Mercury Redstone
Mercury Redstone
Mercury Redstone
53107
GO#GC _
HUNTSVILLE, AL,48AMA
N67-37935
(ACCESSlO]_ NUMBER) (THI_U)
o
._ (NASA CR
,_?_
(PAGES) ORI TMX On A;_ NUMBIEr/)
/
(CATEGORy)
SATURN/APOLLO
SYSTEMS
OFFICE
National
Aeronautics
and
Space
Administration
MSFC
Focm
454
(Revised
September
1961)
THE
MERCURY-REDSTONE
PROJECT
December
1964
SATURN/APOLLO SYSTEMS OFFICE GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA
FOR
E WOR
The
purpose but
was
to collect, the
history'of
States'
first manned
launch
to identify
signimanned
for the
design
operation
of future
The
report
was
by
Support
of the Office
information of a large
in the
report reports,
of project personal
which with
interviews
Space CorInc.
Center and
(both of NASA),
the Rocketdyne
Aviation,
The
report
was
prepared
by
the following
General
Electric
personnel:
F.
E.
Miller,
Engineer
J.
L.
Cassidy,
Engineer
J.
C.
Leveye,
Technical
Writer
R.
I. Johnson,
Project
Leader
The
project
was
directed
by:
Dr.
J.
P.
Kuettner,
Deputy
Director,
SATURN/Apollo
Systems Project)
Office,
MSFC
(formerly
Director,
Mercury-Redstone
ii
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
Title SECTION SECTION SECTION 1 2 3 S_iRY INTRODUCTION D_RCURY-REDSTONE 3.1 3.2 3.3 SECTION 4 VEHICLE 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 SECTION 5 Mission Flight Mission MISSION Objectives Trajectory Profile and Sequence of Events
Page
DESCRIPTION Introduction Structure Propulsion System Network Telemetry, (Destruct) and Television System Control System Electrical Power Communications, Fuel Dispersion 4-1 4-1 4-7 4-12 4-32 4-34 4-39 4-39 4-44
MAN- RATI NG 5.1 5.2 5.3 Introduction Automatic Reliability TEST Inflight Program PROGRAM 6-1 6-1 Tests Vibrations Development 6-11 6-17 6-22 Abort Sensing System 5-1 5-1 5-31
SECTION
Introduction Vehicle Special Mass Booster AND Test Program Reliability of Recovery LAUNCH
Dampening
Inflight System
SECTION
OPERATIONS 7-1 and Countdown 7-6 7-35 7-42 Facilities Aspects and Displays 7-44 7-73
Prelaunch Preparation Launch Organization Emergency Range Special Egress Launch Safety
Operations
SECTION
Introduction Development Manned Operational TO Flights Changes _%_D Resulting.from LAUNCH VEHICLES Flight Testing Flights
SECTION
SECTION
I0
- REFERENCES
LIST
OF
ILLUSTRATIONS
Title
1-1
JUPITER-C,
3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4 4-5 4-6 4-7 4-8 4-9 4-10 4-11
During
Boost,
MR-4
Mission
3-3 3-4
Boost,
MR-4
versus
Time,
3-4 3-6
Flight Profile,
of MERCURY-REDSTONE
3-8 4-2
of Launch
Vehicle
Structure
4-3 4-8
Rocket
Engine Engine
Pneumatic Details
of Booster
System
Mechanics Pulse
of Tilting Program for Tilting LEV-3 Stabilizer System and Center of Pressure
Program
MERCURY-REDSTONE MERCURY-REDSTONE Location During MERCURY-REDSTONE T = 80 Seconds MERCURY-REDSTONE Station T --60 Seconds
4-18
Time
4-12
Moment
4-13
versus Bending
4-14 4-15
Maximum
Design
Wind
Altitude Bending
Lateral
4-16
Longitudinal
Natural 4-27
4-17 4-18
of Angle on Vehicle
of Attack Angle
versus
Time
4-28
Effects of Pitch and Yaw Hardover (As a function of flight time. ) MERCURY-REDSTONE Vehicle Attitude Angle
of Attack 4-29
4-19
Effects of Yaw
and
Pitch Hardover
on 4-30
iv
L}ST OF
ILLUSTRATIONS
(CONT.)
Figure
Title
of Roll
Hardover
Dispersion
(Destruct)
4-40 4-46
After
of MERCURY-REDSTONE System
Abort Responsibility MERCURY-REDSTONE 5-4 5-5 5-6 5-7 5-8 5-9 5-10 5-11 5-12 5-13 5-14 5-15 5-16 6-1! 6-2 6-3 6-4 6-5 6-6 6-7 6-8 MERCURY-REDSTONE Off-the-Pad Abort Preflight Inflight Attitude Attitude Attitude Attitude Attitude Control Chamber After Abort Liftoff
versus Flight
Time
for
Engine
Cutoff
Diagram Diagram
Diagram
Diagram
5-26 5-27
Detector Sensor
5-29 5-31
MERCURY-REDSTONE MERCURY-REDSTONE Flight Vertical Aft Section Location General General Environment Test Fixtures Summary
Stamp
Test
Longitudinal
ME RCURY-REDSTONE
LIST OF
ILLUSTRATIONS
(CONT.)
Figure
6-9 6-10 6-11 6-12 6-13 6-14
Title
MERCURY-REDSTONE Deceleration Release Recovery Water Booster Parachute of Deceleration Parachutes Impact Recovery Package
Flight Unreefed
Sequence
6-25 6-26
Parachute
and
Deployment
versus
Time
in Seconds
Showing
Close 6-35
6-15
on MERCURY-REDSTONE 6-36 7-3 Organization Status 7-6 7-12 7-37 7-39 Location Complex for 56, Canaveral VLF 56 56 Pad 5 7-41 7-45 7-47 7-48 7-49 Structure, VLF 56 7-51 7-55 Measuring Panels, 56 Panels, Blockhouse 56 Panel, Blockhouse 56 56 7-56 7-57 7-59 7-60 7-62 56 7-63 7-65 High Frequency 30.3 7-66 8-4 8-8 Toward end of 8-12
Site Checkout
Time
Diagram of Emergency MERCURY-REDSTONE Service White Design Remote Auxiliary Inverter Structure, Room Pad
7-7 7-8 7-9 7-10 7-11 7-12 7-13 7-14 7-15 7-16 7-17 7-18 7-19 7-20 8-1 8-2 8-3
Cape
on Level
of Blast Control
Deflector, Panel,
VLF
Platform, Panel,
White Blockhouse
Environmental Propulsion Over-all Generator Autopilot Test Capsule Recovery and Test and Rack,
Panel
Propulsion
Blockhouse
Blockhouse Network 56
Blockhouse - UHF
Radio MR-1
Network, During
MERCURY-REDSTONE Liftoff
Parachute
Deployment
of MERCURY-REDSTONE
MR-1A
Oscillations in Yaw
vi
LIST OF
ILLUSTRATIONS
(CONT.)
Fibre
Liftoff of MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-3 MR-3 MR-3 MR-3
Title
pa e
8-19 Configuration 8-20 8-22 Track and Profile Flight Profile 8-22 8-22 8-24 8-27
MERCURY-REDSTONE (Capsule No. 7) 8-6 8-7 8-8 8-9 8-10 8-11 8-12 MERCURY-REDSTONE MERCURY-REDSTONE MERCURY-REDSTONE Liftoff Flight
Acceleration MR-4
Acceleration Chart
MR-4
Flight
8-27 8-27
of Recovery
vii
LIST
OF TABLES
Table
Title
Mission
Sequence
of Events
3-7 4-32
Booster
Flight
Telemetry Propulsion
Measurements System
During
5-4
Abort Sensing System Reliability Switches, Attitude Error Sensors, Abort Sensing System Reliability Chamber Pressure Sensors MERCURY-REDSTONE MERCURY-REDSTONE Evaluation Sound of Flight Data During Test Results Measurements Mission Reliability Reliability
Test Plan A for Attitude and Voltage Detectors Test Plan B for - A - B Combustion
5-5
5-6 5-7 5-8 6-1 6-2 6-3 6-4 7-1 8-1 8-2 8-3 8-4
Prediction Prediction
Results
Vibration
Rules
List
Sequence
of Weak MR-3
8-15 8-25
viii
SECTION SUMMARY
1.1 This
GENERAL report presents Project three a brief - the years but complete States' the last development first flight manned history launch of the vehicle. the MERCURYAt this time,
United after
a continuing
vehicles systems
planned for
questions
as the
following
answered
new manned
When
is a vehicle
manned in the
of the
individual ground
involved
personnel
in the the
and groups
efforts ?
of view
provided The
to these failures
questions as well
are as the
in of the prore-
identified presented
In addition, extensive
special
investigation
of a booster
covery
system.
Section
the vehicles
major in the
of the
launch
These operations
Emergency emergency
a mobile
vehicle. for the premature spacecraft mission within termination. the launch pad
impact Room"
predictor enclosing
Automatic
1-1
Range
safety
destruct weather
procedures survey
and
implementation.
Prelaunch
techniques.
Other the
sections
of this program,
report
present
descriptions testing,
the
vehicle
design, flight
man-rating
operations, the
testing,
to an orbital to check
program,
MERCURYthe following:
REDSTONE
systems
to brief
periods
of space
flight
(weight-
flights
Suborbital capsule
provided return
of the their
accelerations was
on a
duration
The
mission
for man
the
launch space
vehicle
were
as follows: including:
with a brief
flight
experience
Evaluate a.
ability
to perform control
as a functional of capsule
unit
during before,
space during,
flight and
by:
manual
attitude
b. Study
Use
during during
man's the
physiological astronaut
Recover
The
adaptation
tactical on ground
missile and
was flight
made tests.
of design for
changes
and of the
modifications REDSTONE
conversion
and
operations
to a manned
performance.
1-2
The implementation of the above guidelines was carried out in three major phases: 1.2
A basic The
Basic Redesign. Modification after Ground Tests. Modification after Flight Tests.
REDESIGN was necessary and to adapt additions and the the REDSTONE the new to the launch as major MERCURY vehicle mission. dis1-1. To
BASIC
redesign
required
made
physically
REDSTONE program,
shown areas
in Figure were
redesign
Increased creasing
REDSTONE 123.5
propellant seconds.
to 143.5
pressurized between
compartment. section. abort sensing system at the toxic Hydine and to the launch used are in cov-
Addition emergency
incorporated more
Utilization
in lieu
of the
provisions
in man-rating
in the
report.
a total
were
made
before plus
the
Project increased
completed. booster's
listed that
above astronaut
many
to the
extent
abort
was
necessary.
AFTER test
GROUND several
program,
included: An engine An H202 The Wires abort piping bottle rate elbow. bracket. switch roll rate mounting switch. stud. bracket.
in the
An antenna
mounting
1-3
69.90'
32.08'
REDSTONE
I JUPITER-C
Figure i-1.
and MERCURY-REDSTONE
1-4
The A-7
success engine
of the was
firings
instability to be the
Enlarging
injector
of another
oscillation tower
Modification
1.4 Problem
MODIFICATION areas MR-1 electrical added. A scale integrating velocity of eight factor discovered launch
TESTS test program need for led to the following ground-negative Thus, a one until foot ground modifications: all other strap was
the
connections
separated.
error
due
to excessive caused
pivot
torque
on the
LEV-3 an excess
MR-1A Use
second. solved
and
relocation
the problem. aecelerometer on MR-2 and properly, fix, MR-BD. thus a time-based These use later engine flights cutoff timer cutoff
integrating employed
accelerometer
functioned
of the
discontinued. thrust second controller before on MR-2 deactivation on the P failed of the remaining wide-open abort flights, Pc causing switches. velocity mode (fuel LOX depletion To prevent cutoff arming a and arming) to take
The 0.5
occurrence of the
switches to the depletion c Velocity cutoff arming was predicted keeping cutoff velocity,
depletion
than
chamber capability
MR-2,
MR-BD
rates
that was
sensor was
deleted
MR-BD.
of 10 degrees
retained. An interaction required 6 and the 10 cps. of the addition The second bending mode filter noted with to reduce on flights the yaw control MR-1A and pitch loop and axis gain MR-2. control
between
1-5
Flights MR-1A, MR-2, and MR-BD indicated excessive adapter section vibrations. On MR-3 these were dampenedwith 340 poundsof a lead impregnated rubber compoundaddedto the bulkhead and walls of the section. Fourteen longitudinal stiffeners were also addedto the internal skin surface. Since Astronaut Shepardstill noted considerable vibrations during boost on MR-3, an additional 102pounds of the dampeningcompound, X-306, were addedto the instrument conpartment of MR-4 1.5
The Only ranted intervals Grissom's ing this the were path FLIGHT PROGRAM REVIEW Program flights of the were last the was originally as the flights. the scheduled success for eight of the flight tests. warat
program came
from
relatively charted
in space
orbital
originally to four
failures place.
increased
The
final
Program and
included and
the
following
flights: operational
Four
develand
opmental MR-4).
MR-BD),
two manned
(MR-3
MR-1 first
MISSION flight vehicle, MR-l, (now sensing Cape system mission. and was launched Its on 21 November primary mission
MERCURY-REDSTONE hours the EST, automatic for the 6.0 and at Cape inflight
at 0859 to qualify
Canaveral abort
vehicle
combination
MERCURY during
ing a velocity craft. revealed mature having After that booster risen
powered only
mainstage
ground on its
network launch
after
booster
deactivated.
As a result
tests, electrical
the
following line
changes was
were
ground
provided
1-6
An "engine pressure switch-missile program device permission circuit" was incorporated to insure reaction to an authentic cutoff signal just prior to 135 seconds after liftoff. 1.7
MR-1A MISSION encountered first mission, with hence 1960. in the velocity than expected MR-I, the second MERCURY-REDSTONE The launch was velocity occurred slightly launch at comwas
of MR-1A cutoff
integrating caused
capsule
of the
lV[R-1A
as expected. levels.
measured
abort
mained
maximum
tolerable
1.8
MR-2
MISSION MR-2 the second pressure expected. was and launched third on 31 January several 1961, changes the direct at 1145 were engine cause EST. made. to operate of the In the A malat a follow-
launches,
function higher
controller This
on MR-2 malfunction
ing factors: The circuit When higher was the thrust armed. pressure was decayed, given did an abort signal occurred. of the the escape rocket. exlevel resulted in a LOX depletion before the normal cutoff
chamber
impulse retro
by the abort
firing mode,
rockets
capsule
high
deceleration
during
re-entry.
factors
combined
to cause and
the
to impact Safety
the
target
area.
the
land
too long
safety, limit
very
to the
right-hand
impact
established
1-7
(BOOSTER development
DEVELOPMENT) missile (MR-BD) evaluated vehicle bending but test. their This adapter
MISSION was launched on 24 March 1961, in the and at 1230 booster which EST. after assured in the ex-
incorporated and frequencies were that the only control vibrations again
appeared
in the The
were gave
ampliindi-
of the that
integrating were
measures
successful.
1.10
MISSION the on first 5 May and no manned 1961. system control flight. All With missions malfunction system was after but Astronaut assigned occurred. noted. the MR-2 data Shepard to the No This fur-
MERCURY-REDSTONE aboard, booster evidence ther test. cated flights. to the proved The MR-3 were lifted
successfully bending
of second the
incorporated flight,
flight indi-
astronaut levels
powered of the
telemetry
than
previous
1.11
MR-4
MISSION the MERCURY-REDSTONE successful objectives hatch beyond that effective. the manned were suborbital achieved, during Program flight. excepting recovery, recovery material on 21 The was MR-4 Again capsule water all carrying systems recovery. entered the Astronaut worked As Grissom properly a result and vibracomEST, of
capsule
capsule
weight
of the dampening
indicated proved
of MR-4 program.
MERCURY-REDSTONE accomplished.
of "man-into-space"
A compilation below.
of the
milestones
of the
MERCURY-REDSTONE
Project
is presented
1-8
MILESTONES
OF
THE
MERCURY-REDSTONE
PROJECT
A Working Group was formed cal Laboratory and the Lewis sider a man-in-space program. NACA and DOD's Army a Joint Manned Satellite Group.
September
October
The plans of the Panel for a Manned Satellite Program were approved by the Director of ARPA and the Administrator of NASA (NACA became NASA on 1 October 1958). The joint working group and panel then became the Space Task Group and began operations at the Langley Research Center. 6 NASA and the Army Ordnance Missile Command AOMC tentatively agreed to supply 10 Redstone for the program. 3 26 NASA Project program. informed AOMC was to proceed officially with (AOMC) met, and and 3 Jupiter missiles
October
November November
an 8 Redstone to the
missile
program.
MERCURY
assigned
manned-satellite
1959 January 8 NASA funded AOMC for 8 Redstones. Agency (ABMA), an element of AOMC, scheduling of the MERCURY-REDSTONE Project priority MERCURY rating. was assigned The Army Ballistic began production Project. " the Missile planning
and
April
27
a "DX Rating,
nation's
highest
1960 January 7 The first MERCURY-REDSTONE at ABMA. MR-1 receipt completed its checkout of the first MERCURY booster MR-1 was static test fired
February
and was
stored
pending
June
30
Spacecraft checkout
arrived
at ABMA
for
July 1 20
August 3
The MERCURY-REDSTONE Project ABMA to the Marshall Space Flight MR-1 MR-1 underwent and a similar flight test
transferred of NASA.
from
Spacecraft
2 arrived
at Cape
1-9
August 22
September26 After storage to avoid a hurricane, MR-1 was re-erected andthe capsule mated. November 21 After a third mating of the spacecraft, MR-1 failed during launch. A ground support cable connection causedpremature shutdown. December19 MR-1A was successfully launched, providing the first flight test of the MERCURY-REDSTONE. 1961 January 31 February March 24 Flight MR-2 (Booster MR-2 andCapsule5) was successfully launched, carrying the 37-poundchimpanzee "Ham" into space. The decision was madeto make oneadditional booster development(BD) flight before attempting a mannedflight. Flight MR-BD was a successful launch, proving the flight worthiness of the booster design improvements. This flight also provided testing of the emergency egress tower andother emergency rescue ground equipments. Flight MR-3 successfully carried Astronaut Shepardin the planned ballistic trajectory; he thus becamethe United States' first man in space. The second man in space, Astronaut Grissom, was successfully launchedaboard Flight MR-4. The MERCURY-REDSTONEProgram was phasedout.
May 5
July 21 September
1-10
SECTION2 INTRODUCTION The development modification of the first launch vehicle suitable for a mannedpayload was accomplished in less than two years. During this brief time, the MERCURYREDSTONEProject team encountered an entirely new scope of design problems in modifying an existing vehicle, the REDSTONE,for its mannedpayload. Rocket propulsion systems hadpreviously beenutilized in mannedaircraft such as the German ME-163 and the American X-series of research vehicles (X-I, X-1A, X-2, andX-15), however, the relatively small quantity of propellant on these aircraft and their ability to maintain flight without propulsion indicated that the REDSTONEengineers would be required to resolve significant new problems including the following: High explosive yield of propellants. Acceleration, noise, and vibration environments. Safety for ground personnel and facilities. Water recovery of the payload. On-pad emergency egress of the astronaut. Abort sensing and implementation procedures. Abort parameter limits to maximize safety without jeopardizing mission reliability.
The short development time required and the success of the two mannedflights (the fifth and sixth launches of the series) are an indication of the dedication andcompetence which was applied to this task. However, greater tribute to the project is the fact that many of the basic solutions developedin the modification of the REDSTONEfor manned flight are valid for present andfuture launch vehicles (as evidenced by their use in the SATURN/APOLLO Program). The purpose of this report, then, is to review the MERCURY-REDSTONEProject emphasizing the problems encountered, their resolutions and their implications and applicability to future mannedlaunch vehicles. Often, the items of greatest technical importance which may be useful for succeedingprograms is so dispersed among many technical reports that they are retained in a single location only in the memory of a few key project personnel. It is hopedthat this report, which points outuniquefeatures of the MERCURY-REDSTONE Project, suchas the recoverable booster tests as well as the failures and successes of the flight andground test programs, will serve as a focal 2-1
point for guidance of future mannedsystems project engineers. More detailed information than could be included in this brief report can be obtainedfrom the reports listed in the References, which served as sources for the information presented here. By early 1959, the performance required of a launch vehicle neededfor the first phase of the manned-flight program was determined. The vehicle hadto have both the reliability and performance to place a manned, two-ton payload safely into a suborbital trajectory in which at least 5 minutes of weightlessness would be experienced and an apogeeof at least 100nautical miles would be attained. In addition, the vehicle had to be available in time to support the desired flight schedule. These requirements narrowed the choice to launch vehicles which had already been developedfor a military mission. Section3 of this report presents a discussion of the mission and launch vehicle selection. The REDSTONE,a tactical surface-to-surface missile had beenunder development and testing for several years prior to its utilization in the MERCURYProgram. The first launch of a REDSTONEmissile took place on 20 August 1953, almost 8 years prior to the first mannedMERCURY-REDSTONElaunch on 5 May 1961. During this interim, the basic missile hadundergone several development changesand improvements in its design andperformance. At the time of its selection in January 1959for the MERCURY Program, two versions of the REDSTONEdesign existed. The first, an advancedmodel (Block If) of thetactical missile, utilized an improved engine, the A-7, and alcohol and LOX as propellants. The second, the JUPITER-C, was a multistage vehicle utilizing increased capacity tanks compared to the REDSTONE,the Model A-5 engine, andthe more toxic Hydine (60 percent UDMH, 40 percent diethylene triamine) and LOX as propellants. This extendedperformance booster stage was coupledwith upper stages of scaled Sergeant solid propellant motors. A four stage version of the JUPITER-C placedEXPLORER I, the free worldts first satellite, into orbit. Sincethe Block II REDSTONE,the most advancedand reliable version could not meet the MERCURYperformance requirements, the configuration selected coupled the Model A-7 engine andpropellants of the Block II model with the enlarged capacity tanks of the JUPITER-C. It is interesting to note that by the time of the first mannedlaunch (MR-3), the total reliability of all 69 previous REDSTONEflights was 81 percent; however, the Block II model had achieved 11 consecutive successesand the JUPITER-C had achievedseven consecutive successes. 2-2
The REDSTONE,
Program
require-
ments for the suborbital flightwith regard to both performance ever, even though the vehicle had demonstrated
rate safety features which would prevent the loss of an astronaut in the event of a mission failure. The modification of the vehicle design and launch operations and the development manned REDSTONE man-rating, of new quality control and test procedures, necessary for its use as a
launch vehicles.
Safety during launch. Satisfactory operation within human-factors Adequate performance margins tolerances.
The three
actual phases
of the treated
vehicle
and
its
for
manned
flight
took
place
in
separately prior
to application.
tests. tests.
Although program
there and
were design
hardware concepts
changes
during
the major
development alteration.
the
basic
man-rating
The
MERCURY-REDSTONE Space Ballistic and was Project Flight Missile Space directed Office Center
mission (MSFC),
was
by the
joint
participation Division
of the of the
Marshall Army
then with
Operations Group
Agency
(ABMA)
(STG)of
(NASA) Task
in the Group.
MERCURY At ABMA
Program. the
to aid
MERCURY Aircraft
McDonnell
MSFC
design
coordination
in the
SATURN/APOLLO
Program
today.
2-3
SECTION3 MERCURY-REDSTONEMISSION
3.1 MISSION 1959, vehicle both OBJECTIVES several needed the decisions for the were first and made in regard manned to place miles In addition, of the choice later to the flight performance program. two-ton required The vehicle of
phase
of the
to have into
a manned, apogee
payload 5 min-
a suborbital
in which have
at least
it would orbital
desired
flights
narrowed mission.
to launch
vehicles
which
developed
time, Agency
were
available
Ballistic
JUPITER-C a record
an advanced 50 successful
military The
verifying
REDSTONE elongated
requirements; structure,
the
JUPITER-C
performance re-entry
MERCURY. and
vehicle satellite,
had
studies
for placing
United
EXPLORER
REDSTONE
suborbital requirements
of availabilityand performance.
referred to as man-rating,
use
of the
elongated
tanks
was
necengine
a nominal
of 143.5 burning
seconds, time
the
original
REDSTONE
vehicle. nitrogen
greater
required
addition
of a seventh
high-pressure
3-1
tank the
the
larger
fuel
tank
and
an auxiliary
hydrogen
peroxide
tank
topower
To
decrease
the
complexity
for
the
basic
MERCURY-REDSTONE
three
changes
were
made: The REDSTONE for and stabilized vehicle met the guidance. guidance platform The (ST-80) LEV-3 was system of the replaced was by less the LEV-3 more
autopilot reliable, mission. The were sion, A short tion plane, aft
complex,
requirements
MERCURY-REDSTONE
unit,
instrument tank
and tactical
adapter ver-
assembly.
the
arrangement
simplified
coordination.
the
vehicle,
alcohol
was
chosen
as for
fuel. greater
Although perform-
(UDETA) considered
higher However,
to be with
ledto greater
a problem erosion
the was
extended initiated
burning to select
of these for
vanes. use in
Hence,
a program
of the
highest
quality
MERCURY.
To
provide to the
for
safety, an
an
automatic egress
inflight operation
was the
added launch
launch
emergency primary
complex.
were
considerations
in man-rating
REDSTONE.
The
was
aerodynamically payload
less characteristics
stable
the
REDSTONE. the
unique was
to become To compensate
unstable for
in the this
supersonic
approximately of ballast
after
instability,
added
forward
instrument
compartment.
were
also
because changes
of the reduced
decreased the
lateral
bending
frequencies. bending
configuration
MERCURY-REDSTONE
those
As a result, second
appeared to be filtered
out of the
system
3.2 The
TRAJECTORY for the MERCURY-REDSTONE vehicle's available during the the modified during final mission propulsion was based on the Included thrust shutdown. were also performance in the calcuat
system.
of flight
including
buildup
from
were
vertical. and
Figures acceleration
curves
dynamic
velocity,
MERCURY-REDSTONE
mission.
6O0
500
400
!
300
200
100
I
5O Elapsed Figure 3-1. Dynamic Pressure
I
100 Time/Seconds During Boost, MR-4 Mission 3-3 150
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
En > 2000
ine
Cutoff
i000
I
0 50 100 150 200
I
250
Elapsed
Time/Seconds
3-2.
Velocity
During
Boost,
MR-4
Mission
12
4 Deployment
--
/ Retrofire
Main
Parachute
I
0 2
i _i
4 6 Time
Jl
8 - Minutes Time, MR-4
I
10
I
12
I
14
Figure 3-4
3-3.
Axial Acceleration
versus
Mission
Many which
studies some
were
the
normal of the
on the
vehicle
or control included
involved to the
trajectory land
program
time
over
The
path
remained
over
the
Cape
area for
for
first
thirty During
folthe
lowing abort
presented
a difficult to shut
range
engine,
probability and
of an early equipment.
in a hazardous
condition
personnel
safety
played azimuth
role of the
the
specified was
limits. the
from was
no other
along
the
flight launch.
path. The
later
MR-1A 8.)
mission
launched
at 100 degrees
Section
MISSION
PROFILE
AND
SEQUENCE profile
OF EVENTS injected the MERCURY feet and per Mach capsule second. number in a subThe 6.3. injection The
41.80
altitude cutoff
maximum
acceleration
In Table onds abort. down. early eter higher sequent switches Both occur times profile. after
3-1,
several
important was
are
Thirty prior
secto shut-
liftoff
a circuit time,
Prior
to this
could was
an engine This
shutdown
circuitry
armed.
escape occurred
cutoff cutoff
to allow ratio
than early
nominal
performance depletion.
mixture chamber
propellant deactivated
pressure cutoff.
were
an abort originally
cutoff
activation seconds,
and pressure
to
at 137.5 were
of MR-2, shows
indicated flight
selected
for
flights.
Figure
a typical
3-5
Q M
#
I C_
_2
3-6
(143 This
seconds), 9.5
the
abort
system before
was capsule
deactivated separation.
and
the
escape 3-5
tower
jet-
occurred
seconds
Figure
is a block
of the
MERCURY-REDSTONE
mission
sequence.
Table MERCURY-REDSTONE
Mission
Event Liftoff Begin Arm Stop tilt program circuit fuel tank tilt cutoff velocity program for (MR-l, (MR-BD, engine cutoff -IA, and -2) -3, and-4) by abort system
Time
After
(Seconds)
arrest circuit
integrator arrest
fuel depletion cutoff circuit (chamber pressure sensing switches changed to fuel depletion mode) cutoff time (initiated by velocity system integrator)
Nominal
Escape tower deactivation Capsule Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Booster Capsule
separation
and abort
separation maximum maximum capsule capsule impact impact altitude altitude re-entry, main (MR-3 (MR-3 (booster) (capsule) maximum deceleration
unreeled
3-7
Pilot
Ready
Firing
Signal
t
[ Booster
I
Cutoff I i,6 t
I i Abort
! !
Booster
Operation
-*
Signal I
I
t I
I Capsule
Separation
I I
I Escape
Rocket I I -1 I I
_ire
I _*_" I
I
Capsule Posigrade Separation Fire Rocket ]
I [ !
!
t
Capsule Orientation I
Tower
Separation I |
I
[ CastPhase I I
!
Astronaut
Maneuvers
II
Manual
Control to Retroattitude
I I t_
I
I
Mission
Drogue
Chute
Deplo_
L _nC_u_oOo_Xo,, i
I imps, I or
Emergency Chute Deploy
Mission
Alternative Procedures
Figure
3-5.
Block
Diagram
of
MERCURY-REDSTONE
Mission
Sequence
3-8
SECTION
VEHIC LE DESCRIPTION
4.1 The
INTRODUCTION over-all units, are 83.38-foot shown length in Figure in this of the 4-1. MERCURY These units booster and the was made up from contained several within
booster them
systems
described
section.
4.2
STRUC
TURE
GENERAL vehicle skin was and primarily frame Figure was 1.35 constructed design 4-2 with the with 5052 aluminum longerons alloy for using a semisupport The
a ring
additional view.
units.
shows
in an exploded
of safety
on the
propellant
The
structural
Section Section
Shield
With
airborne
equipment
installed,
the total
booster
dryweight
was
8195
pounds.
SECTION transmitted center from section the was engine to the center section this carried by a four-strut load to the from aft the
skin
of the
designed The
stringers was
over
version,
forward tail
or container container
fasteners
in compression. in tension.
unit was
fasteners
4-1
-X
Axis
0
Escape Rocket and Tower
L,I
MERCURY Capsule
X-Axis
Zero
Sta 15"
P.r 8
Separation Adapter
Ring
-W-53.66" A 42:16"
;RS
Instrument
LA S1_ |Ui
Compartment 3
RE( El'
f-- - ""ql
l_f-|1 |1
18.8' 37 50'
||
li
) Oxidizer Ta_
Center
Section [ -Z Fin I
Power Unit
r|ill d
11 -
16.83' 59.00'
II II II ux II II II II II q
I! il
+Y
,_)_ Tail
_ /_ ___
, Unit
/,,
fl"_-i_t \\ _
Rocket Fins
Engine
At
t__._
t
+X Axis
Figure 4-2
4-1.
Booster
Units
Aft Unit
__ /_/_ _/_/'_._
Alcohol /
Instrument
Compartment
,d Oxygen
Tank
/
_ Rocket Engine
Tail
Unit
Carbon Vanes
Jet (4)
Air
Rudders
(4)
Figure
4-2.
Exploded Vehicle
View Structure
of Launch
_/4-4
was on the
0. 090
inch and
on the
aft
unit,
0.063 tail
inch unit.
fuel wool
on the line,
LOX
tank
and
feed
which
through
of the bulkhead
center was
section common
was to both
designed tanks
to withstand and was in the fuel to fuel Nominal tank pressure and designed
25.3
psi for
during
a minidirection. without
oxidizer 90 psid.
pressure vented
psig,
was
19.5
gallons,
nominal
AFT of the
SECTION container aft section, The containing section and was 53.66 section the 139.64--inch-long in length, above aft section. was Positioned instrubelow it antenin
of the
inches was
ballast
the nitrogen
pressurizing
communication
The
instrument
had
four
access
doors
both
pressure and
and
temsup-
controlled. associated
power teleme-
vehicleTs destruct
the
system, mounted
on a T-shaped
structure
of two plates
was
between During
12 and preflight
15 psia
during the
flight
by a
approximately to maintain
of heat,
cooling 40 C.
compartment
temperature
10and
was drop-off
controlled plate,
air
from
the
compartment by means
through of a cooling
temperature
4-5
packagemounted on a cable mast, and returning the cooled air to the compartment through a balanced distribution system. Regulation of the air temperature was affected by a temperature sensor control valve, which varied the air flow through the cooling package. Componentsof this system were the coolant container, blower, check valve, vent valve, control box, air temperature sensor, ducting dehumidifier', three-way valve, andthermoswitches. 4.2.4 TAIL UNIT
The tail unit consisted of the cylindrical section surrounding, but not including, the rocket engine. The air rudders and jet vanes were also parts of the tail unit. This unit was designed to support the entire launch vehicle while standing freely on the launch pedestal. The MERCURY-REDSTONE not use hold down arms during launch. did Inside eachfin and attachedto the tail unit was a servomotor used to rotate the jet vane andair rudder. The servomdtor was driven by electrical signals from the control computer located in the instrument compartment. Located within the upper portion of the tail unit were sevenspheres containing high pressure gases for tank pressurization. The tactical missile hadtwo sets of three tanks each. However, a seventh tank had to be addedduring the MERCURY-REDSTONEmodification program to provide pressurization throughout the increased burning time of the engines. Two hydrogenperoxide tanks used in the propulsion system were also located in this area. The second or auxiliary tank was also addedbecauseof the lengthenedburning time. Two connectors were located on the bottom of Fin II for mechanical and electrical power connections and grounding of the vehicle through the launch pedestal. These connectionswere the last ground-vehicle connectionsto be detachedas the missile lifted off. 4.2.5 ADAPTER AND CAPSULE INTERFACE
The adapter was a conical section bolted to the aft unit which provided the interface betweenthe launch vehicle and the capsule. The capsule was attached to the booster adapter with the capsule adapter-clamp-ring retaining device. The clamp ring secured the lower edge of the capsule to the upper edge of the adapter. The ring had three segmentswhich were fastenedtogether by explosive bolts. The bolts were wired 4-6
separately to provide redundant ring cutting. Each bolt was covered by a shield to prevent fragments of the severed bolt from striking the capsule or booster. To assure proper electrical continuity betweenthe adapter and the capsule, interface templates were used to mount two electrical plug connectors. The physical separation of the booster and capsule was accomplished by firing the capsule's posigrade rockets. However, to be effective, the booster had to be in the cutoff condition with little, if any, residual thrust. Zero thrust was to be expected about3.2 secondsafter booster engine cutoff. Residual thrust from the LOX venting did not interfere with the separation since the LOX vented at low force and in a direction perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle. The posigrade rockets, which extendedinto the ballast section, fired into the upper endof the aft unit and filled the ballast section with gas. The gas pressure further helped the separation by pushing the capsule away from the booster. The Lewis Research Center, NASA, conducted tests and determined that this gas increased separation velocity by approximately 25 feet per second. 4.3
4.3.1 The and the PROPULSION SYSTEM
GENERAL system was composed and to the at the pneumatic container beginning into of the rocket engine, propellant were feed contained The was system, within propulsion by
struts. period
system deflection
achieved
of carbon
inserted
exhaust
engine.
The
subsystems
and
components
of this
system
are
described
in the following
para-
graphs.
4.3.2 The
ROCKET Rocketdyne
ENGINE Model A-7 engine (Figure 4-3) it was was the the powerplant same powerplant to improve at sea was for the MERCURYin the efficiency
launch
vehicles.
of thrust turbopump
ethyl
driven
peroxide.
Turbopump
Fuel
Line
Heat Exchanger
Main Valve
Fuel
Steam Duct
Mixture Control
Ratio Valve
Figure 4-8
4-3.
A-7
Rocket
Engine
The engine starting sequencewas initiated from a ground source by a manual firing command signal. Figure 4-4 illustrates the main actions leading to mainstage burning. Liftoff occurred when approximately 85percent of rated thrust was attained. The thrust level of the enginewas maintained at a specific magnitude by a thrust control system, which compared the actual thrust chamber pressure with a preset electrical null and regulated the flow of hydrogenperoxide into the gas generator. By controlling the flow of peroxide for producing gas the speed of the turbopump controlled the amount of propellants entering the thrust chamber. Once started, engineoperation normally continueduntil the vehicle had reached a predetermined velocity. Whenthis velocity was attained, an integrating accelerometer emitted a signal that initiated an automatic cutoff sequence (Figure 4-5}. This sequenceconsisted essentially of closing the peroxide, main LOX, andfuel valves to stop the engine. As pressure in the thrust chamber decreased, a signal started a timer in the capsule which ultimately triggered capsule separation. 4.3.3 PROPELLANT FEED SUBSYSTEM
The propellant feed subsystemdelivered propellant to the engine at the required pressures and flow rates. The system also included provisions for ignition fuel control. From their tanks, LOX and fuel passed through the turbopump, main valves, and control orifices to the engine. The turbopump consisted of a steam driven, two stage, compoundturbine; a geared speedreduction unit; and two centrifugal propellant pumps. Both pumps operated at the same speed. The turbine ran at a nominal 4800 rpm. Maximum safe speedwas 6000 rpm. Minimum allowable fuel inlet pressure was 16 psig, and minimum oxidizer inlet pressure was 23 psig. During ignition, LOXat tank pressure plus static headwas mixed in the combustion chamber with pressure-controlled ignition fuel from an external ground supply. This method resulted in a controlled oxidizer-rich ignition. 4.3.4 HYDROGENPEROXIDESUBSYSTEM
The hydrogenperoxidesubsystemdrove the turbopump. Hydrogenperoxide concentrated to 75 percent was fed at 1.28 poundsper secondfrom the H202 tanks to the steam generator where it was chemically decomposedinto steam. The steam at approximate 4-9
Figure 4-10
4-4.
Engine
Starting
Sequence
Diagram
PROGRALI CUTOF_ /
I_:ITIATES
/
_fISSILE CUTOFF / / / /
MAI_:STAGE AID LOCKII: RELAYS DEE[[ERGI_,0PE_[ PEROXIDE SIiUTOFF VALVE CONTROL VALVE DEE_RGIZES, PEROXIDE SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSES AHD GEneRATOR CEASES TURBOPUI,_P DECELERATES
CLOSES
FLOW V
TO
SI_EAM
_ERGIZES
.k H I_
FAILURE LINK TO
SENSLUG
_PEROXIDE PRESSURIZING E_ERGENCY CUTOFF RELAY DEE_ERGI ENERGIZES,CLOSES VEHICLE ON GROUND (WHEN 01_LY)
PEROXIDE
TAI,!KS
POSITION
_.....
---e
FUEL VALVE TANK DEE_ERGI FUEL VALVE
DEE_/ERGI
ZES ,OPENS
I
ZES, CLOSES
ILOX
PRESSURIZING
DEE'_R2G_LOSES IGNITER DEF2_ERGI FUEL ZES. VALYE CLOSES IGNITION CONBUSTION FUEL FLOW CHAMBER TO CEASES
Figure
4-5.
Engine
Cutoff
Sequence
Diagram 4-11
740 F and 385psi, was passed through the turbopump, and exhaustedthrough the LOX and pneumatic system heat exchanger. 4.3.5 PNEUMATIC CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
The pneumatic control subsystem (Figure 4-6) provided gaseousnitrogen, at a nominal 580psi, to operate propellant and peroxide valves and to pressurize the peroxide tanks. A tap on the system provided preflight and inflight fuel tank pressurization. LOX tank pressurization andcontrol were also maintained during preflight by gaseousnitrogen, but inflight pressurization was maintained by LOX converted to gaseousoxygen in the heat exchanger. Prior to liftoff, a ground source of pressurized gaseousnitrogen operated the subsystem and supplied nitrogen for the tail section purging (to remove moisture and any volatile gas accumulations) and for fuel line bubbling (to keep the fuel temperature above freezing). 4.4
4.4.1 The tude CONTROL SYSTEM
GENERAL MERCURY-REDSTONE of the vehicle three throughout reference flight. Launch Vehicle control This indicating, gyros type) had been was system maintained the proper attiand
accelerometer
a cutoff
to the
predetermined
attained.
jet
vanes were
located utilized
exhaust
of the
unit,
with
the
the jet
control
stability
until
the air
rudders
Later, their
upper the
atmosphere greater
effective-
controlling
influence.
4-7
illustrates was
the
of the LEV-3
system
in block system
diagram control
form. computer,
As
shown, control
system box,
composed device,
stabilizer and
program
sequencer,
four
electro-mechanical
actuators
feedback.
4-12
FUEL
TANK
VALVE
TANK
REPLENISHING
VALVE
FUELTANK VENT
FUEL TANK VENT VALVE CONTROL FUEL tOX LOX TANK TANK TANK FILL
AUXIN2021
YDROGEN PRESSURE VENT PEROXIDE SWITCH VALVE VALVE
AND
LOX GASEOUS
TANK
VENT
DRAIN VALVE PEROXIDE VENT AND OVERFLOW VALVE MAIN PEROXIDE VALVE SWITCH
NITROGEN (GN 2) STORAGE SPHERES TANK PRESSURE LINE LINE VALVE LINE VALVE COIL
LOX
PRESSURE MAIN
SENSING
PEROXIDE VALVE
VALVE
CONTROL STEAM
PRESSURE PEROXIDE
EXCHANGER
DOME
FUEL BUBBLING CONTROL VALVE LOX TANK REPLENISHING VALVE CONTROL VALVE LOX TANK VENT CONTROL VALVE VALVE
LOX
TANK
LOX
TANK LINE
CONTROL
Figure
4-6.
Pneumatic
System 4-13
iil
O
[__
_o
4-14
OPERATION was essentially an autopilot. attitude after 4-8 tilting program. liftoff, shows the It did not navigate During tilting the nor guide phase was the vehi-
powered
pitch the
gyro. plane
operation device
occurred. system,
stabilization control
zero
system,
shifting
to tilt pitch
aligned was
to the
new
vehicle
made
to align angle
longitudinal measurement.
turn
trajectory
to fly without
of attack
angles required
were steps
of one 4-9
a desired for
rate
Figure
program
was
used
to signal
cutoff
when
the
proper
The sent
by the pickoffs
gravitational
acceleration angle
when
the calibrated
cession
reached.
4.4.3 The
LEV-3 LEV-3
SYSTEM (Figure box, frame 4-10) and from consisted a shock which of pitch and yaw-roll gyros, an The
mounted, vehicle
baseplate. acceleration
provided measured.
gyros which
and
three yaw,
potentiometer
program
of each source;
by a 400 cps
power
angular rpm,
velocity
Slip between
resulting
in a gyro 4-15
Pitch Po_ntiometer
%1
---
I
I
- Z
Figure 4-16
4-8.
Mechanics
of Tilting
Program
I if
g_
<
I1
/
\
0 0
o 0 e.2
o
0 0
/
0
0 if)
\
0
0
\
_ 0
0 N
qoungq dalg
1V
I_a!laaA paaa!qaV
tuoa:I
aalJV
4-17
Fig_ure 4-18
4-10.
MEIICURY-REDSTONE
LEV-3
Stabilizer
System
spin equal
of 22,000
rpm.
The
gyro per
wheel
weighed
1.5
pounds
and had
an angular
moment
second.
gyro
had
prior
This vertical.
ele-
not necessarily
surface
or vehicle's
longi-
The tion as
integrator
gyro
was
pivoted
at one
end This
of its pivoting
spin
axis
and
mounted
within
a junc-
switching
relays. The
allowed
a measure
The was
indicated
latter
subtracted contacts
picked from
by eight
4.4.4 The
CONTROL computer
COMPUTER was a magnetic main signals summing and the LEV-3 amplifier a power system, which supply. filter contained filters, was RC to
control
to obtain proper
angular channels
velocity
to the
of the control
4.4.5 The
RELAY box
BOX mainly relay of four and signals signals duty drove to the switches coils) sets power from and relay the (channels) distribution the control of relays, (heavy each duty) set relay. closed proper its set
consisted (polarized)
having The
a signal
sensing relay
polarized
thereby contacts
energized when
heavy which
supplied
actuator
actuator
28 volt
(de-energized limits.
the heavy
duty
reached
preset
4-19
DEVICE was an extremely onboard provided sequencer) unit was precise, clock the tilt during program master three the channel vehicleVs pulses, telemeter with which the magnetic flight. vehicle calibration the program tape It was device started
of this
and speed
SEQUENCER received command signals from the program device pulses and distrib-
vehicleTs chain.
system pulses
train
of time
by means
of a series
pressurization.
depletion
4.4.8 The
ACTUATORS electro-mechanical by a series of gears devices driven which by adc converted motor. electrical Each a gear of the train, energy four a vane posiinto
mechanical actuator
consisted potentiometer,
dc servomotor,
proportional potentiometer.
to the
was actuator
to the its
control commanded
to cancel
out the
input
velocity
to the
polarized position,
in the
relay
commanded
preventing
and control
vanes
rudders carbon
were vanes
by four coupled
rotary rudders
drove drive.
possible rudders.
deflection
carbon
vanes
degrees
4-20
4.4.9
VEHICLE DYNAMICS
Two aspects of the vehicle dynamics are considered in this section, normal flight and control malfunctions. During normal flight, maximumdynamic pressure occurred at 80 seconds after liftoff with cutoff following at 143 seconds (see paragraph 3.2). Throughout this period the center of gravity andcenter of pressure shifted as shown in Figure 4-11 such that the static margin passed through zero at 89 seconds. At this point the vehicle became aerodynamically unstable. The time at which the instability beganwould have been earlier had not 487 poundsof ballast and 442 poundsof dampeningcompoundbeen added to the aft section. The flight bending moment distribution is shown in Figure 4-12 and the lateral bending modes in Figure 4-13. Both rigid-body and rigid-plus_lastic body calculations are shown. The three sigma plot of bending moment was based on the wind velocities expected at the Cape. These wind velocities used in the calculations are shown in Figure 4-14, andwere assumed to build up in the most unfavorable direction from 0 to maximum velocity at a rate of 0.05 meter per secondper meter of altitude. The natural bending frequencies of the MERCURY-REDSTONE were lower than those experienced by the tactical missile. These lower frequencies caused some feedback in the control system (see changes). The lateral bending frequencies are shown in Figure 4-15 and the longitudinal frequencies in Figure 4-16. Angle of attack was calculated for both ultimate loading and that expected for a three sigma wind. Figure 4-17 shows that the smallest margin (1.5 degrees) occurred at 70 seconds and that at maximum dynamic pressure (MaxQ), the margin had increased to over 2 degrees. Malfunctions in the control system which could have led to a catastrophic damagewithin theshortest time , generally, wouldhaveresulted in control surface hardover. Therefore, jet vane-air rudder hardovers in yaw, pitch, and roll were studied. The effect of hardover on attitude angle is shownin Figure 4-18, on angle of attack in Figure 4-19, and on roll acceleration in Figure 4-20. Roll acceleration can cause a critical
"eyes up vTcondition and attitude for the astronaut changes if the were condition. 4-21 radial acceleration because they reaches define the 6 gTs. rate Angle at which of attack the vehicle angle studied
approaches
a breakup
CG/D
CP/D
14
12
10
CP/D
CG/D
00
50 Flight Time
100 (see)
150
Figure
4-11.
During
Center Time
of of
Gravity Flight
and
Center
of
4-22
t',,-
r_ @ I
I
_o H
r_
i 0
b_
Z 0
r_
II I I I Ill
I I
i
_4
I
t l II I i LJ
4-23
L_.
b--
// //
_
c=> r,D @
II
L_.
/ /
I I
I
_3 (D ;>
\
\
<
\
,-,-I
\\ \\_
"_
z_ 0
!
_,__
_ _
:_ .,.-i
<
I
I
I
I
I
I
4-24
110 100 9O
_9
80 70 --_ 60
8
_
"a e_
.p-I
50
4o 30
....
wind velocity
velocity
2 t
10 0
I
20
I
40 Altitude
I
60 (Feet
I
80 x 1000)
]
100
]
120
Figure
4-14.
Maximum
Design
Wind
Velocity
versus
Altitude 4-25
Frequency 18 17 16 15 14
cps
Natural
Freq.
I
0 20
l
40 Flight
l
60 Time
l
80 - Seconds
I
100
l
120
l
140
Figure
4-15.
Lateral
Bending
Natural
4-26
Frequency cps 9O
8O
7O
6O
5O
4O
3O
2O
First
Natural
Freq.
10
I
20
I
40
I
60 Flight Time
I
80 - Seconds
I
100
I
120
l
140
Figure
4-16.
/ /
/
70 aULT a3c r - Structural ultimate angle of attach (failureoccurs) Expected angle of attack due to 3a wind
/ / /
6O aULT_/ 50
/
/
CD
4O
/ /
/
/
\
q)
v
_9
3O
<
/
J
f
2O
10
0 50
I
60
I
70 Time
I
80 - Second
I
90
I
100
I
Ii0
I
120
MERCURY-REDSTONE
Comparison
28
(Starting {at
20
_9
16
O 0 b_
12
b_
Pitch
Hardover at
(Starting at 60 or 80 Sec)
0 0.2 Time
I
0.4 (Sec) From
I
0.6 Start
I
0.8 of Malfunction
I
1.0
I
1.2
Figure
4-18.
on Vehicle
Angle
of Attack
4-29
28
Hardover therefore,
16
b_
/ /
_25 Yaw Hardover Starting at 120 Seconds *25 Yaw Starting at Hardover 60 or 80 Seconds
_12 <
Hardover 60 or 80 Seconds
.5
J
0 0.2 Time 0.4 (Seconds) 0.6 from Start
I
0.8 of Malfunction
I
1.0
I
1.2
Figure
4-19.
Effects a Function of
of Yaw Flight
and Time)
Pitch
Hardover
on
Vehicle
4-30
24
Angular Acceleration in Roll at 80 Seconds - 25 Radians/Sec 2 when all actuators fail hard over in roll (+_25)
2O
16
.r.4
b_
12
Automatic 40 Limit
Abort
System 6g Limit
_._ - Ncceke_: s ,v
0.3 of Malfunction
0.4
0.5
Figure
4-20.
Effect
of Roll
Hardover
at 80 Second
4-31
4.5
The tional
POWER of the
NETWORK MERCURY-REDSTONE network. The was components instrument box and the tail comprised of the of a general system were in the which operacontained middle were in
a measuring
in the pressurized, of the aft unit, the tail unit. to the below 4-21. except A cable
conduit
terminal 4-1.
box and
distributor. power
in Table
Electrical
is shown
diagrammatically
Table Electrical
4-1 Supplies
Power
Power 28 vdc
Type
Source One 1850 amp-minute battery at 10 Minute rate. Zinc-Silver oxide; 72 hour standby life One 2650 amp-minute battery at 10 minute rate. Zinc-Silver oxide; 72 hour standby life One 50 amp-minute battery at 10 minute rate. ZincSilver oxide; 72 hour standby life Instrument battery in-
Equipment
Powered
28 vdc
60 vdc
Control
Signals
LEV-3 Autopilot, Control Computer, Program Device, AZUSA, DOVAP, Rate Switches, and Measuring System Prelaunch: Serving Strip Heaters, H20 Blanket line Heating
4-32
I
r
|
/
o _ ooooo o o
I
I
_ I_
.
,-i
,--i
_-i
o o
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,-_ _
_-_
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._ _
4-33
I TELEMETRY
I AND
TELEVISION
equipped before
with and
equipment This
capable equipment
and prin-
equipment
consisted
Decoders.
4.6.2 The
AND
DECODERS were the principal system ground. the antennas, components was to provide For positive the destruct of the command means the and
The
vehicle
redundant
throughout, to these
sharing
connections
components.
various
command
signals (located
(FM),
dual-comtones.
transmitters FM carrier
was audio
applied
decoders, circuitry
the com-
completing 4.7.
execution
of the
paragraph
TRANSPONDER Velocity and Position) is a long baseline continuous the instantaneous wave system velocity
Doppler and
principle. ballistic
It is used trajectory
to predict
of impact.
The
broadcast Model
frequency 0,
from
the
launch
site
was
36. from
the
the
in frequency to the
retransmitted being
stations.
transmitting determination
sta-
in a known coordinates.
geometrical
configuration,
accurate
of trajectory 4-34
AZUSA
TRANSPONDER high-precision, interferometer of a short all-weather principle. baseline ground The electronic It was station used tied trajectory in trajectory in with measuring and impact 709 a
It consisted
an IBM carried
MERCURY-REDSTONE
TELEMETRY MERCURY-REDSTONE 17 standard per subcarrier second. telemetering frequencies Sixteen channels system modulating transmitted at the in early rate was a PAM-FM-FM System employ221.5 while The sysof the a
a RF carrier information
While it is still
latest
in the
available. and
It consisted a power
of a Model
FM-FM
package,
1101 power
amplifier,
divider.
were 4-2.
launch
vehicle
These
measure-
measurements, channel
a tabulation
commutated
straight
assignments
4.6.6 The
ANTENNAS following is a list Command DOVA P A Z USA Telemetry of the number and 1 pair, 2 pairs, 1 antenna, 3 antennas, type of antennas cavity installed slot. handlebar type. on the launch vehicle:
in phase.
Figure
4-22
shows
the locations
of the
antennas.
TELEVISION only, a television During the camera boost was installed of flight, on the the exterior of the instrument pictures of the 4-35
phase
camera
transmitted
Dovap
III
Telemetr'
Dovap
/
Telemetr
l
,Telemetry
Dovap
Azusa
Command
I
Dovap
Figure 4-36
4-22.
Antenna
Locations
earth below. The camera was mounted to view upward and slightly inward, thus mirrors were used to reflect the earth's image into the camera lens. At engine cutoff, the mirrors and their mounting bracket were jettisoned by squibloaded mechanisms. This permitted the camera to view the separation of the capsule from the booster. Table 4-2 MERCURY-REDSTONEBooster Flight Telemetry Measurements
Measurement
C C
C C C S S
C C C S S
C C C S S
C C C S S
C C C S S
LOX Alcohol
Flow
Rate
(0-25
gallons
at Pump
Pressure
Error Signal of Thrust Controller (i 5 psia Combustion Chamber Pressure After Cutol
_tructural Pressure-Vibration-Temperature Instrument (0-30 psi) Instrument Temperature Vibration (+ 30 g) Compartment Compartment of AZUSA - Capsule Pressure C Temperature Transponder Ring, Skin Lateral S Low S Rate S S S S S S S C C C C C C C C C
Mounting
Vibration - Capsule Mounting RingFrequency, (Lateral) Vibration - Instrument Compartment Switch Bracket (longitudinal) Vibration- LEV-3 (longitudinal) Base Plate
S 4-37
Flight Mechanics Angular Velocity-Pitch (+ 10 degrees per second) Angular Velocity - Yaw (J:10 degrees per second) Angular Velocity - Roll (+ 10 degrees per second) Longitudinal Acceleration (0 to 6 g) Longitudinal Acceleration (-0.5 to +0.5 g) SpeedPips (from gyro velocity integrator)
Vehicle Tilt Input Control Program, to Flight LEV-3 Sequencer (minus Program)
S S C S S S
S S C S S S
S S C S S S
S S C C C S
S S C S S S
S S C S S S
S S S
S S S S C C C C C
S S S S C S C C C
S S S S C S S C C
S S S S C C C C C
S S S S C C C C C
Gyro Pitch Position (+ 15 degrees) Gyro Gyro Yaw Roll Position Position - Jet - Jet - Jet - Jet
(_: 15 degrees) (+ 15 degrees) Vane Vane Vane Vane No. No. No. No. 1 ( 15 degrees) 2 (+ 15 degrees) 3 (i 15 degrees) 4 (i 15 degrees)
S C C C C C
S S S S S S S C C C C
S S S S S S S C C C C
S C C C C C C C C C
S S S S C S S C S C C
S S S S C S S C S C C
- Attitude
Abort - Angular Velocity (_: 5 degrees per second) Abort - Angular Velocity (+ 5 degrees per second)
Abort - Angular Velocity - Roll (+ 12 degrees per second) AbortAbort Control from Voltage
Separation Detached
Signal Signal
Table 4-2 (Cont) MR-1 MR-1A MR-2 MR-BD MR-3 MR-4 Signals Liftoff Cutoff Emergency Cutoff CommandControl Battery Voltage (45-65 vdc) Inverter Voltage (105-130vac) Fuel Dispersion - Safe (5 to 2 1/2 vdc) Fuel Dispersion - Armed (5 to 2 1/2 vdc)
S S C C C
S S C C C C
S S C C C C
S S C C C C
S S C C C C C
S S C C C C C
4.7
FUEL
DISPERSION
(DESTRUCT)
SYSTEM
(destruct system) consisted of two redundantly connected unit, and prima cords placed in the propellant
The the
remote prima
arming cord.
unit employed This fire unit was upon receivers and was
igniter to liftoff
squibs, by the
capable personnel.
squibs The
would command
receipt fuel
from
engine
shutdown, interlock
a three-second in the
for
astronaut officer's
shutdown circuit.
not included
safety
and
command
signals
is explained
in paragraph
5.1.5.
the destruct
system.
4.8
INITIAL
DESIGN
CHANGES
GENERAL redesign was changes necessary and to adapt were the JUPITER-C made: to the MERCURY mission.
following
additions
4-39
Vehicle
[ ] ] [ [
I
I I
Remote Arming
Igniter
prima Cord
I I
Decoder KY55/ARVv InE_ni!i_f!ks | Shutdown 3 Sec Delay[ ] I t
Remote Arming
Igniter
b Prima Cord
Unit
Igniter Squib
Figure
4-23.
Fuel
Dispersion
(Destruct)
System
4.8.2
STRUCTURE
4.8.2.1
Center
Section
To handle
meet the
the loads
propellant increased
tanks propellants,
were
used. the
To tank skin
thickness
4.8.2.2
Aft
Section
The military
aft
unit
and
adapter these
permanently separated
to
the
center to
(tank) provide
section. terminal
In guidance.
the
version
payload
short by actor.
adapter
including contractor.
the This
capsule placed
booster responsibility
separation for
clamp separation
ring
was with
supone
plied contr
The
aft
unit
was
lengthened
7.08
inches
to
provide
access
to
the
capsule
retrorockets.
4-40
dish was
was retained
added
a booster of the
recovery
to protect aft
posigrade
which
fired
into the
section
separation.
to increase cooling
the of the
electronic Layout
was
the pressuri-
compartment
completely
redesigned
control
and abort
systems.
Due the
to its
payload
and
elongated
tanks,
the
became
in
supersonic
to Figure ballast
of steel
added
of the test
compartment. as a result
reduced
during for
of the addition
of dampening
necessary
vibration
control.
Because and
of the
extra
loads
imposed were
by the
increased inner
weight skin
of the
MERCURY
capsule
propellants,
stringers
added
to the
structure
Tail
Unit actuators steel from shields the were additional added heat generated during the longer
to the fins.
A nitrogen an explosive
gas
purge
system in the
was engine
added area
to the while
tail
unit
to prevent pad.
the
accumulation
of
mixture
on the
launch
4.8.3 Nominal
REDSTONE.
burning
time
required and
the
addition
of a seventh hydrogen
high
pressure tank
nitrogen the
pressurization,
an auxiliary
peroxide
to power
turbopump.
To prevent from
major
changes A-7
was for
immediately replacement
the A-6
to the
shortage
of hardware
would
occurred
the
MERCURY-REDSTONE
4-41
This early changeoveravoided a foreseeable problem area but required an accel.erated test program. A conservative approach was taken with regard to the choice of propellants. The JUPITER-C had used Hydine for greater performance, but its toxicity was considered undesirable for mannedflights. In addition, the A-7 engine had never flown with Hyaline. Thus for MERCURY-REDSTONE,alcohol was chosen. This selection led to a problem with the vital jet vanes. Alcohol eroded the vanesfaster than Hydine and this coupledwith the increased erosion of the vanes. Alcohol eroded the vanesfaster than Hydine and this coupled with the increased burning time required a selective program to obtain jet vanesof the highest quality A fuel line bubbling system was added. By bubbling nitrogen gas through the fuel line during the prelaunch countdownfuel freezing was prevented during long holds. Chamber pressure sensing line heaters were addedto eliminate failure due to water vapor freezing in the lines. The propellant feed subsystem was modified to include a fixed LOX stand pipe and a ground computer for automatic LOX topping during prelaunch activities. Within the rocket engine system: the pump volute bleed line was removed, the servo valve was modified, the computer assembly was modified, the main fuel and oxidizer valves were shimmed, andthe LOX pump wear ring was changedto stainless steel to eliminate sparking (by maintaining proper blade clearances). O-ring materials were changedin the hydrogenperoxide subsystem to reduce leakage. (Over-aged seals were also replaced ) 4.8.4 FLIGHT CONTROLSYSTEM
The ST-80 REDSTONEstabilized platform was eliminated and the guidance system replaced by the LEV-3 autopilot. 4.8.5 AUTOMATIC INFLIGHT ABORT SENSING SYSTEM
To assure crew safety, an automatic inflight abort sensing system was addedto the booster, and emergency egress operations were incorporated at the launch site. Installation of the automatic inflight abort sensing system sensors required some modification of the other vehicle systems.
4-42
POWER power requirements were also and distribution of the new modified network equipment. were required to meet the
ground
equipment
or changed
to match
vehicle
systems.
4.8.7
INSTRUMENTATION, made
COMMUNICATIONS,
AND
TELEVISION
and flightexperiments.
systems
were
added
to provide
accurate
and
redundant
teleme-
A television MERCURY
monitoring Control
system
was
added
to the
aft unit
to display
separation
to
personnel.
SYSTEM system destruct the was modified to include the a three-second capsule sufficient delay time between com-
destruct distance
initiation booster.
to permit
to separate
GROUND vehicle
EQUIPMENT structure was level, event modified and had so that it was remotely and controllable, blast shield tower.
a semi-clean protected
a flame
deflector firing
in the
of accidental
of the escape
Additional tional
air
conditioning test
was
added and
to the additional
blockhouse launch
to offset personnel.
the heat
of the
addi-
electrical
equipment
blockhouse generator
monitoring subsystem.
equipment
was
installed
for
the abort
system
and
the
The into
of abort support
from
the
pad
necessitated the
the
batteries
equipment failure
to maintain
launch
of power
Electronic of the
to receive
telemetry
of the onboard
4-43
system, control
purposes.
These
data ground
were
displayed
in the 7).
of the electrical
support
equipment
to Section
An emergency
egress
system
was
added.
Other
equipments
were
added
as described
in Section
7.
4.9
LATER
MODIFICATIONS
GENERAL the test modifications. details concerning programs These several changes for problem occurred the areas were discovered of both the which ground used 8. required and flight detests. the
as a result
methods 6 and
effects
in Sections the
quick
reference. below:
Accordingly,
modifications
rea-
grouped
4.9.2
FROM instability
GROUND was
discovered this
removed
occurred following
during components,
to vibrational or beefing
failure up:
were
modi-
b.
C.
switch switch
bracket.
d.
e.
f. g.
FROM
impregnated of the
added
bulkhead
walls
an additional
4-44
102pounds of compoundwere added(see Figure 4-24). Longitudinal stiffeners were also addedto the internal skin surface as follows: Flight MR-BD 4 stiffeners Flight MR-3 14 stiffeners Flight MR-4 14 stiffeners Prior to MR-BD the H202 pressure regulator was set at 570psig. After MR-2 the thrust control servo valve was adjusted to a minimum of 25 percent open for smoother starting. Excessive pivot torque on the LEV-3 longitudinal integrating accelerometer, used for engine cutoff, was prevented after MR-1A by relocation of 5 of 8 electrical leads and use of softer wire on the remaining three. In addition to this accelerometer, a timebased cutoff at 143 seconds was employed on MR-2 and MR-BD. Velocity cutoff arming and switching of the Pc switches to the depletion mode (fuel depletion arming) were separated after MR-2; also, velocity cutoff arming was advanced to 131seconds, and fuel depletion arming was set at 135 seconds. The roll-rate abort sensor was foundunnecessary and was deleted after MR-2 to increase mission success. A network filter was addedto the control computer to reduce control loop gain between 6 and 10 cps after MR-2. After MR-l, a one foot ground strap was addedand the Fin II connector mounting modified (see Figure 4-25). The vibration pickup was moved from the rate switch bracket to LEV-3 baseplate after MR-1A for the remaining flights. For Flight MR-BD two jet vane deflections, onelow frequency vibration transducer, and oneengine chamber pressure measurement were telemetered via straight channels. An "Arm Cutoff to Capsule" switch was addedto the blockhouse propulsion panel after MR-1.
4-45
0 0 0 _
_rj
2_ -_._
.,==(
.o
'4--)
._
2_
-.4 " .-
<
r<
g_
<
I
<
0
I.
_------(_.
c_
o L)
<
o
_.,i
r/}
4
I
0 Z
,.-.;
4-46
Fin I
Fin II
Launcher
Ground
Strap
Strap Has ~ 1 Ft Travel Before Connection Is Broken ,_ 50 Pounds Pull Break Connection Ground Strap From Engine Is Required To
k Propulsion Connector
Is Protected Blast
Figure
4-25.
Ground
Strap
Function
Just
After
Liftoff
4-47
SECTION MAN-RATING
5.1 The
TION program crew for safety the MERCURY-REDSTONE abort This capability was the was flights, of these was from further mission planned the to achieve time the
by providing
capsule
safety
increased reliability
to improve programs
success operation
by permonitor-
vehicle
ing of the
abort
sensing
flights.
The well
was
initiated
at a time reliability.
when
the
REDSTONE reliability,
been for
an established Section
This
for new
manned program
required
could
and the
reliability; safety
therefore, by adding
man-rating system
on increasing vehicle
astronaut's necessitated
an abort
making
those
changes
by mission
requirements.
1959,
the
Army The
Ballistic following
Missile March,
Agency the
received Group
the (STG)
adaptation. an abort
ABMA held
to design
During
May
between
STG, an abort
only
the
to be "open During
loop," and
obtaining additional
amount and
system
testing were
possible. phased
1959
quality
control
procedures
in as permitted
by the
launch
schedule.
5.2
AUTOMATIC
INFLIGHT
ABORT
SENSING
SYSTEM
GE_RAL automatic which inflight could lead the abort sensing system was developed to detect safety. booster vehicle If such engine malfunca malfuncan abort
of the
astronaut's the
tion was
sensed,
shutdown
and send
5-1
signal to the capsule. This signal activated the escapesystem through the MAYDAY relays. The abort sensing systems thus, hadto be compatible with the vehicle, the capsule interface, andthe modes of flight operation. A block diagram of the system is shown in Figure 5-1. 5.2.2 SYSTEMCRITERIA
Crew safety required immediate and decisive action in the event an emergency condition developed. The abort action had to prevent the emergency condition from becoming a catastrophe, i.e., a condition which gravely endangeredthe life of the astronaut. An automatic abort sensing and implementation system was selected since some
emergency addition, loads was conditions an automatic not well could system develop would from too rapidly to permit an astronaut, manual whose activation performance and sense all of abort. under In flight relieve the
established,
requirement
to monitor
emergency
situations.
5.2.3 The
GUIDE LINES the development system launch of this syste_u were as follows: critical performance
sensing of the
to the
The abort sensing system components and one signal sent to the capsule. The abort condition signal exists. shall be given as soon
be located
on the
launch
vehicle
as possible
after
an emergency
be activated
at liftoff
and completely
deactivated
at
The
guidelines
design
were
Existing wherever
hardware,
easily
and
reliably
monitor
the
Electrical power for the normal ac and dc supply GSE monitoring Sensor and system of sensors shall
shall be taken from the launch vehicle's Loss of power shall be an abort condition.
performance or sensor
Switching eliminated.
5-2
Attitude Abort
Sensor
Sensors
vdc
+5 degrees/second ,5 degrees/second
L [I '
-_
sensors can be
must
Astronaut
out
before __
_ le i
-7
I t'-"--""--_
-`L'T'3-''
[ Abort booster is also 2_'dc Booster booster catastrophic Loss of booster the failure abort. de-energizes strophic initiating 28 vde, initiated by ' through energizes detection vde, after calmrelays, 28 capsulecapsule L.O., D ] _ loss of
Abort f / [ relavs_-l--_[---_ /J
Not Active Until Pressure Limit: seconds 210 _ 300 psig psig +15 psi L.O. +30 sec.
/ _w_
1_ /"_/ ] / _ ] Nominal Abort At 135
interface, failure
capsule detection
i Emergency Cutoff (Range Only) Abort System Abort Attitude Rate Control Combustion Signal Signal Abort Combustion No. Signal 2 from Capsule Telemetered Bus Signal Error Switch Abort Abort Information Signal Signals (Pitch and Signal Abort Abort Yaw) Safety
No.
Notes
: The system At the normal capsule booster automatic active engine no longer signal. the abort sensors in the are booster will abort lift-off abort supervised equipment. abort at lift-off. cutoff accept bus at and all becomes
ground
Figure
5-1.
Automatic
5-3
The guidelines for hardware design were as follows: Flight-proven equipmentshall be used to the greatest extent possible. All equipment shall be subjectedto a thorough qualification test program. All componentsof the abort sensing system shall be subjected to a thorough reliability test program. MALFUNCTION AND PERFORMANCESTUDIES
5.2.4
Prior to selecting the abort parameters, a failure mode analysis was made of 60 REDSTONFtactical missile flights to determine the best choice of malfunction sensors (Table 5-I). The study included a large number of componentswhich had failed or could conceivably fail and found that sensing eachcomponentand mode of failure was both impracticable and degradingto operational reliability. However, the study did indicate that many malfunctions led to identical results, thus permitting the use of only a few basic types of sensors. The parameter sensors and limits selected are given in Table 5-2. To determine the abort limits in attitude andangular rates, probability studies were made based on REDSTONEperformance. The results, tabulated in Table 5-3, led to the final selection of the abort limits. The chamber pressure limits for abort were established by a study of the thrust buildup andnormal fluctuations, (Figure 5-2). The electrical voltage limit was set just abovethe minimum required to operate the missile electrical systems. 5.2.5 5.2.5.1
With the
ABORT SENSINGRELIABILITY
General addition of an abort sensing system of a false was used to the abort in the launch signal sensing the vehicle, curtailing system mission reliability
probability
also
subject
astronaut an actual
to unnecessary emergency
to reduce paragraphs
probability describe
of failing specifically
to detect
of parameters abort
employed a false
the probability
an actual
condition
5-4
Table 5-1 Flight Failure Analysis of REDSTONEPropulsion System Mode of Failure 1. Roughcombustion
Gas generator system performanc e drop.
Probable
Cause
Corrective
Action
i Dry
and
slow
start.
lead
start
was
a.
H202 tank pressure regulator failure. H202 depletion. Vortex in H202 tank. valve
Improved (8073214)
b. c.
tanks.
Valve lower
bearings friction.
were
redesigned
to
High LOX flow, and preliminary data used in flight prediction analysis. Increased pressure drop across the gas generator system during flight.
test used
data
became
available prediction
in MR flight
Gas generators on all engines inspected for proper loading. firing of the boosters included tion from nominal to high and low thrust levels in 10 steps.
control imopera-
a.
Water froze in pressure transducer sensing line. Improper servo valve calibration.
a.
b.
b.
Strip heaters were installed on pressure transducer sensing lines to maintain temperature above freezing. Interchange of servo valves was not allowed. Replacement limited to use of recalibrated spare only. cable to servo valve was not permitted during on MR vehicles.
control inop-
5-5
Mode
.
of Failure
Probable Same as 8.
Cause Same
Corrective as 8.
Action
Cutoff velocity, flight time, and range greater than predicted. Fuel depletion (cutoff earlier than predicted).
10.
of
was
employed
A review of the REDSTONE propulsion system inflight malfunction and performance deviations was conducted to ascertain that necessary actions were taken to correct the possible deficiencies of the MERCURY-REDSTONE booster. Note: Failure missiles, missile boosters 1 and 3, which occurred during flight tests of earlier REDSTONE resulted in unsuccessful accomplishment of the booster and mission. The other 8 failures were less serious and permitted the to complete their missions.
Table MERCURY-REDSTONE
Parameter Vehicle Attitude Pitch Yaw Roll Vehicle Angular Vel oc ity Engine Combustion Chamber Pressure 60 vdc Power Control Supply
Limit
and
Tolerance
Control Detector
Voltage
if connector
5-6
Table 5-3 REDSTONEAttitude Angles and Rates During A Normal Ballistic Trajectory
" Item
Predicted Maximums
Probability less than 0.155 at 95 percent confidence* Probability less than O. 058 at 95 percent confidence* Probability less than 0. 028 at 95 percent c onfidenc
e*
Attitude Angles !(degrees) Pitch Yaw Roll Attitude Rates (degrees per second)
Pitch Yaw Roll
from
flight
test
data
of 50 previous
REDSTONE
and
5.2.5.2 If a particular
Vehicle
to be detected or by redundancy
performance
parameters
in the
sensor
Attitude
Error
and
Rate failed
Switches and control the vehicle axis. failure deviations Also, the since would such in the have been
sensor
normally also
to one axis,
sensors
5-7
0 o
v
_4
I ke_ o
',-4
"o o .o o o
5-8
Detectors dc control it failed, attitude case, the voltage the LEV-3 was lost, attitude and the and the control would would have voltage not have have been gone detectors been able
deviations rate
out of since
switches power
would 3ource.
in operation
were
by the
400 cps
Combustion Parallel
Pressure employed
one pressure
failed.
of a False from
Abort a failed
Sigr_al abort sensor of high recovery were made: precludes acceleration area. successful flight In order loads, mission completion
subjects
to the
hazards
buffetting sensor
an off-nominal provisions
to prevent
Sensor voltage operation level of this and from sensor, an abort an attitude a loss signal piekoff of this would of the voltage have LEV-3 would been had have given. to be made
inoperative,
not
Switches spring contacts turning kept was around the switch arm in the motor zero was rate position. Closing rate of
possible its
at a rate
limits.
Voltage control
Detectors detectors drop were used value Switches pressure lock-in This increased relays, lock-in during at mainstage and place feature thrust the engine parallel giving permitted ignition, pressure an abort ground in series before and both abort would would have have been had to
voltage
indicate
a voltage
initiated.
switches
switches signal
in the if the
prevented and
switches of them
buildup
monitoring
5-9
Capsule-Launch Vehicle Electrical Interface The Capsule-launchvehicle interface provided the means for the launch vehicle's 29 vdc to energize the capsule catastrophic failure detection relays. Loss of this voltage after liftoff would have initiated an abort signal, Two physically separate electrical interfaces were provided in order to prevent a false abort signal dueto an interface wire connectionbreak. 5.2.6 ABORT SIGNAL INITIATION AND SEQUENCING
The over-all system was designed to initiate abort signal: By wire link before liftoff. By radio link before and after liftofL By manual (astronaut) initiation after capsule umbilical drop. By the launch vehicle inflight abort sensing system after liftoff. These modes of abort initiation andthe time sequencingused are shown in Figure 5-3 through 5-6. As indicated in the figures, range safety considerations determined a major stepin the sequencing. If an abort was required early in the flight (before T+30 seconds), the booster might have fallen on land if the abort signal was permitted to shutdownthe engine in the normal manner. Thus, initiation of engine shutdownwas limited to the RangeSafety Officer during that period. 5.2.7 5.2.7.1
The
MERCURY-REDSTONE 5-7 Bus and (input Abort The bus. and abort 5-8
Figures Abort
respectively. the
circuits: Cutoff
Relay
Engine
signals bus
from
were the
would liftoff.
command
relays
via hardwire,
5-10
--
JJ
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B <J _o c_ m
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o X _
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X X -
x x
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p----m_ l----,----l.----i
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5-11
eL
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5-12
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/
"_.:_ _-_< ;_.i-_ _ _
_iii ,'
@\J #
"----..
L_:f_
5-13
r,.)
hi)
2;
0
5-14
b-
4_
_e
[-N
b_0
T+---_ I
o_ v
g_
v.--
q_ O
z
O
>0
I
6_
0
_,.4
p_
T_
o _N
09
0 O'
I O
P_
_5
T
.<
=
.<
_lnsde
_ITSS!N
:_80
5-15
o"_ [.-, o o
r_ v I
_.-I
_o _
I
Z
0
F_
5-16
bus
was
equipment. if an abort
For
safety
and
as a final in the
check, automatic a.
condition
existed
to liftoff.
of the
gyro
system the
in pitch, limit,
yaw,
and
exceeded
specified
a signal
to the
abort
b.
Rate The
Switches three rate switches were movements abort bus. mounted occurred The roll the in the pitch, yaw, and roll axes. a
axes,
to the
only
monitored
by telemetry
Co
energize
voltage a signal
below
50 volts,
to indicate
the
bus. Chamber switches With a rise Pressure were Switches mounted on the pressure, the chamber prevented buildup. engine the to sense switches chamber actuated, switches due locking in the
do
Combustion Two pressure pressure. in relays abort (failure) parallel given due
in chamber
switches
during
thrust the
possibility switches
of the
seconds,"
necessary
an abort Cutoff
shutdown. Officer Officer was prohibited not shown permitting signal paths until on the 30 seconds schematic, These cutoff.' 5-17
out" were
engine employed
main
thus
cutoff. for
to provide
redundant
abort. Relays K5 andK16, the two emergency cutoff relays, were operated by command receiver No. 1 and commandreceiver No. 2, respectively, and like the command receivers, were poweredfrom independent28-volt supplies. These relays triggered the abort bus and started two timers which blocked the fuel dispersion (destruct) system for three secondsafter receipt of an emergency cutoff command. This eliminated the possibility of fuel dispersion before an attempted abort. CapsuleAbort If the astronaut initated an abort, the signal openedcontacts K17-1and K17-2, which initated abort and enginecutoff as stated above, cutoff was blocked until after liftoff. All wires which supplied abort signals or power from the launch vehicle to the capsule were duplicated for redundancy. Abort Relay The abort contacts K7-1, -2, -3, and -4, were tied directly to the abort bus. Co-_tactsK7-1 andK7-3 provided the lock-in feature to the abort bus when liftoff relay, K3,was de-energized. Oncethe abort bus was energized from any of the abort sensors, the bus locked-in if the vehicle had moved 3/32 of an inch, an amount sufficient to de-energize the liftoff relay. Abort could also be initiated up to liftoff by commandfrom the ground through a hardwi re comlection to the capsule After liftoff, ground commandof abort could only be given through the capsule command receivers. The abort relay gavean abort signal directly to the capsule andwould initate enginecutoff 30 secondsafter liftoff. As an additional safety feature the vehicle electrical system supplied the capsule a constant 28-volt signal through the series-normally-closed contacts of K7-1 and -2, K7-3 and -4. This inadvertant loss of electrical power to assured abort by removing power from the abort circuit to the capsule. Engine Cutoff Enginecutoff could be initiated by six sources subsequentto liftoff plus thirty seconds: a. Abort (by energizing the commandreceiver relays). b. Integrator velocity cutoff. c. Propellant depletion (by meansof combustion chamber pressure switch within 8 secondsof calculated cutoff).
f.
5-18
d. Abort from capsule e. Cutoff command from Launch Director (until liftoff). f. Emergency cutoff by RangeSafety Officer. 5.2.7.2
The Attitude of the Error attitude Sensor error limits sensing The input sensor in pitch, triggers, signals sensor was to actuate yaw, and each were output roll with derived actuated the abort attitudes two bus if the vehicle cut-
function
deviated off.
beyond
prior
to engine adjustable
Three
OR-type pickoffs
from the
potentiometer circuit.
and the
Supply Reference
50 to 60 volts 0C + 55 C.
Paragraph
impedance
50 K ohms
or greater
0. 005 microfarads
f.
Minimum Limits
Abort
Tolerances Limit 5 degrees 5 degrees 10 degrees Plus Plus Plus Tolerance 1.0 degree, 1.0 degree, 2.0 degree, minus minus minus 0 degree 0 degree 0 degree
basic
is shown
in the
block
5-9.
Each
gyro
corresponding polarity
to gyro signal
compared when
respect were
to ground, reached.
limits
direction
5-19
"
7
I
00
0
0
0 ;>
o o
o o
e-"
o
._._
t!
ql
--IZ_--
I
I
I
I i
5-20
The
trigger
input
gated-diode
as a base
by
emitter oscillator
input from
oscillator contacts
and
amplified
to operated
a relay
details
on the was
5-10).
cathode input
diode
direction until
causing the
input
PNPN
The the
diode
in the diode.
PNPN the
supply in the
voltages reference
achieved The
by use zener
as the
source,
compensation resistor
combination
temperature
compensation. Oscillator coupling output diodes was in the capacitor-coupled rectifier due rectified which circuit to a rectifier prevented variations was the circuit. The level in the that in the an
changes and
to voltage output
amplifier from
above for
the
time
to charge
in the transient
collector voltage
to remove
de-energized.
5-21
z-
.b
0
0 r._
',_, :1
___
-tl-" <
_:_
Iv""--
5-22
input. of the of the PNPN coupling diode. capacitor between oscillator and dc
amplifiers. d. e. Loss nor Short Open circuit or short of either circuit transistor of the in the output. or diodes sensor circuit in the would reference not have network. caused an abort,
resistors the
power
within
not mentioned
above.
attitude. to close
Yaw
switches
designed rate
and yaw roll rate separate roll rate rate switch (or axis, axes. switch
rates were
minus
second. in the pitch, abort. parameter. damping to angular velocity pole, about doubledevice, yaw, The
motions switches
vehicle used
to signal
used
only for
monitoring
supported
on bearings, was
axis.
absence The
a single
switch
Motor mentum
power of the
was gyro
In the to insure
event
of power for
failure, several
the
angular
mo-
operation
minutes;
however;
5-23
iU-_
fi
o
.@
i "_ C)
eO
_d
<
. .tit
ti,4 ! t.Ca )
_'_ I
.E
7,4.
"
5-24
have
been
in the the
angular
velocity
required have
to give remained
the in the
Also, and
switch
contacts
would
would
of a dry life
inert
hours. selected degree built A rate to give It had The closed and
bearings assuring
thus life.
The
switches
to withstand switch
vibrations was
between in series
monitor
output
switches switches,
and had
was
used
an abort, system
caused
occurred.
except
rate
was
connected angular
by excessive
to the
the
of the
other readout.
telemetry
is shown
5.2.7.4 The
Detector from the potentiometer voltage. loss of the _bort the.absence Loss abort sensing pickoffs of this sensing system, signal of the voltage LEV-3 would gyros have dein sen-
dc control and
resulted error
vehicle
to'monitor error
voltage
of an abort
attitude
decrease
in or loss
of control
voltage
potential.
at the for
of the
the
exact
voltage timer
employed
delay
5-25
To Abort
Bus
* 28 VDC
(
.mm_
.mm.
mmm
mm
i_
L_"____ R,_ate,-:w_teh
!! 1
__ __ J
LI
It_
Telemeter
Figure 5-26
5-12.
Attitude
Rate
Switch
Block
Diagram
I
I
Z IA
cq
! u_
IA
II
V
Z IA
dl
5-27
been units
tested
Three been
such
employed similar
H program, in the
as ground
JUPITER
system.
conducted
by Quality
Division
voltage
deviation between
voltage The
pickup extreme
temperature
launch mission
temperatures, paragraph
deviation
was
not considered
relevant
vehicle
(reference
5.3.3).
voltage a bridge
dc nominal) formed
was
by a voltage
divider
and R10 (Figure balanced the Q2. position. causing the cutoff
5-14).
the its
voltage, 60-volt
voltage and
range,
Conduction A drop
to 50 volts feedback
drove action
of resistor in cutoff
R-7 condition.
maintained the
Q1 and
Q2 cutoff, For
immediately bridge
de-energized became
actuating unbalanced
abort
voltages the
50 volts
circuitry to cutoff.
in such
as to cause
transistors
to be biased
The
control
was the
power,
silicon
transistor
stage of this
which
functioned snap-
stage
provided
operation required
would
by voltage
detect
signal
as a result
of a negative
transient.
5-28
>
o
,F.._
o o 0
c_L) to
,m o
o_,,!
M
A W
_
q
.m
T
+
v
0 N 0
r_
! u_ N
I
I(
9
5-29
C-l,
provided Capacitor,
a time
delay
for
a negative the
voltage time
tran-
C-2,
across
increased
delay
100 milliseconds. voltage was was open. voltage relay dropped causing This for below 28 volts the critical 50 volt at the both level, output safe the control a voltin the safe range, the output relay was energized and
output
control the
dc to appear required
through input
mode
of the levels
control well
below thus
circuits detector
in series
Chamber
Sensor pressure were was mounted tubes. switch, Figure 5-15, spring the the force developed on the Increasing Subsequent signal. adjusted deThe as shown monitored on the with thrust two redundant frame with pressure chamber pressure supplied
combustion These
by independent pressure was actuated pressure spring 5-2. of sequencing false was
diaphragm pressure creasing preloaded in Figure The and Since out method prevented any of the
transmitted the
pressure and
would controlled
microswitch abort
actuation
engine
prior
the
switch
abort
buildup. switched
loss abort
of pressure circuit
pressure
were
to a normal
5-3_
(_
Electrical Receptacle
Adjusting Screw
Vent Figure 5-15. Chamber Pressure Sensor 5.3 RELIABILITY PROGRAM 5.3.1 INTRODUCTION It was evident at the beginning of
creased tensive identified new. proper 5.3.2 above flight and that history, improved. program of the indicated many of the the program that missiles. areas the abort of its mission Since design and reliability the and had to be inhad had were assure the an exbeen
system
capsule the
established
to ul:grade
booster
new components.
TESTING program was conducted protion Program. to prove of this The test the REDSTONE's was program adaptation called the potential to
test
Program.
A major Reliability
program
MERCURY-REDSTONE
successful
found
5-31
problem areas, developedsatisfactory solutions, and established procedural and quality standards. Tests in the total program included the following. Factory Testing a. Aft section tests including abort system. b. Tail section tests. c. Propulsion subsystem tests. Structural Load Simulation a. Thrust unit flight simulation. b. Transportation load simulation. Static Firing - Noise and Vibration Capsule andAdapter a. Mating compatibility test. b. Flight adapter checkout. c. Separation ring test. ComponentQualification and Development Tests. The factory testing was a combined temperature-humidity-vibration test series conducted by Chrysler Corporation's Missile Division (CCMD). Also conductedby CCMD were the structural load simulation tests on the thrust unit. This test included appliction of bending, shear, andlongitudinal loads simulating flight and transportation loads. A static firing test conductedby MSFC measured noise and vibration at several points on the missile, adapter, and capsule. Functional and mating compatibility tests were also made at MSFCwith the capsules for MR-1 through MR-BD. A checkoutwas made on eachflight adapter starting with the adapter for MR-3. In addition several component developmentandqualification tests were madeto solve individual problem areas and prove flight readiness. The details of these tests and their results are described in Section6. Of special note was a total system-environment test of the Instrument Compartment containing the abort sensing system. The test was made on a specially designed "rock androll" test fixture, formally namedthe Vertical Test Fixture (Figure 6.3). This was probably the biggest and most important ground test effort of the program. The abort
5-32
system was operated under actual angular rates and attitude changes, coupled with vibration, humidity andtemperature environments. Additional details are given in Section 6.3.3. 5.3.3 ABORT SYSTEMRELIABILITY TEST PROGRAM Of special interest was the program designedto assure a high abort system reliability. The plan for this program is presented here. The plan called for testing of systems and subsystems. In addition to testing large groups of componentssimultaneously, this methodhad the advantageof testing the various componentsandtheir interaction. Suchtests were conductedat the Chrysler plant. In addition, qualification tests were conductedfor each componentof the abort system at MSFC. Using three or more units of eachof the componentscomposingthe abort system, a modified test-to-failure program was to explore the modes of failure, environmental levels of failure, and critical operation and environmental conditions. The purpose of the tests was to isolate any mode of failure so that necessary corrective action could be taken. The tests were designated as follows: First Level Each componentwas tested under those environments expectedprior to and during flight.
Second Each Level component maximum was was stressed capability stressed operationally of that under particular and environmentally component. critical environment at the
component failure
a predetermined
occurred.
plans and
were
developed
which Plan
differed
in the
levels
A {Table error
detectors,
attitude
These
instrument pressure
designed engine.
combustion
chamber
of their
on the
5-33
Table 5-4 Abort SensingSystem Reliability Test Plan A for Attitude Rate Switches, Attitude Error Sensors, andVoltage Detectors*
SecondLevel
OF +14 5F 20 to 50 cps at 0.06 inch double amplitude 50 to 2000 cps at 8g.
Third Level
- 25F +160F and and +77F +77F
20 to 50 cps at 0.09 inch double amplitude 50 to 2000 cps at 12 g. Repeat with g increased by 4 g increments until failure. 3O g 30 g Longitudinal 15 g Lateral
Shock Acceleration
* The number of samples tested were 6_ except, only sensors were tested due to component availability.
First
Level
Third
Level
as in Table
Vibration
20 to 100 cps at 0.04 inch double amplitude 100 to 2000 cps at 20 g. 25g
Shock Acceleration
30 g NONE
5-34
temperature indicated
excursions. temperature,
tests at thiswas
functional
The the
level cycle,
two tests; temperature. component at all three consecutive omitted vibration for test
at the
extreme
temperature
one at
was
first
cycled and
at all
three
high order,
accelerated,
This
as acceleration vibrational
consisted The
from
to locate the
in all tested
afterward was
vibrational
third until
cycled
component of all
in both directions for 10 milliseconds waveform in both along, tests, tests was
waveform 8 milliseconds
waveform
if square
acceleration acceleration
directions
of all three
direction
acceleration
scheduled.
test-to-failure STUDIES the reliability for manned The would first place
RELIABILITY flight to its were MR-2 suitability made. which based their study shown The
of the flight
was 8.3).
in re-
was
based
at the using
second
number results
of flights of the
by each average
be defined 5-6.
The
in Table probability
results
evaluation estimated, as
were shown
5-7.
of booster and
to be between
78 percent
84 percent
at a 75 percent
confidence
level.
5-35
Table 5-6 MERCURY-REDSTONEReliability Prediction (10February 1961)*-A Running Average Probability Of Booster Success Crew Escape Straight Average 81.2 98.6 50 Percent Confidence 80.3 97.6 95 Percent Confidence 77.4 94.3
Table 5-7 MERCURY-REDSTONEReliability Prediction (10February 1961)*-B Number of F rings of ComponentsComposing MR Subsystem Probability of Booster Success 75 Percent Confidence as Based
on
Subsystem
Past Firings
**
lO to _7 10 27 to 67 67 _7
i0 to 67
* ** Many required
Basis: Based
Configuration Achieved
as with
of Subsystem Action. exceeding the launch flight. the those operations _hese facts, of vehi-
originally
designed
to mission mission.
developed the
conducive
abort,
MERCURY-REDSTONE
cle reliability was in the range of 88 percent to 98 percent probability for launch success and crew survival, respectively. The successful MR-BD flight gave the assurance that the MERCURY-REDSTONEwas ready for mannedflights. As stated previously, a portion of these studies was an evaluation of all components comprising the launch vehicle. Most of these componentsor their prototypes had flow in earlier REDSTONEarid JUPITER-C vehicles. The rating of the componentsand their allied systems necessarily considered not only the number of times flown but also any malfunctions which were known to have occurred and whether this type of malfunction had been completed eliminated for future flights. liability study was made. For the third calculation, the effect of each malfunction was carefull adjusted in value based on its possible contribution to a vehicle failure that could occur and adversely affect a MERCURY-REDSTONEmission. Particularly sensitive to such judgment was the impact of human errors. Both humanerrors and componentmalfunctions which had occurred during a recent firing were given more weight than the earlier occurrences. Consideration was also given to system design improvements, incorporated during the period of system use, andrepetitive performance improvement or learning curve in both personnel performance and improved operational techniques. The malfunction and failure data thus derived was then examined for the possibility of occurrence in the MERCURY-REDSTONEvehicle, as fabricated andchecked out under its more stringent standards of construction andquality assurance. This componentand system evaluation resulted in synthetic data which were deemed as representing reasonable expectedfailure or malfunction rates in the MERCURYREDSTONElaunch vehicle. Reduction of these data to a common confidence level was based on the assumption that the calculated reliability was the mean of all reliabilities represented by a series of samples of like size. A further interpretation of this implies that the calculated reliability represented the mean:: of the actual reliabilities of the individual flights. In addition, it was assumed that this hypothetical series of reliabilities followed a Gaussian or normal distribution. This derivation of an estimated standard deviation then permitted the determination of system reliability for various confidence factors. The reliability estimates thus derived were presented in terms of confidence factors in which the level of confidence was interpreted to mean that the reliability estimated would be as stated or higher in the percentage of cases represented by the confidence level. Typical of such data derived at this point in the program was: 5-37 Thus, a third and more refined re-
(Successful
Level
method
of data
to more
readily
permit
of the percentage
is shown will
below.
confidence or calculated
interval
expected
reliability Reliability
75 to 94 Percent 69 to 98 Percent
This
portion
of the the
study
thus
attempted
a reliability
and
confidence flight
factor history,
by
to previous and
different 5-8.
missions.
on which
in Table
5-8 Components
on MERCURY-REDSTONE
NO,
Flights Flight LEV-3 Network Structure LOX manhole Elongated Propulsion I-I 02 regulators 2 A-7 engine controller start 67 10 42 45 tanks cover 10 10 and Actuators Control 27 67
Observed Malfunctions
Weighted Failures*
Anticipated Failures**
1 2
0.75 1
10 0
0.25 0
0.25 0
3 4 5 0
1.5 0 0.4 0
Thrust
H2 02 lead
5-38
Observed Malfunctions
Weighted Failures*
0.25 0
0.20 0
Compartment Errors
67
which
would
cause
Anticipated failures are weighted failures that boosters in spite of present corrective action. QUALITY GENERAL MERCURY-REDSTONE the human errors quality assurance ASSURANCE AND MERCURY
not be eliminated
AWARENESS
PROGRAM
placed
primary
emphasis This
on
eliminating was
motivation. PROGRAM dealt with the personnel best. motivation MERCURY or the human
Awareness
of quality. issued
It inspired people
awards
was
a keystone
program. stamps the should be noted. stamps Since identified the the REDSTONE hardware flight each was which components handler
MERCURY system
weapon into
MERCURY
a man promoted By
space.
In addition
stamps part.
of the
7 October
that the
MERCURYprogram.
documentation further
hardware preliminary
and final
by circular
5-39
enclosures, respectively. Use of any spare parts or documentationnot identified by the square stamp was prohibited. This identification procedure further assured that the 100percent inspection directive for
5.4.3 The DOCUMENTATION quantity of development documentation was placed was increased only and slightly over records that of the Project MERCURY was carried out.
accurate
rather were
REDSTONE
MERCURY and
documentation electronic
mechanical kept
procedure
Running were
were
on all parts,
and functional
required
to be complete
in all details.
5.4.4 The
QUALITY improved
ASSURANCE
TESTING and procedures, assured the proper testing and correct were
documentation
of components. and
parts
for
MERCURY-REDSTONE with those were were all for closest assigned parts the tactical to the
Progam
coincidently characteristics
Once stamp.
included quality
each of the
component. combined
During units.
systems Tests
buildup,
included
magnaflux and
of engine tests
parts, which
inspection simulated
of electrical conditions
soldering of application.
acceptance
After tems
checkout functionally
was
Since installed,
all
would system
work
as a single
vehicle
system. Then
power were
and that
checked
no deteriorations
as a result
intercoupling.
The
final
test actual
was
the
test. feasible
The
ground and
equipment where
was
connected equipment
launch
simulated
not be operated.
began
with
a launch
countdown
and
5-40
equipment was operated sequentially in the same order as it would on an actual flight. Telemetry recordings were made through an RF link. At the completion of the test, the records were examined for proper equipment operation. If the records were good, the vehicle was acceptablefor launch use. Special procedures were also established for the testing and selection of spare parts for each booster. All spare assemblies and subassemblies, assigned to a specific vehicle, were checkedfor compatibility at MSFC during checkout tests. These parts were then identified by missile number and, if not used at the launch site, were returned for checkout with a subsequentreassignment.
5-41
to the
electrical
of special is also
vibration the
development
detailed
in Section
6.2
VEHICLE
TEST
PROGRAM
GENERAL MERCURY-REDSTONE component status were selection special was test program retained the Only high after final quality the test procedures neared tests full to which used systhe
vehicle
The
systems
vehicle
subjected
the
assembly
analysis.
Alignment Pressure Continuity Network Radio Guidance Over-all Instrument Over-all Simulated Final
flight
pressure
The nents,
testing
sequence
was and
based finally
on the
pyramidal vehicle
testing was
philosophy,
whereby checked.
compoThis type
subsystems, illustrated
functionally operation
in Figure
verified
proper
of all
hardware
within
6-1
V
+ Noise and Vibration Firing Test Static ] Networks Incl Mechanical Alignment Cooling Test System Mechanical Functional Pressure Tests and Over-all Test #2 Instrument Calibration Tests Over-all #1 Guidance and Control Radio Frequency Checkout Continuity Tests
Telemetry Calibration I
il
Booster
_/ Test
Abort
System Tests
Over-all Test _3 Final Pressure and Mechanica: Functional Ar Simulated Flight Test Ship to Cape
Figure 6-2
6-1.
MERCURY-REDSTONE
System
Test
Flow
Diagram
Within this section, reference to boosters will be made based on their assembly number, not their ultimate flight number; e.g., booster MR-8, which served as the launch vehicle for Flight MR-4, shall be referred to as MR-8. This notation on the use of nomenclature is necessary due to the similarity of the numbering systems. A cross tabulation of booster and flight numbers is as follows.
Booster MR-1 MR-2 MR-3 MR-5 MR-7 MR-8 MR-4 MR-6 No. Flight MR-1 MR-2 MR-IA MR-BD MR-3 MR-4 Not Not (Shepard) (Grissom) Launched Launched ("Ham"} No.
ANALYSIS throughout to assembly replacement were buildup, release. of faulty documented MR-3, LOX tank a final mechanical enor
analyses
performed the
Difficulties components
during
resulted specified
in either
On these were
cover, hole
bulkhead
diameters bolts
to 0. 390 _+0. 005 inch, and torquing the due these bolts
In the 3/8
it was aluminum
to disassemble required
to the
value
6.2.3
STATIC
FIRING
6.2.3.1 As part
Introduction of the prelaunch launch and test were vehicles reliability stand conducted procedures was under at the and scheduled rated checkouts, for thrust Space static each firing of the tests These eight MERCURYsatisfactory were A total conducted of 32
to insure tests
Marshall
(MSFC). with
on the
MERCURY
boosters
an accumulated 6-3
and operation of the propulsion unit, additional tests were run to derive both
Capsule vibration
and
Vibration missile
Tests and capsule test were tower evaluated using early in the procapsule. not detri-
in a series shown
in the
static
a boilerplate were
in Table
6-1,
indicate
these
environment
conditions
to the booster
or capsule.
Location
Longitudinal
Pitch
Tail
System of MR-1 required tests and MR-2, a major seals during therefore, the heat redesign of the H202 sysseals indi-
in lieu the
results
of the
properly
satisfactory produced
O-rings
by H202
system
blankets,
modifications.
6-4
6.2.3.4
When MR-4
Oscillation was static 10 eps) oscillation A thorough of the from MR-2 MR-3 to the test the tests
Problems fired was had the first time, in the present revealed the second The MR-3 an unexpected oscillograph during that bending the the low frequency traces static of the oscillation engine param-
(approximately eters. boosters. resonance was MR-1 the mounted and This
firings were
of the the
previous result of
oscillations
mode
stand. to the
resonant
stand.
did not
because this
in a different
ification
stand
prevented
resonance.
Boattail simulating
Heater the
Tests launch countdown, and heater the LOX was critical ducts series loaded several hours within through prior specified the acas to
actual
parameters
doors as eight
hold periods
hours
successfully
without
adverse
6.2.3.6 When
LOX several
Cover occurred
Seal
Leaks in the was of the when LOX tank manhole cover the seal of various and characinch at even
a test
program
initiated cover
cause
However,
complete
tightened
to 190 inch-pound
Tests actual launch conditions, the required with the the LOX LOX system. replenish level during system extended was
to determine periods.
capability were
to maintain experienced
No difficulties
when pressure
water
(used (Pc)
in the
inert
combustion
sensing
lines then
single
thrust
transducer
line.
The
6-5
froze the water preventing proper operation of the sensors. This difficulty was solved by the utilization of strip heaters on all three lines. 6.2.4 ALIGNMENT TEST (MECHANICAL)
After static firing andbefore the integrated mechanical-electrical checkouttests, mechanical alignment checks were performed on the power unit, the taft section, the aft unit, and, finally, onthe entire thrust unit. All six boosters successfully completedtheir alignment tests; however, four problem areas occurred during this checkout. The test plan included a capsule adapter mating alignment check. Since noneof the adapters were available at the time of the alignment tests, only the mating surfaces were checked. Difficulty in assembly of the jet vaneplates caused the plates on MR-1 and MR-3 to be off in perpendicularity. On MR-2 and -8 the plates were off in angularity. These discrepancies were minor andwere waived. Thefirst three vehicles required shimming of the engine. MR- 1and-2 were shimmed becausethe mountingholeswould haveotherwise been too close to the edge of the mounting ring. MR-3 was shimmed and MR-1 additionally shimmed to correct for thrust vector misalignment. 6.2.5 PRESSUREAND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
Pressure and functional a_alysis tests were performed to assure correct operation of the pneumatic andhydraulic systems of the vehicle. All systems on all vehicles were within limits. Actually, two sets of pressure and functional tests were made; the first immediately after the alignment tests and the final before booster shipment to the launch site. Vehicles MR-3, -5, -7, and -8 were shipped with 10 psig air pressure in the gaseousnitrogen spheres. 6.2.6 CONTINUITY TESTS(ELECTRICAL)
Electrical assembly and installation and ground support equipment compatibility were checked. All vehicle connectors andcables were inspected, andresistance measurements were made on all wire to assure that continuity existed. In addition, all vehicle distributors and the ground support equipment were verified prior to connecting to the vehicle. Several installation discrepancies were revealed in MR-2, -3, -5, -7, and -8, all of which were corrected prior to release of the vehicle. After correction of these discrepancies, the test results were satisfactory.
6-6
6.2.7
6.2.7.1 This
NETWORKTESTS
Introduction of tests and group performed consisted of tests on the of the that from vehicle were test, given cutoff the test, of relay vehicle general and classification over-all Test diodes, of No. and 1.
group tests
component electrical
in this were
the
contacts, schematics.
ascertained
comparison
Component tests
System
Electrical operation
Network) of components in two parts. location reasons, the associated The and special high to the The pressure spheres, first operaat-
without
verified solenoids.
electrical safety
of propulsion-control was given spheres. the verified operation that on all to the The
circuits part,
and pressure
venting
valves associated
position propulsion
component were
operation
satisfactory
Cutoff test
Test was
(Shutdown
and
Abort
System of the
Networks) vehicle abort the were cutoff circuits, television verified The proper found causing circuitry destruct on-off as the name
of the
command command of
into and
junction
operation
MR-3's two
shorting
function. had
of the
problems. necessary
Vehicle to replace
however, panel,
in the
as a result
Over-all test
Test is defined
No. as
1 (Sequential a test
Flight
Simulation) a switch-on internal engine power, cutoff sequence a rocket signal is 6-7 is
followed sequence,
by a transfer a simulation
firing
of liftoff,
given. Over-all test No. 1, the third network test, was designed to test the sequential operation of the valves, relays, and solenoids involved in the engine firing; also tested were the program device, flight sequencer, andphysical separation of the top and tail umbilicals. During the over-all test No. 1 on MR-1 and MR-2, trouble was encounteredwith the preflight cooling system operation and circuitry, which was corrected by replacement of componentsand rewiring. As a result, later LN2 external cooling systems were required to pass a checkout simulation prior to the over-all test. A false abort was indicated during MR-2's over-all test. The exact initiator of the abort could not be identified, but the rate switch circuitry was suspected. A redesign of this circuit was madeto eliminate any possible cause. The program device was found to be faulty on MR-3. MR-5, -7, and -8 passed over-all test No. 1 satisfactorily. 6.2.8 RADIO FREQUENCYSYSTEMSCHECKOUT
These tests were performed to insure that each RF componentoperated properly within specified limits during individual functional checks. In addition, the tests verified that the RF componentswere compositely compatible with themselves andwith the general network. Interference was encounteredwhen MR-2 and MR-5's television circuits were in a standby mode. However, during normal operation the television oscillator frequency radiation dropped to a noninterference level. 6.2.9 CONTROL SYSTEMSCttECKOUT
The control system checkout was performed to ascertain the function of the system as it related to the vehicle performance requirements. Controlled inputs were introduced into the system, and the outputs were accurately checked for proper polarity and scale factors. MR-l, -2, -3, and -5 tested satisfactorily. Replacement of faulty attitude error sensor was necessary on MR-7. Dust in the pitch attitude sensor of MR-8 required cleaning of the sensor before final acceptance. 6.2.10
This test
2 proper The functioning test sequence system. vehicles. of the was The vehicle's simiiar results control to that of over-all system of over-all test
network. of the
control all
2 were
for
6-8
6.2.11
INSTRUMENTATIONCALIBRATION
Signal outputs from the various measuring transducers were first checked to calibration curves via hardwire link; then, the information was colmected to the telemetry packageand rechecked via RF link. The results of the instrumentation and calibration tests on MR-1 and MR-2 were completed satisfactorily. The remaining vehicles had several minor problems none of which indicated a specific problem area. 6.2.12 OVER-ALL TEST NO. 3
In this test the control, RF, and instrumentation subsystems were integrated and tested as a complete system. The test consisted of a brief subsystem operational check and then a complete simulated firing and flight sequence. The vehicle was put in a readyto-fire condition, firing commandwas given, and the sequenceof events that followed was automatic until liftoff. Liftoff was simulated by de-energizing the tail plug supervision relays in the ground equipment and the liftoff relays in the vehicle. This meLhod of simulating liftoff allowed continuous monitoring and recording of vehicle operation during the simulated flight period. After liftoff, the program device controlled the operation of the flight sequencer, the telemeter calibrator, andthe tilt program of the LEV-3. The vehicle was then given a normal cutoff from the velocity integrator, and, shortly thereafter, the test was completed by simultaneously removing all power from the vehicle and ground equipment. Vehicles MR-l, -2, -3, and -5 completed the tests with satisfactory results. MR-7 encountered a broken lamp contact in the ground propulsion panel. Additional shield grounding was required to eliminate erratic pulses on MR-8's program device channel No. 1. 6.2.13 SIMULATED FLIGHT TESTS
This final test of the booster was designed to prove the compatibility of all electrical and electro-mechanical systems (vehicle and ground equipment) in simultaneous operation. Safety-relay boards were installed in the main, tail, andpower distributors to make this test more realistic. The test was performed using a simulated countdown procedure. Preliminary checks were made in which the vehicle subsystems were energized and operationally verified. The vehicle was then placed in a ready-to-fire condition, and the firing commandwas given. The vehicle underwent a typical flight program, controlled by the program device, with small deviations from the normal trajectory simulated by the tilt program of the LEV-3. At liftoff plus 140 seconds, cutoff was given by the velocity integrator, and 30 seconds later the test was terminated by simultaneously removing power from the vehicle and the ground equipment. 6-9
Since the vehicle's instrumentation was active during the test, its telemetered information was utilized for evaluation. MR-1 and -3 passed successfully. MR-2 had problems with foreign material causing shorts in the commutated telemeter channels. MR-5 had flight sequencerproblems which were solved by redesi_ and removal of two zener diodes. The roll rate gyro was also defective andwas replaced, as was the thrust controller transducer. MR-7 was rerun twice before the proper procedures were used and MR-7 passed. The pitch attitude potentiometer hadto be cleaned and the pitch rate switch replaced before MR-8 passed its simulated flight test. 6.2.14 RETEST AFTER MODIFICATION
After the test program had progressed through the simulated flight test, a number of changesto assure the best possible boosters were incorporated. After making these changes, the systems affected were rechecked to verify proper operation. The most extensive modifications were made on MR-5; thus, the MR-5 checks consisted of a continuity test of newand modified cables, a series of network tests which verified proper operation of the vehicle's electrical circuitry, measuring and control systems check, and an operation verification of the RF equipment. An over-all testwas thenperformed to verify proper operation of the network, control, RF, and measuring system. Inflight measurements were telemetered to verify calibration of the measuring system. Proper operation was obtainedduring these tests. 6.2.15 BOOSTER-CAPSULECOMPATIBILITY TESTS
The original test plan included mating each capsule plus its GSEto the booster and its GSEat MSFC for a final compatibility test prior to shipment to the launch site. The compatibility tests were to include electrical continuity, RF, separation, abort system, and an over-all test. On MR-1 several compatibility problems (notedbelow) were encountered; however, MR-2 tests experienced no newcompatibility difficulties. Therefore, for vehicles MR-3 through MR-8 only the capsuleadaptorswere matedand tested. Compatibility measurements on the Booster MR-1 and its GSEindicated that the MAYDAY circuit from the vehicle GSEto the capsule would allow a high current flow and could possibly prevent completion of the abort sequence. To assure launch director abort capability, a diode was addedto the capsule circuitry. During the final RF checkout on MR-1 and -2, the booster's DOVAPsignal interfered with the capsule's 6-10
two command receiver signals. A change in command frequency and removal of the booster DOVAP eliminated this interferenee. Also during the mating, the elamp ring retention devices were found to be incorrectly designed andwere redesigned by MSFC. Lastly, electrical connectors and wire bundles from the booster to the adapter could not be properly installed. Relocation of the connectors and removal of the recovery system package solved these interface problems. 6.3
6.3.1 In addition conducted tests were SPECIAL RELIABILITY TESTS
GENERAL to the to attain conducted developmental the degree tests, several special reliability by the reliability, manned quality test programs were These and check-
of assurance of the
required over-all
payload. control,
as a portion
out program.
6.3.2 Structural
THRUST testing
UNIT of the
STRUCTURE thrust flight unit loads on the was were tail and done in three separate vehicle tests: to 150 percent the loads the were of the of
imposed center
value
margin (Figpro-
axial
pellant
pressurized tower.
conducted
test loads
determined exceeding
the
tail
unit's
capability
to withstand values.
flight
handling
Ground when
of design
applied
AFT section,
SECTION MRF1, containing the guidance and cooling test control system setup phases. were Outputs imposed of the at ambient systems under tempertest 6-11 system, was the subjected as the "rock abort system,
to temperaand roll"
known
was
motions cycles,
3_7
33
If
t_,)_
mN_
,JJ_ro
_i
fill
3 =
_._."
0
_3
_F
_._
I q)
o_,,_
==
6-12
',', .........................
, , i ,
',r _
t_4 b I'
./
".
_,
Distribution
ible
Flexu| , I
t, 4 _i I , ";_J ,
_le
Fke
r-- //
"
/A',
\\
__ ................... Z
_ Ob_erv: tion FZ_O, rm Bungee
1%._ ....
s_""-'---- 4
_L
_ $1_ke r Top $_aker Flexure Mount Bottom Shaker Flexure
Tor_hon
Bar
1
B:.se [J
\/tt.ti....... i i-iiv/
olalioo Pad-
8"
-T
..J
Figure
6-3.
Vertical
Test
Fixtures 6-13
>
e-E_ _ _"
I I I
>
_em
_o
_=' z
__
N
r_
I _.__
i _ 30
o_I
b_
.5
_ _= _ 0
<Y_
_._
_o
[--- ;_oI_ om _[_ _ _
_ _ _,_0
o_
i
._ . _._
6-14
were continuously recorded and indicated intermittent operation of the pitch program and the pitch and yaw rate switches. During the seventh cycle when the loads exceededdesign values, the telemetry commutator intermittently failed, and a command receiver pitch rate switch and one computer output channel failed. All malfunctions were corrected prior to flight qualification. A subphasetest, the abort systems test, determined that the proper abort signals were given when the abort pitch and yaw rate switches were oscillated (rocked) and the voltage to the control voltage sensor was stepped below the abort limit.
Phase pad II and temperature IIIInstrument tests (Figure compartment 6-4) were cooling completed and transportation without discrepancies. and
6.3.4 The
SYSTEM fill and and vent valves, suction lines, and rocket engine were chamber. tested 2000 at
LN 2
temperature
tested
in a combined LOX
-10 F and
up to 20 g's test.
swept
20 and
cps.
results
6.3.5
TAIL
SECTION tail and The section, RMF73, tested of this test containing under are all similar given mechanical conditions 6-3. and pneumatie imposed on
temperature results
propulsion
in Table
COMPATIBILITY and functional This vehicles and only compatibility checkout MR-3 the was of the capsule part and booster
through-8, flight
over-all
checkouts
were
by the
MERCURY-REDSTONE.
SYSTEM test program abort was system. conducted The tests to assure and their the proper are and reliable functionin para-
results
detailed
6-15
_D
.o
o
o
_ 0 _._
"_
.,_
._ .~
,__ ,_ 0 _
_
0 Z
_
_
<
o
_ _ 0
o 0
.--._ _
<
<
<
<
<
o o o
o I
,-i
....
,._
;_
"_
_u
0 o _ O o LQ _ o L_ 0 0_ 0
0 c_ 0
b_ cO
_
_ o LQ c',l
0 0
0 b_ ',,l b_ ',1
',1
0,1
'-,I
o
o o
_
od
<
0 _' o o0 o0
(.)
r...)
r_
0
r..q
6-16
Failures Failure Bracket of Redesign second minor in final Abrasion Support of Bracket in Support Not considered ancy Design Pad
Remarks bracket phase failure design. in design tested with during only used
Support
of test - larger
rivets
incorporated
Single
a major
discrep-
Pneumatic
System
None
Acceptable
6.4
MASS
DAMPENING
OF INFLIGHT
VIBRATIONS
GENERAL second successful of the Since at launch diameter flight_ instrument the major and MR-2, a program was where initiated vibration in this during of the to reduce sensitive area were the vi-
compartment sources
comthe due to
environment in the
flight, the
of the the
booster, by mass
pri-
approach
was that
to reduce subjected
structure
dampening
of the panels
were
environment.
METHOD step
OF MASS-DAMPENING to reduce the vibrational specific was chips vehicle environment gravity which was would a program be easily Branch to applied. at MSFC. polyapplied.
in an effort
developed
by the
material
in epoxy was
sulfide.
Figure
4-24
illustrates
compound
of the
material
were
applied
to the
inner
sides
of the
recovery
compartment
and 40 pounds
were
applied
upper
bulkhead
of the
instrumentation
compartment
proper.
This
made
a total
of
210 pounds
applied
to MR-BD.
In MR-3, applied
the
material access
was
applied
to the
above
areas
but also
were of
doors
instrumentation
compartment
making
330 pounds
to MR-3.
material of the
was
applied
to the
doors,
the
lower
bulkhead, as well
and
all the
of MR-4 amount
as the
for a total
compartment material
the
most
significant to the
environment, would
it is felt
that
235 pounds
applied
instrumen-
been
sufficient.
6.4.3
VIBRATIONAL
MEASUREMENTS
Introduction flight at least the on the to the two vibration vibrational adapter transducers environment ring and axis was were during oriented vehicle. on the rate installed powered to measure This gyro in the flight. aft unit of the
to measure mounted
longitudinal
of the
Measurement to measure
located
oriented MR-1A
vibration the
longitudinal
direction
vehicle
overshot velocity
area, platform
location The
on the
sensitive axis
of the
remained
oriented then
vehicle.
906 was
on each and
of the
subseto
flights. body
Measurement bending
was
oriented longitudinal
in the
to the
of the
vehicle.
are
shown
in Figure
measurements
were
calibration
level
measurement.
6-18
Instrument
Compa:'tment
Compartment
I I
I I I STA 63.3 Figure 6-5. Location
I I
I I I STA 37
9Ol I
I I S_A -16.5 Compartment Vibration Transducers
of Instrument
6-4 Measurements
Measurement
3g 3g
6g
8g +_0.5g
Sg
lOg
Measurement characteristics
901 of measurement a sharp increase 901 are shown in Figure level 6-6. The comafter
measurement
indicates
in the vibration
immediately
6-19
Flight
Time Capsule Moanting T3 Max. Amplitude Reached Max. Mag. G's PK/PK * * * 58 52.4 Time Ring-Lateral T4 Vibration
Flight Number
12 10 7 5 6 Measurement
* * 29.7 30 23.6
28 24 37 47 43 SkstemCapabilities
Figure
6-6.
General
Characteristics
of Vibration
Measurements
(901)
ignition the
(To) and
during
The
energy The
for level
this
phase
is due
mainly
to
acoustic
then
decreases
time after
aerodynamic gradually
turbulence increases
structure
to a maximum it decreases
at approximately
1 occurs
(T4) and
remains
separation
trajectories the
flown
were
except flight
for
MR-1A. those
It is,
therefore, The
valid
to
of another.
tabulated
various
as measurement mounted
however, adapter
is to be expected ring.
901 was
on a sub-
stantial
structure,
6-20
6.4.3.3
The are general shown
906 of measurement flights in Figure 906 were 6-7. Since very this similar to those was that of 901 and mounted it was
in the by the
proper, dampening
magnitudes that
v_ith those
of the
earlier
decreased in flights
were latter
comparison
to the
6.4.4 The
CHARACTERISTICS increase in vibration 80 seconds in the levels to 54 due to the as aerodynamic the amount The turbulence of mass addition
decreased dampening
seconds,
instrumentation
compartment.
oF-I
"0
T1
Flight
Time
LEV-3
Base T3
Plate T4 Time Vibration Returns to Low Level Seconds 120 115 115 117 110
Flight Number
Time Sec. 70 65 69 70 71
1 - Measurement 903 Vibration Switch, Rate) used here For Comparison because 906 was not flown on MR-1A. - Measurement Figure 6-7. General System Capabilities Exceeded. of Vibration Measurements (906) 6-21
Characteristics
of dampening compound, therefore, had two beneficial effects. It lowered the amplitude of the vibration levels, and it shortened the time the critical flight components
were subjected to substantial vibration levels.
The
vibration 1.
of the
the
most
spectrum
indicates
lies
and
flight
to flight.
flat
no appreciable
response
instrumentation
compartment.
6.5 6.5.1
BOOSTER GENERAL
RECOVERY
SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT
interesting, design,
yet
aspects
development,
testing
G's
(RMS)
I0 cps
B.
W.
Filter
1.0
.8
HR-BDI .6 I11 i
Sat Irated
Data
i'l"
.4
_,
/?,
m 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 Frequency (ps)
200
400
600
Figure 6-22
6-8.
Longitudinal
Vibration
Spectra
for
MERCURY-REDSTONE
Vehicles
would permit reuse of the booster. This project was the first extensive development of a recoverable booster and would have actually been implemented if that portion of the program had not beencancelled becauseof a lack of funds. Recoverable boosters and the systems required for such recovery are still of interest today. Present operational analyses indicate that the economics of extensive space operations may necessitate the utilization of the recoverable concept for launch vehicles.
large quence, both the carried Preliminary boosters the such design as the studies S-IC are stage already of the recovery and the fact determining SATURN" the feasibility vehicle. are the of recovering As a consedue to be to V launch
technical through
first
testing
of development
hardware.
none
of the of the
boosters propulsion
to water was
iropact
tests
were that
static they
checkout after
water
immersion.
which
successfully that
general
conclusion reuse 8
reacheff.was of the
sea after
would
not prevent
successful
booster
cleaning
The
MERCURY-REDSTONE because Recovery The thus sion The required of several system
program
to a booster
recovery
development
ballast
weight recovery
be replaced weight
system, mis-
booster
had and as
good
and flotation
charac-
parachute
landing severe
stability phase
deploy-
be expected state
in future
Recovery to outline
design,
high
enough
problems
Over-all out
size
of the
REDSTONE ships
water
recovery equipment.
with-
extensive
to available
handling
6-23
6.5.2
DESIGNREQUIREMENTS
REDSTONEbooster structural data which influenced recovery system design were: Booster weight (dry) 15,000 pounds Booster diameter 70 inches 700 inches Booster length Maximum load (longitudinal) Maximum load (lateral) Water impact velocity 8g 3g 40 feet per second(maximum)
The trajectory considerations which in_fluenced recovery system design are given in the following paragraphs. Booster re-entry attitude was not predictable; the booster could be stable at any angle of attack, spinning, or tumbling at first stage parachute deployment. As a result of the undefinedbooster attitude, time of flight to impact could vary for a given trajectory. The altitude at which the booster would decelerate to a subsonic velocity could vary between65,000 feet and 20,000 feet, dependingon angle of attack and stability. Therefore, aerodynamic means of sensing velocity or altitude were not suitable for first-stage parachute deployment initiation. There could be a variation in the cutoff signal of up to _+8.7 seconds in order to meet the required cutoff conditions in the planned trajectory. These variations were due to variations in engineburning time, mixture ratio, and wind shear effects during powered flight. This range of about 17 secondsprevented use of a program timer for primary recovery system sequencingwith a subsonic first-stage parachute deployment. 6.5.3 6.5.3.1
The recovery
RECOVERYSYSTEMDESIGN
Introduction system a deployment to distribute system system. 6-12 consisted system, the of a g sensitive a two-stage forces switch, parachute a sequencing system, system, a system containers, and an
to initiate a structure
parachute
protection, operation
to the
system operation
in aself-containedunit. system.
through
6-24
o o
c/'r_
6-25
Figure 6-26
6-10.
Deceleration
Parachute
Unreefed
Figure
6-11.
and
Deployment
of
6-27
Figure 6-28
6-12.
Water
Impact
6.5.3.2
Regardless time sensing into tude, sensing gram the before
Sequencing of the booster attitude of fall, the re-entry deceleration Velocity. possible without Thus, to deploy regard peak with the occurs at a definite
deceleration to the
an acceleration first stage attitude, in addition the REDSTONE the booster At runout first stage of parachute altito a g prohad
device airstream
coupled
a backup out)
(which
when
interval variants
to insure planned
that
be given
deployment booster,
stage
deployment aneroid
by either was
switches.
each first
blocked
parachute first
of a late
of the
flying
at zero the
malfunction. at greater
conditions, velocity
possibly
of the
parachutes
the possibility
of an unsuccessful
of Parachutes was designed force to use pyrotechnic entend charges the riser to fire and the parachute parachute parachute would
insured that
around than
a spinning
booster. per
It was second
booster
rotation
one-half
revolution
of deployment.
The and
final canopy
recovery inflation
would
be deployed to fhr_l
by the :_:paration
first
stage
parachute. stage
Full parachute.
line
t)_:ior
of the
first
The
first-stage on the
parachute booster
would to a value
to limit When
the
bending time
sufficient
to orient
the parachute stage for more and within parachute than the
to allow
altitude, been
of descent of the
capability
recovery
parachutes.
time
first-stage
parachute, 6-29
acting
would also
have reefed
then
extracted
and deployed
the
three The
recovery recov-
to limit
the load
designed level
to open
in two steps
of reefing per
to limit
booster's
terminal
velocity
at sea
to approximately
40 feet
6.5.3.4 The
Parachute
Systems was high fabric aIlowed The joint. a 17-foot-diameter subsonic riser the chain The velocity which parachute riser parachute full was was conical deployment. joined to deploy necessary was stowed "fist" The ribbon type, of higl_ was riser. regardless lip of the deployment riser to a level was designed before atThe
first-stage design
due to the
to insure
To limit
booster stage
in any attitude,
parachute
After the
delay
sufficient
the
booster
vertical and
attitude, the
parachute
disreefed.
It would parachute
decelerate
booster
to a velocity
suitable
final-stage
deployment.
The opy,
final
were
designed They
as a cluster
solid
conical were
can-
67-foot
attached
which parachutes
recovery a stable
were
were
two-stage
reefing
and to limit
structural
strength
envelope
Parachute
Containers and riser, deployment and risers. four system fiberglass consisted storage of mortars for for the the first re-
canisters
final
and their
first
stage
was
stored
bag
within
a pyrotechnic bag
mortar.
extended The
to a deployment riser
lower
out of the
deployment bag and attached to the chain riser. The chain wasattachedto an explosiverelease mechanism at the center of the recovery unit structure and to a bridle chain of flexible steel cables. The bridle extendedto the lids of each of the three final recovery parachutes and single riser canisters. These storage canisters were fabricated of molded fiberglass for thermal protection of the parachutes. 6.5.3.6
The recovery Structure structure the The stabilized The and loads recovery proved into the parachute outer ends was composed risers of the and of a conical, the first-stage were attached six-leg parachute to the attached in the spider were structural to the MSFC the outer with a heavy center (Figring,
spokes
by a series system
of tension structure
of the labde-
structures
capable booster
of sustaining structure
distributing damage.
recovery
parachute
without
The
device recovery
was
hub
of the
mortars parachute
spokes.
canisters attached
occupied to the
electrical of the
access
doors
Heat protection
Protection was necessary would system under fiberglass the to protect have was impinged a Dural was the recovery directly plate a heat coated unit upon with from it. the heat of the separa' nozentire
rocket of the
which
Directly
under Over
each the
shields, with
protective of glass
of heavy
cloth A smaller
an inner
blanket's the
protective
package heat
first
stage
parachute first-
protective
have
removed
by the
riser.
Instrumentation information and to be furnished sequencing. by the The recovery system of the was outer limited surface to temperaof one of
acceleration,
temperature
6-31
,'-;tructurai
Tension
Members
Main
Parachute
on
Safety
S_ Squib}
itch
fur
Container t):trachut( ,
for Risers
Main
Figure 6-32
6-13.
Booster
Recovery
Package
the parachute storage canisters adjacent to the main parachute risers was to be measured. A step-resistance accelerometer network would have telemetered information relative to parachute opening and water entry shock level via means of an output which was to have shown the function of recovery sequencing relative to a time base on the telemetry readout record. The stepping was arranged so that the sequencingreadout would have shown whether primary or secondary sequencingoperated the system and if sequencingmalfunctions occurred. 6.5.4
A major was
of possible
to this
problem the
method
To measure conducted
withstand Redstone
water Arsenal.
at the
The
impact
and pond
tests
were
conducted 25 feet
with deep.
REDSTONE test,
in the
the booster
in weight
booster
retrieval
bulkhead
waterproofing
handling
level a steel
and tape
were
used
angle
of flotation The
of the depth of
of submersion. by using
into the
a high-speed
camera
printed
on the
of the
During
these
the
was: and LOX tanks of water empty. in both the respectively. LOX in tanks fuel and LOX tanks was re-entry which to
900 pounds
pressurized probable
Water after
used
and
from damage
a height to the
of 3 feet booster.
to check
the
instruments
and
to determine
6-33
LOX
and
fuel kept
with
device, during
making
away
connector in the
valve
which reactions.
provides
venting
from
a height
of 25 feet
to obtain velocity
an impact
velocity
of 40 feet
second, upon
impact equipped
of the MERCURY-REDSTONE
booster
with parachutes.
vertical
acceleration 1/25
measured second
during after
from the
25 feet water
was
13.94
approximately had,
of 18 inches
initially
of the
energy
transferred
is shown vertical
in Figure acceleration
6-14. versus
Maximum time
penetration is shown
4 inches.
in Fig-
6-15.
was was
sustained limited
by the
fuel
tank of the
and
the
unit fuel
skin
pressure of the
the damage.
seams
in the tail
due to shearing
rivets.
Calculations condition, The With grees pretest assembly actual the and
prior
to the
test and
the
angle
booster,
in a dry
submersion booster
80 inches attributed
at the
of the and
actual
calculations which
of the
rocket
not previously
final
center
booster
after
impact
was
directly This
below
the longitucondition
fin II.
to rotate
booster
to any
position
6-34
0. 989 G F
210
180
150
120
9O
6O
/
-I I I
I
22.0 0
30
45
67
90
ol
i
03
I
0.6 Time
I
0.9 in Seconds
I
1o2
I
1.5
Figure
6-14.
in Seconds
6-35
_9
0 ,,,,,,,,4
r,,l
N
r/l 0 _,,,4
<
6-36
SAFING to the
TESTS flotation to floating tests, aboard the proper the procedures vessel. were established
the booster
recovery
water
the The
was
first was
lowered
into
the
water
and the
then tank
tanks
pressurized After
fuel the
and
the
air
to 800 psig.
permitted
for
approximately
30 minutes.
the waiting
Airbags bility
were to the
the
booster
and
to provide
accessi-
that and
it was drain
in its valve
mode. fuel
rotated were
valve
accessible.
SEA
TESTS from which which the sea was performed developed in the as part and of the test program quarry using test. The
had were
been
practiced ocean
in the were:
Atlantic
REDSTONE with
by United
Stated
Naval
available
handling
maximum with
subhose
by flushing
The
sea
tests
were
conducted
during
from with
Virginia. and
An eight-man
hand
of a Landing
booster.
first
took wind
place was
under from
excellent the
weather
conditions. 8 knots,
Ceiling with a
visibility swell
southwest
at about
6-37
The primary objective of this first retrieval attempt was to check out the proposed handling procedures. As the first step, the booster, swimmers, and their rubber boat, andthe towing crew aboard the Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP) were launched. The LSD drained the well andmoved away several thousandyards. The swimmers then approachedthe booster and went through the sating procedures without any difficulty, and also installed the handling connections. After the safing operation was completed the booster was taken in tow by the LCVP and positioned astern the LSD which was maintaining a constant heading toward the sea. The LSD was ballasted so as to have 8 feet of water in the well at the stern gate sill. The LCVP continued towing until its bow was over the LSD stern gate then reversed, disconnected its tow line, and moved off to the port side andstood by. Swimmers with lines from the LSD attached lines to prescribed connections on the booster, and the booster was positioned over saddles. Once the booster was positioned, deballasting of the well proceeded until booster rested firmly on saddles. After the well was drained, the booster and recovery equipment were checked for damage. The second operation omitted the safing procedure, but went through with towing the booster out andback into the LSD with the LSDmaintaining a heading of 2 to 3 knots into the waves. While the booster was floating at sea, a P2V aircraft was conducting visual training, establishing radar tracking limits, and taking aerial photographs of the operation. The third operation was very similar to the second. A changeon the tiedown location of the nylon retaining slings was made. The slings were positioned so that they went up and over the booster to the opposite wing wall instead of under, around, and over the booster to the wind wall as in the first two operations. The fourth and final operation was a complete simulated recovery. The booster was set free and all personnel stayed aboard the LSD. The LSD deballasted and steamed off ten miles from booster. At ten miles the booster was held on surface radar while the P2V at a 1500-foot altitude, tracked it a distance of 50 miles. Once the tracking exercises were over, the LSD started toward the booster. Ballasting of the LSD and preloading of the LCVP were performed while enroute. Whenthe
6-38
LSD was approximately 1000 yards from booster, the LCVP was launched and proceededto the booster. Upon arriving at the booster, the swimmers went through the safing operation; the booster was taken in tow, andbrought into the well of LSD and positioned as before.
6-39
GENERAL plans for under Annex which of the mate of the MR-1 were vehicle fifteen the MERCURY-REDSTONE conditions This that vehicle at MSFC was prior provided for preliminary to Cape the first mating Canaveral two vehito elimia first final
followed
experience also
mated
vehicle
originally
at CCMTA spacecraft,
of the and
GSE, Experience
mate, this
in that not
and MR-3
CCMTA
By the
weeks
and capsule
delivery
checkouts.
TESTS of launches separately MR-1 from and St. MR-1A, Louis was a fit test and the spacecraft and the booster The adapter
MSFC,
between
the
(MAC),
particular to the
to be used, was
where
to arrival progressed
confidently
without
undergoing
checks.
mate for
occurred
about composite
before
launch,
which
provided
suffi-
exhaustive electrical
launch cali-
During component
between and
launch measuring
calibrations,
component and
checks phasing-in
con-
a schedule
predicated
on availability
of personnel
7-1
booster tests. The diagram in Figure 7-1 showsthe building-block approach used in scheduling the MERCURY-REDSTONElaunch site checkout. The double asterisks indicate combined spacecraft-launch vehicle tests, and the single asterisks indicate launch vehicle-GSE systems tests. Malfunction SequenceTests These tests verify proper operation of cutoff circuits by simulated malfunctions. During the automatic sequence, RF, navigation, and gyro systems are not ordinarily operated. Guidanceand Control Over-all Test This test is conductedto verify proper operation of all vehicle systems. All systems of both spacecraft and launch vehicle are operated. Umbilical release andretraction is simulated, andordnance systems monitoring is performed. Guidanceand Control Plug Drop Over-all Test This test verifies the compatibility andproper operations of all vehicle systems while simulating the firing as closely as possible. All systems of all stages are operated, the umbilicals released and one-shot relays andexplosive switches are fired. Rangesupport is required for this test. Simulated Flight Test This test is conductedto verify compatibility andproper operations of all vehicle systems. Umbilical release is simulated, all systems of spacecraft, vehicle, andrange are operated, andordnance systems are monitored. Rangesupport is required for this test. Booster Integrated Test Booster integrated test includes network, mechanical, andmeasuring over-all tests. Commandreceivers are normally operated but all other RF systems, gyro systems, and navigational systems are not operated. These tests are normally conductedin preparation for the final combined systems over-all test such as the guidanceand control over-all test, the plug drop over-all test, andthe simulated flight test. Individual major tests are indicated in separate blocks and are adequatelydefined by their titles.
7-2
Pad
Set
Up
Delivery
!
Erection and XlignmentVehicle Launch BUS Calil)ration
I
Ground Checkout Support Booster Equipmcnl I Spc,ccl:d[ .Xrri_al I)cli_ t'r_ to }lang;]v lot' inspection and 'rs" I
_
I
f-
_J
Full Pressure
,
in Laboratol3 Command I RF Bench Checks f Only
i Icon,, ck II ch l
I
I Trail and Set Blockhouse t'p l
I t_o_t_'r.,ttl_deCon,.o_ I
I
I Guidance and Control Test ] *
Cooling Bench
Control Check
Over-Mi
Booster
Cooling
R F Compa
tlbility
[
1"
Boo6ter Activity
H202 Check
(h'er-all Attitude
Test Abort
Over-all Plug
Test Drop
Vehicle
Tvst/Oper:dion
Launch
Figure
7-1.
Launch
Site
Checkout
Scheduling 7-3
prelaunch supervision were conducted. A list Functional Functional Functional Leakage Leakage Leakage Leakage test test test test
checkout of the
vehicle
was
carefully
conducted
under 18 mechanioperating
engineer.
Each tests
procedures.
follows:
- Fuel - Engine
control
switches
1 and 2.
- High - Engine
ground peroxide
control system.
pressure
systems.
- Hydrogen - Steam
exhaust test.
system
and turbopump
functional
test
components Leakage Pressure Leakage Leakage Leakage Pressure Leakage Functional Leakage Activity test test test test test test test - Igniter fuel
! ",
- Combustion
chamber
- LOX replenishing
SCHEDULE the
OF
PRELAUNCH
ACTIVITIES Program, on experience vehicle with checkout procedures were adjusted with for The the the the to provide launch launch history
MERCURY-REDSTONE operation, schedule based of launch compared vehicle listed and the below. number
a more
vehicle. encompassed
MR-4
21 workdays,
46 workdays utilized
checkout
of MERCURY-REDSTONE sequence L indicates of operations launch L-25 vertical L-24 Begin day
MR-4 The
was
chronological days,
operations days
to launch Cable
Booster
arrival
erected,
of command
receivers.
measuring
calibration
preparations.
7-4
L-23 Mechanical systems test, including component and leak tests. Laboratory calibration of abort rate switches. Measuring calibration continued. L-22 Not a work day. L-21 Continuemechanical checks andmeasuring calibration. telemetry, AZUSA, andDOVAP. Check
L-20 Full pressurization test. Program device checks and verification. L-19 Booster over-all test number 1 as follows: a. Ready-to-fire failure cutoff. b. Ignition failure. c. Destruct command receiver. d. e. Cutoff arming to capsule. Install booster recovery packageballast.
L-18 Functional cooling system check, gyro control tests. L-17 Complete cooling test. L-16 Mechanical mate of spacecraft to booster. L-15 Not a work day. L-14 Electrical mate of spacecraft and booster, over-all test number 2, and off-the-pad abort test. L-13 Over-all test number 1, normal flight sequence. L-12 Partial RF compatibility test, astronaut insertion procedures, and booster peroxide system activity test. L-11 Complete RF compatibility test, and conduct egress tests. L-10 Not a work day. L-9 Not awork day. L-8 Over-all tests as follows:
a. b. c. L-7 Over-all Over-all Over-all test test test number number number of over-all 3, :emergency 4, 5, pilot abort override test. _ test. 5. verification of any test.
attitude tests 3,
abort 4, and
over-all for
Preparation
fit checks. L-4 L-3 flight Simulated Booster safety, flight test. compartment review meeting. 7-5 pressurization test, and booster
briefing,
7.2
LAUNCH
ORGANIZATION
AND
COUNTDOWN
7.2.1
RESPONSIBILITIES
General shows the The show MERCURY-REDSTONE broken the lines lines enclose the and launch organization functions, connecting as it evolved the lines solid are lines for the
of MR-4.
9
connecting
lines
of action,
of coordination.
/
Launch Director
,
Test Coordinator (NASA) Blockhouse I I n I i W Central
,
Control
I
I I
L_
(LOD) Blockhouse
i
Test Conductor (LOD) Blockhouse
H
Capsule Racks
Aeromed
Console Capsule
Blockhouse
Figure 7-6
7-2.
MERCURY-REDSTONE
Launch
Organization
7.2.1.2
Over-all this
Operations mission
Director control he was was exercised by the by the operations director are director. and flight In carrying controller. out A entitled
responsibility,
launch
presented
in a document Operations
Project
representative Center
Project the
MERCURY,
Control launch
launch
coordinator, kept
the
flight
operations flight.
director
advised
and principal
throughout
powered
Director was responsible AMR concerning director command for The for support, the for the technical and capsule decision. plus for readiness accomplishment and astronaut The eight launch of the launch vehicle objecmission respon-
system, tives. were sibility egress, until launch supported tions from was the
the
complex, problems
to the
operations abort
countdown,
to liftoff the
responsible
monitoring director
launch
to the action
to assure coordinated
that
information the
emanating possibility
complete
and properly
to eliminate
of contradictory
or overlooked
support
requirements.
Conductor also acted operations as the launch vehicle test conductor and was and supported launch
launch
range
complex
launch
capsule
systems personnel.
capsule sule
systems
and blockhouse
activities
of McDonnell
personnel
operation.
7-7
7.2.1.5
The launch
Range
Coordinator range coordinator was in continuous that function. the AMR communication countdown was with the with,
to assure launch
in phase
MISSION
RULES
AND
LOD
PRIORITY used
were and
during
LOD scrub
priority
scrub
established list
priority booster
reference It also
or scrub criteria
rules MCC.
similarly
priorities
Action Abort
C ommands Abort of the mission will only be commanded: a. From the blockhouse: On the basis of impending booster catastrophic failure either on the pad or during powered flight. b. By the RSO, for range safety reasons during powered flight. Capsule or booster malfunctions not be cause for abort command control center. will from
Remarks Booster abort system installedopen loop on MR-l, 1A, and BD. (Abort system is open loop on flights IV[R-l, IA, and BD only. ) Blockhouse monitors booster by telemetry. Blockhouse abort command is to capsule command receivers only. RSO Commands:
a. Booster engine shutdown. b. Booster destruct: (3-second time delay built into booster between shutdown and destruct arming).
7-8
Table 7-1 MERCURY-REDSTONEMission Rules andScrub Priority List (Cont.) Action Retrofire
Retrofire will trol center.
Blockhouse
Booster
telem-
Mandatory.
etry displays for abort control Command Mandatory. Recovery Capability Recovery is mandatory. Weather Launch area Minima Capsule impacts dicted to occur prein an Forces
Surface winds - 18K maximum, Upper winds - 120K maximum at any altitude. Seastate - 3 or calmer. Visibility - 5 miles. Cloud coverage - no cloud coverage that will preclude camera coverage of booster operation from liftoff through separation. Range Instrumentation Support
Countdown strumentation ing count. Flight safety AZUSA Mark I Beat-Beat Mark II Telemetry E LSEE Mod IV radar Mod H radar (S-band, SCR-584) FPS-16 (C-band) Station 1-16 (Cape) FPS-16 (XN-2, C-band) Station 3-16 (GBI) FPS-16 (XN-1, C-band) PAFB-Stanley FPS-8 Surveillance radar FPS-20 Surveillance radar sky screen, vertical wire Command system Hold Proceed Proceed Proceed Proceed Hold Proceed Proceed Proceed Proceed Hold
7-9
Table 7-1 MERCURY-REDSTONEMission Rules andScrub Priority List (Cont.) Action Commands
Proceed Proceed Proceed Proceed Hold Hold Proceed Proceed Proceed Proceed Beach) Proceed ff one operates Proceed if one operates Hold if both are out Proceed Hold Proceed
Remarks
Electronic instru- MPS-25 (Carter Cay C-band) mentation FPS-16 (XN-1, PAFB)
DOVAP (uprange) transmitter DOVAP-blockhouse, receiver Tel-2 (TCM-18) telemetry antenna Telemetry ship Telemetry aircraft (1 required)
Documentation Metric cameras Cine CZR ROTI ROTI ROTI IGOR IGOR IGOR, theodolitic cameras
and
sequential
(Askania)
(Melbourne and Vero Melbourne Beach Vero Beach PAFB False Cape Williams Point Recovery Area:
Primary
and
Secondary
7.2.3
LAUNCH
COUNTDOWN
Countdown personnel
Procedures fatigue, The the The first the 10-hour MERCURY-REDSTONE parts normally part holds) began was performed on the from countdown day was per-
of these
T-640 2300
countdown. launch
hours normally
on the perof
operations liftoff.
from
T-390
This
system
afforded
launch the
in
On those section
of the if the
com-
only within
of the
performed
resched-
a short
of time.
7-10
To assure that all functions during a countdownwere properly integrated, the responsibility for such integration was assignedto the over-all test conductor. Schedulingof prelaunch tests was similarly accomplished. The launch vehicle test conductor prepared the master operational schedule following coordination with STG, AMR, LOD, andother participating organizations. Countdownprocedures on the capsule were prepared in detail by McDonnell Aircraft Company andwere closely coordinated with the over-all launch countdownto assure the timely phasing-in of capsule operations. The master operational schedule was considered the master document, and the AMR andprocedure were geared accordingly. Detailed countdownprocedures were written for use in checking out the many systems andsubsystems of the capsule and booster. The countdowndocument included each key procedure of major importance andeach was identified by the title of the responsible individual in the countdown. These procedures appeared at the proper time and in proper sequencein the count. As each test or procedure was completed, the cognizant engineer reported the fact to the test conductor who then checked it off the list. Due to unforeseendevelopments, some last minute requirements are normally written into all affected launch procedure documents. Experience gained in earlier operations indicated that rapidly changing weather conditions could cause a delay such that it became necessary to scrub the launch. A scrub prior to LOX loading required only rescheduling the beginning of the next countdown. A scrub after LOX loading required emptying the LOX and purging and drying the launch vehicle, the process requiring approximately 12 hours. The precount and final count could then begin subject to the target launch crew rest requirements. It was decided, therefore, that LOX loading would be delayed to occur as close to vehicle liftoff as feasible. As a result, the LOX loading time was shifted from T-305 minutes to T-180 minutes in the countdown. This changewas madebetween the MR-3 and MR-4 launches. A bar chart of the schedule of countdownprocedures and launch vehicle status for the MR-4 launch is presented in Figure 7-3. 7.2.3.2
The Detailed pages of the Countdown present code the utilized Schedule complete (MR-4 t schedule for the MR-4 PAD-M) down launch. is given
following
countdown
to identify Part
7.2.3.2. minutes
to T-390
through
7-11
O _)
o_
_J c_
IIII
II
i i
7-12
Countdown complex instrument doors. personnel install, (except booster roger man and appointed wire stations. booster is on critical compartment power. and aft
3. 4.
BH-CAP PAD-E
and
PAD-CAP
safety
control On.
battery).
5. 6.
M BH
abort from
PAD-E
apply
booster
(prelaunch). generator data. the tapes: vent vent valve. valve and after overflow components following covers and voltages to flight battery
7.
GEN
Adjust voltage
8.
PAD-M
Remove sealing a. b.
assembly. test. c. d. )
(Replace
components e. f. g. h. i. 9. 10. RANGE PAD-E and G Alcohol Alcohol LOX Check Leave pump vent
cap.
On with
sides
Off.
(perform
PAD-CAP I I M MEAS
and
open
for
work.
measuring blockhouse
voltage measuring
ing equipment. 16. M:EAS Calibrate all recorders and make final checks.
7-13
I - Launch
18. PAD-M
devices. over-all substitute. check. capsule DOVAP may (Hardwire subsystems tuneup be used for checks. anytime only.) test. (Vehiprior test cable for control
19.
PAD-E
Connect battery
T-635
i. 2. 3.
BH-CAP BH-CAP RF
transponder )
spheres
to approximately
required (including
3.
PAD-M&P
Perform procedure.
components
according
to
4.
PS
Check required
liftoff
and
camera
start
circuits
as
by AMR. blockhouse azimuth a final sequence alignment launch for all check capsule recorders. of LEV-3 at T-130). RF equipment: HF Recovery beacon beacon capsule systems power. test. for all booster RF equipment: 230.4 5000 telemetry trailer stow for for flight. Mc (U) Mc (U) UHF Recovery (to be
5. 6.
SEQ PAD-E
7.
RANGE
Command
8. 9.
PAD-CAP PAD-CAP
Apply Begin
i0. RANGE
11. T-620 1.
Tune Move
booster measuring
to adjacent launch.
Complex
26 and
7-14
Part
I - Launch
T-620 (Cont.)
2.
PAD-M
components 3. 4. 5. T-610 i. P and PAD-M PAD-M PAD-M PAD-M Load Drain Remove Install vent T-605 water.
680 cc water. tail fuel is open. voltage LEV-3 integrator checks. for S- and C-band S- and C-band radar radars beacon away from On. gyros On for and warmup attitude prior to weather overflow shelter. line after verifying fuel
setting
T-600
1. 2.
BH-CAP RANGE
C-
and
radar S-band
beacon radar
Readout qualified
3.
GEN
Check
clear
after
battery
installation. T-580 1. 2. T-540 1. TC M PAD-M Reset TC panel. SbA block pressure valve. with valve test open. Off). control destruct checks. block is to arm removed and safe. from cappres-
Step dummy Verify sule sure Leave control mast until hand Cap for check and
2. T-530 1. 2.
P RANGE PAD-E
3.
RANGE
Prepare check.
AZUSA
4.
PAD-CAP
Verify
shorting
plug
in escape
tower.
7-15
Part
I - Launch
Countdown Remove boom No. Green fuses plug 5, Red fuses TBI Jumper fuel
(Cont.) in booster hardwire 24 and 34). 1, 2, and 3. tail abort 25; plug (Fuse Fuse and booster box box No. 2,
T-530 (Cont.)
5.
PAD-E
for
fuses
33 and fuses
6. 7. T-520 1.
(alcohol)
2. 3, 4. 5.
PAD-M M M RANGE
On yellow blower On. booster station. to special AZUSA Off. blower caps
warming On.
light.
AZUSA
transponder
with
6. T-515 1. 2. 3. 4.
sequence transponder
test
procedures.
check.
pressurizing T-500 1. ALL BOOSTER STATIONS Standby sequence. 2. 3. PAD- PAA PAD-E Top Verify secured 4. PAD-M Make fuel T-497 1. 2. T-495 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. RF RF G M M M M C Verify Verify Verify Command Command Telemeter Calibrator Control off 5000
for booster
psi
plumbing
checks
prior
to
reference test
transmitter Off.
On.
system
On.
7-16
Part
I - Launch
T-495
(Cont.) 8. 9.
C P TC
autopilot warning
of instrument operation
valve
10.
PAD-M
Monitor pressurizing.
instrument
compartment
ii. GEN 12. SEQ 13. SEQ 14. M 15. M 16. M 17. RF 18. C 19. C 20. P 21. AXN
Over-all Sequence Time DOVAP AZUSA AZUSA Telemeter Rudder Verify Verify Power
test and
power
E&I recorders
pulse On.
On.
blower On.
On.
On (LOD
only).
ok (light On).
On).
ok (light test
transfer
On and
Off
(momentarily). 22 23 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. SEQ G L AXN C RF M SEQ C PD G Record all battery bus voltages. On and Off. power Off (verify). transfer.
Simultaneous Network Emergency Rudder Telemeter Secure Secure Control Check Torque indicated all all drive roger
command
of satisfactory power
booster Off.
Off (LOD
only).
flight gyro
tape. abort is
_+until
by TC. integrator reading when to TC). fuel tank pressure. 7-17 prior cutoff to fuel signal. loading is made (clear and
announcement
2.
MEAS
Monitor
Part
I - Launch
Countdown Start Fill Check Torque Verify Watch Roger Roger Remove shorting fuel igniter for
(Cont.) loading. tank. fuel leakage LOX bolts. and ballast vent for on fourth platform. in tail.
T-490
(Cont.)
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
PAD-M
T-450
I. 2. 3.
of test test
PAD-CAP
capsule
4. 5. 6. T-440 1. 2. 3.
squib fuel
bus
PAD-M
loading. fuel to determine after fuel ullage. loading is made (clear and vehi-
reading
announcement
verify
4. 5. 6. 7.
C TC and BH M ANNOUNCE
PS
Disarm
Establish vehicle RF RF ME NT
All personnel not having specific vehicle preparation activitiesclear service structure for capsule ordnance connection.
8. 9.
CTC PAD-CAP
Remove Remove
capsule power. shorting plug and connect all ordescape trailer. based on trailer alcohol rocket.
nance except I0. T-420 I. PAD-M PAD-M Remove Adjust fuel TRMV
temperature. 2. 3. 4. PAD-M BH PAD-M Safety Secure Engine wire TRMV. power. regulated to zero psig.
booster control
7-18
Part I - Launch Countdown(Cont.) T-400 1. 2. 3. PAD-M PAD-M PAD-M Install tail weather shelter - pendingweather. Resume LOX pump bearing purge. Install following covers andsealing tapes: a. LOX tank vent valve. b. c. 4. 5. T-390 1. PAD-M PAD-M END H_0_ tank vent and overflow assembly. Steam seal drain.
Install instrument compartmentdoor O-rings. Final vacuuming. END operations on first part of split count and secure all systems for standbyperiod. The count will be resumed at T-390 minutes at the predesignated time.
PERSONNE L Prepare peroxide capsule loading. peroxide and monitor system. and ground system for
CAPSULE
PS and PAD-CAP
Load
capsule
II - Launch second
Countdown section of the count: switch On. escape before rocket pickup) -
up the
RF silence but
be cleared. sequence power. covers valve. and overflow assembly. and sealing tapes: reset switch.
3. 4. 5.
to destruct
7-19
Part 9. PAD-M
II - Launch
cable mast
eject control i0. ii. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. T-390 I. 2. PAD-CAP PAD-CAP RANGE PAD-E PAD-E PAD-M PAD-M PAD-M CTC Prepare Move
capsule
capsule
checkout
trailer to launch.
Standby Make
to resume
resistance
Install control battery Ready Adjust Torque Verify LN 2 equipment. fin clamps turbine. completion
to launch
position.
of capsule
ordnance
con-
nection. Reset T-385 Make quency 2. PAD-E Make flight sequencer. final check of 400 cycle inverter adjustment. of precooling motor fre-
check
operation. 3. T-380 I. 2. M PAD-CAP C, GEN Safety wire Verify Check DCR switches.
helium voltage
and Off). 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. PAD-M E E PAD-M ANNOUNC E ME NT Load LN 2 boom bypass tank (booster). On (Off after LN 2 is loaded).
fillOn.
block
8. 9.
Verify
vehicle
Electrically destruct
connect
I0. ii.
M PS
Verify Verify
destruct destruct
7-20
II - Launch
aft section. access check door remove test for cables. flight. and I-II. (do not for flight. all structure-
13. 14.
PAD-M PAD-E
HI-IV
compartment
doors
2. 3. 4.
E E MEAS
switch
On.
compartment
temperature. T-345 1. 2. 3. CTC PAD-E PAD-CAP and PAD-M Call Final Verify and T-330 T-325 1. 1. 2. PAD-CAP PADPAA capsule vertical disconnect personnel alignment. of peroxide lines at capsule on station.
trailer. interior platform operational blockhouse clear and check. No. 2. standby to clear to
ANNOUNCEMENT
all nonoperational
personnel 3. PAD-PAA Position of structure 4. 5. T-320 i. PADPAD-M PAD-M PAA Open Drop Close valve
secure for
outrigger
clearance No. 4.
post).
2 mast valves
bunge
to ground and 4,
1, 3, both supply
Disconnect water
safety line
showers of
at back
road
blocks
area
of non-
personnel
GSE hatch.
7-21
Part
II - Launch
T-315 T-316
i. i.
2.
T-305
i.
for
and searchlight
2.
TC
Announce come
for
personnel blockhouse.
behind
blockhouse
to
T-300
I. 2. 3. 4. 5.
On (voltage
clear).
reference regulator
On.
T-298
i. 2.
T-295
i.
2. 3.
RANGE PS
for
all
RF systems conductor
to test
4.
PAD-M
Make structure
remote from
operational blockhouse.
check
of service
5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
M M BH-CAP PS ANNOUNCE ME NT
RF
silence
Off. wire On DCR power. switch personnel, On (pad cleared capsule abort position). system switches.
center. panel.
safety.
7-22
Part T-295 (Cont.) T-290 I0. CTC ii. TC I. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. RANGE BH-CAP RANGE M RANGE RANGE M M C
II - Launch
Countdown Arm Verify C- and Proceed AZUSA AZUSA Readout Command Telemeter Calibrator Control DOVAP Begin Sequence Recorder DCR DCR No. No. the squib proper S-band with ground On.
RF components reading.
station
AZUSA carrier On. On. computer On. check and time 1 On.
and
report
completion
to TC.
On.
On.
of DOVAP E-1
and
recorders On.
pulse
2 On (allow
at least
30-second
warmup).
o
C C C P AXN
On.
6. 7. 8. 9.
voltage
On).
ok (light test
On and
(momentarily). 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. SEQ G L AXN C C C RANGE RANGE RANGE Record all battery control voltages. commands On and power Off (verify). Off.
Simultaneous Network Emergency Rudder Program Control Cutoff Destruct Switch drive roger
of satisfactory power
transfer.
Off.
7-23
Part
II - Launch
Countdown Cutoff Destruct DCR DCR Secure Report ference Secure systems No. No.
(Cont.)
T-285 20. RANGE (Cont. ) 21. RANGE 22. M 23. M 24. RANGE T-280 1. 2. T-275 1. ALL RF MONITORING STATIONS M TC
command
Receive
RF checks.
T-270
1.
2. 3.
TC
CTC PS
that
all RF equipments
have
been
squib squib
arming
position). 4. 5. 6. M ANNOUNC ANNOUNC E ME NT E ME NT Safety Capsule Operational power 7. T-265 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. G PAD-M PAD-PAA TC M PAD-CAP E E MEAS Secure Engine Move wire DCR switches. disarmed. return to vehicle after
abort
capsule.
instrument
compartment
9.
PAD-M
Reconnect structure.
water
supply
line
at back
of
shower
on west
side.
Reconnect
Part
II - Launch
T-260
1. 2.
PAD-PAA PAD-CAP
capsule
peroxide
T-255 T-250
1. 1. 2.
door. and power up. door near III (when ambient). masts.
change instrument
compartment reaches
3. 4.
and capsule
T-245 T-200
i. i. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
static
firing.
Bring LOX
Open platform 1. Connect fuel bubbling and start flow. Make bolts. final torque check on LOX manhole
8.
MEAS
measuring
9.
PAD-MEAS
that are
all
hand
valves position
in proper
10. 11.
PAD-M PAD-M
plug-in
steam
exhaust. purge.
bearing
on alcohol decision
T-180
I.
prior when
LN 2
7-25
Part
II - Launch
(Cont.) heater On. and pressure. has left Hangar S. loading sequence.
T-180 (Cont.)
2. 3. 4.
P PAD-M MEAS CTC P and P P PAD-CAP PAD-CAP PAD-CAP PAD-PAA PAD-M PAD-M PAD-E PAD-M
T-165 T-145
i. I. 2. 3.
End
Weight
after
LOX tanking.
LOX topping Verify Terminate Capsule Remove Tail Install Prepare azimuth
T- 140
i. 2. 3.
T-135
i. 2. 3. 4.
heater sheet
equipment
5.
Move
H202
truck
into
position.
T-130
i. 2.
3.
PAD-E TC
and
PAD-M
T-125
i.
with a hold
be absorbed installation.
to astronaut insertion.
T-123 T-120
i. i. 2.
CTC P ME/MS
astronaut On.
heaters tank
H202
temperature above
70F,
3. 4. T-115 i.
heaters
(booster).
purge.
7-26
II - Launch
(Cont.) check. computer eject line operation. connected. door and check).
(after
azimuth
4.
PAD-E,
PAD-M,
and M
compartment is in place. cooling On. instrument loading. personnel from No. switch
On when
5. 6. 7. 8. T-95 I. 2. 3. 4. 5. T-90 1. 2.
On.
compartment
temperature.
the
area.
safety
wire
capsule check
No,
2 mast
connected. 3. T-85 i. 2. 3. 4. PAD-CAP PADPADPAD-M PAD-M PAA M Install Open Close capsule platform water hatch. 2. valves safety water and purge. mainstage stick (short momentarily 1 and shower supply 2 and and line open stow at back 3. for of launch.
secure.
5. 6.
PAD-CAP PAD-E
T-80
i. 2.
PAD- M PAD-M
drain ignition
screw
chamber. resistance
sensing
7-27
Part
II - Launch
T-80
(Cont.)
5.
PAD-M
6.
PAD-E
Open install
near
blockhouse
and
room.
van
position.
control launch
pressure (redline
regulator 655 psig T-65 i. PAD-M and E Turn heater 2. T-60 1. 2. PAD-PAA PADPAD-M PAA Open Open
minimum).
on P and
and transducer
platform platform
Disconnect supply.
structure
pneumatic
3.
TC
Obtain structure
from
all
stations
to remove
4.
PAD-PAA
up of high
pressure
system
5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
PS C G G PAD-CAP
and On.
first
motion
circuitry.
structure.
TC panel and
for
launch.
7-28
II - Launch
PAD-M
PAD-PAA
Move mote
to edge
of pad
and
ready
re-
Close
spheres psig
hand box.
valve.
5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
regulator bottle
I0. CP
Position operation
T-50
2. 3. 4.
sensing
On and
Off for
check. vehicle
M-113
emergency
is on station. T-45
.
tail
and
secure
for
launch.
2. 3. 4.
doors
of dis-
PAD-M
hand
valve
is full
PAD-M
Make
of cable
mast
supply
regulator.
.
PAD-CAP PAD-M
room. the following open: inlet. bottle pressurizing. hand valves in the
T-40
i.
are
PAD-M
Remove
scaffold.
7-29
(Cont.)
6. T-35 1.
PAD-M ANNOUNCEMENT
I Close taildoor Ill-IV. All personnel not stationed in the blockhouse for launch, clear the area to launch location.
2. 3. 4. 1. 1.
squib room
door
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. T-29 1.
M
i
RF silence Check Control Functional DOVAP Standby band On. for that
all brown
computers check
radar away
checks pad.
C-
and
S-
radars
T-25
1. 2. 3.
CTC CTC PS
beacons switch
Squib
is Safe). 4. 5. 6. 1. 2. T-22 1.
$
ANNOUNCEMENT RF RANGE M M M
Capsule DCR
abort
is to be armed. On.
monitor
On and
Off as request
for
2.
CTC
Arm
capsule
bus.
7-30
Part
II - Launch
T-22 (Cont.)
3.
CTC
4. 5.
t
abort abort
system armed
T-20
1. 2.
purge On.
On.
AZUSA AMR
T-18
g
1. 2.
telemeter
T-16
1. 2. 3. 4.
Simultaneous C TC CTC M M M M P M C M MEAS Rudder Obtain Begin drive Dr. transfer wire
T-15
1. 2. 3.
Debus'
ok for
of capsule on DCR
Cut safety Preflight Calibrator Preflight Pressurize Calibrator Rudder Preflight Ground house
T-14
1. 2.
to 0 percent.
T-12 T-10
1. i. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Off. Off.
voltage
minus
in block-
T-9
1.
.2.
M M MEAS RANGE AB M
Off (left
side).
3.
is set
up.
T-8'45"
1. 2. 3.
Off
On.
In 1 second
oscillator
7-31
Part
II - Launch
Countdown
(Cont,)
Calibrator Forced Telemeter Telemeter Preflight Remotely Command Command Check Sequence Time Program Check Rudder Verify Power pulse that
On. calibration recording recording calibrator move receiver receiver On and Off, Off, Off, to launch 1 On, 2 On. is on schedule. minute speed. position, Off,
On, device On. adjustments. On (prep ok (light test complete). On). On momentarily, On and Off.
switch
Simultaneous Cutoff Network Emergency Rudder Check Clear Check a. b. c. d. drive LEV-3 signal stations Power command. roger
commands
satisfactory power
power Off,
transfer.
position control
panel
(all
capsule
e. f. g.
(MEAS). (SEQ).
Hangar
D (AB).
7-32
Part
II - Launch h. i. j.
Countdown Pad
safety
T-2'30" i. 2. 3.
4. 5. T-2 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. T-60" 1. 2. 3. T-50" T-47" T-35" 1. 1. 1. 2.
P M
PS CTC CP M C P G RANGE BH-CAP RANGE P AB BH-CAP SEQ P ALL STATIONS
(indication).
with
telemeter
to range Off.
LOX topping LOD telemeter Freon Sequence Firing Verify occur. flow
On.
speed.
sequence
as major
items
Announce Announce Announce Announce Announce Announce Announce Announce Announce Announce Announce
"Vent valves closed." "Fuel tank pressurized. " "LOX "LOX tank pressurizing. " tank pressurized."
7-33
Part
II - Launch
(Cont.)
T+0
1.
2. 3.
e
in 10 second
increments until
until
in 30 second
increments
termination. 4. BH All personnel in place T+5 TEST 1. BH Sequence during except flight. Slow. Launch Director remain
recorders
TERMINATION 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. PAD-M PADP PAD-M GEN PAA Secure Close Vent Secure Secure high pressure GN2.
generators.
Explanation AB ABT
of code
used
in countdown. Telemeter Blockhouse Auxiliary Blockhouse McDonnell, Pan American panel cherry-picker test conductor control panel (booster) tower station abort network hangar panel panel operations) Aeromedical D (booster) (Dr. Debus, panel)
operations
panel
(booster) vehicle
NASA pad
capsule
operations
7-34
PAD-E G&C, network PAD-M Fueling, operations PAD-MEAS PAD-PAA Pan American PAD-SAFE PD PS Pad RANGE Items remote RF Blockhouse SEQ Blockhouse current) TC Test 7.3 EMERGENCY
i
propulsion,
Measuring TY
Pad safety (PAA) pad operations Program safety device panel rack (blockhouse) central control to
handled range
and
RF system
(booster) voltage,
function
recorders
(SEQ,
conductor
panel
(vehicle)
EGRESS
OPERATIONS
7.3.1
ORGANIZATION General
OF RESPONSIBI.LITIES
7.3,1.1
on the AMR and surrounding safety regulations. was vested The responin NASA.
the protection,
astronaut
safety conceivable
all the
phases areas
of the
launch
and
flight,
in proximity
to the
vehicle
were
sectors.
7.3.1.2
Launch
Pad
Area
This
area
inside
the fence
56, Area
priSquad
responsible
director operations
capsule conducted
occurred,
was
7-35
7.3.1..3
This area
Site
Recover_
Area land area from along four the nautical flight Banana commander. line miles uprange the of the water pad area for this to
including
offshore delegated
as well site
as the
River.
Responsibility
launch
recovery
Downrange consisted of the "of the range area from approximately normal for Task capsule the Force 12 nautical recovery within miles area, this offshore with area a was
operations Commander.
TIME
STUDY which of the equipment The available were and of these one for studies. was
each
period
in the the
countdown.
studies
divided the
into
categories: Figure
astronaut
astronaut
is a compilation
The
basic
rule
predominant be provided
in the for
final the
of the with
methods
employed risk
was
that perre-
a minimum
to rescue operations
members access
of the
rescue
involved
in rescue
to the
capsule.
7-4
the
heavy and
the
time
the the
astronaut total
would man-seconds
be exposed
to a
indicated
all personnel booster. for the the These guidelines of the of It was reoperation
be exposed
studies,
status type
could
reduce
every
possible
successful and
of a rescue of the
largely the
dependent operations.
skills,
individuals
affecting
7-36
0_o0
u w z
w o
"0
z z
c_
C
u3
U3 o3 C
i:
u
c c
o o (3
c_ bJ_
o
o o (.0,1
_5 Im
W .. W I,..0 Z
7-37
7.3.3
EMERGENCY
EQUIPMENT
Aerial tower,
Tower shown in Figure Because than egress around the 7-5, was originally to gain controlled intended, experience, structure astronaut tower, cab cherry was by STG, and since under after certhe to be
MERCURY-ATLAS. revealed it was was it to be faster selected removed vertical next should to the booster for from
of desire remote
studies conditions,
of the the
structure
picker, de-
capable
of reaching
heights capsule
astronaut such
a means The
from the
of the
be lowered
within
Special the
pushbutton
switches
MERCURY-REDSTONE The structure capsule remote remote hatch control control when the until
located
on the
was the
structure minutes of
from for
in this
position
emergency
M-113
Carrier carrier The limited M-113 was selected to provide of withstanding heat The transportation 12 psi had to
provide edge
of a fire
track
designed of the
country
operation,
scrub modified
of up to 35 miles miscellaneous
specifically to these
communications listed
and
equipment
emergency
operations
as follows: Communications a. 30.3 mc transmitter net, UHF and radio receiver. and receiver. system.
b. c. d. e. 7-38
inter-phone system.
inter-phone speaker.
Auxiliary a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. Vehicle
Shepards Crash
on 25 feet with
five-minute
fire
axe to provide
hook
aperture.
The the
members countdown
of the
PARS,
M-113 The
armored personnel
carrier were
during kept at
a minimum
numbers
to a potential
(cherry
picker)
with assigned
the the
egress following
developed
by the
egress
committee,
the
Perform booster
egress position
the
capsule pad.
while
the
launch event
capsule
Assist, covery
by the outside
launch the
site launch
recovery complex
commander, area.
in re-
,Emergency of the
Equipment emergency
Location egress equipment, the cab has is moving service been at approximately structure positioned has next the been T-55 minutes, back hatch; operator is to its
7-6. the
moved
personnel
in to embark
mobile
7-40
0 O ,-..t
, _
0 t_
N
0
.N
7-41
before
proceeding required
to its for
launch rescue
The fighting
other from
equipment, liftoff,
is also
shown.
7.4
RANGE
SAFE TY
7.4.1 For
RANGE ballistic
SAFETY
OFFICER
(RSO)
OPERATIONS the was time the RSO had point a plotting the The " were Cape. the board vehicle data C-band The beat-
vehicles, the
such real
display would sources radars beat nal terms beat gram strip
indicating impact
where
if thrust
to the
"Impact AZUSA
Patrick by
II at the
system, received
developed
by two antennas.
ranges. flight
representations were
deviations for
recorders
skyscreen telemetry
NASA Beat-Beat
MK II telemetry
tracked
transmitters.
To protect of AFMTC mand Two for Cape lance, terms (program for each C-band accordance
life
and
property each
from vehicle
an erratic launched
vehicle, from
the
Range to carry
Safety two
(RSD) com-
and/or
destroying
MERCURY-REDSTONE by at Cape 3. For were Central the RSO's provided versus data
safety.
transmitters
Transmitter board versus altitude board on the displays cross versus could Cape, range
of the
positions ground
range cross
(ground range
range The
profile). flight
if necessary, AFB
at Patrick
prescribed
7.4.2
ABORT
CONSIDERATIONS period (destruct) between an abort was initiated requested between by range by STG. the safety This cutoff command and period
command separation
assured 7-42
a sufficient
existed
spacecraft
separation
time
with along
the the
that impact
the line.
destruct
corridor
RSD concurred (to T+8 seconds), however, fly if the that capsule
blockhouse
to ascertain
long the
incorporation command,
seconds
of RSD. good
assured
if an abort flight
booster
continue
in powered
to a safe
LAUNCH original
AZIMUTH
CONSIDERATIONS launch adequate coverage, selection azimuth distance of 105 degrees from downrange Cape was selected on the
MERCURY-REDSTONE overland optimum recovery launch different areas. area time, tracking This
of minimum
islands impact
(including
on analysis
and the
development of lateral
of a system displacement.
of interchangeable
directions
While
the
in a 105-degree trajectory
launch time
had and
originally
stated
azimuth; to a
MR-2, program
and the
trajectory MR-2
on an azimuth
trajectory.
interval problem
between
the
and
MR-3
RSD investigated the early violate launch the Inasmuch a RSD indithe azi-
the
in further right
flight
would (X-Y
range
as imposed launch
plot). change,
was
too close
requested
three-sigma if the
deviation agency
to grant for
the
waiver
to change
launches.
STG con-
azimuth
7-43
IMPLE established
ME NTATION the methods, Handbook a set for of procedures Pad and the the Area reissued was prepared. It was flight issued This document to the The docu-
entitled
prior
of MR-3, defined,
action personnel
of these
detailed
studies
procedures impractical
serial
MERCURY-ATLAS
7.5
SPECIAL
LAUNCH
FACILITIES
AND
DISPLAYS
7.5.1
SERVICE
STRUC TURE
General its use shown in the MERCURY-REDSTONE 7-7, was used In order for the Program, launching the service structure on
in Figure launch
JUPITER,
vehicles.
vehicle, explained
of major following
modifications paragraphs.
White
Room service capsule. prior structure The was the was area utilized for checkout to the and and preparation booster preparation, the approxit
of the
capsule
mated of checkout
of the
checks.
taken
capsule
period
requested three of
possibility
conditioning were
capsule
on level
as follows: winds.
withstand be readily
hour for
winds
exceeding
55 miles
per
hour.
7-44
Figure
7-7.
Service
Structure,
Pad
5,
VLF
56,
Cape
Canaveral 7-45
Special hospital-type floor coverings. Air conditioning system to provide a 20 percent safety factor for both temperature andhumidity control. A 20 by 50-inch camera platform with live load capacity of 350pounds. Sincethis project was carried out on a crash basis, it is obvious that no formal design procedures were possible. The enclosure was consequentlydesigned and constructed on a day-by-day basis on the site in order to meet the required date for 1V[R-3. The room proved effective and satisfactory in the flights of MR-3 and MR-4 and is shown in Figure 7-8. 7.5.1.3
A solid Escape fuel escape to separate The presence which had Rocket rocket the Flame and Deflector tower were the attached booster above fatal train to the capsule. This rocket was had a if in-
rocket proved
occurred. bridgewire
(safing escape
arming In deflec-
incorporated
to eliminate
this Figure
potential 7-9
a flame structure.
be provided.
the design
Controls of the MERCURY-REDSTONE lengthy countdown 1960. service periods. In subsequent to utilize were structure The was initially and proposed opera-
tional
in August pad,
emergency vision exacting requirements purposes, Platform shown addition mote remote crash hicles 7-46 for
launch
it was
decided
to meet
design
remote rescue
control blockhouse.
7-10
was
mounted for
position tower
lowering proved
provided.
structure
very
in operations. were
Adaptation on a
emergency months
between basis.
of ve-
on a time-available,
noninterference
u_
r_ o
F,,I
0 0 0
_-,I
7-47
u_
>
_9
_9 _9
O 9
_D
_D (D
7-48
9
_D
I L--
i_i
!i
7-49
7.5.1.5 To provide to the tions located located positioned moval. to show mounted of these house. was four also
Television visual monitoring Control and white for Center, around remote television the launch three three, control by the blockhouse were mounted and for information locawere camera
structure the
room side
on level of level
to show was
northwest at the
it could
camera structure
movement
to the
launch
on top of the blockhouse, cameras A fifth could camera, after located available of the be controlled positioned structure
an over-all
remotely recorders
block-
service
removal,
substituted output
cameras
commercial and
networks at the
for use
in their
nationwide
coverage
manned
MR-3
discretion
7.5.1.6
Auxiliary Platform
It was originally intended that the capsule contractor would provide such necessary scaffolding and access media on levels three and four of the service structure as required. In a meeting on 6 October 1960, of the launch operations committee, STG ad-
vised that provisions for access to various levels of the capsule were too restricted and proposed an auxiliary level at the base of the escape tower. revealed during the first mating of MR-1. This problem was made was and
an auxiliary platform was proposed which would accommodate 300 pounds of equipment.
The platform would also provide associated electrical interInstallationof the platform was This platform is shown
locks, railings, access ladders, and other equipment. satisfactorilycompleted by 8 December in the upper section of Figure 7-11.
on a priority basis.
7.5.1.7 Platform
Reinforcement designed the first for load mating the limits of 10 personnel at CCMTA, was 4000 being pounds (2000 pounds) it was deflected. with greater observed and 500 pounds that these re-
of MR-1 platform
exceeded loads
Investigation loads to be
platform
approximately
7-50
>
>
0 @
7-51
the
manned and
flights.
Design
of the
at an flights in of
installation
on a noninterference
installation
completed
Modification modifications
shelter protection
was
provided capsule
on the from
fourth the
service elements
level
to
of the This
work-
ing conditions. available A special protected A cable connect Additional level shelter. enclosed storage boom capsule lights
entailed
rehabilitation
and modification
of an
was
provided
for
safe
and
was
cables,
used
to damage.
from
potential
provided
house
and on the
structure
to provide
illumination
and for
photographic
coverage. Special handling equipment for the capsule tester was designed and
manufactured. Cable between trays and cable three hanging and four. equipment were designed and installed
levels
7.5.2 The
ABORT
COMMAND
SYSTEM vehicle the from vehicle abort the was system unmanned systems. such that the circuitry checkout, Abort Director seconds and re-
MERCURY-REDSTONE in the GSE, used approach part until of the liftoff had seconds during was this turned for
and booster missiles. The Launch until which abort subsequent Control
different
eight booster
adequate after
be observed from
period. over
command
MERCURY
7-52
Redundancyfor the abort system required that each hardwire abort line, from the GSE to the vehicle, have the capability to command an abort should the need arise. The MERCURY-REDSTONEvehicle also incorporated a means by which the destruct system could be checkedwithout simulating vehicle lfftoff. This was accomplished by adding circuitry and componentsto the GSEto provide a liftoff signal to the command receivers only. Abort batteries were incorporated into the ground support equipment to maintain an abort capability by the Launch Director in the event of a launch complex power failure. This was accomplished with relays which would normally be energized but which would de-energize with the loss of power and place the capabilities of receiving abort indications, sounding a buzzer, and retaining the indications when received. This provided a reliable and effective means to monitor, detect, and correct malfunctions and/or improper operation of the abort system. After liftoff, telemetry data, optional from two ground stations, was transmitted (one via hardwire) to the brush recorder, which was maintained in the firing room to monitor the control and abort systems, tilt program, and premature cutoff. This informa -_ tion was provided to the RF abort panel operator so that RF abort capability would be monitored after lift*off. Shutdownof the engine in normal flight was accomplished by aziintegrator cutoff which differed from most other launch vehicles. An integrator clock panel was used in the GSEto check the integrator time. Engine combustion pressure switches were incorporated as a part of the automatic abort system to sense a loss of combustion pressure. Two methodswere designed into the GSEto check the
0
and chamber
of the
switches. the
First, pneumatic
a pressure operation,
simulator and
near
the relays
com-
to check circuit
secondly,
utilized
electrically.
A followup remained of the These plugs the GSE, were of the capsule
ground the same it was replaced launch umbilical release. properly However, to correct
cable
was
added
that of the
the
ground
potential the
vehicle
GSE.
Tempo
relay
timers
used the
timers. ejected
masts
case
of this
equipped release
several the
preflight
occasion
to be reliable,
fault
release. 7-53
7.5.3
BLOCKHOUSE
ELECTRICAL
GROUND
SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT
7.5.3.1 The
General specialized installed equipment, in the required for the launching Launch of ME RCURY-REDSTONE Facility (VLF) 56.
following was
vehicles,
blockhouse
on Vertical
Inverter panel,
Panel shown in Figure frequency vehicle 7-12, was a standard inverter panel used and for pre-
deviations 115-volt,
and voltage
indications
contained
400-cycle
inverters.
Control panel,
Panel shown in Figure 7-13, was system. control used to control In addition, located on this and monithe panel. instru-
instrument could
compartment
cooling
compartment
be pressurized
by a manual
Measuring panel,
Panel shown in Figure of the was 7-13, provided control DOVAP, with of all RF AZUSA, these equipment on-
which
consisted switch
telemeter,
An RF silence from
installed periods
in series
controls
equipment
radiating
during
of RF silence.
the ground
panel
had
a 5-volt power
measuring supply, the destruct line blocking to turn used the heater
indicator receivers,
with
or vehicle for
control
arming
thrust
control, The
sensor line
a manual abort
on prior capsule
transfer.
to prevent checkout.
receiving
the booster
booster
Panel the auxiliary propulsion panel, pressure for the shown test, components in Figure and the test ac and 7-14,
components The
instrument switch
7-54
f,.,i
i
_L
I t',,,,.
7-55
o o
! I N?
_,,4
!! .
g
o o (.) _
_,,,i
w_
"t
o % >
d
I
g
._J .L.."
7-56
t,_
.o
o
ml
4
I
.g
7-57
compartment selector
test
portions was
of the
panel.
This in the
switch
was
switch
launch
provided
manual
individually compartment
The test
instrument the
compartment. heaters
The were
ll5-volt, also
60-cycle controlled
(H202)equipment
Propulsion panel,
Panel shown in Figure 7-14, was the standard model selector high pressure and panel as used switch, system controls. also in precutoff inIn
a function button,
cutoff controls,
presented
Over-all test up at
Panel shown tail in Figure booster it was all the 7-15, and made was previously after used each item vehicle as a portable test. For The the panel
console
of the
Program, for
of GSE. during
including:
mainstage,
combustion
pressure
Auxiliary network
Network panel,
Panel shown in Figure The panel 7-16, contained The monitored the and power recorder controlled transfer control, with was lights test specific switch cutoff
MERCURY-REDSTONE and the indication switch meters potential emergency light to monitor to monitor faults with the the missile
sequence
switch, abort
(when ground
busses,
indicator also
in the
vehicle
inverters
were
contained
7.5.3.9 The
Panel shown in Figure 7-16, for was the standard and vehicle type used on all until previous
generator
missiles. 7-58
a constant
28 volts
ground
power
the vehicle
i_!
l9
4
i i
!1
I
1
@ o 0
Iil
mU
0p.I
b "-"
7-59
oi_0
I <
tjJ',
0 ,.,) 0 l:q
q)
f.-i 0 D
,,,.,.-#
<
I.-i 0
El
J_ill
<i'_ i,:
7-60
1 and
2 provided
voltages to the
for
the
vehicle monimiscela
capsule for
laneous voltage
contained
supervision
indicator
vehicle
indicators.
Rack shown the in Figure 7-17, timer was panel. the and the composed In addition control program of the control panel, the the autopilot vane controls control,
integrator attitude
vehicle
control,
flight output.
sequencer,
device,
LEV-3
monitors
the
autopilot
rack
was
a brush
recorder IV.
that These
the
input monitored
of the
and the
position
of vanes
II and
7.5.3.11 The sisting and down test black vehicle tial for the test
Test
Console shown and abort The test in Figure panel, master conductor. with operations, the Abort status 7-18, countdown clock panel was made clock up of three master control vehicle gave the The essenbuzzer. panels panel, countthe con-
panel. launch
provided
launch panel
and
The
communications stations
(except
supervisor at the
countdown
speaker.
panel
functions given
determined and
of the received
countdown. are
indications positive
by lights
Indications
retained
until
is taken.
COMMUNICATIONS to the usual communications links peculiar used to the in all missile launches, the following flights,
MERCURY-REDSTONE
manned
with
the Capsule
(Missile
Operational
Interphone
System)
(prior
to liftoff). 7-61
]r_
v-, _, -b2
rc 7-.!7
+\utonilot
Ru.cl,:.
>lo+:,::
,_u;_,c 5{3
Figure
7-18.
Test
Conductor's
Console,
Blockhouse
56 7-63
High frequency radio network for recovery and rescue operations operating on 30.3 mc. Figures 7-19 and 7-20 show graphically the many participating individuals and agencies who had either a monitor or transmit-receive capability on one or more of these special communication links in support of launch operations. A short time preceding the launch of MR-3, a NASApolicy was established which permitted on-the-spot transmission of launch operations to the public. This required a crash program to provide this coverage and to organize operations so as not to interfere with the preflight procedures. To minimize interference with critical operations, it was decided tO exclude live television from the blockhouse and MERCURYControl Center. In order to maintain security, the networks were required to provide one camera crew from a television pool, and a single mobile unit which was present until final service structure removal. One television camera was installed on level three and wired through Blockhouse 56 for use by the news media. Four television pictures were provided by the launch operations directorate from their closed-loop system used in support of operations. These five television channelswere controlled by an LOD operator in Blockhouse 56. Television coverage thus provided was transmitted to Blockhouse 26 through cables provided by the news media. The command station at Blockhouse 26 was mannedand monitored by commercial networks personnel. The mobile unit had the capability of direct broadcasting. A 208-volt power source was made available to the mobile unit from the Cape operational critical power. This mobile unit was located between Complexes 56 and 26 during the periods when access was permitted to the complex. This arrangement proved satisfactory and was repeated to a somewhat lesser degree during the launch of MR-4. An informational telephone network was set up for each operation. A three-point operational telephone link was provided betweenthe blockhouse, MSFC, and the Advisor to the Office of Launch Vehicle Programs at NASAHeadquarters. An additional commentator link from the information center in Hangar R relayed information to Washington, MSFC, and local points, such as the press site. In addition, a commentator link was provided from the observation room of the MERCURY Control Center to the Office of SpaceFlight Programs at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
7-64
J,
-1
I L_
I 0
I 1 I t
i
_:_=_ _= _: L' ,
_E
r. "_ o lu
i-1
i
K_ o_
_._
7. o _ _=_
7-65
_- l
_ "_
"-r
o
2_
N/,
]7/
J f,i'
.,.,_
0 r-i
o o o
-,,,,I
.----,--/..,......_
_ ,___. I
2:
o
e_
N
<
<1 o o
_, ,,,-.-,, i
ll
[
,% o 0 o o
q
o o 0
@,I I L"-o
_o
o
0 - 0
-4 I
7-66
7.5.5
INSTRUMENTATION
Monitoring used
Instrumentation at AMR for monitoring of metric the launch of rockets instrumentation, equipment, category " data plant was divided engineering safety which equipcould into
These documentary
consisted
tracking telemetry
photography,
flights
another
Much was
of this required
category.
to obtain obtaining
events.
was
means guidance
combustion ignition,
are was
samused im-
Flight Vehicle
and television
monitors
displayed
in central
Metric
instrumentation. Metric a. electronic radars (GBI), in the Cay, instrumentation at Cape Carter consisted Patrick San Salvador The of the following: Grand the stations, Carter Cay Bahama C-band except tracked radars In video the separa-
Canaveral, and
Cay,
capsules. to loss
beacon beacon
track. for
available
as tracking vehicle
impact
scopes the
distance accuracies
C-band 0.6 to
from
Canaveral, VERLORT
GBI, (very
and long
San range
7-67
tracking) of the
site)
tracked
the
to be reduced quality
radar
were
not sufficient.
in the reduction
program
(Doppler D, Lateral
stations C,
56, Airport,
Merritt
Beach,
of 73. 738 mc. the beacon The from 0.05 was and
Cape
powered flights,
DOVAP the
combined
transponder com-
telemetry The
transmitter telemetry
onboard
on subse-
I and
AZUSA
Mark
both I was
in the for the was MR-l, MR-BD, interrogated used and of flight to 5.8 for
MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-IA, MIR-3, on 5000 the also input post and MR-2 and mc MI:t-4 and flights, flights. transmitted impact metric
II was
used
on 5060 for
data
were
approximately varied
through meters Metric a. optic Fifteen were 2000 and using tion,
accuracies
same
of the
following: as CZRWs and from focal liftoff length RF-5Vs, to lenses film
kno_vn source
operated The
continuous were
running fixed
system. were
in orientaand vehicle
The
azimuth the
elevation
of the
vehicle
by referencing
7-68
light source, paint pattern and/or the base of the flame to fixed reference targets in the field of view of each camera. Position b. errors varied from 0.04 to 0.1 meter for MERCURY-REDSTONE. Cine-theodolites with 24-inch focal length lenses and 35mm film size, tracked the vehicles from four sites on the Cape, Cocoa Beach, and Patrick AFB. The cine-theodolites photographedthe vehicle, azimuth and elevation dials, timing pulses, andthe frame count on each picture. This furnished backup data from liftoff to 2000 feet for the fixed ribbon frame cameras andprimary data to approximately 150,000 feet altitude. Position accuracies varied from 1.2 to 2.9 meters. Three attitude cameras, using 35mm film and lenses of 40-, 48-, and 60-inch focal length, tracked the vehicles to loss of view. Attitude data (pitch, yaw, and roll) were reduced from 0 to 2000feet altitude. Yaw and pitch accuracies varied from 0.0 to 0.3 degrees. 7.5.5.3
Photographic camera rate, did tial Photographic coverage Coverage was divided into engineering cameras to other cameras sequential had data, range while provide cameras cameras, vicinity of the and timing documentary or a known frame
c.
cameras sequen-
not have
timing.
naturally
provided running launch from pad. flame periscope on was from Tracking ROTI's respec(north AFB.
documentary
(fps),
were details
from and
of capsule
Twelve at 32 fps.
at 96 fps
and
35mm to loss
running each
surveillance
camera. and
Long
IGOR's
at Melbourne focal
Vero
30 fps, Cape
500-inch
IGOR's
were
of Cocoa,
Patrick
length
lenses,
and Williams
7-69
Links were carried links were for on each redundancy. at Hangar and made MERCURY The capsule REDSTONE D, Blockhouse on one at MCC, ORV using D. with the same each TEL informahad II, one
on both links
recorded
GBI,
(Ocean TEL
Vessel). and a
Real-time limited
at Blockhouse
56 and Hangar
System original
Displays planning the STG requested MERCURY and source trailer, was that flight a booster monitoring performance trailer. and because was and In the of the abort absence limited resysof
display
in the location
flight
program TEL
monitoring
eliminated
III was
to monitor
MERCURY-REDSTONE
As a consequence, within 5 or
the
the Operation
request and
that Flight
this
be available MCC to
10 seconds
Director
As a result manned
requirement, established
measuring
flights
following: brush open-loop switches abort recorder flights under displays were the after eight utilized expanded left the recorder first eight to monitor to monitor were the the available abort manned system flights. a backup the MCC, as during The
to give from
seconds
seconds
provision the
booster
latched was
bus
in the
On position was
event
signal
operation
to either was
display
alternatively (1)
telemfor the
receivers, part
A direct performance
between console at if an
blockhouse
immediate occurred
of information
unexpected 7-70
powered
The
blockhouse
booster on a brush
of
over-all The
performance, measurements pitch yaw roll position position. position. jet vane
were minus
Deflection Pressure Combustion Abort Attitude Angular Angular Combustion Control Abort Capsule Emergency bus
No.
2.
abort, abort,
cutoff
voltage from
capsule. signal.
performance MC C for
display
presented The
on an 8-chandisplayed infor-
information from
mation
by hardwire
TEL
MCC.
transmission ably the a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. to noise MCC Abort Attitude Angular Control Abort Angular Combustion Combustion Tilting Input
unreliability. as follows:
display
of launch
is listed bus
program, to flight
sequence.
7-71
k. 1.
m. Acceleration of missile, fine, longitudinal. To assure that the best information from qualified sources was available within the shortest possible time, the following ground rules were
established: a. The MCC console was monitored engineer. forwarded verification 15 seconds, performance Chief, booster with the information blockhouse upon was and to the on any of his by the MSFC Project Director
and an LOD measuring b. The Flight measuring Director engineer after within
booster and
Deputy d. The
Deputy
blockhouse to assure
telemetry
stations e. The
command data.
action
on the
basis
of MCC
booster
7.5.5.6 The
Communications
for
Recovery aboard the and beacon capsules aircraft and could of the have been used force. beacon as a backup A UHF were
recovery
and
homing carried.
purposes On the
after
unmanned
recorded
capsule. Center,
maintained force.
between
MERCURY
Control
recovery
Abort
Landing
Predictor was high the Abort wind Landing Predictor. Because capsule, winds was aloft of the the usual availto of four points, there slow
system and
drift
of a MERCURY Using
adequate.
data,
and
2 hours, landing
programmed
capsule during
seconds
corresponding an abort,
times, personnel
to the obtained
MERCURY
an approximate
landing
by observing
7-72
abort
time
point.
Information a Cape
thus abort
provided, would
perresult
Control
whether favorable
in an unsafe
wind conditions,
if necessary.
7.6
METEOROLOGICAL
ASPECTS
GENERAL input to the Missile MERCURY-REDSTONE Range, the MERCURY data. of the Program network, Forecasts United was and were States a divided the responsibility. recovery Project While of the a small need
Atlantic
forces,
supplied
Weather there
of capability
existed
in this
arrangement, support
additional Group
that
Project about
Weather and
Support
information
areas,
extended-range
7.6.2
WEATHER
RESTRICTIONS
General restrictions into two that affected the MERCURY-REDSTONE Program may logically
Nominal Aborted
Restrictions are those which might mission. combination and (3) the affect the This performance group may launch of the spaceinto
combination
in a normal
during capability
capsule's covering
of successfully
7.6.2.3 The
Arbitrary
Restrictions of this category were those which have no specific effect upon the
restrictions
successful occurred
completion during
of an operation, phase.
of upmost observation
importance
ff a failure
the boost
Optimum
of the booster-capsule
7-73
through escape
the systems
zones was
of maximum mandatory
dynamic for
pressure flight.
and
through
the
separa-
a manned
WEATHER
MINIMUMS booster launch occurring preparations present itself area. during was subject to easily weather satisfied minimums phase tanking. particularly weather are could mini-
as follows: hamper
countdown oxygen
such a hazard
as liquid to missile
Lightning relating
preparation,
devices. gusts, An 18-knot standard than used this for are a limiting (sustained) all factor after removal (gust) wind operations. 10 percent of
Ground the
especially
service
or 25-knot
velocity
were
at the
level
of the
jet
stream
placed The
the critical
limitations of both
MERCURY-REDSTONE. and aloft speed, are as well sufficiently before of the the as
direction winds
vertical strong
months,
of the
time but
flight
simulation
warm
months becomes
upper
winds
a strong area,
maximum
that
it persists
Critical
periods conditions
of no upper lend
problem,
themselves
to reasonably
prediction.
WINDS was subject wind and to a variety its attendant size pad, limit or during of weather state its restrictions, sea. most Structural of surviving phase, might vicinity the range. imporlimitaa landing result of the The in
capsule is the
surface
small the
planned minimums
trajectory must
or in the be satisfied
7-74
frequency of
is not high, patterns,
and
seas
in the
Cape
area
or along
the
trajectory
with (most
a great frequently
weather months).
at any
time
AND
VISIBILITY to even more weather limitations. for safe The recovery. and ceiling limit Since visibility and of wind recovery in the visibility rethat and
leads
elements
of ceiling
of unfavorable low.
search
7.6.6 The than ness point. This present bility 7/10 could total half
(C LOUDS} of the variability selected to track many Cape Canaveral in the as the a rising other mean limiting missile than from area exceeds 40 percent the year. but only more Cloudi-
throughout factor,
of 30 percent of the
as a starting
is dependent time.
factors
been than
known 1/10
to range all
conditions
of clear accurately.
capability
be predicted
The
more proceeded
than
a fair to within
share one
of good hour
weather
conditions. launch scrubbed coverage necessitated unaffected seasons within North thus, While months, surface another time,
of planned were optical weather those cooler skies across months; prediction. for the cooler and on
of weather. problem.
four
during colder
the warm
during
months.
Weather alternating
with
clear fronts
of several There
movement
of major the
relationship
during more
warmer
reliable
scheduled
stream
a definite barely
conditions
in recovery
areas
subsided
occasion.
7-75
7.6.7 Within
SUPPORT capability, meteorological support Prediction to the of moment-tosite during Aircraft the last recon-
of forecasting Program
variability in sky condition, of the countdown of the near but serves area
of both MR-3
the Cape
rather
the latter variety present tive to optical tracking. ing technique, proved
restric-
Group's
compositBeach, convective
to be a very beyond
surveillance
disturbances
of a single radar
at Cape
Canaveral.
7-76
8 PROGRAM
8.1
INTRODUCTION test program and booster manned consisted of six flights and prior in three launch phases. vehicle The first three The The last testing of the flights fourth two
designers. shots.
to the manned
were
providing of the
MERCURY
capsule.
Table
is a summary
MERCURY-REDSTONE
Capsule Number
Payload
i llll
iAstronaut. A stronauY
Alan Virgil
Shepard Grissom
Parameters Flt path Velocity Maximum Range /_ at cutoff at cutoff, altitude (deg fr local fixed vert)
(ft/sec)
miles)
(nautical
level
(sec)
217.2
1154 74
1230 0
8-1
Table 8-1 Summary of the MERCURY-REDSTONEFlight Test Program (Cont'd) Parameter Pitch (%abort limit) Roll " Yaw " Pitch rate " Yaw rate " MR-BD 16 34 29 35 14
section pertains MERCURY was A total MR-3 17 12 13 22 14 MR-4 20 12 24 50 14
The
flight
of the
this
of these
using made.
LITTLE In addition,
booster.
development
program
conducted occurring
with final
MERCURY-ATLAS
8.2
DEVE
LOPMENT
FLIGHTS
GENERAL three MERCURY-REDSTONE the adaption with the of the flights, REDSTONE capsule. MR-l, to the -1A, and -2, were development mission Launch and capsule,
to prove interfaces
MERCURY were
MERCURY Florida.
All flights
to testing manned
booster to follow.
A discusfor
operations (MR-l,
no abort
if conditions
an abort. system.
to preclude
a mission
to a malfunction
MERCURY-REDSTONE Launch automatic combination during 8-2 the Complex inflight for 56. abort the
Flight The
MR-1
was mission
launched was
1960 loop
from
Pad
5 of of the
primary
sensing
and
to qualify which
MERCURY portion
mission, and
6.0
powered
of the
successful
spacecraft
Prior to the launch on 21 November, a launch attempt was madeon 7 November 1960. This attempt was scrubbed at T-22 minutes when a low hydrogenperoxide pressure indication in the capsule was discovered. Previously, a 60-minute hold at T-120 minutes was made to correct difficulties with the spacecraft's hydrogen peroxide system. MR-1 was the combination of Booster MR-1 and Spacecraft 2. The firing command was given from the blockhouse at 0859 EST and normal ignition occurred. At first motion of the vehicle an engine shutdownsignal was given. Prior to complete shutdownthe thrust was sufficient for lVIR-1to rise 3.8 inches, then settle back on the pedestal. The engine shutdownsignal also caused the capsule escape tower to be jettisoned. Still surrounded by the smoke created by the jettison rockets the vehicle tilted slightly on its pedestal, but remained erect. The capsule's drogue chute deployed, then its main parachute, andfinally the auxiliary chute. Still attached to the capsule, which had remained on the booster, the chutes fell to the pad. (Figure 8-1.) After the first three seconds, the vehicle rested on the launch pedestal, fully fueled and armed. Liquid oxygenwas venting and the fin frames were deformed due to the force of impact. No power or command connectionswith ground suppgrt equipment remained after liftoff; therefore, no control could be exercised over the booster or the capsule. To prevent further damage, especially the possibility of accidental signaling of the destruct system, range safety left the command carrier on throughout that day andthe following night to insure saturation of the receivers thereby blocking them from detecting any spurious signals. The vehicle was allowed to remain on the pad to evaporate the liquid oxygen. The following morning the LOX tank was vented, as were the high-pressure nitrogen spheres in the engine pneumatic system. The fuel and the hydrogenperoxide tanks were then emptied. All circuits were deactivated, the service structure was moved into place, andlastly the destruct system arming device and primacord were removed. The investigation which followed found the cause of the engine shutdownto be due to a "sneak" circuit created when the two electrical connectors in Fin II disconnected in the reverse order. Normally the 60-pin control connector separates before the 4-pin power connector. However, during vehicle erection and alignment on the launch pedestal, a tactical REDSTONEcontrol cable was substituted for the specially 8-3
Figure 8-4
8-1.
MERCURY-REDSTONE
MR-1
During
Parachute
Deployment
shortened apparently
cable. to fully
The
cable
block longer
was
then
adjusted, cable.
but
compensate
REDSTONE
of the
improper
mechanical plug.
adjustments, This
plug
disconnected
prior
permitted through
of a three-amp plug,
would
to ground diode.
the power
to pass thrust
The cutoff
terminated
the escape
tower.
The
spacecraft
did not separate in the upon was spacecraft its expiration, less than 0.25g.
the
launch
because cutoff'
sensing
(This
sensing
lg,
blocked
signal.
The
barostats the
properly drogue,
was
less in the
than
proper
parachute
was
released
sensed
on the
problem
a "ground
strap"
12
grounding network
throughout distributor to 129.5 of escape had been sequencer chamber a normal jettison
made
a cutoff liftoff;
signal for
jettisoning the
rocket pad,
on the have
condition was
would
existed
This
by modifying pressure cutoff capsule was also circuit to start added in the was
signal. the
normal cutoff
could
be received signal
the
sequence. propulsion
An arm panel.
cutoff
to capsule
to the
blockhouse
of the the
booster
and was
capsule
indicated it was
both
could
be reused used
after
refurbish-
capsule
not damaged
subsequently
on MR-1A.
8-5
M:R-I's MR-3
tail
sustained
minor then
damage returned
so it was to MSFC
decided where
conclusion Orientation
at MSFC sequence
at the
Table
of events
MR-I flight.
Table MR-I
8-2
Sequence of Events
Event First Power Cutoff Cutoff Control Liftoff Abort Escape Motion plug disconnect signal) signal)
Range
Time
(+ 0. 001 sec)
0.600 0.025 0.609 0.617 0.635 0.639 0.648 0.752 0.775 due to +0.010
disconnect signal)
tower
Telemetry interference jettison rocket exhaust Chamber pressure decays armed, deployed
to 0 and
3, 775
MR-1A composed the MR-1 tower mission except jettison feet. simulated were on the of the M_R-3 launch set for vehicle MR-1. and resetting mated and the No. 2 spacecraft. was the same as,
The
capsule
parts
minor
such
a tri-nozzle backup
deployment vehicle on
was was
flight arranged
test
on 17 Decemon at
18 December 0222
following high
nitrogen required
of the capsule
correction
15 minutes.
integrator, thus
caused capsule
boosting
6 miles
predicted to 1.0
resulted 11.0
predicted predicted.
downrange effect"
High also
at separation
were
contributing
factors
to the
increased
deceleration.
A thorough tion eight material the was the problem also identified electrical
laboratory
check
of the torque
was pivot
made
and
the
source
of the
malfuncby
as excessive wires.
of the and
caused wire
Relocation silver,
(85 percent
copper) and
wires cutoff
solved timer
MR-2 but
it was
M:R-3 and
MR-4
because
modified
integrator
operated
properly.
The well
abort below
was
open the
loop
on MR-1A. was
All sensors
showed
system indicated
at engine of 5.4
cutoff,
an abort was
degrees thrust
shutdown.
The
condition
to nose-up
coupled than
with
low fuel
flow gave
an oxidizer
to fuel
mixture were
ratio sufficient
3.6 to
predicted; of engine
however, operation.
the residual
propellants
duration
was
proper first
throughout mode
powered
but
small
The The
frequencies frequencies
second
mode
occurred The
near degrees.
liftoff
to about
9 cps
at cutoff.
of attack
of 6.0
8-7
U N I T E D
Figttre 8-8
8-2.
Liftoff
of MERCURY-REDSTONE
Mtt-IA
transducer direction
was and
located another
on the was
abort
rate
switch
mounting direction
in a capsule approx-
ring.
The
by a sharp attained a
liftoff the
(over-all) vibrations
at 10 seconds.
500 to 1200
vibratory negligible.
level
decreased showed
separation mostly
vibration
in the
high
vibration
not considered
critical.
a 13-minute 100-minute
hold hold
at T-200
minutes
to change
the
capsule
high
at T-60 length
an attitude countdown
capsule.
Due to the
minutes.
8.2.3
FLIGHT
MtR-2 MR-2 space was launched at 1154 male support EST from Cape named the first Canaveral Ham. flight This to carry and was a to space as sucthe
On 31 January cessfully first primate travel and well the flight placed test
into
downrange period
performed and
capsule sea.
its passenger
covered
approximately
in the
flight
revealed early
that
the
mixture of the
ratio LOX.
servo The
valve
failed
in the
causing
depletion
increased conditions
by hydrogen resulted
peroxide thrust,
pressure early
which shutdown,
in high
and
an inadvertent
8-9
The abort was dueto timing within the abort sensing system. The abort pressure switches were timed to be transferred from the abort modeto the normal shutdown mode at 137.5 seconds. This was 5 secondsbefore normal expected shutdown. However, the early depletion of LOX shuts downthe engineat 137 seconds, one-half second before the pressure switches were transferred. Thus, the decrease in chamber pressure was interpreted as a malfunction, and the abort sensing system signaled abort. To correct the problem on the remaining flights the abort chamber pressure sensors were switched to the normal shutdownmodeat 135 seconds, 2.5 secondsearlier than before. At shutdownthe vehicle had a velocity 659 fps above normal due to the higher thrust. To this was added492 fps gained from the firing of the abort rockets. During the abort the retro rockets were properly jettisoned, but these would have remained attached to the capsule during a normal flight and decreased its velocity by 460 fps. Thus, the capsule had a velocity 1611 fps higher than normal, resulting in the extensive departure from the planned trajectory. Analysis of the mixture ratio servo control valve showedthat movementfrom the 100 percent open position occurred three times and that the valve probably did not stabilize at a somewhatclosed position as a result of (1) a gas leak in the transducer sensing line, (2) icing in the transducer sensing line, and/or (3) shifting of the null setting. The higher than expectedhydrogen peroxide tank pressure was probably due to pressure regulator tolerance which was 5 percent in the 0 to 600 psig range (or 30 psi). Sincethis is normally acceptable no changeswere made in the regulator setting. All measured data from the abort system sensors, except for the chamber pressure which gave the actual abort, showedlevels below the abort limits. As expected, the pitch attitude abort limit of 5 degreeswas reachedapproximately 8 secondsafter engine cutoff. The spacevehicle was properly controlled throughout powered flight. The profile varied less than 3 degrees below the pitch program andwas 1 degree above the expected final angle of 40 degrees. Structural oscillations of the secondbending mode were still present in pitch and yaw during power flight. The maximum amplitude occurring from 100 to 135 seconds, was 0.35 degree per secondand represented a nose deflection of 0.02 inch. 8-10
The measured deflection of vane No. 1 was approximately 0.8 degree during the period of 125to 135 seconds. A narrow band analysis
ments probably ring was gave beyond and the resulting of aerodynamic a maximum the until setting was made of the indicated The lateral high and longitudinal levels, on the and vibration and, measurewere
capsule liftoff,
to ignition decreased
level
magnitude 70 and
22 seconds
then
to another
80 seconds, and
125 seconds normal previously vibration a maximum insignificant reached negligible cutoff and
on the
had in seconds
rate
immediately value
ignition g's
during and
over-all value
occurred
the
level
70 seconds. until
vibration when
seconds
it remained
138 seconds
it showed
transient.
vibration between
analysis the
above
was
the system.
efcontrol the
REDSTONE increased
was
length
payload, of
of the bending
MERCURY-REDSTONE mode frequency Figure to this reduced mode. 8-3 critical shows
by a factor to the as
of the
control
problem the
of a filter between 6
control
loop
10 cps,
frequency
bending
MR-2 tank
was section
MR-2
launch
and
Capsule air
No. transport
5.
The
launch the to
because returned
plugged where
geometry
of welds. to the
acceptable,
launch
Cape.
The
.._ 0
<
!
Z
0
.o
0 0
.o
0 <
0
b_
n_ 0 0
_4
! 0 0 0
_,,i
b_ Lo 4_ 0 I
t._ !
8-12
the
capsule
were
mated
on 19 January
1961,
flight
test
was
conducted of the
1961.
countdown was
was
to minimize to 1040
fatigue
part
The second
part was
started
due mainly
spring The
vehicle
and to cool
the capsule
as follows: minutes, 13 minutes - To catch up on vehicle work (8 minutes) and complete tuneup of range command system (5 minutes). - By the range to recheck nonessential S-band personnel radar. from pad. the
At T-260
- To remove
On the
afternoon
of the
MR-1
launch
attempt, launch
officials
of AMR suggested
be looked for
MERCURY-REDSTONE was was too very necessary MERCURY steep close a flight to the
and that the 105 degrees by the range. different vector that the
tion of the destruct vehicle teristics. one which 102 degrees. until the MR-2 had different It was was
velocity
turning
and different
aerodynamic trajectory
suggested during
be changed be changed
flatter
M:R-1 trajectory.
changes
active.
THE three
MR-BOOSTER
FLIGHT were
(MR-BD) launched areas within in the a 10-week design. Several period. For each
a solution in flight.
developed.
of these
solutions,
had been
The
schedule some
called
for
the
fourth
flight
to be manned; all
however, would
existed decision
of the
program at this
whether to follow
to be made
or to launch
test vehicle.
from MSFC, STG, and NASAheadquarters. MSFCwas requested to make a technical recommendation regarding the booster's readiness to fly with a mannedpayload. Within MSFC, the design divisions were requested to appraise the vehicle. The appraisal was to consider vehicle reliability, trajectories. all areas of possible failure, and
An estimated trend of mission reliability was developedbased on all research and development, tactical REDSTONE, JUPITER-C, and previous MERCURY-REDSTONE launches. A secondestimate was madebased on the numerical range of probability to achieve the booster mission with the MERCURYconfigurationas composedof"known and flown" subsystems. The probability of booster success, thus estimated by both methodswas between 78 percent and 84 percent at a 75 percent confidence level (see paragraph 5.3.2). Each division prepared a failure appraisal covering past malfunctions, corrective actions taken, and the expected repeatability of probable malfm_ctions. Special emphasis was placed on the areas which were considered weak spots in the systems. Corrective actions, if any, to correct these weak spots were also recommended. In the areas of structures, propulsion, control, test, quality assurance, and launch operations, a list was prepared of those items which might contribute to future booster failures. This list, Table 8-3, included both componentsneedingattention and procedures andpractices requiring improvement. The Aeroballistics Division reviewed the trajectories with regard to the way in which the mission's performance could be reduced to a more conservative level and still meet the mission requirements specified by STGat the beginning of the program. A trajectory giving the required 5-minute weightlessness but with an 8 g re-entry deceleration was proposed. This trajectory included, for astronaut safety, a shallow powered phase which allowed water impact near the Cape in the event of an abort. This trajectory was rejected by STG and in the end the original trajectory with 5 minutes of weightlessness and 11 g re-entry forces was used for all remaining flights.
8-14
8-3
Priority List of Weak Spots all Divisions and Project Offices) Priority Points Action Being Talcvn
a.
Priority Thrust
List controller
(Components) 27. 7 20. 0 timer 16.7 15.0 regulator system (tank pressure) cleanliness 8.2 7.5 5.6 S S S S S * S
Hydrogen Hydrogen
LOX manhole
b.
Priority
List integrator
(Components)
( 5 points
or less) 3.0 * X X X X
pressure
nulling
if failure
2.1
Co
Emergency Personnel
(3) Handling
(4) Cleaning
S (Cape) 1961 S
on 15 February
taken
of listings/average
priority
8-15
in Table manned
8-3, flight
that
developflight was
development)
for the
MERCURY-
launching.
was
at 1230 the
1961. launch
The
booster
qualified following:
in the
vehicle
changes
A control from
computer
filter
network
was range
added
to reduce
the
attitude
gyro modes.
gains
frequency added
bending
Four
in the ballast
to provide
frequency
and
dampening. control to insure and servo a safe always valve liftoff. compensated closed position flight was the adjusted controller in peroxide from 0 to 25 per-
During for
performed tank
satisfactorily pressure. The from pressure monitor The were thrust hydrogen 590,
variations
peroxide
regulator
was
set
outlet
down The
to the
range
a blockhouse
A drift and
transducer by the
suppressor of shields
protected
LOX leaks
from
by the
installation Flight
of insulation. timing included caused (normal - Arm - Arm - Shift changes were made of the of the mode. cutoff cutoff signal (was from to prevent velocity the cutoff pressure changes abort arming switches were (was experienced signal from from
chamber Timer
as follows:
136 seconds).
velocity Pc
137.5
switches
abort
mode
(was
137.5
d. e. The
145
seconds
cutoff
(was
143 seconds). at 142.5 from Roll seconds. the abort rate was backup circuit to preclude in itangle
roll only
sensor
as a redundant
8-16
earlier used
flights on the
less
than
flights.
was
also
on MR-BD. angles
This of attack.
a control control
maneuver
of higher tilt
arrest This
from of attack
vertical to 2.30
8 seconds
(Q max).
degrees. profile
tilting
brought
the missile
back proved
flight
deviations.
The experiment
withstand
additional
MR-BD's
indicators, were
c put on straight
a P
to the commutated
commutated.
During
flight,
lateral
vibrations the
were second
again bending
in the instrument of the vehicle. which occurred monitor, range assumed The
vibration
occurred
the period
70 seconds in range,
after was
increased Vane
vibrations was
were
network
completely
camera
was
removed
from
MR-BD
to save
the hardware
for
the
MR-4
attached and
to MR-BD
was and
a boilerplate.
It had equivalent
weight,
aerodynamic interface,
of the actual
capsule. was
no electrical to indicate
abort
stalled
an inadvertent
During some
additional was
checks topping.
were
No holds caused
occurred, by sloshing
experienced
at launch.
at 41,000 than
feet
caused
approximately
miles
anticipated.
8-17
8.3
MANNED
FLIGHTS
8.3.1
FLIGHT
MR-3 at 0934 EST the into space 8-4). The flight United States' first astronaut, which were after Alan B. Shepard, 5 minutes and attempt no was was
launched
weather
recovery
MR-3
and
the
Freedom completed
7 capsule on 4 May,
8-5). second
The
split
countdown resumed
part
portion
EST on 5 May.
The and
booster's capsule
Cutoff The
seconds on
down
no evidence the
of second
bending of the
effectiveness Shepard
filter
flight
Astronaut that
flight, MR-2
than
those material
to the ballast
of dampening the
added
along it was
14
decreased instrument
vibrations; compartment
however, of the
dampening
to the
next
flight
(MR-4).
transducers ring,
were measured
installed vibration
in the in the
aft
unit. plane
901,
on the
pitch 906,
axis measured
mom_ted
LEV-3
direction. respectively.
revealed
by a detailed
vibration
during
flight
duration
to aerodynamic similar
shorter
in MR-3
with
levels flights.
instrument
compartment
8-18
Figure 8-4.
Liftoff of MERCURY-REDSTONE1VIR-3
8-19
,5
rj
0 !
0
r_
.4
I O0
8-20
in the
longitudinal
direction
at
in its
second-body
bending
throughout
The
vehicle
shut
down
properly then
and
capsule
order),
under heart
respiration radio
control the
astronaut
maintained
communications
center
at the
Cape.
a flight miles
of
13 minutes
and
the The
sea
from
were the
of landing
Champlain
minutes.
Seven
holds
were T-265
called
during
as
follows: the hold ) capsule capsule pad. the weather drifted the situation and check The the work. work. pad for RF checks. point was shortened
to clear 60 minutes
at this
up on the
count.
to complete to complete
to clear
the
hold
between
minutes, several
fuel pressure
pressure. returned
The and
fuel
vent
cycled
regulated
stayed
normal.
8-21
Periscope
VisuM
Observ.
_ \
s "_4"44
_5' '
14
_ _" \
Manual
Control
_ / ,W' /
.t-'" "
3.0 ...... _ 6:20
_ -/
HEC.ok,
/------Re-entryAttituds ,_
Turnaround
--
/_.._3:10
/
Spacecraft Periscope Separation Deployment / Acceleration " Re-entry J 6:44
#
2:37
Maximum
And
Tower
Separation
0.05
lie-entry
7:48
=_
r.....
Drogue,
Scope
_2:32 8_: ii171 _:20 0 :0 0 Time MIN:SEC Main Chute Deployment 15:22 Landing Deployment
Figure
8-6.
MERCURY-REDSTONE
MR-3
Flight
\
Cape Maximum Velocity 6,414 ft/sec Acceleration, g Units 12
10
Re-entry
Min,
22
See
pior, ?
W Bahama Islands _ 105" East of North 4 Main Parachute L _,'Idi ng Long. Point Lat. 2 _1 Retrofire
Computed i Actual
75 75
51 _ 53' 27
Z7
12' 13,7'
I
2 4 6 Tim Minutes
I
10
I
12
I
14
Figure
8-7.
Figure
8-8.
Profile
8-22
MR-4 carried ballistic Again Astronaut space Virgil mission. systems I. Grissom Liftoff performed was in Liberty at 0720 perfectly Bell EST and 7 on the on 21 all vehicle
all booster
As with
MR-3,
the
mission
were a brief
powered
5 minutes
of weightlessness,
ability
to perform data.
as a functional
unit during
space
flight.
the astronaut. the capsule. for ground support and recovery forces.
but was
capsule
recovery
were
fully
met.
The weight
capsule caused
was
lost
when
helihad
increased prematuraly
by water
which
after
opened.
No complaints fectiveness
of vibration of additional
were
expressed
by Astronaut
Grissom, added
the
efunit.
102 pounds
of dampening
compound
the
flight,
the
scheduled minutes.
built-in was
hold made
was
advanced the
of T-120 prior
to LOX loading.
forecast,
90 percent, menced.
operations an alternate
not have
procedure
LOXing)
provided
by 24 hours
The
first
launch due
attempt
on 18 July
1961,
had
no
holds,
however,
the
flight
was
scrubbed
to unfavorable
photographic
weather
conditions.
second
attempt
was checkout
made
on 19 July.
At T-130
hold
was
to complete required
minutes hold
minutes
a 91-minute
for better
in a scrubbed
8-23
Figure 8-24
8-9.
Liftoff
of
MERCURY-REDSTONE
MR-4
The
third
and
successful
attempt
had
3 holds
duration. to
minutes, capsule
necessary
to permit hold
At T-30 searchlights
a 9-minute
searchreceiving made to
to secure in the
blockhouse. optical
Finally, conditions
a 41-minute
favorable
focal-length
8-10
indicates
the used
flight for
that
the
launch
azimuth east
was
3 to 100 degrees the MR-3 could flight cause of the that both
of north. that
was
indicated
Bahama listed
spacecraft,
shows
The and
time
history
occurring MR-3
during flight.
the
MR-4
flight
is shown
in Figure
8-11
to that
of the
The The
force was
and the
point
are
shown
in Figure of pre-
8-12.
as a result The
mature from
of the
immediately 3 to 4 minutes.
after
hatch
actuation
retrieved
the water
MR-4
the ballistic
series
flights.
Program
success flights,
Para
me ter
miles nautical
dynamic
pressure,
8-25
Table 8-4 Comparison of Flight Parameters for MR-3 and MR-4 Spacecraft (Cont.) MR-3 Flight 6.3 11.0 5:04 6,414 7,388
MR-4 F1 ight 6.3 11.1 5:00 6,618 7,580
Parameter Maximum exit longitudinal load factor, g units Maximum re-entry longitudinal load factor, g units Period of weightlessness, min:sec Earth-fixed velocity, at cutoff, ft/sec Space-fixed velocity, at cutoff, ft/sec
8.4 The
CHANGES reliability
RESULTING requirements
FLIGHT
by a manned changes
operational flight
launch safety
procedures. review
consisted
operation
and
organization resulting
described described in
design
modifications
4.8.2.
the
flight
the
procedures
and
operations
were launch
modified was
or
and grounding
use
resulted and
through
ground
adjustment
clamp.
MR-2's transport,
tank
distortion
was easily
due
to improper on the
of the
tarpaulin
during
air
a matter
prevented
vehicles.
change and
was
made
MR-3
and
MR-4
to prevent change
poor involved
weather moving
a costly
hazardous from
to develop. minutes.
The
to T-180
This before
a longer had
hold,
if necessary, chance
and
a 90 percent
of remaining
8-26
Max
AP
Approx
I02. M
Nautical
Miles
Time
Reference
MIN:SEC
34
Altitude
For
Jtetrofirmg
At
0446
Retrofire
Sequenc,
Is
Initiated
I_
10
_J
_/_
34
+ 3
Minute
Arte.-
Retrofire
,qUirts
Normal
Orbiting
Attitude
_ .o 34 , +
_.n 3
._
Exereime
Of
Manual
Control
System
\ \
"_<._
--,
._0
Sec
After
Retropavkage
f/..S_
Programming Mlneuver A
o 'r'-0.05
--'5 Sec Period Of Rate Damping s-=-0333 Spaceer;fft ._.eparation and 0323 Cutoff, Periscope Tower Extended Separation Period Total of Weightle0sness Flight Time A[_rox Approx 15 5 Minutes Minutes Open Parachutes Dr<g_ee_10820 Main Ixtend Perimcope kga n 0 05g 074_ _X . M:LX l_ad Tangenti:d FaeU)r 1 lg
Range,
Nautical
Mile=
Figure
8-10.
Flight
Profile
for
MR-4
Acceleration, g 12 Unit=
'i
6 3 i
Re-entry
LaunchVehicle Cutoff Min, 23 Sec Cape Canaveral i_*_e, , ";:',: A/C-4 A/C-5 Spacecraft Landing Point
4 Time,
Figure
8-II.
Time Flight
History
Figure
8-12.
of the crew
launch safety
and
vehicle
MERCURY-REDSTONE
Program
as guidelines
for future
efforts.
8-28
9 LAUNCH VEHICLES
9.1 The
INTRODUCTION preceding sections of this report launch for have, vehicle, manned beginning in the course of describing many and which report, and items are our the which still major development represent appropriate purpose the lessons was to
manned
As stated record
of occurrences, complete
highlight and
a review
of the to the
successes) It is to
development
manned
vehicles. MERCURYdiscussed
9 is addressed. to manned
contributions vehicle
Program categories:
made
launch design,
under
man-rating,
testing,
9.2
MAN-RATING
GENERAL to man-rating, of the with the booster, the third there are do have a few remarks which, impact while on any not specifically manned In the were first project. original related They pro-
design
an important
question, flight
predicated, seem
however,
to be quite REDSTONE
an early missiles
unmanned prior
to that flight
flight.
In addition,
SATURN introduction
w
it is quite
it is vital program.
in the answer
many
of planners
in terms
values
of reliability for
to requirements
of unmanned However,
analyses.
flight
9-1
had demonstrated, in actual flight, its capability to perform all required functions properly. This latter criteria resulted in the mannedflight being delayeduntil the fifth launch attempt, rather than the third, becauseof failures occurring in two earlier launches (MR-1 and MR-2). Delaying the introduction of man becauseof these failures did not result in a lengthy delay in the program and is probably justified on the basis of the qualitative increase in confidence achieved with the additional launches and the relatively small increment in time and cost incurred. In summary then, it would appear that it is qualitative, not quantitative confidence,that determines when a launch vehicle is ready for mannedflight. In support of this argument is the fact of the admittedly low quantitative confidence level which must have beenassociated with including a man on the first rocket aircraft flights. The MERCURY-REDSTONEwas able to satisfy this criteria within reasonable constraints of time and cost; however, the flight program history clearly indicates a need for comprehensive analysis of flight schedules, including the introduction of man, with failure contingencies taken into account. As launch vehicles approach andperhaps exceedthe cost of a SATURNV, it becomes imperative to determine well in advanceof the first flight, what action can be taken to reduce the requirement for additional launches, prior to mannedflight, in the event of a booster failure. Future programs will be efficient and timely only if we resolve a meansfor obtaining this intrinsic, qualitative confidence level without resorting to an additional unmannedlaunch eachtime a failure occurs. A thorough understanding of failure effects through ground testing and analytical studies is but one of' the means to achieve that goal. Other items include flight safety (abort) systems to accomodatefailures and detailed quality assurance programs such as were developedfor MERCURY-REDSTONE. When is a launch vehicle man-rated? Whenits developers have a high, but qualitative confidence that it will perform all of its functions properly and, in the improbable event of an inflight failure, safety of the crew will be assured with an abort sensing and implementation system. Ultimately, this confidencewill be achieved, as with rocket aircraft presently, prior to the first full scale launch attempt. The MERCURY-REDSTONE was the first man-rated rocket launch vehicle. There existed the unique opportunity and responsibility to investigate and provide both vehicle reliability andcrew safety. Although crew safety is highly dependenton vehicle reliability, the term, crew safety, is used here to distinguish those elements of the vehicle design and operations that enhancedthe astronaut's probability of a successful 9-2
recovery in the event of a failure. MERCURY-REDSTONE'scontribution to these aspects of man-rating are described in the following paragraphs. 9.2.2 CREW SAFETY
The greatest single item addedto the MERCURY-REDSTONE, which improved crew safety, was the automatic inflight abort sensing system. Automatic abort systems have also been used on the MERCURY-ATLAS. A combination of automatic and manual systems is planned for the SATURN. In determining which parameters the abort sensing system should monitor in order to identify vehicle failures as rapidly and safely as possible, the MERCURY-REDSTONE designers faced perplexing alternatives. As the number of parameters increased, the probability of correctly identifying the cause of a failure also increased, and, in addition, the time betweenthe first failure indication and vehicle destruction would increase, permitting more time for safe astronaut ejection. However, as a consequence of monitoring more parameters, the sensing system complexity also increases, thereby increasing the probability of its failure which could lead either to a falsely aborted mission or an astronaut fatality. The design team elected to monitor as few parameters as possible to reduce the probability of a false abort and develop a simple system of high reliability. The reduced time betweenthe first failure indication and vehicle destruction was accomodatedby an automatic abort implementation system. Since all vehicle component or subsystem failures which may affect the mission completion or astronaut safety eventually lead to measurable changes in vehicle performance, those performance parameters were selected which would give the earliest indication of a failure, coupled with engine chamber pressure and electric power as two subsystems whose performance affected or was affected by a majority of the other vehicle subsystems. The selection of abort sensing parameters and the establishment of their limits remains as oneof the major problems confronting the designers of mannedlaunchvehicles. The criteria developedby the MERCURY-REDSTONEteam and the specific parameters they selected have turned out to be of major value andguidance to other launchvehicle programs such as ATLAS and SATURN. The inter-relationship of the abort parameters monitored and the mode of abort (manual or automatic) was also recognized at this early date, increasing the validity of the design which was eventually employed on the MERCURY-REDSTONElaunch vehicle. 9-3
Since the abort system was totally new at the time of the MERCURY-REDSTONE design, many guidelines were established. The abort system had to be tailored to the vehicle, utilize existing hardware, if possible, and sense only those parameters that were easily and reliably measured commensurate with the probable failure modes. Reliability of the system was stressed in hardware selection, test, and modesof opertion. Additional details of the first abort system are given in Section 5. It is important to note that an automatic system was chosen becauseit was felt the astronaut could not respond quickly enoughto the emergency conditions possible with the REDSTONEbooster. Only the GEMINI manual abort system deviates from this basic criterion due to the
of explosion. GEMINI's propellant combination which has a low probability
The abort
abort
system
also
ground
rules
for as pres-
essential sure,
safety rates
by each
manned
vehicle
project voltage
attitude design
electrical
(power). provided
three and
monitoring were
of nearly abort
component
To these modes.
parameters
designed
to monitor
The
sensors
used
the the
abort system
parameters had
were
to have
negative an abort
also
the
redundant
MERCURYto the
MERCURY-ATLAS.
same
philosophy
applied
SATURN.
The vated
inflight
abort
sensing capsule
sent
actiThis
shutdown, also
astronaut, 5.2).
the safety,
range and
flight. input
sequencing
abort
signal
of all other
manned
launch
vehicles.
9-4
9.2.3
VEHICLE RELIABILITY
The abort sensing system described aboveprovided crew safety in the event of a hazardous failure. However, a catastrophic failure never occurred with the MERCURYREDSTONE,thus indicating the successful efforts of man-rating the basic vehicle systems to provide a reliable booster flight. The high quality of the design, manufacture, test, and checkout of the vehicle contributed to the near-perfect reliability of the MERCURY-REDSTONE. Achieving this level of quality, however, was not based on normal levels of effort. Rather, better performance from each individual in the booster program was gained through a highly motivating MERCURYAwareness Program. This program usedpublicity, awards, and symbols to emphasize the importance of the individual contributor in achieving reliability. MERCURYstampsplaced onMERCURYREDSTONEdocuments and mannedvehicle hardware continuously called attention to the fact that the astronauts' lives dependedon high reliability. This program proved its effectiveness and has been duplicated in all other manned launch vehicle and payload programs. 9.3
9.3.1 The DESIGN
GENERAL and the modifications made to the tactical and to the The following missile contributed significantly for deon the
changes
manned
presented
to the reasons
major for
vehicle design
resulting manned
systems vehicle
their
to guidelines
PROPULSION major decision regarding of the This program the propulsion to avoid confusion substitution, system a change and and the was midway changing through human revisions. to the the errors A-7 manned by elim-
at the
beginning
avoided
resulting
hardware
procedural
9-5
The propellant prevalves isolated the propellant tanks from the enginesystem prior to launch and served no function once the engineswere started. Sincethey could failclosed during burning and thus initiate a false shutdownand abort, they created an unnecessary hazard. The ATLAS, TITAN, and SATURNenginesystems for manned payloads have also deleted the prevalves from flight use. Propellant explosive andtoxic properties must be considered in mannedlaunch vehicle design. The MERCURY-REDSTONE used ethyl alcohol and LOX. This combination was well known to designers andfuel handlers and thus presented no newproblems. The toxicity of Hydine, which was used on the JUPITER-C, was considered unsafe for the astronaut in the event of a pad abort or a prelaunch emergency egress. Mannedflights present the problem of longer than usual holds to make sure everything is A-Okay. Long holds, however, mean a greater chilldown of the LOX lines andthe total engine system. This can result in hazardousfreezeups. MERCURY-REDSTONE brought this problem to the designerst attention and required fuel line bubbling, extra instrument insulation, and heater jackets for the chamber pressure sensor lines. These system features are also being used on SATURN. Long holds also required an accurate LOX fill and "topping" system to assure meeting flight requirements. Special sensors and a computer were addedto the propellant loading system. Leakageof propellants into the enginebay could cause an accumulation of an explosive mixture. To minimize this danger the area was purged with nitrogen prior to liftoff and new seal materials were used in the hydrogenperoxide system. This safety requirement has also been imposed upon the SATURN. 9.3.3 STRUCTURES
Although the basic REDSTONEin the JUPITER-C configuration was used, a new aft section was necessary to provide the compartment space necessary for the guidance, control, andcommunication systems. The design of this section followed a design rule established then by MSFCwhich has been used on the SATURN. The rule states "the structure shall be self-supporting under all expected loads without internal pressure stabiiization. " To obtain maximum performance with safety, the tank walls varied in thickness consistent with the 1.35 factor of safetyandthe anticipated loads. 9-6
Prior to MERCURY-REDSTONE,the payload-vehicle interface was the dual responsibility of both prime contractors. However, to assure a safe separation and to place single responsibility for the separation on one agency andcontractor, the MERCURYREDSTONE's separation plane was totally contained within the adapter section, and the capsule contractor was given responsibility for this section. The vehicle-adapter mechanical interface then became a simple flange and bolt circle. 9.3.4 GUIDANCEAND CONTROL
Mannedflight required the guidance to be simple and reliable; therefore, MERCURYREDSTONE'sguidance was a well-tested autopilot. During first stage burning, the SATURNalso uses a simple autopilot. This design rule enhancescrew safety in the relatively hazardous pad and maximum dynamic pressure regions of flight. 9.3.5 DESTRUCTSYSTEMAND RANGE SAFETY
The range safety fuel dispersion (destruct) system was modified by the addition of a destruct delay. This time delay would have permitted abort of the capsule to a safe distance from the booster before destruct explosion. The delay has been incorporated as a safety feature on all mannedvehicles since MERCURY-REDSTONE. The MERCURY-REDSTONEalso established the needfor examination of launch trajectories and guidance accuracy versus range safety boundaries. The destruct delay caused the range safety limits to be proportionately narrowed, but the amountof narrowing was a function of the vehicle and its modes of failure. Hence mannedlaunch vehicles require coordination betweendesign and range safety requirements to attain maximum flexibility during launch. 9.3.6 DESIGNCRITERIA
In addition to the specific system design guides, several general design criteria were established during the MERCURY-REDSTONEdevelopment. These included the overall design factor of safety of 1.35 and the yield factor of 1.1. 9.4
9.4.1 The test TESTING
GROUND program
TESTING established for the six boosters report. used The in the MERCURY-REDSTONE
Program
is described
in Section
6 of this
MERCURY-REDSTONE
9-7
experienced the first application on a man-rated vehicle of the pyramidal testing philosophy, whereby components, subsystems, and then the entire vehicle are functionally checked. This type of testing verified proper operation of all hardware within the vehicle. As part of the prelaunch procedures and checkouts, eachof the MERCURYREDSTONEboosters were scheduledfor static firing tests to insure satisfactory performance and reliability under rated thrust conditions. Due to the high degree of reliability under rated thrust conditions. Dueto the high degree of reliability necessary for a man carrying vehicle, actual launch and flight conditions were simulated as closely as possible. A total of 32 static tests were conductedon the MERCURY and its test boosters with an accumulatedtime of over 2,230 seconds. 9.4.2 FLIGHT TESTING
The MERCURY-REDSTONEflight program developedthe first man-rated spacesystems and accomplished the initial objective which was to gain spaceflight familiarization. The flights and the accomplishments of each toward the ultimate goal of space travel are covered in Section8 of this report. A particularly significant contribution of the MERCURY-REDSTONE Program to MannedLaunch Vehicle developmentwas that the spacecraft was the first to experience the environment and requirements of space flight. Of equal importance to the experience of the astronauts was the invaluable training of the ground crew in the preparation, launching, and the recovery of the first two mannedspacecrafts. 9.5
OPERATIONS of the MERCURY-REDSTONE evolved which should checkout and launch operations, a number conas of
of manned
vehicles.
Facility
must
planned equipment
at the require
very
inception
lead
development are
period
of the in manned
egress they
procedures must
mandatory in the
space phase
be considered to provide
earliest system.
design
space
vehicle
Integration that
of launch
operations
under
one
is essential will
to assure result.
a feasible,
coordinated
countdown
of reasonable
duration
9-8
Experience indicated that somedegree of automation will help to reduce the countdownperiod to an acceptable length. Serious consideration should be given to improving the reliability presenting, anddigesting inflight information. of obtaining,
Design of the space vehicle should consider test and launch operation requirements at the launch site. Design compatibility should be emphasized in the area of GSE, communications systems, ordnance requirements, emergency conditions, and interface considerations. Realistic scheduling is essential throughout a program but shouldbeespecially emphasized at the launch site where numerous supporting organizations must participate. Test schedulesat the launch site should be coordinated by one central point to assure that precedence, priority, conflicting checkout functions, and other AMR programs are properly coordinated and controlled. The complexity of mannedlaunch vehicles and the launch operations dictates that a single point of entry for range support is necessary. This procedure will assure that all NASAproblems are coordinated within NASA to prevent conflicting or confusing information from reaching range or contractor personnel. Weather restrictions on launch operations must be reduced ff critical schedules, such as launch windows, are to be met on an operational basis. Vehicle design should consider this factor in terms of allowable ground and upperair winds. A study should be initiated to provide a method of optical coverage through the maximum dynamic pressure region which is independentof ground weather conditions.
9.6
CONC
Throughout this section the phrase " also used in all other manned programs" many has been repeated many times. The numerous
manned
the MERCURY-REDSTONE
opportunity to take
the first steps into space has proved to be the making space travel.
9-9
SECTION REFERENCES
10
This
section
presents
reports
and
documents are
related
MSFC For
fourth
booster MR-4
Boosters boosters
not launched.
Manned
respectively.
the
MSFC
prepared
in accordance booster
with MR-5
the
flight
numbers, and
under
MR-BD,
MR-4,
respectively.
GENERAL AOMC CR-SS-60-6 Satellite and Space Program Progress Report for NASA, 6 July 1960 (C) (AOMC). Hammack, Jerome Bo, Herberlig, Jack C., The MERCURY-REDSTONE prqgram, 9-15 October 1961 (American Rocket Society).
ARS 2238-61
CHRYSLER
CORPORATION
MISSILE
Chrysler
ME-M5
Chrysler
GLC-R-5
10-1
Chrysler GLC-M-29
DeBaker, J. L., Final Report for Humidity Test of MRT-1 Aft Section, 15 January 1961 (Ground Tests) (CCMD).
Perry, D.G., Combined Vibration and Temperature Environmental Evaluation Tests on the REDSTONE Tail Unit for MERCURY-REDSTONE 1 April 1960 (CCMD). Missiles,
Chrysler SL-M56
Chrysler SL-M59
Fama, N., and Suddath, J., Structural Reliability Testing of MERCURYREDSTONE Thrust Unit Reports I and 15 April 1960 (CCMD). Sorce, Peter S., Van Camp, L., Stevens, R.E., REDSTONE Missile Malfunction Stud,/ (MERCURY-REDSTONE Program), 15 June 1960. (S) (CCMD).
II,
Chrysler DSD-TM-12-60
Chrysler ML-M134
Schayer, D.E., Combined Vibration and Temperature Environmental Tests of Mechanical Components for MERCURYREDSTONE Missiles, 26 April 1960
(cc m).
Chrysler ML-M135
Torigian, R.M., Reliability Test of the RE 7112 a REDSTONE A-7-1 Rocket Engine, 14 April 1960 (CCMD).
NATIONAL NASA
AERONAUTICS Conference
AND SPACE
orbital Space Flight, 6 June 1961 (NASA). Results of the Second U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight, 21 July 1961 (NASA). Abort System Experience and Application to the Design of Advanced Crew Safety Systems (Manned Space Center - NASA). MSFC MHR-2 MERCURY-REDSTONE December 31, 1961 Office). Chronology to 1961 (Historical
May
MTP-M-S&M-TSR-60-1
Barraza, R.M., Glover, J.C., MERCURY Booster Recovery, 30 November 1960. Hildebrand, Arnold G., Evaluation of Flotation and Drop Tests MERCURYREDSTONE Booster, 25 March 1960
DLMT-TN-28-60
10-2
MTP-M-LOD-DR 60-3
Spencer, Clayton M., MERCURYREDSTONE Thrust Unit Water Recovery, 26 October 1960. Humphrey, John, and Bertram, Emil, Preliminary MERCURY-REDSTONE Booster Recovery Operations at Atlantic Missile Range, 20 May 1960.
NASA SP-45
Kuettner, J.P., Bertram, E.P., MERCURY Project Summary, MERCURY-REDSTONE Launch Development and Performance 1963 (USA). Kuettner, J.P., Bertram, E.P., The Manned Rocket Vehicle MERCURYREDSTONE, Proceedings of the Twelfth International Astronautical Congress, 1962 (USA).
DG-TR-7-59
Brandner, F.W., Proposal for MERCURY-REDSTONE Automatic flight Abort Sensing (Technical Scientific System, Staff,
In-
LOD Brochure
FREEDOM 7, The First United States Manned Space Flight, Undated MR-3, (LODBROCHURE). PR Progress Report Launch Operations Directorate, 13 January 1961 12 February 1961, 23 February 1961 (LOD). Leonard, Data for Project, E.L. Revised Range Safety the MERCURY-REDSTONE 17 February 1961 (C) (AERO).
MSFC
DOD-
(C)
MSFC
MTP-AERO-61-9
MSFC
TPR-M-60-12
MSFC
STR-M-60-1
MERCURY-REDSTONE Monthly Status Report, January 1961 (MPO). MERCURY-REDSTONE Report, February Monthly Status 1961 (C) (S&MD).
MSFC
STR-M-61-4
MSFC
STR-M-61-6
MERCURY-REDSTONE Monthly Status Report, March 1961 (C))S&MD). Bertram, E.P., Dutton, R.E., Final Report MERCURY-REDSTONE Project Launch Operations, 28 May 1962 (LOD).
MSFC
MTP-LOD-62-5
10-3
MSFC MTP-AERO-61-69
Clarke, W.G., Preliminary Evaluation of MERCURY-REDSTONE Launch MR-4, 22 August 1961 (C) (AERO). Smith, for the MR-4, J.W., Atmospheric Environment Flight of MERCURY-REDSTONE 28 September 1961 (IUO) (AERO). of MR-4,
MSFC MTP-AERO-61-74
MSFC
MTP-AERO-61-76
Ledford, Harold, Actual Traiectory MERCURY-REDSTONE Flight Test 22 September 1961 (C) (AERO).
MSFC
MTP-P&VE-P-61-20
Riquelmy, J.R., King, N.W., Montgomery, J.L., MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-4 Flight and Evaluation of Propulsion Unit and Associated Systems, 9 November 1961 (C) (P&VE). Index and Test Results Part I of the Fir-
MSFC
MTP-LOD-OIR-61-23.1
Hinds, Noble F., Instrumentation Operations Analysis Part IIb at the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-4, 24 August 1961 (C) (LOD). Heezen, Kenneth F., Hill, Lawrence F., Firing Site Weight Report Part III of the Firing Test Report MERCURYREDSTONE MR-4, 2 August 1961 (C) (LOD).
MSFC
MTP-LOD-MP-61-23.3
10-12
MTP-M-LOD-DR 60-3
Spencer, Clayton M., MERCURYREDSTONE Thrust Unit Water Recovery, 26 October 1960. Humphrey, John, and Bertram, Emil, Preliminary MERCURY-REDSTONE Booster Recovery Operations at Atlantic Missile Range, 20 May 1960.
NASA SP-45
Kuettner, J. P., Bertram, E.P., MERCURY Proiect Summary, MERCURY-REDSTONE Launch Development and Performance 1963 (USA). Kuettner, J.P., Bertram, E.P., Th___e Manned Rocket Vehicle MERCURYREDSTONE, Proceedings of the Twelfth International Astronautical Congres s, 1962 (USA).
DG-TR-7-59
In-
LOD Brochure
FREEDOM 7, The First United States Manned Space Flight, Undated MR-3, (LODBROCHURE). Progress Report Launch Operations Directorate, 13 January 1961 12 February 1961, 23 February 1961 (LOD). Leonard, Data for Project, E.L. Revised Range Safety the MERCURY-REDSTONE 17 February 1961 (C) (AERO).
MSFCDOD-PR
(C)
MSFC MTP-AERO-61-9
MSFC TPR-M-60-12
Leonard, N. T., MERCURY-REDSTONE Monthly Status Report, December 1960 (C) (MPO) MERCURY-REDSTONE Monthly Status Report, January 1961 (MPO). MERCURY-REDSTONE Report, February Monthly Status 1961 (C) (S&MD). Monthly Status (C))S&MD).
MSFCSTR-M-60-1
MSFC STR-M-61-4
MSFC
STR-M-61-6
MSFC
MTP-LOD-62-5
Bertram, E.P., Dutton, R.E., Final Report MERCURY-REDSTONE Proiect Launch Operations, 28 May 1962 (LOD).
10-3
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-3
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-60-10
System,
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-60-11
Coleman,
R.H.,
MERCURY-REDSTONE Test Report for Detector, (IUO) (QUAL). Mission Reliability MERCURY-REDSTONE, (IUO) (RPD). Con-
System Reliability trol Voltage Failure 30 November 1960 MSFC MTP-M-RP-61-6 Dalton, Charles, Booster Flight for 24 February 1961
of
FLIGHT
REPORTS
MERCURY-REDSTONE MSFC
Flight,
MR-1 Lisle, Ben J., Teague, MERCURY-REDSTONE: Trajectory (NASA). for MR-l, Roger, Final 1 August Project Standard 1960 (C)
MNM-M-AERO-2-60
MSFC
MM-M-SAR-2.1-60
of
MSFC
TIS
tion Summary Concerning MERCURYREDSTONE Mission MR-I, 15 October 1960 (C) (G and CD). MSFC MTP-M-TEST-61-10 Earnest, Hugh S., MERCURY-REDSTONE Static Firing of No. 1 Test 1961
Nos. 347, 348, and 349, April (IUO), MR-1 (TEST). MSFC MTP-M-S&M-P-61-1 Riguelmy, MR-1 Flight and Associated (C) (S&MD). MSFC MTP-LOD-DIR-60-49.1 J.R.,
Index and Test Results Part I of the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE Vehicle MR-l, 27 December 1960 (C) (LOD). Hinds, Noble F., Instrumentation Operation Analysis Part IIb of the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-l, Undated (LOD)
MSFC
MTP-LOD-ED-60-49.2b
I0-4
MSFC
MTP-LOD-MP-60-49.3
Martin, Thomas E., Firing Site Weight Report Part III of the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-l, 6 January 1961 (C) (LOD). Guidance and Control MR-l, 3 August 1960 Covington, Measuring 4 August System (MSFC). Checkout
MSFC
MM-M-SAR-2.3-60
MSFC
MM-M-SAR-2.5-60
A.G., MR-l,
MSFC
MM-M-SAR-2.6-60
Fisher, A.E., Pickard, M.F., Final Mechanical Analysis of MR-1 Thrust Unit, 5 August 1960 (MSFC). Gwinn, Ralph T., Consolidated Instrumentation Plan Part IIa of the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-I, 19 November 1961 (S) (LOD). Master Operational Schedule Part IV of the Firing Test Report MERCURYREDSTONE Spacecraft MR-l, 15 November 1960 (OUD) (LOD). Final Acceptance Test Report 12 September 1960 (SAR). Bryan, MR-l, F.G., Test Conductor's 1 Aug_ast 1960 (SAR). Electrical Analysis 28 February 1961 MR-l,
MSFC
MTP-LOD-EF-TR-49.2a-60
MSFC
M-LOD-G-TR-49.4-60
MSFC
MM-M-SAR-2-60
MSFC
MM-M-SAR-2.4-60
Report
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-7
MR-1 (IUO)
Flight MR-IA Clarke, W.G., Preliminary Evaluation of MERCURY-REDSTONE Launch MR-1A, 13 January 1961 (C) (AERO). Ledford, Harold, Actual Trajectory MERCURY-REDSTONE Flight Test MR-1A, 1 March 1961 (C) (AERO). Smith, J.W., for MERCURY _, 24 Atmospheric Environment REDSTONE-1A Vehicle 1961 (IUO) (AERO). of
MSFC
STR-M-61-3
MSFC
MTP-AERO-61-10
February
MSFC
MTP-M-S&M-P-61-5
Riquelmy, J.R., King, M.W., McDonald, N.G., MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-IA Flight Evaluation of Propulsion Unit and Associated Systems, 24 February 1961 (C) (S&MD). 10-5
MSFC
MTP-LOD-DIR-61-61.1
Index and Test Results Part I of the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE Vehicle MR-1A, 16 January 1961 (C) (LOD). Final Acceptance Test Report MR-3, 15 December 1960 (IUO) (QUA). Davis, MR-3, C.H., Final 1 December Alignment 1960 (IUO) Report (QUAL).
MSFC
MTP-M-QD-60-8
MSFC
MTP-M-QD-60-8.1
MSFC
MTP-LOD-ED-60-61.2b
Hinds, Noble F., Instrumentation Operation Analysis Part lib of the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-1A, 2 February 1961 (C) (LOD). Martin, Thomas E., Heezen, Kenneth F., Firing Site Weight Report Part III of the Firing Test Report MERCURYREDSTONE MR-1A, 2 February 1961 (C) (LOD). Gwinn, Ralph T., Consolidated InstruFiring Test MR-1A,
MSFC
MTP-LOD-MP-60-61.3
MSFC
MTP-LOD-EF-60-61.2a
mentation Plan Part IIa of the Report MERCURY-REDSTONE 16 December 1960 (S))LOD).
tion Summary Concerning MERCURYREDSTONE Mission MR-2, 20 January 1961 (C) (G&CD). MSFC MTP-M-SAR-60-3.1 Davis, MR-2, C.H., Final Alignment Report 10 October 1960 (SA&RD).
MSFC
STR-M-61-2
Clarke, W.G., Preliminary Evaluation of MERCURY-REDSTONE Launch MR-2, 25 February 1961 (C) (AERO). Ledford, tlarold, Actual Trajectory MERCURY-REDSTONE Flight Test 4 April 1961 (C) (AERO). of MR-2,
MSFC
MTP-AERO-61-30
MSFC
STR-M-61-7
Smith, J.W., Atmospheric Environment for the Flight of MERCURY-REDSTONE 2, 25 March 1961 (AERO).
10-6
MSFC
MTP-M-COMP-61-2
Fallon, Robert A., Smith, Martha E., DOVAP Flight Test Data Missile MR-2, 1 March 1961 (C) (COMP). Riquelmy, James R., King, Merle W., MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-2 Flight Evaluation of Propulsion Unit and Associated Systems, 2 June 1961 (C) (S&MD). Index and Test Results Part I of the Fir-
MSFC
MTP-M-S&M-P-61-10
MSFC
MTP-LOD-OIR-61-4.1
ing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE Vehicle MR-2, 20 February 1961 (C) (LOD). MSFC MTP-LOD-EF-61-4.2a Gwinn, Ralph T., Consolidated mentation Plan Part IIa of the Report MERCURY-REDSTONE 9 February 1961 (S) (LOD). InstruFiring Test MR-2,
MSFC
MTP-LOD-ED-61-4.2b
Hinds, Noble F., Instrumentation Operation Analysis Part IIb of the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-2, 7 April 1961 (C) (LOD). Martin, Thomas E., Firing Site Weight Report Part III of the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-2, Undated (C) (LOD).
MSFC
MTP-LOD-ED-61-4.3
MERCURY-REDSTONE MSFC
Booster
Development
Flight, MR-BD Fallon, Robert A., Smith, Martha E., DOVAP Flight Test Data MERCURYREDSTONE BD, 8 May 1961 (C) (COMP). Riquelmy, J.R., King, M.W., McDonald, N.G., MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-BD Flight Evaluation of Propulsion Unit and Associated Systems, 3 August 1961 (C) (S&MD). Index and Test Results Part I of the Fir-
MTP-M-COMP-61-6
MSFC
MTP-M-S&M-P-61-7
MSFC
MTP-LOD-OIR-61-11.1
ing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE Vehicle MR-BD, 7 April 1961 (C) (LOD). MSFC MTP-LOD-ED-61-11.2b Hinds, Noble F., Instrumentation ations Analysis Part IIb of the Report MERCURY-REDSTONE 14 April 1961 (C) (LOD). OperFiriNg Test MR-BD,
MSFC
MTP-LOD-MP-61-11.3
Heezen, Kenneth F., Firing Site Weight Report Part III of the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-BD, 17 April 1961 (C) (LOD).
10-7
MSFC
MTP-LOD-EF-61-11.2a
Gwinn,
mentation Plan Part IIa of the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-BD, 23 March 1961 (C) (LOD). MSFC MTP-AERO-61-36 Clarke, W.G., Preliminary of MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-BD, MSFC MTP-AERO-61-43 19 April 1961 Evaluation Launch
(C) (AERO). of
Ledford, ttarold, Actual Trajectory MERCURY-REDSTONE Flight Test MR-BD, 24 May 1961 (C) (AERO). Smith, J.W., Atmospheric for MERCURY-REDSTONE _, 1 May 1961 (IUO) Environment BD Vehicle (AERO).
MSFC
MTP-AERO-61-51
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-4
Final Acceptance Test Report Thrust Unit MR-5, 21 March 1961 (IUO)(QUAL). Davis, MR-5, C. It., Final 24 February Alignment Report 1961 (QUAL).
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-4.1
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-4.2
Lackey, M., Electrical Systems Analysis MR-5, 24 January 1961 (IUO) (QUAL). Bruce, MR-5, R.B., Test Conductors 23 January 1961 (IUO) Report (QUAL). Systems 1961
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-4.3
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-4.4
Smith, A.G., Radio Frequency Test Report MR-5, 26 January (IUO) (QUAL). Guidance and Control System MR-5, 31 January 1961 (IUO) Measuring 30 January
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-4.5
Ckeokout (QUAL).
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-4.6
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-4.7
Sarture, A.C., Final Mechanical bly Analysis Thrust Unit MR-5, 13 March 1961 (IUO) (QUAL).
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-4.8
Kulas, F., Final Pressure and Functional Analysis, Thrust Unit MR-5, 9 March 1961 (IUO) (QUAL).
Flight, MR-3 Martin, James J., Jr., Description of MERCURY-REDSTONE Launch Vehicle for Flight No. MR-3, 21 July 1961 (S&MD).
10-8
MSFC MTP-M-TEST-61-6
Earnest, H.S.,
Static Firing of MERCURY-REDSTONE No. 7 Test No. 346, 7 March 1961(MR-BD) (TEST). Fallon, Robert A., Smith, Martha E., DOVAP Flight Test Data MERCURYREDSTONE 3, 26 July 1961"(C) (COMP). Final Unit, Acceptance Test Report Thrust MR-7, 7 April 1961 (IUO) (QUAL). Report (IUO)
MSFC MTP-M-COMP-61-7
Manning, F.T., Final Alignment Thrust Unit, MR-7, 3 April 1961 (QUAL).
Electrical Systems Analysis Thrust Unit, MR-7, 29 March 1961 (IUO) (QUAL). Lackey, M., Test Conductor's Thrust Unit_ MR-7, 23 March (IUO) (QUAL). Norton, C.M., Radio Frequency Test Report Thrust Unit MR-7, 20 March 1961 (IUO) (QUAL). Guidance and Control Thrust Unit, MR-7, (IUO) (QUAL). Report 1961
MSFC MTP-M-QUAL-61-10.4
Systems
MSFC MTP-M-QUAL-61-10.5
Instrumentation Analysis Thrust Unit MR-7, 31 March 1961 (IUO) (QUAL). Sartore, A.C., Final Mechanical Assem-
MSFC MTP-M-QUAL-61-10.8
F.,
Riquelmy, James R., King, Merle W., MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-3 Flight Evaluation of Propulsion Unit and Associated Systems, 3 August 1961 (C) (S_MD). Hinds, Noble F., Instrumentation Operation Analysis Part IIb of the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-3, 29 June 1961 (C) (LOD). Heezen, Kenneth F., Firing Site Weight Report
MSFC MTP-LOD-ED-61-17.2b
MSFC MTP-LOD-MP-61-17.3
Report Part II of the Firing Test MERCURY-REDSTONE MR- 3, 22 May 1961 (C) (LOD).
10-9
Systems Analysis MR-3, 1960 (IUO) (QUA L). Conductor's 1960 (IUO) Report (QUAL). Systems 1960
Smith, A.G., Radio Frequency Test Report MR-3, 1 December (IUO) (QUAL).
MSFC MTP-M-QD-60-8.5
MSFC MTP-M-QD-60-8.6
Guidance and Control System Checkout MR-3, 2 December 1960 (IUO) (QUAL). Measuring System Analysis MR-3, 2 December 1960 (IUO) (QUAL). Kulas, F., Final Mechanical Pressure and Functional Analysis of Missile MR-3, 5 December 1960 (IUO) (QUAL). Gwinn, Ralph T., tation Plan Number REDSTONE (LOD). MR-3, Provisional Instrumen1 MERCURY7 April 1961 (C)
MSFC
MTP-M-QD-60-8.8
MSFC
MTP-LOD-EF-61-16
MSFC
MTP-LOD-EF-61-17.2
Gwinn, Ralph T., Dean, Kenneth J., Consolidated Instrumentation Plan Part IIa of the Firing Test Report MERCURYREDSTONE M-R-3, 28 April 1961 (C) (LOD). Jones, Charles B., Technical Information Summary Concerning MERCURYREDSTONE MR-3, 20 April 1961 (G&CD). (Super) Clarke, W.G., Preliminary of MERCURY-REDSTONE 8 June 1961 (C) (AERO). Evaluation Launch MR-3,
MSFC
STR-M-61-8
MSFC
MTP-AERO-61-49
MSFC
MTP-AERO-61-53
Ledford, Harold, Actual Trajectory MERCURY-REDSTONE Flight Test 14 June 1961 (C) (AERO).
of MR-3,
MSFC
MTP-AERO-61-59
Smith, J.W., Atmospheric Environment for the MERCURY-REDSTONE 3 Vehicle Fli___, 20 July 1961 (IUO) (AERO). Index and Test Results Part I of the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE Vehicle MR-3, 23 May 1961 (C) (LOD).
MSFC
MTP-LOD-OIR-61-17.1
Flight, MR-4 MERCURY-REDSTONE Monthly Status Re.._.9._,5 May 1961 (C) (QUAL). 1
10-10
MSFC
MPR-M-61-2
MERCURY-REDSTONE Monthly Status Report, 12 June 1961, MR-4 (QUAL). MERCURY-REDSTONE Monthly Status Report, 5 July 1961, MR-4 (QUAL). MERCURY-REDSTONE Report, July 1961 (C), Monthly Status MR-4 (QUAL).
MSFC
MPR-M-61-3
MSFC
MPR-M-61-4
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-20
Final Acceptance Test Report, Thrust Unit MR-8, 21 June 1961 (IUO) (QUAL). Davis, Thrust C.H., Unit, Final MR-8, Alignment Report 1 June 1961 (QUAL). Thlxlst (QUAL). Unit,
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-20.1
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-20.2
Electrical System Analysis MR-8, 19 June 1961 (IUO) Nash, E.C., Thrust Unit, (QUAL).
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-20.3
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-20.4
Radio Frequency Systems Test Report Thrust Unit, MR-8, 17 June 1961 (IUO) (QUAL). Gibson, J.H., Instrumentation Thrust Unit MR-8, 17 June (QUAL). Gwinn, Ralph T., Dean, Provisional Instrumentation ber 1 MERCURY-REDSTONE 3 June 1961 (LOD). Ha Analysis (IUO)
MSFC
MTP-M-QUAL-61-20.6
1961
MSFC
MTP-LOD-EF-61-20
MSFC
MTP-LOD-G-61-23,
Gwinn, Ralph T., Dean, Kenneth J., Consolidated Instrumentation Plan Part IIa of the Firing Test Report MERCURYREDSTONE (Booster No. 6, Capsule No. 11) 14 July 1961 (C) (LOD). Heezen, Kenneth F., Hill, Lawrence F., Firing Site Weight Report Part III of the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-4, 2 August 1961 (C) (LOD). Jones, Charles E., Technical Information Summary Concerning MERCURYREDSTONE Mission MR-4, 29 June 1961 (IUO) (G&CD). Speer, F.A., Preliminary Evaluation MERCURY-REDSTONE Launch MR-4, 8 December 1960 (C) (AERO). of
MSFC
MTP-LOD-MP-61-23.3
MSFC
MTP-M-G&C-61-29
MSFC
MTP-AERO-61-19
10-11
MSFC
MTP-AERO-61-69
Clarke, W.G., Preliminary Evaluation of MERCURY-REDSTONE Launch MR-4, 22 August 1961 (C) (AERO). Smith, J.W., Atmospheric Environment for the Flight of MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-4, 28 September 1961 (IUO) (AERO). Ledford, Harold, Actual Traiectory MERCURY-REDSTONE Flight Test 22 September 1961 (C) (AERO). of MR-4,
MSFC
MTP-AERO-61-74
MSFC
MTP-AERO-61-76
MSFC
MTP-P&VE-P-61-20
Riquelmy, J.R., King, N.W., Montgomery, J.L., MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-4 Flight and Evaluation of Propulsion Unit and Associated Systems, 9 November 1961 (C) (P&VE). Index and Test ing Test Report Vehicle MR-4, Results Part I of the FirMERCURY-REDSTONE 15 August 1961 (C)(LOD).
MSFC
MTP-LOD-OIR-61-23.1
MSFC
MTP-LOD-ED-61-23.2b
Hinds, Noble F., Instrumentation Operations Analysis Part IIb at the Firing Test Report MERCURY-REDSTONE MR-4, 24 August 1961 (C) (LOD). Heezen, Kenneth F., Hill, Lawrence F., Firing Site Weight Report Part III of the Firing Test Report MERCURYREDSTONE MR-4, 2 August 1961 (C) (LOD).
MSFC
MTP-LOD-MP-61-23.3
10-12