235 Phil.

465

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-53373. June 30, 1987 ]
MARIO FL. CRESPO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LEODEGARIO
L. MOGUL, PRESIDING JUDGE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT
OF LUCENA CITY, 9TH JUDICIAL DIST., THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue raised in this case is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a
criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and
insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.

On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the
Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the
Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
CCC-1X-52 (Quezon) ‘77.[1] When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed
a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of justice of the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the
presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion.[2] A motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the
arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate
the matter to the appellate court.[3]

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of
injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as
CA-4G. R. SP No. 06978[4] in an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals
restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until
further orders of the Court.[5] In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he
recommended that the petition be given due course.[6] On May 15, 1978 a decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining
the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the
case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for
review.[7]

On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,
resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused.[8] A motion to dismiss for, insufficiency of
evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court,
[9]
attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of
August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.[10]
On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment stating:

"O R D E R

For resolution is a motion to dismiss this case filed by the prosecuting

fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the
Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein
among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the
reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment of a
pre-existing obligation the liability of the drawer can only be civil and not
criminal.

The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of
the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the
Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the
requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's independence and
integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and therefore hereby
DENIED.

WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December

18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.”[11]

The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary
restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-
08777.[12] On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals
against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the
Court.[13] In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979.[14] A motion for
reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of
February 19, 1980.[15]

Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby
petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be
perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and
trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not valid and
of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and
declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil.[16]

In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving
due course to the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to
file a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by
the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it being
meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a
separate comment to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the
resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer
this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En
Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.

Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to
dismiss the information.

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or

by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.[17]
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal.
He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that
presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is
sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[18] The
reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the
fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.[19] It
cannot be controlled by the complainant.[20] Prosecuting officers under the power
vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting
persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to
be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office.[21] They have
equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become
convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
[22]

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation[23], that the fiscal determines

the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The
Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal
prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to
prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that
the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction.[24] Neither has the
Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a
certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and
control of criminal prosecutions.[25] Thus, a fiscal mho asks for the dismissal of the
case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the
same commit no error.[26] The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move
for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is
innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt.[27] In a
clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscal's
should normally prevail.[28] On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or in
final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the Courts to restrain a criminal
prosecution[29] except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the courts to do so
for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive and vindictive manner.[30]

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or
control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the
chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the
Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or
opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion
to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in
Court.[31]

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The

Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and
determine the case.[32] When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant
for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either
voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.[33]

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above
stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the
accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to
the Court for appropriate action.[34] While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in
court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition
the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court.[35] The only qualification is that the action of the Court
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused,[36] or the right of the People to
due process of law.36-a

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not are whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion
to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may
grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case.

However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed
by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum
in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be
designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for
prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case
thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.

The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see
that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused
before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the
fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to
enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused
should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility
of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much
less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it hands of a private
prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void.[37] The least that the
fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn
over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his
direction and control.[38]

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of
the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions
of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal maybe disregarded by the trial court,
the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or in-
formation has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Bidin, Sarmiento, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, C.J., reserving the filing of a separate opinion.
Padilla, J., no part; senior partner of counsel for private respondent is a close
relative.

[1]
Copy of information, Annex A to Annex E; pp. 54-55, Rollo.
[2]
Annex C to Annex E; pp. 70-71 Rollo.
[3]
Annex D to Annex E; p. 72, supra.
[4]
Annex E to Annex E; pp. 73-108, supra.
[5]
Annex F to Annex C; p. 109, supra.
[6]
Annex G to Annex E; pp. 110-118, Rollo.
[7]
Annex H to Annex E; pp. 119-129, supra.
[8]
Annex I to Annex E; pp. 130-132, supra.
[9]
Annex J to Annex E; pp. 133-139, supra.
[10]
Annex K to Annex E; p. 140, supra.
[11]
Annex L to Annex E; pp. 141-142, supra.
[12]
Annex E; pp. 42-53, supra.
[13]
p. 145, supra.
[14]
Annex A to petition; pp. 23-26, supra.
[15]
Annex D; pp. 40-41, supra.
[16]
pp. 5-21, supra.

Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, now Section 5, Rule 110 of 1985 Rules
[17]

on Criminal Procedure, People v. VaIdemoro, 102 SCRA 170.

[18]
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846.
[19]
U.S. vs. Narvas, 14 Phil. 410.

People vs. Sope, 75 Phil. 810; People vs. Liggayu, 97; Phil, 865; Zulueta vs.
[20]

Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; People vs. Natoza, G.R. L-8917, Dec. 14, 1956.
[21]
Bagatua vs. Revilla, G.R. L-12247, August 26, 1958.
[22]
Zulueta vs. Nicolas, supra.

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court; Presidential Decree 911;
[23]

Sections 1-4, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

[24]
People vs. De Moll, 68 Phil. 626.

Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Bataan vs. Dollete, 103 Phil. 914; People vs. Pineda,
[25]

G.R. No. L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748

[26]
People vs. Natoza, supra; Pangan vs. Pasicolan, G.R. L-12517, May 19, 1958.
 People vs. Jamisola, No. L-27332, Nov. 28, 1969; People vs. Agasang, 66 Phil.
[27]

182.
[28]
People vs. Pineda, supra.
[29]
Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 103, 112.

Dimayuga vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304, 307; University of the Philippines vs. City
[30]

Fiscal of Quezon City, G.R. No. L-18562, July 31, 1961.

[31]
PD 911, now Section 4, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure;
Estrella vs. Orendain, Jr., 37 SCRA 650-652, 654-655; Gonzales vs. Serrano, L-
25791, Sept. 23, 1968, 25 SCRA 64; Caeg vs. Abad Santos, N-40044, March 10,
1975, 63 SCRA 96; Oliveros vs. Villaluz, L-33362, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 327;
Noblejas vs. Salas, L-31788 and 31792, Sept. 15, 1975, 67 SCRA 47; Vda. de Jacob
vs. Puno, 131 SCRA 144; Circular No. 13, April 19, 1976 of the Secretary of Justice.

Herrera vs. Barreto 25 Phils. 245; U.S. vs. Limsiongco, 41 Phils. 94; De la Cruz
[32]

vs. Mujer, 36 Phils. 213; Section 1 Rule 110, Rules of Court, now Section 1 also
Rule 110, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[33]
21 C.J.S. 123; Carrington
[34]
U.S. vs. Barreto, 32 Phils. 444.
[35]
Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Bataan vs. Dolleto, Supra.
[36]
People vs. Zabala, 58 O.G. 5028.

36-a Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43-101.

[37]
People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361 (1976).

U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32 Phils. 442; U.S. vs. Gallego, 37 Phils. 289; People vs.
[38]

Hernandez, 69 Phils. 672; U.S. vs. Labil, 27 Phils. 82; U.S. vs. Fernandez, Phils. 539;
People vs. Velez 77, Phils. 1026.

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