Original Article

Explaining US unilateral military intervention in

civil conflicts: A review of the literature

Amber Aubone
Political Science, St. Mary’s University, One Camino Santa Maria, San Antonio, TX 78228, USA.

Abstract Recent third-party use of force in hastening the exit of Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi illustrates that third-party military intervention is one foreign
policy tool among many that leaders may use to achieve desired ends. Numerous
works from international relations and foreign policy scholars explain third-party
intervention using a variety of approaches and methods, and examining multiple
levels of analysis. The survey of the literature provided here contributes to our
understanding of US unilateral intervention by examining this phenomenon using
both general theories of third-party intervention, as well as more refined foreign
policy theories explaining US intervention in particular. As such, the survey includes
works employing various approaches and levels of analysis, and thus serves two
purposes: (a) to assist in the cumulation of knowledge pertaining to US unilateral
intervention through consolidation of theory and empirical findings; (b) to serve as a
source from which scholars can identify contradictions and future avenues of
research pertaining to third-party intervention.
International Politics (2013) 50, 278–302. doi:10.1057/ip.2013.1

Keywords: intervention; Libya; Cold War; US military; peacekeeping;

foreign policy

Introduction

Recent third-party use of force in hastening the exit of Libyan leader Muammar
Gaddafi illustrates that third-party military intervention is one foreign policy
tool among many that leaders may use to achieve desired ends. Numerous works
from international relations (IR) and foreign policy scholars explain third-party
intervention using a variety of approaches and methods, and examining multiple
levels of analysis. Debates continue among those who portray political leaders
as rational, utility-maximizers, all behaving similarly when faced with the same
conditions, and those who depict leaders as driven by their individual or
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www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/
 Explaining US unilateral military intervention in civil conflicts

collective psychologies, represented as a tangled web of knowledge, experience,

worldview and personality. Some argue that these factors, combined with
institutional goals, laws, bureaucratic competition and procedures, make foreign
policy decision-making an uneven, nonlinear process.
The survey of the literature provided here contributes to our understanding
of US unilateral intervention by examining this phenomenon using both
general theories of third-party intervention, as well as more refined foreign
policy theories of US intervention, in particular. As such, the survey includes
works employing various approaches and levels of analysis, and thus serves
two purposes: (a) to assist in the cumulation of knowledge pertaining to US
unilateral intervention through consolidation of relevant theoretical arguments
and empirical findings; and (b) to serve as a source from which scholars can
identify contradictions and future avenues of research pertaining to third-party
intervention.
The rest of the article assesses the works of numerous scholars from
IR and foreign policy fields explaining both general third-party military
intervention and specific US military intervention in civil conflicts. Because
this particular phenomenon has been granted so much attention over
the years, the factors emphasized by various scholars are sorted into two
broad categories – external determinants of intervention and internal
determinants of intervention. External determinants refer to those related to
the international system, relations between states, and characteristics of the
target state and civil conflict. Internal determinants, on the other hand,
refer to those related to domestic politics, institutions and perceptions of the
intervener.
Although the literature presented in this study also applies to interveners other
than the United States, focusing on the United States clarifies the comparison of
general IR approaches to foreign policy approaches for explaining the same
phenomenon – US military intervention in civil conflicts. General IR theory, for
example, would present the United States as representative of a major-power,
democratic intervener. Foreign policy theory, on the other hand, provides the
opportunity to distinguish US intervention behavior from that of other states
given unique US history and culture. In future studies, some of the works
summarized here for explaining US unilateral intervention could also be applied
to other major-power, democratic interveners, comparing the explanatory power
of general IR and foreign policy theories.

Defining Intervention

The external and internal determinants of intervention correspond to a ques-

tion posed by James Rosenau: ‘y what is the relative potency of individual,
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role, governmental, societal, and systemic variables with regard to intervention

as a form of foreign or international policy?’ (1969, p. 165). Rosenau’s (1969)
work marks an important stage in the historiography of intervention studies in
that he proposed a definition of intervention, for the specific purpose of enabl-
ing the creation of parsimonious theories and means for testing these theories
empirically: interventionary behavior is that which is both ‘convention-breaking’
and ‘authority-oriented in nature’. Convention-breaking implies change in the
normal pattern of behavior between the intervening state and the target state,
and this change in behavior on the part of the intervener must be intended to
affect the authority structure of the target in some way. In all, the event must
be both convention-breaking and authority-oriented for an act to be considered
an intervention, and it can be employed using military, economic or diplomatic
means.
Providing further classification of intervention, it may be unilateral or multi-
lateral in form, depending not on the number of parties intervening but on the
number of parties making up the command structure. A unilateral intervention
is one conducted under the leadership of one state, while a multilateral inter-
vention reflects an international command structure. More specifically, where
more than one state intervenes on the same side of a party to a civil conflict, the
intervention is deemed unilateral for each state involved if they are not united
under one command structure (Regan, 2002). One other classification of inter-
vention deserves discussion – whether it is deemed neutral or biased. Whereas
multilateral interventions are often perceived as motivated by neutral interests,
unilateral interventions are usually considered biased toward one side or
another, with the intervening state’s leadership hoping its favored side ‘wins’.
The depictions of intervention described above fall short of including more
contemporary forms of intervention, such as peacekeeping, which may be con-
ducted by an international organization, ad-hoc group of states or one state.
Rost and Greig (2011) examine state-conducted peacekeeping in civil conflicts
and define it as ‘the deployment of military personnel by a single state or an ad-
hoc coalition of states to a conflict-affected country with the aim of monitor-
ing, keeping or restoring peace, rather than the aim of helping one of the
conflict parties to win or prevent its defeat’ (p. 5). As they point out, some of
the same factors that determine military intervention also determine a third
party’s decision to deploy peacekeepers to a conflict-affected country, parti-
cularly those pertaining to strategic interests. Other factors may also play a role
in peacekeeping, including the urgency for intervention. The decision to deploy
peacekeeping troops may incur costs similar to those for biased military
interventions in terms of the opportunity costs associated with having to make
trade-offs, as well as political costs associated with failed attempts.
Whether taking a ‘phenomenon-centric’ or ‘actor-centric’ approach (Findley
and Teo, 2006), most contemporary studies of intervention in civil conflict
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 Explaining US unilateral military intervention in civil conflicts

emphasize the expected-utility calculus of the intervening state’s leadership.

Potential benefits of intervention include containing the spread of conflict,
perhaps mitigating the loss of life and infrastructure in the target country,
establishing or strengthening relations with the supported party, and, related,
having greater (or maintained) influence over the policy of the target state
following the cessation of fighting. Potential costs faced by an intervener
pertain both to direct costs of intervention, such as loss of life and resources, as
well as indirect costs, such as those related to political survival of the third
party’s leadership, or loss of perceived legitimacy by the international comm-
unity. Probability of success may be determined by the intensity of the conflict,
parity of forces, duration of conflict, number of parties involved, among other
factors. That is, a number of external and internal variables are considered by
third-party leaders as part of the cost-benefits analysis associated with inter-
vention. Scholars have addressed the influence of these determinants in their
analyses of intervention, and each is described below.

External Determinants of Intervention

As described in the introduction, external determinants refer to those related

to the characteristics of the conflict and target state, relations between
the potential intervener and target state, relations between the intervener and
other states in the international system, and international norms. That is,
they are characterized by emphasis on the conflict, state and system levels
of analysis.

Characteristics of the conflict and target state

In conducting cost-benefits analysis pertaining to the utility of unilateral military

intervention in a civil conflict, third-party leaders may consider both dynamic
and fixed characteristics of the conflict and target state (Aydin, 2010). Dynamic
aspects of a conflict pertain to intensity, the presence of a humanitarian crisis, its
potential for spreading, the duration of the conflict and government-rebel parity.
‘Fixed’ characteristics of the state affecting the decision to intervene pertain
to the resource wealth of the state, its proximity to a third party and level of
economic development.
Expectations and findings regarding how these factors affect third-party
intervention are framed in terms of how they weigh in the expected utility
calculus of third-party interveners. More intense, prolonged conflicts may deter
military intervention given that they signify high costs with lower potential for
success (Regan, 2002; Aydin, 2010). Regarding intensity, Regan contends that
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the leadership within potential intervening states assesses the likelihood of

success of the intervention by observing the intensity of the conflict, indicated
by the number of casualties per year. ‘A very intense conflict will generally
take a substantial intervention to bring a halt to the fighting; the larger the
intervention, the greater the costs of adopting such a policy. But also the
more intense the conflict, the less likely it is that an intervention will be
successful y making the expected utility from intervening low’ (Regan, 2002,
pp. 49–50).
Regan finds empirical support for this claim, though it is interesting to note
that while his analysis indicates a negative relationship between intensity
and the likelihood of intervention, it indicates a positive direction between
the number of casualties overall and the likelihood of intervention. Rost and
Greig’s (2011) analysis also reveals a greater likelihood of peacekeeping
deployment to civil conflicts with more battle deaths, although this effect only
seems to hold for peacekeeping on the part of major powers. Also, using a
revised version of Regan’s dataset, Aydin (2010) finds that intense civil wars
are more likely to experience third-party state intervention. The United States
has intervened in conflicts displaying various levels of intensity, from Grenada
to Vietnam, thus intensity alone does not suffice to explain US military
intervention.
Following the end of the Cold War and the increase in the number of civil
conflicts taking place in the international system, some perceived it a
responsibility of the international community to intervene in civil conflicts in
order to prevent them from spreading, as well as to mitigate the loss of life and
infrastructural damage incurred (Jervis, 1991/1992; Dowty and Loescher, 1996;
Finnemore, 2003). More recent studies have supported the belief that conflict is
contagious, emphasizing one conflict’s role in the onset of other civil and
international conflicts (Leeds, 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Moore and
Shellman, 2007). Brands (1987) argues, for instance, that US intervention in
Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and Grenada is partially explained by the
perception that these conflicts could spread and instigate broader regional
instability.
One indicator in quantitative studies, which has been used to measure the
propensity for a conflict to spread, is the number of borders of the target state.
Using such a measure, one would expect that the number of borders a state has
would increase the likelihood of third-party intervention in order to prevent
contagion. Regan (2002) finds, however, that countries with a higher number
of borders are less likely to experience intervention in their civil conflicts, a
puzzling result.
Another indicator of the potential spread of conflict pertains to the refugee
flows generated by a conflict, the likes of which may lead to political instability
in neighboring countries. Dowty and Loescher (1996), for instance, argue that
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the potential for massive refugee flows makes it often too costly for major
powers or international organizations not to intervene. They imply that if the
international community were to intervene early in the civil conflicts of other
states, they would experience lower costs in the long run than the costs of
intervention in the short run. Pointing to the specific case of Rwanda, Dowty
and Loescher highlight the cost of inaction with the following statement: ‘The
international community spent 1.4 billion dollars in humanitarian relief in the
nine months immediately after the genocide in Rwanda and will continue
to pay for a long time in terms of protection of refugees and rehabilitation
costs’ (p. 44).
In their analysis of US military intervention in civil conflicts, Mullenbach
and Matthews (2008) find support for the claim that third parties are more
likely to intervene in conflicts with high refugee flows. Similarly, Rost and
Greig’s analysis (2011) indicates that refugee flows partially determine a state’s
deployment of peacekeepers to a civil conflict, although this is only the case for
non-major powers. However, it is worth noting that there is no statistical
support for the relationship between genocide and peacekeeping in Rost and
Greig’s study.
Another characteristic of the conflict, which may affect the likelihood of
third-party intervention, pertains to other attempts at intervention. Where
other attempts have failed, a third party may assume the conflict is less likely to
be resolved. Conflicts in which previous interventions were unsuccessful are
less likely to experience intervention, as potential interveners may learn from
others’ mistakes (Aydin, 2010). On the other hand, where parties to a conflict
appear to be open to mediation, potential interveners may perceive a greater
likelihood of a successful outcome. This expectation corresponds to Rost and
Greig’s (2011) finding that more mediation acceptances attract peacekeeping
deployments. Examination of US intervention in civil conflicts indicates that
the United States seems undeterred by the failed interventions of other states;
US intervention in Vietnam reflects downplaying of the French failure just a
decade earlier, and its intervention in Afghanistan reflects a similar disregard
of the Soviet failed intervention.
Yet another characteristic of a conflict that may affect the likelihood of inter-
vention is the parity of government-rebel capabilities, as a change in government
in the target state may have substantial effects for a potential intervener. As Gent
(2008) contends (and his findings support), the greater the parity between
government and rebel forces, the greater the value-added of an intervention.
Thus, when supporting the government, a third party is more likely to intervene
in the ‘toughest’ conflict cases, or those in which the government is faced with a
more capable threat. Likewise, when supporting rebel forces, intervention is
more likely where rebel forces have greater capabilities, as there is a greater
perceived chance of winning.
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Fixed characteristics also appear to strongly influence intervention decisions.

Aydin (2010) finds that greater oil wealth and economic development both
decrease the likelihood a civil conflict will experience intervention, while regime
type appears to have no effect. Likewise, proximity to an intervening state may
have a substantial influence on third-party intervention, as is indicated in
Yoon’s study (1997) examining US military intervention in civil conflicts, as
well as those of Findley and Teo (2006) and Kathman (2010). As Kathman
argues, neighboring states are more inclined to intervene in the civil conflicts of
proximate states given the greater posed threat to their own regional stability,
as well as greater economic relations and ethnic ties with neighboring states.
Examining US intervention behavior in particular, the United States’ rise in
power resulted in increased intervention in the affairs of other states in the
Western Hemisphere, and between 1898 and 1933, the United States intervened
in civil conflicts taking place in Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti and
the Dominican Republic (Boot, 2002; Gent, 2010). One of the primary factors
motivating these interventions pertained simply to the proximity of these states
to the United States. Driven by the desire to keep European powers out of the
Americas, as stipulated in the Monroe Doctrine, the United States hastened
Spanish withdrawal from the Caribbean starting with its intervention in the
Cuban war of independence against Spain. Intervention by the United States
into Latin American conflicts would only become more common during the
Cold War, where the containment of communism within the United States’
sphere of influence presented a vital security interest. This security concern was
justified by the discovery of Soviet missile bases in Cuba on 14 October 1962,
demonstrating that neighboring communist states allied with the Soviet Union
could pose a real and urgent threat.

Relations between the third party and target state

Following from the last section, dyadic relations may influence the intervention
decision, particularly those related to alliances and/or military ties between
potential interveners and the target state. Huth (1998), for instance, finds that
major powers are more likely to intervene militarily in an international crisis on
behalf of a state with which it has military ties. Although Huth observes inter-
national crises rather than civil conflicts, the notion that a state is more likely to
intervene in the affairs of another with which it has military ties could also be
applied to civil conflicts. If an intervener has a stake in maintaining the current
leadership of another state with which it has a military alliance, for instance, it
may be more inclined to intervene militarily should the other state be engaged in
civil conflict. However, in her study examining US intervention in civil conflicts
Yoon (1997) does not find empirical support for the relationship between greater

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military assistance to a state and a greater likelihood of US military inter-

vention in the civil conflict of that state. Similarly, Rost and Greig (2011) find
no statistically significant relationship between defense pacts with a target
country and state-conducted peacekeeping. However, Findley and Teo (2006)
find that an alliance with a target country increases a potential intervener’s
hazard of intervention on the side of the government by nearly three times.
Likewise, they find that rivalry with a target state increases a third party’s
hazard of intervention on the side of the opposition by 108 times.
Aside from military ties, a state may also have economic ties with another
that could theoretically make it more inclined to interfere in the target state’s
civil conflict. While Yoon (1997) does not find empirical support for the
suggestion that economic ties with a target state will increase the likelihood of
US military intervention, Fordham (2008) emphasizes the indirect effect of eco-
nomic ties. Specifically, he argues, although security interests weigh signi-
ficantly in the US decision to intervene in civil and international conflicts, what
constitutes a security interest is itself largely determined by economic interests.
Fordham’s study indicates the need for more research on understanding the
relationship between military intervention and economic factors. Finally, Rost
and Greig (2011) find that trade relations with a target state increase the
likelihood that a third party will send peacekeeping troops to a civil conflict,
although this finding only seems to hold for non-major power interveners.
Other dyadic ties include shared ethnicity or cultural similarities between the
intervener and populations within the target state (Mitchell, 1970; Pearson,
1974a, b; Horowitz, 1985; Blechman, 1995; Carment et al, 1997; Carment and
James, 2000; Saideman, 2001; Mullenbach and Matthews, 2008; Aydin, 2010;
Kathman, 2010; Rost and Greig, 2011). One may expect shared ethnicity to
pertain more to minor-power intervention than to that of major powers,
particularly among contiguous states (Kathman, 2010), but Mullenbach and
Matthews (2008) find ethnic linkages to be a significant determinant of US
intervention in civil conflicts. Furthermore, Rost and Greig’s (2011) study
indicates both major and non-major powers are more likely to deploy peace-
keepers to civil conflicts where they share religious or ethnic ties with the
second largest religious/ethnic group in the target state. This finding suggests
that third-party interveners, including the United States, may take on the role
of protector of minority ethnic groups in other states.
One might also consider that instances of US military intervention in the
nineteenth century primarily served the purpose of protecting US citizens,
merchants and diplomats living abroad, reflected in the pattern described by
Max Boot: ‘A revolution takes place; violence breaks out; American merchants
and diplomats feel threatened; US warships appear offshore; landing parties
patrol the city for several days; then they sail away’ (Boot, 2002, p. 60).
Although not extensive in scope, no fewer than 18 of these landings took place
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in Latin America in the nineteenth century, including Argentina, Peru,

Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Mexico, Chile, and Panama. However, American
attempts to protect merchants, diplomats, missionaries and civilians living
abroad were not contained to Latin America. The Boxer Rebellion in China
created a hostile environment seething with anti-Western sentiment. Allied
troops from the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany and
Japan all intervened in an attempt to rescue foreigners trapped at a legation in
Peking.
Although evacuation of US citizens and government employees from hostile
environments still continues, these are not considered interventions. Further-
more, in their analysis, Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) find the presence of a
salient ethnic linkage to be a significant determinant of US military inter-
vention, depicting the following countries as having a salient ethnic linkage
with the United States: Israel (Jewish-Americans); Cuba (Cuban-Americans);
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh/Azerbaijan (Armenian-Americans); Ireland
and Northern Ireland/United Kingdom (Irish-Americans); Italy (Italian-
Americans); Greece and Cyprus (Greek-Americans); Poland (Polish-Americans);
Mexico (Mexican-Americans); and South Africa, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Nigeria,
Liberia and Haiti (African-Americans).

World systemic and other dyadic relations

Having examined characteristics of the target state and the relationship

between the target state and the potential intervener, the survey turns to world
systemic factors explaining intervention and the use of force in general.
Balance-of-power theory has implications for intervention in that a state’s
leadership might intervene in the civil conflict of a rising power in order to
weaken it, or it might intervene in a civil conflict in which another third party is
currently involved in order to weaken the other third party (Balch-Lindsay and
Enterline, 2000). Furthermore, non-major powers may be more or less inclined
to intervene in the conflicts of other states in anticipation of a response by one
of the major powers.
Findley and Teo (2006) also account for the effects of dyadic relations
between potential interveners in the international system. Incorporating an
‘actor-centric’ approach to explaining intervention, they argue, ‘potential
interveners (the actors) undertake evaluations of the changing civil war context
(the phenomenon), which is constituted not only by ground conditions, but
more importantly, the sequences of decisions by other third parties as well. This
in turn informs if and when they will intervene’ (2006, p. 829). Their findings
support this argument: intervention by a rival on the side of the government
increases the hazard of intervention on the side of the opposition nearly 11 times.

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Likewise, intervention by a rival on the challenger’s side increases a third party’s

hazard rate of intervention on the side of the government by approximately four
times. Using game theory analysis, Gent (2007) also confirms with statistical
evidence that third parties are more likely to intervene when another actor with
more divergent interests has intervened. Where other potential interveners share
convergent interests, a free-rider problem may exist, potentially explaining the
lack of unilateral intervention in some humanitarian crises.
In the nineteenth century, the United States’ rise in power and corresponding
interventions reflected rivalry with Germany and the need for naval stations
for its expanding Navy. In an effort to gain control over Samoan harbors in the
late nineteenth century, for example, the United States, Great Britain and
Germany intervened in a civil conflict between the German-backed Mata’afa
Iosefo and Malietoa Tanu, supported by the United States and Great Britain.
Likewise, existing structural explanations of military intervention contain
arguments that the United States was likely to intervene in certain conflicts
during the Cold War due to its rivalry with the USSR and concern with the
balance of power. In particular, Rosenau identifies three systemic variables
that are likely to affect the propensity toward intervention: ‘the basic structure
of the international system, the degree to which ideological rivalry sustains the
structure, and the stability of the nations that comprise the system’ (1969,
pp. 167–168). Owen and John (2010) also contends that in an effort to promote
external security, states have attempted forcible regime change in another state
in order to gain an ally, establish favorable trade relations with the target state
and mitigate the influence of an ideological rival.
Other scholars have empirically tested the relationship between the bipolar
nature of the world system during the Cold War and theories of enduring
rivalries on intervention behavior (Lagon, 1992; Yoon, 1997; Regan, 2002;
Mullenbach and Matthews, 2008). The common assumption is that US inter-
vention in civil conflicts during the Cold War was driven largely by the security
concerns of containment and the motivation to be more powerful than its rival,
the USSR. In fact, Yoon (1997) finds that two factors constitute together the
most substantial determinant of intervention by the United States in a civil
conflict during the Cold War – if an ally to the USSR intervened and if one of
the parties to the conflict was communist.1
The Cold War may be treated not just as a structural variable (focusing on
the polarity of the international system), however, but also as a dyadic variable
(relations between two specific states). Similarly, as previously mentioned,
Fordham (2008) finds that dyadic relations are important for explaining
US military intervention; specifically, whether or not an ally is a participant in
a conflict, as well as whether or not a rival intervenes, substantially increases
the likelihood that the United States will intervene in either a civil or
international conflict. However, Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) find no
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statistically significant relationship between adversary intervention and US

military intervention in a civil conflict, though they do find a positive, stati-
stically significant relationship between adversary and US military intervention
when examining only the Cold War years.
Finally, Gent’s (2010) more recent work uses both game-theoretic and
historical analysis to illustrate that patterns of US military intervention in the
Caribbean correspond to a threat of external influence in the region. Gent’s
analysis indicates that the United States has even intervened pre-emptively, not
acting solely following intervention on the part of a competitor.

International norms

An understanding of intervention would be incomplete without considering

international norms that both constrain and promote intervention. As Martha
Finnemore argues, ‘Normative context is important because it shapes con-
ceptions of interest and gives purpose and meaning to action. It shapes the
rights and duties states believe they have toward one another, and it shapes the
goals they value, the means they believe are effective and legitimate to obtain
those goals, and the political costs and benefits attached to different choices’
(2003, p. 53). As such, third-party interventions, including those on the part of
the United States, reflect different normative contexts. Early forms of US
intervention reflect a normative context in which it was common to use force to
collect debts on behalf of European powers, primarily in order to keep these
powers out of the Western Hemisphere (Boot, 2002).
Following a shift toward the preference of arbitration over the use of military
force to settle contention between states, a shift that Finnemore attributes to the
increasing number of lawyers in politics, only humanitarian-based intervention
was viewed as legitimate. This is not to say that states did not intervene for other
reasons, but their leaders did make efforts to justify interventions through
rhetoric emphasizing of humanitarian interests. Likewise, they also attempted to
win UN approval of their actions, as ‘Humanitarian military intervention now
must be multilateral to be legitimate; without multilateralism, claims of humani-
tarian motivation and justification are suspect’ (Finnemore, 2003, p. 73). This is
why, Finnemore argues, the United States, Britain and France sought UN
authority for their protection of Kurds in Iraq.
Finally, the preservation of international order also forms a context that
molds state interests and, thus, when, where and how states are most likely to
intervene. What constitutes order has changed over time, and US intervention,
as well as that of other states, reflects these changes. Interventions by the
United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, for example, reflect
concerns for containing communism and capitalism, respectively. Following

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the end of the Cold War, order is better understood as maintaining regional
stability, state strength vis-à-vis terrorist and/or extremist networks, and
mitigation of humanitarian crises. More recent interventions on the part of the
United States reflect this shift in the perception of order, with most recent
examples including Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Internal Determinants of Intervention

The discussion thus far has focused largely on international, external factors
for explaining intervention. Yet, within the field of IR, greater attention has
been granted to highlighting the two-level game of foreign policy (Putnam,
1988; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003). Because intervention is a means for
achieving foreign policy goals, one must consider domestic politics in the third-
party state when explaining intervention.

Political structure of intervening state

Several scholars have provided theoretical justification for why democratic

states behave differently than non-democratic states in the use of force, with a
common thread linking the difference to state–society relations (Bueno de
Mesquita et al, 2003; Western, 2005; Koga, 2011).
In particular, democracies are expected to use force less frequently than
autocracies, particularly against other democracies. Emphasizing liberal
theory, Western (2005) traces this argument to Immanuel Kant and attributes
the lower proclivity of war for democracies to the public’s material and
normative concerns.
A similar argument describing the reluctance of democracies to use force is
exhibited in Bueno de Mesquita et al’s proposal that both democratic and
autocratic leaders are concerned with political survival and thus make decis-
ions that garner the approval of the ‘winning coalition’, or those necessary to
keep the leader in power. Given the structure for selecting leaders in demo-
cracies, the winning coalition is larger than that of autocracies, ultimately
leading to the generalization that foreign policy aims to attain and protect
public goods that serve the larger coalition, such as broad security- or value-
based interests. Autocratic leaders, in contrast, have smaller winning coalitions
and thus are more inclined than their democratic counterparts to pursue
private goods. In examining third-party intervention in civil conflicts, Koga’s
(2011) findings support the notion that democratic leaders are more cautious
about intervening, intervene in pursuit of public goods, are more likely to
intervene where there is a high probability of success, and are more likely to
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intervene where there are substantial ethnic ties between the intervening and
target state. Autocratic leaders, on the other hand, intervene primarily in
pursuit of lootable goods or other resources and are thus less concerned with
the conflict’s ultimate outcome.
The arguments and empirics discussed thus far portray democracies as
peaceful, yet democracies do use force regularly. Western (2005) contends that
Kant provides an explanation for this inconsistent behavior, one that again is
linked to the democratic public’s material and normative concerns. Kant
generally argues that autocracies are more aggressive and more easily resort to
the use of force, given that there are fewer institutional constraints to declaring
war. Autocracies are likely to use force in the pursuit of resources, which
presents a threat to citizens of democracies, who are concerned with protecting
their wealth. Likewise, their normative values lead to the perception of
autocratic, oppressive leaders as illegitimate. These material and normative
values justify the use of force for preventive purposes and for the sake of
spreading democracy.
The protection and promotion of democracy recurs in US foreign policy
rhetoric. Some have argued that the prevalence of democratic peace in the
modern era, and the theoretical justification of this phenomenon in the epistemic
community, has made the promotion of democracy a higher priority for US
foreign policy (Meernik, 1996; Florini and Simmons, 1998; Enterline and Greig,
2005). According to Meernik, state leaders may use pre-emptive force or
intervene in civil conflict in order to promote democracy, with leaders basing this
decision on the assumption that democracies do not go to war with one another,
while autocracies tend to be more aggressive. That is, concerns for self-interest as
well as regional or global peace motivate these actions. Regarding the former,
the pre-emptive use of force for the purpose of promoting democracy in a
particular state may prevent future attack from the said state, and may also lead
to the establishment of a favorable regime, which may be open not just poli-
tically, but also economically. From a collective perspective, if democratic peace
theory is accurate (that is, democracies do not go to war with one another), and
assuming this is simply because they are democracies, then a world (or region)
with more democracies should be more peaceful.
Civil conflicts present an opportunity for US leaders to assist in establishing a
democratic regime in a state that was autocratic before the outbreak of
hostilities, or an opportunity for the United States to preserve a democratic
regime in a state undergoing conflict. However, the assumption that the United
States intervenes in some civil conflicts to promote democracy is problematic.
First, it defies numerous historical cases in which the United States intervened,
either militarily or through endorsement, in order to overthrow a democratically
elected leader, particularly during the Cold War. In such instances, preventing a
target state’s leadership from forming an alliance with the Soviet Union
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appeared to outweigh the benefits of promoting democracy. Saunders’ (2011)

theoretical framework distinguishing internally from externally focused pre-
sidents is useful for understanding this inconsistency. Internally focused pre-
sidents are more inclined to intervene to support and promote democracy than
are externally focused presidents who pursue more limited policy objectives.
Another problem pertaining to US promotion of democracy through the use
of force relates to its effectiveness. It is assumed by those promoting democracy
abroad that democratic transition inherently leads to democratic consolida-
tion. This assumption is most likely based on the success stories of Japan
and Germany following US occupation and installation of democracy. However,
the results of Meernik’s (1996) study reveal that ‘in the majority of cases,
regardless of the manner in which democratic change is measured, the majority
of US military interventions do not appear to lead to increased levels of
democracy’ (p. 400). Similarly, Enterline and Greig’s (2005) assessment of the
prospects for democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan are far from certain, given
findings demonstrating variance in the survival of regimes in which democracy
was imposed (Pickering and Kisangani, 2005; Pickering and Peceny, 2006).
Despite the possibility that the promotion of democracy may be rhetorical and
have little potential for success, it has still been the most frequently cited
justification by political leaders for United States’ use of force abroad.

Domestic conditions of the intervening state

A very basic understanding regarding intervention is that a state can only

intervene in the civil conflict of another if it has the capabilities to do so. That is,
though a third party might be willing to intervene, it might lack the capabilities
and, thus, the opportunity (Most and Starr, 1989). This serves as an obvious
explanation for why the United States leads other states in the number of
interventions in the post-World War II era; correspondingly, Rost and Greig
(2011) find that major powers are 89 per cent more likely to deploy peacekeepers
to a civil conflict. However, it should be noted that 60 per cent of post-World War
II interventions in civil conflicts through 1999 were carried out by minor powers
(Regan, 2002). Despite having substantial capabilities, it is possible for a state
to be stretched too thin, and one may assume that if a state is already involved
in one conflict, it is less likely to intervene in yet another. Huth (1998) backs
this expectation with empirical support, finding that third parties are less likely
to intervene in others’ international crises when the potential intervening state
is already involved in either an international or civil conflict. In examining
US intervention over time relative to that of other states, one can observe
an increase in the frequency and extent of intervention as US capabilities have
expanded.

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Aside from the basic idea that capabilities matter, many scholars have linked
military intervention, or the use of force in general, to the socio-economic
conditions of intervening states. The main tenet of diversionary-war theory in
particular is that leaders are more likely to use force when the nation is faced
with dire economic problems or the leaders themselves are faced with personal
scandals, hoping that mobilizing forces will divert the public’s attention from
domestic problems. Expecting a rally-‘round-the-flag’ effect, leaders anticipate
that external military ventures will increase public support for the adminis-
tration and buy time for resolving economic problems or covering up scandals.
Although Huth (1998) finds that the greater the prospect for electoral victory,
the less likely a state is to intervene in the international crises of other states,
overall empirical support for diversionary-war theory has been inconsistent
(Ostrom and Job, 1986; Lian and Oneal, 1993; Leeds and Davis, 1997; Meernik,
2001; DeRouen and Peake, 2002; Clark, 2003; Fordham, 2004). Gent (2009)
provides an explanation for this inconsistency by utilizing a strategic probit
model; his findings indicate that the relationship between diversionary incentives
and war depends on the actor involved in the crisis. That is, diversionary
incentives play a greater role in the attacking state’s decision calculus, and
appear to matter for defending states only when faced by an economic crisis. The
invasion of Grenada presents a potential case of diversionary war, as some
argued that President Reagan ordered the invasion to divert attention from the
failed intervention in Lebanon (Meernik, 2004, p. 174).
Other explanations of the use of force address the audience costs of a
particular action (Fearon, 1997). Should a leader promise to protect national
interests in a heightened security environment, he may incur the costs of
inaction by not following through, including failing to act pre-emptively.
Similarly, one might argue that leaders who promise to protect human rights
and prevent genocide may incur audience costs should they not intervene in
humanitarian crises. This may explain why, following the end of the Cold War,
there has been an increase in the frequency of humanitarian interventions
(Dowty and Loescher, 1996; Regan, 2002; Weiss, 2001; Talentino, 2005;
Mullenbach and Matthews, 2008). Dowty and Loescher (1996) claim that in
addition to the avoidance of the potential for refugee flows and the spread of
conflict, changing international norms also explain third-party intervention in
humanitarian crises.2 The heightened concern with humanitarian issues abroad
is often linked to the growing public awareness of international affairs on the
part of citizens in the intervening state. It is argued that citizens, bombarded by
media images of human suffering, pressure political leaders to intervene, and
political leaders act or suffer the political consequences (Fearon, 1997).
In fact, Regan (2002) finds empirical support for the relationship between
greater media attention covering a country undergoing civil conflict and a
greater likelihood of intervention. Western (2005) also emphasizes the presence
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of latent public support and media influence in explaining US military

intervention (and non-intervention).

Domestic political competition

Another explanation for intervention relates to domestic politics within the

intervening state. Western (2005) contends that intervention and non-
intervention on the part of the United States can be traced to the ability of
different political groups to advocate either for or against intervention. These
elite groups vary in their willingness to use force, the motives for which they
consider force justified, and in their support of multilateralism. Whichever
group best manages information flow, made easier by access to the presidency
and other organizational assets, is able to make a stronger case to the public for
or against intervention. Media access to the conflict may inhibit the ability of a
group to manage information, whereas in conflicts where there is little media
access, information must be obtained through government channels, providing
some degree of control for those in power. Latent public support is a key factor,
as political survival weighs heavily in the decision calculus of politicians; if there
is little latent public support for intervention, determined by the credibility of
proposed threats and anticipation of victory, intervention is unlikely. Corres-
ponding to Western’s argument, Owen contends, ‘By suppressing an enemy
ideology abroad, it can remove a source of moral and perhaps material support
for enemy ideologues at home. It can make domestic ideological foes look
disloyal or unpatriotic if they oppose this use of force. It can halt or reverse any
impression elites may have that the enemy ideology has transnational mom-
entum’ (2010, p. 4).
Political competition as an explanation for behavior stems not only from
ideological differences among elites but from the drive to be recognized and
valued as an agency or public servant. Some theories of decision-making, for
example, point to the competition among bureaucratic agencies and among
presidential advisers for influence (Allison, 1971; Farkas, 1996).
Although no large-N study examining intervention in civil conflicts appears
to incorporate bureaucratic competition as a factor (as such factors are more
often examined in qualitative studies explaining intervention), internal com-
petition has important implications for our understanding of the decision to
intervene in civil conflicts: the decision to intervene might in fact be a result of
this competition, with the chosen policy explained by whose argument was most
persuasive. Western’s (2005) comprehensive analysis of five cases illustrates that
US intervention and non-intervention are determined by an elite group’s ability
to dominate information flows, given latent public support. For example, by
highlighting that Eisenhower drafted three plans for intervention in Indochina,
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 Aubone

Western attributes the ultimate reluctance of Eisenhower to intervene not to

prudence but to the strength of political opposition.
Such behavior implies that strategic behavior in the domestic realm trumps
such behavior in the international realm. For instance, some argue that in the
early years of the Cold War, US leaders of the Democratic Party were
burdened with proving they were not ‘soft on communism’. Thus, they may
have been more inclined to use military force to contain communism than
Republicans (Record, 2002). However, Regan (2002) finds no empirical
support for the relationship between a change in administration and the
likelihood of intervention. He does, on the other hand, find that a divided
government decreases the likelihood of intervention. However, Mullenbach
and Matthews (2008) find no statistically significant relationship between
unified government and the likelihood of intervention when examining US
military intervention.
These perspectives, which emphasize domestic politics, processes, structures
and personalities, highlight the complexity of decision-making, leading one
to believe that simplistic explanations assuming rational behavior, as well as
those focusing on higher levels of analysis, overlook the importance of
domestic influences.

Individual and collective beliefs

Individual and collective beliefs regarding the appropriate use of force form
predispositions to intervene or not, with the ultimate decision to intervene and
strategy used constrained by various other factors previously discussed.
Although belief systems are most commonly associated with psychological
approaches, they are also incorporated in rational-choice approaches through
the concept of learning.
Scholars utilizing a rational approach often treat the state as unitary actor
and treat beliefs as malleable perspectives about the world, beliefs that can be
updated through adaptation (Tetlock, 1991). Adaptation occurs when leaders
assess the success or failure of a given policy and adjust policy accordingly.
Simply, where a policy fails to achieve a satisfactory goal, this policy is less
likely to be used to achieve a similar goal in the future. As this relates to
military intervention in civil conflicts, one would expect that if the outcome
achieved following military intervention is satisfactory, military intervention
is more likely to be used again in the future to achieve similar goals; where it
is unsatisfactory, it is less likely to be used. According to some, adaptation is
more appropriate for explaining change in the level of tactics, and possibly
operations and strategies, but less so for explaining change in end-goals and
collectively held beliefs (Tetlock, 1991).

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Others utilizing a rational approach focus less on the impact of a single

outcome on later policy than on what a number of outcomes may have
on policy. The underlying assumption in these studies examining the effect of
past interventions on later decisions to intervene indicate that state leaders are
unlikely to be greatly influenced by single interventions and that even the
effects of particularly vivid interventions wane over time (Nevin, 1996;
Pickering, 2001, 2002; Record, 2002). These scholars argue that it takes a
number of failures for a state and its leaders to reconsider the use of a
particular policy, such as military intervention, in future situations. Both Nevin
(1996) and Pickering (2001, 2002) find, for example, that states are less likely to
intervene after encountering a series of intervention failures rather than after
only one failure.3
Another strand of learning literature examines learning at a richer level,
attempting to assess how leaders, their advisers and groups learn from past events
and apply what they have learned to later decisions. Much of this literature utilizes
a cognitive-psychological approach to learning, arguing that individual leaders,
not states, make decisions, and that such individuals are bounded rationally, with
experiences and pre-existing beliefs serving as both guides for and constraints on
foreign policy decision-making (Jervis, 1976; Tetlock, 1991). Such an approach
has been applied by those connecting the use of historical analogies by political
leaders to the likelihood and form of intervention (May, 1973; Vasquez,
1976, 1993; Khong, 1991, 1992; Tetlock, 1991; Vertzberger, 1998; Record,
2002). Specifically, vivid memories of past instances of intervention and non-
intervention engrave lessons in the memories of leaders and filter one’s perception
of current conflicts. Khong (1991, 1992), for instance, provides a detailed account
of how Lyndon Johnson was both guided and blinded by his perception of the
Vietnam conflict as parallel to that which occurred between North and South
Korea. Furthermore, Johnson formed part of the generation that believed
acquiescing to aggression could lead to disastrous consequences, as Munich had
demonstrated. Correspondingly, Vasquez (1993) states:

It seems that in all societies [lessons from the past] are derived from the
most traumatic experiences that society as a whole goes through. For
most, this is the last major war. Subsequent events, particularly more
limited wars, will affect those lessons, but for the generation that lived
through the traumatic experience, only another major war will lead to an
opportunity to rethink lessons. (207)

Although the effects of such events may wane over time and across generations,
Vasquez contends that the socialization that takes place within government
institutions makes some lessons endure changes in leadership and generational
turnover (1976; 1993, p. 208).
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 Aubone

Aside from historical analogies, other scholars utilize a cognitive-psycholo-

gical approach related to more abstract beliefs about the world. These scholars
contend that the stickiness of pre-existing beliefs4 stems from the cognitive
schemata developed by individuals, used as guides for making decisions on a
number of issues (Jervis, 1976; Tetlock, 1991). Because these schemata simplify
the decision-making process, individuals are unlikely to change them frequen-
tly and are more inclined to make reality conform to these schemata than the
other way around (Tetlock, 1991). Such pre-existing beliefs will affect one’s
propensity to use military means to accomplish end-goals, providing yet
another reason why one particular event may not alter the underlying beliefs of
individual leaders, as well as the collectively held beliefs of a group, concerning
the appropriateness of military intervention in certain situations. This is
particularly likely where outcomes cannot be defined simply as successes or
failures, that is, where the outcomes are ambiguous, limiting the ability to draw
clear lessons (Vasquez, 1993, p. 210; Meseguer, 2006).
In explaining US intervention, Western (2005) refers to collective belief
systems, while Saunders (2011) emphasizes the beliefs of individual US pre-
sidents in explaining where interventions take place and the strategy used.
Recall that Western distinguishes the collective belief systems by the willingness
to use force in general, the conditions under which it is justified, and whether
multilateralism is preferred to unilateralism. This implies that advocates of
these belief systems have predispositions toward the use of force and its
appropriate implementation, and they will utilize existing information channels
to win support for their perspective.
Emphasizing individual rather than collective belief systems, Saunders argues
that leaders perceive threats differently, with some presidents perceiving threats as
driven by the internal structure of another state, while others perceive threats
externally, as incidents of foreign policy actions on the part of other states. These
underlying beliefs determine both who presents a threat, thus enhancing the
likelihood of intervention in some cases compared to others, and the extent of an
intervention. Presidents who perceive threats as linked to the internal political
structure of target states tend to prefer more transformative strategies – seeking to
transform the internal political structure – while externally focused presidents
emphasize non-transformative strategies, focusing on limited responses to unfavor-
able policies rather than altering political structures. Using this typology, Saunders
illustrates the effect of internally versus externally focused belief systems by
comparing the intervention behavior of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy
and Johnson. When examining the Vietnam conflict in particular, Saunders’
analysis reveals that the more internally focused Kennedy considered supporting a
coup to remove oppressive South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem, a US ally,
while externally focused Johnson worked within the alliance, with no intention of
removing Diem from power, despite his perceived illegitimacy.
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Saunders demonstrates that leaders’ beliefs reflect pre-presidential prefer-

ences and are unlikely to change, even over the course of the presidency,
indicating that a fundamental shift in beliefs at the individual level is unlikely.
However, this does not preclude collective learning, which may in fact form
pre-presidential individual beliefs, as past experiences and interpretation of
events form the belief structure of later leaders (Vasquez, 1976, 1993; Tetlock,
1991; Khong, 1992,; Vertzberger, 1998).
The emphasis on the rigidity of beliefs accords with Vasquez’s depiction
of ‘hard-line’ versus ‘accommodationist’ beliefs and their persistence follow-
ing ambiguous outcomes (1993, pp. 201–204). Similarly, Tetlock contends,
‘Countries get [few] observations and y [often receive] ambiguous feedback
that does not tell them why things are going wrong. This allows vested interests
greater latitude to reinterpret the data in ways consistent with their biases’
(1991, p. 12). Finally, Lavoy argues, ‘causal uncertainty limits the ability of
state leaders to draw clear and accurate lessons from the past y . Even when
officials obtain enough evidence to calculate the outcome of possible courses of
action, they must make difficult trade-offs when a decision involves multiple,
competing values’ (1991, pp. 737–738).
Such cognitive-psychological interpretations of beliefs and learning as those
described above imply that the decision of whether or not to intervene militarily
may be influenced by learning from the past on the part of the potential interven-
ing state, but that this learning is not systematic or rational in the scientific use of
the term. Thus, scholars who advocate such an approach to explaining military
intervention often focus on the details of specific instances when leaders were
faced with the decision to intervene and chose to do so (or not) based on their
perceptions of past intervention outcomes (Khong, 1991, 1992; Vertzberger,
1998; Record, 2002). As of yet, there have been few large-N analyses of the
effects of psychological interpretations of past intervention outcomes on later
decisions to intervene (Nevin, 1996; Pickering, 2001, 2002). However, some
scholars have provided examples of how the use of historical analogies speci-
fically might be applied to foreign policymaking and the decision to intervene by
examining the relationship between the cognitive complexity and policy expertise
of leaders and their use of historical analogies (Dyson and Preston, 2006).
One final approach to learning applicable to the use of military intervention –
causal-analytic learning – focuses on learning that takes place within epistemic
communities and within institutions, and how learning by these communities
ultimately manifests in discussions within the political leadership. This is a more
efficient depiction of learning, as it represents the attempt by leaders to better
understand the appropriate use of particular tactics in achieving end-goals
(Lavoy, 1991; Tetlock, 1991). Applying this to military intervention, some
equate the Weinberger-Powell doctrine following Vietnam as such a type of
learning (Record, 2002). Rather than arguing that military intervention should
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 Aubone

not be used following the failure in Vietnam, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine

specified conditions for which future military intervention would be most
appropriate and successful (Powell, 1992). That is, leaders considered that one
policy may not be appropriate in all situations and that conflicts should be
examined carefully to determine whether intervention is indeed likely to achieve
its intended goal. Such an interpretation would lead one to believe that state
intervention behavior can also be affected by causal-analytic learning prompted
by past intervention outcomes, though the effects of this type of learning would
be difficult to assess in a large-N study.
Whether using rational, cognitive-psychological or causal-analytic appro-
aches, those examining the relationship between past outcomes and the
likelihood of intervention provide some insight into when and where the
United States is likely to intervene militarily. Yet, how states learn and how
this learning is applied to policymaking is still subject to debate. During the
Cold War, for example, one would expect that the United States would be less
likely to intervene in civil conflicts following Vietnam. What Yoon (1997) finds
is the exact opposite: US intervention in civil conflicts during the Cold War is
more likely in the post-Vietnam era. Although she ultimately traces this to
Reagan’s administration, this in and of itself is revealing. It illustrates the claim
that pre-existing beliefs are sticky and that learning at the state level may be
rare, particularly where the lessons are ambiguous (Jervis, 1976; Vasquez, 1976,
1993; Record, 2002; Saunders, 2011). It may be that US leaders learned not
necessarily to stop intervening in general, but to use less overt forms of
intervention. If this is what occurred, it supports the notion that learning is
more frequent at a tactical level than at a strategic level.

Conclusion

From this literary survey, scholars may be inspired to develop theoretical

arguments, employ new methods, analyze more recent data or employ different
approaches in pursuit of an explanation for various contradictions found in
the literature. However, even before further creation and innovation, the
comprehensive summary of works presented here suggests the need for an even
more inclusive monograph, one that could be expanded a number of ways.
First, one could incorporate works theorizing and analyzing the intervention
behavior of other major powers. On the basis of these works, the empirics
pertaining to the behavior of these states could be compared, and their
concordance with general IR and specific foreign policy theories assessed.
Second, one could incorporate newer forms of military intervention associated
with participation in multilateral, post-conflict stability operations. Third,
critical approaches largely unrepresented in this survey should be included in a
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 Explaining US unilateral military intervention in civil conflicts

more extensive monograph if it is to be considered ‘comprehensive’. Although

not as innovative as developing the latest theoretical model or utilizing the
most complex method, comprehensive surveys of existing scholarly work prove
useful references to the both scholars and students alike.
Furthermore, as described above, numerous scholars have made valuable
contributions to our understanding of third-party intervention in civil
conflicts in general, and US intervention in particular. Together these works,
made up of a variety of approaches, levels of analysis and methods, illustrate
the complex interplay of internal and external factors affecting the decision to
intervene. They also demonstrate the need for various means of examining
intervention behavior, as no one perspective or method suffices. Thus, this
survey of the literature also highlights progress in the field (and perhaps lack
thereof) toward explaining intervention. One might even say that it has an
epistemic effect of encouraging intervention scholars to refrain from becoming
too attached to one approach, lest we, too, act as cognitive misers.

About the Author

Amber Aubone is Assistant Professor and Director of Undergraduate

International Relations at St Mary’s University, Texas who received her
PhD from the University of North Texas. She teaches courses on the causes of
war, national security, political research methods and US foreign policy.

Notes

1 Note that whether the USSR intervened is not statistically significant in Yoon’s study (1997).
2 However, Dowty and Loescher admit that the presence of a humanitarian crisis as an
explanatory variable is more powerful when explaining multilateral interventions than unilateral
interventions.
3 Interestingly, Pickering (2001, 2002) finds a parabolic relationship between the number of
consecutive failures and the number of interventions in international conflicts. That is, after
reaching a threshold of failures, the direction begins to move in the opposite direction and third
parties then participate in more interventions in international conflicts.
4 Note that there is also a body of literature, which emphasizes the ‘stickiness’ of standard
operating procedures within institutions (George, 1969; Holsti, 1977).

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