MARIO FL. CRESPO, vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L.

MOGUL
G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987
Crespo vs. Mogul
G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987

Doctrine: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is
to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:

1. On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.

2. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there
was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal for the filing of the information.

3. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion
for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to
August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.

4. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in
the Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding
with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court.

5. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course.

6. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining
the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of
Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.

7. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review
reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal
of the information filed against the accused.

8. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the
trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the
private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.

9. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating that “the motion’s trust
being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced
before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also
erodes the Court’s independence and integrity.”

10. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of
preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals.

11. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of
arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979.

12. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19,
1980.

13. Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs
while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion
and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits?

RULING: YES.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action
of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED
Community Rural Bank vs Judge Talavera

Facts:

Community Rural Bank (Bank) filed a complaint with the prosecutor’s office of
Cabanatuan charging several persons with Estafa. After preliminary
investigation, 6 informations for estafa were filed, 2 of which were raffled to the
branch where respondent, Judge Talavera, presided.

The accused appealed the finding of the Fiscal to the DOJ Secretary, which the
latter denied, so Judge Talavera issued a warrant of arrest with no bail against
the accused.

Later, the accused filed with Judge Talavera a motion for reinvestigation and to
lift the warrant of arrest. The Bank was not notified of this motion. Judge granted
the motion without any hearing thereon. When the reinvestigation was
conducted, the Bank was still not notified.

The assistant provincial prosecutor who conducted the reinvestigation reversed

the earlier findings of the fiscal. On the same day, a motion to dismiss was filed
with Judge, which he granted, and he also ordered the release of the accused.
The Bank was never notified of any of these proceedings. Bank then filed an MR
arguing it was deprived of due process. It also asked that the criminal
information be reinstated. Judge denied this. Hence, Bank filed the present case
charging Judge Talavera with (1) serious misconduct and/or gross inefficiency
and (2) violation of Rules 1.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Issues:

1. Whether Judge Talavera was correct in granting the motion for reinvestigation
after the resolution of the fiscal finding that there was prima facie evidence
against the accused was affirmed by the DOJ Secretary.

2. Whether Judge Talavera was correct in granting the motion to dismiss

3. Whether Judge Talavera was correct in taking cognizance of the motions

without notice of hearing
Held:

1. No. Judge Talavera should not have entertained the motion for
reinvestigation, since DOJ Secretary Serafin Cuevas already denied with finality
the appeal of the accused, finding that there was prima facie evidence against
the accused. The secretary of justice, who has the power of supervision and
control over prosecuting officers, is the ultimate authority who decides which of
the conflicting theories of the complainants and the respondents should be
believed. The provincial or city prosecutor has neither the personality nor the
legal authority to review or overrule the decision of the secretary.

Section 7 of Department Order No. 223 (the rules governing appeals from
resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations) provides:

Sec. 7. Motion for Reinvestigation. – At any time after the appeal has been perfected and before the
resolution thereof, the appellant may file a motion for reinvestigation on the ground that new and material
evidence has been discovered which appellant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered during
the preliminary investigation and which if produced and admitted would probably change the resolution.

Here, the motion for reinvestigation was filed 3 months after the DOJ Secretary
already denied their appeal with finality. Clearly, therefore, Judge Talavera was
wrong in granting the motion. In granting the Motion for Reinvestigation,
respondent effectively demolished the DOJ’s power of control and supervision
over prosecutors.

2. It was also an error for the Judge to grant the Motion to Dismiss by relying
merely on the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the reinvestigation. In
his Order, he merely stated that the motion to dismiss is meritorious, and
nothing more. The Order failed to demonstrate an independent evaluation or
assessment of the evidence against the accused.

The Judge acted with undue haste when he granted the Motion only a day after
the reinvestigation was concluded. This leads to the conclusion that the judge
did not personally evaluate the parties’ evidence before acting on the Motion.
The discretion to grant a Motion to Dismiss rests solely with the court. However,
mere approval of the position taken by the prosecution is not equivalent to the
discretion required. Once a complaint or an information is filed in court, the
judge -- not the prosecutor -- assumes full control of the controversy. A grant of
the motion to dismiss is equivalent to a disposition of the case itself, which is a
subject clearly within the court’s exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
When Judge issued the warrants of arrest without bail against all the accused, it
is presumed that he had studied the Information and the Resolution of the
prosecutor and agreed with the latter’s findings of probable cause. Thus, the
grant of the Motion for Reinvestigation and of the Motion to Dismiss for alleged
insufficiency of evidence posed a serious contradiction of the earlier finding of
probable cause.

3. Finally, Judge granted both of the Motions despite the obvious lack of notice
to the Bank and lack of hearing. This lapse effectively deprived it of its day in
court.

The Rules of Court require that, with the exception of motions that the court may
act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion
should be set for hearing by the movant. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court explicitly require that notices be sent at least three days before
the hearing and directed at the parties concerned; and that they state the time
and place of hearing of the motion, with proper proof of notice thereof. Without
such proof, the motion is considered pro forma; thus, the court cannot act upon
it.

The purpose of the notice is to enable the adverse party to appear for its own
protection and to contest the motion. Elementary due process mandates that the
other party be notified of the adverse action of the opposing party, so as to avoid
a capricious change of mind and to ensure impartiality of the trial. Here, the
Motions for Reinvestigation and to Dismiss were fatally defective, as neither
contained any proper notice of hearing. Respondent thus grossly erred in taking
cognizance of these Motions.

In criminal proceedings, the word “party” is held to mean not only the
government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by
the orders issued and/or judgment rendered therein.

Undoubtedly, complainant had an interest in the maintenance of the criminal

prosecution. Its right to intervene therein was practically beyond question, as it
neither instituted a separate civil action nor reserved or waived the right to do
so. Thus, as the party injured by the crime, it had the right to be heard on a
motion that was derogatory to its interest in the civil aspect of the case. Due
process necessitates that it be afforded this opportunity, especially because of a
conflict between the positions of the public prosecutor and of the offended party.
All told, respondent showed his lack of understanding, not only of the basic and
established superior-subordinate relationship between the secretary of justice
and the provincial prosecutors, but also of the functions and duties of the trial
court in “the proper scheme of things” in our criminal justice system.

Judges are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. The Code of Judicial Ethics requires them to be
embodiments of, among other desirable characteristics, judicial competence.
They are not common individuals whose gross errors “men forgive and time
forgets.” Judge was FINED P20,000.00
SEBASTIAN SERAG, LINO NAPAO, THOMIX SEGUMALIAN, JOSE OLIVER SEGUMALIAN,
RODOLFO TALANQUINES, ROQUE SANMILLAN, EDGAR STA. CRUZ, ELEAZAR SAÑOL,
NEMESIO PANUGOT, TEODORICO DELA CRUZ, VICENTE DELA CRUZ, ABRAHAM DELA
CRUZ and MARILYN SILFAVAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. DAISY SIBYA
G.R. No. 163818 October 20, 2005

Facts:

On May 11, 2001 Atty. Jesus Sibya, Jr. a mayoralty candidate in San Joauin, Iloilo and his driver
Norberto Salamat III was shot to death in front of Sibya’s residence. The Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group filed a criminal compliant for murder nad attempted murder against Lino Napao, then
incumbent mayor of San Jaoquin and Sebastian Serag. Provincial Prosecutor filed two Informations
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimbal, Iloilo: (1) for Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Firearms, and (2) Attempted Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms against Serag and Napao and
seven unidentified persons.

Norberto Salamat III and Ma. Daisy Sibya, the widow of deceased Atty. Jesus Sibya Jr. filed a before
the Provincial Prosecutor a supplemental complaint for murder and frustrated murder and violation of
PD no. 1866 against Serag and Lina Napao.

On July 26, 2001, the Provincial Prosecutor issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause for
murder and attempted murder with the use of unlicensed firearms against Serag, Lino Napao, Juan
Napao and 14 other accused, including those whose identities were earlier unknown.

The Provincial Prosecutor filed, in the RTC of Guimbal, Iloilo, an Amended Information for Murder
and an Amended Information for Attempted Murder with the use of unlicensed firearm against the said
accused.

Accused Juan Napao and the 14 other additional accused filed a petition for review of the Joint
Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

The trial court found probable cause for murder and attempted murder against the accused.
Consequently, the court issued an Order for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused who
were still at large.

A day before the arraignment, the Secretary of Justice affirmed with modification the resolution and
downgraded the charges from murder to homicide and from attemted murder to attempted homicide.
The Prosecutor likewise ordered to amend the information.

Ma. Daisy Sibya, likewise, received, the said Resolution and filed a motion for the reconsideration of
the said resolution, serving copies thereof on the RTC and the accused-petitioners by registered mail.

In compliance with the said Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the Provincial Prosecutor filed
before the RTC a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Information for homicide and attempted
homicide in the two cases, and for the court to admit the said second Amended Informations. The
motion was set for hearing at 2:00 p.m. of June 6, 2002. During the said hearing, the private
prosecutors opposed the motion and moved for deferment, contending that the private complainant had
earlier filed a motion for reconsideration of Resolution and that it would be premature for the
Provincial Prosecutor to file a motion for the admission of the Second Amended Information and for
the court to admit the same.

However, the RTC verbally granted the motion of the Provincial Prosecutor, and admitted the Second
Amended Information for Homicide. Criminal Case No. 926 for the attempted homicide was, likewise,
dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the said case. The court forthwith arraigned the
accused for homicide, who pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

The RTC granted the motion of the Provincial Prosecutor for the admission of the Second Amended
Information for Homicide, and ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 926 without prejudice to its
re-filing in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Accordingly, the Information was re-filed in the MTC,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1604. The accused were arraigned for the said cases. The court held that
the finding of probable cause for murder against the accused did not bar it from admitting the Second
Amended Information for Homicide. Likewise, the pendency of the private complainant’s motion for
the reconsideration of the May 20, 2002 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice was not a valid reason
for the deferment of the arraignment of the accused for homicide. The private prosecutors moved for
the reconsideration of the order of the trial court which, however, denied the motion.

She insisted that the admission by the RTC of the Second Amended Information downgrading the
crime charged therein to Homicide and the arraignment of the accused therein on June 6, 2002 were
premature since the Secretary of Justice had not yet resolved her motion for reconsideration of the May
20, 2002 Resolution.

On November 22, 2002, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the RTC from
proceeding with Criminal Case Nos. 925 and 926.

The Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution granting the motion for reconsideration of the private
complainant, setting aside Resolution No. 258. Consequently, the May 26, 2001 and July 26, 2001
Resolutions of the Provincial Prosecutor were reinstated. The Secretary of Justice opined that the
killing of the deceased was, after all, qualified by treachery. He further declared that he was not
proscribed from taking cognizance of and resolving the private complainant’s motion for
reconsideration notwithstanding the arraignment of the accused. He directed the Provincial Prosecutor
to withdraw the Second Amended Information for Homicide and Attempted Homicide and to file, in
lieu thereof, separate Informations for Murder and Attempted Murder, respectively, against the said
accused.

The accused-petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said Resolution. They argued that,
with their arraignment in the RTC and the MTC, the Secretary of Justice should have denied the private
complainant’s motion for reconsideration, conformably with Section 7(2) of DOJ Circular No. 70.
However, the Secretary of Justice denied the said motion.

The Court of Appeals eventually issued an order nullifying the order downgrading the offense charge to
the abovementioned accused and the arraignment.

Issue:

WON the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in nullifying and downgrading the
offense charge and the arraignment.
Held:

The appellate court’s nullification of the June 6, 2002 and July 26, 2002 Orders of the RTC and the
arraignment of the petitioners on June 6, 2002 are well-founded. Section 13 of DOJ Circular No. 70
reads:

SECTION 13. Motion for reconsideration.— The aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution on appeal, furnishing the
adverse party and the Prosecution Office concerned with copies thereof and submitting proof of such
service. No second or further motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

The private respondent received a copy of Resolution of the Secretary of Justice downgrading the
charges from murder and attempted murder to homicide and attempted homicide. She had the right to
file a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution on or before June 6, 2002. Indeed, she filed
such motion, through the private prosecutors, by personal delivery to the DOJ on June 4, 2002.
Thereafter, it behooved the RTC to suspend the proceedings until after the Secretary of Justice had
resolved such motion with finality, including the consideration of the motion of the Provincial
Prosecutor for the admission of the Second Amended Information for homicide, the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 926, and the arraignment of the petitioners for homicide. It was, in fact, premature
for the Provincial Prosecutor to file such motion for the admission of the Second Amended Information
since the Secretary of Justice had not yet resolved the said motion; after all, he may still reconsider
Resolution No. 258, which he did on November 18, 2002, effectively reversing his previous ruling
affirming the assailed Resolutions of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 26, 2001 and July 26, 2001, and
thus reverting to the original charges of murder and attempted murder.

The trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused’s motion for review of the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until
resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor’s finding
or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no
appeal was taken therefrom to the Department of Justice.

The pendency of an appeal before the DOJ is enough reason for the deferment of any proceedings in
the trial court and petitioner, through the private prosecutors, correctly moved for the deferment of the
admission of the second amended informations for homicide and attempted homicide. It should be
considered that the motion to defer was even with the conformity of the public prosecutor and the
appearance of the private prosecutors is pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure.

If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be
given due course if the accused had already been arraigned. Any arraignment made after the filing of
the petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice from exercising his power of review.
Soriano vs People and BSP

G.R. No. 162336 February 1, 2010

Facts:
Soriano was charged for estafa through falsification of commercial documents for allegedly securing
a loan of 48 million in the name of two (2) persons when in fact these individuals did not make any
loan in the bank, nor did the bank's officers approved or had any information about the said loan.
The state prosecutor conducted a Preliminary Investigation on the basis of letters sent by the
officers of Special Investigation of BSP together with 5 affidavits and filed two (2) separate
information against Soriano for estafa through falsification of commercial documents and violation of
DORSI law.

Soriano moved for the quashal of the two (2) informations based on the ground:

1. that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, for the letter transmitted by the
BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint and was defective for failure to comply with the
mandatory requirements of Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as statment of
address of the petitioner and oath of subscription and the signatories were not authorized
persons to file the complaint; and
2. that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, for the commission of estafa uner par.
1(b) of Art. 315 of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation of DORSI law (Sec.
83 or RA 337 as amended by PD 1795), and therefore a person cannot be charged of both
offenses.

Issue:
Whether or not the complaint filed complied with the mandatory requirements of law.
Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in an order denying a
Motion to Quash.

Ruling:
Yes, the letters transmitted were not intended to be the complaint but merely transmitted for
preliminary investigation. The affidavits and not the letter transmitting them initiated the preliminary
investigation and therefore is the complaint which substantially complied with the manadory
requirements of law.

No. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without
prejudice on his part to present special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after
trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by
law.
SAMUEL U. LEE and MAYBELLE LEE LIM vs. KBC BANK N.V.

G.R. No. 164673 January 15, 2010

Facts:

Midas Diversified Export Corporation (MDEC) obtained a $1,400,000 loan from KBC Bank a Belgian
corporation license to do business in the Philippines. Samuel U. Lee, assistant treasurer and director of
MDEC, executed a promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring all of
MDEC’s rights over Confirmed Purchase Order No. MTC-548 to KBC Bank issued by Otto Versand, a
company based in Germany, and covered a shipment of girl’s basic denim jeans amounting to
$1,863,050

Another loan was obtained amounting to $65,000, from KBC Bank by Maybelle L. Lim (Lim),
treasurer and assistant secretary of MDEC, she executed a promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a
deed of assignment transferring all of MDEC’s rights over Confirmed Purchase Order No. WC-128 to
KBC Bank issued by Otto Versand, and covered a shipment of boy’s bermuda jeans amounting to
$841,500.

MDEC failed to pay the said loans. KBC filed a complaint for estafa upon learning through facsimile
message from Otto Versand that the latter did not issue the purchase order, did not order items covered
by the purchase order and did not pay any amount. The said case was filed with the Regional Trial
Court and upon finding probable cause, Judge Winlove M. Dumayas issued a warrant of arrest against
Lee and Lim.

Lee and Lim filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice challenging the resolution issued
by State prosecutor Subia. DOj Secreatary Hernando Perez directed the withdrawal of the information
filed against Lee and Lim holding that the facsimile message constituted hearsay evidence. Tereafter
Prosecutor Sibucao filed a motion to withdraw the information against Lee and Lim to which grabted
by the RTC.

Issue:

WON the issue of admissibility of the facsimile message may be properly ventilated during the full
blown trial and not during the preliminary investigation.

WON Judge Dumayas in ordering the withdrawal of the information against Lee and Lim, ailed to
make his own evaluation and merely relied on DOJ recommendation.

Held:

Yes, the facsimile messages should be ventilated during the full blown trial and not during the
preliminary investigation.

The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary’s recommendation finding the absence of probable
cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely relied to
recommendation of DOJ.
In the present case, Judge Dumayas, in his 26 March 2003 Order, did not (1) positively state that the
evidence against Lee and Lim is insufficient, (2) include a discussion of the merits of the case, (3)
assess whether Secretary Perez’s conclusion is supported by evidence, (4) look at the basis of Secretary
Perez’s recommendation, (5) embody his assessment in the order, and (6) state his reasons for granting
the motion to withdraw the informations.

Judge Dumayas’ failure to make his own evaluation of the merits of the case violates KBC Bank’s right
to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Judge Dumayas’ 26 March 2003 Order
granting the motion to withdraw the informations is void.
Okabe v. Judge Gutierrez and Maruyama, G.R. No.
150185, 27 May 2004
Facts:
Charged for Estafa, Petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and
to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information
submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa
and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant,
the respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached
thereto. The petitioner further alleged that the documents submitted by the investigating prosecutor
were not enough on which the trial court could base a finding of probable cause for estafa against
her.
The court denied the petitioners motions on the following grounds:
(a) Based on its personal examination and consideration of the Information, the affidavit-complaint
of respondent Maruyama and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor duly approved by the city
prosecutor, the court found probable cause for the petitioners arrest. Since the petitioners motion for
a determination of probable cause was made after the court had already found probable cause and
issued a warrant for the petitioners arrest, and after the latter filed a personal bail bond for her
provisional liberty, such motion was a mere surplusage;
In denying her motion for a determination of probable cause, she posits that the respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
If the RTC judge may rely on investigating prosecutor’s resolution in the determination of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused.

HELD:
NO. In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused, the judge should not rely solely on the said report.[The judge should consider not only the
report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence
of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the
investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. The duty to make such determination is
personal and exclusive to the issuing judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and rely on the certification
of the investigating prosecutor that he had conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance with
law and the Rules of Court, as amended, and found probable cause for the filing of the Information.
The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable
cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. The purpose of the mandate of the judge
to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those
falsely charged of crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, the judge must make a personal determination of the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Under Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the investigating prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary investigation of a case
cognizable by the RTC, is tasked to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent therein is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is for the purpose of securing the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and
public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial.

If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of the Information against the
respondent, he executes a certification at the bottom of the Information that from the evidence
presented, there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Such certification of the investigating prosecutor is,
by itself, ineffective. It is not binding on the trial court. Nor may the RTC rely on the said certification
as basis for a finding of the existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.