Page 1 of 6

Potential Failure Mode And Effects Analysis (DESIGN FMEA)

COMPO
Part Number Engg. Change Level LEVEL: SYSTEM ✘ SUB-SYSTEM FMEA Number:
NENT
Part Name Disk Brake Sub-Assembly Design Responsibility: Prepared by: AB
Model Year(s)/Vehicle(s) Key Date 1-Jun-20 Date (Orig.) 1-May-20
Core Team: AB, PCN, KM, PKC. Date (Rev.)
Item / Current Design Action Results

Classification
Function

Occurrence

Occurrence
Severity
Responsibility

Detectiion

Detectiion
Potential Effect(s) of Potential Cause(s) Recommended

Severity
Requirement Potential Failure Mode Controls Controls RPN & Target Actions Taken
Failure of Failure Action RPN
(Prevention) (Detection) Completion Date Completion
Date

Disk Brake Stop vehicle Vehicle does not stop. Vehicle control 9 SC Mechanical linkage Designed as 5 Salt Spray Test of 4 180 Top coat addition Name & Target SST conducted 9 2 4 72
Sub-system travelling on dry impaired; Regulatory break due to per Zinc mechncial linkage as on plating Date on mechanical
(Item) / Stop asphalt road non-compliance. inadequate plating per ISO 4042 changing the linkages with
Vehicle on within specified corrosion standard ISO requirements. plating plating as ISO
demand distance, with protection. 4042/Zn8/Cn/ specification to 4042/Zn8/Cn/T
cosidering specified pedal T0. ISO 2 and test
different road movement. 4042/Zn8/Cn/T2, passed for 240
conditions to increase SST hours.
such as dry, resistance to 240
wet etc. hours from 72 Completed on
(function). hours. DD-MM-YY.

Master cylinder Previous 2 Testing in protype 4 72

vacuum lock due to proven design vehicle and test rig.
seal design. of seal used.

Loss of hydraulic Previous 2 Testing in protype 4 72

fluid from loose proven vehicle and test rig.
hydraulic line due connector
to incorrect torque
connector torque specification.
specification.

Loss of hydraulic Previous 2 Testing in protype 4 72

fluid due to proven vehicle and test rig.
hydraulic lines hydraulic lines,
crimped/compresse joints and tube
d, inappropriate material
tube material (braided).
specified.

Vehicle stops in excess Vehicle control 9 CC

of specified distance. impaired; Regulatory
non-compliance.

Stops vehicles with Regulatory non- 9 CC

more than required compliance.
pedal movement.

Alow umimpeded Vehicle movement is Decreased Brake Pad 7

vehicle movment partially impeded with life; Diminished
on no pedal no pedal force. Vehicle Control.
force.
 Page 2 of 6

Potential Failure Mode And Effects Analysis (DESIGN FMEA)

COMPO
Part Number Engg. Change Level LEVEL: SYSTEM ✘ SUB-SYSTEM FMEA Number:
NENT
Part Name Disk Brake Sub-Assembly Design Responsibility: Prepared by: AB
Model Year(s)/Vehicle(s) Key Date 1-Jun-20 Date (Orig.) 1-May-20
Core Team: AB, PCN, KM, PKC. Date (Rev.)
Item / Alow umimpeded Current Design Action Results

Classification
Function vehicle movment

Occurrence

Occurrence
Severity
Responsibility

Detectiion

Detectiion
Potential Effect(s) of Potential Cause(s) Recommended

Severity
onRequirement
no pedal Potential Failure Mode Controls Controls RPN & Target Actions Taken
force. Failure of Failure Action RPN
(Prevention) (Detection) Completion Date Completion
Date

Vehicle does not move Consumer unable to 8 SC

although there is no drive vehicle.
pedal force.
 Page 3 of 6

Potential Failure Mode And Effects Analysis (DESIGN FMEA)

COMPO
Part Number Engg. Change Level LEVEL: SYSTEM ✘ SUB-SYSTEM FMEA Number:
NENT
Part Name Disk Brake Sub-Assembly Design Responsibility: Prepared by: AB
Model Year(s)/Vehicle(s) Key Date 1-Jun-20 Date (Orig.) 1-May-20
Core Team: AB, PCN, KM, PKC. Date (Rev.)
Item / Current Design Action Results

Classification
Function

Occurrence

Occurrence
Severity
Responsibility

Detectiion

Detectiion
Potential Effect(s) of Potential Cause(s) Recommended

Severity
Requirement Potential Failure Mode Controls Controls RPN & Target Actions Taken
Failure of Failure Action RPN
(Prevention) (Detection) Completion Date Completion
Date
 Page 4 of 6
DFMEA RPN TABLES FOR SUGGESTED RANK AS PER AIAG FMEA
MANUAL - 4TH EDITION:

Suggested DFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria

Criteria:
Effect Severity of Effect on Product Rank
(Customer Effect)

Potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or

Failure to involves noncompliance with government regulation without 10
Meet Safety warning.
and/or
Regulatory Potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or
Requirements 9
involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning.

Loss of primary function (vehicle inoperable, does not affect 8

Loss or safevehicle operation).
Degradation
of Primary
Function Degradation of primary function (vehicle operable, but at reduced 7
level of performance).

Loss of secondary function (vehicle operable, but comfort / 6

Loss or convenience functions inoperable).
Degradation
of Secondary
Function Degradation of secondary function (vehicle operable, but comfort / 5
convenience functions at reduced level of performance).

Appearance or Audible Noise, vehicle operable, item does not 4

conform and noticed by most customers (> 75%).

Appearance or Audible Noise, vehicle operable, item does not

Annoyance 3
conform and noticed by many customers (50%).

Appearance or Audible Noise, vehicle operable, item does not 2

conform and noticed by discriminating customers (< 25%).

No effect No discernible effect. 1

 Page 5 of 6
DFMEA RPN TABLES FOR SUGGESTED RANK AS PER AIAG FMEA MANUAL - 4TH
EDITION:

Suggested DFMEA Occurrence Evaluation Criteria

Criteria: Occurrence of
Likelihood of Criteria: Occurrence of Cause - DFMEA Cause - DFMEA
Rank
Failure (Design life/reliability of item/vehicle) (Incidents per
items/vehicles)

≥ 100 per thousand

Very High New technology/new design with no history. 10
≥ 1 in 10

Failure is inevitable with new design, new application, or 50 per thousand 9

change in duty cycle/operating conditions. 1 in 20

Failure is likely with new design, new application, or 20 per thousand

High 8
change in duty cycle/operating conditions. 1 in 50

Failure is uncertain with new design, new application, or 10 per thousand 7

change in duty cycle/operating conditions. 1 in 100

Frequent failures associated with similar designs or in 2 per thousand 6

design simulation and testing. 1 in 500

Occasional failures associated with similar designs or in 0.5 per thousand

Moderate 5
design simulation and testing. 1 in 2,000

Isolated failures associated with similar design or in 0.1 per thousand 4

design simulation and testing. 1 in 10,000

Only isolated failures associated with almost identical 0.01 per thousand 3
design or in design simulation and testing. 1 in 100,000
Low
No observed failures associated with almost identical ≤0.001 per thousand 2
design or in design simulation and testing. 1 in 1,000,000

Failure is eliminated
Very Low Failure is eliminated through preventive control. through preventive 1
control.
 Page 6 of 6
DFMEA RPN TABLES FOR SUGGESTED RANK AS PER AIAG FMEA MANUAL - 4TH EDITION:

Suggested DFMEA Detection Evaluation Criteria

Opportunity for Criteria: Likelihood of
Rank
Detection Likelihood of Detection by Design Control Detection

No detetection Almost
No current design control; Cannot detect or is not analyzed. 10
opportunity impossible

Not likely to Design analysis/detection controls have a weak detection capability; Virtual
detect at any Analysis (e.g., CAE, FEA, etc.) is not correlated to expected actual 9 Very Remote
stage operating conditions.
Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to launch with
pass/fail testing (Subsystem or system testing with acceptance criteria 8 Remote
such as ride and handling, shipping evaluation, etc.).
Post Design Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to launch with
Freeze and prior test to failure testing (Subsystem or system testing until failure occurs, 7 Very Low
to launch testing of system interactions, etc.).
Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to launch with
degradation testing (Subsystem or system testing after durability test, e.g., 6 Low
function check).
Product validation (reliability testing, development or validation tests) prior
to design freeze using pass/fail testing (e.g., acceptance criteria for 5 Moderate
performance, function checks, etc.).

Prior to Design Product validation (reliability testing, development or validation tests) prior 4 Moderately
Freeze to design freeze using test to failure (e.g., until leaks, yields, cracks, etc.). High

Product validation (reliability testing, development or validation tests) prior

to design freeze using degradation testing (e.g., data trends, before/after 3 High
values, etc.).
Design analysis/detection controls have a strong detection capability.
Virtual Analysis -
Virtual analysis (e.g., CAE, FEA, etc.) is highly correlated with actual or 2 Very High
Correlated
expected operating conditions prior to design freeze.
Detection not
Failure cause or failure mode can not occur because it is fully prevented
applicable; 1
through design solutions (e.g., proven design standard, best practice or Almost Certain
Failure
common material, etc.).
Prevention