Mediterranean Politics | Balkans

EU Policy Towards the Western Balkans:

Between Continuity and Revision
Panorama

Dušan Reljić are palpable. Without doubt, it is essentially the EU’s

Senior Research Associate pledge to accept the Western Balkan states as fu-
EU External Relations Research Division ture members that motivates the governments in the
German Institute for International and Security Affairs
region not to let the often barely suppressed con-
(SWP), Berlin
flicts escalate further. The governments are aware
that acts contravening the EU’s policy in the region
would instantly jeopardise their countries’ accession
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Even though two decades have passed since the prospects. The EU’s leverage was clearly visible
start of the violent disintegration of the Yugoslav fed- when, in the autumn of 2010, Serbia gave in to de-
eration, a number of conflicts in the region are still mands from Brussels, backed by direct pressure on
unresolved. For the most part, they are ethno-politi- Belgrade from certain leading EU Member States, to
cal in nature, both within the successor states in the abandon its goal of achieving the condemnation of
region and between them. Consequently, the West- Kosovo’s secession in the United Nations General
ern Balkans (the politically correct term used by the Assembly. Instead, in early 2011, Belgrade and Pris-
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European Union (EU) to describe the former Yugo- tina started an “EU-facilitated dialogue” aimed at re-
slavia plus Albania minus Slovenia) remain a perma- solving humanitarian and other issues, all of which
nent testing ground for the EU’s ability to act in the would hopefully further stabilise the region in spite of
self-assigned role of the “driving force” (in the par- the Kosovo conundrum.
lance of the European Commission (EC)) for conflict However, it is far from certain that Belgrade and
transformation. Indeed, it was the Yugoslav catastro- Pristina will be able to find a durable modus vivendi
phe in the 1990s that originally challenged the EU to that would eventually pave the way for EU member-
demonstrate that it can be more than a trade pact ship. Equally undecided is the future of Bosnia and
and induced it to develop far-reaching ambitions in Herzegovina, where the three main ethnic groups
the international arena. In due course, the “Balkan are still debating the same issues that led to war
impulse” led to the construction of the EU Common twenty years ago – how to share power, the degree
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). As of today, to which their country should be a (con)federal or
the EU’s international standing and credibility still unitary state, and whether more centralisation is re-
depend to a great extent on its scorecard in the ally the precondition for entry into the EU. The list of
Western Balkans. Memories of the EU’s disarray in the most serious “open wounds” in the Western
the early days of the Yugoslav catastrophe are im- Balkans would be incomplete without pointing out
mediately recalled whenever new EU foreign policy the fragile relationship between the Slavic and Al-
projects, such as the current ones in the Mediterra- banian populations in the Republic of Macedonia.
nean, are debated. The latter’s implacable demands for ever more au-
Enlargement was repeatedly characterised by the tonomy have a familiar ring in the region: in the past
EC as one of the EU’s most effective foreign policy decades, such designs have preceded State disin-
instruments. In order to remake the Western Balkans tegration. Moreover, there is a solid body of evi-
“in its own image,” the Union is exercising its norma- dence-based research to corroborate that the Alba-
tive power to a greater extent than it ever has before nians in Kosovo, the Republic of Macedonia and
when dealing with transition countries. The effects Albania itself strongly support the unification of their
nation, the second biggest in the Western Balkans, tutions to the would-be members from the Western
in one state. Balkans has not achieved the expected results
based on the experience of Central and Eastern
Europe. The region’s de-industrialisation following
The Failing Transition the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the ensu-
ing wars was not reversed, and new exportable
Against this backdrop of a number of complex unre- goods and services did not materialise to the neces-
solved issues, the EU’s policy strives to prepare the sary extent. Budget deficits, external debt and job
Western Balkan countries for membership in the Un- losses have soared. In addition, organised crime and
ion while simultaneously assisting them to overcome the failure to contain corruption, serious deficiencies
the effects of war, economic backwardness and in the judiciary, the inadequate skills of the workforce
weak governance. With some shocking exceptions and insufficient infrastructure all undermine econom-

Panorama
in Kosovo, there was little violence in the Western ic performance and weaken social cohesion.
Balkans in the last decade and most of the govern- Maintaining stability in the Western Balkans de-
ments complied, to various degrees, with the com- pends to a great extent on convincing the population
plex conditionality imposed by the EU in the frame- that the sacrifices – whether of an economic nature
work of the accession process. (fiscal austerity, social welfare cuts, etc.) or in terms
of ideals (giving up national or nationalistic traditions
and goals) – are worth enduring because of the

Med.2011
The transition model proposed higher aspiration of achieving EU membership. In
by the EU and other Western this context, the precise timeline for achieving this
membership is of lesser importance to the popula-
institutions to the would-be
tion; for the people, it is far more significant to see a
members from the Western change for the better in everyday life. If the public
Balkans has not achieved authorities deliver improvements in living standards
the expected results based and the quality of governance, the population will

207
support policies that concentrate on reform, democ-
on the experience of Central
racy and the rule of law. However, the pounding eco-
and Eastern Europe nomic crisis is swiftly demolishing the credibility of
Western Balkan politicians’ promises of a better fu-
Presently, the most dangerous threats to stability in ture life in the EU, as amply documented by the an-
the region – with all the possible repercussions for nual Gallup Balkan Monitor. Accordingly, conditions
the security of the EU and the continent as a whole are arising for a “second coming” of nationalistic
– come from the unrelenting economic crises. Even populism, which already fatally wounded the former
though all parts of the Western Balkans are firmly Yugoslavia in the nineties.
chained to the EU through trade and investments, In the Western Balkans, nationalism is usually ac-
economic growth in the Western Balkans has fal- companied by received wisdom about “historic stra-
tered in the last two to three years. The majority of tegic alliances” with external powers such as the US,
the countries in the region would need double-digit Russia, Turkey or nowadays even China. Nationalists
annual growth rates just to avoid lagging too far be- and conservatives often present such junior partner-
hind the EU. Instead, the economies of most coun- ships of their countries as a better alternative for the
tries in the region have shrunk as a result of both the future than to remain in the eternal waiting loop out-
recent global recession and domestic failings. Un- side the EU. Indeed, even the most pro-European-
employment (which stands at around 20% in Croatia minded people in the Western Balkans increasingly
and Serbia and more than 40% in Bosnia and the despair of the widespread impression that the EU is
Republic of Macedonia) is increasing, and the pros- becoming something of a “moving target.” The rea-
pects of there being more jobs soon are bleak. For- son for this, in addition to domestic socio-economic
eign investment, often presented as the cure-all to- stagnation, is the obvious displeasure of some influ-
gether with credit-fuelled domestic demand, has ential Member States towards further enlargement in
significantly diminished. In essence, the transition the near or medium-term future. Whereas Greece,
model proposed by the EU and other Western insti- Italy, Austria and other countries in the neighbour-
 hood (and with strong financial and economic inter- whole natural “interest zone,” the European conti-
ests in the region) support continuity in the enlarge- nent, then the EU Member States must re-examine
ment policy and have even proposed introducing a their policy towards the region. This revision has to
fast track for the EU membership of the Western start with the financial centrepiece of the EU’s trans-
Balkan countries, Germany, the Netherlands, France formative power, the Instrument for Pre-accession
and a number of others insist on “moderation” when Assistance (IPA), which is meant to help with re-
it comes to accepting new members. Evidently, the forms, secure a successful socio-economic transi-
EU is applying stricter conditionality in the negotia- tion and foster the integration of the Western Bal-
tions with the Western Balkan aspirants than in any kans with the EU even before membership.
previous enlargement round. Furthermore, Member
States do not hesitate to make use of the enlarge-
ment process for their domestic objectives (for in- A significant subsection of the
Panorama

stance, in the disputes between Athens and Skopje, political decision-makers in the
Ljubljana and Zagreb, the Hague and Belgrade, Ni-
EU does not take notice of the
cosia and Ankara, etc.). The outcome has been a
“creeping nationalisation” of the enlargement policy, deteriorating popular attitudes
which discredits the EU’s commitments to aspirant in the Western Balkans towards
States and undermines the transformative power of the Union
the enlargement process.
Med.2011

A significant subsection of the political decision-

makers in the EU does not take notice of the deterio- As IPA funds are chiefly disbursed according to the
rating popular attitudes in the Western Balkans to- population size of the beneficiary countries, Turkey
wards the Union and the possible implications for will receive the lion’s share of the €11.5 billion allo-
the EU’s security and thus, also, its international cated for the years 2007 to 2013. For instance, in
standing. In contrast, the US insists that events in 2012, the EU plans to support Turkey (which is
the Western Balkans continue to pose the principal presently lucky to have almost Chinese levels of
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challenges to stability in Europe. Starting from the economic growth) with nearly €900 million, whereas
premise that the Western Balkans is a crucial region Serbia, the largest Western Balkan country, will re-
for Europe’s future, the US has pledged to continue ceive less than €207 million. In addition, a signifi-
to “work with Europe on Europe” until the European cant part of the pre-accession funds is consumed by
project is completed with the inclusion of the West- various intermediary organisations and the engage-
ern Balkan aspirants. To this end, Washington does ment of expert consultants from EU countries. How-
not hesitate to exert pressure on EU Member States, ever, once a country enters the EU, it is “showered”
such as the Netherlands or Slovenia, demanding with money from the EU. Consequently, available
that they not impede the accession process of funds are often not fully tapped because the new
Western Balkan countries because of their national members are unable to carry out a sufficient number
political agendas. However, it remains to be seen of meaningful projects in time. In the case of Croatia,
whether this US intervention will be effective or the increase is expected to be tenfold, so the coun-
whether “nationalisation” will become an overriding try will probably have, in its first year as an EU Mem-
trait of EU policy towards Southeast Europe. The ber State, around €2 billion at its disposal. Predict-
US’s inconclusive political interventions with certain ably, Western Balkan countries have submitted
influential Member States on behalf of Turkey’s EU proposals to allow them increased access to EU
membership may indicate the limits to persuasion structural funds even before accession.
even when attempted by the hegemon. Bozidar Delić, Serbia’s deputy prime minister for Eu-
ropean integration, has, since early 2011, led the
initiative to reform the EU’s pre-accession assist-
Integration Before Membership ance instruments. He has gone even further and pro-
posed that the EU, possibly through its new Finan-
If the EU wishes to keep the Balkans from back-slid- cial Stability Facility, provide limited loan guarantees
ing into protracted conflicts, and if it intends to pro- to Western Balkan states so that they can raise
vide evidence that it can guarantee the security of its funds in capital markets on better terms. Lower inter-
est rates and longer repayment schedules for fresh citizens of most Western Balkan states in 2009 and
capital would permit the Western Balkan countries 2010 are examples of how the EU can export its
to increase their investment in industrial and other laws, rules and institutions to perspective Member
projects that could boost employment and thus ease States before full integration. Gradually expanding
some of the social pressures. Delić argues that in the acquis communautaire by establishing similar
this decade alone his country would save more than “communities” (transport, justice and home affairs,
€3 billion if the interest rates that Serbia currently foreign and defence policy, employment, media and
pays on foreign capital markets were reduced to the culture, etc.) with aspirant countries would promote
rates applied to countries able to rely on EU loan stability, predictability and trust in mutual relations.
guarantees. Obviously, in return, the Western Balkan This method could also serve as a model for the EU
countries would have to accept maximum external to pursue integration with its eastern neighbourhood
fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance. A strict and the Mediterranean.

Panorama
monitoring mechanism could be created by expand-
ing the role of Eurostat, the EU’s statistics office,
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Already, References
a number of Western Balkan countries have stand-
by arrangements with the IMF that ensure access to European Commission, Directorate-General for Econ­
financial liquidity. Stricter external surveillance of the omic and Financial Affairs. Progress towards
financial flows in aspirant countries is beneficial to all meeting the economic criteria for accession: the

Med.2011
involved, as public procurements and other expendi- assessments of the 2010 Progress Reports and
tures from state coffers tend to be among the prime the Opinions. Occasional Papers 73, December
sources of corruption and crime. 2010.
Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010, www.balkan-moni-
tor.eu/index.php/dashboard.
Gradually expanding the acquis Gordon, Philip H. (Assistant Secretary of State for
communautaire by establishing European and Eurasian Affairs). Testimony to

209
the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
similar “communities” (transport,
on European Affairs: “Unfinished Business in
justice and home affairs, foreign Southeast Europe: Opportunities and Challeng-
and defence policy, employment, es in the Western Balkans.” Washington, 14
media and culture, etc.) with April 2010. Available at: www.state.gov/p/eur/
index.htm.
aspirant countries would promote
Hillion, Christophe. The Creeping Nationalisation
stability, predictability and trust of the EU Enlargement Policy. Report No. 6.
in mutual relations Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Poli-
cy Studies (SIEPS), 2010, p. 6. Available at:
www.sieps.se/en/publikationer/the-creeping-
However, a new “growth agenda” alone is not suffi- nationalisation-of-the-eu-enlargement-poli-
cient. More determined steps are required to foster cy-20106
deeper integration without waiting for the countries Sanfey, Peter. Economic Prospects in South East
to be fully ready to enter the EU. The Energy Com- Europe. Newsletter 8/2010, Regional Coopera-
munity Treaty, which entered into force in July 2006, tion Council, Sarajevo. Available at: www.rcc.int/
and the abolishment of entry visa requirements for index.php?action=articles&id=50.