also stated that
the Hindu and Sikh refugees were not for killing Gandhiji but to
convert Gandhiji from his ovcr-zeal for the Muslims,
12A.88 He then deposed to the violent speeches and writings in
Marathi press in Maharastrian part of Bombay. But he stated there
were similar writings in the Punjab also.
12A.89 He stated that there was a movement led by Golwalkar
at Nagpur and Bhopatkar at Poona to stage a coup d'etat to take
over the Government of India after killing the leaders. There were
behind this movement some princes and chieftains like Jaisalmer,
Jodhpur, Alwar, Bharatpur, Baroda and Bhopal. And Mahatma's
murder was considered as the first step in that direction.
12A.90 He has also deposed about the internal differences in
the Cabinet and in the Congress leadership-particularly between
Sardar Patel and J)iaulana Azad and between Pandit Nehru and
12A.91 Mr. Sahni also stated that t.he Government should have
Imd and as a matter of fact did have previous knowledge of the
changer to Mahatma's life and a responsible section blamed the Gov-
I'I'nment for negligence and neglect.
Master Tara Singh
12A.92 There was a meeting of the All India States Hindu
dilasabha at Bombay on 29th, 30th November and 1st December,
(Ex. 275-A). One of the at the meeting of 30th Nov.
by Muslims and the Government was protecting the interests

or Muslims while Hindu and Sikh refugees were dying of cold in
Delhi. Gandhiji had no feelings for them. He cared more for the
Muslims and he was requesting them not to leave India. He said
that the English had left the eternal enmity between Hindus and
Muslims ...... Mr. Jinnah had said that as long as Islam remained
they would not allow a single Sikh to live in Pakistan. He (Master
Tara Singh) retorted that as long as Hindu Dharma lived, they ushall
not allow a single Muslim to live (loud cheers)". Nowadays, he
said, many Muslims were calling themselves nationalists but no
Musalman . could ever be a true Hind-loving man. He would ai-
a
to live in India but they could not allow ICtheir necks to be cut by
Musalmans". He wanted all Musalmans to be sent to Pakistan.
12A.93 Mr. Savarkar also at that meeting drew the attention of
the public to the danger from Muslims who were joining the Con-
gress. c'How could a Muslim Leaguer become a nationalist over-
night." The Musalmans wanted to create another Pakistan in India.
He said that Rajajis were their next enemy and that Congress re-
pressive policy towards the Hindus would rouse ,cHindutva" in the
hearts of the masses.
12A.94 This evidence shows that:
(1) The partition brought into Delhi a large number of Hindu
and Sikh refugees who had to emigrate nom Pakistan
both before and after the partition.
(2) They came to India with great hopes of welcome anG} re-
habilitation but the attitude of Congressmen and of
Mahatma Gandhi disappointed them and they were ex-
tremely angry, frustrated and exasperated.
(3) Although they had full faith in Gandhiji but this faith
was largely eroded by Mahatma's solicitude for the Mos-
lems who had brought about the partition and the advice
to them to go back to their homes made them angrier.
(4) Even with all this anger and anguish, their attitude was
not one of the Mahatma even though
their ex-
(5) There. was amongst a large number of Hindus, particularly
the Hmdu Mahasabha, a strong feeling against Mr. Gandhi
for his fast to coerce the payment of 55 crores and up
peasement of Moslems, and neglect of disJ:1onoured, dill"
heartened, pillaged, robbed and homeless Hmdus-the fl'·
fugees from Pakistan.
(6) Besides this there were riotous scenes religiouH
communities in Delhi and its environs whlch led to mul'
ders on the streets of old Delhi.
. (7) There VIr"'8.S moral pressure from Lord Mountbatten and the
complaints of Maulanas which made the Mahatma resort
to the fast. This made the Hindus angrier still.
(8) The extreme Hindu elements of the South particularly
of Poona compendiously called Savarkarites became mor('
and more infuriated against the Mahatma and the more
extreme elements from amongst them were led to the
extreme step of personal violence against the Mahatma.
(9) There was a split in the Central Cabinet in which Sardar

Patel was on one side and Pandit Nehru and Maulana
Azad on the other; so much so that it reached the stage
of Sardar Patel's resignation sent to the Mahatma because
Sardar thought that he had the Mahatma's confidence.
(10) Mahatma Gandhi's presence and fast did restore commnal
peace in Delhi but the hearts of some of the extreme
Savarkarites were bent on Mahatma's removal by v.i.olence.
(11) The causes which led to the murder of the Mahatma was
the Congress of Moslems, neglect of Hindu
refugees, his gomg on fast and giving of 55 crores.
B-What was Happening in Delhi After The Bomb Was Thrown
U;e
various political bodies in Delhi.
12B.2 Ex. 135 dated January 24, 1948, is the weekly intelligence
abstract of Delhi Police. It mentioned under the beading 'general'
about the relief which people had felt at the giving up of the last
by Mahatma Gandhi but the orthodox Hindu sections declined to
be a party to the seven point peace pledge. The explosion at Birla
House was considered to be the index of seething unrest prevailing
amongst the masses against the Gandhian ideology and an inune-
diate revision of the Government's policy towards the Muslims was
demanded.
the late Dr. Sir Gokal Chand Narang, a former Minister of the
Punjab, Professor Ram Singh, L. C. Rai, Desh Bandhu Gupta. Ram
described Mahatma Gandhi's fast to be helpful to the· Muslims to Be
IIbl,. to gct morc value [01' their property and that the
\'1111 playing into the hands of Maulana Azad to hel:p Pro-
'"tllIlll' Ram Singh said that the fast proved belpful m ndiculing.the
Illndus and Sikhs all over the world. Kesho Ram charactensed
Ilhatma Gandhi as a dictator and said that he might meet the fate
"f 1Ii/.le1· soon. (Italics are by the Commission.)
12B.4 Under the Sikh Affairs, there is an account of meeting

"t which one of the speakers said that the Muslims could never be
I"yal to India.
12B.5 Under heading 'Muslims', an account is given of two
IIlI'ctinas on the 19th and 23rd January recognising the selfless ser-
I' Ices of Mahatma Gandhi.
12B.6 At the Congress meetings, emphasis was laid on main-

I!lining communal harmony and Mr. Brahm Prakash denounced the
lIetivities of the R'.S.S.
12B.7 The socialists criticised the Deputy Prime Minister for
being anti-socialist.
12B.8 Under the heading 'Miscellaneous' the incident of Madan-
lar causing an explosion at the time of the prayer meeting is men-
tioned. It is also stated that nobody was injured and the accused
was arrested red-handed. This appears to be tone down account of
Madanlal episode, almost innocuous.
l'al' reference is made to the dastardly murder of Mahatma Gandhi

which had caused indignation amongst the public excepting a small
section of the orthodox Hindus who we're feeling jubila.nt over it.
(Italics are by the Commission.)
12B.l0 Under the heading 'Hindu Affairs', it was stated that the
orthodox Hindus were criticising the Congress for their policy of
appeasement. V. G. Deshpande, Mahant Digvijay Nath and Pro-
Mahatma Gandhi's attitude had strengthened the hands of Pakis-

tanis. They criticised the communal policy of the GQvernment of
fndia and the measures taken by the Mahatma to coerce Indian
Cabinet to pay 55 crores to Pakistan. Mahant Digvijay Nath ex-
horted the gathering to turn out Mahatma Gandhi and other anti-
Hindu elements. Professor Ram Singh also opposed the Mahatma's
policies. Resolutions were passed condemning payment of 55 crores
and in regard to Kashmir. Shouts of 'Long Live Madanlal' were
raised . . Besides this, there \vere other slogans. The Hindu Maha-
sabha c:ondemned the fast of Mahatma Gandhi, the payment of 55
crares, the seven point peace pledge and those members of the Hindu
Mahasabha who had signed the peace pledge.
12B.ll The socialists had decided to mobilise public opinion in
support of a demand for a ne'" Cabinet. Mr. J. P Narayan at 11;
private meeting held on the 31st, accused the police for inadequltll'
.arrangements culminating in the assassination of Gandhiji and lh" . .
had therefore decided to carryon propaganda for suppression or
communalism.
12B.12. The C.LD. report, dated January 27, 1948, Ex. 137. abo
gives an account of the meeting which was held on the 27th un!!"1
the auspices of the Delhi Provincial Hindu Sabha to which referell('"
has already been made in a previous document, Ex. 136. In lIUI,
document the proceedings are described at a greater length. 11
emphasised the raising of the slogan "Madanlal Long Live"
12B.13 After the meeting (of 27th January) was held, the Chid
Commissioner, Sahibzada Khurshid, in a confidential
tion, Ex. 143(1) dated January 30, 1948 pointed out to the D.LG.
that the Deputy Commissioner had said that he had not given any
pernlission for the meeting to be held and he would like to know
as to how the meeting was allowed to be held. If the police did
not know that such a meeting was to be held then the intelligenc'.'
was extremely bad and the Superintendent of Police is really unfit
to hold this job and if the police knew that the meeting was going
to be held and still they did not take any action to prevent it. the
police officers were guilty of gross dereliction of duty. The Chief
Commissioner wanted to have a report in regard to the matter so
that he could take the matter up with the Ministry of Home Affairs.
12B.14 The D.I.G. had recommended the detention of Mr. V. G.

Deshpande and Prof. Ram Singh, two Mahasabha leaders who had
participated in the meeting of the 27th January, but the Chief Com-
1Jlissioner considered one month's detention inadequate and his
nion was that people should be prosecuted for defiance of orders.
12B.15 On February 3, 1948, (Ex. 143) Mr. R. N. Bannerjee wrote
to the Chief Commissioner saying that Government agreed that a
of the prohibitory order shQuld be prosecuted.

12B.16 It appears that the explanation was called of the Super·
intendent of Police, New Delhi, and of Deputy Superintendent Jas-
want Singh. Their respective explanations are Exs. 82 dated 11th
February 1948 and 83 also of the same date.
12B.17 The explanation of Dy. Supdt. Jaswant Singh was that
the Inspector incharge of Parliament Street Police Station had told
:-tim that there was no information about the meeting and he heard
?bou.t it at p.m. and reached the place with a guard and on
mquIry the FJiindu Mahasabha people said that they had obtained
permission of the District Magistrate which was later on found to
be incorrect. As the meeting was in progress and large number of
audience was present, it was considered inadvisable to disperse the
meeting hence no action was taken and action was 'now' being taken
tulder section 188 LP.C. i.e. prosecutions were to be started. The
report of Police Superintendent A. N. Bhatia, Ex. 82 was on similar
lines and it added that the Hindu M'ahasabha people' had stated that
the permission had been applied for and obtained. When the police
11I',,·.li'd on being shown the permission, the Hindu Mahasabha people
.,JlIII l.lwt it would be shown shortly but no permission was shown.
III tlli' meantime the audience had swelled to more than two-
11",Il:;;mu and necessary precautions were taken to prevent any
1,,,':l('h of peace but in view of the crowd, it was thought inadvisabl.e
101 the meeting. The explanation further said that the apph-
,"11011 to hold the meeting was presented by the Delhi Provincial
IIllIdu Mahasabha on the 26th of January which was received by
Ih,' poiiC'e after the meeting had been held, and that those who are
Uililly of breach of the order would be prosecuted under the la"..·.
'/"ill' explanations of Superintendent Bhatia and of Dy, Superinten-
d"lIt Jaswant were forwarded to the Chief Commissioner by
II", 11.I.G., Mr, D. W, Mehra, who added a note Ex. 143 (3) dated Feb-
'Ilolry 15, 1943 that the application had been forwarded by the Dig-
II i("l Magistrate to him and his (D.I.G.'s) reply was that permission
Illight be given if the Hindu Mahasabha gave an undertaking to be
mouerate in their speeches, which indeed is an astonishing rider by
.1 D.I.G. who should have known the conditions in Delhi better. The
I'('cord does not show what had happened to the application but it
was rcceived in the D.I.G.'s office on 29th of January after the meet-
lI\g had been held,
12B.18 Mr. Mehra pOinted out that the Superintendent of Police
hud no intimation of the meeting excepting on the 27th January at
·1-;-10 p.m. when a number of people were seen at the place. The
Porliament Street Police officer reached the spot with a small posse
of police and was assured by the Mahasabha leaders that the per·
mission of the District Magistrate had been obtained which was
clearly false and when the Inspector insisted on showing the per-
mission, it was not produced. By that time the crowd had become
two thousand and it was inadvisable to disperse the crowd. He added'
Curther, as an excuse. that a number of meetings had been held for
the purposes of preaching communal unity so as to enable Mahatma
Gandhi to break his fast-implication being that the other meetings
having been held without permission why not this one. He added
that in his opinion, New Delhi Police was guilty of error of judge-
ment and necessary action would be taken against the officer con-
cerned and that a case had been registered under section 19 of the
Punjab Public Safety Act against the conveners.
12B.19 Ex. 143(4) is a letter by Mr. Bannerjee to the Chief Com-
missioner dated February 17, 1948, in which he asked whether the
meeting of Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan in Connaught Place on Feb-
ruary 4 was in defiance of the orders under section 144 and if so, it
showed that the police were either not vigilant or connived at such
breaches of the law and Government wanted that this laxity should
be put down strongly. It also added that the slogans Live
Madanlal" which were shouted at the 27th January meeting should
have been brought t9 the notice of the Government immediately;
and that effective arrangements should be made for full reporting
of objectionable speeches which should be scrutinised by the Dis-
trict Magistrate and by the Chief Commissioner and forwarded to
the Home Ministry.
12B.20 Ex. 143(5) dated 23rd February, 1948, is another letter
by Mr. Bannerjee to the Chief Commissioner, regarding the defiance
158
of the Governmental prohi ilory order and the holding of the meet·
ing Oil Ibc 27th. It mentioned that ordinarily the District Magis·
trat(' should have refused the application for holding the
immediately and the police should have been informed of the DIS'
trict Magistrate's order. It was to be noted that atmosphere follow.
ing the bomb outrage at the Birla House on the 20th January wal
certainly surcharged and it was difficult to follow why there should
have been any hesitation in rejecting the application for holding the
mceting. To this the Chief Commissioner replied on 11th March,
1948, Ex. 143(6), in which It was said that condolence meetings were
being held in connection with the death of Mahatma Gandhi and
lhat when the meeting of the 27th had started, it was difficult to
disperse it and it also said that Mehra was taking disciplinary action
ugamst the police officers who failed to do their duty in not
pers!ng the meeting.
12B.21 There is a letter dated March 11, 1948, Ex. 143(8) from
the Chief Commissioner to Mr. Bannerjee in which it is stated that
Mehra acted unwisely in suggesting that permission should be given
if the leaders gave an undertaking not to make intemperate spee-
ches. The letter also mentioned the letter of the Chief Commission('r
to Mehra that the meeting should have been dispersed and it also
mentioned that disciplinary action was being taken against those
officers. It suggested that Randhawa may be told that he acted in-
discreetly in not rejecting the application for meeting forthwith.
Mr. Randhawa on March 8, 1948, Ex. 143(9). gave his explanation
referring to what the D.I.G. had advised him and added that no
undertaking was given and no permission was granted, and that it
was the duty of the Superintendent of Police, New Delhi to have
satisfied himself whether any permission had been granted.
12B.22 On March 23, 1948, Ex. 143(11) the Government of India
expressed its disapproval of the action of Mr. Randhawa who in its
opinion acted indiscreetly by not rejecting the application forth-
:wl\h.
128.23 The Commission is of the opinion that the opinion of the
Chief Commissioner was right and the meeting should not have
b£!cn allowed to be held. It is difficult to accept the excuse that
the police came to know about the proposed meeting at 4-30 P.M.
when people began gathering. Public meetings are not called at
the .spur of the moment and this one had been applied for a day
{'nrlier and must have been advertised earlier. It is demonstrative
or police incompetence or lethargy if not complacence.
JanuarY,1948. It is more or less reiteration of what is already

contained in the police fortnightly reports.
12B.25 On January 21, 1948 when Mr. Sahni attended the pra-
yer meeting, he there but .he could· not say how
The Mahatma, he said, Was not afraid of death and could stand . .in
15D
lilt' line of the trajectory of a bullet if it was directed against him.

This he did at Calcutta with a lantern in hand when he was threat-
l'III'd with death.
12B.26 The Commission might add that one of the greatest and
BlOst well deserved tributes paid to the Mahatma was by the late
1lon'ble Dr. Khan Sahib, Premier of the N.W.F.P. who said in a
what he thought was right irrespective of its danger to his life.

C-Political Conditions in Delhi
12C.l According to Miss Maniben Patel's diary, Ex. 273, the re-
lations between Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel and Maulana Azad
were not happy but after the murder of Mahatma Gandhi Mr, Nehru
wrote a confidential letter dated 4th February 1948 saying
that now that Mahatma Gandhi was dead, they should work in co-
operation. On 24th February 1948 Maulana Azad came and said
"Gone is gone, all should work together" ........ uSardar said that
neither Maulana nor Jawaharlal wanted him. He will remain out-
side. Maulana did not refute this". On 25th February 1948 Jaya-
prakash Narayan met G, D. Birla and said to him that there were
differences between Jawaharlalji and Sardar. Jawaharlalji wanted
Mahajan toO go from Kashmir Diwanship and Sardar did not want
lhis.
12C.2 On March 2, 1948 the entry is rather revealing:

"Devdasbhai came at 8-30 P.M •
. . . , Sardar talked: "I have never talked to you. But there

were efforts to drop me out since three months before Gan-
dhi's death. Ewn socialists, Maulana were involved in it.
Bapoo (Gandhijee) said to me at that time, "You both are
unable to cope up with each other and there are no chances- of
it being so" even in future. One of the two should be taken in.
Looking to your popularity at present you should be raised",
I said "No" and added that this was a useless taJk. Jawahar-
laljee is younger than I. He enjoys an international fame
and moreover these people are propagating that I am bent
upon turning them out. Such a step will only confirm their
propaganda.
"Once Jawaharlal had gathered four or five Maulanas
before Bapoojee (Gandhijee) including Maulana Hafiz-ul-
Rahman. Hafiz-ul-Rahman started talking tall. I said, "Tell
me in specific terms and I shall search". I will change people
if something is proved. But I shan not remove anybody on
the basis of vague charges. In fact their real intention was to
remove Randhawa. Even Bapoojee (Gandhijee) had said
that to talk to remove the Chief Commissioner is a useless
if there is something more then give in writing to
"Then there was a storm in Ajmer. H. V. Iyengar was st'nt
direct without consulting me. Then 1 wrote to them that such
interference by sending officers directly without consultinu:
me is not proper. Upon this he wrote, "I cannot abdicate
functions?" All this was going on while Bapoo's fast came III
between. Those people had decided to take in J ayapraknsh
removing me.
"This 55 crores episode pinched me much. This 55 crorell
was paid and Bapoojee's (Gandhijee's) murder was a resulL
of this.
a talk with you regarding 55 crore affair and told that it was
di:!lhonourable. Then he should M.ve told this to me.
only on the next day.

"I went to the Viceroy from Bapoojee, and asked him that
he told Bapoo (Gandhljee) that it was dishonourable. You
have thus let down the Cabinet. Sardar showed all the papers
to MountbaUen. Later on he apologised. Panditjee said it is
'petty-fogging'. I said in the Cabinet that we should agree to
pay 55 crores. But I am to stay no longer. I am. under intoxi-
cation either of age or of power. Therefore I do not want to
stay in the Cabinet any longer.
"Later on I wrote a letter to Bapoojee on the next day
oefore going to Bombay that I should be relieved. Even
Maulana does not want me.
"I had talks with Gandhljee even on the last day. At that
time Bapoojee told me that it is not possible to pull on with
'p,ither of you. Both of you should remain. Tomorrow we
shall clarify everything when we meet.
"Jawaharlaljee wrote a letter to me two or three days after
returning from Rajghat. The letter was a nice letter saying
that 'gone is gone' and we should work together forgetting the
past. I too wrote to him a good letter.
"But on the other hand J ayaprakash started attacking in
open Public Meeting. There Achyut declared 'today it is high
time that Jayaprakash should be taken in after removing
Sardar'.
"Later on J awaharlaljee scolded J ayaprakash in the Party
meeting. But he did not want that this should come in the-
newspapers. Therefore issue contradiction in newspapers.
"My Lucknow speech was not relished "l:!y
He twisted that in his newspaper, and attacked it strongly.
161
"Maulana came to me in office with a letter of appointment

three or four days after this and asked me to forget the past
and work in a team spirit. I told him that he and Jawahar-
lnljee had decided to remove me. But he did not contradict
it.
"Your Brajkrishan and Aruna arc also in league.
"Now Jayaprakash has started attacking me in Bombay
and Soorat."
12C.3 On March 5, 1948 Sardar got a heart attack and the entry
on the 6th March was "Sardar was affected by propaganda against
him. His eyes were full of tears",
12C.4 The Times of India dated 18th February, 1948, Ex. 242, re-
ported a speech of J ayaprakash Narayan at Pat.na on February 15
where he said that he was not a believer in fate and was convinced.
that if the prominent Congress Ministers had not patronised and
nttended RS.S. rallies and had warned the youth of the country
really against joining the organisation .... Mahatma Gandhi would
never have been taken away. He also accused the officials of
attempting to blanket the criminal and sabotage any effort made
to unearth the conspiracy and added if he desired he would have
got any portfolio and he was not saying all that because he wanted
a Cabinet post. .
12C.5 It appears that the Ministry of Home Affairs took objec-
tion to the meeting held on 4th February, 1948 which was addressed
by Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan. It said that it was clear that the
police were either insufficiently energetic or were conniving at it.
This was most reprehensible and strong warning should be given to
the local administration not to pennit such defiance of prohibitory
orders. This communication was under the signatures of Mr. V.
Shankar and is dated February 6, 1948.
12C.6 According to the report in Bombay Chronicle of February
4, 1948, Ex. 241, Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan at a press conference on
Mahatma Gandhi's death said:
"Weare prepared to take up any responsibility to deal with
this crisis-any kind of responsibility whether in the Working
Committee of the Congress or in the Government or anywhere
else."
12C.7 Some socialist leaders like Mr. J ayaprakash Narayan, Dr.
Ram Manohar Lohia and Mrs. Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya issued a
statement at a press conference in which they said that "the assassin
was not one person but there was a wide conspiracy and organisa-
tion behind it. They laid blame on the Hindu Mahasabha, R.S.S.
and the Muslim League and such like bodies for the assassination of
Mahatma Gandhi. They accused the Government of not protecting
the Mahatma against a 'prowling assassin'. They then asked for re-
constitution of the Government and demanded that the Home
Ministry must be entrusted to a person who will have no other
portfolio and who will be able to curb the cult and organisations Qf
11-2;9 HA.
162
communal hate and there should be no place for communalists in

the reconstituted government and, in particular, the Home
Minister must push through at top-speed the programme of purify-
ing Government services of all communal elements and of educat-
ing them into a national cit:zenship".
12C.S Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan then said that a man of 74
had departments of which even a man of 30 would probably find it
difficult to bear the burden. He said that there was too much burden
on the Home Minister but added as a suffix that he was not censur-
inghim.
12C.9 According to the Times of India, dated February 18, 1943,
Ex. 242, Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan said that the people should not
distrust the campaign that he had undertaken to draw pointed at-
tention to the weakness of the Central administl'ation:
"He had nothing to benefit personally, he said, from a frank
and free criticism and an over-all estimation of the events
leading up to Mahatma Gandhi's assassination. He was no
believer in fate and was convinced that, if prominent Con-
gress Ministers had not patronised and attended RS.S. rallies
and had warned the youth of the country clearly against join-
i.ng the organisation and provided other suitable outlets for
their energies, Mahatma Gandhi would never have been
taken away from us when we most needed him.
"Even after the bomb was thrown at him during the prayer
meeting no strong action was taken, but instead attempts
were made to blanket the criminals by officials within the
administration, who sabotaged any effort that might have
been made to unearth the conspiracy."
12C.I0 Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan then said that it was . . . .Tong
that he desired a Cabinet portfolio which he had refused several
time:o. said that he was also taunted for having exaggerated the
differences between Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel but he had only
mentioned them with the intention of clearing the atmosphere of
rumours. He had ideological differences with Sardar Patel but he
used to meet him quite often.
12C.11 He criticised the Government for having spokesmen of
big businessmen included in the Cabinet. He wanted the commu-
nalists and communal saboteurs to be replaced by democratic minded
nationalists.
12C.12 In the "BOmbay Chronicle" of February 28, 1948, Ex. 243,
is given a report of a speech of Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan at Bombay
where he demanded the resignation of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mooker-
.jee, Mr. R K. Shanmukham Chetty,.Sardar Baldev Singh and Mr.
C. H. Bhabha. He blamed the Central Cabinet for encouraging com-
munal organisations in the COtultry which resulted in Gandhiii's
murder and demanded the banning of communal organisations. He
said that he did not demand that the socialists be included in
the Cabinet but there were a number of nationalists who could be
163
llH're and the portfolio of !n'formatioll and Broadcasting should

'q)arated from that of Home otherwise it will result in dictatorship.
IIe said that he was not against Sardar but he wanted a man who
frl':'e from wrnmunalism to be inchal'ge of Home Department.
:.:?C.l3 This \vaS a strong condemnation of Sardar Patel wit

r1wrge of communalism added to other charges.
t2C.14 Miss Maniben Patel deposed before the Commission that

Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan and the Socialists were anxious to have
Sardar Patel removed.
12::.15 This evidence shows that two the Hindu Maha-

sabha and the SociaLsts had held meetings in defiance of the prohi-
bitory order under S. 144 Cr. p.e. The former criticised the Con-
gress for pandering to the Muslims and condemned the giving of
Rs. 55 crores at the instance of Mahatma Gandhi and also criticised
him for helping the Muslims. The latter were after Sardar Patel's
head and wanted him and the non-Congress elements in the Cabinet
to make an exit. But both the Hindu Mahasabhaites and the Jaya-
prakash Narayan socialists were endeavouring to achieve their
.objective by defiance of the prohibitory order, thereby showing
little regard for legal processes.
12C.16 The Commission is not called upon to pronounce on the
propriety or otherwise of the two opposite views expressed, but it
cannot help remarking that meetings in defiance of the prohibitory
·orders showed an utter lack of regard for lawful orders promul-
gated and the shouts of "MADANLAL ZINDABAD" (Long Live
Madanlal) showed a lamentable lapse on the part of the conveners
of the Hindu Mahasabha meeting of the 27th .January and compari-
son of M",hatma Gandhi to Hitler with prediction of meeting a
similar fate cannot be termed political innocuousness but clearly
showed violent illwi11.
12C.17 The protective measures and security arrangements at

irla House have been set out in this chapter and many suggestions
were made as to what should have been done. What was done was
the increase in the number of policemen stationed at Birla House
.and the deployment of plain clothes policemen in Birla House for the
purposes of watching persons attending the prayer meetings. By
witnesses who should know, like Mr. M. K. Sinha, Mr. B. B. S.
Jetley and Mr. G. K. Handoo who were senior police officers, these
;arrangements have been termed inadequate and a pattern of pro-
tective measures was suggested by Mr. G. K. Handoo in his state-
ment. As has been said at another place, it would be highly specu-
lative to say that those measures would have been sufficient to give
proper protection.
12C,18 The Commission hac; set out the complexity of the Dl'ob-
lem, the fearlessness and utter disregard for his own life
by
Mahatma Gandhi and the genuine desire of people to come to his
'prayer meeting not only to have a darshan of the Mahatma but also
164
to touch his feet for achieving religious merit. In these circum
stances, to devise any foolproof means of protection _ might
been very difficult but, in the opinion of the CommissIon, what walt
suggested in his statement by Mr. HandaD was worth trying atllj
because its success was a matter of speculat:on was no valid reason
for not attempting it and it was a mistake not to have tried it.
12C.19 Further, the evidence of ?olice witnesses that Bcmb:.lY

police from Poona should have been called, is based on good com-
monsense and the Commission is of the view that that should also
have been done although according to Mr. D. W. Mehra, witness
No, 23, and Mr. U, H. Rana, witness No.3, both D.I.Gs., it .vould
have been inefficacious. With this view the Commission does not
agree. Efficacious or not may be conjectural and was in the lap of
gods but it was one of the precautions which ordinary prudence
required that it should have been taken.
12C.20 The holding of meetings or allowing meetings to be held,
which were in contravention of prohibitory orders, shows how little-
regard political parties including the Hindu Mahasabha and the-
Socialists had for lawfully promulgated orders but meeting of the
Hindu Mahasabha which was held on the 2-7th January showed how
ineffective the police itself was. It either did not know that permis-
sion had not been obtained by the sponsors of the meeting or it did
not care. In either case, one cannot compliment it on its efficiency.
12C.21 The evidence of Mr. Bannerjee shows that the Adminis-
tration was not at its best after the Partition and many things:
which ordinarily should have happened did not happen, like'
Weekly Conferences. So also important events, such as the·
attempted murder of Mahatma Gandhi on the 20th January, was
reported neither to the District Magistrate nor to the Home Secre-
tary nor does it appear that either of them tried to get any reports.
12C.22 It would be fair to add that the conditions in Delhi from
after the Partition right upto the time the fast was undertaken were
most disturbed and disturbing. There were Hindu-Muslim riots in
the old city and there were disturbances even in the area round
about the city. According to Mr. V. Shankar, witness No. 10, the
time of the District Magistrate was mostly taken up with the law
and order problems, and Mr. M. S. Randhawa who was then the Dis-
V
read out to him he agreed with it and added:
.• I would like to add that a number of murders were taking
place in the city due to communal tensions. As a matter
of fact when I took charge of the District and I was count·
ing the treasury every ten minutes I wouLd get a message·
that somebody or other was murdered in the city. That.
shows how grave the situation was. The situation was so·
grave and dangerous that when I went out in the evening
my rounds .I was never sure that I would get back home·
alive or uninjured."
This shows that not only the police administration was
dll"J(!4,wised at the time due to the Partition and communal distUlb-
"HC'C'S but even the cIvil adminislration of the District had a trt'men-
d'lIl:; burden put upon it to keep law and order in the city as well
,I:i al'c:ls lOund the city. The conditions were so disturbed that two
.. l1i('t'l's were killed, one of them was a member of the Indian Civil
:;I'!Ticc who was a Special Magistrate in Delhi, and the other an army
.. Coincidentally they were both named Mishra.
j The RS.S. has been discussed in a separate chapter along
wrL!1 Hindu Mahasabh .. and Hindu Rashtra Dal but Mr. Banerjee's
"\'iucnce in regar.d to this organisation and also that of Mr. Morarji
I h'sai and other witnesses had again been given here because, in the
.. pinion of the Commission, that is part of the general conditions pre-
\':Iiling in Delhi. The evidence of Mr. a N. Bannerjee is that the
H.S.S. as a body were not responsible for the bomb throwing or for
I\'0 murder of Mahatma Gandhi nor were the conspirators acting
III t'leir capacity as members of the organisation. As a matter of
rad, the principal accused who have been shown to be members
of the Hindu Mahasubha belonged to th;:! Rashtra Dal
which was a distinct Savarkarite organisation. It has not been
proved that they were members of the as.s. which shows that they
were believers in a more violent form of activities tha,n mere parades,
rallies, physical exercises and even shooting practices.
12C.25 There is no proof that any of the ministers or any of the
of the Government were patro!lising or attending R.S.S.
rallies and this charge made against them, on the evidence which has
been put before the Commission, is not established. Commission is
not concerned with the demand for resignation of non-Congress
leaders of India who had been drafted by the consent of all parties
into the Central Cabinet after independence was achieved, the object
being to have a national Government rather than merely a party
Government.
12C.26 The political conditions were not quite happy. There was
want of cordiality between Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel and
between Sardar Patel and Maulana Azad. As a matter of fact,
Sardar Patel and Maulana Azad had not been getting on well with
each other since 1940 and perhaps from earlier days.
much so that Sardar Patel sent in his resignation to Mahatma Gandhi

requesting him to let him get out of the Cabinet. The seriousness
of these differences has been brought out in Pyarelal's book "Mahatma
Gandhi-The Last Phase" Vol. II at page 721 and also in Miss Maniben
Patel's di.ary of January 25, 1948 and of March 2, 1948 where a fuller
account is given showing what moves were being made and how
the cleavage was widening. These differences were partly patched
up after the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. This shows that the
Cabinet was divided on some vital matters. Mr. J. N. Sahni has
state1 that Sardar did not want to lose the sympathy of the Hindus
because the other party were trying to get asmstance of the Muslims.
That may be representative pf the different approach to national
problems the propriety of which is not for the Commission to
but it only proves that there were dilferences in the Cabinet at thl."
time which were a continuation of differences in the Congr2ss itself
and its Working Committee. -
12C.28 The Socialists for some reason did not like Sardar Patel
whose pragmatic approach to problems was not to their liking.
Sardar Patel, Sardar Baldev Singh and Mr. N. V. Gadgil an:l people
of that way of thinking had serious with the other section
of the Cabinet, Pandit Nehru and Maulana Azad and Raft Ahmad
Kidwai. One of the reasons of this cleavage appears to have been
the han:lling of Kashmir affairs and another the anxiety on the part
of the former not to lose the sympathy of the Hindus and Sikhs in
general and particularly of the refugees who had come from Pakistan
and the insistence of the latter td keep the sympathies of the Muslims
in India by not allowing the refugees to oust th2m from their homes.
By itscH it might have been a laudable objective but in the conditions
that W2re then prevalent, the refugees were not prepared to accept
the propriety of that logic or its reasonableness. They could not
why the very people whose approach to Pakistan had made them
homeless and ha:l exposed them to indignities of all kinds should
get the best of both the worlds Clnd they, whose sacrifices had made'
it poss;ble for India to achieve independence, should be treated as
undesirable outsiders if not aliens.
12C.29 Commission does not accept the view that Prime Minister
Nehru or any of the ministers were against or unsympathetic to the
incoming refugees from Pakistan an:! the evidence given by Mr. J.
N. Sahni on this point correctly represents the state of mind of Mr.
Nehru but that was not what the refugees believed; and when
Mahatma Ga!ldhi also made post prayer speeches indicative of want
of sympathy for them it exasperated them against Mahatma Gandhi
because for them Congress was Mahatma Gandhi and Mahatma
Gandhi was Congress. They got still more exasperated when they
came to know that the Mahatma wanted them to go back to their
homes which they were not ?repared to do under any circumstance
whatever be th:! sacrifice required. They knew exactly what had
happened to them and they anticipated no different treatment at the
hand of the Pakistan authorities and people. The doings of the
mujahids, the Razakars, the Khaksars and the League volunteers and
the attitude of the officials an,d others did not predicate a pleasant
welcome for them and, therefore, they insisted that the Muslims
should go to their homeland flS they had come to theirs. Whether
this attitude of mind was right or wrong is not for this Commission
to decide but thii> was the attitude of the refugees, which got further
exasperated by the fast of Mahatma Gandhi and the giving of the
55 crores to Pakistan which, in the opin:ion of Hindus, was an
atrocious thing to do because that money was not only likely but
sure to be used for the purpos2 of fighting against the Indian Army
which had been sent to protect the indefensible Kashmir at a time
when there was nothing to stan the on rush of Pakic;tani army to
forciblv the fa'ir valley of Kashmir except the bravery of
the Indian Jawan,
167
D-Statement of Oflicers of The Home Ministrll
12D.l The Commission proposes to give a fuller account from
the statements of principal witnesses who at the time were COD-
nected with the Home Ministry. 'rh:0se witnesses were Mr. V.
Shankar, I.e.s., Private Secretary of Sardar Patel, Mr. R. N.
Bannerjee, I.e.s., Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Miss
Maniben Patel, M.P. daughter of Sardar Patel.
Mr. V. Shanka-r, Wit. l(P), Wit. lO(K)
12D.2 Mr. V. I.C.S., witness No. 10, was at the relevant
time Private Secretary to the Home Minister. He was witness No.1
before Mr. Pathak. He state:! that from the intelligence reports
as well as from the discussions between the Bombay Premier and
the Home Minister, the Sardar knew "that there was a move to
assassinate Mahatma Gandhi and also that perhaps the (If
that movement was at Poona", but the witness did not about
any particular individual who had given that information. At that
time there were rumours and suspicions of a vague nature but the
bomb incident was the first concrete piece of evidence on which
action could be taken.
12D.3 Sardar Patel's modus operandi in dealing with cases of
this kind was this. He used to hold personal discussions with
people in Delhi and Intelligence authorities h the Pro-
vinces and also with Premiers and Home Ministers of those Pro-
vinces. Also when he visited the Provinces he used to discuss these
matters generally with the Premiers and Home Ministers concerned.
The main executive agency was the Provincial Governm"?nts but
the Sardar used to give them a1vice where the Intelligence Bureau
could be of assistance.
12D.4 At the time of the bomb incident the Sardar was at
Ahmedabad. There he met Mr. Kher and Mr. Morarji Desai. In
paragraph 7 he stated that so far as the conspiracy was concerned
the action used to b"? taken by the Government of Bombay either
on their own initiative or on instructions or on getting
instructions from the Sardar. There was a close contact between
the Central Intelligence and the Bombay Special Police and the
D.I.B. used to seek instructions from the Sar-dar where necessary.
He said: "The general line, as far as I remember, in this case was
to investigab the truth or otherwise of any information that was
coming to the notice either of the Government of India or of the
Government of Bombay and to pursue or drop it, as the case may
be, on the completion of the investigation. I know that during this
period all sort of rumours were prevailing and naturally the police
had to screen the information that came to their notice and took
action when it was warranted."
12D.5 The general instructions were that the suspects "should
be particularly kept under watch" and the first concrete evidence
on the basis of which any effective action could be taken was the
confessional statement of Madanlal. Before that there were only
rumours. The Sardar, Mr. Kher and Mr..... Morarji Desai knew that
there was a conspiracy but not as to who was in it. Even a man
like Mr. N. C. Kelkar was being mentioned.
168
12D.6 Details of the measures taken for the protection or
Gandhiji were stated in reply to a question by Mr. Ananthasayanam
Ayyangar in the Constituent Assembly. Ex. 142. They consisted in
increasing the strength of the police at Birla House and a request
by police to search every visitor who went to the prayer meeting.
The Sardar said that he himself pleaded with 'Mahatma Gandhi to
allow the police to do its duty by searching the visitors but the
Mahatma did not agree saying that his life was in the l)ands of
God and if he had to die no precaution would save him.
12D.7 In reply to supplementary questions Sardar said that it

was inadvisable to rlisclose all the facts lUlder investigation but he
could say that an officer was sent to Bombay immediately after the
arrest of Madanlal who took a copy of his statement to the Bombay
C.LD. As a result of discussion it was thought expedient that
some persons might be arreste:! but it was inadvisable to arrest
them all immediately as that would give a hint to the other con-
spirators who would thus go underground. "Therefore, both the
Bombay Police and the Delhi CJI.D. after consultation, came to the
conclusion that the conspiracy should be pursued and a little more
time might be taken. It is also true that they were on the track
of these people, but they were not all Bombay."
12D.il A further question was put whether it was not possible

for th Delhi C.I.D. to procure photographs of the assassins from
Bombay and whether it was not correct that the persons arrested
(Madanlal) had given out the name of the assassin to be and whether
those photographs could be supplie::l to the police in order to
identify the assassin and arrest him in time. The reply to this
question was that the Delhi Police did, in pursuance of the infor-
matirlll received, try to trace. people but they were not all in
one place and it was not possible to take photographs of the people
who were not in Bombay. When asked if the Bombay Police had
informed the Government that a desperate chapter had left Bombay
in pursuance of the conspiracy, the answer was in the negative.
12D.9 As far the witness's recollection went, Government

kn!!w of the existence of a set of people who felt that the tragedy
which had overtaken the Hindus and Sikhs of Punjab and Hindus
of Bengal had its root in the partition of the country which was a
consequence of the appeasement policy of Muslims fonowed by the
Congress for a number of years the main inspiration of which was
Gandhiji. According to the witness, the Kesari school of thought
in Poona was openly expressing this view and that was the view
of some of the refugees who were in Delhi and East Punjab and in
this there was a certain amount of political and religious rivalry
involved. It had not assumed such a serious fonn which could have
culminated in political assassination until Gandhiji's fast. The
atmosphere thereafter was surcharged with hatred of Paldstan
which was augmented by what happened in Kashmir. The main
issue engaging public a.ttention at the time was that of Kashmir and
the plight of refugees from both wings. of Pakistan. They inter-
rupted Ghandhiji's prayers, protested against his philosophy and
169
'1l"lilocis, his helping the cause of Muslims in India which went to
lilt' ('xlent of preventing even those who wanted to go to Pakistan
'I<>rn doing so, The held by Hindus and Sikhs from West
I'nldstan was that the Muslims should be sent away which was
I "lIlrary to the policy of the Government of India or the views and
WI:,lLes of Gandhiji himself. The Sardar realised that because of
(Iundhiji's refusal to allow security precautions being taken it would
IIlIt be possible to safeguard his life. But the matters were aggravat-
I,d by the payment of Rs. 55 crores to Pakistan which, according
t" the witness, was insisted. upon by Gandhiji at the pursuasion of
r,01':1 Mountbatten that it was a moral obligation.
12D.I0 According to the witness, the police did not get any con-
or tangible evidence about the conspiracy until they got the
<'onfessional statement after which both the Intelligence Bureau
lind the Bombay Police were on the trail of those whose names had
mentioned by MadanlaL "Special groups of people were sent
to trace them out from their reported places of refuge but they
c!vaded police parties, I also know that a speclial watch was kept
lit possible points of entry into Delhi. As far as my recollection
Hoes, Shri Nathuram Godse himself said that he Was cognisant of
these activities of the police and took successfully the precaution
10 avoid them". There were difficulties in detecting anyone because
of the overcrowding at the railway station. The difficulty was high-
lighted by the fact that one Suryadev one of the conspirators had
remained undetected for years after the murder.
12D.ll The actual investigation was entursted to the Bombay
Police but the officers of the Intelligence branch were asked to help
them. As far as the witness could remember, Madanlal was locked
up in Delhi, perhaps in Red Fort and it was there that he gave the
information which he did. This impression of Mr. Shankar was
,erroneous.
12D.12 Mr. Shankar was examined by this Commission on April

10, 1967. He did not know anything about Ketkar's giving infor-
mation through Enl ukaka Kanitkar but there was information of
the existence of a hostile camp at Poona known as the Kesari
school which was against Gandhiji and Savarkar was its inspiration,
But their activities were watched by the Bombay Special Branc.h
which since the British days used to deal with political matters and
it was not the ordinary C.I.D. The witness said that the Sardar
must have seen the statement of Madanlal made on the 25th Jan-
uary. Even earlier, a gist of the statements of Madanlal made from
time to time wer:! conveyed to him by the D.I.B. and the witness
distinctly remembered that the Sardar had ordered to keep persons
ment'ioned by Madanlal under surveillance.
12D.13 Mter Madanlal incident the Sardar tried to get
'Gandhiji's consent to plain-clothes policemen shadowing him during
his journey from the room in Birla House to the place of the prayer
meeting but he Would not agree; however he had no objection to
·the tightening of the security measures in other respects in accord-
'ance with what has been stated above. The witness could not say
170
whnt actual action was taken by the police to ensure that 1.11IJI,'
who could recognise Godse were posh:.! at strategic points of aLT"I'"
to the prayer ground. The District Magistrate was at the timp n
hu:;y person and he could not keep in touch with the detail,.,1
developments in important cases of crime in his charge.
12D.14 In cross-examination by Mr. Vaidya, Mr. Shankar :-'Hld
that Mr. Morarji Desai or Mr. Kher used to tell the Home Minish••
on the telephone, or orally if the Sardar to be in Bombll.v
ahout important developments in the province. This also applic·d
10 tll(' developments in regard to "this case". The witness did 11ul
IUlO\\' nnylhing about Ketkar or Kanitkar. He did not have ally
1'!'I'"lketiol1 of the information about the conspiracy given by MI
[\.11)1':tl'ji Desai to the Sardar nor did he have any recollection about
j'r"r, Jain.
120.15 The statements which were put by the witness before till'
'ardar more detailed than Ex. 5. He could not recollect havinH
scen the detailed statement of Madanlal but a report of the state-
mcnt was received by the Sardar at that time. The witness could
lIot remember whe!l he was shown the short statement Ex. 5 and
lilt' long statement..annexure!IV (which is really Ex. I, but has been
w["ongly recorded as Ex. 6) whether these were the statements
which were by the Sardar. He could not say what steps
Uw S:n'dar took afer the report was submitted to him. The Sardar
Ilsed to get from the officers concerned what steps they proposed
10 lake and then he would indicate his own mind. The reason why
lilt' investigation was handed over to the Bombay Police was that
t 11(> main conspiracy was planned there.
12D.16 The statement of Mr. Shankar shows that-
(1) The discussion between the Bombay Premiert and the
Home Minister indicated that there was a "move to
assassinate Mahatma Gandhi and the centre of that move-
ment was Poona". -
(2) The Sardar used to discuss this matter with the Intelli-
gence officers at Delhii and in the Provinces and also with
the Premiers and Home Ministers of the Provinces when-
ever he visited them or they came to Delhi.
(3) When the bomb was thrown, the Sardar was at Ahmeda-
bad. There Mr. Kher and Mr. Morarji Desai met him.
(4) Action in regard to the conspiracy was left to be taken
by the Government of Bombay but the genera] instruc-
tions were that the suspects should be kept under
surveillance.
(5) Although there were rumours previously, it was after the
bomb was thrown that there was definlte information
about the conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi upon
which any concrete action could be taken.
(6) As a result of the bomb throwing, the police at
House were strengthened.
171
(7) C,lvcrnmcnt was aware of the existence of a number of
Deople who felt that the tragedy which had
the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal was a consequence
of thO! appeasement policy of the Congress of which the
inspiration came from Gandhiji. The feelings against
Gandhiji's assumed serious form after Gandhiji's fast and
thereafter the atmosphere was surcharged with hatred of
Pakistan.
(8) The Hindus and Sikhs insisted that the Mohammedans
• should be sent aw§v from Delhi. The matters were
aggravated when the 55 crares were paid at the persuasiGn
of Lord Mountbatten who said it was a moral obligation.
(9) After some tangible evidence of the conspiracy had been
obtained from statement, the IntO!lligence
Bureau and the Bombay Police were on the trail of those
mentioned by Madanlal an:l. special groups of people were
sent to trace them from their haunts and even Nathuram
Godse was aware of this activity but he managed to
successfully evade it.
(10) The actual investigation was entrusted to the Bombay
Police but officers of the Intelligence Branch were asked
to help him.
(11) As far as the witness k!lew, Madanlal was kept in the
Red Fort where he made his confessfonal statement.
(This appears to be erroneous because the police case
Station and it was there that he was interviewed by

Mehta Puran Chand.)
Mr. Shankar did not know anything about Ketkar or
Kanitkar nor about the information which Mr. Morarji
Desai gave to the Sardar nor about Professor Jain.
(13) Statements of Madanlal were shown to the Sardar but the·
witness does not seem to be clear as to which statement
was shown. He stated that the statement shown was more
detailed than Ex. 5, but whether it was Ex. 1., i.e. the fuller
statement of Madanlal, or 'Ex. 6, the statement made by
Madanl9.1 on the 1st day, the witness could not say.
Mr. R. N. Brl11.nerjee, Wit. 19
12D.17 Mr. R. N. Banerjee, Le.S. (retired) who was the Ii'ome
Secretary of the Central Government at the time! was examined by
Mr. Pathak on January 22, 1966. In that statement he has given an
account of what happened on January 30, 1948 and on the consecutive
few days. His statement is this: he did not know of the conspiracy
to murder Mahatma Gandhi prior to 30th January and the first he
came to know about the conspiracy was on the 31st after the crema-
tion, when a meeting of some of highest of the land was held and
it was there disclosed that there was a conspiracy to murder the
Mahatma. N ormaUy the Police should have informed him about the
174
xf"cdJect but what ,va!;: read out gave more particulars about 1Il"
Bombay haunts and "PHIR AYEGA".
12D.20 Sanjevi had slated at the conference 'held at Home Milllil
ler's house that he had sent the full confessional statement madp \'1'
the substance of which was that Apte and Godse must h;I\'"
,gone back to their 2 or 3 haunts in Bombay.
12D.21 The witness then said that when the bomb was throw II
:at Birla House the District Magistrate should have taken more activi'
interest in the matter and found out what was happening and it WIIK
not only the D.-strict Magistrate but everybody fJ;om Home Minish']'
iiownwards should have taken more interest.
12D.21A He then stated that the Police had been depleted and
there was no proper organisation and even magisterial organisation
was defective so much so that the ordinary meetings which used to
'be held between the Home Secretary, the D.LE., the Chief Commis·
'sioner, Deputy Commissioner and Senior Superintendent of Police
of Delhi and one or two Magistrates where the matters connected
with administration were also could not be held regularly.
It was really the breakdown and the weakness of the administration
and want of proper cooperation between the Police and the Adminis-
tration which led to this laxity on the part of individual officers and
.to the catastrophe. •
12D.22 Asked as to what should have been done if information

·was given to Bombay Government as early as July 1947 that Mahatma
'Gandhi's life had been threatened, Mr. Bannerjee said that the Gov-
;:>rnment should have ordcr('d to kCf!p those persons under surveillance
and should have also informed the Delhi Police about the matter and
proper and adequate measures should have been taken to stop any
narm coming to Mahatma Gandhi.
12D.23 He also said that on Professor Jain's infonnation, proper

directions should have been given to the Secretary or the head of the
Police and he should have been asked to submit his report within a
short but speCified time and the progress of the investigation should
have been watched and more interest taken as to what the Police
were doing. When asked if the Bombay Home Minister was right in
giving instructions to Mr. Nagarvala, Mr. Bannerjee said that he
,did what he should have done, leaving the matter in the competent
hands of an officer of the ability of Mr. Nagarvala in whom both Mis
Kher and Morarji Desai had full confidence. Mr. Kher, when told at
the meeting of the 31st that nothing was done by Bombay Police even
when the officers of the Delhi Police were sent, was very sceptical
and put a call through to Bombay but could not get Nagarvala. This
is supported by the Diary of Miss Maniben Patel. A call was put
through to Bombay but she could not say what happened.
12D.24 Mr. Bannerjee was asked as to why after the bomb ex-
plosion he himself did not think it necessary to ask the Police what
they were doing, his reply was that the Ministry had just come into
being and he must have prepared a note in regard to the matter but
.," ""tid not exactly what he wrote the record was not before
hlill hut it W£1S correct th£1t they reLed upon lhe efficiency of the
1',,11"" which proved a mistake.
120.25 Mr. Mehra who used to see him never mentioned to him
,oI'HIl[ the conspiracy. He again repeated that the Delhi Police should
IHI\'(' called the Bombay Police to see that no suspicious persons from
.dlarashtra got anywhere near Mahatma Gandhi. He was then
"foss-examined by Mr. Vaidya and he stated that they did not know
"il,:ut the conspiracy, nor was it mentioned to them before the
(If January 31; "it came to us like a bolt from the blue". He re-
I"':lted that he came to know about the conspiracy for the first time
Ull January 31, 1948. No statement of Madanlal went to Sardar Patel
!hrough him and if Mr. Shankar had stated before the Commission
lhat any names had been mentioned, that might be correct. Loose
II·iterated, was held after the cremation when everybody was in a

H!ournful mood.
12D.26 At the meeting Sanjevi was asked by the Sardar what

haa happened. He replied by making the allegation that the names
had been sent to Bombay but nothing was done there and this he
I'mphasised at that meeting. He was asked about the meeting of the
1st February and he said if it was an official meeting he must have
been present. A high-powered body meeting on February 1 was for-
med to take decision as to what should be done for the future. He
could not remember if Sanjevi's explanation was called. No copies
·of Police diaries were sent to the witness, nor could they have been
sent to the Governor General, except through the Secretariat which
was the nonnal practice. He said: "I feel it very difficult to be able
to reconcile this statement of the Superintendent of Police, C.LD. with
the scene that I recall of the meeting of the 31st January, 1948, at
which everybody was in extreme anguish and was surprised to hear
that there was a conspiracy and the names of the conspirators were
disclosed in the statement of Madan La!." No complaint was made by
Mr. Sanjevi or Mr. Mehra to witness about the conduct of the Bombay
_Police concerning the investigation.
12D.27 Cross-examined by Mr. Chawla, Mr. Bannerjee said that

he took the bomb thrown as an abortive attempt to assassinate Ma-
hatma Gandhi.
12D.28 Mr. Banerjee was recalled and was again examined by

the Commission. He was asked what the responsibility of the Minis-
ters was if they got the kind of information which Mr. Morarji Desai
got. He replied that such information should ordinarily have been
passed on to the Secretary asking him to take necessary precautions.
Asked if there were any rules, he said there were Rules of Business
·of Government which contemplated that the Minister jncharge should
'nonnally act through the Secretary but the Congress Party had taken
·office on September 2, 1946 and the prescribed procedure was not
always seriously followed.
192
12F.9 Mter the bomb it was said that it was just a prank bUl
the Mahatma said that he did not think so. A significant part of hl'l
statement was, "We could not find out if there was a plot. Nor did
we have the tir:le to look into it. The programme in Gandhiji's camp
was such that everyone of us was busy practically every minute and
had to do the task that had been allotted to us."
12F.I0 She did not know i1 any precautions beyond the incrca:R'
in plain clothes policemen and request of the police to search the
people who came to the prayer meeting were taken.
12F.ll The arrangements made at Gandhi meetings were not
like those now made for the Prime Minister. But Gandhiji believed
in God and in His great mercy. She did not know that Madan!al
had been arrested and had made a statement nor what he j1&d
stated.
12F.12 Mr. Pyarelal, l,I,itness No. 54 was the Secretary of the
Mahatma. When the Mahatma learnt about the bomb he at once
said that there was a conspiracy to murder him. Previous to that he
thought that it was just military practice.
12F.13 They had not time to find out who the conspirators were.
Circumstances were changing so fast that there was no time to keep
pace with them. One had to perform one's duties which were
ed and every minute was taken up.
12-F. 14 He knew that Madanlal had been arrested and Gandhiji
said that he (lVJadanlal) should not be harassed. The ashramits!s
had a feeling that Mahatma Gandhi bore a charmed lire, and God
would protect him as long as he was wanted and if He did not want
him to serve the Nation any longer He would call him back. He
came to know about the persons behind the conspiracy after the
case went into court. He himself was not consulted about the secu-
rity measures.
12F.15 Mahatmaji was com'inced that there was a conspiracy but
he did not know its extent or its nature. The witness had never
been able to reconcile himself to the failure of the Police to trace
the people mentioned by Madanlal. Either it was ineffiCiency or
there was lack of will. Threatening letters came to the Mahatma
but they were not handed over to the Police.
Miss Manuben Gandhi, Witness 99
12F.16 Miss Manuben Gandhi, witness No. 99, stated that tlH'!Y
had no. knowledge of danger to the Mahatma's life till after the
bomb was thrown and they drew that inference after that incident
and when they mentioned to the Mahatma about the danger to his
life he just laughed and said if the God wished him to live he will
live.
12F.17 The members of the Mahatma's party did feel that there
was danger for about two or three days after the bomb incident but
there to satisfy the Sardar. He believed in protection of God. She

said that Mahatmaji's reaction to search of visitors was thut
he would have rather died than allowed it.
193
12F.l8 This evidence does not show that the inmates of the Birla
II<HLlle and those who were round- a.bout were
'\'1111 one man who was arrested or mOOre: -·,and they

""VI'!' found out if he had made any
III' had made. As far as they are concernetl;':.Itheytook no pre,cau-
IIOIIlS of any kind to protect the .....
12F.19 The view:is thRt'.it to'lproted. if God
d'H'S not lJI..ill it b.1.lt'.that)s' no -reason.. wh-y3I101 iJ!tjper precaution:s,
I\lIn when he went to the prayer ground, and that there used to
)11'was late and was walking fast and they. did nQt think it ilec:es-
r.ary to have people 'in front or af ·the badt'f.Why; that was so is not;
..
They had not time to think about anything else exeept the task'
lhat was allotted to them. That might be an esteemahle way. of work-
ing but it is no credit to them if they did not even move theh little o
linger to do soml::tbing for. the prdtection. the Mahatma.

'. .. ",I ,\'. ','100 ,;
12F.20 Those who have . Q:f "cQ:ndUcting Mahatma's'
meetings or of. other .in"dtys When there'
\\"as no questIOn of danger to theIr' ltves to topple
one over the other just to touch the Mahatma's feet. when women
particularly used to think it an act of devotioticand: piety to do so,.:
all sides of the Mahatma and all. qthef they ""-"ent.

to a public meeting and' '.lsed·
anybody could have jumped i.n· front .'!f "afmost pros-

trated ·apd shot him " .,-.. .
12F.21 It is no justificafiori to say that told that.
the PoHce protectilJi him."One hal::. the Police"'

tgr
Mahatma expe.ct t? .I'!-"m. OI:,o the
Mahatma on all SIdes mIght a protectIon at
prayer . . "", . ,,:1
12F.22· Assuming though ·not' de€iding that, tl1e,;F\olice-was negli.. ,
13-259 HA ' .. . " ""

194
his march to the prayer meeting if not for anything more sinisll'l'.
1t is still more surprising that even the Congress volunteers WNJI
told that it was no longer necessary for them to look after the saCety
o[ the Mahatma which in the opinion of the Commission was a sen
()us lapse on the part of those who were looking after the Mahatmn
and to his ordinary safety.
12F.23 It was also a mistake on the part of those who
managing his prayer meetings to allow people to stand on both Side:!
of the passage along which the Mahatma had to pass to go to
tfo
ILI'a!' him.
12F.24 Commission would like to emphasise that mere stationing
{If volunteers without a melange of efficient plain-clothes
policemen supported by spotters and watchers might not have been
:;utlicient. But all the same a phalanx of Congress volunteers on
('ither side of the passage would have been a protection though
haps not as good as the ones suggested by Mr. G. K. Handoo and
Mr. M. K. Sinha and Mr. B. B. S. JeUey more particularly
Mr. Handoo.
12F.25 From amongst those who were in the party of Mahatma
Gandhi or in his party four witnesses have been examined: Mr.
llrij Krishan Chandiwala who was witness No.2, before Mr. Pathak
and now witness No. 11; Dr. Sushila Nayar, witness No. 53; Mr.
Pyarelal, her brother and the Mahatma's Secretary, witness No. 54;
;lIld Mahatma Gandhi's brother's grand daughter Miss Manuben
Gandhi, witness No. 99.
Btij Krishan ChandiwroUt, Witness 11
12F.26 Witness No. 11 Mr. Brij Krishan Chandiwala before Mr.
Pathak deposed to the disturbance in Delhi in September, 1947,
Ilindu-Muslim riots were going on in Delhi, as a result of which,
many persons were killed and a curfew was imposed. This witness
used to inform Gandhiji of the conditions in the city. Some people
lhought that Muslims would have been killed but for Gandhiji. The
rl'fugees from Pakistan were very angry with the Mahatma. They
opposed him and used "hot words" when he went to Kingsway Camp.
'J'b is opposition steadily grew and the letters received were full of
;lllllse::; and threats and many refugees used to call him names to his
rUC(' when they came to interview him. One evening there was a
pr()cession which converged on Birla House shouting slogans like
"Khoon ka ,Badia Khoon se lenge". (We shall avenge bloodshed by
hloodshed). They were opposed to the payment of 55 crores to
procession and if Pandit Jawaharlal had not come Gandhiji would

have been attacked. Thereafter Police force was posted at Birla
I rouse; thus shOWing that the stationing of the police was a conse-
quence of this attack and not the information given by Mr. Morarji
Desai to the Sardar.
12F.27 A very large number of people used to attend Gandhiji's
prayer meetings and they were opposed to the recital of the Quran
1!H're but later on the opposition became feebler.
195
12F.28 The conditions in Delhi had become fairly peaceful !=>n
Gandhiji's arrival but the Maulanas who used to come and see hlm
\\'('re not satisfied. Thereafter the Mahatma undertook a fast and
then the people promised to abide by the conditions put forward by
him for breaking the fast.
12F.29 The people had not shed communal hatred and that is
why a hand-grenade burst with a big bang after the Mahatma finish·
his prayers on 20th January and he had a narrow escape. 2 or
;j persons were arrested and "we became more vigilant and took
great care about Gandhiji". 3 or 4 days after a Police officer came
and informed the witness that the bomb thrown was a result of a
conspiracy to murder Gandhiji, and that the names of 9 persons.
who were involved in it, had come to their knowledge but he could
not name the officer.
12F.30 The witness was under the impression that the Police would
arrest those persons and there was no cause of fear. That very night
the witness told Gandhiji about what the Policeman had said and
Gandhiji was of the opinion that it was a conspiracy to kill him.
The Police force at the Birla House was strengthened thereafter.
After the murder of Mahatma Gandhi the witness came to know that
Sardar Patel had asked for search of every person coming to the
prayer meeting. The witness was under the impression that when
the Police had come to know about the names of the people involved
in the conspiracy they would be arrested and there was no longer
any danger. "I could never imagine that the Police would be so
careless even after knowing abou.t the conspiracy and the conspirators
that Gandhiji was to be murdered. I did not try to know about the
arrangements made by the Police to arrest the conspirators because
I know that Sardar Patel will not be slack about protection of
Gandhiji. I cannot say that arrangements were made by Sardar
Patel."
12F.31 Mr. Chandiwala was recalled by this Commission on April
10, 1967. He stated that the incident of the procession was before
the bomb was thrown and eVen by that time the conditions were not
normal because of the reasons the witness had already given in his
previous statement. They all knew that the Home Minister was very
anxious abouJ: the safety of Gandhiji and they were certain that he
and his Government would do everything to protect the Mahatma's
life. They did not do anything because they knew that the Police
was looking into the matter. When the Police told him about 9 per-
sons who were involved in the throwing of the bomb and that they
knew their names, the witness became quite satisfied and confident
about the measures which Government would take and for that
reason in the camp they did not "follow the action which the Gov-
ernment was taking".
12F.32 The Mahatma's.fatih in God was so strong tha.t when the
Mahat':la to the Frontier Province in 1938 an armed guard of
Khuda1. Khtdmatgar was put at Utmanzai but Gandhiji had the
guards removed. In the opinion of the Commission this part cf the
statement must be based on dimming of memory, because the Khudai
196
l{hidmatgar were unarmed and in the then Frontier Province they
could not have been allowed to carry arms. unless the witness
laLhis which 'they' inightf have been carrying•• but the CC!Il}If.1sslon.
cannot be sure." . -
12F.33 The witness added that the Congress at Blrlu
IIouse were not alerted because they all did not think that anything
happen.: - .
12F.34 There 'used to be a cordon round Mahatma Gandhi when
hf' walked from'Birla HOuse' to the prayer meeting but on January
:!II, he wa's late and he'- walked" -very fast and it was· IlQt considered
Il('cessary to have people in front as well as at the back.. Nobody
could imagine that anyone would suddenly jump up from the crowd
and fire in such a short time. At the time of the firing the witness
was in. front and Gandhiji was following him. He was or e paces-
in front su?denly.:a up and fired at GandhlJl.
12F.35 witness was not aware of the identit1 of the persons
responsible for throWing the bomb and they were not suspecting
persons from Poena, because he and those round about Mahatma
Gandhi COUl9 never imagine that Poona people would commit such
nn outrage. The witness never found out who were at the back of
Madanlal nor could he' remember anybody else doing it. He could'
lIot rcmemoer if the newspapers gave the identity or the description'
of the persons 'who were responsible for the outrage.
12F.36 The witness did not know anything about Ketkar, Balukaka
Kunitkar or Professor Jain or about any information given by them
rCf.lal·ding Gandhiji's life being in danger. At no stage did they
know that a conspiracy was being hatched in Poona, or in the pro-
vince of Bombay to murder Mahatma Gandhi. When the witness
talked to Mahatmaji about what the Police had told him the Mahatma
!mid "Yes, there is:a conspiracy. I believe so." But the witness never
usked him how 'he- knew.
12F.37 As large crowds came to the pt:ayer meeting it was not
Tlnssible for the Police standing outside Bir1a House to find out about
nthuram Godse. Besides,'quite a number of people used to come
In deputation to see Mahatmaji.
12F.38 The witness said that once a youngman came to him in &n
n...:italed mood and he said' he wanted to see Mahatmaji and if. he
wns not allowed to do sa the witness would be 'Sorry for- it.,. He ('(Juld
not say who he was; it might be that the mam' wanted to tell
Gandhiji that his life was in danger or he might. have become a
murderer himself. The witness reiterated that he cOuld .not imagine-
that the Police would become so careless as not to protect Gandhiji.
12F.39 The w.itness: w.as by'"M"r: Vaidya. When-
nsked whether Delhi 'Police was "inclined"towards R.S.S., he said they
might ha17e been in favour of Hindus but not inclined towards R.S.S.
11k could not say whether top policl'mell used to visit the l'olh;e tent
uutside Bida House but they used 10 bc present at the.
Jugs. The witness wC\s not with wha.t the Pohee did exeept-
the plain-cl?thes armed with .revolvers bemg at

llie prayer meetings. Gandhiji refused to allow the peopl:e. bemg
sL'arched.
12F.40 This witness's statement shows that-
(1) There was considerable cO':lmunal ten.sion in De.lh.i; people
were opposed to giving of protectLOn to Muslims or the gIvmg of 55
crores to Pakistan.
(2) The people round'about'Mahatma Gandhi did'.not. realise
danger to the life of the Mahatma and they had full confidence m
the Police doing the right thing.
(,;) There used to be a cordon round the Ma.hatma when h!,! walk-
ed to the prayer meeting; but an the fateful day there was none
,because the Mahatma was late and they thought it was not
to have people in front and behind him.
12FAl The statement of this witness does not sh9W that the
inmates of .Gandhiji's camp realised the danger to Mahatma Gandhi's
hfe. It also appears that they were not getting Correct information
Ivhich is shown by the witness saying that two or three persons were
arrested on the 20th and that later on a policeman had told them
that names of nine persons had been ascertained ·and they were being
traced.
'Dr. Sushila Nayar, Witness 53
12F.42 The next witness in this series is Dr. Sushila Nayar, witness
No. 53. Being Mahatmaji's medical adviser, this witness was close
Co him and knew most of the things: that. \yere happening in the
Mahatma's camp. She has deRosed in regard. to 'panchgani incident
s:aying that some people did come a.nd create trouble at the prayer
meeting but she could not say if Nathuram Godse was one of them.
But they were the same group of Rindt! Mahasabha workers who
were subsequently responsible for his assassination. Those demons-
trators waived black flags but she could not say 'what happened
later.
12F.43 In 1946 when the talks were going on between Mr. Jinnah
and the Mahatma, some young men of whom one was Nathuram
Godse and another was Thatte, came to Sevagrarri and objected to
Mahatma's talks with Mr. Jinnah. These people stopped Mahatma
'Gandhi when he was coming out of the enclosure but they were re-
moved by the ashramites from 'his path. One of them-the Witness
!lot whether it was G?dse or a lotig' sharp
kmfe m hls pocket but nobody m the ashram Could imagine that
anybody would do harm to Mahatma Gandhi. The fatalistic attitude
in the 'camp was that as long as God wanted the Mahatma to serve
198
the country, he will. But according this witness, there was no
deliberate lack of alertness or neglIgence on the part of the
authorities.
12F.44 After the Partition, the Mahatma tried his level best for
communal peace q.nd protection of minorities wherever they
He went to N oakhali then came to Bihar and then returned to DeIhL
He blamed persons who were guilty of violence and. ad,:ised
majority community to behave properly towards the mmonty WhlCh
caused discontent amongst the refugees who used to shout dogans
outside Birla House.
12F.45 Tn January 1948, the Mahatma went on fast because com-
munal feelings had become too oppressive for him and he was anxious
that minorities should be given proper protection saying that "evil
was not weighed in golden scales". After four or five days of the·
fast, the Mahatma's health began to deteriora,te. There was a
in the mentality of Hindus and Muslims of Delhi.
12F.46 Before the bomb incident, they never felt that Mahatma
Gandhi's life was in danger although there were rumours th",t
Mahatma Gandhi's life was in danger and plain-clothes policemen
were stationed which the Mahatma did not like. After the 18th
January when he gave up his fast, the Mahatma was too weak to·
attend the prayer meetings and he was carried in a chair. He
addressed the meeting although his voice was very feeble.
12F.47 After the bomb was thrown, somebody said it was just a
prank but the Mahatma said he did not think so. The police there-
after wanted to search everybody coming to the prayer meeting but
Mahatma objected. The prayer meetings became bigger and
bIgger and people were let in without interruption. She could not
say anthing about the talks between Mahatma Gandhi and the
late Balasahib Kher on 28th January because then she v. . as in
Bahawalpur. I
12F.48 There was big difference of opinion between Gandhiji
and the Sardar regardmg the payment of 50 crores to Pakistan. The
Sardar could not see Gandhiji at the time of the fast because he ha.d
to go out of Delhi on account of a previous engagement.
Hindus were angry with Mahatma Gandhi for many
(1) He did not allow reta.liation against Muslims.

(2) not allow the Muslims to be squeezed out of their
(3) the Hindus in India as he did the Muslims.

(4) He insisted on payment of 50 crores.
12F.50 In cross-examination by Mr. Vaidya, the witness said that
the knew that the bomb was in furtherance of a conspiracy
but dId not know who the conspirators wcrf'. WhC'n she praisC'd the
199
workers for the work they had done at the Wah Camp (this
was near Rawalpindi), the Mahatma did not agree and said she did
not know them. They were like "Black Shirts", Nazis or fascists.
12F.51 She added that they could not find out if there was a plot
nor did they have time to look to those things because the programme
in Gandhiji's camp was very tight. There was a sardarji who said
"What difference does it make if an old man dies. Why make such
a fuss." He was a Sikh constable. But this story she heard from
some one.
:2F.52 When the bomb incident took place, she was sitting next
to Gandhiji. She was not examined by the Police. At first, Gandhiji
thought that it was military practice but it was "Subsequently that
they sa.w smoke and somebody said that a bomb had been thrown.
She ·....'06 not aware of any precautions taken beyond the increase in
the number of policemen.
12F.53 On cross-examination by Mr. Chawla, the witness said that
she did not know about the arrest of Madanlal nor about any state-
ment made by him. She said she would not be surprised if ?llega-
tions about some policemen being pro-1t.s.S. were made.
12F .54 Tn those days, communai poison had gone very deep and
nobody knew who was harbouring whom and what kind of a person
he was. Security arrangements like the ones which are made for
the Prime Minister were not made far Mahatma Gandhi and she
added that people like Manatma Gandhi believed in God and His
mercy and did not think any fUrther security was necess&ry.
Mr. Pyarelal, Witness 54

12F.55 Mr. Pyarelal who was Secretary of the Mahatma from
1920 right up to the time of his death, has written a book "Mahatma
Gandhi-The Last Phase" in 2 volumes. The facts stated therein, he
said, were correct and authentic according to his belief. The Mahatma
was opposed to the Partition because he said "You shall have to
divide my body before you divide India".
12F.56 Sardar Patel did say that Muslims could stay in India and
they will get protection but they could not have divided loyalties.
Mahatma Gandhi exhorted the Muslims to condemn the abduction of
Hindu women and that those Hindu women should be restored and
asked the Muslims to make a public statement that those women
should be restored to their families but no organised Muslim society
issued any such appeal as far as the witness could remember, but
individuals might have done so. The Mahatma constantly said "Don't
you se.e I am mounted on my funeral pyre" and that although nobody
believed that independence could be won by non-violence, after the
attairunent of independence people were saying good-bye to non-
violence. Mahatma Gandhi said he would not be surprised jf in spite
of all the homage paid to him by the leaders, they would say one day
"we have had enough of this old man; why does not he leave us
alone?" This was in connection with the general fall of standards
200
which haci ,c9Jl1S
M",hatma
J9 ranks. and growi':lg
and theIr
which
from the
betwe£n
12F.571n .Septern,&er (}oSl.se and Thatte and othe.r per-
lions came to Sevagram to prevent Mahatma Gandhi from gomg to
Bombay to meet Mr. Jinnah. They were arrested by
the Police and a knife was found on one of them. In hIS first volume,
he had recorded the conversation between the persons arrested and
lhe police and -the arrested said that he would become martyr
he w.ill Gandhi. He further and
l-iald that a )amapar -would p.e qUlte enough and tpe Jamadar referred
to W:ls Nathurarv. Godse.
12F.58 When the bomb was burst, Mahatma Gandhi did not realise
that it was a bomb. He thought that it was a military practice and
lhose in the camp also did not realise its significance. When Mahatma
Gandhi lean';:t about the bomb, at once realised that there was a
conspiracy mtuder him. 'After the bomp was thrown, IJ.O names
were mentioned except that of Madanlal.' When the witness was
going about in the refugee,camps, he heard a rumour that an 'attempt
would be mf'de on the life of the Congress .leaders, including Mahatma
Gandhi and Pandit Nehru. ,·This he told by Hans Wireless.
He info1'11\ed the Deputy Commission",;r, Mr. Randhawa, of this be-
lwc('n and 18t)1 January but .he could not say if anything
was done. The witness,:had this feeling that people opposed to the
Maha,tm'l might commit such an offence. He never told the Mahatma
what he had learnt.
12F.59 In 1934 there was an attempt to murder Mahatma Gandhi
by throwinR a bomb when he visited Poona in connection with anti-
untouchability campaign. By 1947, the people had in-
v(mted a techniqtW of making"-tH.e pictures of· Cdrig:ress leaders as
their shooting targets. ,,:, ;
The witness could not say what names·,."were given to Bala-
Hahlb Kher or were passed on to Sardar Pliltel. Sardar Patel came
; to .Gandhiji and told him about the conspiracy and Sardar wf!nted
but Gandhjji would not
The witness £e;er saw the statement 'of Ma.danlal. . If it
'lis 1Il l!lCnewspapers, he 4ad no recollecijcm,of it. Those
md, Mahatma Gandhi never believed that he would be murdered
11('111
11111 were ,moving ve,:y fast and "we:could, not anticipate-what
going to happen next':, ' .
1:W..112 The .witness l;Iad a feeling .. police were,inflltrated
hy and,,l?!o-R.S.S, and there ,nvth1na very
as a numbef"of Delhi Police. of'ficer.s'" ...vel'('
IIwml-wlws the, vICtims. of Musliro ·h'ighhandedness,.in\W-est;Punjab
thl) FI.-onlier rhe' witl\esi, also rQPpated what thl'
shouting about the
201
12F.63 The conditions then were so extraordinary that it would
b'" difficult fQf anyone to say what steps should have been taken
that lone should have expected gre.ate.r to arrest the
conspirators and preventing them from aChlevmg their end.
12F.64 The witness had no recollection of 'People's Age' sayin&
in ALlgust 1947 that there was a conspiracy to Mahatma. Gandhi
and that the Deputy Commissioner and the PolIce were
12F.65 The witness could not say anything about the. interview
between Mahatma Gandhi and Balasahib Kher as he hImself was
not present at the interview.
12F.66 Cross-E'xamined by Mr. Vaidya, he said that he did
know Balukaka Kanitkar personally but he (Balukaka) used to wnte
long letters to Mahatma Gandhi which the witness read out to the
Mahatma.
12F.67 Sardar Patel had told witness that he went to Gandhiji and
conveyed the information of a dangerous conspiracy against his life
and that he (the Sardar) should be allowed to take security measures,
e.g., search of persons going to the prayer meetings and stationing of
armed guard at the prayer meeting.
12F.G8 The \v'itness said he did not think that Mahatma Gandhi
had any conscious premonition of impending death.
12F.69 On further cross-examination the witness said that there
was no time to fmd out about what the conspiracy was and who the
conspirators were. They had to perform their duties assigned to
them.
12F.70 The witness knew that Madanlal was arrested and Gandhiji
said that he should not be harassed by the police. "Somehow or the
other We had the feeling that Mah.atma Gandhi had a charm and
nothing would happen to him and he himself said that God will
protect him a':i long we he was wanted ...... "
12F.71 The 1Ditness came to knOw about the consylrators after the
caSe went into the Court. He knew nothing about what the police
a highhanded manner. (Italics by Commission).

12F.72 Cross-exB;mined by Mr. Chawla, the witness said that the
that there was a conspiFacy but of its extent
."1 have never been able to reconcilEl myself to the faHure

of the polIce t? the people who wer!'! mentioned in !VIa-danIal's
It was sheer inefficiency .or .lack of will tei. .do the
12F.74 to
letters did come the Mahatma but were
over to the police and sometimes they were ·not even
202
Visnwanath Shah, Witness 3 (P)
12F.75 Another witness whose testimony may be discussed at this·
stage is witness No.3. Vishwanath Shah, Mr. He
that after the 55 crares were given to PakIstan under the mS,tructIons
of Gandhiji, there were processions and agamst the
Mahatma in Delhi and the atmosphere was agamst the Mahatma of
which the Government was aware.
12F.76 Thatte with others came to demonstrate against Mahatma
Gandhi and the police knew about it. The demonstrators also threw
stones but the Congress volunteers drove away the demonstrators.
The Mahatma objected to this and asked "why had we badly treated
them?" Thereaft'er the Mahatma left for Noakhali.
12F.77 After his return from Noakhali, Brij Krishanji had
the volunteer.:; to look after the protection of Gandhiji in Birla House
and afterwards he said that the police would do it and the volunteers·
were no longer necessary. Some volunteers of the Seva Dal used
to be present at the prayer meeting. A woman in Birla House told
the witness that some persons used to roam about the Birla House
whom she suspected. She was the wife of a driver. The witness·
told the Dolice about this. The woman identified Madanlal Pahwa.
and said that he and his companions used to roam about Birla House.
12F.78 The witness was present when Gandhiji was shot :md so-
were plainclothes policemen. The number of police personnel had
been increased after the bomb was thrown.
Manuben Gandhi, Witness 99

12F.79 The fourth witness in this group is witness No. 99, IVIanu-
ben Gandhi, who is the grand daughter of Mahatma's brother. Shb
stated that since 1945 nobody felt nor was it ever mentioned that
Mahatma's life was in danger nor did Mahatma feel any danger. In
the month of January 1948 a number of refugees used to interview
the Mahatma and complained to him that they had lost everything,
and that they had been brutally treated by the Pakistanis. "\Vhat
was there to do, they sought Mahatma's protection." Old women said
to him that whatever had happened the responsibility was his because
they knew nobody else excepting him, not even Nehru. But they
always said this in a prayerful mood. Till the bomb was thrown
nobody knew that there was danger to the Mahatma's life but from
incident they began to draw this inference. When they men-
I
dOeS not wish me to live then He would take me away". After the
bomb W'1S thrown Lady Mountbatten came to congratulate the
no bravery. If somebody fired at me point-blank and I faced his

bullet a smile, the name of Rama in my heart, 1
sho1l1d mdeed be deservmg of congratUlations." The Mahatma wel>
203
being asked to permit special protection for him but he would hove
none of it.
12F.80 During his fast a number of people visited him including
Maulana Hifzul Rehman. He was a frequent. visitor made
Mahatma miserable by pouring in to his ears stones of mIserieS of
Muslim population. The Mahatma said to him "You protect the
Hindus and I shaH protect the Muslims."
12F.81 The members of the Mahatma's party did feel danger fOl""
2 or 3 days after the bomb was thrown; but after that everybody
thought that it was alright.
12F.82 The most important part of this witness's statement is her
deposition about the visit of Nathuram Godse on JaQ-uary 30, lU48.
At about noon Nathuram Godse came to Birla House. Nobody
stopped him coming because people used to come like that "and we-
did not think that it was anybodY special who had come". 'There
was nothing special about it because people used to come to see the
places where the Mahatma lived, slept or had his meals. Nathuram
also came there. He must have come by the back door; quite a
number of people used to do so to have darshan, i.e., to pay homage,
and nobody stopped them. The Mahatma at the time when
ram came was sleeping outside in the sun and if he wanted he cuuld
have shot him there. She was certain that it was Nathuram Godse
who came because when he fired the fatal shots she was present and
she recognised him to be the same person who had come on that
day. Her feeling was that when he came at noon he was overawed
by the very presence of the Mahatma.
12F.83 This fact of Nathuram Godse coming to Birla House on the

30th is not mentioned in her book, "Last Glimpse of Bapuji" Ex. 246.
The events of the 30th January, 1948, are given in that 1:.ook in
Chapter 31 from page 300 to 315, but this important fact is not there.
She was examined by the Police on January 30, after the murder but
in that statement also this fact is not mentioned. This was an inci-
dent of such importance that one would have expected it:;; mention
at that stage. Her attention was drawn to that statement, Ex. 248.
Her reply was that nobody asked her at that time and
there was hardly any time to mention anything. But she
has, in an article in "The Blitz" Ex. 245 which was
its Republic Day number of 1969, stated' this fact about Nathuram
and before the Commission she stated on oath that what was con-
tained therein was correct. She had also said in the article that she
had !"elated this matter to both Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel, but on
the 31st January. They are both dead and there is no means of
checking this statement.
12F.84 When asked whether the Mahatma himself felt that his life
was in danger, reply 'Yas that she could not say anything; the
Mahatma never saId anythmg. He was a firm believer in God and
never felt any danger. When asked whether Mahatma had any pre-
monition of death, her reply was that they never felt that he had
any prC'momtlOn but after his death they realised thflt he- did have
204
some premonition, but he never said
12F.85 She was asked whether the Mahatma was miserable UIJlluL
what was happening around him, her answer was "Yes". When w.1I
· cd whether Mahatma was unhappy because of what was h.a)?Pl'III'11i
· in the country or because of the consequences of the partItlOn, IH'I
answer was "because of both; both these affected bim," She Will'
· asked whether Joilahatina was unhappy because the Government W,HI
,misbehaving or the people were misbehaving or both were misbchav
ing; her answer again was; "because of both."
12F.86 Sardar Patel had asked permission to search the peopl!'
who were coming to the prayer meeting but the Mahatma refused
saying that it would mean that he had no faith in God.
12F .87 It appeared to the Mahatma that he was the only believer
in non·violence. She then produced her book where events from
December 1947 to the day of immersion of his ashes into the Triveni
are given. This is Ex. 246.
12F.88 She was asked if Mahatma used to receive threatening
letters in January, 1948, her reply was in the affirmative.
12F.89 She staled that she was surprised, rather annoyed to see
the same man stopping the Mahatma because he had been there in
the morning, but she did not think that there was any danger from
the man because he had folded both his hands and she thought he
was going to nay respects to the Mahatma. Nathuram Godse in his
statement in court had stated he had his revolver in his folded hands.
If that is so, it is surprising why nobody spotted it in the audience
not even those leading the procession.
12F.90 She was asked what the Mahatma would have done if the
people going to the prayer meetings were searched, her reply was
that he would rather have died than allowed that kind: of thing.
12F.91 Manuben is rather an important witness. She was ('losely
related to the Mahatma and was closely associated with him. She
was one of the two girls who used to conduct him to the prayer
meetings and was in front of the Mahatma at the time of the murder.
:a
places where Mahatma slept, worked and had his meals and actually
saw him sleeping in the grounds, ·the Commission should 'be reluctant
to disregard it. But at the same time, even her statement has to be
carefully weighed in the scales. If there are any lacunae serious or
otherwise which the Commission must take into account. then it
should do so; and apply the prinCiple of care and caution in the assess.
ment of all evidence, particularly as that of this witness. There. are
in this case many lacunae:
(1) This statement was never made by this lady anywhere before
although she could have done it at the earliest opportunity on the
30th J annary when she was examined by the police after the' murder.
205
(2) She has sOlid that she mentioned this fact to Pundit Nehru
111HI Sardar Patel the next day, but neither of these facts are men-
1100H'd in her book published in 1962 but written before September
IO!, 1961.
(:3) The fact that Nathuram Godse came to the Birla House the
:HJth at noon time was so important that in the course of
I'vents it should have been mentioned in her book which was wntten
III a when she had more time to think and which, according to
Iwr, is based on her diary giving a record of the events as they
Jlappenecl.
(4) She has said in the preface "In this book I have mainly given
IIday-to-clay account of Bapu's life up to the great event of his
departure from this world". In the context it was and should have
heen treated as a great event.
(5) The statement of Nathuram in court shows how determined

he was to pllt an end to the life of the Mahatma. And it is rather
difficult to believe that with those feelings in bis heart which are
disclosed in his \vritten statement in court, he should have let that
opportunit.y go. He had no compunction at the evening 'Orayer time;
it is difficult to find any reason for his havin.1I; it at noon. A deter-
mined assassin does not go for darshans of his victims even if they
happen to be Gandhis. The Commission is not the f2ct
that it had oeen decided as Godse's statement shows that he should
surrender after shooting.
(6) This 'Nitness had all the earnestness. and moral faith and
simpliCity which characterised the Mahatma's camp but that is no
safeguard against mistaken identities or lapstts memoriae.
12F.92 Judged in the light of probabilities and taking into consi-

deration both the position of the witness. her background and train-
ing in Gandhian ways and keeping in view the proper approach to
important fi'lcts deposed to by important witnesses such as this one
is, ihe Commission feels it inexpedient to act on this piece of evidence,
that a man who was bent upon murdering Mahatma shculd
have come to Bida House, should have had an opportunity of murder-
ing him and als0 almost certain escaping, would not that oppor-
tunity but would return to commit the murder in the midst of a large
crowd where t1l.ere was every possibility of his attempt failing and
his plan going aWry and little or no possibility of his e'lcaping. In
the circumstances, it would be proper not to take this !=llcce of evi-
dence into consideration for or against the matters in controversy
and treat this episode as "unproven".
12F.93 If this piece of evidence is accepted, it would be a sad

commentary on the security measures taken for the protection of
Mahatma Gandhi particularly after the bomb incident. If anybody
could walk in then the stationing of the poli(:.e or deployment of
plainclothes policemen. or employing a .platoon or even a company-
of the Army was meanmgIess and secunty arrangements illusory.
206
12F.94 It may also be mentioned that neither in ,his stateml'ul
made to the Bombay Police which is detailed nor in l1is statement
before the Court did Nathuram Godse mention anything about hIM
visiting the Birla House on the 30th or going to the place where til"
Mahatma was sleeping.
12F.95 In his statement to the Bombay Police he has . an
of his movements which is detailed no attempt at
anything qua himself. He says that they Vlslted the prayer meetmg
on the evening of the 18th. On the evening of the 19th all of
including Madanial, went to Birla House where the prayer meetmg
was in progress. The Police statement contains the day-ta-day
. account of what they were doing but there is nothing to show that
Nathuram Godse was anywhere near Birla House on the morning
of the fateful day. In his Police statement he said that en the morn-
ing of the 30th they went to Birla Mandir and from there they went
to a jungle behind the Birla Mandir where shots were fired and it
was t1ecided that Nathuram Godse should do the shooting and then
surrender to the Police; the hand-grenade etc. were not needed and
therefore they '\VE're buried, after having been made harmless and
out of gear.
12F.96 The evidence of these four important inma.tes of the Gandhi
camp at Birla House show that-
(1) There was some kind of information of danger to Gandhiji's
life although th.e evidence is not consistent on this point; but no
particular precautions were taken beyond increasing the Delhi Police
and policemen. The inmates had their set tasks and they had no
time to jo anything about the threatened danger-were probably as
fatalistic as the Mahatma himself. Or as two of them, Mr. Brij
Krishan Chandiwala and Miss Manuben have stated thev were sure
the police would look after the safety.
(2) Sardar Pate! did want to get the people coming to the prayer
meeting searched but the Mahatma would not agree.
(3) The Mahatma came to realise that the Congress was paying
lip sympathy to non-violence and he was considered as a burden.
(4) The Mahatma Wc;ts distressed over the events which had over-
taken the over the consequences of the partition and because
·of the condltions mto which the body politic due to not subserving
"the high moral standard set by the Mahatma had fallen.
(5) Godse and Thatte had attacked Mahatma Gandhi in Septem-
ber 1944 also and that at Sevagram during the Gandhi-Jinnah
pourparlers.
had made a black flag demons-
did realise that the bomb rwas a part of a
(8) There was a feeling of antagonism against the Mahatma and

;PandH Nehru in the Refugee Camps also.
(9) The inmates knew nothing about Balukaka's warning.
(10) Mr. Pyarelal whose power. of ?bse1:"ation and is
elements.
(1l) Balukaka though not known personally to Mr. Pyarelal
I'nrried on correspondence with the Mahatma.
(12) The inmates of Gandhiji's Camp were so engrossed in their
I'espective chores allotted t? them the s.chedule was so "tight"
that they had no time to thmk about lmpendmg danger and were
wholly heedless towards any danger to the Mahatma's life.
(13) The way the procession to the prayer meeting w:as for:n ed
with people in front and at the back of the WIth a httle
more vigilance on the part of the aides the approachmg of Nathu.ram
Godse so near as to shoot point blank would not have been pOSSIble.
G-Measures Taken To Protect Mahatma Gandhi

12G.l This heading may be divided into t.wo sub-heads: (i)
before the bomb incident, and (ii) after the bomb incident. In this
connection reference may be made to two notes submitted by Mr.
D. W. Mehra, D.I.G., Delhi, on the subject of security measures
taken. In point of time the first is Ex. 10 dated February 1, 1949,
which is annexure VI to Mr. Sanjevi's note Ex. 7, and the second is
Ex. 134 submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs also by Mr.
D. W. Mehra on February 7, 1948.
12G.2 Ex. 10 shows that after the arrival of Mahatma Gandhi in
September 1947 a guard of one and four Foot Cons-
tables were posted at the Birla House. Their main duty was to see
.that mobs did not gather inside or in the viCinity of Birla House so
"3S to become a source of annoyance to Gandhiji and also to deal with
people who objected to the reciting of the Quran at Gandhiji'Si
prayer meetings. Mr. Brij Krishan Chandiwala's evidence shows
that whenever there was apprehension of a large crowd making a
demonstration, a posse of police was sent to Birla House to control
them. According to P.W. 116 Sub-Inspector Dasondha Singh of the
Tughlaq Road Police Station. who was a witness at the trial, ordi-
narily there used to be €lne Head Constable and one Foot CL.nsttble
in the prayer grounds. There were at the main gate of the Birla
House one Head Constable and four Constables. They were to main-
tain law and order in the prayer groW1ds.
12G.3 After the bomb incident, the number of policemen was in-
'creased and a larger force was stationed at the Birla House. Ex. 10
also shows that after the bomb incident the number of policemen
was immediately increased to one Assistant Sub-Inspector, tW()
Head Constables and sixteen Foot Constables. In addition to this,
there were plain-clothes policemen, one Sub-Inspector, four Head
Constables and two Foot Constables who were all armed with re-
volvers. Three plain-clothes men were stationed on the path leading
:irom Birla House to the place where prayer meetings were held, and
208
a small detachment ot troops for moving patrol aU round the COlli
pound was also stationed. The instructions to the police on dulv
were to watch people as they came in to the prayer meetings and 10
interrogate suspicious looking persons. The uniformed police nw I
plain-clothes section were asked to patrol the grounds of the Bid,.
House and its immediate vicinity so as to spot suspicious
persons lurking about the place. The Superintendent of Polic'I',
New Delhi, Mr. Bhatia, immediately after the bomb outrage int!' ..
viewed Mr. Brij Krishan Chandiwala, witness No. 11, who was 0111'
of the important members of the Mahatma's party at the Bida Housp
and he told him that a more strict supervision over the visitors was
required and suggested that the police on duty should search suspi·
cious looking persons. To this suggestion he did not agree, saying
that Bapu would not tolerate it, and this very reply was repeated to
the D.I.G. on January 21 when he made a similar request to Mr.
Chandiwala.
12G.4 It may be added that according to Mr. Morarji Desai and

other witnesses Sardar Patel had also put forward this proposal of
screening in September 1947 when the M3hatma returned from
Calcutta but the reply was equally an emphatic 'No'. The D.I.G.
also saw Gandhiji and suggested stricter screening of visitors but
Gandhiji would have none of it, saying in his characteristic way
that his life was in the hands of God and if he had to die nothing
would save him and that as long as God wills that he should serve
the people, he will; and when God wills otherwise He will take him
away. A report of this was made to the Inspector General and it
was decided that short of searching persons going to the prayer
meetings, all possible steps should be taken by the police on duty to
ensure Gandhiji's safety. The exact boundaries of this precaution
were not delimited or delineated.
12G.5 In addition to this, the Superintendent of Police, New Delhi

was to be present as far as possible at the prayer meetings. The
D.I.G. himself also started attending. the prayer meetings but he
fell ill on the 24th; and on the fateful day the Superintendent of
Police, New Delhi, could not be present as he had another important'
appointment in connection with the threatelled strike of some·
workers of the Central P.W.D. It is difficult to imagine anything·
more important than the protection of the Mahatma's life, but"
evidently the Delhi Police thought differently. In the second docu-.
ment Ex. 134 the same arrangements made after the bomb incident
as given in Ex. 10 have been set out. In addition, it was stated that
a military patrol of two N.C.O.s and twelve men was deployed in
order to stop unauthorised persons going in. In paragraph 5 of this
document, Mr. Mehra has set out a short account of how the murder·
was committed. Ex, 134 was a note prepared for the purposes of a·
starred question in the Constituent Assembly by Mr. Damodar·
Swarup Seth, notice of which was given but was most probably·
withdrawn.
12G.6 There .is also another note of Mr. Mehra which was sent to-
Mr. in the second half of March 1948. That is Ex. 44. In:
209
II was staiC'rl that the Sub-Insperlor of C.LD. was in the imme-
.1,' \'idnity of the place where Mahatmaji was shot and the plain-
men and some uniformed police were also among the
",,'\",J. A uniformed guard was present on the main gate and two
'.tables at the back of the house where the bomb had exploded.
Mr. Mehra was personally present with Gandhiji when the
1,011,'1' started his fast and Gandhiji talked to him about the steps to
I", laken to improve Hindu-Muslim relations. Because of the mental
"mcicty on account of Gandhiji's fast and four months of constant
"I'duous labour Mr. Mehra fell ill with an attack of influenza en
IIllh January 1948 and was in bed for 4 days. In spite of that he
""'Ilt to Mahatmaji on 21st January and he resolved to attend all his
I,r:lver meetings which he did and also watched to find out if there
','r'l"1: any suspic'ous looking persons. He continued to attend the
I meetings but he again feU ill on the 24th and went to Birla
Iiouse on the 30th when the great tragedy had taken place.
12G.8 It had also been decided that the Superintendent of Police
/\. N. Bhatia should personally attend Mahatma Gandhi's meetings
lindhe continued to do so but on the fateful day he was also absent
due to the threatened strike of the C.P.W.n.
12G.9 Mr. Mehra stated that it was impossible for anyone to have
·:topped the tragedy considering Mahatmaji's aversion to placing
IIny restraint on people coming to his prayer meetings.
12G.I0 The note ended with pointing out the difficulties which
they were meeting in trying to protect the persons of the Prime
Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister. He attached a copy of
the letter which the Prime Minister had written to him objecting to
the restrictions which have been placed on him. This shows that
Ihe§e leaders who had struggled against the British rule for so long
were not prepared to believe that the very people whom they had
:o:crved and led to victory and whose confidence and affection they
had won, were going to injure them.
12G.ll Mr. Vishwanath Shah, witness' No.3 before Mr. Pathak,

who was the head of the Congress volunteers at Bhangi Colony and
nt the Birla House said that before his depart-ure to Noakhali Gan-
dhiji used to stay in the Bhangi Colony where protection arrange-
ments were made by 300 Congress volunteers. But after he returned
from there, he stayed in Birla House. Mr. Brij Krishan Chandiwala
had directed the volunteers to look after the safety of Gandhiji but
afterwards he said that the protection would be in the hands of the
police and the volunteers were no longer required. Still the Seva
Dal used to be present at the time of the prayers. One of the women
inmates of the Birla House, the wife of a driver told him that some
suspicious looking persons were roaming about the Birla House.
This information was conveyed to the police and that woman identi-
fied Madanlal after the bomb explosion and said that he and his
companions were the suspicious looking persons. That Godse, Apte
etc. were reconnoitring the place was stated by them
III theIr statements as accused before the Trial Court. Shah added
14-259 HA
210
that plain clothes policemen used to be present at prayer HII'd
ings and after the bomb explosion the number of polIcemen was 111
creased.
12G.12 In answer to question No.8, of interrogative questionnnll'l'
issued by the Commission, the Delhi Inspector General of Police hllil
in his affidavit dated April 12, 1968 set out the steps that the polit'I'
took to protect Mahatma Gandhi which were as follows:
" .... According to letter No. 1547-C & T 27-29 dated 7th Feb-
ruary, 1948 from the then D.I.G., Delhi to the Deputy Secre-
tary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home
on the subject of draft reply to Starred Question No. 1
put up by Shri Damodar Swarup Seth, the police guard of 1 H('
and 4 Constables already on duty in the Birla House was in-
creased to 1 ASI, 2 HCs., and 16 Constables immediately fol-
lowing the bomb outrage on 20-1-1948. In addition, plain
clothes staff of 1 S.1., 4 HCs and 2 Constables (all armed)
detailed for duty at the Birla House. The police on duty had
full instructions to watch people as they went in and to in-
terrogate suspicious persons. The uniformed and plain' clothes
sections were also directed to patrol the ground of Birla
House and its immediate vicinity to ensure that no suspicious
persons lurked about the place. The Superintendent of Police,
New Delhi also met Shri B. K. Chandiwala, Secretary, and
other members of "Mahatma Ji's entourage" and suggested
that in view of the bomb episode a very strict supervision over
visitors to the prayer meetings was necessary and that the
police on duty should be permitted to search all suspicious
persons. This was, however, not accepted. The D.I.G. Delhi
also met Shri Chandiwala and Gandhi Ji himself and sug-
gested stricter screening of visitors to the prayer meetings.
Gandhi Ji, however, did not accept the suggestion and said
that his life was in the hands of God and that if he had to die
no precautions could save him. It was, thereafter, decided
that short of searching all persons going to the prayer meet-
ings, all possible steps should be taken by the police on duty
to (:'miure Gandhi Ji's safety. Accordingly, instructions
were also issued to the poHce officers on duty at the Bida
House. In addition to the police arrangements, a military
patrol of 2 N.C.O.s and 12 men were also on duty at Birla
House to stop unauthorised ingress. A copy of this letter is
enclosed as appendix 'A'.
"There is another letter No. 294-SP/S dated 29-5..48 from Shri
Rikhi Kesh, the then S:P./CID on Special Duty at Red Fort,
Delhi, according to which, after the bomb explosion, the
guard of 1 H.C. and 4 constables was supplemented by 2
ASIs, 1 H.C. and 4 Constables from the local police and
2 H.Cs and 12 Constables from the Police Lines, out of which
1 AS.1., 1 H.C. and 8 Constables were detailed in the prayer
meeting. In addition IS.!., 4 H.Cs. and 2 armed constables
were detailed in plain clothes. Out of the 8 uniformed cons-
tables, 4 were armed with lathis and 4 with rifles. The armed
constables took their position at different corners along the
prayer platform. Plain clothes men were scattered at different
places among the gathering while 1 S.L and 1 H.C. always
walked with Mahatma Ji from Birla House to the prayer
platform and back. The two men always took post
close to Mahatma Ji as possible. A copy of thIS letter IS
enclosed vide Appendix 'B'."
12G.13 In answer to question No. 18 which was i
lerms; 1
"It has also been stated that the co-conspirators of Madan Lal
Pahwa flew from Bombay by air and were noticed and subse-
quently identified in Court by air staff. Was any special
police stationed at airports in Bombay and in Delhi to arrest
the persons who were co-conspirators of Madan Lal
and whose descriptions had been given in the confessIOnal
statement of Madan La!?"
the Inspector General of Police, Delhi,
answer:-
"The steps taken are detailed in the unsigned note of S.P.jCID
copy of which is appendixed 'E' which is part of file No.
2/Terr/140."
12G.14 This docwnent is a copy of another copy which itself is
undated and is unsigned. It purports to be a copy of an unsigned
note of the Superintendent _of Police, C.I.D., Delhi, and has been
discussed in the Chapter dealing with Ex. 5-A. The Commission is
unable to find much or any help from this document.
12G.l5 Mr. M. M. L. Hooja, witness No. 59, stated that in Decem-
ber 1947 and January 1948 there was a shortage of police personnel
because the Muslim officers and men had gone away to Pakistan
and what remained was inadequate. The fact that Mahatma Gandhi
did not allow search of persons going to his prayer meetings put
limitations on the efficacy and efficiency of the precautionary
measures taken by the police.
12G.l6 He was asked what steps the Home Minister should have
taken when he got information of a conspiracy like that of Mahatma
Gandhi case, he replied that he could not answer that question. It
lVould depend on the personality of the Home Minister.
12G.17 Mr. M. S. Randhawa, witness No. 18, has also stated that
"On account of the departure of Muslim police to Pakistan in very
large numbers, the police organisation in Delhi was seriously
depleted and policemen had to be hastily recruited from the rural
area to fill the gap. They were not trained properly".
12G.18 At pages 437 and 438 of book "Mahatma Gandhi-The
Last Phase". Vol. II, Pyarelal has stated-
"The bulk of the police force of Delhi was Muslim. A number
of them, with their uniforms and arms, had deserted. The
loyalty of the rest was doubtful. Sardar Patel had to wire
176
12D.29 Sardar Patel, for instance, passed orders directly to Ma

Sanjevi without their going through the Secretary; then he inform''''
the Secretary or the Secretary came to know later.
12D.30 Mr. Bannerjee was again recalled on April 26, 1968, ami
was examined regarding certain Home Ministry files and particularly
and is dated 5th February, 1948. This was followed by another lett('I'
to the Chief Commissioner, Ex. 140(3) where the matter of interview
of accused by counsel was again referred to and it was stated that
it was one of the important duties and functions of the District Ma-
gistrate to keep himself informed of the progress of investigation in-
to a case of this kind (i.c. a case connected with MahatmA
Gandhi) and it was not quite clear why Randhawa had not asked' the
District Superintendent of Police to report to him. It was not just
enough for Randhawa to say that had all the details been given to him
he would have rejected the application for interview.
12D.31 Mr. Bannerjee again stated that the first time it was
brought to the notice of the higher authorities that there was a con-
spiracy was at the meeting which was held after the cremation, and
that the whole thing had been kept by the Police to themselves. San-
jevi had not informed witness although their relations were quite
friendly. The Home Secretariat, he said, had not taken action be--
cause it had no information about the conspiracy and the information
came to it like a bomb-shell. Ex. 140 (5) dated February 27, 1948
shows that the witness was not being kept in touch with the investi-
gation into the murder case and he asked Sanjevi to keep him in
touch and do so at personal meetings "and I did w.rite to him about
it". He was asked why the Home Minister who was interested in
the progress of the investigation of the murder case did not show
any interest in the bomb case, his reply was: "My assessment of that.
is that they d:d not take the case so seriously. then and they trusted
the high police officials who were in-charge of the investigation and
they were under the impression that such high police officials would
do their duty."
12D.32 Regarding the R.S.S. the witness said that they were not
responsible for the bomb throwing as such and. in his opinion the can·
spirators were not acting as members of the R.S.S.; but some of the
activities of that body were anti-social and objectionable and the Gov-
ernment felt guilty after the 30th January for not having taken pre-
cautionary measures against that association. He also complained
that when decisions were taken in regard to the banning of R.S.S.,
the news leaked out and appeared in the Press the next morning and
thus the tall·poppies of RS.S. went underground in the early fore-
noon 01 the 1st February. To a question about the keeping in touch
with investigation of offences, the witness said that ordinarily it could'
not be part of the functions of the Secretariat or the Minister to take
an active part in Police Administration. In Mahatma Gandhi's case
the Minister and the Secretariat started issuing directives to the'
Police arId the Magistracy because it realised that the Police had not
properly. He said: "The long and short of it is that jl1l
"piLe of the information that was received on the night of the 20th
uud 21st from Madanlal, nothing was done for three or four days and
1'\'1'1\ niter that nothing effective was done." In his opinion Ministry
"lid the Secretariat should have functioned, i.e. started taking inte-
as soon as it came to know that there was default on the part of
tIll' Police. I
120.33 According to the witRess, there were three acts of omi-
III;iui1 in the case: (1) the Bombay Police did not take any action for
three or four days after they gGt the informatioll; (2) the Delhi Police
did not remind the Bombay Police or did not ask them what they
were doing; (3) the Delhi Police did nat requisition a few members
u( the Bombay Police to come and keep watch on Gandhiji's residence
us was the well-recognised convention in dealing with inter-provi-
vincial crime in those days. Apte and Godse had some kind of a his-
Lory and the Bombay Police should have known about it and had they
heen brought to Delhi they would have nabbed them or they would
not have dared to come to Delhi,
12D.34 He was then cross-examined. In his cross-examination,
the witness said that his own reaction was that the bomb thrown was
the act of an individual fanatic but he could not recollect that it
(\ccurred to him that there were others associated with him but he
never thought that there was a conspiracy of the kind which it turn-
ed Ollt to be. He did think that the bomb case was a serious matter
but he did not interfere because the matter was left in the hands of
high police offiCials, the highest in the land; and he had a right to
think that they would do their duty in a manne,; and
Mr. Sanjevi was considered a very clever Police Officer in his pro-'
vince. Mr. Sanjevi never told him anything and it was really the
procedure which made it difficult to ask Sanjevi as to the progress
of the investigation.
120.35 As far as the witness could remember, at the meeting of
31st, two Bombay haunts of Godse and Apte were mentioned. In
regard to his statement of sharing of blame betwl?en Police of Bom-
bay and Delhi, he was again by Mr. Kotwal and his
reply was that Bombay were blameworthy because after having re-
ceived the information about the two or three haunts of Godse and
Apte they did nothing to nab them, and they did not get into contact
with Delhi Police, did not tell them what they were doing, did not
send Bombay Police to further interrogate Madanlal. When his
attention was drawn to his previous statement he said that if he
had known what was contained in the statement of Madanlal, he
would have rung up the Chief Secretary of Bombay and would have
asked what was happening and would not have aHowed the matter
to rest as it did.
12D.36 Mr. Bannerjee's evidence when summarised comes to
this: (1) That as far as he was concerned he did not know that
there was any conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi, that for the
first time they came to know about it on 31st January 1948 when a
meeting was held at the house of the Home Minister after the cre--
mation. (2) That there was a convention of Police of one Province
being sent to another to help in investigation of offences committed
12-259 HA
212
for reliable Gurkha police from West Bengal. A contin
gent of 250 constables with some sub-inspectors of poli('"
was sent by the Chief Minister of the Central Provincl"
in response to an urgent message from him. There weI "
rumours of a coup d' eta.t on the part of the Muslims t"
seize the administration. Searches of Muslim houses lJy
the police had revealed dumps of bombs, arms and am
munition. Sten guns, Bren guns, mortars, and wirek
transmitter sets were seized and secret miniature fac\,,-
ries for the manufacture of the same, were uncoverl'd.
In explanation the Muslims alleged that arms were plant-
ed by their enemies in deserted Muslim houses. That
was not unlikely in some cases. But in a number of plaC'('s
rifles, Sten guns and mortars were actually used by the
Muslims in pitched fights."
12G.19 Dr. Sushila Nayar's statement Ex. 94 dated January 5,
1968 shows that on hearing of rumours of the possibility at an at·
tempt on the life of Mahatma Gandhi the police posted plain clothes
policemen but their desire to search the visitors was not agreed to
by the Mahatma.
12G.20 She also mentioned that when Gandhi-Jinnah talks ¥.ere
going on, some an'gry youngmen came to Sevagram and objected
to Mahatma having talks with Jinnah. They were removed from his
pathway by the Ashramites. Later she learnt that one of them
had a long knife on him and that Godse was one of those young men..
12G.21 The Ashramites had however come to believe that no
harm could be done to the Mahatma by anyone. That was the evid-
ence of Mr. Brij Krishan Chandiwala also.
12G.22 Commission would like to observe that the police report
of the incident does not support Godse's participation in that de-
monstration but it was staged by the determined anti-Gandhite the
intrepid L. G. Thatte supported by some Bengali anti-Gandhites.
12G.23 Mr. M. K. Sinha when asked about the action which
should have been taken after the statement of Madanlal said:
"1 still think that if adequate and prompt action had been
taken to locate the persons described in Madanlal's
statement. then the assassination should have been pre-
vented. 1 had heard rumours when 1 . . \·as here that whis-
pers about the conspiracy were current in Bombay and
were even known to officials."
12G.24 Mr. V. Shankar, witness No. 10, has stated that the SardaI'"
asked Mr. Sanjevi to watch the persons mentioned by MadanlaL
The modus operandi of the Sardar in regard to this conspiracy was
stated by Mr. Shankar before Mr. Pathak thus:
As far as this particular conspiracy was concerned, the action
"used to be taken by the Bombay Government either on their own
initiative or on seeking instructions or on getting instructions from
Sardar Patel." But there was a close contact between the Bombny
213
1'1 (0 ier and the Sardar and the liaison between the Central In-
klligence and the Bombay Special Police was maintained by the
J )jrcctorate of Intelligence Bureau.
"The general line, as far as I remember in this case was to

investigate the truth or otherwise of any information that
was coming to the notice either of the Government of
India or of the Government of Bombay and to pursue or
drop it as the case may be, on the completion of the in-
vestigation ..... all sorts of rumours prevailing and na-
turally the police had to screen the information that came
to their notice and took action when it was warranted."
12G.25 In his statement regarding police arrangements, Mr. V.
Shankar reiterated what was stated by Sardar Patel in the Con-
stituent Assembly in reply to Mr. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar's ques-
tion on February 6, 1948. He also stated that when Mahatma Gandhi
was requested to allow the search of visitors, he was adamant in
his opposition to it, although he had no objection to the tightening
cf security measures in other respects. He could not say whether
any persons were posted at strategic points of access to the prayer
meeting to identify persons who could likely be Mahatma's assai-
,ants but the Sardar, he said, had told Mr. Sanjevi to keep persons
mentioned by Madanlal under "surveillance".
12G.26 Mr. Shankar also stated that the police did not get any
tangible evidence of any conspiracy till after the confessional state-
ment of !-.:adanlal and after that the Intelligence Bureau and t.he
Bomhay police were hot on the trail of the persons mentioned there-
in and a speCial watch was kept at possible points of entry into Delhi
but the difficulty of detecting them at the railway stations was that
the railway stations were overcrowded. So much so that one of the
conspirators, Surya Dev, remained undetected for years after the
murder.
12G.27 Mr. Banerjee's statement was that it was not for the
Minister to supervise prosecutions personally but Sardar Patel,
although he did not take much interest in the investigation after
the Bomb Case, took a great deal of interest after the murder. Mr.
Bannerjee also said that if the Inspector General of Police, who was
the Director of Intelligence Bureau, was entrusted by Government
with the investigation of a case, it would not be Government's func-
tion to scrutinise the investigation. Neither the Minister nor the
Secretary need do anything further. But in this particular
after the murder the Home Secretary i.e., himself took over the su-
perintendence of the investigation i.e., choosing of the police to
investigate was taken over by the "Home Secretariat" and that is
what they should have done after the Bomb Case also. The records
of the Home Office, he said, would show how meticulous was the
control which the Home Secretary e.xercised over these matters.
12G.28 Miss Maniben Patel stated that the Sardar pleaded with
l\Cahatma Gandhi against the payment of 55 crores and told him that
the payment would not be appreciated by our 0'\1\;11 people and the
money will be misused by Pakistan and he also pleaded with Mahat·
rna Gandhi against his undertaking the fast but the Mahatma did
not agree. He also wanted the police to search the visi tors to 11 \I
prayer meetings but Mahatma did not agree. According to her, [h,
Sardar took all the precautions that he possibly could take.
12B.29 According to Mr. R. N. Banerjee, what Sanjevi ShO,III,1
have done was to get the Bombay Police over and the proper lillO'
to take precautions was after the bomb was thrown. Bombay Poll! (
should have been brought over to identify the persons from Maha
rashtrian areas of Bombay. Even if the Mahatma not agn'\'
able, the check could have been more vigorous and the matter should
have been proceeded with more vigorously and the police should
have been alert after Mehta Puranchand's interview 'lJl,ith Madan
1al and the Police should have known that Madanlal had sympathi"
sers outside and they were in Delhi also.
12G.30 As witness No. 17 before Mr. Pathak, Mr. Banerjcl'
stated that the fault of the Delhi Police was that they did not re-
mind the Bombay Police as to whatever information it had sent to
them and the fault of Bombay Police was that they did not send
any police to Delhi for the purpose of identification.
12G.31 Examined before this Commission, Mr. Bannerjee depos-
ed to certain important matters which might be enumerated thus
(1) If any information was given by Professor Jain, then
proper directions should have been given by the Bombay
Government and conduited through the Secretary to the
Head of the Police and he should have been asked to
submit his report within a short but specific time and
more interest should have been taken in what the police
was doing.
(2) It was not the duty of the Minister to be directing inves-
police official and directions were given to him that would

be sufficient. "Leaving the matter into the hands of Mr.
Nagarvala was sufficient if the Government had confi-
dence in him." He added that in those days the Govern-
ment relied on the efficiency of the police which in the
case of Mahatma Gandhi may have proved to be a mistake.
(3) If the Bombay Government had been informed as early
as July 1947 that any person or set of persons had threat-
ened the life of Mahatma Gandhi, then that Government
should have ordered its police to keep those persons under
watch. It should also have informed Delhi Police and
adequate measures should have been taken to stop any
harm coming to the Mahatma.
(4) to Mr. R. N. Bannerjee, the three acts of omis-
SIon In thiS case were-
(a) The Bombay Police did not take action for three or four
days after they got the information.
(b) The Delhi Police did not remind them or even enqUire
from them as to what they were doing.
(c) The Delhi Police did not requisition a few Bombay
policemen to come and keep watch on Gandhiji's resl-
dence as was the well recognised convention in dealing
with interprovincial crimes in those days. Such a con-
vention was denied by Mr. Rajadhyaksha now I.G.P.,
Bombay. And Commission has been unable to find any
corroborative proof from official records.
(5) The Bombay Police was to be blamed because after they
had received information about two or three haunts of
Godse and Apte, they did nothing to nab them. (State-
ment of Madanlal does not support the giving of these
names or their haunts.) And further they never told the
terrogate Madanlal. Bombay pOlice deny any responsI-

bility for sending suo motu their police to interrogate
Madanlal.
Had he himself known anything about it-according to his
statement, he came to know about the conspiracy aftel'
Mahatma's crem.e!tion-he would have kept on asking the
Chief Secretary cf Bombay as to what the Bombay Police
was doing.
(6) It was on January 31, 1948. when an emergency meeting
was held after Mahatma's funeral, that it came to be dis-
closed that there was a conspiracy to murder Mahatma
Gandhi and that Madanlal had made a confessional state-
ment disclosing who some of his co-conspirators were.
At that meeting the Sardar asked Sanjevi as to what had
happened and his reply was that names had been sent to
Bombay Police but they did nothing. But added Mr. Ban-
nerjee that neither Sanjevi nor Mehra had ever complain-
ed to him regarding the inaction of the Bombay Police.
It was at that meeting that Mr. Sanjevi had stated that
he had sent to Bombay the confessional statement of
Mandanlal the substance of which was that Apte and
Godse must have gone back to one or the other of their
two or three haunts fn Bombay.
(7) The Director of Intelligence Bureau and Mr. D. W. Mehra,

Dy. I.G.P., Delhi were quarrelling amongst each other and
the District Magistrate failed in his duty. The police
should have known that Madanlal had sympathisers out-
after Mehta Puran Chand had interviewed MadanlaL
(8) Mr. said that even under the prevailing prac-
tice, Mr. Sanjevi should have discussed "With him the
bomb case but unfortunately the first time a copy of the
statement of Madanlal was placed before him was at the
meeting after Mahatma's funeral. Mr. Bannerjee him-
self had no detailed information regarding the grave off-
ence of Madanlal before the meeting and it was lor that
reason that the Home Secretariat remained inactive.
216
(9) When Mr. Bannerjee was recalled, he said that the ollin
of the Inspector General of Police and Director, Intelligl'tll'"
Bureau were held by selected members of the police IOL ('t'
for 'which special qualifications were required and, thc!'.
fore, it could not ordinarily be said to be a part of th,-
functions of the Minister or the Secretary to take actll'l
part in police administration and it was for the police l"
make proper investigation and keep the Governml'til
informed of what it was doing.
12G.32 When recalled Mr. R. N. Bannerjee stated that the news
of the bomb explosion reached him Delhi the same evening when
tne bomb exploded and it was in the newspapers the next morning
His own reaction was, that it was an act of an individual fanatlt·
and it never occurred to him that there was anybody behind it,
although he 'did see in the newspapers that Madanlal's compani.on:;
had escaped. He never thought that there was a conspiracy of l.he
kind it turned out to be. Although they thought that the bomb
serious matter, he did not interfere in the investigation, because it
had been left in the hands of a very senior and high police officer
who had come from Madras with high reputation.
12G.33 It appears that even after the murder Mr. Bannerjee had
not kept himself in touch with the investigation of the case nor its
progress. In his letter, Ex. 140(5), to the D.I.B. dated February 27,
1948 which was after 28 days of the murder, he said that he knew
nothing about it as he had not kept in touch 'with the investigation.
He had to write to the D.LB. that the Ministry should be kept
formed of the progress of the investigation and he wanted the pro·
gress to be discussed with him orally.
12G.34 Said Mr. Bannerjee: "The long and short of it is that
in spite of the information that was received on the night between
the 20th and 21st from Madanlal, nothing was done for three or
four days and even after that nothing effective was done." Mr.
Bannerjee added: "It may be said that it was really the procedure,
the working of the Home Ministry which made it difficult for me to
question Sanjevi in regard to the progress of the investigation".
This passage from his evidencE shows that there was something
wrong in the working of the Home Ministry which had made the
of the Ministry, that is, Home Secretary, rather ineffective.
If the Home Secretary could not question Mr. Sanjevi in regard to
the progress of the investigatior. it is difficult to imagine anybody
alse doing so.
12G.35 .It is. unnecessary to add that Mr. Bannerjee has found
fault both with the Bombay Police as well as Mr. Sanjevi for not
makil')g full use of the information which they had received from the
sta tement of Madanlal
12G.36 A photostat copy of page 3 of the Hindustan Times dated
January 28, 1948 has been produced before the Commission Ex. l06·C.
When read ""ith the news contained on that page it shows th"t
Gandhiji attended the Urs at the tomb of Khwaja Kutub·ud-din
near Mehrauli on the 27th. There are two pictures. one showing
Gandhiji addressing the gathering and the other qandhiji and P8!·ty
Photostat copy of the Hindustan Times, dated the 28th January, H·48
containing a,n account of the Mahatma's visit to the shrine of Khwaja
Qutub-ud-din near Mehrauli. (Para. No. 12G.37)
Photostat copy (two pictures in one) of Hindustan Times, dated 28th January, 1948 showing Mahatma Gand::i
(a) addressing a meeting, ",nd (b) with the party outside the inner entrance of the of
Khwaja Qutub-ud-din. Mehrauli. (Para. No. 12G.381
outside the inner entrance of the shrine. This document is imporL-
lUlt as showing that in spite of the bomb explosion the Mahatma
going to public meetmgs and the photograph shows that he was
jJl close proximity to the public which was hardly helpful in taking
lIny protective measures.

12G.37 This is a puzzling piece of evidence. On the one hand
evidence shows that protective measures, leaving out the ques!.ion
whether they were adequate or not, were being taken for the pro-
tection of Mahatma Gandhi at Birla House, some police had been
stationed and plain-clothes policemen deployed; instructions had
been given to keep a look out for suspicious-looking persons what-
ever that expression may imply. But this photograph and the ac-
count of it in the Hindustan Times of the 28th January shows that
the Mahatma, unmindful of the threats, which had been received
and of the dangers to which he was exposed was going about
amongst the populace irrespective of who they were. This photograph
shows the Mahatma at the Urs of a Mohammedan Saint. He is 5ur-
rounded by a large cro\vd and is sitting amongst them and pro-
o30ly addressing them. This piece of evidence proves that the
Mahatma was unmindful of his own safety and was prepared to go
into any crowds where he thought he should go or was taken. At
a previous ·page the mood of the Mohammedan residents of Delhi
has been set out. The mood of the Hindu and Sikh refugees has
also been given. The Mahatma seems to have cut across dangers
from both and was prepared to brave them and even to expose him-
self to the hazards and the dangers which a visit to a place like the
Tomb of Khwaja Kutub-ud-din Bukhtiyar at Mehrauli would have
exposed him. Some time one wonders if any protective Pleasure,
which ingenuity would devise, could have been sufficient but it does
show this that the Mahatma's faith in the Almighty was in super
abundance.
12G.38 The photostat copy is attached hereto showing how un-
the Mahatma was going about amongst the people and
10 how close proximity was he to them.
12G.39 Or does it show that the Mahatma was safer in the
Shrine of a Saint even though he was a Mohammedan Saint than
he was at his residence at Birla House tinder the protection of the
Police whether in uniform or in plain clothes.
H-Adequacy of Measures
12Hi.1 It was submitted that in view of the evidence of intense

feeling against Mahatma Gandhi and angry attitude and conduct
of the refugees and there was a large number of them in Delhi and
that the Hindu Mahasabha and the R.S.S. were using this intense
feeling for their own purposes. the security arrangements as set out
in these documents were wholly inadequate, more so because when
on January 13. 1948 the Mahatma went on fast to force the payment
of 55 crores of rupees to Pakistan, the feelings against him were
further intensified as shown by the slogans which were
during the fast, "MARTA HAl TO MARNE DO" (IF HE WAN'!.::)
216
TO DIE, LET HIM DIE). In these circumstances it is rightl\
submitted that more attention should have been devoted to SeCUl'l1 \
and the crowds should have been kept at a little distance from 1111
Mahatma.
12H.2 Mr. D. W. Mehra, witness No. 23, stated that if orders h:,,j
so. Mr. Mehra was asked what suspicious looking persons would
be like. The reply was, "it would depend upon the person on dut,l
to make up his mind" in this respect. He did not know if instl'u('
tions had been given to the police to watch persons from Bombay
side coming to Gandhiji's prayer meeting or coming to Birla
When asked if he had given any special order to any police ofHct"!
for watching people from Bombay-side, his reply was that he did
not do so because Mr. Sanjevi was incharge and it was Mr. Sanjevi
who was looking into the entire matter. He himself did not mah
any suggestion to Mr. Sanjevi in this respect.
12H.3 He was asked whether the Poona Police, if called in, would
have been able to spot or stop the persons who subsequently mur-
dered Gandhiji, his reply was that he would not be able to answer
the question. It was possible that they (Poona Police) might
or might not have been able to do so.
12H.4 Mr. G. K. Handoo, witness No. 48", stated that as the Hindu
Mahasabha was influential all over the country and the Partition
had produced communal feelings, he would, if he had been inchargc
of security, have got C.I.D. policemen from all the Provinces where
Hindu Mahasabha was strong and he would have stationed them
on a special look-out in the prayer meetings.
12H.5 Miss Maniben Patel, witness No. 79, said "I know this
that my father argued with Gandhiji, ta.lked to him to have prop(:r
protection and allow him (Sardar Patel) to order the search of per-
sons who came to his prayer meetings. The Police officers also talk-
ed to Gandhiji. but Gandhiji would not have any of it". He said
he would stop his .prayer meetings rather allow this kind of thing.
12H.6 Mr. Morarji Desai in his statement in the Bombay Legis-

lative Assembly (in Ex. 232) said that the only way that Mahatmaji
could be protected was by searching people; but to put it into opera-
tion the Mahatma had to be consulted, otherwise he would have left
Delhi.
12H.7 Mr. Purushottam Trikamdas, witness No. 15, stated that
Mahatmaji should not have been asked about the search, because
it was the duty of Government and the Police to protect him. He
blamed Government for having taken a lackadaisical attitude in the
matter.
12H.8 Mr. J. P. Narayan agreed with Mr. Purushottam's views
and was of the opinion that it was not necessary to ask Gandhiji.
have
2l!J
12H.9 In Pyarelal's book "Mahatma Gandhi-The Last Phase"
,II order to spare him from the complaints of the Muslims. At

.,lluther place, he has said that Gandhiji was to leave for Wardha
"II February 2, 1948. This is supported by Mr. N. V. Gadgil's article,
Ex. 103.
12H.10 Dr. M. S. Randhawa (witness No. 18) stated that if he had

known about the conspiracy to murder Mahatmaji, he would have
on a meeting at a higher level to be called by Home Minis-
leI' and that he would have stopped the prayer meeting whether
JI.-iahatmaji liked it or not, because his life was more important. Dr.
Handhawa had said, "I personally had a great respect for him as a
leader". He added that he would have controlled the people coming
to the prayer meeting.
12H.U. On 30th January, 1948 Police Superintendent A. N. Bhatia

\\'as absent. Assistant Sub-Inspector Amar Nath came on duty at
4-30 p.m. The statement of Raghunath Naik P.W. 76 in Court, ""ho
was a gardener, shows that the assailant was caught hold of by him,
by an army man and 2 police constables showing that the PoliCe
was present at that time.
12H.12 In the Constituent Assembly on February 6, 1948, Sardar

Patel in reply to a question by Mr. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar gave
details of the protective precautions taken at Birla House and the
protection afforded for Mahatma Gandhi's safety. They were pat-
terned on the lines indicated in Ex. 10. There Sardar Patel also
said that he himself pleaded with Gandhiji for allowing the Police
to do their duty in regard to protection, but he was unsuccessful.
The police considered that in order to make the protection effective,
they should search every visitor to the prayer meeting. Sardal'
Patel also asked Gandhiji about it but Gandhiji did not agree to it.
12H.13 When carefully analysed this evidence shows that the

police considered the search of visitors to the prayer meetings the
only method and means of protecting the Mahatma but to that the
M::ahatma whose faith in God was unbounded and unlimited was not
agreeable. His presence at the Urs of a Mohammedan Saint Kutub-
ud-Din Bakhtiyar at Mehrauli shows how unmindful he was of any
warning about danger to his life or how he could be amongst crowds
leaving his life and fate in the hands of their good sense and in Al-
mighty's protecting hand. A clear picture of his visit is given in
the photograph which has been attached. No other method was sug-
gested by the police and because of the Mahatma's strong objection·
to the remedy it could not be adopted. Witnesses have stated that
Mahatma's objection should have been disregarded but it appears
that they have ignored, perhaps unconsciously, the strong
ality that the Mahatma was and it is unimaginable that
could be done without his kno'lhing it and against his wishes and in
this matter it would have been a challenge to his faith in the pro-
tective hand of God if the police had persisted in searching or
screening.
220
12H.14 Commission does not agree that Mahatma's wishes '"
·"iews as to prayer meeting being free to all could be ignored ,.,
treated unceremoniously_ If he objected to the search, that was Ih.,
end of that protective measure and other modes had to be SUggl'stl'oI
and devised by the Police.
12H.15 All the witnesses who have appeared before the Clnll
mission and the statements made by Bardar Patel in the ConstitU('lll
Assembly and the evidence of Mr. Morarji Desai show that the onl,I'
method of protection which was advised at the time was the search
of visitors to the prayer meetings to which Mahatma had takt-II
strong objection. But it appears that the police advisers did Dol
suggest any other method of giving protection to the Mahatma.
12H.16 One method of protection has been suggested by Mr. Ban·
nerjee, v.itness No. 19, and other witnesses from Bombay and Delh!
that the Bombay police should have been called in sO as to identify
any Maharashtrian, who could have been a suspect, for being spu1-
ted out by watchers from that part of the country. Mr. Kamte,
witness No.4, had also suggested in his letter to Mr. Rana that
Poona police should have at once been sent to Delhi to protecl
Mahatma Gandhi and that appears to be a very sound suggestlOn
because the Commission finds that soon after the murder 4 police
officers of various ranks were flown from Poona to Delhi for the
protection of the Ministers. One fails to see why this protection was
not sought at the earliest opportunity when according to the Delhi
police Madanlal had disclosed that his companions were Maharash-
trians and one of them was a Poona editor of an avowed and blatant
anti-Congress and anti-Gandhi paper, the Hindu RClshtra and the
defunct Agmni. Commission is asswning without deciding the
claim of the Delhi police about the disclosure of the Agrani on the
very first day by Madanlal.
12H.17 Mr. J. N. Sahni, witness No. 95, stated that after the mur-
der of Mahatma Gandhi' the Government of India became very
alert: and for the protection of Ministers Mr. B. B. S. JeUey and
Ivlr. G. K. Handoo were called in from U.P. to take charge of secu-
rity of the Ministers. Mr. JeUey when recalled by the Commission
said that he was not called in for the purpose to Delhi but Mr. G. K.
Handoo was. Mr. Handoo, when recalled, admitted that he was
brought to Delhi after the murder and posted as Deputy Director
of Intelligence under the Ministry of Home Affairs from the first
week of March, 1948. Mr. M. K. Sinha, Deputy Director, Intelli-
gence Bureau, has stated that he was put in charge of the Security
of the Prime Mi ister and Sardar Patel after the murder.
12H.18 Mr. B. B. S. JeUey was questioned by the Commission as

to how the Viceroys used to be guarded when they went to a dis-
trict or into a Police Range. He replied that the local police \\as
not able to cope with the arrangements and plain-clothes and uni-
formed police had to be imported and deployed at all strategic points
and the place where he was staying had to be heavily guarded. He
also said that there were high senior police officers around the Vice-
roy wilen he walked. They. used to the of Viceroy
even )IY inducting some policemen as hIS domestIc servants at a
I,IUI'(' where he would stay. He also said that he went to Mahallna'
I illildhi and showed him the weapons which he had seized from the
II :-l,S. and told the Home Minister that something serious
1(lIppen from the RS.S. What he meant was not particularly S%e-
111111)..( happening to Mahatma Gandhi but even to the Central Mltis_
I"I'S like Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel.
G. K. HandoD
12H.19 Another witness who has given valuable evidence re-
Nphru soon after the murder of Mahatma, Gandhi. He said th" he

was brought in after the murder expressly for the purpose of "I'cra-
llising a security section in the Intelligence Bureau both V.!.Ps.
also for the border. He was put in charge of secunty of theP:ime
l'Ilinister. The V.I.Ps. were categorised and as Prime Ministerwas
lhc head of the Government, he (Handoo) was put in charge 0; his-
s('curity and various other officers were put in charge of other l:inis-
ICTS. When asked what kind of security measures he took in such-
produce a whole blueprint.

12H.20 The security arrangements, he said, are so arrange.! that
the Prime Minister is never within 25 yards of the range of in as-
sailant with a revolver or a pistol. There are two rings the
V.I.P., one the inner ring and the other outer ring, the fOltter is
within 2-3 yards from the V.I.P. and the latter about 25 yart4away
from the V.I.P. This is what usually happens. There is no J:bysical
search of persons coming to the V,I.P. unless one of the spotters is
suspicious in which case a physical search is at once con:llcted
Tl;lere were reports that other members of the Godse
likely to attack the Prime Minister and also the Home and
the life of the other two ministers Maulana Azad and Mr, Rafi.-\hmed
Kidwai was also in danger.
12H.20A The statement of Mr. Handoo that Godse adm.ited to
him that their next target would have been Prime Ministe? Nehru
and the statement of Mr. J. N. Sahni that Nehru's life was also in
danger find corroboration from an anonymous letter in to
Is is in the Intelligence Bureau file Ex. 224A at pp. 77-78. II praises

Godse for having murdered Mahatma Gandhi and it is strongly
anti-Nehr..l who was therein dubbed as a "crusher of Hindu
community", It ended "May God, Jawaharlal Nehru
12H.20B All this sho\J..-g that there was a school of which
was prepared to go to the extent of indulging in politicallSsassina_
tion to achieve their political and communal objectives. F'ortuna-
tely after the murder high ranking police officers who knw some-
thing about security and were themselves active and alerttere call-
ed in and the danger to the Cabinet Ministers was thus Oi"erted.
12H.21 ?,hen what precautions he would have taken to
protect a lIkely VIctIm If he had been told that the were
from Bombay, Mr. Handoo replied tlmt he would at once gd 1111 ..
touch with the C.LD. authorities at Bombay and request th!'lll I,
send immediately a complete list of all such terrorists who (''''' I I
be associated with the commission of such a crime. He would III"
have asked them to send their very best spotters out of their {',III
staff who would easily be able to identify those terrorists whmw 1,·1
he would have got by that time. He added that the provincial C, I II
must have a list of all such persons who are likely to commit 011"11
ces of a violent nature.
12H.22 As far as Godse's group is concerned, there is no evid!'IIi'
before the Commission that the Poona or Bombay police knew tlt"I"
as potential murderers. Their activities are shown as SaVarkill'll"
and some were potentially dangerous. That could hardly be SYII"
nymous with political assassination of people like Mahatma Gundlll
12H.23 He was asked what arrangements should have been m;I' I,'
after the bomb was thrown at the Bida House, his reply was thai
protections of the nature given in the blueprint should have bl'I'1i
.given i.e. an inner ring and an outer ring should have been fornwd
along with the spotters, searchers from Bombay Province for iell'lI
tifying any likely assailants. When asked what he would do in til,·
case of Mahatma Gandhi who would have gone on fast, he said why
should he (Mahatma) have known anything about it. The pol in'
would have come from Bombay. The inner and outer rings would
have been dressed exactly like Congress volunteers who would 1)1'
around Mahatma and spotters could have been dressed as Malis and
other domestic servants and nobody would have known about it
He also said that he would have made arrangements for a watch 10
be kept at railway stations, the air terminals, terminal routes, dh"
ramsalas and other places where people are likely to come and st<lY.
12H.24 He was asked to send a note on Security which he h<lfi
been kind enough to send and which is marked Ex. 281. He has
divided Security into two parts; Physical Security Measures and
Internal Security Measures. The physical security measures sug-
gested by him are no different from what was taken in the case or
Mahatma Gandhi but the internal security measures, he said, mtisL
be unobtrusive and carefully planned the element of surprise always
being introduced to avoid their getting known and thus becoming
ineffective. He has also described in his note how rooms of tht'
v.I.P and the servants and stenographers and the mail received by
V.I.P. are scrutinised. That might not have been possible in the
case of the Mahatma. But what he has said about the sp.otters is
important. He has described how spotters are employed and what
they are supposed to do. But the important part which may apply
to a person like Mahatma Gandhi is that three specially selected
armed plain-clothes police officers should always "cover" the V.LP.
and to do this they have to merge into the background provided by
the VJ.P. They should appear as personal staff and carefully be-
have as such, their integrity and loyalty should be above board.
12H.25 With regard to the Mahatma he said as follows:
"In the case of Mahatma Gandhi and his security-it appears
that no well-defined or carefully planned security mea-
sures whether physical or internal had been made by the
clhi Police or lntelli.gence 13urea.u. Admittcdly the
responsibIlity for askmg for det'll1cd and careful secunly
measures to be instituted was by the Congress party-
but if they failed to judge the seriousness and danger of
the situation-it was undoubtedly the business of the
Delhi Police or the Intelligence Bureau to do so-parti-
cularly after the exploding of the gun-cotton slab by
Madan Lal on 20th January 1948 at Gandhiji's prayer
Delhi Police to immediately wireless Bombay and Poona

(the I.G. Police Bombay and the D.I.G., C.I.D. Poona) to
send over immediately a plain-clothes squad of intelligent
and knowledeable police officers who would help in iden-
tifying the Maharatta youths who had conspired to kill
Gandhiji.
"What again is most tmfortunate-is the fact that the Bombay
Police in spite of the knowledge they had of the danger
to Gandhiji's life and even after Madanlal's arrest-failed
to olIer sending their knowledgeable plain-clothes staff
to help in identifying any of the Maharatta youth who
had been described by Madanlal If the Bombay or
Poona Policemen had arrived-and if they had been utilis-
ed by the Delhi Police properly and carefully in batches
of Birla House and the actual prayer meeting, it would

possibly have made it much more difficult for the assassin
to succeed and after <;1.11 security is never fool-proof but
is always an intelligence and. strenuous attempt to make
it more and more difficult for the assassin."
l2H.26 The Commissio'1 is not oblivious of the fact that a strong-
min::Ied person like the Mahatma was not easily amenable to this
hnd of protection and any obstrusive interference with his way of
life or with his entry into the prayer ground or exist therefrom
'would have been promptly resented by him. But as has been point-
ed out by Mr. RclUdoo, it should have been possible to do the whole
thhg in such an unobstrusive manner and use police watchers and
spotters as domestic servants like Malis, etc., which would have been
much great'2r protection than any other which short of a search could
h:'lye provided.
12H.27 No one can be sure that even this precaution would have·
been sufficient to protect the Mahatma because it has been noticed in
cases like murders of high dignitaries in other parts of the world that
in spite of every precaution mishaps do happen. Besides the Com-
mission is not sure of the Mahatma's reaction to the sudden appear-
a''1ce at Birla House of Marathi-speaking "Malis and domestics".
Could the operation have remained unobstrusive from the Mahatma's
observant eye? There can be no guarantee against mishaps and
cClJculated crime but it is the duty of those looking after the security
of a V.I.P. to minimise the chances of such mishaps. Whether in
spite of this protection a determined man like Godse would have
224
succeeded or not is in the realm of conjectures lind no one cun answl'l"
that question. But it was worth trying to pl'Ovide the ldnd of pw-
tection which Mr. Handoo and others have suggested and it should
have been possible for high ranking policemen to have been brought
into Birla House and such means of protection devised which would
have minimised the risk without at the same time giving unneceSS<lry
offence of Mahatma's susceptibilities.
12H.28 In this connection the Commission must refer to the state-
ment of Dr. Sushila Nayar, witness No. 53, who said that Mahatma
Gandhi was not particularly fond of security and security police,
who had even to hide themselves behind bushes when the Mahatmn
went to the prayer-meetings. There is, however, other evidence to
show that short of searching the Mahatma was not averse to other
security arrangements. This hiding of plain-clothes police behind the
bushes which has been deposed to by Dr. Sushila Nayar is explainable
by the desire of those plain-clothes policemen to be unobstrusive and
not necessarily due to Mahatma's objections to their presence. iIf
Mahatma Gandhi did not object to the D.I.G. Mehra's presence or to
the presence of Supdt. Arnar Nath Bhatia, it is doubtful that he woul::l
have objected to others but that is again conjectural.
12H.29 Mr. M. K. Sinha, witness No. 44, has also stated that he
would have called over the Bombay police to act as watchers an(i
suggested that they should have a ring round the Mahatma.
12H.30 Thus, these police witnesses, Mr. Jetley, Mr. Handoo and
Mr. Sinha, particularly Mr. Handoo, have suggested that Mahatma
Gandhi should have been flanked, rather surrounded by a ring of
armed police officers disguised, as and dressed in uniform of Congress
volunteers. The whole thing, according to them, would have been
unobtrusive because the police officers would either, have been
dressed as domestic servants or as Congress volunteers. An this is
all right and would work in the case of a person who is prepared to
be under such protection as indeed it has been seen in the case of the
Prime Minister Nehru addressing public meetings in various State
capitals or even in Delhi. But the difference in the case of Mahatma
Gandhi was this: Mahatma Gandhi was not only a political leader,
a great politician and an eminent and wise statesman but also a Saint.
His detractors in England ironically called him a 'Nake:l Fakir', in
the erstwhile Frontier Province the people called him 'Malang
in the North and South Western districts of the Punjab he was called
a 'Sain Baba' and in the Capital of the Punjab he was called "Lal1-
gotiwala" to which was added "teri sada hi jai" (may you always have
victory) showing that they considered him not merely a Congress
1
leader but a 'Sain' or a Saint as well. People touched his feet for
religious merit and as a religious duty. Whenever he went to Lahore
or the erstwhile Frontier Province it used to be an almost impossible
task to keep the multitudes away from him. On one occasion at the
Lahore Railway Station it took the volunteers in charge of reception
over an hour to take him out from his compartment to a waiting
motor car which was standing in the porch of the railway station and
the distance was not more than 25 yards and the train was conse-
quentllr considerably delayed. And the volunteers were big sturdy
225
111('11.Wherever he went crowds wanted to have his "darshan and
deedar" and to pay obeisance to him. Whether it was at Abbotabad
In the heart of non-Pathan frontier district or it was in Peshwar the
I:cntre of the Pathans, or Lahore the centre of the Punjabis, the mil-
ling crowds wanted to come and touch his feet and howsoever IDJ,;ch
lhe Congress volunteers or the Red Shirt volunteers tried to protect
him from these affectionate and respectful attentions of the crowds,
lhey could not always succeed because people wanted to pay homage
to him by touching his fect and thus to get religious merit and this
was so in the cas:! of men or women, Pathans or Pathanis, Hindus or
I-Jindwanis (Hindu women) including Sikhs and Sikhnis.
12H.31 And the Mahatma was a firm believer in God unafraid of
dcath because he firmly believed that "as long as God wills that he
should serve the people, he will, and when God wills it otherwise,
nothing will save him". In such circumstances it was not quite easy
to have a ring of volunteers or officers around him because it was
noticed many a time that ring of even strong, sturdy and hefty
Pathans or tall stalwart Punjabis broke down when the milling
crowds pushed forward to pay their homage to the unique leader that
Mahatma Gandhi was, a combination of saintliness, of foresighted
statesmanship and a very astute politician.
12H.32 It has been suggested that crowds should have been kept
away from him and that they should not have been allowed to come
within 20 yards of him. It was worthwhile trying but
whether such a thing could have been possible or not it is not easy
to say. The Mahatma was a powerful magnet for the crowds. The
crowds did not only come to hear him but they also wanted to
homage to him and, therefore, t.he solution suggest€'d by tl:ese
able police officers was easy to suggest but perhaps difficult to put
into operation.
12H.33 Commission is fully alive to these difficulties because there
is no Indian who has had anything to do with public life, and parti-
cularly with the Mahatma, who has not himself witnessed these
scenes of great enthusiasm, of great respect and homage of the
Mahatma and who has not himself been hustled by the crowds. At
the same time one cannot lose sight of the danger which was portend-
ed by the blasting of the bomb and the information which had been
received before the bomb and what was disclosed by Madanlal and
Prof. Jain after the bomb. Even though the Mahatma was a man of
very strong will and very strong minded and not easily amenable
to the kind of protection suggested, yet in the opinion of the Com-
mission and in spite of what has been written above and was common
knowledge in regard to the Mahatma's way of life, this unobtrusive
:-nethod of giving protection to the Mahatma was worth trying and
;hould have been given a trial. It could have been equally efficacious
as a search and perhaps less annoying and less obstrusive and less
objectionable to the Mahatma.
given him some protection and should have been tried. People like
15-259 "HA
226
Vishwanath Shah, witness No.3, before Mr. Pathak, if asked to pill
their volunteers around Mahatma might have prevented
appearance of Godse in front of the Mahatma and would thus nul
have given him an opportunity to shoot point blank at him.
is a song "What will be will be", Perhaps it is truej but such pure·
fatalism cannot be allowed in the functioning of Governmentnl
duties and whatever is feasible must be put into operation irrespec-
tive of its ultimate success or failure.
12H.35 No one can be sure that even if this precaution could
have protected the Mahatma or would have been sufficient for the
purpos'2 because it has noticed that in other countries in spite
of the arrangements and precautions taken, mishaps have
happened.
12Hi.36 Commission would also wish to emphasise that some cle-
ment of opposition to Mahatma Gandhi had been created by his latest
politics and manifestation of danger had come in the form of the
bomb expiosion. Therefore, in spite of what its result would have
been, precautions as suggested by these knowledgeable officers were
eminently caned for.
12H.37 One mnre defect which the Commission has noticed is
this: A Sub-Inspector was put in-charge of the plain-clothes police-
men whereas iYl case of V.LPs. officers of a much higher rank
are employed. it is not merely the humbler rank which the Com-
mission has taken into account, but also the fact that the Sub-
Inspectors could not be so well trained in protective duti2s as were
officers who were brought in later for protective duties of the Central
Ministers, whose life, in the opinion of the Commission was, from
the point of view of national security and country's stability of the
greatest importance and they well deserved the strictest police
vigilance and protection, in spite of their personal distaste of and
horror against such protection.
L Causes of Murder of Mahatma Gandhi

12I.1 The very reserval of the decision about payment of 55 crores
to Pakistan has been stressed by witnesses to be a major reason of
the murder of Mahatma Gandhi. On January 9, 1948, the Cabinet
decided not to pay 55 era res to Pakistan Government. On January
13, Mahatma Gandhi went on fast. On January 14 there was a
Cabinet meeting and the decision not to pay was reversed. Mahatma
Gandhi characterised the decision of the Union Government as a
unique action, and Pyarelal in his book "Mahatma Gandhi, The Last
Phase" Vol. II at page 719 has said "What tl)en was the motive behind
the Union Government's decision? he (the Mahatma) asked. l'It
was my fast. It changed the whole outlook. Without the fast, they
could not go beyond what the law permitted and required them to
do .......... There is a homely maxim of law which has been in
practice for centuries in England that when common law seems to
fail, equity comes to the rescue". At an earlier page it is stated that
Gandhiji was asked whether his fast would not have the effect of
227
the Gujrat refugee train massacre and the Karachi
riots. "Gandhiji answered that he had rehearsed to himself that
possibility but he was not in the habit of allowing himself to be
deflected from the pursuit of truth by such considerations."
12L2 Mahatma Gandhi while breaking the fast said: "I embarked
on the fast in the name of Truth whose familiar name is God ....... .
With tl)at same name on my lips I have broken the fast". (See
Gandhiji's Delhi Diary pages 351-352).
12I.3 Soon after the money was paid to Pakistan, Mr. N. V.
Gadgil went to Maharashtra on a tour. He observed that many
people there did not like "Gandhiji's behaviour". When he came
back, he met Gandhiji and repeated to him that he had told the
people that they had purchased Gandhiji's life for 55 crores of
rupees, a cheap bargain. In his article Ex. 103 at page 116 he adds:
"Little did I then realise that this invaluable thing, (Gandhiji's life)
was soon to leave us". According to him, it was this payment
which resulted in the bomb outrage.
12I.4 Mr. Rajagopalachari in his book 'Gandhiji's Teachings and
Philosophy' has mentioned th3.t Sardar Va!1abhai Pa-tel casually
.remarked to him that the payment of 50 crores to Pakistan insisted
UpO'1 by G"ndhiji ha::i rcsulted in his assassination. Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel felt that the consp:racy to kill Gandhiji was due
to Hindu anger against him on account of his advice to pay a huge
sum of 50 crores when Pakistan was organising and carrying out the
wicked military campaign against India. This was considered to be
bexcuseabh by a small militant anti·Gandhi Maharashtrian group
as a climr1x of Gandhiji's disservice to the nation and decided to put
an end to his life and they thought that there wa9 no other way Qut
excepting his assassination.
121.5 Mr. Rajagopalachari had added that whether the as!'assina-
tion was due to the payment of 50 crores or it may not be the result
of a more ancient grudge but insisted that India should
out its agreement and not start its career of independence by
breakin,g promises. According to him. if 50 crores had not been
paid, India would have lost moral power, Gandhiji would have clied
of a broken heart instead of by a Hindu's revolver, sO crores given
away saved India's moral status and added to it.
121.6 But India was left with the ignomity (If dimming the light
which led hcr to freedolTl.
121.7 According to Mr. Purushottam Trikamdas, witness No. 15,
the causes of the murder of Mahatma Gandhi were his befriending
through th: fast), and the attitude of the Hindu Mahasabha towards
'Gandhiji.
121.8 The Hindus and the Sikhs from the Punjab and N.W.F.P.
'when they. came to Delhi or East PW1jab or West U.P. considered
228
that they were coming to their homeland and they had a feeling Ihu t
they were being treated as unwanted people because Mahnl ... !!
Gandhiji's feeling was that they should return to their homes, 1111"
more resentment was caused when lesser leaders started taking UII'II
cue from the Mahatma and echoed the idea in loudspeaker VOl\IIII"
All this made Mahatma Gandhi more unpopular.
12I.9 These were the feelIngs of the refugees but the III
general and particularly the member of the Hindu Mahasabha hud
resented the policy of appeasement of Muslims of Mahatma Gandhi
which in their opinion had resulted in partition and they were oj' lin
opinion that the architect of this was none other than Mahatma
Gandhi. They resented the payment of 55 crares for whkh
the Mahatma went on fast and the other conditions which tl w
Mahatma had imposed for breaking the fast so much so that Lll4'
Hindu Mahasabha leader, Mr. Ashutosh Lahiri, repudiated the CIIIl·
currence of the Hin:lus to the 7 Point Pledge which had been sign('"
by the leaders of several communities mc1uding the Hindus.
12:I.10 The refugees backed by the Hindu Mahasabha in D('lld

were angry and vociferOUSly showed their anger by processions and
slogans but theirs was only a vocal pt'Otest. The SavD.rknri1P
Maharashtrians in Poona became more exasperated and more de:-:-
perate and were less considerate. They had come to the conclusion.
as Gopal Godse's statement has shown, that nothing less than
removal of the Mahatma from the scene would save the Hindu and
11 indutva and being followers of a different philosophy they decid('d
to put that philosophy of political assassination into practice and they
conspired to murder Mahatma GaYldhi. In their second attempt
they succeeded in achieving their objective, although their first
attempt proved abortive. He has gone so far in his deposition that
even the arrest of Nathuram Godse and Apte and their confede-
rates would not have saved Gandhi's life showing the intensity of
anti-Gandhi feelings in their group and the extent of the conspiracy.
12I.ll 11k J. N. Sahni has stated that the Hindu and Sikh
refugees from the Punjab had full faith in Mahatma Gandhi and
almost worshipped him but this faith was eroded by certain happen-
ings:
(i) The blatant wooing of the Muslims by the entire Govern-
ment not to leave India and asking thOse who had I eft to
return. Whether the policy was right or wrong, perhaps
it was right, the refugees did not like it because they
thought that, if the Mohammedans emigrated, they would
be able to rehabilitate themselves in the houses and shops
left by those emigrating Mohammedans.
(ii) The insistence of Mahatma Gandhi and his going on fast
for the giving of 55 crores to Pakistan made them extre-
mely angry because in their view this money was going
to be used for killing the Indian soldiers who were
defending Kashmir.
(Hi) The atlilude of the MUlillms ill India throughout had been
olle o[ support [or PDkisldll ilnd as a matter of fact it was
the vote of the Muslims in what became India \-, hich had
brought about the creation of Pakistan and the feeling
amongst Hindus and Sikhs was that they must join
together to protect their rights and this movement had
DImost become an all-India movement.
121.12 Besides, there were the post-prayer speeches of Mahatma
(:lIlIdhi which were not to the liking of the Hindus. The Mahatma
liS insisting on the protection of Muslims and their rights but
t!lI'J'e was no sympathy shown towards the Hindus and the Sikhs,
wlio were made to sacrifice all they had for the sake of Indian
Independence. They had been thrown out of their homes and had
uftpt' suffering unmentionable brutalities of rape, abduction, murder,
loot and arson, reached Delhi which they thought was their home
l:!nd and where they were expecting that they would be given
protection as well as be rehabilitated but their expectations were
bdied. They were not prepared to hear sermons that they and
lheir families should starve and freeze outside in the cold without
:my protection against the inclemency of w.eather and those who
were responsible for their misery and who had brought Pakistan
inlo existence should enjoy the protection of the Government of
India. This feeling was taken full advantage of by the Hindu
Mahasabha particularly by the extremists of the South, Maharashtra
[0 be exact.
121.13 The feeling amongst the Hindus and the Sikhs who had
come from West Pakistan and feeling amongst Hindus generally
throughout India particularly amongst the Hindu Mahasabha circles
wUs that it was the appeasement policy of the Congress which hud
led to miseries of the Hindus in Pakistan; and which had first led to
the creation of Pakistan and then to their being made homeless,
and that appeasement policy to them appeared to be continuing in
the speech<:.'s which were being made not only by Mahatma Ga.ndhi
but also by lesser Congress leaders who tried to outdo Mahamata
Gandhi. (See J. N. Sahni Wit. 95).
121.14 Mahatma Gandhi was misled by his followers who were
trying to build a persecution complex on behalf of Muslims and
were giving false ideas about the affluence of the refugees and their
misbehaviour and their Jiving in an extravagent manner. This made
the refugees desperate and they had an absolute disgust which in-
creased because som <:.' Congress leaders were working hard to
appease the Muslims, absolutely ignoring the essential needs of the
vast population of the Displaced Hindus.
121.15 AIl this might lead to the conclusion that the refugees
were thirsti':J.g for the blood of the Mahatma. But that was not so.
"The good that the Mahatma had done and the services that he had
Tendered in the hour of need to the Punjabis, Hindus. Sikhs and
others alike and the reverence in which he was held by them for
<out-weighed what th,e refugees were feE-ling after the partition. As
:Mr. Sahni has 'put it they were not likely to hann the Mahatma
by persons from another Province; that the Delhi Police. in thill
casp. should have called in the Bombay Police, and as he put 1t, there
were three acts of omission in the case (i) Bombay Police did not
take action after getting information from Delhi, (ii) Delhi Polico
did not remind the Bombay Police, a.nd (iii) Delhi Police did not
requisition any member of the Bombay Police to help them in t:be
investigation. (3) His statement also shows that the
was not kept in touch with the investigation and that the D.I.R
informed the Minister directly, that was not in accordance with the
Rules. (4) There was no cooperation between the Secretariat and
the Minister and the D.r.B. was communicating information direc-
tly to the Minister.
Miss Maniben Patel, Wit. 79
12D.37 The next \\-i.tness whose testimony is relevant in regard
to the Government of India is Miss Maniben Patel, witness No. 79.
Her stateme':1.t is this.
120.38 She did not know whether any intimation was given to
her father regarding G. V. Ketkar's information to the Government
of Bombay that Mahatma's life was in, danger. She remembered
that her father argued with Mahatma Gandhi that the giving of
Rs. 55 crores would not be appreciated by the people and even the
understanding with Pakistan was that the .money had to be paid
after the overall settlement of all the problems. The Sardar em-
phasised that the giving of that money will be misinterpreted by'
the people and Pakistan would use it against IIndia and it would
certainly hurt the susceptibilities of the people in India.
120.39 She did not know whether her father knew that there
was a conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi, or that the payment
of Rs. 55 crores would infuriate somp. men to commit violence
against Gandhiji. Sardar also told the Mahatma that his fast would
not be appreciated and that they would treat it as a weapon to
force Government to pay 55 crores.
120.40. Birla House was guarded by the police before the bomb
was thrown and it was more strongly guarded thereafter.
12D.41. She remembered that Mr. Morarji Desai came to Ahme-
dabad when the Sardar was there on 22nd January, 1948, and he
was with her father for a long time but she could not remember
anything about the talk between her father and :Mr. Desai in regard
to Prof. Jain. But sh; said that Mr. Desai must have talked to her
father about this matter but she did" not know what he exactly told
her father. She did not remember if Madanlal had made any state-
ment and what it was. All this information about who threw the
bomb and why must have been found out by Mr. Shankar and he
must have conveyed it to her father. She could not remember if
the Sardar gave any orders in regard to that matter.
120.42. She remembered that Mr. SanjeVi used to come and see
her father whenever he wanted to. Sanjevi 'must have talked to
her fatiler about throwing of the bomb case and the matters con-
nected therewith and the precautions taken but she could not re-
member. She herself never asked anything. She used just to sit
170
nnd listen if she was present at an interview of anyone with her

father. She remembered that her father argued with Gandhiji and
of him to have proper police protection. Police. officers
talked to Gandhiji but Gandhiji would have none of It. Gandhi]l
said that he would rather stop prayer meetings tha1). allow that
kind of thing.
12D.43 She could not remember if she came to know anything

used to be sent to her father wherever he was. They were flown
if -they were of sufficient impo'\-tance. She said:, "I think that my
father was being informed of the day to day investigation into the
bomb case. I do not remember if my father gave any directions in
regard to anything to be done or not to be done in connection with
the case. My father would not order the arrest of anybody unless
he had positive proof that the arrest was for the protection of the
country".
120.44 She was not present at the high power meeting of top
le<J.ders after the funeral. Therefore, she could not say a,nything
about it. Sh2" could not say whether it was there for the first time
that Madanlal's statement and its contents were brought to light.
"We did know that Mahatma's life was in danger and whatever
precautions could humanly be taken were taken. But this much I
can say that I had no idea that there was a conspiracy to murder
Mahatma Gandhi. It is very difficult to say anything about immi-
nent danger to Mahatma Gandhi's life. That his life was in danger,
we knew, and from the fact that there were infuriated people in
the country ........ At that Hme at least I thought_ that the danger
to Gandhi's life was more likely to come from Muslims
120.45 She was put a specific question about Balukaka Kanitkar

having conveyed the information about danger to Mahatma
Gandhi's life to Mr. Kher who had apprised the Sardar of this fact.
She did not know anything about it because Mr. Kher must have
talked to her father on the secret phone or he must have told him
about this in the office where she was not present. She did not
know anything about things happening and speeches being made
in Poona or Ahmednagar indicative of violence against Mahatma
Gandhi. She did remember that a fortnight before the murder Q
newspaper editor from Poona, from whose paper security had been
demanded, came to see her father at 5.00 A.M. bu"t- she would not
be able to recognise him because it used to be dark at that time.
But she could remember that he talked about the payment of
rity from his paper. He complained that Mr. Morarji Desai had
been unfair to him.
120.46 Before Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated her father

went to see him. She accompanied him. They talked on various
matters but he did not broach the subject of search of persons com-
ing to his prayer meetings. The news of the murder was conveyed
·to them by Brij Kishan Chandiwala soon after they returned home.
physically. But it was the militant group of Maharashtrian Savar-
karites which got exasperated, excited to white heat so high in
intensity that it was their pistol which put an end to the life of
Gandhi the Mahatma, the Saint, philosopher, statesman, and a prac-
tical believer in the "Left Check".
121.16 The causes of his assassination were the appeasement of
Moslems, the partition, the sufferings of the Hindu minorities of
Pakistan who had to leave their homes and become refugees, the
post-prayer speeches echoed. by lesser Congress leaders which com-
positely led the militant Mal,larashtrian group of Savarkarites to still
that voice which may be called voice of reason and truth by some
and voice of further appeasement by Gandhi's detractors and
opponents. To that may be added Mr. Rajagopalachari's ancient
grudge theory.
Adequacy of the arrangements
121.17 After the 'bomb outrage, the previous nwnber of policemen,
i.e. 1 Head Constable and 4 Foot-Constables was increased to 1
Assistant Sub-Inspector, 2 Head-Constables and 16 Foot-Constables.
In addition to this, there were plain clothes policemen cf 1 Sub-
Inspector, 4 Head Constables and 2 Foot-Constables who were all"
armed with revolvers with directions to keep a watch on all suspi-
cious looking persons and the plain-clothes policemen had instruc-
tions to watch as they came to the prayer meeting and to
interrogate suspicious looking persons. These in the opinion of the
Commission, were inadequate in face of the warning given by the
bomb explosion and if the story of the Delhi Police that the editor
of the Arg:mi or the Hindu Rashtriya was disclosed on January 20,
1948, is correct. then it was still more insufficient and the bringing
in of Bombay Maharashtrian Police sufficient in strength was neces-
sary.
1211.18 For a person of the position of Mahatma Gandhi the
security arrangements actually made appear to the Commission to
have been inadequate protection with no senior police officer to be
in-charge.
12I.19 The evidence of Mr. G. K. Handoo and Mr. B. B. S. JetIey.
both U.P. II,P. officers of experience shows that the former was called
in for the protection of the Central Ministers after the murder of
Mahatma Gandhi. There is no charm in a mere name or rank of a
police security guard. The charm lies in the experience of the
guard and his knowledge of technique of security which t\ccording
to Mr. Handoo is given in the secret instructions laid down for
security. A high r.mking officer of that position and with that
experience should have been called in to give protection to Mahatma
Gandhi. As to whether he would have had an outer ring or an inner
ring which Mr. Handoo has spoken of or whether they would have
deployed their plain-clothes police officers as domestics or as grass
cutters or malis WQuid have been his look-out. From what the Com-
mission has been able to see, no serious attempt seems to have been
made to prevent the coming in of persons like Nathurarn Godse, etc.
231
to the prayer meeting if not to the house itself. It was the duty of
the high ranking police officers at Delhi to have devised a proper
method of protection if an indiscrimation search was not possible or
other officers who knew
Firstly, police from Bombay Province who would be

knowing the persons whose identity was disclosed by Madanlal
whether in his first statement or in his second statement should have
been immediately called in. The Commission is not oblivious of the
fact that Mr. D. W. Mehra, DJ.G., Delhi Police. did not think: it much
of a protection nor did Mr. U. H. Rana, DJ.G., C.LD., Poona think
so without screening of visitors. Whether it would have been much
of a protection or would have proved sterile it was an effort worth
making. Secondly, Mahatma Gandhi when he was going into the
prayer ground should have been flanked by policemen in plain-
clothes, if necessary dressed like volunteers. Even in pre-partition
days in spite of their violent objections and protests, both Mahatma
Gan::lhi and Pt. Nehru, the former an object of worship and the
latter a darling of the people had this protection from sturdy Cong-
ress volunteers at least in Northern India and then there was no
danger of assault. There should have been not merely Constables
but some officers on duty to cover him on all sides when he was
going into the prayer meetings, and these persons could have been
dressed in such a manner that they would have been indistinguish-
able from other Congress volunteers whose head was Mr. Vishwanath
Shah who appeared as a witness before Mr. Pathak. Even a ,group
of Congress volunteers might have been a protection at least from
so sudden an attack as Nathuram Godse's.
121.21 A reference to Ex. 281, a note given by Mr. G. K. Handoo,
shows what sort of security arrangements would have been neces-
sary in the present case. Whether arrangements should have been
exactly on the lines suggested by Mr. Handoo is not for the Com-
mission to decide, but there is no doubt that the type and rank of
policemen who were stationed at Birla House for the protection of
Mahatma Gandhi, were not the type which could be effective in any
emergency as indeed they were not when the emergency did arise.
121.22 Mr. Mehra has stated that the Police Superintendent of

New Delhi had been directed to attend the meetings as far as
possible. That was a most vague kind of direction which failed to
be effectuated on the 30th when his presence might have been of
some use. Evidently, he thought that it was more important to
settle a trade dispute than to look after the safety of Mahatma
Gandhi. And Mr. Mehra himself dropped out due to illness.
121.23 Kno'Ning the conditions in Delhi and knowing the intensity

of feelings against Gandhiji's post prayer speeches and with the
warning of the bomb outrage the Police at Delhi should have been
more alert. It is unfortunate that those in charge of security forgot
about the existence of the blue-print referred to by Mr. G. K.
Handoo.
CHAPTER XIII
ALWAR
Index of Paragraphs
13.2 Mr. U. C. Malhotra's Diary and other police diaries.
13.7 Dr. N. B. Khare's statement.
13.24 Panna Lal Chaube's evidence.
13.44 Girdhar Sharma Siddh.
13.49 Mr. M. M. 1.. Hooja.
13.66 Conclusion.
CHAPTER XIII
Alwar Mairs
13.1 After the murder of the Mahatma the Intelligence Bureau
and the Delhi Police became very active and started inquiries as to-
the happenings in the neighbouring Indian States; one such State
was Alwar. It appears that as Dr. N. B. Khare was one of the very
prominent anti-Gandhites and had gone to the extent of issuing
all kinds of pamphlets against Mahatma Gandhi and was the Prime
Minister in Alwar where Hindu Mahasabha movement and the RS.S.
was specially fostered and there were circumstances leading to the
suspicion of the Alwar Raj as wen as the Alwar Ministry being
concerned in the murder of Mahatma Gandhi, an investigation was
ordered to be conducted in that State and Mr. U. C. Malhotra who
was a Superintendent of Police in Delhi, was appointed Chief Police
Officer of that State. He was sent to Alwar by plane and his first
case diary shows that in the same plane Mr. K. B. Lall, I.C.S., and
the Home Minister of the State also flew to Alwar. The facts which
are dealt with in this chapter are either those which have been
extracted from the police diaries of Mr. Malhotra or what other
police officers did at Alwar. In this chapter is also given a brief re-
sume of the statements of Dr. N. B. Khare, Panna Lal Choube, and
of Girdhar Sharma Siddh. The reports of the officers of the Direc-
torate of Intelligence Bureau are also briefly given.
13.2 Ex. 96 dated February 7, 1948 to February 10, 194B, contains
a case diary of Mr. U.C. Malhotra who was appointed Chief Police
Officer of State. The case diary No.2 dated February B, 1948,
contains the following information:
(1) A printed poster in Hindi a handwritten copy of which is
Ex. 105, incited the public to murder Mahatma Gandhi; to cut him
into pieces and throw his flesh to dogs and crows. This was an
anonymous poster and it was not discernible as to where it was
printed.
(2) One Nathuram Shukla from Nagpur had visited Alwar to-
the end of December 1947 and he delivered speeches from·
Hmdu Mahasabha platform. His description is given as being
Godse's description.
(3) A foreigner disguised as a Sadhu came to Alwar and stayed
with Giridhar Siddha, the secretary of the local Hindu Sabha. He
had brought a letter containing a printed letter giving the news of
assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. This news was out at 3 P.M. at
whereas the assassination actually took place at 5 P.M. at
13.3 Sweets were distributed: Prime Minister Khal'e had
"addressed meetings pouring upon Gandhiji the curse of a Brahlllill
The Hindu Mahasabha and RS.S. were encouraged by Dr. Khal'"
by allowing persons like Prof. Ram Singh. V. G. Deshpande :L1l1l
Maulichandra Sharma as State Guests or personal f:,'llests with 1hc'
Prime Minister.
13.4 One Rikhi Jaimuni Kaushik, an editor of a newspaper, pro
·duced a printed article which contained the following information:
(a) Anti-Gandhi Front party in Alwar distributed a pamphll'l
in which Hindus were requested to fast and pray for the death or
Mahatma Gandhi.
(b) The RS.S. at Alwar had distri
on Mahatma's assassination day,
(c) A few days before Mahatma Gandhi's assassination. Dr.
Khare had saId that he was Anti-Gandhi Front man.
(d) Pro-Hindu Sabha journalists were financially helped by
Alwar Darbar.
13.5 In the case diary No.3 of February 9, ]948, the allegation
made that at a place called Bhojpuri the R.S.S. leaders had been
training Godse, Madanlal and Wadse in shooting was not substan-
tiated.
13.6 Ex. 138 dated February 3, 1948 by Inspector Balmokand re-
lates to the arrest of two persons Pandit Girdhar Sharma Siddh
and a sadhu who was his companion but his name was not known.
Infonnation received by the Inspector was that Siddh and his com-
panion were keeping certain documents concerning the murder case
either in the house of Siddh or in the office of the Hindu Sabha
Alwar. Both these places were searched and certain documents
were taken possession of which are set out in that exhibit. Siddh
was arrested but the sadhu had left before the arrival of the Delhi
Police for some unknown place. This gives no useful or relevant in-
formation.
Dr. N. B. Kha1'e wit. 62
13.7 Dr. N. B. Khare, witness No. 62, stated that he was Premier
of C.P. and Berar in 1937-38 and was Prime Minister of Alwar State
from April 1947 to February 1948 when he was made to resign. He
denied that there were anti-Gandhi feelings in Alwar town or in
Alwar State, though there were disturbances in the State as in many
other places in Northern India. He was in Delhi on January 30.
1948, and had no knowledge of the investigation by the Indian Police
conducted in Alwar in connection with the bomb incident or the
assassination of Mahatma Gandhi.
13.8 Annual function of the R.S.S. was held in Alwar before the
assassination of Mahatma Gandhi and RS.S. people did not require
any permission to hold the meeting but as there was scarcity of
food, he had to give facilities for the purpose. It was incorrect that
Godse and Parchure interviewed him at Alwar before the murder.
Probably, he was in Delhi at the time. He was expelled from the
237
Indian National Congress in October 1938. He has refuted what-
said in the Harijan, at page 25 of the pamphlet, Ex. 99.
13.9 Before the Partition, the Muslims who wer.e strong in Alwar
rt'\'olted and wanted the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan but
f!'bellion was put down and he as Prime Minister took such acbon
liS was necessary. The Muslims were carrying on propaganda
nnd 'Quaid-e-Azam Zindabad'. They killed a cow and its blood was
sprinkled on an idol They also killed the pujllri of the temple and
his wife.
13.10 Dr. Khare joined the Hindu Mahasabha in 1949. He
accepted full responsibility for a document Ex. 88 dated October
if:
given facilities to KS.S. people for training in arms. He had no
knowledge that they were having rifle practice. It was incorrect
that they got funds from the Maharaja or himself. He gave no State
protection to the KS.S. volunteers and he never encouraged RS.S.
movement in Alwar.
13.11 He denied the allegation made by Panna LaI Choube, wit-
ness No. 47. Parchure and Godse never came to Alwar during his
term of office and he had no private meeting with them.
13.12 He was opposed to Gandhiji's politics but not to his person
and he would not be a party to doing injury to him. Godse and
Parchure never came to Alwar and they could not have asked him
for a pistol from out of the museum. It was nonsense to say that
the conspiracy was hatched in Alwar. He was not the real person
behind the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi and it was a malignant
lie to say that Godse was his tool It was incorrect that he brought
any secret papers from Alwar or that militant Hindu Sabha leaders
were helped by him or they wanted to establish headquarters of the
RS.S. in Alwar.
13.13 He did write to the Home Minister, Mr. G. L. Nanda, to
release G. V. Ketkar. His point was that the Government of India
should not be vindictive.
13.14 In cross-examination he said that it might be wrong for'
him to say that there was no conspiracy because he does not know
any law. What he really meant was that there was no big conspiracy
with a political party at its back. When the Commission pointed out
to him that the way he expressed himself showed that he had some
knowledge of the facts leading to Mahatma's murder, he replied that
he had used unfortunate language and that he had no knowledge of'
conspiracy or of any intention on the part of anyone to assassinate
Mahatma Gandhi. .
13.150 He knew Nathuram Godse only slightly because when he
visited Poona as Member of the Viceroy's Council, Godse came to-
238
'call on him. He did not know that he was a leader of the RaKh1r1l
Dal but he did know that he was the editor of the paper Agrani. II.,
did not meet Parchure before 1952 but met him at Gwalior Wh('11 III'
went there for election to Parliament. He knew Apte also slightl,r
13.16 He never heard that Godse came to Alwar. He did 1101

know of any pamphlet calling upon Hindus to fast and pray fill
Mahatma Gandhi's death. Nor was he aware of any sweets b(,lIlf!
distributed on the day of Mahatma's assassination. He said thal Iw
'was an anti-Gandhi i.e., against his philosophy but not anti-GandhI
qua his person. He did not know if one of the ministers extend.·"
full facilities to the RS.S. The head of the RS.S., Golwalkar. did
visit the State when he was the Prime Minister and he attended
meetings because he was a Nagpur man. He might have addres!'l'd
the meetings also. He condemned Gandhism at the meetings and
"Guruji" also did the same. When asked whether he had allowed
the RS.S. volunteers to be trained in 'the Samant Infantry', lw
said he had no recollection.
13.17 A sword was presented to him by Thakur Singh

he presented to Golwalkar on h's birthd::ty as he had no usc
for a sword. That was becaus2 he was ridiculing the R.S.S. who
hE'Ll military parad:!s but ca:.. l"i?d only lathis and he told them it
was no lise carr.v;rt" l(lthis. They should carry swords. If the Maha·
r::!.ja gave any 1n")1 out of his personal funds, he would not know.
13.13 He W:'.H consl"Fltulat-:d by Savarkar for j jng Maha·
sabha privately and not at a public meeting. .
13.19 A meeting was held in Nagpur in 1933. Savarkar presi

but he (Khare) was a mere spectator. He (Khare) joined the Hi
Mahasabha in 1949.
13.20 It was correct that he started All India Hindu National

Front in Delhi in August 1947 over which Savarkar presided. It was
a mer!t ng of important people including some princes. The meeting
was organised by Pt. Mauli Chander Sharma and himself but he
could not be present at the meeting because of trouble in Alwar
nor was the Maharaja present. He did not know anything about
meeting of All India Anti·Gandhi Front held in Dadar in November
1947 under the presidentship of Savarkar. It was possible that a
resolution was passed at the meeting declaring Alwar to be a Hindu
Raj. He had no connection with Hindu Mahasabha or as a matter of
fact with any other organisation. He was being maligned by Praja
MandaI people by saying that he was a RS.S. supporter but he had
sympathies with the Hindu Mahasabha even before 1949. He again
said that he had no knowledge about the conspira-cy to murder
Mahatma Gandhi and he was shocked to hear about the
tion.
13.21 He wrote to Mr. Nanda and wanted an inquiry to be held a.s
why d Poona bomb case was withdrawn. He did it because his
mterest was bona fide.
239
13.22 It was not his policy to suppress the Muslims as such in
Alwar but anybody who disturbed the peace o.r challenged the
1L1lthority of the State had to be dealt with strongly. He did not
IUlOW that a Muslim Chowkidar was killed in the garden where the
IU';.S. were lodged and that led to rioting in Alwar. He did not
II now that a pamphlet was issued in Alwar that Gandhiji should be
lilleked into pieces and his flesh be thrown to dogs. If he had known,
would have taken steps against it. He had no knowledge of the
It-nnet 'Gandhi Murdabad', Ex. 105.
13.23 The Maharaja chose his ministers from political parties

und one of the ministers was a member of the Hindu Mahasabha.
After the bomb was thrown, it did not strike him that there would
be an assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. He did not take any more
Interest in the incident. '
13.24 Panna Lal Choube, witness No. 47, is now living at Mathura.
I-Ie was an informer of the C.I.D. right up to 1952. He joined the
Hindu Mahasabha at AIwar because he wanted to find out what
[hey were doing. They, in collusion with the Prime Minister Dr.
Khare, were preparing to have a communal riot. The RS.S. were
to hold a meeting in Alwar and they were lodged in a garden, the
Muslim chowkidar of which was killed. There were communal
riots in the town. The responsibility was of the Prime Minister.
13.25 Three months before the assassination, Hakim Rai called
Parchure and Godse to Alwar. There was a private meeting at
which he (Parma Lal) was present but he was a police informer at
the time. Dr. Khare was also present and he said that he had been
unfairly treated by Mahatma Gandhi and in his opinion Mahatma
Gandhi was a danger for India and something should be done in re-
gard to him. Dr. Khare was President of All India Hindu National
Front Alwar, which was vituperative and against Mahatma Gandhi.
13.26 Godse and Parchure visited the arms museum in the Palace
and they wanted to take away pistols from there. The Curator
helped them in getting them an old Mauser pistoL It was taken
but as it was useless, it was returned by Godse and Parchure.
13.27 At a private meeting, Dr. Khare told the Hindu Mahasabha
leaders that they could pull down the mosques and whoever would
do it in the shortest time would get the land under the mosque.
There was looting of the Muslims for eight days.
13.28 He produced a pamphlet, Ex. '89, highly provocative against
Muslims. There was an inquiry by the Government of India and
several people were arrested including Panna Lal himself. Hindu
Mahasabha people fled from and hid themselves in the house
of Professor Ram Singh in Delhi.
13.29 The conspiracy to assassinate was hatched at Alwar in
which Dr. N. B. Khare took a prominent part. Dr. Parchure said
that it was not in the interest of the country that the Mahatma
-should live and that Godse alone could assassinate Gandhl and
240
Godse said, "Don't bother, I shall do the whole thing."
there was some private talk with Godse.
13.30 He was in Alwar when the Mahatma was assassinated an(1
also when the bomb was thrown but he- had no connection with
police in what was British India.
13.31 Investigation was by an Inspector of Police from Delhi
Excepting Parchure and Nathuram Godse, Panna Lal saw no onc
in Alwar. He had given his statement in writing to the Inspector
General of Police. He added that he told the Inspector General of
Police that there was an arms factory in Alwar. He told Mrs. Suchcta
Kripalani also. He was with her in Wardha Jail. He repeated that
the person at the back of the assassination was Dr. N. B. Khare and
Godse was only a tool. As no Congress leader would take any notice
of him. he could not talk earlier to them, He was a Congressman and
a political sufferer.
13.32 In cross-examination he said that he was working for

Alwar Police and was paid by them. He was passing off as a pujm·i.
The office of the Hindu Mahasabha was at his house. Hakim Rat
told him that Godse and Parchure were big leaders of the Hindu
Mahasabha.
13.33 He did not think that Godse and Parchure would actually
assassinate Mahatma Gandhi.
13.34 He did not inform anyone about
cept the police.
13.35 He had been to jail five times and was convicted for
strikes, distribution of pamphlets etc.
13.36 Cross-examined by Mr. Chawla, he said he was a member
of the executive committee of the Hindu Sabha in Alwar. He was
its Secretary. Ram Chander Vyas was its President. He met Godse
twice-once at the meeting which was for three hours and another
time he met him in Delhi at the house of Professor Ram Singh
about one and a half month before the assassination.
13.37 In his speech Ex. 88 on the occasion of Dussehra on Octo-
ber 3, 1938 Dr. Khal'e was asked to hoist a flag and he said that this
was an open rebellion against Gandhism and he uttered a curse
upon Gandhism and its author. He pointed out the failures of the
various principles that the Congress and Mahatma Gandhi were
propagating. He said that Congress was dying in Sind,
Punjab and the Frontier Province and also in Gujarat and Kathia-
war. He ended the speech by saying, "So truth is dead, Hindu-
Muslim unity is buried, Khaddar is gone and Ahimsa is murdered
Long live Mahatma Gandhi", This document was published from
Alwar on October 12, 1947.
13.38 Ex. 89 is a pictorial representation showing the Muslims
trying to kill cows and some other provocative representations.
241
13.39 Ex. 90 is a Hindi document which gives the statement of
Godse in court.
13.40 Ex. 99 dated September 9, 1938 is a pamphlet of about 32
pages. It contains his (Dr. Khare's) defence against the charges
made against him when he was expelled from the Congress.
13.41 The Directorate of Intelligence BUreau in their affidavit
dated November 25, 1967 have stated that they knew nothing about
the activities of Choube, whether he was or was not a police in-
former.
13.42 The Inspector General of Police of Rajasthan has in reply
to the questionnaire stated that there was nothing to show in the
record that Panna Lal Choube was working as a police informer in
Alwar State but sometimes used to get money from the .:Inspector
General and later on actually from some other police officers. Panna
Lal Choube WDS associating with Hbdu Mahasabha but the police
does not know that he was also associating with Raizada Hakim Rai.
13.43 The Commission is unable to accept the testimony of
Choube. On his own showing he is a police informer and there is
no l'=liable evidence that he had anything to do with the Hindu
Mahasabha or he was so high up as to be allowed to be present
when a matter like the murder of Mahatma Ga!1dhi was discussed.
It is incredible that Dr. Khare would do anything like encouraging
murder in the presence of a person like Choube.
Giridhar Sharma Siddh Wit 77
13.44 Giridhar Sharma Siddh, witness No. 77, was a Municipal
Commissioner and an Honorary Magistrate and as such knew Dr.
Khare who was the Prime Minister of Alwar. He was Joint Sec-
retary of the Hindu Mahasabha which was fairly strong in Alwar but
it received no help from the State or from the Maharaja. He knew
Hakim Rai but he is dead. He also knew Panna Lal who called
himself a Brahmin but is really a kalal by caste. He was not a
pu.1ad of a temple but that of a Kotwali.
13.45 Nathu Ram Shukla came to Alwar on behalf of Hindu
Mahasabha and stayed there for ten days with Sharma Siddh and
he (Giridhar Sharma) was arrested because of that.
13.46 As far as he, Siddh, knew, no Marathas came to Alwar
during those days. The Maharaja did not have a hand in the con-
spiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi. He was suspected because a
meetin.e: of the Kshatriva Mahasabha was held in Delhi over which
he presided and he made a speech in which he said that he was pre-
pared to tak';! all the Hindus who were displaced from Pakistan
and his Government also gave help to the refugees III Alwar Camp
because Hindu Sabha workers could not raise sufficient amount of
funds from private persons to help the refugees. Dr. Khare was
also helping in the matter of the. refugees. And both of them the
Maharaja and Dr. Khare visited the Hindu Sabha Relief Com-
mittee.
16-259 rIA
242
13.47 There was no anti-Gandhi movement but the movemenl
was against Gandhism. It was incorrect that sweets were di:;trl
buted after the murder.
13.48 He was arrested as a suspect in the Gandhi murder casl'.

He has been a Hindu Sabha worker since 1943. He did not know
if Dr. Khare helped the RS.S. Rally in Alwar in 1947.
Mr. M. M. L. Hooja, Wit. 59
13.49 Mr. M. M. L. Hooja, witness No. 59, then Assistant Dircclill
of Intelligence Bureau, made a report Ex. 95, to the D.I.B. dated
telligence Bureau. Therein he said that searches of R.S.S. organi·

sers had not given any startling result nor did the searches in Dhoj·
purl or Rajgarh which was a strong centre of R.S.s.
13.50 Mr. Hooja concentrated his investigation on two points:

(1) possible connection of the local people in the conspiracy to
assassinate Mahatma Gandhi and (2) patronage and assistance by
the State to the RS.S. organisation.
13.51 There considerable evidence of patronage and aid by
the State to the RS.S. Full facilities were provided for the train-
ing camp and rally organised in May-June 1947 of R.S.S. officers.
This was given under the direct ordera of the Prime Minister and
the Heme Minister apparently with the knowledge of the ruler.
Both Prime Minister and the Home Minister took prominent part
in RS.S. activities and the Prime Minister was in constant touch
with all local activities and extended fullest patronage.
13.52 The State gave military training to three branches of
R.S.S. from November to the beginning of February. But the year
is not given. It must have been from end of 1946 and beginning
of 1947. The volunteers had come from aU parts of the country
but chiefly from U.P. and Delhi. The whole scheme was \"Jell
organis",d. The RS.S. volunteers were put up in the Old Pratap
Paltan lines but they made their own food a,rrangements. The
training of volunteers included physical training, bayonet exercises,
drill and rifle exercises. They also did firing practice with mU7;:o]e-
loaders. Some were given secret training in rifle and re'.'olver
practice. Part of the expenses were borne by the Home Minister
either from the secret ftmds of the State or from the non-official
subSCriptions raised by him.
13.53 The Prime Minister's residence was searched and some
documents connected with militant communal leaders and organi-
sation were seized. The Secretary and P.A. of the Prime Minister
said that he had taken some secret papers with him. Interrogation
also revealed that the Prime Minister was in very close touch with
the RS.S. organisation. He wanted to establish the headquarters of
RS.S. in Alwar for a year. A number of prominent militant leaders
of the Hindu Mahasabha visited him.
243
13.54 An ordnance factory had been set up in the State and pro-
-duction had started. The Commission would like to remark that
Dr. Khare in his statement before the Commission has stated that
this ordnance factory was a part of the military organisation and
had been started with the pennission of the Political Agent at Jaipur
and also with the full knowledge and permission of Sardar Patel
and then Member for Home and the States.
13.55 The investigation into the conspiracy leading to Mahatma
Gandhi's assassination revealed that one Nathu Ram Shukla of
Jabbalpur had come and stayed under State patJ;onage and toured
various parts of the State. It was suspected by people that he really
was Nathuram Godse but this matter was being investigated.
13.56 Investigation was unfortunately hampered by the fact that

the local police was unreliable and even the I.G.P. was a "staunch
Rajput".
13.57 The Alwar State ordnance factory was visited ,nd what
was manufactured there has been shown under a separate heading.
13.58 Another report of Mr. M. M. L. Hooja dated February 23,
1943 restates that Nath Ram Shukla was suspected to be the same
man as Nathuram Godse. This is Appendix D-1 and a part of Ex. 95.
13.59 With regard to RS.S. activities he said that it received
full facilities in connection with officers training camp. It was in
the form of supply of petrol, furniture, accommodation, essential
and controlled articles, electricity, etc. which were under the
orders of the Prime Minister and the Home Minister with the know-
ledge of t.he Ruler. Dr. Khare also attended the functions of the_
R.S:S. and its rallies at Rajgarh. Besides some Ministers and high
officials, the Ruler also attend:!d a RS.S. function at Bansur 34 miles
away from Alwar.
13.60 There was evidence that the expenses on ammunition, etc.
used in training the volunteers was to be spent by the Home Ministry
and there was evidence to show that the Ruler has given his tacit
appruval to the policy of his Ministers..
13.61 There is evidence that Dr. Khare indulged in anti-Mahatma
ani anti-Congress propaganda and actively supported the local
Hindu Mah<'-sabha and obtained monetary help for the Mahasabha
leaders' visiting the State and helped Pandft Mouli Chander Sharma,
Secretary of All-India Hindu Convention, and a militant I; indu
Mahasabhaite. The Ruler also made large contributions to the
leaders of the All India Hindu Mahasabha, the All-India Kshatriya
Mahasabha and the communal press. Dr. Khare was, on January
4, 1948, paid Rs. 10,000 by the Ruler for sec;ret donations and some
other sums were also paid to some other Ministers. Among the
leaders who visited the State were Dr. Moonje, V. G. Deshpande,
lvIouli Chandra Sharma, Ashutosh Lahiri, Raja Jagmanpur, Capt.
Keshav Chandra. Some of the public meetings were addressed by
244
Dr. Khare and other Ministers addressed meetings of the Hindu
Mahasabha where the Congress Government was criticised. They
spoke against Mahatmaji and Pandit Nehru in strong terms.
13.62 The Ruler was determined to organise the Raj;p.uts on
lines.
13.63 An Aeronautical College was established in November 1947
with 6 aircrafts purchased from time to time. A letter which was
seized shows that a request was made to the Ruler that he should
raise the army and give full facilities for raising vohmteers or con-
scripted militia formed of Hindu ycmng men of the State, and to
meet the increased demand of fire arms and ammunition. Factories
should be established for the production of arms.
13.64 There is also evidence that on September 25, 1947 V. D.
Savarkar had sent a cyclostyled letter criticising Pandit Nehru and
the Congres!:i Government for its failure to protect the Hindu
minorities in Paki!:itan and in ordO'!r to meet an Islamic attack, the
State should. have a mighty force of Hindus alone and if Congressite
Ministers were unwilling to accept this indispensable programme,
they shouB resign a'!1d hand over Government to Hindu Sangathan-
ists and Sikhs.
13.65 The Commission would like to say here, that Dr. Khare in
his statement has said that there was a danger of an uprising by
the Muslims and it was necessary in those circumstances to be
alert and provide sufficient· force to meet that dang:!r. He went
further and said that the Meos and the Muslim League had revolted
against the Raj and wanted it to acce::le to Pakistan. This rebellion
was to be put down and it was his duty as the Prime Minister
of the State to see that order was preserv3:d' and he took such
measures as in his opinion were necessary for the purpose. This
was done after the Cabinet took a decision that the rebellion should
be put down by the use of necessary force.
13.66 The evidence relating to Alwar bri
facts.
13.67 Soon after the murder police officers were sent to make
an inquiry as to how far the Ruler of Alwar and his administrator
were connected with the conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gahdhi
end the murderer of Mahatma Gandhi. The police officers", ho were
sO'!nt from Delhi ,made a thorough inquiry and made their reports
which have been set out above. Before the murder and even befpre
the Partition, the Hindu Mahasabha and the R.S.S. activities had
been quite prominent in Alwar State. Evidence shows that
nent Hindu Mahasabha leaders were helped with money and
material to carryon their activities in the State. The R8.S. and its
organisers were also welcomed in the State. Tho? RS.S. volu'!1teers
were given training in military parades and there is some indication
that they were trained in the use of arms also. At any rate, the
State was trying to raise a force of volunteers or a militia to meet,
according to Dr. N. B. Khare, the Mea menaco? and the menace of
lhe Muslim League which also was quite prominent and was trying to
force the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. And Dr. Khare has
stated that as a Prime Minister it was his duty to suppress any
anti-Raj movement whoever the sponsors of that movement, and
his explanation is that all that was done was for the protection of
the Raj. He said that Muslims were strong in Alwar. They revolt-
ed with a demand for accession by the Maharaja to Pakistan and
that rebellion had to be put down. He has gone further and said
that propaganda against the Raj was being carried on, placards
were being distributed, public meetings were being held shouting
'Pakistan Zindabad', and a cow was killed and her blood sprinkled
·on Hindu idols.
13.6B The Commission appreciates the misgivings of the Gov-
-.ernment of India in regard to Alwar where all these activities were
carried on which had a communal colour and a!l. anti-Congress and
anti-Praja Man·hl1eanings. Besides these, Dr. N. B. Khare himself
had been rather intemperate in condemning Mahatma Gandhi, so
much so that he resorted to the ancient cult of cursing and he did
so against Mahatma Gandhi qy issuing "A Brahmin's Curse" Ex. 28
dated October 12, 1947. But he has denied that any facilities
given to the RS.S. for training in arms, or that he had got any
funds from the Maharaja to be given to the RS.S. or giving State
protection to the RS.S. volunteers or encouraging them. He was
'opposed to Gandhiji's politics and not his person. He denied any
association of Godse or Parchure with Alwar. But police reports
containing information no doubt collected after th-e murder have a
different story to give.
13.69 The reports show that on the day of the murder of
Mahatma Gandhi sweets were distributed and one Rikhi Jainmuni
Kaushik, an editcr of a newspaper, produced some information before
the !lolice officers showing an anti-Gandhi Front Party in Alwar and
distribution of !lnmphlets in which Hindus were asked to fast and
pray for Mahatma Gandhi's death. The KS.S. at Alwar had dis-
tribut('d sweets and picnics had been arranged on Mahatma Gandhi's
assassination day. - Dr. Khare had said a few days before Mahatma
Gandhi's murder that he was an anti-Gandhi Front man. Anti-
Gandhi journalists were financially helped by Alwar Darbar.
13.70 Other documents show that on the Dussehra day (:n October
.3, 1938, Dr. Khare hoisted a flag of open rebellion Gandhi
and uttered a curse upon him and on his philosophy.
13.71 Mr. Hooia in his report Ex. 95 stated that there was consi-
derable evidence of patronage and aid by the State to the RS.S.
Camps and rallies were arranged in May-June 1947 and aid was
the direct orders of the Prime Minister, and both the
PrIme MI!lI;>t.er and Home prominent part in the
RS.S. actIvItIes. PrevIously, mIlItary trammg had also been given
and the RS.S. volunteers were put up in the old regimental lines
and arrangements made for their food. The report also shows that
-t.he expenses were borne by the Home Minister either from SEcret
State funds or from subscriptions. A number of promi-
nent militant leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha had visited the
Minister.
13.72 There was also evidence that an ordnance fact0ry had bel' I!
set up. But it appears that this was a part of the military organl·
sation started with the permission of the Political Agent at Jaipur.
There was also evidence that one Nathu Ram Shukla of Jabalplll
had Alwar and that gave rise to a rumour that it was
N athuram Godse who had done so.
13.73 All this evidence put together shows that an
had oeen created in Alwar State which was anti-Congress and also
anti-Gandhi. Whether the reason was as given by Dr. Khare thaL
Hindus were being encouraged and the State was making all arrange-
ments to meet a revolt or rebellion by the Meos and the Muslim
League or whether it was a purely anti-Gandhi movement is not easy
to decidl!. But it does appear that there was a genuine apprehen-
sion of revolt by Meos and Muslims. However, Dr. Khare's antE'ce-
dents and his encouragement to the R.S.S. and to the militant Hindu
Mahasabha leaders were indicative of conditions being produced
which were conducive to strong anti-Gandhi activities including a
kind of encouragement to those who thought that Mahatma Gandhi's
removal wiiI bring' about a millennium of a Hindu Raj. But on
this evidence the Commission cannot come to the conclusion that
there was an active or tacit encouragement to people like Nathuram
Godse to achieve the objective of their conspiracy to commit murder
of Mahatma Gandhi. But there is no doubt that an atmosphere
was being created which was anti-Gandhi even though it may not
have been an encouragement to the persons who wanted to murder
Mahatma Gandhi.
CHAPTER XIV
Gwa,lior
Index of Paragraphs
Gopi Krishan Katarey
Mr. B. B. S. Jetley
CHAPTER XlV
Gwalior Affairs
14.1 Mr. Gooi Krishan Katarey who claims to have been an active
political worker in Gwalior for about 30 years stated in his affidavit.
Ex. 91, that a month or two before the assassination of the Mahatma
there was a leading article in a weekly which was the mouth piece
of the Hind'u Mahasabha that Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru
should be murdered, and that the Hindu Mahasabha received full
patronas:e of the Government of Gwalior. He also s.aid that about
a fortni.gnt before the murder of Mahatma Gandhl a cheque of
Rs. 65,000 was given to one of the accused in the Gandhi Murder Case
to regroup goondas and purchase arms to launch a murderous attack
on the Congress workers who were demanding responsible
ment in Gwalior and that it was out of this fund that the pistol by
which the assassin shot Gandhiji was purchased. When these matters
came to light, Sardar Patel hushed them up because the Maharani
of Gwalior "beseeched for forgiveness". He added that it was a
trag€dy that the real criminals who masterminded the murder were
not tried.
14.2 This deponent then appeared as a witness before the Commis.-

sion as witness No. 51. He said that he was a freedom figh.tpr and
was receiving a pension of Rs. 100'00 per month from the Madhya
Pradesh Government in recognition of his services to the na.tion.
14.3 He said that he tried to get a copy of the editodal to which

he had referred in his affidavit regarding incitement to murder
Gandhiji and Pandit Nehru but he could not get it. He had read the
article and had a clear recollection.
14.4 The cheque referred to by him was given to Dr. Parchure.

The Maharaja thought that national movement was a danger which
should be fought out. He, Katarey, had told Mr. Leela Dhar Joshi
after he becan1e the Premier of the State with regard to the ch{.qu€
and he said that he would consult Sardar Patel before doing anything.
Subsequently. he was told that as the Maharaja had acceded no
action was called for. The witness was externed for some time 'aI:.d
after he returned he met a person who was anti-Congress and was
doing anti-Congress propaganda. He had got Godse's statement pub-
lished and he said that it was financed by Sardar Angre's son. His
name was Gokhale and was from Poona.
14.5 He was cross-examined and he admitted that when the

came to. Gwalior to investigate the offence of murder.
he dId not gIve any mformation to the police. He only talked to
Mr. LeE la Dhar Joshi.
180
12D.47 Her father's life was in danger because he was consi
ed an anti-Muslim and threats used to come from that quarter.
120.48 She added that her father was publicly accused for beinl(
responsible for the murder at a meeting by Jayaprakash Narayan.
Maulana Azad was present at the meeting a.nd he did Dot protest
which WOoS a great shock to her fatber.
120.49 The statement of :Madanlal was shown to her father in

Delhi and porlions of it were read out to him. She could not say if
a copy of the stat.ement of Madanlal was sent to her father in Ahl'!lc-
dabad or in Saui"8shtra. She could not say whether her father tried
to find out anything about the bomb-throwing on his arrival in Delhi
nor when the statement of Madanlal was brought to her C3ther by
Shankar. Hel' father never talked to her about matters of State.
After his return from Gujarat police officili-ls including Sanjevi came
and talked to him about Madanlal's offence but she could not say
what talk there was nor could she remember whether any police
officers were sent to Bombay. Shankar used to be generally pl'psent
when Sanjevi came to see her father. She herself never tried to find
out anything about the offence committed by Madanlal. 8.1-.:e could
not remember if there was any talk between her father and Bala-
saheb Kher aftel" the murder about earlier information about dangel'
to Mahatma Gandhi's life.
"Q. Do you remember if at any time Bala Sahib Kher mentioll-
ed it to your father that it was weighing on his mind thal
some information conveyed to him earlier was not taken
much note of?
A. I can definitely say that nothing of that kind happened.
Bala Sahib did not eithel' blame himself for being negli-
{{ent nor was any blame against my father. Bala Sahib
I knew very well and at no stage did he ever blame him-
self for being negligent in the matter of handling of this
information of danger to Mahatmaji's life."
12D.50 She did remember that a Jain was involved in the matter
but she could not remember if Mr. Morarji Desai had mentioned to
her father that Prof. Jain had given information about Madanlal's
connection with persons who wanted to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi.
12D.51 She was then cross-examined by Mr. Kotwai. One of the

reaspns :why Mahatma Gandhi fasted was to pacify inflamed commU-
nal feehngs roused in Delhi and roundabout.
12D.52 If was correct, she said, that there were sections of people
who wanted to see her father oUsted from the Ministry and her
father had written to Gandhiji to relieve him from office.
Im.53 In reply to a question by the Commission she said that
was a move by those against her father to oust her father from
and he had to Gandhiji tha;t he should be relieved
of hIS office. She characterIsed the allegation as absolutely false that
1)(,]' fulhl'r IH)I. jJl"l'kctllll: aha!'11111 l;aJ\dlli 1)('I';)Il:l(' (If Ilt-
tempts to l'l'tllOV(' him fnull oJIj('(', Un tht, otl,lel' h;ltld she salu
her father did not want to sLay on in the Cabinet and had sent hu>
resignation to Mahatma Gandhi. It is prepostewus to think that her
father would not protect Mahatma Gandhi whom he to be
the greatest asset that India had. As a matter of fact GandhlJl C!PPo,s-
cd the presence of Policemen in Birla House in order to mamtam
the reputation of the State. The witness placed before the Com-
mission a book by Mr, G, D. Birla named 'Kuchh Dekha Kuchh
Sunaa' and drew the attention of the Commission to pages 57-58.
120.54. Gandhiji made a speech (post prayer) which was pub-
lished in the Harijan of January 25, 2948 where he said: "I wonder
if with a knowledge of this background to my statement anybody
would dare call my fast a condemnation of the policy of the Home
Ministry. If there is any such person, I can only tell him that he
would degrade and hurt himself, never the Sardar or me .... "
12D.55 Her diary of the 24th February shows that there was a
very great rift in the Cabinet and the Sardar conveyed to Gandhiji
that both Maulana and Jawaharlal had decided to pull on without
him and that he would help by remaining outside the Cabinet, and
Maulana, when he heard this did not demur to this showing that
they had both decided to remove him. This fact is corroborated by
an entry dated 2nd March 1948 where it is stated that since about 3
months before Gandhiji's murder efforts were being made to drop
Sardar out. Socialists and Maulana were in it. Gandhiji had said
to the Sardar "You both are unable to cope with each other and
there are no chances of it being so even in future. One of the two
should be taken in. Looking to your popularity at present you
should be raised." Sardar said: "No" and added "this was a useless
talk. JawaharlalH is younger than 1. He enjoys an international
fame and moreover these people are propagating that I am bent
upon turning them out. Such a step will only confirm their propa-
ganda." Muslims wanted to remove Randhawa and nobody was
prepared to make any specific charge against him. The attempt at
that time waS to remove the Sardar and take in J ayaprakash.
12D.56 Payment of 55 crores pinched the Sardar very much,
'That amount was paid and Mahatma's murder was a result of that.
Even Jawaharlal objected to paying of 55 crol'l!!S and Sardar made
a statement the next day following Jawaharlal's. The Sardar went
to the Viceroy and asked him whether he had told Mahatma that
non-payment was dishonourable, that he had let down the Cabinet.
The Sardar showed all the papers to Mountbatten and he then apo-
logised, Panditji said it was petty-fo?,.t=;ng. The SarQ.ar said that
the amount should be paid but he would not stay in the Cabinet.
Sardar said that he should be relieved and that even the Maulana
did not want him. But after the death of the Mahatma, Jawaharlal
wrote a nice letter to the Sardar saying "gone is gone, we should
work together forgetting the past". The Sardar also reciprocated
but Jayaprakash started attacking the Sardar in public meetings.
Achyut declared at a public meeting that Sardar should be removed
nnd J ayaprakash should be appointed in his place. Later Nehru
250
14.6 This evidence is not relevant to the inquiry as it does not
fall within of the terms of reference.
14.7 Mr. Jetley. D.I.G., witness 55, had investigated into the
Gwalior matters. He had gone to Gwalior because it had gone round
that the Marath"l princes had something to do with the Marathu
clique rt$ponsible for Gandhiji's murder. He said. "r went to
Gwalior just to find out how things stood and all that I saw W<\S
that these prince'> had no hand in the assassination and no connection
with the clique".
Mr. RanL't, v)itness 3
14.8 Mr. Rana the D.I.G. (C.I.D.), Poona, witness No.3, who was
sent to inquire intp the part of the princes in the tragedy, also has
stated that the Princes of Gwalior. Alwar, and Bharatpur had no
hand in the conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi. The statement
of Gopal Godse, witness No. 33, is the same.
14.9 The question before the Commission is not whether thr
GwaIior prince was or was not a party to the conspiracy to murder.
The real questi-:ln before the Commission is whether there was any
pre-information in regard to the threat to the life of Mahatma and
of the which resulted in the murder of Mahatma. Gopi
Krish.m Katarey does not claim that he had this knowledge. All
that he says is that in a. Hindu Mahasabha weekly of Gwalior an
incit?merlt was given for the murder of 'Mahatma Gandhi and of
Pandit Nehru, and that the Hindu Mahasabha received the
of the G'Nalior Government and Rs. 65,000 was given to Dr. Parchun'
to regro1lp goondas for murderous assaults on those who had given
an ultirr.atum to Gwalior Government for responsible Government
Assuming, though not deciding these statements to be true they are
no proof of the fact that this witness had any pre-knowledge of thl'
danger to Mahatma Gandhi's life or of the conspiracy. The news-
paper th:lt he had referred to has not been produced. Even the namp
has not been given. And then there is the evidence of Mr. JcUcy
and Mr. Rana, both high Police officers, that the Maratha princes
had no hand in the assassination and no connection with the Maralha
conspirators. In view of all this, the Commission thinks the evidencr
to bp insufficient to prove anything relevant to the inquiry.
Vol. m
251
CHAPTER XV
Index of Paragraphs
Poona. Stronghold of the Hindu Mahasabha.
Documentary evidence about communal tension.
The Agrani or the Hindu Rashtra-Its tenor & tone.
Security from newspapers.
The Agrani-Security from.
Other groups.
Hindu Rashtra Dal.
Special Reports discontinued.
Jayaprakash Narayan's speeches.
Parchure's speech.
Ketkar's speech.
Gopal Godse's articles.
Reply to Jayaprakash Narayan's speech.
Poona conditions as revealed by documentary evidence.
Government not ignorant of Poona happenings.
Evidence of witnesses.
Statement of Mr. N. M. Kampte.
Statement of Mr. U. H. Rana.
Statement of Rac .Sahib Gurtu.
Statement of D.S.P. Poona.
Statement of G. S. Chambal.
Statement of Dy. S.P. Deulkar.
Statement of Insp. G.P. Angarkar.
Statement of Mr. K. M. Munshi.
Statement of Mrs. Sarla Barve.
Statement of Gopal Godse.
Statement of Mr. R. K. Khadilkar.
S. R. Bhagwat:
Conclusions.
CHAPTER XV
Poona
15.1 As Poona has been described to be the stronghold of Hindu
Mahasabha and as out of the eight accused tried for the conspiracy
to murder Mahatma Gandhi the principal four accused belonged to
Poona, and V. R. Karkare was their close associate and V. D. Savar-
kar was their mentor, the Commission thinks it necessary to deal
at length with and analyse .the evidence of the witnesses who have
deposed about Poona and also to give a resume of the documents
which relate to different movements and activities of political parties
in Poona. '
15.2 We might usefully begin with the documentary evidence pro-
duced in connection with the events and happenings in Poona. That
the conditions in the Maharashtrian districts of Bombay Province
particularly Poona and its neighbouring districts were not peaceful
is shown by the following docwnents produced from Bombay Secre-
tariat files.
15.3 As long back as December 1946 there was communal tension
in parts of Poona District and therefore on December 2, 1946, the
District Magistrate of Poona issued a prohibitory order under section
144 of the Criminal Procedure Code prohibiting manufacture, receipt,
exhibition or transferring by sale or otherwise certain type of arms.
This was extended from time to time till August 1947.
15.4 On 30th April, 1947 again a similar order was passed prohibit-
ing the receipt, sale or transfer of similar kinds of arms within
Poona Municipality and certain other suburban areas and vil1ages.
15.5 Ex. 172 is an extract from the Bombay Province Weekly
Letter, dated July 19, 1947 showing that the Maharashtra Provin-
cial Varnashram Swarajya Sangh, Poona, had publicly honoured
one V. N. whose real name was Daji Joshi, who had been convicted
of the murder of Collector Jackson and had been released after serv-
ing out his sentence. This function was on July 6, 1947, where about
200 persons were present. Joshi was garlanded and offered a purse
of Rs. 500 and a biography of Savarkar. G. V. Ketkar, V. B. Dawre,
V. B. Gogte and others made speeches in his honour and Gogte
referred to a statement of Dr. Keskar, ex-Secretary, A.I.C.C. that
they (the people) would be required to handle anns in future and
said that they would be forced to have recourse to arms to check
the Nizam's designs on Maharashtra. This was reported to the
Bombay Government and in the Secretariat there was the usual
noting. Finally, Mr. B. G. Kher on July 31, 1947, wrote "H.D.
should expect and be prepared for a terrorists' campaign in some
districts". It wm; upon this that there was a note by Mr. Dehejia and
256
a circular was issued to the District Magistrates on August 7, 194'/
(Exs. 173 and 174).
15.6 It may be remarked that this meeting appears to be IW
different from similar felicitationary and appreciative meeLiIlJ.:tI
held in the case of released or convicted political assassins whl'lI
tumultuous welcomes were, before 1947, given by the populace alld
nationalists of all hues. This meeting appears to have differed j II
only this respect that the laudation was initiated by the Hindu
Mahasabha rather than the more radical and less communalistk
section of political opinion which was wedded to non-violence in-
deed. But in the prevailing stormy atmosphere overcast with
violence the matter was rightly taken notice of and
were justifiably ordered but the question of adequacy remains to
bl?' determined.
15.7 note, Ex. 172, as appears to be the Secretariat practice,
started with Mr. S. M. Dalal, Assistant Secretary, dated July 22,
1947, and nine days later reach€d the Premier through the Home
Minister; and the Premier passed the following order:-
"H.D. should expect and be prepared for a terrorists' campaign
in some districts."
Sdf-
B.G.K.
31(7
15.8 The matter came back to the Home Department and the
Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai, rightly ordered that the matter be dis-
cussed with the Secretary. After discussion, the Secretary, Mr.
V. T. Dehejia, on August 5, 1947, recorded the note, Ex. 173. This
note pointedly referred to the danger and likelihood of a terrorists
campaign being started and it emphasised the necessity of having a
contented and efficient police force and how it should function for
obtaining necessary information about the activities of commWlal
and economic agitators like Communists, Forward Blockists, Socia-
lists and KisaD Sabha workers. This shows that the Government
was apprehensive of the outbreak of violence and wanted to gear up
the whole admi istrative machinery to meet this menace.
15.9 Thereupon, on August 7, 1947, the circular, Ex. 174 was sent
out marked "Terrorists' Campaign/Precautions to meet". In this
document it was stated that there are indication of violent and
terrorists methods being planned and resorted to by various parties
and it was necessary to check them. For that purpose the instruc-
tions therein contained were-
(1) Efficiency of the police force should be maintained at a
very high level, its grievances looked into and closer con-
tact kept between officers and men and steps taken to
ensure that disaffection spreading in the force was
brought to the notice of the higher officers.
(2) It was essential that information about the activities of
communalists and communal organisations as wen as of
economic ngitalol's like Comll1unists, Forward Blockists,
Socialists and Kisun Sabha workers was quickly obtain-
ed and Government kept continuously informed of their
activities. For the purpose, contacts should be established
and information received passed on to Government. No
information should be considered too trivial to be reported
and weekly confidential reports should in future cover
not only major events but even minor indications of pre-
paration of creating trouble should be included. It was
also mentioned that propaganda of parties intending to
create trouble could take many forms, e.g., small classes
of study groups or lectures ostensibly for harmless pur-
poses but really for party propaganda; 'tamashas'
in short, many ostensible hannless activities might be re-

sorted to with the sinister object of furthering party
ideology. Local officers should therefore be on the lookout
for any attempt to put across party propaganda through
these media and to keep a careful watch for insiduous
propaganda.
(3) Weekly reports of the Mamlatdars to District Magistrates

which were likely to be colourless should report unusual
and striking events noticed by them.
15.10 In June 1947, on information being received by Govern-

ment that the Hindu Mahasabha proposed to observe July 3 as
anti-Pakistan Day by organising 'Prabhat Pheries' (pre-dawn
processions), hartals and meetings, a telegraphic circular was
issued on June 30, 1947, Ex. 179, to all District Magistrates asking
them to take steps-ban or regulate meetings and processions, if
any trouble was apprehended. This was on the basis of a note of
Mr. Dehejia, Ex. 174. of the same date (June 30, 1947) indicating
that there was likelihood of trouble due to the intended observance
of the anti-Pakistan Day on July 3, 1947, by the Hindu Mahasabha
and the matter first went to Mr. Morarji Desai and then to Mr. B. G.
Kher.
15.11 Again on October 3, 1947, there was another confidential
note, Ex. 175, under the signatu·re of Mr. B. G. Kher, stating that
Hindu Mahasabha is importing Sikh refugees into the Province
and getting them to make inflammatory speeches and the Collec-
tors were therefore asked to register the arrival of refugees and
stop their addressing meetings to create trouble. Reference was
made particularly to Satara where refugees were imported to ere--
ate trouble. On this. there was a circular, Ex. 176, dated 8th Octo-
ber 1947, giving directions in accordance with the previous
ment, Ex. 175, and there was an order that any action taken should
be reported to Government immediately. Copies of this were sent
to the D.S.Ps. and all the administrative heads of different Divi-
sions and Districts. Mr. Morarji Desai has stated that this was done
to reglslter them so as to give them relief.
17-259 HA
15.12 Thus we have three circulars based on three different not
ings in the Secretariat-(1) Ex. 179 on June 30, 1947; (2) Ex. 174 on
August 7, 1947; and (3) Ex. 176 on October 8, 1947-a11 dealing with
the Hindu Mahasabha's communal activities which were a common
factor of these Secretariat notings and the orders passed thereon.
15.13 There is other documentary evidence concerning what WU!i
happening in Poona particularly.
15.14 The Bombay Provincial Weekly Letter, Ex. 155, of July 5,
1947, shows that there was a bomb explosion on June 26, 1947 in
Poona city. The matter went up to the Premier, Mr. B. G. Kher,
and on July 9, 1947, his remarks were, "Was not the editor of Agrani
arrested? I would like to know progress." On what basis the
Agl'ani was brought in is shown by the statement of Mr. Morarji
Desai that there was some information indicative of the editor's
connection with such subversive activities. Upon this the Home
Department, Bombay, sent an express letter, dated July 12, 1947, to
the District Magistrate, Poona, Ex. 156, asking for progress of the
investigation. It enqUired whether the editor of the Agmni was also
arrested in connection therewith, adding that Government should
be kept informed as to the investigation into the matter. After
a fortnight or so of the letter, the District r...lagistrate, on July 29,
sent his reply, Ex. 157, about the bomb explosion and enclosed
therewith a report of the D.S.P., Poona, dated July 23, 1947, Ex.
157A, in which the details of the bomb explosion of June 26 were
given which were to the effect that N. R. Athawle, Secretary of the
Poona City Hindu Mahasabha was arrested in connection with the
bomb explosion; that he had made a confessional statement under
S. 164 Cr. P.C. to the effect that the bomb had been given to him by
N. D. Apte of the Agrani; that he (Athawle) threw the bomb from
the second storey of the library; that Athawle's house was searched
but nothing incriminating was found; and that against Athawle
and Apte information was laid Wlder section 4 of the Explosives
Substances Act (Exs. 157 and 157A) and "their trial was awaited".
15.15 The Commission is unhappy to note that in Poona as also

in Ahmednagar and in many other cases in which Government
wanted information or sent orders, there was considerable delay in
execution. In this particular case, it did not require a fortnight to
send the requisite information which must have been with the D.S.P.
at the time. The letter of the Home Department was dated July 12,
1947; the District Magistrate wrote to the D.S.P. on the 17th and he
in turn replied on the 23rd July and the District Magistrate's letter
to Government is dated 29th July. Unless there were other matters
of unusual importance requiring priority in consideration of which
the Commission has not been apprised, this was undue delay in
matters requiring a more prompt attention.
15-.16 Ex. 158 which gives the Secretariat noting in regard to this
bomb incident is an important document. On August 4, 1947, Mr.
V. T. Dehejia noted that for the purposes of giving sanction under
section 7 of the Explosives Substances Act, the District Magistrate
should furnish necessary details. Upon, Mr. Morarji Desai
21>0
IIllldc a note saying that he had been informed that the confession
hnd been retracted soon after it was made shOWing a greater aware-
I)I'S5 on the part of the Minister than his pennanent Secretariat,
IIl\d that without the confession there would be no proof left and
he also lsked for the papers. Mr. B. G. Kher thereupon wrote in
his note that the matter should be more seriously treated and the
Il.S.P. should be told to investigate the case thoroughly. The note
Illentioned that the "Agrani" had boastfully said that it was a
matter of honour that the Hindu Mahasabha should be accused of
throwing a bomb. He also said that the Home Department was
returning his security. The Premier added, "Is terrorism to be
allowed to be openly encouraged? If not what action does H. D.
intend to take? I would like to see Secretary, H.D." If nothing else,
it shows that the Premier took a serious view of the terrorist activi-
ties and expected the Home Department to do the same but it is not
indicated what he expected the Home Department sitting in Bombay
to do. Unfortunately there is little evidence of Poona Police or local
authorities tnking a serious view of the bomb case. As a matter of
fact, the D.S.P. as witness No. 38 has stated before the Commis-
sion that the bomb was not a serious matter as it was not thrown on
anyone and it was intended to create a scare. It is a matter of sur-
prise that an offence under sections 3 and 4 of the Explosives Subs-
tances Act with a punishment of seven years was treated by the
D.S.P. as not serious and the injuries to a boy and damage to a car
meant nothing to the head of the Poona District Police.
15.17 The next note dated August 13, 1947, is again by Mr. V. T.
Dehejia saying "Discussed. Please ask the D.M. to report how the
case stands at present". Thereupon communications Ex. 160, dated
trict Magistrate is dated August 28, 1947, Ex. 161. It is not shown
on the record as to what happened in the Secretariat after this letter
was received; but on September 3, 1947, the District Magistrate,
Mr. S. G. Barve, gave sanction for the withdrawal of the case against
Athawle and Apte under section 494, Cr. P.C. The public prosecu-
tor was directed to put in the application for withdrawal which he
did and the case was thus withdrawn.
15.18 It may here be remarked that even with the confessional

statement of Athawle the case against Apte was no stronger as the-
confession of a co-accused is a very weak piece of evidence against
a co-accused if it is any evidence at all. (See s. 30 of the Evidence
Act.) All that such a statement couId probab1y be used for was to
furnish the police a strong base from which to direct their investi-
gation to secure other admissible and stronger evidence if their
ability and energy and willingness could procure it.
15.19 The Commission had before it the D.S.P. of Poona as wit-
ness No. 38 and is not very happy about his evidence. He stated
that the Agra.ni or the Hindu Rashtra did not preach violence and
had no knowledge if the Agrani was stopped. It never came to
.his knowledge that either Apte or Nathuram Godse preached vio-
lence 01 indulged in any illegal activities. But there is nothing on
:WO
the record to show what energetic steps, if any, were taken ttl
make a thorough investigation into the origin, possession and 1I11U
or misuse of the bomb.
15.20 It appears that a copy of this order was sent to Governmenl
along with the relevant papers and after the usual noting by till'
Secretary, the Home Minister and the Premier was gone through,
the Premier discussed the matter and Mr. Morarji Desai's order
"Discussed, file" 10.11. (1947). (Ex. 164). Thereafter the Homl'
Department of Bombay Government, by a letter dated Novembc'l'
21, 1947, returned all the papers regarding this bomb explosion, to
the District Magistrate. Thus ended the bomb episode in which u
boy was injured and a car damaged right near the City Library.
Athawle, a staunch Hindu Sabhaite, was arrested and confessed, thc
investigation could go no further. The Commission, however, can-
not overlook the fact that the matter is very old now. No papers
connected with this case are available from the record rooms because
after some specified time they are destroyed. And although officers
of the Commission were able to make a successful search in th{'
Record Rooms of the Delhi Coilectorate, they were unable to do
in Poona and Ahmednagar.
The Agrani or the Hindu Rashtra-Its tenor and tone.
15.21 The activities of and writings in the newspaper the AgTani
regarding the arrest of Athawle and Apte in· connection with the
bomb explosion on June 26, 1947, are both important and reflective.
On July 6, 1947, Ex. 152, the editorial, was rather aggressive in tone
saying that it was gratifying to note that Government had started
suspecting the Hindu Mahasabha of a bomb conspiracy; the con-
nection of the Sabha with the actual war weapon was worthy of the
high honoW' and that it was possible that Godse also might not
escape the attention of the police; that the Congress Government
was seeking to obstruct the Hindu Mahasabha organisation by these
arrests and even the AgTani might be stopped; and that the
Black-Day observance was the beginning for the fight of
jCHinduistic" movement.
15.22 On July 8, 1947, Ex. 153, there was another editorial in the
Agrani, the gist of which was that Apte must have an opportunity
to seek justice; and it complained that Apte was produced before the
Magistrate in a surreptitious manner, presumably for a remand.
These comments translated into English were sent to various autho-
rities including the District Magistrate, the District Superintendent
of Police, Poona, and Government of Bombay. Upon this, on
July 12, 1947, Mr. DeheJIa recorded:-
"Is Apte the editor of AgTani?" (Ex. 153).
15.23 Ex. 154, dated July 9, 1947 is a brief life sketch of N. D. Apte
in the Agrani written by N. V. Godse. In that the Congress Govern-
ment consisting of Hindus was blamed for trying to suppress the
spirit of Hindu youth and it was added that Apte was ever eager to
translate his ideas into action. He had taken out processions and
held demonstrations for the repeal of the Arms Act. had
founded a IW1l' Club at Ahmednagar but Government took away
the rines and about 2000 cartridges. Aple and 25 volunteers had
to the dais of the meeting of Mr. Kriplani and demanded
apology from the organisers of the meeting for having broken up
the meeting organised by the local Hindu Sabhaites at which Mr.
.Jllmnadas Mehta was to speak and that because Congressmen had
I'c(used to apologise, the meeting arranged for Mr. Kripalani was
broken up. It also said that Apte and others had been arrested
under a provision of law under which ten years imprisorunent
could be given. Then there was an exhortation whether the society
was going to allow "such fresh flowers willing to sacrifice their lives
to be perished". "The motherland is broken into pieces, women were
raped on the open road, everything was lost and the Khojas stand-
ing guards on the rapes of their own wives, the Congress High
Command have begun to scoul at you. How long will you bear
this?" Copies of this were forwarded to the Ministers as well as to
the Secretary, Home Department, Bombay Government, Bombay.
15.24 This indeed was incitement to commit illegal acts.
from newspapers
15.25 Ex. 267 is a list of newspapers against Whom action was
taken by demanding security. These were the Kat, the Agrani, the
Kesari and the Maratha. This document shows iliat in 1947 securi-
ties were demanded from these newspapers. Before this, security
was demanded in 1946 from Agrani which was forfeited in 1947.
The security of the Maratha was also forfeited. This action was
taken because there were provocative articles in these newspapers
which continued in spite of warnings having been given by the
Press Advisory Committee. Fresh security was demanded from the
Agrani for Rs. 5,000 and as it did not deposit any security it
publication from July 14, 1947 and restarted as the Hindu
RashtTa. From the Maratha the security demanded was Rs. 20,000
and it was reduced to Rs. 10,000. From the Kal a security of
Rs. 3,000 was demanded in 1946 and that was deposited. That news-
paper was given a warning in 1947. On the 4th August, 1947, Provin-
cial Press Advisory Committee had advised the return of these
securities as a gesture of goodwill. This recommendation was
accepted; on 14th August, 1947 a press note, Ex. 289, was issued and
securities were returned. This matter is deposed to by Mr. Dehejia
and by Mr. Morarji Desai. Mr. Dehejia said that the papers men-
tioned from Poona were mostly Hindu Mahasabha papers. He
added that these newspapers criticised the pro-Muslim. policy of
Mahatma Gandhi but did not preach violence against the person of
the Mahatma or against any other Congress leader. Had there been
any such incitement, strong action would have been taken. Mr.
Morarji Desai said that securities were returned to the newspapers
as gesture of goodwill in order to celebrate ushering in of the Inde-
pendence.
The Agrani-security from
15.21> Ex. 268 dated September 5, 1946 is the noting in the Home
Department, Bombay, suggesting that maximum security of
262
Rs. 3,000 should be asked from /.he Artl'llni as it was the' WOI til
offending paper in the matter of fomenting feelings of hatred Iu.
tween Hindus and Muslims. With this note, Mr. Morarji 1l"Hnl
agreed but he cautioned that it was doubtful if the High Court Wo1l1.1
uphold the order.
15.27 Ex. 269 dated August 14, 1947 shows that on the occasiOll IIf
Independence Day celebrations and as a gesture of goodwill toward"
the Press, the Government decided to cancel the orders of demalltl
ing or forfeiting securities in the case of newspapers which had
closed down in consequence of such notices. The Bombay Provill
cial Press Advisory Committee also advised it and hoped that th"
Press would reciprocate. As a consequence of this the order of fot'
feiture was set aside and the security of the Agrani was returnpd
In spite of this, it does not appear that there was any reciprocation
on the part of the Hindu Rashtra which took the place of th/·
Agram.
15.28 In two of the il' of the Agrani and the Hindu Rashtra
there is a clear indication of incitement to violence. In Ex. 233-A
the issue of the Agrani dated April 12, 1947, one of the captions is
"Mahatma Gandhi, commit suicide" and epithets like "his cowardly
philosophy", "his cowardly and worthless non-violence" were used
towards him. He was also called Sokaji and it was said that he
should commit suicide. If not, he should bid good-bye for ever to
Indian politics.
15.29 In the same issue of the Hindu Rashtra, Ex. 233 of Septem-
ber 7, 1947, it was said, l'And if anyone has really the urge for
Akhand Hindustan (lit. undivided India) and if a feeling of sacrific-
ing one's own life for its sake has been created, then do not strike
at a wrong place! The flood of Indian bravery will in no time integ-
rate the whole of India into one".
15.30 All this shows that the writings in the Agrani or the Hindu
Rashtra were strongly anti-Gandhi but were so worded in Marathi
which perhaps did not come within the purview of the Indian Penal
Code, i.e., incitement to murder.
15.31 There were some speeches made which were also of an in..
fiammatory and inciting nature. Dr. Parchure in his speech, Ex. 131,
said that Gandhiji and Nehru will surely reap the fruits of their
sins in a short time if the attitude assumed by them is continued.
15.32 At another meeting on the following day, i.e., December 3,

1947, Ex. 206, Mr. G. V. Ketkar presided and he said that they
should consider Gandhiism-cum-FaIse Nationalism as their enemy
tenned as being against Gandhiji himself.
Groups
15.:i3 The Commission will now bricfIy deal with other documents
relating to the activities of the various groups and parties and
duals jn Poona and separately djscuss them because they 9articularise
those activities.
[-{indu Rashtra DaZ
13.34 In 1942 an organisation known as the Hindu Rashtra Dal

was formed with V. D. Savarkar as its President (Ex. 34 dated August
1, 1944) and its original organisers were Date, Gogte, N. D. Apte and
N. V. Godse. The aims and object of the movement were the fmther-
ancc of Hindu Sabha activities. This document also shows that in
Maratha Indian States such as Sangli, Miraj and Indore were present.
It also shows that Savarkar was the Chief architect and force bC'hind
the Dal, almost its Fuhrer. He laid down the policy and exhorted
its volunteers to show and give implicit allegience to him as the sole
director.
15.35 The aims and objects have been stated at another place but
the importance of this document lies apart from showing the old
association of Godse, Apte etc. in the staging of a demonstration of
black flags before Gandhiji's meeting at Panchgani to protest against
C.R. formula. In that demonstration, about 15 Dal volunteers led by
N. D. Apte took part. It may be added that this demonstration is
ah.o proved by the evidence relating to Panchgani wherein rather an
exaggerated and misleading picture was drawn by some witnesses
15.36 On May 22, 1947, Ex. 54, a document which deals with the
Hindu Rashtra Dal was issued by Rao Sahib Gurtu. for DJ.G., C.I.D.,
Poona to all D.S.Ps. and District Magistrates. This document also
has been discussed at another place and it is not necessary to do so
again. Suffice it to say that the object of this document was to warn
the district authorities against the attempts to revive and to revitalise
the Dal. There was a meeting on July 3, 1947 in the Tilak Samarak
Mandir (Ex. 112) under the auspices of the Poona City Hindu Sabha,
where about 5,000 persons were present to observe the anti-Partition
Day as a Black Day. Mr. L. B. Bhopatkar of Poona presidt>d. The
speakers included G. V. Ketkar and N. V. Godse besides other local
leaders of the Hindu Sabha movement. Ketkar expressed his grati-
fication at the success of the observance of the Black Day and Godse
said that the time for action had arrived.
15.37 In the meanwhile refugees from West Punjab etc. had start-
refugees foom making speeches in regard to the atrocities in the

Punjab and to register them on their arrival. This document has
already been referred to.
15.38 On AUf!ust 8, 1947. a letter, Ex. 113, was issued by the Gov-
ernment to the D.I.G., C.I.D., Poona and fhe Commissioner of Police.
Bombay asking for the list 01 officers and members of the H..S.S. IIIld
leaders of Hindu Mahasabha organisation and directing th(;!m to I.I·I'P
a strict watch on the operations of these two movements and »('1111
reports regarding that matter. This appears to be based on the IlOlI'
of Mr. B. G. Kher and Mr. M. R. Desai, Ex. 1'77, dated 7th AUgUiit
1947. Pursuant thereto a list was prepared and sent on August III,
194'1, Ex. 114.
15.39 Likewise a similar list, Ex. 114A, was prepared about Ahmed-
nagar which is a very important document. Amongst the Hindu
Sabha workers at Poona there were N. V. Godse, N. D. Apte, thl'
la,ttel' shown as potentially dangerous and a staunch Savarkaritt'
organizer of the Hindu Rashtra Dal, the activities of the former wen'
of a similar nature. Other members were G. V. Ketkar, also a staunch
Savarkarite, editor of the Maratha and a trustee of the KeS8l'i
Marhatta Trust and described as the brain behind Hindu Sabha
vities. Another member was N.-R. Athawle shown as a co-wol'kN
of N. D. Apte potentially dangerous who was arrested under section
3 of the Explosives Substances Act, Another person was D. R. Badge
who is shown as proprietor of Sha.stra Bhandar dealing in
unlicensed weapons, a staunch Hindu Mahasabhaite and against
whom there were two prosecutions under the Arms Act and was
potentially dangerous. There is also another list of the Poona Dis-
trict Hindu Mahasabha leaders. That also includes N. V. Godse,
N. D. Apte, G. V. Ketkar, N. R Athawle and several other Mahara-
shtrians.
15.40 Even at the e)ppense of repetition it may be stated that this
is a document which would show the close association of Apte, Godse,
Badge and others with an active Savarkar Group which is really
repetitive of what the documents relating to 1942 and 1944 showed.
The as.sociation was thus old.
SpeciaL reports discontinued

15.41 The D.S.P. of Poona in his weekly report, Ex. 117, dated
September 22, 1947, said that there was nothing particulal' to report
about the RS.S. or the Hindu Mahasabha.
15.42 Mr. Rana, D.I.G., C.I.D., by his letter, Ex. 120A, dated Sep-
tember 17, 1947, suggested that special reports regarding Hindu
Mahusablia and R.S.S. were unnecessary as weekly reports were
being submitted. On this letter, there was some noting in the Home
Department and the suggestion of the Home Secretary was that the
reporting was necessary. Thereupon, on September 23, 1947, letter,
Ex. 120B, was sent saying that the reports were necessary. In his
report dated September 30, 1947, the D.8.P., Poena, said that there
was nothing special to report about tIie activities of the Hindu Maha-
sabha during the week; but he has given the a:ctivities of the RS.S.
They had a flag salutation, a march past and physical exercises. The
report also stated that the Sangh stood for revenge aga:inst injustice
and protection of Hindu religion and culture; that the 8angh was not
after jobs but its objective was to resurrect the past Hindu glory.
This was really a rehearsal for the meeting of the one lq"kh of
teen, which was to be held shortly after,
265
15.4J It appears that there was some l'cconsideratioll of the lll<.,tLCr-
Ily the Cabinet and it was decided on September 30, 1947 (Ex. 113·C),
lhat the special reports may be discontinued and they were dis("(!uti-
Ilucd by a letter of Government, Ex. 120 dated November 3, 1941.
Thus t.he special reports which were asked for in regard to the acti-
vities of the RS.S. and Hindu Mahasabha were thereby discontinued
probably due to the fact that the ordinary' weekly reports sent by
the C.lD., Poena and the Commissioner of Police of Bombay would
be sufficient. But thereby the importance which the directive as to.
!;pecial reports gave to watching the activities of these organisations
was considerably impaired. Mr. Morarji Desai qualified this by S<.lY-
ing th::.t the discontinuanCe was for "the present",
Jayaprakaslt Narayan's speeches
15.44 On November 26, 1947, a meeting was held in Kirkee Bazaar
attended by about a thousand persons. It was addressed in Poona by
Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan. the Socialist leader (Ex. 122). In this
speech, Mr. Narayan wanted the arsenal and ammunition factory
workers to know the then prevailing politics. He said that the Mus-
lim League had achieved Pakistan at the cost of the poor Muslims
and that the rich capitalist Mohammedans had run away to Pakistan.
He exhorted others not to drive away the Muslims and thus create
more enemies and that it was the rulers of Indian States, the rajas
and maharajas, who were trying to create trouble amongst Hindu
and Muslim labourers in order to strengthen their own position.
Further that the Army personnel were citizens of the country and
had a right to take part in polities. He described the evil of commu-
nalism which according to him was still prevailing in the Army which
he deduced from rioting and killing which was being done by the-
Armed Forces. This is a matter upon which the Commission is not
called upon to express its opinion but perhaps the Defence Forces
would not relish this accusation against them.
Parchure's speech
15.45 There was a meeting in the Tilak Samarak Mandir, Poona
on December 2, 1947 (Ex. 131), The chief speaker was Dr. D, S.
Parchure of Gwalior who was convicted in the Gandhi Conspiracy
Case but was acquitted on appeal. He was described as a second
Savarkar and that so great was his influence that on every mosque
in Gwalior flew the Bhagwa flag. In his speech Dr. Parchure, after
referring to the state of affairs in Gwalior, advocated the use of force
to achieve whatever they wanted. He also said that Gwalior Army
was full of Muslims who were in a majority and that the State was
increasing the Muslim elements and that Adviser Srinivasan had
advised the ruler that Parchure and his followers "were dugs"
The trend of speech was anti-Congress and extremely anti-Muslim.
He criticised Pandit Nehru's policy as regards Kashmir and pointed
out the qUiescence of Hindus in the face of Mohammedan aggressive-
ness. In the end he made a significant remark, the importance of
which was perhaps not then appreciated, that Gandhiji and Nehru
would surely 1'eap the fruits of their sins in a short time. This !:lpeech
was made in Hindi and because there was no Hindi shorthand
porter in the police, it could not be taken down in verbatim and was
266
reproduced from memory by the police reporters who were the\"('
When the report of this went to Government they wanted a mOl"!'
.authentic report of the speech but there could be nothing bettl'l
because of the speech not being in MarathL
15.46 On the reports submitted to the authOlities there are SOlll('
interesting notes showing that Parchure was a prominent Hindu
Mahasabha leader in Gwalior, a fiery speaker using intemperate lan-
guage. By Ex. I3lA dated December 24, 1947, Mr. Rana, D.I.G., C.LD.,
sent a report of the meeting to Bombay Government pointing oul
that the report of the speech was from mental notes and was not II
verbatim report. It was also pointed out that Dr. Parchure was r;()t
on the list of persons whose speeches were to be reported in verbatim.
pn December 31, 1947 the D.S.P., Poona, wrote to the District Magis·
trate, Poona informing him about the report not being tClken in
verbatim and also that he would try to keep a watch on the activitic.'i
of Dr. Farchure if he returned to Poona and necessary action takcll
'to prohibit him from making speeches preswnably in Poona. A copy
evidently Went to the A.D.LG., C.I.D. also and his note is that the
papers be filed.
Ketkar's speech
15.47 On December 3, 1947, there was a meeting presided over by
G. V. Ketkar (Ex. 206). In this speech he described Gandhism as
enemy No.1 showing thereby that his attitude of mind was not very
different from that of the other members of the Savarkar Group in
regard 1.0 Gandhian philosophy. Of course, it does not mean that he
was equally a votary of viplence or protagonist of murder.
15.48 An abstract of intelligence (Ex. 121) dated December 27,
1947, shows that on December 18, the Poona Police raided the house
of R. J. Deshmukh who had close contact with R. S. Khanolkar and
recovered therefrom sten gun cartridges, rifle cartridges, revolvel
cartridges, bombs and hand-grenade shells and also a bottle contain-
ing arsenic tri-chloride. In connection with this find five persons were
arrested and investigations made but the second para of this report
states that the collection of anus and ammunition was to facilitate
the people in the Hyderabad struggle which, it appears, wa5 a lumdy
cover for the collection of arms by this group of people to WJ11Ch
Godse etc. belonged and was an easy facade to hide their real inten-
tions and objectives.
15.49 On March 22, 1947 on the eVe of New Year's Day (Hindu
Calendar) an objectionLlhle 'amphl"'t. F,x. 265A. advocating terrorism
of Savarkar type was distributed at the Railway Stations, Shivaji
NagaJ' and Dehu but the police could not discover where they \\'crc
printed and who distributed them.
Gopal Godse
15.50 Gopal Godse, witness No. 33, has published certain articlcf!
-regarding the murder of Mahatma Gandhi. In Ex. 56 in th", Tf!onthly
journal, the Puinjan, of August 1966, he said that it was difficult fo'r
officials to think that a person who had failed once to assassinatf'
267
Gandhiji would not dare to make another attempt because of the
arrest of one person and the likely arrest of others v,itbin a few days
and a strong cordon of security men around Gandhiji. He has added
that there was complacency shown by security police in carrying out
investigation between January 20, and January 30, 1948. "The
miserably failed to derive any advantage from the t.e:,
of Jain and Madanlal. If only they had shown keenness m mvestl-
gation the tragedy would have been avoided." "In spite of all the
precautions there are things such as a luck, chance or suitability of
circumstances. A person gets an opportunity many a time just by
15.51 Ex. 57, issue of that journal of September 1966, deals with
the subject when the plot could have been hatched. The issue of
November-December, 1966 of that journal is Ex. 55 under the heading
"Gandhi Murder and Maulana Azad". Gopal Godse has said that
Nathuram did not like the murder of Gandhiji and both he and Apte
would have laid down their lives to prevent Partition and to protect
the life of Gandhiji and he has blamed Maulana Azad for creating
between Sardar Patel and Pt. Nehru through, as it
Gandhiji. He blamed Maulana Azad for being the author of the
conditions which were laid down by Mahatma Gandhi for creaking
his fast.
15.52 The Bombay Secret Abstract dated January 17,1948, Ex. 214,
relates to a meeting in Poona on January 6, 1948, where Mr. Y. Joshi,
President of Hyderabad State Hindu Sabha urged upon the public
·opinion to support the struggle of the Hindus in Hyderabad State and
requested the Government to fortify the borders and to provide arms
and ammunition to the public to defend themselves. Mr. G. N.
Kanitkar on the following day said that Hyderabad was not likely to
accede to the Indian Union and the Government should provide arms
to people living on the border areas.
Reply to Jayaprakash Narayan's speech
15.53 Ex. 71 is the report of the proceedings of the meeting of the
Hindu Mahasabha at Shivaji Mandir held at 6-30 P.M. on November
28, -1947. where about 2,000 people were present and the s:peakers
were V. B. Gogte and N. V. Godse and the subject on which
were made was "Hindu Nation and Jayaprakash Narayan". The
speakers twitted Jayaprakash Narayan about his socialism and ridi-
culed his attack on the Hindu Mahasabha and the R.S.S. and accused
the socialists of hypocrisy and also spoke about the atrocities of
Muslims on Hindu women and accused the socialists of helping in the
creation of Pakistan and the Partition of India and its consequences.
15.54. They also protested against handing over Kashmir to Sheikh
Abdullah taking it away from a Hindu ruler. It was also said tl-:tere
that the R.S.S. and the Hindu Mahasabha were accused of conspiracy
to murder Pt. Nehru. There was also a reference to Mahatma
Gandhi.
15.55 The documentarY eviden'ce which has been briefly analysed
:and discusSed above shows that Poona was in a state of agitation
scolded Jayaprakash in party meeting, but he did not want that to
Come in newspapers. The speech that the Sardar made at Lucknow
was not liked by which was misinterpreted in hill
newspaper. The Sardar said that Brajkrishan and Aruna were also
in league in his removal and that Jayaprakash had started
ing him in Bombay and at Surat.
12D.57. On the following day i.e. 5th March Sardar had a heart
attack. At 4 P.M. on that day he told Sushila Nayar that he had
to go with Gandhiji who had gone alone.
12D.58 The diary shows that the Sardar was saying that he must
die and go to Gandhiji.
12D.59 One of the causes of friction with Pandit Nehru was that
Narayan told G. D. Bida, (entry of 26th February, 1948).

-12D.60 Maniben's diary dated 25th January shows that the Sar-
dar had a talk with Gandhiji, Pt. Nehru, Chetty, Mathai on the 13th
January about 55 crores. Gandhiji's eyes were full of tears and his
words were very harsh. After that "Sardar's heart was broken in
the Cabinet and the talk .... revealed_ that he had said: "Now. I
cannot continue in the Goverrunent'."
12D.61 The diary also shows that there was a meeting after the
cremation on 31st January at 7.00 P.M. where the following were
Morarji at Bombay and Raja Maharaj Singh talked to Pt. Nehru on

the phone.
12D.62 On 2nd February, 1948 Sanjevi warned the Sardar that

he should not go out for a walk in the mornings as there was dan-
ger to his life and that of Panditji.
120.63 On 3rd February, 1948 a man came with his daughter
who was employed in the telephone office and she gave a number
in Alwar and repeated what she had heard on the telephone. San-
jevi was called and asked to inquire into the matter at Alwar.
E-The state of the Delhi Administration
.1 About the state of administration at the time Mr. Bannerjee
"Every week there used to be a conference which was attend·

ed by the Home Secretary, DIE of Delhi, the Chief
!llissioner, the of Delhi, senior
mtendent of PolIce, DelhI, and one or more senior
trates or senior police officials. The matters connected
with administration were discussed and deCision taken as
to. what should be done. But in actual practice this also
faded because such conferences could not be held
larly. It is really the break-down and the weakness of
the Administration and the want of proper cooperation
between the police and. the Administration which led to
this laxity on the part of the individual officers and to the
catastrophe. Immediately after this incident a new
pector-General of Police was appointed. He was from the
Frontier Police Mr. D. W. Mehra."
12E.2 Evidently the Home Secretary of the Central
who has 31ways been the recognised pivot of the administratIOn con-
'cel ning law and order and security was kept ignorant and there is
noLhing to show that the seriousn"ess of the offence was indicated to
him or he was kept or he kept himself informed of the progress. of
the investigation or what the Delhi Police were doing or what m-
formation was coming in to the Home Minister or his private secre-
tariat.
12E.3 Mter 20 years of the occurrence when all the facts are
known it is easy to be wise but perhaps if the Home Secretariat had
been as meticulous after the bomb explosion as it was after the
murder as stated by Mr. Bannerjee, police vigilance and police i,.-
vestigation might have been more intelligent and more fruitful than
it was and might not have been sterile.
12E.4 It was unfortunate that after the bomb incident neither

the District Magistrate who appears to be an alert and intrepid and
able officer was brought into the investigation nor was the advice of
Mr. R. N. Bannerjee sought. Even after the murder, on February
27, 1948 Mr. Bannerjee was complaining that he was not kept in touch
with the progress of the investigation and this in spite of his later
statement that after the murder the Secretariat took charge and
there was meticulous control which must have been after the letter.
But the Commission agrees with Mr. Bannerjee that after entrusting
the investigation to the highest ranked police officer like the Director
of Intelligence Bureau and Inspector General of Delhi the Govern-
ment of India and the Minister of Home Affairs was not expected to
scrutinise or direct investigation. It may be added that it is not
their function nor are they trained for it. Commission agrees with
the opinion of Mr. K. M. Munshi, one of the seniormost Advocates in
India and an ex-Governor of U.P. and one time Home Minister of
Bombay. In his deposition he said that if a Minister receiving any
information of an offence or likelihood of the commission of an
offence passes it on to the Inspector-General of Police he must be
taken to have proceeded properly. He cannot order an arrest nor
can he investigate himself nor direct how to investigate. He gave
an instance of a rel20rt reaching him, where, he was Governor of
U.P., of danger to the life of Prime Minister Nehru. He passed it
on to the Inspector General through the Home Minister but the
news turned out to be without any substance.
12E.5 Mr. R. N. Bannerjee, Secretary of the Home Ministry, stated
that the R.S.S. as a body were not, in his opinion, responsible for
the bomb throwing on Gandhiji or for his murder, nor did the con-
spirators act in their capacity as members of the R.S.S. but the acti-
vities of that association were so anti-social and objectionable that
in his opinion Government was rather tardy in not dealing with that
organisation. After the 30th January, theref?re, the
felt guilty about not having taken any preventive or pumhve artIon
against the KS.S. and it was banned soon 8;fter the
meeting of 31st January, 1948. As Mr. Banner]ee has put It, the deCI-
sion about banning KS.S. should have been kept secret but unfor-
tunately it leaked out to the Press and before any action could be
taken the top leaders of the KS.S. went underground.
12E.6 Mr. Morarji Desai also said that danger to Mahatma
Gandhi was from the KS.S. and from the Hindu Mahasabha. He
put. the matter thus:
"I could not say who the exact persons were who wculd do
harm to Mahatma Gandhi. But from the information I
had I could say that they were likely to be either the re-
fugees or the KS.S. and Hindu Mahasabha, not necessarily
from Poona. It was also possible that they could be
Muslim fanatics and tbis class of people was dispersed all
over the country and they were more in the North than
in Bombay."
12E.7 Mr. Khadilkar, witness No. 97, stated that danger to the
Mahatma was from the Rashtra Dal. According to Mr. V. Shan;r::ar,
Sardar Patel also knew of the danger to Mahatma Gandhi from
R.S.S.
12E.8 Mr. V. Shankar. witness No. 10, has stated:

"My impression is that there was information of the existence
of a hostile camp in Poona which was then known H.s the
Kesari school of thought against Gandhiji and Dr. Savar-
kar was said to be the inspirer of that school and as far
as I know their activities were kept under watch by the
Bombay Special Branch",
showing thereby that the Poona school was against Gandhiji and
was a potential source of danger. According to Mr. J. N. Sahni, wit-
ness No. 95, there were two schools of thought in DeIhl, one for
banning communal organisations and .the other was against it. Mr.
B. B. S, Jelley, witness No. 55, when recalled on January 14, 1969
stated that there was a list of 600 to 700 cases against the RS.S.
in a couple of months after the Independence, the charge against
them being of collecting arms, attacking villages and assaulting in-
dividuals, and he recommended that the R.S.S. should be banned.
He actually went to see the C.LD. Chief at Lucknow and also Mr.
Govind Vallabh Pant who was then the Premier of U.P. and Mr.
Lal Bahadur Shastri, who was the Home Minister, and recommend-
ed to them R.S.S. be banned. They agreed with him but said that
they wiU have to consult Sardar Patel. This organisation was ban-
ned but after the murder. He also said that Sardar Patel called
him (JeUey) and told him that it was difficult to ban R.S.S. because
the Muslims were already against them and he did not want a sec-
tion of toe Hindus also to be against them.
12E.9 Dr. Sushila Nayar, witness No. 53, has the' re'aciio\l
of Mahatma Gandhi regarding the KS.S. thus. she prnis('(i
185
before the Mahatma the work of R.S.S. volunteers at Wah, he said that
she did not know them. They were like the Black shirts, like the
rascists and the Nazis.
12E.I0 Mr Pyarelal. witness No. 54, said that he felt that in the
Delhi Police there was infiltration of anti-Gandhi feeling ana of pro-
H.,S.S. elements,' though this has been denied by practically all the
official witnesses.
12E.ll MI", Jayaprakash Narayan in his Press conference on
February 3, 1948, at Delhi blamed the Government for not doing
ull that they could to protect Mahatma Gandhi and accused them
of negligence. On February 6, 1948, Mr. Shyama Prasad Mukerjee
condemned communalism which was reported in the 'Times of India'
of 7th February (page 7), Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan again returning
to the charge against the Government in his speech reported in "The
Times of India" of February 18, 1948, Ex. 242, said that if prominent
Congress Ministers had not patronised and attended KS.S. rallies and
had warned the youth against joining the organisation, Mahatma
Gandhi would not have been killed. He also said that it was wrong
that he wanted a Cabinet portfolio and that he would have got It
long ijgo if he wanted it. "Even after the bomb was thrown no
strong action was taken but attem;Jts were made to blanket tne
criminals by officials within the administration who sabotaged any
effort that might have been made to unearth the conspiracy." The
Commission has had no corroboration of this wholesale condemnatIon
of the officials or any Minister patronising or attending KS.S. rallies.
In a speech reported in the Bombay ChTOnicle dated February 2t1.
1948. Ex. 243, Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan once again reverted to the
charge of responsibility of the Government for not looking after
Gandhiji's safety. He demanded the resignation of Dr. Shyama
Prasad Mukerjee, Mr. Shanmukum Chetty. Sardar Baldev Singh and
Mr. C. H. Bhabha.. and demanded the bifurcation of the Home ana
Information and Broadcasting Ministries.
12E.12 Rajaji in his book "Gandhiji's Teachings and Philosophy"
published by the Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan at pages 20-22 has stated
.as follows:-
"WhGoo:,
to kill Gandhiji was due to Hindu anger against him on
account of this advice of his to pay a huge sum of money
to the Pakistan Government when it was organising and
carrying out a wicked military campaign against us. Our
folly in helping the enemy with fifty crores rupees at
that juncture was thoue:ht to be inexcusable and the small
militant Maharashtrian group felt this as a
climax of Gandhiji's disservice to the nation and decided
to put an end to this foolish saint whom the nation could
not otherwise get rid of. So great was his influence and
so foolishly did the people venerate and obey him that
these conspirators thought, according to the Sardar, that
there was no way out other than assassination."
i,II WOlS th(' opinion or Snrdnr Patel showing that he was fully
11 111'1' or IIlI' 1.11:1l 01(' of 55 crores to Pakistan had
ct"1':I!t,(1 In Ill!' 11111H1:, or 111(· 1>"1)1111'
186
12E.13. In the speeches of Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan there WD.H •
strong condemnation of communal organisations the Hindu Mahn
sabha, the R.S.S. and the Moslem League and a demand for UH'II
being banned. He even accused the ministers of having given en-
couragement to the RS.S. by attending their rallies. There i:; II"
evidence of Central Ministers having done so·
12.K14 Mr. R. N. Banerje..e stated that after the funeral ot
Mahatma Gandhi at the informal meeting of the 31st January lher,·
was a feeling that the R.S.S. should have been banned earlier.
Whether it should have been done or not was for the Cabinet to
deCide; but his Own evidence shows that the KS.S. as such W8') not
responsible for the conspiracy or the murder. The banning of that
communal organisation in that case would not have affected the con-
spirators or the course of events because they have' not been provl'd
to have been members of the RS.S. nor has that organisation been
shown to have had a hand in the murder. And even if it had been
banned Godse, Apte and their group could not have been arrested
as members of an illegal organisation.
12E.15 What thc effect of earlier banning of the organisation
would have been is difficult to say as evidence on the point is scanty
and inconclusive. But if the .;police could not enforce the ban under
S. 144 Cr. P.C. it is highly speculative if an effective check would
have been possible by banning the organisation.
Mr. M. S. Ranclhawa, Witness 18
12E.16 Mr. Randhawa stated that from September 1947 to Janu-
ary 20, 1948 it never came to his knowledge that the life Mahatma
Gandhi was in danger. He took him to a village to open a Pan-
chayat Ghar without taking any special precautions. The inference
which he wanted the Commission to draw from this was that the
District administration had no knowledge of the danger to the life
of the Mahatma.
12E.17 He must have learnt, he said, of the throwing of the bomb
on the 20th January but the inference which he drew was that it
was a protest against Gandhiji's speeches rather than an attempt on
his liCe and that is the impreSSion which he continued to have right
upto the murder.
12E.18 Mr. Randhawa referred to his letter of explanation, Ex.
140(7) dated 7th February, 1948 in which he explained the reason
why he allowed Mehta Puran Chand, Advocate, to interview Madan-
181. He there said, "I must mention a. serious lapse on the part of
Superintendent of Police, New Delhi that he did not keep me in-
formed of the progress of investigation of this case and 1 did not
receive a single report from him which could give me an indication
that Madanlal accused was involved in a conspiracy to murder
Mahatma Gandhi". A special report regarding the bomb inCident
was cycIostyled on the 26th January and a copy sent to his office
on the 27th January. "I was under the impression that Madanlal
had exploded a cracker or a bomb simply as a protest against
Mahatma Gandhi's views and was not wanted in a conspiracy to
murder case ........ ", His explanation was not accepted by the
Home Ministry and was characterised as "obviously unsatisfactory".
187
llK19 Mr. Randhawa deposed that he did not meet the Home
during the period 20th to 30th January, 1948 nor "'as a
IIlI'l'ling of the Emergency Committee called. At any rate, he was
II"L invited. He agam reiterated that he did not know before the'
:1I)Lh that there was a conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi. He'
never informed by Sanjevi nor by Mehra nor did they inform,
him as to what statement Madanlal had made. He himself never made
lilly inquiries regarding that statement because he had many things
III attend to particularly the law and order situation in the city.
11(, might, he said, have gone to the spot after the bomb was thrown
n:: reported in The Statesman of the 21st January but he was quite
jlositive that he was never told that it was an attempt on the life
IIi" the Mahatma. He said that the statemcnts made in Ex.140(7)
correctly represent his impression because the matters were fresh
In his mind at that time. He added that he could not remember if he
read the newspapers of the 21st January. The newspapers are apt
to exaggerate and what is stated therein mayor may not be correct.
12E.20 When asked what he would have done if he had known
about the conspiracy, he said that he would have gone to the Home
Minister and got a meeting of the Emergency Committee called to
devise means for doing something appropriate. He was shown a
copy of Ex.84, Special Report of the Superintendent of Police, but
he said that he could not remember whether he read it or not, nor
whether it did reach him at all.
12E.21 Mehra used to meet him during those days, but he never
informed him as to what was being done in regard to the bomb
throwing case. He said that it was absolutely false that Arnar Nath
Bhatia met him every day and gave him the progress of the case.
12E.22 When further examined, he said, "If I had known about
this attempt to murder, I would have gone to the Home
and had a special meeting. called ...... of the high level officials
led to devise means of taking proper precautions".
12E.23 He added, '''1 would have stopped the prayer meetings.
whether Mahatma Gandhi liked it or not because his life was very
hnportant and I personally had a great respect for him as a leader".
He added that he saved the life of Mr. M. A. Jinnah and other Mus.
lim League leaders when they were attacked at the Imperial Hotet
by Khaksars. It was probably in May, 1946. Further he said, "1
would have controlled the people who were coming fO the prayer
meetings".
12E.24 During the fast of the Mahatma the refugees were mak
ing demonstrations against him and were even saying "MARTA
HAT TO MARNE DO". "I could not remember the slogan 'Madanlal
Zindabad'."
12E.25 The situation at the time of the fast, etc. was very tense.
The whole thing was in a flux. The refug2es were very ::.ngry. A
large number of refue-ees used ·to e-ather outside Birla House and
shout slogans "GANDHI KO MARNE DO (Let Gandhi Die)". It
was partly due to the fact th<lt he in5i5tcd on the payment or 10'\
crores and in spite of helping the refugees the Mahatma W<l.S /llvllll/
help to the Muslim commWlity.
12E.26 Mr. Randhwa was, therefore, under the impression thai
the bomb was a protest against his pro-Muslim or
policy. It was suspected that the RS.S. and the conservative 1')1
tremist Hindus were at the back of this bomb incident and that II
was a mode by which the refugees showed their resentment.
12E.27 He denied that the Delhi Administration or the Delhi
police were sympathetic towards the R.S.S. As a matter of tact, it
was under his orders that hundreds of members of the R.S.S. wer!'
arrested.
12E.28 In his first statement before this Commission he said th;\l
he received no reports from the C.I.D. or anybody else that
Mahatma's life was in danger. He came to know of the bomb inci-
dent but he was never told that it was a part of a conspiracy no!'
how the investigation was going on.
12E.29 Mr. Mehra used to meet him quite often but never inform-
ed him about the developments in regard to the bomb case, nor who
were the persons connected with the bomb explosion or who the
conspirators were. Hie did not know till after the murder that some
Marathas from Poona were involved in the conspiracy.
12E.30 Describing the state of affairs at the time, he said that the
istrict Magistrate was a very busy person. He had many problems
to tackle and he could not keep himself in touch with the detailed.
developments in important cases of crime in his charge.
12E.31 He was asked in regard to what the communist paper
"People's Age" contained saying that Mahatma Gandhi was going
to be murdered and that the Delhi police was infiltrated by R.S.S.
people and that the Deputy Commissioner Randhawa was behind
the movement and, therefore, they were not very keen on protect-
ing the life of Mahatma Gandhi, his reply was "It is an utter lie. I
do not mind calling it a damn lie". He said that he had too much
respect for Mahatma Gandhi to be guilty of any such want of inter-
est in his safety.
12E.32 He said it was correct that Mahatma Gandhi was opposed
to the searching of people who attended his prayer meetings and
that in his opinion the police could not have searched against his
would have been as effective. "I would like to add that if a person
is determined to kill another man and is prepared to lose his own
life, he can do it in spite of precautions". People in uniform, he
saia, would not have been effective. On the other hand, they wouIe!
have been a hinderance.
he
group of people were hostile to him. The Home Ministry dia no,
169
Inform him of the danger to Mahatma Gandhi or of a conspiracy to·
Mahatma Gandhi. As such, no special security measures were
lulu>!! as far as he could remember. He added that if he had known
.. I'lIut the facts of the bomb throwing, he would have taken a nUIn·
!,,'I' or measures including searching of all people who were attend-
his. prayer meetings. He would have stopped people from
"H('nding the prayer meetings excepting those who were closely
with the Mahatma. When asked whether proper step to
),r' t<lken would have been to post such policemen at the gates of the
l\il'ia House as could identify the conspirators, his reply was: "Apart
fl'lIln the protective measures which I have 1\arrated above I would
I,HVC posted plain-clothes men, secretly armed, to protect Gandh:ji
!Iud also taken all possible measures to arrest the suspect. In fact,
Ih(' entire police machinery would have been set in action against
!1w conspirators."
12E.34 PoFce Superintendent Amar Nath Bhatia, witness No. 17,

when recalled on April 24, 1968, said that he was meeting the De-
puty Commissioner every day. C.LD. officials were also there and
they told Mr. what was happening in connection v'ith
the case. He 'was not aware whether Mr. Randhawa made ... ny
romplaint against him to the Home Ministry that he was not keep-
inA" him (Mr. R'andhwa) in touch with the investigation. But as
above, Mr. Randhawa has denied any such information.
12E.35 The Commission would not expect the Deputy Commis-

sioner and District Magistrate to keep in touch with every investi-
gation which the police is conducting. Commission also realises
that at the time of the fast and at the time the bomb was thrown,
Delhi was in a turmoil. There were Hindu-Muslim riots. So much
60, that even officers in-charge of law and order were constantly in
as deposed to by Mr. Randhawa and as stated by Mr. Justice
Khosla jn his book 'The Stern Reckoning'. One I.e.s. officer from
U.P., Mr. Mishra, and another army officer, also a Mishra, were shot
dead by the rioters. Meos at that time had fully armed themselves
and it was after a fierce interchange of firing that they capitulated
and then they were put in the camp and went away to Pakistan
although later they returned. Similarly, there was danger from
Pandaras from Bulandshahar side who had also armed themselves
and Vi"ere stated to be marching on to Delhi. As a matter of tact,
army had to be deployed to keep law and order in Delhi. Then there
were the refugee's who could not be said to be in a peaceful state of
mind. They were agitating and b a state of turmoil and not exact-
ly peacefu1. Rightly or ....rtangly they considered that Mahatma
Gandhi was responsible for their miseries. In those circumstances,
the District Administration must have been under a great stress
and it is quite possible that the District Magistrate may not have
given that attention to the incident of bomb throwing at a prayer
meeting of the Mahatma as he otherwise would have done. It is
only one newspaper that gave out the information about a plot to
kill Mahatma Gandhi. The other newspapers just gave factual
news. Commission has no reason to doubt that Mr. Randhawa was
not informed of what was happening in regard to the progress of
the investigation into the bomb case. But eVE'n then one would have
190
,expected that in view of the regard and affection which Mr. HnTld
hawa, according to his own statement, had for the Mahatma allli III
view of the high position that he held in India and even in tl\ll
internaional'world, a little more attention should have been giV('11
in spite of aU his multifarious duties. He could find out as to whul
·the Police was doing in the investigation of the bomb case,
12E.36 Mr. Randhawa was in the witness box before the Cum
mission and he gave the impression of being a very strong mill
determined officer and it would not be an exaggeration on his part
when he said that had he known about danger to the Mahatma, hI'
would have even stopped the prayer meetings and would haVt'
screened everybody going to the prayer meetings. Whether hI'
would have succeeded in this or not, he appeared to the Commissioll
to be quite capable of doing this.
F-Conditions at irla House-What Precautions The Gandhi

Ashramites Took
B-rij I{ri::;/wn Chandiwala, Witness 11
12F.l Brij Krishan Chandiwala, witness No. 11, stated that the
refugees were in angry mood. Once in Mahatma's face they called
him names. On another occasion a procession came to Birla House
(::
payment of Rs. 35 crares to Pakistan. And many people were
objecting to the recital of the Quran at the prayer meetings. Al-
though conditions at Delhi became calm, the Maulanas complained
to Mahatma Gandhi about their safety. When Gandhiji broke his
fast, the people's minds and "hearts were not clean" and that is why
"a hand-grenade burst with a great sound on the 20th January, 1948
after his finishing prayer and Gandhiji had a narrow escape. Arrests
were made after this incident. About 2 or 3 persons were an·ested.
From that day we became very vigilant and took great care about
Gandhiji. Three or four days later a police officer came to see me
and informed that the incident of 20th was a conspiracy to murder
Gandhiji and thc names of 9 persons have come to our knowledge
who were involved in it... . I thought that police ",,;11 at once
arrest those persons and there was no reason of fear left". Gandhi-
ji's opinion also was that it was a conspiracy to kill him. Police
were posted at the gates and whoever came to see him came through
me by appointment. He added that he could not imagine that the
police could be so careless that after knowing about the conspiracy
Gandhiji would be murdered. He himself did not try to find out
what arrangements were made by the police to arrest the conspira-
tors because he knew that Sardar Patel was anxious about the
6afety of the Mahatma and that Government would do everything
to protect the life of Mahatma Gandhi. "After we came to know
that the police was looking into the matter, we did not do anything."
He was satisfied when the police officer told him that they had
got 9 names involved in the case and they were confident that the
measures taken by the Government would prevent any harm com-
·tng to Gandhiji and it was for that reason that they did not try to
find out what action Government was taking.
1:.W.2 He also added that there were volunteers also but
It IH'vcr struck them (Chandiwala nnd others) that anything senous
will happen and that is why they did not warn the Congress volun-
Ic'l't's. Besides. they were under the impression that nothing would
huppcn after what had happened on the 20th of January.
12F.3 Ordinarily, they used to form a cordon .round Gandhiji when
hi' went to the prayer ground. But on the 30th it v.--as late and
(;andhiji started walking very fast, and although it is not so stated
Il means that there was no cordon on that day. They had stationed
pl'ople on both sides of the passage through which Gandhiji was to
puss and it was not, therefore, necessary to have people in front 8S
well as at his back because nobody expected that a person would
lOuddenly jump up from the crowd and fire in'such a short time.
12F.4 They never suspected that any kind of outrage would be
t'ommitted by Poona people. They were suspecting other persons.
Although Mr. Chandiwala had come to know that Madanlal had
thrown the bomb he never tried to find out who was at the back of
the offence.
12F.5 Large crowd used to come to the prayer meeting. The
police was outside the Birla House. It would have been difficult for
anyone to find out about the presence of Nathuram Godse. There
was always such a big crowd that it would have been difficult to
find out about his presence. It could not have been an impossible
task to catch hold of Nathuram Godse. He again added that he
could never imagine that the police would be so careless as not to
prevent Gandhiji being murdered.
12F.6 He added as has been said above that \,,-hen the police told
them about 9 persons who were involved fn the bomb case and that
they knew their names, he became quite satisfied and confident
about the measures which the Government would take.
VishwaMtlt Shah, Witness 3
12F.7 Vishwanath Shah, witness No.3 before Mr. Pathak, stated
that an adverse atmosphere was created against Gandhiji. After
returning from Noakhali he stayed at Birla House. "At first Brij
Krishanji had directed our volunteers to look after the protection
of Gandhiji at Birla House but afterwards he said, 'Now the protec-
tion would be managed by the police: the volunteers were no
longer necessary'. Still some volunteers of the Seva Dal used to iit
and be present at the time of the prayer." He also said that police
in plain clothes used to be present at the prayer meeting.
Dr. Sushila Nayar, Witness 53
12F.8 Dr. Sushila Nayar, witness No. 53 statE'd that nobody in
the Ashram could imagine that anybody would do harm to Mahatma
Gandhi. They took the fatalistic attitude that as long as God
wanted the Mahatma to serve the country, he will. But there was no
deliberate lack of alertness or negligence on the part of the authori-
ties. Before the bomb incident they never felt that Mahatma's life
was in danger. But there were rumours {hat Mahatma's life may
be in danger and that is why security men in plain clothes were
stationed in Birla House and the plain clothes policemen had to hide
themselves behind bushes to keep themselves out of Mahatma's
sight.
172
.::onspiracy to murder in his capacity as Secretary to the Home Millin

try because the D:rector of Intelligence Bureau who was also ,the 1,11:1
pector General of Police in Delhi was in constant touch With iWIl
The persons who were present at the meeting of the 31st Janumy
were: Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel, Chief Minister of Bombay M.
Kher, Mr. Rajagopalachari, and Sanjevi. Sanlevi read out the COli
fessional statement of Madanlal and said that he had sent a cop.\'
of that statement through two Policemen to Bombay on 21st January
but the two Policemen had returned after two or three days aud
.coropla"ned that the Bombay Police had taken no notice of them a11l1
had asked them to return to Delhi. As the statement stands
the reference is to Madanlal's statement of the 20th January and nol
of the 24th because the officers were flown on 21st January. TIll'
statement contained the names and particulars of the conspirators,
2 or 3 places in Bombay and Madanlal had told the Police "PHIH
AYEGA" from which Mr. Bannerjee understood that those
would return to kill Mahatma Gandhi. It also transpired that Gods!'
had reconnoitred the prayer ground at Birla House a day previoua
to the murder i.e. on 29th January.
12D.18 As far as Mr. Bannerjee could remember Sanjevi did net

inform the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi. Mr. Bannerjee ascribed
gross incompetence and lethargy to Mr. Sanjevi in not having inform
ed him or to remind the Bombay Police as to what action was taken.
Sanjevi admitted at the meeting that he did not remind the Bombay
Poli"e. Mr. Bannerjee did not ask Sardar Patel whether he had any
prior ltnowledge of the conspiracy and the statement of Dr. Jain first
came up after it appeared in the Press. He also deposed ,that it was
the dut) of the Bombay Police to have sent their men to Delhi and
it was the duty of Mr. Sanjevi to have insisted on the Bombay Police
sending their men to Delhi in order to trace the associates of Madan-
lal and to prevent the carrying out of the object of the conspiracy.
According to him, there was a convention for the Police of the pro-
vince to which the culprit belonged to send its men to the province
where the offence was committed. This was an inter-provincial con-
vention. According to this the Bombay Police itself should have
moved in the matter and the Delhi Police should have taken a more
active part. When the statement of Mr. Shanker that after the con-
fessional statement of Madanlal both the Bombay Police and the
Intelligence Bureau were hot on the trail of the persons mentioned
therein but they evaded their watch, was put to Mr. Bannerjee, he
replied that he agreed that the Police did not get any concrete and
tangible evidence until they got the confessional statement but he did
not agree with the remaining part of Mr. Shankar's statement be-
cause the enquiries he had made after the meeting led to a different
conclusion. Further, at the meeting everybody was disgusted with
the Police inaction and Mr. Bannerjee described his own knowledge
in an article in a book called "The Civil Servant in India" by Mr. K.
L. Panjabi where he said the following:-
"All the same a great deal of temporary disintegration occurr-
ed in Secretariat administration. In the Delhi province
(which never had a proper wholetime Inspector General of
Police ever since its creation in 1912) t.he police force got
and weak; and minimum liaison between the-
Chief Commissioner and the Home Department on the one
hand and the district administrat;on on the other could
hardly be maintained. Mahatma Gandhi's assassination on
the 30th January 1948 was partly a of this con-
fused state of affairs. After the cremation there was a meet-
ing at Sardar Patel's residence in the evening of the 31st
and it was disclosed for the first time that by the early
morning of the 21st January the Delhi Police had in their
possession statement made by Madanlal (who detonated
a hand-grenade at Mahatma Gandhi's prayer meeting at
Birla House on the 20th evening and who made a confes-
sion to the police overnight) in which the full history of
the conspiracy was set out. The Delhi police did function
in one respect, namely, that they sent Madanlal's statement
to the Bombay Police by the 21st January evening but the
papers lay with the Bombay police. Both Godse and Apte
could have been found and nabbed in one of their two.
Bombay haunts on the 23rd. Unfortunately nobody took
any action on this statement of Madanlal and the Delhi
police did not even remind the Bombay police. The Delhi
maeistracy and the Home Secretariat remained ignorant of
the statement (as the head of the Delhi police never kept
them informed) till the world was staggered by the 'Hay
Ram' shot on the 30th evening. All these matters are
however still too 'contemporary', and their details must be
left to the futUre historian."
12D.19 Mr. Bannerjee was examined before this Commission on

May 11, 1967. He stated that as far as he could remember no news-
paper had stated that there was a conspiracy "behind the bomb eX-
plosion" and the public came to know about it after the 30th Janu-
ary. Had he known that this bomb-thrown was the result of a con-
spiracy, he would have taken up the matter himself and would asked
the Police as to what it was doing. Mr. Bannerjee again gave an
account of what happened at the meeting on the 31st January 1948
where the confessional statement of Madanlal was mentioned for the
first time and the people present at the meeting came to know about
it only then. If the Police had been vigilant it should have been
possible for them to arrest the persons mentioned in the confessional
statement. Nathuram Godse and Apte were in Delhi and were
noitring BirIa House and the places round about it on the 29th Janu-
ary. Mr. Bannerjee again repeated his statement about the conven-
tion of inter-provincial assistance by the Police. He said that they
knew nothing of the conspiracy and Mr. Sanjevi never gave them any
information. When Sanjevi was asked why he had not done so, he
said he was sorry, and the ....itness again repeated the incompetency
and lethargy of Mr. Sanjevi in that he did not inform him
(Mr. Bannerjee), he did not order the Bombay Police to send their
men to Delhi and did not remind the Bombay Police in regard to the
information which had been sent to them. He squarely placed the
blame on the Bombay Police and Mr. Sanjevi for allowing the cons-
piracy to fructify. The first statement of Madanlal recorded on the
20th was put to the witness and his reply was that he could not
against the Muslims and in pW'suance of that agitation met:!tings were
held wherein sometimes fiery speeches were made which were not
only anti-Muslim, they were anti-socialist and also anti-Congress.
15.56 There was a collection of arms by certain individuals the
ostensible object of which was to help the Hindus agitating in the
neighbouring Hyderabad State. A bomb was even thrown in the
heart of the city. But even though the thrower of the bomb VJas
arrested and he made a confessional statement that N. D. Apte had
given him the bomb, the police could not proceed because the
fessional statement was withdrawn and even without its withdrawal
it was a piece of evidence of very little, if any, value. It also appears
that the police did not think this bomb throwing to be serious because
according to the District Superintendent of Police, Mr. Pravinsinhji
Vijaysinhji, it was not thrown on any individual, showing thereby
that unless it was directed against a person or persons, according to
the head of the District Police, it was not a serious matter.
15.57 Two speeches which have been brought to the notice of the
Commission, one by Mr. G. V. Ketkar that Gandhism was enemy
N0. 1 and the other by Dr. PCl.rchure that Gandhi and Nehru will
soon reap the fruits of their sins-these speeches were made on two
successive days in December, 1947-show that the trend of speeches
of some of the Hindu Mahasabha workers was not free from
ing violence or at least producing disaffection agai.nst the Congress
leaders which could well have led to violence.
15.58 The Government was not wholly ignorant and inactive in
regard to what was happening in Poona. That was as long back as
July 1947· It ordered lists of Hindu Mahasabha and RS.S. leaders to
be compiled which lists showed that some of them were Savarkarites
and some of them were both Savarkarites as well as potentially dan-
gerous. The order passed by Government for speCial reports in
regard to these persons was subsequently withdrawn because it was
considered that the ordinary weekly reports were sufficient for the
Pl.U'POSf' of apprising the Government of what was happening. The
discontinuance of the special reports even though "for the pre-
sent" could impair that watchfulness which a specific and special
order for special reports would have implied.
15.59 The Hindu Mahasabha Press particularly the Agrani was
writing in a rabid strain, so much so that a substantial security had
to be demanded from it. Yet it was not deterred from its ·propaganda
policy, much to the chagrin of the police, which is shown by the evi-
dence of Deputy Superintendent Angarkar, witness No. 68.
15.60 As the story of the happenings in Poona is unfolded ratheJ

vi vidJy by the statements of high ranking police officials like the
Inspector General of Police, Bombay, the Deputy Inspector General.
C.LD., District Superintendent of Police and other SUbordinate pulicC'
officials, the statement of each witness is sometimes briefly and some·
times at great length discussed and analysed and at the end of each
witness a resume of what he has started has been given. This has been
269
done t.o facilitate appreciating what each witness has said and what
points the evidence of each witnesl:!; has brought out. At the end ,of
;?6n
discussion and analysis of the oral evidence of and the
documents which have been placed before the ConumsslOD.
15.61 The evidence of what one may term non-official
has been separately dealt with.
Statements of witnesses in Poana
15.02 Commission will now take up the analysis of the evi
PODIl3.witnesses.
N. M. Kanite wit. 4
before Mr. 'Pathak. He stated that Hindu Mahasabha movement did

exist in Poona but he could not say if it was a strong movement. Its
aims and objects were to unite the Hindus and protect their interests
and there was anatogonism between the Hindu Mahasabha and the
Congress. The Hindu Rashtra Dal in Poona was led by Chitpawan
Brahmins but he was not aware of any anti-Gandhi movement in
Poona in particular and in Maharashtra in general although some of
the leaders did not agree with his non-violence.
15.64 Although the Hindu Mahasabha was not very much excited
about Partition, it was eXCited when the news of what was happening
in. western Punjab came.
15.65 The C.LD. must have reported the speech,es made by Hindu
Mahasabha workers in July 1947. And if the speech ascribed to
Nathuram Godse by Mr. G. V. Ketkar was made the police reporters
would certainly have recorded it.
15,66 He had no knowledge of any information given to Balasahib
Kher about the danger to the life of Gandhiji, either by Ketkar or
Balukaka Kanitkar. But he knew that the C,I.D. watched the move-
of those persons from whom there was apprehension of
violence.
15.67 He read about the throwing of the bomb in the newspapers.
Nobody informed him about that fact. He could not connect Madan-
lal with any person in Poona nor could he say if the Poona Police
knew that Madanlal was living in Ahmednagal'. Mr. did not
know professor Jain. Between the explosion of the bomb and the
murder of the Mahatma he did not know what the conspirators were
and he had no reason to suspect Poona people being involved in it.
The first time he came to know about this fact was when Mr. Sanjevi
telephoned to him about the murder on January 30. 1948 in the
evening.
15.68 After he got the information, he telephoned to Mr. Gurtu,
A.n.I.G., C.I.D. and his reply was that he knew that Poona people
were political suspects and were against Mahatma Gandhi for his
270
giving 55 crares. Mr. Sanjevi had given some names to hun H,c
could not recollect those names but he had passed them on to
Mr. Gurtu and Mr. Gurtu said that he did know that they were
against Mahatma Gandhi. He might have given only one name and
M·e. Gurtu inferred the others.
15.69 The Poona Police were not associated in the investigation
from 20th to 30th January 1948 excepting that Mr. Rana was in Delhi
and hRd been given certain information and also a copy of Madanlal's
statement dated January 24, 1948 which was shown to hi
(Mr. Kamte) by Mr. Rana a day or two after the murder.
15.70 He did not try to find out what was happening in Delhi about
t.he investigation oi the bomb case. Generally it was the practice that
if there was anything worth the Provincial Police knowing it, the
D.LB. used to inform the Inspector Generals and the D.LGs., C.LD.
15.71 Nagarvala did not give him any information in regard to
what the Minister had told him regarding Professor Jain which in
his opinion Nagarvala should have done. Nagarvala said to him that
the Minister had told him not to inform either him (Kamte) or the
Commissioner_ He (Kamte) did not ask Nagarvala why that was so.
In normal course this matter should have been reported to him
cause ilj)portant matters are normally conveyed to the !iuperior
officel"S. After he got this information from Nagarvala, he asked the
Minister and he replied that he said that because he believed that he
(Kamte) was not in Bombay and Barucha was not very effective.
Mr. Kamte added that he might be wrong but his impression was
that the Minister thought that he should get the credit for "bringing
into light the offenders".
15.72 When asked why the Poona Police remained absolutely
ignorant about the conspiracy, he said the Holice could not be present
everyv,,-here and certainly not in a jail where the conspiracy started.
He added that orders were sought for the arrest of Karkare but he
could not recollect why those orders were not passed or why Karkare
was not arrested.
15.73 Commission may here observe that Karkare was ordered to.
be detained but the order was made much too late and by that time
Karkarc had vanished from Ahmednagar as also had Madanlal
against whom orders were passed earlier_
15.74 Immediately after he got information about the murder he·
sent for Rana and asked him for the statement of Madanla} which
Rana showed him. Mr. Kamte then asked him why he had not taken
immediate action, come to Poona and informed Gurtu. His rE'ply
was that he was waiting for Inspector Angarkar who was then on
Mr. Kamte did not think that the Poona Police was sympathe-
tic towards the conspirators or the R.S.S.
15.75 Mr. Kamte was asked what a police officer should have done
if he had been given the information which was given by Profess0r
Jain. He replied-
"I would have asked the Branch concerned to register an
offence and to arrest the persons named in the information,
II it was merely an intention 1 wuuld have arrested tho::ie pel'·
sons. I would also have stationed oflicers from Maharashtra
round about Mahatma Gandhi with the direction that they
should keep an eye on any person who comes from Maharashtra
specially the named persons, and arrest them if and when they
came near Mahatma Gandhi or if they acted in a suspicious
manner."
15.76 He was shown Ex. 5 and was asked what the Bombay PC.!lice
shollld have done with that. He replied that the C.LD., Poona should
have been informed.
15.77 If the information given to Nagarvala was that some people
of Poona and Ahmednagar were involved in the conspiracy t.hen he
should have got in touch with the C.LD., Poona.
15.73 He (Kamte) first said that he did not know that the intention
of the conspirators was to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi. He knew
nothing about the facts contained in Nagarvala's letter to Mr. Sanjevi
dated 30th January 1948, Ex. 8. Then Mr. Kamte added that he bad a
faint recollection ·'that Nagarvala may have told me about the theory
<)f kidnapping" He thought that it was a fantastic theory.
In answer to another question he said:-
"The vigilance will depend on the suspicion against the
persons concerned. In this case. the suspicion was not of mur-
dering Mahatmaji but the suspicion was that there were some
people in Poona who were against Mahatmaji's idea of giving
55 crores to Pakistan. If Gurtu had learnt about Madanlal's
statement, he could easily have come to the conclusion that
these are the people who were conspiring to murder
Mahatmaji."
The Poona Police did not have sufficient information which
could have led them to keep a watch on those persons.
15.79 When asked whether he asked Rana llS to why he had kept
the statement of Madanlal with himself without taking any action,
he replied that he could not remember what reply Rana gave but
he followed up that with his letter which has already been mentioned.
He did not know of N. V. Godse before the murder, nor did be know
about Karkare. He had never read the Agrani or the Hindu Rashtra,
He did not. know that Mr. Jedhe had warned Mr. N. V. Gadgil about
the Poona people. Mr. Jedhe never gave him (Mr. Kamte) any
information.
15.80 He did not know that Karkare was involved. in some serioUS"
offences and warrants for his arrest had been issued. He came to
know about it after the murder of Mahatma Gandhi.
15.81 Mr. Kamte was recalled and he said that as far as he knew
the police had no lmowledge that "a conspiracy to murder Mahatma
Gandhi was brewing up", Had they known it they would have taken
action in time. He said that the practice was that whenever a bomb
was thrown on a person of the prominence of Mahatma Gandhi,
272
'mformation was sent to the D.LGs. of C.LD. of all the Provln{'!'"
·concerned and if ramifications were all over India then ever
lnspector General and Deputy Inspector Generals, C.I.D. would ht'
informed. If the identity of the persons committing an offence WU:I
not known, sending of information to Inspector Generals of different
Provinces would be really futile because it would not help anybody.
But if there was a reasonable suspicion that the accused may escap"
into other parts of India then it would be wise to send information
t.o all the Inspectors General.
15.82 He had been told as a police officer that the accused person
in a case like a bomb throwing case belonged to the Province or
Bombay, he would at once have informed the D.I.G., C.I.D., thn
Commissioner of Police, and the Inspector General of Police, Bombay
and also of the bordering Provinces. If he had known that tlw
accused persons were not outsiders a!ld were Delhiwalas, he would
have stationed his men at the railway stations, airports and other
terminals including the roads leading out of the town but he would
have only placed those men who were intelligent. His experience
was that accused persons do not usually try to flee at once but they
first try to hide and later seek an opportunity to go out of the placC'.
Had he known that the people in the conspiracy were from Bombay
he would have placed 20 or 25 persons from Bombay around
Mahatma Gandhi to see that the conspirators did not get anywher('
near him. Godse etc. were known to Poona C.LD. There must have
been good reason why they were not shadowed. Once a man waf!
in a list called the Black List, he was shadowed for 24 hours. As th<'
names of Godse etc. were not in that List it means the C.LD. did not
know that they were dangerous.
15.83 As far as he-lrnew there was a rule that information had
to be given to the District Magistrate of the commission of seriou9
offences, at least that would happen in Bombay. He had heard of
Mr. G. V. Ketkar of Poona but did not know him personally.
15.84 In cross-examination he said if the statement Ex. 1 had been
shown to him eluiier, he would have got those persons mentioned
there shadowed and kept them under constant watch. If the state-
ment showed that there was a conspiracy to murder, he would have
asked the police to arrest them at once and had he been told that
one was an editor of the Hindu Rashtra, Poona and the other thC'
owner of Shastra Bh,'1ndar. he would have been able to find out at onc('
through his subordmate staff as to the identity of those persons.
Before the murder he had not heard of Apte or Nathuram Godse.
If he had arrested them, he might or might not have put shadow on
their close associates.
15.85 Hindu Mahasabha policy was extremely anti-Muslim. Mr.
Rana was not pro-Hindu Mahasabha.
"Q. Supposing action in Poona on the basis of Madanlal'lI
statement which had been brought by Mr. Rana to Poonn
even on the 27th or in any case before the actual assassino.·
tion of Mahatma Gandhi had led to the arrest of th,·
persons therein indicated, i.e., Badge, Godse, Apte and
273
Karkare, would it have resulted in the banning of the
Hindu Mahasabha and R.S.S.?
Ans. No,"
Local police in Foona had not been informed of the statement of
Madanlal. Delhi Police should have asked them to arrest the accus-
ed indicated by Madanlal.
15.86 Mr. Kamte was again recalled but his examination was in
regard to his correspondence with Mr. Rana. In cross-examination
by Mr. Kotwal, Mr. Kamte said that had he been in place of Mr.
Sanjevi he would have got into contact with the Inspector General
of Police, Bombay and if a request had been made by the D.II.B., he
would have certainly sent Bombay men to Delhi. He added that
Poona people had no personal grudge against Gandhiji and it came
as a surprise to him when he heard about Gandhiji's murder.
15.87 lIn his letter to Mr. Sanjevi dated 20th April, 1948, Ex. 97,
Mr. Kamte had complained about Rana's bungling. He said that his
intention was to make Rana realise the desirability of taking steps
inunediately, he got a copy of Madanlal's statement and his desire
was that Rana should not commit a mistake like that again. 11 shows
that in the opinion of Mr. Kamte, Rana bungled in not making any
use of the statement of Madanlal which had been handed over to him
in Delhi on 25th January, 1948. But will there be another Gandhi
to be protected?
15.88 Mr. Kamte when recalled stated that as far as he knew the
police in Poona had no knowledge about conspiracy to murder
Mahatma Gandhi. If they had known about it, they would have
taken timely action. It would not be a matter of surprise that the
police knew nothing of the conspiracy which must necessarily be
formed in secret but the surprise is the failure of the police to work
out anything useful after it got information from two sources-
(1) Madanlal's statements, the first one of the 20th and the second
one of 24th January; and (2) information given by Professor Jain to
Mr. Morarji Desai and by him conveyed to Deputy Commissioner
Nagarvala at Bombay-and both of them remained bogged in sterile
investigation and tangential theories showing either complacency or
paralysis.
15.89 The evidence of Mr. Kamte may be summed up thus:-
(1) The Hindu Mahasabha movement in Poona was there but
he could not say if it was a strong movement.
(2) The Hindu Rashtra Dal was led by Chitpawan Brahmins
but he did not know of any movement in Poona being anti.
Gandhi though the leaders of the Dal were no believers
of non-violence.
(1) The police would have reported the speech alleged to be
made by Godse about Gandhiji's living for 125 years if it
had been made.
18-259 HA
274
(4) He had no knowledge of information given to Mr. Kht'r
by Balukaka Kanitkar. But the C.LD. did watch person"
likely to commit violence.
(5) He knew nothing of the information given by Jain to Mr.
Morarji Desai who should have conveyed it to him and not
to Nagarvala. Nagarvala also did not give him any
mation.
(6) Sanjevi when informing him about Gandhiji's murder did
give him some names which he could not recollect,
but he passed them on to Mr. Gurtu who knew them to bl'
anti-Gandhi. It is possible that Sanjevi might have given
only one name and the others were worked out by Gurtu
(7) After the murder and after he heard Madanlal's statement,
he asked Rana's explanation.
(8) He would have stationed Bombay Police around Gandhijl
t1 check on people from Maharashtra side if he knew that
the conspirators were from Bombay.
(9) He had not seen precis of Madanlal's statement, Ex. 5.
(10) Nagarvala should have got into touch with Poona and
Ahmednagar. If Gurtu had known of Madanlal's state-
ment, he would have inferred conspiracy and who were in
it.
(11) He did not know of kidnappir>g theory which was a fantas-
tic theory in any case.
(12) He was .-tever told of what M:-:'. Je::lhe had said.
(13) The police in Poona had no 1 :e-knowledge of conspiracy
to murder. Had they known I.t they would have taken
timely action.
(14) Godse etc. were known to Poona C.LD. but they were not
shadowed.
(15) Had he known of Madanlal's statement, the persons men-
tioned therein would have been shadowed and kept under
watch. From the mention of editor of the Hindu Rashtm
others could have been identified.
(16) From the mere fact that the conspirators were Godse and
others, the Hindu Mahasabha could not be banned.
(17) The Kamte-Rana correspondence shows that Mr. Rana
had bungled.
H. Rana, wit. 3
15.90 Mr. U. R Rana, D.l.G., C.LD., witness No.3 when examined
(In 7th Februa.ry, 1967, state.d that he was called by Mr. Sanjevi on
the day followmg the exploslOn and was told that Madanlal had given
certain information shov.;ng that his companions were from Bomb<lY
side but it die! not disclose where they belonged to. He had not stated
that they belong to Poona but he had mentioned Savarkar. Ranll
275
'was also told that Madanlal had said that one of them was •
:Sadhu with a beard and another was his servant named Shankar and
-the third was an editor of a newspaper and he did not say where the
newspaper was published. Since Savarkar was mentioned, Mr. Rana
;at once concluded that they must be Savarkarites.
15.91 Mr. Rann himself had no information about Annexure V

,(Ex. 5) or Ex. 5A.
15.92 When the Delhi Police officers returned from Bombay, and
'Sanjevi told him ahout their having been sent back, told
:Sanjevi that it must have been because of their remaining in Bombay
in uniform would have UPSgt the arrangements and Sanjevi was
satisfied that everything was being done properly in Bombay. He
:also deposed that he did not give a copy of the full statement, Ex. 1.
ta Mr. Morarji Desai and that the copy of the statement which he
brought from Delhi was meant for Mr. N agarvala and therefore he
did not take it back from him. He did not accept the statement of
·Mr. Nagarvala that he, the witness, showed the statement to Nagar-
vala and then took it back. This in short is what he stated before
the Commissim when he appeared the first time.
15.93 When recalled at Baroda, Mr. Rana said that he could not
. recollect whether Shankar's name was mentioned on the 21st
. January or after the murder.
15.94 During the time that he was D.I.G., C.I.D., Poona, he did not
hear the story of Godse and others going to Panchgani. Nothing of
'importance came to his noLce about the activities of Nathuram Godse
or of Apte or of Badge or of their group, nor that they were directed
towards violence. The police reporters whose duty it was to report
proceedings or the of the meetings addressed by politicians
did not make any such report. These persons were not on the Black
List to be shadowed. Nor did he know that the Kesari group was a
militant group. He did not know that G. V. Ketkar, Bhagwan and
·others were connected with the Hindu Mahasabha.
15.95 He was . . .then examined about Ahmednagar affairs. He did
not know that the Collector, had written to Govenunent
that brinqing in of refug=es would disturb the hitherto peaceful
communal atmosphere of Alunednagar but he lmew that refugees used
to out processions and shouted anti-Muslim slogans. He said
that It was not correct that he was present when a procession of
refugees was taken out or a meeting was held by them at Ahmed-
nagar as stated by Madanlal. He said that he was not in Ahmed-
nagar then.
15.96 He said that it was correct that the Razakar movement was
causing: border incidents in Ahmednagar District. He could not
remember any murder committed by the Razakars but they were
. committing robberies and dacoities.
15.97 He had no lmowledge of Karkare and Madanlal having been
276
Karkare and Madanlal, he replied that he must have seen it because'
there was his endorsement dated January 14 on it. But it was not
within his province to recommend or not to recommend detention.
They were not persons with a provincial "reputation". He was not'
camping at Ahmednagar in January but the A.D.I.G. (Crime) was.
15.98 He was away to Delhi from the 20th to 27th January and
therefore he could not have known of the happenings in Poona in his
absence.
15.99 Mr. Rana was then examined in regard to various bomb
incidents at Ahmednagar and he said that he had seen the reports
and sent Inspector Razak on 12th December 1947. If written reports
were sent in regard to Ahmednagar incidents and his initials are on
them, then he must have seen them. He was shown the report of
Inspector Razak about the activities of Madanlal etc. but he saiathat
it did not come to his notice but it might have come to his office.
Nor did he know that Karkare was holding conferences with Apte
and Godse. According to what he lmew, neither Godse nor Apte
were of provincial or inter-provincial importance. It was not
ed to him that Godse and Apte were meeting Karkare in Ahmed-
nagar.
15.100 He had not seen Ex. 67, the report of Sub-Inspector
Balkundi dated 29th January 1948 about the identity of Madanlal. If
the D.S.P. had received any information in regard to Madanla1 in
the ordinary course he should have sent it to him. There were
violent activities in Poona and Abmednagar but there was nothing
to show that they w.ere anti-Gandhi. They were anti-Muslim.
15.101 Mr. Rana had not seen the report about recovery of arms
at the house of S. V. Ketkar nor had he seen the report dated January
26, 1948, of 'Inspector Razak about activities of various persons in
Ahmednagar (Ex. 58).
15.102 He had not seen Ex. 54 regarding activities of Hindu
Rashtra Dal. It was not reported to him that the activities of Godse
and Apte were directed towards violence or that Godse and Apte
both belonged to Hindu MaJrnsabha.
15.103 Proceedings of meetings of Hindu Mahasabha in June and
July were not brought to his notice.
15.104 He had the list, Ex. 114, prepared but he could not say if
the names of Godse, Apte, AthawJe and Ketkar were there or not.
Periodical reports were sent about the persons on the list but they
were discontinued after the orders of Government passed on his
recommendation.
15.105 He did not remember about the speeches of Mr. Jayaprakash
Narayan at Kirkee made in November 1947. (Exs. 122 and 12ZA).
But he must have seen a report of the speech of Dr. Parchure on 2nd
December 1947 (Ex. 131) wherein he said that Gandhi and Nehru will
reap the fruit of their sins quite soon. He did not remember the
speeches made the following day at a meeting in Tilak Samarak:
277
Mandir by Professor Mate and G. V. Ketkar, Ex. 206, wherein the
latter said that Gandhiism-cum,....false nationalism was enemy No. 1.
The practice was that if the speech :vas of
was sent by the office to him and he In turn m his discretion sent It
to Government. If the speeches were of persons who were listed,
.then the speeches were reported in verbatim. He sent the report,
Ex. 131. of Dr. Parchure's speech in order to let Government know
about it. He added that from the information that he received from
C.I.D. both Provincial and of the Districts there was nothing to
indicate that there was any group or set of persons who were inclin-
ed or intended to murder Mahatma Gandhi or any other prominent
Congress leader.
15.106 When asked about the statement of Mr. Munsm about
'the Poona school of thought led by Savarkar, he said it did exist but
<there was no information that its violence would be directed against
Mahatma Gandhi nor did he know that the Kesari group was against
Mahatma Gandhi.
15.107 The Provincial C.LD. had no information of conspiracy to

murder Gandhiji before 20th January, 1948. He could not say any-
thing about its existence after the 20th January but if they had any
information they must have reported to him.
15.108 Mr. Rana then described the system of classifying persons
as to their relative imp9rtance. The Provincial C.I.D. reported to
the Provincial Government and the Government of India whenever
they got any information relevant to all-India matters; the Provincial
C.LD. reported directly to D.LE.
15.109 Although he arrived at Delhi on the 20th evening, he learnt
.about the bomb explosion at Birla House the next morning. He did
not know that Madanlal had anything to do with Ahmednagar.
Mr. Sanjevi called him 'on 21st morning and asked him if he knew
about MadanlaI. What passed between the two of them was con-
tained in his correspondence with Mr. Kamte, the then Inspector
,General of Police, Bombay.
15.110 Mr. Rana said:-

"I saw Mr. Sanjevi ·fl.t about 9.30 a.m. or 10 a.m. He said
that Madanlal had started talking and the latter stated that
he came from Bombay; met Savarkar; and also gave'the name
of one Karkare and mentioned one Sadhu who had a servant.
Mr. Sanjevi did not give me the name of the Agrani or its
properietor or editor or the name of Hindu .Rashtriya, its pro-
prietor or editor. I would to repeat that he (Mr. Sanjevi)
did not mention the names of either newspaper-Agrani and
Hind.u Rasht1iya-or their proprietors or editors."
15.111 He advised Mr. Sanjevi to send two "Dolice officers to
"Bombay and Poona because Savarkar lived in Eombay and Poona
'was the stronghold of the Hindu Mahasabha. He could not say if
:Sanjevi knew any name besides Karkare's.
276
15.112 He did not know what information Delhi Pulice officel's
carried to Bombay or whether they took a copy of Madanlal's stote-
ment with them. No document was shown to him by Mr. Sanjevi
at the time. Before the statement of Madanlal dated 24th January
was given to him, he was not given a gist or any information about
the contents of the statement. The statement was given to him on
the evening of the 25th which he read in the train but he did not
discuss the contents with anyone. Nagarvala told him that he had
not sent the Delhi officers back but he had told them not to stay near
Hotel whose proprietor was a suspect.
15.113 In the statement of Madanlal which he brought to Bombay,

the name of the Agra.ni or the Hindu Rashtra was mentioned. There
was also mention of the editor and of the propriefor. There appears
to be some confusion in the witness's mind as the name Agrani is
not there. He did not telephone to Poona from Nagarvala's house
because Nagarvala told him that there was a big organisation and
they wanted to make simultaneous arrests and Nagarvala's informa-
tion was that they wanted to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi. Therefore,
he did not inform his office in Poona to take any precautions in regard
to the editor of the Agrani. Besides, he was going to Poona next
morning and he thought he would take action when he reached there.
15.114 He did not think that the culprits would return immediate-
ly to put their design into operation. Sanjevi was also of the same
opinion more particularly because one of them had been arrested.
15.l15 He did not fly to Bombay because he did not like flying
and air journeys did not suit him. The statement was not sent by
air by the D.l.B. because he did not think that the conspirators would
act so swiftly. Mt. Sanjevi had told him that he should proceed
discreetly and cautiously so that they might make a clean sweep of
all the persons in the conspiracy. This was particularly so because
of Savarkar whose operations were deep-laid and quite wide in their
extent.
15.l16 Mr. Nagarvala only knew the name of Karkare and no other
name. Rana did not advise Mr. Sanjevi to get Maratha policemen
into Birla House to be on watch or any other persons from Poona or
Bombay. He could not say if anybody else had advised him.
15.l17 Mr. Rana was asked a specific question whether the culprits
were known to the Poona C.lD. as being persons who were likely
to take part in violent activities. He replied:-
"1 can now say that amongst them Apte, Godse, Karkare,
Athawle and Badge were the potential mischief makers who
were taking part in violent activities."
15.118 He was then asked if the sending of Bombay Police would
have averted the catastrophe. He replied that there were too many
asswnptions in the question, that the same persons would commit the
offence, they would select the same place or the men sent there woule.
be able to identify them. He said that upto the 24th January he did
not know that Madanlal had named any other persons excepting
270
Karkare and Savarkar. He was not told that Madanlal had made
a statement to the police on the midnight of 20th January 1948.
Sanjevi did tell him that Madanial had other associates on Bombay
side and one of them was a Sadhu wearing a beard but he did not
say that amongst them one was a manager or editor of the RlUhtriya
newspaper nor did Sanjevi say that MadanIal had given descriptions
of six companions as his co-conspirators.
15.119 Mr. Sanjevi did not tell on the 21st nor on the 24th that
one of the persons described by Madanlal was the editor of the
Agrani.
is correspondence with Mr. Kamte .
• 15.121 He did not leave J\'IadanIal's statement with Nagarvala

because (1) Nagarvala already had the information from Home
Minister, (2) He had been informed ahout Karkare and Savarkar,
(3) Nagarvala had nothing to do with Poona, and (4). He himself
was ,going to Poona the following day and he would take action
himself.
15.122 If the Delhi Police officers had gone to Poona, Police there
would have taken action. He said whatever DeThi Police may say,
the names of the Agrani and the Hindu Ra.shtriya were not mention-
ed uptil the statement of Madanlal dated 24th. From the fact that
the officers returned from Bombay it can be inferred that either
the Bombay Police had all the necessary clues or the officers them-
selves did not go to Poona. Whatever explanation he had to give he
gave in his letters to Mr. Kamte. He said that in those days it was
difficult to talk on the telephone because telephone operators were
not above suspicion.
15.123 He said even with the Bombay Police round about irla
House, it would have been possible to stop the catastrophe only if
Gandhiji had allowed the people going to his meetings to be searched
or screened. Constituted as Mahatma was, used to mixing with the
crowds, it was difficult to protect him in those conditions against a
possible murderous assault.
15.124 He was in Delhi screening information regarding complicity

of different persons in the conspiracy and also about' Godse having
been at different places. There was no truth in the allegation made
against the ruling houses at Gwalior, Alwar, or Bharatpur. That was
the result of his investigations. Mr. G. K. Handoo did come and see
him at Gwalior and told him that his information was that Eakshi
Ram knew something about the conspiracy of murdering Mahatma
Gandhi by Godse and he could, if he liked, meet him. Rana advised
him to write to the D.lE. who would give directions. His (Mr.
Rana's) attention was drawn to his letter, Ex. 208, dated April 3 1946
to Mr. Sanjevi in whlch he said that Bakshi Ram. might be
to some other conspiracy. He said that he did write that and th-e
D.lB. agreed with him as his endorsment shows.
280
15.125 Sending Madanlal to Bombay did not occur to anyone. He
wanted Inspector Angarkar because Nagarvala wanted Badg.e to be
identifie::1 and Angarkar lmew everyone and their associates. He
did not read the Hindu Rashtra.
15.126 He talked to Nagarvala ahout the steps he (Nagarvala)

was taking in the investigation but he did not tell him anything of
the descriptions allegedly given by Madanlal in his statement.
Nagarvala told him that the Delhi Police officers wanted his help in
arresting Karkare. He did not say that they had mentioned the
newspaper Agrani or Hindu Rashtra. The only name they had and
which they mentioned to Mr. Nagarvala was "Kirkree".
15.127 The witness was shown Ex. 5A. He said he had never
seen it before and what was contained in document would not be
sufficient to identify any of the accused persons. He speaking
about himself. But with the portion within the red pencil line it
could have been of some assistance.
15.128 He went to see the Home Minister on the 28th morning.
His object was to find out who his informant was which Iiagarvala
had not been able to get. If the identity had been given, it is possible
that they might have been able to find out something more. He
reached Delhi after the murder on February 2. He did not know
anything about Sathe who was mentioned by Mrs. Barve.
15.129 !In cross-examination he said that when he went to Mr.
Sanjevi on the 21st there were some other police officers one of whom
was Rikhikesh and the other wag Bhatia who were investigating
officers in the bomb case. Neither of them had a statement of
Madanlal with them-and the talk was oral, no document was referred
to and nobody mentioned the editor of Agrani or Hindu Rashtra or
any newspaper nor was he asked by Mr. Sanjevi to find out about
the editor of a newspaper. He was told that Madanlal had
tioned three persons-Karkare and a Sadhu and his servaht, and the
other companions were Marathas from Bombay side. As soon as
Marathas of Bombay were mentioned, he (Rana) suspected Savarkar
and his group. He mentioned Bombay to Sanjevi because Savarkar
resided there and Poona because it was the stronghold of Hindu
Mahasabhaite group. He had not h-eard that the officers going to
Bombay had taken a preCis of Madanlal's statement. He was told
that Madanlat's statement was in Urdu; it was being translated to
help him and the Bombay Police in the investigation in Bombay.
15.130 Mr. Sanjevi knew that he (Rana) was to travel by train
and not by air and also when he would get to Bombay. He was to
evening of 27th. As far as he knew, Mr. Sanjevi did not use

telephone or wireless communications for conveying the gist of
Madanlal's statement to Bombay or to Poona.
15.131 From the fact that Mr. Sanjevi knew that he (Rana) waf;
travelling by train, he must be Wlder the impression that because
one of the conspirators had been arrested, the others were not likely
2Ul
to come back soon La commit any furlher ofTences. Mr. Sanjevi told
him that it would be suffiCient if he took necessary adion on reaching
Bombay and Poona and that he should proceed cautiously and
secretly and round up the whole lot in. one sweep. On 25th
Sanjevi told him that one of the conspIrators was an. edltor of a
newspaper, but he did not mention the name of the person or the
place of publication of the paper.
15.132 On his attention being drawn to his previous statement

dated 7th March 1967, Mr. Rana said that the previous statement was
made under a misapprehension and his present statement was the
correct thing. He had not then refreshed his memory by rea?ing his
correspondence with Mr. Kamte and he must have got mlxed up
about the dates.
a 15.133 Mr. Sanjevi did not tell him that the Delhi Police officers
had taken a copy of Madanlal's statement and the same had been
returned by Nagarvala.
15.134 When on January 27, 1948 he was staying with Nagarvala,
he asked him why he had sent back the Delhi officers, his reply was
that he had not sent them back; and told him what had actually
happened.
]5.135 Mr. Rana said that it was absolutely incorrect that Mr.
Morarji Desai did not inform Mr. Nagarvala. Only Professor Jain's
identity had not been disclosed. If it had been disclosed it was
possible that the Police might have got some more information but
that is only a "might have".
15.136 Nagarvala also told him that he had made enquiries from
Ahmednagar and was told that Karkare was no longer there and he
had posted his men to be on thp. look-out for Karkare in Bombay and
he also wanted some Police officers from Poona to identify Badge,
s known trafficker in illicit arms. N agarvala told him that his theory
wa:;; that the attempt was to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi. He had con-
cluded this on the basis of the information he had from his informers.
Nagarvala told him that there were 20 principals and each one of
them had a lot of persons working under them and Nagarvala believ-
ed that infonnation to be correct.
15.137 When Nagarvala was speaking "and I was listening to him
and asking him some questions also about it. I did not think this
theory to be fantastic; on the other hand I asked him to inform the
D.LB. on telephone."
15.138 On 27th they spoke to the D.LE. at about 7.30 P.M. He
(Rana) spoke to Sanjevi first and told him that Nagarvala denied
the sending of Police officers back and that he seemed to be proceed-
ing on the right lines but he did not mention the kidnapping theory
to Sanjevi but told him to take extra precautions at Birla House.
'Then Nagarvala spoke to the D.I.B. and mentioned the kidnapping
theory. N agarvala also stressed that necessary steps should be taken
to guard the residence of Mahatma Gandhi and protect his person .
.Nagarvala also told him what steps he was taking. Nagarvala had
2U2
a diary in which he had names of suspects. He read the names out
to him (Rana). It was a sman Policeman's notebook. Out of the
persons named in that pocket book Badge alone was involved in the
conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi. Those names did not
includ2 any editor of a newspaper. Had Nagarvala known about the
editor he would have contacted Poona and got the suspect arrested;
at any rate that name would have been mentioned in the diary.
15.139 When Nagarvala mentioned the theory of kidnapping to

Sanjevi, Sanjevi did not deprecate it or show any disapproval because
if he had Nagarvala would have told him about it. MI;'. Sanjevi
neither disapprove:! of the kidnapping theory nor did he suggest any
additional steps to be taken by the Bombay Police. Rana again em-
phasised that he impressed upon Sanjevi the necessity for greater
and stringent protective measures because of the theory of kidnap-
ping and a large number of persons being involved in it.
]5.140 He did not expect the associates of Madrmial to be moving

about openly. He expected that they would do so surreptitiously and
would be lying low. He did not telephone to Poona because it was
not expedient. He did not show the statement of MadanIal to the
Home Minister. !It was not correct that he .did not show the state-
ment of Madanlal to anyone because he heard to show it to the
Home Minister. He also told the Home Minister that Nagarvala
was proceeding on right lines. The Mi ister did not give him (Rana)
the name of his infonnant.
15.141 When he went to Poona he asked for Angarkar but he was
ill. Then he asked for Deulkar but he also was not available being
away to Alibaug and he was called back immediately by wireless.
Rao Sahib Gurtu khew the names of all the culprits mentioned by
Madanlal. Other officers were available in Poona but he (Rana)
only wanted Angarkar or Deulkar because they were the only ones
who knew the names of the associates of Karkare and their hide-outs.
He did not ask anyone about the presence of those persons in Poona.
Subsequent enquiries showed that when he reached Poona, Apte and
Godse were not there and he himself did not know the whereabouts
of Badge. He learnt that Karkare was called Maharaj. After the
murder Sanjevi asked Kamte to send some Police Officers from
Bombay and they were sent by military plane on 31st January but
he did not know who they were. That was because there was a fear
that Central Cabinet Ministers would also be attacked. When Rana
was sent back to Delhi to supervise the investigation he stayed with
Sanjevi and on the morning of the third day they had a talk with
each other but Sanjevi did not tell him that Nagarvala had proceeded
on wrong lines.
15.142 The evidence of Mr. Rana can be divided into 3 parts
(1) dealing with his statement regarding what happened in Bombay
or Poona and matters connected therewith; (2) dealing with DeW
investigation; and (3) his, investigation in Indian States.
15.143 Mr. Rana's evidence regarding Bombay shows that:-
(1) The name of Shankar was not given to him on the 21st
January and what he stated earlier was a mistake.
2113
(2) Nothing of importance was heard by him about the activl·
ties of Apte, Godse or Badge nor that Apte and Godse were·
indulging in violent activities and their names were not
on the Black List to be shadowed.
(3) He did not know that the Kesari group of Hindu Maha-
sabhaites was a militant group, nor that Savarkar group
would commit violence against Gandhiji. He could not \
think that Gandhiji would be murdered.
(4) He had no knowledge of activities of Karkare and
Madanlal or of the arms find at the house of S, V. Ketkar
at Ahmednagar.
(5) Razakars were causing border incidents.
(6) He had no knowledge about meetings of Rashtra Dal at
Dadar in 1947.
(7) There were violent activities in Alunednagar and in Poona
but they were anti-Moslem in nature.
(8) He got the list of Hindu Mahasabha workers: compiled and
periodical reports were sent about those persons but they:
were discontinued on his recommendation.
(9) He could not remember about the speeches made by Prof.
Mate and G. V. Ketkar at the meeting of the 3rd December
1947 where G. V. Ketkar said their enemy No.1 was false
nationalism-cum-Gandhlism. He sent Ex. 131 the report
of the speech of Dr. Parchure to Government.
(10) There were no reports in Poona about conspiracy to
murder Mahatma Gandhi. The reports from districts did
not show that there was a group or a party which was
conspiring to kill the Mahatma. If there had been any
such party it would have been reported to him.
(11) Inspector Angarkar was required at Bombay because Mr.
Nagarvala wanted somebody to identify Badge, a trafficker
in arms.
(12) Mr. Nagarvala told him that Karkare was no longer in
AJ?-mednagar. (See 19 below).
(13) a whlch
(14) Both he and Mr. Nagarvala spoke to Mr. Sanjevi on the

telephone on the 27th and Mr. Nagarvala conveyed to him
his kidnapping theory which was not disapproved of by
Mr. Sanjevi.
(15) Mr. Nagarvala had some names with him and they did not
include the editor of a newspaper.
(16) He would not have imagined that the culprits would move
about openly as they did. He thought they would be III
hiding.
2H4
'i ...7) He reached Bombay on the 27th January and as lie had
fever he stayed the night with Nagarvala. He showed the
statement of Madanlal to Nagarvala buf as it was a long
statement he took it back promising to send him a copy.
He fIrst wanted to find out about the complaint of the Delhi
Police Officers and besides (i) Nagarvala had the informa-
tion given by the Home Minister; (ti) had
nothing to do with Poona investigation; and (iii) he was
going to Poona the. following day and he could look to
conspirators from Poona.
(18) If Mr. Morarji Desai had disclosed Jain's name, the Police
might have got more infonnation but that was only "might
have".
(19) Nagarvala told him Karkare was not in Ahmednagar.
(See 12 above).
(20) After the murder Poona police officers were flown to
Bombay to protect the Central Ministers.
15.144 About Delhi:-
(1) Mr. Rana was called by Mr. Sanjevi and whatever passed
between them was reported in his correspondence with
Mr. Karnte, the then I.G.P. Bombay, Exs. 30 to 33.
(2) Mr. Sanjevi did not mention the names of the 'Agraru' or
'Hindu Rashtra' or their editor or proprietor. Super-
intendents Bhatia and Rikhikesh saw him on the 21st but
they did not have the statement of Madanlal with them and
talk was oral.
(3) Mr. Rana advised sending of two officers to Bombay and
Poona but he does not know what information they carried
with them nor whether they carried Madanlal's statement
with them. He advised Bombay as Savarkar lived in
Bombay and Poona as it was stronghold of the Mahasabha.
If Delhi Officers had gone to Poona the Police there would
have helped them.
"(4) Gist of the statement of Madanlal dated 24th January was
not given to him.
(5) He showed full statement of Madanlal to Mr. Nagarvala
but took it back from him and Mr. Nagarvala did not read
it through.
(6) No one expected attack on the Mahatma to be repeated so
soon, neither Mr. Sanjevi nor he himself.
(7) He did not fly to Bombay as flying did not suit him. He
went by train and Mr. Sanjevi lmew about it.
(8) Mr. Sanjevi told him to proceed carefully and make a clean
sweep of all the culprits.
(9) Mr. Nagarvala knew the name of Karkare only,
285
(10) Mr. Rana did not advise Mr. Sanjevi to get Maratha Police-
at Birla House.
(11) He could not now say that Apte, Godse, Karkare, Athawle
and Badge were taking part in violent activities. But the
efficacy of sending Bombay Police was prOblematic. They
could only have been effective, if at all, if they had been·
allowed to screen those attending the prayer meetings.
But Gandhiji did not allow it.
(12) The names of 'Agrani' and IHindu Rashtra' were not
till the 24th January, 1948 when Madanlal's fuller
statement was recorded. There is a mistake as to the
AgTani.
(13) It did not occur to anyone to send Madanlal to Bombay,
(14) He had not seen Ex. 5-A or Ex. 5 before.
(15) He was told that MadanIa! had mentioned three persons,
Karkare, a sadhu and a servant, and that the other
nions were Marathas from Bombay side. This made him
suspect Savarkar's group.
(16) Mr. Sanjevi did not use the telephone or wiresless
munication for conveying the gist of lVladanlal's statement
to Bombay.
(17) Mr. Sanjevi told him that it would be sufficient if he took
necessary action on reaching Bombay and Poona but he
should proceed cautiously and secretly.
(18) He also told him on the 25th that one of the conspirators
was the editor of a newspaper but no names were
tioned.
(19) Godse, Apte, Karkare and Badge were not on the Black
List.
(20) There were violent activities in Poona and Ahmednagar
but they were not directed against Mahatma Gandhi.
(21) The bomb throwing in Ahmednagar and was
Muslim and anti-Razakar and not against Congress or
Mahatma Gandhi.
(22) He could never have imagined that Gandhiji would be
murdered.
(23) He would not have concluded from the alleged speech of
Godse about Gandhiji's living for 125 years that his
tion was to murder Mahatma Gandhi.
(24) From the descriptions given in the fuller statement of .
Madanlal he would not have been able to identify the-
persons. ' "!.ti
Z86
'·-(25) He could not remember if he was told at Delhi that cloth"
marked 'N.V.G.' were found at Marina Hotel.
,(25A) The report of Ahmednagar Police about Madanlal and
Karkare had been seen by Mr. Rana but he made no USft
of that infonnation. If he had no recollection of it, ho
should at once have asked his office if there was any infor-
mation.
(26) If Delhi Police had gone to Poona, Poona Police would
have given them every assistance.
15.145 Mr. Rana said that:-
(1) There was no truth in the allegation that ruling housell
of Gwalior, Alwar and Bharatpur had '3Ily hand in the
conspiracy.
(2) Mr. Handoo did came to see him at Gwalior and told hir.
that Bakshi Ram knew something about the conspiraC)
but he (Rana) advised him to write to the D.LB. Ran-'
had written to the D.LB. that Bakshi Ram must be
ring to another conspiracy and the D.ILE. agreed with hin
:Rao Sahib Gurtu, wit. 22.
15.146 Rao Sahib Gurtu, witness No. 22, was the Assistant D.I.G.,
C.LD. at Poona. He stated that the D.S.P. Ahmednagar made a
reference towards the end of 1947 or thereabout about Madanlal
who had address2d a meetinp( of reii.lgees \',hich had resulted in
. disturbances but he could not whether there was anv report
about his activities after that. TI-:e witness also knew about Karkare
who ws') B. prominent Hindu Mahasabha leader in Ahmednagar but
he could n t S:;JY if his activities were of a violent No such
report wa3 made to h:m. He did :lot know that Karkare had a shop
for the sale 01 arms and ammunition and he remembered that a meet-
ing of Raosahib Patwardhan was disturb'i!d but whether there was
any assault on him or not he could not say.
15.147 Reports used to come in about the communal activities of
the group consisting of Nathuram Godse, Karkare, Apte and Badge
and several other persons whose names he could not recollect, but
·they went under the name of Hindu Sabha Movement. Their
paganda was against Gandhiji's polic;es towards Muslims but not for
doing harm to Mahatma Gandhi least of all murdering him. There
were reports that bombs were being prepared by some of the
·ers of the Hindu Mahasabha rv!ovement but not that they intended
to Murder Mahatma Gandhi. .
15.148 When the bomb was thrown at BirIa he had a vague
suspicion that that might be the handi-work of the Hindu Mahasabha
and KS.S. group but he had no idea as to who exactly were involved
in it. There was nothing in the C.LD. record to direct their atten-
tion to or fhl'! group with which he was connected nor that
'he was connected with the Hindu Sabha workers in Poona. It did
'not strike the C.I.D. police in Poona that he might be so connected
'with any particular group of Hindu Mahasabha workers of Poon.
267
-or Ahmednagar. No directions were sent from Delhi 0': Bombay
asking the people in Poona to investigate about the throwmg of the
homb. Mr. Rana also, when he returned from Delhi. did n?t give
.any names alleged to have been given by Madanlal.
15.149 The witness did not even know that Madanlal had made
. a confessional statement and there was no information in Poona about
the association of Madanlal with the R.S.S. group in Poona nor was
any information given about the confession of Madanlal to the police.
15.150 The activities of Karkare as far as the witness knew and
.as far as was known to the police were confined to addressing meet-
ings. The reports showed that he was strongly opposed to Mahatma
Gandhi's policies and was propagating Hindu Mahasabha policies but
the witness had no knowledge that one of their aims and objects was
to murder top ranking Congress leaders, Mahatma Gandhi or
Jawaharlal Nehru or Patel or anyone of that stature.
15.151 Nathuram Godse, Apte and Badge were active members
·of the Hindu Mahasabha but there was no actual incitement to
violence by them although their propaganda tended towards violence
without falling under anyone of the provisions of the Penal Code.
15.152 To this knowledge, there was no directive between January
20 and January 30 for investigation against Karkare, Apte, the Godses
or or anyone else who might have been considered dangerous
for the lives of Congress leaders. The warrant for the arrest of
Karkare was to be executed by the District Police and in the ordinary
course the Poona C.ILD. woul1 come to know about it as a piece of
information. The witness did not know anything about the deten-
tiO!1 order of Madanlal nor had he seen it earlier. Whether the order
was passed on any recommendation by the Provincial C.1.D. the
witness could not naturally recollect.
15.153 The witness was shown an intercepted letter of Karkare
(Ex. 43) which was addressed to various newspapers in Poona for
publication. He said he must have come to know about it as it bore
his endorsement. He knew about the orders for the detention of
Karkare but could not say why they were passed.
15.154 Activities of Godse were also being watched by the police
but it was not a continuous watch so as to prevent his eluding it.
No orders were issued for the arrest of anyone after Madanlal made
a containing names of his if he did give
thelr names. If any names had been given to Poona Police, it would
have taken. steps to apprehend them. He coul1 not remember having
any talk With during the period January 20 to January 30,
1948. If the wltness had been told .that one of the persons mentioned
'by Madanlal was the editor of the Ag1'ani or the Hindu Rashtra he
would have arrested him at once. When asked how he would have
arrested persons named by Madanlal when warrants on Karkare
that Was being
288
15.155 In his cross-examination he stated that reports were sent
every week to amongst others, the D.I.B. by the D.I.G. compiled
the reports received from the D.S.Ps. and that these reports contamed
the names of Godse, Apte, Karkare, Savarkar and Dr. Parchure of
Gwalior. Although from August 15, 1947, a watch was kept by the
local police on certain Hindu Mahasabha and ,RS.S. workers, the
watch was discontinued in November 1947 but the witness could not
give any reason but that must have been under Government's orders.
15.156 He stated that there were bomb incidents in Poona also

as they were in Ahmednagar. One of them was in the Poona City
Library in July 1947 in connection with which.Athawle and N. D.
Apte were arrested but what Athawle stated he could ;not remember.
W'hen asked why the editor was not arrested, he could not say but
probably there was no evidence against him. The matter was being
investigated by the District Police and not the Provincial C.I.D.
15.157 It never occurred to witness that Madanlal arrested in

Delhi was the same person about whom a report had been made
earlier and this not even after seeing the account of the bomb in the
Times of India, Ex. 106, or the report of the Mahatma's speech in
the Bombay Chronicle, Ex, 108. Poona group was opposed to the
help Mahatma Gandhi had given to the Muslims and they strongly
disapproved of givJng 55 crorcs. The witness was never shown a
copy of the statement of Madanlal brought by Mr. Rana. He had no
information about the conspiracy to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi. He
did, on being shown previous files, recollect about S. V. Ketkar's
statement that the arms belonged to Karkare.
15.158 In by Mr. Chawla, the witness stated

that the Agrani was a very strong anti-Muslim paper and was attack-
ing the policy of Mahatma Gandhi; but he had no lmowledge that
this group of people, connected with the Agrani, were collecting arms
to bring about a revolution. The reports in regard to Godse's
activities and that of his group were being sent to the D.LG., C.LD.,
Mr. Rana, but really the Assistant D.I.G. looked into these matters.
No names were given to him by Mr. Rana. The Delhi Police never
contacted him and a month later he came to know that they had
come to Bombay and that they had been sent back from Bombay.
Witness did not lmow whether they wanted to see him or not.
15.159 Rao Sahib Gurtu was examined by the Commission at
Dharwar as he was not keeping good health but in spite of that he
appeared to be quite alert and made his statement without showing
any impairment of memory and without fumbling.
15.160 What emerges from his statement is this: that happenings
in Ahmednagar and in Poona including the activities of Karkare and
Madanlal at Ahmednagar and of Godse, Apte and Badge at Poona
were being reported to the Provincial C.LD. but they could not dis.
cover that the activities were so blatantly and violently against
Mahatma Gandhi and the Con.gress that there was likelihood of any
harm being done to them and secondly, that as things appeared
then, the bomb incidents in Poona which were being investigatect
2lHl
by the District Police and the Provincial C.I.D. had no connection
with anti-Gandhi or anti-Congress activity.
Thirdly, the Poona C.LD. had no information about what Madan-
lal hQd stated or that he had named anybody who might have been
connected with Poona Hindu Mahasabha directly. But if the n:,me
of Karkare had been given to the Provincial C.LD. earlier and that
is as far as the witness would go, it might have led to the activities
of Karkare's friends being enquired into by Poona Police or C.LD.
Fourthly, if at any time, the name of the editor of the Agrani
had been mentioned, in all probability, this witness would have
seen to his apprehension.
Fifthly, Mr. Rana, on his return from Bombay, did not show the
confessional statement of Madanlal to this witness. As t(l what he
would have done may be a matter of conjecture but foresight re-
quired that he should have been taken in confidence at an earlier
stage.
Sixthly, there was no communication between this witness and
Mr. Nagarvala and about what Mr. NagarvaJa was this
ness knew nothing.
Pra'vinsinhji Vijaysinhji, wit. 38.
15.161 Witness No. 38, Mr. Pravinsinhji Vijaysinhji. was the D.S.P.
of Poona between July 1947 and May 1949 and subsequently rose
to be the Inspector General of Police of Bombay. His deposition
shows that in the middle of 1947 communal violence in Poona
City was running very high because of the Partition and the
feelings against Muslims had been worked up and was intensified
because of the influx of refugees from the Punjab. The prominent
Hindtl 1-1ahasabha workers then induded Bhopatkar, Abhayankar,
Apte, Nathuram Godse and G. V. Ketkar but their activities were
confined to being anti-Muslim. There was no overt attack
the Muslim League or against the Muslims; although they carried
on propa,ganda against the because it agreed to the Par-
tition and there was strong feelin.e: a,gainst Mahatma Gandhi as being
the main architect of Partition. there was no overt attack
them.
15.162 The trend of speeches of the Hindu Mahasabha workers
was anti-Mu'5lim but not inciting to violence. This witness knew
nothing about anythinl; said by Nathuram Godse against Mahatma
Gandhi indicating that Mahatma Gandhi's life was in danger. He
has :o;tated that if such a thing had been said. he would have come
to know through his L.I.B. staff. The person incharge of the L.I.B.
Inspector An!{arkar.
15.163 At the time there was no refugee camp in Poona City but
there were number of refugees who were carrying on petty trades.
15.164 Instructions had been issued for watching the activities of
the Hindu Mahasabha and R.S.S. workers. Their meetings were at-
tended by the reporters and the special police, stationed at the r6.il-
way stations and the bus stops, used to report about their arrivals
19-259 HA
and departures from Poona. This witness knew nothing about why
the Agrani was stopped or why the Hindu Rashtra was started. Those
newspapers, said he, did not preach any violence. The witness
denied any partiality of the police for the Hindu Mahasabha or the
RS.S.
15.165 A specific question was put to the witness about the July
speech of Nathuram Godse in which he said that secret organisations
should be formed and revolutionary methods resorted to and he had
hinted that the time had come to do away with the top ranking
Congress leaders or that Gandhiji or Nehru being thorns in the
establishment of Hindu raj should be removed, and his reply was
that it did not happen during his time. He was a reader of the
Kesari and he heard nothing about the activities of Apte or his taking
part in the bomb explosion. At no time did it come to his notice
that Nathuram Godse or Apte were indulging in illegal activities.
15.166 There was nothing in the newspapers to indicate that
Madanlal was or might be one of the refugees of Poona. No official
help was asked for from the Poona Police in the investigation con-
nected with the throvdng of the bomb at Delhi and there was no
marked activity in Poona after the bomb was thrown. On the day
the Mahatma was murdered the houses of some of the Muslims were
set on fire and there was danger of the breach of the peace and
therefore the help of Army was requisitioned. Situation was very
inflammatory.
15.167 This witness knew nothing about Sathe who was mentioned
in the statement of IV!b:s. Barve. If Mr. Barve had the information
that Poona people had gone to Delhi to murder Mahatma Gandhi,
he would certainly have passed it on to him (the witness). The
police was quite vigilant and tried to keep itself informed of the
activities of every person who was likely to resort to violence. But
it had no knowledge about what Apte and Godse were doing.
15.168 Mr. Rana gave no orders to the witness for arresting or-
keeping watch on the activities of anyone after his return from Delhi
in January 1948 nor did he say anything about Madanlal nor did
it strike anyone that Madanlal had associates in Poona. As the
situation became very tense after the murder of Mahatma Gandhi,
the police did not direct its energies towards finding out who the
associates of Nathuram Godse were.
15.169 In connection with the Poona City Library bomb
Apte and Athawle were arrested. Athawle made his confession but
in view of withdrawal of the confession the case was withdrawn,
The bomb was not thrown on any particular person but its object
was to create a scare. The fact that a bomb had been thrown was
not sufficient to warn the police to take stringent measures.
15.170 Coming to Hindu Rashtra Dal, the witness stated that a
circular was issued to watch its activities and the activities of its
members but he could not remember who its members were.
15.171 He did not know if Balukaka Kanitkar wrote anything
to a Minister. After the bomb was thrown. this witness had no,
2111
information about Nathuram Godse and Apte having left Poona nor
before the bomb was thrown did he receive any information con-
cerning these t ....-o. This witness could not remember about the
speech made by Nathuram Godse or what was said by socialists led
by Jayaprakash Narayan or I.Vkhta Hindu Mahasabha
workers were trying to kill Mahatma Gandhi.
15.172 Mr. Vaidya in his cross-c>.:umination referred to Ex. 71,
report of a meeting of 28th November 1947 where it is stated that
Hindu Mahasabha leaders had been accused of their intention to
kill Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru and there was no denial of that
allegation; on the contrary, the allegation of the socialists was re-
peated as if it was a matter of pride of the Hindu Mahasabha work-
ers. The report of this meeting never came to the notice of this
witness. .
15.173 It appears to the Commission that this ttuestion contains
an important error. There is no mention of murderinl1; Gandhiji.
It only mentions Pt. Nehru. In the diary of 28th November, 1947,
sent to the D.LG., C.LD. by this v.itness, there was mention of the
condemnation of the Hindu Mahasabha by the socialists but the
witness could not recollect anything about this.
15.174 The D.I.G., C.LD. on his return from Delhi wanted Angar-
kar who was not available and he did not want anybody else.
15.175 In reply to Mr. Chawla the ....itness said that he had no'
recollection of Godse's name being mentioned in connection with
Poona bomb case, nor did he know anything of Karkare or Madanlal
in connection with the activities of Godse and Apte nor that Madan-
lal and Karkare were visiting Poona. As far as the witness could
remember, Godse did not advocate violence in his newspaper. Badge
had an arms store and had been convicted for possession of
arms before the witness took charge of Poona but he never came
to know that Nathuram Godse and Apte were collecting arms. But
wards Hyderabad movement. But he could recollect nothing about

the activities in the district of Ahmednagar brought out in the sec-
ret abstract.
15.176 As for the events essential for the purposes of this Inquiry,
this witness is not of much assistance as he either does not know
anything about the main actors in the tragedy or has no recollection
of events. His evidence comes to this :-
(1) In 1947 there were communal riots in Poona intensified by
the arrival of refugees from Pakistan, Punjab.
(2) Activities of prominent Hindu Mahasabha workers werE'
confined to being anti-Muslim and propaganda against
Congress because of the Partition of which Mr. Gandhi.
was considered to be the architect.
(8) Trend of speeches of Hindu Mahasabha leaders was not.
tending to violence and there was no indication of danger
to Gandhiji's life.
292
(4) He does not know why the Agrani was stopped or Hindu
R3shtra started hut it did not preach violence.
(5) He had no knowledge about the alleged July speech of
Godse.
(6) No official help was asked for the Delhi bomb case.
(7) The police had no knowledge of the activities of Godse or
Apte or their advocating violence.
(8) Referring to the bomb throwing by Athawle he said mere-
ly because a bomb was thro',vn was not sufficient to be a
warning to the police.
(9) He knew nothing about Kanitkar's warning, if
any.
(10) He did not know who the members of the Rashtra Dal
were.
(11) Report of Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan's speech about accu·
sation against the Hindu M'ahasabha members' intention
to kill Mahatma Gandhi did not come to him.
IG. S, Chnubal, wit. 31.
15.177 Deputy Superintendent G. S. Chaubal, witness No. 31, was
in the C.I.D. (Special Braner-I) and was incharge of the headquarters
at Poona at the relevant ' j ',]C in 1947-48. His duties included gene--
ral supervision of the Intdligcnce Branch incharge of confidential
records. Amongst others he was dealing with communist affairs,
i.e., their a:::tivities in the whole Province but he was not incharge
of the intelligence regarding activities of the R.S.S. He knew Apte
and Godse only by sight.
15.178 His report in regard to what happened at Panchgani and
his statement in this regard is what has been stated by many others
that all that happened was that about 15 people led by N. D. Apte
held a black flag demonstration against Mahatma Gandhi and then
had to leave the place. According to the intelligence reports that
he got. there was nothing to show of the existence of a conspiracy
to Mahutma His report in l'f'!;{Hrd to that incident
is Ex. 48 dated July 1914. He of the organisation
called Hindu Rashtra Dal which was started by Nathuram Godse
and others but h(> b.ew nothing about its a(>tivities as mentioned
in Ex. 34. HC' knew nothing about any contact which the De!hi
oolice might have had with Poona. Pelice during the period 20th
January to January 1948. He did not watch the activities of
Nathuram Godse and on the whole his testimony is not of much im-
portance to what. was happening in Poona.
N. Y. Deutkar, wit. 6.
15.179 Another witness from Poona was Deputy Superintendent
of Police N. Y. Deulkar, witness No.6, who was a Deputy Superin-
tendent of Police in the C.LD. Branch of Poona. He did know N.
ches at public meeting \vhich were Laken down in extenso by police
reporters. He al!Oo kl1.ew th'-lt 1)1". Parchure of Gwalior protested
against the policy of Mahatma Gandhi. The leadcrs_ of
the Hindu Rashtra Dal were Godse and Apte and and tnat
whenever these people made any speeches lht'y used to be re(.;urdcd
by police reporters. There were no reports made to him '·lhal- the
members of the Hindu Rashtra Dal \vere on their activi-
ties prejudicial to the safety of the Central or C(Jl1Mress
leaders or against the stability of the State." lk ci,d nut know
Karkare or about his activities.
15.180 When asked about the nature of activities in PC:Jtla truro

November 1947 to January 1948, his reply was that 1"(,po,t5 about
the speeches used to come to him and he sent them on to L"
officers. When the activities of any individual had to be watched
it was done by the City Intelligence Branch. He could not remem-
ber whether N. V. Godse was under police surveillance but when the-
reports were shown to him that Godse was under police surveillance
since 1944, his reply was "whether he wa_s so from November 1947
to January 1948, I am not able to say". What he meant to say ·Nas
that the public activities of Godse were being reported but there
was no shadow put on him. This was in spite of the fiery speeches
which he had made. As to what he (Godse) exactly said in his
speeches, the witness could not say.
15.181 He could not say anything about the forfeiture of the secu-
rity (If the Agrani for objectionable writings in July 1947 as he (thi:
witness) was not in Poona at that time. Although he read the arti-
cles in the AgTani, he did not know that the Government was
ously examining them because of their being dangc-ro.ls. He d:d
not know anything about the starting of the Hindu Rashtra Dal by
N. V. Godse or its inauguration by V. D. Savarkar.
15.182 The movements of Godse were not watched when he left

Poona. Godse, Apte, BadgE:', Karkarc and Shankar fn'm the
area within hig (the ',vitness's) jurisdiction. Badge \\·2S d!:al-
ing in arms but as far as the witness could sav it \\'a'; 1"'.ot !ll'·gal
trafficking. The witness was shown the C.LD. file coniainL'g r::cord
of Godse's activities but he could not say whether he had the
file at any time earlier. He was a!'>ked if he .,.,:ould r0,·cmmend a
watch being kept on the pers'JIls mentioned had he 5,:,en file
earlier. His reply was in thE' afllrmative. The ' ',1" to
Ex, 34. a note on Hindu Rashtra Dal from the polke papers "h·-:w-
ing that the office-bearers of the Dal were Godse, and olhers.
15.183 Deputy Superintendent Deulkar was recalled and he '-,aid

that there ;nC'iccn: :;t Panchgani on July 1944 at
of the Mahatma Gandhi's mr·etings. Whatf'vC'l" happe..,ed i\'8S ('0'·-
rectly recorded in Ex. 129. The pc-rson leading th(> palty 0:. ,hat
occasion was N. D. Apte. He had no information as to thf' pr,-·sr:'nce
of Nathuram Godse at that r.w?ting nor about the re:·overy "f
knife although he was personally present at the meeting .. N··bedv
.....-as arrested and. therefore. the statement that Goclile
was arrested and then let off. would be incorrect.
294
15,184 He said that when the bomb was Uu.'own at Delhi, he was
not in Foona. He had been sent on an assignment to Janjira Stale.
After the murder he was called back by the D.I.G., C.LD., Poona
but he did not come via Bombay. In cross-examinatlOll he was asked
about the speech made by Dr, Parchure on December 2, 1947, Ex.
131. Be said he had not seen it before.
15.185 When he was going to Janjira, it was unli
visited the Special Branch, Bombay.
15.186 He did not know Badge by sight. To sum up:
(1) Deputy Superintendent of Police Deulkar knew that Godse
and his party were opposed to pro-Muslim policy of the
Government.
(2) Godse made fiery speeches which were taken down by
police reporters.
(3) There was no report made to witne3S about the members
of Rashtra Dal carrying on activities against the safety
of the Central Government Ministers or Congress leaders.
(4) He could not remember if Godse was under police
veillance.
(5) He could not say anything about forfeiture of the secu-
rity of the Agl·ani as that was before his coming to Poona.
(6) He has given what the avocations of Godse, Apte and
Badge were.
(7) He reported the Panchgani incident. Godse, was not t
but N. D. Apte was.
(8) It was unlikely that he went to Bombay Speci
on his way to Janjira.
G. P. Angllrkar. wit. 68
15.187 Deputy Superintendent of Police G. P. Angarkar, witness
No. 68, was in the Intelligence Branch during the relevant period
July 1947 to end of January 1948. Police shorthand reporters sent
the proceedings of meetings to him and he sent them on to higher
officers. Amongst those whose speeches had to be reported were some
Hindu Sabha workers but there were no R'.S.S. workers in the list.
Amongst the former v.-as Barrister Savarkar and L. B. Bhopatkar.
Savarkar was the President of Hindu Mahasabha, Nathuram Godse
was a kind of a bodyguard of his but was not particularly prominent.
Apte was at one time a Government servant and an honorary re-
cruiting officer in the Indian Army in Ahmednagar. Badge had a
Shastra Bhandar which was raided several times. Reports were
sent to other districts also in regard to Badge when he sent any
arms to those districts. But he was not considered dangerous and,
therefore. his absence from Poona was not noticed.
15.188 Nathuram Godse's movements were not being watched but
Apte's were to some extent. He was dangerous because of his anti-
MusUm policy. ThE' witness could not remember Godse making
a speech about Gandhiji's living 125 year<:. Jf such a speech had
been made. it would have been reported and brought to the notice
of the D.LG., C.LD.
15.189 After the "Agruni" stopped, it restarted under the name
"Hindu Rashtra" and this v.as allowed in spite of police objection.
The Agrani was strongly anti-Congress but not particularly anti-
Gandhi. Security was taken from it because of its policy of violence
encouragement of communal tension.
15.190 In June 1947 a bomb was thrown on what is known as
Shivaji Road by one Athawle and he disclosed that it had been given
to hir.1 by Apte. Both of them were arrested. Case against them
was s?nt up for trial but was withdrawn. The arrest was the result
of vigilance of the police but the Intelligence Branch was not res-
ponsible for prosecutions. It was in regard to this case that the
local ns.p. remarked it was not serious as it was not meant to be
thrown on any particular person.
15.191 From July to December there were a large number of
searches for arms. In one case a socialist leader Limaye was arrest-
ed and on a raid a number of weapons including automatic weapons
were found and five persons were arrested. In another search an
account book was found with an entry of Rs. 2,000 having been paid
La Apte and Badge for the purchase of a machinegWl, thus showing
that these two persons were not so harmless. Cases were filed in
court but were later on withdrawn and some of the persons men-
tioned in the account book were not even arrested. Had the pro-
secution proceeded, Apte and Badge would have been in it. The
witness could not say Wlder whose orders the cases were withdrawn.
That was in December. He himself was against the withdrawal of
cases because all his efforts were thereby rendered useless.
15.192 There was no such activity in Poona in the month of Jan-
ury. When the bomb was thrown at Birla House and Madanlal's
name was mentioned, it did not convey anything to the police in
Poona because they knew nothing about Madanlal.
15.193 Inspector AlIJIIlQrkar knew Apte and Badge but not Godse
very well; but only as a police officer and not as a friend. Mr. Gartu
never asked him about Apte, Godse and Badge nor was he :;ent to
Bombay to help Mr. Nagarvala. If Deulkar was sent to Bombay
he would not know.
15.194 Ther!) were no repqrts in the Local Intelligence Branch
about the activities of Nathuram Godse nor anything to show that
he was indulging in violent activities. There was no sympathy in
the Local Intelligence Branch for Godse and his party.
15.195 The witness had information about Hindu Rashtra M
who were ralled Savarkarites. He used to watch the movement!!
of followers of Savarkar in a general way and they searched their
houses also. To his knowledge the activities of Hindu Mahasabha
in Poona were not directed against Mahatma Gandhi but were di-
rected against meeting the danger from Muslims.
15.196 The policy of the Agl'.1ni was anti-Gandhi and anti-Con-
gress and the paper was pronouncedly a communalist paper. In
cross-examination the witness said that Savarkar and Bhopatlwr
were in the list of extreme political agitators.
296
15.197 'I'he witness had throughout served in Poona in the C.LD.
as well as in the District and whenever the ofIicers needed him thl;'!Y
took his help and found him useful.
15.198 The Savarkarites were condemning pro-Muslim policies of
Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress but they were not against Gan-
dhiji personally.
15.199 After the partition there was Hindu-Muslim tension in
Poona also. He could not say whether the recovery of arms had
anything to do with the Hindu Mahasabha. After the arrest of Baba
Sahib Pl"anjpe the witness came to know that the weapons were
being sent to Hyderabad. They came to know about the connection
of the Hindu Mahasabha with the arms when the account book ".vas
found in a raid. He did not know that Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan
also was interested in the movement of arms to Hyderabad. In the
raid above-mentioned, Apte and Godse were not arrested i:;ecause
they were not in the house where the raid was conducted. In lhe
account book above-mentioned, the names of Apte and Badge were
there but not of Godse. Apte and Badge were not arrested.
15.200 The C.LD. staff in Poona was limited and they watched
first one railway station and then two and no plainclothes policemen
were placed at the houses mentioned in the list, Ex. 115. Occasional
visits used to be paid to see about their whereabouts.
15.201 Ex. 121 dated 27th December 1947 shows that the collec-
tion of arms was for the people's struggle in the Hydcrabad Statl>:.
15.202 The witness could not remember if Mr. Jayaprakash Nara-
yan made a statement at a meeting that Hindu Mahasabha leaders
wanted to murder Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and other
Congress leaders.
15.203 During the period 20th January to-ilOth January 1848 thE::
Local Intelligence Branch was not asked to search for Karkar/:'.
He had not seen any such requisition. List of dangerous persons
who were to be watched was made by Government or by the C.l.D.
They kept a watch also over persons whom they thoug-ht dangerou:--.
and were not in the Badge W('IS one of them. He was watched
because he was dealing in arms. One man stationed to watch his
movements was to watch the movements of others also. He used
to find out who visited him and where he himself went.
15.204 Bad(!e ha-l B. rlistinguishable appearance. He had a long
beard and long hair. His house was searched a number of Lime;;.
'He was considered danlZerous in the context of Hindu-Muslim t<'!n-
sian.
15.205 Apte's house was searched about twice in 1947 and Nnthu-
ram Godse's once. 'fhe offices of the Agrani were not searched.
15 ?"6 If h'" thnt the editor of the Agrani was jn thc
('{)"c·...,:r::tc'V for bomb throwing at the Bida House, he would certainly
hi,.,., .. -1 l' hI" was not in Poonfl. he would have tden
to fI..,-i ("lut h;" wh"'·"'<'Ihouts ('Ind the.., tried to follow him. If he had
known that he had gone to Bombay he would have trailed him there.
He would have tried to trace him wherever he was and even follow-
ed him to New Delhi. If he had known that Gcdse was one of the
ass::.ciation of Madanlal he would at onCe have connected Apte with
him because they were great friends. Athawle would also have
considered as an associate.
15.207 Mr. Khadilkar, M.P., had stated before the Commission
that Inspector Angarkar used to be "amongst them", i.e., he was
quite friendly with them and knew everything and, therefore. he
did nflt make any report to the police about the danger to Mahatma
Gandhiji's life. Commission thought it necessary to examine Ins-
pector Angarkar on this point and examined him at his vil1ae;e
because of his failing health. He said. "The relations between
political workers belonging to the Congress Farty and parties of
that kind and the police were not so cordial as to be called friendly
towards each other." He did not know anything about what Mr.
Khadilkar had stated to be within Angarkar's knowledge.
15.208 Because of the Partition. there was anti-Congress feeling.
The Conaress people were taken as pro-Muslims and were accused
of to appease the Muslims. The Hindu Mahasabhaites wanted
the Muslims to go away to Pakistan.
15.209 There was no shadowing of these extreme Hindu Maha-
sabha workers nor of the Hindu Rashtra Dal but they did try to
find Ollt what was e'oing on amongst them by posting their men
at strategic places. The police reporters used to report any
heJd in the town, i.e., those meetings about which they came to
know anything.
15.210 Mr. Khadilkar. as far as he could remember. was at that
time a sickly person suffering from lung or abdominal ulcers. HE'
was not an active worker. He was not in the Congress. He was
in the Workers and Peasants Farty.
15.211 The witness 'Nas specifically asked if there was
in tl,e ail' intense feelings against Mahatma Gandhi. His
rl'ply WRS that the situation was tense and even Congressmen were
agaimt the ,1nrl '''',<1<; happy' in his ll)inrl. Nobody
knew what was happening or would happen and nobody was satis-
fied. Hp :::0 pressf'd fOT time that he did not tGlk to Congress-
m['n OT Hindu Mahasabhaites or the R.S.S. and that class of people
anr'l ('V('f) i-l' the' police wanted to talk to them they would not talk
to th"'m. The Hindu Mahasabha was opposed to Mahatma Gan:lhi
because of his appeasement policy towards the Muslims. Apte was
dangerous at that time because of his anti-Muslim policy. .
lfi.212 The witness did not know that Ballikaka Kanitkar had
written anything to Mr. B. G. Kher. He knew G· V. Ketkar only
as a police officer would. From the activities of the Hindu Maha-
sabha or the RS.S. or the Rashtra Dal he could not say that they
\""'1'(' to 'l!ommit violence Congress leaders. !east of
all Manatma Gandhi. Their activities were directed against
the Muslims.
15.213 It was not correct that in 1947 after the Independence, he
used to go and meet Congress workers quite often. It may be that
he met them in 1954 when Samyukt Maharashtra movement was at
its height. But it would not be correct to say that he became friend-
ly with anyone. He was only doing his police duties.
15.214 He had no information in July-August 1947 that Gandhiji's

liie was in danger. Mr. Khadilkar may say so but the witness had
no such information.
15.215 After Independence, his relations with the Congress lea-
ders were neither friendly nor unfriendly. As a police officer he had
to do his duty as best as he could. The atmosphere W[\S tense and
they had a great deal of work. The Hindu-Muslim tension
caused because of the atrocities committed by Muslims against
Hindus in Pakistan and Hyderabad State. Some of the Hyderabad
State Congress leaders had come to reside in Poona. They jOined
hands with Hindu Mahasabhaites and socialists because they found
them to be more useful than the Congress in the matter of collec-
tion of anus. It never came to his knowledge that the collection
of arms was meant to be against the Congress leade'rs Bnd to
kill them. The collection of arms was on a large scale.
15.216 He had no suspicion that Badge, Apte, Godse and such
class of people were going to murder Mahatma Gandhi. Savar-
karites were not against Mahatma Gandhi's person but against his
policies. But he never thought that they were going to murder him.
Badge was preparing daggers in his two-roomed tenement.
15.217 A full summary of the evidence of Inspector Arlgarkar whv,
in the opinion of the Commission, was an important witness as he
was a clever, clear-headed and an intelligent police oUicer whosE'
demeanour in the witness box was straight and unhesitating, shows
that-
(1) In Poona there was a tense atmosphere as there was a
strong feeling against the Muslims which was aggravated
by two factors, the atrocities committed on Hindus by the
Muslims in Pakistan and the atrocities of the Razakars in
Hyderabad.
(2) There was a great deal of collection of arms particularly
by members of the Hindu Mahasabha but. as far as
witness knew, the arms collection was for use again;;"
the Muslims and particularly for use by Hindus to prowct
themselves against the Razakars in Hyderabad State.
(3) There was intense feeling against the Congress for
policy of appeasement of the Muslims.
(4) There was also an intense feeling against Mahatma Ganclhi
but not against him personally but against hjs pro-:t<.-1uslim
policies.
(5) Apte, Godse and Badge had come to the notice of the
police but that wns regard to their activities ag .. inst
the Muslims.
(6) According to the evidence of this witness there was noth-
ing to indicate that anybody in Pouna was going to use
violence against the Congress leaders, of all against
Mahatma Gandhi and certainly not to murder him.
(7) There was bomb throwing in Poona and number of
searches were made which resulted in finding: arms in the
houses of various people and even cases were started but
those cases were withdrawn much to the chagrin of the
police and this witness.
(8) Some prominent State Congress people from Hydcrabad
had come and settled down in Poona and weI''':
ing with the Hindu Mahasabhaites and socialists because
use in Hyderabad State.

(9) The witness never came to know that the collection at
arms was for the purpose of using against the Congress
leaders or to kill them.
(10) The collection of arms was on a large scale.
(11) This witness had no suspicion that Badge, Apte and Godse
and people of that class were going to commit the murder
of Mahatma Ga.ndhi. He did not know Karkare. He did
know that the Savarkarites were against the policies of
Mahatma Gandhi but not against his person.
{12) Apte, Godse and Badge were not shadowed as they were
not of sufficient importance. The only persons from am-
ongst the Hindu Mahasabha who were watched and whose
speeches were taken down in verbatim were Savarkar and
Bhopatkar, but even they do not seem to have been sha-
dowed.
{i3) The policy of the Agrani was anti-Gandhi anti-Con-
gress and this was pronouncedly a communalist paper.
(14) The witness denied that he was friendly with the Congress
or any other party after Independence and that he knew
anything about what Mr. Khadilkar .had stated regarding
the danger to Mahatma Gandhi's life and the atmosphere
being full of violence towards Mahatma Gandhi.
(15) Had he known that Godse was an associate of Madanlal,
he would have followed him wherever he went. whether
he was in Poona or Bombay or even Delhi.
K. M. Munshi, wit. 82
15.218 Mr. K. M. Munshi. an eminent Advocate, who has held
every kind of high office in the Government and became a well-
known Congress leader, stated in his deposition (witness No. 82)
that there was a group of political thought against Mahatma Gandhi,
compendiously known as the Kesari Group.
15.219 This group was led bv Savarkar who advocated violence
ever since he was a student and believed in political assassinR.tion
as an intcgrfll part of patriotism for achieving freedom. This school
of thought had a number of youngmen, highly patriotic, devoted to
the country. prepared to make any sacrifice required. to liberate the
country from foreign rule and it was confined to Western rudis.
in Bengal were different.
15.220 As a result of the upsurge of Gandhian -movement this
grollp of terrorists became isolated b:)cau,,2 the masses began to
follow Gandhiji as he was a Mahatma. In spite of the doubts which
many people including Mr. Munshi himself entertained in regard to
Gandhian movement, all active politicians had per-force to join him
which resulted in the eclipse of the terrorists school still further,
both in Poona and in Calcutta, but some of them, according to Mr.
saw the wisdom of generating strength by joining the Civil
isobedience Movement of Mahatma Gandhi.
15.221 A C LD. report at page 18 of I.E. file No. 8/CA/48-II shows
that the :Kesad group were something different from wJi"at may be
called the Savarkar group. This document shows that when by
August 1943 something like Rs. 2.19,514/- \vere collected as purses to
V. D. Savarkar, the Kesari group became apprehensive that Savarkar
may ultimately eclipse Lokmanya Tilak. It is not necessary for
the Commission to go into these dissentions but it has thought fit
to point out this distinction because that distinction exists in ofticial
papers.
] :5.222 As a consequence of this conflict in political methods and
the \vant of faith in Gandhiji or Gandhian methods in the "Kesari"
school of thought in Maharashtra .persona1 prejudices against
Mahalma Gandhi resulted. But due to the flood of emotional pat-
riotism resulting from Gandhiji's "Quit India" Movement and the
inability of anyhod:v to withstand its influence, nobody was pre-
pared to ta!:e the odium of anti-Gandhism. But Savarkar never
his flag; he continued to believe in political assassination
as a permissive method for achieving Indian freedom; however, he
remained quiscent and retreated into the background while the
country was being swept by the "Quit India" Movement of Gan-
dhiji. There was in the Kesari school of thought a certain section of
people who genuinely believed that Hindus required a stron.'Z'Orga 4
nisation to meet Muslim aggressiveness and were apprehensive of

the weak-kneed policy of the- secularity group.
15.223 The witness further stated that Partition was ine\'itable
u.nder the circumstances created in the country; but Gandhiji was
opposed to it resulting in strained relations with 3awaharlal Nehru
and Sard .. r Patel. Mr. Munshi was of the opinion that had India
not been divided at that time, there would have been civil war at
aU levels resulting in str('ct flghFr.1 in every town and also amongst
the Services and the Police; but in North India the feel-
in.!;:· continued to exist Rmongst the Hindus in general that Mahatma
Gandhi was resp011sible fOt" the and he became very· un·
po-puJar because of his insistenc!" on giving 55 crores to Pakistan.
The feeling of the Hindus throuc:haut was that if the Mahatma h::Hi
not appeased the Muslims by conce-ding Pakistan, Hindus would
have been spared the miseries to which they were subjected.
:101
15.224 This is, in the opinion of the Commission, a fair and correct
assessment of the political thought at the time in the country as a
whole in general and in Maharashtra in particular and also in north-
ern Provinces of India. This has been discussed this stage with the
happenings in Poona because Poona was the centre of the Kesari
group and of the activities of the extreme Hindu views which exist-
ed in the Maharashtrian districts round about Poona. The Com-
mission will have very much more to say ,:,nd other evidence to
discuss both oral and docul'rle-ntarv in this connecfion. But it would
suffice to say that there was a strong anti-G<l."!ldhi feeling amongst
the Hindus in Maharashtra of which the lead was in
the hands of the Kesari group. In that case, Savarkar was tried Cl8
a member of the conspiracy but was acquitted. It has been stated
b€fore the Commission that the inspiration came from Savarkar
and he even patted Madanlal for what he was proposing to do.
Mrs. SarZn Ba1·ve> 1./.'it. 39
15. 225 Mrs. Barve, witness No. 39, in her 'vriften statement,
Ex. 72, said thal hel" husband \vho was the District Magistrate of
Poona did come to know abollt the illegal activitie5 of the Hindu
Mahasabha members and that is why a watch was kept on their acti-
vities. She accused the authorities of not takinp; any proper notice.
'fhe throwing of the bomb on the 20th January 1948 was. accordin.l! to
her, a precursor of something very serious, e.g. murder. She also
stated therein that her husband did know something about the
impending trouble at Delhi and fOl' that reason he Mr.
l\tforarji Desai and informed him about it.
15.226 She stated that two or three days before the murder of
Mnhatma Gandhi a man calIed Sathe came to their house but as her
husband was not present he told her that some Poona people had
to Delhi to take the life of Mahatma Gandhi and that she re-
peated that story to her husband and that Baburao SaJ1:':s and
"Vasantr8.o Deshmukh, other Marathp.. had made prepara-
tions to burn down houses of Brahmins who were vitally afraid of
Mnr<tth:l goondas. She a!;kcd :-)athf> where he Jived 8.nO he said,
"Sadashiv Pcth" and that he w:;os a retired school teacher.
15.227 On the 27th January 1948, she found her husband rather
restless. He telephoned to Mr. Kamte, Inspeetcr General of Police,
",fter ti'skjng her to go out of the rO{1!Yl. A Jitt12 while later she told
her husband what Sathe had told per which made her husband
-more restless. worried and serious and h(! was telephoning
most of the t.ime. After thl') murder, her arranged for
military to come into the town and curfew was ordered and her
husband slept for an hour or so and she accompanif>d her husband
on two or three occasions. The curfew order continued for about
a fortnight. She then deposed as to the Brahmins and non-Brahmins
·disturbances. She said that there was a definite plot to kill Mahatma
Gandhi.
15.228 She was examined as a witness (No. 89) and she again
'stated flbout Sathe and that she gave the information to Mr. Barve.
302
She had no personal knowledge about the persons who were going:
to create trouble.
Gopal wit. 33
15.229 Gopal Godse, witness No. 33, stated that Nathuram Godse
and Apte were collecting arms for Hyderabad trouble -which had
the approval of the Provincial Government. They were both study-
ing Delhi politics and the threat of fast convinced Nathuram and
Apte that Gandhi was trying to coerCe the Government and this be-
came a second reason for the collection of arms and ammunition by
Nathuram Godse and Apte.
15.230 At one stage it had been given out that Pakistan National
Assembly would meet in Delhi. It was the intention of Nathuram
Godse and Apte and others to blow up that National Assembly.
15.231 Another thing that was worrying Nathuram and Apte was
that Pakistan was not sending' India's share of arms and ammuni-
tion. India, on the other hand, was sending to Pakistan her share of
ammunition in India. Intention of Nathuram, Apte and others
were to blow up those trains but it was not necessary because those
trains never went. .
15.232 When it was given out that 55 crores were not going to be
paid to Pakistan, they were very happy.
15.233 The witness has tried to show that there was no conspiracy
before the 13th January 1948 but it is not for this Commission to go
into that matter.
15.234 As has been stated elsewhere, Gopal Godse denied
ram's going to Panchgani in 1944 to murder Mahatma Gandhi.
Nathuram was not satisfied with Gandhiji's policies but it was not
correct that Nathuram intended to kill Mahatma Gandhi in July
1947 and what he is alleged to have said could only be his annoyance
with Mahatma Gandhi's utterances.
15.235 Peo'1le were exasperated and they did want something to
stop the mao,:;acre which was going on and the anti-Indian things
which were being done in Delhi and the fast to give 55 crores was
Uthe last straw which broke the camel's back".
15.236 If a strict watch had been kept and police from Ahmed-
nagar, Poona or Bombay had closely watched the movements, of
Nathuram or Ka):'kare or Apte, it is possible that this murder may
not have been committed by them but that would not have pre-
vented other people from doing the same thing. The feeling among
the public was so much against Mahatma Gandhi.
15.237 He added that on 21st January 1948 the police did try to
search for him at Delhi Junction and the train was delayed by
half an hour but they never found hi m. Even Poona Police would
not have been able to locate him because they did not know him.
He said that what Mandanlal told Professor Jain was wrong because
there was no conspiracy at the time.
:lO3
15.238 The conspiracy was not to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi but
to kill him. The bomb was exploded to create commotion and
divert the public and their attention and those of the conspirators
who were sItting amongst the congregation would have killed
Gandhiji by means of revolvers but the revolvers were fOW1d to be
defective and the object was to be achieved by throwing hand..
grenades. But there was a big crowd and hand-grenades would have
killed others also. For that reason, Nathuram and Apte stopped
the operation. I
15.239 It was not correct that their party received money or arms
from the sardars of Gwalior or they or the ruler had any connec-
tion with them. That allegation was absolutely false because by
helping the conspirators they would not gain anything nor were
they going to get back their raj.
15.240 Even if the conspirators had been arrested, others would
have assassinated Gandhiji and nothing that the police could do
would have prevented them. The feelings were at their highest and
nothing would have saved him.
15.241 Maulana Azad a great deal of influence over Gandhiji's
pro-Muslim policies. Maulana Azad wanted Sardar Patel to leave
so that he could induce Gandhiji to do many things for the benefit
of Pakistan and Muslims in India. In his view, Gandhiji was mis-
led by Maulana Azad in the matter of giving 55 crores. That was a
position of no return and the consequences that followed were in-
evitable.
15.242 He said that Mr. M. D. Pathak, Advocate of Bombay, also-
took part in the demonstration against Gandhiji at Panchgani. He
could also depose that Nathuram never went to Panchgani nor was
there the incident of a dagger. In cross-examination he said there
was no plan to murder Pakistan leaders.
15.243 He stated that on the 21st morning before the train started
from the Delhi Junction, Madanlal was brought by unifonned
police. He (Gopsl) and Karkare were at the platform but Madan-
lal did not point them out. The only Gwalior man he knew was Dr.
Parchure. 1
15.244 Nathuram and Apte used to go to Ahmednagar.

1.5.245 An the conspirators walked out of the prayer-meeting
within five minutes of the ignition of the gun-cotton slab. There
were a number of policemen at the Birla House on the 20th and no-
body tried to stop the taxi in which the conspirators escaped. The
taxi-driver also had a grievance against Mahatma Gandhi. He had
come to know that they were responsible for the bomb.
15.2'16 Other witnesses who have deposed to the state of affairs
and conditions in Poona are Messrs S. R. Bhagwat, witness No. 69,
R. K. ·.Khadilkar, M.P., witness No. 97, G. V. Ketkar, witness No.1.
Besides, there are the statements of Balukaka Kanitkar, Ex. 81, re-
corded by the police and his writings, Ex. 11, his letter to H.E. the
304
Governor General of India and his writings in the Purushartha1
Ex. 166. They have been discussed in different chapters wherein
they appropriately fall.
R. K. Khadilkal', wit. 97
15.247 As Mr. G. V. Ketkar, witness No.1, had stated that he had
talked to Mr. R. K. Khadilkar about what he observed and what he
heard and about what Godse had told hllll, the Commission thought
it necessary to examine Mr. Khadilkar who readil:{ consented to
appear before the Commission and his statement on this matter is
very revealing.
15.248 When questioned about what Mr. Ketkar said about his
talking to him, Mr. Khadilkar's (witness No. 97) reply was that he
had no recollection of his travelling with Mr. Ketkar or Mr. Ketkar
informing him of what Godse had said.
15.249 When questioned about what Mr. G. "V. Ketkar had stated,
his reply was that he was all the time under the impression that
the local police intelligence which was under Inspector Angarkar,
knew everything and he thought that they must have sent the
necessary information to the authorities in Bombay. He also stated
that after the first attempt, i.e., the incident of the bomb, they had
come to lmow that Balukaka Kanitkar had taken the precaution of
warning the authorities that there was a persistent rumour in
Poona that somewhere some conspiracy was hatching in order to
do away with the Mahatma.
15.250 He has deposed that there were rumours even before the
Oxst attempt of January 20, 1948 of a conspiracy being hatched ill
Poona to attack Gandhiji. The rumours were to the effect that
something will happen to Gandhiji because he had succumbed to
the pressure of those who favoured Partition; he was responsible for
the giving away of 55 crares to Pakistan which was the proverbial
last straw and people were decrying him and saying that "now
there was no escape for him".
15.251 One instance of this objection to Mahaimaji which might
be termed a noi so violent opposition was given by this witness. He
said that when before the Partition of the country and that was in
August HJ47, there was a proposal to hold a joint meeting of the
citizens on the occasion of the death anniversary of Lokmanya Tilak,
and the Mahatma, who was in Poona at the time was to be invited
to be the main or rather the only speaker and Mr. Shankarrao Dea,
the Provincial Congress President, was approached to move in the
matter, opposition came from the members of the Hindu Mahasabha,
the militant people amongst whom led by Nathuram Godse said
that they would under no circumstances agree to such a joint meet-
ing and jf it was held it would be disturbed. As there was thi:;
violent opposition to the joint meeting, the proposal was given up.
15.252 The following passage from the statement of Mr. Khadil-
kar is demonstrative of the atmosphere in Poona
"The atmosphere was highly tense and critical of Mahatnw
Gandhi though there were no open threats. But the writill.t:l"
in the Press and the trend of the public speeches made as also
of the private talk showed that people were very critical of
the Mahatma because according to them he had betrayed
India-they identified India with Hindus only-and would
continue to betray the country in future. At that time there
was a newspaper called the Hindu Rashtra which had taken
the place of the Agrani in which this feeling was ventilated
very clearlv. There was another Hindu Mahasabha paper
called the Kal which was also highly critical-of course,
veiled criticism which showed a little bitterness." .
15.253 The witness added that he was absolutely certain that

before the first attempt was made but after the Partition and the
giving of 55 crores, the atmosphere in Poona was highly poisonous
Clnd antagonistic towards Mahatma Gandhi and people thought that
if he to live he would barter away the country to appease
Pakistan, and the witness and people like him blamed the
ment for not taking proper precautions against the movement which
was afoot in Poona; and they blamed the Bombay Government more
because they should have taken proper precautions. He repeated
that the Poona Police intelligence was "with them"; they were
sensing what was happening and what the atmosphere was and he
and h's friends could never imagine that they would not apprise
the Government of what the true state of feelings was. After the
giving of 55 Cl'ores the writings in the Press clearly demonstrated
the extreme indignation and resentment of the people against those
who had betr<lyed the country and it was not directed against the
Muslims. The attention of this witness was drawn to what Mr.
Dehcjia, Secretary of the Bombay Home Department, had stated that
the violent propaganda in Poona was anti-Muslim. To this his reply
was that it was incorrect that the Muslims were the target of this
resentment or incitement to violence; it was more correct to say that
the sullenness and resentment was directed more against the Con-
gress and particularly against Mahatma Gandhi. He admitted that
none of them rushed to Bombay or to Delhi to warn the authorities
but nonetheless they were anxious about the safety of the life of
the Mahatma.
15.254 He was again asked about the warning given by Balukaka
Kanitkar and he said that it was not that Balukaka had writter::
during the period between the first attempt and the murder but only
that he had already warned the Government about the danger to
Congress leaders including Mahatma Gandhi. But he could not say
that there was anyone who had given this warning during this
period.
15.255 The witness has also said that for some time before the
bomb was thrown, the atmosphere was surcharged with communal
fanaticism but t"!1at was directed against Gandhiji who was consi-
dered to be the prime mover towards appeasement of Muslims.
The witness has given two reasons for not getting into
touch \\ j(h the authorities-one, that Inspector Angarkar, head of the
20-259 HA.
local intelligence, knew abouL it and he was under the impression
that he would convey this information to the higher authorities in
Poona, who would naturally relay it to tne higher authorities in
Bombay; and the other is that Balukaka Kanitkar had alrMdy sent
the information to the Ministers in Bombay. Perhaps, an earlier
information given to the authorities by people who were aware of
the foul atmosphere and even to the local District Magistrate might
have been more efficacious. He also said that if his information were
definite, he would have run to Bombay and informed the Ministers
at Bombay in spite of his being a "protestant against the Congress".
S. R. Bhagwat, wit. 69
t 15.257 Mr. S. R. Bhagwat, witness No. 69, in a letter, Ex. 115A,
to Mr. M· G. Kanitkar, said that the late Balukaka Kanitkar had
informed the late Mr. B. G. Khel' and the late Sardar Patel about
the plot to mmder Mahatma Gandhi but no one believed him.
15.258 Mr. Bhagwat before this Commission saia that Balukaka
Kanitkar in one of his speeches said that the relations and friends of
Nathuram Godse were saying that Mahatma Gandhi was in favour
of Muslims and was not protecting the Hindu interests. He must,
therefore, be removed. He should not be given any place or position
where he could influence the decisions in regar.d to P"akistan but he
did not say that people were saying that the Mahatma should be
murdered.
15.259 Mr. Bhagwat added that he wrote personal letters to

Balasahib Kher and Sardar Patel at Delhi telling them "from what
I am notiCing in the atmosphere all around me and from the move-
ments that are being carried on, Mahatma Gandhi' was (going to be)
murdered. The atmosphere from which I sensed danger to Mahatma
Gandhi's life were the speeches made by Balukaka K'anItkar and
his friends and others". He could not remember exactly who those
friends and others were but they told him that "I would hear some M
thing within about a week or so about Mahatma Gandhi's life". It

was only Balukaka's speech about which he wrote to Mr. B. G. Kher
and Sardar Patel but nobody believed him
15.260 He met Mr. B. G. Kher before the murder and he told the
witness that he did not believe that Gandhiji's life was in danger
and that "I was imagining".
15.261 In cross-examination he said that Balukaka spoke about the
existing situation about a couple of months before the assassthation
and he (Bhagwat) wrote to Mr. B. G. Kher, Mr. Morarji Desai and
Sardar Patel because he was interested in the protection of Mahatm<l
Gandhi's life. He thought it was sufficient to have written to the
highest and it was not necessary to inform the police. He had
of those letters but they had got burnt.
15.262 Mr. Morarji Desai was questioned about this and he replied
that he di? not. remember anything about what Mr. Bhagwat had
says he wrote to him (Mr. Desai) thel'
307
15.263 This merely restates what Balukaka is alleged to
ht>.ve written to Mr. B. G. Kher. Even Mr. Morarji Desai admits that
Balukaka did write something to Mr. B. G. Kher but no names were
mentioned and the statement of witness S. R. Bhagwat does not carry
the matter any further than what Balukaka wrote or said in his
speeches. .
15.264 The witness is rather vague ahout things. He says that he
sensed danger in the atmosphere from speeches made by Balukaka
and his friends whose he does not remember but he says some
people told him that something would happen to Mahatma Gandhi
withh a week. Was this statement made after the 20th January
1948 or before is not quite clear. Even on his own shOWing it is only
Balukaka's speech about which he wrote to Mr. Kher and Sardar
Patel. He does not seem to have said anything about whal he was
told by the friends of Balukaka. It is not quite clear why no infor-
mation was given to the police except that the highest and the
mightiest had been informed and so the people who were to do the
actual investigation were by-passed and remained ignorant of Mr.
Bhagwat's knowledge.
Conclusion
15.265 Broadly speaking, there was a strong school of political
thought in Poona which was associated with the Hindu Mahasabha,
a part of it and yet ideologically different. This school has compen-
diously been. called by Mr. K. M. Munshi as the Kesari group led
by Savarkar. By Mr. Kamte it was called a group of Chitpawan
Brahmins but it was not really anti-Gandhi. Even in this group
there were some people who were willing to resort to political assassi-
nation and there were others whose activities might have consisted
of strong anti-Muslim propaganda but they would not go so far as to
commit a murder of political opponents.
15.266 The evidence which has been led before this Commission,
particularly of officials. the Inspector General of Police, witness
No.4 N. 114. Kamte. the Deputy Inspector General of Police of C.I.D.,
Bombay witness NO.3. U. H. Rana. the Assistant Deputy Inspector
General of Police Sahib Gurtu. witness No. 22, the District
Superintendent of Police M:'. Pravinsinhji Vijaysinhji, witness No. 38,
the Deputy Superintendent of Police N. Y. Deulkar, witness No.6,
the Inspector of Police, C.LD., G. P. Angarkar, witness No. 68, almost
unanimously shows that:-
0) the Hindu Mahasabha was strong in Poona;
(2) there were bomb incidents; and
(3) there were collections of arms in regard to which a num-
ber of searches were carried out and persons arrested.
But all these activities were directed against Muslims in order to
drive them out of India and force them to go away to Pakistan or
these ;3.ctivities were being carried on for the purpose of aiding with
a supply of arms to Hindus across the borders of Hyderabad State
where a struggle was going on against the Nizam's rule and the
deprediations of the razakars. The evidence of these witnesses gives
no indication of these activities being directed against the Congress
or Mahatma Gan::lhi or other leaders like Jawaharlal N2hru, Mal,llana
Azad etc. but emphasis their anti-Muslim and anti-razakar character.
15.267 It is true that people like Godse an.d Apte were carrying on
propaganda against the Congress and even against Mahatma Gandhi
but that propaganda was against Gandhiism as they understood it,
i.e., it was directed against Muslim appeasement policy of Mahatma
Ganjhi or giving away of 55 crores to Pakistan or the attitude of the
leaders towards the atrocities which were committed or
were being committed on Hindus in western wing of Pakistan. All
this produced a commotion in Poona, particularly among the Hindu
Mahasabha circles and they were taking full advantage of those cir-
cumstances and were carrying on propaganda on the platform as well
as in the Press and using it for the collection of arms, throwing of
bombs etc. It might be that their propaganda was against the
Muslims in the first instance but as Mr. Morarji Desai has said, it was
ment to embarrass the Government also. And those of them who
were more hot-headed Jike Godse, Apte, etc., particularly Nathuram
who according to his brother Gopal Godse, witness No. 33,
had taken a deep interest in the affairs of the country were greatly
affected by the Partition and by the atrocities committed on Hindus.
15.268 Nathuram was also worrying about [ndia's share of Defence
equipment and they were exa.sperated and wanted to stop the mas-
sacre of Hindus. The fast of Mahatma Gandhi had produced a
tremendous effect on him and was the "last straw which broke the
camel's back". Gopal Godse has gone even further and said that
even if Nathuram Godse, Apte and Karkare had been arrested, there
would have been others who would have taken their place and would
have finished Mahatma Gandhi Gandhi, showing though not saying so
that conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi had larger ramifications
than police investigation showed or were brought out at the trial in
Judge Atma Charan's court.
15.269 The group which actually took part in the conspiracy to
murder was the most militant group among the Hindu Mahasabha
workers. They had formed a separate organisation called Hindu
Rashtra Dal which from the evidence produced before the Commis-
sion was perhaps more militant than the R.S.S. and had implicit faith
in the ideology preached by V. D. Savarkar which consisted of
"Tooth for Tooth and Eye for Eye".
15.270 Mr. K. M. Munshi, witness No. 82, stated that Mahatma
Gandhi had a tremendous influence so much so that any politician
of any note could not remain out of his influence but the Savarkaritc:;
of Poona did not agree with him particularly in his non-violcnt('.
school. thought, according to him, consisted of youngnwll
highly patnohc, devoted to the country, prepared to make
sacrifice required but as they were under the influence of Savark,lI
who advocated violence and believed in political assassination, the>y
kept out of the Congress and were isolated when the masses began
to follow Mahatma Gandhi and as a result of this difference, conflict
:109
personal prejudice against Maha!ma q-andhi... Savarkar lower-

ed his flag; he cO:1tinued to beheve m political assassmahon a
permissive metho.::u. in aC?ie,:,ing freedom. believej Hmdus
l'2quired 2. gtrong orgamsalLOn to meet Muslim. aggreSSIveness
they were apprehensive that the weak-kneed polIcy of
grOUl) in the Congress would be dangerous to the solIdanty of the
a11d would sap their strength. This class of people held
Mahatma Gandhi responsible for the Partition of India and his un-
popularity increase::i when at his instance 55 crores were given to
Pakistan. There was a feeling amongst the Hindus particularly of
this school that if the Mahatma had not adopted the policy of
appeasement of MU'3lims there might not have been al?-Y ,,:nd
at least the Hhdus would have been spared the mlsenes to whlch
they were subjected on Partition.
15.271 The documentary evidence relating to the state of affairs
in Poona which have been placed before the Commission, shows that
there was intense communal activity which the speeches made at
Hindu Mahasabha public meetings proclaim"2d; but those documents,
whether relating to Anti-Pakistan Day or welcome to Daji Joshi who
had been cO:1victed of murder of Jackson or about the importation
of Sikh refugees or reports of bomb throwing or collection of arms,
all had an anti-Muslim base. These did not show any anti-Congress
leaning -blatantly so proclaimed. But occasionally there were writ-
ings and speeches which had a different complexion, the speech of
Dr. Parchure in Hindi on December 2, 1947 which was particularly
directed against Mahatma Gandhi and Pt. Nehru and speeches
the following day where the president, Mr. G. V. Ketkar, described
Gandhiism-cum-false nationalism as enemy No. 1.
15.272 The Agrani and its successor the Hindu Rashtra were
writing violent articles and in two issues Ex. 233A and Ex. 233 the
tone was particularly inciting and that in spite of the return of
security to the Agrani on the Independence Day. These articles
showed that this paper was not reconciled to Gandhian philosophy
and was preaching .Savarkar ideology.
15.273 To put it in seriatim the affairs in Poona miJtht be sum-
marised as follows:-
(1) There was a tense atmosphere as there was a strong feeling
against the Muslims which was aggravated by two factors
-(a) atrocities committed on Hindus in Pakistan and (b)
the atrocities committed by razakars in Hyderabad State.
(2) Arms and ammunition were being collected particularly by
members of the Hindu Mahasnbha but as fat" as the evid-
ence of official witnesses is concerned this was meant for
use agzlinst the Muslims and for the protection of Hindus
against the Razakars in Hyderabad State.
(3) The against the Congress were strong of
lts MuslIm appeasement policy and the feelings against
310
Mahatma Gandhi were no different but these people wen!
not against him personally but only against his pro-
Muslim policy.
(4) Apte, Godse and Badge had come to the notice of the police
but that was in regard to their activities against the
Muslims. Even though Apte had been named as one of
the persons connected with bombs, there is no evidence
against him or against Godse of being violently inclined
against Mahatma Gandhi, at least no information was
collected by the C.I.D. in Poona .or is discernible from the
documents or from the evidence of witnesses.
(5) There was no indication in Poona that there was going to
be any us:! of violence against the Congress leaders still
less against Mahatma Gandhi and certainly not to murder
him.
(6) There was violence in Poona, there was bomb throwing, a
number of searches were made in the house of Hindu
Mahasabha workers resulting in finding of arms, fire-arms
etc. and even court cases were started but they were
withdrawn, according to Inspector Angarkar, much against
the wishes of the police and to their chagrin.
(7) Some prominent members of the Hyderabad State Congress
and State Hindu Mahasabha had settled down in Poona
and they were getting the assistance of the Hindu Maha-
sabha in collecting arms which could be sent to Hyderabad
State for use. According to evidence of Inspector
Angarkar the Hindu Mahasabha and the socialists were
more useful .to these people than the Congressmen.
(8) It may be added that the collection of arms was on a large
scale and it was in one of the searches that an account
book was found in which it was sho"Wll that Rs. 2,000 had
paid to Apte or Badge for the purchase of a machine-
gun.
(9) The Savarkarites which included Godse, Apte and Badge
were against the policies of the Congress and of Mahatma
Gandhi but there was nothing to indicate that they were
against his person and they were not persons of sufficient
importance to be shadowed or watched. As far as the
police was concerned, the policy of the Agrani was anti-
Gandhi anti-Congress and pronouncedly communalist.
(10) None of the police witnesses seem to have kno"Wll that
Madanlal had any associates in Poona still less that Godse
was one of them. According to Inspector Angarkar if he
had known it he would have followed Godse wherever he
was whether in Poona, or in Bombay, or in Delhi.
(11) SomE: non-official like the late Balukaka Kanitkar, Mr.
S. R. Bhagwat, Mr. R. K. Khadilkar then of the Workers
and Peasants Party and the late Mr. Keshavrao Jedhe,
lVI. C. I\. and Mr. G. V. KeLkar did know that the atmos-
phere in Poona was surcharged and tense, the writings in
the Press, the speeches on public platforms and private
t<lIks an:1 rumours nfioat portended danger to top Congress
leadership particularly Mahatma Gandhi, Mr. Nehru,
Sardar Patel and Maulana Azad. Of these genlemen, only
two-Balukaka Kanitkar and Mr. Bhagwat-informed the
authorities, Mr. B. G. Kher and Sadar Patel, but not the
police or local authorities.
It is surprising that this information was not passed on by any
authority to the C.LD. for being vetted.
15.274 The police officers did not know in whicl} direction the
Hindu Rashtra Dal was operating. There is no indication in these
documents showing any proper exercise of vigilance in regard to
of rmti-Gandhism whether against the polices of lVlilhatma
of appeasing Muslims etc. or against him personally.
15.275 (a) Befcre the Delhi bomb explosion, no information was
given to the Poona Police or the Provincial C.I.D. about the danger
to the life of Mahatma Gandhi. Neither Mr. R. K. Khadilltar, nor
Balukaka Kanitkar, nor Mr. S. R. Bhagwat, gave any information to
the police.
(b) Whatever information the Bombay Premier or the Home
Minister got from Balukaka Kanitkar or which they otherwise had
relating to the danger to the life of Congress leaders, including
Mahatma Gandhi, was not reported to the police to be vetred by
careful inquiry. This, in the opinion of the Commission, should have
been done. Not doing it was an error.
(c) After the bomb was thrown at Birla House, no infonnation
as to what Madanlal had stated was given to Poona Police or Provin-
cial C.I.D. nor were they asked anything about Karkare. ll(full par-
ticulars of an information about the latter could be obtained from
the Poona C.I.D. after the murder, it could have been obtainable after
the bomb explosion also.
(d) If it was possible, the services of Angarkar and Deulkar
should have been called for earlier.
(e) Mr. had seen the report about Madanlal and Karkare
sent by Ahmednagar Police and even if he could not, while at Delhi,
recol1e anything about them, he could have, even as a precautionary
lTI2USl1lC, as:;:ed his office if there was any information about them.
(f) Even as late tlS the 28th January when Mr. Rana reached
Poena in the evening, he met his officers. Rao Sahib Gurtu gave him
the yarious names of persons whose description was given by Madan-
lal in his statement. He took no action on t11at information. No
... infcrmatj{'n was to Mr. Nagarvala or to Mr. Sanjevi or to Mr.
Kamtc. Nor did he take ;;tny precaution of immediately ffying his
Poona Police officers to Delhi to spot and watch the conspirators and,
if possible, to arrest them. It is true Angarkar was sick and Deulkar
was nd there, but Deulkar could have been called to Bombay and
312
giverl mstructions there to fly to Delhi along with other policemen.
1£ he could not, for any reason, come to Bombay, the fault would n6t
have been of the D.I.G., C.LD.
(g) There is no indication of co-operation of Delhi, Bombay and
Poona police officers to make a combined and co-ordinated effort to
find the antecedents of Karkare and to find out who his associates
were. As a matter of fact, there was a complete lack of co-operation
between the various police forces.
(h) Ahmednagar Police had a cQroplete record of Karkare and as
to who his associates were. It was known at Ahroednagar that Aptc
was his associate and Godse also used to visit him with Apte. This
information could have been worked out by the Poona C.LD. as re-
ports about Madanlal and Karkare had been sent to the D.I.G., C.I.D.
The statement of Madanlal should have been sent to Poona by air
and not sent by a circuitous route-Delhi-Allahabad-Bombay-
Poona.
(i) 'it was a mistake on the part of Delhi Police not to have indi-
cated to the Poona C.LD. about Karkare direct and ask them to
investigat:. To leave it to Mr. Rana's slow process investigation was
an error to which he also largely contributed by not informing his
office. All these were contributory factors in facilitating the conspi-
rators in achieving their nefarious design.
(j) The fault of the high ranking police officers at Delhi and of
the Poona C.LD. (Provincial) lay in complacency, thinking that the
conspirators will not strike so fast. This was due to slow thinking
and solvenly action.
15.276 The Commission is not oblivious of the fact that these
police officers are making their statements 20 years or more after the
events took place. Age and lapse of time affect memory and also
enfeeble the mind, but even then broad facts such as tensity of the
atmosphere and feelings tending to violence against Mahatma Gandhi
were not matters that could easily be forgotten or innocence about
which could easily be explained by impairment of one's faculties. In
judging the action of the police, it should not be forgotten that, now
all the facts and loopholes are known which was not the case when
these various officers were investigating.
CHAPTER XVI
Qf Paragraphs
D. M. S, objection' refugees coming.
V. R. Karkare.
Balkundi's report about Karkare.
Razak's list.
Commission's narration of evidence and comments thereon
List of bombs throwers.
Narration and comments continued,
Suspicion about Madanlal.
Deshmukh goes to Poona and Bombay.
Dy. Supdt. Deshmukh (then S.I.),
Insp. Razak No. 34.
SUb. Insp. Rane.
Sub. Insp. L. N. Joshi.
Sub. Insp. Balkundi (Dy. S. P.).
D.S.P. J. S. Rane.
Mr. R. C. Joshi (D. M.).
Conclusions from evidence-.
CHAPTER XVI
Ahmednagar
16.1 Documentary evidence regarding Ahmednagar -shows that
Karkare even in the beginning of 1947 was prominent among the
Hindu Mahasabh3ites. He went to Noakhali and was making provo-
catory speeches on Noakhali happenings: So much so t?e
District Magistrate made orders under sectIon 144 Cr.P.C. hIm
and another. There is a later report showing that he was importing
arms but people did not care much for him and the MUSlims were
dead against him and a strict look-out was maintained against him.
This is shown by Exs. 257-259A.
16.2 The order passed by the Government of Bombay for the com-
piling of the list of Hindu Mahasabha and RS.S. leaders was appli-
cable to Ahmednagar also. Ex. 114A relates to that District and V. R.
Karkare was one of the names therein mentioned. This was up to
August, 1947.
16.3 On September 13, 1947, the District Magistrate of Ahmednagar
Mr. H. A. Khan wrote to Government of Bombay, that coming in of
ten thousand refugees into Visapur Camp would create communal
disorder in the District which was hithertofore free from communal
trouble. This proposal was rightly criticised in the Secretariat office
but '.!ltimately the Minister ordered that some kind of restriction
should be placed on the visitors to the camp and it should not be
turned into a fair, which was likely to happen if no control was kept.
Whether such an order was right or wrong or justified or not is not for
this Commission to decide becaU3e the sole judge of what should be
done in circumstances such as the ones that then existed was the
authorities then exercising power. Law and order was their
responsibility and nibbling at them is not conducive to orderly
administration of agitating areas.
16.4 On 14th October, 1947, there was a note, Ex. 260(1), regarding
news in the Hindu Rashtra that Karkare was called to the Police
Station; several of his letters were confiscated; his specimen signa-
tures taken and the people of the city were agitated about it but
Karkare had not been arrested. But Government had "a strong eye
on him". On 6th November. 1947, Ex. 212, from .a house in Ahmed-
nagar occupied by Hyderabad State Congress workers, arms were
found. On the same day, the District Magistrate passed an order
prohibiting bringing or transportbg knives and other sharp-edged
weapons into or through Ahmednagar City and Cantonment.
(Ex. 148). The order under section 144, Cr.P.C. issued by the
District Magistrate was extended by Government Ex. 149.
16.5 Ex. 266 dated January 22, 1948, is an extract from the Weekly
Confide'!1tifll Report of the District :M.agistrate. It shows that V. R.
Karkare had gone to consult the Hindu Mahasabha leaders about the
315
future line of Hindu Mahasabha work and the local Hindu Maha-
sabha workers did not co-operate with him on account of his activities
amongst the refugees. This appears to be an incorrect report because
there is other evidence to show that Karkare had vanished from
Ahmcdnagar before the 10th of January, 1948, and had gone on the
task 01 murdering Mahatma Gandhi and not consulting the
leaders about the future line of Hindu Mahasabha work. Ex. 227
dated 31st January 1948 shows that Karkare ha:l been out of Ahmed-
nagar for the last 12 or 13 days and he was reported to have paid a
ViSlt to the Refugee Camp at Chembur and was moving about in
Bombay, which was only partially correct because he was not in
Bombo.y but in Thana and was not moving about in Bombay. Ex. 228
is an innocuous kind of a report showing that Karkare had not been
arrested under the Detention Order as he had absconded from
Ahmednagar.
16.6 Ex. 67 January 29, 1948 is Sub-Inspector Balkundi's
report to the D.I.G., stating that Madanial appeared to be the same
person who was operating in Ahmednagar and that he had left with
V. R. Karkare "some 15 days back" and had not returned to Ahmed-
nagar. Madanlal was a staunch RS.S. member and was a revolu-
tionary. But this report whatever its authenticity was a belated
document.
16.7 On Ja:luary 26, 1948 Inspector Razak sent a report to the
D. S. Ps. of Ahmednagar and Poona including therein a list of persons
named by S. V. Ketkar and other persons. These names had been
obtained with the help of Inspector Savant of the CI.D. presumably
during the investigation. This report attached to Ex. 58---Razak's
letter has the names of 2S. persons amongst whom were S. V. Ketkar,
V. R. Karkare, R. S. Rekhi and D. V. Go::ise. Amongst the Ketkar,
Karkare and Rekhi were considered to be persons holding extreme
views, whatever that word may mean. Two of them D. V. Godse
and Chandekar were stated to be from Poona. S. V. Ketkar and
Rekhi were connected with Karkare's Guest House and D; V. Godse
was a brother of Nathuram Godse, ani were members of
Karkare's amateur dramatic troupe.
16.8 In his testimony before the Commission Inspector Razak
stated that nothing came out of this report but his investigation
disclosed that Madan Lal was inclined towards violence. lIn the
report no recommendation was made.
16.9 The impGrtance of this document, Ex. 58 containing the list
scnt by Inspector Razak lies in this that a number of Hindu Maha-
sabha workers in Ahmednagar had some direct or indirect connection
with Karkare-some were employed by him, others were members of
his amateur dramatic troupe. Some of them had the requtation of
having extreme views. But either this document was not seen by
the officers to whom it was sent or its implications were wholly ignor-
ed. It does show this much at least that Karkake was an important
personage in the Hindu Mahasabha movement. He was one of the
persons who had extreme views. H: had considerable influence in
50 far at; the workers were either employed in his guest house or were
collaborating with him in stagir dramas and plays. Madan Lal was
:117
also associaLe or Karkat'c aId h was not !loll-violent. From this
one should hov(> im::lginec1 thaL even if tbe objective of the local
edministration was only to keep the nnti-Muslim feelings under
control, '-l closer watch would hsye been kept on both Karkare and
!\I[adcln LOll and the watch that was being kept on their movements
or th8 tro::i!ing whi<::h W3S bei:1g done might have been a little more
vigilant and stringent to be effective. It gives one the impression
that whatever watch was kept was neither adequate nor efficient.
What should be the extent of closeness of watch is a matter for which
there is no evidence.
16.10 The incidental and happenings at Ahmednagar from an
imporbnt link in the chain of events which culminated in the conspi-
racy to murder Mahatma Gandhi. What was happening there was
the precursor of that diabolical crime. The district of Ahmednagar
borders on what was then the Hyderabad State and they had common
borders of considerable length on the north and the east; on the other
borders were the districts of Poona and Nasik. The political affilia-
tions in t'1is town and the district wer.e, not 'to an inconsiderable
extent, Ii':1ked with the rather militant and non'? too non.;violent
activiti8(; of the Hindu Mahasabha and R.S.S. and allied groups of
Hindus. All its various activities, mostly anti-Muslim and directed
against those who had what is popularly called a secular approach
to national or local problems, were bound up with Poona which pro-
jected themselves into Ahmednagar and in other bordering districts
of the pre-1947 Bombay Province.
16.11 The witness from Ahmednagar, who were examined by the

Commission, were with the exception of on·e, Police officials and that
exception was the Collector of the district Mr. R. C. Joshi, LC.S.,
wit. 80. As a preface to this part of the report it may be sfated that
in 1947-48 there was a well organise::!, strong and extremely anti-
Indian Razakar movement in Hyderabad State with its consequential
reaction i.e., disturbances in that State and its repercussions in that
part 0'" British India which included Ahmednagar. According to
Police District Superintendent Rane. witness No. 40, the Razakars
trespassed into tbe district and indulged in violence by committing
murders and .r1rson in the border areas of Ahmednagar district.
Conseguently he had to visit the border areas several times; and" was
therefore absent from the headquarters quite often and for long
periods because of the depredations of the Razakars resulting in
excitement among the people of the district and the town of Ahmed-
nagar. The Hindu Mahasabha agitation became intensified in
Ahmednagar partly as a consequence of the Razakar trouble in
HyderRb3d State and partly because of the advent of a large number
of Hindu who came from that part of the country which
became the western wing of Pakistan. As a matter of fact, Mr. R. C.
Joshi, the then Collector of Ahmednagar, witness No. 80, has stated
that his prerlecessor Mr. Khan had warned the Provincial Govern-
ment that t1le bringing in of large number of Hindu refugees from
West Punjab, Sindh etc., would create law and order problem because
of resultin.g communal tension. But in spite of this advice, which
must h.r1ve been given from the best of motives but without realising
the problem of rehabilitation of millions of displaced persons, about
318
Hindu refugees were brought to Ahmednagar and were given
shelter in a former Jail at a place called VisapW', about 26 miles from
Ahmednagar. These refugees had passed through blood, and fire
and had come to India lacerated in body and- soul, deprived of their
wordly belongings and robbed of honour. The horrors they had been
through are to horrible to relate here. One can take judicial notice
of Mr. Justice G. D. Khosla's book "The Stern Reckoning". The un-
fortunate mass of humanity had to be sheltered and Visapur was as
good a place as any oth=1'. It was a necessity and an aftermath of
Partition and its two nation theory.
16.12 Among these refugees was one Madanlal Pahwa from

Pakpattan, a tehsil town in Montgomery district oj West Punjab, with
an ebullient effervescent temper, who subsequently figured
nently in the conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi, beca1.¥ie he was
the person who exploded the bomb at the prayer meeting,of the
Mahatma on the 20th January 1948 and was the first to be arrested.
16.13 This Madanlal came into contact with and was helped by
Vishnu Ramkrishna Karkare who was also an accused in the conspi-
racy to kill Mahatma Gandhi. He owned and ran a hotel in
Ahme:1nagar and used his position and influence to the fullest extent
in inciting the refugees to take out processions and indl,llged in anti-
Muslim activities. Their feelings and ire could in the circumstances
be easily roused. They perhaps did not need much peIsuasion
because expelled from the Punjab leaving their all there, they could
not have been very happy to see their counterparts here enjoying
their properties and pursuing their avocations and politics in peace
and if necessary und:f official protection. Madanlal easily became
an instrument which the conspirators were only too rea:1y to employ.
IG.14 Evidence, documentary and oral, relating to the happenings

in Ahmednagar shows the trends in that part of the country. The
conditions there were as said above complicated by communal
sian .8. combined eliect uf the violent activities of the mza)c1.rs both
inside the District of Ahmednagar as well as in Hyderabad State,
and naturally what happened in those districts and the disorders,
robberies, arson and even murders which were committed bv the
razakars could not help in maintaining a peaceful atmosphere inside
the District; all this accentuated the stresses and strains inside the
district much to the bewilderment of the new administration and
newly appointed and perhaps freshly promoted officers.
16.15 Besides the 1"azaka1" activities and their consequences, the

induction of refugees from West Punjab and N.W.F.P. 1:iecame an
additional factor which disturbed the communal atmosphere of the
District nnd of the town of Ahmednagar. This is not to say that the
refugees should not have been brought. But they were a problem
though 1 problem resulti.ng from the Partition. If the refugees were
in an a.1gry mood 01' in ag.e:ressive mood or asked for rehabilitation
by insisting on jobs and business opport-unities being given to them,
one cannot blame them for it. After all it was not their fault that
thcy had to leave their hearths and homes. It was the inevitable
consequence of the Partition of India on the basis of Hindus and
31g
being two nations and all the Hindus and other 0011-
.1I,1oslems being driven aWay from West Punjab and other "emits of
v..'estern wing of Pakistan.
16.16. As a counter-blast to the atrocities committed by the Ra.za-
ka1's and what the refugees had gone through, the already strong
Hindu Mahasabha movement got a fillip and an opportwlity to be-
eome more aggressive and to operate in a more fruitful field. These
must have added to the anxieties of the District authorities and must
have given them some very difficult and even anxious moments. In
judging what happened in Ahmednagar, the Commission cannot lose
sight of the conditions created as a consequence of events to which
a brief reference has been made above.
16.17 Mr. Morarji has stated, when his attention was drawn to
the extension of the restrictions under section 144(6), Cr. P.C. Ex.
149, the original order was dated November 6, 1947 Ex. 148: "From
this order, passed under section 144, Cr. P.C., I would not say that
the general condition of the town was disturbed. I would say th ... t
there were some people who were determined to disturb the peace
of the town. Therefore this precautionary measure had to be taken."
He also said "It is not correct to say that general population of
Hindus was arming itself against the Razakars' depredations but some
might have been doing it. The object of passin!!: the order was 10
prevent people carrying arms. The Government was not in any 'J:ay
inclined to overlook the possession of arms even by those who we!"c
ostensibly doing it with the object of meeting the Razakar move-
ment.. I must add that there was no such movement in the town
itself. What was happening was that people on the border were
arming themselves with the help of the RS.S. and that also only
some people."
16.18 The order under section 144, Cr, P.C. dated 6th Novembel',
1947 shows that it was to operate not only in the city and canton-
ment areas of Ahmednagar but in several other areas and talukas,
in all 16. The letter of the District Magistrate dated 1st January.
1948 asking for extension which is based on the letter of the D.S.P,
shows that due to communal situation in the Punjab and
operation in Hyderabad State "fearful attitude" was arising among
the people in the district, that there was danger of arms being im-
ported in the district with a view to transporting them outside fOI"
the sake of protection to which was added his own opinion that the
standstill agreement with the Hyderabad State had had no effect
on the activities of the people from Hyderabad and reports of trouble
were being received from areas on the borders and therefore
tension was necessary. Here the dividing line between the effect
of Razal<:.a1' menace and refugee trouble gets obliterated and the two
merge as it were. All this shows that anxiety produced by the Raza-
kar movement was not confined to only a few people but was general
in the district and that attempts were being made to import arms
far protection as well as for export to meet this menace.
16.19 But evidence shows that there was a general apprehension
of trouble from the Razakars from across the border. It may be true
that everyone was not arming himself but people on the border b
particular and some people in the interio:' were also getting anns-
320
whether it was actually for meeting the Razalcar menace or not
may be difficult to say-but there is not doubt that under the garb
<If fear of RazakaT depredations arms were being collected.
16.20 There were at least four incidents of bomb throwing but

turned out to be directed against the Muslims particularly of
the town of Ahmednagar, although the district authorities had been
treating them as connected with the RazakuTs.
16.21 In the meantime, refugees in Visapur were getttng restive.
They wanted accommodation; i.e. houses to live in, shops to work
in and employment and they were agitating, taking out processions
to emphasise their demands. This is proved by the statement 01
Mr. R. C. Joshi. witness No. SO and other Vvitnesses from Ahmed-
nagar particularly Mr. J. S. Rane, I.P., D.S.P. of Ahmednagar during
the relevant period who has also stated that the refugees were agi-
tating for the expulsion of the Mahomedans from Ahmednagar
saying that the Mahomedans were getting the best of both the
worlds. They did not like the Mahommedans having the facilities
they were having in Ahmednagar while they, an uprooted mass of
Hindus from West Punjab, were living on doles in an out of the way
place like Visapur.-
16.22 In the resume of the evidence produced before the Com-
mission of witnesses from Ahmednagar, the various incidents have
been given at great length and it will be unnecessary to repeat them
except to mention them where it is necessary for the purposes of
the report.
16.23 The evidence of the witnesses and the documents produced
before the Commission show that four bombs were thrown in Ahmed·
nagar town between November 24, 1947 and December 26, 1947. (See
Ex. 61 and other relevant evidence).
16.24 The bombs thrown were as follows :-
(1) 24th November 1947 on the Tazia procession in Kappad
Bazar,
(2) 7th December in Vasant Talkies.
(3) 14th December on the house of Kazi Subhanbhai.
14) 26th December on the Tatti Darwaza Mosque.
In cOllnection with bombs; information was being sent by the

District authorities to Government. On December 8, 1947. the Dis"
trict LViagistrate wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary to the Bombpy
Govemment giving details of the bomb in Vasant Talkies and thl'
extent of the damage done. A copy of this letter had been sent to
the D.LG .. C.LD., Poona, Thereupon Inspector Razak of the C.LD ..
witness No. 34, was sent to Ahmednagar to investigate or to help
in the investigation into the bomb incidents. By then there had
been two explosions. Inspector Razak came and conducted his
investigation" and his evidence shows that the bomb explosions
caused by the workers of the Hindu Mahasabha but nobody had been
although Karkare and Madanlal who were both accLised
in the Gandhi Murder case were suspected to have been at the bottom
of these explosions. On December 18, 1947, he made a report (Ex.
61) stating that the bombs excepting the one that was thrown in
Kappad Bazar which was different, were of the same type, similar
do the bombs whieh had been found on June 3, 1947, in a bpmb
tory owned by Vansen Puspsen in Bombay which had been unearth-
ed by the Bombay C.I.D. and one of which was brought to Poona
by a police officer Inspector Ranbhice and in connection with that
find some Gujaratis had been arrested. This, according to him, show-
-ed a common source and a common agency operating. On December
24, 1947 (Ex. 62) the houses of the Secretary of the Muslim League
and Captain of the Muslim National Guards were searched but noth-
ing incriminating was fOWld. The report of this is Ex. 62. This
document also shows that the lives of Congress leaders including the
local Secretary Mr. Saptrishi were threatened and that the bomb
Qn the Moharram procession was similar to the one that was burst
in Shanivar Pet in Poona.
16.25 As a result of these activities and the suspicion which the
police had against Karkare and Madanlal, a watch was kept on their
movements by p.lainclothes policemen but both continued making
inciting speeches. Although they were directed against Mahomme-
dans. they did not preach violence; so the evidence of witness No
tive. These activities were reported to the D.S.P.

16.26 Two reports were. sent about the bomb incident in Kappau
Bazar throwt:J. on the shop of one Ismail, M.L.A. reciting \\-hat had
happened and the damage which had been done. They are exhibits
73 and 74, dated December 15 and 16, 1947: the former by the Dis-
trict Magistrate and the latter by the D.S.P.
16.27 As a consequence of the suspicion which the police had (;r.
account of the throwing of the bombs, the house of Karkare w<,.5
searched but nothing incriminating was found. According to thE'
evidence of Inspector Razak, witness No. 34, it was as a result of
this suspicion and on account of bomb-throwing that the house of
Karkare was searched but evidently nothing was discovered. Ac-
{!ording to Sub-Inspector Deshmukh, witness No. 32, the houses of
Karkare and S. V. Ketkar were searched under the orders of the
D.S.P. by Sub·Inspector R'ane, witness No. 35, and_ Deshmukh, wit·
ness No. 32, and after this the movements of Karkare were ordered
to be trailed.
16.28 As a matter of fact, what seems to have happened is this:
There was a murder of 8 widow in Poona. That was investigated
by the District Police of Poona but evidently nothing came out d
it and the investigation was closed and the case ended as being un-
traced but due to the persistence of a brother of the deceased woman,
Savant, now Deputy Commissioner of Police of Bombay,
was appointed by the Provincial C.LD. to investigate the case. His
investigation in Poona led to the association of the woman with
S. V. Ketkar who was at that time in Poona but had after the mur-
der of the widow shifted to Ahmednagar and was working as man-
of Karkare's hotel. In that connection, on January 1, 1948,
21-259 HA.
tb.ere was search of the house of S. V. Ketkar conducted by Sub--
Inspectors Rane and Deshmukh under the directions of
tion, some gold ornaments were also found. A list of that is con-
tained in the report of Inspector Savant, Ex. 76, but it is necessary
to set them out or enumerate them at this place. They. to put it
briefly. consisted of country made handgrenades, a revolvE'r, daggers,
explosives, fuses, pistol and rifle rounds and other ammunition-all
cQ.otained in a steel trunk of which the key was with Ketkar. Be-
sides this, there was a nose-ring, ear-rings, a silver ornament box
and letters. On January 2, 1948, the D.S.P., witness No. 40, a
report, Ex. 75, regarding the recovery of arms. It also showed that
Ketkar had stated that these arms were kept in his house by V. R.
Kal'kare; that handgrenades found in the house of Ketkar were of
the same type as those thrown in Vasant Talkies and on the Tatti
Darwaza Mosque in the previous month. Inspector Savant's report,
Ex. 76, also mentioned the articles which were found therein and
Poona. Copies of the report, Ex. 75, were sent to the District Magis-
trate of Poona and Ahmednagar and to the D.I.G., C.r.D. and the
Inspector-General of Police, Poona. Police Superintendent Hane,
No. 40, has stated that he took no personal interest in the
matter as it related to the C.I.D. This indeed would have been sur-
prisinl:{ if it had been literally eorrect. But the witness added that
explains the reason for sending Exhibits 74 and 75, i.e., relating
to the bombs thrown in December 1947 and the recovery of the
bombs on January I, 1948 on search of S. V Ketkar's house. On
the same day, January 2, 1948, Inspector Razak sent a report, Ex.
77, infr>rming his D.I.G., C.I.D. about the nature of the bombs thrown
in Kappad Bazar Mosque and also that he had discussed the clues
with the D.S.P. showing that that officer was kept fully informed
of what was happening. Indeed, that is what one would have ex-
pected because the head of the District Police could not be ignored.
16.29 To revert to Ex .. 76, report of Inspector Savant, it shows
that Ketkar was arrested; he had named Karkare as the person who
had given him the bombs; that the matter was reported to the D.S.P.
and that information under Arms Act and Explosive Substances Act
had been laid: that the searches of the house and hotel of Karkare
had been conducted by the City Police Sub-Inspector under the
orders of the D.S.P.; and that the interrogation of Ketkar did not
disclose anything further.
16.30 The weekly confidential diary of the D.S.P. (Ex. 78) Jated
January 5, 1948 gives a description of the doings of the refugees from
Visapur camp. It states that the Peshawar group of refugees from
Policemen had been put on duty. It also stated that the refugees
had demanded aud got the green flag on a mosque removed and they
had also tried to remove other green flags from other Muslim build-
lngs. was a procession on 3rd January, 1948 led by Madanlal
{. Karkare and S. Kulkarni who were shouting anti- Pakistan
slogans and demandll1g the expulsion of Muslims from Ahmednagar.
The procession then proceeded to Sarosh Garrage owned by
Khan Sahib Sarosh where they asked K. S. Sarosh to employ
them in place of their Muslim employees. Sarosh discussed the
matter with Madanlal and four other refugee leaders. The beha-
viour of Madanlal was very rude even when the District Magistrate
and D.S.P. arrived there. The former explained to the refugees
as to what they were going to do for them e.g., opening of a Co-
operative Bank for them, but Madanlal was still very arrogant and
the District Magistrate had to warn him against his rowdy beha-
viour. The report shows that Karkare was inciting the refugees to
create trouble in Ahmednagar. Mr. Raosaheb Patwardhan who had
gone to advise the refugees had to go back because of the attitude
of the processionists. The report adds that it was learnt that Kar-
kare was exciting the refugees and that the people in general did
not like this rowdyism.
16.31 S. 1. Balkundi who was then Sub-Inspector, C.I.D. at Abmed-

nagar, made a report Ex. 66, on 4th January, 1948. It mentions
about this very procession. It also mentions about the arrival
of the D.S.P. and the District Magistrate. It state::; that Madan-
lal working with Karkare had arranged the procession and the
real object of the procession was to protest against the sear-
ches which had been in the houses of Karkare and S. V. Ketkar
degree methods against S. V. Ketkar. The processionists also ;;aid

that the police was after t.he Hindus and was frightened as it were
of curbing the Muslims, that although searches had been made in
the house of Karkare etc. yet no searches were made in the houses
of Irani and Ismail Bandhubhai although they possessed a
good number of arms. This report support the incident in regard
to the procession going to Sarosh Garrage and demanding the
stitution of Hindus in place of Muslim employees and also of what
the Collector and the D.S.P. did when they arrived at the spot. The
significant part of this report is in the last paragraph at page 198
which is as follows :-
"It is learnt that this procession was arranged by Mr. Madan-
lal Kashmirilal who is a refugee but staying at Nagar with
Mr. Karkare and working as a paid worker of Maha Sabha.
The procession was taken out more or less as a protest for
search of the house and hotel of Mr. V. R. Karkare and !o
brine the pressure on Police in their investigation of the bomb
cases."
In the end S. I. Balkundi suggested that in order to maintain the
peace of the city Madanlal and Karkare should either be externed
from Ahmednagar or detained. It also mentions that Katchi mer-
chants were winding up their business and were intending to leave
..
the Home Department of Bombay Government, to the C.I.O., Bom-
bay, and the I.G.P. This report was seen by the D.1.G., C.l.D. on
324
January 14, 1948 and exhibit 66-A, dated January 7, 1948 is a letter
fOI'\\o"arding copies of this report from the D.LG.'s office. In his
letter of explanation dated February 9, 1948 (Ex. 69) S. 1. Balkundi
said that he had been sending weekly and special reports about
Madanlal and Karkarc and also that he had recommended the de-
tention of both these persons as their activities in Ahmednagar had
become more and more dangerous. S. 1. Balkundi in his oral state-
ment has supported the contents of his report and also that he had
recommended detention or externment of these two individuals.
Further he stated that Karkare was acting under the Hindu Maha-
sabha and that at that time he did not know Karkare's connection
with Apte or Nathuram Godse. It may be added that in his report
(Ex. 66) he had stated that Madanlal was a bad egg, was instigat-
ing the refugees, was conspiring and trying to contact the Sikh and
Punjabi elements in the Army.
16.32 On the same day the District Magistrate and the D.S.P.
made enquiries after the report regarding the recovery
of arms and ammunition from the house of S. V. Katkar whether
Karkare had any hand in the bomb explosions in the city. There
were references to the recovery of arms and ammunition from
house of Ketkar.
was in hot temper; while the meeting was being addressed he

was shouting and threatening. S. I. Balkundi (witness 37) has also
deposed about this incident. He has stated that Madanial and
his companions created disturbances during the meeting but it was
not correct that Madanial got hold of Patwardhan and tried to
attack him with a knife. Karkare also arrived there and he also
stated shouting and demanded that he and Madanlal should be
allowed to speak. They tried to snatch away the mike from tlJe
rostrum. Thereafter the meeting ended and when the audience
dispersed Madanlal and two others were arrested. Madanial was
kept in the Jpck-up for some time: "wi it was added that Madanlal
used to create trouble all the time. Inspector Razak (witness
34) has slated that both Madanlal and Karkare were brought to
the Police Station and interrogated there but nothing useful was
found and there was no indication that their activities were directed
against the Congress leaders or that they were conspiring against
the lives of the Congress leaders. Madanlal on that occasion gave an
undertaking not to take part in violent movements and he was let
off. S. L Balkundi (witness 37) deposed that on or about January 6,
1948 both Madanlal and Karkare disappeared from Ahmednagar and
police had no information where they had gone. The police were on
the look out for them and were watching the house of Karkare hut
to the knowledge of the witness Karkare did not retuln nor did
MadanIa"!. The witness was sure that neither of them returned
because the police was on the look out for them. As a matter of fact,
it was S, I. Deshmukh (witness 32) who was on t.he look out for these
people.
16.:!4 From the testimony of another witness Sub-ll."fJector L. N.
Joshi (witness 36) who was a Police shorthand reported in Ahmed-
nagar at the time, it appears that MadanIaI had told him that he
was going to Delhi to get marriea. This was on or about i0th January,
1948. This witness was quite friendly with witness No. 32 S. I. Desh-
mukh of the L:I.B. and did even accompany him to Poona when
Deshmukh went to search for Karkare and yet he never told S. 1.
Deshmukh or any other police officer as to what Madanla! had told
him about his going to Delhi to get married. There is sufficient cor-
roboration of the fact that Madanlal had been saying that he was
going to Delhi to get married. He had said that to Pro£. Jain (witness
No. 27). In his statement the latter stated that abollt a week before
the bomb explosion at Delhi Madanla! came to him and told him
that he was going to Delhi to get married and he would return soon.
So that the recollection of Sub-Inspector Joshi about mention of the
marriage is correct. Joshi has said that it was on or
ahout the 10th January that Madanlal had told him about his in-
tended going to Delhi. The dates may not be absolutely accurate
but they tally to a very large extent and are sufficiently close to
show that about a week Or so before the bomb incident, MadanIaI
left Ahmednagar to go to Delhi and one of the police officers did have
that information but for some reason or another the information was
not conveyed by him to his brother or superior officers. We shall
revert to this matter later.
16.35 On January 11, 1948 S. 1. Deshmukh intercepted a letter by
Karkare addressed to the "Dainik TrikaI" and "The Hindu Rashtra"
where Karkare gave information about the searches which had been
effected in Ahmednagar in connection with the bomb incidents. The
letter which was intercepted is exhibit 43, and was addressed to seve-
ral neswpapers in Poona including Dainik Trikal and Hindu Rashtra.
It evidently was not dated: the date of interception is January 2,
1948. It states that eight days after the search of Karkal'e's house
another was made of that house on January 1, of his tea
hOllse and Deccan Guest house. During the search Karkare and his
staff were present but nothing objectionable was found in the search.
Evidently one of the employees had a dagger which was returned to
him when it was pointed out that it was meant for his protection.
The reason given in the letter for this search ·.vas that Ken'kare was
assisting the refugees and had therefore become an eyesore to the
a speech and shouted "Swatantra Vir Savarkar-ki-jai", "Hindu

Rashtra-ki-jai"; finally at Karkare's request the crowd melted away.
The letter also mentioned the trouble which some of the visitors
from outside al}d guests at the hotel had to undergo. It appears that
there is some discrepancy in regard to the date when the intercep-
tion took place. The witness has stated January 11, the letter seems
to be of 2nd January but knowing as we' do that Karkare was not
seem. in Ahmednagar after the 6th or so 11th January must be 8
mistake due to dimming of memory and lapse of time.
16.36 The weekly report of the District Magistrate, dated Jan-
326
Ketkar and to his statement that Karkare had given them to him
eight days earlier. On January 9, Inspector Razak (witness 34) ad-
vised Deshmukh, so that evidence of Razak shows, to recommend
the detention of both Madanial and Karkare. S. I. Balkundi
(witness 37) has stated that he recommended-and that is proved
by his weekly report also, dated 4th January 1948 (Ex. 60)- that
Madanlal ancl. Karkare be detained or externed.
on January 12, and on the same day the Home Minister Mr. Morarji
Desai made an order that the persons mentioned in the report should
be arrested and asked why the District Magistrate had not done so
earlier.
16.38 As stated above, according to witness No. 37, S. 1. Balkundi,
the recommendation was made by him regarding Madanlal and
Karkare on January 4, 1948 (Ex. 60). Madanlal was ordered to be
detained on January 16, 1948. What happened between the period
of the recommendation and the order of detention was passed, there
is no evidence and it could not be said that on this point the officers
were illuminating. But the matter is very old and perhaps their
memory has got dimmed and one cannot blame them for it. Mr.
R. C. Joshi, n.M. (witness 80) has stated that he had made the order
because he was satisfied that Madanlal was acting in a manner
prejudicial to the maintenance and safety of public order. He alsv
made an order ior the detention of three or four others but Karkare
was not among them.
16.39 As a matter of fact the order for KarlCare's detention wa:;
passed on the 24th January and the suggestion had come from
Bombay Government to take action against him. The only remark
that might be made at this stage is that even though the order wa:;
"semi-judicial" such long delay is inexplicable in a maiter of pre-
ventive and not punitive action. It appears that in the Secretariat
itself the order of the Minister ordering arrest was de-
layed and it was not sent out till January 19, 1948 (Ex. 80). When
it reached Ahmednagar is not quite clear but in Ex. 145, dated Jan-
uary 21, 1948, Mr. R. C. Joshi writing about the explosion of bombs
and arrest of Karkare, refers to the letter of January 19, 1948. In
that letter he said that the reason for not Karkare was
that apart from the statement of S. V. Ketkar, implicating Karkare,
there was no other evidence to connect him with the offence and
that the D.S.P. had explained that it was under those circumst-
ances that Karkare was not arrested; and that the witness had in-
formed the D.S.P., that in view of the Government's orders. Karkare
should be arrested. He also said that according to the oral instruc-
tions of the Government he had ordered the detention of four re-
fugees who led the procession in Ahmednagar on January 3. What
happened between this letter and the order of detention of Karkare
on January 24, 1948, is not quite clear. It will be more correct that
there is no evidence on that point but ultimately orders were passed
on the 24th for Karkare's detention. Mr. R. C. Joshi has stated
that he did not know what statement S. V. Ketkar had made and in
his explanation he was really giving the explanation of the D.S.P.
without giving his own opinion regarding sufficiency cr otherwise
()f the reason for arresting or not arresting Karkare. This is rather
fatuous. If Mr. Joshi was exercising his discretion or what he terms
semi-judicial powers, he could not have acted on this material, but
one cannot presume a misuse or abuse of powers of detention by a
District Magistrate.
16.40 Both the Times Of India and the Bombay Chronicle, news-
papers from Bombay, gave the news as to the throwing of the bomb
at Delhi, in their editions of 21 January 1948, Exhibits 106 and
There was some description of Madanlal as being a tall, wheat C0m-
plexioned but it could not be said that it was very illuminating be-
cause that might fit in any Punjabi refugee. Besides in the Bombay
Chronic/e, Madanlal was described as "fair complexioned, medium
built, Ex-Serviceman, wearing Euro:pean dress". This description
was equally unilluminating. Witness No. 32, S. I. Deshmukh, has
that he had a complete record of Madanlal's activities and
woul1 have given a complete record of what he was doing and \"'ith
whom he was associating. But even then from the description
which the Press had given he told the D.S.P. Ahmcdnagar. of his
.:mspiC'ion about the identity of Madanlal but when he did it he
does not now remember. S. 1. Balkundi (witness 37) stated that
from the description of Madanlal in the Press he suspected that
he was the same person who was operating in Ahmednagar. He
know.
16.41 The statement of the D.S.P. (witness 49) is that it did not
strike him that Madanlal arrested at Delhi was the same person
·of Ahmednagar, but he had a faint recollection that Inspector Razak
and S. 1. Deshmukh had mentioned to him their suspicions about
the identity of Madanlal. He told them that if that was so Madan-
lal must have been interrogated by the Delhi Police who would
find out everything. He told Deshmukh that if he wanted to go to
Delhi he could do so and also told Razak that on his return to Poona
he might as well tell the DJ.G., CJ.D., about this suspicion. Sur.
prisingly enough, this gentleman did not think it expedient to tele-
phone the D.l.G., C.l.D., about it nor did he inform the Distri:::'t
Magistrate. He also told S. 1. Deshmukh to go to Poona to make
enquiries about Karkare but this was soon :liter he had come to
know that Karkare had disappeared from Ahmednagar. This ac-
cording to the D.S.P. might have been on or about January 24, 1948,
because a day or so earlier Deshmukh had come to see him. He
has added that suspicion of Deshmukh with regard to Madanlal
was not very strong and that was the reason he had not sent him
to Delhi: and as he did not think the suspicion to be well founded,
therefore he did not make any written report on this matter.
16.42 S. I. Balkundi (witness 37) had his suspici0n about Madan-
lal and he made a report (Ex. 67), dated 29th January 1948 and sent
It on to the D.l.G., C.LD., Poona, in which he stated that this Madan-
lal seemed to be the same person who was in Ahmednagar and was
working with Karkare and had disappeared from there. He gave
328
the full address of Madanlal and also something about his Punjab
residence and some other particulars.
16.43 It is indeed surprising that this document should have been
about that time. As a matter of fact, on 6th February 1948 (Ex. 68)
Balkundi's explanation was called by Mr. N. S. Gurtu, A.D.LG., on
this point. There is some mistake in this document about the desig-
nation of the officer. It was not the D.LG. but the A.D.LG. who·
was camping in Ahmednagar at the time. The explanation of Bal-
kundi among other things, was that he did not at the time know that the
D. LG. was there. Literally it is true. D.I.G. had '110t come to Ahmed-'
nagar, the A.D.I.G. had come. Between them it is difficult to be-
lieve that Balkundi would not know about it or that he would not
go to him and thus not give such an important bit of information
to him. Of course, the witness could have had good reason for it
which he has not disclosed to the Commission. He further stated
in his explanation that he had been reporting about the activities·
of Karkare and Madanlal and had recommended their detention be-
cause they were becoming more and more dangerous and that after
the meeting of Raosaheb Patwardhan that was disturbed by the-se
people, the atmosphere of Ahmednagar had become too hot and
therefore they stopped their activities and left for Poona in the
second week of January 1948, and since then Karkare had not re-
turned to Ahmednagar.
16.44 If the evidence regarding the suspicion which the various
had in regard to the identity of Madanial is co;-rect then
Ex. 67 is a very important document, if true. This document, as
stated above, is dated January 29, 1948. When it reached Poona, we
do not know. What endorsements were made on it, that also we do
not know bec.:,use the original is not before the But
there is no cogent explanation why Sub-Inspector Balkundi should
have sent a written report on the 29th when all the time was
satisfied with having mentioned his suspicions as to Madallial to
Inspector Rnzo.k. It was this witness who had made a written re-
commendation for the detention of Madanlal and Karkare and he
was watchillg their activities which shows that he was
alert as to what was happening in the town. But why he should not
have a written report about his suspicion earlier is difficult to
understand. His explanation for not sending report earlier is that
he had talked to Inspector Razak and Razak had told the D.S.P. But
inquiry in Ahmednago.r about Karkare, It appears that Mr. Gurtu did

not know anything about the report nor does it seem to have been men-
tioned to him. As said earlier in his explanation, Ex. 69, dated Febru-
ary 9, 1948. Balkundi gave three reasons: (1) That he was not aware
of the DIG's camping at Ahmednagar. Literally it may b(;' true that
D.LG. was not there and it was the A.D.I.G. but why A.D.LG. was not
informed is not clear. (2) That the D.S.P. informed him (Balkundi)
that he was wanted at Poona with full details regarding the relatives
and servants of Karkare and the collection of that information had
kept him busy and that he had handed over information with
3:lU
Kal'kare's phoLOgraph to Dy. S. P. Chuubal. (3) That he was
sta!1tiy reporting about the movements of Karkare and Madanlal and
had finally recommended their detention.
16.45 It is difficult to believe that the AD.I.G, or the DJ.G, should
be camping at Ahmednagar and a Sub-Inspector of crD not
know about it. It is also difficult to accept the explanatIOn of not
sending the report earlier. It is possible that this witness .had a sus-
piCion about Madanlal but like others in his force he acted III a rather
slovenly manner. Of course, it must be mentioned that it may
equally be difficult to find an explanation for putting in a false
at that stage. That it did go to Poona is proved by a subsequent
document, a letter by the AD.I.G. making a reference to this report.
The Commission finds it difficult to accept that at such a late
this document could usefully be written but at the same time it
cannot corne to the conclusion that this document is wholly u faked
document subsequently introduced but its utility was lIil <lnd its.
objecti?e difficult to find.
16.46 It i;;, of course, possible and even probable th&.t Sub-Inspector"
Balkundi had suspicion $lbout the identity of Madanlal. He might
even have mentioned it to Razak who in turn informed the D.S.P.
but the attitude of this witness does not show that this suspicion was
so strong or really was anything more than vague or nebulous.
16.47 When Mr. Gurtu called Balkundi and asked him why he
had not submitted his report about the activities of Madanlal and
Karkare, his reply was that he had been sending reports from time
to time and it was on this occasion that he brought this Ex. 67 from
the record room and that is how it was produced,
16.48 From the evidence it does appear that S.l. Ba:lkundi was
aware of the activities of Ka,rkare and Madanlal. It, also appears
that he did suspect that MadanlaL the thrower of the bomb, was
the same who had been operating in Ahmednagar but for some fE'a-
son did not put his suspicion in writing and when he did SO its
utility was nil. It also appears that it was this witness who gave
the particulars of Karkare to Poona C.LD. and the photograph which
was on the LB. file was supplied by him.
16,49 Now. we come to another portion of the activities of the
Ahmednagar Police.
16.50 Balkundi, witness No. 37, has stated that both

Nathuram Godse and Apte used to come to Ahmednagar and they
met Karkare and that he and his staff were watching the nctivitif'S
of both these persons although nothing emanated from this attempt-
ed intelligence, He also stated that he did not know if Karkare was
sending any money to Godse and Apte. But he did know jhnt
Karkare was acting under the aegis of the Hindu Mahasabha. I-TC'!
stated that when Madanlal and Karkare had left Ahnwd-
nagar in or about the second week of January 1948 as the place W;lS
too hot for them, he thought that he might have gone to Kolhllpl1r
to stay with one Jere who was one of the paid workers of the Hindu
330
Mahasaoha. Now this is an important piece of evidence because in
take shelter with one Mr. Jere who had been working at Nagar and
that this information had been passed on to Inspector Razak who was
working on it; but that unfortunately this was on February 7, 1948.
16.51 Aiter Madanlal had thrown the bomb, a letter addressed to
Karkare was intercepted by witness No. 32, Sub-Inspector Deshmukh.
The wri'';er of that letter could not be traced but in that letter it was
written that a building had to be constructed in Bombay which was
not possible without Karkare's help. Deshmul<h took this letter to
the D.S.P. and told him that it meant much more than what appear-
ed on the surface. In other words, it was in code. A copy of the
letter was sent by the D.S.P. to the DIG, CID requesting that
inquiries be made in Bombay. Deshmukh suggested to the D.S.P.
that he (Deshmukh) should go to Bombay and Poona to find out
about the whereahuuts of Karkare and he left for Bombay on the
pretext of purchasing a rectophote machine, taking with hi.m Sub-
Inspector L. N. Joshi, because Joshi belonged to Poona and knew
Apte and Godse. They went to the Agrani Press and made inquiries
about Api:e and Godse. This was on January 29, 1948. They were
told that neither of them was in Poona. They then went to Apte's
house on S"ome pretext and asked Mrs. Apte about Apte's address.
She s;;.jd that Apte had gone to Gwalior. Joshi remained on in
Poona and Dcshmukh went to Bombay to find out about Karkare's
brother who was working in a mill in Dadar. He made ir.quiries
ab:1ut Karkare till about 9 p.m. when he learnt about the murder of
Mahatma Gandhi.
16.52 An extract from the weekly diary of Deshmukh, Ex. 53.
shows that he arrived at Poona on 28th January, 1948 and made con-
fiden-::ial inqliiries till 11 p.m. On January 29 he made more
confidcntinl inquiries and left Poona at 11-30 a.m., arrived at Bombay
at 4 p.m. and went to Kurla and made inquiries there and then
returned to Dadar. On the following day, i.e., January 30, he moved
about in Bycuna. V.T., Kalbadevi, Dadar and Parel areas and made
confidential inquiries. In this report it is not stated as to what ('(m-
fidential inquiries he was making or about whom, but one or two
important matters emanate from this portion of the testimony of this
witness.
(1) That Dcshmukh had gone to Poona to look for Karkal'e; and
if that was so it is difficult to imagine why he should have gone to
the Agrani Press and asked about him and then the:e h7 made
inquiries about the whereabouts of Apte Godse. It IS stIll very
.surprising that Deshmukh and L. N. JOShI should have gone to
Mrs. Apte to find out where her husband was and then this witness
(Deshmukh) should have left for Bombay to look for KarkRre. The
whole thing does not fit in or appear to be very logical If Karkare
was being iooked for then the witness should have stated that they
went to find out about him from the Agrani Press and from Mrs. P,pte
whi:::n he has not stated. And this connection between Karkare
the Agr.ani Press or Mrs. Apte appear somewherp. at least III
the evidence before the Comrmsslon.
331
(2) It shows that the witness was connecting Karkare with P.pte
and Godse. Why it is not clear. He has nowhere in his
dence that according to his knowledge, Godse and Apte were asso-
ciating with Karkare in Ahmednagar although Sub-Inspector
Balkundi, witness No. 37, has stated that both Godse and Apte used
to meet Karkare in Ahmednagar.
(3) If Karkare had taken shelter in Kolhapur with Jere, why was
he being looked for in Poona? Besides why was the police in Kdha-
pur not contacted about him?
(4) It is difficult to find out any cogent reason for the inquiries
made by these witnesses about Apte and Godse and not about
Kar\<are. As has been said above, the thing does not fit in properly
and picture seems to be out of focus as it were. Either these wit-
nesses had knowledge about the association of Karkare and
and Godse or they had not. If they had, one would have
that they would have informed the authorities about this matter and
when Karkare disappeared from Poona, they might have looked for
him at places where Apte and Godse were or they had no knowledge
about this association.
16.53 But much is clea.r that Sub-Inspector L. N. Joshi did
know Mrs. Apte. As a matter of fact, he has stated that he had
helped Karkare to start business and Karkare was helping Apte in
his publication work. He has also stated that Deshmukh had suspi-
cion that Aptp and party had gone to Delhi but he does not st'em to
have mentioned the fact to anybody nor informed the D.S.P. He has
further staled that Mrs. Apte had no suspicion when he made
inquirit')s about Apte because they had known each other for some
time. This previous acquaintance of Joshi with Apte and Karkare
can have a sinister meaning and yet may be more or less innocuous.
Joshi has stated that he had no sympathy for the Hindu Mahasabha.
L. N. Joshi also stated that he accompanied Deshmukh because he
knew friends of Karkare in Poona and went to the Agrani office for
that reawn. In the circumstances, it was, perhaps, not very wise
for Mr. Deshmukh to have taken L. N. Joshi with him.
16.54 But the reason of his going to Poona and Bombay remains a
mystery in view of his previous knowledge about the hiding of
Karkare in Kolhapur with Jere.
16.55 Witness No. 32, Police Deputy Superintendent Narayanrao
Kunjvihari Deshmukh, who was a Sub-Inspector in the Local Int€1li-
gence Branch at the relevant time was stationed at Ahmednagar to
keep watch over the activities of different political parties incIudi<1g
the Hindu Mahasabha and R.S.S. He has stated that to his know-
ledge there was no organisation known as Hindu Rashtra Dal in
Ahmednagar The leaders of Hindu Mahasabha were C. M. Saptrishi
and Gaikavadi but he had not heard the name of Apte but he knew
Karkare. HE' used to visit Visa pur refugees' camp where refugees
from Peshawar had been brought-probably he does not distinguish
the Peshawari Hindu from any other from West Punjab. There the
talk among the refugees, as one would expect, was against Muslims;
the complaint being that the Muslims had abducted, raped and
molested Hindu girls and young women in Pakistan and they were-
themselves India while the refugees had suffered great
mdIgnlty and barbanty at the hand of Muslims and had to come
all the. way from their homes in the Punjab to Ahmednagar nearly
2,590 away. They wanted service, jobs, business and they
obJected to hvmg on Government doles and loans. One can well
believe that they were work hungry, angry young men and passivity
was not one of their virtues nor laziness their shortcoming. Madanlal
and Karkare became prominent in the Hindu Mahasabha. In order
to bring refugees into the Hindu _Mahasabha movements Karkare
promised them business and other kinds of help.
16.56 The refugees, led by Karkare, used to take out procession in
Ahmednagar. On one occasion they took a procession to the Garage
of Khan llahadur Sarosh Irani. The District Magistrate and the
District Superintendent of Police came to the spot. The DiRLrict
Magistrate promised them help but at the same time warned them
that he would not allow them to misbehave by taking down green
flags from the mausoleums tombs of Peers and others and from
othzr Muslim religious buildings. Thereafter the processionists went
away. This was some time in the first week of January 1948.
16.57 This witness has referred to a circular (Ex. 54) which was
issued by the D.l.G. of Police, C.LD. on May 9/10, 1947, asking the
District Superintendents of Police of the province to maintain a close
watch on the Hindu R<I,shtra Dal's activities and to report to him any
attempt madE; by its volunteers and others to implement the advice
given by Barrister Savarkar at the meetin.£t of the Dal at Dadar on
the and 10th May 1947. Accompanying this document is a precis
of the summary of the proceedings of the Dal of that date at 'xhich
about 125 volunteers were present from all over the province of
Bombay and neighbouring Hindu States like Hyderabad, Kolhapur,
SangIi, Miraj, Indore Baroda besides others from the province of
J
Bombay itself. Savarkar there delivered four speeches giving the

aims and objccts of the Hindu Rashtra Dal, its constitution and his
views on the communal riots in India and the partition of the Punjab
and Bengal. The aims and objects of the Dal were to propag3te
Hindu Sangathanist ideas. Savarkar was its dictator. He retired
and nominated his successor who was authorised to nominate p-cvin-
cial and district organisers. During the course of his speeches
Savar:<ar osked the volunteers to establish mass contact and propa-
gate Savfl.rkal··vad in the villages and to inculcate in the villagers a
spirit of aggression; to protect themselves from Muslim atrocities;
and also advised them to assist the villages to secure arms licences.
He had emphasised the necessity of the Hindu Rashtra Dal and rder-
red to Muslim atrocities in the Punjab and in Bengal, and pre;l.ched
retaliation. "You should not stan until you retaliate in the same
spirit and. manner· If Hindu women were raped and Hindu Lemples
damaged, equal number of mosques should be destroyed. He advised
the volunteer:;, to oppose the Constitution if it was detrimental to the
interests of Hindus and the "Hindudom".
16.58 In December 1947, said the witness, there were some bomb
incidents but the local police could not find out, who were respon-
sible for them. The Provincial C.I.D. was therefore called in from
Poona but the culprits could not be traced or found.
16.59 to this witness, on lst January 1948, as is shown
"from his daily bulletin report there was a search in the house of
Karkare and in the house of S. V. Ketkar, and large quantitir:s of
arms and ammunition were found. This search was conduded by
'Suh-Inspector S. S. Rane. Thereafter, Karkare's movements were
watched and there was a policeman trailing him.
16.60 On the 1lth January 1948 this witness intercepted 3. letter
of Karkare addressed to the Danik Hindu Rashtriya wherein Karkare
had given information about the searches.
16.61 Letters of Karkare and other Hindu Mahasabha leaders in
Ahmednagar began to be censored, i.e., outgoing and also their incom-
ing letters. This witness was making reports in regard these
tetters which he was intercepting.
16.62 On the 16th January 1948, orders were passed for the deten-
1ion of Madanlal and on the 24th Janua.ry for the detention of
Karkare. It appears that both Madanial and Karkare disappeared
'from Ahmednga,r and they were never arrested till one after the
bomb incident and the other after the fatal shot was fired which
·ended the iife of Mahatma Gandhi.
16.63 The witness also stated that the activities of Karkare were
not of a nature but he was ta.king part in the Hindu Maha-
meetings. The witness never came to know about any S2Cl'et
meeting between MadanIaI, Karkare, Apte and Godse; his duty being
to make enquiries about illegal activities of persons, correlate them,
.and to submit them to the D.S.P.
16.64 Madanlal and Karkare disappeared in about the second

week I.lf January and the matter was reported to the D.S.P. and he
must have ir.formed the DIG of Police, CID. From what this wit-
ness k.lew the activities of Madanial and Karkare were not directed
against the Congress leaders nor did they attack them nor was there
.any indication of their intention to commit violence against them but
they ',V'el'e anti-Muslim. He was not present at the meeting where
Madanlal assaulted Raosahib Patwardhan but he went subsequently
when I'vladanlal was brought to the Police Station. The witness inter-
cepted a letter addressed to Karkare-the sender's name he did not
lenow nor find out. In that letter it was stated that a building had
to be constructed in Bombay and that without Karkare's help it
·could not be constructed. The letter was taken by the witnes:; to the
D.S.P. To the witness the letter meant much more than what it
said and it appeared to be in code. The letter was sent
to the DIG. CID requesting that enquiries be made. This letter ,\':as
received after the bomb was thrown at Delhi and before the murder.
What became of this letter or what action was taken is not indicated
by the evidence before the Commission.
16.65 Th..e witness had a complete record of Madanlal's activities

and he knew Madanlal. He says that if a photograph of Madanlal
had been sent to Ahmednagar or had appeared in the newspapers or
his description had appeared, he would at once have been able to spot
334
him and would have given a complete record of what he wa::,: doing
and wIth whom. He stated that he had told the D.S.P. Ahmednagar
of his suspicion about the identity of when exactly it was
don.:::, h.:- does not say. On some pretext, on December 29, 1947, he
went to Bombay taking witness L. N. Joshi who was a stenographer
(witness No. 36) with him. They first went to Poona and made
enquiries from the Agrani Press about Apte and Godse who were
known to L. N. Joshi but they were told that they were not in Poona.
On the pretext of getting some books printed, they went to Apte's
house and made enquiries from Mrs. Apte about Apte's address and
she told them that Apte was in Gwalior. Leaving Joshi in Poona,
the witness went to Bombay looking for Karkare in Dadar and heard
the samE. evening at 8 p.m. that the Mahatma had been shot dead.
He said that they had gone there because of their (Apte and Godse)
as'iOCiation with the Hindu Mahasabha movement. It is a little sur-
prising that this witness should have gone to enquire about G,dse
and Apte when he has deposed before the Commission that he did
nct know of any connection between Madanlal, Karkare, Godse and
Apte. He also stated when his attention was drawn to his
movement diary that he left Ahmednagar on the 28th. He made
enquiries at Poona the whole day and at 11 p.m. he left for Bombay
and on that day he made confidential enquiries at Bombay on the
30th January learnt of the murder of the Mahatma and returned the
same night to Ahmednagar. Even on the 29th January he did not
kno\,; that Madanlat who had been arrested at Delhi was the
person whose activities they had been watching in Ahmednagar.
Nobody had conveyed that information to him.
16.66 He did not go to the Bombay CID because they were not
likely to know anything about Karkare who was only a hotel keeper
ond was not a big man.
16.G7 This witness suspected that Madanlal who had thrown the
bomb might be the same person about whom orders of detention had
been passed in Ahmednagar and he told the D.S.P. about this also
but he could not say whether that gentleman passed on the
Han tu. the Provincial CID. But this witness seems to be drawing
m0re upon his imagination because in the latter part of the statl'r.-:.ent
he ha<; stated that even upto the 29th January 1948 he did not know
that MadanlaI arrested in Delhi was the same person whose acti-
vitiE.s they had been watching in Ahmednagar. Then it is difficult
to see what he was going to do at Poona or at Bombay. At any rate
there is no indication of what he did there except that he looked for
Karkare. It is important to remember that Karkare's name had not
been mentioned to this witness as an associate of Madanlal in the
bomb throwing.
16.03 The next witness regarding Ahmednagar is Sheikh Abdul
Razak Ismail (witness No. 34). He is now an Additional
dent of Police, C.B.I. (on leave preparatory to retirement) in ch:J.rge
of corruption. At the relevant time he was Inspector in the Provin-
cial C.I.D. and was stationed at Poona and incharge of the cir(:le in-
cluding Ahmednagar. As there had been some bomb explosirms in
Alunednagar he was called in on December 13, 1947 to Ahmednagar
33.
'0 investigate these incidents (Ex. 60). There had been some born:"
explosions, one of them inside the Vasant Talkies belonging to
K. B. Sarosh Irani on 7th December, 1947. The other bomb incidt:nts
were in Kappad Bazar, Tatti Darwaza Mosque and one other on the
occasion of the Muharram festival but nobody had been arrested in
connecUon therewith although Madanlal and Karkare were suspected.
On 18th December he made a report (Ex. 61) stating that the bomb
was thrown on the Swari on 24th November, 1947 but it caused no
damage because it did not explode. On 7th December, 1947 there
w<is an explosion inside Vasant Talkies of a crude handgrenade which
injured about 12 persons. On the 14th December, 1947, a bomb was
thro'wll near the shop of Ismail Bandhubhai, M.L.A. which injllred
an This was at about midnight. His report Ex. 61 ::shows
had been found on June 3, 1947 in a bomb factory in Bombay '-,wned

by Oll'.:' Vansen Puspsen (Ex. 62) unearthed by the Bombay C.I.D.
2nd were brought to Poona by a Police Officer and in connection y:ith
that case some Gujaratis had been arrested. This shows a common
source and a common agency operating. According to a document
(Ex. 62) dated 24th December 1947, the houses of Secretary of the
Muslim League and Captain of the Muslim National Guard:;; wl:'re
searched but nothing incriminating was found. This document
shows that the lives of Congress leaders including the local Sec,etary
Sr.ptrishl were being threatened and that the bomb on the Muhanam
Swari was similar to the one burst in Poona Shaniwar Peth on 28th
December 1947.
16.69 As a result of the suspicion on account of the throwing of

bombs, the house of Karkare was searched but evidently nothing
was found. And Madanlal had no house. On the 2nd January 1848
this witness made a report (Ex. 59) showing that activities of Karkare
were being watched, that Police lnspector Savant of the C.LD. got
certain information as a consequence of which the house of S. V.
Ketkar was searched, from where some bombs and other arms and
ammunition were found. Ketkar had stated that the bombs had
been given to him by Karkare and the interrogation of one Shiru
Limaye which had been ordered was cancelled. He was at the tmle
in custody in Poona.
16:70 On 5th January 1948 both Madan Lal and Karkare WE're
brought to the police station and interrogated but nothing useful was
found and there were no indications that they or their activities were
di,ected against the Congress leaders or they were a danger to the
live:;; of Congress leaders but Madan Lal gave an undertaking not to
take part in violent movements.
16.71 The witness on or about the 9th January 1948 asked Sub-
Inspector Deshmukh to make a report and get both Madan Lal and
Karkare detained. On 18th January the witness returned to Poona.
Before that he had asked S.I. Deshmukh as to what had been done in
regard to his suggestion of getting detention orders. Deshmukh's
reply was that he had sent a reoort but no orders had until then
been received. The witness was sending his reports from time to
336
time. He says it was for the higher officers to send Special Police
officers to investigate the bomb cases.
16.72 On the 26th January 1948 (Ex. 58) he made a report to the
D.I.G., C.LD., Poona, about the activities of 25 persons giving details.
Copies were sent to D.S.Ps. of Poona and Nagar. These contained
names of persons some of whom S. V. Ketkar had "involved" in his
statement. Of these some were active workers of a group holding
"extreme views"; and two D. V. Godse and V. V. Pandit were from
Poona. About D. V. Godse it was mentioned that his brother was
prominent in a dramatic society. but evidently no action was taken
on this report, and it had recommended none. This report is Exhibit
58. The significant part of this report is that he had mentioned
therein five persons S. V. Ketkar, V. R. Karkare, B. B. Paradkar,
Rekhi and Dattaraya brother of Nathuram Godse. Their activitie!:
are very clearly given in this document, but there is no mention of
Madanlal in this report and the witness says that he did not know
.about him. Anyhow it showed a probable source of the bambi':
th l"cwn in Ahmednagar. Whether a more vigorous investigation
could have led to anything more relevant to this enquiry before the
Cmmnission would be in the realm of conjecture. But this does show
that Karkare was not a man whose activities could be ignored.
lG.73 About 2 days after the bomb incident at Delhi this witness
.and S.1. Deshmukh went to the D.s.P. and mentioned to him th.eir
suspicions about the identity of Madanlal arrested at Delhi indicat-
in,,! that he might be the same person who was active in Ahmednagar
but this witness has not mentioned it in any of his reports.
16.74 He has also stated that at Ahmednagar his investigation
showed that Karkare and Madanlal were indulging in anti-Muslim
activities. They had tried to incite the Hindus by showing a nalil'd
woman being by persons who looked like Moham-
mad ens· But he came to know that the photograph was of a
local prostitute who had been got hold of by Karkare and the photo-
graph was manufactured in order to incite the Hindus against the
MusEm". He has also said that he did not,..l'eport this matter to the
D.S.P.
16.75 He was cross-examined by Mr. Vaidya and he reiterated
that he along with S. 1. Deshmukh told the D.S.P. of their suspicions
regarding Madan Lal and that the D.S.P. after the January 1948
ordered Sub-Inspector Deshmukh to go to Delhi and search for
Karkare and verify if Madanlal was the same person. He has also
referred to a confidential letter written by the District Magistrate,
Mr. R. C. Joshi (witness No. 80) to the Chief Secretary. Bombay
with a copy to the D.LG., C.LD., Poona. But this letter does not
throw much light on anything excepting that the District Magistrate
had reported about the bomb incidents which appeared to be of a
communal nature, that the Police was investigating but it adds
nothing to what this witness has already stated.
16.76 He could not remember whether he received any instruc-
tiORS from Mr. Rana, D.LG., C.LD. of the Province regarding the
persontl mentioned in the witness's report between 26th January and
January 1946 01' even earlier. The witness wanted to arrest
Karkare in connection with the bombs which had been found and he
has deposed that his opinion was that if Madanlal was the same
person whom they were looking for as he suspected then it might
have led to the arrest of his lIe produced a copy of
a statement of Madanlal which was given to him on 2nd February
1948 and is marked Exhibit 65. It is a longish document and in type
extends over 18 pages. He could not say whether there was any
contact between Bombay City Police and the Poona Police between
20th January and 30th January 1948 in regard to Madan Lalor the
bomb thrown at Delhi.
16.77 In cross-examination by Mr. Chawla this witness stated

that Madanlal and Kakare were associates in their activities
against Muslims. But he did not know that Nathuram Godse or
Apte were helping Karkare or MadanlaI. He came to know of
their activities betweEn 20th January and 26th January and that is
the reason why he has mentioned their names in his report. But
surprisingly enough he did not know of the activities of Nathuram
Godse or of Apte in Poona.
16.78 When Karkare and were brought to the Police
Station on 5th January 1948 in connection with the bombs that were
found in the house of S. V. Ketkar there were no indications that
they were after the life of Mahatma Gandhi or other Congress
leaders and Madanlal had given an lUlderstanding not to take part
in violent movements. He further stated that he did not read any
newspapers and when his attention was drawn to the description of
Madanlal in 'Bombay Chronicle' he said that the description would
not have been sufficient to enable him to connect Madan Lal with
Madanlal of Ahmednagar. In the end he stated that if any of the
Police Officers who knew Madanlal had been sent to Delhi it is
possible that the murder of Mahatma Gandhi might have been pre-
vented. It is surprising that this witness did not know anything
about Apte or Nathuram Godse in Poona.
16.79 His evidence and his reports before the Commission gives no
indication that his energies were directed to anything other than
Quiring into the anti-Muslim activities of Karkare and his conferers.
The mention of Nathuram Godse in the report is also indicative of
his association with the Ahmednagar people in the same connection.
The whole trend of the report Ex. 58 is towards showing association
of these persons as members of an anti-Muslim movement <lcting in
toe guise of a dramatic society amongst other illegal activities. He
has mentioned about the suspicion of Deshmukh regarding Madanlal.
But his evidence is indicative of the disturbed condition of
Ahmednagar with bomb throwing and Karkare and Madan Lal's
nssociation with these incidents and also that their activities were
:::ufficiently prejudiCial to merit detention.
16.flO Sub-Inspector Shantaram Sakharam Rana, witness No. 35,
was stationed in Ahmednagar in as of the
City Police Station. He knew Karkare as a member of the Hindu
Mahasabha whose activities became intensified after the partition of
HA
the country in 1947. Karkare made propaganda against Muslims
and "talked" against the Congress. He was associating and mixing
with the refugees. The activities of such persons had, according
to the witness, to be watched by the police.
16.81 The witness also knew Madanlal, a refugee at Visapur, who
took a prominent part in refugees' processions and meetings.
Madan Lal became acquainted with Karkare and was staying with
him in his hoteL The activities of Madanlal were also anti-Muslim.
In November and December 1947, four bombs were thrown in
Ahmednagar-one on a procession of Tazias on the occasion of the
Moharram; another bomb ",-as thrown on a mosque; the third in
Vasant Talkies; and the fourth at the Tatti Darwaza. Inyestigation
into these incidents and the searches made by the police could not
produce any results and the culprits could not be found. The propa-
ganda carried on by Karkare and Madanlal and others was mainly
directed against Muslims but was also against the Congress.
16.82 In December 1947, watch had to be put on the movements
of Karkare and Madanlal Both of them continued, however, making
inciting speeches but they did not preach violence, not even against
Muslims. Police also got information about the private meeting
held by these people. In the beginning of January 1948 refugees
took a procession to Khan Bahadur Sarosh asking him to give them
employment. In that procession Madanlal and Karkare were
present. The D.S.P. and the District Magistrate arrived there and
asked the processionists to come over to his (D.M.'s) bungalow and
discuss their grievances there. On January 5, 1948, t.here was a
meeting held which was addressed by Raosahib Patwardhan.
Madan Lal disturbed that meeting; he was shouting and threatening
and was in "hot temper". Madanlal was arrested at the Patw:ar9han
meeting and was brou'ght to the police station and was kept there
the whole night. Although the witness knew that Karkare was a
companion of Madanlal he did not know anything about Godse and
Apte nor did it strike him when MadanIal was arrested in Delhi
'fhat it was the same person who was creating trouble in Ahmednagar.
16.83 This witness made reports against Karkare. The move-
ments of Madanlal and Karkare were being watched and plain-
clothes policemen were deputed from November 1947 to do so.
Orders for their detention were passed later on different dates in
January. This witness was asked to be on the look out for them to
arrest them. But about the middle of January 1948 or even a little
earlier they disappeared from Ahmednagar and their whereabouts
could not be traced. The police was giving information to the
D.S.P. whenever any person left the jurisdiction of Ahmednagar
City Police. No attempt was made to find out where Karkare or
Madanlal had gone. AU that the police knew was that they had
gone out of their jurisdiction. The witness talked to Deshmukh
about the vanishing of both KElrkare and Madanlal but he already
knew about it.
16.84 The point in this witness's evidence is that the movements

of both Karkare and Madanlal were ordered to be watched from
r\ovcmbcr 1947 <1nd they wC're even tmiled but they managed to
E:scape without anyone knowing when they went trway Cl' where.
And as far as one can see, no attempt as made to find cut where
they had "gone. This fact of vanishing was known to Sub-Inspector
D<:2shmukh of the City Station. His evidence also ,;;hows that Madan
Lal \-;':83 hot-tempered and had assaulted Raosahib Patwardhen.
16.85 Witness No. 36, Lakshman Narayan .Toshi is a D.S.P.
atbched to the C.LD., Bombay C.B.I. He was working as a Sub-
Inspector in the C.I.D., Ahmednagar, in 1947-50 under the D.S.P.,
Ahmednagar. His duties at the time were only to take down
Marathi shorthand notes. There were no particular directions zs to
what meetings he should attend but he went whenever the D.S.P.
ordered him to go. In the later half of 1947, there was a great deal
Of commotion in the city and number of meetings were held rmd
addressed by various leaders but the speeches of Karkare and
Madan Lal were not recorded. The witness knew Madan Lal who
told him that he was studying in a college. He also narrated to him
about the conditions of refugees and their disabilities and also com-
mented on the riots that took place in Pakistan. The witness did
not know if Madan Lal took part in any violent movement. He
never talked about any Congress leader from which it might have
been gathered that he was anti-Gandhi or anti-Congress. He
(witness) was specifically asked if the Ahmednagar Police was pro-
Hindu Mahasabha or pro-KS.S. to which he gave an emphatic reply
that they were doing their duties impartially and even obtained
warrants for the arrest of Madan Lal and Karkare.
16.86 On January 10, 1948, Madanlal told him that he was going
to Delhi to get married. When the news of bomb throwing at
Gandhiji's meeting came on the radio or was published in the news-
papers it struck the witness that it was the same Madan Lal who
was in Ahmednagar and he talked to the Sub-Inspector about the
suspicion. But evidently no use was made of this information, if
indeed it was given. Secondly, when detention orders against
Madan Lal were passed and he absconded, this witness gave no in-
formation of the absconding; or his going to Delhi assuming he knew
of the detention orders. He also was searching for i.v.I;adan LaI. Sub-
Inspector Deshmukh had a similar suspicion and hev went to speak
to the D.S.P. about the identity of this Madan LaI. This was on or
about the 24th January 1948. They both went to the D.S.P. but
Deshmukh did the talking and Inspector Razak was also there. Ac-
cording to him the D.S.P. said that the Delhi Police would be coming
to enquire and that they should not bother themselves about it but
should arrest Karkare and get all the details of Madan La!. What
that meant the witness did not know.
16.87 On the 27th or 28th January, Deshmukh asked the witness
tc <"!ccompany him to Poona. Why it was five days or so later, he
could not say. As he knew some friends of Karkare in Poona, that
is why they went to Poona. They visited AgTani Press and some of
Deshmukh's friends. While Deshmukh used to make enquiries, this
witness used to stand outside. He does not know whether they
went to Nathuram Godse's House but they did go to Apte's house,
23-259 HA
340
at about 15-30 or 16-00 hours, Anand Ash7am. The witness went
in and asked Mrs. Apte about the whereabouts of Karkare and she
said that she did not know about Karkare but Apte had gone to
Nagpur for publishing Savarkar's literature and from there he might
have gone to Gwalior.
16.88 Deshmukh went to Bombay and the' witness remained in
Poona because he had some business in C.I.D. office. From their
and his Mahasabha friends with Madan. Lal and Karkare had gone
to Delhi. He also said that Inspector Abdul Razak was present
when they went to see the D.S.P. but about" this he was not quite
sure.
16.89 The statement of this witness is rather important. Al-
though he knew that Madan Lal had gone to Delhi, he gave no
information to Sub· Inspector Deshmukh. If the movements of
Madan Lal and Karkare were being watched and the witness knew
Madan Lal, as he says he did, it is difficult to believe that he did not
know that the movements of Madan Lal were being watched.
Besides he took his meals at Karkare's hotel and so did Madan La!.
16.flO Another matter which is rather important is this that he
knew A?te's family because Apte's father and his father were school
friends as students and were on visiting terms.
16.91 The witness was a ticket collector at the railway station
when Apte was a teacher in the Mission High School in Ahmednagar
and he had helped Karkare with money to start a hotel. He says
he knew Karkare hut was not a friend of his. He says that he did
not know about the activities of Karkare nor did he enquire from
Deshmukh as to why Karkare was being chased by the police on the
ground that that was not within his province. Nor did he ask after
the D.S.P. had ordererl that search should be for Karkare.
About the middle of January he came to know that there was a
warrant to arrest Karkare, that he did not ask Deshmukh <'.tbout the
activities ("of Karkare because that was none of his business. Nor
was it his husiness to find out whether Karkare was in Ahmednagar
when orders for his detention and warrants to arrest him were
issued. He knew that Inspector Razak wanted K1:.rkal'€ to be
detained and both Razak and he were staying at the Police Club.
16.92 Deshmukh had asked the witness to go with him to Poona

in order to help him and the witness went to Poona partly for that
and partly for his official duties which he had with the C.LD. office
there. Nobody at the office asked him about Karkare. He visited
Apte's House at about 3-30 p.m. but he did not know anything <tbout
Godse but he did know about the relations between Karkare and
Apte. Karkare was helping Apte in his publication but he was not
sure whether Karkare was financing the project. He went to Apte's
house because he knew about the relations between the two; he did
not know anybody at the Agra.ni Press. He asked Mrs. Apte if her
husband was insured on the specious plea that one of her friends
341
Yadarkar was an insurance agent and he asked Mrs. Apte about her
husband and others going to Delhi, because Deshmukh was asking
him to do so.
16.93 But from the information given by Mrs. Apte he did not
conclude that they had gone to Delhi, although his companion
Deshmukh had such suspicion.
16.94 The witness says that he did not know about the activities
of Karkare although he was friendly with him since 1937. He did
not know that Karkare's house was searched in connection with
bomb explosion and yet in the next breath he says that he knew
that Karkare's house was being searched in connection with bomb
explosions, and that Inspector Razak had come in that con-
He has admitted that he knew Mrs. Apte and her
husband since and that his friend wanted to get insurance of
Apte but he does not know what company his friend was an agent
for. He did hear Razak and Deshmukh talking about the detention
of Karkare.
16.95 This witness was friendly with Karkare. He had helped
him to start a hotel. He had been friendly with Karkare for ten
years and it is difficult to believe that he did not know about his
fKarkare's) activities. He also knew Apte and was aware of the
fact that Apte and Karkare were friends. He knew that Karkare
was out of town and yet he gave no such information to the police
when the police was looking for him. He also knew that Madan Lal
was leaving for Delhi, this information he did not give to the police.
He had gone to Poona to find out Karkare some of whose friends
he knew there.
16.96 Police Deputy Superintendent Anant Shamrao Balkundi,

witness No. 37, is now the Deputy Superintendent of Police C.LD.
Aurangabad. From July 1945 to July 1948 he was a Sub-Inspector.
C.LD., at Ahmednagar and his duty was to watch political activities
of persons and parties and submit reports. In about the middle of
1947 a refugee camp was established at Visapur near Ahmednagar.
Karkare who was a Hindu Mahasabha leader took the €'arliest 0ppor-
tunity of working amongst the refugees. He incited the refugees
against the Muslims and held Morchas in Ahmednagar. As a result
of his activities Madan Lal and some other refugees were attracted
towards Karkare and they also started taking part in Hindu Maha-
sabha activities. They led black flag processions. From the
Mausoleums and tombs of peers, etc., they removed green cloth
coverings. There were also bomb explosions from about the middle
of 1947, one of which was thrown in Vasant Talkies which created
panic amongst the public. The object of these activities was to
scare. away Muslims a.nd force them to quit which was one of the
objectives of the party. As a result of these activities Madan Lal
Pahwa came into lime-light and his movements began to be watchC'd
by the Police. As the activities of Madan Lal and Karkare were
dangerous, this witness made a report to the D.I.G., C.l.D. on
January 4, 1948 for their detention or externment. On the same day
;a report (Ex. 66) was made by this witness which shows that a
342
procession of refugees carrying lathis and hockey sticks and shouting
slogans against Muslims was led by Karkare, Kulkarni and Madan
LaI. They passed through the Muslim localities shouting that
Muslims should be driven away. They were also shouting that the
Police was maltreating S. V. Ketkar who had been arrested in
connection wih the possession of bombs, fire-arms and ammunition
and that the reason of this maltreatment was to make him involve
Karkare as the real possessor of these things. This procession, ac-
cording to the report, was arranged by Madan Lal who was staying
with Karkare and was a leading worker of the Hindu Mabasabha
and its real objective was to protest against the searches of the
house and hotel of Karkare and to pressurise the Police in regard
to the bomb case investigation to stop or soften it. The report
states further that Madan Lal was a bad-egg who instigated the
refugees; the recommendation was that Madan Lal and Karkare
should be detained or externed from the city so that they do not do
any mischief. The report also stated that Muslims were getting
nervous and that Katchi merchants were winding up their
to leave the city.
16.97 There was a public meeting on 5th January, 1948 and one
of the speakers was Raosahib Patwardhan. Madan Lal and his
companions created disturbance at this meeting but the story that
Patwardhan was got hold of by Madan Lal and he attacked or
attempted to or wanted to attack Patwardhan was not correct. How-
ever, both Karkare and Madan Lal were shouting that they wanted
to speak. They snatched away the mike from the stage and the
meeting then dispersed. Two Or three persons including Madan Lal
were arrested. Madan Lal was kept in the Police Station and evi-
dently nothing more was done in regard to the incident at the
meeting; that from about the 6th January 1948 both )Madan La] 'l.nd
Karkare disappeared from Poona. But the witness could not
ber if he mentioned this in his report to the D.LG., CJ.D. The
house of Karkare was being watched but the witness did not know
whether he returned or not. Madan LaI, however, did not return
to Ahmednagar. An order for detention of Karkare and Madan LaI
was passed but the witness does not know when and nothing of
importance took place upto 20th January 1948.
16.98 When on the 20th January a bomb was exploded at Birla
House at Mahatma's prayer meeting and the matter was reported
in the Press this witness suspected that Madan LOll therein de-scribed
was the same person who had been carrying on activities in
Ahmednagar. He conveyed his suspicion to Inspector Razak who in
turn informed the D.S.P. but what orders the D.S.P. gave, the witness
does not know. •
16.99 On 29th January 1948 and it is not clear why it is so long
after the news appeared in the Press the witness sent a report
(Ex. 67) to the D.I.G .. C.LD. The purport of this report was that
from the description which appeared in the Papers about Madan LaI
who was arrested in Delhi it appeared that this Madan Lal was the
same person who was operating in Ahmedna'gar and trouble.
Madan L'il and Karkare had left Ahmednagar fifteen days earlier
<llld had gone to Bombay but their further movements and where-
abouts were not known and it was worthwhile making enquiries
Delhi Police about Madan Lal who according to the report was
a staunch Sanghite (R.S.S.) and had revolutionary ideas.
16.100 This (Ex. 67) is a very important document if it is a true

document. This report has no endorsement on it of the office of
the D.I.G. of its receipt or what happened to it. This witness had
not made a report in writing about the absconding or disappearance
of Madan Lalor Karkare. The explanation of the witness about
not sending his report earlier is that he had talked to Inspector
Razak. If that was sufficient one fails to see the necessity of
making this report on the 29th January, 1948. The A.D.I.G. was camp-
ing at Ahmednagar about this time but no report was made to him
while he was there. On 1st February 1948 Mr. Gurtu, A.D.I.G.P.,
C.LD. Poona called witness to Poona in connection with the enquiry
in. Ahmedmigar about Karkare. There Gurtu gave him certain
instructions about Karkare. But Mr. Gurtu did not know anything
about the report nor does it seem to have been mentioned to him.
16.101 The next piece of evidence which is of importance in

connection with this witness is his explanation dated 9th February
1948 (Ex. 69). He stated therein (1) that he was not aware of the
D·I.G's. camp at Ahmednagar; (2) that he could not make arrange-
ments for interrogation of Ved Prakash on 1st Febl'uary 1948 because
of disturbances in the city; (3) that the D.S.P. informed him that
he, the witness, was wanted at Poona with full details regarding
the relatives and servants of Karkare and the collection of that in-
formation had kept him busy and he had handed over the information
along with Karkare's photograph to Deputy SUperintendent Chaubal;
(4) that he was constantly reporting about the movement of
Karkare and Madan Lal through weekly and special reports find had
finaIIy reported about the detention of both of them on 4th January
194'3; (5) that after the meeting of Raosahib Patwardhan on 6th
January 1948 the atmosphere at Ahmednagar had become too hot
for Karkare and Madan Lal and therefore they had disappeared
from Ahmednagar; (6) that Karkare had written to his wife that
he would be arriving during the course of the week and strict watch
was being kept at the Railway Station and motor stands; (7) that
Karkare had gone to Kolhapur where he was likely to take shelter
with a Mr. Jere.
16.102 This document has already been discussed at a previous
page and it is not necessary to deal with it again.
16.103 Another important piece of evidence which emanates from

the statement of this witness is that Godse and Apte both used to
come to Ahmednagar and met Karkare and that this witness and
hi!': staff were watching the activities of both Apte and Godse in
Ahmednagar although nothing emanated from this attempted intelli-
gencE!. The witness did not not know if Karkare was sending any
money to Godse and Apte. And he had no information about any
plot being hatched in Ahmednngar. .
344
16.104 This witness was both hy Mr. Vaidya as-
well as by Mr. Chawla. He was asked about the search into the
house of Ketkar where arms and ammunition were found but he
does not remember whether he was present when Ketkar was
interro'gated. He was asked if he had made any report in regard
to Karkare's connection with arms and ammunition and his reply
was that he CQuid not say anything tmless he saw the report. Now
this is a very peculiar answer. If a report was made the question
would not arise and if no report was made there was nothing that
this witness could see. The witness was asked about the activities
of the Hindu Rashtra Dal but he said that he could not remember.
16.105 The evidence of this witness shows that both Karkare <.nd
Madan Lal had earned notoriety in Police circles because of their
anti-Muslim activities and the incitement to refugees and also in
regard to the bombs which have been thrown; that Madan Lal had
disturbed the meeting of Raosahib Patwardhan in a disorderly
manner. Hs was arrested in connection there\.,.-ith but what
happened next one does not know; that the activities were of such
a prejudicial nature that this witness had to recommend the extern-
ment or detention of those two persons as early as 4th January 1948;
that soon after both Madan Lal and Karkare vanished from
Ahmednagar in spite of the fact that a Police watch was being kept
on them and that this witness had a suspicion that Madan Lal
arrested at Delhi was the same person who had been operating in
Ahmednagar. He conveyed his suspicion to Inspector Razak who
in turn gave the information to the D.S.P. If this statement is true
and it might well be no one seems to have done anything in regard
to the suspicion possibly because it was not considered well founded.
However, the most important bit of information that this witness has
given is that both Apte and Godse visited Karkare and there was
information with the Ahmednagar Police therefore that these two
persons were co-workers in the Hindu Mahasabha with Karkare
and even their movements were watched but with negative results.
16.106 Jagannath Shivram Rane, witness No. 40, was the D.S.P.
at Ahmednagar during the period October 1947 to April 1948. His
evidence shows that during that period there were two main pro-
blems which were occupying the attention of the police in the
district: one, the Razakar trouble in Hyderabad State and the other
an exciting time to the police because the people used 10 come from
Hyderabad State and were causing excitement. Some Razakars
were arrested. The witness had to go to the border areas often
because of a number of incidents of arson and murder committed
by the Razakars and sometimes he had to stay there for lon'g periods
which meant absence from the headquarters. One can well under-
stand that the Razakar problem was causing serious and acute
anxiety to the District administration in respect of areas bordering
Hyderabad State-good bit of Ahmednagar was surrounded by
territories Hyderabad State. Those areas of that State which are
called M.arathwada now from part of the Maharashtra State 'after
the lingnistic readjustment and territorial changes.
16.107 Hindu Mahasabha agitation also WH::; anotber trouble :;pot.
There was a section of the local population which were its protago-
nists and then there were refugees from Pakistan who were
agitating for the expulsion of Muslims who, the refugees said, were
getting the best of both the worlds. They did not. the Muslims
having the facilities they were having. In that agItatlOn Madan Lal
had started taking and did take a leading part-pulling down green
flags from Durgahs, mausoleums and other Muslim places of worship.
The local man connected therewith was Karkare. The movements
of both these persons were being watched by the Intelligence
Branch. The reports showed that the agitation by Karkare and
Madan Lal was directed against Muslims; and the bomb incidents
which had taken place were also directed against them. These
incidents were reported to witness by the intelligence staff. The
investigations into the bomb incidents had been infructuous although
directions used to be given by this witness as to what should be done.
16.108 There were searches made in Ahmednagar in connection
ith possession of illicit arms. Therefore, the houses of S. V. Ketkar
Id V. R. Karkare were searched and in the former's, some explo-
.:lives, a pistol and a revolver and ammunition were found and as a
result Ketkar was arrested and was sent up for trial and convicted.
But the search of Karkare's house did not result in finding any in-
criminating article.
16.109 There were no reports to the witness of Madan Lal and
Karkare making anti-Congress speeches or propaganda. But they
were kept lillder watch. The Sub-Inspector who kept watch over
Karkare and Madan Lal sent daily reports to the witness but in his
(witness's) opinion the watch was kept because of Hyderabad. It
is unfortunate that the witness was not asked to explain what he
meant by "because of Hyderabad". But in his note at the time of
signing his statement he has said that it was not because of
Hyderabad but because of their attitude towards Muslims, which
makes more sense.
16.110 Warrants were issued for the detention of Madan LaI and
Karkare on the report made by the Provincial C.LD. Evidently, the
D.S.P. was not consulted. But the detention according to him was
because of their anti-Muslim activities, and as far as one can see had
no connection with their anti- Congress tendencies.
16.111 There are some reports made by this witness and others
to the Goverrunent which would merit mention at this stage. On
15th December 1947, the District Magistrate made a report (Ex. 73)
to the Government of Bombay on the bomb explosion on the 14th
December near the shop of Ismail, M.L.A. in Kappad Bazar. On the
16th December, the witness made a report (Ex. 74) to the Govern-
ment about the same bomb incident. On 2nd January 1948, this
witness made a report (Ex. 75) regarding the recovery of arms and
ammunition on the previous day from the house of S. V. Ketkar. It
also shows that Ketkar had stated that these anns had been kept
in his house by V. R. Karkare from whose house, when searched,
nothing incriminating was found. The report also shows that the
J':ILi
grenades found in the House of Ketkar were of the same type as
tnose thrown in Vasant Talkies and on the Tatti Darwaza mosque
in the previous month. In this connection, reference may also be
made to Ex. 76 dated 2nd January 1948, by Inspector Sawant under
whose direction the search was conducted in Ketkar's house, about
the articles found therein and about the interrogation of Karkare.
A copy of this report was sent to the D.S.P., Ahmednagar, the
Original to the D.I.G. of Police, C.I.D., Poona.
16.112 This witness stated in reply to a question by the Commis-
sion that he did not take any personal interest in these searches as
it was a C.LD. matter. This detente would be surprising if true.
But he added that the District Police was also takinR part and that
under police practice he was sending reports to the Provincial Gov-
ernment. That would explain his reports Exs. 74 and 75 above-
referred to. Ex. 76 also shows that Ketkar was the Manager of
Karkare's hotel and that among other things found at the former's
house were some ornaments also-these ornaments resembled those
which had been removed the body of the woman in Poona,
in regard to whose murder Inspector Sawant was makin·g investi-
gation although Poona Police seemed to have closed the case as
untraced. Why the clues arising from the recovery of ornaments
was not followed up one does not know. At any rate, it would only
fall within the purview of this inquiry showing what the local police
was doing in regard to this group of Hindu Mahasabha workers.
16.113 Ex. 77 is a report by Inspector Razak showing that the
bomb thrown on the mosque within the city police jurisdiction was
similar to the one with regard to which he had made previous re·
ports; that he had discussed the case with the D.S.P. and the various
clues that were being followed up; and that the activities of :E{arkare
were being watched. The report also said that in·structions had been
given to the city police for the interrogation of one Shiru Limaye
at Poona whose connection is not clear.
16.114 Ex. 78 dated 5th January 1948 is the weekly diary of the
witness. It shows that Madan Lal and Karkare had been inciting
the refugees and that they wanted Muslims to go away from
Ahmednagar. It also stated that Madan Lal was very rude in his
behaviour. .
16.115 On January 19, 1948 as Ex. SO shows the District Magis-
trate was directed by Government that Karkare should be arrested
in connection with the arms found in the house of Ketkar and that
they also wanted to know why he had not been detained earlier.
16.116 About the warr"ants for the detention of Karkare the
witness stated that they were issued on the reports made by the
Provincial C.LD., that he was not consulted in the matter and that
their activities were only in regard to Hyderabad for whiCh they
were being watched by the police. In cross-examination and in his
clarification the witness stated that the investigations into the arms
and ammunition and incidents connected therewith were being made
by the Provincial C.LD. It has been suggested to him that the
347
bombs found in the house of Ketkar had connection with the pre-
vious bomb incidents. He also said that he did not recommend the
detention of anybody in connection with these bombs because he
did not think the mattter sufficiently serious as to merit detention
under an extraordinary law. In his clarification, he said that he did
not think that the detention of these persons was on account of their
activities against Hyderabad but a consequence of their anti-
Mahomedanism.
16.117 The witness stated that it did not strike him that Madan Lal
who was arrested at Delhi was the same person who was opel'atin;..(
in Ahmednagar a.1though he had a faint recollection that Insp('('lor
Razlk and Sub-Inspector Deshmukh had mentioned to him that they
suspected him (Madan Lal) to be the same person. The witness told
them that if that was so then Madan Lal must have been interrogated
by the Delhi Police who would find everything out. He told D('sh-
mukh that if he wanted to go to Delhi he could go and also 'told
Abdul Razak that on his return to Poona he might as well tell the
D.l.G., C.LD., about Madan Lal. But he himself did not think it
necessary to telephone the D.LG. about it nor did he inform his
District Magistrate about it. He also told Deshmukh to go to Poona
and make enquiries about Karkare but this was soon after it was
known that Ka,rkare had disappeared. This must have been on or
about the 24th January 1948, because a day or so earlier Deshmukh
came to see him. Deshmukh's suspicion according to the witness was
not very strong and the witness did not send him to Delhi.
Pel'sonally, he did not think the suspicion to be wellfounded and so
he did not make any written orders in regard to the matter.
16,113 Ex. 77 shows that Inspector Razak, witness No. 34, had dis-
cussed the bomb cases with this witness and the clues that he had
followed. It also shows that Karkare's movements \\ ere bEing
watched. It is surprising, however, that although the offence::; ff'U
within the Explosive Substances Act which is a serious matter and
were made in connection therewith, this witness did r.ot
take any serious interest in the matter, Of course, it is possible that
he was more concerned with what was happening on the Hydera.bad
border or what was happening in Ahmednagar town itself owing to
tht;! influx of refugees there and the Hindu Mahasabha carrying on
anti-Muslim agitation.
16119 But one thing seems to be clear that higher authorities in
the district did not know or attach importance to the association of
Kal'kare with Apte .and Godse about which evidence has been given;
and that a facade, unknown to the Police, had been created for the
operation of this group which culminated in the assassination
of Mahatma Gandhi.
R. C. Joshi, wit. 80
16.120 Quite a valuable bit of information was given by Mr. Ram-
chandra Chintaman Joshi, I.C.S., witness No. 80, now Secretary, Re-
venue and Forests Department, Bombay, who was the Collector and
District Magistrate of Ahmednagar from November 1947 to February
1951. His evidence shows tha.t there was considerable communal ten-
sion in the District as well as in the town of Ahmednagar one of the
main causes being the presence of refugees from the western wing
848
of Pokistan: These refugees were lodged at a place called Visapur
about 26 miles away from Ahmednagar. They hB,ve been described
as "certainly not non-violent and quite turbulent", Another reason
for communal tension was incidents connected with razakar activity
in the neighbouring Hyderabad State which incidents affected both
the District and town of Ahmednagar.
16.121 As a matter of fact, Mr. Joshi's predecessor, Mr. H. A. Khan,
on September 13, 1947, made a report to Government pointing Qut that
the coming of about 10,000 refugees from the Punjab side would
create a difficult communal situation and he,suggested that the visits
by local leaders to the camp should be restricted and speeches relat-
ing to Punjab atrocities should be prohibited. He also pointed (Jut
that Ahmednagar District was on the borders of Hyderabad State and
people from that State were frequently coming to Ahmednagar and
were carrying on propaganda there; that up to that time the District
was frl-'e from communal disorders but if no check was kept cn the
of the refugees, it was likely that communal agitation would
flare up.
16.122 This gentleman. Mr. H. A. Khan, on November 6, 1947,
issued an order under section 144, Cr. P.C. prohibiting the importa-
tion, transportation or sale of consignments of knives and other sharp
edged weapons like daggers, spears, axes, either by post, rail way or
other means of conveyance without the previous permission of the
Magistrate. This is Ex. 148. Mr. Joshi sent a report to the Govern-
ment requesting extension of that order under section 144(6), Cr. p.e.
for an indefinite period (this is Ex. 149) and the order was extended.
The refugees in Visapur were getting restive. They wanted houses
and employment and they were agitating and taking out processions
to emphasise their demands.
16.123 There was throwing of bombs in Ahmednagar town;
were four bomb incidents;
1. 24th November 1947 on the Tazi in Kappad
Bazar.
2. 7th December in Vasant Talkies.
3. 14th December on the house of Kazi Subhanbhai.
4. 26th December on the Tatti Darwaza mosque.
These activities, this witness did not suspect as being directed
against the life of Mahatma Gandhi nor could he have any such sus-
picion. There was a procession on 3rd January, 1948 in which Madan
Lal took a prominent part. This witness was receiving weekly re-
ports from the police and was sending weekly reports to Government.
12.124 Some of the documents which have been exhibited before
Commission and to which the attention of this witness was drawn
may well be referred to at this stage. Documents about the orders
by Mr. Khan and the extension order under section 144(6) have
already been referred to. On December 15, 19.47. Mr. Joshi made .a
report to the Chief Secretary of Bombay PrOVlnce and a copy of It
was sent to the D.LG., C.r.D. This is Ex. 73. It relates to the bomb
whicb uras thrown in Kappad Bazar. This place was inspected by
Mr. Joshi and hl.' hus set out the damagl.' lhut it had cau:;l.'d and alsu
the measures wbidl had ordered to be taken by the C.LD. and the
D.S.P.
16.125 On January 2, 1948, Inspector Savant made a report to the
D.I.G., C.lD., Poona giving the facts of the case in regard to S. V.
against whom there was suspicion of murder of a woman in
Poona. This is Ex. 76. S. V. Ketkar was at that time working as a
manager of Karkare's boarding houses. S. V. Ketkar's house was
searched and quite a number of handgrenades, revolvers, daggers,
fuses, explosives and ammunition were found. Besides this, some gold
and silver ornaments were recovered and S. V. Ketkar was arrested.
His explanation to the police was that about a week earlier all these
things had been given to him by V. R. Karkare who was a Hindu
Mahasabha worker. The matter was reported to the D.S.P.,
nagar. A report was lodged under the Arms Act and Explosive Sub-
stances Act. Karkare's house was also searched but evidently noth-
ing incriminating was found there. The possession of explosive
stance is rather a serious matter but there is nothing to indicate that
this report was sent to the District Magistrate or was seen by him.
Mr. Joshi has stated that the D.S.P. had informed him of the recovery
of bombs from Ketkar's house and about the search conducted at his
house. S. V. Ketkar was prosecuted under Explosive Substances Act
and as no prosecution can be entertained without sanction, this wit-
ness must have seen the report. The matter is 20 years old and it
may be that the witness cannot now remember it.
16.126 Ex. 66 dated January' 4, 1948, is a confidential report sent
by A. S. Balkundi showing the taking out of a
sion by the refugees on January 3, led by Karkare. Kulkarni and
M<l.dan Lal-the first two being Hindu Mahasabha workers and the
latter a refugee. They were shouting slogans against Pakistan and
Muslimf> and 'Savarkar ki jai', The object of this procession was to
put pressure on the police because of their searching Karkare's house
and it was being said that Ketkar was being maltreated and pressuris-
ed in order to force him to implicate Karkare. This document also
refers to the procession marching to Khan Bahadur Sarosh's Garage
and thE'ir leaders being received by Sarosh and the arrival of the
trict Magistrate and the D.S.P. The District Magistrate tried to
pacify them by promising help but at the same time was firm ['gainst
their illegal activities. The District Magistrate has stated that Ex. G7'
was not brought to his notice. Mter his attention was drawn to
Ex. 66 of 4th January and Ex. 67 of January 29, 1968, the later was
also .-'I. report of Balkundi, the witness said that he had
met the processionists at Sarosh's Garage, but he did not know about
Ex. 66; nor was Ex. 67 brought to his notice. Ex. 67 mentions the fgct
that Madan Lal arrested at Delhi was probably the same person
whose activities were being watched in Ahmednagar.
16.127 On January 8, 1948. the witness submitted his weekly re-
port which is mentioned in Ex. 150. In this document it is stated
that S. V. Ketkar from whose possession the arms and ammunition
were found had stated that the articles had been given to him by
Karkare for being kept in his house about 8 days earlier thereby
involving Karkare. This information was conveyed to Mr, Morarj't
De!iai Lhrough.Lhe Home SecreLary, Mr. Dchejia, on January 12, 1948,
.and the same day Mr. Desai passed the following order:
"Immediate arrest of the persons concerned should have J:oeen
made re: 'A' and 'B' pp. 2 and 4 (B. refers to Karkare). Why
::!.:t;his not done? The n.M. might detain these people f:ven
It appear:s: that in pursuance of this order, the witness passed an

order for detention of Karkare on January 24, 1948. The letter from
the Home Department, Bombay to the witness directing him to make
an orde. made by the Home Minister on January 12 directing imme-

diate arrest of Karkare was not sent from the Bombay Secretariat till
the 19th and why the order for detention was not passed
earlier than the 24th January if it had to be passed at all.
aary and if the latter then no action should have been' taken. The
witneS3, in reply to the letter of the 19th asking him to explain why
he had not arre;;ted Karkare earlier, sent his explanation which is
Ex. 145 dated January 21, 1948. In this the witness has stated that
the reason for not arresting Karkare was that apart from the state-
ment of Ketkar implicating Karkare there was no evidence to con-
nect him with the offence and the D.S.P. did not think that to be
sufficient for the arrest of Karkare. On this statement the action
against Karkare was uncalled for. It shows some very slow thin:ting
and slower action. The activities of Karkare, even on the evidence
before this Commission, were not very peaceful or even legitimate.
preservation of law and order, then the situation created was such
that they should have been used unless the situation in Hyderabad
was such that the use of these powers would have added to commo-
tion and general insecurity. The Commission cannot ignore that
aspect of the evidence before it. But there is no evidence submittpd
to justify the conclusion that the hesitency partly or even wholly
attributable to the Razakar depredations. The document also men-
tions that according to the oral instructions sent to 'him he had
ordered the detention of four refugees who had taken part in the
procession on January 3, 1948.
16.128 Sub-Inspector Balkundi, witness No. 37. has stated 1"hat he

made a report to D.I.G., C.I.D., the detention or ex-
::re
document which is before the Commission is a coPy and does not
show what happened to it in the c.I.n. office and when it was sent
to the District Magistrate at Ahmednagar or the D.S.P. or whether
the orders were passed on the basis of this document.
16.129 The order detaining Madanlal is Ex. 42 dated January 16.
1948. This again is not clelil1' why if the Government order was o.n
January 3 and report of Sub-Inspector Balkundi was on January 4.
;j[)
1948, this detention order was ddaycd fur such a long lime. If lilt,
Governmeht had given oral instructions for detention on th(' ;lrd.
unless there was something very special on which the District M;lgl:;
trate wanted to be satisfied under the law, there does not sccm 1(1 11<'
any' rea;;un why the detention should have been so long d('I,I,VI'd
Eitg2r the refugees who were ordered to be detained wen' aetilli: III
a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public safety or tlH''y \\1'11
not. If they were, one would have expected immediatc ord(')':; tIl lw
passed and 1£ they were not, then the exercise of the POWt'I'S \\'11
improper, if not mala fide.
16.130 At this stage, it may be added that the Gover nlt'llt dut,S
not seem to. have asked Mr. Joshi as to why Madanlal's dl.'lelltiull
orders were issued so late 01' why he was not arrested but they rilll
evidently make an inquiry as to the reasons for and the circumst,\llt'('S
under which Karkare managed to escape from ;md
according to Sub-Inspector Balkundi, witness No. 37, he and Mad;mLiI
disappeared from Ahmednagar on or abou,t the 6th January. 'rhis
event must or at least should have a place in the Polic(' WCt'ldy
reports which unfortunately have not been produced.
16.131 The explanation of Mr. Joshi is Ex. 146 dated February 7,
1948. Therein it is stated that the report of the finding of arms was
received by him on January 3, 1948 and he was making plH.jllirit's
from t!le District Superintendent of Police as to whether Karkarl'
had any connection with the bomb explosions but he was told that
with the c:xception of Ketkar's statement there was no evidence. The
investigation had been entrusted to the Provincial C.LD., Foona, who
did ntn keep him in touch with the investigation and it was not rlue
to his mistake that Karkare escaped from Ahmednagar. He left
Ahmedn,Jgar as soon as Ketkar was arrested and his escape was
mainly due to the inaction of the C.LD. but even then he himself fel t
throughly ashamed but he had ordered the detention of 5 rcfu.L(I'{'S
and also he had ordered that whereabouts of Karkare sh'mId be
traced out.
16.132 'rile witness was also asked about Ex. 67 dated January 29,
1968. a document about which reference has been made in the
dence of SLib-Inspector A. S. Balkundi. In this document, Balkundi
had reported to the D.I.G., C.LD. that Madanlal who had been arrest-
ed in Delhi might be the same person who was operating in Ahmed-
nagar. The District Magistrate evidently had not seen this document
because it was never brought to his notice and he has stated that h'
did not know or suspect Madanlal who was arrested at Delhi of being
the same person as the one who was in Ahmednagar and that it was
after the murder that it became a common knowledge that ;1mongst
persons who were connected with Mahatma Gandhi's murder, were
Madanla! and Karkare and that they were the same persons Rgainst
whom detention orders were passed by him.
16.1S3 Some orders had been given about the detention of some
persons connected with R.S.S. and it was with l"I',L{nrd to them that
this witness talked to Mr. Morarji D('sai tlnd that was after th('
murder. If the use of telephonic ('olltl1l1ull('uLlon was possible (lfl('1
the murder, it was equally so 111'1'<1('(' lind It is difficult to see wh:\' till'
352
Government did not convey its orders for detention using that vehicle
of communication. But it was not done and that can only be n{plain-
ed on the usual secretarial procedural red tape of having everything
in writing. The witness has stated that Ex. 145 which he sent 10 the
Government was really the explanation of the D.S.P. which had blen
given to him and that he himself was very unhappy about the inci-
dent. In his view, Karkare should have been arrested on S. V. Ket-
kar·s arrest. But there is no explanation why it was not done. Most
of all, if Madanlal and Karkare were indulging in unlawful or barm-
ful and prejudicial activities, why proper watch on them was not kept
and who:!n they disappeared why no alarm was given or information
sent to the Provincial Police to trace them.
16.134 Also why no such action was taken after the warrants for
detention became impossible of execution is not explained.
16.135 The evidence of witnesses from Ahmednagar shows that
(1) there were bomb explosions there; (2) there was a strong anti-
Moslem movement there; (3) the refugees were restive and wanted
to be rehabilitated; (4) Hindu Mahasabha was using the refugees
for their own ends; (5) arms were found from S, V. Ketkar's house
which he alleged had come from Karkarej (6) the D.S.P. did not
think the explosive substances cases to be serious; (7) Karkare had
association with Godse and Apte of which the police was a\('are;
(8) there \\·as a full record of Madanlal's doings in Ahmednagar with
the Poiicej (9) Madanlal when arrested at Delhi was suspected by
Ahmednagar police to be the same who was operating in Ahmcd-
nagar; (10) the D.S.P. was apprised of this suspicion but it was either
not well founded or was not taken seriously; (11) Bombay Police did
not seek <lny information from Ahmednagar Police regarding
Karkal'e or Madanlal: (12) Karkare was acting under the aegi<; of the
Hindu Mahasabha but Sub-Inspector Balkundi did not know '....
he was sending money to Godse and Apte. Balkundi also stated that
and Apte used to meet Karkare at Ahmednagar. Their acti-
vities were watched but nothing was found against them. (13)
Inspector Balkundi also stated that he was called to Poona by
f'...Ir. Gurtu and his report dated February 9, 1948 shows that he gave
the information which was required from him. He gave a photo-
grapn of V. R. Karkare to Dy. Supdt. Chaubal on February 3, 1948.
He went to Poona on February, 7 as a result of a wireless message
su:nmoning him to Poona.
16.136 This evidence shows that had efforts been made carlier
either by the Delhi Police or the Bombay Police the complete record
of Karkare as well as of Madanlal would have been availablC' and if
a photograph had been publiShed in the newspapers, the Police of
Ahmednagar would have come to know about him and would have
been in a position to give the information. Commission would like to
add that issuing photographs of arrested persons is not always a very
wise mode of investigation because of the fear that identification
paradf!s or identification by witnesses might be held to be valueless.
CHAP'l'lm XVII
Razakllf Movement
17.1 The statements of Ahmednagar disLrict olTicials ..:iVt, a fairly
clear account of the Razakars and their depredations and Sp(lII;I\(lI,Y
activities and the consequential effect on the people of the dist.l'kt
J. S. Rane, wit. 40
17.2 The statement of Mr. J. S. Rane, witness No. 40 (pag('
who was the D.S.P. of Ahmednagar from October 1947 to April I!HH,
shows the conditions prevailing in Ahmednagal' during his [prill of
office. He has stated that he had an exciting time becauJ-;{' of [he
Hyderabad problem which was due to people coming frolll
Hydet'abad and causing excitement. He arrested some alld
had to go to the border areas because there were a numb£']" of in('i-
dents of arson and murder committed by Razuku1"S: sOllwtiml'S h..
had to be away from the headquarters for long periods unel stay at
the border areas.
R. C. Joshi. wit. 80
17.3 According to the District Magistrate Mr. R. C. Joshi. witn{'s.'{
No. 80 (page 2). there was border trouble due to Hydcrabad bpcaus('
of frequent acts of violence of the Razakars against the Ilf
Ahmednagar District which the Police had to watch. So prOmilH'llt
was the Razakar trouble in the minds of the district officials that they,
the District M'agistrate, Mr. R. C. Joshi, and others, connectcd tlw
bomb thrown on December 8. 1947, with it. Mr. Morarji Desai. Wit-
ness No. 96 has also stated that it was not the general population
which was arming itself but the people on the border with the hl'Jp
-of the R·.S.S. and that there was no such movement in the town itself.
Tllis statement of Mr. Morarji Desai tends to minimize the disturbt'd
and trot: blous conditions resulting from the Razakar movemen r. btl t
it is difficult to imagine that only a fringe of the population in th('Sl'
border districts agitated by Razakar deoreelations though P('!'-
haps only a few suffered as a result thereof. This is all the mo\'(' so
as it was agitating the whole country practically. He was dealing:
with the Razakar movement in his official capacity. He statl'd, "lh('
razaka1' was creating a kind of commotion amongst certain s0.ctiolis
of Hindus in these two districts specially because the ?'azakan; \\ C'l'e
in raids into the border villages of these two districts", lh"
two districts referred to in the statement being Ahmednagur awl
Sh.o!apur. The District Magistrate of Ahmednagar evid p ntly did
thmk that the trouble of the borders of the Nizam's State \\-a5 S('riOllH
and so did the D.S.P., so much so thQ.t even the bombs thrown in
Ahmednagar were taken by these gentlemen to have a Razabn mi-
gin. The reports of these officers contained in official files show tll(,
seriousness of the situation.
17.4 The report of the District Magistrate dated 12. i!I·17
shows the disturbed conditions resulting in munler. arson, ('utling III
crops, lifting of cattle and molestation ot wOITI('n. Thf'rl' WII'II II tlllPI'1
attack on village Khandoi on hordl"'l·H. On .lnnlllll'y 1\,
333
354
1948 there was firing on village Jainpur. The weekly letter of Janu-
ary 12, 1943 shows the number of murders, rapes, et;c. in HydeJ.:ubad
State itself which could not but cause commotion amongst the Hir.dus
of the bordering districts if not of the Hindus of the whole
tra as also in the rest of India.
17.5 Razakar trouble in Hyderabad State, the atrocities committed
0':) Hindus in Pakistan and including those who were fleeing from
the inferno, caused a strong reaction in India. In the Marathi-
areas of Bombay Province there was a strong though not so
numerous a militant group, a section of the Hindu Mahasabha which
could not bear all these atrocities on their co-religionists and
quiet or quiescent. They never liked the Congress policy of non-
violence and still less what they considered the policy of appeasement.
This added to their dislike of the Congress and Congress leaders Elnd
a fillip to Savarkar's school of thought. They started arms coilection..
for Hyderabad State and made every effort to do so even in breClch
of the provision of the Arms Act; so much so that the D.S.P. of
AhmecinagDr requested the District Magistrate' to promulgate a pro-
hibitory order under section 144, Cr.P.C. against import, export or
tran300rt of arms. This order was later extended under s,'ction
144(6j, Cr.P.C. by Government. (Ex. 148-original order). Whether,
in view of the dangers to which the Hindu inhabit;mts of the State
of Hyderabad and those residing on its borders in Bombay Province
were exposed, this was a wise or unwise policy or whether an admin-
istration, which could not protect its citizens against desperadoes
who had assumed the role of Ghazis. should have acted in thi'S manner
or not is not a matter on which the Commission is called upon to
expr2ss its opinion. The fact remains that there were Indian agencies,
some genuine and others not So altruistic, which considered the col-
lection of arms and supplying them to people who were bemg
subjected to lust and blood thirsty greed of fanatical religionists as
the proper answer and took active steps to put their plan of meeting
the"menace into operation by procuring and supplying arms. This
also gave an opportunity to use this menace as a facade by the Hir!du
Mahasabha for their anti-Congress propaganda.
17.6 Amongst those who advocated the supply of arms plctce
of prominence goes to the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha, but f>":en
some Congressmen did not hesitate to join the cry for arming the
people. Mr. H. B. Bhide in his speech at Belgaum on the occasion
of protesting against the Direct Action Day (on May 23. 1947),
B3.1$l1astri Hardas at Nasik vide weekly letter of May 24. 194'7: (>r::1
Mr. Ashubsh Lahiry and Mr. V. B. Gogte. all members of the Hindu
Mahasab l18. advocated collection of arms· They got the support of
Mr. K. M. .Jedhe in January or February 1948. And in January 1948
BfTukaka Kanitkar extended his weighty support which was further
buttressed l::y the resolution of tDe Maharashtra Provincial Con!'!l,'('':s
Committ0C', referr",d to in the speech of Mr. V. B. Gogte. Ex. 214 dated
January 6. 1948. Ex. 211-A contains on various accounts of
oersons collecting and selling arms in widely distant places: e.g .•
Manma:d. Satara, Landa. Godhra and Bijaour, and also speeches of
Messrs. A''lnasahib Shinde. Nagre. V. B. Gogte and Joshi, showing a
!mectrum of political opinion.

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REPORT

1-259 HA. [digitised by sacw.net]

('ll1Ipll'r XVII' dl'als wlih ('01H1i!lulls in nOlllhnv

1.20 Findings have been given in Chapter XXVI.

adversary system it's presumed that if each side produces

2.12 Qn January, 1948 a meeting under the auspices of the Hindu

2.21 Two sets of investigations, independent of each other, were'

2.22 The First Information Report under sections 4 and 5 of

2.23 Before the First Information Report was actually recorded

2.24 On the 21st January a remand of 15 days was obtained,

2.25 On further enquiry it was discovered that the number of the

2.40 The murder of Mahatma Gandhi, who was acknowledged to·

3.2 The object of this meeting, according to Mr. R. N. Bannerjee

:l.4 The confessional statement of Madanlal was read by Mr.

Mr. Bannerjee again repeated that the words, "PHIR AYEGA",

3.36 Paragraph 4 sets out the protective measures taken at Birla

evidence lOOlept lhls crypl1c reference. 0 questiOns weI'e put to

whleh is annexure I, Ex. 8. Bu.t these letters make no JReDticm of

/lSkcd Mr. NaprvalL

wholly dunned to think of giving much atlentlcm to Nqarvala's

youth were mentioned.

(viii) The proposal to seuclI p8IWIIs goIDf; to the prayer meet-

(x) NagarvDID told them tbat he had 10000ted 3or4 perIOIIlend

Two lette7'S of Mr. J. D. Nagaroola

Knl'lt:1I'(,'s ]'('ndp7,vous in Bombay was known to the Police

Short notice question No. 8'64

Kamte's Letters and Rana's replies

'vhich were revealed later, the culprits h<1d out on the

:>.4 V. R. Karkare belonged to Ahmednagar. He owned a hotel, the

5.5 Of the accused, Madanlal threw a bomb or ignited a gun·

5.6 According to the judgment of the trial court the investiga-

5.9 The story of the prosecution was that a conspiracy to murder

2711 C-Anothcl" picture of the pislol

(See Exhibit 276 and Exhibit 276-A).

5.14 On return to Bombay on January 23, Apte stayed at the

:;.34 The Commission has appended to this portion a COpy cf the

5.38 The second term refers to any communication by such per-

5.44 If the scope of the Commission is only to be circumscribed

ary, means a combination of persons for an evil or unlawful purpose;

5.4:7 In the notification, the word used in clause (a) is 'conspiracy'

Godse and others to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi. Even according I

5.55 In his statement before the Commission in answer to a

ii.59 Professor Jain has deposed with regard to the conspiracy

!i fiO Itwould be relevant to mention that what Professor Jain

!i,lll The debate in Parliament and the story disclosed by Mr

6.1 It will be helpful if the background of the various accused

6.3 au January 2 or 3, 1948, Godse and Apte went to Ahmed-

6.11 It is not necessary to go further back than January 1948.

6.13 On 31st January, 1948, Apte and Karkare left Delhi by

6.15 He was mentioned by S. V. Ketkar as the person who had

6.22 On 29th January, Karkare went to Birla Dharmshala and

6.26 After the explosion on the 20th he stayed at the Frontier

Karkare and then returned to Poona.

(1,29 It is not necessary to set out Shankar's movements because

7.4 In a. criminal case, the matter substantially and materially

7.5 In the trial of the Gandhi Murder Case, or at the appellate

'Ul It may be remarked that res judica.ta in Criminal cases has

7.12 This Commission is not sitting as a Court of Appeal against

7.13 As has been said. the rule of res judicata is inapplicable