1

China’s Path to Power

Contents

1. Introduction
Why compare the Ming Dynasty with China Post 1979? What does it tell us about the
future?

2. Comparative Analysis
Similarities in foreign and defence policies between the two periods; Why these similarities
exist, key determinants – capability, intent & the international system.

3. Capability
Key elements – military, economic and political.

4. Intent
Key drivers – prestige and recognition, a secure and developing region, energy security,
maintenance of the state.

5. International System
Differences in the environment, but similarities in the approach!

6. Assessing China’s Future – “seek truth from facts”

Summary of key determinants; Will the dynamics remain; Taiwan; Implications for the
future.

7. Qualifications
Historical analogy; Vietnam; the US; the UN

8. Conclusion
The constant: a great and powerful country, achieved through a constructive and
pragmatic approach

Bibliography
 2

1. Introduction

‘China lurks on the horizon, inescapable, unstoppable, thousands of years old. Mao used to
say of any meeting held anywhere in the world, they must be talking about China because
China is everything’.
The Defence Theory of Relativity
By Brian H. Cooper

I believe that the foreign and defence policies of the modern Chinese state – from 1979

onwards – can be likened to those of Chu Ti, the Yung-lo Emperor of the Ming Dynasty

(reign 1403 - 24), and that an analysis of the underlying fundamentals provide us with an

insight into the likely, or possible future foreign and defence policies of China.

Why examine the foreign and defence policies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) post

1979? At the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Communist Party of China’s Central

Committee in December 1978, the Chinese leadership decided to embark upon a fundamental

policy shift, whereby China would open up to the outside world, through changes to

economic, foreign and defence policies1. Since this time China has undergone three important

processes of change; a redefinition of its national identity, a reconstruction of its strategic

culture, and a reflection on its security interests2. These changes were a stark break from the

preceding ‘reign’ – that of Mao and the ‘Gang of Four’ – with the new policies consistently

adhered to since Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, arguably the second founder of the PRC.

Why, in comparison, should we examine the Ming Dynasty, but in particular the reign of its

third emperor Chu Ti, in order to understand China’s future? ‘The Ming period is the only

1
These changes were but some of the many changes heralded by the Third Plenary Session. Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng
2
Qin Yaqing, National Identity, Strategic Culture and Security Interests: Three Hypotheses on the Interaction
between China and International Society, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, December 2002
 3

segment of latter imperial history … during which all of China proper3 was ruled by a native,

or Han, dynasty’4, a strong, assertive and highly centralised regime that, due to ethnicity, had

‘China’s’ interests at heart. Within this period I have chosen the Yung-lo reign as it

represented a distinct separation – and took a clearly different direction – to that of the

preceding and subsequent reigns, and because Chu Ti is often called the second founder of the

Ming Dynasty5. Old institutions were modified to meet the challenges and needs of the

changing times, including reforms across military and civil administration6. Chu Ti’s foreign

and defence policies were focused on politically dominating the periphery, primarily to ensure

internal cohesion and to protect the state, and foreign exploration and commerce to both

benefit China economically, but primarily to gain deference and acceptance of China’s

superiority by all other states.

The constant between the two periods is that China has been and is now a great and important

power and wants the world to tell it so. As this is a discussion of the PRC’s future policies –

and that its leadership views Taiwan as part of China – then it will be considered as such. It is

also my premise that China will not instigate hostilities against the US in the next 10 years,

with the possible exception of Taiwan, so the notion of a US blockade of China (oft

mentioned as a driver of Chinese policy making) is spurious. I argue that current Chinese

policy is in essence the same as Chu Ti’s policies, which were neither expansionist – apart

from achieving what he believed to be ‘China’, and what needed to be done to protect China

proper – nor exploitive in that they did not seek to colonise or subjugate far away lands,

although certainly to achieve economic benefit.

3
Ming China did not include Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, and Jilin. Hermann Kinder
and Werner Hilgemann, The Penguin Atlas of World History Volume 1, Penguin Books, London, 2003, p.227
4
Fredrick Mote and Denis Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China, Volume 7, The Ming Dynasty 1368-
1644, Part 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p.1
5
Hok-Lam Chan, in Mote and Twitchett, op.cit, p.205
6
Hok-Lam Chan, ibid, p.205
 4

2. Comparative Analysis

Similarities between the periods

History never simply repeats itself, however many historical periods share similarities. This is

clearly the case with the two periods of Chinese history under discussion: the Yung-lo period

and the post-1979 period. Despite half a millennium apart, they do share some significant

similarities; the first relates to building upon a new start; the second the pragmatic and

constructive approach to periphery states; and the third is the lack of intent to use force.

The state of China at the beginning of Chu Ti’s reign was one of building upon a new start.

The Ming Dynasty had been in existence for 35 years – the founding emperor Hung-wu for 30

of those years – and a solid foundation and guiding principles had been laid down. Considered

one of the greatest emperors of China, his reign was focused on re-establishing ethnic Chinese

rule of China. His foreign policy had faced the challenge of reinstating Chinese leadership and

controlling relations with other states, in particular with Inner Asia7. He died in 1398, but the

following three years - the period 1399-1402 under the reign of Chen-wen – was one of civil

war – ended when Yung-lo, who was based in Beijing, captured Chen-wen’s imperial palace

in Nanking. Yung-lo inherited a China that was in essence complete, that is it included those

areas that were then considered China, and had largely achieved the physical boundaries to

guarantee its integrity, be they man-made (the Great Wall) or natural (the Taklamakan desert).

The foreign and defence policies of the Yung-lo Emperor were therefore characterised by a

pragmatic and constructive approach in a strategically benign environment. States on the

periphery were always of greater importance that those further afield because of their

relevance to the integrity of China – the perennial Chinese concern. This benign environment

then allowed China to focus on internal, rather than external issues.

7
Inner Asia here includes what we today call Central Asia, Mongolia and Manchuria.
 5

The state of China circa 1980 was one of relative peace and internal security, and improving

economic growth, again having built on a preceding ‘reign’ that had reestablished the country.

After the death of Mao in 1976, and a short interregnum of the ‘Gang of Four’, internal

cohesion had been achieved and economic development had begun in earnest. Radical social

and economic readjustments and changes in policy direction occurred with regard to most of

the former regime’s direction, and China’s strategic environment became less threatening. It

was during the 1980s and 1990s that China’s grand strategy began to change, the essence of

which was that emphasis was placed on cooperation rather than struggle8. This was due to a

number of factors. China had become a status quo state, because the international system had

changed sufficiently and the new system was beneficial to China, and had thus redefined its

National Identity. China saw the diminishing efficacy of violence in international affairs and

did not believe that international relations had to be a ‘zero-sum’ game, resulting in her

reconstructing her strategic culture into a more cooperative and less aggressive approach.

Finally, China’s security interests had to be reconsidered to encompass areas outside of

traditional nation-state concerns to include economic, societal and regional issues9.

It is not surprising then that modern China’s approach to the periphery has mirrored that of

Chu Ti in that the aim has been to guide, cajole and influence these states without resorting to

the use of ‘hard’ power. We see this in Chu Ti’s approach to the ‘Western Regions’ – roughly

equivalent to today’s Xinjiang province – which were important because of their proximity to

the core provinces, and because it provided a useful barrier to remnants of the former Mongol

empire. Rather than try to absorb the region, he was content to have the ruler recognise him as

his overlord and pay tribute as this avoided the substantial cost of providing a garrison for the

area that did not threaten China. This region then acted as a buffer, passing on intelligence

8
Qin Yaqing, op.cit
9
Qin Yaqing, ibid
 6

about central Asia, and providing mutually beneficial trade. Relations with Tibet however

were based on a very different past. Tibet ‘recognised’ China, but was not subservient to her.

By 1403 the two were separate sovereign entities, as opposed to the relationship that existed

during Kublai Khan’s reign of the Yuan Dynasty. Ming interest in Tibet was focused on

Buddhism, horses and cessation of hostilities along the common border, although Tibet posed

no serious threat to China10. Perhaps this would have been different had Tibet been a unified

state, however as with the Mongols it was not and the numerous power brokers were unlikely

to unite against China. Relations with Burma followed much the same path as the other

periphery states, perhaps again because it was not united (there existed northern and southern

entities) it was not considered a threat, and China maintained a tributary relationship with the

northern state. The greatest closest power to China in the early 15th century was Timurlane’s

empire (The Timurid). Timurlane’s son Shahrukh, who succeeded his father in 1405, was

treated as an equal by Chu Ti11, which was indeed an unusual position for a Chinese emperor.

The traditional relationship between foreign rulers and the Chinese emperor was one of

deference and acknowledgement that the Emperor was his suzerain. The strategically benign

environment China found itself in meant that its significant military capabilities on land, if

only latent at sea were not employed (apart from punitive expeditions against the Mongols).

How does China view the world today? According to their Defence White Paper:

The current international situation continues to undergo profound and complex changes. Peace and

development remain the dominating themes of the times. Although the international situation as a
12
whole tends to be stable, factors of uncertainty, instability and insecurity are on the increase .

In other words while the situation is complex and challenging, China sees the world in

10
Morris Rossabi, in Denis Twitchett and John Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, Volume 8, The Ming
Dynasty 1368-1644, Part 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p.242
11
Chu Ti is alleged to have addressed him as an equal in a letter. Morris Rossabi, ibid, p.251
12
PLA Daily, China’s National Defence in 2004, 27 December 2004, Chapter 1: The Security Situation,
http://english.chinamil.com.cn
 7

essentially a positive light, with opportunities present. Again we see the similarities with Chu

Ti’s time. The international situation had changed with the end of the Timurid threat, yet the

direction of its new leader was not certain. A new united Korea presented opportunities to

China, as long as it did not ally with the Mongols. Finally Chu Ti needed peace and stability

to improve the ‘domestic’ environment and ensure his legitimacy.

We see in these periods leaders taking the opportunity to build upon a reinvigorated China,

and utilise all of China’s strengths to protect China from foreign domination and restore her

perceived place in the world. With one exception, China’s substantial military power (from a

regional perspective) was used sparingly. I contend that China’s foreign and defence policies

during these periods have been governed by a reluctance to employ its military capability and

intent to develop and maintain constructive yet pragmatic relations with regional and global

actors. Nor did China seek economic or political control over regional states, although she

certainly sought to heavily influence them. These two periods have witnessed a China that

sought negotiation and diplomacy first and foremost over military conflict.

The trends and constants in Chinese foreign and defence policy, taken from these periods, are

in priority: maintenance of the state (social cohesion and at least modest prosperity for the

individual); the possession of significant political, economic, soft and hard (military) power

(Comprehensive National Power(CNP) to be able to shape the region as China sees fit and to

be able to act without undue constraints to her core issues and concerns (geostrategic

manoeuvrability); to display technological genius (including in the form of impressive

military capabilities and now with the space program); and, perhaps as a sum of all this, to be

acknowledged as a great power. The question we must now ask is how China developed and

implemented the required policies to achieve this environment during these two periods?
 8

Why do these similarities exist?

International diplomacy refers to the complete process of foreign policy making and

implementation13. Policy making ‘involves the analysis and assessment of past and current

data, in light of our past experience and that of others … in order to identify the need and

available options for action in the future and the likely implications of those options’14. There

is little doubt that Chu Ti and Deng Xiaoping had learnt from China’s past, and the prevailing

international systems, as they formulated policy. The second part of the process, policy

implementation, is carried out by military, economic and political means, and impacted by

political, security (both internal and external), economic and societal dynamics. The process

of foreign policy making has however become more complex than in the past due to: the

emergence of ethical issues such as human rights and democracy; a greater focus on

economics and the environment; new complexities of the security aspect due to transnational

issues like the proliferation of WMD, crime and terrorism; and the pervasive nature of modern

communications15. Once these drivers for policy making have been assessed, capabilities are

developed to achieve the policy goals, through political, economic and military means.

However simply having the capability to do something does not mean a state will do

something, and here intent (or lack of it) to use capability is of central importance. Most

importantly though is to have the capability, for it then provides policy options that would

otherwise not exist.

I will now deal with three determinants for policy development; capability, intent and the

environment in which states must operate (the international system) in the following chapters,

and how these have influenced China’s foreign and defence policy during the two periods.

13
Brian White, Diplomacy in John Baylis, and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics: An
introduction to international relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp.396-397
14
B. Raman, Decision-making in Foreign Policy, South Asia Analysis Group, www.saag.org/notes/note86.html
15
B. Raman, ibid
 9

3. Capability

Capability has long been seen by realist analysts as at the core of a country’s foreign policy.

Great powers, it is said, tend to behave more aggressively as they could afford to do so with

their great capabilities, either in a military or economic sense. For China, its rising influence

in the past few decades has sparked similar suspicion. Many believe that China could follow

the path of Germany or Japan in the lead up to the World War II. An analysis of capability

then (military, economic and political) is essential to understanding China’s foreign policy.

Military

Chu Ti’s military capabilities compared to those of states on the periphery were significant.

Indeed since the break up of the northern Mongol empire, no force threatened China’s

existence. While he had substantial land forces, at no time did Chu Ti bring them together for

major invasions (with the exception of Annam). Given the fractured nature of the Mongol,

Tibetan and Burmese regions, Chu Ti could well have concentrated a significant portion of his

military capability and enforced favourable terms on them. Similarly with the quality and

quantity of ships at his disposal, in particular the seven-masted ocean going ships which had

the range, endurance and firepower to outmatch any regional – and perhaps global – power.

Assessing modern China’s current and likely future military capability is a much easier

process given the publication of national policy. The current iteration, China’s National

Defence in 2004, highlights a number of foci, such as: the Taiwan issue; missile defence; US

regional alliances (primarily Japan but also Australia); the Revolution in Military Affairs

(RMA); and deterrence (both conventional and nuclear). The issues of terrorism and

separatism, major concerns for China for some time, are also addressed in a manner

‘internationalising’ them, with the White Paper stating that ‘traditional and non-traditional
 10

security issues are intertwined with the latter posing a growing threat’16. None of these foci or

rationale for capability development are necessarily threatening to China’s region, and indeed

much of the enhancements to, and introduction of new, capabilities is because China’s

military capabilities had atrophied over a long period of time.

The military capability of both periods has been characterised by the possession of a force

capable of deterrence. Recent US developments in missile defence have been of particular

concern to China as they could potentially nullify China’s primary instrument of deterrence

and strike against Taiwan, that is short and medium range conventional missiles. Linked to

this have been developments in Japan (at US urging), including constitutional changes to

facilitate the deployment of the Japanese Self-Defence Force overseas, an improved and

increased ability to project power, and substantial involvement in the US missile defence

programme. The likelihood of a joint US-Japanese missile shield – while primarily as a

response to North Korean actions – would greatly worry China, not least of all because of its

potential inclusion of other participants, most notably Taiwan, South Korea and Australia.

These issues have the potential to reduce China’s deterrence capability, and in so doing

encouraging the development of new and better capabilities, both qualitatively and

quantitatively, for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

China has recently placed a greater emphasis on enhancing Navy, Air Force and Second

Artillery Force (SAF) capability because of the greater role they will play in future conflict.

The SAF ‘is responsible for deterring the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China,

and carrying out nuclear counter-attacks and precision strikes with conventional missiles’17.

The current offensive strength of the SAF is around 200 warheads, which is further

16
PLA Daily, China’s National Defence in 2004, Chapter 1: The Security Situation, op.cit
17
PLA Daily, China’s National Defence in 2004, Chapter 3, ibid
 11

constrained by the limited quality and quantity of the delivery systems18. What is significant

is that China sees the possibility of deterrence and counter-attacks through conventional

weapons, including the hundreds of short range ballistic missile that the US missile defence

system is designed to nullify, and maintains a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons.

China’s current military capability is shaped by, apart from the Taiwan issue, contextual

(recognition as a great power, regional security environment, energy requirements) and direct

(domestic politics, defence policy, military-industrial complex) drivers19. To expand upon

this, in a contextual sense, significant military capabilities (whether needed or not) such as

aircraft carriers add to a nations prestige and recognition as a ‘great power’. Regional military

capabilities have been improving for some time and as a result China must improve her

capabilities to retain the ability to operate effectively (in a military sense) within the region.

Perhaps most importantly in a contextual sense is the importance of protecting access to

energy sources, because of their significance to national development and as a corollary

domestic cohesion. In a more direct sense, the military-industrial complex is an important

driver as it provides a vital source of employment but also national research and development

activities that offer broader benefits to China. Of course, as with most countries, domestic

politics is a significant driver for military capabilities, and aspects of capability development

will be heavily influenced by domestic pressures and challenges.

Nationalism is often used, and is a particularly useful tool, in developing and maintaining the

integrity of the state and responding to domestic challenges. Indeed authoritarian regimes

with diverse groupings within their societies find Nationalism particularly useful for this

18
Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, Chinese Nuclear Forces 2006, NRDC Nuclear Notebook, vol. 62,
no.3, May/June 2006 pp. 60-63, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
19
David Shambaugh, China’s Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress, in Ashley Tellis
and Michael Willis (ed.), Strategic Asia 2005 – 06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, National
Bureau of Asian Research, Washington D.C, 2005, pp. 67-103
 12

purpose20. One way of fostering this nationalism is through the acquisition of advanced

military capabilities. There is also a significant level of international prestige and status that

comes from the possession of certain military capabilities, such as aircraft carriers,

submarines, ballistic missiles and of course nuclear weapons. An aspect of nationalism is the

competitive nature of states. General Mi Zhenyu of the PLA has argued that ‘the development

of anything is necessarily competitive’21, and by extension military development is

‘competitive’. Taking this argument further, a country may introduce an advanced weapon

system not because it needs it for power projection per se, but as a means of gaining prestige

and increasing one’s CNP, while at the same time mindful of the perception of this activity.

While certain newer capabilities could well be used to project power, there is no discussion in

official Chinese writings on the projection of power on a global scale, and indeed there is

evidence to suggest that this is not Chinese policy. The evidence of such an intent would

primarily been seen through capability development and acquisition. According to a well

respected US defence magazine, ‘one country that is undertaking a major naval expansion is,

oddly, left out of the trend toward expeditionary warships: China’22. Aircraft carriers, for

example, are a capability not needed for an invasion of Taiwan, but would be required for

power projection beyond the South China Sea and the ‘first island chain’23, into the central

Pacific and the Indian Ocean. There is no doubt however that the prestige and significance an

aircraft carrier would add to China’s status, something akin to the large ocean going vessels

that participated in Cheng Ho’s voyages which left all who saw them awestruck24. China has

20
David Brown, Why might constructed nationalist and ethnic ideologies come into conflict with each other?,
The Pacific Review, vol.15, no.4, Routledge, 2002, p.557
21
General Zhenyu, China’s National Defense Development Concepts, Part Four: The Revolution in Military
Affairs in Michael Pillsbury (ed.), Chinese views of Future Warfare, Institute for National Strategic Studies,
www.ndu.edu/chinaview/chinacont.html
22
Defense News, April 3 2006, vol. 21, No.14, Army Times Publishing Co., Springfield, 2006
23
The ‘first island chain’ runs from Japan through to Taiwan, the Philippines and on to Malaysia.
24
One such account was by Niccolo da Conti from his stay in Calicut. Gavin Menzies, 1421: The Year China
Discovered the World, Bantam Press, 2003, p.116
 13

purchased the former Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag, however the reason for this purchase is

unclear. Will it be used to refine anti-carrier tactics and doctrine, to be used to represent an

“Opposing Force” (OPFOR)25? A one-off second-hand aircraft carrier, might be feasible and

cost effective for this purpose. Should it become a harbinger for a new power projection

capability however, regional powers and the US would certainly reassess China’s future

direction. Likewise is the situation regarding strategic bombers, a capability not needed to

strike Taiwan but certainly required if the aim was to project power far from one’s borders.

Despite the lack of these ‘combat indicators’, there is certainly a view in the US that China is

developing capabilities for “contingencies other than Taiwan”26.

How will China’s current and developing military capabilities be employed to achieve

China’s national objectives? China’s current maritime strategy is one of denial, an essentially

defensive approach designed to prevent an adversary from successfully achieving their

desired outcome. Indeed this is an approach long advocated in Chinese history. Sun Tzu, circa

500 B.C.E., advocated an indirect approach to fighting, the tenets of which were deception,

speed, avoidance of attrition, striking what is weak and vulnerable, emphasis on manoeuvre,

and attacking the enemy’s will to fight27. China current defence policy could be characterised

as such. A more direct strategy is one of limited control, where China would be able to

operate with a high likelihood of successfully completing a mission. This generally means a

sustained period of tactical advantage, and/or an abbreviated period of strategic advantage,

but long enough to achieve the (limited) objective. The ability to successfully overcome

(though not necessarily destroy) a US carrier battlegroup, already in position supporting

25
The OPFOR program is designed to represent a plausible military force which US forces can train against.
Army Regulation 350-2, Training, Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program, cited at Federation of American
Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar350-2.pdf
26
The Pentagon’s View of China, StratFor Intelligence Brief, Strategic Forecasting Inc. (STRATFOR),
http://www.stratfor.com
27
Sun Tzu, cited in Craig Snyder (ed.), Contemporary Security and Strategy, MacMillian, London, 1999, p.26
 14

Taiwan, would be an example of this and would not indicate Chinese power projection

capability or the capabilities of a regional threat. China appears well on the way to achieving

this level of capability. The most aggressive military strategy that China might adopt is one of

command or dominance (in a regional and not global sense) whereby China would be able to,

with a high degree of confidence, conduct operations in strategically unfavourable conditions

(for China). Specific capabilities and force structures, which would be plainly evident, would

be required to achieve this strategy. There is no indication yet that China is seeking to develop

this level of capability. Rather I see China adopting the second of these maritime strategies, as

advocated by Corbett (Some Principles of Maritime Strategy – 1911) and Richmond

(Statesman and Seapower – 1946), where maritime power is closely linked to operations on

land and logistics and used to achieve the national political objective28. This maritime strategy

is essential if China is to continue to develop its other elements of national capability,

economic and political power.

Economic and Political

Economic and political capabilities are closely intertwined, and this has been especially

evident in policy making and implementation during the two periods examined. Economically

the powerhouses of the 14th and 15th centuries were China, India and the Middle East, and this

is where the majority of world trade occurred. China undertook significant trade with the

periphery, while overseas trade was largely for exotic desires that while not necessary for

development, certainly added to the prestige of the ruler.

Modern China’s relations with the periphery, and in particular Southeast Asia, have been

significant not primarily for their economic value, but rather the political value. China’s

28
Rowan Walker, The Development of Naval Strategy: A Review of Literature, in Contemporary Security and
Strategy, Study Guide, Deakin University, Geelong, 2005, p.14
 15

relationship is both with ASEAN and the individual countries that make up that organisation –

countries that acknowledge China as the “paramount regional power”29. There have been

frequent visits by China’s leaders to ASEAN capitals, and reciprocal visits to China. China

has been conscious to have agreements of some kind – however modest they may be – as

concrete outcomes of these visits30. In 2003 China acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and

Co-operation (TAC)31. While arguable largely symbolic, it nevertheless means a great deal to

ASEAN leaders and enjoys greater significance because of those who have not signed (the

US). The adoption of the Declaration of Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, where

unilateral actions were replaced by an understanding to exercise self-restraint in the conduct

of activities that would complicate matters32, is another example of China’s constructive and

focused approach to regional interaction. We see then a repeat of the tribute system where the

value of the tribute from the vassal is outweighed by that bestowed by China.

In short, China’s political, economic and military capabilities can be summarised as ensuring

the maintenance of the state and addressing ‘the rise of “Taiwan independence” forces, the

technological gap resulting from RMA, the risks and challenges caused by the development of

the trends toward economic globalisation, and the prolonged existence of unipolarity vis-à-vis

multipolarity ’33. These are the fundamentals that drive modern China’s capability

development. The question must be asked, if a more dominant China at the centre did not

behave like a hegemon (Chu Ti’s China), why would the China of today do so? We must now

turn to intent to understand how and why the China of these two periods chose not to employ

the capabilities it had developed.

29
These states do however recognise that the US is still the predominant military power. Milton Osborne, The
Paramount Power: China and the Countries of Southeast Asia, Lowy Institute for International Policy,
http://www.lowyinstitute.org
30
Milton Osborne, ibid
31
China View, Xinhua Online, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-10/08/content_1113134.htm
32
Signed between ASEAN and China in November 2002, Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines
Government, http://www.dfa.gov.ph/news/pr/pr2004/may/pr327.htm
33
PLA Daily, China’s National Defence in 2004, Chapter 1: The Security Situation, op.cit
 16

4. Intent

Compared to capability, intent is perhaps more important for understanding foreign policy.

After all, the United States could have been a ‘superpower’ at the end of the First World War,

but chose not to. Historian Warren Cohen has argued that, between the world wars, the United

States opted instead for a foreign policy of "empire without tears" dominance of world

markets with an absolute minimum of military and political commitments34. The US had the

capability, but not the intent to use it, in an international system that allowed the US to ‘rise’.

China’s intent during these two periods has been maintenance of the state, possession of

significant political, economic and military power (CNP to allow geostrategic

manoeuvrability), the ability to display technological genius, and to be acknowledged as a

great power. None of these have required China to act aggressively.

Chu Ti’s foreign policy directed at the periphery was progressive for the time, seeking to

avoid military conflict rather than territorial conquest. This is supported by Chu Ti’s discourse

with a rival power of similar strength, the Timurid. This approach can only be adopted when

the state is comfortable with its borders, a situation I believe exists today. Recognition by

other, sometimes far away, lands were also valued, but more for their exotic nature, with the

six voyages of Cheng Ho providing a good example35. Some have argued that these

expeditions were an attempt to track down Chu Ti’s predecessor, who it was said had fled

overseas, while others believe the expeditions were simply to aggrandise himself and to seek

legitimacy36. Whatever the reason, what we do know is that the expeditions were not ones of

colonisation, subjugation or mercantilism, but rather voyages of discovery with the intent of

obtaining the exotic and displaying China’s advanced civilisation.

34
Maarten L. Pereboom, Trade and Economics as a Force in U.S. Foreign Relations, eJOURNALUSA,
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0406/ijpe/pereboom.htm
35
The voyages were sent in 1405, 1407, 1409, 1413, 1417, 1421 and 1431, and visited, amongst other places,
Calicut, Ceylon, Hormuz and the west coast of Africa, Wang Gangwu, in Twitchett and Fairbanks, op.cit, p.320
36
Wang Gangwu, ibid, p.320
 17

Chu Ti is regarded by some historians (Hok-Lam Chan) and contemporary writers (Swaine &

Tellis) as an expansionist attracted to military conquest, primarily in order to enhance his

reputation. The cases of his numerous campaigns in the north – primarily against the Mongols

– are often identified in support of this argument, as are the six expeditions of Cheng Ho. The

Mongols campaigns, however, were not ones of conquest or territorial expansion, but one of

active defence against a perpetual threat – one that endangered the core of China proper. And

they could hardly be described as ‘campaigns’, but rather ongoing skirmishes against

individual or small groups of tribes – sometimes offensive actions, sometimes defensive

actions – in what could be described as guerrilla warfare37. Similarly, Cheng Ho’s expedition

sought to establish diplomatic embassies, trading privileges, and support for the tributary

system38, rather than military conquest or colonisation. This defensive approach to countries

to the east and south ‘confirmed the past practices of the Han, T’ang and Sung empires’ (all

ethnic Chinese), and established ‘an important doctrine of Ming foreign policy’39.

I believe this doctrine has been adopted by China post 1979 as she has not attempted to

subjugate or incorporate peripheral states as the former Soviet Union did with Eastern Europe,

and instead has adopted a “peaceful rise” strategy primarily implemented through the use of

soft power. China has the physical borders it needs in the Himalayas, the Taklamakan Desert

and the East China Sea to provide the ‘wall’ she has always felt she needed. China will of

course seek to have great influence over these peripheral states and for these states to view

China as the major power in the region as she has always done. China however realises she

can use other elements of her CNP to achieve her ends, without resorting to hard (military)

power.

37
Morris Rossabi, op.cit, p.226
38
It has also been claimed that at least part of the purpose of the initial expeditions was to find the usurped
Chen-wen emperor. Hok-Lam Chan, op.cit, p.222
39
Wang Gangwu, op.cit, p.311
 18

The foreign and defence policies of the PRC post 1979 also differentiated between those

aimed at the periphery and those aimed at states further afield. During this period China has

been a non-aligned power adhering to ‘an independent foreign policy of peace and a national

defense policy of the defensive nature’40 – merely rhetoric or honestly felt? Since the

breakdown in bilateral relations in the early 1960’s, the Soviet Union had represented a

modern day Mongol threat. Its collapse however has led to a degree of rapprochement

between China and Russia. China has sought a strategic dialogue with Russia – in particular

since 200141 dealing with nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula, Iraq and the Middle East

more broadly, and terrorism42. This has culminated in the Joint exercise ‘Peace Mission 2005’

in August 2005, the first major Joint exercise involving foreign forces on Chinese soil. The

significance of this exercise can not be understated. China has sought positive engagement

with a former enemy, albeit done with a wary eye.

China has also sought to positively engage with the other major North Asian powers, Japan

and South Korea, including through the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite

Cooperation, to strengthen cooperation in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation, and

the realisation of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula43. Although the current state of relations

with Japan is at a low ebb, this is largely as a result of Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the

Yakusuni Shrine, although both sides exploit bilateral tensions for domestic purposes. These

major domestic policy considerations mean foreign policy making is that much more difficult

for China. North Korea represents the greatest dilemma for China. Should it collapse, it would

cause great problems, yet China has adopted what appears to be a constructive and subtle

approach to the issue. Almost as bad for China is the effect of North Korean missile and

40
PLA Daily, China’s National Defence in 2004, Forward, op.cit
41
When the two countries signed the Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation
42
PLA Daily, China’s National Defence in 2004, Chapter 9: International Security Cooperation, ibid
43
PLA Daily, China’s National Defence in 2004, Chapter 9: International Security Cooperation, ibid
 19

nuclear developments on Japanese security policy. Should the North’s bellicose actions

continue, highlighted on 9 October 2006 by its first nuclear test, the likely result is a Japan

equipped with an effective missile defence system, and a Self-Defence Force with more

operational latitude. Neither outcome is in China’s interest, and so China seeks to guide and

prod North Korea as much as possible without risking the collapse of the North Korean state.

The importance of the periphery however is not limited to the issues of threat, border

demarcation and control, but also energy security as this is fundamental to internal stability

and development. China places greatest emphasis on the economic and security fields with the

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)44. The SCO may well be morphing into a central

Asian energy block, countering US efforts to control energy at the source, with the possible

inclusion of Iran leading to the control of much of the world’s oil and gas reserves45. China

has invested heavily in developing oilfields in Kazakhstan, with crude oil from there already

flowing into China via an overland route. To the south, the agreement with Laos, Myanmar

and Thailand will see a trial program of processed oil shipments to China's Yunnan

Province46. Both this deal, and the supply of energy by land routes from Central Asia and

Siberia, provide China with an alternative to the Strait of Malacca as a route for shipping oil.

Economic ties and energy security are the primary drivers of China’s foreign policy beyond

the periphery, and China often utilises regional groupings to achieve these objectives. Primary

among them has been China’s interaction with ASEAN under the auspices of the ASEAN

Plus One, ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)47. While bilateral

trade is of course very important for both parties, it is energy security and political traction

44
Members include China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
45
F. William Engdahl, USA out-flanked in Eurasian Energy Politics, Centre for Research on Globalization, 3
June 2006, www.globalresearch.ca
46
China Economic Net, http://en.ce.cn/Industries/Energy&Mining/200604/06/t20060406_6621771.shtml
47
PLA Daily, China’s National Defence in 2004, Chapter 9: International Security Cooperation, op.cit
 20

that are the primary driver for the intensity of this relationship. China is heavily engaged in

securing future oil supplies from Africa, even cancelling debt and scraping tariffs to obtain

favourable exploration opportunities48. Indeed nearly 60% of China's oil imports come from

the Middle East and Africa have to be shipped through the Malacca Strait, a strategically

vulnerable bottleneck involving three ASEAN members. China has sought to develop

flexibility in the delivery of its energy requirements, as mentioned above, to reduce the ability

of others to influence Chinese policy. It must also be acknowledged that during the Yung-lo

emperor’s reign China was not in significant economic contact with distant lands, as she is

today, and no other state could place the pressure on China that could be done today.

The intent during both these periods was to establish and maintain legitimacy of the polity,

exercised through strong leadership. In fact it was during these periods of strong state

leadership throughout China’s history that there was considerable opposition to prolonged

periods of use of force. Such opposition was based on ‘both pragmatic bureaucratic

calculations and more normative beliefs, including a long standing, deep-seated notion that

successful and just regimes attain their objectives, wherever possible, through a reliance on

“benevolent” behaviour and the force of example’49. Both periods began with their leaders

seeking international recognition, Chu Ti through tribute from vassal states and the PRC

through acceptance into international bodies, for with that came legitimacy and internal

cohesion. Importantly today’s China seeks to prevent such recognition for Taiwan, as the

resultant legitimacy would likely embolden formal independence. Legitimacy however can

also develop over time, even in the absence of formal recognition. We must now look at the

international system and examine how this external determinant has impacted policy making

and implementation during the two periods.

48
F. William Engdahl, op.cit
49
Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy. Past, Present, and Future, RAND,
Washington, D.C., 2000, p.209
 21

5. The International System

We need to understand the international system for it is a key determinant in policy

development, providing the framework in which states must operate, and certain guidelines by

which states must behave. The state of the World and nature of international politics circa

CE.1400 was very different to that of today, since prior to about 1500 the ‘global system was

a dispersed one’, and while there were linkages between Asia and Europe, there was no

‘provision for self-maintenance and defence against interlopers’50. To China’s north the

remnants of the Mongol led Yuan Dynasty (the Northern Yuan) had been expelled from

Korea and in Japan the division between the northern and southern courts had ended. Thus the

three (including China) major north Asian nations were each – at the same time – united and

under native leadership. The Mongols, while fractured, remained a potent albeit unpredictable

force on China’s northern border. To the west and south, Persia and South and Central Asia

had been subjugated or laid waste by Timurlame. Further afield Europe was in religious and

social upheaval as a result of the Papal Schism and roving mercenary armies51, while Islam

was spreading further into Africa and, by the Ottoman Turks, into southern Europe. China

then had significant states on the periphery (Japan and Korea) with whom she could engage,

but none further afield. Additionally there was no state which China had to engage, but there

were borders that needed guarding as territoriality still mattered.

The state of the World in the late 20th Century had been shaped by forces that did not exist

600 years ago. The changes in state versus state behaviour – the change to the international

system – initially brought on by the Treaty of Westphalia, and over the past 100 years by the

clash of empires and ideologies, in which China was not a central player. Most recent of

course was the environment under which two dominant blocks were involved in a Cold War

50
George Modelski, ‘The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State’, in Comparative Studies in
Society and History 20, No.2, 1978, p.218
51
Jerome Burne, Chronicle of the World, Chronicle Communications, London, 1991, pp.402-11
 22

whose influence and impact spanned the globe. China still faced a threat from its northern and

now also its western borders, while its relationship with South Korea (now divided) and Japan

were problematical at best given recent history. Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East

(despite the Egypt-Israel peace treaty) were in turmoil due to a resurgent Islam. While

territoriality still matters, it is transnational threats and access to energy sources that drives

today’s foreign and defence policies, representing a profound and complex change to the

international system. Since the end of the Cold War the key drivers influencing international

relations – and by default the paradigm under which China must operate – are US military,

economic and political primacy, growing economic interdependence, and the convergence of

world political systems and values52. So unlike Chu Ti there existed major powers with which

China not only could engage with, but had to engage with.

Although the new international system is arguably less confrontational in a strict territorial

sense, for China it is no longer a question of incorporating other states or large areas of

foreign territory, but rather one of mutual recognition and acceptance of neighbours, including

border agreements and treaties. Over the past 15 years China has either resolved or is in the

process of resolving border disputes with all bordering states, with the only significant

outstanding issues remaining to do with some sections of the border with India53. While many

other issues remain unresolved, these foreign policy initiatives have highlighted China’s

return to a constructive approach in dealing with the periphery, in a similar vein to that

adopted by Chu Ti.

Having said that there have been actions that would contradict the assertion of a peacefully-

rising China. The taking of Mischief Reef in 1995 was perhaps a more significant event for

52
Hugh White, The limits to optimism: Australia and the rise of China, in Australian Journal of International
Affairs Vol. 59, No. 4, December 2005, p.471
53
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng
 23

Chinese foreign policy than is generally assumed. While its strategic significance and value is

debatable, it was a grab for territory – a less frequent occurrence in today’s world – and China

was probably surprised by the strength of the reaction from the Philippines in particular, and

ASEAN in general54. This action was particularly unhelpful to China’s efforts to present a

positive and benign view of itself. Since these events, China’s public policy has been one of

portraying its progress as a ‘Peaceful Rise’55, and one mutually beneficial for both China and

others. This has been approached through a number of foreign policy initiatives including

acceding to ASEAN’s TAC, and the Declaration of Conduct of the Parties in the South China

Sea. Indeed it is in Southeast Asia where China’s foreign policy implementation has had some

success in portraying itself as peaceful and benign, and contrasting itself to that of the US.

China has stayed out of the internal affairs of ASEAN states, and any loans or defence

equipment sold is not tied in any way. In examining China’s policy in this area Osborne uses

the concept of paramountcy to describe China’s position in relation to Southeast Asia,

differentiating it from hegemony or domination and that China ‘accepts that other states have

the right to exert influence in individual states’56. Given that China accepts that other

important states will be involved in the region, we should expect to see structures evolve

where China works with major powers to achieve her national interests.

54
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Secretariat, http://www.aseansec.org/2089.htm
55
Phrase coined by Zheng Bijian in 2003 to described China development, now often replaced by ‘Peaceful
Development’. People’s Daily, http://english.people.com.cn/200404/26/eng20040426_141521.shtml
56
Milton Osborne, op.cit
 24

6. Assessing China’s Future – “seek truth from facts”

Summary of key determinants

The analysis has shown that during these two periods China has had significant political,

economic and military power, a mature understanding of the extant international systems in

which it had to operate, and a desire to use an economy of force where possible in achieving

its national objectives.

Some scholars believe Chu Ti’s reign was characterised by military campaigns, forcible

restoration of the tributary relations, and the annexation of Annam57, an aggressive and

militaristic policy. Yet this is not borne out by the facts. The Mongols represented a continual

threat that China was unable to diplomatically engage as they were no longer a unified entity.

As a result numerous raids were conducted against the Mongol groups, designed to disrupt

rather than to subjugate. In Manchuria, rather than conduct an aggressive military campaign,

Chu Ti instead ‘relied upon diplomacy to secure the kind of relationship he wanted’, seeking

peace and ‘tried to prevent (the Jurchens) from allying with the Mongols or Koreans to pose

threats to the Chinese borderlands’58. China had fostered positive relations with Korea, and

‘although he had the power to intimidate Korea, (Chu Ti) also knew that it enhanced his

position to be seen as the recipient of tribute from foreign rulers’59. The relationship was

mutually beneficial and the Korean’s enjoyed substantial independence. In both cases Chu Ti

had the capability, but not the intent to use it. Again the example is proven true for Japan

where, probably as a result of a positive initiative from the Japanese Shogun, Chu Ti

regularised trade and exchanged frequent diplomatic missions60. There was no thought of

conquest or aggressive use of force to influence Japan, but rather a constructive, if pragmatic,

57
Hok-Lam Chan, op.cit, p.183
58
Morris Rossabi, op.cit, p.261
59
Morris Rossabi, ibid, p.279
60
Hok-Lam Chan, op.cit, p.269-70
 25

approach. Judged by the norms of the day, Chu Ti’s foreign and defence policies were not

expansionist or aggressive, but designed to ensure the unity, security, prosperity and respect

(legitimacy) for China. He was an advocate for trade and increased contact – but not conquest

– in particular with Inner Asia, but also further afield. Notably, he did not try to incorporate

Tibet, as the Yuan Dynasty effectively had, and rarely imposed his world order on rulers, as

long as there was no threat to China itself. Foreign rulers recognised China as the ‘Middle

Kingdom’61 and gave tribute, however the value of the tribute presented to the Chinese court

by the ‘Vassal’ was often less than that of the gifts bestowed upon the Vassal by the Court.

By the end of Chu Ti’s reign China was undoubtedly the greatest seafaring nation of the time.

When we compare the maritime expeditions of the Europeans less than 100 years later, the

differing motives of the Western and Eastern sea explorers are clearly evident. The Chinese

were essentially on a dignified tour of the world, initially perhaps in a search for Chen-wen,

but ultimately for the rich gifts of tribute and prestige. The Europeans, conversely, were

engaged in a war with Islam and working for profit. Indeed Prince Henry the Navigator’s

motives for his voyages were cosmographical knowledge, profit, commerce, and the war

against Islam. In China, the economic considerations were reserved for the inland activities62,

they had no interest in ‘finding’ Europe. Yet this was the very rationale for Columbus’

voyages, to find a shorter route to China, for purposes of trade and missionary zeal63.

Today’s China is again attempting to regain its pre-eminence in the region, however the

reality is that a major power (the US) seeks to limit China’s rise? China has never been a

global power, in the way that Britain and France had been and the US is today, yet it does for

61
Morris Rossabi, op.cit, p.224
62
Michael Bosworth, The Rise and Fall of 15th Century Chinese sea power, www.cronab.demon.co.uk
63
D.K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires. A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century. Second Edition,
MacMillan, London, 1989, p.5-6
 26

the first time have global interests. ‘China is a rising but not yet strong power, whose further

growth in capabilities depends fundamentally on the quality of its external environment’64. As

such in the near term China will not force an issue – or confront the US – unless it is of

critical importance, so as to maintain this external environment. As Kishore Mahbubani asks

us, the question Chinese policy makers would be asking of themselves is whether the US will

allow China to rise, or whether it will block this rise65.

The core issues of concern for future Chinese foreign policy are in priority order: energy

security and trade (for without which the Chinese economy would falter and result in internal

dislocation); Taiwanese independence; North Korea (either implosion or external conflict);

missile defence and nuclear proliferation; and the South China Sea (specifically the Spratly

Islands and potential energy reserves). Of course the internal and external environments exist

in a symbiotic relationship. Global economic downturn and deficiencies in energy supply

could well lead to significant internal problems for China. So future foreign and defence

policies will be tailored to ensure internal security, cohesion and prosperity in the first case

and external matters second (where they can be differentiated from internal matters).

Will these dynamics remain?

We can expect China to remain economically aggressive but not militarily so, not too

dissimilar to the US in the 1920’s. It will be politically active, but this will be aimed not at

ideological confrontation but rather maintaining access to energy supplies, and reducing the

number of states that recognise Taiwan. More broadly activities aimed at securing the

periphery, and on recognition of China’s place and importance in the world, will continue. It

is easy to incorrectly attribute hegemonic ambitions to policies whose aim is national

64
Swaine and Tellis, op.cit, p.152
65
Kishore Mahbubani, Global powers in a decade of strategic change, in Peter Abigail (Director), Global
Forces 2005, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, April 2006, p.16
 27

development such as China’s interest in the South Pacific, that is to access raw materials and

reduce Taiwan’s influence, rather than simply to counter the US66. Given these two periods

have been some of the most celebrated in China’s history (for reasons of economic strength,

prestige and recognition), and that China’s leaders recognise this, it is logical to assess that

the fundamentals of these successes will be followed in future policy making.

The PRC of today, unlike its first 30 years, has no enemies67, much as Chu Ti enjoyed with

the qualification of skirmishes with the Mongol tribes. There are no indications that China’s

low level military capability (compared to the US) nor its pragmatic approach to international

relations is about to change. Should any of the aforementioned capability developments take

place (identified in chapter 3), it may indicate that China does indeed have other motives, and

that she has changed to become more assertive and ambitious. It could also indicate that

China fears externally created incidents may be addressed primarily, or indeed solely, through

military force. Contrariwise, China could develop these power projection capabilities but not

have the intent to use them, as was the case with Chu Ti’s naval capability. In a military

context, capability and intent is a complex calculus: intent without capability is a forewarning

of what may come to pass; capability without intent is a potential future threat awaiting only

circumstance and opportunity; and capability and intent is a threat manifest.

In summary, perhaps the most important similarity between the two eras is that the decisions

on policies were made by entities (the Emperor or the Politburo) prepared and able to institute

consistent policies over extended periods (over 20 years) for the maintenance and

strengthening of the state. As Paul Kennedy states in Preparing for the Twenty-First Century,

66
Brendan Taylor, Assessing China’s Asian Ambitions in Security Challenges, Kokoda Foundation, Vol 1, No.1,
November 2005, p.24
67
Ross Terrill, Riding the Wave. The rise of China and options for Australian policy. Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, Canberra, March 2006, p.18
 28

one of the key elements for states is the need for political leadership. Politicians in

democracies such as Japan and the US, who have come to power through compromise and the

like, are generally not prepared to make controversial decisions whose benefits may not

materialise until well into the future68. So for as long as China is not a western democracy and

the external environment remains it will be easier to hypothesize her future policy direction.

There are certain potential generic and specific drivers which could compel China to act in a

more aggressive and assertive manner, contradicting the constants I have identified? In a

generic sense, some historians argue that history shows when a state expands its power, the

natural corollary is that the state expands its interests69. This is because increased power leads

to increased interests and commitments, the increase in the state’s relative power engenders a

desire for enhanced international standing, and that increased power ultimately leads to

increased ambition. Would such a situation lead to China approaching the periphery, energy

supplies and future ‘friends’ in a more aggressive and mercantile way? Conversely there are

others who argue that the changing nature of power in the international system suggests that

traditional assertive behaviour from major powers is obsolete70. Qin Yaqing argues that the

higher the level of ‘positive identification of a state’s identity’ and the more obvious its

‘cooperative strategic culture’ (two areas of positive change for China post 1979), the more

likely it is that the interaction between the country (China) and the international system will

be benign71. Buzan neatly summarises the modern state’s view on the application of military

force in an assessment of modern strategic thought in that almost no national objective, short

of state survival, justifies the cost of major conflict72.

68
Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, HarperCollins, London, 1993, p.345
69
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House, New York, 1987
70
Evan Luard, The Blunted Sword: The Erosion of Military Power in Modern World Politics, New York, 1988
71
Qin Yaqing, op.cit
72
Barry Buzan, Introduction to Strategic Studies, Military Technology and International Relations, MacMillian
Press, London, 1994, p.34-5
 29

In a more specific sense issues may evolve beyond China’s control that she will need to act

upon. Likely scenarios to inhibit China could include: energy strangulation; a Taiwanese

initiated crisis (most likely based around independence); a US initiated crisis (more likely

brought on by a Hawkish US administration); and/or an information campaign focusing on

“the emerging China threat”73, a fear campaign centred on China being a threat and aggressor

in the Asia-Pacific region, which some argue has already begun. More likely is the possibility

that, not by any grand design, a number of individual actions could combine to create a

significant event, resulting in a Gestalt effect. Such a confluence of factors could occur in

2008. That year will see the beginning of the US Presidential election cycle (January), the

Taiwanese Presidential election (March), the PRC Presidential election (March), the Olympic

Games in Beijing (August), and the conclusion of the US Presidential election cycle

(November)74. The issue of China’s rise, and its potential to be a destabilising force (if the US

information campaign is successful) could well be a major issue during the US Primaries, and

is certain to influence the Taiwanese election. The result of this may well influence Mainland

China’s Presidential election through significant pressure being placed on Hu Jintao by

‘Hawks’ in the Communist Party to deal with Taiwan. An aggressive administration in

Taiwan could well gamble that China will not do anything to jeopardise the Olympics, with

any action Taiwan takes influencing the US election agenda.

Taiwan

The question of Taiwan represents the single most important defence and foreign policy issue

for China. Even though China considers it an internal matter, China is not so naïve as to

believe that any action it may take with regard to Taiwan will not have substantial foreign

policy effects. Perhaps as a hangover from the ‘century of shame’, China feels compelled to

73
Bill Gertz, The China Threat. How the People’s Republic Targets America, Regnery Publishing, Washington
D.C, 2000,
74
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook
 30

‘recover’ any and all territories that might be considered Chinese, and of these only Taiwan

remains. It is unlikely that China would resile from her position that Taiwan must return to

the fold, unless in doing so it would adversely affected the survival of the state itself.

China is developing all aspects of her CNP to prevent Taiwanese independence, including

military power through focused capability improvements, and her political ‘power’ with

regard to states and entities that recognise (or more importantly don’t recognise) Taiwan.

Increased economic interdependence between China and Taiwan however means that China

will try all possible avenues short of the use of hard power to reclaim Taiwan. Too much

disruption and destruction while reincorporating Taiwan could well risk the state itself.

Implications for the future

We can now simplify the guiding principals for the Chinese leadership as they formulate

future policy by what I call “The 3 Laws of China’s Grand Strategy”:

1. The most important task for the government is to maintain the integrity of the

state, and improve China’s CNP and the prosperity of the Chinese people;

2. Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and no effort will be spared in achieving

this goal, except where this would contravene the first law; and

3. China has no designs beyond its borders and will not attack other countries, except

as required in defence of the first and second laws.

By following these injunctions, China would continue to prosper, show itself as a responsible

global citizen, and counter accusations of being a hegemon and threat to the region.

So what policies should we expect to see from China in the foreseeable future that would be

consistent with these fundamentals? Perhaps just as important, what policies would contradict

the identified maxims?

 31

Improving relations with the periphery is not simply about countering the US, but also vital

for China’s prosperity. China does not want to deal with failed economies, but with

prosperous states and regions, and we have already seen this with China’s interaction with

ASEAN and the improvement in both trade volume and liberalisation. Perhaps China

envisions a new East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, partially to counter US encirclement, but

also to continue China’s economic prosperity. We are witnessing the beginnings of such an

enterprise, starting with the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) meetings and now with the

establishment of the East Asian Caucus (EAC). Such an arrangement would also help to

finance the rebuilding of North Korea, should a united Korea come to pass. This new East

Asian Co-prosperity Sphere would however have China as the lead, instead of Japan.

China will also try to prevent Japan, through the use of soft power, from gaining a permanent

seat on the United Nations Security Council, and China has already had some success with

ASEAN support on this issue. China will be careful to not antagonise or provoke the US,

because China knows she is not yet powerful enough to take on the US, but at the same time

understands that she can not appear as submissive to the US. Just as importantly, and perhaps

to assist in standing up to the US, China needs a ‘friend’ and not another ‘client’. It needs this

‘friend’ not for protection, but to highlight some aspect of national selflessness, that it might

help others simply because they are a friend and not seek reward. Of course all states do what

is in their national interest, and at some time in the future a favour may well be “called-in”.

Indeed the fact that China is not involved in any military alliances and can stand alone would,

as Machiavelli states, highlight China’s strength75. With the recent rapprochement Russia may

have been a candidate for such a friend, but there appears a lack of real trust and genuine

friendship between the two and the nationalist and protectionist policies of Russia and

75
Niccolo Machiavelli, ‘How the strength of every principality should be measured’ in The Prince, Translated
by George Bull, Penguin Classics, London, 1999, p.34-5
 32

pragmatic approach of both leaders make their relationship more one of convenience76.

Indonesia represents a potential ally, despite recent history (c.1960s), given its importance as

an energy source and its geostrategic position, including the Malacca and Sunda Straits where

Chinese oil must transit. It could also provide a lucrative market for Chinese weapons.

Ironically it may well be India – currently being heavily courted by the US – that may end up

as China’s ‘friend’. While some border issues and China’s support for Pakistan remain, recent

concessions by both sides and reopening of border passes augur well for future relations77.

China’s Grand Strategy to achieve this end state will require a complex programme of

interrelated activities and policies that will take years to achieve the desired results. Within

the field of policy making we can expect to see the continued development of China’s CNP

(to provide geostrategic manoeuvrability), concurrent with a concerted effort to continue the

“peaceful rise” or “peaceful development” without alarming neighbours. This will require a

coordinated strategic ‘Shaping and Influencing’ campaign, that is the steady promotion of its

position through the use of ‘soft power’ that includes aid, development projects, political and

economic agreements and visits (both military and civilian) to shape the Asia-Pacific region

and influence decision makers, and to counter the US information campaign. One way of

assisting this campaign will be through continual demonstrations of greatness, including

through the space programme and high-technology military capabilities. The other major

method will be through actively participating and encouraging regional groupings that

exclude, or at the very least marginalise, the US and Japan (such as the EAC and SCO).

China’s first step in this campaign will be to continue diplomatic and economic manoeuvring

to ensure access to energy sources. To diversify these sources and provide redundancies in

76
George Freedman, Third Quarter Forecast, June 22 2006, STRATFOR, http://www.stratfor.com
77
China and India recently reopened an old Silk Road border pass. David Lague and Amelia Gentleman, Along
the Silk road, A Smoothing of Tensions, International Herald Tribune, July 7, 2006, www.iht.com
 33

case of crises, China will continue to seek access to areas in Africa, central Asia (partly

through SCO members), Russia (individually), possibly with Indonesia (a potential new

‘friend’), and increasingly South America. Secondly, diplomatic and economic manoeuvring

to avoid encirclement by the US and its allies. I agree with those commentators who believe

that China seeks to replace the US as the pre-eminent power in Asia and prevent containment

by the US and Japan78. China may well try to counter any encirclement by dividing US allies:

Australia through every increasing economic influence and ties from natural gas, coal and

uranium sales and possibly a free trade agreement79; Taiwan through unification (although

that is likely to be through aggression in the short term); India through economic and security

linkages; and Japan through economic necessity. Thirdly, increased participation in

internationally (if not UN) recognised peacekeeping and development activities. Primarily

here would be participation in Afghanistan, perhaps in the form of a Provincial

Reconstruction Team. Involvement in these activities would showcase China’s commitment

as a ‘global citizen’ working for the betterment of other states, a trend that has already begun.

The boldest move that could bring the greatest gain for China, would be not only to resolve

the North Korean nuclear issue, now a more urgent issue than at any time in the past given the

recent nuclear test, but to see Korean unification on Chinese terms. The 47,000 US land and

air force troops in South Korea and Japan (not including the Marines in Okinawa)80 are there

primarily for the defence of South Korea from a North Korean invasion. The heavy US

investment in missile defence, and the sole reason for Japan’s participation, is due to North

Korea’s long range missile programme and the potential to weaponise them with nuclear

warheads. An effective and operational missile defence system would severely restrict the

78
Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1997, p.11
79
William Tow, ANZUS: Regional versus Global Security in Asia? International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Vol. 5, No. 2, 2005, p.213
80
Christopher Langton (ed), The Military Balance 2006, The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Routledge, London, 2006, p.42
 34

effectiveness of China’s short range missile systems, a major component of their military

capability, and the consequences for Chinese strategy would be immense. In short, North

Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes cause severe problems for China’s foreign and

defence policy development and implementation. Should North Korea suddenly or

unexpectedly collapse, a huge strain – through both the economic cost and resultant refugee

problem – would be placed on South Korea and China to rebuild the country. Should China

be able to achieve a unified Korea, with an accommodating approach to China, she would

have a prosperous and dynamic trading partner on the border with no foreign troops stationed

there. Internationally she would have removed a known proliferator of WMD and state

sponsor in the illegal arms and drug trade. Most importantly, China would have removed the

rationale for Japan’s missile defence programme, and a potential Japanese nuclear weapons

program. A unified Korea would also seem more likely to lean toward China than Japan81.

From a military capability point of view it will be more obvious to determine China’s future

intentions. The current public source of information for China’s defence policy is ‘China’s

Defence in 2004’, a document that offers little in the way of assessing future capabilities and

policy. Indeed it is precisely because of this document’s lack of detail that the US argues, in

its annual assessment of China’s military power, indicates China’s sinister motives82. An

initial and simple step, that would help to counter ‘the China threat’ campaign, would be

provide more openness with regard to defence policy and capabilities. At a more detailed

level, specific capability and force structure information would provide a vital insight into

China’s future intentions, rather than assessing the number of new combat aircraft purchased

or the percentage increase in defence spending. It is important to acknowledge that straight

line extrapolations of future military capabilities derived from existing baselines and past

81
Terrill, op.cit, p.23
82
Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Washington, 2005
 35

rates of development are fraught with pitfalls83.

One way to achieve China’s grand strategy and maintain positive relationships with other

major regional powers, while preventing one or a grouping of them from constricting China

may be through what Amitav Acharya describes as an “Asian Concert” – with obvious

reference to the ‘Concert of Europe’ (1815-54) – whereby the US, Russia, Japan and China

(to which I would add India) could, on an ad hoc or issues-based criteria, defuse high level

regional tensions84. A united Korea could also be added to this ‘concert’. Such a grouping,

with China as first among equals, could well see the end-state of China’s ‘peaceful rise’.

83
Swaine and Tellis, op.cit, p.164
84
Amitav Acharya, International Relations Theory and Cross-Strait Relations, The International Forum on
Peace and Security in the Taiwan Strait, July 1999
 36

7. Qualifications

Historical analogy

There is a danger in the use of historical analogy, especially when one is comparing examples

600 years apart. It can be dangerous ‘especially if such reasoning is un-tempered by

recognition that no two historical events are identical and that the future is more than a linear

extension of the past … the instructiveness of historical events tends to diminish the greater

their distance in time and space from the day and place they occurred’85. The rules and norms

for how states act, the international system and how diplomacy works, has changed

dramatically over the last 300 or so years since the Treaty of Westphalia. Contrariwise,

George Santayana’s famous dictum, “Those who cannot learn from the past are doomed to

repeat it”, has utility as we seek to understand why a country may pursue a certain course of

action and how we might divine its future. Yet events do not repeat themselves with such

accuracy as to allow precise prediction of what will or will not happen if one chooses this or

that course of action. Historical analogy then is an art, not a science, and to disprove the

theory for any number of examples does not necessarily invalidate the general theory. The

analogy I am using is by necessity a generalisation, and I am also only drawing a general

conclusion and more likely courses of action, rather than stating “this will happen in this

precise manner”!

Vietnam

The example that would prove this theory wrong – if it had been a mathematical problem –

would be Chu Ti’s policy toward Annam (Vietnam). Vietnam had for a long time been part of

earlier Chinese empires, and ‘the political and intellectual life of Vietnam, and even such

basic habits as the manner of eating (with chopsticks), had already borrowed deeply from

85
Jeffery Record, Perils of Reasoning by Historical Analogy: Munich, Vietnam, and American use of force since
1945, Occasional Paper No.4, Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, March 1998,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat4.pdf
 37

China by the fifteenth century’86. One reason given for Chu Ti’s incorporation of Vietnam

into China was because it was so similar to China. The more likely reason, however, was that

Yung-lo was caught up in internal Vietnamese politics with his candidate for King of Annam

being murdered87. As a result Chu Ti was left with no option but to invade, in order to save

face and prove he was in control of the vassal, and once again China chose incorporation

versus subservience for Vietnam. Apart from Vietnam, at no stage did Chu Ti violate the

Ancestral injunctions on countries not to be invaded, the guiding principals that the Ming

Dynasty founder had laid down and adhered to88.

Again for the PRC post 1979 the exception is Vietnam. What the Chinese refer to as the

‘counter-attack in self defence’ occurred during February and March 1979. The attack was in

response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and installation of a pro-Vietnamese

government89 at the expense of China. In essence the invasion was to teach Vietnam, a former

‘tributary state’, a lesson for acting against the wishes of its suzerain. The attack on

Vietnam90, at the beginning the period, represents the sole major military expedition of the

period, yet not undertaken for reasons of conquest or colonisation. Rather it was to teach a

‘minor’ country – not an equal – that it should not act without the approval of China91.

While I would argue this was a result of the ‘immaturity’ of the new leadership, in terms of its

embryonic phase of instituting the new policies, it must be included as it occurred within the

parameters of this study.

86
Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, Vol. 1: The Lands below the winds, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1988
87
Wang Gangwu, op.cit, p.315-6
88
The countries not to be invaded included: Annam, Champa, Korea, Siam, the countries of the Western Oceans
(South India) and Eastern Oceans (Japan), and states that would represent modern Malaysia and Indonesia,
Wang Gangwu, op.cit, p.311-12
89
T.E Vadney, The World Since 1945, Penguin Books, London, 1992, p.519-520
90
China had taken the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974.
91
The Chinese attack was in response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, and the removal of the Chinese
backed Pol Pot. Hutchinson Encyclopaedia of World History, Helicon Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 1995, p.100
 38

The US

The relationship with the US is unique in this study. While Chu Ti’s China had to deal with

major powers, such as the Timurid, it had not faced a nation that was at the same time both far

stronger militarily, politically and economically, but also one that so profoundly impacted

China’s foreign and defence policies. China needs to be seen as being as important and

powerful, the equal of the US in Asia, which currently it is not. It is at the very least the

perception of equality, if not the actuality of it, that China is striving for, and to achieve this

as soon as possible. It is only through achieving this that China can be seen as the equal of the

US, truly a ‘Great Power’.

The UN

Another new dimension, which was not part of the political environment during Chu Ti’s

reign, is that of international bodies and organisations. China, post 1979, has been an ardent

supporter of the United Nations, indeed stating that ‘the United Nations is playing an

irreplaceable role in international affairs’92. The UN provides China with ‘equality’ in the

sense that as one of the five Permanent Members, China is a ‘Great Power’. However

membership of the Security Council has not been abused by China, only casting its veto

power twice since 1979, the least of all the permanent members93. Further since 1990, China

has been a keen participation in recent peacekeeping activities, sending more than 4000

personnel to 13 UN peacekeeping operations, including Cambodia, the Congo, Liberia, East

Timor, Kosovo and Haiti94. This conduct has greatly assisted China in her plan of gradually

building a reputation as a responsible major world power.

92
PLA Daily, China’s National Defence in 2004, Chapter 1: The Security Situation, op.cit
93
Corresponding figures were: USA-53, UK-14, USSR/Russia-9, France-7. Report of the Open-ended Working
Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/417/02/PDF/N0441702.pdf?OpenElement
94
PLA Daily, China’s National Defence in 2004, Chapter 9: International Security Cooperation, op.cit
 39

8. Conclusion

It is true that differences can be found between the two periods I have examined, but most

important are the many similarities that have proved enduring, even given the vastly different

state of China, the world and international relations. Yung-lo’s interest overseas was political,

for recognition and prestige, which is also true for modern China. For modern China however

there is now the economic imperative, whereas the Ming sought the exotic and the different as

they would amplify the Emperor’s greatness. Both the Yung-lo period and the PRC post 1979

however have been governed by a reluctance to employ military capability and intent to

develop and maintain constructive yet pragmatic relations with regional and global actors.

What of the possible threat of an expansionist China? As Lanxin Xiang identifies, territorial

expansion and Chinese tradition are not really compatible, when assessed from an extended

historical perspective95. Even Bernstein and Munro who espouse the ‘China threat’ agree that

Deng Xiaoping, whose guiding principles or injunctions continue to influence Chinese policy

making, did not seek to expand China’s control beyond its borders96. Although a communist

state, China has not emulated the confrontational ideological rhetoric espoused by the Soviet

Union, seeking cooperation rather than struggle to achieve a secure external environment so

they can have a prosperous internal environment97. Perhaps it is because of this focus that

China has been accused of pure self-interest and a very mercantile, as opposed to liberal, view

with regard to trade and international relations. All the more reason for China to have a

‘friend’, to show there is more to modern China than self-interest. Irrespective of these

differences and variables, the constant is that China is a great and important power and wants

the world to tell it so!

95
Lanxin Xiang, Key issues in North Asian security: China-Taiwan, The DPRK and the nuclear balance, in
Peter Abigail (Director), op.cit, p.54
96
Bernstein and Munro, op.cit, p.13
97
Kishore Mahbubani, Global powers in a decade of strategic change, in Peter Abigail (Director), op.cit, p.17
 40

Bibliography

Abigail, Peter (Director), Global Forces 2005, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra,
April 2006

Acharya, Amitav, International Relations Theory and Cross-Strait Relations, The

International Forum on Peace and Security in the Taiwan Strait, Taipei, 26-28 July 1999

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Secretariat, http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm

Baylis, John and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to
international relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005

Bernstein, Richard and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, Alfred A. Knopf, New
York, 1997

Bosworth, Michael L, The Rise and Fall of 15th Century Chinese sea power,
www.cronab.demon.co.uk/china.htm

Brown, David, Why might constructed nationalist and ethnic ideologies come into conflict
with each other?, The Pacific Review, vol.15, no.4, Routledge, 2002

Burne, Jerome, Chronicle of the World, Chronicle Communications, London, 1991

Buzan, Barry, Introduction to Strategic Studies, Military Technology and International

Relations, MacMillian Press, London, 1994

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook

China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn

China Economic Net,

www.en.ce.cn/Industries/Energy&Mining/200604/06/t20060406_6621771.shtml

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng

China View, Xinhua Online, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-10/08/content_1113134.htm

Deakin University, Contemporary Security and Strategy, Study Guide, Deakin University,
Geelong, Vic, 2005

Deakin University, Contemporary Security and Strategy, Reader, Deakin University,

Geelong, Vic, 2005

Defense News, April 3 2006, vol. 21, No.14, Army Times Publishing Co., Springfield, 2006

Engdahl, F. William, USA out-flanked in Eurasia Energy Politics?, Centre for Research on
Globalization, 3 June 2006, http://www.globalresearch.ca

Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org

 41

Fieldhouse, D.K, The Colonial Empires. A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century.
Second Edition, MacMillan, London, 1989

Freedman, George (ed.), Strategic Forecasting Inc. (STRATFOR), http://www.stratfor.com

Gertz, Bill, The China Threat. How the People’s Republic Targets America, Regnery
Publishing, Washington D.C, 2000

Hutchinson, Dictionary of World History, Helicon Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 1995

Kennedy, Paul, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, HarperCollins, London, 1993

Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House, New York, 1987

Kinder, Hermann and Werner Hilgemann, The Penguin Atlas of World History Volume 1:
From Prehistory to the eve of the French Revolution, Penguin Books Ltd, London, 2003

Lague, David and Amelia Gentleman, Along the Silk road, A Smoothing of Tensions,
International Herald Tribune, July 7, 2006, www.iht.com

Langton, Christopher (ed), The Military Balance 2006, The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Routledge, London, 2006

Luard, Evan, The Blunted Sword: The Erosion of Military Power in Modern World Politics,
New Amsterdam, New York, 1988

Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince, Translated by George Bull, Penguin Classics, London,
1999

Menzies, Gavin, 1421: The Year China Discovered the World, Bantam Press, 2003

Modelski, George, ‘The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State’, in Comparative
Studies in Society and History, vol.20, No.2, 1978, p.218

Mote, Fredrick and Denis Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China, Volume 7, The Ming
Dynasty 1368-1644, Part 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004

Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen, Chinese Nuclear Forces 2006, NRDC Nuclear
Notebook, May/June 2006 pp. 60-63 (vol. 62, no. 3) 2006 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,
Annual Report to Congress, Washington D.C., 2005

Osborne, Milton, The Paramount Power: China and the Countries of Southeast Asia, Lowy
Institute for International Policy, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/
People’s Daily, http://english.people.com.cn

Pereboom, Maarten L, Trade and Economics as a Force in U.S. Foreign Relations,

eJOURNALUSA, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0406/ijpe/pereboom.htm
 42

Philippines Government, Department of Foreign Affairs,

www.dfa.gov.ph/news/pr/pr2004/may/pr327.htm

Pillsbury, Michael (ed.), Chinese views of Future Warfare, Institute for National Strategic
Studies, www.ndu.edu/chinaview/chinacont.html

PLA Daily, China’s National Defence in 2004, 27 December 2004,

http://english.chinamil.com.cn

Raman, B, Decision-making in Foreign Policy, South Asia Analysis Group,

http://www.saag.org/notes/note86.html

Record, Jeffery, Perils of Reasoning by Historical Analogy: Munich, Vietnam, and American
use of force since 1945, Occasional Paper No.4, Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War
College, March 1998, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat4.pdf

Reid, Anthony, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, Vol. 1: The Lands below
the winds, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988

Snyder, Craig (ed), Contemporary Security and Strategy, McMillian Press, London, 1999

Swaine, Michael and Ashley Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy. Past, Present, and
Future, RAND, Washington, D.C., 2000

Taylor, Brendan, ‘Assessing China’s Asian Ambitions’ in Security Challenges, Kokoda

Foundation, Vol 1, No.1, November 2005

Tellis, Ashley, Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, Strategic Asia 2005-06, The
National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington D.C., 2005

Terrill, Ross, Riding the Wave. The rise of China and options for Australian policy. Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, March 2006

Tow, William, ANZUS: Regional versus Global Security in Asia? International Relations of
the Asia-Pacific Vol. 5, No. 2, 2005

Twitchett, Denis and John Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, Volume 8, The Ming
Dynasty 1368-1644, Part 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004

United Nations, Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Increase in the Membership
of the Security Council, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/417/02/PDF

Vadney, T.E, The World Since 1945, Penguin Books, London, 1992

White, Hugh, The limits to optimism: Australia and the rise of China, in Australian Journal of
International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 4, December 2005

Yaqing, Qin, National Identity, Strategic Culture and Security Interests: Three Hypotheses on
the Interaction between China and International Society, Shanghai Institute for International
Studies, December 2002, www.irchina.com