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One World, Rival Theories

Author(s): Jack Snyder
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 145 (Nov. - Dec., 2004), pp. 52-62
Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC
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 ne orld,
RivalTeorie
relationsissupposedto tellus howtheworldworks.
Thestudjof international
fall short.Buttheycanpuncture
It'sa tallorder,andeventhebesttheories
illusionsandstripawaythesimplisticbrandnames-suchas "neocons"or "lib-
foreign-poliy debates.Evenin a radically
eralhawks" thatdominate
changingworld,theclassictheorieshavea lot to saqy. By Jack Snyder

he U.S. governmenthas enduredsev- approaches: realism, liberalism, and an updated

eral painful rounds of scrutiny as it form of idealism called "constructivism." Walt
tries to figure out what went wrong argued that these theories shape both public dis-
on Sept. 11, 2001. The intelligence course and policy analysis. Realism focuses on
community faces radical restructuring;the military the shifting distribution of power among states.
has made a sharppivot to face a new enemy; and a Liberalismhighlights the rising number of democ-
vast new federalagencyhas blossomedto coordinate racies and the turbulence of democratic transi-
homeland security.But did Septem-
ber 11 signal a failure of theory on
par with the failures of intelligence
and policy? Familiartheories about
how the world works still dominate
academic debate. Instead of radical
change,academiahas adjustedexist-
ing theories to meet new realities.
Has this approachsucceeded?Does
international relations theory still
have somethingto tell policymakers?
Six years ago, political scien-
tist Stephen M. Walt published a
0B much-cited survey of the field in
cr
these pages ("One World, Many
Theories," Spring 1998). He
0rr sketched out three dominant
CL
..J
O

0z JackSnyderis theRobertandReneeBelfer
rr,
U) professor of international relations at
ColumbiaUniversity.
NOVEMBER IDECEMBER 2004 53
52 FOREIGN POLICY
 One World, Rival Theories

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to Practice

tions. Idealism illuminates the changing norms of Internationalrelations theory also shapes and
sovereignty, human rights, and international jus- informsthe thinkingof the public intellectualswho
tice, as well as the increased potency of religious translateand disseminateacademicideas.Duringthe
ideas in politics. summer of 2004, for example, two influential
The influence of these intellectual constructs framers of neoconservative thought, columnist
extendsfar beyonduniversityclassroomsand tenure Charles Krauthammerand political scientist Fran-
committees.Policymakersand publiccommentators cis Fukuyama, collided over the implications of
invoke elementsof all these theorieswhen articulat- these conceptual paradigmsfor U.S. policy in Iraq.
ing solutions to global securitydilemmas.President Backingthe Bush administration'sMiddle East pol-
GeorgeW. Bush promisesto fight terrorby spread- icy, Krauthammerarguedfor an assertiveamalgam
ing liberaldemocracyto the Middle East and claims of liberalismand realism, which he called "demo-
that skeptics "who call themselves'realists'....have cratic realism."Fukuyamaclaimedthat Krautham-
lost contactwith a fundamentalreality"that "Amer- mer's faith in the use of force and the feasibilityof
ica is always more secure when freedom is on the democraticchange in Iraq blinds him to the war's
march."Strikinga moreeclectictone, National Secu- lack of legitimacy, a failing that "hurts both the
rity Advisor Condoleezza Rice, a former Stanford realistpart of our agenda, by diminishingour actu-
Universitypoliticalscienceprofessor,explainsthatthe al power, and the idealist portion of it, by under-
new Bushdoctrineis an amalgamof pragmaticreal- cutting our appeal as the embodiment of certain
ism and Wilsonianliberaltheory.During the recent ideas and values."
presidential campaign, Sen. John Kerry sounded Indeed, when realism, liberalism, and idealism
remarkablysimilar:"Ourforeignpolicyhas achieved enter the policymaking arena and public debate,
greatness," he said, "only when it has combined they can sometimes become intellectual window
realismand idealism." dressingfor simplisticworldviews. Properlyunder-
54 FOREIGN POLICY
 stood, however,their policy implications are subtle (Mindful of the overwhelming importance of U.S.
and multifaceted.Realisminstillsa pragmaticappre- power to Europe's development, Joffe once called
ciation of the role of power but also warns that the United States "Europe'spacifier.")China'scur-
states will suffer if they overreach.Liberalismhigh- rent foreign policy is grounded in realist ideas that
lights the cooperative potential of mature democ- date back millennia. As China modernizesits econ-
racies, especially when working together through omy and enters international institutions such as
effective institutions, but it also notes democracies' the World Trade Organization, it behaves in a way
tendency to crusade against tyrannies and the that realistsunderstandwell: developingits military
propensityof emergingdemocraciesto collapse into slowly but surely as its economic power grows, and
violent ethnic turmoil. Idealismstresses that a con- avoiding a confrontation with superiorU.S. forces.
sensus on values must underpinany stable political Realismgets some thingsrightaboutthe post-9/11
order,yet it also recognizesthat forging such a con- world. The continued centralityof militarystrength
sensusoften requiresan ideologicalstrugglewith the and the persistenceof conflict,evenin this age of glob-
potential for conflict. al economic interdependence,does not surprisereal-
Each theory offers a filter for looking at a com- ists. The theory'smost obvious successis its abilityto
plicated picture. As such, they help explain the explain the United States'forceful militaryresponse
assumptionsbehind political rhetoricabout foreign to the September11 terroristattacks.When a state
policy. Even more important, the theories act as a grows vastlymore powerfulthan any opponent,real-
powerful check on each other.Deployed effectively, ists expect that it will eventuallyuse that power to
they revealthe weaknessesin argumentsthat can lead expand its sphereof domination,whetherfor securi-
to misguidedpolicies. ty, wealth, or other motives. The United States
employedits militarypower in what some deemedan
imperialfashion in large part becauseit could.
IS REALISM STILL REALISTIC? It is harderfor the normally state-centricrealists
At realism's core is the belief that international to explain why the world's only superpower
affairs is a strugglefor power among self-interested announced a war against al Qaeda, a nonstate ter-
states. Although some of realism's leading lights, rorist organization.How can realisttheory account
notably the late Universityof Chicago political sci- for the importanceof powerful and violent individ-
entist Hans J. Morgenthau, are deeply pessimistic uals in a world of states?Realists point out that the
about human nature, it is not a theory of despair. central battles in the "war on terror" have been
Clearsightedstatescan mitigatethe causes of war by fought againsttwo states (Afghanistanand Iraq),and
finding ways to reduce the danger
they pose to each other.Nor is real-
ism necessarily amoral; its advo-
cates emphasize that a ruthless Inliberaldemocracies,realismis thetheorythat
pragmatismabout power can actu-
ally yield a more peaceful world, if everyonelovesto hate.Itclaimsto beanantidote
not an ideal one.
In liberal democracies, realism tothenaivebeliefthatinternationalinstitutions
is the theory that everyone loves to
hate. Developed largely by Euro- andlawalonecanpreserve peace.
pean 6migr6s at the end of World
War II, realism claimed to be an
antidote to the naive belief that international insti- that states,not the UnitedNations or Human Rights
tutions and law alone can preserve peace, a mis- Watch, have led the fight against terrorism.
conception that this new generation of scholars Even if realists acknowledge the importance of
believed had paved the way to war. In recent nonstate actors as a challenge to their assumptions,
decades, the realist approach has been most fully the theory still has importantthingsto say about the
articulated by U.S. theorists, but it still has broad behaviorand motivations of these groups. The real-
appeal outside the United States as well. The influ- ist scholar Robert A. Pape, for example, has argued
ential writer and editor Josef Joffe articulately that suicide terrorism can be a rational, realistic
comments on Germany'sstrong realist traditions. strategy for the leadership of national liberation
NOVEMBER IDECEMBER 2004 55
 One World, Rival Theories

movements seeking to expel democratic powers multilateral institutions and treaty regimes-not
that occupy their homelands. Other scholars apply what standard realist theory predicts.
standard theories of conflict in anarchy to explain These conceptual difficulties notwithstanding,
ethnic conflict in collapsed states. Insights from realism is alive, well, and creatively reassessing
political realism-a profound and wide-ranging how its root principles relate to the post-9/11
intellectual tradition rooted in the enduring phi- world. Despite changing configurations of power,
losophy of Thucydides, Niccol6 Machiavelli, and realists remain steadfast in stressing that policy
Thomas Hobbes-are hardly rendered obsolete must be based on positions of real strength,not on
because some nonstate groups are now able to either empty bravado or hopeful illusions about a
resort to violence. world without conflict. In the run-up to the recent
Post-9/11 developments seem to undercut one Iraq war, several prominent realists signed a pub-
of realism's core concepts: the balance of power. lic letter criticizingwhat they perceivedas an exer-
Standard realist doctrine predicts that weaker cise in American hubris. And in the continuing
states will ally to protect themselves from stronger aftermath of that war, many prominent thinkers
ones and thereby form and reform a balance of called for a return to realism. A group of scholars
power. So, when Germany unified in the late 19th and public intellectuals (myself included) even
formed the Coalition for a Realis-
tic Foreign Policy, which calls for
a more modest and prudent
hassucha powerful
Liberalism that
presence approach. Its statement of princi-
ples argues that "the move toward
theentireU.S.political from
spectrum, empiremustbe haltedimmediately."
The coalition, though politically
tohuman
neoconservatives advocates,
rights diverse,is largelyinspiredby realist
theory.Its membershipof seeming-
assumesitas largelyself-evident. ly odd bedfellows-including for-
mer DemocraticSen.GaryHartand
Scott McConnell,the executiveedi-
century and became Europe'sleading military and tor of the American Conservativemagazine-illus-
industrial power, Russia and France (and later, tratesthe power of internationalrelationstheoryto
Britain) soon aligned to counter its power. Yet no cut through often ephemeral political labels and
combination of states or other powers can chal- carrydebate to the underlyingassumptions.
lenge the United States militarily, and no balanc-
ing coalition is imminent. Realists are scrambling
to find a way to fill this hole in the center of their THE DIVIDED HOUSE OF LIBERALISM
theory. Some theorists speculate that the United The liberal school of internationalrelationstheory,
States'geographicdistance and its relativelybenign whose most famous proponents were German
intentions have tempered the balancing instinct. philosopher Immanuel Kant and U.S. President
Second-tier powers tend to worry more about WoodrowWilson,contendsthat realismhas a stunt-
their immediate neighbors and even see the Unit- ed visionthatcannot accountfor progressin relations
ed States as a helpful source of stability in regions between nations. Liberalsforesee a slow but inex-
such as East Asia. Other scholars insist that armed orable journey away from the anarchic world the
resistance by U.S. foes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and realists envision, as trade and finance forge ties
elsewhere, and foot-dragging by its formal allies between nations, and democratic norms spread.
actually constitute the beginnings of balancing Becauseelectedleadersare accountableto the people
against U.S. hegemony.The United States' strained (who bear the burdensof war), liberalsexpect that
relations with Europe offer ambiguous evidence: democracieswill not attackeachotherandwill regard
Frenchand Germanopposition to recent U.S. poli- eachother'sregimesas legitimateand nonthreatening.
cies could be seen as classic balancing, but they do Many liberalsalso believe that the rule of law and
not resist U.S. dominance militarily.Instead, these transparencyof democraticprocessesmakeit easierto
states have tried to undermine U.S. moral legiti- sustain internationalcooperation, especially when
macy and constrain the superpower in a web of thesepracticesareenshrinedin multilateral
institutions.
56 FOREIGN POLICY
 Liberalismhas such a powerfulpresencethat the on several measures of democratization and the
entire U.S. political spectrum, from neoconserva- rule of law. The White House'ssteadfastsupportfor
tives to humanrightsadvocates,assumesit as large- promoting democracy in the Middle East-even
ly self-evident.Outsidethe UnitedStates,as well, the with turmoilin Iraqand rising anti-Americanismin
liberalview that only electedgovernmentsare legit- the Arab world-demonstrates liberalism's emo-
imate and politicallyreliablehas taken hold. So it is tional and rhetoricalpower.
no surprisethat liberalthemesareconstantlyinvoked In many respects,liberalism'sclaim to be a wise
as a responseto today's securitydilemmas.But the policy guide has plenty of hard data behindit. Dur-
last severalyearshave also produceda fiercetug-of- ing the last two decades, the proposition that dem-
war between disparate strains of liberal thought. ocratic institutionsand values help states cooperate
Supportersand criticsof the Bushadministration,in with each other is among the most intensivelystud-
particular,have emphasizedvery differentelements ied in all of internationalrelations, and it has held
of the liberalcanon. up reasonablywell. Indeed, the belief that democ-
For its part, the Bush administrationhighlights racies never fight wars against each other is the
democracypromotionwhile largelyturningits back closestthingwe have to an iron law in social science.
on the international institutions that most liberal But the theory has some very important corol-
theorists champion. The U.S. National Security laries,which the Bushadministrationglosses over as
Strategyof September2002, famous for its support it draws upon the democracy-promotionelementof
of preventivewar, also dwells on the need to pro- liberal thought. Columbia University political sci-
mote democracy as a means of fighting terrorism entist Michael W. Doyle's articles on democratic
and promoting peace. The Millennium Challenge peace warned that, though democraciesnever fight
program allocates part of U.S. foreign aid accord- each other,they are proneto launchmessianicstrug-
ing to how well countriesimprovetheirperformance gles againstwarlikeauthoritarianregimesto "make
NOVEMBER I DECEMBER 2004 57
 One World, Rival Theories

the world safe for democracy." It was precisely Nor is it clear to contemporaryliberal scholars
Americandemocracy'stendencyto oscillatebetween that nascentdemocracyand economicliberalismcan
self-righteouscrusadingand jaded isolationismthat always cohabitate. Free trade and the multifaceted
promptedearlyCold Warrealists'call for a more cal- globalization that advanced democracies promote
culated, prudent foreign policy. often buffet transitional societies. World markets'
Countriestransitioningto democracy,with weak penetration of societies that run on patronage and
politicalinstitutions,are more likelythan otherstates protectionism can disrupt social relations and spur
to get into internationaland civil wars. In the last 15 strifebetween potential winnersand losers. In other
years, wars or large-scale civil violence followed cases, universal free trade can make separatism
experimentswith mass electoraldemocracyin coun- look attractive, as small regions such as Aceh in
tries includingArmenia,Burundi,Ethiopia,Indone- Indonesia can lay claim to lucrative natural
sia, Russia, and the formerYugoslavia.In part, this resources.So far,the trade-fueledboom in Chinahas
violence is caused by ethnic groups' competing created incentives for improved relations with the
advanced democracies, but it has
also set the stage for a possible
showdown between the relatively
While thevirtues
advocating
aggressively of wealthy coastal entrepreneursand
the still impoverishedruralmasses.
democracy, hasshown
theBushadministration While aggressively advocating
the virtues of democracy,the Bush
forliberalism's
littlepatience emphasisonthe administration has shown little
patience for these complexities in
importance ofinternational
institutions. liberal thought-or for liberalism's
emphasis on the importance of
internationalinstitutions.Farfrom
demands for national self-determination, often a trying to assureother powers that the United States
problemin new, multiethnicdemocracies.More fun- would adhere to a constitutional order, Bush
damental,emergingdemocraciesoften have nascent "unsigned"the InternationalCriminalCourtstatute,
political institutions that cannot channel popular rejected the Kyoto environmentalagreement, dic-
demandsin constructivedirectionsor crediblyenforce tated take-it-or-leave-it arms control changes to
compromises among rival groups. In this setting, Russia, and invaded Iraq despite opposition at the
democratic accountability works imperfectly,and United Nations and among close allies.
nationalistpoliticianscan hijack public debate. The Recentliberaltheoryoffersa thoughtfulchallenge
violencethat is vexingthe experimentwith democracy to the administration'spolicy choices. Shortlybefore
in Iraqis justthe latestchapterin a turbulentstorythat September11, political scientist G. John Ikenberry
began with the FrenchRevolution. studied attemptsto establishinternationalorderby
Contemporary liberaltheory also points out that the victors of hegemonic struggles in 1815, 1919,
the rising democratic tide creates the presumption 1945, and 1989. He arguedthat even the most pow-
that all nations ought to enjoy the benefits of self- erfulvictorneededto gain the willing cooperationof
determination.Those left out may undertakeviolent the vanquishedand other weak states by offeringa
campaigns to secure democratic rights. Some of mutually attractivebargain,codified in an interna-
these movements directtheir strugglesagainst dem- tional constitutional order. Democratic victors, he
ocratic or semidemocraticstates that they consider found, have the best chance of creating a working
occupyingpowers-such as in Algeriain the 1950s, constitutionalorder,such as the BrettonWoods sys-
or Chechnya, Palestine,and the Tamil region of Sri tem after World War Ii, becausetheir transparency
Lankatoday. Violence may also be directedat dem- and legalismmake their promisescredible.
ocratic supportersof oppressiveregimes,much like Does the Bush administration's resistance to
the U.S. backing of the governments of Saudi Ara- institution building refute Ikenberry'sversion of
bia and Egypt. Democratic regimesmake attractive liberal theory? Some realists say it does, and that
targets for terroristviolence by national liberation recent events demonstrate that international insti-
movements precisely because they are accountable tutions cannot constrain a hegemonic power if its
to a cost-conscious electorate. preferences change. But international institutions
58 FOREIGN POLICY
The Leading Brands

Theories: Realism Liberalism Idealism

(Constructivism)

ofdemocracy,
Spread International isshaped
politics
Self-interested
states
compete economic
global ties,and bypersuasive collective
ideas,
Core Beliefs international will andsocial
forpower
andsecurity organizations culture,
values,
strengthen
peace identities

Key Actors in which

States, behave
similarly States,
Promoters
ofnewideas,
international
institutions,transnational
activist
networks,
International oftheir
regardless typeof
andcommercial
interests andnongovernmental
Relations government
organizations

Main Military andstate

power International
institutions
and
commerce andvalues
Ideas
Instruments diplomacy global

Doesn't
account
forprogress Failstounderstand
that
Theory's andchangeininternational democratic survive
regimes only Does
notexplain
which
power
Intellectual Blind relations
orunderstanding
that iftheysafeguard
military
power structures
and
social
conditions
canbeasource
of andsecurity;
someliberals
forget
Spots
legitimacy todemocracy allow
thattransitions forchanges
invalues
military
power aresometimes
violent

What the Theory WhytheUnitedStates Theincreasing

role
ofpolemics
to Why spreading has
democracy
responded
aggressively about theimportance
values; of
Explains About terrorist theinability
attacks; of
becomesuchanintegral
partof
transnational networks
political
the Post-9/II current
U.S.
international
secu-
international
institutions
to terrorists
(whether orhuman
restrain
military
superiority rity
strategy advocates)
World rights

What the Theory Thefailure

ofsmaller
powersto
balance
theUnited theUnited
States Whyhuman abuses
rights
militarily Why has
Fails to Explain theimportance
ofnon- failed
towork
with
other
democ- continue, intense
despite
States; activism
forhumanitarian
About the suchasalQaeda;
stateactors racies international
through
theintense
U.S.
focuson normsandefforts
for
organizations international
Post-9/I IWorld democratization justice

can nonetheless help coordinate outcomes that tutional order remainpowerful. Sooner or later,the
are in the long-term mutual interest of both the pendulum will swing back.
hegemon and the weaker states. Ikenberrydid not
contend that hegemonic democracies are immune
from mistakes. States can act in defiance of the IDEALISM'S NEW CLOTHING
incentives established by their position in the inter- Idealism,the belief that foreign policy is and should
national system, but they will suffer the conse- be guided by ethical and legal standards,also has a
quences and probably learn to correct course. In long pedigree.BeforeWorldWar II forced the Unit-
response to Bush's unilateralist stance, Ikenberry ed Statesto acknowledge a less pristinereality,Sec-
wrote that the incentives for the United States to retaryof State Henry Stimson denigratedespionage
take the lead in establishing a multilateral consti- on the grounds that "gentlemen do not read each
NOVEMBER IDECEMBER 2004 59
 One World, Rival Theories

other'smail."Duringthe ColdWar,suchnaiveide- Forconstructivists,internationalchangeresults

alismacquireda badnamein the Kissingerian cor- from the work of intellectualentrepreneurs who
ridorsof powerandamonghardheaded academics. proselytizenew ideasand "name and shame"actors
Recently,a new versionof idealism-called con- whose behaviordeviatesfromacceptedstandards.
structivism by its scholarlyadherents-returned to a Consequently, constructivists
oftenstudytheroleof
prominentplace in debateson internationalrela- transnationalactivistnetworks-such as Human
tionstheory.Constructivism, whichholdsthatsocial RightsWatchor theInternational Campaignto Ban
realityis created throughdebate aboutvalues,often Landmines-in promotingchange. Such groups
echoesthe themesthat humanrightsand interna- typicallyuncoverand publicizeinformationabout
tionaljusticeactivistssound.Recenteventsseemto violations of legal or moral standardsat least
vindicate the theory'sresurgence;a theory that rhetoricallysupportedby powerfuldemocracies,
emphasizesthe roleof ideologies,identities,persua- including"disappearances" duringthe Argentine
sion,andtransnational networksis highlyrelevantto military'srule in the late 1970s, concentration
the
understanding post-9/11world. campsin Bosnia,and the hugenumberof civilian
Themostprominent voicesin thedevelopment of deathsfromlandmines.Thispublicityis thenused
constructivist theory have been American, but to pressgovernmentsto adopt specificremedies,
Europe'sroleis significant.Europeanphilosophical such as the establishmentof a war crimestribunal
currents helpedestablishconstructivist theory,andthe or the adoptionof a landminetreaty.Thesemove-
European Journalof InternationalRelationsis oneof mentsoftenmakepragmaticargumentsas well as
theprincipaloutletsforconstructivist work.Perhaps idealisticones, but their distinctivepowercomes
most important,Europe'sincreasinglylegalistic fromtheabilityto highlightdeviationsfromdeeply
approachto international relations,reflectedin the held normsof appropriatebehavior.
process of forming the
EuropeanUnionout of a
collection of sovereign
states,providesfertilesoil
for idealistand construc-
tivistconceptionsof inter-
nationalpolitics.
Whereasrealistsdwell
on the balanceof power
andliberalson the power
of international tradeand
democracy, constructivists
believethatdebatesabout
ideas are the fundamen-
tal building blocks of
international life.Individ-
uals and groups become
powerfulif theycan con-
vinceothersto adopttheir
ideas. People's under-
standing of their interests
depends on the ideas they hold. Constructivistsfind Progressivecauses receivethe most attention
absurdthe idea of some identifiableand immutable from constructivistscholars,but the theoryalso
"national interest," which some realists cherish. helps explain the dynamicsof illiberaltransna-
Especially in liberal societies, there is overlap tionalforces,suchas Arabnationalismor Islamist
between constructivist and liberal approaches, but extremism.ProfessorMichaelN. Barnett's1998
the two are distinct. Constructivists contend that book Dialoguesin ArabPolitics:Negotiationsin
their theory is deeper than realism and liberalism Regional Order examines how the divergence
because it explains the origins of the forces that betweenstatebordersandtransnational Arabpolit-
drive those competing theories. icalidentitiesrequiresvulnerableleadersto contend
60 FOREIGN POLICY
for legitimacy with radicals throughout the Arab shared understanding highlights the need for dia-
world-a dynamic that often holds moderates logue across cultures about the appropriate rules of
hostage to opportunists who take extreme stances. the game. This prescription dovetails with liberalism's
Constructivist thought can also yield broader emphasis on establishing an agreed international
insights about the ideas and values in the current constitutional order. And, yet, the notion of cross-
international order. In his 2001 book, Revolutions cultural dialogue sits awkwardly with many idealists'
in Sovereignty:How Ideas Shaped Modern Inter- view that they already know right and wrong. For
national Relations, political scientist Daniel Philpott these idealists, the essential task is to shame rights
demonstrates how the religious ideas of the Protes- abusers and cajole powerful actors into promoting
tant Reformation helped break down the medieval proper values and holding perpetrators accountable
political order and provided a conceptual basis for to international (generally Western) standards. As
the modern system of secular sovereign states. After with realism and liberalism, constructivism can be
September 11, Philpott focused on the challenge to many things to many people.
the secular international order posed by political
Islam. "The attacks and the broader resurgence of
STUMPED BY CHANGE
public religion," he says, ought to lead internation-
al relations scholars to "direct far more energy to None of the three theoretical traditions has a strong
understanding the impetuses behind movements ability to explain change-a significant weakness
across the globe that are reorienting purposes and in such turbulent times. Realists failed to predict the
policies." He notes that both liberal human rights end of the Cold War, for example. Even after it hap-
movements and radical Islamic movements have pened, they tended to assume that the new system
transnational structures and principled motivations would become multipolar ("back to the future," as
the scholar John J.
Mearsheimer put it).
Likewise, the liberal the-
ory of democratic peace
is stronger on what hap-
pens after states become
democratic than in pre-
dicting the timing of
democratic transitions,
let alone prescribing how
to make transitions hap-
pen peacefully. Con-
structivists are good at
describing changes in
norms and ideas, but
they are weak on the
material and institution-
al circumstances neces-
sary to support the emer-
gence of consensus about
new values and ideas.
that challenge the traditional supremacy of self- With such uncertain guidance from the theo-
interested states in international politics. Because retical realm, it is no wonder that policymakers,
constructivists believe that ideas and values helped activists, and public commentatorsfall prey to sim-
shape the modern state system, they expect intellec- plistic or wishful thinking about how to effect
tual constructs to be decisive in transforming it-for change by, say, invadingIraq or setting up an Inter-
good or ill. national Criminal Court. In lieu of a good theory
When it comes to offering advice, however, con- of change, the most prudent course is to use the
structivism points in two seemingly incompatible insightsof each of the threetheoreticaltraditionsas
directions. The insight that political orders arise from a check on the irrationalexuberanceof the others.
NOVEMBER I DECEMBER 2004 61
 One World, Rival Theories

Realists should have to explain whether policies Theories of international relations claim to
based on calculationsof power have sufficientlegit- explain the way international politics works, but
imacy to last. Liberals should consider whether each of the currently prevailing theories falls well
nascent democratic institutions can fend off pow- short of that goal. One of the principal contribu-
erful interests that oppose them, or how interna- tions that international relations theory can make
tional institutions can bind a hegemonic power is not predicting the future but providing the
inclinedto go its own way. Idealistsshould be asked vocabularyand conceptualframeworkto ask hard
about the strategic, institutional, or material con- questions of those who think that changing the
ditions in which a set of ideas is likely to take hold. world is easy. 1H

Wantto KnowMore?

Stephen M. Walt's "InternationalRelations: One World, Many Theories" (FOREIGNPOLICY,

Spring 1998) is a valuable survey of the field. For a more recent survey,see RobertJervis, "Theo-
ries of War in an Era of LeadingPower Peace" (AmericanPolitical ScienceReview, March 2002).

ImportantrecentrealistcontributionsincludeJohnJ. Mearsheimer'sThe Tragedyof GreatPower

Politics (New York:Norton, 2001) and FareedZakaria,From Wealthto Power: The Unusual Ori-
gins of America's World Role (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1998). Important realist-
inspiredanalyses of post-9/11 issues include "The StrategicLogic of SuicideTerrorism"(American
Political ScienceReview, August 2003), by Robert A. Pape; "The CompulsiveEmpire"(FOREIGN
POLICY,July/August 2003), by Robert Jervis; and "An Unnecessary War " (FOREIGNPOLICY,Jan-
uary/February2003), by John Mearsheimerand StephenWalt. Read about a currenteffort to inject
realism into U.S. foreign policy at the Web site of the Coalition for a RealisticForeignPolicy. For
a worriedlook at the realistresurgence,see LawrenceE Kaplan,"Springtimefor Realism"(TheNew
Republic,June 21, 2004).

Recentadditionsto the liberalcanon are BruceRussettandJohn R. Oneal'sTriangulatingPeace:

Democracy,Interdependence,and InternationalOrganizations (New York:Norton, 2001) and G.
John Ikenberry'sAfter Victory:Institutions, StrategicRestraint,and the Rebuilding of OrderAfter
Major Wars (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2001). To read about the dangersof democra-
tization in countrieswith weak institutions,see EdwardD. Mansfield and Jack Snyder,Electing to
Fight: Why EmergingDemocracies Go to War (Cambridge:MIT Press,2005) and Zakaria'sThe
Future of Freedom:Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York:W.W.Norton & Co.,
2003). Charles Krauthammerand FrancisFukuyamatussle over strains of liberalismin a recent
exchange.Krauthammermakesthe case for spreadingdemocracyin "DemocraticRealism:An Amer-
ican Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World," an address to the American EnterpriseInstitute, and
Fukuyamaresponds in "The Neoconservative Moment," (The National Interest, Summer2004).
Krauthammer'srejoinder,"In Defense of DemocraticRealism" (The National Interest,Fall 2004),
counters Fukuyama'sclaims.

Read more on constructivismin AlexanderWendt,Social Theoryof InternationalPolitics (New

York:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1999). MargaretE. Keck and KathrynSikkinklook at construc-
tivismat work in ActivistsBeyondBorders:AdvocacyNetworksin InternationalPolitics (Ithaca:Cor-
nellUniversityPress,1998). More focusedworksincludeSikkink'sMixed Messages:U.S.HumanRights
Policy and LatinAmerica(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2004) and MichaelN. Barnett'sDialogues
in Arab Politics:Negotiations in Regional Order(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1998).

S)For links to relevantWeb sites, access to the FP Archive,and a comprehensiveindex of related

FOREIGNPOLICYarticles, go to www.foreignpolicy.com.

62 FOREIGN POLICY