Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
Instrumented System (SIS)
A Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is a system comprising sensors, logic solvers and actuators whose
purpose is to take a process to a safe state when normal predetermined set points are exceeded, or safe
operating conditions are violated
A. Safety Lifecycle
The Safety Life Cycle (SLC) is a core concept in all recent standards related to Safety Instrumented
Systems. The IEC 61508 is a basic safety publication of the IEC and as such, it is an “umbrella”
document that covers multiple industries and applications. IEC 61511 is an industry‐specific standard
for the process industries that is based on IEC 61508.
SLC is an engineering process that contains all the steps needed to achieve high levels of functional
safety during conception, design, operation, and maintenance of instrumentation systems. It is a plan‐
do‐assess‐adjust sort of activity with a clear objective. An automation system designed according to
SLC requirements will predictably reduce risk in an industrial process.
The safety life cycle provides:
A structured and consistent framework for the specification, design, implementation and
maintenance of safety instrumented systems
Guide to risk assessment methodologies
The performance requirements of each safety instrumented function
1. Safety Lifecycle – Analysis Phase
It starts from the concept phase of a project and finishes when all of the safety instrumented
functions are no longer available for use. The key idea here is that safety must be considered from
the very inception of the conceptual process design and must be maintained during all design,
operation, and maintenance activities.
The Figure shown above provides a detailed diagram of activities in the analysis phase of the
safety lifecycle. When the conceptual process design is complete, detailed process safety
information is available such as:
Types and quantities of chemicals used
Pressures, temperatures, and flows of the intended design
Process equipment used and its design strength
Control strategy and intended control equipment
Drawings, diagrams, and other relevant information
Given this information, a hazard and risk analysis is performed that identifies possible hazards and
then establishes the consequence and likelihood of each. On some projects, consequence is
determined through detailed analysis, and on others it is done by estimation. Likewise, likelihood
analysis is sometimes performed by detailed analysis and sometimes by estimation. With the
emergence of new techniques such as Layer of Protection Analysis; however, the trend is clearly
toward more analysis.
The consequence severity and the likelihood frequencies determine risk. In some cases, the risk
of a hazard is within tolerable levels, and no risk reduction is needed. For these cases, no SIS is
required. In other cases, risk reduction is required, and the quantity of risk reduction is specified
by an order‐of‐magnitude level called the safety integrity level (SIL).
2. Safety Lifecycle – Realization Phase
When all safety instrumented functions are identified and documented, the design work can
begin. A conceptual design is performed by choosing the desired technology for the sensor, the
logic solver, and the final element.
Redundancy may be included so as to achieve high levels of safety integrity, to minimize false
trips, or for both reasons. Once the technology and architecture have been chosen, the designers
review the periodic test philosophy constraints provided in the SRS. Given that safety
instrumented systems will, hopefully, not be called on to activate, they must be completely
inspected and tested at specified time
3. Safety Lifecycle – Operation Phase
The operation phase of the safety lifecycle begins with a pre‐startup safety review (PSSR) of the
SIS design. During the PSSR, the engineers must answer a number of questions such as:
Does the system meet all the requirements stated in the safety requirements
specification?
Have all safety instrumented functions met SIL targets and Mean Time To Trip Spuriously
(MTTFS) targets?
Have all the necessary design steps of the safety lifecycle been carried out successfully?
Has the manufacturer’s safety manual been followed for all equipment?
Is there a periodic inspection and test plan for each safety instrumented function?
Have the maintenance procedures been created and verified?
Is there a management‐of‐change procedure in place?
Are operators and maintenance personnel qualified and trained?
If the answers to these questions are acceptable, the process can proceed with startup and
operation.
While in operation, proper operating procedures and all maintenance activities including periodic
function testing and mean time to repair targets have to be followed. Periodic functional testing
must be done as per the time schedule established during the conceptual design verification
calculations and must be done per the plan established to ensure that all potentially hidden
dangerous failures are detected. All periodic inspection and test activities must be documented.
It is very important that each safety instrumented function is restored to full operation after each
test. Bypass valves and force functions must be removed and these restorations must be
documented.
The safety lifecycle includes management of all modifications made to the system during its useful
life. For each, the engineer making the change must analyze the impact of the change and go back
to the appropriate step in the safety lifecycle. If new technology is chosen, the SIL verification
must be repeated. The new SIL level must meet or exceed the original. Decommissioning is
considered as well. The engineer must analyze the effect of decommissioning the system. Are all
safety instrumented functions no longer needed? If some are still needed, they must be relocated
or decommissioning must not proceed
B. SERVICES
1. SIS Gap Assessment
The SIS gap assessment is carried out to identify any critical and potential gaps between the SIS
best practices and the requirements of ANSI/ISA 84.00.01‐2004 (IEC 61511) with the design and
the implementation, the operation as well as the maintenance of the existing SIS. The findings will
be categorized based on their impacts to the safety, business as well as environment and will be
used as a basis for SIS opportunity improvement. All findings and recommendations that have
significant safety, business and environmental impact shall be documented, followed‐up, tracked
and closed out
Following figure shows the example of assessment result of SIS Gap Assessment
2. SIL Verification
The purpose of SIL Verification is to determine if each SIF that hasn’t been verified would meet
the target Safety Integrity Level (SIL) specified during the SIL classification performed during
design.
For each SIF the average probability of failure on demand (PFDavg) will be calculated using SIL
software package (such as SIL Solver, ExSILentia) and the results compared with the PFDavg range
for the target SIL. A standard test interval will be defined for all calculations. Reliability data is
generally obtained from the industry database such as OREDA, EXIDA SERH (Safety Equipment
Reliability Handbook). Compliance with the architectural constraints specified in IEC61508.2 is
also verified as well as SIL Capability.
Scope of Work
Following typical process will be included.
Data Collection
- Determine SIFs
- Collect P&ID and Loop Drawing Diagram
- Collect Datasheet of instruments (Sensor, Logic Solver and Final Element)
- Collect other required information
SIL Verification
- Determine SIF Definition using Exsilentia
- Determine SIF Target Selection using Exsilentia
- Conduct SIF Verification
Compliance Report
- IEC 61511 Compliance Report
Following figure shows the snapshot of SIL Verification
3. SIS Training
We provide standard and custom training of Safety Instrumented System. The detail can be seen
in Training section in this website.