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G.R. No. 199515. June 25, 2018.*

 
RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO,  a.k.a.  “RHODORA RACHO
TANAKA,” petitioner,  vs.  SEIICHI TANAKA, LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, and the
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents.

Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Divorce; Under Article 26

of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino
may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was validly
obtained according to the foreign spouse’s national law.—Under
Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and a
Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was
validly obtained according to the foreign spouse’s national law,
thus: Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.  Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. x  x  x The second paragraph was
included to avoid an absurd situation where a Filipino spouse
remains married to the foreign spouse even after a validly
obtained divorce abroad. The addition of the second paragraph
gives the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have the marriage
considered as dissolved, and ultimately, to grant him or her the
capacity to remarry. Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable
only in issues on the validity of remarriage. It cannot be the basis
for any other liability, whether civil or criminal, that the Filipino
spouse may incur due to remarriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign laws and foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that
the divorce decree and the national law of the foreign spouse must
be pleaded and proved like any other fact before trial courts.—
Mere

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_______________

*  THIRD DIVISION.

 
 
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presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is insufficient.

In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), this Court established the
principle that before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this
jurisdiction, a separate action must be instituted for that purpose. Courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and foreign judgments; thus,
our laws require that the divorce decree and the national law of the
foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved like any other fact before trial
courts. Hence, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010): The
starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.

Supreme Court; Question of Fact; Petition for Review on

Certiorari; The probative value of the Certificate of Acceptance of
the Report of Divorce is a question of fact that would not ordinarily
be within the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) ambit to resolve. Issues in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are limited to questions of law.—Upon appeal to this Court,
however, petitioner submitted a Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce, certifying that the divorce issued by Susumu
Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Prefecture, has been
accepted on December 16, 2009. The seal on the document was
authenticated by Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. The probative value of the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is a question of
fact that would not ordinarily be within this Court’s ambit to
resolve. Issues in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court are limited to questions of law.

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Remedial Law; Evidence; Admissibility of Evidence; Under

Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of
official records that are kept in a foreign country requires that it
must be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an
embassy or lega-

 
 
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Racho vs. Tanaka

tion, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any

officer of the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that
foreign country.—Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of
Court, the admissibility of official records that are kept in a
foreign country requires that it must be accompanied by a
certificate from a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that foreign
country: Section 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was
accompanied by an Authentication issued by Consul Bryan Dexter
B. Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan,
certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an official in and for
Japan. The Authentication further certified that he was
authorized to sign the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce and that his signature in it was genuine. Applying Rule
132, Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce between
petitioner and respondent. The Regional Trial Court established
that according to the national law of Japan, a divorce by
agreement “becomes effective by notification.” Considering that

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the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was duly

authenticated, the divorce between petitioner and respondent was
validly obtained according to respondent’s national law.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; Equal
protection, within the context of Article III, Section 1 only provides
that any legal burden or benefit that is given to men must also be
given to women.—In this particular instance, it is the Filipina
spouse who bears the burden of this narrow interpretation, which
may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution
provides: Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building,

 
 
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and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of

women and men. This constitutional provision provides a more
active application than the passive orientation of Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution does, which simply states that no
person shall “be denied the equal protection of the laws.” Equal
protection, within the context of Article III, Section 1 only
provides that any legal burden or benefit that is given to men
must also be given to women. It does not require the State to
actively pursue “affirmative ways and means to battle the
patriarchy — that complex of political, cultural, and economic
factors that ensure women’s disempowerment.”
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Divorce; Once a divorce
decree is issued, the divorce becomes “validly obtained” and
capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status should be
given to the Filipino spouse.—In 2009, Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta for Women, which provides that
the State “shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations.” This necessarily includes the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Thus, Article 26
should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to
determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce
abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes
“validly obtained” and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry.
The same status should be given to the Filipino spouse.
Same; Conflict of Laws; Divorce; It would be inherently unjust
for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national laws
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from something that a foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the

prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce proceedings
will not be protecting our own nationals.—The national law of
Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from initiating or
participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently
unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national
laws from something that a foreign law may allow.
Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in
divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals. The
Solicitor General’s narrow interpretation of Article 26 disregards
any agency on the part of the Filipino spouse. It presumes that
the Filipino spouse is incapable of agreeing to the dissolution of
the marital bond. It perpetuates the notion that all divorce
proceedings are protracted litigations fraught with bitterness and
drama. Some marriages can end amicably, without the

 
 

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Racho vs. Tanaka

parties harboring any ill will against each other. The parties
could forgo costly court proceedings and opt for, if the national
law of the foreign spouse allows it, a more convenient out-of-court
divorce process. This ensures amity between the former spouses, a
friendly atmosphere for the children and extended families, and
less financial burden for the family.
Same; Family Law; Marriages; Divorce; Patriarchy; To rule
that the foreign spouse may remarry, while the Filipino may not,
only contributes to the patriarchy.—It is unfortunate that
legislation from the past appears to be more progressive than
current enactments. Our laws should never be intended to put
Filipinos at a disadvantage. Considering that the Constitution
guarantees fundamental equality, this Court should not tolerate
an unfeeling and callous interpretation of laws. To rule that the
foreign spouse may remarry, while the Filipino may not, only
contributes to the patriarchy. This interpretation encourages
unequal partnerships and perpetuates abuse m intimate
relationships.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Recent jurisprudence holds that a
foreign divorce may be recognized in this jurisdiction as long as it
is validly obtained, regardless of who among the spouses initiated
the divorce proceedings.—Recent jurisprudence, therefore, holds
that a foreign divorce may be recognized in this jurisdiction as
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long as it is validly obtained, regardless of who among the spouses

initiated the divorce proceedings. The question in this case,
therefore, is not who among the spouses initiated the proceedings
but rather if the divorce obtained by petitioner and respondent
was valid. The Regional Trial Court found that there were two (2)
kinds of divorce in Japan: judicial divorce and divorce by
agreement. Petitioner and respondent’s divorce was considered as
a divorce by agreement, which is a valid divorce according to
Japan’s national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Capacity to Remarry; Even under
our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution of the marital tie is
to grant both parties the legal capacity to remarry.—Here, the
national law of the foreign spouse states that the matrimonial
relationship is terminated by divorce. The Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any
qualifications that would restrict the remarriage of any of the
parties. There can be no other interpretation than that the
divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is

 
 
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absolute and completely terminates their marital tie. Even

under our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution of the
marital tie is to grant both parties the legal capacity to remarry.
Thus, Article 40 of the Family Code provides: Article 40. The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

order of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Br.
254.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Lorenzo U. Padilla for petitioner.

                                  
LEONEN, J.:
 
Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires that the
national law of the foreign spouse and the divorce decree be
pleaded and proved as a fact before the Regional Trial
Court. The Filipino spouse may be granted the capacity to
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remarry once our courts find that the foreign divorce was
validly obtained by the foreign spouse according to his or
her national law, and that the foreign spouse’s national law
considers the dissolution of the marital relationship to be
absolute.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the
June 2, 2011 Decision2 and October 3, 2011 Order3 of
Branch 254, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, which
denied Rhodora Ilumin Racho’s (Racho) Petition for
Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to
Marry.4 The denial was on the ground that a Certificate of
Divorce issued by the 

_______________

1  Rollo, pp. 3-31.

2   Id., at pp. 32-37. The Decision, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 10-0032,
was penned by Presiding Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub.
3  Id., at pp. 38-39. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Gloria
Butay Aglugub.
4  Id., at pp. 40-48.

 
 
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Japanese Embassy was insufficient to prove the existence

of a divorce decree.
Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on
April 20, 2001 in Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. They lived
together for nine (9) years in Saitama Prefecture, Japan
and did not have any children.5
Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed
for divorce and the divorce was granted. She secured a
Divorce Certificate6 issued by Consul Kenichiro Takayama
(Consul Takayama) of the Japanese Consulate in the
Philippines and had it authenticated7 by an authentication
officer of the Department of Foreign Affairs.8
She filed the Divorce Certificate with the Philippine
Consulate General in Tokyo, Japan, where she was
informed that by reason of certain administrative changes,
she was required to return to the Philippines to report the
documents for registration and to file the appropriate case
for judicial recognition of divorce.9
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She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with

the Civil Registry of Manila but was refused by the City
Registrar since there was no court order recognizing it.
When she went to the Department of Foreign Affairs to
renew her passport, she was likewise told that she needed
the proper court order. She was also informed by the
National Statistics Office that her divorce could only be
annotated in the Certificate of Marriage if there was a
court order capacitating her to remarry.10

_______________

5   Id., at p. 33.
6   Id., at p. 50.
7   Id., at p. 51.
8   Id., at p. 33.
9   Id., at p. 6.
10  Id., at p. 33.

 
 

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She went to the Japanese Embassy, as advised by her

lawyer, and secured a Japanese Law English Version of the
Civil Code of Japan, 2000 Edition.11
On May 19, 2010, she filed a Petition for Judicial
Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry12 with
the Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City.
On June 2, 2011, Branch 254, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas
City rendered a Decision,13  finding that Racho failed to prove
that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. It stated that while she
was able to prove Tanaka’s national law, the Divorce Certificate
was not competent evidence since it was not the divorce decree
itself.14
Racho filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 arguing that
under Japanese law, a divorce by agreement becomes
effective by oral notification, or by a document signed by
both parties and by two (2) or more witnesses.16
Racho filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 arguing that
under Japanese law, a divorce by agreement becomes
effective by oral notification, or by a document signed by
both parties and by two (2) or more witnesses.16

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In an Order17 dated October 3, 2011, the Regional Trial

Court denied the Motion, finding that Racho failed to
present the notification of divorce and its acceptance.18
On December 19, 2011, Racho filed a Petition for Review
on  Certiorari19  with this Court. In its January 18, 2012
Resolution, this Court deferred action on her Petition
pending her submission of a duly authenticated acceptance
certificate of the notification of divorce.20

_______________

11  Id., at pp. 33-34.

12  Id., at pp. 40-48.
13  Id., at pp. 32-37.
14  Id., at p. 36.
15  Id., at pp. 53-63.
16  Id., at pp. 56-57.
17  Id., at pp. 38-39.
18  Id., at p. 39.
19  Id., at pp. 3-31.
20  Id., at pp. 64-65.

 
 
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Racho vs. Tanaka

Petitioner initially submitted a Manifestation,21 stating

that a duly-authenticated acceptance certificate was not
among the documents presented at the Regional Trial
Court because of its unavailability to petitioner during
trial. She also pointed out that the Divorce Certificate
issued by the Consulate General of the Japanese Embassy
was sufficient proof of the fact of divorce.22 She also
manifested that Tanaka had secured a marriage license on
the basis of the same Divorce Certificate and had already
remarried another Filipino. Nevertheless, she has
endeavored to secure the document as directed by this
Court.23
On March 16, 2012, petitioner submitted her
Compliance,24 attaching a duly authenticated Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce that she obtained in
Japan.25  The Office of the Solicitor General thereafter
submitted its Comment26  on the Petition, to which
petitioner submitted her Reply.27
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Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a

divorce by agreement becomes effective upon notification,
whether oral or written, by both parties and by two (2) or
more witnesses. She contends that the Divorce Certificate
stating “Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce
issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan
on December 16, 2009” is sufficient to prove that she and
her husband have divorced by agreement and have already
effected notification of the divorce.28
She avers further that under Japanese law, the manner
of proving a divorce by agreement is by record of its
notification

_______________

21  Id., at pp. 66-72.

22  Id., at p. 67.
23  Id., at pp. 69-70.
24  Id., at pp. 82-86.
25  Id., at pp. 87-89.
26  Id., at pp. 126-151.
27  Id., at pp. 176-197. All notices to respondent Tanaka were returned
unserved (Id., at pp. 216-217).
28  Id., at pp. 14-15.

 
 
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and by the fact of its acceptance, both of which were stated

in the Divorce Certificate. She maintains that the Divorce
Certificate is signed by Consul Takayama, whom the
Department of Foreign Affairs certified as duly appointed
and qualified to sign the document. She also states that the
Divorce Certificate has already been filed and recorded
with the Civil Registry Office of Manila.29
She insists that she is now legally capacitated to marry
since Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan states that a
matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.30
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General
posits that the Certificate of Divorce has no probative value
since it was not properly authenticated under Rule 132,
Section 2431 of the Rules of Court. However, it states that it

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has no objection to the admission of the Certificate of

Acceptance of the

_______________

29  Id., at pp. 16-17.

30  Id., at p. 22, as cited in the Petition:
TERMINATION OF MATRIMONIAL
RELATIONSHIP
Article 728. 1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by
divorce.
....
31  RULES OF COURT, Rule 132 sec. 24 provides:
Section 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.

 
 
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Report of Divorce submitted by petitioner in compliance

with this Court’s January 18, 2012 Resolution.32
It likewise points out that petitioner never mentioned
that she and her husband obtained a divorce by agreement
and only mentioned it in her motion for reconsideration
before the Regional Trial Court. Thus, petitioner failed to
prove that she is now capacitated to marry since her
divorce was not obtained by the alien spouse. She also
failed to point to a specific provision in the Civil Code of
Japan that allows persons who obtained a divorce by
agreement the capacity to remarry. In any case, a divorce
by agreement is not the divorce contemplated in Article 26
of the Family Code.33
In rebuttal, petitioner insists that all her evidence,
including the Divorce Certificate, was formally offered and
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held to be admissible as evidence by the Regional Trial

Court.34  She also argues that the Office of the Solicitor
General should not have concluded that the law does not
contemplate divorce by agreement or consensual divorce
since a discriminatory situation will arise if this type of
divorce is not recognized.35
The issue in this case, initially, was whether or not the
Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the Petition for
Declaration of Capacity to Marry for insufficiency of
evidence. After the submission of Comment, however, the
issue has evolved to whether or not the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is sufficient to prove
the fact that a divorce between petitioner Rhodora Ilumin
Racho and respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained
by the latter according to his national law.

_______________

32  Rollo, p. 138.
33  Id., at pp. 138-147.
34  Id., at pp. 182-183.
35  Id., at p. 188.

 
 
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I
 
Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between
a foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in the
Philippines as long as it was validly obtained according to
the foreign spouse’s national law, thus:

Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the

Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have

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capacity to remarry under Philippine law.36 (Emphasis

supplied)

The second paragraph was included to avoid an absurd

situation where a Filipino spouse remains married to the
foreign spouse even after a validly obtained divorce
abroad.37  The addition of the second paragraph gives the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have the marriage
considered as dissolved, and ultimately, to grant him or her
the capacity to remarry.38
Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable only in issues
on the validity of remarriage. It cannot be the basis for any
other liability, whether civil or criminal, that the Filipino
spouse may incur due to remarriage.

_______________

36  As amended by Exec. Order No. 227 (1987).

37  See Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 223 Phil. 357; 139 SCRA 139 (1985)
[Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division]; and Republic v. Orbecido III,
509 Phil. 108; 472 SCRA 114 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].
38  See Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 642 Phil. 420; 628 SCRA 266 (2010) [Per
J. Brion, Third Division].

 
 
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Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial

court is insufficient.39 In Garcia v. Recio,40 this Court
established the principle that before a foreign divorce
decree is recognized in this jurisdiction, a separate action
must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and foreign judgments; thus,
our laws require that the divorce decree and the national
law of the foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved like
any other fact before trial courts.41 Hence, in Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas:42

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce

judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice
Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign
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judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts

under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.43

_______________

39   See Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723; 366 SCRA 437 (2001) [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division].
40  Id.
41  See Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 733
[Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
42  Supra note 38.
43  Id., at pp. 432-433; pp. 281-282, citing Remedial Law, Vol. II, Rules
23-56, 529 (2007); Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 37; Garcia v. Recio,
supra note 39; and Bayot v. Court of Appeals, 591 Phil. 452; 570 SCRA 472
(2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].

 
 
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II
 
Respondent’s national law was duly admitted by the
Regional Trial Court. Petitioner presented “a copy [of] the
English Version of the Civil Code of Japan (Exh. “K”)
translated under the authorization of the Ministry of
Justice and the Code of Translation Committee.”44 Article
728(1) of the Civil Code of Japan reads:

Article 728(1). The matrimonial relationship is terminated

by divorce.45

To prove the  fact  of divorce, petitioner presented the

Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Takayama of Japan on
January 18, 2010, which stated in part:

This is to certify that the above statement has been made

on the basis of the Acceptance Certification of Notification
of Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama
Pref., Japan on December 16, 2009.46
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This Certificate only certified that the divorce decree, or
the Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce,
exists. It is not the divorce decree itself. The Regional Trial
Court further clarified:

[T]he Civil Law of Japan recognizes two (2) types of divorce,

namely: (1) judicial divorce and (2) divorce by agreement.
Under the same law, the divorce by agreement becomes
effective by notification, orally or in a document signed by
both parties and two or more witnesses of full 

_______________

44  Rollo, p. 36.
45  Id., at p. 22.
46  Id., at p. 50.

 
 
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VOL. 868, JUNE 25, 2018 39

Racho vs. Tanaka

age, in accordance with the provisions of Family Registration Law

of Japan.47

Thus, while respondent’s national law was duly

admitted, petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence
before the Regional Trial Court that a divorce was validly
obtained according to the national law of her foreign
spouse. The Regional Trial Court would not have erred in
dismissing her Petition.
 
III
 
Upon appeal to this Court, however, petitioner
submitted a Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce,48  certifying that the divorce issued by Susumu
Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Prefecture, has
been accepted on December 16, 2009. The seal on the
document was authenticated by Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular
Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.49
The probative value of the Certificate of Acceptance of
the Report of Divorce is a question of fact that would not
ordinarily be within this Court’s ambit to resolve. Issues in

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a petition for review on  certiorari  under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court50 are limited to questions of law.

_______________

47  Id., at p. 39.
48  Id., at pp. 88-89. The original Japanese document and an English
translation by Byunko Visa Counseling Office, Tokyo, Japan are attached.
49  Id., at p. 87.
50  RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)

 
 
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40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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In Garcia and Corpuz, this Court remanded the cases to

the Regional Trial Courts for the reception of evidence and
for further proceedings.51 More recently in Medina v.
Koike,52 this Court remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals to determine the national law of the foreign
spouse:

Well-entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier

of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the function of
the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are
received with respect and are in fact binding subject to
certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled that appeals
taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of
fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to
the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule
45 appeals as above adverted, the Court may refer the case
to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal.—. . .

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An appeal by  certiorari  taken to the Supreme

Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting
issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals
for decision or appropriate action. The determination
of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact
are involved shall be final.53

_______________

51   See also Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568; 514

SCRA 607 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division]; and San Luis
v. San Luis, 543 Phil. 275; 514 SCRA 294 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago,
Third Division] where this Court remanded the cases to the trial courts to
determine the validity of the divorce decrees.
52  Supra note 41.
53  Id., at p. 5; p. 741, citing Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Sarabia
Manor Hotel Corporation, 715 Phil. 420, 433-435; 702 SCRA

 
 
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Racho vs. Tanaka

The court records, however, are already sufficient to

fully resolve the factual issues.54 Additionally, the Office of
the Solicitor General neither posed any objection to the
admission of the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce55 nor argued that the Petition presented questions
of fact. In the interest of judicial economy and efficiency,
this Court shall resolve this case on its merits.
 
IV
 
Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the
admissibility of official records that are kept in a foreign
country requires that it must be accompanied by a
certificate from a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, consular agent or any
officer of the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
that foreign country:

Section 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public

documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer

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having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and

accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, 

_______________

432, 445 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Far Eastern

Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, 721 Phil. 760, 766-767; 710 SCRA
358, 364 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; and RULES OF COURT, Rule
56, Sec. 6.
54   See Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna Metal Multi-purpose
Cooperative, 738 Phil. 37; 728 SCRA 482 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third
Division] where this Court resolved the issues of the case despite being
factual in nature due to the sufficiency of the court records. In this case,
the records of the Regional Trial Court were received by this Court on
November 19, 2014 (Rollo, p. 214).
55  Id., at p. 138.

 
 
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42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign

service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

 
The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce
was accompanied by an Authentication56 issued by Consul
Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in
Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular
Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an
official in and for Japan. The Authentication further
certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and that his signature
in it was genuine. Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is
admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce between
petitioner and respondent.
The Regional Trial Court established that according to
the national law of Japan, a divorce by agreement “becomes
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effective by notification.”57 Considering that the Certificate

of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was duly
authenticated, the divorce between petitioner and
respondent was validly obtained according to respondent’s
national law.
 
V
 
The Office of the Solicitor General, however, posits that
divorce by agreement is not the divorce contemplated in
Article 26 of the Family Code, which provides:

Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the

Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

_______________

56  Id., at p. 87.
57  Id., at p. 39.

 
 
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Racho vs. Tanaka

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.58 (Emphasis
supplied)

Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be

“validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse,” the Office of
the Solicitor General posits that only the foreign spouse
may initiate divorce proceedings.
In a study on foreign marriages in 2007 conducted by
the Philippine Statistics Authority, it was found that
“marriages between Filipino brides and foreign grooms
comprised 5,537 or 66.7 percent while those between
Filipino grooms and foreign brides numbered 152 or 1.8
percent of the total marriages outside the country.”59 It also
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found that “[a]bout four in every ten interracial marriages

(2,916 or 35.1%) were between Filipino brides and
Japanese grooms.” Statistics for foreign marriages in 2016
shows that there were 1,129 marriages between Filipino
men and foreign women but 8,314 marriages between
Filipina women and foreign men.60  Thus, empirical data
demonstrates that Filipino women are more likely to enter
into mixed marriages than Filipino men. Under Philippine
laws relating to mixed marriages, Filipino women are twice
marginalized.
In this particular instance, it is the Filipina spouse who
bears the burden of this narrow interpretation, which may
be

_______________

58  As amended by Exec. Order No. 227 (1987).

59   Philippine Statistics Authority, Foreign Marriages of Filipinos:
2007, March 11, 2011
<https://psa.gov.ph/old/data/sectordata/sr11566tx.html> (last accessed
June 1, 2018).
60   See Philippine Statistics Authority, Number of Nationalities of
Bride and Groom, Philippines: 2016
<https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/attachments/crd/specialrelease/Table%206.pdf>
(last accessed June 1, 2018).

 
 
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44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution

provides:

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in

nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.

 
This constitutional provision provides a more active
application than the passive orientation of Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution does, which simply states that
no person shall “be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
Equal protection, within the context of Article III, Section 1
only provides that any legal burden or benefit that is given
to men must also be given to women. It does not require the
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State to actively pursue “affirmative ways and means to

battle the patriarchy — that complex of political, cultural,
and economic factors that ensure women’s
61
disempowerment.”
In 1980, our country became a signatory to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).62 Under Articles
2(f) and 5(a) of the treaty, the Philippines as a state party,
is required:

Article 2
....
(f) to take all appropriate measures, including legislation,
to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and
practices which constitute discrimination against women.
....

_______________

61   Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No.

221029, April 24, 2018, 862 SCRA 880 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
62   The Philippines became a signatory on July 15, 1980. The treaty
was ratified on August 5, 1981. <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en>.

 
 
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VOL. 868, JUNE 25, 2018 45

Racho vs. Tanaka

Article 5
....
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of
men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women[.]

 
By enacting the Constitution and signing on the
CEDAW, the State has committed to ensure and to
promote gender equality.
In 2009, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9710 or the
Magna Carta for Women, which provides that the State
“shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
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discrimination against women in all matters relating to

marriage and family relations.”63 This necessarily includes
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is
irrelevant for courts to determine if it is the foreign spouse
that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is
issued, the divorce becomes “validly obtained” and
capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status
should be given to the Filipino spouse.
The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino
spouse from initiating or participating in the divorce
proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino
woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from
something that a foreign law may allow. Parenthetically,
the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce
proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.
The Solicitor General’s narrow interpretation of Article
26 disregards any agency on the part of the Filipino spouse.
It presumes that the Filipino spouse is incapable of
agreeing to the dissolution of the marital bond. It
perpetuates the notion 

_______________

63  Republic Act No. 9710 (2008), Sec. 19.

 
 
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46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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that all divorce proceedings are protracted litigations fraught

with bitterness and drama. Some marriages can end amicably,
without the parties harboring any ill will against each other. The
parties could forgo costly court proceedings and opt for, if the
national law of the foreign spouse allows it, a more convenient
out-of-court divorce process. This ensures amity between the
former spouses, a friendly atmosphere for the children and
extended families, and less financial burden for the family.
Absolute divorce was prohibited in our jurisdiction only
in the mid-20th century. The Philippines had divorce laws
in the past. In 1917, Act No. 271064 was enacted which
allowed a wife to file for divorce in cases of concubinage or
a husband to file in cases of adultery.65

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Executive Order No. 141, or the New Divorce Law,

which was enacted during the Japanese occupation,
provided for 11 grounds for divorce, including “intentional
or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year
prior to the filing of [a petition for divorce]” and “slander by
deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such
an extent as to make further living together
impracticable.”66
At the end of World War II, Executive Order No. 141
was declared void and Act No. 2710 again took effect.67 It
was only until the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 that
absolute divorce was prohibited in our jurisdiction.

_______________

64  AN ACT TO ESTABLISH DIVORCE (1917).

65  Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on
the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband committed
in any of the forms described in article four hundred and thirty-seven of
the Penal Code, cited in Valdez v. Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 948 (1920) [Per J.
Street, En Banc].
66  Baptista v. Castañeda, 76 Phil. 461, 462 (1946) [Per J. Ozaeta, En
Banc].
67  Id., at pp. 462-463.

 
 
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VOL. 868, JUNE 25, 2018 47

Racho vs. Tanaka

It is unfortunate that legislation from the past appears

to be more progressive than current enactments. Our laws
should never be intended to put Filipinos at a
disadvantage. Considering that the Constitution
guarantees fundamental equality, this Court should not
tolerate an unfeeling and callous interpretation of laws. To
rule that the foreign spouse may remarry, while the
Filipino may not, only contributes to the patriarchy. This
interpretation encourages unequal partnerships and
perpetuates abuse m intimate relationships.68
In any case, the Solicitor General’s argument has
already been resolved in  Republic v. Manalo,69  where this
Court held:
 

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Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce. . . validly

obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it
only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be
the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is
the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put
words in the mouths of the lawmakers. “The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum,
or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.”
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word
“obtained” should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse,
still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when
to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature
or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to

_______________

68  Supra note 61.

69  Id.

 
 
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48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to

carry out such ends and purposes. As held in League of Cities of
the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately
reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is
couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless
and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in
mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the
law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that
the spirit of the law controls its letter.

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To reiterate, the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is

to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign
divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to
remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place
and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore,
the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual
effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose
marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation
of the latter’s national law.70 (Emphasis in the original)

_______________

70   Id., at pp. 11-12, citing Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Star

Ferry, Inc., 298 Phil. 79, 86; 227 SCRA 317, 322 (1993) [Per J. Quiason,
First Division]; Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corpora-

 
 
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Racho vs. Tanaka

Recent jurisprudence, therefore, holds that a foreign divorce

may be recognized in this jurisdiction as long as it is validly
obtained,  regardless of who among the spouses initiated the
divorce proceedings.
The question in this case, therefore, is not who among
the spouses initiated the proceedings but rather if the
divorce obtained by petitioner and respondent was valid.
The Regional Trial Court found that there were two (2)
kinds of divorce in Japan: judicial divorce and divorce by
agreement. Petitioner and respondent’s divorce was
considered as a divorce by agreement, which is a valid
divorce according to Japan’s national law.71
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The Office of the Solicitor General likewise posits that

while petitioner was able to prove that the national law of 

_______________

tion v. NLRC, 283 Phil. 649, 660; 206 SCRA 701, 711 (1992) [Per J.
Romero, En Banc]; Victoria v. Commission on Elections, 299 Phil. 263,
268; 229 SCRA 269, 273 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc]; Enjay, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 315 Phil. 648, 656; 245 SCRA 588,
593 (1995) [Per J. Quiason, First Division]; Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v.
NLRC, 345 Phil. 1057, 1073; 280 SCRA 806, 822-823 (1997) [Per J.
Francisco, En Banc]; National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada Security
Agency, Inc., 493 Phil. 241, 251; 453 SCRA 70, 79 (2005) [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, First Division]; Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. v. Monetary
Board, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 545 Phil. 62, 72; 516 SCRA 154, 164
(2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division]; Republic v. Lacap, 546 Phil. 87, 100;
517 SCRA 255, 268 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division];
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) v. Philippine
Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated (PEJI), 604 Phil. 547, 553; 586 SCRA
658, 664-665 (2009) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Second Division]; Mariano,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 312 Phil. 259, 268; 242 SCRA 211, 219
(1995) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]; League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v.
Commission on Elections, 623 Phil. 531, 564-565; 608 SCRA 636, 663-664
(2009) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc]; and Fujiki v. Marinay, 712 Phil. 524,
555; 700 SCRA 69, 101 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
71  Rollo, p. 39.

 
 
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50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Japan allows absolute divorce, she was unable to “point to

a specific provision of the Japan[ese] Civil Code which
states that both judicial divorce and divorce by agreement
will allow the spouses to remarry.”72
To prove its argument, the Office of the Solicitor General
cites Republic v. Orbecido III,73 where this Court stated:

[R]espondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his
former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he
is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

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Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that

paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209,
as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow
a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. However, considering that in the present petition
there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we
are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated
to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in
his favor.74

The Office of the Solicitor General pointedly ignores that

in Orbecido III, the respondent in that case neither pleaded
and proved that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen, nor presented any evidence of the
national law of his alleged foreign spouse that would allow
absolute divorce.
In this case, respondent’s nationality was not
questioned. The Regional Trial Court duly admitted
petitioner’s presenta-

_______________

72  Id., at p. 142.
73  Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 37.
74  Id., at pp. 116-117; pp. 123-124.

 
 
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VOL. 868, JUNE 25, 2018 51

Racho vs. Tanaka

tion of respondent’s national law. Article 728 of the Civil Code of

Japan as quoted by the Office of the Solicitor General states:
 
Article 728 of the Japan Civil Code reads:
1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by
divorce.
2. The same shall apply also if after the death of
either husband or wife, the surviving spouse

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declares his or her intention to terminate the

matrimonial relationship.75
 
The wording of the provision is absolute. The provision
contains no other qualifications that could limit either
spouse’s capacity to remarry.
In  Garcia v. Recio,76  this Court reversed the Regional
Trial Court’s finding of the Filipino spouse’s capacity to
remarry since the national law of the foreign spouse stated
certain conditions before the divorce could be considered
absolute:

In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution

of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1)
absolute divorce or a  vinculo matrimonii  and (2) limited
divorce or a  mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond
in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which
type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree  nisi  or an interlocutory
decree — a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It
is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board,
although an absolute divorce may follow after 

_______________

75  Rollo, p. 142.
76  Supra note 39.

 
 
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52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is

effected.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may
under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage
may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce
which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior.

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On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains

a restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before
this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according
to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of
the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity
to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.77

Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that

the matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce. The
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not
state any qualifications that would restrict the remarriage
of any of the parties. There can be no other interpretation
than that the divorce procured by petitioner and
respondent is absolute and completely terminates their
marital tie.
Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute
dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both parties the
legal capacity to remarry. Thus, Article 40 of the Family
Code provides:

_______________

77  Id., at pp. 735-736; p. 453, citing 27A CJS, 15-17, §I, 611-613, §161
and 27A CJS, 625, §162.

 
 
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Racho vs. Tanaka

Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage

may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.

 
Petitioner alleges that respondent has since remarried,
the National Statistics Office having found no impediment
to the registration of his Marriage Certificate.78 The
validity of respondent’s subsequent marriage is irrelevant
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for the resolution of the issues in this case. The existence of

respondent’s Marriage Certificate, however, only serves to
highlight the absurd situation sought to be prevented in
the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:79

It is true that owing to the nationality principle

embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In
this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. . . .
....
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.

_______________

78  See Rollo, pp. 69-70.

79  Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., supra note 37.

 
 
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Racho vs. Tanaka

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our

laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should

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not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends

of justice are to be served.80

The ruling in  Van Dorn  was eventually codified in the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code through
the issuance of Executive Order No. 227 in 1987. The grant
of substantive equal rights to the Filipino spouse was broad
enough that this Court, in the 1985 case of Quita v. Court
of Appeals,81  “hinted, by way of  obiter dictum”82  that it
could be applied to Filipinos who have since been
naturalized as foreign citizens.
In  Republic v. Orbecido III,83  this Court noted the obiter
in  Quita  and stated outright that Filipino citizens who later
become naturalized as foreign citizens may validly obtain a
divorce from their Filipino spouses:

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and

applying the rule of reason, we hold that paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should like-

_______________

80   Id., at pp. 362-363; p. 143, citing Recto v. Harden, 100 Phil. 427
(1956) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc]; Paras, Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 52 (1971);
Salonga, Private International Law, p. 231 (1979).
81   360 Phil. 601; 300 SCRA 406 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second
Division].
82  Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 37.
83  Id.

 
 
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Racho vs. Tanaka

wise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a

foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to
its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason,

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disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A

statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.84

To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that

under our laws, petitioner is still married to respondent
despite the latter’s newfound companionship with another
cannot be just.85  Justice is better served if she is not
discriminated against in her own country.86  As much as
petitioner is free to seek fulfillment in the love and
devotion of another, so should she be free to pledge her
commitment within the institution of marriage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is  GRANTED. The Regional
Trial Court June 2, 2011 Decision and October 3, 2011 Order in
S.P. Proc. No. 10-0032 are  REVERSED  and  SET ASIDE. By
virtue of Article 26, second paragraph of the Family Code and the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce dated December
16, 2009, petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho is declared capacitated
to remarry.
SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Martires and

Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

_______________

84  Id., at pp. 114-115; pp. 121-122, citing Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of
Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 850, 855 (1957) [Per J. Montemayor, En Banc].
85  Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., supra note 37.
86  Id.

 
 
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Racho vs. Tanaka

Petition granted, judgment and order reversed and set

aside.

Notes.—The law confers jurisdiction on Philippine

courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. (Medina vs.
Koike, 798 SCRA 733 [2016])

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Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign

laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven like any other fact. (Id.)

 
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