PNUD HD Perspectives Gsni

2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES
TACKLING SOCIAL NORMS

A game changer for gender inequalities
The substantive content in this publication is based on
A game changer for gender inequalities research for the 2019 Human Development Report. The
team that created this report includes Pedro Conceição,
Jon Hall, Yu-Chieh Hsu, Admir Jahic, Milorad Kovacevic,
Tanni Mukhopadhyay, Anna Ortubia, Carolina Rivera
and Heriberto Tapia. Contributors to the research are
acknowledged at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/
human-development-report-2019-acknowledgements.
The Human Development Report Office (HDRO) of

the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
produced this publication in collaboration with the
UNDP Gender Team.
Copyright @ 2020 By the United Nations Development Programme 1 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017 USA
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission.
General disclaimers. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Human Development Report Office (HDRO) of the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the
delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may
not yet be full agreement.
The findings, analysis, and recommendations of this publication do not represent the official position of the UNDP or of any of the UN
Member States that are part of its Executive Board. They are also not necessarily endorsed by those mentioned in the acknowledg-
ments or cited.
The mention of specific companies does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by UNDP in preference to others of a
similar nature that are not mentioned.
Where indicated, some figures in the analytical part of the Report were estimated by the HDRO or other contributors and are not
necessarily the official statistics of the concerned country, area or territory, which may be based on alternative methods. All the
figures used to calculate the human development composite indices are from official sources. All reasonable precautions have been
taken by the HDRO to verify the information contained in this publication. However, the published material is being distributed
without warranty of any kind, either expressed or implied.
The responsibility for the interpretation and use of the material lies with the reader. In no event shall the HDRO and UNDP be liable
for damages arising from its use.
Printed in the USA, by AGS, an RR Donnelley Company, on Forest Stewardship Council certified and elemental chlorine-free papers.
Printed using vegetable-based ink.

Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.
Contents
Human Development Perspectives BOXES
Tackling social norms—a game changer for gender inequalities 1 1 Practical and strategic gender interests and needs 4
The situation of women: an inequality plateau? 1 2 Overlapping intersecting identities 7
Gender inequality and empowerment: catching up in the basics, 3 The gender social norms index in practice 11
widening gaps in enhanced capabilities 3 4 Artificial intelligence and the risk of bias: making horizontal inequalities worse? 13
Are social norms and power imbalances shifting? 5
The gender social norms index—measuring beliefs, biases FIGURES
and prejudices 6 1 Progress towards gender equality is slowing 2
Widespread biases and backlash 8 2 Gender inequality is correlated with a loss in human development due to
What causes change—and what determines its nature? 9 inequality 3
3 Remarkable progress in basic capabilities, much less in enhanced capabilities 4
Restricted choices and power imbalances—a lifecycle perspective 12
4 The greater the empowerment, the wider the gender gap 5
Policies to tackle social norms—game changers 12
5 How social beliefs can obstruct gender and women’s empowerment 8
Notes 16 6 Only 14 percent of women and 10 percent of men worldwide have no gender
References 17 social norms biases 8
7 Progress in the share of men with no gender social norms bias from 2005–2009
to 2010–2014 was largest in Chile, Australia, the United States and the
STATISTICAL TABLES
Netherlands, while most countries showed a backlash in the share of women
A1 Gender Social Norms Index, last available period 20 with no gender social norms bias 10
A2 Gender Social Norms Index, last available period by gender 22
A3a Gender Social Norms Index, changes over time 24 TABLES
A3b Gender Social Norms Index, changes over time by gender 25
1 Gender Inequality Index: Regional dashboard 3
A4 Gender Inequality Index 26
2 Definition of bias for the indicators of the multidimensional gender social
norms index 8
3 Bias against gender equality is on the rise 9
ii | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES


Human Development Perspectives

Tackling social norms—a game changer for gender inequalities
Gender disparities are a persistent form of women from Argentina to Mexico.6 A move-
inequality in every country.1 Despite remark- ment born in Chile created a hymn named
able progress in some areas, no country in the “a rapist in your way,” shouted in unison by
world—rich or poor—has achieved gender thousands of women across the world (367
equality. All too often, women and girls are times in 52 countries and on every continent
discriminated against in health, in education, except Antarctica7) demanding that society
at home and in the labour market—with nega- stop blaming the victims of rape.
tive repercussions for their freedoms. Why is progress towards some aspects of
This is the time for a reality check. The gender equality getting slower and more diffi-
commemoration of the 25th anniversary of cult? Are there hidden dimensions of gender
the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and inequality? To explore these questions, the
Platform for Action (Beijing+25) provides 2019 Human Development Report argues that
an opportunity to reassess the path to gender progress towards gender equality is confront-
equality and adjust actions to close gender ing moving targets and inequality traps, with
gaps. disadvantaged groups catching up with basic
The world is not on track to achieve gender achievements, but trailing in more empower-
equality by 2030. The Human Development ing enhanced achievements. One example: In
Report’s Gender Inequality Index (GII)—a the 50 countries where adult women are more
measure of women’s empowerment in health, educated than men, they still receive on aver-
education and economic status—shows that age 39 percent less income than men—despite
overall progress in gender inequality has been devoting more time to work.8
slowing in recent years.2 For instance, based on Social norms are central to the understand-
current trends, it would take 257 years to close ing of these dynamics. For example, societies
the gender gap in economic opportunity.3 often tell their girls that they can become
The number of female heads of government is anything they want and are capable of, while
lower today than five years ago, with only 10 investing in their education. But the same
women in such positions among 193 countries societies tend to block their access to power
(down from 15 in 2014).4 positions without giving them a fair chance.
Beyond what is measured, there are unac- Globally almost 50 percent of people say they
counted burdens behind the achievements: think men make better political leaders, while
the double shift at home, the harassment in more than 40 percent feel that men make bet-
public transportation, the discrimination in ter business executives—a social judgement,
workplaces, and the multiple hidden con- just for being a woman, an invisible barrier and
straints that women face. an affront to fairness and real meritocracy.9
New social movements are emerging
all around the world. Different forms of
demonstration—including online campaigns, The situation of women:
women marches and street performances— an inequality plateau?
demand new ways of looking at gender equal-
ity and women’s empowerment. The #MeToo There has been remarkable progress on gender
movement gives voice to many silence break- equality. Over the past century, women in
ers, uncovering abuse and vulnerability. In most countries were granted basic political,
India the #IWillGoOut movement demands economic and social rights.10 Restrictions to
equal rights for women in public spaces.5 In vote, go to school and work in different eco-
Latin America the #NiUnaMenos movement nomic areas were lifted, with the principle of
sheds light on femicides and violence against equality typically granted in constitutions.11
Social norms— a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 1

The trend gained global momentum in the fundamental functions of a human life.”15 This
second half of the 20th century.12 is evident in the Gender Inequality Index and
This strong push was a basis for optimism be- its components—reflecting gaps in reproduc-
fore the turn of the 21st century. In 1995—the tive health, empowerment and the labour mar-
year of the Beijing Declaration and Platform ket. No place in the world has gender equality.
for Action—the Human Development Report In Sub-Saharan Africa 1 woman in every 180
highlighted sizeable gender disparities, larger giving birth dies (more than 20 times the rate
than today’s, but documented substantial in developed countries). And in most regions
progress over the preceding two decades, par- adult women are less educated, have less access
ticularly in education and health, where the to labour markets than men and lack access
prospect of equality was visible on the near ho- to political power (table 1). Moreover, gender
rizon. The conclusion: “These impressions are inequality translates into other areas of human
cause for hope, not pessimism, for the future.”13 development, threatening progress across the
After 1995 the situation of women contin- 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
ued to improve, with remarkable strides in Gender inequality is correlated with a loss
A plateau in gender education, almost reaching parity in average in human development due to inequality (fig-
primary enrolment, and in health, reducing the ure 2). No country has reached low inequality
inequality comes global maternal mortality ratio by 45 percent in human development without reducing the
with a great cost after 1990.14 But gains in other dimensions of loss coming from gender inequality. Investing
women’s empowerment have been smaller, and in women’s equality and lifting both their
progress towards gender equality is slowing living standards and their empowerment are
(figure 1). The space for gains based on current thus central to the human development agenda
strategies may be eroding, and unless the active and to achieving the Sustainable Development
barriers posed by biased beliefs and practices Goals (SDGs). Not only are 45 targets and
that sustain persistent gender inequalities are 54 specific indicators of the SDG framework
addressed, progress towards equality will be far directly linked to gender,16 the effects of these
harder in the foreseeable future. inequalities are linked to all dimensions of
Overall, it is still the case— as Martha development.17 This implies that investment
Nussbaum has pointed out — that “wom- in gender equality has a catalytic effect on the
en in much of the world lack support for 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.
FIGURE 1
Progress towards gender equality is slowing
Gender Inequality Index (mean value)
0.500
0.400
0.300
0.000
1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Source: Human Development Report Office (see table A4).
2 | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

TABLE 1
Gender Inequality Index: Regional dashboard
Maternal
mortality Adolescent Share of
ratio birth rate seats in
Gender (deaths per (births per parliament Population with at least Labour force
Inequality 100,000 live 1,000 women (% held by some secondary education participation rate
Index births) ages 15–19) women) (% ages 25 and older) (% ages 15 and older)
Female Male Female Male
Region 2018 2015 2015–2020 2018 2010–2018 2010–2018 2018 2018
Arab States 0.531 148.2 46.6 18.3 45.9 54.9 20.4 73.8
East Asia and the Pacific 0.310 61.7 22.0 20.3 68.8 76.2 59.7 77.0
Europe and Central Asia 0.276 24.8 27.8 21.2 78.1 85.8 45.2 70.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.383 67.6 63.2 31.0 59.7 59.3 51.8 77.2
South Asia 0.510 175.7 26.1 17.1 39.9 60.8 25.9 78.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.573 550.2 104.7 23.5 28.8 39.8 63.5 72.9
Source: Human Development Report Office (see table A4).
FIGURE 2 and functionings from the basic to the more

enhanced, representing different levels of
Gender inequality is correlated with a loss in empowerment. And there has been faster pro-
human development due to inequality
gress towards equality in basic capabilities
Loss in human development due and slower progress in enhanced capabilities.
to gender inequality (percent) Disadvantaged groups catch up in the basic and
90 fall behind in the enhanced, a dynamic that
tends to perpetuate the unequal distribution of
power.18 Gender equality–related capabilities
60 follow a similar pattern.
On the positive side women are catching up
in basic areas of development. Legal barriers
30 to gender equality have been removed in most
countries: Women can vote and be elected,
they have access to education, and they can in-
0 creasingly participate in the economy without
0 10 20 30 40 50 formal restrictions. But progress has been une-
Inequality in Human Development Index ven as women move away from basic areas into
distribution (percent)
enhanced ones, where gaps tend to be wider.
Note: Countries mapped by their Gender Inequality Index performance relative These patterns can be interpreted as reflect-
to their performance on the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index. The
higher the loss due to gender inequality, the greater the inequality in human ing the distribution of individual empower-
development.
Source: Human Development Report Office.
ment and social power. Women make greater
and faster progress where their individual em-
powerment or social power is lower (basic capa-
bilities). But they face a glass ceiling where they
Gender inequality and have greater responsibility, political leadership
empowerment: catching up and social payoffs in markets, social life and
in the basics, widening gaps politics (enhanced capabilities) (figure 3). This
in enhanced capabilities view of gradients in empowerment is closely
linked to the seminal literature on basic and
Progress in human development is linked to strategic needs coming from gender planning
expanding substantive freedoms, capabilities (box 1).

FIGURE 3
Remarkable progress in basic capabilities, much less in enhanced capabilities
Enhanced Agency
capabilities and change
Social Tradeoffs/
norms power imbalances
Progress has been Subsistence and Basic

uneven as women participation capabilities
move away from basic

areas into enhanced
ones, where gaps Source: Human Development Report Office.
tend to be wider
BOX 1
Practical and strategic gender interests and needs
The notion of practical and strategic gender interests gender roles and relations, such as a law condemning
and needs (pioneered by Caroline Moser),1 which in- gender-based violence, equal access to credit, equal
forms much of the gender policy analysis framework, is inheritance and others. Addressing them should al-
connected here to the concept of basic and enhanced ter gender power relations. Sometimes practical and
capabilities and achievements. As articulated in gender strategic needs coincide—for example, the practical
social policy analyses,2 practical gender needs refer to need for childcare coincides with the strategic need to
the needs of women and men to make everyday life get a job outside the home.3 The difference is compa-
easier, such as access to water, better transportation, rable to that between basic and enhanced capabilities.
childcare facilities and so on. Transformative changes that can bring about normative
Addressing these needs will not directly challenge and structural shifts are the strongest predictors of
gender power relations but may remove important ob- practical and strategic interventions expanding wom-
stacles to women’s economic empowerment. Strategic en’s agency and empowerment for gender equality.
gender needs refer to needs for society to shift in
Notes
1. Molyneux 1985; Moser 1989. 2. Moser 1989. 3. SIDA 2015.
Take access to political participation (figure for heads of state and government it is almost
4, left panel). Women and men vote in elections 90 percent.
at similar rates. So, there is parity in entry-level Similar gradients occur even for women
political participation, where power is very who reach higher power. Only 24 percent of
diffused. But when more concentrated polit- the parliamentarian seats are held by women,
ical power is at stake, women appear severely and they represent only 5 percent of heads of
underrepresented. The higher the power and government in 2019.19 And with portfolios
responsibility, the wider the gender gap—and unevenly distributed, women most commonly

FIGURE 4
The greater the empowerment, the wider the gender gap
Global gender gap in politics Global gender gap per type of employment
(gap with respect to parity, percent) (gap with respect to parity, percent)
100 100
80
80
60
60
40
40 20
0
20
-20
0
-40
Votea Lower house Upper house Speakers of Head of Contributing Own Employees Employers Top 100 Top 500
or single parliament government family account entertainers billionaires
house workers
Basic Enhanced Basic Enhanced
a. Assumes an equal proportion of men and women in the voting population.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the World Values Survey, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, ILO (2019b) and Forbes (2019).
held in environment, natural resources and of women have reached parity in enrolment
energy, followed by social sectors, such as social in primary education. But this may not be
affairs, education and family. Fewer women had enough for achieving parity in adulthood,
portfolios in transport, economics or finance. as large differences persist in occupational
Certain disciplines are typically associated with choices, with the share of female graduates in
feminine or masculine characteristics, as is also science, technology, engineering and math-
true in education and the labour market. ematics (STEM) programmes lower than
Economic participation also shows a gradi- 15 percent for most countries.22 The transi-
ent (see figure 4, right panel). When empow- tion from the education system to the world
erment is basic and precarious, women are of paid work is marked by a gender equality
overrepresented, as for contributing family discontinuity associated with women’s repro-
workers (typically not receiving monetary pay- ductive roles.23 Women on average comprise
ment). Then, as economic power increases from 43 percent of the agricultural labour force in
employee to employer, and from employer to developing countries while the share of fe-
top entertainer and billionaire, the gender gap male holders of agricultural land reaches only
widens, with women representing only 21 per- 18 percent.24 Some discontinuities represent
cent of the world’s employers and 12 percent of a natural part of the development process—
the top billionaires.20 Empowerment gradients the constant need to push new boundaries to
appear even for a set of similar companies, as achieve more. Others represent the response
with the gender leadership gap in S&P 500 of deeply rooted social norms that preserve
companies: only 5.8 percent of CEOS are fe- underlying structures of power.
male.21 Although women’s overall employment
by these companies might be close to parity,
women are underrepresented in more senior Are social norms and power
positions. imbalances shifting?
This pattern appears in other aspects of
development. Women today are the most Gender inequality has long been associated
qualified in history, and newer generations with persistent discriminatory social norms

prescribing social roles and power relations people’s perception of themselves and others,
between men and women in society.25 Social thus engendering a sense of belonging to par-
norms held by individuals and their reference ticular identity groups. The beliefs people hold
groups are values, beliefs, attitudes and prac- about appropriate behaviour often determine
tices that assert preferred power dynamics for the range of choices and preferences that they
interactions between individuals and insti- exercise—in that context norms can determine
tutions.26 As broader constructs, norms are autonomy and freedom, and beliefs about
operationalized through beliefs, attitudes and social censure and reproach create barriers for
practices.27 individuals who transgress. For gender roles
People’s expectations of individuals’ roles these beliefs can be particularly important in
in households, communities, workplaces and determining the freedoms and power relations
societies can determine a group’s function- with other identities— compounded when
ing. Women often face strong conventional overlapping and intersecting with those of age,
societal expectations to be caregivers and race and class hierarchies (box 2).
homemakers; men are expected to be bread- How prevalent are biases from social norms?
As broader winners.28 Embedded in these social norms How are they evolving? How do they affect
are longstanding patterns of exclusion from gender equality? These are difficult questions,
constructs, norms household and community decisionmaking mainly because social norms and attitudes are
are operationalized that limit women’s opportunities and choices. hard to observe, interpret and measure. But us-
through beliefs, So, despite convergence on some outcome ing data from the World Values Survey wave 5
indicators—such as access to education at all (2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014), a gen-
attitudes and practices levels and access to health care—women and der social norms index can be constructed to
girls in many countries still cannot reach their capture how social beliefs can obstruct gender
full potential.29 equality along multiple dimensions (figure 5).
Beliefs about what others do and what others
think a person in some reference group should
do, maintained by social approval and disap- The gender social norms
proval, often guide actions in social settings.30 index— measuring beliefs,
So it is useful to measure the beliefs and atti- biases and prejudices
tudes that create biases and prejudices towards
women’s empowerment in society. The gender social norms index, proposed
Social norms cover several aspects of an indi- here and introduced in the 2019 Human
vidual’s identity—age, gender, ability, ethnicity, Development Report for the first time, com-
religion and so on—that are heterogeneous and prises four dimensions—political, educational,
multidimensional. Discriminatory social norms economic and physical integrity—and is con-
and stereotypes reinforce gendered identities structed based on responses to seven questions
and determine power relations that constrain from the World Values Survey, which are used
women’s and men’s behaviour in ways that lead to create seven indicators. The answer choices
to inequality. Norms influence expectations for vary by indicator. For indicators for which the
masculine and feminine behaviour considered answer choices are strongly agree, agree, dis-
socially acceptable or looked down on. So they agree and strongly disagree, the index defines
directly affect individuals’ choices, freedoms individuals with a bias as those who answer
and capabilities. strongly agree and agree. For the political indi-
Social norms also reflect regularities among cator on women’s rights, for which the answer
groups of individuals. Rules of behaviour are is given on a numerical scale from 1 to 10, the
set according to standards of behaviour or index defines individuals with a bias as those
ideals attached to a group’s sense of identity.31 who choose a rating of 7 or lower. For the
Individuals have multiple social identities and physical integrity indicators, for which the an-
behave according to identity-related ideals; swer also ranges from 1 to 10, the index defines
they also expect others sharing a common iden- individuals with a bias using a proxy variable
tity to behave according to these ideals. Norms for intimate partner violence and one for repro-
of behaviour related to these ideals affect ductive rights (table 2).

BOX 2
Overlapping intersecting identities
When gender identities overlap with other identities, norms and stereotypes of exclusion can be associated
they combine and intersect to generate distinct prejudic- with different identities. For instance, regarding median
es and discriminatory practices that violate individuals’ years of education completed in Angola and Guatemala,
equal rights in society. Intersectionality is the complex, an important gap distinguishes women in the highest
cumulative way the effects of different forms of discrimi- wealth quintile from those in the second or lowest quin-
nation combine, overlap or intersect—a nd are amplified tile (box figure 1). If the differences are not explicitly
when put together.1 A sociological term, intersectionality considered, public programmes may leave women in the
refers to the interconnected nature of social categories lowest quintiles behind. Moreover, individuals’ different
such as race, class, age, gender, ability, ethnicity and social identities can profoundly influence their beliefs
residence status, regarded as creating overlapping and and experiences about gender. People who identify
interdependent systems of discrimination or disadvan- with multiple minority groups, such as racial minority
tage. It emerges from the literature on civil legal rights. women, can easily be excluded and overlooked by poli-
It recognizes that policies can exclude people who face cies. But the invisibility produced by interacting identi-
overlapping discrimination unique to them. ties can also protect vulnerable individuals by making The gender social
Overlapping identities must be considered in re- them less prototypical targets of common forms of bias norms index captures
search and policy analysis because different social and exclusion.2
how social beliefs
How gaps in median years of education distinguish rich from poor in Angola and Guatemala, 2015 can obstruct gender
10.4
equality along
9.2 multiple dimensions
6.5 6.7
5.4
4.9 5
4.4
2.9
1.4 1.6
Total Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest Total Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest
15–49 quintile quintile 15–49 quintile quintile
Angola Guatemala
Note: Lowest quintile refers to the poorest 20 percent; highest quintile refers to the wealthiest 20 percent.
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys.
Notes
1. IWDA 2018. 2. Biernat and Sesko 2013; Miller 2016; Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008.
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys.
For each indicator a variable takes the value bias from one person to block a woman’s pro-
of 1 when an individual has a bias and 0 when gress in society. A second gender social norms
the individual does not. Two methods of ag- index (GSNI2) is based on a simple “intersec-
gregation are then used in reporting results in tion approach.” It measures the percentage of
the form of an Index. The core gender social people with at least two biases.32
norms index (GSNI) is based on the “union The methods are applied to two sets of coun-
approach.” It measures the percentage of people tries. The first set consists of countries with
with bias(es), independent of the number of bi- data for either wave 5 (2005–2009) or wave 6
ases. In many instances, it might take only one (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey and

FIGURE 5
How social beliefs can obstruct gender and women’s empowerment
Dimensions Political Educational Economic Physical integrity
Men make better Women have University is more Men should have Men make better Proxy for Proxy for
Indicators political leaders the same rights important for a man more right to a business executives intimate reproductive
than women do as men than for a woman job than women than women do partner violence rights
Dimension index Political empowerment Educational empowerment Economic empowerment Physical integrity
index index index index
Gender social norms index
Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia 2019.
uses the latest data available. This set includes Widespread biases and backlash
75 countries and territories accounting for
81 percent of the global population. The sec- According to the count index, 91 percent of
ond set consists of only countries with data for men and 86 percent of women show at least
both wave 5 and wave 6. This set includes 31 one clear bias against gender equality in areas
countries and territories accounting for 59 per- such as politics, economic, education, intimate
cent of the global population. partner violence and women’s reproductive
TABLE 2
rights (figure 6).
About 50 percent of men and women in-
Definition of bias for the indicators of the multidimensional gender social norms terviewed across 75 countries say they think
index
FIGURE 6
Dimension Indicator Choices Bias definition
Only 14 percent of women and 10 percent of men
Strongly agree, agree,
Men make better political Strongly agree and worldwide have no gender social norms biases
disagree, strongly
leaders than women do agree
Political disagree
Percent of surveyed population responding with biases
Women have the same rights 1, not essential, to 10, towards gender equality and women’s empowerment
Intermediate form: 1–7
as men essential
Women Men
Strongly agree, agree, No bias 13.9 9.4
University is more important Strongly agree and
Educational disagree, strongly
for a man than for a woman agree Bias in: 17.6
disagree 1 indicator 23.7
17.2
Men should have more right Strongly agree and
Agree, neither, disagree 2 indicators 20.3
to a job than women agree 17.1
Economic
Strongly agree, agree, 3 indicators 15.7
Men make better business 17.8
disagree, strongly Agree
executives than women do 4 indicators 13.9
disagree 13.5
5 indicators 9.0
Proxy for intimate partner 6 indicators 2.9 6.3
1, never, to 10, always Strongest form: 2–10 all 7 indicators 0.4 1.1
Physical integrity violence
Proxy for reproductive rights 1, never, to 10, always Weakest form: 1 Note: Based on 75 countries and territories with data from wave 5 or 6 of the
World Values Survey, accounting for 81 percent of the global population.
Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019), based on data from the World
Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia 2019. Values Survey.

men make better political leaders than women, the United States and the Netherlands (fig-
while more than 40 percent felt that men made ure 7). At the other extreme, indicating a
better business executives. Almost 30 percent backlash, the share of men with no bias fell in
of people agree it is justifiable for a man to beat Sweden, Germany, India and Mexico. The share
his partner. of women with no gender social norms bias
Women are skewed towards less bias against increased the most in the Netherlands, Chile
gender equality and women’s empowerment. and Australia. But most countries in the sample
Men are concentrated in the middle of the dis- showed a backlash, led by Sweden, India, South
tribution, with 52 percent having two to four Africa and Romania (see figure 7).
gender social norm biases. More than 50 per-
cent of women are biased in the political arena.
Men present biases higher than 63 percent in What causes change — and
both the political and economic dimensions, what determines its nature?
especially for the indicators “Men make better
political leaders than women do” and “Men How can practices and behaviours either change
should have more right to a job than women.” or sustain traditional gender roles? Norms can
Globally close to 50 percent of men agree change as economies develop, with changes in
men should have more right to a job than wom- communications technology, with new laws,
en. This coincides with the fact that profession- policies or programmes, with social and politi-
al women currently face a challenge in finding a cal activism and with exposure to new ideas and
partner that will support their career.33 practices through formal and informal channels
More worrying, despite decades of progress (education, role models and media).35
in advancing women’s rights, bias against gen- Policymakers often focus on the tangible—
der equality is increasing in some countries, on laws, policies, spending commitments, pub-
with evidence of a backlash in attitudes among lic statements and so on. This is driven partly
both men and women. According to the by the desire to measure impact and by sheer
GSNI2, the proportion of people with mod- impatience with the slow pace of change. Yet
erate and intense biases against gender equality neglecting the invisible power of norms would
grew over the last few years in 15 countries miss a deeper understanding of social change.36
(out of 31). The share of both women and men Consider the subtle differences between
worldwide with moderate to intense gender descriptive and injunctive norms.37 Descriptive
biases grew from 57 percent to 60 percent for norms are beliefs about what is considered a
women and from 70 percent to 71 percent for normal practice in a social group or an area.
men (table 3). Surveys have shown that young- Injunctive norms state what people in a com-
er men may be even less committed to equality munity should do. This distinction is important
than their elders.34 for practice, as it can lead to an understanding
Progress in the share of men with no gender of why some aspects of gender norms and rela-
social norms bias was largest in Chile, Australia, tions shift faster than others.38
TABLE 3
Bias against gender equality is on the rise
% of people
Index Description Group 2004–2009 2010–2014 Change
Women 83.4 84.6 1.2
GSNI With some bias
Men 89.4 89.9 0.5
Women 56.6 59.7 3.1
GSNI2 With moderate to intense biases
Men 70.0 70.8 0.8
Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on World Values Survey for 31 countries with time series data, representing 59 percent of the global
population.

FIGURE 7
Progress in the share of men with no gender social norms bias from 2005–2009 to 2010–2014 was largest in Chile, Australia, the United States
and the Netherlands, while most countries showed a backlash in the share of women with no gender social norms bias
Men Women
Chile Netherlands
Australia Chile
United States Australia
Netherlands China
Argentina Slovenia
Poland Japan
Thailand Ukraine
Japan Trinidad and Tobago
Trinidad and Tobago Thailand
Spain United States
Korea (Republic of) Jordan
China Germany
Georgia Russian Federation
Romania Mexico
Morocco Malaysia
Jordan Cyprus
Ghana Spain
Cyprus Uruguay
Malaysia Brazil
Rwanda Ghana
Russian Federation Rwanda
Uruguay Argentina
South Africa Poland
Brazil Korea (Republic of)
Ukraine Morocco
Turkey Turkey
Slovenia Georgia
Mexico Romania
India South Africa
Germany India
Sweden Sweden
–0.1 –0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 –0.1 0 0.1 0.2

Mean change (value) Mean change (value)
Note: Balanced panel of 31 countries and territories with data from both wave 5 (2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 59 percent of the global population.
Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019), based on data from the World Values Survey.
The family sets norms, and experiences from shaped by rigid social and cultural expectations
childhood create an unconscious gender bias.39 related to masculinity.43 Some of the endorsed
Parents’ attitudes towards gender influence masculinity norms relate to physical toughness
children through mid-adolescence, and chil- (showing higher tolerance for pain, engaging in
dren at school perceive gender roles.40 Parenting fights, competing in sports), autonomy (being
practices and behaviours are thus among the financially independent, protecting and pro-
predictors of an individual’s gendered behav- viding for families), emotional stoicism (not
iours and expectations. For instance, children “acting like girls” or showing vulnerabilities,
tend to mimic (in attitudes and actions) how dealing with problems on their own) and het-
their parents share paid and unpaid work.41 erosexual prowess (having sex with many girls,
Adolescence is another key stage for gender exercising control over girls in relationships).44
socialization, particularly for boys.42 Gender is a Social convention refers to how compliance
social construct of attributes or roles associated with gender social norms is internalized in indi-
with being male or female. What it means to be vidual values reinforced by rewards or sanctions.
a man or a woman is learned and internalized Rewards use social or psychological approvals,
based on experiences and messages over the while sanctions can range from exclusion from
course of a lifetime, normalized through social the community to violence or legal action.
structures, culture and interactions. Young ado- Stigma can limit what is considered normal or
lescents in different cultural settings commonly acceptable and be used to enforce stereotypes
endorse norms that perpetuate gender inequali- and social norms about appropriate behaviours.
ties, and parents and peers are central in shaping A social norm will be stickiest when individuals
such attitudes. Though men usually have more have the most to gain from complying with it
agency than the women in their lives, men’s and the most to lose from challenging it. Social
decisions and behaviours are also profoundly norms have enough power to keep women from

BOX 3
The gender social norms index in practice
How does a subjective indicator of social norms compare with objective Biases in social norms also show a gradient. The political and economic
indicators of gender inequality? dimensions of the multidimensional gender social norms index indicate bi-
The multidimensional gender social norms indices appear linked to gen- ases for basic women’s achievement and against more enhanced women’s
der inequality, as might be expected. In countries with higher biases (mea- achievement (box table 1). Overall, the biases appear more intense for more
sured through the multidimensional gender social norms indices), overall enhanced forms of women’s participation. The proportion of people favour-
inequality (measured by the Gender Inequality Index) is higher (box figure 1). ing men over women for high-level political and economic leadership posi-
Similarly, the indices are positively related to time spent on unpaid domestic tions is higher than the proportion of people favouring men over women in
chores and care work. access to basic political rights or paid employment.
Box figure 1 Countries with higher social norms biases tend to have higher gender inequality
Gender Inequality Index (value) Time spent on unpaid domestic chores

(ratio between women and men)
0.42
5 4.76
0.4
0.3
0.76 2.94
3
0.2 0.19 2.23
2
1.46
0.1 0.74 1
0 0
0.0–0.25 0.25–0.5 0.5–0.75 0.75–1.0 0.0–0.25 0.25–0.5 0.5–0.75 0.75–1.0
Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI) level Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI) value
Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019), based on data from the World Values Survey and UNDP (2019), Dashboard 2 in the statistical annex.
Box table 1 Biases in social norms show a gradient (percentage of people biased by indicator)
Politics The economy

Basic Enhanced Basic Enhanced
Not essential: Men make better Men should have Men make better
Women have the political leaders more right to a business executives
same rights as men than women do job than women than women do
Simple average 29.2 46.1 36.0 40.3

Median 28.2 48.0 30.7 41.0
Weighted average 25.6 47.4 40.0 41.4
Note: Based on 75 countries and territories with data from wave 5 (2005–2009) or wave 6 (2011–2014) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 81 percent of the global population.
Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019), based on data from the World Values Survey.

claiming their legal rights due to pressure to Early marriage condemns girls to live a life
conform to societal expectations.45 with heavily restricted choices— every year
Social norms can also prevail when individu- 12 million girls are victims of forced marriage.
als lack the information or knowledge to act or By region, the highest rates are registered in
think differently. Because of intertwined social Sub-Saharan Africa, with 36 percent of women
dynamics, challenging discriminatory norms marrying before their 18th birthday, and South
that impede gender equality and women’s em- Asia, with 29 percent.48
powerment requires acting on more than one The disparities of childhood and adolescence
factor at a time. are amplified when women reach adulthood.
For unpaid care work, women bear a bigger bur-
den, on average spending about 2.5 times more
Restricted choices and than men do. This affects women’s labor force
power imbalances— participation, which is consistently lower than
a lifecycle perspective for men, both globally and by human develop-
ment grouping. In 2018 the global labour force
Human development Gender inequality within households and com- participation rate was around 75 percent for
munities is characterized by inequality across men and 48 percent for women.49 Professional
is about expanding multiple dimensions, with a vicious cycle of women mostly have two options for their per-
substantive freedoms powerlessness, stigmatization, discrimination, sonal partners—a super-supportive partner or
and choices, and too exclusion and material deprivation all reinforc- no partner at all.50 Husbands are considered a
ing each other. Human development is about key factor in two-thirds of women’s decisions
often women face expanding substantive freedoms and choices, to quit the workforce, often because women
heavily restricted or and too often women face heavily restricted or had to fill the parenting vacuum.51 In other
even “tragic” choices even “tragic” choices. instances, the struggle to reconcile care work
Examples of restricted choices can be identi- with paid work can lead women to occupation-
fied in a lifecycle approach. Some represent bla- al downgrading.
tant limits to basic freedoms and human rights, Additionally, skilled women, who are more
and others, subtle manifestations of gender likely to participate in the labor market, face
biases. Social norms can affect girls even before social norms that make them less attractive
they are born since some countries deeply pre- potential partners in the marriage market. This
fer bearing sons over daughters. In 1990, when contributes towards a lower marriage rate for
only few countries had access to technology to skilled women, and might induce a nonlinear
the determine a baby’s gender, only 6 countries relationship between their labor market pros-
had imbalanced sex rations at birth—today it is pects and their marriage outcomes.52
21 countries. Older women’s challenges accumulate
Discrimination continues through the way through the life course. They are less likely than
households share resources. Girls and women men to have access to pensions, even though
sometimes eat last and least in the household.46 they can expect to live three years longer. Along
The gender politics of food—nurtured by as- the way, social norms and path dependence
sumptions, norms and practices about women — h ow outcomes today affect outcomes
needing fewer calories—can push women into tomorrow—interact to form a highly complex
perpetual malnutrition and protein deficiency. system of structural gender gaps.
Among children attending school, determi-
nants of occupational choices appear very early.
Girls are less likely to study subjects such as sci- Policies to tackle social
ence, technology, engineering and mathemat- norms— game changers
ics, while boys are a minority of those studying
health and education. For example, in OECD Universal policies can provide basic floors but
countries, on average among STEM graduates, may not be enough to eliminate horizontal
only 32.6 percent are women.47 More worrying, inequalities rooted in social exclusion and
artificial intelligence applications can replicate longstanding social norms. Social exclusion
and exacerbate these biases (box 4). happens when people are unable to fully

BOX 4
Artificial intelligence and the risk of bias: making horizontal inequalities worse?
Artificial intelligence applications have the potential to cameras and sensors on a large scale. How does this
support positive social change—indeed, in some do- differ from mass surveillance?
mains their impact could be revolutionary. But as with Machine learning algorithms are not biased inher-
any new technology, actually achieving these positive ently; they learn to be biased. Algorithmic bias occurs
results is challenging and risky. when the learning algorithm is trained on biased data-
Many groups of people across the globe may be sets and subsequently “accurately” learns the patterns
on the receiving end of artificial intelligence’s down- of bias in the data.2 In some cases the learned repre-
side. They may lose their jobs as more tasks are per- sentations within machine learning algorithms can even
formed by machine learning—even if net job loss is exaggerate these biases.3 For example, women are less
contained, inequalities in income and wealth could rise, likely to receive targeted ads for high-paying jobs poten-
and the quality of jobs fall. Workers may see strong tially because the algorithm that targets the ads trained
biases against their skin colour or gender embedded on data in which women had lower paying jobs.4 And a
in machine learning, and they may be subjects of sur- computer programme used in the United States to as-
veillance. Algorithms for job matching may reproduce sess the risk of reoffending by individuals in the criminal Targeted or affirmative
historical biases and prejudices. Companies need poli- justice system incorrectly flagged black defendants as action policies that
cies on transparency and data protection so that work- high risk nearly twice as often as white defendants.5
ers know what is being tracked. Regulation may be Facial recognition services can be much less accu-
directly support
needed to govern data use and algorithm accountability rate in identifying women or people with darker skin.6 disadvantaged groups
in the world of work. The well recognized lack of diversity among the
can complement
As uses of artificial intelligence become pervasive, people designing and developing artificial intelligence
questions arise about the rise of propaganda and ma- is another problem. Few women work in artificial intel- universal policies
nipulation, undermining democracy, and about surveil- ligence, as in the tech sector in general, and among the
lance and the loss of privacy. For example, artificial men, racial diversity is limited.7 Diverse teams, bring-
intelligence applications are linked with the developing diverse perspectives, representative of the general
ment of smart cities.1 This involves collecting data from population, could check biases.
Notes
1. Glaeser and others 2018. 2. Caliskan, Bryson and Narayanan 2017; Danks and London 2017. 3. Zhao, Wang and others 2017. 4. Spice 2015. 5. IDRC 2018. 6. Boulamwini
and Gebru 2018. 7. IDRC 2018.
participate in economic, social and political life has clearly been disadvantaged historically,56
because they are excluded based on cultural, with policies having a defined timeframe so
religious, racial or other reasons.53 This may that they are applied only if the targeted group
mean a lack of voice, lack of recognition or lack is truly disadvantaged. Clear communication
of capacity for active participation. It may also about the policies is crucial to prevent grievanc-
mean exclusion from decent work, assets, land, es and feelings of disadvantage.
opportunities, access to social services or politi- Since gender remains one of the most preva-
cal representation.54 lent bases of discrimination, policies addressing
When horizontal inequalities are large, tar- deep-seated discriminatory norms and harmful
geted or affirmative action policies that directly gender stereotypes, prejudices and practices are
support disadvantaged groups—as with access key for the full realization of women’s human
to credit, scholarships or certain group quotas rights.57
in employment and education— can com- Policies can target social norms directly.
plement universal policies. Several historical Changing unequal power relationships among
examples show that a combination of universal individuals within a community or challenging
and targeted policies can reduce horizontal in- deeply rooted gender roles can be achieved
equalities.55 But there is also a risk that targeted through education, by raising awareness or by
policies further reinforce group differences or changing incentives. Education and raising
grievances, since members receive benefits pre- awareness are both based on providing individ-
cisely because of their group identity. Targeted uals with new information and knowledge that
policies are particularly relevant when a group can foster different values and behaviours. Such

initiatives might include formal education, This way, fathers’ share of childcare during the
workplace training or media campaigns against early months or years of a child’s life can be in-
gender stereotyping. To change incentives, creased, which may allow for changes in social
protective mechanisms can confront possible norms around childcare that can be reflected
harm due to traditional gender norms or a throughout a child’s life.
backlash, such as school bullying or workplace Balancing the distribution of care, particular-
harassment. Changing incentives can also be ly for children, is crucial precisely because much
introduced to delay early marriage and reduce of the difference in earnings throughout the li-
teenage pregnancies. The three dimensions (ed- fecycle is generated before age 40, leading wom-
ucation, awareness, incentives) often reinforce en to miss many labour market opportunities
each other, as the examples of policies included during the early stages of their careers.64 These
here suggest. missed opportunities coincide with childbirth,
For example, Québec’s 2006 nontransferable which can encourage women to withdraw from
parental leave for fathers shifted incentives the labour market. Offering access to affordable
so that fathers became more involved in childcare can provide mothers opportunities to
Policies are important home caregiving. With new benefits fathers make their own work–life decisions, allowing
increased their participation in parental leave them to engage in paid work. Mothers tend to
in areas ranging by 250 percent,58 contributing to reverse the adjust their choices around paid work to the
from protection social norm that expected mothers to take sole demands of childcare.65 That is why accessible
from violence and responsibility for care work. And in households and affordable childcare is relevant for mothers’
where men had the opportunity to use the ben- freedom to engage in paid work.66
discrimination efit, fathers’ daily time in household work was The impact of regulations and laws goes
to access to 23 percent higher than in households where beyond changing the balance of care. Policies
public services new fathers did not participate, long after the are important in areas ranging from protection
leave period ended.59 This example also shows from violence and discrimination to access
the importance of including men in gender to public services. But the way policies are
equality policies. In fact, according to a survey designed and implemented is determined,
on implementing gender strategies or policies in part, by participation in politics. Thus, af-
in Organization for Economic Co-operation firmative action quotas that increase minority
and Development (OECD) countries, almost participation in politics can result in a stronger
everyone considers changing men’s and boys’ institutional commitment to equality and non-
attitudes towards care activities to be the discrimination. Even though Tunisia is a young
priority.60 Yet, even though the importance democracy (its first constitution was ratified
of adequately engaging men and boys in over- in 2014), it now has one of the world’s most
coming gender inequality or addressing their progressive gender parity laws, with legislated
own gender-related vulnerabilities is widely candidate, constitutional and electoral quotas.
acknowledged, public policies have yet to fully The regulations guarantee equal opportunities
consider that dimension.61 for women and men at all levels of respon-
Thus, laws and regulations can balance the sibility in all fields and ask candidates to file
distribution of care work in households, but candidacy applications on the basis of parity
only about half of the countries in the world between men and women. By 2018 women oc-
offer paternity leave in addition to maternity cupied 47 percent of local council positions.67
leave, and half of them offer fewer than 3 weeks Almost all countries with high female political
for fathers and 80 percent offer fewer than 14 representation have such enabling measures as
weeks for mothers.62 In 2007 the Republic of positive discrimination and affirmative action.
Korea started to reserve a year of paternal leave, Policies can also increase the representation
and by 2014 the number of male workers who of girls in STEM. Laboratoria, a nonprofit
took advantage of it had tripled.63 And some organization established in Latin America in
countries offer economic incentives for work- 2014, combines applied coding education,
ers to use leave, as in Sweden, where parents socioemotional training and job placement
receive a small gender-equality financial bonus services to create opportunities for girls from
for every day they use parental leave equally. low-income families. It operates in Brazil,

Chile, Mexico and Peru, and has graduated service delivery model combining community-
more than 820 girls and aims to reach 5,000 based distribution of contraception with social
young women by 2021.68 Other examples in- marketing benefits women and their commu-
clude the Costa Rican Technological Institute, nities.71 In Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi,
which set up a specialized training centre to the government, with support from the United
build women’s capacity in STEM and entrepre- Nations Population Fund, is implementing a
neurship. Cenfotec University and the institute national module for comprehensive sexuality
established a follow-up strategy to create tech- education in all schools to empower girls and
nology training spaces and support all women women through awareness of and access to
interested in a STEM career. NiñaSTEM sexual and reproductive health assistance and
(GirlSTEM), launched in early 2017 by the family planning services—and to provide the
Mexican government in partnership with the community a platform for dialogue on sexual
OECD, invites women with prominent science education and sexual and reproductive rights.72
and mathematics careers to act as mentors, Finally, social norms mold individuals’
visiting schools and encouraging girls to choose behaviours and beliefs about violence against
STEM subjects and be ambitious.69 women. Preventive policies can target both But remember:
For girls to choose STEM they must be in women and men. For example, SASA!, a pro-
school. Some interventions can change incen- gramme designed by Raising Voices and first even norms can
tives for girls to stay in school by either delaying implemented in Kampala, Uganda, targets tra- be shifted towards
marriage or reducing adolescent pregnancy. ditional social norms that perpetuate violence gender equality
Cash transfers have been proven to increase against women. Addressing both women and
school attendance. The Zomba Cash Transfer men in households, it approaches the power
Programme in Malawi, where pregnancy is a imbalance at the individual and structural lev-
key reason girls drop out, gave conditional and els by making communities rethink household
unconditional transfers to girls in school. It relationship dynamics. Today the programme’s
significantly reduced HIV prevalence and preg- results have been widely tested and standard-
nancy and early marriage rates and improved ized, as in Haiti and Tanzania, and it has been
language test scores.70 scaled up to 25 countries.73
As with education, it is important to consid- The backlash against changing gender roles
er how women may be uniquely vulnerable to in households, workplaces and politics affects
health inequalities because of their sexual and entire societies influenced by shifting power
reproductive health care needs. Reproductive relations. The resistance to changes in gender
health, which gives women agency and con- expectations may lead to a perceived clash and
trol over their own body and fertility, still has reveal subconscious biases. But remember: even
much room for progress. In Tigray, Ethiopia, a norms can be shifted towards gender equality.

Notes
1 UNDP 2018; UN Women 2019; WEF 2018; World Bank 2012. 51 Stone and Lovejoy 2004.
2 UNDP 2018. 52 Bertrand and others 2016.
3 WEF 2018, 2020. 53 Stewart 2006.
4 UN Women and IPU 2019. 54 UNDESA 2009.
5 Divya 2018. 55 Stewart 2016.
6 Giraldo-Luque and others 2018. 56 Langer and Stewart 2015; Stewart 2016.
7 Hinsliff 2020; Minutaglio 2020. 57 UN CEB 2017.
8 Calculations based on data from UNDP 2019, Statistical table 4. 58 Silcoff 2018.
9 Calculations based on data from the World Values Survey 59 Patnaik 2019.
(Inglehart and others 2014). 60 OECD 2017.
10 UNDP 2018; UN Women 2019; WEF 2018; World Bank 2012. 61 Barker and others 2016.
11 Haan 2009; IPU 2019; WEF 2020. 62 Human Development Report Office calculations based on data
12 Dilli and Riipma 2019. from the WORLD Policy Analysis Center’s Gender Database 2019.
13 UNDP 1995, p. 29. 63 Park 2015.
14 UN 2015. 64 OECD 2017.
15 Nussbaum 2001, p. 1. 65 OECD 2017.
16 UN 2015, SDGs. 66 Del Boca 2015; Jaumotte 2013; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017;
17 UNDP and UN Women 2019. Thévenon 2013. Québec introduced a low-fee universal child
18 See the discussion in Human Development Report 2019 (UNDP care programme in 1997 for children up to age 4, increasing the
2019). participation of young women in the labour force. This incentive
19 UN Women and IPU 2019. to join the labour force or to work more also yielded substantial
20 Forbes 2019; ILO 2019. lifecycle labour supply effects (Lefebvre, Merrigan and Verstraete
21 Catalyst 2020. 2009). And when Québec introduced universal access to low-fee
22 UNDP 2019, Dashboard 3 Women’s empowerment. child care in 2008, nearly 70,000 more mothers took jobs than if
23 UNDP 2019, Dashboard 2 Life-course gender gap. no such programme had existed, for an increase of 3.8 percent in
24 FAO Stat 2011. women’s employment and 1.7 percent increase in Quebec’s GDP
25 Keleher and Franklin 2008; Marcus 2018; Marcus and Harper (Fortin, Godbout and St-Cerny 2012; Herrera 2019).
2014; Munoz Boudet and others 2012; Sen, Ostlin and George 67 UN Women 2018.
2007. 68 OECD 2017. Source: Human Development Report Office based on
26 Marcus and Harper 2014. Guaqueta (2017), Laboratoria (2019) and World Bank (2013).
27 Bicchieri 2006; Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter 2002; Ostrom 2000. 69 OECD 2017.
28 Galvan and Garcia-Peñalosa 2018. 70 Baird, McIntosh and Özler 2013; Hagen-Zanker and others 2017.
29 OECD 2017; UNDP 2019; UN Women 2015b; UN Women 2019; 71 The programme recruited volunteer community health workers
WEF 2018. who administered injectable contraceptives, charging a small
30 Mackie and others 2015. fee, or provided counselling and referrals for other methods. The
31 Charles 2012. option to have community meetings and provide contraceptives
32 A third Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI) follows the synthetic door to door took the cultural and social conditions into account in
Alkire–Foster methodology (GNI/AF), which implements a version increasing the awareness, acceptability and use of modern con-
of the intersection approach (to define the headcount of biased traceptives (Bixby Center for Population Health and Sustainability
individuals) coupled with a measure of the intensity of biases (see 2014).
Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia 2019). 72 As well as family planning services, to provide the community
33 Wittenberg-Cox 2017. with a platform for dialogue on sexual education and sexual and
34 Coontz 2017; Pepin and Cotter 2017. reproductive rights. Information about sexual and reproductive
35 Marcus and Harper 2015. health is disseminated through youth peer networks, many of
36 Green 2016. them affiliated with school, community, religious and youth asso-
37 Gintis 2007. ciations. The government has received United Nations Population
38 Cislaghi, Manji and Heise 2018; Cooper and Fletcher 2013; Fund support to develop the school club model and two manuals
Marcus and Harper 2014. for teachers and students (UNFPA 2019).
39 Bandura 2003; Mackie and others 2015; Munoz Boudet and others 73 The word “sasa”, which means “now” in Kiswahili, is an
2012; Sood, Menard and Witte 2009. acronym for the four phases of the approach: Start, Awareness,
40 Bian, Leslie and Cimpian 2017; Cunningham 2001. Support, Action. The programme begins by partnering with a
41 OECD 2017. local organization, which selects an equal number of female and
42 Amin and others 2018. male community activists—regular people interested in issues
43 Masculinity is the pattern of social behaviours or practices of violence, power and rights, as well as institutional activists
associated with ideals about how men should behave (Ricardo working for the police and in health care, local government and
and MenEngage 2014). faith-based groups. The activists receive training in new concepts
44 Kågesten and others 2016. and ways to approach power imbalances. They then take the lead
45 UN Women 2015b. in organizing informal activities with their community networks to
46 UNDP 2016. encourage open discussions and critical thinking. Combined, the
47 UNDP 2019, Dashboard 3 Women’s empowerment. strategies ensure that different community members are exposed
48 UNDP 2019, Dashboard 3 Women’s empowerment. and receive information from people they trust (Raising Voices,
49 UNDP 2019, Statistical table 5 (GII). London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and Center for
50 Wittenberg-Cox 2017. Domestic Violence Prevention 2015).

References
Alkire, S., and J. Foster. 2011. “Counting and Multidimensional Del Boca, D. 2015. “Child Care Arrangements and Labour Supply.”
Poverty Measurement.” Journal of Public Economics 95(7): 476–487. IDB Working Paper 569. Inter-American Development Bank,
Amin, A., A. Kågesten, E. Adebayo and V. Chandra- Mouli. 2018. Washington, DC.
“Addressing Gender Socialization and Masculinity Norms among Dilli, S., S. G. Carmichael and A. Rijpma. 2019. “Introducing the
Adolescent Boys: Policy and Programmatic Implications.” Journal of Historical Gender Equality Index.” Feminist Economics 25(1): 31–57.
Adolescent Health 62(3): S3–S5. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations).
Baird, S.J., E. Chirwa, J. De Hoop and B. Özler. 2013. “Girl Power: 2011. The State of Food and Agriculture: Closing the Gender Gap for
Cash Transfers and Adolescent Welfare: Evidence from a Cluster- Development. Rome.
Randomized Experiment in Malawi.” NBER Working Paper 19479. Fehr, E., U. Fischbacher and S. Gächter. 2002. “Strong Reciprocity,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Human Cooperation, and the Enforcement of Social Norms.” Human
Bandura, A. 2003. “Social Cognitive Theory for Personal and Social Nature 13(1): 1–25.
Change by Enabling Media.” In A. Singhal, M. Cody, E. Rogers and Fletcher, E., R. Pande and C. T. Moore. 2017. “Women and Work in
M. Sabido, eds., Entertainment-Education and Social Change: His- India: Descriptive Evidence and a Review of Potential Policies.” HKS
tory, Research, and Practice. London: Routledge. Faculty Research Working Paper RWP18–004. Harvard University,
Barker, G., M. Greene, E.G. Siegel, M. Nascimento, M. Segundo, John F. Kenendy School of Government, Cambridge, MA.
C. Ricardo, J.G. Figueroa, J. Franzoni, J. Redpath, R. Morrell, Forbes. 2019. “The World´s Billionaires.” 5 March. www. forbes.com/
R. Jewkes, D. Peacock, F. Aguayo, M. Sadler, A. Das, S.K. billionaires/#1360ce67251c. Accessed 9 October 2019.
Singh, A. Pawar and P. Pawlak. 2016. What Men Have to Do
Fortin, P., L. Godbout and S. St-Cerny. 2012. “Impact of Quebec´s
with It: Public Policies to Promote Gender Equality. Rio de Janeiro,
Universal Low-Fee Childcare Program on Female Labour Force Par-
Brazil: Instituto Promundo, and Washington, DC: International
ticipation, Domestic Income, and Government Budgets.” University
Center for Research on Women.
of Quebec at Montreal and University of Sherbooke. www.oise.
Bertrand, M., P. Cortés, C. Olivetti and J. Pan. 2016. Social norms, utoronto.ca/atkinson/UserFiles/File/News/Fortin-Godbout
labor market opportunities, and the marriage gap for skilled women -St_Cerny_eng.pdf. Accessed 9 October 2019.
(No. w22015). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Galvan, E., and C. Garcia-Peñalosa. 2018. “Gender Norms and
Bian, L., S.J. Leslie and A. Cimpian. 2017. “Gender Stereotypes Labour Supply: Identifying Heterogeneous Patterns across Groups
about Intellectual Ability Emerge Early and Influence Children’s of Women.” Preliminary version of paper presented at the Eighth
Interests.” Science 355(6323): 389–391. Meeting of the Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, 3–5
Bicchieri, C. 2006. The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynam- July, Paris.
ics of Social Norms. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Giraldo-Luque, S., N. Fernández-García and J.C. Pérez- Arce.
Bixby Center for Population Health and Sustainability. 2014. 2018. “La centralidad temática de la movilización #Niunamenos en
“Ethiopia: CBD of Injectable Contraceptives Scaling Up Community- Twitter.” El profesional de la información 27(1).
Based Distribution of Injectable Contraceptives in Tigray, Ethiopia.” Gintis, H. 2007. “A Framework for the Unification of the Behavioral
Berkeley, CA. Sciences.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30(1): 1–16.
Boulamwini, J., and T. Gebru. 2018. “Gender Shades: Intersectional Glaeser, E.L., S.D. Kominers, M. Luca and N. Naik. 2018. “Big
Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification.” Proceed- Data and Big Cities: The Promises and Limitations of Improved
ings of Machine Learning Research 81: 1–15. Measures of Urban Life.” Economic Inquiry 56: 114–137.
Caliskan, A., J.J. Bryson and A. Narayanan. 2017. “Semantics Green, D. 2016. How Change Happens. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Derived Automatically from Language Corpora Contain Human-Like Press.
Biases.” Science 356(6334): 183–186.
Guaqueta, J. 2017. “Bootcamps: Raising Expectations for Girls in
Catalyst. 2020. “Pyramid: Women in S&P 500 Companies.” 15 January. Math, Science and Technology.” World Bank Blog, 24 February.
Charles, A. 2012. “Identity, Norms, and Ideals.” In Exchange Entitle- https://blogs.worldbank.org/education/bootcamps-raising
ment Mapping: Theories and Evidence. Perspectives from Social -expectations-girls-math-science-and-technology. Accessed 9
Economics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. October 2019.
Cislaghi, B., K. Manji and L. Heise. 2018. Social Norms and Gender- Haan, F. 2009. A Brief Survey of Women’s Rights. United Nations. UN
Related Harmful Practices: What Assistance from the Theory to the Chronicle. https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/brief-survey
Practice? Learning Report 02. London: London School of Hygiene & -womens-rights. Accessed 20 February 2020.
Tropical Medicine. Hagen-Zanker, J., L. Pellerano, F. Bastagli, L. Harman, V. Barca,
Coontz, S. 2017. “Do Millennial Men Want Stay-at-Home Wives?” The G. Sturge, T., Schmidt and C. Laing. 2017. “The Impact of Cash
New York Times. Transfers on Women and Girls.” Briefing. Overseas Development
Institute, London.
Cooper, L.B., and E. Fletcher. 2013. “Reducing Societal Discrimi-
nation against Adolescent Girls Using Social Norms to Promote Hinsliff, G. 2020. “The rapist is you!’: Why a Chilean protest chant
Behavior Change.” Girl Hub, London. is being sung around the world.” The Guardian. https://www.
theguardian.com/society/2020/feb/03/the-rapist-is-you-chilean
Cunningham, M. 2001. “The Influence of Parental Attitudes and
-protest-song-chanted-around-the-world-un-iolador-en-tu-camino.
Behaviours on Children’s Attitudes towards Gender and Household
Accessed 20 February 2020.
Labor in Early Adulthood.” Journal of Marriage and Family 63(1):
111–122. IDRC (International Development Research Centre). 2018.
Artificial Intelligence and Human Development: Toward a Research
Danks, D., and A.J. London. 2017. “Algorithmic Bias in Autonomous
Agenda. Ottawa.
Systems.” In C. Sierra, ed., Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Interna-
tional Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Freiburg, Germany: ILO (International Labour Organization). 2019. Labour statistics.
International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/. Accessed 9 October 2019.
References | 17
Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin and B. Puranen ment). 2017. The Pursuit of Gender Equality: An Uphill Battle. Paris.
et al. (eds.). 2014. World Values Survey: All Rounds—Country- Olivetti, C., and B. Petrongolo. 2017. “The Economic Conse-
Pooled Datafile Version. Madrid: JD Systems Institute. http://www. quences of Family Policies: Lessons from a Century of Legislation
worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp. in High-Income Countries.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 31(1):
IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union). 2019. A World Chronology of the 205–230.
Recognition of Women’s Rights to Vote and to Stand for Election. Ostrom, E. 2000. “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social
http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm. Accessed 20 February Norms.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 137–158.
2020.
Patnaik, A. 2019. “Reserving Time for Daddy: The Consequences of
Jaumotte, F., S. Lall and C. Papageorgiou. 2013. “Rising Income Fathers’ Quotas.” Journal of Labor Economics 37(4): 1009–1059.
Inequality: Technology, or Trade and Financial Globalization.” IMF
Park, J. 2015. “South Korean ‘Superdads’ on Paternity Leave Break
Economic Review 61: 271–309.
with Tradition.” Reuters, 24 September. www.reuters.com/article/
Kågesten A, S. Gibbs, R.W. Blum, C. Moreau, V. Chandra-Mouli, us-southkorea-superdads/southkorean-superdads-on-paternity
A. Herbert and A. Amin. 2016. “Understanding Factors that Shape -leave-break-with-traditionidUSKBN0U626220151224. Accessed
Gender Attitudes in Early Adolescence Globally: A Mixed-Methods 9 October 2019.
Systematic Review.” PLoS ONE 11(6): e0157805.
Pepin, J., and D. Cotter. 2017. “Trending towards Traditionalism?
Keleher, H., and L. Franklin. 2008. “Changing Gendered Norms Changes in Youths’ Gender Ideology.” Council on Contemporary
about Women and Girls at the Level of Household and Community: Families. https://thesocietypages.org/ccf/2017/04/06/trending
A Review of the Evidence.” Global Public Health 3(Sup1): 42–57. -towards-traditionalism-changes-in-youths-gender-ideology/.
Laboratoria. 2019. “Building the Digital Skills Young Women in Latin Accessed 19 February 2020.
America Need to Thrive in Tech.” www.laboratoria.la/en/impact. Raising Voices, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine
Accessed 9 October 2019. and Center for Domestic Violence Prevention. 2015. Is Vio-
Langer, A., and F. Stewart. 2015. “Regional Imbalances, Horizontal lence Against Women Preventable? Findings from the SASA! Study
Inequalities, and Violent Conflicts: Insights from Four West African Summarized for General Audiences. Kampala: Raising Voices.
Countries.” World Bank, Washington, DC. http://documents. Ricardo, C., and MenEngage. 2014. Men, Masculinities, and Chang-
worldbank.org/curated/en/768071468191326719/Regional ing Power: A Discussion Paper on Engaging Men in Gender Equality
-imbalances-horizontalinequalities-and-violent-conflicts-insights from Beijing 1995 to 2015. Washington, DC: MenEngage.
-from-four-West-African-countries. Accessed 6 August 2019.
Sen, G., P. Ostlin and A. George. 2007. “Unequal, Unfair, Ineffective
Lefebvre, P., P. Merrigan and M. Verstraete. 2009. “Dynamic and Inefficient Gender Inequity in Health: Why It Exists and How
Labour Supply Effects of Childcare Subsidies: Evidence from a We Can Change It.” Final Report to the WHO Commission on Social
Canadian Natural Experiment on Low-Fee Universal Child Care.” Determinants of Health. Women and Gender Equity Knowledge
Labour Economics 16(5): 490–502. Network, Geneva.
Mackie, G., F. Moneti, H. Shakya and E. Denny. 2015. “What Are Silcoff, M. 2018. “‘The Daddy Quota’: How Quebec Got Men to Take
Social Norms? How Are They Measured?” Working Paper 1. United Parental Leave.” The Guardian, 15 June. www.theguardian.com/
Nations Children’s Fund, New York, and University of California–San world/2018/jun/15/the-daddy-quotahow-quebec-got-men-to-take
Diego Centre on Global Justice, San Diego, CA. -parental-leave. Accessed 9 October 2019.
Marcus, R. 2018. The Norms Factor: Recent Research on Gender, Sood, S., T. Menard and K. Witte. 2009. “The Theory behind
Social Norms, and Women’s Economic Empowerment. Ottawa: Entertainment-Education.” In A. Singhal, M. Cody, E. Rogers and M.
International Development Research Centre. Sabido, eds., Entertainment-Education and Social Change: History,
Marcus, R., and C. Harper. 2014. “Gender Justice and Social Research, and Practice. London: Routledge.
Norms—Processes of Change for Adolescent.” Girls: Towards a Spice, B. 2015. “Questioning the Fairness of Targeting Ads Online.”
Conceptual Framework 2. Overseas Development Institute, London.
Carnegie Mellon University News, 7 July. www.cmu.edu/news/
Marcus, R., and C. Harper. 2015. “How Do Gender Norms Change?” stories/archives/2015/july/online-ads-research.html. Accessed 24
Overseas Development Institute, London. October 2019.
Minutaglio, R. 2020. “How A Chilean Chant Became the World’s Most Stewart, F. 2006. “Social Exclusion and Conflict: Analysis and Policy
Powerful Feminist Anthem: ‘Un Violador en Tu Camino’ Has Been Implications.” Oxford Centre for Research on Inequality, Human
Performed in 52 Countries and Counting.” Elle. https://www.elle. Security and Ethnicity, Oxford, UK. www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/pdf-
com/culture/career-politics/a30858742/las-tesis-chilean-chant research/crise-pp1. Accessed 9 October 2019.
-feminist-anthem/. Accessed 20 February 2020.
Stewart. 2016. “The Dynamics of Horizontal Inequalities.” Think Piece
Mukhopadhyay, T., C. Rivera and H. Tapia. 2019. “Gender Inequal- for Human Development Report 2016. United Nations Development
ity and Multidimensional Social Norms.” Working Paper. United Programme, Human Development Report Office, New York. http://
Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/stewart_layout.pdf. Accessed 6
Office, New York. August 2019.
Munoz Boudet, A.M., P. Buitrago, B. Leroy De La Briere, D.L. Stone, P., and M. Lovejoy. 2004. “Fast-track Women and the
Newhouse, E.C. Rubiano Matulevich, K. Scott and P. Suarez “Choice” to Stay Home.” The Annals of the American Academy of
Becerra. 2018. “Gender Differences in Poverty and Household Political and Social Science 596(1): 62–83.
Composition through the Life- Cycle: A Global Perspective.” Policy
Thévenon, O. 2013. “Drivers of Female Labour Force Participation in
Research Working Paper 8360. World Bank, Washington, DC.
the OECD.” OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper
Nussbaum, M.C. 2001. Women and Human Development: The 145. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Capabilities Approach, Vol. 3. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Paris.
Press.

Titus, D. 2018. “Social Media as a Gateway for Young Feminists: Les- ———. 2015a. “Making National Social Protection Floors Work for
sons from the #IWillGoOut Campaign in India.” Gender & Develop- Women.” Policy Brief 1. New York.
ment 26: 231–248. 10.1080/13552074.2018.1473224. ———. 2015b. Progress of the World’s Women 2015–2016: Trans-
UN (United Nations). 2015. The Millennium Development Goals forming Economies, Realizing Rights. New York.
Report. New York. ———. 2017. “Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value.” www. unwomen.
UN CEB (United Nations System Chief Executives Board for org/en/news/in-focus/csw61/equal-pay. Accessed 9 October 2019.
Coordination). 2017. Leaving No One Behind: Equality and Non- ———. 2018. “Historic Leap in Tunisia: Women Make Up 47 Per Cent
Discrimination at the Heart of Sustainable Development. New York. of Local Government.” 27 August. New York. www.unwomen.org/
UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social en/news/stories/2018/8/feature-tunisian- women-in-local-elections.
Affairs). 2009. Creating an Inclusive Society: Practical Strategies Accessed 9 October 2019.
to Promote Social Integration. New York. www.un.org/esa/socdev/ ———. 2019. Progress of the World’s Women Report: Families in a
egms/docs/2009/Ghana/inclusive-society.pdf. Accessed 10 October Changing World. New York.
2019.
UN Women (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund). 2019. “In Burundi, Empowerment of Women) and IPU (Inter- Parliamentary
Sexual Health Education Helps Youth Protect Themselves, Their Union). 2019. “Women in Politics 2019.” New York.
Futures.” 18 January.
WEF (World Economic Forum). 2018. The Global Gender Gap Report
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 1995. Human 2018. Geneva.
Development Report 1995: Gender and Human Development. New
———. 2020. The Global Gender Gap Report 2020. Geneva.
York.
Wittenberg-Cox, A. 2017. “If You Can’t Find a Spouse Who Supports
———. 2016. Human Development Report 2016: Human Develop-
Your Career, Stay Single.” Harvard Business Review, 24 October.
ment for Everyone. New York. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/
https://hbr.org/2017/10/if-you-cant-find-a-spouse-who-supports
files/2016_human_development_report.pdf. Accessed 5 August
-your-career-stay-single. Accessed 18 February 2020.
2019.
World Bank. 2012. World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality
———. 2018. Human Development Indices and Indicators: Statistical
and Development. Washington, DC.
Update 2018. New York.
———. 2013. Solutions for Youth Employment. Washington, DC.
———. 2019. Human Development Report 2019: Beyond Income,
www.s4ye.org/sites/default/files/S4YE%20Digital%20Jobs%20
beyond Averages, beyond Today: Inequalities in Human Develop-
Case%20Study%20-%2013.%20Laboratoria.pdf. Accessed 7
ment in the 21st Century. New York.
November 2019.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and UN
World Policy Analysis Center. 2019. Gender Data Base. www.
Women (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and
worldpolicycenter.org/maps-data/data-download. Accessed 10
the Empowerment of Women). 2019. “Gender Equality as an
October 2019.
Accelerator for Achieving the SDGs.” New York.
Zhao, J., T. Wang, M. Yatskar, V. Ordonex and K.-W. Chang. 2017.
UN Women (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and
“Men Also Like Shopping: Reducing Gender Bias Amplification Us-
the Empowerment of Women). 1995. Beijing Declaration and
ing Corpus-level Constraints.” Proceedings of the 2017 Conference
Platform for Action: Beijing+ 5 Political Declaration and Outcome.
on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing.
Adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women, 4–15 Septem-
ber, Beijing.
References | 19
TABLE A1 Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI), last available period
GSNI GSNI2 Share of people biased by dimension
TABLE (share of people (share of people with Share of people
A1 Country Period
with at least 1 bias)
%
at least 2 biases)
%
with no bias
%
Political
%
Economic
%
Educational
%
Physical integrity
%
Algeria 2010–2014 97.83 87.00 2.17 80.08 74.08 37.17 86.75
Andorra 2005–2009 27.01 7.43 72.99 14.08 8.73 1.81 12.01
Argentina 2010–2014 75.41 42.49 24.59 43.35 30.43 17.04 52.86
Armenia 2010–2014 94.11 81.28 5.89 72.82 75.91 24.89 66.14
Australia 2010–2014 46.24 23.00 53.76 32.48 18.06 4.09 20.93
Azerbaijan 2010–2014 99.14 93.82 0.86 85.13 91.97 30.90 72.16
Belarus 2010–2014 90.37 71.70 9.63 77.82 58.45 21.19 55.52
Brazil 2010–2014 89.50 52.39 10.50 43.41 36.63 9.32 77.95
Bulgaria 2005–2009 76.84 44.40 23.16 53.67 37.13 10.95 39.42
Burkina Faso 2005–2009 98.38 85.86 1.62 66.42 77.27 33.20 88.81
Canada 2005–2009 51.53 23.26 48.47 25.40 21.39 4.91 30.50
Chile 2010–2014 74.40 42.20 25.60 42.10 28.40 20.10 52.60
China 2010–2014 88.27 64.42 11.73 55.47 54.87 22.02 67.01
Colombia 2010–2014 91.40 57.21 8.60 49.34 33.73 10.78 82.28
Cyprus 2010–2014 81.05 49.44 18.95 48.14 43.85 14.03 53.31
Ecuador 2010–2014 93.34 58.90 6.66 46.34 36.44 23.46 84.36
Estonia 2010–2014 76.34 51.19 23.66 57.05 45.29 15.79 36.24
Ethiopia 2005–2009 85.27 35.14 14.73 30.27 22.00 8.00 80.60
Finland 2005–2009 51.16 22.67 48.84 24.58 23.08 6.22 29.69
France 2005–2009 56.00 26.81 44.00 35.25 25.55 6.71 22.41
Georgia 2010–2014 94.09 77.12 5.91 65.89 66.97 18.14 74.63
Germany 2010–2014 62.60 33.07 37.40 26.59 30.91 15.78 44.68
Ghana 2010–2014 99.16 92.69 0.84 86.84 78.01 30.02 90.73
Haiti 2010–2014 98.91 92.82 1.09 76.33 72.06 59.91 88.13
Hungary 2005–2009 65.89 40.36 34.11 42.84 37.86 18.75 30.99
India 2010–2014 98.28 83.25 1.72 64.10 69.91 35.24 88.38
Indonesia 2005–2009 97.44 80.36 2.56 66.47 66.40 19.31 90.55
Iran, Islamic Republic of 2005–2009 98.54 92.49 1.46 84.63 88.86 55.42 78.69
Iraq 2010–2014 97.50 90.58 2.50 88.33 79.75 31.33 85.08
Japan 2010–2014 68.81 41.67 31.19 46.87 41.79 16.21 26.28
Jordan 2010–2014 99.33 95.67 0.67 91.17 89.42 28.75 81.50
Kazakhstan 2010–2014 96.22 79.02 3.78 75.22 67.54 21.71 68.51
Korea (Republic of) 2010–2014 87.07 62.91 12.93 63.68 54.33 25.67 58.27
Kuwait 2010–2014 97.77 91.56 2.23 88.10 77.13 36.45 83.12
Kyrgyzstan 2010–2014 96.73 84.87 3.27 76.80 71.53 41.00 81.73
Lebanon 2010–2014 96.08 82.33 3.92 75.42 60.17 31.08 82.83
Libya 2010–2014 99.13 92.89 0.87 83.14 84.45 31.49 92.15
Malaysia 2010–2014 98.54 88.38 1.46 79.69 74.54 43.00 94.31
Mali 2005–2009 98.82 93.36 1.18 81.89 88.87 47.61 84.87
Mexico 2010–2014 87.70 51.00 12.30 41.40 29.35 20.70 75.55
Moldova, Republic of 2005–2009 90.06 67.21 9.94 60.33 58.80 16.73 65.20
Morocco 2010–2014 96.25 80.58 3.75 69.00 72.50 19.58 82.50
Netherlands 2010–2014 39.75 15.88 60.25 21.29 13.56 4.63 22.03
New Zealand 2010–2014 46.14 21.28 53.86 27.23 16.65 5.35 25.33
Nigeria 2010–2014 99.73 94.99 0.27 85.83 83.42 46.18 92.78
Norway 2005–2009 41.27 16.00 58.73 19.51 21.85 3.71 16.78
Pakistan 2010–2014 99.81 98.07 0.19 81.32 91.02 51.11 93.75
Palestine, State of 2010–2014 98.00 92.30 2.00 89.30 79.50 26.70 83.50
Peru 2010–2014 87.96 49.99 12.04 38.44 27.05 14.36 79.76
Philippines 2010–2014 98.87 86.80 1.13 70.62 73.80 39.08 91.48
Poland 2010–2014 79.75 47.31 20.25 43.74 41.99 11.91 53.02
Qatar 2010–2014 99.73 94.90 0.27 91.56 81.66 27.60 87.25
Romania 2010–2014 85.50 60.84 14.50 48.78 55.88 20.69 63.54
Russian Federation 2010–2014 86.83 68.56 13.17 68.43 58.77 22.66 50.02
Rwanda 2010–2014 99.15 89.39 0.85 67.78 65.68 36.15 97.64
Serbia 2005–2009 82.62 48.61 17.38 47.05 35.49 13.20 66.56
Singapore 2010–2014 92.34 73.20 7.66 76.18 52.23 26.18 65.66
Slovenia 2010–2014 59.21 28.25 40.79 33.58 25.91 8.04 29.93
South Africa 2010–2014 96.32 80.90 3.68 75.56 57.06 38.80 88.80
Spain 2010–2014 50.50 25.16 49.50 29.40 20.48 11.61 28.05
Sweden 2010–2014 30.01 10.75 69.99 16.05 9.16 2.61 14.13
Switzerland 2005–2009 56.03 26.94 43.97 20.56 29.80 9.28 31.18

(share of people (share of people with Share of people TABLE
Country Period
with at least 1 bias)
%
at least 2 biases)
%
with no bias
%
Political
%
Economic
%
Educational
%
Physical integrity
%
A1
Thailand 2010–2014 95.47 74.50 4.53 67.30 50.86 29.02 84.53
Trinidad and Tobago 2010–2014 85.99 51.25 14.01 39.14 37.74 5.61 72.17
Tunisia 2010–2014 96.35 84.07 3.65 78.42 79.34 24.48 83.82
Turkey 2010–2014 96.52 85.70 3.48 76.02 80.25 32.04 77.56
Ukraine 2010–2014 86.53 65.40 13.47 62.63 57.69 18.23 56.61
United Kingdom 2005–2009 54.60 25.50 45.40 26.07 25.15 6.65 30.34
United States 2010–2014 57.31 30.07 42.69 39.90 14.81 6.54 34.57
Uruguay 2010–2014 74.60 36.70 25.40 28.60 34.30 9.20 51.40
Uzbekistan 2010–2014 97.93 87.73 2.07 78.67 80.33 48.60 83.93
Viet Nam 2005–2009 92.89 69.17 7.11 59.40 62.49 20.36 70.56
Yemen 2010–2014 97.80 92.10 2.20 87.40 87.20 45.30 81.00
Zambia 2005–2009 96.84 80.56 3.16 66.04 55.41 23.53 89.07
Zimbabwe 2010–2014 99.52 84.78 0.48 78.16 57.30 16.20 96.27
Overall averagea,b last available 88.35 67.82 11.65 58.68 56.61 25.63 71.95
NOTES DEFINITIONS MAIN DATA SOURCES

a Averages for the global aggregate were Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI): Percentage Columns 1–7: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia
calculated weighting for each country’s 2015 of people with at least one bias among seven (2019) based on data from the World Values Survey
population as published by UNDESA (2019). indicators. (Inglehart and others 2014).
b Based on 75 countries with data from wave 5
(2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014) of the Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI2): Percentage
World Values Survey, representing 81 percent of of people with at least two biases among seven
the global population. indicators.
Table A1 Gender Social Norms Index, last available period | 21

TABLE A2 Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI), last available period by gender
(share of people (share of people with Share of people
with at least 1 bias) at least 2 biases) with no bias Political Economic Educational Physical integrity
% of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of
Country Period women men women men women men women men women men women men women men
TABLE Algeria 2010–2014 96.96 98.68 79.39 94.41 3.04 1.32 70.44 89.47 61.82 86.02 29.05 45.07 85.14 88.32
A2 Andorra
Argentina
2005–2009
2010–2014
22.99
73.47
30.69
77.65
6.19
37.55
8.56
48.22
77.01
26.53
69.31
22.35
11.10
37.65
16.80
49.96
7.23
24.87
10.11
36.88
1.81
13.18
1.81
21.51
10.47
54.31
13.42
51.17
Armenia 2010–2014 92.18 96.16 73.82 89.20 7.82 3.84 62.66 83.60 69.86 82.33 20.44 29.62 59.45 73.24
Australia 2010–2014 37.53 54.54 15.40 30.25 62.47 45.46 24.54 40.06 11.46 24.35 3.10 5.05 16.67 24.99
Azerbaijan 2010–2014 98.37 99.92 89.27 98.49 1.63 0.08 77.78 92.67 88.01 96.02 22.44 39.58 63.92 80.60
Belarus 2010–2014 86.73 94.73 61.72 83.65 13.27 5.27 72.61 84.05 46.80 72.40 13.47 30.43 48.28 64.19
Brazil 2010–2014 88.89 90.16 46.49 58.86 11.11 9.84 37.65 49.73 28.91 45.08 9.17 9.48 80.69 74.96
Bulgaria 2005–2009 67.35 87.09 31.39 58.44 32.65 12.91 44.22 63.87 23.96 51.35 8.96 13.09 32.65 46.72
Burkina Faso 2005–2009 98.07 98.64 80.52 91.19 1.93 1.36 60.57 72.31 71.62 82.58 27.91 38.42 87.14 90.45
Canada 2005–2009 50.80 52.68 22.79 23.97 49.20 47.32 24.88 26.10 20.24 22.82 4.27 5.65 30.28 31.01
Chile 2010–2014 69.43 79.51 32.94 51.72 30.57 20.49 35.90 48.48 20.71 36.31 12.62 27.79 49.90 55.38
China 2010–2014 84.65 91.78 59.07 69.60 15.35 8.22 50.76 60.03 47.72 61.78 19.50 24.46 64.55 69.40
Colombia 2010–2014 91.73 91.07 53.94 60.53 8.27 8.93 47.90 50.80 29.53 38.00 8.66 12.93 82.28 82.27
Cyprus 2010–2014 77.18 85.01 41.87 57.17 22.82 14.99 40.96 55.48 31.71 56.25 8.95 19.21 54.70 51.89
Ecuador 2010–2014 93.06 93.64 55.48 62.54 6.94 6.36 41.77 51.20 34.03 39.00 20.16 26.98 84.19 84.54
Estonia 2010–2014 71.80 81.91 44.35 59.58 28.20 18.09 51.59 63.75 37.61 54.71 13.68 18.38 31.94 41.52
Ethiopia 2005–2009 83.47 86.98 26.72 43.10 16.53 13.02 23.76 36.40 13.87 29.66 5.91 9.97 81.18 80.05
Finland 2005–2009 44.33 58.61 17.22 28.61 55.67 41.39 20.10 29.46 17.97 28.65 5.49 7.02 25.65 34.08
France 2005–2009 55.65 56.39 24.07 29.80 44.35 43.61 33.30 37.38 25.04 26.11 5.23 8.32 20.97 23.98
Georgia 2010–2014 92.76 95.66 72.42 82.64 7.24 4.34 62.56 69.80 61.48 73.42 16.80 19.71 71.19 78.66
Germany 2010–2014 55.26 70.29 25.78 40.71 44.74 29.71 20.42 33.05 23.19 38.98 11.64 20.12 39.43 50.16
Ghana 2010–2014 98.92 99.39 88.77 96.54 1.08 0.61 82.82 90.78 68.39 87.46 21.63 38.26 89.55 91.89
Haiti 2010–2014 97.96 99.90 86.20 99.58 2.04 0.10 72.86 79.90 50.94 94.05 43.29 77.21 81.31 95.10
Hungary 2005–2009 61.66 70.73 32.06 49.85 38.34 29.27 36.77 49.79 33.14 43.26 17.13 20.61 28.03 34.36
India 2010–2014 97.09 99.21 77.14 88.03 2.91 0.79 56.69 69.91 61.79 76.24 31.04 38.52 85.94 90.26
Indonesia 2005–2009 96.44 98.36 72.57 87.55 3.56 1.64 55.31 76.70 54.95 76.86 17.29 21.16 91.26 89.90
Iran, Islamic Republic of 2005–2009 97.79 99.24 88.59 96.29 2.21 0.76 79.48 89.71 84.50 93.19 46.66 63.99 76.22 80.92
Iraq 2010–2014 94.92 99.84 82.31 98.09 5.08 0.16 80.21 95.71 65.85 92.37 22.07 39.75 78.81 90.78
Japan 2010–2014 64.93 72.98 37.68 45.96 35.07 27.02 44.08 49.87 39.26 44.52 15.40 17.08 21.01 31.95
Jordan 2010–2014 99.17 99.50 95.50 95.83 0.83 0.50 90.83 91.50 88.33 90.50 20.17 37.33 79.17 83.83
Kazakhstan 2010–2014 94.78 97.85 72.89 86.00 5.22 2.15 71.43 79.52 61.10 74.86 19.12 24.66 63.68 74.00
Korea (Republic of) 2010–2014 84.30 89.90 58.63 67.30 15.70 10.10 58.65 68.82 50.99 57.76 24.15 27.23 55.36 61.24
Kuwait 2010–2014 96.28 99.00 84.03 96.00 3.72 1.00 78.34 93.88 61.49 85.52 28.45 40.57 85.12 83.77
Kyrgyzstan 2010–2014 96.34 97.15 80.89 88.99 3.66 2.85 71.99 81.79 64.27 79.08 34.82 47.42 82.07 81.39
Lebanon 2010–2014 94.61 97.62 77.78 87.07 5.39 2.38 69.61 81.46 56.37 64.12 29.08 33.16 82.35 83.33
Libya 2010–2014 98.63 99.58 87.72 97.60 1.37 0.42 72.25 93.07 74.01 93.95 17.59 44.15 89.87 94.24
Malaysia 2010–2014 97.31 99.70 82.44 94.01 2.69 0.30 72.63 86.38 63.13 85.33 33.70 51.80 94.78 93.86
Mali 2005–2009 98.60 99.04 90.49 96.17 1.40 0.96 78.15 85.57 85.49 92.21 43.99 51.17 81.89 87.80
Mexico 2010–2014 88.21 87.19 49.25 52.75 11.79 12.81 40.36 42.44 25.67 33.03 19.18 22.22 76.22 74.87
Moldova, Republic of 2005–2009 88.38 91.92 58.62 76.77 11.62 8.08 53.72 67.68 52.27 66.06 12.70 21.21 61.16 69.70
Morocco 2010–2014 93.54 98.99 67.55 93.79 6.46 1.01 55.63 82.55 59.27 85.91 15.40 23.83 76.32 88.76
Netherlands 2010–2014 32.51 48.08 12.48 19.80 67.49 51.92 17.68 25.45 9.72 17.99 2.55 7.01 18.86 25.68
New Zealand 2010–2014 41.49 52.12 18.05 25.21 58.51 47.88 23.86 31.44 14.52 18.98 3.73 7.37 23.86 27.48
Nigeria 2010–2014 99.53 99.93 91.97 97.84 0.47 0.07 80.52 90.84 77.16 89.34 40.45 51.59 90.72 94.73
Norway 2005–2009 38.55 43.97 12.92 19.07 61.45 56.03 19.18 19.84 17.22 26.46 2.74 4.67 16.05 17.51
Pakistan 2010–2014 99.61 100.00 96.61 99.45 0.39 0.00 74.79 87.46 87.09 94.72 49.35 52.77 93.02 94.45
Palestine, State of 2010–2014 97.07 98.98 89.06 95.70 2.93 1.02 85.35 93.44 71.68 87.70 18.75 35.04 81.05 86.07
Peru 2010–2014 86.31 89.61 46.77 53.19 13.69 10.39 34.51 42.34 21.71 32.35 13.33 15.38 80.33 79.20
Philippines 2010–2014 98.75 98.98 83.29 90.31 1.25 1.02 65.10 76.14 67.43 80.17 32.96 45.21 91.69 91.26
Poland 2010–2014 79.04 80.55 45.86 48.95 20.96 19.45 41.11 46.73 41.07 43.04 9.39 14.76 54.73 51.08
Qatar 2010–2014 99.67 99.81 94.35 95.54 0.33 0.19 89.95 93.46 80.60 82.92 27.98 27.16 85.78 88.99
Romania 2010–2014 83.07 88.12 55.73 66.34 16.93 11.88 42.71 55.32 52.79 59.23 17.07 24.60 62.09 65.11
Russian Federation 2010–2014 82.63 91.94 61.45 77.22 17.37 8.06 63.14 74.83 52.51 66.35 18.75 27.42 43.64 57.80
Rwanda 2010–2014 99.22 99.08 89.22 89.56 0.78 0.92 67.92 67.64 60.91 70.54 36.36 35.93 97.66 97.62
Serbia 2005–2009 76.74 88.35 38.87 58.09 23.26 11.65 36.21 57.61 21.93 48.71 8.80 17.48 64.78 68.28
Singapore 2010–2014 90.78 94.42 71.12 75.97 9.22 5.58 73.75 79.40 49.53 55.79 22.86 30.57 63.56 68.43
Slovenia 2010–2014 53.90 66.44 22.24 36.22 46.10 33.56 29.55 38.89 20.45 33.33 5.03 12.22 26.95 34.00
South Africa 2010–2014 95.46 97.24 76.90 85.18 4.54 2.76 71.76 79.61 52.42 62.02 36.88 40.86 88.61 89.01
Spain 2010–2014 49.10 51.99 23.25 27.19 50.90 48.01 27.93 30.96 17.98 23.14 11.46 11.77 28.50 27.57
Sweden 2010–2014 28.31 31.71 7.75 13.75 71.69 68.29 14.60 17.51 6.94 11.38 1.36 3.87 13.55 14.72
Switzerland 2005–2009 54.69 57.63 25.38 28.79 45.31 42.37 23.55 17.02 31.68 27.57 6.24 12.90 27.05 36.10

(share of people (share of people with Share of people
with at least 1 bias) at least 2 biases) with no bias Political Economic Educational Physical integrity
% of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of
Country Period women men women men women men women men women men women men women men
Thailand 2010–2014 96.19 94.72 73.12 75.82 3.81 5.28 66.69 67.02 49.51 52.97 29.62 28.30 84.31 85.02 TABLE
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
2010–2014
2010–2014
84.49
93.17
87.80
99.21
45.26
73.73
58.54
93.38
15.51
6.83
12.20
0.79
35.22
67.25
43.90
88.49
31.02
68.30
45.90
89.27
4.20
17.16
7.32
31.07
71.90
78.28
72.51
88.80
A2
Turkey 2010–2014 95.61 97.41 81.12 90.15 4.39 2.59 71.20 80.70 76.37 84.01 29.60 34.40 73.63 81.37
Ukraine 2010–2014 81.75 92.39 56.50 76.28 18.25 7.61 52.27 75.29 48.34 69.11 12.66 25.05 52.25 61.94
United Kingdom 2005–2009 48.86 60.92 20.59 30.90 51.14 39.08 21.56 30.99 19.17 31.61 4.41 9.10 28.19 32.68
United States 2010–2014 53.91 60.92 25.39 35.05 46.09 39.08 36.86 43.14 10.56 19.32 5.70 7.44 32.72 36.55
Uruguay 2010–2014 75.38 73.73 33.52 40.25 24.62 26.27 27.84 29.45 32.77 36.02 7.77 10.81 47.73 55.51
Uzbekistan 2010–2014 97.50 98.62 84.11 93.46 2.50 1.38 74.65 85.03 76.50 86.40 43.96 55.94 80.63 89.16
Viet Nam 2005–2009 93.06 92.72 67.64 70.63 6.94 7.28 57.14 61.54 59.70 65.14 20.74 20.00 71.55 69.63
Yemen 2010–2014 96.02 99.60 86.65 97.59 3.98 0.40 79.88 94.98 79.08 95.38 39.24 51.41 74.10 87.95
Zambia 2005–2009 95.23 98.41 75.07 85.92 4.77 1.59 60.03 71.90 47.57 63.06 20.00 26.97 87.23 90.86
Zimbabwe 2010–2014 99.56 99.48 80.85 89.47 0.44 0.52 74.09 83.04 46.23 70.54 11.91 21.32 95.37 97.33
Overall averagea,b last available 86.09 90.58 62.36 73.02 13.91 9.42 53.03 64.01 49.68 63.18 22.41 28.68 69.71 74.09

a Based on 75 countries with data from wave 5 Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI): Percentage Columns 1–14: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia
(2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014) of the of people with at least one bias among seven (2019) based on data from the World Values Survey
World Values Survey, representing 81 percent of indicators. (Inglehart and others 2014).
the global population.
b Averages for the global aggregate were Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI2): Percentage
calculated weighting for each country’s 2015 of people with at least two biases among seven
population as published by UNDESA (2019). indicators.
Table A2 Gender Social Norms Index, last available period by gender | 23
TABLE A3a Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI), trends
(share of people with (share of people with Share of people
at least 1 bias) at least 2 biases) with no bias Political Economic Educational Physical integrity
2005–2009 2010–2014 2005–2009 2010–2014 2005–2009 2010–2014 2005–2009 2010–2014 2005–2009 2010–2014 2005–2009 2010–2014 2005–2009 2010–2014
Country % % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Argentina 76.66 75.41 42.22 42.49 23.34 24.59 34.65 43.35 37.48 30.43 14.34 17.04 56.75 52.86
Australia 52.23 46.24 27.20 23.00 47.77 53.76 32.37 32.48 26.05 18.06 7.35 4.09 26.05 20.93
Brazil 87.98 89.50 53.63 52.39 12.02 10.50 44.55 43.41 39.69 36.63 11.79 9.32 74.30 77.95
TABLE Chile 89.71 74.40 60.94 42.20 10.29 25.60 57.78 42.10 47.65 28.40 32.57 20.10 66.64 52.60
A3a China
Cyprus
91.45
80.31
88.27
81.05
65.20
51.13
64.42
49.44
8.55
19.69
11.73
18.95
52.23
43.93
55.47
48.14
52.54
47.29
54.87
43.85
18.12
10.80
22.02
14.03
77.10
56.05
67.01
53.31
Georgia 92.73 94.09 78.93 77.12 7.27 5.91 66.47 65.89 78.73 66.97 23.33 18.14 57.13 74.63
Germany 59.11 62.60 31.13 33.07 40.89 37.40 26.43 26.59 26.94 30.91 14.32 15.78 39.90 44.68
Ghana 98.17 99.16 87.21 92.69 1.83 0.84 78.88 86.84 78.23 78.01 21.64 30.02 88.46 90.73
India 91.40 98.28 75.91 83.25 8.60 1.72 62.12 64.10 68.32 69.91 38.63 35.24 75.31 88.38
Japan 72.08 68.81 45.80 41.67 27.92 31.19 46.44 46.87 39.69 41.79 18.34 16.21 37.04 26.28
Jordan 99.55 99.33 96.98 95.67 0.45 0.67 84.75 91.17 94.95 89.42 36.29 28.75 94.92 81.50
Korea (Republic of) 86.60 87.07 65.54 62.91 13.40 12.93 64.36 63.68 60.51 54.33 29.35 25.67 54.87 58.27
Malaysia 98.17 98.54 87.42 88.38 1.83 1.46 82.75 79.69 70.02 74.54 46.08 43.00 90.84 94.31
Mexico 85.96 87.70 49.81 51.00 14.04 12.30 42.56 41.40 35.38 29.35 24.17 20.70 70.51 75.55
Morocco 95.00 96.25 77.42 80.58 5.00 3.75 65.25 69.00 69.00 72.50 28.33 19.58 85.67 82.50
Netherlands 52.45 39.75 22.47 15.88 47.55 60.25 24.72 21.29 23.32 13.56 5.32 4.63 28.95 22.03
Poland 80.91 79.75 50.36 47.31 19.09 20.25 46.48 43.74 42.92 41.99 14.28 11.91 56.26 53.02
Romania 83.45 85.50 60.42 60.84 16.55 14.50 52.36 48.78 58.00 55.88 17.12 20.69 59.68 63.54
Russian Federation 86.38 86.83 63.30 68.56 13.62 13.17 61.48 68.43 61.00 58.77 27.98 22.66 44.96 50.02
Rwanda 97.87 99.15 79.76 89.39 2.13 0.85 65.03 67.78 55.14 65.68 28.00 36.15 90.97 97.64
Slovenia 60.46 59.21 33.17 28.25 39.54 40.79 37.22 33.58 27.77 25.91 10.80 8.04 32.02 29.93
South Africa 93.32 96.32 71.69 80.90 6.68 3.68 61.33 75.56 55.22 57.06 19.98 38.80 81.04 88.80
Spain 51.40 50.50 25.39 25.16 48.60 49.50 30.09 29.40 27.73 20.48 12.62 11.61 28.05 28.05
Sweden 19.01 30.01 6.38 10.75 80.99 69.99 7.68 16.05 8.26 9.16 1.08 2.61 9.42 14.13
Thailand 97.98 95.47 81.29 74.50 2.02 4.53 74.12 67.30 57.82 50.86 27.44 29.02 85.79 84.53
Trinidad and Tobago 88.73 85.99 48.40 51.25 11.27 14.01 35.86 39.14 35.44 37.74 8.03 5.61 79.72 72.17
Turkey 93.84 96.52 77.57 85.70 6.16 3.48 65.67 76.02 70.77 80.25 19.46 32.04 75.25 77.56
Ukraine 87.28 86.53 64.58 65.40 12.72 13.47 60.60 62.63 58.18 57.69 32.47 18.23 50.80 56.61
United States 60.63 57.31 33.74 30.07 39.37 42.69 42.23 39.90 19.41 14.81 7.81 6.54 38.84 34.57
Uruguay 73.60 74.60 39.20 36.70 26.40 25.40 36.10 28.60 32.90 34.30 6.30 9.20 51.70 51.40
Overall averagea,b 86.46 87.28 63.55 65.38 13.54 12.72 54.24 56.20 53.43 53.82 24.26 24.19 68.71 69.40

calculated weighting for each country’s 2015 of people with at least two biases among 7
S ee table 2 in the main text for detailed definitions

of the political, economic, educational and physical
integrity dimensions.

TABLE A3b Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI), trends by gender
GSNI GSNI2
(share of people with at least 1 bias) (share of people with at least 2 biases) Share of people with no bias
2005–2009 2010–2014 2005–2009 2010–2014 2005–2009 2010–2014
Country % of women % of men % of women % of men % of women % of men % of women % of men % of women % of men % of women % of men
Argentina 71.05 82.93 73.47 77.65 35.90 49.27 37.55 48.22 28.95 17.07 26.53 22.35
Australia 43.89 61.85 37.53 54.54 18.81 36.98 15.40 30.25 56.11 38.15 62.47 45.46
Brazil 87.10 88.94 88.89 90.16 49.20 58.49 46.49 58.86 12.90 11.06 11.11 9.84
Chile 87.80 91.82 69.43 79.51 52.95 69.76 32.94 51.72 12.20 8.18 30.57 20.49
China 89.59 93.24 84.65 91.78 59.93 70.26 59.07 69.60 10.41 6.76 15.35 8.22 TABLE
Cyprus
Georgia
76.39
89.04
85.09
96.88
77.18
92.76
85.01
95.66
41.85
71.91
62.02
86.83
41.87
72.42
57.17
82.64
23.61
10.96
14.91
3.12
22.82
7.24
14.99
4.34
A3b
Germany 55.09 63.41 55.26 70.29 24.90 37.80 25.78 40.71 44.91 36.59 44.74 29.71
Ghana 96.83 99.48 98.92 99.39 80.08 94.19 88.77 96.54 3.17 0.52 1.08 0.61
India 87.69 94.28 97.09 99.21 66.43 83.11 77.14 88.03 12.31 5.72 2.91 0.79
Japan 68.52 76.60 64.93 72.98 40.78 52.17 37.68 45.96 31.48 23.40 35.07 27.02
Jordan 99.51 99.60 99.17 99.50 95.41 98.57 95.50 95.83 0.49 0.40 0.83 0.50
Korea (Republic of) 81.35 91.98 84.30 89.90 57.26 74.02 58.63 67.30 18.65 8.02 15.70 10.10
Malaysia 96.67 99.67 97.31 99.70 80.53 94.32 82.44 94.01 3.33 0.33 2.69 0.30
Mexico 87.64 84.22 88.21 87.19 47.92 51.76 49.25 52.75 12.36 15.78 11.79 12.81
Morocco 90.30 99.83 93.54 98.99 63.32 91.89 67.55 93.79 9.70 0.17 6.46 1.01
Netherlands 51.41 53.53 32.51 48.08 19.59 25.48 12.48 19.80 48.59 46.47 67.49 51.92
Poland 76.61 85.65 79.04 80.55 45.30 55.92 45.86 48.95 23.39 14.35 20.96 19.45
Romania 78.70 89.12 83.07 88.12 52.43 69.96 55.73 66.34 21.30 10.88 16.93 11.88
Russian Federation 82.22 91.40 82.63 91.94 53.12 75.58 61.45 77.22 17.78 8.60 17.37 8.06
Rwanda 96.98 98.79 99.22 99.08 74.51 85.16 89.22 89.56 3.02 1.21 0.78 0.92
Slovenia 57.66 63.69 53.90 66.44 29.73 37.14 22.24 36.22 42.34 36.31 46.10 33.56
South Africa 90.28 96.36 95.46 97.24 61.83 81.53 76.90 85.18 9.72 3.64 4.54 2.76
Spain 48.25 54.75 49.10 51.99 22.64 28.31 23.25 27.19 51.75 45.25 50.90 48.01
Sweden 17.80 20.21 28.31 31.71 5.71 7.05 7.75 13.75 82.20 79.79 71.69 68.29
Thailand 97.18 98.80 96.19 94.72 78.18 84.51 73.12 75.82 2.82 1.20 3.81 5.28
Trinidad and Tobago 86.71 90.74 84.49 87.80 42.33 54.47 45.26 58.54 13.29 9.26 15.51 12.20
Turkey 92.09 95.57 95.61 97.41 71.80 83.30 81.12 90.15 7.91 4.43 4.39 2.59
Ukraine 84.51 90.67 81.75 92.39 56.76 74.15 56.50 76.28 15.49 9.33 18.25 7.61
United States 54.55 66.94 53.91 60.92 28.25 39.44 25.39 35.05 45.45 33.06 46.09 39.08
Uruguay 74.10 72.97 75.38 73.73 36.69 42.34 33.52 40.25 25.90 27.03 24.62 26.27
Overall averagea,b 83.38 89.35 84.61 89.90 56.56 70.01 59.69 70.76 16.62 10.65 15.39 10.10

calculated weighting for each country’s 2015 of people with at least two biases among 7
Table A3 Gender Social Norms Index, trends | 25

TABLE A4 Gender Inequality Index
SDG 3.1 SDG 3.7 SDG 5.5 SDG 4.6
Maternal Adolescent Share of seats Population with at least some Labour force
Gender Inequality Index mortality ratio birth rate in parliament secondary education participation ratea
(% ages 25 and older) (% ages 15 and older)

(deaths per 100,000 (births per 1,000 women
Value Rank live births) ages 15–19) (% held by women) Female Male Female Male
HDI rank 2018 2018 2015 2015–2020b 2018 2010–2018c 2010–2018c 2018 2018
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
1 Norway 0.044 5 5 5.1 41.4 96.1 94.8 60.2 66.7
2 Switzerland 0.037 1 5 2.8 29.3 96.4 97.2 62.6 74.1
3 Ireland 0.093 22 8 7.5 24.3 90.2 d 86.3 d 55.1 68.1
4 Germany 0.084 19 6 8.1 31.5 96.0 96.6 55.3 66.2
4 Hong Kong, China (SAR) .. .. .. 2.7 .. 76.6 82.9 54.1 67.8
TABLE 6 Australia 0.103 25 6 11.7 32.7 90.0 90.7 59.7 70.5
A4 6 Iceland
8 Sweden
0.057
0.040
9
2
3
4
6.3
5.1
38.1
46.1
100.0 e
88.8
100.0 e
89.0
72.1
61.1
80.6
67.6
9 Singapore 0.065 11 10 3.5 23.0 76.3 83.3 60.5 76.3
10 Netherlands 0.041 4 7 3.8 35.6 86.6 90.1 58.0 68.9
11 Denmark 0.040 2 6 4.1 37.4 89.2 89.4 58.1 65.9
12 Finland 0.050 7 3 5.8 42.0 100.0 100.0 55.0 62.2
13 Canada 0.083 18 7 8.4 31.7 100.0 e 100.0 e 60.9 69.7
14 New Zealand 0.133 34 11 19.3 38.3 97.2 96.6 64.6 75.7
15 United Kingdom 0.119 27 9 13.4 28.9 82.9 85.7 57.1 67.8
15 United States 0.182 42 14 19.9 23.6 95.7 95.5 56.1 68.2
17 Belgium 0.045 6 7 4.7 41.4 82.6 87.1 47.9 58.9
18 Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. 12.0 .. .. .. ..
19 Japan 0.099 23 5 3.8 13.7 95.2 d 92.2 d 51.4 70.7
20 Austria 0.073 14 4 7.3 34.8 100.0 100.0 54.8 65.9
21 Luxembourg 0.078 16 10 4.7 20.0 100.0 100.0 53.5 62.7
22 Israel 0.100 24 5 9.6 27.5 87.8 90.5 59.2 69.1
22 Korea (Republic of) 0.058 10 11 1.4 17.0 89.8 95.6 52.8 73.3
24 Slovenia 0.069 12 9 3.8 20.0 97.0 98.3 53.4 62.7
25 Spain 0.074 15 5 7.7 38.6 73.3 78.4 51.7 63.4
26 Czechia 0.137 35 4 12.0 20.3 99.8 99.8 52.4 68.4
26 France 0.051 8 8 4.7 35.7 81.0 86.3 50.3 60.0
28 Malta 0.195 44 9 12.9 11.9 74.3 82.2 43.3 66.2
29 Italy 0.069 12 4 5.2 35.6 75.6 83.0 40.0 58.4
30 Estonia 0.091 21 9 7.7 26.7 100.0 e 100.0 e 57.0 70.9
31 Cyprus 0.086 20 7 4.6 17.9 78.2 82.6 57.3 67.2
32 Greece 0.122 31 3 7.2 18.7 61.5 73.2 45.3 60.7
32 Poland 0.120 30 3 10.5 25.5 82.9 88.1 48.9 65.5
34 Lithuania 0.124 33 10 10.9 21.3 92.9 97.5 56.4 66.7
35 United Arab Emirates 0.113 26 6 6.5 22.5 78.8 d 65.7 d 51.2 93.4
36 Andorra .. .. .. .. 32.1 71.5 73.3 .. ..
36 Saudi Arabia 0.224 49 12 7.3 19.9 67.8 75.5 23.4 79.2
36 Slovakia 0.190 43 6 25.7 20.0 99.1 100.0 52.7 67.4
39 Latvia 0.169 40 18 16.2 31.0 100.0 e 99.1 e 55.4 68.0
40 Portugal 0.081 17 10 8.4 34.8 53.6 54.8 53.9 64.2
41 Qatar 0.202 45 13 9.9 9.8 73.5 66.1 57.8 94.7
42 Chile 0.288 62 22 41.1 22.7 79.0 80.9 51.0 74.2
43 Brunei Darussalam 0.234 51 23 10.3 9.1 69.5 d 70.6 d 58.2 71.7
43 Hungary 0.258 56 17 24.0 12.6 96.3 98.2 48.3 65.0
45 Bahrain 0.207 47 15 13.4 18.8 64.2 d 57.5 d 44.5 87.3
46 Croatia 0.122 31 8 8.7 18.5 94.5 96.9 45.7 58.2
47 Oman 0.304 65 17 13.1 8.8 73.4 63.7 31.0 88.7
48 Argentina 0.354 77 52 62.8 39.5 66.5 d 63.3 d 49.0 72.8
49 Russian Federation 0.255 54 25 20.7 16.1 96.3 95.7 54.9 70.5
50 Belarus 0.119 27 4 14.5 33.1 87.2 92.5 58.1 70.3
50 Kazakhstan 0.203 46 12 29.8 22.1 98.3 d 98.9 d 65.2 77.1
52 Bulgaria 0.218 48 11 39.9 23.8 94.2 96.2 49.5 61.6
52 Montenegro 0.119 27 7 9.3 23.5 88.0 97.5 43.6 58.1
52 Romania 0.316 69 31 36.2 18.7 87.2 93.1 45.6 64.2
55 Palau .. .. .. .. 13.8 96.9 97.3 .. ..
56 Barbados 0.256 55 27 33.6 27.5 94.6 d 91.9 d 61.9 69.6
57 Kuwait 0.245 53 4 8.2 3.1 56.8 49.3 57.5 85.3
57 Uruguay 0.275 59 15 58.7 22.3 57.8 54.0 55.8 73.8
59 Turkey 0.305 66 16 26.6 17.4 44.3 66.0 33.5 72.6
60 Bahamas 0.353 76 80 30.0 21.8 88.0 91.0 67.6 82.0

SDG 3.1 SDG 3.7 SDG 5.5 SDG 4.6

HDI rank 2018 2018 2015 2015–2020b 2018 2010–2018c 2010–2018c 2018 2018
61 Malaysia 0.274 58 40 13.4 15.8 79.8 d 81.8 d 50.9 77.4
62 Seychelles .. .. .. 62.1 21.2 .. .. .. ..
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
63 Serbia 0.161 37 17 14.7 34.4 85.7 93.6 46.8 62.1
63 Trinidad and Tobago 0.323 72 63 30.1 30.1 74.4 d 71.2 d 50.4 71.3
65 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 0.492 118 25 40.6 5.9 67.4 72.0 16.8 71.2
66 Mauritius 0.369 82 53 25.7 11.6 65.7 d 68.1 d 45.0 71.8 TABLE
67 Panama
68 Costa Rica
0.460
0.285
108
61
94
25
81.8
53.5
18.3
45.6
74.8 d
53.8
68.4 d
52.3
52.5
45.7
80.5
74.6
A4
69 Albania 0.234 51 29 19.6 27.9 93.5 92.8 47.2 64.9
70 Georgia 0.351 75 36 46.4 16.0 97.4 98.6 57.8 78.7
71 Sri Lanka 0.380 86 30 20.9 5.8 82.6 d 83.1 d 34.9 72.2
72 Cuba 0.312 67 39 51.6 53.2 86.7 d 88.9 d 40.0 67.4
73 Saint Kitts and Nevis .. .. .. .. 13.3 .. .. .. ..
74 Antigua and Barbuda .. .. .. 42.8 31.4 .. .. .. ..
75 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.162 38 11 9.6 19.3 73.1 90.0 35.6 58.6
76 Mexico 0.334 74 38 60.4 48.4 58.4 61.1 43.8 78.9
77 Thailand 0.377 84 20 44.9 5.3 43.1 48.2 59.5 76.2
78 Grenada .. .. 27 29.2 39.3 .. .. .. ..
79 Brazil 0.386 89 44 59.1 15.0 61.0 57.7 54.0 74.4
79 Colombia 0.411 94 64 66.7 19.0 53.1 50.9 58.6 82.0
81 Armenia 0.259 57 25 21.5 18.1 96.9 97.6 49.6 69.9
82 Algeria 0.443 100 140 10.1 21.3 39.1 d 38.9 d 14.9 67.4
82 North Macedonia 0.145 36 8 15.7 38.3 41.6 f 57.6 f 42.7 67.5
82 Peru 0.381 87 68 56.9 27.7 57.4 68.5 69.9 84.7
85 China 0.163 39 27 7.6 24.9 75.4 d 83.0 d 61.3 75.9
85 Ecuador 0.389 90 64 79.3 38.0 51.9 51.9 56.6 81.8
87 Azerbaijan 0.321 70 25 55.8 16.8 93.9 97.5 63.1 69.7
88 Ukraine 0.284 60 24 23.7 12.3 94.0 d 95.2 d 46.7 62.8
89 Dominican Republic 0.453 104 92 94.3 24.3 58.6 54.4 50.9 77.6
89 Saint Lucia 0.333 73 48 40.5 20.7 49.2 42.1 60.2 75.3
91 Tunisia 0.300 63 62 7.8 31.3 42.3 d 54.6 d 24.1 69.9
92 Mongolia 0.322 71 44 31.0 17.1 91.2 86.3 53.3 66.7
93 Lebanon 0.362 79 15 14.5 4.7 54.3 g 55.6 g 23.5 70.9
94 Botswana 0.464 111 129 46.1 9.5 89.6 d 90.3 d 66.2 78.6
94 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines .. .. 45 49.0 13.0 .. .. 57.3 79.2
96 Jamaica 0.405 93 89 52.8 19.0 69.9 62.4 60.4 73.9
96 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 0.458 106 95 85.3 22.2 71.7 66.6 47.7 77.1
98 Dominica .. .. .. .. 25.0 .. .. .. ..
98 Fiji 0.357 78 30 49.4 19.6 78.3 d 70.2 d 38.1 76.1
98 Paraguay 0.482 117 132 70.5 16.0 47.3 48.3 56.9 84.1
98 Suriname 0.465 112 155 61.7 25.5 61.5 60.1 39.2 64.2
102 Jordan 0.469 113 58 25.9 15.4 82.0 d 85.9 d 14.1 64.0
103 Belize 0.391 91 28 68.5 11.1 78.9 78.4 53.3 81.4
104 Maldives 0.367 81 68 7.8 5.9 44.9 d 49.3 d 41.9 82.0
105 Tonga 0.418 96 124 14.7 7.4 94.0 d 93.4 d 45.3 74.1
106 Philippines 0.425 98 114 54.2 29.1 75.6 d 72.4 d 45.7 74.1
107 Moldova (Republic of) 0.228 50 23 22.4 22.8 95.5 97.4 38.9 45.6
108 Turkmenistan .. .. 42 24.4 24.8 .. .. 52.8 78.2
108 Uzbekistan 0.303 64 36 23.8 16.4 99.9 99.9 53.4 78.0
110 Libya 0.172 41 9 5.8 16.0 69.4 d 45.0 d 25.7 79.0
111 Indonesia 0.451 103 126 47.4 19.8 44.5 53.2 52.2 82.0
111 Samoa 0.364 80 51 23.9 10.0 79.1 h 71.6 h 23.7 38.6
113 South Africa 0.422 97 138 67.9 41.8 i 75.0 78.2 48.9 62.6
114 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.446 101 206 64.9 51.8 52.8 65.1 56.6 79.4
115 Gabon 0.534 128 291 96.2 17.4 j 65.6 d 49.8 d 43.4 60.2
116 Egypt 0.450 102 33 53.8 14.9 59.2 d 71.2 d 22.8 73.2
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
117 Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. 9.1 91.6 92.5 .. ..
118 Viet Nam 0.314 68 54 30.9 26.7 66.2 d 77.7 d 72.7 82.5
119 Palestine, State of .. .. 45 52.8 .. 60.0 62.2 19.3 71.1
Table A4 Gender Inequality Index | 27

TABLE 4 GENDER INEQUALITY INDEX
SDG 3.1 SDG 3.7 SDG 5.5 SDG 4.6


HDI rank 2018 2018 2015 2015–2020b 2018 2010–2018c 2010–2018c 2018 2018
120 Iraq 0.540 131 50 71.7 25.2 39.5 d 56.5 d 12.4 72.6
121 Morocco 0.492 118 121 31.0 18.4 29.0 d 35.6 d 21.4 70.4
122 Kyrgyzstan 0.381 87 76 32.8 19.2 98.6 d 98.3 d 48.0 75.8
123 Guyana 0.492 118 229 74.4 31.9 70.9 d 55.5 d 41.2 73.6
124 El Salvador 0.397 92 54 69.5 31.0 39.9 46.3 46.1 78.9
125 Tajikistan 0.377 84 32 57.1 20.0 98.8 d 87.0 d 27.8 59.7
TABLE 126 Cabo Verde 0.372 83 42 73.8 20.8 k 28.7 31.2 65.1 73.2
A4 126 Guatemala
126 Nicaragua
0.492
0.455
118
105
88
150
70.9
85.0
12.7
45.7
38.4
48.3 d
37.2
46.6 d
41.1
50.7
85.0
83.7
129 India 0.501 122 174 13.2 11.7 39.0 d 63.5 d 23.6 78.6
130 Namibia 0.460 108 265 63.6 39.7 40.5 d 41.9 d 56.2 65.9
131 Timor-Leste .. .. 215 33.8 33.8 .. .. 25.0 52.6
132 Honduras 0.479 116 129 72.9 21.1 34.2 32.6 47.2 83.7
132 Kiribati .. .. 90 16.2 6.5 .. .. .. ..
134 Bhutan 0.436 99 148 20.2 15.3 7.6 17.5 58.2 74.5
135 Bangladesh 0.536 129 176 83.0 20.3 45.3 d 49.2 d 36.0 81.3
135 Micronesia (Federated States of) .. .. 100 13.9 0.0 l .. .. .. ..
137 Sao Tome and Principe 0.547 136 156 94.6 14.5 31.5 45.8 43.3 76.2
138 Congo 0.579 145 442 112.2 14.0 46.7 d 51.3 d 66.9 71.6
138 Eswatini (Kingdom of) 0.579 145 389 76.7 12.1 31.3 d 33.9 d 41.4 65.9
140 Lao People's Democratic Republic 0.463 110 197 65.4 27.5 35.0 d 46.0 d 76.8 79.7
141 Vanuatu .. .. 78 49.4 0.0 l .. .. 61.5 79.6
142 Ghana 0.541 133 319 66.6 12.7 55.7 d 71.1 d 63.6 71.5
143 Zambia 0.540 131 224 120.1 18.0 39.2 d 52.4 d 70.8 79.8
144 Equatorial Guinea .. .. 342 155.6 18.0 .. .. 55.2 67.1
145 Myanmar 0.458 106 178 28.5 10.2 28.7 d 22.3 d 47.7 77.3
146 Cambodia 0.474 114 161 50.2 19.3 15.1 d 28.1 d 75.2 87.6
147 Kenya 0.545 134 510 75.1 23.3 29.8 d 37.3 d 63.6 69.1
147 Nepal 0.476 115 258 65.1 33.5 29.0 d 44.2 d 81.7 84.4
149 Angola 0.578 144 477 150.5 30.5 23.1 38.1 75.4 80.1
150 Cameroon 0.566 140 596 105.8 29.3 32.7 40.9 71.2 81.4
150 Zimbabwe 0.525 126 443 86.1 34.3 55.9 66.3 78.6 89.0
152 Pakistan 0.547 136 178 38.8 20.0 26.7 47.3 23.9 81.5
153 Solomon Islands .. .. 114 78.0 2.0 .. .. 62.4 80.3
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
154 Syrian Arab Republic 0.547 136 68 38.6 13.2 37.1 d 43.4 d 12.0 70.3
155 Papua New Guinea 0.740 161 215 52.7 0.0 l 9.9 d 15.2 d 46.0 47.6
156 Comoros .. .. 335 65.4 6.1 .. .. 37.4 50.7
157 Rwanda 0.412 95 290 39.1 55.7 12.9 d 17.9 d 84.2 83.6
158 Nigeria .. .. 814 107.3 5.8 .. .. 50.6 59.8
159 Tanzania (United Republic of) 0.539 130 398 118.4 37.2 11.9 d 16.9 d 79.4 87.2
159 Uganda 0.531 127 343 118.8 34.3 27.4 d 34.7 d 67.2 75.0
161 Mauritania 0.620 150 602 71.0 20.3 12.7 d 24.9 d 29.2 63.2
162 Madagascar .. .. 353 109.6 19.6 .. .. 83.6 89.3
163 Benin 0.613 148 405 86.1 7.2 18.2 d 33.6 d 69.2 73.3
164 Lesotho 0.546 135 487 92.7 22.7 32.8 d 25.1 d 59.8 74.9
165 Côte d'Ivoire 0.657 157 645 117.6 9.2 m 17.8 d 34.1 d 48.3 66.0
166 Senegal 0.523 125 315 72.7 41.8 11.1 21.4 35.2 58.6
167 Togo 0.566 140 368 89.1 17.6 27.6 d 54.0 d 76.1 79.3
168 Sudan 0.560 139 311 64.0 31.0 15.3 d 19.6 d 24.5 70.3
169 Haiti 0.620 150 359 51.7 2.7 26.9 d 39.9 d 63.3 72.8
170 Afghanistan 0.575 143 396 69.0 27.4 j 13.2 d 36.9 d 48.7 82.1
171 Djibouti .. .. 229 18.8 26.2 .. .. 54.8 71.1
172 Malawi 0.615 149 634 132.7 16.7 17.6 d 25.9 d 72.9 82.0
173 Ethiopia 0.508 123 353 66.7 37.3 11.5 n 22.0 n 74.2 86.5
174 Gambia 0.620 150 706 78.2 10.3 30.7 n 43.6 n 51.7 67.7
174 Guinea .. .. 679 135.3 21.9 .. .. 64.1 65.1
176 Liberia 0.651 155 725 136.0 11.7 18.5 d 39.6 d 54.7 57.5
177 Yemen 0.834 162 385 60.4 0.5 19.9 d 35.5 d 6.0 70.8
178 Guinea-Bissau .. .. 549 104.8 13.7 .. .. 67.3 78.9
179 Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 0.655 156 693 124.2 8.2 36.7 65.8 60.8 66.5

SDG 3.1 SDG 3.7 SDG 5.5 SDG 4.6

HDI rank 2018 2018 2015 2015–2020b 2018 2010–2018c 2010–2018c 2018 2018
180 Mozambique 0.569 142 489 148.6 39.6 14.0 27.3 77.5 79.6
181 Sierra Leone 0.644 153 1,360 112.8 12.3 19.9 d 32.9 d 57.7 58.5
182 Burkina Faso 0.612 147 371 104.3 11.0 6.0 n 12.1 n 58.5 75.1
182 Eritrea .. .. 501 52.6 22.0 .. .. 74.1 87.1
184 Mali 0.676 158 587 169.1 8.8 7.3 f 16.4 f 61.3 80.9
185 Burundi 0.520 124 712 55.6 38.8 7.5 d 11.0 d 80.4 77.6
186 South Sudan .. .. 789 62.0 26.6 .. .. 71.8 74.3 TABLE
187 Chad
188 Central African Republic
0.701
0.682
160
159
856
882
161.1
129.1
15.3
8.6
1.7 n
13.4 d
10.3 n
31.1 d
64.8
64.7
77.9
79.8
A4
189 Niger 0.647 154 553 186.5 17.0 4.3 d 8.9 d 67.3 90.5
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES
.. Korea (Democratic People's Rep. of) .. .. 82 0.3 16.3 .. .. 74.3 87.3
.. Monaco .. .. .. .. 33.3 .. .. .. ..
.. Nauru .. .. .. .. 10.5 .. .. .. ..
.. San Marino .. .. .. .. 26.7 .. .. .. ..
.. Somalia .. .. 732 100.1 24.3 .. .. 19.1 74.3
.. Tuvalu .. .. .. .. 6.7 .. .. .. ..
Human development groups
Very high human development 0.175 — 15 16.7 27.2 87.0 88.7 52.1 69.0
High human development 0.331 — 56 33.6 24.4 68.9 74.5 53.9 75.6
Medium human development 0.501 — 198 34.3 20.8 39.5 58.7 32.3 78.9
Low human development 0.590 — 557 101.1 21.3 17.8 30.3 58.2 73.1
Developing countries 0.466 — 231 46.8 22.4 55.0 65.8 46.6 76.6
Regions
Arab States 0.531 — 148 46.6 18.3 45.9 54.9 20.4 73.8
East Asia and the Pacific 0.310 — 62 22.0 20.3 68.8 76.2 59.7 77.0
Europe and Central Asia 0.276 — 25 27.8 21.2 78.1 85.8 45.2 70.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.383 — 68 63.2 31.0 59.7 59.3 51.8 77.2
South Asia 0.510 — 176 26.1 17.1 39.9 60.8 25.9 78.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.573 — 550 104.7 23.5 28.8 39.8 63.5 72.9
Least developed countries 0.561 — 434 T 94.4 22.5 25.3 34.9 57.3 78.8
Small island developing states 0.453 — 192 57.5 24.6 59.0 61.5 51.0 70.2
Organisation for Economic
Co‑operation and Development 0.182 — 14 20.5 30.1 84.8 87.7 51.6 68.5
World 0.439 — 216 T 42.9 24.1 62.8 71.2 48.0 74.9
NOTES j Refers to 2017. Maternal mortality ratio: Number of deaths due to actively looking for work, expressed as a percentage
a Estimates modelled by the International Labour k Refers to 2013. pregnancy-related causes per 100,000 live births. of the working-age population.
Organization. l In calculating the Gender Inequality Index, a value Adolescent birth rate: Number of births to women MAIN DATA SOURCES
b Data are average annual estimates for of 0.1 percent was used. ages 15–19 per 1,000 women ages 15–19.
2015–2020. m Refers to 2015. Column 1: HDRO calculations based on data in
Share of seats in parliament: Proportion of seats columns 3–9.
c Data refer to the most recent year available n Updated by HDRO based on data from ICF Macro held by women in the national parliament expressed
during the period specified. Demographic and Health Surveys for 2006–2018. as a percentage of total seats. For countries with a Column 2: Calculated based on data in column 1.
d Based on Barro and Lee (2018). T From original data source. bicameral legislative system, the share of seats is
e Based on data from OECD (2018). calculated based on both houses. Column 3: UN Maternal Mortality Estimation Group
DEFINITIONS (2017).
f Updated by HDRO based on data from United Population with at least some secondary
Nations Children’s Fund Multiple Indicator Cluster Gender Inequality Index: A composite measure education: Percentage of the population ages 25 Column 4: UNDESA (2019b).
Surveys for 2006–2018. reflecting inequality in achievement between women and older that has reached (but not necessarily Column 5: IPU (2019).
g Based on cross-country regression. and men in three dimensions: reproductive health, completed) a secondary level of education.
h Based on data from the national statistical office. empowerment and the labour market. See Technical Columns 6 and 7: UNESCO Institute for Statistics
note 4 at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/ Labour force participation rate: Proportion of (2019) and Barro and Lee (2018).
i Excludes the 36 special rotating delegates the working-age population (ages 15 and older) that
appointed on an ad hoc basis. hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the
engages in the labour market, either by working or Columns 8 and 9: ILO (2019).
Gender Inequality Index is calculated.
Table A4 Gender Inequality Index | 29

Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.

PNUD HD Perspectives Gsni

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

PNUD HD Perspectives Gsni

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

PNUD HD Perspectives Gsni

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

TACKLING SOCIAL NORMS

The Human Development Report Office (HDRO) of

TACKLING SOCIAL NORMS

ii | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

TACKLING SOCIAL NORMS

Human Development Perspectives

Social norms­— ­a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 1

Progress towards gender equality is slowing

Gender Inequality Index (mean value)

Source: Human Development Report Office (see table A4).

2 | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

Gender Inequality Index: Regional dashboard

Source: Human Development Report Office (see table A4).

FIGURE 2 and functionings from the basic to the more

Social norms­— ­a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 3

Remarkable progress in basic capabilities, much less in enhanced capabilities

Progress has been Subsistence and Basic

move away from basic

Practical and strategic gender interests and needs

4 | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

The greater the empowerment, the wider the gender gap

Basic Enhanced Basic Enhanced

a. Assumes an equal proportion of men and women in the voting population.

Social norms­— ­a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 5

6 | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

Overlapping intersecting identities

Social norms­— ­a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 7

How social beliefs can obstruct gender and women’s empowerment

Dimensions Political Educational Economic Physical integrity

Gender social norms index

Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia 2019.

8 | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

Bias against gender equality is on the rise

Social norms­— ­a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 9

–0.1 –0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 –0.1 0 0.1 0.2

10 | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

The gender social norms index in practice

Gender Inequality Index (value) Time spent on unpaid domestic chores

0.2 0.19 2.23

Politics The economy

Simple average 29.2 46.1 36.0 40.3

Social norms­— ­a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 11

12 | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

Social norms­— ­a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 13

14 | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

Social norms­— ­a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 15

16 | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

18 | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

20 | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

NOTES DEFINITIONS MAIN DATA SOURCES

Table A1 Gender Social Norms Index, last available period | 21

22 | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

NOTES DEFINITIONS MAIN DATA SOURCES

NOTES DEFINITIONS MAIN DATA SOURCES

S ee table 2 in the main text for detailed definitions

24 | 2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

2005–2009 2010–2014 2005–2009 2010–2014 2005–2009 2010–2014

NOTES DEFINITIONS MAIN DATA SOURCES

Social norms— a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 1

Social norms— a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 3

Social norms— a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 5

Social norms— a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 7

Social norms— a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 9

Social norms— a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 11

Social norms— a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 13

Social norms— a game changer for tackling gender inequalities | 15