N A S A TECHNICAL NOTE NASA TN 0-7780

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I' APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT -

~ SPACECRAFT STRUCTURE SUBSYSTEM

I by P. D. Smith
Lyizdon B. Johlzson Space Center
Hotlstoz2, Texm 77058
'*6-@ .
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D. C. OCTOBER 1974
 1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No.

4. Tltle and Subtitle I 5. Report Date

APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT

SPACECRAFT STRUCTURE SUBSYSTEM

7. Author(s1 8. Performing Organization Report No.

P. D. Smith, JSC JSC S-400

10. Work Unit No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 914-50-31-00-72
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 11. Contract or Grant No.
Houston, Texas 77058
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
1
2. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 14. Sponsoring Agency Code
Washington, D. C. 20546

5. Supplementary Notes
The JSC Director waived the use of the International System of Units (SI) for this Technical Note,
because, in his judgment, the use of SI Units would impair the usefulness of the report o r result
in excessive cost.
6. Abstract

The flightworthiness of the Apollo spacecraft structure was verified primarily through a rigorous,
vehicle level, ground test program and flight tests. The failures and anomalies encountered
during this testing were the major factors considered i n determining necessary modifications to
the basic design of the spacecraft structure. In this report, these failures, their causes, and
their resolutions a r e discussed. A description of the spacecraft structure and discussions of the
ground and flight test programs a r e presented.

17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s)) 18. Distribution Statement

' Apollo Spacecraft ' Flight Tests STAR Subject category: 31.
'Structural Design
' Structural Failure

' Structural Engineering

'Ground T e s t s
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of Pages 22. Price

None None 60 $3
APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

The material submitted f o r the Apollo Experience

Reports (a s e r i e s of NASA Technical Notes) was reviewed
and approved by a NASA Editorial Review Board consist-
ing of the following members: Scott H. Simpkinson
(Chairman), Richard R. Baldwin, J a m e s R. Bates,
William M. Bland, Jr., Robert P. Burt, Aleck C. Bond,
Chris C. Critzos, E. M. Fields, John M. Eggleston,
Donald T. Gregory, Edward B. Hamblett, Jr., Kenneth F.
Hecht, David N. Holman (Editor/Secretary), and C a r l R.
Huss. The prime reviewer for this report w a s Donald T.
Gregory.
 I
I CONTENTS

~ Section Page

SUMMARY .................................... 1

. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
i
~ DEVELOPMENT OF STRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1 STRUCTURAL DESCRIPTION .......................... 4

I Block I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
I
Block I1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
I

TEST DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Block I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Block I1 ..................................... 23
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM AREAS ........................ 25

Block I Ground Test Anomalies ....................... 25

Block I1 Ground Test Anomalies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Flight Anomalies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
CONCLUDING REMARKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

APPENDIX A . DEVELOPMENT TESTS SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

APPENDIX B- COMPONENT TESTS SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

APPENDIX C . COMPLETE MODULE TESTS SUMMARY (BLOCK I) . . . . 47

APPENDIX D . DYNAMIC TESTS SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

APPENDIX E . STATIC STRUCTURAL TESTS SUMMARY (BLOCK II) . . . . 51

iii
 TABLES

Table Page

I APOLLO CM DESIGN CHANGES FOR WATER IMPACT ........ 17

I1 APOLLO BOILERPLATE FLIGHT HISTORY .............. 18

I11 BOILERPLATE CONFIGURATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

IV SPACECRAFT 011 AND 012 CONFIGURATION DIFFERENCES . . . . . 22

FIGURES

Figure Page

1 Block I spacecraft configuration ..................... 2

2 The LES assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

3 The LES structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

4 The LET structure and insulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

5 Block I CM boost protective cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

6 Block I CM heat shield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

7 Block I CM inner structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

8 Block I CM inner shell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

9 Block I service module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a

10 Block I SM general arrangement ..................... 8

11 The CM/SM interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

12 Spacecraft/lunar module adapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

13 Adapter panel separation lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

14 Structural stiffener . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

15 Block I1 integrated stations and axes ................... 11

16 Block 11 boost protective cover ...................... 11

iv
I Figure Page
I

17 Block I1 CM heat shield ......................... 12

18 Block I1 CM inner structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

19 Block I1 service module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

20 Block I1 SM general configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

21 Honeycomb splice joint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

V
 APOLLO EXPER I ENCE REPORT
SPACECRAFT STRUCTURE SUBSYSTEM
By P. D. Smith
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center

SUMMARY
I
In ily 1961, NASA distributed to potential contractors t..e original Apollo space-
craft development statement of work containing the basic ground rules for design of the
Apollo spacecraft. A contractor was selected t o design, develop, and fabricate the
launch escape system, command module, service module, and spacecraft/lunar module
adapter. Structural development progressed from the basic ground rules outlined in the
statement of work through development testing to obtain design information, through com-
ponent tests, and then into static and dynamic tests of full-size modules and combined
modules. Concurrently with the ground testing, boilerplate vehicles were manufactured
and flown to obtain data during abort and normal boost flights. These data were then used
in the design and testing of spacecraft modules.

This report discusses the structural evaluation from the awarding of the contract
through ground and flight t e s t s to the time of the first lunar landing mission in July 1969.
The spacecraft modules are described, and ground and flight t e s t s having structural sig-
nificance a r e discussed as well as anomalies occurring during the ground and flight tests.

The conclusions reached in this report a r e that rigorous test programs a r e needed
to uncover any weakness in structural design o r manufacturing defects; that c a r e should
be exercised in the design and inspection of honeycomb sandwich construction; and that
extreme c a r e should be taken to a s s u r e that correct boundary conditions a r e imposed on
the component during testing.

INTRODUCTION

The Apollo spacecraft structure has five modules: the command module (CM), the
service module (SM), the lunar module (LM), the spacecraft/lunar module adapter (SLA),
and the launch escape tower (LET). The structure of the LM is discussed in a separate
report, but the structural systems of the other modules a r e discussed in this report.

The Apollo structural subsystem consists of the primary structural framework, the
structural shell, mounts for tanks and engine, and a support structure for equipment and
electrical and plumbing lines. The CM boost protective cover (BPC) and the CM/SM
fairing a r e also part of the structural subsystem.
 The Apollo structure evolved in two
phases referred to as Block I and Block 11.
When the spacecraft design began, the con-
cept of a lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR)mis-
sion had not been approved; therefore, the
CM w a s not designed to dock with another
vehicle. The f i r s t phase of the vehicle de-
sign (denoted Block l') w a s well underway
when it was decided to proceed with an LOR
mission. The most practical approach was
to continue the Block I design effort and test
Xa
XS
Xc
XL
=

=
=
Apollo station
SM station
CM station
Launch escape
system station

'T-
J4
XL400.8
Xa141?d.2

Launch escape assembly

program and to provide docking hardware

and other changes to the spacecraft later.
The vehicle configuration that included the
docking hardware w a s designated Block 11.
The Apollo Block I spacecraft configuration
is shown in figure 1.

The development plan for the struc-

t u r a l subsystem specified that the structural
elements would be designed based on the
maximum flight load conditions and on the
worst - cas e environmental conditions ex-
pected during the mission. These loads and
environmental conditions were changed con-
tinually as they were defined more accu-
rately. Development tests were conducted
on the elements and subassemblies of the
spacecraft to verify the basic techniques
used for analysis, design, and manufacturing.
Wherever possible, well-known and reliable
design techniques, types of structures, and
structural materials were used to avoid ex-
tensive development. The Apollo Program
was the first spacecraft program in which
extensive u s e was made of large, bonded,
honeycomb sandwich panels as a primary Aft interface to Saturn I Y B
Xa 502
load-carrying structure. instrument u n i t

The flightworthiness of the Apollo

Figure 1. - Block I spacecraft
spacecraft structure w a s verified primarily
through a rigorous, vehicle level, ground configuration.
test program. This ground testing was sup-
plemented by flight t e s t s and a formal loads
and s t r e s s analysis. The problems involved in developing and verifying the structural
subsystem and the manner in which these problems were resolved a r e discussed. Be-
cause verification of the structural design was accomplished mainly by ground testing,
I the failures and anomalies encountered during this testing were the primary f a c t o r s con-
sidered in determining the modifications to the basic structural design. These anomalies
and their resolutions a r e discussed and a detailed description of the spacecraft structure
is contained in this report. The ground and flight t e s t s a r e also described.

2
 DEVELOPMENT OF STRUCTURE

The Apollo statement of work (SOW) contained the ground rules for design of the
structure, described the basic functions of the spacecraft (SC), and specified that the
structural subsystem would be designed to protect the crewman and the equipment from
meteoroids, radiation, and thermal extremes. In addition to normal flight loadings,
the structure would be designed to withstand (1) tumbling of the escape vehicle at max-
imum dynamic p r e s s u r e during launch, (2) a n entry acceleration of 20g measured along
the axis of symmetry, and (3) aerodynamic noise emanating from the launch escape
system (LES) during both the launch and escape modes.
The development plan contained the following milestones: basic concept design,
determination of external and internal loads, analysis of the structure for these internal
loads, development of materials and processes, development testing, verification testing
and analysis in lieu of testing, major ground tests, and flight tests. Development of the
baseline structural configuration of the spacecraft began with established mission r e -
quirements, progressed into functional requirements, and then evolved into a design
concept. Trade-off studies were conducted to establish the proper design approach.
Changes to the basic configuration resulted from design improvements and from defi-
ciencies discovered during analysis of ground and flight test data. Additional require-
ments for modifications were determined during manufacturing, installation, design
reviews, and stacking (joining of modules) of the flight article.

The Block I spacecraft w a s certified partly by a formal loads and s t r e s s analysis.

Beginning in 1967, a complete, formal structural analysis for Block I1 w a s prepared
using SC-103 as a baseline vehicle (ref. 1). Data on the most recent external and in-
ternal loads, on vibration and thermal environments, and on the latest design weights
and trajectories were used. Changes to the flight characteristics and the weight of the
launch vehicle, as well as data obtained from instrumented spacecraft flight vehicles,
were incorporated into the analysis of the Block I1 design. In addition to baseline anal-
ysis, loads for each subsequent mission were compared to baseline loads, and any new
structural modifications were analyzed.

The testing of the Apollo structure was planned so as to ensure against uncertainties
in design and fabrication. Development t e s t s were conducted to obtain basic design in-
formation before assembly testing. Components were then tested to verify the design
concept. Complete modules were tested to verify design strength and to establish the
confidence needed to proceed with flight tests. The plan used in the testing of major
modules was to test all critical loading conditions where practical. When loads were
multidirectional, a sufficient number of selected conditions to verify the structural
strength were tested. When both thermal and mechanical s t r e s s e s were present, heat
was applied o r mechanical loads were increased, where practical, to account for thermal
effects. This ground test program identified areas that needed to be modified and pro-
vided confidence that the structure could withstand the design environment.

3
 STRUCTURAL DESCRl PTION

Block I
This section describes the structural subsystems as designed originally. Modi-
fications to this original design a r e discussed in chronological order.

Launch escape system. - The LES is designed to propel the CM away from the
remainder of the spacecraft and booster during an abort from the launch pad through the
early portion of the second-stage boost when the LES is jettisoned. The LES configu-
ration is illustrated in figures 2 and 3. The LES includes the nose cone, canard as-
sembly, pitch control, launch escape and tower jettison motors, structural skirt, tower
structure, tower/CM separation assembly, BPC, and forward heat shield separation
and retention assembly. However, only the tower, structural skirt, and BPC a r e
considered part of the structural subsystem.

The LET assembly is a t r u s s made of welded titanium tubing with fittings at the
ends for attachment to the structural s k i r t and CM (fig. 4). The tower is insulated to
protect it from aerodynamic heating and impingement from the launch escape motor
plum e.

The structural s k i r t is a truncated cone that distributes the loads among the four
tower attach points to the launch escape motor. The forward ring of the skirt mates
with a flange on the aft end of the motor (fig. 3). The s k i r t assembly is made of tita-
nium and is protected from aerodynamic heating and impingement from the launch es-
cape motor plume by an ablative coating.

Nose cone
Nose cone XL 400.7
Canard s u b a s s e m b l y 7
Pitch-control motor 7
Tower jettison motor assembly

launch escape motor 26-in. diameter 387.3

Launch escape motor

Structural
skirt 7

Power systems and

instrumentation
wire harness

Insulation

BPC lapex section) Xl 0

Figure 2. - The LES assembly. Figure 3. - The LES structure.

4
 The BPC protects the CM from
damage caused by aerodynamic heating
during the boost phase or by launch escape
motor plume heating in the event of an
abort. It is attached to the LES tower and
is jettisoned with the LES. The BPC
(fig. 5) consists of the following three
basic assemblies.

1. The forward cover is a conical-

shaped hard cover that extends from
station Xc 81 forward to the apex of the
spacecraft. It is connected to the LET at
lube J: 2.5-in. outside diameter. Dimensions denote station Xc 96. The hard cover is made of
0.15-in. wall ablative material
lubes I , L, M, 0 , Q: 2.5-in. thicknesses i n
outside diameter, 0.05-in. wall inches 0.69-inch-thick fiberglass honeycomb sand-
lubes F, P: 3.5-in. outside wich material and has a coating of cork
diameter, 0.125-in. wall bonded to the outer surface.
Figure 4. - The LET structure 2. The flexible aft cover is designed
and insulation. s o that it drapes over the CM heat shield.
It extends from station Xc 81 to station Xc 14
Laminated fiberglass and is made of t h r e e layers of material:
an inner layer of glass fabric impregnated
on the inner surface with Teflon, a center
layer of 0.0095-inch-thick Nomex fabric,
and an outer layer of 0.3-inch-thick cork.
Honeycomb
f core laminated 3. The hatch panel covers the CM
fiberglass panel hatch and is made of fiberglass honeycomb
sandwich material with a layer of Armalon
bonded to the inside surface. A window
permits crew visibility from inside the CM.

Command module heat shield. - The

CM heat shield encloses the inner structure
motor D o r t s 4 W and consists of the forward, crew compart-
I ment, and aft sections (fig. 6). The heat
shield is constructed of ablative material
bonded to brazed P H 14-8 steel honeycomb
AR boost cover
panels. The forward section is conical,
extends from station Xc 81 to station Xc 133,
and houses the Earth-recovery system and
two reaction control system (RCS) pitch en-
gines. It is jettisoned before landing to g e r -
mit deployment of the parachutes. The
crew compartment continues the conical
Figure 5. - Block I CM boost shape and extends from station Xc 81 to
protective cover.
station X 23. The crew compartment
C
heat shield is attached to the inner structure

5
 Forward Xc 133.5
compartment
by longitudinally oriented stringers and
heat shield f r a m e s and by one circumferential f r a m e .
LET leg well /-xc 80.75
The f r a m e s a r e located between sta-
Brazed stainless *Crew hatch tions Xc 23 and Xc 43, and the stringers
steel honeycomb
t' .\ Crew a r e located between stations Xc 4 3 and Xc 81.
Insulation J?P!; Slotted holes in the f r a m e s and s t r i n g e r s
permit radial movement caused by thermal
effects. The aft heat shield is a shallow,
spherically contoured assembly that en-
Inner
structure
closes the large end of the CM and is at-
tached to the aft bulkhead of the inner
Aft c o r n p a r t m y
heat shield L Umbilical housing
structure with 59 bolts. These bolts a r e
installed in oversize holes to permit the
heat shield to move relative to the inner
Figure 6. - Block I CM heat shield.
structure.

Command module inner structure. - The CM inner structure is a p r e s s u r e vessel

that houses the crew, the equipment required f o r crew comfort and safety, and the
equipment required to control and monitor the spacecraft systems. Figures 7 and 8 show
the CM inner structure. The structure provides a load path from the LES/CM interface
(fig. 1) to the CM/SM interface. The CM has an internal volume of approximately
365 cubic feet. The inner structure is enclosed by the CM heat shield f o r thermal pro-
tection and is subdivided into the forward apex, forward sidewall, aft sidewall, and aft
bulkhead sections.

-Access cylinder

Forward bulkhead

Forward hatch

r L E T attach point

-Aft longeron
1Aft bulkhead inner
face sheet assembly

Figure 7. - Block I CM Figure 8. - Block I CM

inner structure. inner shell.

6
 Forward apex: The forward apex structure consists of the access cylinder as-
sembly and a flat forward bulkhead, both made of aluminum honeycomb. The volume
between the inner mold line of the forward heat shield and the outer mold line of the
apex structure houses the Earth-landing system and its associated interfaces, the for-
ward heat shield ejection system, the pitch engines of the CM RCS, and part of the post-
landing uprighting system.

The forward bulkhead contains four support longerons, which attach to the LET
feet by explosive bolts. The longerons a r e continuous a c r o s s the bulkhead and down the
forward sidewall to the ring at station X 42. The two longerons on the plus-Z side of
C
the bulkhead have integrally machined lugs that extend into the crew compartment and
mate with the s t r u t s of the crew couch foot attenuator. The two longerons on the
minus-Z side of the bulkhead have bolt-on fittings that partially support the fixture for
the main display panel. All four longerons have integrally machined flanges that attach
to the four apex gussets.

Forward sidewall: The forward sidewall (forward half of the crew compartment)
is a truncated cone with the base at station X 4 2 . 7 and the top intersecting the forward
C
bulkhead. The structure is made of aluminum honeycomb and contains the sidewall por-
tion of the longerons as integral members. Two additional longerons a r e bonded to the
inner mold line 23 inches on either side of the minus-Z axis and extend from
station Xc 81. 5 to station Xc 4 2 . 7 . Both longerons have integrally machined'lugs that
extend into the crew compartment and mate with the crew couch head attenuator struts.

The crew compartment sidewall has six major penetrations: a crew hatch, two
rendezvous windows, two side windows, and a guidance and navigation frame. Each
penetration has a machined f r a m e welded to the inner skin and bonded to the honeycomb
c o r e and outer face sheet.

Aft sidewall: The aft sidewall is an inverted truncated cone with the base at
station Xc 4 2 . 7 and the top intersecting the aft bulkhead at station Xc 1 4 . 0 7 . The volume
between the inner mold line of the crew compartment and aft heat shield and the outer
mold line of the aft sidewall contains the engines and tanks of the RCS system, part of
the environmental control system (ECS), the waste water tank, four crushable ribs, part
of the CM postlanding uprighting system, part of the CM/SM umbilical, and equipment
that can withstand being exposed to the environment of space. The aft sidewall is a
honeycomb sandwich shell with nine integral longerons. Six of these longerons are coin-
cident with the radial beams of the SM and serve as part of the CM/SM load interface.
T,wo of the remaining three longerons are continuations of the main forward longerons.
The third supports a s t r u t from the crew couch.

The aft sidewall contains 23 T-stringers bonded to the outside face sheet to inter-
face with the crew compartment heat shield frames. The primary shear and torsion
load path from the crew compartment heat shield to the inner structure is through
fiberglass angles bolted to the aft sidewall at about station Xc 41. 7. The aft sidewall
contains a continuous machined ring that is welded to both the inner skins of the side-
wall and aft bulkhead and the integral longerons. The honeycomb c o r e s and outer face
sheets of the aft shell are bonded to this ring. Two fittings are bolted to this ring and
to two aft longerons and interface with the Z - Z attenuator s t r u t s of the couch.

7
 Aft bulkhead: The aft bulkhead is a shallow, honeycomb dome with the concave
side upward. It is attached to the aft sidewall at the ring at station Xc 14. This bulk-
head forms the lower end of the crew compartment and supports the aft ring in a radial
direction.

Service module. - The SM contains the spacecraft primary propulsion system,

RCS, fuel cells and associated equipment for providing electrical power, and radiators
for environmental control and electrical power subsystems cooling. A fairing encloses
the space between the SM and CM and houses the structural connection between the two
modules.

The SM structure is shown in figures 9 and 10. The SM outer structure is a cy-
lindrical section of 1-inch-thick bonded aluminum honeycomb sandwich. The upper end
of the SM is enclosed by a 1-inch-thick aluminum honeycomb bulkhead, and the aft end
is enclosed by a 3-inch-thick aluminum honeycomb bulkhead. A heat shield attached to
the aft side of the aft bulkhead protects the bulkhead structure and service propulsion
system (SPS) tanks and plumbing from heat caused by the SPS engine being fired. The
interior is subdivided by six one-piece radial beams. The upper ends of these beams
a r e made in the form of triangular t r u s s e s with circular pads to support the CM. Three
tension ties structurally join the CM to the SM; explosive devices sever these ties to
separate the CM from the SM. One of these tension ties is shown in figure 11.

Flyaway ground-
+z support-equip-
ment tower
I umbilical 7

Sector E(%") Mylar insulation lcovers entire area)

Forward bulkhead

Oxidizer Storage

Compression pad
r,- SMICM fairing
Sector III(60")
Fuel storage

Figure 10. - Block I SM general

Figure 9. - Block I service module. arrangement.

8
 The center tunnel formed by the ra-
-V X C 23.xK)
dial beams houses the SPS engine and two
r l e n s i o n tie helium pressurization tanks. The SPS pro-
pellant tanks a r e located i n four of the six
bays and a r e supported on the aft bulkhead.
14.500 I The four RCS engine quadrants a r e mounted
n to the SM external shell, and the associated
1010 4 Ablative material tanks a r e attached to the interior of the
shell on hinged doors.

Spacecraft/lunar module adapter. -

The SLA is the load-carrying structure be-
tween the SM and the instrument unit (IU)
of the launch vehicle. It protects the LM
during the boost phase of flight and supports
the LM on four ball joints located at sta-
tion X 585. Figure 12 shows the dimen-
a
Figure 11. - The CM/SM interface. sions of the SLA.

The conical shell is divided into two

154 in. I
sections: the upper section from the SM
I
interface to the LM attachment plane and
the lower section from the LM attachment
plane to the IU interface. The upper and
lower sections of the shell consist of four
quarter panels spliced together with longi-
tudinal plates. The panels a r e 1.7-inch-
thick aluminum honeycomb sandwich. The
frames are bonded into the panels and are
spliced at the quarter-panel joints with me-
chanical fasteners. The lower section has
chemically milled areas of varying thick-
nesses in both face sheets to distribute the
concentrated loads from the LM into the
shell. Both the upper and lower sections
have reinforced a c c e s s holes that a r e cov-
ered by doors during flight.

Pyrotechnic devices separate the SLA

f r o m the SM and simultaneously cut the SLA
forward section longitudinally at its four
splice joints and circumferentially a t the
LM attachment plane. The four panels then
deploy approximately 40" to expose the LM
for docking or to permit the SPS to propel
S-IPB instrument u n i t 2

Figure 12. - Spacecraft/lunar

module adapter.

9
the command and service module (CSM)from the SLA and booster if an abort is required
after jettisoning of the LET. The pyrotechnic separation lines a r e shown in figure 13.

Apollo flight vehicles SC-009,SC-011, and SC-101 did not include an LM but used
a stiffening member in the SLA in place of the LM. This stiffener, shown in figure 14,
weighed approximately 70 pounds and provided the stiffness necessary to stabilize the
SLA shell structurally.

separation line

LBlast shield

Separation

Figure 13. - Adapter panel

separation lines.

S L A ~

Figure 14. - Structural stiffener.

Block II
More than a year before the f i r s t Block I spacecraft was flown, the Block I1 space-
craft design was begun. The structural experience gained from the boilerplate flights
and from the Block I structural ground test program w a s combined with the new require-
ments for a vehicle that could dock with an LM and perform a lunar mission. A sketch
showing the Block II spacecraft general arrangement with station numbers is shown in
figure 15.

Structural changes from Block I to Block I1 were numerous; the major changes a r e
described in the following sections. Some of the vehicle descriptions a r e taken from
reference 1.

Launch escape system. - Modifications were made to conform the BPC to the m d -
ified C M shape caused by relocation, deletion, and changes to such parts as umbilicals,
antennas, RCS engines, and ablator thicknesses. Figure 16 shows the Block I1 BPC.

10
 X~398.5
X, 1483.1
RCS Ditch enaine w r t s

RCS roll
- RCS pitch engine ports

+Z

Hard cover seal

CM heat shield ablator

Silicone sponge seal --I

Figure 16. - Block I1 boost

protective cover.

Command module. - The Block I1

heat shield confimration is shown in
figure 17. The forward portion was modi-
fied to a truncated cone. The stainless
steel honeycomb substructure w a s modified
to essentially the s a m e substructure as that
flown on SC-017 and SC-020. Figure 18
shows the inner structure of the Block I1 CM.
Changes made in the tunnel a r e a to provide
docking capability included adding a docking
ring and latches and a thermal isolation ring.
Figure 15. - Block I1 integrated The CM/SM umbilical was relocated to the
stations and axes. plus-Z axis, and the parachute attachment
Brazed
Insulation

Inner
structure
-d-c-
steel honeycomb
stainless

fil&r
Xc 104.5

Xc 81.13

xc 43.42
Forward bulkhead

xc 23 23

Figure 17. - Block I1 CM heat shield.

Figure 18. - Block 11 CM

inner structure.

was modified to a single attachment fitting for the two drogue and t h r e e main parachutes.
All storage bays were modified because of repackaged and redesigned CM equipment.
The three CM/SM tension ties were strengthened.

All Block I1 command modules used the unified side hatch. After the SC-012 f i r e ,
the CM two-hatch system was redesigned to provide a single, integrated, outward-
opening hatch. This redesigned hatch was made with an aluminum slab inner structure
and an ablative material heat shield outer structure; fiberglass honeycomb insulation was
sandwiched between the two structures. On SC-106 and subsequent vehicles, the hatch
was modified by machining the slab to 0.1-inch thickness in many small a r e a s to peduce
weight.

Service module. - The Block I1 SM is illustrated in figures 19 and 20. The r e -

quired factor of safety for the structure aft of the forward bulkhead was reduced f r o m
1 . 5 to 1 . 4 because total weight increases to the CM and LM would have caused an in-
c r e a s e in weight of the SM and SLA structure if the factor of safety had remained at 1.5.
The booster was designed primarily with a factor of safety of 1.4; therefore, the deci-
sion was made to design the SM and SLA with a 1.4 factor of safety. The required struc-
tural factor of safety forward of the SM forward bulkhead was kept at 1.5 t o make the CM,
LES, and CM/SM interface stronger than the remainder of the spacecraft and booster.
The structure between the SM forward bulkhead and the CM provides the base f o r a CM
abort and w a s not designed to be the "weak link" in the structure used during aborts.
The forward bulkhead w a s modified to permit equipment to be mounted on it. The
longer Block I SPS tanks had been installed through holes in the forward bulkhead;
the shorter Block IT tanks were supported by three s t r u t s attached to the forward dome.

Equipment previously located in bay I was relocated to r e s e r v e bay I for experi-

ment equipment. The three fuel cells were relocated to the forward end of bay IV,
and the two oxidizer tanks for the fuel cells were located on a common shelf in bay IV.
Electronic equipment previously in bay I was relocated to the forward bulkhead.

12
 r G r e e n docking light SMICM fairing

Sector m 160")
Oxidizer storage -,
Sector ll (70")
Oxidizer sump - Sector II509

-SM RCS
motor
(four sets)

Scimitar antenna

-Radial
beam

+-- edension . +Y

sctor (60")
Fuel storage,
Fuel sump> Aft b u l k h e a d 1

Forward
Figure 20. - Block I1 SM
general configuration.

Figure 19. - Block I1 service module.

The thicknesses of the radial beam webs were changed from 0.018 i 0.005 inch to
0.015 f 0.003 inch. The electrical power system (EPS) radiators were relocated to the
CSM fairing.

The outer shell panels that enclosed bays I1 and I11 and bays V and VI (SPS tank
bays) were changed to two 130" panels. This permitted the ECS radiators to be contin-
uous a c r o s s the 130" panel, and the radiator tubes were oriented horizontally instead of
vertically as in the Block I design. The outer skin material of the shell panel w a s
changed from 7178-T6 to 2024-T81 aluminum to provide greater strength at elevated
temperatures. The thicknesses of the panel face sheets also were changed. Additional
RCS propellant tanks were added, which required lengthening the RCS doors to approxi-
mately 96 inches.

The SM also was modified to relocate the CSM umbilical to the plus-Z quadrant.
Six sway b r a c e s also were installed (two each on beams 2, 4, and 6) to reduce axial-
torsional coupling at the CM/SM interface.

Spacecraft/lunar module adapter. - Only minor modifications were made to the

original SLA design. Before the LM w a s flown on the late Block I flights (SC-017 and
SC-020), 10 new access ports were added to the vehicle structure for servicing the LM
on the pad; 4 a c c e s s ports were deleted; and the personnel access door on the plus-Z
axis was enlarged to accommodate LM equipment while on the pad.
 The LM design weight increased from 26 500 pounds at the time of the original
SLA design to 29 500 pounds and then later to 32 000 pounds. The loads imposed by the
29 500-pound LM required some design changes to the LM attachment ring at sta-
tion Xa 585; however, because the decision had been made to reduce the design factor of
safety of the SLA from 1 . 5 to 1.4, the effect of the LM weight change from 29 500 pounds
to 32 000 pounds was minimized.

The.SLA panels originally were designed to deploy to 40" * 5". To provide ad-
ditional clearance for extracting the LM, this angle was changed to 45" * 5". In the
spring of 1968, the panels were designed to be jettisoned, and this design w a s f i r s t
flown on the Apollo 9 mission. At the s a m e time, a spring system also was designed to
eject the LM.

TEST DESCR IPTI ON

Block I
Static tests. - The development test program was started in the latter part of 1962
and continued through 1965. The majority of the development t e s t s were t e s t s in which
new methods of construction, joints, and material properties were verified before pro-
ceeding to assembly tests, full-scale module testing, and stacked configuration tests.
Appendix A lists the Apollo Test Requirements (ATR) number and briefly describes the
purpose of each development test.

Component-level development testing was conducted to evaluate and verify specific

a r e a s of the modules for specific environments before full-scale module testing began.
A summary of these t e s t s is presented in appendix B.

Module-level tests. - Tests of CM o r CSM complete assemblies were conducted

to demonstrate that the structure would meet the design requirements under critical
load and environmental conditions. During the t e s t s of the command and service mod-
ules in the stacked configuration, a stub tower w a s used to introduce loads into the
upper end of the CM, and a short cylindrical section was used to simulate the adapter
at the aft end of the SM. The stack was tested to Saturn V maximum qcu, lift-off, and
first-stage end-boost conditions. The load was applied in the direction to produce the
analytically determined critical loading on the structure. The various module-level
t e s t s a r e identified in appendix C together with the ATR number and test objectives.

Dynamic tests. - Dynamic testing w a s conducted at the development, component,

full-size module, and stacked module levels. Appendix D briefly decribes the objectives
of the tests and lists the ATR numbers. Two s e r i e s of dynamic t e s t s were conducted
at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) (formerly the Manned Spacecraft
Center (MSC)); one used a boilerplate vehicle (BP-9), and another used a production SM
and a boilerplate CM (BP-27).

In mid-1963, two vibration test programs were conducted by MSC on the BP-9,
SM, insert, and adapter assembly at Ellington Air Force Base, Houston, Texas. These

14
tests were designed to determine the dynamic characteristics of the BP-9 structure.
The results of the f i r s t test program indicated a possible structural deficiency; as a r e -
sult, modifications were made to several ring frames and longerons. The second test
program was conducted to determine dynamic characteristics of the modified structure.
These t e s t s provided data that were later correlated with instrumentation data produced
during the flight of the boilerplate structure.

The dynamic testing of a boilerplate CM and a production Block I SM structure was

conducted on BP-27 at MSC in January and February 1965. Although designated as a
boilerplate, the SM was actually a production model with m a s s simulated and dummy
equipment installed to provide correct dynamic response. The CM w a s a t r u e boiler-
plate. This s e r i e s of t e s t s was designed to determine the overall lateral modes of the
stacked command and service modules in the free-free configuration and to obtain the
shell modes of the SM.

After these tests, BP-27 w a s shipped to the NASA George C. Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC) to be mated with other spacecraft and booster modules for dynamic testing.
The test configuration consisted of an LET, a launch escape motor, the BP-27 CSM,
SLA-1, a cruciform flight stiffener in lieu of an LM, an IU, and a Saturn IVB (S-IVB).
Data from the t e s t s revealed significant oscillating torsional movement of the CM with
respect to the SM. Investigation revealed that the single sway brace designed to provide
torsional restraint at the CM/SM interface w a s not tight. The sway brace had an over-
s i z e hole in one end to permit easy installation of the brace, and the testing had further
elongated the hole. A new sway brace was installed with a tight-fitting bolt that reduced
the torsional motion but did not eliminate it. The sway braces on all subsequent space-
craft were drilled on assembly and installed with tight-fitting bolts. Additional torsional
restraint was recommended in September 1965. Because insufficient evidence was avail-
able to prove that a change w a s mandatory, no modification was made. Later MSFC
Saturn V dynamic test data and MSC analysis showed that one sway brace w a s insufficient.
Five braces were installed on Block I SC-017 and SC-020, and six were installed on all
Block I1 spacecraft. The five-brace configuration was installed on the MSFC test vehicle
and demonst rated successfully.

Acoustic environment t e s t s of the SC-007 Block I command and service modules

were conducted in 1965.

Landing impact tests. - The landing impact test program on Block I vehicles was
designed to test the integrity of the spacecraft structure only and did not include testing
of the internal attenuation s t r u t s of the crew couches.

The Apollo spacecraft was originally designed to land on land; however, in the
spring of 1964, the primary landing mode w a s changed to a water landing. This change
was made primarily because water landing sites are more numerous throughout the world
and because energy-absorbing systems f o r land landings a r e more complicated than those
required f o r water landings. The increased weight of the vehicle increased the r a t e of
descent to the point where it was doubtful the structure could withstand a land landing.

The Block I landing impact test program consisted of numerous impacts of boiler-
plate test vehicles on both land and water. These drop t e s t s began in 1962 and used BP-1
and BP-2 as test articles. These boilerplate vehicles were not structurally similar to

15
the spacecraft but could be classified as rigid-body vehicles. The drop t e s t s had the
following obj ectives.

1. To evaluate crew shock attenuation system at land impact

2. To evaluate vertical and transverse acceleration loads at land impact

3. To determine and evaluate the stability and dynamics of the vehicle

4 . To evaluate g-forces on the primary structure and simulated crew couch

5. To confirm preliminary c r i t e r i a and determine if any new conditions existed

The f i r s t test article to approach any similarity to the flight vehicle w a s BP-28,
which was built to test the aft heat shield, aft bulkhead, and plus-Z toroidal a r e a . Be-
cause the manufacturing tooling was in use f o r flight hardware, the construction of BP-28
differed somewhat from the flight hardware. For example, the aft heat shield w a s made
from aluminum honeycomb instead of steel honeycomb and therefore required a different
total thickness and different face sheet thickness to obtain the s a m e cross-sectional
moment of inertia as the production heat shields. On the first BP-28 drop, the aft heat
shield crushed on impact and pierced the aft bulkhead of the inner structure. This fail-
u r e is discussed l a t e r in this report. After the BP-28 failure, the aft heat shield was
redesigned by making the face sheets thicker and using denser honeycomb c o r e in the
impact area of the heat shield.

At this time, consideration w a s given to cutting one of the two legs of the main
parachute harness to increase the hang angle from the nominal of 27.5" to approximately
35", thus decreasing the impact p r e s s u r e s on the aft heat shield. The heat shield w a s
designed with thicker face sheets and a denser c o r e extending into the plus-Z/minus-Y
quadrant as opposed to a design symmetrical about the Z - Z axis.

The plus-Z quadrant of the forward bulkhead and tunnel w a s also found to be under-
strength f o r p r e s s u r e s caused by water impact angles above 27.5". The tunnels on
SC-009 and SC-011 were filled with foam. The forward bulkhead and tunnel a r e a s were
modified on SC-017 and subsequent vehicles. These changes a r e shown in table I. The
modifications consisted of replacing the honeycomb c o r e in the plus-Z quadrant with
densified core, using thicker face sheets and doublers on the tunnel, and adding densified
core to some a r e a s of the tunnel.

Block I impact testing w a s concluded with seven BP-28 watel' drops, two CM-007
water drops, and one BP-12A water drop to verify the sides and forward bulkhead a r e a
and the redesigned heat shield.

16
 TABLE I. - APOLLO CM DESIGN CHANGES FOR WATER IMPACT

I Component

Aft heat shield

~~
SC-002 and SC-009

Bonded doublers
sc-oia
Chemic ally milled
I SC-017, SC-020, and Block 11

Chemically milled
I
face sheets Stepped 0.042, Stepped 0.050, 0.030, and Stepped 0.050, 0.030, and
0.022, and 0.020 in. 0.020 in.
0.012 in. Dual hang-angle capability Single hang-angle capability
Dual hang-angle
caoabilitv
-~ ~ ~~

I
Honeycomb c o r e No change Densified c o r e at impact a r e a Densified c o r e a t impact a r e a

I
I
Inner aft sidewall
face s h e e t s
No change Doubler 0.020-in. aluminum;
180" segment (outer only)
0.032-in. aluminum w a s 0.016-in.
aluminum; 180" segment (outer only)

I I Forward bulkhead
core
~~
I ~
No change
~
No change
I Densified plus-Z quadrant

Docking tunnel No change No change 0.025 in. was 0.016 and 0.010 in.
face sheets (outer) plus- and minus-Y quadrant
0.050 in. was 0.016 and 0.010 in.
(outer) plus-Z quadrant
Doubler 0.016 in. (inner) plus- and
minus-Y quadrant
Doubler 0.040 in. (inner) plus-2 quadrant

Core Densified c o r e plus-Z quadrant, plus- and

minus-Y quadrant

Flight tests. - The Block I flight development program was separated into boiler-
plate and spacecraft flights. Pad abort t e s t s (using only the LES motor for propulsion)
and higher altitude abort t e s t s (using Little J o e I1 rocket boosters) were conducted at the
White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) on several boilerplate vehicles and one production
spacecraft. Flights from the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) used both
boilerplate and spacecraft vehicles and were launched on Saturn I, Saturn I-By and
Saturn V boosters. The boilerplate flight history is documented in table 11.

Boilerplate : The boilerplate vehicles used for flight were structurally similar.
The command modules were made of 0.19-inch welded aluminum plate with internal lon-
gerons that distributed the loads from the LET and provided connecting points for six SM
longerons. The command modules were covered with cork for protection from heating
before the u s e of the BPC on BP-23. A l l service modules, adapters, and inserts used
for the Saturn flights were constructed with six longerons, 0.16-inch aluminum shells,
internal f r a m e s , and stringers. The service modules were approximately 152 inches
long; the adapters and i n s e r t s f o r the Saturn flights were 92 inches and 52 inches, re-
spectively, with 154-inch diameters. The launch escape towers were very similar to
production models. Table ILI lists each flight boilerplate and the modules used to make
up each configuration.

Spacecraft: The flight test program for the Block I spacecraft w a s planned to c e r -
tify the spacecraft structural design and LES for l a t e r manned flights. In the flight test
program, emphasis was placed on man rating Apollo hardware in space and providing
sufficient levels of flight test verification and proficiency in flight operation to ensure
mission success.

17
 TABLE 11. - APOLLO BOILERPLATE FLIGHT HISMRY

Hission Boilerplate Purpose Launch d a t e Launch s i t e Report number

PA- 1 BP-6 To demonstrate that the Apollo Nov. 7, 1963 White Sands TM X-5321
spacecraft could abort from Missile Range,
the launch pad and t o recover N. Mex.
the spacecraft crew

A-001 BP-12 To determine aerodynamic and May 13, 1964 White Sands MSC-R-A- 64- 1
operational c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s Missile Range,
of the launch escape vehicle N. Mex.
(LEV) during an abort at a
transonic velocity and high
dynamic p r e s s u r e

To confirm capability of LES

to propel CM away from
Little J o e I1 launch vehicle

AS- 101 BP- 13 TO demonstrate the compatibility May 28, 1964 John F. Kennedy Space MSC-R-A-64-2
of the spacecraft with the launch Center, Fla.
vehicle in launch and exit trajec.
tory and environment for Apollo
Earth-orbital flights

To demonstrate the primary

mode of the L E T jettison
using the L E T jettison motor

AS- 102 BP-15 S a m e a s for AS-101 except that Sept. 18, 1964 John F. Kennedy Space MSC-R-A-64-3
alternate mode of tower Center, Fla.
jettison was demonstrated
using pitch-control and
launch-escape motors

A-002 BP-23 To demonstrate satisfactory Dec. 8, 1964 White Sands MSC-R-A-65-1

LEV performance using Missile Range,
canards and the BPC N. Mex.

To verify the abort capability

in the maximum dynamic p r e s -
s u r e region with conditions
approximating the Saturn
emergency detection subsys-
tem limits

A-003 BP-22 To demonstrate satisfactory May 19, 1965 White Sands MSC-A-R-65-2
LEV performance a t an alti- Missile Range,
tude approximating the upper N. Mex.
limit for the canards (Test
conditions w e r e not achieved
because of a failure of the
Little J o e I1 launch vehicle;
however, the LEV performed
satisfactorily under the actual
abort conditions.)

PA- 2 BP-23A T o demonstrate the ability of June29, 1965 White Sands MSC-A-R-65-3
the LES using canards and Missile Range,
the BPC to abort from the N. Mex.
launch pad and to recover
the spacecraft crew

18
 TABLE III. - BOILERPLATE CONFIGURATIONS

Boilerplate Cod igur at ion

BP- 6 LES, CM, and pad abort adapter (truss)

BP- 12 LES, CM, SM, and 10-in. extension to mate with

Little J o e 11

BP-13 LES, CM, SM, insert, and adapter

BP-15 Same as BP-13

BP-23 Same as BP-12

BP-22 Same as BP-12

BP-23A Same as BP-6

Mission A-004; SC-002: The f i r s t spacecraft flight was that of SC-002 in Janu-
a r y 1966. The primary structural objective of this flight w a s to demonstrate the integ-
rity of the LES structure for an abort in the power-on tumbling boundary region. This
vehicle consisted of an LES (including BPC), CM, SM, and an aluminum ring that mated
the SM to the Little J o e I1 booster. The structure w a s basically a production model.
The heat shield for the CM had cork for an ablative material, and the substructure had
bonded doublers as described in table I. The CM was modified because, in May 1965,
an analysis revealed that 18 of the 24 f r a m e s in the CM aft compartment were under-
strength. Further analysis determined that SC-002 would be satisfactory if one of i t s
aft f r a m e s (number 9) was modified and a precompressed gasket was installed between
the aft and crew compartment heat shields. This gasket was also included on all heat
shields having spacecraft-type ablative material. The gasket provided a vertical load
path from the aft heat shield to the crew compartment heat shield for some of the loads
that would otherwise have been transferred through the aft frames. The SM had no op-
erating systems. Four steel plates, weighing 2000 pounds 'each, were installed for
ballast on the aft bulkhead of the SM in sectors 11, 111, V, and VI. One RCS engine was
production type with mass-simulated tanks; the other three engines and tanks were
simulated.

Before the SC-002 flight, several structural changes had been required. The dy-
namic t e s t s conducted on BP-27 at MSFC had revealed the need for a tight-fitting sway
brace at the CSM interface, and the dynamic testing on SC-007 SM had shown several
a r e a s Of concern, one of which was the integrity of the SM radial beams. To further
test the beams, 14 channels of flight instrumentation on SC-002 were reallocated to
continuously record s t r a i n s of the webs of radial beams 2, 4, and 5. The purpose of
the 14 s t r a i n measurements was to obtain data on t h e dynamic response of the radial
beam webs to the acoustic environment during flight so that a comparison of these

I9
fluctuating s t r e s s e s could be made with s t r e s s e s obtained during the simulated ground
acoustic test of SC-007. This comparison would ascertain whether the radial beam webs
were prone to fatigue failure. Adhesive-backed damping tape was installed on one side
of the web on radial beam 2 to a s s e s s the effectiveness of that tape in reducing the dy-
namic response of the webs.

The flight plan for SC-002 w a s to launch on the two-stage Little J o e I1 booster;
initiate an abort maneuver at approximately 60 000 feet; orient the launch escape vehicle
(LEV) to the proper CM base-down attitude with the canard system; jettison the tower;
and proceed to impact with the normal parachute Earth-landing mode.

The SC-002 w a s launched at WSTF on January 20, 1966, at 8:17 a . m . m. s. t. ,

and the CM landed 410.0 seconds later. Significant excerpts from the postflight report
state:

"Analysis of the flight data indicates that spacecraft 002 performed with no struc-
tural problems throughout the flight. Interface loads calculated for the maximum load
flight conditions throughout the flight show that the limit load capability of the structure
w a s not exceeded. . . . The measured differential p r e s s u r e (on the CM) w a s lower than
the planned p r e s s u r e (11.1 pounds per square inch differential (psid)) because: (a) the
plume impingement p r e s s u r e s were about 80 percent of those predicted f o r a nominal
mission, and (b) the internal p r e s s u r e in the aft compartment was higher than planned
by approximately 1 . 5 PSI . . . . Based upon tracking and onboard films, in addition to
the pressure data, the boost protective cover performed as planned . . . . Examination
of all spacecraft strain, pressure, and acceleration data indicated that the spacecraft
performed adequately in the launch environment . . . . Service module outer shell and
interior vibration data show levels much lower than those obtained in acoustic t e s t s
simulating the flight environment. One exception to this is the vibration level of the in-
ner flange of radial beam 5 which was approximately the s a m e as that obtained in the
acoustic tests, although the spectral distribution was different. This high level indicates
a much greater transmissibility from the outer shell to the radial beam inner flange than
w a s obtained in the acoustic tests. At present this phenomenon is not understood. It

(Subsequent examinations suggest that the radial beam inner cap braces failed due to ex-
pansion of the SM during transonic flight. The braces were modified f o r SC-011 and
subsequent vehicles. ) "Command module vibration data show levels lower than those
obtained in acoustic tests. The majority of data throughout the flight was close to the
noise of the instrumentation systems. ' I

Mission Apollo-Saturn 201 (AS-201) ; SC-009: After the successful flight of SC-002,
the flight test program proceeded to SC-009, already on the launch pad at KSC. On mis-
sion AS-201, SC-009 was launched on a Saturn I-B launch vehicle. Lift-off occurred
from KSC on February 26, 1966, at 11:12 a.m. e. s . t . , and the CM impacted in the
South Atlantic Ocean near Ascension Island approximately 37 minutes later.

The structural test objectives were t o demonstrate the structural integrity and
compatibility of the launch vehicle and spacecraft, to confirm loads, and to verify oper-
ation of the CM heat shield for entry from low Earth orbit. A complete description of
the mission is given in reference 2. Spacecraft 009 w a s structurally similar to SC-002
but included for f i r s t flight both the SLA and flight stiffener.

20
 Analysis of the flight data showed that the vehicle loads were less than expected
and that all loads were well within the capability of the spacecraft. Data from the space-
craft vibration instruments indicated relatively low levels except on the SLA panels,
which exceeded the expected levels. Based on these data, the environmental vibration
c r i t e r i a for the SLA panels were updated.

Mission AS-202; SC-011: Spacecraft 011 was launched by a Saturn I-B booster on
August 25, 1966 (ref. 3). The structural objectives were essentially the s a m e as f o r
SC-009. Spacecraft 011 was approximately 11 000 pounds heavier than SC-009 primar-
ily because of additional SPS propellant. The SLA had a television camera mounted in-
side to view the four SLA panels as they deployed. The structural configuration was
essentially the same as that of SC-009 except for the following differences.

1. The LES tower leg fitting w a s changed from a casting to a die forging.

2. The CM aft sidewall outer skin thickness was changed from 0.016 to 0.036 inch.

3. A doubler was added under the parachute retention bracket.

4. The aft heat shield of SC-011 had integral variations in the skin gage where
SC-009 had bonded doublers. The shear-compression pads were strengthened on the
SC-011 heat shield.

5. The spherical washers used to determine the amount of preload in the tension
tie linkage were replaced on SC-011 with strain-gaged bolts to provide better accuracy.
The structural capability w a s the s a m e as that of SC-009.

6. The SC-011 SLA hinge backup structure was strengthened.

The structural flight test objectives were satisfactorily accomplished. However,

during the CSM/SLA and S-IVB separation, the SPS plume impinged on two of the opened
SLA panels, breaking the retention system on these two panels. Failure of the retention
system w a s assumed because two of the panels moved out of the camera field of view.
A proximity SPS firing of this type normally would not occur except during an SPS abort;
therefore, this failure of the panel retention system w a s considered acceptable. Flight
data indicated that all loads were low during the mission.

Spacecraft 012: Many structural modifications were made to SC-012. A matrix

of configuration differences between SC-011 and SC-012, together with the reason f o r
each, is given in table IV.

All applicable ground testing had been completed satisfactorily and SC-012 was
considered structurally acceptable f o r manned flight when the disastrous CM f i r e oc-
curred on the launch pad at KSC in January 1967.

Apollo 4 mission; SC-017: Spacecraft 017 was the f i r s t spacecraft to be launched

on a Saturn V booster. The primary structural objective of the unmanned SC-017 was
the demonstration of structural and thermal integrity and compatibility of the launch
vehicle and spacecraft. The structural configuration was essentially the s a m e as that
of previous spacecraft except that four sway braces had been added at the CM/SM

21
 TABLE IV.- SPACECRAFT 011 AND 012 CONFIGURATION DIFFERENCES

Item sc-011 sc-012 Reason

:M heat shield honeycomb 'recipitation hardened PH 14-8 PH 14-8 has l e s s notch sensitivity
material (PH) 15-7 and m o r e uniform heat treatment
characteristics.

3M aft frames and (orma1 f r a m e Strengthened f r a m e To obtain a factor of safety of 1 . 5

fittings f o r the f r a m e s and fittings.

3M roll engine panel ?H 17-4 corrosion- 6A1-4V titanium To reduce weight and facilitate
assembly m a t e r i a l resistant s t e e l manufacturing.

CM inner structure 3asic 0.016-in. skin Basic 0,032-in. skin Basic 0,032-in. skin i s a m o r e
outer skin over with a 0,020-in. efficient structure.
most of plus-Z half doubler
of aft sidewall

CM inner structure second- Face-sheet-to-core bond Face-sheet-to-core bond To i n c r e a s e design confidence of

a r y equipment support allowable, 650 p s i allowable, 400 psi equipment support.

CM forward tunnel Xormal tunnel filled Tunnel skins and honey- To make SC-012 structurally capable
with foam for addi- comb c o r e strength- f o r the latest water landing loads.
tional support ened Schedule problems on SC-011 did
not allow the strengthening.

Pilot parachute m o r t a r Bonded Bolted To obtain a factor of safety of 1. 5.

canister fitting to CM
forward bulkhead joint

CM forward bulkhead joint Skin joint Strengthened skin joint Change was made because of low pro-
to forward sidewall by using a doubler and duction quality verification (PQV)
c h e r r y rivets results.

Flotation bag attach points Normal attach points and Strengthened attach points To obtain a factor of safety of 1. 5.
and cables cables and cables

Pad a t the CSM station Pad adjusted by varying New design of pad for The ablator mold line f o r SC-012 and
1010 interface the shim thickness adjustment subsequent vehicles was not known
The pad allowed adjustment to
varying CM ablator thicknesses.

SM RCS tank bracket Aluminum Fiberglass New thermal requirement to prevent

material the fuel in the tanks from freezing.

SLA longitudinal debris Fiberglass Aluminum Fiberglass catcher failed the quali-
catcher material f icat ion t e s t s .

interface. Interference from equipment prevented the installation of a sixth sway brace
as in the Block I1 design configuration. Another mission structural objective was to
confirm launch loads and dynamic characteristics. Details of the flight a r e presented
in reference 4. The mission was completed as planned, and the primary structural
objective w a s accomplished satisfactorily.

Apollo 5 mission: The Apollo 5 flight was designed to check out the LM. Because
this flight was primarily concerned with the LM, it is mentioned only for continuity.

Apollo 6 mission; SC-020: The flight of SC-020 w a s the last unmanned mission
and the last mission of the Block I flight test program. The structural performance of
SC-017 (Apollo 4) had been satisfactory, and no problems were expected on SC-020.

22
Both missions had secondary objectives of demonstrating CSM/SLA/LTA'/Saturn V
structural compatibility and determining spacecraft loads in a Saturn V launch environ-
ment. The structural instrumentation was essentially the s a m e as that on SC-017.

The structural configuration of SC-020 was essentially the s a m e as that of SC-017

except f o r incorporation of the new unified CM hatch and a modification to two SPS tank
skirts. Based on results of the SM static test that showed the tank s k i r t s in bays I1
and VI to be understrength, a modification to these two s k i r t s was made on the pad
at KSC in March 1968.

During the first boost stage of the mission, portions of an SLA panel failed and
separated from the spacecraft. The SLA continued to sustain the flight loads, however,
and the mission w a s accomplished successfully. Details of the flight a r e presented in
reference 5 and in the section entitled "Flight Anomalies.

Block II
Static tests. - Although considerable static testing had been accomplished to ver-
ify the Block I design, the structural modifications, increased weight, and center-of-
gravity changes of the Block I1 design required an extensive ground test program.
However, most of the development test work accomplished for Block I spacecraft was
applicable to Block I1 spacecraft, s o the Block I1 test program consisted mainly of com-
ponent testing and full-scale module testing. Appendix E contains a list of the structural
t e s t s in the Block I1 program and gives the title, ATR number, and objective of each
test.

Dynamic tests. - The Block I1 structural dynamic t e s t s were conducted on SC-105

at MSC (ref. 6). Both vibration and acoustic tests were conducted during February and
March 1968. This program had two primary objectives: (1) the demonstration of the
structural integrity of Block I1 CSM wiring, plumbing, bracketry, and installed sub-
systems when subjected to the dynamic loads resulting from spacecraft exposure to the
aerodynamic noise environment of atmospheric flights, and (2) the demonstration of the
structural integrity of the Block I1 CSM when subjected to the low-frequency vibratory
motions produced during atmospheric flight.

The only structural anomaly that occurred during the dynamic testing was a bent
SPS tank support strut. The strut is attached to the top of the SPS fuel storage tank.
Investigation of installation procedures determined that this failure was caused by im-
proper installation. The installation procedures were modified to prevent such damage
from reoccurring .

Water landing impact tests. - Part of the Block I1 water drop test program w a s
conducted at the contractor plant and part at MSC. The portion of the test program con-
ducted by the contractor established that the Block I1 CM could land on water safely at
its specification weight. The MSC test program was conducted because changes to the

'Lunar module test .article.

23
CM equipment and the resulting increased weight required a redefinition of the compat-
ibility of the structure at these new conditions. The contractor test program consisted
of two drops, designated impact t e s t s 103 and 104, and used CM 2 s - 1 (also designated
CM-99). The 2 s - 1 configuration was a production-type CM except that it had (1) cork
in place of the heat shield ablator, (2) a Block I type aft heat shield, (3) an SC-002 in-
ner crew hatch, (4) simulated uprighting bags and container assembly, and (5) a simu-
lated astrosextant ablator panel. The t e s t s were conducted with three instrumented
anthropomorphic dummies in the crew couches.

Impact test 103 was conducted on November 11, 1966. The measured vertical
velocity was approximately 3 1 ft/sec and the horizontal velocity w a s approximately
4 7 ft/sec. The primary test objective w a s to verify the structural integrity of the crew
compartment heat shield, forward sidewall, forward bulkhead, tunnel, and ablative
hatch with respect to water leakage. Structural damage that .occurred included buck-
ling of the crew hatch inner skin, numerous cracks and t e a r s in the fiberglass panels
and fairings in the plus-Z quadrant on the forward bulkhead, and a skin puncture in the
forward bulkhead probably caused as a result of the fairing failure. A small quantity of
water leaked into the spacecraft, possibly through the p r e s s u r e relief valve.
Impact test 104 w a s conducted on December 16, 1966. This drop had a measured
vertical velocity of approximately 34 ft/sec and a horizontal velocity of approximately
39 ft/sec. The primary test objective w a s to verify the structural integrity of the aft
heat shield, the aft bulkhead, the aft inner sidewall, and the secondary structure. The
configuration was similar to that used in impact test 103 except that a Block I1 sym-
metrical core aft heat shield was used. The drop test was successful.

The water impact test program was conducted at MSC during the summer of 1968
and used BP-28A and CM-099 as test articles. A total of nine water impact t e s t s was
conducted. Of these, eight drops were conducted with vertical velocity only. The ninth
was dropped with both horizontal and vertical velocities. Drop conditions and weight
were selected to represent the latest CM r a t e of descent and impact angle. During the
fourth and fifth drop tests, the face sheets of the aft heat shield wrinkled outside the
bolt circle, the corrugated torus section buckled near the interface between the aft heat
shield and sidewall, and cork used to simulate the ablator separated from the outer skin
near where the torus buckled.

During the ninth drop, the c o r e located in the minus-Z side of the minus-Y axis
of the aft heat shield sheared. A buckle also occurred along a joint at the quarter panel
splice in the minus-Z/plus-Y quadrant of the aft heat shield. The aft bulkhead buckled
and the face sheet separated from the core; however, there was no evidence of c o r e shear.
The CM remained watertight in all three (fourth, fifth, and ninth) drops. These t e s t s
verified the structural capability of the CM for the latest weights and impact velocities.

Flight tests. - The Block I1 spacecraft structure had been adequately qualified by
Block I ground and flight testing and Block I1 ground testing and was therefore considered
operational. The flights of Block I1 spacecraft had no structural objectives, and the
spacecraft carried only minimum structural instrumentation. Structural descriptions
of t h e flight vehicles and discussions of structural performance during all Block I1
flights a r e presented in the mission postflight reports.

24
 S I GNI FI CANT PROBLEM AREAS

Most problems encountered during the development and verification of the Apollo
structural subsystem were discovered in the ground test program when the structure
failed to meet specified c r i t e r i a when exposed to environments and loads. Each failure
was carefully analyzed, and the specific test criteria were reassessed. In some cases,
this reassessment revealed that the test conditions were too s e v e r e and should be made
m o r e realistic. In other cases, structural inadequacies that required design modifi-
cations were identified. Some modifications required retesting; others were certified
by analysis.

Significant problems encountered in the ground and flight test programs and the
resolutions of these problems a r e discussed in this section.

Block I Ground Test Anomalies

Command module static t e s t s (ATR 111014). - Several t e s t s were conducted to
demonstrate that the support structure of the CM Earth-landing system w a s adeauate.
One of these tests, conducted on CM-006, w a s planned to demonsirate the strength of
the pilot parachute m o r t a r and the hardware that attached it to the upper bulkhead. The
m o r t a r fittings were attached to the upper bulkhead by bonding the fittings to the outside
face sheet of the aluminum honeycomb. When the static load was applied, the bond be-
tween the m o r t a r fitting and the bulkhead failed in tension at 63 percent of limit load.
Inserts were bonded into the aluminum honeycomb, and mechanical fasteners were used
to attach the m o r t a r to the inserts. This modification was incorporated on SC-004,
tested successfully to 150 percent of limit load, and then installed on all Block I
spacecraft.

Command module static structural-thermal test (ATR 251003). - One objective of

this test w a s to evaluate under simulated entry conditions the structural-thermal charac-
teristics, such as deflections, s t r e s s e s , gaps-, misalinements, and temperatures of the
heat shield components. The test w a s conducted on CM-004A. The CM had been de-
signed with a tight-fitting joint between the crew compartment heat shield and the aft heat
shield so that, during atmospheric entry, the hot boundary-layer gases would not enter
the cavity between the inner structure and the heat shield. However, during the test,
deflection data indicated there was a separation between the aft heat shield and the crew
compartment heat shield. A silicone rubber seal was placed at the interface between the
two heat shields to prevent hot gases from entering the cavity. This seal was compressed
by tightening the bolts that attached the aft heat shield to the inner structure. No ad-
ditional testing was conducted f o r this condition, and the addition of the s e a l w a s c e r -
tified by analysis.

Water impact test (ATR 101001). - The Block I landing impact test program was
planned to demonstrate the structural integrity of the CM for landing both in water or on
land. The f i r s t water drop test with a test article representative of the spacecraft used
BP-28. This test article was designed to be used for many drops and was constructed
so that damaged sections could be replaced with minimal difficulty. Because the manu-
facturing tooling w a s in use for flight hardware, BP-28 was constructed differently than

25
flight hardware. For example, the aft heat shield w a s made f r o m aluminum honeycomb
instead of steel honeycomb and therefore required a different total sandwich thickness
and different face sheet thickness to obtain the same cross-sectional moment of inertia
as the production heat shields.
On October 30, 1964, BP-28 was dropped into water at impact velocities of
34.2 ft/sec vertical and 44. 5 ft/sec horizontal, which represented the most s e v e r e
three-parachute landing condition. The aft heat shield crushed on impact and pierced
the aft bulkhead of the inner structure. The test article sank within 2 minutes. Although
BP-28 was not a production configuration, it was sufficiently similar to show that a r e -
design was necessary. Aft heat shield p r e s s u r e impact data (from one-fourth-scale and
full-scale water drop tests) were used to redesign the aft heat shield. The aft heat
shield was strengthened on SC-011, SC-017, and SC-020 by using denser honeycomb
core in the plus-Z quadrant and chemically milled face sheets varying in thickness from
0.050 to 0.012 inch. Spacecraft 009 was strengthened by bonding doublers onto the heat
shield. The BP-28 drop t e s t s and one BP-12A drop test were conducted to verify the
integrity of the structural modification made to SC-009. Five additional BP-28 drop t e s t s
and two CM-007 drop tests were conducted to verify the structural integrity of the
modifications to SC-011, SC-017, and SC-020.

Combined module static test (ATR 131003). - A s e r i e s of t e s t s was conducted on

a stacked CSM (SC-004) to evaluate the integrity of the CSM interface structure for crit-
ical maximum qcu and first-stage, end-boost loading, to evaluate the integrity of the
CM structure in the tension-tie a r e a for critical tension loading at lift-off, and to ver-
ify analytical loads and s t r e s s analyses. The configuration consisted of a portion of the
LET, a CM, a n SM, and a short cylindrical section for a base. The SPS tanks were not
production models; they were aluminum cylinders with aluminum s k i r t s and were fitted
with a thick circular plate inside the cylinder for attachment of the loading fixture. P r o -
duction tanks were made of titanium and had aluminum s k i r t s . . The s k i r t s of the alumi-
num and titanium tanks were not similar.

During the end of the first-stage-boost test condition, noises were heard emanating
from the spacecraft at 140 percent of limit load. Strain and deflection measurements
were recorded, and the test was terminated. Inspection revealed extensive damage to
the SM aft bulkhead. The bulkhead honeycomb core had crushed adjacent to the outer
shell in sectors 11, 111, and V (fig. 10). Face-sheet-to-core delamination also had oc-
curred adjacent to the outer shell in sectors I1 and V and in sector I1 along radial beam 1
on the aft side of the bulkhead. Bond separation had occurred between the bulkhead for-
ward face sheet and a ring in sector I1 adjacent to radial beam 2 as well as in s e c t o r s I1
and VI adjacent to radial beam 6. Bond separation also had occurred between the bulk-
head core and radial beam 1. Two possible solutions to this problem were to strengthen
the bulkhead on the test article and all flight vehicles and retest to the design require-
ment of 150 percent of limit load or to accept the demonstrated capability of 140 percent
of limit load. The latter solution w a s chosen because it was the least costly and did not
require a retest. The Block I1 SM was being designed with a factor of safety of 1 . 4 f o r
the portion aft of the upper bulkhead. Therefore, the acceptance of a factor of safety
of 1.4 was considered logical. No further testing of the first-stage end-boost condition
w a s conducted at that time.

26
 After the t e s t s were completed on the stacked CSM-004 (for first-stage end-boost
condition), it was discovered that, although the SM aft bulkhead had been loaded cor-
responding to the correct total propellant load, bays I1 and V had been underloaded be-
cause of an incorrect simulation of the propellant loading on individual tanks. Although
the Block I SPS oxidizer tanks a r e of equal size, they a r e filled for flight by filling the
sump tank in sector I1 first and then allowing oxidizer to overflow into the storage tank
in sector V. This results in more oxidizer being stored in the sump tank than in the
storage tank. Fuel tanks a r e filled in the s a m e way. Test loads were calculated by
dividing the total oxidizer and the total fuel loads equally between the sump and storage
tanks. This e r r o r caused a r e a s of the aft bulkhead to be loaded to only 122 percent of
their end-boost-limit load condition. An additional test w a s conducted to properly ver-
ify the integrity of the aft bulkhead. The SM static test article used in the original tests
(SC-004) was no longer available, so the SC-008 SM was used.

Service module static test (ATR 321082). - The test configuration consisted of
SM-008 with tanks in bays I1 and VI. These tanks were modified to include an approx-
imately 3-foot-long section of production-type lower tank and skirt. The other two tanks
in bays I11 and V were the aluminum cylinders used in the SC-004 test. Because one
fuel tank and one oxidizer tank had production-type lower sections and skirts, simulated
tanks could be used in the other two bays. The CM was represented by a beam arrange-
ment (called a spider), and a cylindrical base section was used.

The test was conducted in February 1968. At 90 percent of limit load, the test
was interrupted because of high strain readings in the sector I1 (oxidizer sump) tank
skirt. Inspection revealed no abnormalities, s o the test was continued. At 97 percent
of limit load, the tank s k i r t in sector I1 buckled. The tank s k i r t failure w a s located aft
of the skirt-to-tank attachment rivet line; it r a n from approximately 9 inches to the left
of the sector I1 center line to approximately 27 inches to the right of the center line,
when looking inboard. A test of the material properties of the failed structure showed
tensile values above specification requirements. The aft bulkhead of the SM distributes
the tank skirt loads into the outer shell of the SM and through radial beams adjacent to
the tanks. The distribution of s t r e s s e s on the tank skirt is a function of the stiffness of
the tank skirt, the aft bulkhead, and the attachment of the bulkhead to the radial beams
and outer shell. The analytically determined stiffnesses used to design these components
were in e r r o r ; this e r r o r resulted in the tank skirt being underdesigned. Static load
t e s t s previously had been conducted successfully on the SPS tanks and tank s k i r t s by
the manufacturer. However, these t e s t s were conducted with the tank skirt mounted to
a rigid base, thus producing incorrect boundary conditions on the skirt and resulting in
improper testing of the skirt. The tank s k i r t was modified by adding riveted doublers
and was retested successfully to 140 percent of limit load.

These test failures emphasized the need for the test article to be as structurally
similar to the flight article as practical because t e s t s of individual components might
not provide the proper boundary conditions. The testing of the SC-004 SM using alumi-
num cylinders to represent the tanks not only produced the incorrect loading into the tank
s k i r t s but also produced the wrong load distribution into the aft bulkhead and radial
beams of the SM.

Service module dynamic test (ATR 121006). - Three separate dynamic t e s t s in-
volving the Block I SM were conducted. The first test, conducted in June 1965, subjected

27
SM-007 to the acoustic environment of the launch and boost phases. This test resulted
in 31 separate anomalies or failures, such as cracks in radial beam webs, cracked
brackets, sheared rivets, broken radial-beam cap-strip tension angles, and a broken
radial-beam horizontal rib. The angles that connected the radial-beam stiffeners were
replaced with round tubular s t r u t s that connected the radial-beam edge members. The
cracked brackets were also strengthened. Results of the SM-007 acoustic test indicated
that the dynamic response of the vehicle structure was significantly higher than the
analytically predicted response, and essentially all equipment and components in the
SM had to be requalified to the higher measured vibration levels.

A s a result of the SM-007 test, the components were requalified and the primary
structure modifications were verified through an acoustic test of a 180" sector of the
SM. The 180" sector was built to provide versatility for testing components; that is,
shelves could be fitted with equipment while other components were being tested.

Dynamic response data from the SC-002 flight in January 1966 were much lower
than similar data from either the SM-007 or the 180" sector test. Those data revealed
that the SM-007 and the 180" sector were overtested. Both the SM-007 test and the
180" sector t e s t s were conducted in a horizontal-flow reverberant test chamber, with
a volume that w a s approximately 4 times that of the SM. The overtest was attributed
to inadequate calibration and control of the acoustic test facility. Those inadequacies
caused the measured vibration response data to be too high, particularly at frequencies
l e s s than 150 hertz.

In 1965, a dynamic test of the Block I orbital insertion configuration (LES, CSM,
SLA, IU, and S-IVB booster stage),was conducted at MSFC. During the test, torsional
oscillating movement of the CM w a s observed at the CM/SM interface. This anomaly
was discussed in the description of the Block I dynamic tests.

Spacecraft/lunar module adapter (ATR 321033). - Static load testing of the adapter
subjected the structure to the critical Saturn V ultimate maximum q a loads. The pur-
poses of the t e s t s were to prove the structural integrity of SLA-2 and LTA-10 for the
Saturn V flight configuration, to demonstrate the structural compatibility of SLA-2 and
LTA-10, and to determine the interaction loads between SLA-2 and LTA-10 during the
midboost flight phase. When the applied test load had reached 108 percent of limit load,
a loud rumbling noise was heard. The test loads were immediately reduced to zero.
Two strain gages showed high residual strains. Investigation in the a r e a of these gages
revealed that (1) the inner face sheet of the SLA aft quarter panel had buckled directly
aft of the station X 583 f r a m e between the minus-Z and minus-Y axes; (2) the web of
a
the aft section ring at station X 583 was bent locally; (3) the inner face sheet of the aft
a
quarter panel had buckled locally; and (4) a void w a s created under the buckled inner
f a c e sheet. This void was approximately 3 inches wide by 72 inches long on each side
of the 315" splice (45" between the minus-Z and plus-Y axes).

An investigation of the failure revealed that fittings used to mount the pyrotechnic
panel thrusters had been omitted from the test article. On flight articles, the fittings
a r e located just aft of the Xa 583 ring at four locations, 45" with respect to the lateral
axes. Stress analysis had not shown that these t h r u s t e r s were necessary to sustain the
test loads; therefore, the thrusters were omitted from the test article. Another pos-
sible reason for this failure w a s slippage of the splice plate that joins the upper and

28
lower portions of the SLA at station X 583. Test data revealed that, at about 20 per-
a
cent of the limit load, the s t r e s s distribution between the inner and outer face sheets
above the X 583 ring had changed. This change w a s attributed t o slippage of the bolts
a
in the splice plate. When the load in the splice plate exceeded the amount of load car-
ried by friction between the bolthead and splice plate, the bolts slipped until the shank
of the bolt contacted the splice plate. The holes in the splice plate a r e drilled larger
than the bolts to allow clearance f o r mating of the two sections either with the SLA
empty or with the LM installed. In addition to repair of the damaged areas, the follow-
ing modifications were made to the SLA test article.

1. The thruster fittings were installed.

2. A s t r a p doubler w a s added to the inner flange of the lower ring at sta-

tion X 583 to prevent the ring from buckling.
a
3. Panel splices were added beneath the four thruster fittings to help distribute
the load from the thrusters into the panels.

4 . Additional 0.25-inch bolts were added to the splice plate at station Xa 583,
45", 135", 225", and 315", to provide additional load-carrying ability a c r o s s the splice.

5. The torque of all the bolts in the Xa 583 splice plate was increased from
80 f 10 in-lb to 110 f 10 in-lb to prevent the splice plate from slipping at low loads.

Before the thruster fittings were installed but after the structure was repaired,
a load test w a s conducted to determine the effect of the r e p a i r s on the distribution of
s t r e s s from the forward SLA section to the aft section. Then, the thruster fittings were
installed, and the test w a s repeated. The second test showed that the s t r e s s levels in
the a r e a of the thrusters had been reduced by approximately 45 percent.

After the test article was modified, the SLA static test w a s conducted successfully
to 150 percent of limit load. Again, this test demonstrated that the test article config-
uration should be as structurally similar to the flight configuration a s practical.

Block I I Ground Test Anomalies

Although considerable static testing had been done to verify the Block I design, an
extensive ground test program was required f o r the Block I1 spacecraft because of struc-
tural redesign, increased weight, changed weight distribution, and updated loads.

During the Block I1 static test program, several structural failures occurred;
some of these led to modifications and retesting. In some cases, a reassessment of the
loads and environment revealed that the test conditions were too s e v e r e and should be
modified based on the latest environment; in these cases, no structural modification o r
retesting was required. In other cases, structural inadequacies were identified that
required design modification and retesting. Only those test failures that required mod-
ification o r retesting a r e discussed in this section.

29
 Command module static t e s t s (ATR 222003). - The CM static tests were conducted
in t h r e e parts, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

Abort load test: The CM test article 2s-2 was subjected to external p r e s s u r e
distribution and internal component body loads simulating the critical flight abort loads.
At approximately 148 percent of limit load, cracks occurred in both the inner and outer
face sheets near longeron 1 between the plus-Y and plus-Z axes. The upper end of the
cracks was on the forward bulkhead at plus-Z, approximately 2 inches outboard of the
tunnel wall. The crack followed a circular weld path to longeron 1 where it turned 90"
and extended radially outboard along the longeron to the sidewall and down the sidewall
adjacent to the longeron. Investigation revealed an excessively thick bond line between
the cabin wall outer face sheets and the longeron that allowed movement between the
longeron and face sheets. Excessively thick bond lines were also found on all command
modules. A strap doubler extending on either side of the longeron was added to all
flight command modules to provide increased strength in the failed a r e a . Test
article 2s-2 was also modified with the s t r a p doubler and satisfactorily retested to ul-
timate load. It was known that bond lines made unintentionally thick resulted in reduced
properties of the bonded joint. Because most of the command modules had been com-
pleted through the bonding stage of manufacturing, only the outside doubler w a s added
to the vehicles.

Main parachute load test: While the CM 2s-2 test article w a s being subjected to
loads representing three-parachute maximum deployment loads at the critical r i s e r pull
angle (tangential direction), a structural failure occurred at approximately 128 percent
of limit load. The horizontal beam broke loose from gussets 3 and 4, the vertical beams
broke loose from the forward bulkhead, and the outer face sheet between gussets 3
and 4 tore loose f r o m the thermal isolation ring and core. Because a flight schedule
impact would have resulted if the static test program had been delayed until r e p a i r s were
made to the 2s-2 CM, CM-102 was diverted to the static test program.
Because of the parachute load test failure, doublers were added to the inside and
outside of the tunnel of CM-102 near the parachute r i s e r attach point. After this change,
the spacecraft w a s successfully tested. Because CM-101 was further along in manu-
facturing, a somewhat different modification w a s used for that vehicle than f o r subse-
quent command modules. Both modifications were verified by static tests. The cause
of this anomaly was a design deficiency that resulted from the inability to predict load
paths and load distribution accurately. After the main parachute tangential load test, a
main parachute vertical load test was conducted. This vertical load test w a s terminated
at approximately 135 percent of limit load when loud noises from within the spacecraft
indicated structural failure had occurred. Investigation revealed that three tee brackets
connecting the main display console to the forward bulkhead had become unbonded f r o m
the lower surface of the forward bulkhead. Inspection of the area beneath the brackets
revealed voids between the face sheet and core. Analysis showed the failure was caused
by strain incompatibility between the display console and upper bulkhead. The analysis
a l s o indicated that the tie between the console and the bulkhead was unnecessary. The
voids were repaired, the tees were left detached from the test article, and the test was
completed satisfactorily. The display panel connections to the brackets were removed
from subsequent spacecraft.

Forward heat shield mortar reaction load test: While testing simulated loads im-
posed by firing the pilot parachute mortar, the upper support bracket failed at 58 p e r -
cent of limit load. The bracket was made from fiberglass to provide thermal isolation

30
of the m o r t a r from the heat shield. The bracket w a s underdesigned because of the
inability to predict accurately the material properties in curved laminated fiberglass
components. A titanium bracket was found to be thermally acceptable and was designed
and tested successfully to 150 percent of limit load.

Combined CM/SM static test (ATR 222002). - Static structural t e s t s were conducted
on the mated CM and SM to ultimate load conditions of critical boost phases during the
Saturn V launch. The major objective of these tests w a s to verify the integrity of the
primary structure; a secondary objective w a s to determine the load and s t r e s s distri-
bution throughout the CSM. The test article configuration consisted of a short section
of the LET used as a fixture to apply loads to the CM, a structurally representative
CSM, and a short cylindrical section attached to the aft end of the SM as a base support.

Maximum qa, load condition: The applied loads were oriented to produce a max-
imum compression s t r e s s in the outer cap of SM radial beam 2. At 120 percent of limit
load, the test was terminated when a strain gage on radial beam 2 failed to stabilize
after loading was stopped. Inspection of the test article revealed that the single sway
brace had buckled. The sway brace was connected between the apex of radial beam 6
and the SM upper bulkhead. This brace, together with the torsional capability of the
radial beams, was designed to provide the torsional load path between the command and
s e r v i c e modules. The following three possible causes of the sway brace test load being
l a r g e r than expected were identified.

1. Misalinement of the test fixture used to apply axial load introduced additional
torsion into the sway brace.

2. The radial beam t r u s s e s at the upper end of the radial beams were all mis-
alined so that a corkscrew effect occurred when an axial load was applied to the CM.
The misalinement exceeded the worst possible tolerance condition.

3. The secondary effects of body loads were not known and therefore were not
accounted f o r in the design of the sway brace. Analytical predictions of this additional
torsional load were not possible and the additional load had to be determined by test.

The t e s t fixture w a s realined, the sway brace was redesigned to a l a r g e r and

stronger tube, and the test was successfully conducted to ultimate load. Five sway
braces were added later when the torsional loads at the interface were determined to be
greater than previously predicted.

At 140 percent of limit load during the retesting of the maximum qcr load con-
dition, s t r a i n gages located on the SM aft bulkhead between the SPS tank and outer shell
changed nonlinearly and registered residual strain after the test load w a s removed.
Inspection revealed a face-sheet-to-core delamination on the aft bulkhead. The c o r e
beneath the void a r e a was filled with bonding material on the test article and on subse-
quent spacecraft. No retesting for the maximum qcr condition was required because
the m o r e critical end-boost condition test would be used for the bulkhead certification.

First-stage end-boost load condition: The first-stage end-boost load condition

test w a s terminated at 120 percent of limit load after a loud noise emanated from the
test article. Strain gage readings had been recorded at 120 percent of limit load just

31
before the noise and were recorded again before removing the load. The second read-
ing showed a sharp increase in s t r a i n in sector III of the SM aft bulkhead. The increase
in strain was attributed to a load redistribution; however, because considerable time
would have been required to remove loading fixtures and SM panels to perform a detailed
inspection, the test w a s continued and achieved 140 percent of limit load without any
additional problems. Inspection revealed that extensive debonding of the face sheet to
c o r e and exterior angle to face sheet had occurred on the SM aft bulkhead. Because of
the history of structural failure in the Block I SM aft bulkhead and the difficulty in pre-
dicting the failing load of honeycomb structure, modification w a s judged necessary. The
bulkhead was modified in the failed a r e a s on the test article and on subsequent flight
service modules by filling the core in bays I1 and V with bonding material and by install-
ing doublers in each bay designed to prevent separation of the angle from the face sheet.
The SM with the modification was successfully retested.

The bulkhead failure was primarily due to an inaccurate prediction of load distri-
bution from the tank s k i r t s into the flat bulkhead and then into the adjacent radial beams
and shell. The load path between the tank skirt and shell was considerably stiffer than
predicted and thus received m o r e of the tank load than predicted when the bulkhead was
designed .

Flight Anomalies
The only significant structural anomaly encountered in the flight test program
occurred during the first-stage boost phase of the Apollo 6 mission - the second
Saturn V flight and the last Block I mission. Approximately 2 minutes 13 seconds after
lift-off, abrupt changes of strain, vibration, and acceleration were indicated by onboard
instruments in the S-IVB, IU, SLA, LM, and CSM. Airborne photography showed ob-
jects falling from the a r e a of the SLA (SLA-9); however, the spacecraft continued to
sustain the required loads, and the mission was not impaired.

A failure investigation w a s begun immediately; however, because the SLA is not

recovered after a mission, the investigation was limited to analysis of flight data, air-
borne photography, manufacturing history (inspection records and material review items),
ground test data, and review of design and s t r e s s analysis data.

The findings of the various reviews and studies were that no basic weakness existed
in the SLA design and that the SLA loads at the time of the anomaly were less than those
demonstrated in the ground test program. When the anomaly occurred, two independent
pressure transducers registered p r e s s u r e drops indicating a hole or holes had opened
in the spacecraft. The suspected holes, the shift in instrument readings, and the photo-
graphs of objects falling f r o m the SLA led investigators to the conclusion that portions
of the SLA honeycomb panels had failed and had fallen from the spacecraft. It was also
concluded that because the designed structural capability of the SLA was m o r e than ade-
quate f o r the flight loads experienced, the failure occurred because of an undetected
manufacturing defect. One possible cause of the failure was separation of face sheets
f r o m the honeycomb c o r e because entrapped moisture in the honeycomb cells became
heated during boost, thereby increasing the p r e s s u r e inside the cells until the f a c e sheets
were blown off.

32
 To eliminate t h e problems associated with entrapped moisture on each subsequent
SLA, small holes w e r e drilled in the inner face sheets of the panels to permit venting
during ascent. Cork insulation was applied over the entire external surface, whereas
only the lower portion of the SLA had been insulated with cork on previous flight tests.
The reduced SLA skin temperatures afforded by the increased insulation would lower
thermal s t r e s s e s , reduce p r e s s u r e inside the honeycomb cells, and prevent reduction
in material properties caused by higher temperatures.

After the manufacture and inspection of SLA-9 but before the SLA-9 flight, radio-
graphic inspection of splices was begun to supplement the ultrasonic inspection. This
improved the inspection of splice joints and resulted in the detection of a slipped blind
splice plate at station Xa 709 on a later SLA. A postflight review of the SLA-9 C-scan
records (from ultrasonic inspection) indicated that the blind splice plate at station Xa 709
also could have been mislocated o r slipped, thereby weakening a joint. To eliminate
the possibility of a defective splice joint at station X 709, this joint was redesigned to
a
enable m o r e accurate inspection. As shown in figure 21, the honeycomb panel splice
joint at station Xa 709 on SLA-9 consisted of an inside (blind) and an outside splice
plate on the outer face sheet, two core splices, and a splice plate on the inner face
sheet arranged such that the splice plate edges and the core splices were a t approxi-
mately the s a m e stations. The inspection procedure used on SLA-9 and each previous
SLA included ultrasonic inspection of all honeycomb panels with C-scan printouts of the
ultrasonic inspection being made and retained for permanent record. The alinement of
splice plate edges and core splices, which used a foam core filling material, made the
interpretation of the ultrasonic inspection data extremely difficult. To remedy this
situation, the splice joint at station X 709 was redesigned by removing the blind inside
a
splice plate from the outer face sheet, enlarging the outside splice plate on the outer
face sheet, and relocating the c o r e splices s o that the plate edges and splices were not
alined. This provided a clear a r e a f o r ul-
trasonic and radiographic inspection and
made interpretation of these inspections New design
much easier and m o r e accurate. This r e - Splice Outside face sheet

design was implemented on SLA-22 and

each subsequent SLA; all other SLA panels
had been manufactured at that time. The
redesign w a s considered a product im-
provement and not a mandatory design
2-
I I

0.125 by0.002 in. perforated ero, ‘ - \ ~

change. 0.25 byO.OO1 in. perforated

Splice splice

Original design
Although the cause of the Apollo 6
structural anomaly could not be determined Core splice

conclusively, the most likely causes have 1

been eliminated. The inspection records

of each SLA after SLA-9 have been thor-
oughly reanalyzed, and the aforementioned
modifications have been implemented to Inside face sheet
provide confidence in the flightworthiness 0.25 byO.OO1 in. perforated
of each SLA. No SLA structural anomalies
have occurred since the Apollo 6 flight. Figure 21. - Honeycomb splice joint.

33
 The experiences associated with this anomaly indicate that, in the design of honey-
comb panel structures, avoiding overlapping edges and splices and making the structure
easy to inspect should be strong design considerations. The possible detrimental effects
of entrapped moisture in honeycomb c o r e cells should also be considered.

CONCLUD I NG REMARKS

Many of the structural failures that occurred in the ground test program were
caused by inaccurate predictions of load paths and load distribution. Two examples of
these a r e the failures of the Block I and Block I1 s e r v i c e module aft bulkheads and the
failure of the single sway brace. The ability to make accurate mathematical models
of the structure and to predict load distribution progressively improved during the
Apollo Program. This ability will be useful in providing more accurate analyses for
future programs. However, a rigorous test program should be conducted to uncover
any design or manufacturing weaknesses.

The u s e of honeycomb sandwich structure has some inherent difficulties that

should be considered for future programs. The inspection of honeycomb structure is
extremely important, and every effort should be made to avoid a design that may com-
plicate the inspection. For example, in the design of joints, overlapping c o r e and face
sheet splices and doublers should be avoided. Good inspection methods a r e now avail-
able, and the u s e of honeycomb should not be excluded on future spacecraft. The u s e
of perforated c o r e should be avoided on future spacecraft because of the possibility of
moisture being absorbed by the honeycomb cells.

No major schedule perturbations were caused by structural problems. Even the

one flight structural failure on Apollo 6 did not prevent the success of that mission.
Modifications to the structure required by test failures were made without major rede-
sign. The axial-torsional coupling discovered during the Marshall Space Flight Center
dynamic t e s t s showed the torsional loads to be almost an order of magnitude greater
than those used for design; however, loads were reduced simply by installing additional
aluminum tube sway braces at the command module/service module interface.

The testing of components requires extreme c a r e to a s s u r e that the proper bound-

a r y conditions a r e imposed on the component. For example, problems that occurred
with the service module service propulsion system tank s k i r t s and aft bulkhead would
have been avoided had the proper tanks been used in the first command-and-service-
module-type static test. Whenever possible, test hardware should be structurally sim-
ilar to flight hardware to eliminate this type problem.

Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center

National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Houston, Texas, March 1, 1974
9 14- 50-31-00- 72

34
 REFERENCES

1. Anon. : Structural Analyses of Apollo Block I1 Spacecraft. Rept. SD67-1103,

North American-Rockwell Corp. (Downey, Calif.), Dec. 1968.

2. Anon. : Postlaunch Report for Mission AS-201 (AS-009). NASA TM X-59649, 1966.

3. Anon. : Postlaunch Report for Mission AS-202 (AS-011). NASA TM X-60788, 1966.

4 . Anon. : Apollo 4 Mission Report. NASA TM X-61639, 1968.

5. Anon. : Apollo 6 Mission Report. NASA TM X-62567, 1968.

6. Anon. : Apollo CSM 105-AV Acoustic and Vibration Test Program. Rept. SD68-466,
North American-Rockwell Corp. (Downey, Calif. ) , Sept. 1968.

35
 APPENDIX A
DEVELOPMENT TESTS SUMMARY

LAUNCH ESCAPE TOWER

1
ATR 502-3 - Structural Tubing Test
Tests were conducted to evaluate the ability to fabricate welded tube joints for
tower use.

BOOST PROTECTIVE COVER

ATR 131005 - Boost Protective Cover Static Structural Test

Tests were conducted to determine the maximum load-carrying capability and

mode of failure of the typical lap joint sections of the soft boost protective cover (BPC).

ATR 391013 - Apollo Boost Protective Cover

Crew Hatch Window Panel Structural Test
Tests were conducted (1)to determine the load-deflection characteristics of the
window panel assembly under critical Apollo mission aerodynamic pressure, (2) to
provide structural verification of the window panel assembly to withstand critical
Apollo mission requirements without failing at ultimate loading conditions, and (3) to
determine the ultimate strength of the window panel assembly and failure mode caused
by mission aerodynamic pressure.

ATR 391020 - Nomex-Layered Aft Boost Cover

Tests were conducted (1) to demonstrate the structural integrity of the BPC on
the command module (CM) for the normal and backup tower-jettison mission under
conditions of 250" F temperature and simulated inertial loading, and (2) to determine
the load-deflection characteristics of the aft boost cover under the two tower- j ettisoning
conditions.

'Apollo Test Requirement.

36
 COMMAND MODULE
ATR 112-B -Main Parachute Riser Attachment Test
Tests were conducted to verify the structural integrity of the parachute r i s e r
attachment assembly f o r the boilerplate CM when loaded by riser harness at critical
angles.

ATR 112-1 - M a i n Parachute Riser Attachment Test

T e s t s were conducted to determine failure loads of the parachute r i s e r attachment
assembly for the boilerplate CM when loaded by the tension strap at critical angles.

ATR 208-2.2 - Command Module Reentry

Heat Shield Component Test
T e s t s were conducted to determine the structural and thermal characteristics of
ablator and honeycomb.

ATR 211-5 -Main Longeron to Parachute

Typical Attachment Test
Tests were conducted to determine the ultimate strength of a typical longeron-to-
parachute attaching lug.

ATR 212-1 - Property Tests of Candidate Apollo

Observation Window Materials
Tests were conducted (1) to determine the effects of vacuum, cryogenic tem-
peratures, and charged-particle radiation on various glass materials, together with the
thermal and mechanical properties of the materials, and (2) to investigate optimum
methods f o r sealing and protecting window panels.

ATR 212-4 - Thermal Test of Sample Command Module

Heat Shield Window Glass
A test was conducted to determine the thermal gradient through the glass under a
simulated, front-face, temperature-time history.

ATR 331030 - Meteoroid Shielding Tests

Tests were conducted (1)to develop and verify empirical formulas for the response
of the command and service module (CSM) to meteoroid impact, and (2) to verify the
integrity of these structures.

37
 ATR 214-2A - Aft Heat Shield Flexibility
These tests were conducted (1) to verify analytical methods for predicting the
s t r e s s e s and deflections of a hemispherical sheet under localized unsymmetrical loads,
and (2) to support the sphere and the sphere-toroid programs used for the aft heat shield.

ATR 471001 - General Instability of Sandwich Cylinders

Subjected to Pure Axial Compression and Pure Bending
These tests were conducted to verify the analytical methods for predicting general
instability failure of sandwich cylinders subjected to axial compression or bending.

ATR 471002 - General I nstability of Sandwich Cones

Subjected to P u r e Axial Compression
These tests were conducted to verify analytical methods for predicting general
instability failure of sandwich cones subjected to axial-compression load. These t e s t s
supported the methods prepared f o r use on the CM and spacecraft/lunar module (LM)
adapter (SLA).

ATR 214-3A - Evaluation of Mechanical

Properties of Some Rigid Foams
The test was conducted (1)to determine the mechanical properties of rigid foam
and (2) to determine the feasibility of using a rigid foam as core material in later sand-
wich cylinder tests. This test supported ATR 471001.

ATR 217 - Command Module Bulkhead Component

Test - Tee and Beam Configuration
The test was conducted to determine the strength characteristics of tees with
different flange thicknesses when bonded to aluminum alloy honeycomb beams.

ATR 218- Apollo Steel Honeycomb Joint Test

This was a proof test of Apollo joint designs; it also verified analytical methods.
These data verified the load-carrying ability of typical Apollo joints. Design variations
were tested to verify analytical methods f o r joint design.

ATR 220 - Steel Honeycomb Foundation Modulus Test

This test was conducted to establish the honeycomb core foundation modulus that
describes the load response of the face sheets, This test, in support of ATR 218, was
conducted (1)to permit design of ATR 218 test specimens and (2) to verify test methods.

38
 ATR 223 - Command Module Penetration Seal Leak Tests
These tests were conducted (1)to determine the helium leakage rates of butyl
rubber O-rings and molded-in-place butyl rubber gaskets proposed for sealing inner
structure penetrations, and (2) to determine the sealing properties of reused O-rings
and the compression set of the gaskets.

I ATR 331034 - Aft Heat Shield Water I mpact Test

I This test was conducted to determine the dynamic effect on a composite structure
from water impact.

ATR 331035 - I mpact Load Test - Command Module

Aft Heat Shield Quarter Panel
I
The impact load test was conducted (1) to determine the structural response of
a modified aft heat shield quarter panel to impact loading, (2) to determine the s t r e s s ,
load o r p r e s s u r e , and acceleration characteristics of the test panel under impact con-
ditions, and (3) to develop a method to determine load and impact p r e s s u r e s for other
test s e r i e s .

ATR 331036 - Aft Heat Shield Component

Test - Pyrotechnic Pressure
The test was conducted (1) to evaluate the structural integrity of the proposed aft
heat shield configuration for water impact, and (2) to verify the analytical s t r e s s analy-
sis for impact loading.

ATR 331037 - Apollo Brazed Steel Honeycomb Repair Test

The t e s t was conducted (1) to verify existing repair design criteria and (2) to
establish design data for new repair methods.

ATR 252 - Particle I mpact Test of Two-Sheet Structures

This test was conducted (1)to investigate the resistance of two-sheet structures
to penetration by hypervelocity projectiles to extend and verify analytical methods, and
(2) to investigate parameters and structural configurations of interest to Apollo that
were not included i n ATR 331030.

ATR 291 - Hatch Window Breakage Feasibility

This test was conducted to determine the feasibility of, and the effort required
for, breaking and removing the hatch window glass to provide ventilation for the crew
after landing.

3s
 ATR 321013 - Fasteners and Joi nt Tests
These tests were conducted to obtain design allowables for various types of
joints i n honeycomb structure.

SERVICE MODULE

ATR 304 - Aft Bulkhead Attachments

Tests were conducted on attachments of the radial beam shear webs to the aft
bulkhead and the service propulsion system (SPS) tank support structure. A failure
during this test required rework and a repeat of the test as ATR 304-2.

ATR 301-5 - Radial Shear Web

Tests were conducted to verify the design approach for an extremely light,
partial-tension field beam. This beam w a s manufactured by machining integral stiff-
eners, webs, and caps from a thick aluminum plate.

ATR 301-3 - Aft Bulkhead

Tests were conducted to verify the design approach on a section of the aft bulk-
head under simulated spacecraft loading.

ATR 301-1 - Outer Panel

This test was conducted on a typical outer panel under akial and simulated air
loads. to verify the design approach.

ATR 301-12 - Outer Panel Joint

Tests were conducted to verify the adequacy of blind attachments to honeycomb
panels.

ATR 304-2 -Aft Bulkhead Components

Additional testing of local attachments on the aft bulkhead was performed because
of a failure on ATR 304.

ATR 301-7 - Friction Joint

Tests were conducted to determine the local characteristics associated with
attaching the outer panels to the radial shear webs and bulkheads with oversized holes.

40
 ATR 301-9 - Panel Edge Member
This test was conducted to determine the basic load path from honeycomb panel
through an extruded edge member to the support structure.

ATR 321013 - Fasteners and Joints

These tests were conducted to determine design allowables on methods of
fastening clips, brackets, and supports to honeycomb structure.

ATR 304-1 - Service Module Aft Bulkhead

Splice and Shear Panel Test
T e s t s were conducted to evaluate the bonded splice and shear panel tie of the
service module (SM) aft bulkh.ead.

ATR 309-1 - Joint Tests; SM to SLA

Tests were conducted (1)to determine the structural integrity of the b a r r e l nut/
epoxy-filled joint design, and (2) to determine the limit and ultimate load-carrying
capability of the joint.

ATR 309-2 - Fasteners and Joint Tests

Tests were conducted (1)to determine design allowables for spacecraft (SC)
joints such as angles, tees, channels, et cetera, and (2) to determine ultimate load-
carrying capabilities for spacecraft joints.

ATR 321007 - Adjustable Radial Beam Pads

This test was conducted to verify a late design change, made after initial testing
of ATR 301-5. This test w a s performed on the subcomponent level because the change
went into effect after SC-004w a s built.

SPACECRAFTlLM ADAPTER

ATR 402-1 - Panel Thermal Tests

These tests were conducted on 21 small honeycomb panels representative of the
SLA shell structure. The panels were tested to failure at elevated temperatures to
substantiate design allowables.
 ATR 402-2 - Joint Tests
Tests on these joints were conducted to verify the design approach on 12-inch-
wide sections of each SLA joint at elevated temperatures.

ATR 403-2 - Lunar Excursion Module Support Structure

Tests were conducted on two specimens, representative of the LM (formerly i
LEM) attachment a r e a of the SLA, (1)to verify the design approach and (2) to supple-
ment the s t r e s s analysis.

ATR 322012 -The SMlSLA Joint

Tests were conducted on a small section of the SM/SLA joint to limit and ulti-
mate tensile loads.

42
 APPENDIX B
COMPONENT TESTS SUMMARY

LAUNCH ESCAPE TOWER

1
ATR 500-1 - Launch Escape Tower
Separation Fitting Test
T e s t s were conducted to verify the structural integrity of the launch escape tower
(LET) attachment housing f o r design loads.

ATR 502-2 - Launch Escape Tower Attachment Fitti ng Test

Tests were conducted (1) to determine the strength and failure mode of the attach-
ment between the LET and tower skirt, and (2) to verify s t r e s s analysis methods.

BOOST PROTECTIVE COVER

ATR 505-1 - Boost Protective Cover

Panel Fastener Test
Tests were conducted (1)to determine the shear characteristics of the boost
protective cover (BPC) panel fastener, (2) to determine if the BPC fastener joint could
sustain the following ultimate design loads without failure: configuration A - 75 lb/in.
(150 pounds p e r fastener), and configuration B - 125 lb/in., and (3) to determine the
failure load and mode of failure of each specimen.

ATR 391008 - Boost Protective Cover Longitudinal Splice

Tests were conducted (1) to determine the shear strength and deflection charac-
teristics of the longitudinal splice joint, and (2) to determine the failure load and mode
of failure of the longitudinal splice joint.

'Apollo Test Requirement.

43
 COMMAND MODULE

ATR 331022 - Static Test of Base Section Subassembly,

Inner Structure and Aft Heat Shield Substructure
Tests were conducted (1)to demonstrate the strength of the command module
(CM) heat shield for the 20g reentry condition, (2) to determine load-deflection data,
and (3) to verify analysis methods. After these tests, the aft heat shield was used in
conjunction with boilerplate elements for a water impact test.

ATR 331023 - Static Test of Typical In n e r Structure

to Heat Shield Attachment, Station Xc 42.67
Tests were conducted (1) to determine the joint shear strength and deflection
characteristics and (2) to determine the failure load and mode of failure of the typical
inner structure to heat shield slip joint at station Xc 42.67.

ATR 331024 - Static Test of Support Brackets of the

CM Helium, Potable Water, and Fuel Tanks
Tests were conducted (1) to demonstrate by a static test the the support-bracket
assembly and installations could sustain limit-design loads without yielding and could
sustain ultimate-design loads, and (2) to verify the analysis methods.

ATR 331025 - Test of Modular Element of the

CM Lower Equipment Bay
Tests were conducted (1) to demonstrate by a static test that the individual elec-
tronic compartments would sustain limit-design loads without yielding and would sustain
ultimate-design loads without failure of the mounting-clamp assemblies, and (2) to ob-
tain load-deflection data.

ATR 331026 - Static Test of Typical Section of

the CM Lower Equipment Bay
Tests were conducted (1) to determine whether the action of the attachment clamp
is affected b y boost loads, (2) to determine whether the lower equipment bay (LEB) sec-
tion would sustain limit-design loads without yielding of the mounting assemblies,
(3) to determine whether the LEB section would sustain ultimate-design loads without
failure of the mounting assemblies, and (4) to obtain load-deflection data.

ATR 331027 - Typical Attachment Test, Launch Escape

System Tower and Forward Heat Shield to I n n e r Structure
Tests were conducted (1) to determine LET bolt torque requirements for obtaining
a specified bolt preload, (2) to determine the effects of axial preloading in the bolt

44
during application of critical mission condition loading, (3) to demonstrate that the joint
could sustain limit-design loads without yielding and ultimate-design loads without fail-
u r e , and (4) to determine load versus deflection characteristics and s t r a i n characteris-
tics of the joint.

ATR 331029 - Test of C M I n n e r Cabin Window Panels and Seals

T e s t s were conducted (1) to determine the validity of the window seal configura-
tion, (2) to ascertain that the leak rate was within acceptable limits, (3) to determine
the ability of the inner cabin window assembly to sustain limit-design loads without
yielding and ultimate-design loads without failing, (4) to determine deflections at se-
lected locations, and (5) to find maximum load capabilities and mode failures.

ATR 331041 -Test of CM and Heat Shield Window Panel and Seals
T e s t s were conducted (1) to verify the ability of the window glass, retainer, and
panel to sustain the ultimate-design aerodynamic pressure without failing, (2) to define
the airload versus deflection and strain characteristics of the heat shield window panels,
(3) to verify the ability of the heat shield .window assemblies to sustain the most critical
entry heating environment without failing, and (4) to evaluate thermally induced s t r e s s e s
and deflection characteristics of window glass and retainers.

ATR 219 - Structural Test of Crew Compartment

Heat Shield Stringer
T e s t s were conducted (1)to determine the spring r a t e of the heat shield stringer
under transverse loading when fully compressed, half extended, and fully extended,
(2) to determine the allowable tensile load of the assembly, and (3) to determine the
mode of failure under transverse loading.

ATR 331042 - Test of CM Crew Hatch Tongue and

Groove Edge Members, Heat Shield
T e s t s were conducted (1) to evaluate the structural integrity of joint edge mem-
b e r s under loads, (2) to determine design-limit and ultimate-load values under the
Apollo mission environment, and (3) to determine the mode of failure i n tension and
compression.

ATR 331033 - Command ModulelService Module

Compression Shear Tie
T e s t s were conducted (1)to demonstrate that the command module/service mod-
ule' (CM/SM) interface shear compression and tension tie could sustain ultimate-design
loads without failing, (2) to verify analytical-loads analysis of the compression-shear
pad, and (3) to determine the mode of failure of the CM/SM interface.

45
 ATR 331054 - Forward Cyli nderlLongeron Gusset
Assembly, Static Structural Tests
Tests were conducted to demonstrate that the forward cylinder gusset assemblies
would sustain limit-design loads without yielding and ultimate-design loads without fail-
ing when subjected to drogue o r main parachute wraparound loads.

ATR 391022 - Frangible Nut, LETlCM I nterface Joint

Tests were conducted to verify the structural integrity of the frangible nut and
LET/CM interface joint for spacecraft (SC) 011 and subsequent spacecraft.

ATR 321011 - Reaction Control System Engine and Tank Supports

Tests were conducted on the tank support structure to simulated dynamic loading
using equivalent static loads.

ATR 131004 - The CMlSM Fai ri ng

Tests were conducted to verify the adequacy of the CM/SM fairing for the ultimate
boost differential p r e s s u r e and umbilical disconnect loads.

SPACECRAFTILUNAR MODULE ADAPTER

No component t e s t s were conducted on the spacecraft/lunar module adapter.

46
 APPENDIX C
COMPLETE MODULE TESTS SUMMARY (BLOCK I)

LAUNCH ESCAPE TOWER

1
ATR 500 - Structural Test of Launch Escape Tower
T e s t s were conducted (1) to verify the structural integrity of the launch escape
tower (LET) f o r critical flight loading conditions, (2) to determine the ultimate strength
and failure characteristics of the tower, and (3) to determine the deflection character-
istics of the tower.
I

COMMAND MODULE

ATR 131003 and ATR 131006 - Combined Module Static

Tests - Command Module and Service Module
T e s t s were conducted (1) to evaluate the integrity of the command module (CM)
interface structure for critical mdximum q a and end-boost first-stage loading, (2) to
evaluate the integrity of the CM structure i n the tension-tie a r e a for critical tension
loading at lift-off, and (3) to verify the analytical loads and s t r e s s analysis.

ATR 251001 and ATR 251002 - Command Module

Static Structural Tests
Tests were conducted (1) to demonstrate by a s e r i e s of static t e s t s simulating
various flight environments that the CM o r component assembly of the CM would sus-
tain ultimate test loads without failure, (2) to obtain load-deflection data, and (3) to
verify analysis methods. Test conditions included three main parachute load conditions,
pilot parachute mortar loads, drogue parachute deployment load, crew couch attach
loads, abort loads, and 165 percent of abort loads.

ATR 251003 - Command Module Static Structural-Thermal Test

Tests were conducted (1) to perform a design evaluation of the CM heat shield
system under Block I heat load trajectory 3A overshoot entry, trajectory-simulated
environment, (2) to verify the ability of the heat shield strain isolation support system
to function properly during entry without jeopardizing the integrity of the ablative
thermal-protective system, (3) to evaluate the structural-thermal characteristics
(deflection, s t r e s s , gaps, misalinements, and temperature) of heat shield components

'Apollo Test Requirement.

47
under entry conditions, and (4) to evaluate the performance of the thermal-protective
(insulation) system to limit the inner-structure outer-surface temperature to 200" F

ATR 111014 - Command Module Static Tests, Forward Section

A series of t e s t s w a s conducted to demonstrate that the CM Earth-landing system
support structure would sustain limit-design loads without yielding.

SERVI CE MODULE

ATR 131007 - Engine M o u n t Stiffness Test

Tests were conducted to determine the stiffness of the Block I service propulsion
subsystem (SPS) engine mounting. Ultimate engine thrust loads were also applied.

ATR 131003 - Service Module Static Structural Test

Tests were conducted that subjected the service module (SM) structure to the
critical Saturn V limit and ultimate boost loads. Thermal environments were not
applied.

ATR 321082 - Service Module Aft Bulkhead Test

Tests were conducted to demonstrate the structural capabilities of the modified
Block I SM aft bulkhead and SPS propellant tanks with s k i r t s representative of space-
craft (SC) 020 to the loading environment of the Saturn V end-of-first-stage boost
condition.

S PACECRAFTlLUNAR MODULE ADAPTER

Tests (ATR 321031 and ATR 321033) were conducted that subjected the spacecraft/
lunar module (LM) adapter (SLA) structure to the critical Saturn I-B and Saturn V limit
and ultimate maximum qa! loads. The test for the Saturn I-B loads used a flight
stiffener, and the test for the Saturn V loads used LM test article 10 (LTA-10). T e s t s
with LTA-10 also were conducted to demonstrate the structural compatibility of SLA-2
and LTA-10 and to determine the interaction loads between LTA-10 and SLA-2.

48
 APPENDIX D
DYNA AI C TESTS SUM AARY

COMMAND MODULE DEVELOPMENT TEST

1
ATR 205 - Vibration and Acoustic Tests of Typical
Command Module Panels
These tests were conducted (1) to determine acoustic transmissibility and sonic-
induced vibration of complex structural panels when subjected to narrow- and broad-
band random vibration as well as reverberant and progressive wave acoustic excitation,
(2) to evaluate the response of complex panels to narrow- and broad-band random vibra-
tion excitation, (3) to determine natural vibration response modes and structural damp-
ing coefficients of complex panels, (4) to determine natural response modes and
damping coefficients of ablative-covered heat shield panels and to evaluate the fatigue
strength of ablative material bonding methods at the predominant panel response fre-
quency, and (5) to evaluate the effect of elevated temperatures (entry heat loads) on
vibration response characteristics of ablative-covered heat shield panels.

COMMAND MODULE COMPONENT TEST

ATR 321025 - Dynamic Tests of Support Brackets of the

Command Module Helium, Potable Water, and Fuel Tanks
These tests were conducted (1) to determine the structural response under sinus-
oidal excitation (mechanical vibration), and (2) to determine the structural integrity
under random vibration.

ATR 331053 - Dynamic Test of Typical Section of the

Command Module Lower Equipment Bay
This test was conducted (1) to evaluate the lower equipment bay (LEB) structural
response in the dynamic environment, (2) to appraise the vibration input to the individ-
ual electronic components when mounted in the LEB, (3) to evaluate coldplate response
when mounted in the LEB and subjected to a dynamic environment, and (4) to appraise
the response of the electronic unit attachment clamps when mounted in the LEB and
subjected to a dynamic environment.

'Apollo Test Requirement.

49
 SERVICE MODULE COMPONENT TEST

ATR 321011 - Reaction Control System Engine and

Tank Support Test
This test w a s conducted to simulated dynamic loading using equivalent static loads.

ATR 311002 - Reaction Control Subsystem Module Acoustic Test

This test subjected a reaction control system (RCS) quadrant on a large panel and
a complete RCS module and service module (SM) panel to an acoustic environment.

COMMAND MODULE TEST

ATR 121006 - Spacecraft Acoustic Environmental Test

This test w a s conducted on spacecraft (SC)007 to verify the structural integrity
of the spacecraft when subjected to a laboratory simulation of the maximum acoustic
environment anticipated during launch. Acoustic attenuation and vibration response
characteristics of the structure were determined.

SERVICE MODULE TEST

ATR 121006 - Service Module Acoustic Tests

These tests were conducted on SC-007 to verify the adequacy of the spacecraft
when subjected to acoustic environments with simulated subsystems installed.

50
 APPENDIX E
STAT1C STRUCTURAL TESTS SUMMARY (BLOCK I I )

LAUNCH ESCAPE SYSTEM COMPONENT TEST

1
ATR 392002 - Apol lo Launch Escape Tower Static
Structural Test - Block I I
T e s t s were conducted to demonstrate the ability of the Block II launch escape
tower (LET) and LET/command module (CM) joint structure to sustain Saturn V abort
condition ultimate loads without failure.

ATR 332117 - Boost Protective Cover Tower Leg Fairing

Tests were conducted (1) to evaluate the structural integrity and to establish the
mode of failure of the boost protective cover (BPC) tower leg fairing, and (2) to demon-
strate the failure modes resulting from the Saturn V maximum qa, abort pressure loading.

COMMAND MODULE COMPONENT TESTS

ATR 332172 - M a i n Display Console Static Structural Test

T e s t s were conducted to demonstrate that the main display console panels and
supporting structure could sustain a vertical inertia load of 78g.

ATR 332113 - Command Module Thermal Isolator Ring Static Test

T e s t s were conducted to verify the structural integrity of the CM forward tunnel
isolation ring.

ATR 332204 - Static Test of Nylon Sea Hoisting Sling Assembly,

CM-108 and Subsequent Vehicles
Tests were conducted (1) to verify the ability of the nylon s e a hoisting sling assem-
bly, its attaching hardware, and CM backup structure to sustain ultimate design load
without failing, (2) to determine the ultimate capability and failure mode of the nylon
sling, and (3) to determine the amount of degradation caused by salt water soaking of
the nylon sling.

'Apollo Test Requirement.

51
 COMMAND MODULE TESTS

ATR 222003 - Spacecraft 2s-2 C M Static Structural Test

Tests were conducted (1)to verify the adequacy of the CM structure to withstand
design-ultimate loads simulating the critical flight-loading environment without failing
and design-limit load without yielding, and (2) to determine stress levels, load distri-
butions, and deformations of the structure under loads.

ATR 222015 - Block I I C M (2s-2) Static Test in Support of

Command and Service Module 103 and Subsequent.Spacecraft
Tests were conducted (1) to verify that the CM structure could withstand design-
limit and ultimate loads, and (2) to determine s t r e s s levels, load distributions, and
deformations of the structure under load. Test conditions were at room temperature and
included three main parachute deployment load tests, drogue parachute wraparound load
(abort case) (both repeats of ATR 222003), docking ring separation reaction load on the
CM tunnel, CM cabin burst p r e s s u r e test (repeat of ATR 222003 on new combined
hatch), and docking ring interface point contact load.

ATR 222020- Block I I C M Parachute Load Static Test in Support

of Command and Service Module 109 and Subsequent Spacecraft
Tests were conducted (1) to verify that the CM structure could withstand design-
limit loads without yielding and ultimate loads without failing, and (2) to determine stress
levels, load distributions, and deformations of the structure under loads.

ATR 332141 - Apollo C M I n n e r Structure Crew Couch Strut

Attachments Static Structural Tests
Tests were conducted (1) to demonstrate the structural integrity of the crew couch
attachments to sustain design-ultimate loads without failing, and (2) to determine the
maximum load-carrying capability and failure mode.

SERVICE MODULE

ATR 222005 - Apollo C M to Service Module Fairing Static Test

Tests were conducted to demonstrate that the Block II CM/service module (SM)
fairing could sustain Saturn V boost-phase limit and ultimate differential p r e s s u r e s .

52
 ATR 332071 - Static Test of Reaction Control System Tank
(Fuel and Helium) Brackets and Mounting o n S M Panel
T e s t s were conducted (1) to verify t h e structural integrity of the reaction control
system (RCS) fuel and helium tank brackets for the critical mission loads, (2) to verify
the structural integrity of the mounting of the RCS tank brackets to the SM panel, and
(3) to determine the structural characteristics ( L e . , load deflection and stress) of the
RCS panel and tank brackets.

ATR 332072 , 312003-2 - Static Test of S M RCS Panel and

RCS Oxidizer Bracket Mounting Assembly
Tests were conducted (1) to verify the structural integrity of the redesigned RCS
panel splice at station X 287 under combined shell and tank loads, (2) to verify the
S
structural integrity of the SM and CM oxidizer tank brackets and the attachment of these
brackets to the RCS panel wider mission load environment, (3) to determine the struc-
tural characteristics of the redesigned panel (i. e., deflection and stress produced by
mission loads, maximum qcu , and dynamic forces), and (4) to determine the .maximum
load-carrying capability of the panel/brackets .
COMMAND AND SERV ICE MODULE STACK TESTS

ATR 222002 - Apollo Combined Module Static Tests (2s-2)

Tests were conducted (1) to evaluate the structural integrity of the combined modu-
lar structure for boost-phase aerodynamic and inertial loads, and (2) to determine load
and s t r e s s distribution within the vehicle.

ATR 222013 - Apollo Block II CMlSM Stack Static Test

Tests were conducted to verify the structural integrity of the CM/SM interface
with the SM radial beam configuration modified to the six sway braces. The 1ate.st
Saturn V maximum qcu loads were imposed for the most critical condition to demon-
strate that the CM/SM structure could withstand limit and ultimate loads.

ATR 222014 and ATR 222018- Block I I CMlSM Stack Static

Test - Saturn V First-Stage End Boost
T e s t s were conducted to demonstrate that the CM/SM structure could withstand
limit and ultimate Saturn V first-stage end-boost loads.

53
 ATR 222017 - Apollo Block I I CMlSM Stack Static
Test - Saturn V One-Engine-Out Condition
Tests were conducted to determine the ability of the launch escape system
(LES)/CM and CM/SM interface and supporting structure to withstand the critical load
orientations of the Saturn V one-engine-out condition.

54 NASA-Langley, 1974 S-400