Week 8 Evidence PDF

Week 8 Evidence
Parental and Filial Privilege

1. Two privileges are embodied in Section 25 of Rule 130, namely: (a) the
parental privilege rule; and (b) the filial privilege rule.
Under the parental privilege rule, a parent cannot be compelled to testify

against his child or direct descendants. Under the filial privilege rule, a child
may not be compelled to
testify against his parents or direct ascendants
2. A person however, may testify against his parents or children voluntarily but
if he refuses to do so, the rule protects him from any compulsion. Said rule
applies to both criminal and civil cases since the rule makes no distinction
(Section 25, Rule 130, Rules of Court). The rule states:
.
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 
B — Disqualifications of W itnesses
"Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No person may be

compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants,
children or other direct descendants."
307
3. In criminal cases, the Family Code of the Philippines, lays down as a general
rule, a policy substantially the same as Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Under the Family Code, no descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal
case, to testify against his parents and grandparents. The Code however,
specifically provides for an exception. The descendant may be compelled to
give his testimony in the following instances:
(a) when such testimony is indispensable in a crime committed against said

descendant, or
(b) in a crime committed by one parent against the other (Art. 215, Family
Code of the Philippines).
The relevant article provides
"Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to

testify against his parents and grandparents, except when such
testimony is indispensable in a crime, against the descendant or
by one parent against the other."
Bar 1998
C is the child of the spouses H and W. H sued his wife for judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. In the trial, the
following testified over the objection of W : C, H and D, a doctor of medicine
who used to treat W . Rule on W 's objection which are the
following: 
(a) xx
(b) C cannot testify against her because of the doctrine on parental privilege.
(c) xx
x
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EVIDENCE 
(The Bar Lectures Series)
Suggested answer:
(a) xx
(b) W cannot invoke the privilege which belongs to the child. C may testify if
he wants to although he may not be compelled to do so (Section 25, Rule 130,
Rules of Court).
Other Privileged Communications Not Found in the Rules of Court

1. Section 24 of Rule 130 deals with the types of disqualifications by reason
of privileged communication, to wit: (a) communication between husband and
wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) communication
between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent;
and (e) public officers and public interest.
2. There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule
130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to
disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to
disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in
tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits (Air Philippines v. Pennswell, Inc.,
G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007).
Under Art. 233 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, information and
statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as confidential.
Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9194 amending Section 9 of R.A. No. 9160 (Anti-
Money Laundering A ct of 2001), institutions covered by the law and its
officers and employees who communicate a suspicious transaction to the Anti-
Money Laundering Council, are barred from disclos- ing the fact of such report
to other persons.
B. Judicial Admissions
1. Under Sec. 4 ofRule 129, judicial admissions are described and defined as
follows:
"Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written,

made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made."
To be a judicial admission under Sec. 4 of Rule 129, certain elements must be
considered:
First, the same must be made by a party to the case. Ad- missions of a non-
party do not fall within the definition of Sec. 4 ofRule 129.
Second, the admission to be judicial, must be made in the course of the

proceedings in the same case. Thus, an admission made in another judicial
proceeding will not be deemed a judicial admission in another case where the
admission was not made. Instead, it will be considered an extrajudicial ad-
mission for purposes of the other proceeding where such admission is offered.
It has been held that " . . . T o be considered as a judicial admission, the same
must be made in the same case in which it is offered (Programme Incorporated
v. Province ofBataan, G.R. No. 144635, June 26, 2006; Camitan v. Fidelity
Insur- ance Corporation, G.R. No. 163684, April 16, 2008).
Third, Sec. 4 of Rule 129 does not require a particular form for an admission.
Such form is immaterial because the provision recognizes either a verbal or a
written admission.
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EVIDENCE 
2. A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the
trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other
stages of the judicial proceeding (Sps. Binarao v. Plus Builders, Inc., G.R. No.
154430, June 16,2006)
3. The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial

admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions require no further proof and
may be controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were made
through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made. Thus, the
admissions ofparties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the
pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them (Cuenco v. Talisay
Tourist Sports Complex, G.R. No. 174154, October
17,2008)
Admission in Drafted Documents

An admission made in a document drafted for purposes of filing as a pleading
but never filed, is not a judicial admission. If signed by the party, it is deemed
an extrajudicial admission. If signed by the attorney, it is not even an
admission by the party. The authority of the attorney to make statements for the
client extend only to statements made in open court or in pleadings filed with
the court (Jackson v. Schine Lexington Corp, 305 Ky. 823, 205 S.W. 2d 1013).
Admissions Made in Pleadings and Motions

1. Admissions made in the pleadings of a party are deemed judicial admissions
(Ching v. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 16). The admission includes admissions
made in the complaint (Delfin v. Billones, G.R. No. 146550, March 17, 2006).
2. The admissions made by the respondent in its complaint are judicial
admissions which cannot be contradicted unless there is a showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made (Martinez
v. Court of Appeals, 438 SCRA 130; Luzon Development Bank v. Conquilla,
470 SCRA 533).
JUDICIAL NOTICE AND ADMISSIONS B. Judicial Admissions
101
3. The admissions made in a motion are judicial admissions which are
binding on the party who made them. Such party is precluded from denying the
same unless there is proof
of palpable mistake (Herrera-Felix SCRA 87).
v. Court of Appeals 436
4. An admission in the answer to the complaint takes on the character of a

judicial admission contemplated in Sec- tion 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot
thereafter contradict it. The exception is found only in those rare instances
when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and because of strong
reasons to support its stand, may relieve a party from the consequences of his
admission. It cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown that the admission,
the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are
conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position
contrary to, or inconsistent with, his pleadings (Heirs of Pedro Clemena v.
Heirs of Irene B. Bien, G.R. No. 155508, September 11, 2006).
As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of

that party and are binding upon him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible
rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to
prove, but it is not evidence. And in spite of the presence of judicial admissions
in a party's pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other
evidence presented (Spouses Santos
v. Spouses Lumbao, G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007).
5. An admission made in a pleading may be an actual admission as when a

party categorically admits a material allegation made by the adverse party. An
admission may likewise be inferred from the failure to specifically deny the
material allegations in the other party's pleadings. The rules of civil procedure
for example, require a defendant to specifical-
ly deny the material averments of the other party. "Material averments in the
complaint, other than those as to the amount ofunliquidated damages, shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied..." (Sec. 11, Rule 8, Rules
ofCourt).
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EVIDENCE 
Averments in Pleadings which are Not Deemed Admissions

There are averments in the pleadings which are not deemed admitted even if
the adverse party fails to make a specific denial of the same like immaterial
allegations (Sec. 11,
Rule 8, Rules ofCourt), conclusions, non-ultimate facts in the pleading (Sec. 1,

Rule 8, Rules ofCourt) as well as the amount of unliquidated damages (Sec. 11,
Rule 8, Rules of Court).
Implied Admissions of Allegations of Usury

Under Sec. 11 of Rule 8, if the complaint makes an allegation of usury to
recover usurious interest, the defendant must not only specifically deny the
same but must likewise do so under oath. Failure to make the proper denial
under oath would involve an implied admission of the allegation of usury.
Implied Admissions of Actionable Documents

1. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, the
genuineness and due execution of the same instrument shall be deemed
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and
sets forth what he claims to be the facts (Sec. 8, Rule 8, Rules ofCourt). The
failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of the said documents
amounts to a judicial admission pursuant to Sec- tion 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court (Philippine National Bank v. Refrigeration Industries, Inc., G.R. No.
156178, January 20, 2006).
2. The failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable
document does not preclude a party from arguing against the document by
evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations,
estoppel, and want of consideration (Acabal v. Acabal, 454 SCRA 555; Phil-
ippine National Bank v. Refrigeration Industries, Inc., G.R.
ure to deny the same under oath.

No. 156178, January 20,2006).
He is however, precluded from arguing that the document is a forgery because

the genuineness ofthe document has been impliedly admitted by his fail-
3. In a case, the plaintiff 

two promissory notes allegedly executed by the defendant. In its answer, the
main defense raised was that the obligation had already been extinguished
because of a Dacion en Pago agreement which ceded and conveyed to the
plaintiff certain properties owned by the defendant. The defense also relied
upon a Confirmation Statement signed by the plaintiff acknowledging that the
defendant had no more loans in favor of the plaintiff. A fter the plaintiff had
rested its case, defendant filed a demurrer to evidence pointing out that the
failure of the plaintiff to file a reply to the answer which raised the Da- cion
and Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of the genuineness and
due execution of said documents.
The plaintiff opposed the demurrer alleging among others, that the documents
relied upon by the defendant should not have been taken into account by the
trial court in resolving the demurrer not only because the documents have not
yet been offered in evidence but that since no Reply was filed and served, then
all the new matters alleged in the answer of the defendant were already deemed
controverted or denied. Under Sec. 10 of Rule 6, if a party does not file a reply,
all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted. The trial
court nevertheless, ruled in favor of the defendant
and dismissed the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial
court erred in considering the documents relied upon in the answer of the
defendant because the genuineness and due execution of such documents were
not at issue.
One of the main issues raised in the Supreme Court was whether or not the
failure of the plaintiff to file a reply and deny the Dacion and the confirmation
statement under oath constituted a judicial admission of the genuineness and
due execution of said documents. The Court ruled in the affir-
mative and in favor of the defendant. It further held that in resolving a

demurrer, the court should not only consider the plaintiffs evidence. The court
also should include judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations
made during the pre-trial, admissions, and presumptions (Casent Realty
103
filed an action to collect upon

104
EVIDENCE 
Development Corporation v. PhilBanking No. 150731, September 14, 2007).
Admissions in the Pre-trial of Civil Cases

Corporation, G.R.
1. One of the purposes of a pre-trial in a civil case is for the court to consider
the possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts (Sec. 2[d], Rule
18, Rules of Court). A pre-trial is mandatory (Sec. 2, Rule 18, Rules of Court)
and because it is mandatory, it is an important part of a civil proceeding.
Admissions therefore in the pre-trial, as well as those made during the
depositions, interrogatories or requests for admission, are all deemed judicial
admissions because they
are made in the course of the proceedings of the case.
For instance, petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note

at the pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of signatures.
The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the
parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission (SCC Chemicals Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, 353 SCRA 70).
2. Admissions in pre-trial briefs arejudicial admissions and well-settled is the

rule that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof (Republic v. Sarabia, 468
SCRA 142; Marmont 

Ramos v. Spouses Dizon, G.R. No. 137247, August 7, 2006).
The parties are bound by the representations and statements in their respective
pre-trial briefs (Republic v. Sarabia, 468 SCRA 142), submission of which
being mandatory in a pre-trial of a civil case. Submission of the pre-trial briefs
are parts ofthe judicial proceedings. Under Sec. 6(b) ofRule 18, a pre-trial brief
shall contain among others, a summary of admitted facts and proposed
stipulation of facts.
The admissions of the parties during the pre-trial as embodied in the pre-trial
order of the court are binding and conclusive on them unless there is a clear
showing that the admission was entered through palpable mistake. Such ad-
Resorts Hotel v. Guiang, 168 SCRA 373;
105
mission cannot be contradicted by the parties. The petitioners are thus estopped
from claiming otherwise (Heirs ofConahap v. Heirs of Regatta, 458 SCRA
741).
Admissions in the Pre-trial of Criminal Cases

1. Although an admission made during the pre-trial is deemed to have been
made in the course of a judicial proceeding and is necessarily a judicial
admission, an admission made by the accused in the pre-trial of a criminal case
is not necessarily admissible against him. To be admissible, the conditions set
forth by Sec. 2 of Rule 118 must be complied with: The pertinent rule provides:
"SECTION 2. Pre-trial agreement— 

or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference
shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and
counsel, otherwise they cannot be used against the accused."
2. Does the above rule-requiring an admission made or entered into during the
trial conference to be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his
counsel before the same maybe used in evidence against the accused, equally
apply to stipulation of facts made during the trial?
In resolving the question in the negative, the Supreme Court ruled:
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel

during trial in open court is automatically reduced in writing and contained in
the official transcript of proceedings had in court. The conformity of the
accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of
the fact . . . that an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a
lawsuit . . . has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings,
by oral or written stipulation . . . which,
unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive. In fact judicial admissions are

frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose
of the trial,
All agreements
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EVIDENCE 
the agent of his client. When such admissions are made, they bind the client . . .
(People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 108028, July 30, 1996; Silot v. De la Rosa,
G.R. No.
159240, February 4, 2008).
Bar 2008
Bembol was charged with rape. Bembol's father, Ra- mil, approached Artemon,
the victim's father, during the preliminary investigation and offered PI million
to Arte- mon to settle the case. Artemon refused the offer.
(a) xx
(b) During the pre-trial, Bembol personally offered to settle the case for PI
million to the private prosecutor, who immediately put the offer on record in
the presence of the trial judge. Is Bembol's offer a judicial admission of his
guilt?
Suggested answers:
(a) xx
(b) Bembol's offer is a judicial admission. A judicial admission is one that is
verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case (Sec. 4, Rule 129, Rules of Court). Bembol is a party to the case. The offer
was made in the course of a judicial proceeding.
An admission is judicial if made not only in the pleadings, or by verbal or
written manifestations in the trial but also in a pre-trial of the case
(Programme, Inc. v. Province of Bataan, G.R. No. 144635, June 26, 2006).
Under Sec. 27 of Rule 130, the judicial admission could be considered as an
implied admission of guilt.
Implied Admissions in the Modes of Discovery

1. Admissions obtained through depositions, written interrogatories or requests
for admission are also considered judicial admissions (Programme
Incorporated v. Province of
Bataan, G.R. No. 144635, June 26, 2006).

107
2. Under Sec. 1 ofRule 26 ofthe Rules ofCourt, a party, at any time after the
issues have been joined, may file and serve upon any other party a written
request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and
relevant document described in and exhibited with the request. The request for
admission may also be of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact
set forth in the request.
The party to whom the request is directed must file and serve upon the party
requesting the admission, a sworn statement either denying specifically the
matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. The sworn
statement must be filed and served within the period designated in the request
which shall not be not less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within
such further time as the court may allow on motion. Ifthe sworn statement
required is not filed and served, each of the matters of which an admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted (Sec. 2, Rule 26, Rules of Court).
3. Under Sec. 3 ofRule 26, any admission made pursuant to the request for
admission is for the purpose ofthe pending action only. The admission shall
not be considered as one for any other purpose nor may the same be used
against him in any other proceeding.
Bar 1984
Through his lawyer plaintiff A sent to defendant B, through B's counsel, a

request for admission of certain facts stated therein material to the case pending
between them. B did not reply at all.
On appeal from an adverse decision, A assigned as error the trial court's

disregard of the facts, the admission of which was the subject of his
unanswered request. A contended that as his request for admission forms part
of the records of the case, although not formally submitted in evidence, and the
records do not show that the defen-
dant ever replied thereto, there was a clear judicial ad-

108
EVIDENCE 
mission by the defendant of all the material facts stated in the request, and that
had the trial court considered such admissions, it would have been contrary to
the find- ings of fact.
Is the plaintiff correct?
Suggested answer:
The plaintiff is correct. Sec. 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court requires the
other party to file and serve a sworn statement either denying specifically the
matter of which an admission or requested or setting forth in detail the reasons
why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. Under the same
section, failure to do so will result into an implied admission of each of the
mat-
ters of which an admission is requested. Since the defendant failed to comply
with the requirements of the Rules, he is deemed to have made an implied
admission of the matters subject of the request for admission.
Admissions in Amended Pleadings

When a pleading is amended, the amended pleading su- persedes the pleading
that it amends and the admissions jn the superseded pleading may be received
in evidence against the pleader (Sec. 8, Rule 10, Rules of Court).
Nature of Admissions in Superseded Pleadings

It has been held that the admissions in a superseded pleading are to be
considered as extrajudicial admissions which must be proven (Torres v. Court
ofAppeals, 131 SCRA 24). In Ching v. Court of Appeals (331 SCRA 16), the
Supreme Court held that pleadings that have been amended disappear from the
record, lose their status as pleadings and cease to be
judicial admissions, and to be utilized as extrajudicial admissions, they must,

in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence.
Admissions in Dismissed Pleadings

109
Admissions made in pleadings that have been dismissed
are merely extrajudicial admissions (Servicewide Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257

SCRA 643).
Hypothetical Admissions in a Motion to Dismiss
Specialists,
A motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations of the

complaint (Magno v. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 285). It partakes of a
demurrer which hypothetically admits the truth of the factual allegations
made in the complaint. However, the admission extends only to such matters
offact that have been sufficiently pleaded and not to mere epithets charging
fraud, allegations of legal conclusions or er- roneous statements of law,
inferences from facts not stated, matters of evidence or irrelevant matters (De
Dios v. Bristol Laboratories, 55 SCRA 349). Only material allegations, not
conclusions in a complaint, are deemed admitted (Dalandan v. Julio, 10 SCRA
400).
Admissions by Counsel
1. Admissions by a counsel are generally conclusive upon a client (De Garcia
v. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 129). Even the negligence of counsel binds the
client (Sarraga v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, 393 SCRA 566).
This rule is not however, without exception. In cases where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of
due process of law, or when its application will result in out- right deprivation
of the client's liberty or property, or when the interests of justice so require,
relief is accorded the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer's gross or
palpable mistake or negligence (Salazar v. Court ofAppeals, 376 SCRA 459;
Silot v. De la Rosa, G.R. No. 159240, February 4, 2008).
2. Admissions made for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some facts are
in the nature of judicial admissions. Such admissions are frequently those of
counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the
11
0
EVIDENCE 
agent of his client. W hen such admissions are made for the purpose of
dispensing with proof of some fact, they bind the client, whether made during,
or even after, the trial. A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and
defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing
and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The
conformity of the accused in the form ofhis signature affixed thereto is
unnecessary in view of the fact that an attorney who is employed to manage a
party's conduct ofa lawsuit hasprima facie authority to make relevant
admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, which
unless allowed to be withdrawn, are conclusive (Silot Rosa, G.R. No. 159240,
February 4, 2008).
Consequences of Judicial Admissions

v. De la
1. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact, as
judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed
with. A judicial admission removes the admitted fact from the field of
controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive to such
party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be
ignored, whether objection is interposed or not. The allegations, statements or
admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A
party cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what
was pleaded (Alfelor v. Halasan, G.R.
No. 165987, March 31, 2006).

2. No evidence is needed to prove a judicial admission and it cannot be
contradicted unless it is shown to have been made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made (Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran, 421 SCRA 423) but
despite the presence ofjudicial admissions in a party's pleading, the trial court
is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented (Santos v. Lumbao,
G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007 citing Atillo v. CA, 266 SCRA 596;
Philippine Health- Care Providers, Inc. v. Estrada I Cara Health Services, G.R.
No. 171052, January 28, 2008) because said admissions may not
11
necessarily prevail over documentary evidence (Asian Pacific
Planners v. City ofUrdaneta, 2008).
G.R. No. 162525, September 23
3. In Canada v. All Commodities Marketing Corpora- tion (G.R. No. 146141,

October 17, 2008), the Court ruled:
"We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the
course of the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations, or stipulations,
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission; they become
conclusive on him, and all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by
the ad-
verse party or not.

4. Specifically, under Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the following are
the effects of judicial admissions:
(a) They do not require proof; and
(b) They cannot be contradicted because they are conclusive upon the party
making it.
"
The above rule however, admits oftwo exceptions, name- :
(1) upon showing that the admission was made through palpable mistake, or
(2) when it is shown that no such admission was made.
5. The mistake that would relieve a party from the effects of his admission is
not any mistake. It must be one that is "palpable," a mistake that is "clear to the
mind or plain to see" (New Oxford American Dictionary 2001 Ed. p. 1232). It
is a mistake that is "readily perceived by the senses or the
mind" (Oxford English Reference, Second Edition, Revised, 2002, p. 1049).
6. A party may also argue that he made no "such admission." This argument
may be invoked when the statement of a party is taken out of context or that his
statement was
ly
112
EVIDENCE 
made not in the sense it is made to appear by the other party
(Philippine Health-Care Providers, Inc. (Maxicare) v. Estra- da ICara Health

Services, supra). Here, the party upon whom the admission is imputed does not
deny making a statement. What he denies is the meaning attached to his
statement, a meaning made to appear by the adverse party as an admission.
The Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court ex- plained the second
exception in this wise:
". . . if a party invokes an "admission" by an adverse party, but cites the

admission "out of context," then the one making the "admission" may show
that he made no "such" admission, or that his admission was taken out of
context.
". . .that the party can also show that he made no "such admission", i.e., not in
the sense that the admission is made to appear.
That is the reason for the modifier "such" because if the rule simply states that
the admission may be contradicted by showing that "no admission was
made," the rule would not really be providing for a contradiction of the
admission but just a denial." (Atillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119053,
January 23, 1997; Sicam v. Jorge, G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007)
C. Admissions, Confessions and the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
"SECTION 26. Admissions of a party. — The act, declaration or

omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against the offeror.
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise is not admissible. — ln_cjyil cases,
an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is
not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi- offenses (criminal
negligence) or those allowed by law
JUDICIAL NOTICE AND ADMISSIONS 
to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may

be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence against
the accused who made the plea or offer.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other
expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence
as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury.
Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. — Thejrights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
except as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act or
declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of
his authority and during the existence of the partnership or
agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a
joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the
party.
Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence,
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Sec. 31. Admission by privies^ — Where one de- rives title to
property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the
latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former.
Sec. 32. Admission tyjjlence. — An act or declaration made in the
presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who
does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as
naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when
proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence
against him.
114
EVIDENCE 
Sec. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused

acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily Included therein, may be given in evidence against
him.
Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did or did
not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he
did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it
may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity,
plan system, scheme, habit, custom, usage, and the like.
Sec. 35. Unaccepted offer. — An offer in writing to pay a particular
sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or specific
personal property is, if rejected without valid cause, equivalent to
the actual production and tender of the money, instrument or
property."
Concept of Admissions and Confessions

1. An admission is an act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact (Sec. 26, Rule 130, Rules of Court). It is a voluntary acknowledgment
made by a party ofthe existence of the truth of certain facts which are
inconsistent with his claims in an action (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 44).
In a confession, there is an acknowledgement of guilt; in an admission, there is

merely a statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgement of guilt
or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged
(Ladiana v. People, 393 SCRA 419).
2. A confession is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of

the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein (Sec. 33,
Rule 130, Rules of Court; Tracy's Handbook, 62 Ed., 242). It is a statement by
the accused that he engaged in conduct which constitutes a crime (29A Am
Jur 2d, Evidence, §708). Hence, when a person de- clares in his Counter-
Affidavit that he performed an act like shooting the victim but denies that he
did so with criminal intent because the shooting was done in self-defense, the
declaration is merely an admission and not a confession (Ladiana v. People,
393 SCRA 419).

3. An admission in a general sense includes confessions, the former being a
broader term because accordingly, a confession is also an "admission . . . by the
accused of the fact charged against him or of some fact essential to the
charge" (4 Wigmore, Sec. 1050). A confession is a specific type of admission
which refers only to an acknowledgment ofguilt. As used, the term admission
refers to acknowledgment of facts which although may be incriminating, falls
short of an admission of guilt.
4. An admission may be implied like an admission by silence. A confession

cannot be implied. It should be a direct and positive acknowledgment of guilt
because Sec. 33 of Rule 130 describes a confession as a "declaration" unlike an
admission which is described not only as a "declaration" but also as an "act"
or an "omission" (Sec. 26, Rule 130, Rules ofCourt).
5. Applied to a criminal case, a confession is an acknowledgment in express

terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an
admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, offacts pertinent to
the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his
guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is
but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is
insufficient to authorize a
conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt (San
Vicente v. People, 392 SCRA 610 citing People v. Licayan, 378 SCRA 281). A
confession is an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime
charged (People v. Buntag, 427 SCRA 180). It is a declaration made at any time
by a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or induce- ment, stating or
acknowledging that he had committed or par- ticipated in the commission of a
crime (People v. Satorre, 408
SCRA 642).
/"Admissions Distinguished from Declarations Against Interest

An admission is oftentimes confused with a declaration against interest. They
are however distinct from each other:
116
EVIDENCE 
- (a) To be admitted as a declaration against interest, the declarant must be dead

or unable to testify (Sec. 38, Rule 130, Rules of Court); an admission is
admissible even if the person making the admission is alive and is in court;
(b) A declaration against interest is made before the controversy arises; an

admission is made at any time, even during the trial;
(c) A declaration against interest is made against one's pecuniary or moral

interest; an admission is admissible as long as it is inconsistent with his present
claim or defense and need not be against one's pecuniary or moral interest;
(d) A declaration against interest is admissible even against third persons; an

admission is admissible only against the party making the admission;
(e) A declaration against interest is an exception to the hearsay rule; an

admission is not, and is admissible not as an exception to any rule.
Effects of Admissions
1. An admission by a party may be given in evidence against him (Sec. 26, Rule
132, Rules ofCourt). His admission is not admissible in his favor, because it
would be self-serv- ing evidence. Declarations of a party favorable to himself
are not admissible as proof of the facts asserted (Cole v. Ralph, 252 US 286, 64
L Ed 567, 40 SC Ct 312, USTC 312a, 3 AFTR 3051; State v. Warren, 242 Iowa
1176, 47 NW2d 221; Jones v.
Dugan, 124 Md. 346, 350, 92 A. 775).
2. Under Rule 130, Section 26, the act, declaration or omission of a party as to
a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. This rule is based on the
notion that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is
true (Republic v. Bautista, G.R. No. 169801, September 11, 2007).

-/Classification of Admissions and Confessions

1. An admission may be express or implied. An express admission is a positive
statement or act. An implied admission is one which may be inferred from the
declarations or acts of a person. A confession cannot be implied. It must be a
positive acknowledgment ofguilt and cannot be inferred. Sec. 33 of Rule 130
refers to a confession as a "declaration" which connotes an affirmative
statement from the person making the confession.
2. An admission may be judicial or extrajudicial. An admission is judicial

when made in the course of a judicial proceeding. An admission is extrajudicial
when made out of court or even in a proceeding other than the one under con-
sideration (Perry v. Simpson, Conn. 313). A confession may be also judicial or
extrajudicial for the same reasons (29A Am
Jur2d,§711)
3. An admission may also be adoptive. This admission occurs when a person

manifests his assent to the statements ofanother person. The admission may be
received in evidence if it can be shown that a party adopted the statements as
his
.
o w n (Fed. Evid.R. 801[d][2][B]; Ed., 44).
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
(a) A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another's
statement. Where it ap- pears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented
to or adopted the statements ofanother, evidence ofthose
statements is admissible against him. This is the essence of the principle of

adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a statement or action by another

person when it is reasonable to treat the party's reaction as an admission of
something stated or implied by the other person. By adoptive admis-
sion, a third person's statement becomes the admission of the party embracing
or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party:
(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;

118
EVIDENCE 
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the as- sertion of another;
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but
ignores further points which he or she has heard the other make; or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made
by another (Republic v. Kenrick Development ration, G.R. No. 149576, August

8, 2006).
Corpo-
Examples of adoptive admissions are the alleged admissions made by

President Estrada when his options had dwin- dled when, according to the
Angara Diary, the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President
and Commander- in-Chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to allegedly
ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider
the option of "dignified exit or resignation." President Estrada did not object to
the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country.
According to the Court, his silence on this and other related suggestions can be
taken as adoptive admissions by him (Estrada v. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108).
Besides, he had several opportunities according to the Court, to object to the

admissibility of the diary, but did not do so seasonably. It is too late in the day
to object to raise his objections in an omnibus motion. The Angara Diary said
the Court also contains direct statements of the President which could be
categorized as admissions of a party like: (a) his pro- posal for a snap election
in which he would not participate; (b) his statement that he would leave by
Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday; and (c)
statements like:
Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa
red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. I just want
to clear my name, then I will go." (Ibid.). 

taken by the Court as admissions indicative ofhis resignation
These words were
from office
.
To rebut the argument that the diary ofAngara is not the diary of the former
president and thus, could not be admissible against him, the Court declared:
"...The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive

admission is a party's reaction to a statement or action by another person when
it is reasonable to treat the party's reaction as an admission of something
stated or implied by the other person (Estrada
v. Desierto, Ibid.)
Effect of Extrajudicial Confession of Guilt; Corpus Delicti

1. While ajudicial confession may sustain a conviction, an extrajudicial
confession is not sufficient for conviction. The rule requires that the confession
be corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133, Rules of
Court).
2. Corpus delicti is the 'body of the crime' or the offense (People v. Strook, 347
III. 460, 170 N.E. 821). Strictly speaking, it means the actual commission of
the crime and someone criminally responsible therefor (People v. Stoll, 84 Cal
App. 99, 257 Pac. 583 cited by Underhill, Criminal Evidence, §34). It is the
substance ofthe crime; the fact that a crime has actu-
ally been committed (People v. Gutierrez, 258 SCRA 70; People v. De Leon,
G.R. No. 180762, March 4, 2009).
Corpus delicti has two elements: (1) proof of the occur- rence of a certain event
—for example, that a man has died or a building has been burned; and (2) some
person's criminal responsibility for the act (People v. Boco, 309 SCRA 42;
People v. Base, 329 SCRA 158).
3. Corpus delicti, and all the elements thereof, may be proved by circumstantial
evidence but such proof must be con- vincing and compatible with the nature
ofthe case (Underhill, Criminal Evidence, §37).
4. While an extrajudicial confession will not be sufficient for conviction

unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133, Rules of
Court), a judicial confession will support conviction without proof of corpus
delicti inde-
120
EVIDENCE 
pendent of the judicial confession (State v. Dena, 28 N. Mexico, 479, 214, Pac.
583).
5. In the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is not enough to

prove that the transaction took place and that the buyer and seller were
identified. The corpus delicti must be offered in evidence. Here the corpus
delicti is the illegal drug. To prove the corpus delicti, a special procedure
must be followed. The police officer should comply with the proper procedure
in the custody of the seized drugs. After seizure and confiscation, the drugs
must be physically inventoried
and photographed in the presence of the accused, and or his representative,

who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. The failure to comply with such a requirement raises a doubt whether
what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court were the
ones actually recovered from the accused. Failure of the officer to comply with
this procedure negates the presump- tion that official duties have been
performed (People v. Naza- reno, G.R. No. 174771, September 11, 2007;
People v. Santos, G.R. No. 175593, October 17, 2007; People v. Cabacaba,
G.R. No. 171310, July 9, 2008; People v. Magat, G.R. No. 179939, September
29, 2008; People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 181545, October 8, 2008).
6. In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was
lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking (Gulmatico v.
People, G.R. No. 146296, October 15, 2007).
7. The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the

accused's lack oflicense or permit to possess or to carry the firearm, as
possession itselfis not prohibited by law (Sayco v. People, G.R. No. 159703,
March 3, 2008).
8. The accused in one case argues that inasmuch as there is no conclusive

evidence of the death of the deceased because his body was never found,
neither was the place where he is supposed to have been buried indicated,
hence, corpus delicti was not established.
The Court ruled that it is not necessary to recover the body or to show where it
can be found in a case of murder or homicide. There are cases like death at sea,
where the finding or the recovery of the body is impossible. It is enough that
the death and the criminal agency causing it be proven. Quoting W harton on
Criminal Evidence, V ol. 2, Sec. 871, pp. 1505-1506, the Supreme Court also
held that by the weight ofauthority, it is a rule now established that the element
of death in the cor-
pus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence. To establish the

corpus delicti by circumstantial evidence, facts are admissible to show the
impossibility of rescue, as at sea, to show the existence and extent of wounds,
and deceased's condition ofhealth; and to show that the wound was sufficient to
cause death and that the party was reported dead. Death is sufficiently shown
by the testimony of a witness that he saw the flash and heard the report, and
that the deceased fell to the ground, declaring that he was shot and that the
accused
shot him (People v. Sasota, 91 Phil. Ill; Jr., 306 SCRA 612).
People v. Agsunod,
Drawing from the early case of Sasota the Court ruled that in a case of murder
or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body of the victim or show
where it can be found. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency
causing death is proven. In the Sasota case, the prosecution witnesses saw the
four (4) armed accused forcibly took the victim from his house to a lake, beat
him up all the way to the boat. While
sailing, the accused continued ill-treating the victim until the latter died. The
body ofthe victim was never found (Also cited in People v. Roluna, G.R. No.
101797, March 24, 1994).
In People v. Ansang (93 Phil. 44), the appellant while rid- ing on a vinta ignited
home-made bombs and threw them at the victims in another boat. W hile the
parts of the boat were later found, the passengers were never seen again.
Holding that the corpus delicti was shown by the facts and that the
victims died, the Court convicted the appellant of multiple murder.
9. The rule on extrajudicial confession in the Rules of Court must be

considered together with applicable constitu-
122
EVIDENCE 
tional and substantive laws which must be complied with for the confession to
be admissible. For instance, Sec. 2(d) of Re- public Act 7438 (Act Defining
Certain Rights ofPersons, Ar- rested, Detained or Under Custodial
Investigation), provides:
"Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained, or under

custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in
the presence of any of the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extraju-
dicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding."
Bar 2006
What are the requirements in order that an admission of guilt of an accused
during a custodial investigation be admitted in evidence?
Suggested answer:
(1) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained, or under

custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in
the presence of any of the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any
proceeding (Sec. 2[d], RA. 

(2) The confession must be corroborated by evi-
dence of corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court).
Bar 2008
The mutilated cadaver of a woman was discovered near a creek. Due to

witnesses attesting that he was the last person seen with the woman when she
was still alive,
No. 7438).
Carlito was arrested within five (5) hours after the discovery of the cadaver
and brought to the police station. The crime laboratory determined that the
woman had been raped.
While in police custody, Carlito broke down in the presence of an assisting

counsel and orally confessed to the investigator that he had raped and killed the
woman, detailing the acts he had performed up to his dumping of the body near
the creek. He was genuinely remorseful. During the trial, the state presented the
investigator to testify on the oral confession of Carlito. Is the oral confession
admissible as evidence of guilt?
Suggested answer:
The oral confession is not admissible as evidence of guilt. The confession is in

the nature of an extrajudicial confession before an investigator while under
custodial investigation. Hence, the statutory provisions under R.A. No. 7438
(Sec. 2[d]) will have to be complied with. Under said law, any extrajudicial
confession made by a person arrested, detained, or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of
his counsel. An oral confession does not comply with the mandatory provisions
of the law. Under R.A. No. 7438, the confession is inadmissible in evidence in
any proceed-
ing (Sec. 2[d], R.A. No. 7438).
10. The above rights refer to an extrajudicial confession person arrested,

detained or is under custodial investigation because a confession made by the
accused before he is placed under custodial investigation need not comply with
the
above.
If he talks to a person in a private meeting with for instance, a municipal

mayor spontaneously, fully and voluntarily confessing the crime to his
commission of a crime, the constitutional requirements in a custodial
investigation do not apply. When the accused talked to the mayor as a confi-
dant and not as a law enforcement officer, the uncounselled confession did not
violate his constitutional rights. Constitu-
of a
124
EVIDENCE 
tional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous

statements, not elicited through questioning by authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the
crime. Hence, such confession is admissible in evidence against him, even
when he did so without the assistance of counsel (People v.
Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199).
11. Custodial investigation has been described as one which involves any
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken
into custody, and the police car-
ries out a process of interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating
statements, that the rule begins to operate (Aquino v. Paiste, G.R. No. 147782,
June 25, 2008).
Note that Republic Act No. 7438 (Sec. 2[f]) has extended the meaning of
'custodial investigation' to include the practice ofissuing an invitation to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed.
12. Voluntary admissions made by the accused such as his possession of a

firearm used in the commission of a crime and the subsequent surrender of the
firearm at a time when he was already under custodial investigation are not
admissible against the accused. At the time the admissions were made, the
police had already begun to focus on the accused and were carrying out the
process of interrogations that was lending itself to eliciting incriminating
statements and evidence. The investigation thus was no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime as the accused was already being held as a
suspect for the alleged killing of the victims. Con- sequently, the rights of a
person under custodial investigation, including the right to counsel, have
already attached in his favor. A ny waiver of these rights should be in writing
and undertaken with the assistance of counsel. Admissions under custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel are barred as evidence. The
records do not disclose any indication

that the accused had waived his right to counsel, hence, his admissions are
inadmissible against him. A suspect's confession, whether verbal or non-
verbal, when taken without the assistance ofcounsel without a valid waiver
ofsuch assistance regardless of the absence of such coercion, or the fact that it
had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even ifsuch confession
were gospel truth (People v. Ador, 432 SCRA 1).
Admission by Silence
1. Admission by silence as expressed in Sec. 32 ofRule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides:
"SECTION 32. Admission by silence. — An act or declaration made

in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party
who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as
naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper
and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against
him."
2. Admission by silence has been traditionally received even in common law as
admissible evidence. The usual pattern for its admissibility involves a
statement by a person in the presence of a party to the action, criminal or civil.
The statement contains assertions against the party, which, if untrue would be
sufficient cause for the party to deny. His failure to speak against the statement
is admissible as an admission.
Suppose upon seeing a policeman, a bystander, in the presence of other people,

points to a man and accuses him as the killer ofanother man found dead the
night before. The man pointed at does not respond. He does not deny the
accusation. His failure to respond may be given in evidence against him. The
idea of the rule on admission by silence is that if an ac-
cusation is made, and a reasonable person would have denied the same if it
were false, the failure to deny the accusation by the person accused may be
construed as an implied admission of the truth of the accusation and may be
given in evidence
against him.
126
EVIDENCE 
3. Not every silence is an implied admission. For instance, the silence of a
person under investigation for the commission of an offense should not be
construed as an admission by silence because of constitutional reasons (Sec.
2[b], R.A. 7438).
4. For silence to be deemed an admission, it is necessary: (a) that he heard

and understood the statement; (b) that he was at liberty to make a denial; (c)
that the statement was about a matter affecting his rights or in which he was
interested and which naturally calls for a response; (d) that the
facts were within his knowledge; and (e) that the fact admitted from his
silence is material to the issue (People v. Paragsa, 84 SCRA 105).
Thus, in one case, despite the many opportunities given to the respondent, he
refused to comment and present his side. The gravity of the charges and the
weight of the evidence against him would have prompted an innocent man to
come out and clear his name. However, he opted to maintain his silence. His
silence can easily be interpreted as an admission of guilt (Ortiz v. De Guzman,
A.M. No. P-03-1708, February 16, 2005; Office of the Court Administrator v.
Bernardino, 450
SCRA 88).
Res Inter Alios Acta; Branches

1. The expression if fully expressed reads: res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet which literally means that "things done between strangers ought not to
injure those who are not parties to them" (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.,
1178; Dynamic Signmaker Outdoor Advertising Services, Inc. v. Potongan, 461
SCRA 328).
2. The res inter alios acta rule has two branches, namely:
(a) The rule that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court).

(b) The rule that evidence of previous conduct or similar acts at one time is not
admissible to prove that one did or did not do the same act at another time (Sec.
34, Rule 132, Rules of Court).
3. The provisions on res inter alios acta read:
y "SECTION 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a third

party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of
another, except as hereinafter provided."
"Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did or did
not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he
did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it
may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity,
plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like."
4. The first branch is a very simple and logical rule which holds that whatever
one says or does or omits to do should only affect him but should not affect or
prejudice others. In other words, both common reason and fairness demand
that a man's actions and declarations should affect him alone and should not
affect others. Thus, if X makes a statement before the media admitting his
participation in a previous murder, his statement is admissible against him
under Sec.
26 of Rule 130. The rest of his statement pointing to Y and Z as co-participants

in the murder are not admissible against Y and Z under the first branch of the
res inter alios acta rule in Sec. 28 of Rule 130. Under this rule, the statement of
X should not affect or prejudice Y and Z.
5. The above rule has reference only to extrajudicial declarations. Hence,

statements made in open court by a witness implicating persons aside from
his own judicial admissions, are admissible as declarations from one who has
personal knowledge of the facts testified to.
128
EVIDENCE 
Bar 2003
X and Y were charged of murder. Upon application of the prosecution, Y was

discharged from the information to be utilized as a state witness. The
prosecutor presented Y as witness but forgot to state the purpose of his testimo-
ny much less offer it in evidence. Y testified that he and X conspired to kill the
victim but it was X who actually shot the victim. The testimony of Y was the
only material evidence establishing the guilt of X. Y was thoroughly cross-
examined by the defense counsel. After the prosecution rested its case, the
defense filed a motion for demurrer to evidence based on the following
grounds:
(a) xx 
(b) Ys testimony is not admissible against X pur-
suant to the rule on res inter alios acta. Rule on the motion for demurrer.
Suggested answer:
(a) xx
(b) The demurrer should be denied. The reliance on the rule on res inter alios
acta is misplaced. The rule applies only to extrajudicial declarations and not to
statements made in open court. Y testified as a witness and was in fact, cross-
examined.
Exceptions to the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule (first branch) 

1. The first branch of the rule admits of certain excep-
tions, to wit: 
(a) admission by a co-partner or agent (Sec. 29,
Rule 130); 
(b) admission by a co-conspirator (Sec. 30, Rule
130); and 
(c) admission by privies (Sec. 31, Rule 130).
2. The basis for admitting the above admissions is that the person making the
statement is under the same circum- stances as the person against whom it is
offered. Such cir-
C. Admissions, Confessions and the .Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
cumstances give him substantially the same interest and the same motive to
make a statement about certain matters (4 Wigmore, Sec. 1080a, 140).
Admissions by a Co-partner or Agent

1. An agent performs some service in representation or on behalf of his
principal (Art. 1868, Civil Code of the Philippines). The agent therefore, is in
legal contemplation, a mere extension of the personality of the principal and
unless the agent acts in his own name, the principal must comply with all the
obligations which the agent may have contracted within the scope of his
authority (Art. 1883; Art 1910, Civil
Code of the Philippines).
Hence, whatever is said by an agent to a third person, during the course of the
agency and within the scope of his actual or apparent authority, relative to the
business contemplated by the agency, is for legal purposes also the statement
ofthe principal and is therefore, admissible against said principal (29A Am Jur
29, Evidence, §815 citing
Hitchman 
260, 38 S Ct 65).
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 62 L Ed

2. The relationship among partners is on the same footing with the relationship
of an agent to his principal. Both the contracts of agency and partnership
involve fiduciary re- lationships. Under the law (Art. 1818, Civil Code ofthe
Phil- ippines), every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its
business and the act of the partner in carrying
out the usual course of business binds the partnership as a rule. Hence, under
the same principle governing an agency, the declarations of a partner may be
admissible against the other partners or the partnership.
3. However, not every declaration or act made or done by a partner or agent is

admissible against the other partners or the principal. For the admission of a
co-partner or agent to be admissible, the following requisites must concur:
(a) The declaration or act ofthe partner and agent must have been made or done
within the scope ofhis authority;
130
EVIDENCE 
(b) The declaration or act of the partner and agent must have been made or
done during the existence ofthe partnership or agency (while the person making
the declaration was still a partner or an agent); and
(c) The existence of the partnership or agency is proven by evidence other than
the declaration or act of the partner and agent (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of
Court).
4. Any declaration made before the partnership or agency existed, or those

made after, are not admissible against the other partners or the principal but
remains admissible against the partner or agent making the declaration. It is
also necessary for the application of the exception that the proof of the agency
or partnership be from a source independent of the declaration made by the
partner or agent.
Thus, if after the partnership is dissolved and liquidated, A A , a former partner

in A B C Partnership, admits before a police investigator that he and his
partners were engaged in smuggling highly dutiable imported cigarettes while
the partnership was operating a buy and sell business, the extrajudicial
declarations of A A are not admissible against BB and CC, his former partners.
His declarations are nevertheless, admissible against him.
5. The above rules also apply to the declarations or acts of a joint owner, joint
debtor, or other persons jointly interested with the party (Sec. 29, Rule 130,
Rules ofCourt).
Admissions by a Co-conspirator
1. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Art. 8, Revised
Penal Code). Once the conspiracy is proven, the act ofone is the act ofall. The
statement therefore of one, may be admitted against the other co-conspirators
as an exception to the rule of res inter alios acta.
2. Assume that two months after a successful bank robbery, A was arrested as a
direct participant in the crime.

During a television interview, he admitted his participation in the robbery. He

also implicated B and C as his other compan- ions in planning and executing
the robbery. Is his statement admissible? The statement is admissible as to him
(Sec. 26, Rule 130) but not as to B and C (Sec. 28, Rule 130).
To be admissible against B and C, the following must concur:
(a) The declaration or act be made or done during the existence of the
conspiracy;
(b) The declaration or act must relate to the conspiracy; and
(c) The conspiracy must be shown by evidence other than the declaration or
act (Sec. 30, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
Observe that the declaration of A was made long after the conspiracy was over.
It then was no longer made during the existence of the conspiracy. In fact, at
the time of the declaration, A was no longer a co-conspirator. Even assuming
that the conspiracy can be proven by independent evidence and even if his
statement was related to the conspiracy, the
declaration is not admissible as an exception to the rule ofres inter alios acta.
Incriminating declarations of co-conspirators made in the absence of or without

the knowledge of the others after the conspiracy has come to an end is
inadmissible (US v. Ner-
linger[CA2 
29A Am Jur, Evidence, § 838).
NY] 862 F2d 967, 27 Fed Rules Evidence Serv 271;
The arrest of the declarant is often found to terminate the declarant's

participation in the conspiracy so that the declarant's post arrest statements do
not qualify as admis-
sible co-conspirator statements (29AAm 

An extrajudicial confession made by an accused is admissible against him but
not admissible against his co-accused who
took no part in the confession (Sparfv. 

trajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and
Jur, Evidence, §840).

US, 156 US 51). An ex-
132
EVIDENCE 
is not admissible against his co-accused (People v. Raquel, 265 SCRA 248). As
against the latter, the confession is hearsay (People v. Camat, 256 SCRA 52).
Bar 1991
During custodial investigation at the W estern Police District, Mario Margal

was informed ofhis constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel. He decided to waive his right to counsel and
proceeded to make a statement admitting commission of a robbery. In the
same statement, he implicated
Antonio Carreon, his co-conspirator in the crime.
(a) xx
(b) Is it (the testimony of Mario Margal) admissible against Carreon as an

exception to the res inter alios acta rule?
Suggested answer:
It is not admissible against Carreon. To be admissible against Carreon, the

following requisites must concur:
(i) The declaration or act be made or done during the existence of the
conspiracy;
(ii) The declaration or act must relate to the conspiracy; and
(iii) The conspiracy must be shown by evidence other than the declaration or
act (Sec. 30, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
Assuming that the conspiracy may be shown by evidence other than the
extrajudicial statement of Margal, the same was made by him after the
conspiracy had already ceased.
3. The rule requiring the concurrence of the above elements does not apply
when the co-accused takes the witness stand and repeats his extrajudicial
confession as a witness. The declarations referred to under Sec. 30 of Rule 130
are
x
merely extrajudicial statements or declarations. When he tes- tifies as a

witness, his statements become judicial and are admissible not only against
him but also against his co-accused. This is because the statements by
witnesses in open court are admissible as testimonies of a person based on his
personal perceptions and knowledge pursuant to Sec. 36 of Rule 130, Rules of
Court.
Jurisprudence holds that the general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or
admission of one accused is admissible only against the said accused but is
inadmissible against the other accused. However, if the declarant/admitter
repeats in court his extrajudicial confession during trial and the other accused
is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, such confession or
admission is admissible against both accused. The erstwhile extrajudicial
confession or admission when repeated during the trial is transposed into
judicial admissions (People v. Buntag, 427 SCRA 180).
4. The Supreme Court also held in one case that a distinction must be made
between an extrajudicial and judicial confession. An extrajudicial confession
may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-
accused since the latter are not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine
him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declar-
ant's co-accused since the latter are afforded the opportunity to cross-examine
the former. Sec. 30 of Rule 130 applies only to extrajudicial admissions and not
to testimonies at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant (People v. Palijon, 343 SCRA 486). W hen the
extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is confirmed at the trial, it ceases to be
hearsay. It becomes instead a judicial admission, being a testimony of an
eyewitness admissible in evidence against those it implicates. Here, the
extrajudicial confession was affirmed by him in open court during the trial.
Thus, such confession already partook ofjudicial admission
(Abay, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 165896, September 19, 2008).
An extrajudicial confession by an accused implicating another, may not be

utilized unless repeated in open court,
134
EVIDENCE 
or when there is an opportunity for the co-accused to cross- examine the

confessant on his extrajudicial statements. It is considered hearsay as against
said co-accused under the res inter alios acta rule, which ordains that the rights
of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another
(People v. Janson, 400 SCRA 584).
5. Assuming that the statement relating to the conspiracy was made by a
conspirator during the existence of the conspiracy, for the statement to be
admitted, the extrajudicial statements of the co-conspirator must be proven by
evidence other than the admission (Sec. 30, Rule 130, Rules of Court;
US v. Arias-Villanueva 
2d, §847). If the only evidence of the conspiracy is the extrajudicial
declaration of the declarant, the statements are not admissible against the
others.
6. In a case, accused-appellant was indicted for par- ricide for allegedly killing
his father in conspiracy with two other persons who are brothers and also his
co-accused in a separate information for murder. The prosecution, presented as
its witness among others, the accused-appellant's wife. It also presented the
affidavits containing the extra-judicial confessions of the other co-accused
who pointed to the accused- appellant as involved in the crime. The extra-
judicial confessions were made after the crime was consummated. The two
brothers were, however, not presented by the prosecution on the witness stand.
In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits

executed by the two other accused. The Solicitor General, in advocating the
admissibility of the sworn statements of the brothers, cites Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[t]he act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration."
The Court held that the inapplicability of the provision relied upon was clearly
apparent. The confessions were made
[CA9 Or] 998 F2d 1491; 29A Am Jur

after the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation of the crime.
Hence, it cannot be said that the execution of the affidavits were acts or
declarations made during the conspira-
cy's existence (People v. Quidato,
Jr., 297 SCRA 1).
7. The res inter alios acta rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle
of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Y et
it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man
should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party
ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against him.
The rule on admissions made by a conspirator is an exception to the foregoing

rule but in order for such admission to be admissible against a co-accused,
Section 30, Rule 130 ofthe Rules of Court requires [among others], that there
must be independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession to prove
conspiracy. If apart from the extrajudicial confession of the confessant no other
evidence of the alleged participation ofthe accused in the conspiracy was
presented by the prosecu-
tion, the culpability of the accused could not be sufficiently established
(People v. Guittap, G.R. No. 144621, May 9, 2003).
Admission by Privies
1. "Privies" are persons who are partakers or have an interest in any action or
thing, or any relation to another (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1077).
Examples: (a) A les- sor and his lessee, a grantor and a grantee; an assignor and
an assignee are privies in an estate or a contract; (b) An executor
or an administrator and the estate of the deceased are privies in representation;

or (c) An heir and his ascendant are privies in blood or succession.
136
EVIDENCE 
2. Z inherits a house and lot from his father X. Assume that X, father of Z,
while the former was alive sold the property and openly told his
acquaintances, that the same lot where his house stood had already been sold to
Y . Is this declaration by X necessarily admissible against Z, the sole heir of Y?
It is not, because the statement was made after X held his title to the land. For
an admission of a predecessor-in-interest to
be admissible against the successor-in-interest, the following requisites must be

present:
(a) There must be an act, declaration or an omission by a predecessor-in-

interest;
(b) The act, declaration or omission of the predecessor must have occurred
while he was holding (not after) the title to the property;
(c) The act, declaration or omission must be in relation to the property (Sec.
31, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
3. Accordingly, when the former owner ofthe property made the declaration
after he ceased to be the owner of the property, the rule on admission by privies
does not apply and what applies is the general rule that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission ofanother (Gevero v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 189 SCRA 201).
Offer of Compromise in Civil Cases

In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and
is not an admission against the offeror
(Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of
Offer of Compromise in Criminal Cases

1. An offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules ofCourt). Example:
Although the marriage of the accused in a rape case extinguishes the penal
action (Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., 287 SCRA 245), an offer of marriage is,
generally, speaking, an admission of guilt (People v. Bulos, 359 SCRA 621).
Court).

2. There is no implied admission of guilt if the offer of compromise is in

relation to: (a) quasi-offenses (criminal negligence); or (b) in those cases
allowed by law to be compromised (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules ofCourt).
Bar 1989
Pedro was charged with homicide for having hacked Ramon to death. Before
the case could be tried, the heirs of Ramon sought out Pedro and discussed
with him the possibility of settlement of the case. Pedro agreed to a settlement.
When the heirs asked how much he was will- ing to pay, Pedro offered P30.000
which the heirs accepted. Is the agreement to settle, as well as the offer to pay
P30,000 by Pedro, admissible in evidence against him as an implied admission
of guilt?
Suggested answer:
The evidence is admissible. Under the Rules of Evi- dence, except those
involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer
of compromise in a criminal case may be received in evidence as an ad-
mission of guilt. Homicide is neither a quasi-offense nor one of those cases
allowed by law to be compromised (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
Bar 2008
Bembol was charged with rape. Bembol's father, Ra- mil, approached Artemon,
the victim's father, during the preliminary investigation and offered PI million
to Arte- mon to settle the case. Artemon refused the offer.
(a) During the trial, the prosecution presented A r- temon to testify on Ramil's
offer to settle admissible in evidence?
(b) xx
Suggested answers:
(a) The offer of Artemon is not admissible in evidence against Bembol as an
implied admission of guilt.
x
138
EVIDENCE 
To be an implied admission of guilt the offer must be "an offer of compromise

by the accused" (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court). The facts of the case do
not indicate that it was Bembol, the accused who made the offer.
(b) xx
x
Plea of Guilty Later Withdrawn
1. The Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sec. 2 of Rule 116), allows the accused, at
arraignment, to plead guilty to a lesser offense with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor provided that the lesser offense is necessarily
included in the offense charged. He may also plead guilty to a lesser offense
even after arraignment after withdrawing his plea of
not guilty.
2. In case the accused withdraws his guilty plea, that plea of guilty later
withdrawn, is not admissible in evidence against the accused who made the
plea (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
An Unaccepted Plea of Guilty to a Lesser Offense

If the plea of guilty to a lesser offense is not accepted, the rule does not provide
for an adverse consequence of the unaccepted plea. On the contrary, the rule
provides that an unaccepted plea of guilty to a lesser offense, is not
admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer (Sec. 27,
Rule 130, Rules of Court).
An Offer to Pay or the Payment of Medical, Hospital or Other

Expenses
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses
occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or
criminal liability for the injured party (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court). In
other jurisdic- tions, this act of rendering aid is sometimes called the "good
Samaritan rule." The phrase is used to refer to the rendering of voluntary aid to
a suffering person.

C. Admissions, Confessions and the Res Inter Alios Acta Rul
Subsequent Remedial Measures

Assume that PP, while negotiating the stairs from the lobby of a hotel to his
third floor room, slipped and fell from the stairs and sustained head injuries.
The hotel owner, upon learning of the accident, immediately ordered the
mainte- nance department of the hotel to install a non-slippery material on
every step of the stairway. In an action for damages against the hotel owner by
PP, may the latter introduce evidence of the subsequent remedial measures
taken to prove an admission by the defendant of the hazardous condition of the
stairway at the time of the incident?
No direct legal provision in this jurisdiction addresses the question as it is. It is

however, interesting to observe that the U. S. Federal Rules ofEvidence (FRE)
in Rule 407 thereof, prohibits the admission of evidence of subsequent
remedial measures when offered to prove the negligence of the defendant.
Evidence of such measures may however, be admissible to prove some other
purpose like the fact that the defendant had ownership ofthe hotel or control
over the same and all the fixtures therein.
Accordingly the rule is based on the policy ofencouraging potential defendants

to remedy hazardous conditions without fear that their actions will be used as
evidence against them (Pau v. Yosemite Park [CA9 Cal] 928 F2d, 880). To
adopt the contrary rule would discourage owners from improving the condition
causing the injury because of their fear of the evi-
dential use of such improvement to their disadvantage (Wer- ner v. Upjohn Co.
[CA4 MD] 628 F2d, 848; 29 Am Jur 2d §463- 464).
The rule (FRE 407) provides that:
"When after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in con-
nection with the event. This rule does not require the ex- clusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered
e
140
EVIDENCE 
for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of

precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment." (FRE Rule 407)
Evidence of Similar Conduct (second branch).

1. The general rule is that the law will not consider evidence that a person has
done a certain act at a particular time as probative of a contention that he has
done a similar act at another time. This is the rule of res inter alios acta found
in Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as amended. A similar conduct
which does not even sufficiently establish a
plan or scheme is not admissible (Enriquez 

119239, May 9, 2000; Espinosa v. Sandiganbayan, 538).
2. Assume that Mr. X is accused of physical injuries. Is evidence that in the

past he committed several acts con- stituting physical injuries admissible to
prove his propensity for committing such acts or that he acted in conformity
with his past acts? Answer: The evidence is not admissible for the purpose for
which it is offered. Sec. 34 of Rule 130 clearly provides:

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Week 8 Evidence

Parental and Filial Privilege

Under the parental privilege rule, a parent cannot be compelled to testify

testify against his parents or direct ascendants

"Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No per- son may be

(a) when such testimony is indispensable in a crime committed against said

The relevant article provides

"Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to

Other Privileged Communications Not Found in the Rules of Court

"Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, ver- bal or written,

Second, the admission to be judicial, must be made in the course of the

154430, June 16,2006)

3. The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case con- stitutes judicial

Admission in Drafted Documents

Admissions Made in Pleadings and Motions

JUDICIAL NOTICE AND ADMISSIONS B. Judicial Admissions

of palpable mistake (Herrera-Felix SCRA 87).

v. Court of Appeals 436

4. An admission in the answer to the complaint takes on the character of a

As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of

v. Spouses Lumbao, G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007).

5. An admission made in a pleading may be an actual admission as when a

Averments in Pleadings which are Not Deemed Admissions

Rule 8, Rules ofCourt), conclusions, non-ultimate facts in the pleading (Sec. 1,

Implied Admissions of Allegations of Usury

Implied Admissions of Actionable Documents

ure to deny the same under oath.

He is however, precluded from arguing that the document is a forgery because

3. In a case, the plaintiff

mative and in favor of the defendant. It further held that in resolving a

filed an action to collect upon

Development Corporation v. PhilBanking No. 150731, September 14, 2007).

Admissions in the Pre-trial of Civil Cases

are made in the course of the proceedings of the case.

For instance, petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note

2. Admissions in pre-trial briefs arejudicial admissions and well-settled is the

SCRA 142; Marmont

Resorts Hotel v. Guiang, 168 SCRA 373;

JUDICIAL NOTICE AND ADMISSIONS B. Judicial Admissions

Admissions in the Pre-trial of Criminal Cases

"SECTION 2. Pre-trial agreement—

In resolving the question in the negative, the Supreme Court ruled:

A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel

unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive. In fact judicial admissions are

159240, February 4, 2008).

Implied Admissions in the Modes of Discovery

Bataan, G.R. No. 144635, June 26, 2006).

Through his lawyer plaintiff A sent to defendant B, through B's counsel, a

On appeal from an adverse decision, A assigned as error the trial court's

dant ever replied thereto, there was a clear judicial ad-

Is the plaintiff correct?

Admissions in Amended Pleadings

Nature of Admissions in Superseded Pleadings

judicial admissions, and to be utilized as extrajudicial admis- sions, they must,

JUDICIAL NOTICE AND ADMISSIONS B. Judicial Admissions

Admissions in Dismissed Pleadings

Admissions made in pleadings that have been dismissed

are merely extrajudicial admissions (Servicewide Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257

3. In a case, the plaintiff 

SCRA 142; Marmont 

"SECTION 2. Pre-trial agreement— 

JUDICIAL NOTICE AND ADMISSIONS 

JUDICIAL NOTICE AND ADMISSIONS 

to clear my name, then I will go." (Ibid.). 

proceeding (Sec. 2[d], RA. 