SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

I, PATRICIA KIM, M.F.A., L.M.S.W., hereby affirm under penalty of perjury:

1. I am a licensed master social worker, duly licensed to practice in the State of New

York. I hold a Master’s in Fine Arts (MFA) and a Master’s of Social Work (MSW) from Columbia

University.

2. I am currently employed by New York Health and Hospitals Correctional Health

Services (“CHS”), where I work full-time as a Discharge Planning Social Worker at the Anna M.

Kross Center (“AMKC”) on Rikers Island. More specifically, I am assigned to the “PACE”

(Program to Accelerate Clinical Effectiveness) unit, which is located within AMKC. This has been

my assignment since I began my employment with CHS in July of 2018. For the last six months,

in addition to my work on the PACE unit, I have also been working with detainees in the “CAPS”

(Clinical Alternative to Punitive Segregation) unit, which is also located inside AMKC on Rikers

Island. My personal office is physically located inside of AMKC—down the hallway from the

PACE Unit and upstairs from the CAPS unit.

3. In my capacity as a CHS social worker on the PACE and CAPS units, I provide

therapeutic counseling that is focused on preparing patients (also referred to as detainees) to engage

in the community-based services outlined in their discharge plan. Specifically, I use

psychoeducation and motivational interviewing to help our mentally ill patients process previous

experiences with community-based services such that they can be best positioned to succeed in the

community upon release from Rikers Island. The direct services I provide to each detainee differ

based on the individual’s psychiatric diagnosis and treatment need(s).

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 4. In addition to the direct services I provide, I am the units’ assigned court liaison. In

this role, I facilitate communication between my patients and their attorneys, request letters from

the appropriate clinical supervisors regarding a patient’s PACE/CAPS program participation for

use in court, and execute records requests after processing signed consent forms. I am also

occasionally required to see patients presented for discharge from any of the MO (“Mental Health

Observation”) housing units, depending on staff coverage needs. These discharge encounters take

place in the C-71 clinic, also known as Hart’s Island, where patients being admitted to Rikers

Island are also seen for a preliminary mental health assessment (if referred during the intake

process), prior to being assigned to a facility and housing unit.

5. Although I have some office-based duties listed above, I spend the majority of each

workday providing direct treatment to my patients in both the PACE and CAPS units and, at times,

in other MO units and discharges in Hart’s Island (as needed). My work therefore regularly

requires me to walk the hallways, stairwell, housing areas, clinical offices, and “day room” areas

in the MO sections of AMKC.

6. I have reviewed the affidavits of DOC Deputy Commissioner Patricia Feeney

(“Feeney Affidavit”), and Mr. Richard Bush (“Bush Affidavit”), dated April 2, 2020, as well as

the affidavit from Dr. Patricia Yang, Senior Vice President of CHS, dated April 14, 2020 (“Yang

Affidavit”), all of which I understand have been submitted by the New York City Law Department

in litigation against the City of New York regarding individuals in DOC custody that are medically

vulnerable to COVID-19.

7. As a CHS staff member who works full time at AMKC, I am an eyewitness to what

has been occurring on Rikers Island since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. I have

personally observed the failures of DOC and CHS to implement the policies outlined by the Bush,

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Feeney, and Yang affidavits. I submit this affidavit to attest that, as detailed below, DOC and CHS

are failing to implement effective, basic, common-sense preventative measures to prevent

transmission of COVID-19 to its medically vulnerable detainees, and are placing the detainees in

their custody—as well as CHS and DOC staff—at risk of grave harm.

The Reality of the Current Conditions on Rikers Island

8. COVID-19 became a tangible presence on Rikers Island in mid-March. Though

emails were received from CHS since March 2 about proper hygiene protocols, I did not observe

such protocols being practiced in the environment I work in. As of March 18, 2020, CHS was

informed that a staff member and detainee had tested positive. By March 21, 2020, the Board of

Corrections reported that 12 DOC employees, 5 CHS employees, and 21 detained persons on

Rikers Island tested positive for COVID.1

9. Following March 21, 2020, an entire week went by, during which I was present for

work and observed that DOC did not provide any sort of masks for detainees nor did CHS provide

such personal protective equipment (“PPE”). It was not until early April that masks were regularly

provided to staff and detainees. However, staff are required to obtain masks from nursing in the

clinic area, which I refused as it increased possibility of transmission. I noted that for several

weeks, Correctional Officers in my housing areas were not wearing appropriate masks (given the

lack of N95 and options other than the standard surgical masks), if they were wearing masks at all,

and were not practicing social distancing. The masks DOC and CHS provide are intended for one-

time use, but detainees are told to use them for at least one week. To date, this is still the practice.

I regularly observe my patients with dirty, torn masks. I have not observed DOC engage in regular

1
Board of Correction Letter to NYC Criminal Justice Leaders re NYC Jails and COVID-19, published March 21,
2020, and available at: https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/News/covid-19/Letter-from-BOC-re-NYC-
Jails-and-COVID-19-2020-03-21.pdf.

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monitoring of detainees’ masks and they did not replace dirty or torn masks for any of my patients.

One patient of mine broke the ear loop on a mask he just received. He was given a piece of tape to

fix it. As of Friday, May 8, when I entered AMKC and passed through the mag detector, I looked

up to see a poster distributed early on by the city regarding COVID health guidelines, that stated,

“If you are feeling well, no need to wear a mask.” This outdated and dangerous message is still

in visible site at the entrance to the facility, almost one month after the Governor’s Order requiring

everyone wear masks in public.

10. To date, CHS and DOC staff have not been provided with adequate PPE. Instead,

PPE is used as a bargaining tool to try to entice staff to work at Eric M. Taylor Center (“EMTC”).

EMTC was a previously closed facility, that was reopened to house detainees who are COVID-19

positive, as well as detainees who are “suspected of having the COVID-19 virus.” See Yang

Affidavit at ¶ 14. CHS Discharge planning staff were informed by CHS Reentry director that they

will receive full PPE upon volunteering to work on EMTC and any other housing areas designated

as having positive or suspected-positive patients. Adequate PPE for all staff and detainees is

currently the exception, and not the rule.

11. The bus transportation system on Rikers Island, alone, is an example of how easily

the virus has been and will continue to be carried all over the island and in between facilities. These

buses carry DOC and CHS staffers, who work on the island, between facilities along their

designated routes dozens of times per day, transporting staff from facility to facility and back to

the command center. It is without question that these buses are not sanitized, or even wiped down,

in between trips, despite the fact that each bus has multiple facilities on their routes, including

facilities that have been designated to house individuals who test positive for COVID-19. That

means the same bus carries officers and staff who work at EMTC, where detainees are known to

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have tested positive for COVID-19, and officers and staff who work at other facilities, recklessly

exposing officers and staff, who work at facilities where detainees are not known to be positive,

to the virus.

12. Hand sanitizer dispensers were installed in staff offices on the unit and soap

dispensers installed in re-entry staff officers off the unit sometime in March. On Monday, April

27, 2020, I spoke to the facility health and safety administrator to inquire as to why those

dispensers that were installed more than a month ago have since remained empty. I was informed

that there is no supply to fill them. The soap dispensers that were installed at the same time hand

sanitizer dispensers had been installed were filled with antibacterial soap only during the week of

April 27. Until then, I used soap that I purchased out-of-pocket and brought into the facility.

13. Despite knowing that asymptomatic transmission was what made this virus so

dangerous and so susceptible to widespread infection, protocols to reduce asymptomatic

transmission were not explicitly announced. CHS staff were informed at the end of March to self-

screen twice a day for the following symptoms: fever (greater/equal to 100); new cough; new

shortness of breath; new sore throat. By then COVID-19 was spreading undetected across the

jails on Rikers Island with frighteningly little enforcement of containment measures. The PACE

housing area, specifically, was designated as Asymptomatic Exposed (AE) at the end of March

and I was informed by CHS staff, can only be assigned if a patient tests positive for COVID-19.

This designation is not made when staff or officers (who are on the unit with the patients for full

tours) test positive. Nor for a housing area that shares the security bubble or the same bridge area

(gated area shared by units) where patients, staff, and officers share small, unventilated spaces.

14. Any measures that have been taken to reduce the spread of the virus are not

routinely enforced. Announcements have been made and directives have been posted, but a number

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of CHS and DOC staff are regularly seen not adhering to the new guidelines. Little has been done

to meaningfully observe the social distancing and protective equipment mandates that are

necessary to stop, let alone slow the spread.

Staff Screening Protocols that are Ineffective & Administered by Untrained DOC Staff

15. In late March when it had been confirmed multiple staff, officers and detainees had

tested positive for COVID-19, I began to observe staff members’ temperatures being taken as we

entered the building. Specifically, I observed that on or about March 27, 2020, temperatures were

taken with a laser thermometer that was held as far as a foot or more from the person’s ear, throat,

or forehead. A social work supervisor’s temperature was recorded and approved for entry at 85

degrees—this temperature was clearly inaccurate, as this is the temperature of someone who

should be in a coma with hypothermia. Temperatures were taken not by medical staff, but by

untrained corrections officers.

16. On March 28, 2020—more than a week after individuals on Rikers Island tested

positive for COVID-19—I was informed that the PACE unit was designated as “asymptomatic

exposed” (AE) and to therefore follow the designated housing protocol. This was necessitated by

a patient in the PACE unit exhibiting COVID symptoms. That patient was then transferred to

another unit where he would be monitored and tested. Again, these protocols were and continue to

be triggered by detainees that display COVID symptoms, not corrections officers or staff. Prior to

the detainee exhibiting symptoms, nearly all the corrections officers in the unit which shares the

security bridge with the newly-designated AE unit tested positive for COVID and no protocols

were initiated. Officers routinely share the security control room (bubble) space with officers from

the other side. Staff are also in the bubble area to check in with officers about any patient issues

from previous tours. The bathroom that is used by both staff and officers is also located in the

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bubble as well as the staff bathroom which officers occasionally use is located down the hall, also

increasing areas of transmission. This COVID screening protocol, merely asks the exposed

detainees about new fever, new cough, new sore throat, new difficulty breathing- everyone

exposed is not tested. Nursing will take temperatures, but patients can refuse. It has become well-

known that about a quarter of contagious COVID positive carriers do not exhibit any symptoms.

It is also widely known that there are a spectrum of symptoms aside from fever, cough, and sore

throat that are typical of COVID-positive status. Staff and officers are screened using the same

inadequate questions.

17. The screening process remains the same. Temperatures are taken by officers who

are wearing masks and gloves. However, staff and officers who are awaiting their temperature

screening are not wearing masks or gloves.

Inadequate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Staff and Detainees

18. As I mentioned above, DOC only began providing masks in early April, after many

correctional officers working inside AMKC became sick and a few tragically lost their lives due

to COVID-19 complications. CHS was not requiring mask use for staff or for patients and certainly

did not enforce its use among discharge planning staff. During a phone conference on April 15

with CHS management and discharge planning staff, I asked why staff were working in proximity

to the AE-designated PACE unit without appropriate PPE and CHS then started to enforce the

order.

19. CHS and DOC staff are still not provided with adequate PPE. Instead, as mentioned

above, PPE is used as a bargaining tool to try to entice staff to work at Eric M. Taylor Center

(“EMTC”). EMTC was a previously closed facility, that was reopened to house detainees who are

COVID-19 positive, as well as detainees who are “suspected of having the COVID-19 virus.” See

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Yang Affidavit at ¶ 14. CHS staffers were informed that they will receive full PPE only if they

volunteer to work on EMTC and any other housing areas designated as having positive or

suspected-positive patients (those who were observed to be symptomatic).

20. On or about March 30, 2020, I observed a Supervising Social Worker in the PACE

unit training a newly hired CHS social worker. During the training, I observed the newly-hired

staffer and this Supervisor walking up and down the hallways outside of the PACE/CAPS units

(PACE units are located directly above CAPS units) and stairwell area connecting the 2 floors that

is shared by patients, DOC officers, and CHS staff. These hallways and stairwell are unventilated

and closed for safety. I observed that neither the Supervisor nor the newly-hired staffer were

wearing masks while walking through these narrow hallways. The Supervisor’s office is located

inside a CHS trailer area on AMKC, where I understand CHS staff members whose assigned

workspace is in this area have tested positive for COVID-19. Note that Mental Health staff, when

assigned desks in cramped office spaces, were working in cubicles and sharing office

supplies/copiers, etc.

21. Training for re-entry staff on how to property utilize PPE was not provided until

April 21, 2020, after repeated demands by the staff. This training took place in the CHS trailer at

AMKC. While at this training, I observed staff in cubicles as well as the administrative assistant

who sits at the entrance of the trailer, with no masks and violating social distancing guidelines.

Similarly, the discharge planning/re-entry social workers who are assigned to work in that trailer

are sitting in close quarters (closer than 6 feet) in an unventilated and cramped space. This is the

same trailer where I understand that seven CHS staffers who have contracted COVID-19 have

worked at various points over the last few months.

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 22. During the April 15th conference call meeting with CHS management and discharge

planning staff, I addressed the distinct lack of staff use of PPE. It was apparent that senior

managerial staff were unaware of how I was using the term PPE despite its widespread use in this

pandemic. I had to explain what I meant by PPE and describe what I observed. I explained that

staff have been observed in areas shared by patients from an AE housing unit; shared by

correctional officers who had tested positive; shared by CHS staff who are specifically assigned

as part of the treatment team and also physically on the AE housing unit; are walking about without

masks on. I added that these individuals were not wearing even masks in these unventilated areas.

The response I received was that they [officers and staff] should definitely be wearing masks. It

has been six weeks since the designation of the PACE unit as an AE housing area, and some staff

are still not wearing masks at all or if they are, are not wearing them appropriately (below the nose

or pulled down under their face) and are still not appropriately observing social distancing

guidelines.

23. The directors and several supervisors for CHS mental health and discharge planning

re-entry are working remotely from home and do not see what frontline staff are dealing with daily.

These higher-ups and supervisors are also in possession of Gate 1 passes that allow them access

to the facilities directly in their cars, bypassing the route bus transportation.

24. Before the April 21, 2020 PPE training, after staff request/demand, our discharge

planning staff were asked to volunteer to complete discharges with patients housed in EMTC, a

facility re-opened for positive or suspected-positive patients. A task, which I refused, and involves

boarding multiple buses to get to and from, including the EMTC bus that is boarded by staff and

officers for a positive and suspected-positive facility. The possibility of transmission is significant

and my own anxiety at the thought is crippling. A colleague revealed that when she volunteered to

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do this, she had to walk the entire length of this COVID positive facility with no PPE and only

was given the PPE when she eventually got to the area where the COVID-positive patient was

waiting. When this was brought up to the director of social work re-entry, he informed us that he

was not aware social workers would be walking through the entire facility before obtaining the

PPE.

Social Distancing is Impossible, Even in Single-Cell Housing Units, and Even with the
Reduction in the Jail Population

25. AMKC’s PACE Unit is made up of 20 single cell units, that form an elongated U-

shape along the large dayroom area. Detainees who are housed in the single cell unit leave their

cell regularly to receive medication and clinical treatment, to shower, and to move about in the

“day room” where they eat their meals. In the dayroom, patients can sit at any one of the tables,

that resemble picnic benches that are bolted to the ground, and they can move freely between the

clinical offices, which are located at either end.

26. Dayrooms and the clinical offices are used as multiple occupancy rooms, but they

are not spacious. Rather, they are cramped and make it difficult for detainees, corrections officers

and staff to use and observe appropriate social distancing requirements in certain housing areas,

such as the Quads or Mods. The PACE unit has a large dayroom area. In the last few weeks, the

tables were marked with X’s made from tape, to illustrate to patients that they should sit several

feet apart. Even these X’s are not six feet apart from each other. Despite these newly installed

“X’s,” social distancing rules are not monitored, nor enforced by DOC staff.

27. On a daily basis, I see patients who are not properly wearing a protective mask,

sitting closer than six feet from their peers while watching television or otherwise while present in

the dayroom. As recently as Saturday, May 2nd, patients are still observed wearing masks beneath

their nose and to my knowledge, no gloves are being provided. Instead, they are occasionally

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reminded to wash their hands, but this hygiene practice is not strictly monitored and cannot be

enforced. I observed corrections officers posted on the unit, sitting at a table together, some with

masks appropriately worn and others without masks—all sitting closer than six feet apart. There

are also men with beards and mask guidelines have consistently stated that a full seal is impossible

for bearded men. Many non-steady officers have been posted to my unit because steady officers

have been out sick. I have more often seen non-steady officers without a mask or gloves.

28. In addition to the PACE Unit, AMKC also has Mental Health Observation (MO)

units, known as the Quads, where patients are housed in single cells that are located directly across

from one another along the length of a narrow walkway. If a detainee stands near the front of his

cell, he will be less than six feet apart from anyone walking through the narrow walkway. As one

can imagine, these housing units are enclosed housing areas that offer little in the way of

ventilation. These are heavily-used walkways by Corrections officers, staff and detainees who are

trying to get from their cells to the dayroom, shower, or wherever they may need to report.

29. The shower designated for the Quad’s patients is located at the front end of the long

walkway, as is the dayroom area where the patients socialize and/or watch the unit televisions.

This is also where the clinical office is located. Unlike the PACE unit’s day room, the QUADS’s

day room is cramped and is difficult to practice social distancing. Patients housed in the QUADS

units have frequent, close contact with one another, as well as with CHS and DOC staff, and cannot

practice proper social distancing.

30. Detainees housed in the QUADS single cell units as described above, have close

and frequent contact with one another and with officers and staff members due to the layout of the

cells in a narrow hallway, congregation in the day room, and the detainees’ use of communal

shower and eating areas, as well as, general population detainees who travel between units to

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deliver food for meals, offer weekly linen/clothing exchange, or collect and dispose of housing

area trash. Therefore, Dr. Yang’s statement that “CHS separately houses and monitors patients

who are most vulnerable to serious complications should they contract the virus[,]” see Yang

Affidavit, at ¶ 9, while technically true, does nothing to address the problem. Even in “separately

housed” units, patients nonetheless have frequent close contact with other detainees as well as

CHS and DOC staff, who are not consistently wearing masks and gloves, engaging in proper and

heightened hygiene, or complying with social distancing requirements.

31. Little effort has been made to enforce social distancing and safer movement

practices. I regularly witness patients in my housing area walk between or directly by other patients

or officers who are talking or the “suicide prevention aid”/officers/staff who are making rounds,

oftentimes without masks or not wearing them properly, and without anyone registering that they

should be trying to social distance. I remind patients to not touch unit surfaces, to not touch their

faces, to practice good hygiene. Nursing staff also give reminders to the patients. However, it’s

mostly as if nothing has changed.

32. AMKC also has housing units—referred to as “MODS”—that are used primarily

for patients who are being assessed for assignment to particular housing areas/units and do not

require an individual cell. As of the date of this writing, the census has been lowered in the MODS

but the unit is simply a large and open room with cots. The men share the same shower and because

the beds are, as has been reported to the media, only a few feet apart, instructions were posted in

the unit advising patients to sleep head-to-toe. Although patients in certain of the Mental Health

Observation units have their own cell units, depending on where they are housed (PACE, CAPS,

QUADS vs. MODS) patients are often exposed to General Population detainees housed in other

units in AMKC.

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 33. Social distancing, as recommended by the CDC for prevention of transmission of

COVID-19, is not consistently possible in AMKC and thus my medically vulnerable patients are

at risk. Observation of mask and handwashing/sanitizing guidelines is also not consistently

monitored nor enforced.

Sanitation of Housing Units and Facilities Generally

34. Sanitation in Rikers Island is done by detainee ‘sanitation crews’ that are tasked

with mopping floors and picking up trash. While I have certainly seen these sanitation crews more

frequently in the last few weeks, the enhanced cleaning has largely been ineffective. I have

observed sanitation crews without proper PPE, and sometimes not even wearing a face covering

when cleaning, or wearing masks inappropriately (under the nose, under the face). I have observed

that the water and cleaning solution (which quickly becomes visibly dirty) is not changed until

after several offices have been mopped. Additionally, the same sanitation crew members are

assigned to clean various units/areas in different parts of the jail and increasing likelihood of

transmission. It is uncertain whether detainees serving on sanitation crews are themselves being

tested for COVID prior to working. And again, asymptomatic patients are still likely to transmit

the virus, especially as they are actively cleaning.

35. My unit consists of my workstation, the workstations of other discharge planners,

including my supervisor's office where we conduct telehealth and phone conferences for the

patients. These offices as well as workstations are not being cleaned by sanitation crews, unless

specifically requested. During the April 15th meeting with CHS management, cleaning supplies

were requested by Social Workers so that we could clean our own stations, this was brushed off

by a co-director of Mental Health on the call and we were asked instead if there was a sink with

soap near our desks. I am required to buy my own cleaning supplies in order to clean my

workstation and the supervisor’s office where I see my patients. I regularly spend over twenty

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minutes cleaning in and around my own workstation as I share the space with colleagues that were

not observing appropriate hygiene, protective guidelines. One colleague that was reluctant to buy

her own cleaning supplies, later tested positive for the virus. I must also spend several minutes

cleaning before and after patient visits for telehealth and/or phone conferences in the supervisor's

office. Donated cloth masks were provided after the April 15th conference call. Prior to this,

speaking for myself, I sourced a P100 welding mask from a friend in the community which I

continue to use to protect my patients as well as myself, my family.

Medically-Vulnerable Detainees are Regularly in Close Proximity to Detainees and Staff

36. Intra- and inter-facility transfers continued to take place even after individuals in

the facility/on the island tested positive and after Governor Cuomo outlined the NY State on

PAUSE order to prevent unnecessary transmission. According to a paper recently published about

the PACE unit, to which I am assigned, “Referrals to PACE units are made exclusively by

[CHS]…Variables that typically affect jail housing decisions […] are rarely compelling enough to

override the clinical recommendation for PACE”.2 Patient transfers are continuing to take place

with the same (outdated) screening questions when articles are stating that the early common

symptoms of fever, sore throat, new cough, difficulty breathing do not necessarily need to be

exhibited (or at all) to be COVID-positive or even in need of hospitalization.3

37. Detainees have also been brought from other facilities on Rikers Island to simply

be discharged from AMKC. They are seen in the main clinic at AMKC (C95), where the rest of

2
Clinical Outcomes of Specialized Treatment Units for Patients With Serious Mental Illness in the New York City
Jail System, Psychiatric Services, published February 11, 2020, available at:
https://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/abs/10.1176/appi.ps.201900405.
3
Presenting Characteristics, Comorbidities, and Outcomes Among 5700 Patients Hospitalized With COVID-19 in
the New York City Area, JAMA, published April 22, 2020, available at:
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2765184.

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the AMKC population cycles through. Patients are brought from other facilities for mental health

evaluation, traversing not just facilities and associated areas during transfer, but also the buses

used for transport. This puts not just the patient, but staff and officers at risk.

38. For weeks after the virus came to Rikers Island, it is my understanding—based on

complaints I heard in passing, that DOC continued to conduct roll call as usual, requiring officers

to stand less than six feet from one another during the change of tour. It was also impossible to

socially distance upon entry into the facility after passing through the mag detector, as the double

gated security enclosure regularly has people waiting to get to their office/post and standing often

right next to each other. I cannot speak to the other facilities.

39. Additionally, I have personally observed detainees from general population

housing areas in facilities outside of AMKC, regularly travel to AMKC in order to complete their

assigned duties with the “linen exchange” or “clothing exchange”—a system in which detainees

are tasked with collecting used clothing and linens in one bin and handing out clean clothing and

linens from the adjacent bin. Detainees also deliver the meals that are subsequently prepped in

each unit pantry area. On or about April 17, 2020, I personally observed several detainees from a

general population housing area complete a linen exchange inside AMKC’s PACE unit without

wearing mask, gloves, or any protective gear. Upon information and belief, one of the detainees

conducting the linen exchange had tested positive for COVID-19 one week before he was making

rounds to various facilities. During these rounds, detainees are taken from unit to unit and facility

to facility, unable to wash or sanitize hands between rounds, despite handling/in close proximity

to soiled clothing and bedding from dozens of detainees in various housing units.

40. The bus routes have not changed either. The same bus will carry staff and officers

from various facilities. The same bus will transport dozens of staff and officers—both those

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knowingly exposed to COVID-19 positive patients and those working in facilities with populations

that have not yet tested positive or who have been returned to certain housing facilities following

quarantine. Staff and officers from various facilities are packed on these buses, without regard for

social distancing requirements and many ride without wearing masks. They then enter their

designated facility and begin their tour not knowing what they have picked up and are passing to

the detainees they oversee, and without regard for who is medically-vulnerable on their tours.

Often, they are unaware because HIPAA laws prevent dissemination of such medically-related

information.

41. The bus route I take from the Perry security building to AMKC is used at certain

hours to carry staff and officers to/from EMTC even though that facility is not on the bus route.

Since EMTC re-opened, I have observed with an incredible amount of anxiety on numerous

occasions, the bus pick up and drop off staff/officers at EMTC. I have been on a packed bus from

AMKC at the end of a tour, that stopped at EMTC and then dropped us off at the security building.

After we departed, the bus took off back towards the facilities on their regular route with windows

up and without cleaning. It is without question that these buses are not sanitized after each trip and

I have observed CHS staff and corrections officers regularly violate guidelines requiring masks

and social distancing while on the buses. Again, EMTC is the facility for all positive or suspected-

positive patients. This apparent oversight by DOC is rife with the possibility of disease

transmission and in no way promotes containment and at a basic level, respect for the health and

safety of frontline staff and in turn, the patients whom we serve.

42. I am aware that since the outbreak, some officers are working in EMTC, directly

with COVID-19 patients, and then they are returning to their steady posts in other facilities. Staff

and officers are being transferred to EMTC for tours—oftentimes over their objections—and

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returned to tours in other facilities without self-quarantining before returning to a facility that is

not designated to house positive patients. I have no knowledge as to whether officers who change

tours between a COVID-19 positive unit and non-positive unit are changing their clothes or PPE

between the tours. New Yorkers staying in their home are being asked to quarantine for two weeks

upon leaving the city before potentially exposing individuals in other states, yet this same practice

has not even been contemplated for officers and staff who are informed that they should still report

to work if they are not exhibiting the symptoms that are screened for (again, not inclusive of the

spectrum that is now disseminated to the public). I was informed by our Occupational Health staff

that even if I test positive, (I received my drive-through test on April 11th and followed up with

OHS on April 14th) as long as I do not have a fever and am not “coughing all over the place,” I

should still report to work.

CONCLUSION

43. Given these practices, no one on Rikers Island can say that everything in their

power is being done to slow or stop the spread. The intra and inter-facility tour changes and

transfers, the lack of PPE and proper hygiene practice, the general lack of enforcement of social

distancing and use of PPE, and the daily transportation system all but ensure that the virus is

continuing to spread and everyone continues to risk exposure. The most medically-vulnerable

among us are no exception. They are limited in where they can go and what they can do, and yet

they are forced to continue to come into daily contact with other detainees, staff, and officers who

we know have been exposed to the virus.

44. The stark inequalities of the criminal justice system have only been amplified

during this pandemic, and it is seen so clearly in how the policies drafted by DOC and CHS

management differ from what is actually taking place on the ground. We know without question

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