Animality and Agency: A Kantian Approach To Abortion: Lara Denis Agnes Scott College
Animality and Agency: A Kantian Approach To Abortion: Lara Denis Agnes Scott College
Animality and Agency: A Kantian Approach To Abortion: Lara Denis Agnes Scott College
1
I use the following abbreviations and translations of Kant’s texts. Volume:page
number citations refer to the Prussian Academy edition of Kant’s works. The page
citations in Conj are to the translation only. Ant: Anthropology from a Pragmatic
Point of View, trans. Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974); C:
‘‘Moral philosophy: Collins’s lecture notes,’’ in Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter
Heath, ed. Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997); Conj: ‘‘Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History,’’ in Kant:
Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nesbet, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970); G: Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James
W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981); H: ‘‘Kant’s Practi-
cal Philosophy: Herder’s Lecture Notes (Selections),’’ in Lectures on Ethics; KpV:
Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York, Mcmillan
Publishing Company, 1993); KU: Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987); M: ‘‘Morality According to
Prof. Kant: Mrongovius’s Second Set of Lecture Notes (Selections)’’ in Lectures on
Ethics; MS: Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991); N: Notes and Fragments, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Curtis Bow-
man, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005); Rel: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. Allen Wood and
George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); V: ‘‘Kant on
the Metaphysics of Morals: Vigilantius’s Lecture Notes’’ in Lectures on Ethics.
2
See, for example, R.M. Hare, ‘‘A Kantian Approach to Abortion,’’ Social Theory
and Practice 15 (1) (1989): 1-14; and Harry J. Gensler, ‘‘A Kantian Argument
Against Abortion,’’ Philosophical Studies 49 (1986): 83-98. For my take on this
approach, see ‘‘Abortion and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law,’’ Canadian Journal
of Philosophy (forthcoming).
3
I have benefited from reading Susan Feldman, ‘‘From Occupied Bodies to Pregnant
Persons: How Kantians Should Treat Pregnancy and Abortion’’ in Autonomy and
Community: Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy, ed. Jane Kneller
and Sidney Axinn (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), pp. 265-282. I have benefited less
directly by reading Rosalind Hursthouse’s ‘‘Virtue Theory and Abortion,’’ Philo-
sophy and Public Affairs 20 (1991): 223-46; and Beginning Lives (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1987). I address Feldman’s arguments directly in ‘‘Abortion and
Women’s Agency: Learning from Feldman’s Kantian Approach’’ (unpublished man-
uscript).
4
The meaning of this vague term will become clearer in the context of later parts of
the paper. Provisionally, to say that abortion is morally problematic is to say that
there are moral considerations that weigh against it in all or almost all instances.
5
For a fuller picture of duties to oneself as I understand them, see ‘‘Kant’s Ethics
and Duties to Oneself,’’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (4) (1997): 321-48; and
Moral Self-Regard: Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory (New York: Garland
Press, 2001).
6
See also G 4:405, 435; KpV 5:32-33, 84, 128; MS 6:380, 382, 390, 394, 408; Rel
6:29, 35-38; and my ‘‘Kant’s Conception of Virtue’’ in The Cambridge Companion to
Kant and Modern Philosophy, ed. Paul Guyer (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2006).
7
This passage provides a representative glimpse of Kant’s view of sexual desire and
its moral dangers:
In loving [merely] from sexual inclination, they make the person into an
object of their appetite. As soon as the person is possessed, and the appetite
sated, they are thrown away, as one throws away a lemon after sucking the
juice from it. ... [A]s soon as anyone becomes the object of the other’s appe-
tite, all motives of moral relationship fall away; as the object of the other’s
appetite, that person is in fact a thing, whereby the other’s appetite is sated
... . (C 27:384-85)
8
See, e.g., C 27:384-89. See also Barbara Herman, ‘‘Could It Be Worth Thinking
About Kant on Sex and Marriage?’’ in A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on
Reason and Objectivity, ed. Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt (Boulder: West-
view Press, 1993); Elizabeth Brake, ‘‘Justice and Virtue in Kant’s Account of Mar-
riage,’’ Kantian Review 9 (2005): 58-94; and my ‘‘From Friendship to Marriage:
Revising Kant,’’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1) (2001): 1-28.
9
Thus, the ‘‘unnatural’’ sexual vices (those, such as masturbation, that are necessarily
non-procreative) fit more neatly into Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue classification of
duties to oneself as an animal and moral being than do the ‘‘natural’’ sexual vices
(those, such as promiscuity, that may result in sexual reproduction). For a number
of reasons, however, it seems appropriate to describe all sexual self-degradation as
contrary to duties to oneself as an animal and moral being. These reasons include
Kant’s (brief) discussion of natural sexual vices in the Doctrine of Virtue discussion
of ‘‘defiling oneself by lust’’ (MS 6:424), and his treatment of the natural sexual
vices along with gluttony and drunkenness and suicide and self-mutilation in his
Lectures on Ethics account of duties to oneself regarding the use of one’s body
(V 27:632, 637-40, 602). For a discussion of nature’s ends for our drives, especially
our sexual drive, see my ‘‘Kant on the Wrongness of ‘Unnatural’ Sex,’’ History of
Philosophy Quarterly 16 (2) (1999): 225-48.
10
For supporting argument and for clarification as to where I reject Kant’s claims
about specific sexual vices, see ‘‘Kant on the Wrongness of ‘Unnatural’ Sex,’’ esp.
pp. 233-39.
Pregnancy
Pregnancy is something that should concern a virtuous Kantian
agent regarding her treatment of herself as an animal and moral
being. The related drives for sex, reproduction, and care of offspring
are inherent to human nature (Rel 6:26-28). Most women of repro-
ductive age have a sex drive directed toward men and engage in sex-
ual activities that naturally lead to pregnancy. Many women at some
point in their lives have a strong urge to have a child. Kant sees
the drives for sex, reproduction, and care of off-spring as compatible
with and conducive to morality. Bearing and raising children are
meaningful, worthwhile activities for individuals and important con-
tributions to society. Nevertheless, the impulses connected with our
animality raise moral problems. The pleasures we associate with sat-
isfying these impulses give rise to temptations to act on them in
ways destructive to our animal nature or otherwise demeaning to
our rational nature.
Pregnancy threatens a woman’s agency and dignity in a variety of
ways. Some ways pregnancy threatens agency directly pertain to her life
and health, and so to her existence and efficacy as an agent. Pregnancy
is, as it has always been, physically dangerous. Indeed, Kant says that
in addition to being ‘‘cannibalistic in principle’’ sex can also be canni-
balistic ‘‘in its effect,’’ such as when ‘‘the woman is consumed by preg-
nancy and the perhaps fatal delivery resulting from it’’ (MS 6:359; see
also V 27:638). Death in childbirth is not uncommon in developing
countries, especially when women are at early or late extremes of fertil-
ity, or when they have had a number of children in quick succession.
Pregnancy-related illnesses that can threaten the health and life of
the woman include gestational diabetes, pre-eclampsia (high blood
pressure), and thrombophlebitis (blood clot formation); all three of
these are more common in older pregnant women (especially women
11
See, for example, Jane Brody, ‘‘The Risks of Pregnancy After 20,’’ The New York
Times (May 11, 2004), D8.
12
Of course, such a view of women can degrade pregnant and non-pregnant alike. In
societies where this attitude is strongest, those without children arguably suffer
more than those with them.
13
There are also, of course, other-regarding duties relevant to sexuality and preg-
nancy. For example, increasing women’s access to safe, reliable birth control is a
good way to support women’s satisfaction of true natural needs, and thus to fulfill
one’s duties of beneficence.
14
I here mean ‘‘character’’ in a broad, non-technical sense: as including not just a
person’s fundamental maxim or the strength of her will’s commitment to the ends
of reason, but also all those practical dispositions and intellectual and emotional
tendencies that make her the sort of person she is (generous, curious, witty, etc.),
and that are thus of at least indirect moral relevance.
15
Kant may be read as regarding the fetus as a free being, despite what I say below
about why it makes sense not to. See, e.g., MS 6:280, 422. I discuss the question of
whether to consider the fetus a rational being more deeply in ‘‘Abortion and
Kant’s Formula of Universal Law.’’
16
There may be others who care about or are invested in the fetus, such as its pro-
spective adoptive parents.
17
No amount of interest in the fetus (or objection to the pregnancy) seems to justify
other people in physically interfering with a woman in order to affect the health of
the fetus. One would need to justify the hindrance of the woman’s external freedom
(to continue or end the pregnancy); and that would be difficult to do (unless the
fetus were a person and the woman were doing something clearly destructive to it).
18
In developed countries where abortion is legal, it is usually physically safer than
childbirth. So I am not discussing physical dangers of abortion. Of course, if a
woman were somewhere where having an abortion is medically more dangerous
than carrying the pregnancy to term, that would be an important consideration
against it. For current information on mortality rates for pregnancy, childbirth,
and abortion, consult the Alan Guttmacher Institute’s website, www.agi-usa.org.
19
When I speak of morally useful ‘‘feelings,’’ ‘‘emotions,’’ or ‘‘sentiments,’’ I mean
not only occurrent feelings, but also emotional dispositions, tendencies, and predis-
positions. Moreover, in much of my discussion of morally useful feelings, I have in
mind also the morally useful inclinations, instincts, and drives that are bound up
with them—such as ‘‘the instinct of humaneness,’’ (V 27:710), ‘‘love as an inclina-
tion’’ (G 4:399), parents’ ‘‘innate inclination towards their children’’ (V 27:670),
and the ‘‘impulse to protect’’ others in danger (V 27:671).
20
At issue here is not ‘‘practical love,’’ the morally required maxim of promoting oth-
ers’ happiness (MS 6:448-53), but types of love that cannot be directly commanded
and yet can be morally useful. They include immediate pleasure in benefiting
another (G 4:398; C 27:413), delight in others (or in the perfections of others) (MS
6:402, 449), and an immediate inclination to help others (G 4:397-98; C 27:417).
‘‘Love of one’s neighbor’’ (or ‘‘love of other human beings,’’ an impartial love for
human beings) is not merely a morally useful feeling, but a ‘‘predisposition[] on the
side of feeling,’’ a ‘‘natural predisposition[] of the mind ... for being affected by
[certain] concepts of duty’’ (MS 6:399). Like moral feeling, self-respect, and con-
science, love of one’s neighbor is presupposed by the moral law rather than com-
manded by it. It is a feeling the consciousness of which ‘‘is not of empirical origin’’
but follows ‘‘from consciousness of a moral law, as the effect this has on the mind’’
(MS 6:399, see also 400-402).
21
Sympathetic feelings may sometimes rise to the level of emotional agitation, but
they need not—and in a virtuous agent, they usually will not. See my ‘‘Kant’s Cold
Sage and the Sublimity of Apathy,’’ Kantian Review 4 (2000): 48-73.
22
Kant explicitly lists parental love along with sympathy as a natural drive helpful to
morality (N 19:77). The Doctrine of Virtue says little about duties special to partic-
ular relationships, such as parent to child (MS 6:468-69); but the Doctrine of Right
hints at the sorts of things expected of parents as a matter of justice (MS 6:280-82).
See also V 27:670-71.
23
See MS 6:442-43; C 27:440-41, 459-60; V 27:710; and my ‘‘Kant’s Conception
of Duties Regarding Animals: Reconstruction and Reconsideration,’’ History of
Philosophy Quarterly 17 (4) (2000): 405-423.
24
Indeed, Paul Guyer argues that, according to Kant’s mature empirical moral psy-
chology, there are always some feelings or desires through which an agent’s pure
practical reason determines her actions. Sympathy is certainly one Kant frequently
mentions in this context, though he gives it a less fundamental role than respect for
the law or moral feeling (KpV 5:73-75; MS 6:399-400, 456-57). See Guyer, ‘‘Hume
and Kant on Reason, Desire, and Action’’ (presented to the 33rd Hume Society
Meeting in Koblenz, Germany, in August, 2006), a revised version of which will
appear as chapter 5 of Guyer’s Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant’s Responses
to Hume (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). Also see Guyer’s ‘‘Duty
and Inclination,’’ in Kant and the Experience of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
25
Kant (amusingly) describes women’s ‘‘fear in the face of physical harm and timidity
in the face of physical dangers’’ as having been designed by nature to facilitate
their protection of their offspring in-utero (Ant 7:305-306). Yet might not such
fearfulness encourage women to (sometimes) avoid or (sometimes) end pregnancies,
and thus be seen (a) as designed by nature to facilitate women’s self-preservation,
and (b) as morally useful on that basis? My aside here reminds us that how we
individuate and teleologically explain morally useful sentiments is a normative
enterprise, engaging reflective judgment. It also suggests that morally useful feelings
may pull us in opposing directions, so that bolstering one sometimes entails simul-
taneously frustrating another. In the remainder of the paper, I will neither assume
that there is a pervasive timidity among women, nor proffer an account of its
natural purpose or moral utility.
26
There is some empirical support linking violence toward animals with violence
toward people (or relevant affective problems). See Alan R. Felthouse and Stephen
R. Kellert, ‘‘Childhood Cruelty to Animals and Later Aggression against People: A
Review,’’ The American Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 144 (1987): 710-17; Frank R.
Ascione, ‘‘Battered Women’s Reports of Their Partners’ and Their Children’s Cru-
elty to Animals,’’ Journal of Emotional Abuse, vol. 1 (1998): 119-33; and Temple
Grandin, ‘‘Behavior of Slaughter Plant and Auction Employees Toward the Ani-
mals’’ Anthrozoos (1988): 205-13. All are reprinted in Cruelty to Animals and Inter-
personal Violence, ed. Randall Lockwood and Frank R. Ascione (Indiana: Purdue
University Press, 1998). There is no reason to think that a large percentage of
women who have abortions emerge with extreme affective problems (or that there
exists what some have dubbed ‘‘post-abortion syndrome’’), though some women
certainly do emerge with emotional difficulties that outlast immediate hormonal
responses to a pregnancy’s end. See Brenda Major, et al., ‘‘Psychological Responses
of Women after First-Trimester Abortion,’’ Archives of General Psychiatry, 57 (8)
(2000): 777-84; Candace De Puy and Dana Dovitch, The Healing Choice: Your
Guide to Emotional Recovery After an Abortion (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1997); and Linda Bird Francke, The Ambivalence of Abortion (New York: Random
House, 1978). Abortion can also create emotional strains for abortion providers,
see Sallie Tisdale, ‘‘We Do Abortions Here,’’ Harper’s, October, 1987, pp. 66-70.
27
Protectiveness of one’s fetus also facilitates treatment of it that will allow it, if born
and nurtured, to become a more efficacious agent than it might have been if not
cared for in-utero. In a sense, then, fostering these feelings can be seen as an indi-
rect duty to future people. Just as Kant says we may have duties of gratitude
toward past people (MS 6:455), I think we may have duties to future people. This
does not amount to a duty not to kill a given fetus, because, of course, if one kills
it there will be no such person.
28
An exception of sorts would be if the fetus were so horribly malformed that abort-
ing it seemed like the kind, loving thing to do. I discuss this type of case further
on.
29
Throughout the paper, I assume that abortion entails the death of the fetus. Proce-
dures that end a woman’s pregnancy before labor naturally occurs, but that do not
harm, kill, or seriously endanger the health of the fetus, might still raise versions of
some of the concerns that I discuss below. These non-fatal procedures are (to vary-
ing degrees, some very much) less problematic than abortion; I can here explore
neither the concerns an approach like mine might have about them, nor how these
concerns would weigh against other considerations. See note 35 for slight
elaboration.
30
Indeed, once a child is born, a woman planning to give it up for adoption may find
her drives to nurture, protect, and raise her own child overpowering. Some women
choose abortion over adoption because they cannot face the prospect of having
and then surrendering their child.
31
This is true both of feelings Kant associates primarily with our animal nature
(pathological feelings, consciousness of which is of empirical origin), and those
Kant associates primarily with our moral nature (moral feelings, consciousness of
which is not of empirical origin). Kant thinks that a tendency toward a sort of ‘‘fel-
low feeling’’ like sympathy extends through much of the animal kingdom, including
us (MS 6:456; H 27:66; M 29:626; V 27:671). As already mentioned, he describes
‘‘love of one’s neighbor,’’ as a ‘‘moral endowment’’ that every human agent has as
part of the ‘‘subjective conditions’’ of her ‘‘receptiveness to the concept of duty’’
(MS 6: 399, 401-402).
32
Certainly a woman planning to carry the fetus to term should foster whatever feel-
ings of attachment she has. But if a woman who feels little or no attachment is in
a situation where continuing a pregnancy is clearly not consistent with respect for
her own rational nature, she would reasonably view the lack of bonding not as
something to be fought against, but something for which to be grateful.
33
But note that, according to Kant, we have a duty to ourselves to work against a
propensity to wanton destruction even of plant life (MS 6:442-43; V 27:682).
34
Barbara Herman introduces the notion of deliberative presumptions in the context
of explaining how the categorical imperative procedure can be used to test generic
maxims (or ‘‘maxim types’’ such as ‘‘to make a false promise in order to further
my own interests’’); the verdicts on these generic maxims are deliberative presump-
tions (e.g., against maxims of making false promises to further one’s own interests)
which an agent can rebut by showing that the actual maxim she is considering act-
ing on is different from the generic one in a morally relevant way (e.g., if the per-
son with whom I am interacting is trying to extract a promise from me through
torture and threats, and making this promise is the only way I can see to escape
his clutches and alert the authorities). See Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 117-19, 148-51.
35
Following up on note 29: Presumably, less weighty reasons could justify a termina-
tion of pregnancy that did not entail the death of (or serious harm or risk to) the
fetus. Moreover, such terminations would, prima facie, be preferable to abortion
when abortion would be justified in absence of an alternative method of termina-
tion, but an alternative method could achieve the end just as well (e.g., when the
end is avoiding a possibly fatal, full-term delivery); still, one would have to con-
sider in each case whether the alternative presented problems abortion did not.
36
Abortion is, in this respect, unlike killing animals for food in parts of the world
with the knowledge and means to meet nutritional needs otherwise.
37
This situation is roughly analogous to that of a person whose dog is incurably and
painfully ill, such that his love and sympathy for the dog pull him in contrary
directions: they make him want to euthanize the poor dog so that the she will not
suffer any further, but they make him recoil at the idea of killing this beloved
dependent being. Even if killing the dog wins out by appearing to be the kindest
thing the man can do for her (and thus turns out to be what best accords with his
morally useful sentiments), doing this nevertheless forces him to act against what at
least some of his feelings of love and protectiveness dictate, and thus exerts a moral
cost upon him.
Objections
There are many objections one might have to this Kantian approach
to abortion. I will consider three. First, it might seem that this view of
abortion rests on implausible assumptions about the effects of abortion
on women’s emotional capacities—such as that a single abortion would
significantly impair a woman’s ability to love a future infant.38 This
objection exaggerates what the Kantian approach assumes and claims.
The argument I have sketched does not assume that abortion usually
or severely damages a woman’s ability to love her future children or
other people. If there were reason to think there were such extreme,
commonly-occurring damage, the presumption against abortion would
be far stronger than I take it to be. The causal connection between
abortion and damage to morally useful sentiments that I postulate is
more tenuous. I take it that, for example, having an abortion may
sometimes (at least temporarily) impair a woman’s ability to bond with
a subsequent fetus. More specifically, all this argument assumes is that
abortion may begin, encourage, or contribute to the erosion of an
aspect of animal nature of high moral utility. The willingness to risk
weakening one’s morally useful sentiments, to endanger the proper
functioning of one’s animal nature, prima facie suggests a lack of
respect for one’s rational nature. Kantians need not assume that having
an abortion is likely to impair irrevocably the agent’s capacity for
parental love in order to hold the view of abortion outlined above any
more than Kant must hold that selling or giving away a tooth seriously
impairs an agent’s ability to eat in order to say that doing so manifests
the vice of self-mutilation (MS 6:423).
38
Research does not indicate that having an abortion makes a woman a less fit or
loving mother. See Christine F. Bradley, ‘‘Abortion and Subsequent Pregnancy,’’
Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 29 (1984): 494-98.
39
Again, however, if—for whatever reason—the future facing the fetus is so terrible
that abortion seems like kindest thing, abortion would presumably fit better with
the drive to protect the fetus than carrying it to term would. In other circum-
stances, abortion may seem the kindest thing on balance, though perhaps not for
the particular fetus: for instance, when the abortion is a selective termination of
one poorly developing fetus in order to give the three other fetuses a woman is car-
rying a better chance of developing well. I cannot consider this sort of case in suffi-
cient depth to say anything illuminating or definitive about it.
40
Kant titles the MS section discussing duties with regard to animals (and some other
things), ‘‘On an Amphilobly in Moral Concepts of Reflection, Taking What Is
Man’s Duty to Himself for a Duty to Other Beings’’ (MS 6:443). We would not
make the mistake of thinking our duties with regard to animals were really duties
to animals if our experience of moral constraint with regard to them felt as though
it were all about us. The confusion occurs because we do (e.g.,) sympathize directly
with animals, feeling their suffering as something to be prevented (if morally possi-
ble) for their own sake. I am saying that a similar thing happens in the case of
fetuses.
41
See Allen W. Wood, ‘‘Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature,’’ Proceed-
ings of the Aristotelian Society LXXII (1998): 189-210; and Kant’s Ethical Thought
(New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 142-45, 370-71.
42
Wood, ‘‘Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature,’’ p. 198.
43
At least, he does not do this in the published writings I draw on here. Wood fur-
ther develops his thoughts on the moral status of the fetus in ‘‘Humanity, Personal-
ity, and Dignity,’’ lecture three of his Isaiah Berlin Lectures on Kantian Ethics,
Oxford University, October 25, 2005.
44
Furthermore, it may be emotionally impossible for a virtuous Kantian agent to
perceive as intrinsically worthless a potential rational being (or a formerly rational
being, such as a human in an irreversible vegetative state), even if her understand-
ing of the formula of humanity is that respect is owed only to persons.
45
Wood himself does not intend that implication. See ‘‘Humanity, Personality, and
Dignity.’’
Conclusion
We can develop a rich account of abortion by focusing on the virtuous
Kantian agent and her duties to herself. Virtuous Kantian agents rec-
ognize the moral value not only of their rational natures, but also
(derivatively) of their bodies, its drives, and its emotional predis-
positions. This recognition infuses their approach to sexuality, preg-
nancy, and abortion. Abortion involves a frustration of some morally
useful sentiments. The moral costs of abortion generate a deliberative
presumption against abortion for inclination-based ends. This presump-
tion may be rebutted when the agent’s reasons for abortion have to do
with such things as physical risks of pregnancy, or conflicts between
the demands of pregnancy and agents’ significant, morally grounded
commitments. Thus, abortion is morally problematic, but often
permissible.47
46
Onora O’Neill wants to extend ‘‘the scope of moral concern’’ to include ‘‘incipient
agents,’’ though she does not challenge Kant’s understanding of the formula of
humanity as explicitly as Wood does. See chapter 4 of Toward Justice and Virtue:
A Constructivist Account of Practical Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), and ‘‘Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature,’’ Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society LXXII (1998): 211-28.
47
Thanks to Roger Wertheimer and John Bishop for comments on an earlier draft of
this paper. Thanks also to the audiences at the 2005 American Philosophical Asso-
ciation Pacific Division symposium on sex and virtue, and the 2006 North Ameri-
can Kant Society Eastern Study Group, especially Jennifer Uleman, Helga Varden,
and Paul Abela.
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