Macaria Torres vs.

CA Case Digest

The amended complaint takes place of the original. Therefore, the admissions made in the original pleading,
superseded by the amended complaint will be considered extrajudicial admission that must be alleged and proven
in court.

Facts:

Margarita Torres was married to Claro Santillan, and they had two children: Vicente and Antonina. Antonina married and
had six children.

After the death of her husband, Margarita cohabited with Leon without the benefit of marriage, and they had a child, Macaria
Torres. Subsequently, Leon and Margarita were married, and Macaria lived with and was reared by her parents.

Lot 551 had been leased temporarily by the Government to Margarita who was the actual occupant of the lot. On December
13, 1910, the Director of Lands issued to Margarita a Sale Certificate over said lot, payable in 20 annual installments. 20 years
before his death, Leon sold and transferred in a notarial deed his rights and interest to the ½ portion of the lot in favor of
Macaria.

On June 6, 1953, about 22 years after the death of Margarita and 20 years after the death of Leon, Vicente Santillan executed
an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot 551 and asking for the issuance of title in his name. A Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita.

Santillan and the children of Antonina filed a case of forcible entry against Macaria, alleging that the latter had entered a
portion of the lot without their consent, constructed a house thereon and refused to vacate upon demand.

Paragraph 3 of the original complaint states:

the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and nearest of kins of Margarita Torres, who died in
Tanza, Cavite on December 20, 1931.

However, Santillan et. al amended the complaint, the underlined portion was deleted so that the statement simply read:

That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza, Cavite, on December 20, 1931.

Macaria claimed to be a co-owner of the lot, being one of Margarita’s daughters. She instituted an action for partition of
the lot, alleging that said lot was the conjugal property of Margarita and Leon, and that she is their legitimated child. The
statement in the original complaint for ejectment, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and is
controlling in the determination of her participation in the disputed property.
The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided. The trial court ruled that the lot was Margarita’s
paraphernal property and adjudicated 2/3 to her heirs by Claro Santillan and 1/3 to Macaria. Macaria’s share was later
increased to 4/6, then reduced by the Court of Appeals to ½. The CA declared that she is not a legitimated child.

Issue:

Is the allegation in the original complaint that Macaria is a legal heir of Margarita an admission of Macaria's legitimation?

Held:

No. The Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any
further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record.

If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence. Having been amended, the
original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an
extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's submission,
therefore there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in
evidence. (Macaria Torres vs. CA, G.R. No. L-37420, July 31, 1984)
FLORENTINO ATILLO III v. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 119053 January 23, 1997

Judicial Admissions

FACTS
Respondent Amancor, Inc. (AMANCOR) a corporation then owned and controlled by petitioner Florentino L. Atillo III,
contracted a loan in the amount of P1,000,000 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, secured by real estate properties.
Before the said loan could be paid, petitioner entered into a MOA with respondent Michell Lhuillier (LHUILLIER) whereby
the latter bought shares of stock in AMANCOR. As a consequence of the foregoing transaction, petitioner and LHUILLIER
each became owner of 47% of the outstanding shares of stock of AMANCOR while the officers of the corporation owned
the remaining 6%.
Due to the need for more capital to support the business operations of AMANCOR, petitioner and LHUILLIER executed
another MOA by virtue of which LHUILLIER undertook to invest additional capital in AMANCOR. As a result, a Supplemental
Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by the petitioner and LHUILLIER which states:
F.L. Atillo III may dispose off (sic) his properties at P. del Rosario St., Cebu City which may involve pre-payment
of AMANCOR'S mortgage loan to the bank estimated at 300,000.00 and while AMANCOR may not yet be in
the position to re-pay said amount to him, it shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank rate.
Thereafter, petitioner incurred a 300,000 loan balance with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. After offsetting the
amount of P300,00 with some of the accounts that petitioner had with AMANCOR, the amount which remained due to the
petitioner was P199,888.89. Since AMANCOR failed to pay, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money.
Court thereafter ordered AMANCOR to pay petitioner P199,888.89 plus interest. The court absolved LHUILLIER. The
petitioner appealed claiming that LHUILLIER should have been declared jointly and severally liable with AMANCOR.

ISSUE
Whether there was res judicata- YES

HELD
The claim that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the appellees as they did not file any opposition or responsive
pleading is untenable. This is because the postponement of hearing on January 14, 1957 to May 16, 1957 was due to
respondents. Likewise, the hearing set on May 16, 1957 was postponed to July 12, 1957 upon motion of the respondents.
Appellant next points out that the lower court should not have dismissed his first petition for annulment because
no "parole" evidence need be taken to support it, the matters therein alleged being parts of the records of L.R.C.
No. 144, G.L.R.O. No. 1025, and L.R.C. 173, G.L.R.O. No. 1474, which were well within the judicial notice and
cognizance of the said court.
As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them,
of the contents of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge
Additionally, if appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records, he should have presented the
proper request or manifestation to that effect instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of
hearing, which the court correctly denied. Finally, the point raised by counsel is now academic, as no appeal was taken from
the order dismissing his first petition, and said order had long become final when the complaint in the present action was
filed.
Lastly, there was res judicata since the first petition (amending the records) is similar to the present petition (asking for
reconveyance of land) as in both instances the effect would be the reversion of 157 hectares at issue. The claim for damages
and other reliefs are not materially different from “such other remedies, just and equitable in the premises" prayed for in
the first case.
GREGORIO SILOT, JR. vs. ESTRELLA DE LA ROSA

[G.R. No. 159240. February 4, 2008]

FACTS:
Petitioner Silot and respondent de la Rosa entered into a contract for the construction of a dormitory-apartment building.
They expressly agreed that Silot shall supply the labor and de la Rosa shall pay 33% of the total value of the materials
purchased for the project. Upon turnover of the completed structure, the total cost of materials actually purchased was
P2,504,469.65, 33% of which is P826,474.98. Silot required de la Rosa to pay a total of P1,018,000.00, or P191,525.02 more
than the amount due. Through her son-in-law, de la Rosa confronted Silot about the overpayment but the latter refused
to return the overpayment. After her repeated demands fell on deaf ears, de la Rosa filed a suit against Silot. Silot, in
retaliation, sued de la Rosa for insufficient payment, claiming that he was supposed to receive P1,281,872.404 but was only
paid P1,008,000.00, thus still leaving a balance of P273,872.40.

During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot, dispensed with the testimony of Ariel Goingo, a witness for de la
Rosa. Atty. San Jose admitted Goingo's proposed testimony to the effect that in consideration of the 33% as mentioned in
the contract, all the material supplies during the making of the additional works mentioned were already accounted for;
that Silot was paid for all works that were performed as well as all materials supplied; that the total sum was P2,504,469.65,
so that 33% of which is only P826,474.98; that de la Rosa paid the amount of P1,018,000.00; hence, there was an excess
payment of P191,525.02; and that de la Rosa never received any demand from nor was she confronted by Silot regarding
an alleged balance.

Consequently, after trial, the RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa and ordered Silot to return the overpaid amount. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of petitioner Silot, constituted judicial admission of respondent's
evidence.

HELD:
Yes.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes arising from negligence of his own counsel.
The only exception to this rule is, as the Court of Appeals itself cited in its decision, when the negligence is so gross that
the client is deprived of his day in court.

In our considered view, however, that exception does not find any application in this case. As the records would plainly
show, Silot was not deprived of his day in court. Also, as the appellate court observed, he could have introduced evidence,
testimonial or otherwise, in order to controvert or correct the admission made by his counsel. Said the appellate court:

…As gleaned from the records, defendant-appellant Silot was not deprived of his day in court. He was given every
opportunity to be heard through his pleadings and manifestations. He was also presented in open court to testify. As
quoted earlier, Atty. Terbio, counsel for plaintiff-appellee de la Rosa, even repeatedly asked Atty. San Jose, defendant-
appellant Silot's counsel, if he would admit the purpose for which the witness Ariel Goingo will testify to dispense with his
testimony, and Atty. San Jose repeatedly answered that "We will admit that." And when asked by the judge if he will admit
it, he answered that they will admit P2,504,000.00.

More importantly, Silot's counsel clearly made admissions of the content of the testimony of witness Goingo, whose
presentation was dispensed with. In People v. Hernandez, we held that admissions made for the purpose of dispensing
with proof of some facts are in the nature of judicial admissions, to wit:
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically
reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused
in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: "[…] an attorney who is employed to
manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit […] has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or
written stipulation, […] which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive." (Italics supplied.) In fact, "judicial admissions
are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client.
When such admissions are made […] for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, […] they bind the client,
whether made during, or even after, the trial.

Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not require proof and may not be contradicted in the absence
of a prior showing that the admissions had been made through palpable mistake.

Furthermore, in the case of Toh v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized the consequence of admitting and dispensing
with the testimony of the proposed witness, thus:

The Court sees no cogent reason why the said witness should be examined any further since his testimony as summarized
in the offer made by counsel was expressly admitted by opposing counsel. With the said admission, the testimony of said
witness is uncontroverted and even admitted as fact by opposing counsel.…
Tan vs. Rodil Enterprises Case Digest
Facts:

Rodil Enterprises filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed against Luciano Tan, alleging that under a Contract of
Sublease, Tan bound himself to pay P13,750.00 as monthly rentals. However, Tan refused to pay the rentals from September
1997 up to the time of the filing of the Complaint.

In his Answer, Luciano Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the government who owns the Ides ORacca Building and
not of Rodil Enterprises. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint, and for the return of whatever amount Rodil
Enterprises had collected from 1987 to 1997, or during such time when he was still paying rentals to the latter.

On 27 June 2000, the MeTC issued an Order, recognizing an agreement entered into in open court by Luciano Tan and Rodil
Enterprises. The Order, inter alia, declared, thus:

On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the following terms to put an end to this civil
case for ejectment between them:

1.) that [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September, 1997 up to the present, which is the
outstanding obligation of [Luciano Tan] as of June, 2000, on or before June 30, 2000; and

2.) [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of each month after June 30,
2000.

Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, averring therein that he had agreed to pay all the rentals due on
the subject premises and to pay the subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due; that the rentals in arrears from September
1997 amounted to P467,500.00; and in line with his good faith in dealing with Rodil Enterprises, he would like to deposit the
aforesaid amount, and the subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due. He prayed that he be allowed to deposit the
Managers Check for the amount of P467,500.00, made payable to the City Treasurer of Manila. However, on 15 August 2000,
the MeTC denied the Motion on the rationalization that Luciano Tan's prayer to deposit the specified sum with the City
Treasurer of Manila contravenes Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of Rodil Enterprises.

According to the MeTC, notwithstanding the evidentiary norm in civil cases that an offer of compromise is not an admission
of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror, the court cannot overlook the frank representations by
Luciano Tan's counsel of the former's liability in the form of rentals, coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The foregoing
gestures, as appreciated by the MeTC, were akin to an admission of a fact, like the existence of a debt which can serve as
proof of the loan, and was thus, admissible. The court pronounced that Luciano Tan had explicitly acknowledged his liability
for the periodic consideration for the use of the subleased property. Estoppel, thus, precludes him from disavowing the fact
of lease implied from the tender of payment for the rentals in arrears.
Petitioner posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and then, reiterated in his Motion to Allow Defendant to
Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his liability, citing Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
states, inter alia, that an offer of compromise in a civil case is not a tacit admission of liability.

Issue:
Can the admission of Tan, made in open court and reiterated in his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals be taken
as an admission of his liability?

Held:
Yes. The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability. It is not admissible in evidence
against the offeror.

The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court in Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, to wit:

To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of
the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for
the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party
making the offer admits the existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the
admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness. Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission of a borrowers loan
balance.

Similarly, in the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co. the Court applied the exception to the general rule. In
Varadero there was neither an expressed nor implied denial of liability, but during the course of the abortive negotiations
therein, the defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff. Finding that there was no denial of liability, and
considering that the only question discussed was the amount to be paid, the Court did not apply the rule of exclusion of
compromise negotiations.

In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly appreciated petitioners admission as an exception to the
general rule of inadmissibility. The petitioner did not contest the existence of the sublease, and his counsel made frank
representations anent the former's liability in the form of rentals. This expressed admission was coupled with a proposal to
liquidate. The Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals was as an explicit acknowledgment of petitioners liability on
the subleased premises. The existence of the Contract of Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not denied by petitioner. The
contracts that were assailed by petitioner are the contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992, the validity of which has been upheld
by this Court in the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 129609 and G.R. No. 135537. (Tan vs. Rodil Enterprises, G. R. No. 168071,
December 18, 2006)
Abay Jr. vs. People of the Philippines

FACTS:

On January 13, 1995, an Information was filed charging Rustico Abay, Jr., Reynaldo Darilag, Ramoncito Aban, Ernesto Ricalde,
Ramon Punzalan, Ariston Reyes, Isagani Espeleta, Cesar Camacho, Leonardo Perello and Danilo Pascual with the crime of
Highway Robbery/Brigandage.

That on or about 7:30 o’clock in the evening of February 17, 1994, at the South Luzon Expressway, Municipality of Biñan,
Province of Laguna, accused Ramoncito Aban y Casiano, Ernesto Ricalde y Jovillano, Rustico Abay, Jr. y Serafico, Ramon
Punzalan y Carpena, Reynaldo Darilag y Apolinario, Leonardo Perello y Esguerra and Danilo Pascual y Lagata, who are
principals by direct participation, conspiring and confederating together with Ariston Reyes y Plaza, Isagani Espeleta y
Arguelles and Cesar Camacho y Deolazo, who are principals by indispensable cooperation and mutually helping each other,
form themselves as band of robbers and conveniently armed with handguns and deadly bladed weapons, and while on
board a Kapalaran Bus Line and a semi stainless owner type jeep as backup vehicle, accused with the use of the aforesaid
handguns and bladed weapons with intent to gain and taking the passengers of the bus by surprise, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously divest and take away personalties of the passengers.

When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty. However, upon motion filed by accused Ramoncito Aban, with the conformity
of the public prosecutor and private complainants Thelma Andrade and Gloria Tolentino, he was allowed to withdraw his earlier
plea of “not guilty”. Thus, pleaded “guilty” to the crime of simple robbery and on even date, the trial court sentenced him.
Meanwhile, trial proceeded with respect to the other accused.
Thelma Andrade, a conductress of the Kapalaran Bus Line, testified that she was on was held-up. She also identified Rustico
Abay, Jr. and Ernesto Ricalde as two of the other companions of Aban.
Gloria Tolentino, a passenger of the bus, testified that someone shouted “hold-up” and ordered them to bow their heads.
She obeyed the order but once in a while she would raise her head. She also identified Rustico Abay, Jr. as one of the
companions of the robbers.

Ramoncito Aban, testified that Camacho and Espeleta, who were both prison guards of the New Bilibid Prison, took him and
his companions, Ricalde, Abay, Jr., Punzalan, Darilag, Reyes, Perello and Pascual, on board the owner-type jeepney of
Camacho to stage a hold-up. He said they held-up a Kapalaran bus and it was Punzalan and Darilag who took the money
and other belongings of the passengers in the bus. He further testified that the February 22, 1994 hold-up was the fourth
staged by their group. According to Aban, the other hold-ups were carried out on February 11, 13 and 17, and all four hold-
ups were staged by the same persons.

All the accused denied participation in the robbery that happened on February 17, 1994. Abay, Jr., Darilag, Reyes and
Ricalde, who were detention prisoners, testified that they were confined in the NBP at the time the incident happened.
Pascual and Perello, both civilians, testified that they were at home then.[9] Genaro Alberto, a prison guard at the Bureau of
Corrections, testified that during the headcount of the inmates conducted at 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on February 17, 1994, no
inmate was found to be missing.

RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31 found petitioners Abay, Jr. and Darilag, as well as the other accused guilty of the crime
charged.The Court of Appeals on appeal acquitted Espeleta, Camacho and Punzalan of the crime charged but affirmed the
conviction of petitioners Abay, Jr. and Darilag, Ricalde and Reyes.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS MAY BE CONVICTED ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONIES OF RAMONCITO ABAN, THELMA
ANDRADE AND GLORIA TOLENTINO.

HELD:
We note that it was not Aban’s extrajudicial confession but his court testimony reiterating his declarations in his extrajudicial
admission, pointing to petitioners as his co-participants, which was instrumental in convicting petitioners of the crime
charged. Settled is the rule that when the extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is confirmed at the trial, it ceases to be
hearsay. It becomes instead a judicial admission, being a testimony of an eyewitness admissible in evidence against those
it implicates. Here, the extrajudicial confession of Aban was affirmed by him in open court during the trial. Thus, such
confession already partook of judicial testimony which is admissible in evidence against the petitioners.

We likewise agree in finding without merit the petitioners’ argument that, since Aban’s testimony is not credible as
to Espeleta, Camacho and Punzalan who were acquitted, then it should also be held not credible as to them. But in our
considered view, the petitioners are not similarly situated as their aforementioned co-accused. Other than the testimony of
Aban, there were no other witnesses who testified on the participation of Espeleta, Camacho and Punzalan. In contrast,
anent the herein petitioners’ participation in the crime, not only is their conviction based on the testimony of Aban, but it
was also established by the eyewitness testimony of Andrade and Tolentino who identified positively the petitioners in open
court. It is also worth stressing as part of the prosecution evidence that Aban testified that malefactors used the same route and
strategy in the perpetration of the robberies which happened on four occasions -- February 11, 13, 17 and 22, 1994. What
happened on February 22 was but a replication, so to speak, of the robbery scenarios earlier perpetrated by the same gang on
three previous dates. It is very clear, however, that Aban, on the witness stand was testifying specifically also about the offense
that took place on February 17 in the Expressway, Biñan, Laguna.

Petitioners claim that no physical evidence was presented by the prosecution linking the petitioners to the crime
charged. But in this case, the alleged failure of the prosecution to present physical evidence does not adversely affect the over-
all weight of the evidence actually presented. Physical evidence would be merely corroborative because there are credible
witnesses who testified on the complicity of petitioners in the crime charged.
PSCFC Financial Corp. vs. CA Case Digest

● When Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it should not be restrictively
construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make the response in his behalf.

● Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing,
and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure.

Facts:

PSCFC filed a complaint against private respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank for annulment of
foreclosure proceedings and damages. Banco Filipino filed its Answer.

PSCFC then served upon Banco Filipino a written request for admission of the truth of certain matters.

PSCFC received Banco Filipino's answer to its request for admission signed by its counsel, Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun.

PSCFC made a second request for admission, impliedly objecting to the first reply having been made by its lawyer, Atty.
Fortun. Banco Filipino objected.

PSCFC asked the trial court for a ruling that the matters sought to be admitted in its second bid for admission should be
considered as impliedly admitted when the answer was made by a lawyer who was not qualified to do so as he had no
direct and personal knowledge of the matters sought to be admitted.

Trial court did not grant PSCFC’s motion. CA sustained the trial court.

Petitioner submits that the answer to the request for admission under Rule 26 should be made by the party himself and
nobody else, not even his lawyer. Consequently, failure of respondent Banco Filipino, upon whom the call for admission
was served, to render the required sworn statement would constitute an implied admission of the facts sought to be
admitted.

Issue:

May a request for admission directed to an adverse party be answered only by his counsel?

Held:

Yes. Section 21 of Rule 138 states —

Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client ...

Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the recognized exceptions as found in Art. 1878 of the Civil
Code which enumerates the instances when special powers of attorney are necessary, or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court
on pre-trial where the parties and their attorneys are both directed to appear before the court for a conference; so that for
counsel to appear at the pre-trial in behalf of the client, he must clothe the former with an adequate authority in the form
of a special power of attorney or corporate resolution.

Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in
relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure ..."

Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it should not be restrictively construed
to mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make the response in his behalf. Indeed, the theory of
petitioner must not be taken seriously; otherwise, it will negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code, 4 as well as Sec.
23, Rule 138, of the Rule of Court.

Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun overstepped his authority, it is only his client,
respondent Banco Filipino, which has the prerogative to impugn his acts and not petitioner, the adverse party.
Interestingly, Banco Filipino has not objected to the response made by its counsel in its behalf. (PSCFC Financial Corp. vs.
CA, G.R. No. 106094, December 28, 1992)
Fule vs. CA [G.R. No. L-79094. June 22, 1988]
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the
prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the
prosecution presented its evidence. At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant waived the
right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial
Court convicted petitioner-appellant.

On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction. Hence,
this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that the Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision
of the Regional Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the
conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed
by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. In Sec.4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel.
(Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]

Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is applicable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules,
renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:

YES. Judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED
to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.

RATIO:

By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be
regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The
use of the term “shall” further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a
duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And more importantly, penal
statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
G.R. No. L-23264 March 15, 1974
ROMULO TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
HELEN VILLANUEVA and HONORABLE CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, respondents.

Facts:
Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to Helen Villanueva. However, despite the fact that Helen was
served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason Romulo filed
a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his evidence.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila declared Helen in default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles
88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal for investigation to determine whether
collusion exists between the parties.
Romulo submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint.
The fiscal issued a subpoena to Romulo’s counsel requiring him to bring Romulo with him as well as copies of other
documents in connection with the annulment case
However, Romulo’s counsel informed the fiscal that he could not comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily
expose his evidence.
In a motion, Romulo Tolentino’s counsel prayed to set the date for the reception of his evidence on the ground that the
City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse of sixty (60) days when he submitted to the City
Fiscal a copy of the complaint.
Respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of Romulo unless he submits himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal to
enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties.
Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that Romulo is not willing to submit himself for
interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of the New Civil Code.
Romulo filed a petition to annul said order and to compel the respondent Judge to receive his evidence.

Issue:
WON the order of the respondent judge dismissing the complaint due to the fact that the plaintiff is not willing to submit
himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal is valid.

Held:
YES, the order of the respondent judge is valid.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for annulment
of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of
non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between
the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for
the plaintiff.
Institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses.
The State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence.
The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by non-
appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this
reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the
State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds.
Second Division

EPIFANIO CRUZ and EVELINA CRUZ, Petitioners, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLANT COURT, CALIXTRO O. ADRIATICO,
RUFINO J. SANTIAGO and GODOFREDO VALMEO, Respondents.
GR No. 72806
January 9, 1989

Regalado, J:

Facts: Petitioners mortgaged certain properties to private respondents who eventually sued them for non-payment and
for the judicial foreclosure of aforementioned mortgages under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. In the course of the
proceedings a compromise agreement was reached and this became the basis of the Judgment on Compromise
issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan:

‘3. Upon full payment of the sums of P55,000.00 and P320,000.00 within the period agreed upon, the plaintiff
shall deliver to the defendants Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-32286 (M) of the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan, Meycauayan Branch, together with all the documents submitted to the plaintiff;

4. Should the defendants fail to pay the sums agreed upon within the period stipulated, the defendants
shall pay plaintiff the entire sum of P92,149.00 under the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage attached to the
complaint as Annex ‘C’ and an additional sum of P44,700.00 as attorney’s fees;

5. Upon failure of the defendants to pay the sums agreed upon within the period stipulated, plaintiff shall
be entitled to a writ of execution directing the foreclosure of all the mortgages subject matter of this
litigation and to the principal sum of P300,000.00 in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage attached to the
complaint as Annex ‘B’ shall be added the sum of P44,700.00 as attorney’s fees.’

For failure of the petitioners to comply with certain provisions of the agreement, private respondent moved for a
writ of execution. The mortgaged properties were foreclosed upon in an auction sale and were purchased by the
private respondents as the highest bidder. The sale was latter judicially confirmed.

Petitioners submitted that the aforestated judgment on compromise was null and void ab initio because it
allegedly "denied them their equity of redemption under Sec. 2, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, by not
allowing the petitioners to pay ‘into court within a period of not less than ninety (90) days from the date of
the service of said order,’ and that it is only if the petitioners default in said payment that the property
should be sold to pay the judgment debt.

Issue: Whether or not the aforestated judgment on compromise was null and void ab initio because it allegedly denied
petitioners their equity of redemption under Sec. 2, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court.

Held: No, the judgment on compromise was not null and void, but valid and enforceable.

Ratio: The procedure outlined therein obviously refers to the situation where a full-blown trial, with the introduction of
evidence is entailed, such that the trial court has to thereafter determine whether the allegations in the complaint
have been proved, then ascertain the total amount due to the plaintiff, and thereafter render judgment for such
amount with an order for the payment thereof in accordance with the prescription of the aforequoted section, sans
the agreement of the parties on those particulars. There being no such agreement, the specified procedure has
necessarily to be followed and the minimum period of ninety (90) days for payment, also referred to as the period
for the exercise of the equity, as distinguished from the right, of redemption has to be observed and provided for
in the judgment in the foreclosure suit. Jurisprudentially, it has also been held that the exercise of the equity of
redemption may be made beyond the 90-days period but before the foreclosure sale is confirmed by the court.

It stands to reason, however, that the aforesaid procedure cannot be of substantial application to, and can be
modified by, a valid agreement of the parties, such as in the compromise agreement subject of and constituting the
basis for the judgment on compromise rendered in Civil Case No. 7418-M of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, as
hereinbefore stated. The dispositions of Section 2 of Rule 68 clearly cannot apply since the parties therein had
specifically agreed on the amounts to be paid, when they should be paid and the effects of non-payment or
violation of the terms of their agreement. Thus, the petitioners undertook to pay on the obligation subject of the
compromise agreement, P55,000.00 on or before August 20, 1984 and P320,000.00 on or before September 30,
1984 and, in case of default on their part, the consequences are spelled out in Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of their
aforequoted compromise agreement, all of which are premised on the precise contingency of failure by the
petitioners to comply within the period stipulated.

Paragraph 5 lucidly provides that, upon the happening of the aforesaid contingency contemplated therein, private
respondent Godofredo Valmeo shall be entitled to a writ of execution directing the foreclosure of all the mortgages
subject matter of said litigation. It is noteworthy that this particular proviso is what distinguishes this case from other
judicial foreclosure cases decided on the bases of compromise agreements but which did not have the same
specification. Ineluctably, therefore, the petitioners herein thereby waived their so-called equity of redemption
and the case was necessarily removed from the operation of Section 2, Rule 68 insofar as its provisions are
inconsistent with the judgment on compromise.

It is hornbook knowledge that a judgment on compromise has the effect of res judicata on the parties and should
not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. To challenge the same, a party must move in the trial court
to set aside the said judgment and also to annul the compromise agreement itself, before he can appeal from that
judgment. Definitely, the petitioners have ignored these remedial avenues.
People vs Berame alias Doming (1976) - Vasquez

FACTS:
1. It was about 6:30 in the evening of April 13, 1966, that an assailant suddenly shot QuiricoManingo, then seated on
a chair facing the main door of the sala of his rented house in Rizal Street, Suba District Danao City.
2. His adopted son Danilo Maningo, was seated one meter away from his right side. Several successive shots were
fired at Quirico Maningo.
3. He saw his father, Quirico Maningo, slump to the floor, wounded, with blood on his neck and breast.
4. He looked towards the main door where the shots came from and saw the accused holding a .38 caliber revolver.
5. He was easily Identifiable, as there was a "big light" at the main door of the house.
6. Appellant was standing on a bright spot as he fired his gun several times at Quirico Maningo.
7. When the firing ceased, the witness ran towards the main door of the house and saw two persons, one of them
being the accuse Berame scampering away.
8. Quirico Maningo, the victim, was rushed to the Danao City General Hospital, but he was dead on arrival.
9. The appealed decision did likewise note that later that same evening, the PC Provincial Commander of the Philippine
Constabulary with a Sergeant Armando Alfoja started the investigation of the killing of Quirico Maningo.
10. In a swampy area at the back of the hospital near the cemetery of Danao City, where it was suspected one of the
alleged assailants was hiding, they saw footprints and recovered a rubber shoe. Appellant was required at the trial to put it
on.
11. It turned out that it corresponded exactly with his right foot.
12. Moreover, appellant took flight after the killing and hid himself He did not surrender until almost a month later,
on May 8, 1966.
13. There was in addition the statement from one of those accused in the original information, Anastacio Montinola.
As one of the suspects, he was pursued by the police authorities. When cornered, instead of surrendering, he decided to
shoot it out.
14. He was hit, it turned out, mortally. He admitted then and there that he was one of the killers of Quirico Maningo,
and his companions were a certain Doming and one Erning. He made the admission anew at the Southern Islands Hospital
when he was further questioned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rubber shoe left in the swampy area can be considered as a demonstrative evidence.

HELD:
YES. The appealed decision, moreover, finds impressive support from circumstances that point unerringly to
appellant's guilt. They simply cannot be explained away. That could be the reason why his counsel did not even bother to
do so. As noted in the decision, a rubber shoe left in a swampy area by someone leaving in a hurry the scene of the crime
was just the right size. It did fit appellant's right foot. That was demonstrative evidence of the most persuasive kind. So it
has been held time and time again. First there was United States. v. Tan Teng. Of more recent vintage is People v. Otadora,
promulgated in 1950. The appealed decision was likewise based on the fact of appellant having been in hiding for sometime
with the evident purpose of evading arrest. He did not surrender until after the lapse of a month. That again was a
circumstance that could not be ignored. There is relevance to this excerpt from the opinion of Justice Malcolm in United
States v. Sarikala: "Third, Sarikala left the scene of the murder immediately thereafter. Flight, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. 'The wicked flee, even when no man pursueth but the righteous
are as bold as a lion "

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of March 8, 1967 finding the accused DomicianoBerame alias Doming
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua is affirmed, with the
only modification that the indemnity due the heirs of the deceased should be in the amount of P12,000.00 and not P6,000.00
 BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. JESUSA P. REYES and CONRADO B. REYES
[G.R. No. 157177, February 11, 2008]

FACTS:

On December 7, 1990, respondent Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter, went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM
account.

Respondent informed one of petitioners employees, Mr. Capati, that they wanted to open an ATM account for the amount
of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her exiting savings account with BPI bank which is account
no. 0233-2433-88 and the other P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.

Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings
account with said bank and the respondent believing in good faith that Capati prepared the papers with the correct
amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures.

Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to where the respondent was seating and
informed the latter that the withdrawable balance could not accommodate P200,000.00.

Respondent explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only and then changed and correct the figure
two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying the change, afterwhich the amount of
P100,000.00 in cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces of P500.00 peso bill were given to Capati with her daughter Joan
witnessing the same. Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the name of resondent Jesusa Reyes with
the new account no. 0235-0767-48 and brought the same to the teller's booth.

After a while, he returned and handed to the respondent her duplicate copy of her deposit to account no. 0235-0767-48
reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7, as the date.

Later on, respondent would become aware that her ATM account only contained the amount of P100,000.00 with interest.
Hence, she filed an action before the RTC.

Petitioner claimed that there was actually no cash involved with the transactions which happened on December 7, 1990 as
contained in the bank’s teller tape.

On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision upholding the versions of respondents.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision with modification

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's finding that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her
newly opened Express Teller account on December 7, 1990.

HELD:

It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence
required by law. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence,
or that evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not mean
absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the
probability of truth is on one side than on the other.
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had heard
and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies
himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of
witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.

Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and examined the pieces
of evidence on record.

After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented by the parties, we find that respondents
failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00
in her Express Teller account.
State v. Tatum

360 P.2d 754 (Wash. 1961)

DONWORTH, J. Ralph Tatum (hereinafter called appellant) was convicted of the crime of first degree forgery and was
sentenced to life imprisonment as an habitual criminal.

The essential facts of the case are summarized as follows:

One William Tousin, of Pasco, received monthly welfare checks from the state of Washington. In February, 1960, Tousin
did not receive his check (the checks were generally mailed to a rooming house in Pasco where Tousin resided). The mail
was normally left on a window ledge in the hallway of the rooming house. Appellant resided at the same place. Tousin's
February check for $28.90 was endorsed and cashed at Sherman's Food Store in Pasco by someone other than the payee,
Tousin.

An employee of the store, Caroline Pentecost, testified that, although she could not specifically recall the above-
mentioned transaction, the initials appearing on the face of the check were hers. She also testified that whenever a check
was presented to her for payment at the store, the store manager had instructed her to initial it and then insert it into a
"Regiscope" machine. This machine is designed to simultaneously photograph, through two separate lenses, both the
check and the person facing the machine.

When it was discovered that the endorsement of the payee was a forgery, the Regiscope film of the transaction was sent
to the Regiscope distributor in Portland to be developed. The processed film shows both the check and the person of
appellant (from his waist up) with the food store in the background. Upon the trial, both the negative and the print
therefrom were admitted in evidence, over appellant's objection....

Were the Regiscope films (the negative and the print) authenticated sufficiently to warrant their admission into evidence?
...

At the outset, with respect to the question of the admissibility of the Regiscope films, it should be noted that this court
has for many years encouraged the admission and use of demonstrative evidence, including photographs. There is
equally well-established precedent for the proposition that the admission or rejection of photographs as evidence lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court.... We have also held that the trial court's discretion extends to the sufficiency
of identification.

What quantum of authentication do courts require before a photograph may be admissible in evidence? It is simply this--
that some witness (not necessarily the photographer) be able to give some indication as to when, where, and under what
circumstances the photograph was taken, and that the photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects illustrated.
The photograph need only be sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the court and the jury.

Witness Pentecost testified that she recognized the background shown in the picture as that of the food store, and, as
mentioned previously, she also testified as to the store's standard procedure of "regiscoping" each individual who cashed
a check at the store. Phillip Dale testified at length concerning the Regiscope process. The testimony of these two
witnesses taken together amounted to a sufficient authentication to warrant the admission of the photograph (both the
print and the negative) into evidence.

The authentication supplied by the testimony summarized above, of course, did not preclude appellant from attempting
to prove that the individual portrayed was someone other than appellant, that the photograph was inaccurate in one or
more respects, the appellant was somewhere else at the moment the photograph was taken, or any other such defense.
But these arguments go to the weight rather than to the admissibility of the exhibits in question. In our opinion, the
Regiscope exhibits, coupled with the other evidence produced by the state, sufficed to establish a prima facie case of first
degree forgery.... The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
 Adamczuk v. Holloway

Procedural: Plaintiffs brought an action in trespass against defendants for personal injuries and property damage arising
out of a collision between a car owned and operated by plaintiff Jack J. Adamczuk, and a car owned by defendant Morris
Cohon, and driven by defendant Elmer Holloway. (A cross-action with the present defendants as plaintiffs and Jack J.
Adamczuk as defendant resulted in a verdict for the latter.)

Facts: D, charged with negligence in a car accident, was prevented from introducing a picture of the accident scene on the
basis that the person who verified it had not taken the picture.

Issue: To be admissible, must a picture be verified by the person who took the picture?

Holding: The jury returned a verdict for defendants. Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was refused and these appeals
followed. The assignment of error which appellant stresses is based upon the refusal of the court to admit in evidence a
certain photograph of the locus of the accident and the approach to it on Highway Route 6.

Rule: If a witness is familiar with the scene photographed and is competent to testify that the photograph correctly
represents it, it should, if relevant, be admitted. The picture’s verification depends on the competency of the verifying
witness, not on whether he took the picture.

Analysis: Appellants contend that the admission of this photograph was of importance because it would show that at the
intersection a person could see to the west, if he held his head at a 45 degree angle, only a distance of about 200 feet. The
engineer testified that a person at the intersection had a clear, unobstructed view to the west of 793 feet. Jack Adamczuk,
in explaining why he did not see the car coming from the west, said that he had his head turned at a 45 degree angle.
Appellees contend that this excuse is of no avail to him and that had he held his head in a normal position he would have
had an unobstructed view to the west of nearly 800 feet. The assignment of error based on the exclusion of the
photograph is overruled.
Sison v People (1995)
GR NO. 108280-23 / 114931-33
IV. Real and Demonstrative Evidence

FACTS
- Several informations were filed in court against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists, charging them with
the murder of Stephen Salcedo.
- The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at Luneta by Marcos loyalists.
Despite the denial of their permit to rally, 3000 of them gathered at the Rizal Monument. Led by Lozano and
Nuega, both lawyers, the loyalists started singing contests, recited prayers and delivered speeches.
- The police asked the rallyists to disperse as they did not have a permit. Atty. Lozano then instructed the Marcos
loyalists by saying “Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators!”. The police then pushed the crowd and
used tear gas to disperse them. Eventually, the crowd fled to Maria Orosa Street.
- Then, a small group of loyalists saw Annie Ferrer, a famous movie starlet and Marcos supporter. Upon informing
her of their dispersal, she angrily ordered “Gulpihin lahat ng Cory hecklers!”. She continued jogging while chanting
“Marcos pa rin! Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!”. She was then arrested. This aggrieved the loyalists and started
attacking persons in yellow. They then saw a man wearing a yellow shirt, which the loyalists chased. This man was
Salcedo. When they caught up with Salcedo, they boxed, kicked and mauled him. Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw
the loyalists attacking Salcedo.
- Ranulfo Sumilang rushed to Salcedo’s aid, and showed a “Marcos loyalist” tag to the loyalists and they backed off
for a while. Although Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from the group, they still boxed Salcedo in different
parts of his head, while some shouted “Iyan, Cory iyan. Patayin!”
- Salcedo managed to get away and then tried to flee towards the Rizal Monument but some of the loyalists still
pursued Salcedo, and mauled him in the process. Salcedo pleaded for his life, but was ignored as the mauling
continued until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang brough Salcedo to PGH but Salcedo was dead
upon arrival.
- Such incident caught national and international attention, and Pres. Aquino put up a reward to apprehend the
people responsible, which were subsequently found to be the petitioners in this case.
- Prosecution presented Banculo and Sumilang as their eyewitnesses, as well as police officers who were in
Luneta. Prosecution also presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts and
photographs
- Petitioners offered their respective alibis:
o Tamayo  in his house in QC and was not photographed
o Neri  in Luneta Theater, was not photographed
o Sison  in his office in Luneta, waiting for his professional photos to develop; he also claimed he had
hernia that prevented him from running
o De los Santos, Pacadar and Tan  they were at Luneta, but denied hitting Salcedo

RTC Ruling: petitioners are guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery, while the other 5 accused was
acquitted for failure to prove guilt.

CA Ruling: increased the penalty of all the accused to reclusion perpetua, except Tamayo. Hence, this automatic review to
the Supreme Court. Petitioners also filed a Rule 45 pet. for review inasmuch as Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion
perpetua too.

- Petitioners argue that the testimonies of Banculo and Sumlang was suspect as they only surfaced after a
reward was announced. Also, Banculo mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another case to be one
 of the accused in this case. Meanwhile, Sumilang was evasive and unresponsive, prompting the trial court
to reprimand him.
- Petitioners also argue that CA erronously gave weight to the Joint Affidavit of the police intelligence-
operative who witnessed the rally. Also, the photographs of the victim Salcedo, and the local newspapers
and magazines should not have been admitted for lack of proper identification by the person or persons
who took the same.

ISSUE WON the RTC erred in sustaining the testimonies of the eyewitnesses, and giving weight to the joint affidavit of the
police and the photographs

HELD: NO!
- First, there is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward. On the contrary, Sumilang
reported the incident and submitted his sworn statement immediately 2 hours after the incident. He already
expressed his willingness to cooperate with the police. Although Sumilang was admonished by the court for
being argumentative and evasive, this is not enough reason to reject his testimony for he did not exhibit
this conduct all throughout his testimony. There were only instances of evasiveness, but his testimony was
correctly given credence. Also, the trial court’s calibration of the credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed as
they can best appreciate the demeanor, as well as the verbal and non-verbal dimensions of the witnesses’
testimony.
- Also, Banculo’s mistake in identifying another person as accused does not make him entirely untrustworthy. An
honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from
persons with imperfect senses.
- Witnesses’ testimonies all corroborate each other on all important and relevant details of the incident. Their
positive identification of the petitioners jive with each other and their narration of the events are supported by
medical and documentary evidence on record.

- Second, the joint affidavit was correctly given weight, as its contents were also corroborated. Besides, such
affidavit merely reiterates what the other witneesses testified to. If petitioners wanted to impeach this affidavit,
they should have placed the police officers on the witness stand.

- Third, it is a rule that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as
to tis production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this
kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is
determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime.
- It is worthy to note that although the counsel for some of the petitioners objected to the photograph’s
admissibility, these photographs were adopted by the counsel of Tamayo and Neri as part of their defense
exhibits. Prosecution also used such photographs to cross-examine all the accused and their counsel did
not object.
- Such use of the photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is
an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. Also, de los Santos, Pacadar and Tan identified themselves
in the photographs and gave reasons for their presence in the rally. By doing such, the accused affirms that the
photographs are faithful representation of the incident.
- The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of
the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the
testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to
impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other
competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.
 - According to the photographs, only de los Santos, Pacadar and Tan were photographed in various belligerent
poses. Sison appears only once, and is shown merely running after Salcedo despite his hernia. Tamayo and Neri
was not in any of the pictures. However, such absence will not exculpate them as the photographs did not capture
the entire sequence of the killing. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were
unequivocally identified by Banculo and Sumilang. Petitioner’s denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball
identification.

Other Ruling by the SC:

- No treachery in this case as there is no proof that the attach was deliberately and consciousy chosen to ensure the
assailants’ safety from any defense by the victim.
- No evident premefiation as the attach against Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous.
- However, there is conspiracy as the loyalists impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them to bring death to
Salcedo.

CA affirmed. Sison, Pacadar, Tan and De los Santos are punished with reclusion perpetua. Tamayo is sentenced prision
mayot ro reclusion temporal. Damages must also be paid to the heirs of Stephen Salcedo.
Cirse Francisco “Choy” Torralba v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 153699. August 22, 2005

Second Division

Chico – Nazario, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The person who actually recorded should have be presented as a witness in order to lay the proper foundation for the
admission of the purported tape recording. Without the requisite authentication, there is no basis for the trial court to

admit the tape recording in evidence.

FACTS:
Cirse Francisco “Choy” Torralba was charged with the crime of libel for allegedly discrediting the honesty, integrity,

reputation, prestige and honor of the late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas in the former’s radio program. As an evidence,

the prosecution presented Segundo Lim and Atty. Manuel Hontanosas, incorporator and then president respectively, of the

The Maritime Services Incorporator (TMSI), former sponsor of Torralba’s radio program.

Atty. Hontanosas, son of the late Judge came to know of the alleged acts of libel through a recording of Torralba’s

radio program which Segundino asked his adopted daughter Shirly Lim to record. Torralba objected to the admissibility in

evidence of the recording that the prosecution should have presented Shirly Lim, the one who actually recorded the same,

for authentication.
ISSUE:

Is the proper authentication of the recording by Shirly Lim, the one who recorded the tape, necessary for the

recording’s admissibility in evidence?

RULING:

Yes. Without the said authentication, the tape recording is incompetent and inadmissible in evidence.

It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its form where a proper foundation has been

laid to guarantee the genuineness of the recording. In our jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence that before a tape
recording is admissible in evidence and given probative value, the following requisites must first be established, to wit: 1) a

showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony; 2) a showing that the operator of the device was
competent; 3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording; 4) a showing that changes, additions, or

deletions have not been made; 5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording; 6) identification of the
speakers; and 7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of inducement.

These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of susceptibility to tampering of tape recordings.

Thus, the establishment of a proper foundation for the admission of a recording provided adequate assurance that proper

safeguards were observed for the preservation of the recording and for its protection against tampering. In the case at bar,
one can easily discern that proper foundation for the admissibility of the tape recording was not adhered to.
PEOPLE vs. AMANSEC G.R. No. 186131 December 14, 2011 R. A. No. 9165, Dangerous Drugs, buy-bust operation,
Chain of Custody, Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, Sale of Illegal Drugs, Non-Presentation of the
Informant, Absence of Surveillance, Defense of Frame up and Denial
OCTOBER 19, 2017
FACTS:

OIC Police Inspector Villanueva together with PO1 Mabutol, Jr., PO2 Pascua, and PO1 Valencia, formed a team for a buy-
bust operation against Benjamin Amansec with the help of an informant. The informant then introduced Mabutol to
Amansec as a drug addict. Mabutol had just told Amansec that he was going to purchase one hundred pesos worth of
shabu when another buyer, later identified as Jerome Pintis, came up to Amansec to also buy shabu. Amansec then
showed both Pintis and Mabutol three plastic sachets containing crystalline substance. Pintis gave a one hundred peso bill
to Amansec and picked one of the three plastic sachets.

After Pintis left, Amansec continued his transaction with Mabutol, and gave Mabutol another of the remaining two plastic
sachets after receiving the buy-bust money. Valencia immediately arrested Pintis and recovered from the latter one plastic
sachet. Pascua thereafter frisked Amansec and retrieved the buy-bust money and another plastic sachet. The team also
marked with their initials the plastic sachets that they had recovered and turned them over to their Investigator. They later
brought the plastic sachets to the Crime Laboratory to have their contents examined and the result showed positive for
the presence of shabu.

Amansec was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

In convicting Amansec of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the RTC held that the prosecution was
able to establish and satisfy the elements in the sale of illegal drugs.

However, the RTC acquitted Amansec of the illegal possession of dangerous drugs charge.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the lower court was correct in finding the accused guilty of SALE of ILLEGAL DRUGS despite the non-
presentation of the informant and absence of surveillance.

2. Whether or not the chain of custody of evidence was established.

3. Rule on the accused’s defense of denial and frame-up.

4. Whether the elements of the sale of dangerous drugs were established in the present case.

RULING:

1. Amansec was charged and convicted for selling methylamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as
shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, which provides:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (? 500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (? 10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and
purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Non-presentation of an Informant

This Court, has time and again, held that “the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the
conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and
cumulative.” If Amansec felt that the prosecution did not present the informant because he would testify against it, then
Amansec himself should have called him to the stand to testify for the defense. The informant’s testimony is not needed if
the sale of the illegal drug has been adequately proven by the prosecution. In People v. Ho Chua, we said:

The presentation of an informant is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. In People v. Nicolas, the Court ruled
that “police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and
informers since their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court. Moreover, drug dealers do not look
kindly upon squealers and informants. It is understandable why, as much as permitted, their identities are kept secret.” In
any event, the testimony of the informant would be merely corroborative.

No prior surveillance conducted

This issue in the prosecution of illegal drugs cases, again, has long been settled by this Court. We have been consistent in
our ruling that prior surveillance is not required for a valid buy-bust operation, especially if the buy-bust team is
accompanied to the target area by their informant. In People v. Eugenio, we held:

There is no requirement that prior surveillance should be conducted before a buy-bust operation can be undertaken
especially when, as in this case, the policemen are accompanied to the scene by their civilian informant. Prior surveillance
is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or a buy-bust operation, there being no fixed or textbook method
for conducting one. We have held that when time is of [the] essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior
surveillance.

2. Inventory and Chain of Custody of Evidence

Amansec asserts that his conviction was incorrect because the evidence against him was obtained in violation of the
procedure outlined in Republic Act No. 9165. He claims that Section 21 of the aforesaid act was violated when the police
officers who arrested him did not take his picture with the shabu they confiscated from him, and when they made no
physical inventory of the shabu in his presence, or in the presence of his representative, the media, the department of
justice, or any elected public official. Amansec avers that his presumption of innocence prevails over the presumption that
the police officers performed their duty in a regular manner.

Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, provide as follows:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the
same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory
examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the
volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does
not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally
issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the
next twenty-four (24) hours;

(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall
within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up
the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the offender:
Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for
legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;

(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of the subject item/s which,
together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction
over the case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the
Board;

(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe all of the above
proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses
or fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72)
hours before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a
member of the public attorney’s office to represent the former;

(7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative sample/s was presented as
evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request
the court for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and

(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of this Act, dangerous drugs defined herein
which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the
presence of representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused/and or his/her counsel, and,
b) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of seized/surrendered
dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be implemented by the DOH.

Ideally, the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken. However “a testimony about a perfect
chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.” Thus, even though the
prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, this will not render Amansec’s arrest illegal or the items seized from him as
inadmissible in evidence. This Court has consistently held that “what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, because the same will be utilized in ascertaining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.”

The prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been
preserved. Both the prosecution witnesses were categorical and consistent that Amansec offered three plastic sachets
containing shabu to Mabutol and Pintis. These were later recovered from Amansec, Pintis, and Mabutol himself. As soon
as the police officers, together with Amansec and Pintis, reached the Police Station, the seized sachets were marked with
the initials of the police officers, with each officer marking the sachet he personally retrieved from the suspects. This was
done before the specimens were turned over to the station investigator for the preparation of the request for laboratory
examination. Thereafter, the specimens were forwarded to the crime lab by the police officers themselves. The Chemistry
Report prepared by the forensic chemist listed the same specimens, which bore the initials of the police officers, and which
were later identified by Mabutol and Pascua in open court as the plastic sachets they marked with their initials.

Besides, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain unless it can be shown that
there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence. Amansec bears the burden of showing the foregoing to
overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly
discharged their duties. This, Amansec failed to do.

Furthermore, there is nothing in RA No. 9165 or in its implementing rules, which requires each and everyone who came
into contact with the seized drugs to testify in court. “As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly
established to have not been broken and the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not
indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand.”

Denial and Frame-up

The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted
and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the
defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. In the cases before us, appellant
failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was
presented to bolster his allegations.

Equally important is the fact that Amansec has not ascribed any improper motive on the part of the police officers as to
why they would hand-pick him, and falsely incriminate him in such a serious crime. No evidence has been offered to show
that Mabutol and Pascua, were motivated by reasons other than their duty to curb the sale of prohibited drugs. Amansec
himself admitted that he only came to know his arresting officers after his arrest. He also testified that he knew of no
grudge that they might have against him. Hence, until Amansec can show clear and convincing evidence that the
members of the entrapment operation team were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their
testimonies deserve full faith and credit.

3. Elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs established

The successful prosecution of the sale of dangerous drugs case depends on the satisfaction of the following elements:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

To elucidate on the foregoing elements, this Court has said that “in prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material
is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence.”
It is evident in the case at bar that the prosecution was able to establish the said elements.

Amansec was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses, as the person who sold to the poseur-buyer a heat-sealed
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. He had been caught red-handed in the entrapment operation
conducted by the police. Such positive identification must prevail over Amansec’s uncorroborated and weak defense of
denial, and unsubstantiated defense of frame-up.

The corpus delicti of the crime was also established with certainty and conclusiveness. Amansec gave one of the two
remaining plastic sachets to Mabutol after receiving the 100.00 buy-bust money.
In People v. Legaspi, we said:

The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully
consummated the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and Legaspi.
TAN vs. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 145006. August 30, 2006.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: It is quite true that this Court has ruled that objection to the admissibility of evidence, if not made
at the time such evidence is offered, shall be deemed waived. However, in all cases where said rule had been applied, the
assailed testimonial or object evidence had been duly presented during the course of the trial.
In the present case, a
judicious examination of the entire record shows that, indeed, the demand letter was never presented during the course of
the trial. Therefore, petitioner’s failure to timely object to the demand letter is excusable.(In other words, not a waiver.)

EMERGENCY RECIT: MTC convicted Tan for violation of BP 22. Tan filed an MR wherein he denied receipt of the demand
letter and alleged that said evidence was not included in the formal offer of evidence. MR denied. RTC and CA upheld his
conviction. Tan argues that no evidentiary weight should be given to the demand letter because, although included in the
formal offer of evidence by the prosecution, it was not presented during trial for proper identification, hence, it should not
have been admitted into evidence even if the defense failed to object to the formal offer thereof. Petitioner insisted that
the prosecution did not have proof of notice of dishonor, thus, petitioner’s guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. SC acquitted Tan. After the direct testimony of Zaragosa where the exhibits marked were only up to Exhibits "Q"
and "Q-1," all the subsequent hearings did not push through. It was then impossible for the prosecution to have presented
and marked as Exhibit “R”, the demand letter. As the demand letter was never presented during the course of the trial,
petitioner was never alerted to its possible inclusion in the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence. Therefore, petitioner’s
failure to timely object to the demand letter is excusable. The prosecution should not benefit from the anomalous
inclusion of the demand letter in the records. Said evidence should be deemed inadmissible and should not have been
considered by the MTC in arriving at its judgment. Since the prosecution failed to present evidence during trial that a
written demand had been sent to and received by petitioner, the second element, that the accused had knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds, had not been established. Hence, petitioner’s conviction for the crime of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
must be set aside.

FACTS:
• David Tan was charged with the Violation of BP 22 (6 counts) in six (6) separate informations. These cases were
consolidated and tried jointly.
• Carolyn Zaragoza, of legal age, the private complainant, testified among others that:
o She met the accused through their common friend, Paul Dy while they were having some business negotiations
(Witness identified the accused through his pictures which were attached to his bail bond, as said accused failed to appear
in court despite notice);
o During her first meeting with the accused, they had a loan transaction which was followed by another loan
transaction in the amount of P1 Million, and for which she gave the accused a Metrobank Check No. 001430 in the
amount of P950,000.00, having deducted the 5% interest from said loan.
o Thereafter, the accused issued several PCI BANK Checks.
o When all these checks were deposited to her account with the City Trust Bank, Sucat (Parañaque) Branch, they all
bounced for reason "Account Closed."
o She thereafter tried to contact the accused but he (accused) refused to talk to her.
o The accused was sent by her lawyer a formal demand through registered mail, for him to pay in cash the
aforementioned bounced/dishonored checks but to no avail.
• Despite ample opportunity given to the accused to present its evidence, it still failed to do so; hence, the court
ordered the case deemed submitted for decision.
• The MTC convicted Tan of violation of BP 22.
• Tan filed a MR with the MTC wherein he denied receipt of the demand letter and alleged that said evidence was
not included in the formal offer of evidence. Said MR was denied.
• RTC upheld his conviction and issued a Warrant of Arrest. MR denied
• CA dismissed his appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision, ruling that Tan’s guilt had indeed been proven beyond
reasonable doubt since the existence of the element that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in or credit with
the drawee bank at the time he issued the checks is established by the demand letter notifying him of the dishonor of the
checks he issued.
• Petitioner filed an MR where he argued that no evidentiary weight should be given to the demand letter because,
although included in the formal offer of evidence by the prosecution, it was not presented during trial for proper
identification, hence, it should not have been admitted into evidence even if the defense failed to object to the formal
offer thereof. Petitioner insisted that the prosecution did not have proof of notice of dishonor, thus, petitioner’s guilt had
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• The CA denied said MR, holding that since said issue was never raised before the trial court nor before the RTC,
the same can no longer be considered by the reviewing court.

ISSUE(S): W/N the demand letter is admissible as evidence.

HELD: No.
RATIO:
• It is quite true that this Court has ruled that objection to the admissibility of evidence, if not made at the time such
evidence is offered, shall be deemed waived. However, in all cases where said rule had been applied, the assailed
testimonial or object evidence had been duly presented during the course of the trial.
In the present case, a judicious
examination of the entire record shows that, indeed, the demand letter was never presented during the course of the trial.
• The transcript of stenographic shows that the presentation of the testimony of the bank representative testifying
for the prosecution was dispensed with since the opposing parties stipulated that the testimony of a bank representative
would prove the following:
x x x the witness will be testifying on the points that at the time the six checks were presented for payment, the first two
checks were dishonored for being "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" while the third up to the sixth checks were
dishonored for reason of "account closed" and per records of the bank, the account of the accused was not sufficient to
cover the amount of the checks issued by the accused as well as the domestic current account of the accused and we have
here the documents, the ledger of the accused which would prove that the accounts of the accused, both savings and
current were not sufficient to cover the checks issued by the accused to the complainant.
• The only other prosecution witness is private complainant Carolyn Zaragosa (Zaragosa), whose testimony is to the
effect that after the checks bounced, she tried to call up petitioner but the latter refused to talk to her, thus, she was
constrained to obtain the services of a lawyer. Nowhere in the transcript of stenographic notes for the hearing did
Zaragosa ever mention the existence of a demand letter. After the direct testimony of Zaragosa where the exhibits marked
were only up to Exhibits "Q" and "Q-1," all the subsequent hearings did not push through. Zaragosa was never
cross-examined. The defense, despite numerous resetting of hearing dates set for presentation of its evidence, failed to
appear during those hearings, prompting the MTC to deem the case submitted for decision without evidence for the
defense.
• Since there were no other hearings held, it was impossible for the prosecution to have presented and marked as
exhibit, the demand letter.
• The very first time said demand letter was ever mentioned or appeared in the record was in the formal offer of
evidence, supposedly marked as Exhibit "R." How said demand letter came to be marked as Exhibit "R" and inserted into
the record truly mystifies this Court. Such circumstance, to say the least, is tainted with irregularity because, as previously
mentioned, such document was never presented or identified in any of the hearings.
• As held in Pigao v. Rabanillo, for documentary evidence to be considered by the court, it must have been
presented during trial and formally offered.
• Although petitioner admits that they failed to submit any opposition to the formal offer of evidence, he
nevertheless raised the issue of the non-presentation of the demand letter in his motion for reconsideration filed with the
MTC. Evidently, the CA made a mistake in stating that petitioner only raised for the first time on appeal, the issue on the
admission of the demand letter into evidence.
• Thus, in view of the foregoing significant circumstances, it would be unreasonable to apply to the present case the
general rule that objection to the admissibility of evidence, if not made at the time such evidence is offered, shall be
deemed waived. As the demand letter was never presented during the course of the trial, petitioner was never alerted to
its possible inclusion in the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence. Verily, therefore, petitioner’s failure to timely object to
this piece of evidence (the demand letter) is excusable. The prosecution should not benefit from the anomalous inclusion
of the demand letter in the records. Said evidence should be deemed inadmissible and should not have been considered
by the MTC in arriving at its judgment.
• With the exclusion of the demand letter from the body of evidence presented by the prosecution, the next
question is, would the remaining evidence still be sufficient to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt? The
answer must be in the negative.
• The elements of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of any
check to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3)
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
• In Ongson v. People, the Court expounded on the kind of evidence necessary to prove the second element, to wit:
As to the second element, we have held that knowledge involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, thus the
statute itself creates a prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit
with the bank at the time of the issuance and on the check's presentment for payment if he fails to pay the amount of the
check within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor.
• The presumption is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor
and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its
payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment
by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the
drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period. Furthermore, the notice of dishonor
must be in writing; a verbal notice is not enough.
• Since the prosecution failed to present evidence during trial that a written demand had been sent to and received
by petitioner, the second element, that the accused had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, had not been established.
As stated in Dico v. Court of Appeals, "[a] notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus
indispensable before a conviction can ensue. x x x. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution." Hence,
petitioner’s conviction for the crime of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 must be set aside.
People of the Philippines, Appellee
vs.
Saturnino Villanueva, Appellant
GR no. 181829
September 1, 2010

FACTS:
Appellant was convicted with 3 counts of qualified rape both in the trial court and the Court of Appeals and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay damages worth P 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P 75,000.00
as moral damages and P 25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count. The victim, AAA is appellant’s daughter and is
allegedly is a minor. The crime was committed in three separate occasions. During the trial, the prosecution presented
their witness who identified the appellant as her rapist. AAA’s birth certificate proving she was under the age of 12 years
old and the medical certificate were marked as Exhibit during the pre-trial but was not formally offer as evidence. The
appellant contested that the documentary evidence used to convict him should not be subjected for the appreciation of
the court.

ISSUE:Whether or not appellant’s contention that the documentary evidence should not be admitted in court for the
failure to formally offer it in court

RULING:
The appeal is partly meritorious. The Supreme Court agree with the appellant that both the medical certificate and
birth certificate of AAA though marked as exhibits during the pre-trial should not have been considered by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals because they are not formally offered in evidence. Rule 132 Section 34 of the Rules of Court
explicitly provide that: “The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified.”

The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already
been offered as part of evidence. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.

However it must also be considered that appellant can still be convicted without a medical certificate. In rape
cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided that the testimony is credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. The trial court is bound to consider only
the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the documents not offered.

WHEREFORE, the court find appellant GUILTY of three counts of simple rape and accordingly sentence him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his victim the amountd of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P 50,000
as moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages to each count.
People vs. Manhuyod
Facts:
A complaint for rape was filed by Yolanda Manhuyod, accused’s wife and mother of the offended party, Relanne S.
Manhuyod against Restitutio Manhuyod Jr. The victim was 17 years old at that time and she was subjected to medical
examination, which confirms that the crime was indeed consummated. accused, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that Relanne and Yolanda had executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance, declaring that they lost interest in the further
prosecution of the [case] as the case arose out of a family conflict which was [already] patched up; thus the prosecution
declared that without the testimonies of the complainants, the prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Court denied his Motion to Dismiss since the affidavit of desistance was made after the filing of the information. Both
Yolanda and Relanne failed to appear both in the Pre Trial and the Trial proper. Relanne and Yolanda had left for Cebu
probably to elude arrest after having learned from both the print and broadcast media that the court had ordered their
arrest for being cited in contempt.
The following exhibits were offered: (1) A, the complaint sheet accomplished and filed by Yolanda with the NBI, CEVRO; (2)
B, the sworn statement of Yolanda given before Atty. Tomarong and subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8 June
1995; (3) C, the sworn statement of Relanne given before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995; and (4) D, the medical certificate
issued by Dr. Refe. Accused objected to the admission of Exhibits A, B and C on the ground that they were hearsay, and to
Exhibit D on the ground that the medical certificate was not conclusive as to the commission of rape.
Court ruled that the evidence constitute[d] part of the res gestae, an exception to the hearsay rule. The Court ruled that
Restituto Manhuyod Jr. is guilty of rape.
Issue:
WON the presented evidence constituted part of res gestae and is sufficient basis for his conviction.
Held:

The trial court brushed aside accused’s invocation of the hearsay rule on the ground that the sworn statements could be
considered as part of the res gestae, thus constituting admissible hearsay pursuant to Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, which reads as follows:

Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as
part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

there are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be
a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.[47]

The elements of spontaneity is critical. The following factors are then considered in determining whether statements
offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously, viz., (1) the time that lapsed between the
occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made;
(3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events
between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement
itself.[48] As to the first factor, the following proves instructive:

T]he rule is that the statements, to be admissible, should have been made before there had been time or
opportunity to devise or contrive anything contrary to the real facts that occurred.What the law altogether distrusts
is not afterspeech but afterthought.

As to the second factor, it may be stressed that a statement made, or an act done, at a place some distance from the
place where the principal transaction occurred will not ordinarily possess such spontaneity as would render it admissible.[51]

Anent the third factor, a statement will ordinarily be deemed spontaneous if, at the time when it was made, the
conditions of the declarant was such as to raise an inference that the effect of the occurrence on his mind still continued, as
where he had just received a serious injury, was suffering severe pain, or was under intense excitement. Conversely, a lack
of spontaneity may be inferred from the cool demeanor of declarant, his consciousness of the absence of all danger, his
delay in making a statement until witnesses can be procured, or from the fact that he made a different statement prior to
the one which is offered in evidence.[52]

The fourth factor, what is to be considered is whether there intervened between the event or transaction and the making
of the statement relative thereto, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind of the declarant which would thus restore
his mental balance and afford opportunity for deliberation.[53]

The last factor needs no further elaboration.

Tested against the foregoing requisites to admit statements as part of the res gestae and factors to test the
spontaneity of the statements, we do not hesitate to rule that the sworn statement of Relanne (Exhibit C) fails to
qualify as part of the res gestae for these reasons: (1) it was executed only on 8 June 1995 or, thirty-six (36) days
after the alleged rape on 3 May 1995, providing her more than sufficient time to concoct or contrive a falsehood;
(2) it was made after she had resolved to file a case for rape against her father, a decision which required much
deliberation and would cause her obvious pain as the filing would expose her to public humiliation and shame, bring
dishonor to her family and visit upon her father the penalty of death; (3) she gave the statement after three critical
intervening events had occurred, viz., her pregnancy, filing the complaint sheet and her being referred to the NBI
medico-legal officer for examination; and (4) it was made far from the place where the principal event -- the alleged
rape -- was committed, i.e., the latter took place in the De la Paz, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, while the statement
was made in Dipolog City, at the sub-office of the NBI, and any map of Zamboanga del Norte will show that
Tampilisan and Dipolog City do not even adjoin each other.

Turning to the sworn statement of Yolanda (Exhibit B), with more reason should this not qualify as forming part of
the res gestae. Yolanda did not witness the principal event and all she knew of it was told to her by Relanne. Even if
the issue of admissibility is confined to what Relanne had told Yolanda, the same conclusion would be reached for
it clearly appears in Exhibit A that Relanne had not spontaneously told Yolanda of the alleged rape. In fact, the latter
had to confront the former only after the accused confessed to Yolanda that he had molested Relanne. Moreover,
the confrontation took place on 3 June 1995, or a month after the alleged rape.
Ilisan v. People of the Philippines (2010) – Nachura, J.
Petitioner: Romeo Ilisan y Piabol
Respondents: People of the Philippines
Concept: Relevance

Brief Facts: In a baptismal party, there was a drunken melee where the group of Ilisan mauled Gaton. Ilisan shot Gaton in
the abdomen, killing him. The RTC and the CA convicted Ilisan of homicide, giving more weight to the witnesses of the
prosecution and notwithstanding the negative results on the paraffin test. The SC upheld the CA, only increasing the actual
damages.

Doctrines: Relationship by itself does not give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto diminish
the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness. On the contrary, a witness’ relationship to the victim would even make
the testimony more credible as the natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the conviction
of the guilty would actually deter them from implicating persons other than the true culprits.

As a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.

Paraffin tests are extremely unreliable.

FACTS:
1. February 3, 2002 - A baptismal celebration was held at Ricky Silva’s residence in Novaliches, Quezon City. Among the
attendees were Ilisan and Joey Gaton. They belonged to different groups of guests.
- While they were having a drinking spree with their respective groups, one of Ilisan’s companions apparently got
irked by the way Gaton looked at him.
- Ilisan and his companions mauled Gaton. A melee ensued, and Ilisan shot Gaton at the abdomen, causing the latter’s
instantaneous death.
- The gun used was a .45 caliber pistol.
2. February 7, 2002 – Information for murder was filed against Ilisan.
3. Pieces of evidence:
- Prosecution: testimonies of Gabriel Gaton (victim’s brother; was summoned to the place of the incident while his
brother was being mauled), Marlon Dellamas (went to the scene of the incident to look for his brother Jojo), and
Edgardo Dag-um (he was at the place where the mauling and shooting transpired). All three positively identified
Ilisan as the gunman. Dellamas and Dag-um were the victim’s neighbours.
- Defense: testimonies. Ilisan and his witnesses Jomarie Ilisan and Jaime Escasinas (Ilisan’s brother and cousin)
claimed that another guest Chito Partisala, a jail guard in Bicutan, was the assailant.
- Also presented Engr. Leonard Jabonillo, forensic chemist of the Central Police District Crime Lab, who testified
that Ilisan tested negative for gunpowder residue when paraffin tests were conducted a day after the
incident.
4. RTC: convicted Ilisan of homicide.
- Accorded more weight to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses over the declarations of the defense.
- No adequate proof that treachery and evident premeditation qualified the killing.
- Sentenced Ilisan to suffer imprisonment for a term ranging from 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to
14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amounts of P75, 000 as actual damages, P50,000 for the death of the victim and P50,000 as moral damages.
5. On appeal to the CA, Ilisan questioned the credibility of the prosecution witnesses who allegedly harbored ill motive
against him because they were either related to the victim or to one of the participants in the commotion.
- Also argued that the negative results of the paraffin residue test conducted on him strongly indicate his innocence.
6. CA: RTC decision was affirmed, with modification of the maximum period of the indeterminate sentence to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal medium, and the reduction of the award of actual damages to P58,520. Hence,
the present petition.
7. Ilisan appealed to the SC, reiterating the issues he raised before the CA.

ISSUES and RULING:

1. WON the prosecution’s witnesses are credible. (YES)
2. WON there was misappreciation of the facts. (NO)
3. WON the paraffin test should be given weight. (NO)
4. WON Ilisan's version of events should be accepted. (NO)
5. WON imposed penalty is correct. (YES except for actual damages)

RATIO:
1. Yes, the prosecution’s witnesses are credible.
- As to Gabriel: The fact that Gabriel is the victim’s brother does not impair his credibility as witness. Relationship by
itself does not give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto diminish the credibility or
tarnish the testimony of a witness. On the contrary, a witness’ relationship to a victim would even make the testimony
more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody
other than the culprit. The natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the conviction of
the guilty would actually deter them from implicating persons other than the true culprits.
- As to Dellamas and Dag-um: There is no indication that the two were improperly motivated when they testified.
Aside from the prosecution witnesses’ relationship with the other participants in the fight, Ilisan failed to show any
other basis for the ill motive he imputes against them. As a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive
for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their
testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.
- The Court is bound by the findings of the TC in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked or misconstrued
cogent facts and circumstances which would alter a conviction.
2. No. There was no misappreciation of facts committed by the courts below.
- The courts were uniform in their reliance on the prosecution’s version. Both were correct in concluding that the
identity of Ilisan and his actual shooting of Gaton were established beyond moral certainty through the
testimonies of 3 witnesses:

Witness Gabriel Gaton:

Q: How far were you when you saw that man who was pointing a gun at your brother Joey?
A: (Witness indicating a distance of 10 meters more or less.)
Q: And how far was the man with a gun from your brother Joey?
A: (Witness indicating a distance of 2 meters.)
Q: What was the position of your brother Joey when the man was pointing his gun to your brother Joey?
A: Sidewise, sir.
Q: What happened after you saw the man pointing a gun at your brother?
A: I shouted: Don’t (Huwag naman) but he ignored me and then the gun went off.
Q: What happened after the gun went off?
A: After firing the gun, he pointed the gun to the bystanders.
Q: What happened to your brother?
A: He fell down, sir.

Witness Dellamas:
Q: What happened after they entered the gate which you said was opened?
A: The person who was armed with a gun shot at Joey Gaton.
Q: How far were you when this person shot Joey Gaton, how far were you to this person?
A: I was very near, ma’am. I was about a meter only away from them.
xxxx
Q: And what happened after this person who you just identified as Romeo Ilisan shot Joey Gaton, what happened?
A: Joey Gaton fell down, ma’am.

Witness Dag-um:
Q: Mr. Witness, you said a while ago that Joey Gaton was already dead, how did he die?
A: He was shot, sir.
Q: Who shot him?
A: Romeo Ilisan, sir.
 xxxx
Q: You pointed to Romeo Ilisan as the person who shot Joey Gaton, how far were you when Romeo Ilisan shot Joey Gaton?
A: About two (2) meters away sir.

3. No, paraffin tests in general have been rendered inconclusive by the SC.
- Paraffin tests can only establish the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand; still, the test alone cannot
determine whether the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm.
- The presence of nitrates should be taken only as an indication of a possibility or even of a probability but not of
infallibility that a person has fired a gun.
- Conversely, the absence of gunpowder nitrates, the day after the incident, does not conclusively establish that he did
not fire a gun; neither are the negative results yielded by the paraffin test a proof of innocence.
- People v. Manalo: "Even if he were subjected to a paraffin test and the same yields a negative finding, it cannot be
definitely concluded that he had not fired a gun as it is possible for one to fire a gun and yet be negative for the presence
of nitrates as when the hands are washed before the test. The Court has even recognized the great possibility that there
will be no paraffin traces on the hand if, as in the instant case, the bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber pistol.”
- Thus, the positive, clear, and categorical testimonies of the three eyewitnesses to the crime deserve full merit in both
probative weight and credibility over the negative results of the paraffin test conducted on petitioner and his witnesses’
anomalous claims.

4. No, such version is a mere afterthought intended to exculpate Ilisan.

- If it is true that they saw Partisala shoot Joey, why did they not tell the policeman who arrived at the scene immediately
that Partisala was the gunman? Why did Jomarie wait until somebody pointed to the accused as the gunman before he
told them that it was Partisala who shot the victim?

5. Yes, the prison term and the other awards for damages are correct, except for actual damages.
- Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance proven, the
penalty should be applied in its medium period (14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months)
- Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law the maximum penalty will be selected from the above range, with the
minimum penalty being selected from the range of penalty one degree lower than reclusion temporal, which is prision
mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years). Thus, the 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor (as minimum) to 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, imposed by the RTC, and affirmed with modification by the CA, is correct.
- Actual damages pertain to the actual expenses incurred by the victim’s heirs in relation to his death, i.e., burial and
funeral expenses. To justify an award, it is necessary for a party to produce competent proof or the best evidence
obtainable, such as receipts.
- In this case, the actual expenses incurred for the wake and burial of the victim were duly shown by receipts in the
aggregate amount of P88,520.00. But the CA awarded only P58,520.00, which appears to have been caused by the non-
inclusion of Exhibit "L," a receipt for P30,000.00 paid by the victim’s wife for the deceased’s autopsy and embalming
treatment, and use of mortuary equipment for the interment.
- Having convincingly proved the nature of the expense in the amount of P30,000.00 in Exhibit "L," it is only right to
increase the actual damages awarded to the victim’s heirs to P88,520.00.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED. CA decision is AFFIRMED with modification.

Digest maker: Kris

Herrera v. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005

FACTS:
In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in order for the latter to
recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied Armi’s allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court
ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the
biological father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing
has not yet garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and that the said
test is unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet recognized in the
Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case;
however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in
Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other hand, as to
determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court provides, which is now known as the
Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following
data:
how the samples were collected,
how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence (Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by courts before admitting scientific test results in
evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:
Whether the theory or technique can be tested,
Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,
Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be had, the DNA test result
must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the biological father. However, a 99.9%
probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100% ) does not immediately result in the DNA test result being
admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in
this case Herrera, is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which
can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the biological father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right against self-incrimination. The
right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
(testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There
is no “testimonial compulsion” in the getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-
incrimination.
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Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz
G.R. No. 171713, 17 December 2007

FACTS:
Minor Diaz filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court for compulsory recognition with prayer for support against
Rogelio Ong, she was represented by her mother Jinky. Before the case, Jinky married a certain Hasegawa Katsuo,
Japanese. That same year, Jinky met Rogelio, they fell in love. The next year, Rogelio and Jinky cohabited. After four years,
Joanna was born, Rogelio recognized Joanna as his, however, that same year, Rogelio abandoned them and stopped
giving support to Joanna, he alleged that he is not the father of Joanna, hence this petition. RTC rendered a decision and
declared the minor to be the illegitimate child of Ong with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the child until she
reaches the age of majority. Ong opposed the CA’s order to directing the Estate and Joanne Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis
for determining the paternity of the minor Joanne.
During the pendency of the case, Rogelion Died. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.
They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that “DNA paternity testing, as current
jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done even if the person is whose DNA is the subject is dead.

RULING:
Yes.The court held that the death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA analysis so long as there
exist, suitable biological samples of his DNA. The New Rules on DNA Evidence permits the manner of DNA testing by
using biological samples–organic material originating from the person’s body, for example, blood, saliva, other body
fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials- that is susceptible to DNA testing. In case proof of filiation or
paternity would be unlikely to adequately found or would be hard to get, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
found from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical remains of the long dead parent could be resorted to.
ANTONIO LEJANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB ET. AL, G.R.
No. 176864. Dec. 14, 2010
GR No. 176389
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176864

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ,
PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.

December 14, 2010

Facts:

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and xxx, seven, were brutally slain at
their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom
gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the
identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the
gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented
star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke"
Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer,
Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public
prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.

The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused
since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.

The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These included the
medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former
laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s
husband.

Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America.
He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the
defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible
witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-
examinations.

On January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty
as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial
court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years
minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.

The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found
sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those
who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of
Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed
still under the safekeeping of the NBI.

The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution
access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same
having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object
evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the government’s failure to
preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.

Controlling Issues:

1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the
others in committing the crime.

Other Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to produce the semen specimen
that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence; and

2. Whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart,
raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister.

Held:

The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to
due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the
semen specimen taken from Carmela.

When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the
technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.
Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did
not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the
meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on
when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged
arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused.

They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its
decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending
adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test.
Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice
that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.

Suspicious Details

Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers
with information against drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of
notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the
"Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special treatment" and she
became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she
unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing
showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and
Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant.

Webb’s U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi through (a) the travel preparations; (b) the two immigration
checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second immigration check; and (e) alibi versus positive identification; and (f) a
documented alibi.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at another
place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the
passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not
have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit
the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S.
and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.

Effect of Webb’s alibi to others

Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to
Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in
the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s
story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.

Conclusion

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the
accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as
to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s
inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed
to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?

The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of
which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.