Mark Nevvit Climate Change and Unsc

Is Climate Change a Threat to International Peace and
Security?
Mark Nevitt*
Abstract
Is climate change a threat to international peace and security? If so, what
actions, if any, should the United Nations Security Council (“Council”) take to
combat the climate crisis? Scientists and security professionals alike predict
massive climate destabilization this century to include climate migration,
competing resource wars, and violent conflict. And four island nations will be
uninhabitable by mid-century, threatening their territorial integrity and very
sovereignty. In this Article I argue that climate change can no longer be
conceptualized as a future environmental and sustainability issue that the
Council can ignore. Rather, climate change is a complex security threat that will
increasingly stress and test international institutions and existing governance
models. Yet is a “Climate-Security Council” truly realistic in light of the Council’s
institutional design and current political paralysis? What could spark Council
climate action? And how should the Council respond to the climate crisis?
I address these questions, and others, proceeding in four parts. I first

describe climate change’s security impacts, analyzing climate change’s
cataclysmic impacts on international peace and security. Second, I analyze the
Council’s gradual willingness to tackle non-traditional security threats. This
offers a possible roadmap for future climate action. In doing so, I analyze climate
change’s existential threat to several island nations, a vanguard climate-security
challenge that strikes at the Council’s core authority and legal responsibilities.
Third, I address the challenges and opportunities represented by any Council
climate action. I conclude by arguing that the Council should explicitly declare
climate change a threat to international peace and security. Doing so unlocks the
door to a menu of legally binding Council actions necessary to meet the existential
challenges of the “climate security century.”

*
Mark Nevitt, Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Summer 2020).
Prior to academia, he served for 20 years in the U.S. Navy as both a tactical jet aviator and
environmental lawyer in national security assignments throughout the world. He previously served
as the Sharswood Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and Class of 1971
Distinguished Professor of Leadership & Law at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.
He especially thanks Professors Maryam Jamshidi, Craig Martin, Jean Galbraith, Eric Jensen,
Thomas Lee, Robert Knowles, Diane Amman, Harlan Cohen, General Charles Dunlap, Lieutenant
Jonathan Todd and participants in the First Annual 2020 National Security Scholars Workshop
and the 2020 Duke Law, Ethics, and National Security Conference for their helpful feedback.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3689320

42 MICH. J. INT’L L. ____ (2021) (forthcoming) Nevitt – updated 22Sep20 (DRAFT)

Introduction
We must make no mistake. The facts are clear. Climate change is real, and it is
accelerating in a dangerous manner. It not only exacerbates threats to
international peace and security; it is a threat to international peace and
security.1
The climate-security century is here. Both the United Nations

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the U.S. Fourth National
Climate Assessment (NCA) recently sounded the alarm on climate change’s “super-
wicked” and destabilizing security impacts.2 Scientists and security professionals
alike reaffirm what we are witnessing with our own eyes: the earth is warming at
a rapid rate, climate change affects international peace and security in complex
ways, and the window for international climate action is slamming shut.
Yet how did we respond to these climate alarm bells? We did little, largely
shrugging a collective global shoulder in response to the loss of life and bleak
scientific reports. U.S. climate leadership slithered away from the world stage,
announcing its withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord. 3 Brazil’s leadership
refused to enforce environmental forest regulations, resulting in devastation to the
Amazon rain forest—the vital and purifying “lungs of the planet.” The Trump
Administration continued massive environmental regulatory rollbacks, even

1 Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Remarks to the Security Council on the Impacts of Climate
Change on International Peace and Security, United Nations Secretary General, Jul. 20, 2011,
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2011-07-20/remarks-security-council-impact-
climate-change-international-peace (last visited Jul. 31, 2020).
2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5 Celsius, Summary for Policy
Makers 6 (2018) [hereinafter IPCC 1.5 Report]; Nat’l Climate Assessment [hereinafter NCA 2018].
Full report available online at: nca2018.globalchange.gov. And the scientific estimates keep getting
worse. In July 2020, scientists from the Center of Excellence for Climate Extremes projected that
climate change will cause average temperatures to rise 4.1 to 8.1 degrees if trends hold, a massive
and catastrophic change to the physical environment. See S. Sherwood et. al, An Assessment of
Earth’s Climate Sensitivity Using Multiple Lines of Evidence, REVIEW OF GEOPHYSICS, (Jul. 22,
2020), available at: https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1029/2019RG000678;
For a discussion of climate change’s “super wicked” problems see Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked
Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 1153 (2009).
3 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc.
FCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015)[hereinafter Paris Agreement]. See also Jean Galbraith,
Two Faces of Foreign Affairs Federalism and What they Mean for Climate Change Mitigation,
112 AJIL UNBOUND 274 (2018) (highlighting federalism challenges within the U.S. system to
address climate change).


dismissing its leading climate scientists.4 Despite a temporary coronavirus-driven
carbon crash, Greenhouse Gas (GHG) levels are the highest in recorded human
history. 5 The Arctic ice caps melted at an extraordinary rate. Australia and
California burned.
Today, there is an ever-widening gap between our understanding of climate
change’s threats and the international community’s willingness to respond to these
threats. The IPCC estimates, for example, that the world has a shrinking window—
approximately one decade—to take massive substantive action to reduce global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or else face the wrath of an angry, sick planet.6
Failure to close the emissions gap will result in enormous, climate-driven
disruption.7
Beyond the global emissions gap, there is an ever-widening global
governance gap. As climate change destabilizes the physical environment, it also
destabilizes existing institutions, forcing us to look at their role in combatting the
climate crisis. Indeed, we must heed earlier calls to action that all “relevant
organs” within the United Nations intensify their efforts to face the climate
challenge. 8 Failure to take substantive international action now will result in
further physical destabilization and the potential loss of four nations.9 After all,

4 President Bolsonaro was sworn in as Brazil’s President in January 2019. He campaigned to
massively roll-back environmental and climate regulations to include deforestation. See, e.g.
Franklin Foer, The Amazon Fires are More Dangerous than WMDs, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 24, 2019.
5 See, e.g., Ishaan Tharoor, World’s Climate Catastrophe Intensifies as Focus Remains on Virus
Pandemic, WASH. POST. Jun. 30, 2020. Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney, Global Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Will Hit Another Record this year, Experts Project, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 3, 2019.
6 The 2018 IPCC report highlighted an emissions gap where there must be dramatic reductions in
GHG emissions prior to 2030 to maintain temperatures below 1.5 degrees Celsius. See also Abrahm
Lustgarten, Refugees Flee from the Earth, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, 11, 18-19 Jul. 26, 2020
(highlighting that 150 million people will be displaced by rising sea levels by 2050).
7 For an overview of climate change’s destructive impacts on civilization, see Kurt M. Campbell and
Christine Parthemore, National Security and Climate Change in Perspective in CLIMATE

CATACLYSM: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Kurt
Campbell ed., 2008).
8 In 2009 the United Nations General Assembly called “on all relevant organs of the United Nations,
as appropriate and within their respective mandates, to identify their efforts in considering and
addressing climate change, including its possible security implications.” U.N. Gen Assembly
63/281 Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications, (Jun. 11, 2009)[hereinafter Climate
Security 2009]
9 It is estimated that four atoll Small Island Developing States — Maldives, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the
Republic of the Marshall Islands — may be uninhabitable by mid-century, threating their very
sovereignty. See Storlazzi et. al, Most atolls will be Uninhabitable by the mid-21st century because
of sea level rise exacerbating wave driven flooding, 4 SCIENCE ADV. 4 (2018), available at:
http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/4/eaap9741 [hereinafter Storlazzi] Kiribati recently


climate change is legally and politically agnostic: it will continue to destabilize
and destroy our physical environment irrespective of our international governance
response.
The Security Council (“Council”) is assuredly one such “relevant organ.”
After all, the Council possesses relatively expeditious and broadly delegated
authorities to take immediate climate action today. Indeed, the Council is
empowered with powerful legal tools in service of its mission to uphold “the
maintenance of international peace and security.” 10 In executing this role, the
Council acts on behalf of all 193 Member nations—who agree to be bound by the
Council’s actions.11 The Council’s authority and expertise in international security
matters can serve a gap-filling, complementary role that works in concert with
ongoing climate efforts at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change’s (UNFCCC), Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and U.N. General
Assembly.12 As Professor Richard Lazarus has exclaimed, climate change is unlike
any other problem facing humanity—it is truly a “super-wicked” problem that cuts
across many disciplines.13 To meet this super-wicked problem, innovative legal
governance solutions are required.

purchased land in Fiji as part of a potential climate relocation plan. Sara Reardon, Pacific Island
to Buy Piece of Fiji as a Climate Plan, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 13, 2012. This also raises core human
rights issues that are beyond the scope of this paper. See generally John H. Knox, Linking Human
Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations, 33 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV. 437 (2009).
10 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility
the Security Council acts on their behalf.”) For an outstanding overview of many of the potential
tools available to the UN Security Council in addressing climate change, see CLIMATE CHANGE AND
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL (Shirley V. Scott & Charlotte Ku ed., Edward Elgar) (2018) [hereinafter
CLIMATE SECURITY]; Pierre Thielberger, Climate Change and International Peace and Security:
Time for a Green Security Council? in FROM COLD WAR TO CYBER WAR (H.J. Heintze & P.
Thielberger eds) (2016). See also Craig Martin, Atmospheric Intervention, 44 COLUM. ENVT’L L.
REV. 331 (2020).
11 U.N. Charter art. 24, para 1 (stating that “Members confer on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agree that in carrying
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf”). See also U.N.
Charter art. 1, para. 1 (stating that the purpose of the United Nations is “to maintain international
peace and security and . . . to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace . . .”).
12 As I discuss below, I do not argue (nor do I envision) that the Council should turn to its Article
42 military authorities to combat climate change’s impacts at this time or within the foreseeable
future. U.N. Charter art. 42.
13 Lazarus, supra note 2.


Of course, any Council climate action must overcome current political
paralysis and criticism that climate change is outside the Council mandate. Yet the
stakes for Council climate inaction are also high. 14 Failure to comprehensively
address climate change presents its own unique costs, particularly as climate
change threatens the territorial integrity and very sovereignty of several small
island nations. The U.N. Charter has sought to uphold the principle of sovereign
equality of all its Members for the past 75 years. In doing so, it has played a critical,
stabilizing role in shaping the post-World War II international order. But climate
change is the ultimate physical and institutional destabilizer, swallowing nations’
and territorial integrity whole, forcing us to look at the international governance
landscape with fresh eyes. Indeed, Council indifference to nation extinction is
fraught with its own legitimacy and credibility costs—can the Council afford to
standby as climate change swallows nations whole?
To be sure, any Council climate action faces political headwinds. In part,
this can be traced to the Council’s institutional design: any member of the
Permanent Five (P5) possesses veto-wielding power over any proposed Council
action. 15 Meanwhile, P5 membership (U.S., Russia, U.K., France, and China)
remains frozen in time, despite calls for membership expansion to better reflect
modern geopolitical and economic realities. Further complicating matters, the
Council is comprised of the world’s worst climate offenders who emit the most
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions.16
Yet the Council has been, in many ways, a dynamic institution since the end
of the Cold War, at times even demonstrating a willingness to address the root
causes of global instability. For the Charter’s first 45 years, its original premise of
a robust “collective security” agenda was largely thwarted by Cold War political

14 Dan Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596 (1999); David Caron, The Legitimacy of
the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 552 (1993). “Climatizing” the
Council exposes the Council to criticism that it is overstepping its historic mandate
15 U.N. Charter art. 27, para 2-3. And independent of climate action, there is a rich scholarly
literature critiquing the Council as hierarchical, anti-democratic, static, and reactive. For a critique
of the Security Council, see Ken Conca, Joe Thwaites, & Gouen Lee, Climate Change and Global
Security: What Role for the Security Council?, 1 PERSPECTIVE (Oct. 2017).
16 The United States, Republic of China, Russia, United Kingdom, and France, are all P5 Members.
At the time of this writing, the United States is the largest historical emitter of GHG emissions while
China emits more GHG emissions on an annual basis than any Member Nation.


realities. Council stonewalling gave way to a rejuvenated “Council 2.0”
commencing in 1990 with Council action against Iraqi aggression and follow-on
peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. Since then, the Council has expanded
its aperture for action to address an increasing menu of non-traditional security
threats to include global health crisis (Ebola and, belatedly, COVID-19), the spread
of weapons of mass destruction, and the underlying causes of conflict and human
suffering.17
This Article argues that climate change’s destabilizing impacts require us to
look at existing international governance tools at our disposal with fresh eyes. As
such, Council climate action cannot and should not be dismissed out-of-hand. As
conflicts rise, migration explodes, and nation are extinguished, how long can the
Council remain on the climate sidelines?18 Hence, my call for a re-conceptualized
“Council 3.o” to meet the climate-security challenges this century.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I describe and analyze the
current state of climate science and the climate-security threats facing the world.
This includes an analysis of the Council’s unique role and responsibility to
maintain international peace and security within the U.N. Charter system. In Part
II, I describe how the Council’s agenda has evolved in recent years to include a
focus on non-traditional security threats to include climate change.19 In doing so,
I offer a possible roadmap for Council climate action, showcasing how climate
change’s existential threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of four Pacific
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) will stress and test Council engagement on
climate change.20 Part III addresses the challenges and opportunities to Council

17 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1625, pmbl. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1625 (September 14, 2005).
18 See supra note 1, at 606-637 (highlighting climate change’s international effects). See also
Kirsten Davies & Thomas Riddell, The Warming War: How Climate Change is Creating Threats
to International Peace and Security, 30 GEO. ENVT’L L. REV. 47 (2017)
19 Political calculations by each Security Council member will play an outsized role in casting a vote
for climate action. Witness the Council’s slow response to the COVID-19 coronavirus crisis. But
there are increased calls for increased Security Council action and that may be changing. See Rob
Berschinski, What the UN Security Council Can Do on Coronavirus: A Global Goods Coordination
Mechanism, JUST SECURITY, Mar. 24, 2020. And Professor Hathaway and others have highlighted
that we need to re-think how we define and face national security threats in the face of the
coronavirus.
20 It is estimated that four atoll Small Island Developing States — Maldives, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and
the Republic of the Marshall Islands — may be uninhabitable by mid-century, threating their very
sovereignty. See Storlazzi, supra note 9.


climate action. Part IV argues that the Council should use its authority under
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter to affirmatively declare climate change a threat to
international peace and security. Doing so activates a series of measured,
gradually escalating steps that the Council should take to address the growing
international climate governance gap. Rather than dismissing Council climate-
involvement, I argue that we should adopt an “institutional risk allocation”
approach where numerous institutions address climate change in a holistic,
complementary way.21 This will require a rejuvenated and reimagined “Council
3.0” that requires a normative reconceptualization of the Council’s role in
upholding peace and security.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE MEETS INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY
A. Climate Change’s Destabilizing Security Impacts
We are entering the climate-security century. As climate change
destabilizes the physical environment, it also destabilizes existing governance
structures. 22 This forces us to look with fresh eyes at the root causes of instability
and the accompanying tools at our collective disposal required to combat the
climate crisis. According to the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) and a near-universal scientific consensus, climate change is “extremely
likely” caused by human activity. 23 And a growing number of scholars now
persuasively argue that we must broaden our definition of security to encompass
climate change, pandemics, and non-traditional threats that have debilitating
impacts on health and human security.24
Consider just a few recent examples of climate change’s destructive path.
In the past eighteen months, massive wildfires destroyed large swaths of Australia

21 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (May 9, 1992)
[hereinafter Framework Convention],
22 See, e.g., Mark P. Nevitt, Climate Change: Our Greatest National Security Threat?, JUST
SECURITY, Apr. 28, 2019 (referring to the 21st century as “the climate-security century).
23 See supra note 1 (highlighting recent studies that predict an increase in global temperatures up
to 8.1 degrees Fahrenheit).

24 See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Covid-19 Shows How the U.S. Got National Security Wrong, JUST
SECURITY, APR. 7, 2020 (arguing that we should broaden the security lens to include pandemics,
other public health threats, and climate change).


and California.25 Hurricanes Michael26 and Florence27 ravaged the coastlines of
Florida and North Carolina. Water shortages, food security, and crop instability—
all exacerbated by climate change—contributed to a rapidly deteriorating security
situation in many developing nations. 28 Scholars now make data-driven,
empirical connections between climate change and increases in violent conflict.29
Both climate scientists and national security professionals forecast a dangerous
world increasingly defined by climate change.30 Consider the following four ways
that climate change impacts international peace and security:
• Extreme Weather. The American Meteorological Society recently
found that anthropogenic climate change increased the likelihood and
severity of 15 of 16 recent extreme weather events. 31 As climate
scientists refine their models, we will be able to predict with greater
certainty the future likelihood of extreme weather events and better
pinpoint their size, location and devastating effects.
• Climate migrants. 32 We have witnessed the rise of cross-border
climate change migrants that are fleeing their homes in response to
climate-exacerbated drought and other environmental hazards. Future

25 REUTERS, California Wildfire that Killed Nearly 85 People Nearly Contained, Nov. 25, 2018,
available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-wildfires/california-wildfire-that-
killed-at-least-85-people-fully-contained-idUSKCN1NU0A9
26 Dakin Andone, Death Toll From Hurricane Michael Rises to 36, CNN.COM, Oct. 20, 2018
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/20/us/hurricane-michael-death-toll/index.html
27 REUTERS, Hurricane Florence Death Toll Rises to 51, Oct. 2, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-florence/hurricane-florence-death-toll-rises-to-51-
idUSKCN1MC2JJ
28 CAMPBELL, supra note 7. see also Emily Atkin, Climate Change is Aggravating the Suffering in
Yemen, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 2018.

29 Kendra Sakaguchi, Anil Varghese & Graeme Auld, Climate Wars? A Systematic Review of
Empirical Analysis on the Links Between Climate Change and Violent Conflict, INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES REVIEW (2017) (summarizing the existing empirical literature, noting that a “majority of
studies find evidence that climate variables are associated with higher levels of violent conflict”).
30 For example, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a report acknowledging
the global human security challenge posed by climate change. See, e.g., DANIEL R. COATS, DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD: WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE
U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 21-23 (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf
31 EXTREME EVENTS STUDY, supra note 35.
32 There is a broad literature on what to call people displaced by climate change (environmental
refugees, climate refugees, or climate migrants?). I use the broader term of “climate migrants”
throughout the paper as it best captures the numerous reasons—all driven by climate change—why
people flee their homes. For a helpful discussion of this academic debate, see Philip Dane Warren,
Note: Evaluating Climate Change Displacement, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2103, 2109-10 (2017).


climate migrant estimates look bleak: one study found that two-thirds
of the world’s population faces severe water shortages, a driver of cross-
border human migration.33 The Syrian refugee crisis, for example, was
preceded by a massive, climate-exacerbated drought that saw internal
displacement from rural areas to cities within Syria. This created the
conditions for political unrest that quickly spread outside Syria’s
borders. 34 Yet there is a widening international governance gap to
address this pending explosion in climate migration.35 Will the Council
play a role in mitigating the effects on the hundreds of millions of
climate migrants anticipated this century?
• Climate Change and Armed Conflict. Studies predict an
increasingly dangerous, Hobbesian world where climate-driven food
insecurity, resource wars, and physical destabilization lead to armed
conflict, violence, and chaos. 36 Scholars now demonstrate a linkage
between climate change’s impacts and violent conflict.37 The Council
specifically connected climate change’s impacts to a conflict area in a
series of recent Security Council Resolution. This reinforces the
Council’s competence in tackling threats to international peace and

33 Nicholas St. Fleur, Two-Thirds of the World Faces Severe Water Shortages, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/science/two-thirds-of-the-world-faces-severe-
water-shortages.html. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Figures At A Glance,
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html (last visited Aug 4, 2020)
34 See F. De Châtel, The role of drought and climate change in the Syrian uprising: Untangling
the triggers of the revolution, 50 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, 521-535, available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2013.850076.
35 For an outstanding discussion of the gaps in international law as it related to refugees, see Jill
Goldenzeil, The Curse of the Nation-State: Refugees, Migration, and Security in International
Law, 48 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 579 (2016); see also Lustgarten, supra note 6, at 11-23.
36 CAMPBELL, supra note 7. CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 13-18, 39 (2007), available at https://www.cna.org/reports/climate (noting that

climate change’s destabilizing impacts include reduced access to fresh water, impaired food
production, health catastrophes, displacement of major populations, greater potential for failed
states to include a rise in terrorism, mass migrations, and escalation of conflicts over resources)
[hereinafter CNA 2007].
37 Kendra Sakaguchi, Anil Varghese, Graeme Auld, Climate Wars? A Systematic Review of
Empirical Analysis on the Links Between Climate Change and Violent Conflict, INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES REVIEW (2017) (providing a systematic, empirical analysis connecting climate change with
violent conflict).


security in conflict areas.38 Will the Council build upon these efforts in
addressing climate change’s role in resource wars and conflict?
• Nation Extinction. Scientists now predict that four Pacific Small
Island Developing States will be uninhabitable by mid-century due to
climate change-driven sea level rise and wave-driven flooding.39 These
nations will lose large swaths of their territory, potentially leading to
wholesale abandonment. Will the Council—which has the express
responsibility to maintain peace and security—standby while nations
lose their territorial integrity and, potentially, their sovereignty?40
These four examples—extreme weather, climate migration, armed conflict, and
nation extinction—are a mere snapshot of climate change’s security impacts this
century.
Despite these threats, our international legal governance institutions have
not kept pace. They have lagged scientific advances, failing to address and climate
change’s security implications. As of this writing, we lack a legally binding path
forward to lower worldwide GHG emissions. Indeed, scientists and security
professionals estimate that our collective failure to keep the average global
temperatures from rising above two degrees Celsius will have devastating
consequences, particularly for developing nations with limited climate adaptation
resources. 41 Increases in global temperature beyond two degrees point could
potentially trigger climate “tipping points,” pouring gasoline on an already
simmering climate fire. Further, climate attribution science advances showcase
that climate change increases the likelihood of extreme weather throughout the
world.42
In response to our increased understanding of climate change’s security
impacts, scientists and policy experts have begun to adopt a security vernacular.
Climate change is not just an environmental concern—it acts as both a “threat

38 See S.C. Res. 2349 ¶ 26 S/RES/2349 (October 14, 2017) (recognizing climate change’s adverse
effects on water scarcity, drought, and desertification in the Lake Chad Basin region).
39 Storlazzi, supra note 9.
41 IPCC 1.5 Report, supra note 1.
42 EXTREME EVENTS STUDY, supra note 35. See also
https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2018/12/10/climate-change-was-behind-weather-
disasters/?utm_term=.61d93dce8d7d
10


multiplier” and a “catalyst for conflict.”43 The 2015 Paris Climate Agreement labels
climate change an “urgent threat” while recognizing climate change’s pernicious
impacts on food security.44 Due to scientific advances, we now have a much clearer
understanding of the relationship between human activity, climate change, and
global security.45
COVID-19’s ongoing deadly global impact—the United States has lost more
people to COVID-19 than all conflicts since World War II—bolsters the need to
reconceptualize and broaden traditional notions of threats to human and national
security.46 Tragically, the novel coronavirus crisis may foreshadow even greater
global health threats as climate change accelerates the spread of vector-borne
diseases around the world.47 But COVID-19 may signal the beginning of a new era
of public health threats, forcing us to reconceptualize traditional notions of
security.
B. The Security Council’s Responsibility for the Maintenance of
International Peace and Security
In what follows, I analyze the Council’s institutional design, delegated legal
authorities, and how conceptions of “legitimacy” impact potential Council climate
action.48

43 MILITARY ADVISORY BD., CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ACCELERATING
RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2014) https:// www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/MAB_5-8-14.pdf.
[hereinafter CNA 2014]. In addition, former Secretary of State John Kerry referring to climate
change as a “weapon of mass destruction” and former Defense Secretary William Perry comparing
it to a slowly unfolding “nuclear war.” See, e.g., Jeff McMahon, Former Defense Secretary
Compares Climate Change to Nuclear War, FORBES, Dec. 9, 2018.
44 See IPCC 1.5 Report, supra note 1.
45 See AMERICAN METEOROLOGICAL SOCIETY, Explaining Extreme Events of 2017 from a Climate
Perspective, available at: https://www.ametsoc.org/ams/index.cfm/publications/bulletin-of-

the-american-meteorological-society-bams/explaining-extreme-events-from-a-climate-
perspective/ (finding that 15 of 16 extreme weather events were made more likely by human caused
climate change) [hereinafter EXTREME EVENTS STUDY].
46 Scholars have debated whether it is best to frame climate change as a “human security” or
“national security” issue. For a discussion of this debate, see Maryam Jamshidi, The Climate
Change Crisis Is a Human Security, Not a National Security Issue, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT
36 (2019).
47 The COVID-19 crisis, while not directly related to climate change, may foreshadow future global
health risks as climate change increases the risk posed by vector-borne diseases. See NCA4, supra
note 1, at 616 (describing climate change’s role in exacerbating vector-borne diseases such as Zika
and West Nile virus that are transmitted by mosquitos).
48 U.N. Charter arts. 39-51. Chapter VII, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of
the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” For a discussion of the role of the Security Council in the face
of climate change, see Trina Ng, Safeguarding Peace and Security in our Warming World: A Role
for the Security Council, 15 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 275 (2010) (arguing that climate
11


1. The Council’s Delegated Legal Authorities & Institutional Design
The Council is composed of five permanent Member nations (“P5”):
Republic of China, Russia, United States, France, and the United Kingdom. P5
membership has remained constant since 1945, a source of enormous controversy
and criticism since the Charter’s inception The remaining ten Council seats are
held by rotating, non-permanent Members elected for two-year terms.49 Highly
competitive and sought after, membership eligibility for these ten seats must take
into account both “equitable geographic distribution” as well as Member nations’
respective contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.50
In addition, 38 of the 193 United Nations Members states are designated Small
Island Developing States (SIDS) that most acutely suffer from climate change’s
debilitating effects. 51 The Charter’s guidance on Council non-permanent
membership eligibility, and a comparably large contingent of Small Island
Developing States suggest that climate change will play a role in the Council’s
rotating membership.52
As a parliamentary matter, the Council does not require the vote of every
Member nation—any Council vote simply requires nine affirmative votes and the
concurrence (or abstention) of all five permanent members. 53 If this voting
threshold is met, Council decisions bind the other Member States.54 Hence, the

change threats are “tantamount to threats to international peace and security given the evolution
of threats since . . . 1945”).
49 U.N. Charter art. 23, para 1-2. The Charter outlines criteria for election to the Security Council,
noting “due regard” is paid to Members contributing to the maintenance of international peace and
security and to “equitable geographical distribution.” Id. In 1965, Council non-permanent
membership was increased from 6 to 10 members. Security Council membership has held steady
at 15 since then (10 non-permanent, 5 permanent).
50 U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1.
51 The SIDS group accounts for fully 20% of the nation’s eligible for election as non-permanent
Council Members. The Charter is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members. As a structural matter, this bolsters Small Island Developing States as a powerful voting
bloc. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 1.
52 Perhaps not surprisingly, Greta Thunberg and other climate activists scrutinized the climate
policies of both Norway and Canada during the most recent Council election in 2020. See discussion
infra Part I.B.2.
53 U.N. Charter art. 27, para 2-3. Id. The Charter is silent on the legal import of abstaining from a
vote, but from the Council’s first meetings permanent member abstention was not treated the same
as a veto. This has been the operating consensus ever since. See Ian Hurd, The UN Security Council
and the International Rule of Law, THE CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 11 (2014).
54 U.N. Charter, art. 25.
12


Council could potentially serve as an expedient international venue to address
climate change.55
The U.N. Charter’s express purpose is to maintain international peace and
security 56 and “is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all of its
members.”57 Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter reaffirms the prohibition on the use
of force. Member nations must “refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state . . .”58 And under Article 24 of the U.N. Charter, the Council has “primary
responsibility” to ensure international peace and security.59 With this authority
comes a special responsibility—with affirmative duties—for the Council to take
measures on behalf of the other Member nations to ensure international peace and
security.
The Council, acting on behalf of all other Member states, can tap into the
Council’s broad enforcement authorities, but only when it has first made a
determination that a situation rises to a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression” within the meaning of Article 39.60 While the Council has
broad discretion in making this legal determination, doing so must still conform
with the U.N. Charter’s governing Purposes and Principles. 61 And the Council
must follow-through with effective enforcement and follow-through—something
that the Council has historically struggled to do.

55 And the Security Council has shown the ability to act relatively quickly in using its powers. In the
aftermath of September 11th, the Security Council passed a resolution.
56 U.N. Charter art. 1, para 1.
57 U.N. Charter art. 2, para 1.
58 U.N. Charter art. 2, para 1 (emphasis added). In the climate change context, GHG emissions
directly causes global warming which, in turn, can threaten the territorial integrity and sovereignty
of vulnerable nations such as Small Island Developing States, discussed infra. Discussion of climate
change’s security impacts is absent from the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change treaty.
59 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility
the Security Council acts on their behalf.” Id (emphasis added).
60 U.N. Charter art. 39. In practice, “threat to peace” is the most common determination that the
Council uses in making an article 39 determination, disfavoring “acts of aggression” and “breach of
the peace.”
61 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. And it is unclear whether this is subject to International Court of
Justice (ICJ) review. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2. The ICJ has historically not reviewed Security
Council decisions.
13


Of course, there must be a bona fide threat to international peace and
security—purely domestic impacts are beyond the Council’s purview. The Council
is prohibited from intervening “in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state . . .”62 GHG emissions and climate change’s
corresponding impacts do not respect neat political boundaries. And there is an
increased understanding that seemingly domestic climate change matters can spill
across international borders quickly, making the international and domestic
distinction increasingly a gray area and not a strict dichotomy.63
2. Council Action: Legitimacy Concerns
Simply because the Council has the ability to take an action, does that mean
that it should? To be sure, the Council possesses wide discretion in determining
what rises to a “threat to the peace” under the U.N. Charter. 64 If the Council
determines that climate change is a threat to the peace within the meaning of
Article 39, the door is unlocked to powerful Chapter VII authorities.65 But core
legal and political legitimacy concerns are always lurking in the background. These
must be taken into account prior to the Council tackling climate change.
Broadly speaking, legitimacy is the belief of an agent that a rule or
institution has a right to be obeyed.66 The Council has few instruments to ensure
compliance with its decisions. While Council resolutions are legally mandatory,
they still depend on states’ “believing that they have in interest in going along with
them.” 67 Professor Dan Bodansky and others have convincingly argued that
democratic government legitimacy principles can be applied to international

63 Pierre Thielberger, Climate Change and International Peace and Security: Time for a Green
Security Council? in FROM COLD WAR TO CYBER WAR (H.J. Heintze & P. Thielberger eds) (2016).
64 U.N. Charter art. 39.
65 U.N. Charter art. 39. See also Christopher K. Penny, Greening the Security Council: Climate
Change as an Emerging "Threat to International Peace and Security”, 7 INT’L ENVIRON

AGREEMENTS 35, 53-54 (2007). For an overview of historic Council actions under Chapter VII, see
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, Actions with Respect to Threat to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression, www.un.org.securicy council/content/repertoire/actions (last
visited Jul. 27, 2020) (listing historic information when the Council “has determined the existence
of a threat and examines instances where the existence of a threat was debated”).
66 Hurd, supra note 53, at 7-8 (2014). The legitimacy literature is wide and varied and beyond the
scope of this article to thoroughly address. For an outstanding overview of legal legitimacy, see TOM
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to
Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L. J. 1011 (2003).
67 Hurd, supra note 53, at 8.
14


governance. As international institutions gain greater authority, their consensual
underpinnings erode. 68 Legitimate authority is synonymous with justified
authority. “Legitimacy” has a normative and socio-political dimension where
perceived legitimacy can affect the Council’s ability to carry out adopt decisions.69
Consider the growing connection between sociological-based legitimacy
and climate activism surrounding Council membership elections. In the last
Council election for non-permanent Membership, nations had their climate
policies and commitment to sustainability heavily scrutinized.70 Greta Thunberg
and other climate change activists, for example, recently spoke out against the
climate policies of two prospective non-permanent Security Council members
(Canada and Norway) in this year’s Council election. The climate activists argued
that these nations were overly reliant on fossil fuels and should take steps to divest
their economies from fossil fuels as a condition for Council membership.71
While the precise efficacy of these climate-advocacy efforts remains unclear
(Norway was elected, but Canada was not) it nevertheless showcased the
increasing role that climate policies will have on shaping governance structures
and their follow-on actions. The increased awareness of climate change’s
devastating impacts—embodied by the work of international climate activists such
as Greta Thunberg, popular writing such as David Wallace Wells Uninhabitable
Earth, and advocacy-legislation such as the Green New Deal—suggest a growing
acceptance for international climate action and a groundswell of support for
popular legitimacy.72
C. Chapter VI Authorities: Pacific Settlement of Disputes
Chapter VI of the UN Charter (“Pacific Settlement of Disputes”) reinforces
the UN Charter’s underlying goal of settling disputes by peaceful means, laying out
the Council’s broad investigation powers. 73 Chapter VI actions can be taken

68 Bodansky, supra note 14.
69 Id. at 601-02.
70 Megan Darby, Greta Thunberg looks to U.N. security council election for leverage on climate,
CLIMATE HOME NEWS, (Jun. 6, 2020) https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/06/10/greta-

thunberg-seeks-influence-un-security-council-election/ (last visited Jul. 30, 2020).
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., DAVID WALLACE-WELLS, THE UNINHABITABLE EARTH (2019).
73 U.N. Charter art. 33. (“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation,
15


without an Article 39 “threat to the peace” determination. Article 34 outlines the
Council’s broad investigatory powers to:
[I]nvestigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international
friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of
the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security.74
The Council may take action on disputes by “recommending appropriate

procedures or methods of adjustment.” 75 In addition, any Member nation may
bring “any dispute” to the attention of the Council or General Assembly.76 The
Council, in turn, may recommend “appropriate procedures” to settle the dispute or
take a specific action such as referring the dispute to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ).77
Under Article 96 of the U.N. Charter, either the Council or the General
Assembly may request that the ICJ “give an advisory opinion on any legal
question.” Alternatively, the Secretary-General may bring any matter which may
threaten the maintenance of peace and security to the Security Council.78 Climate-
security matters could, theoretically, be brought before the ICJ.79 But as Professor
Michael Gerrard and others have opined, the ICJ is not a particularly promising
path for transformative or even substantive climate action.80 Outside the climate
change context, the ICJ’s jurisdiction and enforcement mandate is not universally
accepted.81 Other international tribunals have recently addressed climate security
matters, shining much needed light on asylum seekers from Small Island

enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
agreements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”). Id.
74 U.N. Charter art. 34 (emphasis added).
76 U.N. Charter art. 35. The Security Council’s Chapter VI authorities are largely drafted in a
manner to resolve disputes between Member Nations. Climate change and its corresponding
security implications are a multivariate, collective action problem among all 193 Member nations.
80 Professor Gerrard has stated that seeking an ICJ advisory opinion on principles of international
law in the mitigation context is not a fruitful path. See Statement of Michael B. Gerrard, Security
Council Open Arria Formula Meeting: The Role of Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier for
Global Security, Jun. 30, 2015.
81 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States),
1986 I.C.J. 392 (resulting in the U.S. withdrawal from ICJ compulsory jurisdiction).
16


Developing States.82 Under my institutional risk allocation approach to climate
governance discussed below, I welcome efforts from competent international
tribunals to address climate-security matters—provided that it acts within its
competence and jurisdiction. But I ultimately share Professor Gerrard’s
skepticism that the ICJ or other relevant international human rights bodies can or
will play a leading role in addressing climate change.
D. Climate Change and the Council’s Chapter VII Authorities
Under Chapter VII, the Council possesses broad powers to restore and
maintain international peace and security. 83 Before the Security Council can
activate these broad enforcement authorities, it must first determine whether a
“threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” exists under Article
39.84 In making this critical determination, the Security Council shall:
[D]etermine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.85
Of the three possible Article 39 determinations—(1) threat to the peace; (2) breach
of the peace; or (3) act of aggression, the Council heavily relies upon “threat to the
peace” when addressing non-traditional security threats.86 “Threat to the peace”
is undefined within the Charter—the Council is granted broad discretion in making
this determination. 87 If the Council makes an Article 39 determination, its
powerful Chapter VII authorities are then actuated—a legally expedient approach

82 In 2020, the United Nations Human Rights Counsel recently addressed climate security arising
from an asylum seeker from a Small Island Developing States. While it remains to be seen how this
ruling will be implemented by different nations, it nevertheless demonstrates climate change’s
threats posed to developing nations. Rob Picheta, Climate Refugees cannot be sent back home,
United Nations rules in landmark decision, CNN.com (Jan. 20, 2020)
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/20/world/climate-refugees-unhrc-ruling-scli-intl/index.html
83 U.N. Charter arts. 39-51. Any Council action must be consistent with the UN Charter, Chapter I,
“Purposes and Principles.” U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2.

86 I define non-traditional security threats somewhat capaciously to include global health,
environmental and climate security, gender security, and the threats posed by non-state actors. As
I discuss infra Part II.A, the Council has shown a willingness to address such threats.
87 See Bodansky, supra note 14. See also Anna M. Vrandenburgh, The Chapter VII Powers of the
United Nations Charter: Do They Trump Human Rights Law?, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP, L. REV.
175, 178 (1991).
17


but one that must take into account core legitimacy concerns.88 If the Council
overcomes political paralysis in declaring climate change a threat to the peace,
what steps might the Council take?
Article 40 of the U.N. Charter authorizes the Council to “call upon the
parties concerned to comply with such provisional measure as it deems necessary
or desirable.”89 If Article 40 measures prove ineffective, the Council could next
employ Article 41 economic or diplomatic measures against nations engaging in
extremely harmful climate activities. This authorizes non-military measures, such
as economic sanctions against nations that engage in actions that threaten
international peace and security.90 To be sure, moving from Article 40 to 41 will
increase the action’s underlying legitimacy risk as the Council ratchets from soft
measures to hard compliance measures. As discussed infra Part V, Article 41
sanctions could take many forms. The Council could directly sanction so-called
“climate rogue states” or move to ban the import of a particularly harmful climate
product or individual—Brazil’s massive deforestation efforts that destroy the
Amazon rainforest are but one prominent example. But well-intentioned
economic sanctions may counter harmful state action and also end up harming the
most vulnerable citizens.91
If the Article 41 non-military measures prove to be inadequate, the Council
can next turn to its awesome Article 42 military powers. 92 Article 42 states:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.93

88 This chapter is titled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and
Acts of Aggression” and is addressed in Articles 39-51.
90 U.N. Charter art. 41. I borrow the term “climate rogue states” from Professor Martin to describe
nations that engage in egregiously destructive environmental behavior with a disproportionate

impact on climate change. See Martin, supra note 10.
91 See, e.g., Catherine Tinker, Environmental Security in the United Nations: Not a Matter for the
Security Council, 59 TENN. L. REV. 787, 794 (1992) (stating that sanctions often punish the citizens
of the target state more than its leaders).
92 Martin, supra note 10.
18


As I discuss infra Part V, I do not recommend the Council employing military
measures to address climate change now or in the foreseeable future. Regardless
of the legitimacy or practically of the Council taking climate action today, the
Council has the authority to act relatively expeditious manner.
E. Climate Change and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense
Independent of the Council’s Chapter VI and VII authorities, each Member
nation possesses the inherent right of self-defense in the event of an “armed
attack.” 94 “Armed attack” includes self-defense against non-state actors, but
climate change poses additional, practical problems in addressing both its
causality and attribution.95 Nevertheless, some scholars have begun to theorize
that climate change provides a just cause for war, at least in principle.96 Professor
Craig Martin has opened the dialogue to for expanding the doctrine of self-defense
in the case of atmospheric intervention.97
How might the right of self-defense apply to climate-security impacts?
Consider the case of a Small Island Developing State whose territory is threatened
by sea level rise and wave-driven flooding. Climate change is not a traditional
armed attack within the meaning of Article 51, but its security impacts—loss of land
through sea level rise, extreme weather, drought—are no less devastating. Yet
lowering the legal bar or fundamentally changing our collective understanding of
what constitutes an armed attack has enormous normative consequences for
Article 51 and the right to use force.98
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully address the enormous normative
implications that a fundamental reconceptualization of Article 51 as applied to
climate change would entail. The slowly burning climate crisis and widening

94 U.N. Charter art. 51. It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully flesh out the legal standard
associated with “armed attack: and the inherent right of self-defense under the U.N. Charter. See,
e.g., ROSEMARY RAYFUSE, SHIRLEY V. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE 234
(EDWARD ELGER ED. 2012).
95 This makes it exceedingly difficult to invoke Article 51 to pierce the jus ad bellum regime.
96 Adam Betz, Preventive Environmental Wars, JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS (2019) (arguing that
the “scope and scale of prospective harms threatened by climate change are such that that, were
they to result from an armed attack, there would unequivocally be a just cause for war”). Professor
Betz acknowledges that while environmental war may be justified in principle, there are challenges
in practice. Id. at 20.
97 See Martin, supra note 10, at 41-50.
98 Id.
19


emissions gap is, nevertheless, forcing scholars to try to reconcile climate change
with traditional use of force conceptions.99 As discussed below, the Council has
shown an increased willingness to address the root causes of armed conflict, to
include an increase willingness to address climate change in Security Council
Resolutions and Council-sponsored debates.100
II. SECURITY COUNCIL ENGAGEMENT ON NON-TRADITIONAL
SECURITY THREATS
In what follows, I analyze the Council’s steady evolution and willingness to
address the root causes of threats to international peace and security. In some
cases—such as its Ebola response—the Council made an Article 39 threat to the
peace determination. The Council’s action on Ebola, in particular, offers a
potential roadmap for future climate engagement. While political obstacles
remain, the Council has demonstrated a halting, but unmistakable willingness to
broaden its jurisdiction to address the root causes to threats to international peace
and security.101
A. The Council’s Evolving Definition of “Threat to the Peace”
Following limited Council action during the Cold War—where the United
States and Soviet Union threatened to veto each other’s actions, thus nullifying any
Council action—the Council has shown a willingness to expand its definition of
what rises to a threat to international peace and security. Beyond the changing
political reality, what might account for this change?
First, “threat to the peace” lacks a precise definition within the Charter. The
Council is essentially afforded extraordinary discretion in making such a critical
legal determination. The Council’s broad discretionary authority in making a
threat to the peace determination was reaffirmed in the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s decision in Prosecutor v. Tadic. In Tadic,
the Court held that while an “act of aggression” is more amenable to a legal

99 Id.
100 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2349 ¶ 26, S/RES/2349 (October 14, 2017). (recognizing climate change’s
adverse effects in water scarcity, drought, and desertification in the Lake Chad Basin region). The
Lake Chad resolution was followed up by Council references to climate security in four Security
Council Resolutions in Somalia, Darfur, West Africa and the Sahel, and Mali.
101 See, e.g, S.C. Res. 1625, pmbl. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1625 (September 14, 2005) (addressing the
disparate security impacts on women).
20


determination, “threat to the peace” is more of a political concept.102 As a political
rather than a legal judgment, the Council’s authority “expands each time it finds a
new kind of problem to be a threat to the peace.”103 Of course, any Council action
remains bound by a variety of factors to include the Charter’s Purposes and
Principles and the action’s accepted legitimacy from other Member states.104
Second, we now have a better awareness of the linkage between the
underlying causes of conflict and its corresponding effects. This includes the threat
to international peace and security posed by environmental destruction, non-state
actors, weapons proliferation, and global pandemics. In what follows, I analyze
five key instances where the Council displayed a willingness to go outside
traditional collective security matters, expanding its conception of what may
constitute a threat to international peace and security.
1. Root Causes of Conflict: Environmental and Climate Security
The Council was confronted with massive environmental destruction by
Iraqi leadership during the 1990 Persian Gulf War. In the aftermath of the Persian
Gulf War, the Council passed a resolution declaring that Iraq was “liable under
international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage
and the depletion of natural resources . . . as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion
and occupation of Kuwait.”105 Following the conclusion of the armed conflict, in
1992 the Council acknowledged that ecological and social issues could also
constitute threats to international peace and security:
The absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does not in itself ensure
international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the
economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace
and security.106
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s destruction of the oil fields was inextricably
linked to the Council’s Resolution and action in an international armed conflict.

102 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Establishment of the International Tribunal, IT-91-1-AR72, 35 ILM 32, ¶
29 (Oct. 20, 1995).
103 Hurd, supra note 53, at 3.
104 See supra Part I.B.3; see also Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990).
105 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. ¶ 16 S/RES/687 (1991). This marked the first time that the Council
determined that a state was liable for harm to the environment itself, apart from injury to people
and property. Catherine Tinker, supra note 91, at 789.
106 U.N. SCOR, 3406th mtg., at 143, U.N. Doc S/P 3046 (Jan. 31, 1992). For a brief discussion of the
Council’s approach to soft threats, see Mark P. Nevitt, The Commander in Chief’s Authority to
Combat Climate Change, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 492-95 (2015).
21


By recognizing and acknowledging the destructive capacity of ecological harms,
however, the Council took an initial step toward conceptualizing a broader
framework of threats to international peace and security beyond merely interstate
conflict.
The environmental security connection was further addressed in 2004,
when then-U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed new and emerging
threats to international security. He specifically identified environmental
degradation and climate change as the driver of natural disasters that undermine
international peace and security.107 In 2005, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
stated:
Threat to peace and security in the twenty-first century include not just
international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease
and environmental degradation since thee can have equally catastrophic
consequences.108
In 2005, the Council reaffirmed that it was prepared to address the root cause of
armed conflict—in the context of conflict’s disparate effects on women and gender
issues more broadly— in an effort to “adopt a broad strategy of conflict
prevention.”109 In 2006, Secretary Annan followed up his earlier pronouncements
on environmental security, stating that “global climate change must take its place
alongside [the] threats of conflict, poverty and the proliferation of deadly weapons
that have traditionally monopolized first-order political attention.”110
2. The Legislative Council: Terrorism (2001) and the Spread of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (2004)111

107 The panel noted, “ . . . [i]f climate change produces more acute flooding, heat waves, droughts,
and storms, this pace [of natural disasters] may accelerate.” High Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 53 U.N. G.A.O.R.,
59th Session, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
108 Kofi Anan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All
(2005).
109 S.C. Res. 1625, pmbl. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1625 (September 14, 2005).
110 UN SECRETARIAT Nairobi Framework, n.80 (2006).
111 For a discussion of the Security Council as a legislative body, see Eric Rosand, The Security
Council as “Global Legislator”: Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT’L . L. J. 542, 544
(2005). Alexandra Knight, Note: Global Environmental Threats, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1569,
n.97 (2005). For a discussion within the international relations literature of the Security Council’s
role in combatting climate change, see CONCA ET. AT. Climate Change and the UN Security Council:
Bully Pulpit or Bull in a China Shop? 17 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 2 (MAY 2017).
22


In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks against the United
States, the Council passed Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001. The Council
expressly declared that the terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and
Washington “constitute a threat to international peace and security.”112 In doing
so, it reaffirmed the need to “combat by all means . . . threats to international peace
and security caused by terrorist acts.” 113 Drawing upon its broad Chapter VII
authorities and (at that time) overwhelming international support for action, the
Council required all Member states to pass domestic legislation to both “prevent
and suppress the financing of terrorist acts” and “freeze funds and other financial
assets of persons who commit terrorist acts.”114 Each Member Nation was further
required to adopt domestic legislation to criminalize the “willful provision or
collection, by any means . . . of funds by their nationals or in their territories with
the intention that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts.”115
Three years later, in 2004, the Council made a similar determination
addressing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—to include nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. In making an Article 39 threat to the peace
determination, 116 the Council cracked down on terrorism financing and
strengthened border controls to counter the illegal import of WMD materials.117
Specifically, the Council required states to “refrain from permitting non-state
actors access to WMDs and their means of delivery, enforce domestic laws
prohibiting nonstate actors access to WMDs, and develop and maintain border
controls to prevent the proliferation of WMDs.”118
The Council’s sweeping actions to address terrorism and the spread of
WMDs via implementing domestic legislation remain controversial to this day.

112 S.C. Res. ¶ 3 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (September 28, 1991).
113 Id. at ¶ 5.
114 Id. at ¶ 10.
115 Id.
116 S.C. Res., 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
117 Id.
118 Id; see also Shirley V. Scott & Roberta C.D. Andrade, The Global Response to Climate Change:
Can the Security Council Assume a Lead Role?, 18 BROWN. J. WORLD AFF. 215, 220-221 (2012).
Some security experts have linked climate change to an uptick in terrorist activity and developing
nations have analogized climate change to both terrorism and WMDs. See CNA 2014, supra note
43. Acknowledging this reality, the President of Nauru recently compared the threats posed by
climate change to the threats posed by nuclear proliferation and terrorism.
23


Nevertheless, they showcased the Council’s ability to go beyond interstate conflict
and state aggression in making a threat to the peace determination within Article
39 and follow-through with aggressive Chapter VII mandates. It also
demonstrated how quickly the Council can take ex post action following a
catastrophic event. This marked an expansion of the Council’s jurisdiction—a
significant transformation from the Council’s Cold War stasis.
3. Security Council Action and Natural Disaster Response: Haiti
(2010)
The Council has also shown a willingness to take action, ex post, in response
to natural disasters. In responding to a devastating earthquake in Haiti in 2010
that killed up to 300,000 people, the Council adopted Resolution 1908.119 This
Resolution expanded a pre-existing United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
to include the “immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts undertaken
by the Government of Haiti.” 120 In response to the earthquake, the Security
Council also authorized an increase in the number of military and police personnel
assigned to the mission.121
The Council did not explicitly mention climate change in the Resolution,
and it is unclear if the Council would have ever taken action in Haiti if an existing
U.N. security mission was not already in place. Yet recent climate attribution
science advances showcase that climate change will cause an uptick in extreme
weather, stressing the international community’s ability to respond to future
natural disasters. 122 The Council’s response in the 2010 Haitian earthquake
suggests, however, that ex post responses to extreme weather events are already
within the Council’s zone of competence. It remains to be seen whether the
Council will take proactive, ex ante climate measures outside of armed conflict or
independent of an existing U.N. mission.
4. The Council & International Public Health Crisis: HIV/AIDS
(200o, 2011)

119 S.C. RES., 1908, UN Doc. S/RES/1908 (July 17, 2010).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See generally EXTREME WEATHER, supra note 35.
24


In 2000, the Council addressed the global HIV/AIDS health crisis via
Resolution 1308.123 This “stress[ed] the need of coordinated efforts of all relevant
United Nations organizations.”124 It further noted that the HIV/AIDS pandemic,
“if unchecked” may pose a risk to stability and security,125 reaffirming the Council’s
role and “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security.” 126 While stopping short of making an Article 39 threat to the peace
determination, it encouraged Member States to work with the international
community and international organization such as UNAIDS to develop “long-term
strategies for HIV/AIDS education, prevention, voluntary and confidential testing
and counselling . . . as part of their participation in peacekeeping operations.”127
In 2011, the Council built on this earlier effort in addressing HIV’s debilitating
impacts on international peace and security via Resolution 1983.128 The Council
recognized HIV/AIDS as “one of the most formidable challenges to the
development and stability of societies that required a global response.”
In each instance the Council did not find that the HIV/AIDS crisis was a
direct threat to international peace and security within the meaning of Article 39,
thus activating its Chapter VII authorities. But the Council’s willingness to more
generally address the HIV/AIDS crisis signaled a continual willingness to address
underlying threats that destabilize peace and security, not unlike the Council’s 1991
recognition that ecological degradation can threaten peace and security. Similar
to climate change, HIV/AIDS acts as a destabilizing force that disproportionately
impacts developing nations. As discussed in the Ebola case study below, the
Council’s ability to successfully navigate a global health crisis could serve as a
roadmap for future climate action.
5. The Council and the 2014 Ebola Public Health Crisis: A Potential
Roadmap for Climate Action?
In the summer of 2014, the lethal Ebola virus rapidly spread through the
developing world, devastating several West African nations. Thousands died. Fear

123 S.C. Res. 1308, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1308 (July 17, 2000).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 S.C. Res. 1983, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1983 (June 7, 2011).
25


and misinformation spread throughout the region, further undermining the crisis.
In August 2014, the Presidents of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea requested that
the United Nations take measures to respond to the growing Ebola crisis. Shortly
thereafter, the World Health Organization (WHO) put in place an “Ebola Response
Roadmap” designed to help coordinate the complex international response. As the
Ebola virus cut an increasingly lethal path through Africa, it became clear that
additional international action was needed to combat the crisis. Shortly thereafter
the Council took action, declaring that the Ebola outbreak in Africa constitutes a
threat to international peace and security” within the meaning of Article 39.129
In making a threat to the peace determination, the Council called on all
Member States to take four specific actions while reserving its most potent Chapter
VII authorities. 130 First, it called on Member States to lift travel and border
restrictions that were imposed as a result of the Ebola outbreak.131 Second, it called
on nearby Member States to take measures to facilitate the delivery of
humanitarian supplies and trained personnel to Ebola-affected areas.132 Third, it
called on Member States to actively fight an Ebola-disinformation campaign in an
effort to provide information to the public to follow proper health and safety
protocols.133 Fourth, the Council called on all Member States to provide urgent
resources and equipment to the region.134
The Ebola crisis was a fast-moving global health crisis and U.S. leadership
under then-President Obama proved critical in galvanizing a Council response.
Climate change, in contrast, is largely characterized by the slow onset of events—
such as sea level rise and wave-driven flooding—punctuated by extreme weather.135

129 S.C. RES. 2177, ¶ 6, UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (Sep. 18, 2014) (emphasis added)[hereinafter S.C. Res.
2177]. For an outstanding discussion of the global emergency powers implicated in the Ebola
response, see J. Benton Heath, Global Emergency Power in the Age of Ebola, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J.
1, (2016) (arguing that the “expert nature of international bureaucracies fits awkwardly with the
political decision making required of crisis managers”).
130 S.C. RES. 2177, supra note 135, at ¶ 28-31 (2014). The Council stopped short of using its most
robust Chapter VII authorities—such as the military-sponsored delivery of humanitarian assistance

under Article 42—to areas particularly hard hit by the Ebola virus.
131 Id. at ¶ 28.
132 Id. at ¶ 29.
133 Id. at ¶ 30.
134 Id. at ¶ 31. This includes “deployable medical capabilities such as field hospitals with qualified
and sufficient expertise, staff and supplies, laboratory services, logistical, and transport and
construction support capabilities . . .”
135 Storlazzi et. al, supra note 9.
26


But there are many similarities and even a direct connection between public
health threats such as Ebola and climate change. Researchers have drawn linkages
between environmental factors (such as a changing climate) and increased risk to
infectious diseases.136 Similar to climate change’s destabilizing characteristics, the
Council was deeply concerned that Ebola’s spread would lead to “civil unrest, social
tensions and a deterioration of the political and security climate.”137 Similar to
Ebola, security professionals showcase how climate change—a “catalyst for
conflict”—can lead to unrest and suffering. In its Ebola response, the Council had
to navigate other international institutions and global health efforts both inside
and outside the United Nations.138 The Council’s willingness to address a non-
traditional security threat while navigating the work of the World Health
Organization, U.N. stakeholders, and other international organizations suggests
that future climate action may be within the Council’s zone of competency.
Of course, the Council’s prior willingness to address an increasing menu of
non-traditional threats is not guaranteed. Witness the Council’s sluggish response
to the COVID-19 crisis. The Council has not (yet) declared the COVID-19 crisis a
threat to international peace and security.139 But this, too, may be changing. In
July 2020, the Council addressed the novel coronavirus crisis via Resolution 2532,
calling for a general and immediate cessation of hostilities as the world responds

136 David W. Redding et. al Impacts on Environmental and Socio-economic Factors on Emergence
and Epidemic Potential of Ebola in Africa, 10 NATURE COMMUNICATION 4531 (2019),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-12499-6
137 Id. (“Recognizing that the peacebuilding and development gains of the most affected countries
concerned could be reversed in light of the Ebola outbreak and underlining that the outbreak is
undermining the stability of the most affected countries concerned and, unless contained, may lead
to further instances of civil unrest, social tensions and a deterioration of the political and security
climate”) (emphasis provided). The Ebola crisis also undermined food security, similar to climate
change. Id.
138 This included a complex web of actors to include the United Nations General Assembly,
Economic and Social Council, Peacebuilding Commission, World Health Organization, and the
broader Global Health Security Agenda. At the time of S.C. Resolution 2177’s passage, the Secretary
General was planning on convening a meeting to urge an exceptional and vigorous response” to
Ebola at the sixth-ninth General Assembly. The Council also had to navigate the ongoing efforts of
several first-line responders such as Doctors Without Borders and multinational organizations to
include the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) S.C. Res.
2177, supra note 135.
139 See, e.g., Jolie Myers & Ali Shapiro, UN Chief: Security Council Gridlock Blocks Effective
Coronavirus Response, NPR News, Jun. 9, 2020 https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-

updates/2020/06/09/873060941/u-n-chief-security-council-gridlock-blocks-effective-
coronavirus-response At the time, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres stated
"there was no unity around the world in the strategy to fight the pandemic." Id.
27


to the novel coronavirus crisis. The Council specifically called upon all parties to
armed conflict to engage in a 90 day “durable humanitarian pause” to facilitate the
safe, unhindered and sustained delivery of humanitarian assistance.”140 Yet it is
difficult to predict whether the Council’s slow response to COVID-19 signals a
broader trend toward retrenchment on global collective action issues. Table A
provides a snapshot of recent Council responses to effectively address non-
traditional security threats.
Table A: Security Council Response to Non-Traditional Threats
Date Issue Council Action
1991 Environmental Iraq liable for environmental destruction to oil fields during the Gulf
damage War.141
2000 HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS “may pose a risk to stability and security” if unchecked.142
2001 Terrorism Article 39 specifically triggered. “Terrorist acts” a threat to international
peace and security. Quasi-legislative action.143
2004 Weapons Article 39 specifically triggered. Spread of WMD a threat to international
Proliferation peace and security. Quasi-legislative action.144
2010 Natural Increased security presence following a natural disaster.145
Disaster (Haiti)
2011 HIV/AIDS Article 39 not triggered. HIV/AIDS “one of the most formidable challenges
to the development and stability of societies.”146
2014 Ebola Health Article 39 specifically triggered. The Ebola outbreak “constitutes a threat
Crisis to international peace and security.”147
2020 COVID-19 COVID-19 “likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
Health Crisis security”; Calls upon member states to enact “a general and immediate
cessation of hostilities in all situations.”148
B. Security Council Climate Debate & Resolutions: A Stepping-Stone for

Climate Action?
In addition to the Council’s willingness to address environmental security
matters and other non-traditional security threats, since 2007 the Council has
sponsored several high-level forums discussing climate change’s destabilizing

140 S.C. Res. 2532, UN Doc. S/RES/2532 (Jul. 1, 2020). And P5 political calculations drive decision-
making in more traditional use of force security contexts—witness the Council’s complete failure to
manage the conflict in Syria or find a consensus on the North Korean nuclear threat.
141 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. ¶ 16 S/RES/687 (April 3, 1991).
142 S.C. Res. 1308, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1308 (July 17, 2000).
143 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (September 28, 2001). For background on the Council as
global legislator, see Eric Rosand, The Security Council as “Global Legislator”: Ultra Vires or Ultra
Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT’L . L. J. 542, 544 (2005).
144 S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (April 28,2004).
145 S.C. Res. 1908, UN Doc. S/RES/1908 (January 19, 2010).
146 S.C. Res. 1983, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1983 (June 7, 2011).
147 S.C. Res. 2177, ¶ 6, UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (Sep. 18, 2014)
148 S.C. RES. 2532, ¶ 13 U.N. Doc. S/RES/2532 (Jul. 1, 2020).
28


effects on international peace and security. 149 Concurrent with scientific
advances, U.N. leadership has increasingly spoken out about the link between
climate change and international peace and security.150 While the Council has not
yet determined that climate change is a threat to international peace and security
within the meaning of Article 39, it has gradually—albeit in an ad hoc manner—
addressed climate security matters via a variety of forum. 151 The Council has
examined the linkages between climate change and security via an open debate
forum four times: April 2007, July 2011, July 2018, and January 2019.152
In 2007, the Security Council convened its first open debate on climate
change and security at the initiative of the United Kingdom.153 This meeting offers
the first insight into how different states view Council action on climate security
matters, foreshadowing Member Nations may one day support broader Council
action. From the onset, many Pacific Small Island Developing States and many
European Union members argued that the Council should expand its role to
address climate change’s security implications.154 Among the P5 members, France
envisioned a more active role for the Council in line with Resolution 1625’s call to
address the root causes of armed conflict. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom argued
that the Council should take incremental steps to raise awareness on the issue.155
Perhaps not surprisingly, many of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS)—who
are at climate change’s frontlines—argued that the Council had an affirmative
obligation to address climate change’s devastating effects.156 The island nation of
Tuvalu, for example, described climate change as a “conflict . . . not being fought

149 For a summary of Security Council actions on environmental and climate-related matters, see
generally Dane Warren, Possible Roles for the UN Security Council in Addressing Climate Change,
SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, (Jul. 2015).
150 High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, ¶ 53 U.N. G.A.O.R., 59th Session, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
151 See Warren, supra note 149, at 1-5.
152 Leila Mead, UN Security Council Addresses Climate Change as a Security Risk, INT’L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Jul 31, 2018.

153 Martin, supra note 10, at 34.
154 See Warren, supra note 149, at 2.
155 See Francesco Sindico, Climate Change: As Security (Council) Issue?, 1 CARBON & CLIMATE L.
REV. 29 (2007).
156 Papua New Guinea, a Small Island Developing State, declared that “the impact of climate change
on small islands was no less threatening than the dangers guns and bombs posed to large nations.”
SC/9000 (2007), Statement of Papua New Guinea on behalf of the Pacific Island Forum.
29


with guns and missiles but with weapons from everyday life—chimney stacks and
exhaust pipes.”157
In contrast, China, Russia, and many nations within the Group of 77
(representing much of the developing world) vocally discouraged any Council
climate role. In part, this was aligned with historic antipathy toward a greater role
for the Council shared by many developing nations. They argued that Council
climate action encroached on the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and the Framework
Convention’s governing mandate.158
Despite the lack of a cohesive position on Council climate action, the Pacific
Small Island Developing States kept the issue of climate security alive, bringing
climate change’s adverse impacts before the U.N. General Assembly in 2009.
Here, the U.N. General Assembly passed a Resolution that both reaffirmed the
Framework Convention as the “key instrument for addressing climate change”
while explicitly labeling climate change as a “threat multiplier.”159 It also called on
other U.N. organs to consider climate change’s security implications, leaving the
door open for future Council engagement.160
At the behest of several Pacific island nations and Germany—two consistent
cheerleaders for Council climate engagement—the Council sponsored its second
formal climate-security debate in 2011.161 This Council-sponsored debate focused
on addressing climate change’s role in sea-level rise and food insecurity.162 Once
again, Russia and China continued to oppose Council climate engagement, but the
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Ambassador Susan Rice, supported a Council climate
role as part of the Council’s core responsibilities. Further, a divide began to emerge

157 See Ken Conca, Is There a Role for the UN Security Council on Climate Change?, 9 (2019),
www.tandfonline.com/venv.
158 Id.
159 U.N. Secretary General, Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications, U.N. Doc.
A/64/350 (Sept. 11, 2009).

160 Id. The 2008 U.S. Presidential election signaled an important change in the U.S. role and
leadership in climate governance. The Copenhagen Accord was near universally adopted in 2009
at COP-15 with President Obama in attendance. This reflected a shift in the Framework
Convention’s approach to address emissions from both developing and developed nations, a source
of controversy that led to nations pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol.
161 Germany has consistently advocated for a robust Council role to address climate change. As of
this writing, Germany chairs the Council’s rotating presidency and has expressed a desire to address
climate security matters before the Council.
162 The full transcript of the 2011 debate is available at U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess. 6587d mgt., U.N. Doc.
S/PV.6587 (July 20, 2011).
30


between the Pacific and Caribbean states on Council climate action. Many
Caribbean developing nations remained suspicious of the Council wielding greater
power while several Pacific SIDS welcomed any international action and
attention. 163 The 2011 debate concluded with a Presidential Statement that
acknowledged climate change’s potential to aggravate existing threats to
international peace and security, while highlighting climate change’s impact on
sea-level rise on small low-lying island states.164
In 2017, the Security Council took the historic step of referencing climate
change as a destabilizing security impact in a Security Council Resolution. In
addressing the deteriorating security situation in the Lake Chad region, the Council
specifically highlighted the “adverse effects of climate change and ecological
change” in destabilizing the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin. 165 The
Council followed up in 2018 by recognizing climate change’s destabilizing effects
on the ongoing conflict in Somalia, Darfur, West Africa and the Sahel, and Mali.166
The Council held its third open debate on climate change in July 2018.
Member nations proposed a new “Special Representative of the Secretary General
on Climate and Security” as well as the establishment of an institutional hub for
climate-security matters within the United Nations system.167 The Nigerian U.N.
Deputy Secretary General, Amina Mohammed highlighted climate change’s grave
threat to African food security, noting that the world’s most vulnerable people face
the greatest risk of droughts and food insecurity. 168 While Russia and China
continued their skepticism of Council climate engagement, the meeting
highlighted another frontline climate security issue: climate change’s debilitating
impacts on food insecurity in the African Sahel. The Sahel is one of the poorest

163 Warren, supra note 149, at 3-4. The Caribbean SIDS diverged from their Pacific counterparts in
siding with the Group of 77, in part because climate change’s impacts are more acutely felt by the
Pacific SIDS. Outside the climate change context, the Group of 77 has been generally skeptical of a
greater Council role in international governance. As discussed infra Part III, all four atoll nations
that face extinction reside in the Pacific. Id.
164 U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2011/15.
165 S.C. Res. 2349, S/RES/2349 (October 14, 2017).
166 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2408, S/RES/2408 (March 27, 2018).
167 UNITED NATIONS, Addressing Security Council, Pacific Island President Calls Climate Change
Defining Issue of Next Century, Calls for Special Representative on Issue, Dec. 17, 2018
www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13417.doc.htm [hereinafter 2018 Council Debate]
168 Id.
31


regions in the world that is uniquely vulnerable to food insecurity and drought—
90 percent of the economy is agriculture-based.169
The Council held its most recent open climate change debate in January
2019. Here, the U.N. political affairs chief acknowledged that climate-related
disasters are a present-day reality for millions around the globe. Further, the
debate highlighted the complex relationship between climate-related risks and
conflict, which intersects with political, social, economic, and demographic
factors.170 Both the Administrator of the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and
representatives from the U.N. World Meteorological Organization were in
attendance to brief the Council on the linkage between climate and extreme
weather. 171 The Council invited the UN World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) to the 2019 debate. The WMO Chief Scientist stated,
Climate change has a multitude of security impacts—rolling back the gains in
nutrition and access to food; heightening the risk of wildfires and exacerbating air
quality challenges; increasing the potential for water conflict; leading to more
internal displacement and migrations . . . it is increasingly regarded as a national
security threat.172
This dialogue between the security and scientific communities represents a

positive step as the Council seeks to better understand climate change’s security
impacts. These efforts and similar engagement should be built upon at future
Council-sponsored climate dialogues.
At this most recent debate, the Council’s youth representative specifically
requested a resolution that formally recognized climate change as a threat to
international peace and security.173 This 2019 debate stopped short of the Council
determining that climate change is a “threat to the peace” within the meaning of
Article 39.174 While this specific request fell short of achieving its goal, the 2019

169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. The U.N. Development Program Administrator called on the Security Council to “recognize
the science and empirical evidence, leverage all possible measure that can slow global warming,
and invest in climate adaptation and risk reduction for the millions of people already suffering from
the effects of climate change.” Id.
172 See U.N. News, Climate Change Recognized as ‘threat multiplier’, UN Security Council debates
its impact on peace, Jan. 25, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1031322 (quoting

Professor Pavel Kabat, Chief Scientist, UN World Meteorological Organization).
173 Id.
174 In 2019 concerns over governance issues remained. See U.N. NEWS, Climate Change Recognized
as a “Threat Multiplier”, U.N. Security Council Debates its Role on Peace,
32


debate demonstrated that a steady, growing core group of Member States’ (70 were
in attendance) are invested in examining the complex relationship between climate
change and security under the umbrella of Council leadership.175
In sum, while these four debates and more informal Council-sponsored
Arria-Formula 176 meetings on climate are not legally binding, they provide the
building blocks for a greater potential role for Council climate engagement.
Whether this increased Council climate engagement portends substantive follow-
on action remains to be seen. But as discussed below, climate change’s existential
threat to several Small Island Developing States virtually ensures that the Council
will grapple with climate change in some capacity. Table B provides an overview
of the core Council debates and actions on climate change.
Table B – Key Security Council Climate Change Debates and Resolutions177
Date Nature Key Takeaways
April 2007 First Open • First formal Council-sponsored climate change debate.178
Debate • Russia and China expressed reluctance that the Council was the right
forum.
July 2011 Second Open • Initiated by Germany, Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon explicitly declares
Debate “climate change a threat to international peace and security.
• Presidential Statement on Climate Change Issued179
Mar. 2017 Resolution • Recognizes climate change’s adverse impacts on the stability of the Lake
2349 Chad Basin. Emphasizes the need for the U.N. to develop adequate risk
management strategies.180

https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1031322 (reporting that “[some] Member States believe
that this is stepping on the toes of other UN entities, specifically mandated with taking a lead on
social and economic development, or environmental protection”).
175 In doing so, this “climate-security core” called upon the Security Council to engage with the
science and empirical evidence while building it capacity for future action. In addition to the four
open debates, the Security Council hosted several more informal “Arria-Formula Meetings.” Once
again, Russia and China took a stand against any substantive Security Council role in addressing
climate change, while the Pacific SIDS described climate change’s immediate impacts.
176 For a further discussion of these Arria-Formula discussions, see Camilla Born, A Resolution for
a Peaceful Climate: Opportunities for the UN Security Council, SIPRI Policy Brief, Jan. 2017.
177 This table does not include aforementioned Council-sponsored “Arria-Formula” closed debates
or more informal sessions.

178 Papua New Guinea, speaking on behalf of the Pacific Small Island and Developing States, stated
that “the impact of climate change on small islands was no less threatening than the dangers of
guns and bombs posed to large nations.” See Moztfeldt Kravik, The Security Council and Climate
Change — Too Hot to Handle?, EUR. J. INT’L L. TALK!, Apr. 26, 2018.
179 Because of China and Russia’s insistence that the Council was not the right forum for climate
change, Presidential Statement was significantly watered down, merely stating that “the possible
adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to
international peace and security.” UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
S/PRST/2011/15.
180 Lake Chad has shrunk by more than 90 percent since the 1960s, impacting 45 million people.
The relevant text states, “[The Security Council] recognizes the adverse effects of climate change
and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the Region, including water scarcity,
33


Jan. 2018 Council Pres. • Climate change affecting stability across West Africa and Sahel, requiring
Statement better risk assessment and risk management strategies.
June 2018 Resolution • Climate change’s negative effects acknowledged in Mali’s security situation.
2423
July 2018 Third Open • Nauru President declares “climate change the defining issue of the next
Debate century.”
• Calls for an “institutional hub” for climate security matters and a Special
Representative on Climate & Security; Renewed focus on African food
insecurity.181
July 2018 Resolution • Extended mandate of U. N. Mission in Somalia while recognizing “the
2408 adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, and natural disasters
. . . on the stability of Somalia.182
July 2018 Resolution • Climate change’s negative effects acknowledged in Darfur.
2429
Jan. 2019 Fourth Open • Climate change recognized as a “threat multiplier” by scientists.184
Debate183 • Youth resolution for the Council to recognize climate change as a “threat to
international peace and security” falls short.
C. Nation Extinction: A Growing International Climate Governance Gaps

How might Council climate engagement be accelerated beyond debates and
forums? In what follows, I analyze possible pathways for future Council climate
action. Of course, a “green swan” event such as the breaking off of the East
Antarctic ice sheet or sudden polar ice cap melting—resulting in massive global sea
level rise—could spur immediate Council action.185 Such an apocalyptic “Climate
9/11” event could spark the Council to overcome gridlock, not unlike the Council’s
sweeping action on terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks.

drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, and emphases the need for adequate
risk assessment and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating
to these factors.” S.C. Res. 2349 ¶ 26 (2017).
181 2018 Climate Debate, supra note 167.
182 S.C. Res. 2408 (2018). In addition, S.C. Resolutions 2408 reiterated its continued concern “at
the high number of refugees and internally displaced person, including persons newly displaced by
the drought . . .” S.C. Res. 2408 ¶ 25 (2018).
183 This meeting was initiated by the Dominican Republic, at the time a non-permanent member of
the Security Council. See Stella Schaller & Benjamin Pohl, Security Council Debates how Climate
Disasters Threaten International Peace and Security, WILSON CENTER NEW SECURITY BEAT, Feb. 4,
2019.
184 See U.N. NEWS, Climate Change Recognized as ‘threat multiplier’, UN Security Council debates
its impact on peace, Jan. 25, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1031322.

185 In a recent scientific study, the National Geographic reported that an ice sheet collapse in East
Antarctica ice sheet (holding more than 80 percent of the Earth’s water) is much closer to collapse
than previously thought. Charlotte Hartley, Antarctic ice sheet collapse could add 3 meters to sea-
level rise, SCIENCE MAG., Jul. 23, 2020. For a discussion of the black swan effect, see NASSIM TALEB,
THE BLACK SWAN (2010). The term “green swan” pertains to an unprecedented environmental
event.
34


But regardless of a future green swan event, two forthcoming global climate
report cards will continue to pressurize Council action and attention.186 First, the
widening emissions gap will be highlighted in the IPCC Sixth IPCC Assessment,
scheduled for 2022. The Sixth Assessment is widely anticipated to paint a bleak
picture of collective GHG emissions, building off its 2018 “Global Warming of 1.5
Celsius” Report that highlighted the 10-year window to massively reduce global
emissions.187 Second, the Paris Accord’s first comprehensive “global stocktake” is
set to take place in 2023 (with a second one to follow in 2028). As of this writing,
the global stocktake is anticipated to fall far short of expectations, thus ensuring a
continual international spotlight on our widening emissions gap.188
Climate-driven environmental deterioration will continue to display the
terrifying consequences of the world’s collective failure to address our collective
GHG emissions gap. The emissions gap will continue to manifest itself in a vivid
and violent manner through increased violent unrest, climate-drive migration and
conflict.189 And as discussed below, the stakes associated with the threat of nation
extinction will continue to force climate change on the Council’s agenda regardless
of political preferences and Council paralysis.
Climate change dramatically exacerbates sea level rise, wave-driven
flooding, and extreme weather. 190 Indeed, scientists predict that four island
nations—Kiribati, Maldives, Republic of Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu—will be
uninhabitable by mid-century.191 Climate change will force full-scale abandonment
of their homeland,192 raising the specter of imminent nation extinction.193 Despite
their small physical size, economies, and populations, SIDS have equal standing
with U.N. Member states. It is clear that we must begin to address climate impacts

186 Literature, too, can play a powerful role in raising consciousness about collective action
problems. See, e.g. RACHEL CARSON, THE SILENT SPRING (1962) (documenting the widespread use
of pesticides, helping to spark a grassroots environmental movement).
187 Supra note 1.
188 Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 14 (1)-(2) (2015).
189 See generally CAMPBELL, supra note 7.
190 Id.
191 For a discussion of the challenges facing the Marshall Islands, see generally J. Chris Larson,
Racing the Rising Tide: Legal Options for the Marshall Islands, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 495 (2000).
193 CONCA ET. AL, supra note 117, at 11 (highlighting that the specter of “stateless” U.N. member
states raises complex legal and political questions around sovereignty).
35


on small island developing states now. Delaying action today presents climate
opportunity costs as the emissions gap widens and climate impacts become more
pronounced.
The island climate migrants’ plight also shines a light on another
international governance gap outside the Framework Convention that will grow in
importance. The World Refugee Convention is silent on migrants fleeing
environmental disaster. And the Framework Convention and follow-on accords
do not directly provide legal protections for climate migrants fleeing
environmental or imminent climate disaster.194
While SIDS lack a permanent seat on the Security Council, their influence
and governance voice are growing.195 As a group, SIDS comprise approximately
20% of all UN members and have recently been a driving force behind the Council’s
climate-security debates and discussions.196 SIDS and other neighboring, poor,
low-lying states overwhelmingly lack the capacity to address climate impacts via
traditional climate adaptation measures such as investment in climate resilient
infrastructure. 197 For these small island nations, climate change poses an
immediate, existential threat. This virtually ensures that climate–security matters
will remain active in the international public discourse.198
Indeed, the specter of “stateless” U.N. member states strikes at the heart of
the U.N. Charter-system. The U.N. Charter upholds the principle of sovereignty
and the sovereign equality of each Member nation.199 The Council, in turn, plays a
central, stabilizing role in upholding each nation’s sovereignty and territorial

194 In finding a threat to international peace and security in the 1998 Kosovo crisis, the UN Security
Council previously recognized that the massive flow of refugees contributed to a deteriorating
security situation. S. C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sep. 23, 1998).
195 Of the Security Council’s ten non-permanent members, two seats are filled by the Asia Pacific
Regional Group. Vietnam and Indonesia are currently the two Asia Pacific Members on the
Council.
196 The Pacific SIDS are part of the Asia-Pacific Group, comprised of 53 Member States in Asia and
Oceania.
197 See generally Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L. J. 165 (2008).
198 Complicating matters, the Pacific Small Island Developing States have differed from the
Caribbean Small Island Developing States in seeking Security Council action. The Caribbean Small
Island Developing States has previously endorsed the G77 opinion that the Council must “refrain
from encroaching on the functions and powers that the Charter and tradition have placed within
the purview of the General Assembly.” Conca, supra note 117, at 11.
199 U.N. Charter art. 2, para 1. The United Nations is “based upon the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members.” Id.
36


integrity. The Council’s responsibility and mandate to address all matters of
international peace and security suggest that the Council cannot avoid addressing
climate-driven nation extinction without paying some external cost to its own
legitimacy.
While climate change’s impact on these island nations favors an equitable
solution, this outcome very much remains in doubt and remains subject to the
whims of “political expediency.”200 In what follows, I provide more specificity on
the challenges and opportunities of a new “Climate-Security Council.”
III. A CLIMATE-SECURITY COUNCIL: CHALLENGES &
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION
What are the challenges facing a reconceptualized Climate-Security
Council? Skeptics of any Council action already recoil against its top-down, anti-
democratic approach. Exacerbating matters, developing countries lack a
permanent seat at the Council’s table but stand to face the brunt of climate change’s
impacts.201 But upon closer inspection, you can see an opportunity for Council
climate action that is consistent with its understood mandate. If the Council can
deftly navigate core legitimacy challenges and align its work with ongoing
international climate efforts, it can play a substantive and important role today
that is in accord with its expertise and governing mandate. Indeed, a fully engaged
“Climate-Security Council” actually reinforces and upholds the Council’s historic
role in maintaining international peace and security.202 I turn to the challenges
and opportunities behind any Council climate action below.
A. Challenge: Climate Change is Outside the Security Council’s
Competence and Jurisdictional Mandate
There are six principal organs within the United Nations to include the
Security Council, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), General Assembly,
Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.203 ECOSOC
and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) are the UN entities most
heavily focused on environmental matters while the General Assembly and

200 Restatement (3d.) of Foreign Relations Law § 201 (comment a).
201 In part because of this concern, many “Group of 77” developing nations have been reluctant to
endorse any Security Council role in addressing climate change.

202 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1-2.
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ECOSOC have historically shared responsibility over climate change and
sustainable development goals.204
The Charter is silent on where, exactly, environmental matters reside. This
is not at all surprising: The Charter was drafted in the wake of World War II, well
before the environmental awakening and a full understanding of climate change’s
impacts came into focus.205 In turn, the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate
Change and follow-on agreements have served as the central international legal
mechanisms to address global climate change, but at some point they overlap with
the Council’s authority on security matters.206
Any future Council action on climate must also take into account its
complex 75-year history. Irrespective of prospective climate action, the legitimacy
of Council actions—particularly in its exercise of its Chapter VII authorities—has
been a core concern since the UN Charter’s inception. Developing nations within
the Group of 77 have routinely criticized the Council’s anti-democratic nature and
its closed, static membership since 1945.207 Irrespective of climate change, there
is wariness of the Security Council taking on too large a role within international
governance. Indeed an overly robust Council climate agenda that generates
binding legal obligations on all Member nations risks causing a climate
backlash.208 This shines light on historical critiques that the Council is as an anti-
democratic institution that is further straying from its core mandate.209
Complicating any legitimacy analysis, the Council is comprised of the worst
climate offenders—a point routinely made by developing nations outside the P5.
They account for the majority of the world’s GHG emissions, undermining the
Council’s credibility to address climate change.210 Any Council climate action is

204 Climate Security 2009, supra note 8, para 4.
205 The Charter is also difficult to amend. See U.N. Charter art. 69.
206 Framework Convention, supra note 21. Climate Security 2009, supra note 8, para 4. This
resolution also noted the respective responsibilities of the principal U.N. organs.
207 Warren, supra note 149.
208 See Neil MacFarquhar, U.N. Deadlock on Addressing Climate Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2011.
209 Ash Murphy, Climate Change is a Security Threat, so Where is the Security Council? THE
CONVERSATION, May 15, 2018, https://theconversation.com/climate-change-is-a-security-threat-

so-where-is-the-un-security-council-96658
210 China produces the most GHG emissions of any one nation on an annual basis and the United
States is the world’s largest historic emitter of GHG emissions. The United States has recently
publicly stated that natural disasters causing widespread displacement should be within the
Council’s ambits. UNITED NATIONS PRESS COVERAGE, Addressing Security Council, Pacific Island
38


subject to the normal political constraints by the P5 and non-permanent
members.211 As such, the P5 may already be institutionally disincentivized to take
forward-looking climate mitigation measures that may harm their economies. But
the political and institutional incentives centered around climate mitigation
measures may well act as a silver lining, disentangling the Council from the
Framework Convention’s core mitigation efforts. This will drive the Council to
focus its efforts on security matters and addressing mitigation with precise
action.212
The Council’s slow response in addressing the ongoing COVID-19 global
health crisis showcases the difficulty in rallying Council action around complex
international collective action problems.213 Unlike the Council’s approach to the
Ebola crisis, the Council has not (yet) declared the coronavirus crisis a threat to
international peace and security, but it has taken the remarkable step of calling for
an immediate cessation of hostilities as the world grapples with the pandemic.214
But the COVID-19 crisis arose unexpectedly, requiring the Council to act overnight
to harness a complex global response. In contrast, the climate crisis has been
simmering for decades. There is an existing international governance
infrastructure and scientific community already at work, laying the groundwork
for action.
In sum, underlying Council legitimacy and political economy problems
must be taken seriously. Any Council effort to address climate change must first
proceed with due regard for the rights and economic realities of developing nations

President Calls Climate Change Defining Issue of Next Century, Call for Special Representative
on Issue, (Dec. 17, 2018) https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13417.doc.htm
211 A complete discussion of the political economy and decision-making of the Council is beyond the
scope of this paper. For a fuller discussion of the constraints, restraints, and incentives of Council
decision-making, see generally Conca, supra note 117.
212 Security Council action to assist developing nations is consistent with the core international law
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities between developed and developing nations.
Common but differentiated responsibilities is a core international environmental law principle as
set forth in the Rio Declaration and the Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Framework
Convention, supra note 11, at ¶ 7.
213 The current U.N. Secretary General has called the coronavirus pandemic “the most challenging
crisis since the [United Nations] founding.”

214 S.C. Res. 2532, UN Doc. S/RES/2532 (Jul. 1, 2020). See Rick Gladstone, U.N. Leader Describes
Grave Threat, but the Security Council is Mum, N.Y. TIMES at A5, Apr. 5, 2020. The General
Assembly has also addressed the current coronavirus crisis, adopting a resolution expressing
support for a strong, unified response to the coronavirus pandemic. Yet the General Assembly lacks
the broader security and enforcement mandate enjoyed by the Security Council.
39


and the Framework Convention and other international climate efforts.215 As it
dips its toes into the climate waters, the Council should strive to be in synch with
ongoing climate efforts, playing a substantive role that is aligned with its core
expertise and mandate.
B. Opportunity: Adapting an Institutional Risk Allocation
Framework for Climate Change
The Framework Convention on Climate Change and its follow-on climate
accords have gradually expanded their scope beyond addressing exclusively
climate mitigation measures. Complex security questions—such as how the
international community should address the rising number of climate migrants—
have yet to be addressed by the Framework Convention or other international
governing bodies. The Council alone holds that special mandate. Indeed, the
landmark 2015 Paris Climate Accord is silent on climate change’s adverse effects
on international peace and security, with only a brief mention of food security.216
Further, in the unlikely event that all the Paris Climate Accord’s mitigation
commitments are met, climate change will still massively disrupt international
peace and security. As the emissions gap expands, the security implications will
be extraordinary, particularly in the developing world. Devastating climate
realities will force us to adopt a legal entrepreneurship mindset—using existing
legal tools in new and innovative ways—in solving the climate security crisis.
Security matters are not within the General Assembly and Economic and
Social Council’s mandate, and the Paris Agreement does not squarely address
climate security matters.217 Previously, any United Nations High Level Panel on

215 Framework Convention, supra note 21, at art. 3 (1) (“The Parties should protect the climate
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and
in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”)
216 The Paris Climate Accord does state that there is a “need for an effective and progressive
response to the urgent threat of climate change . . .” (emphasis provided). Under Article 8.4, the
Paris Agreement identifies areas of cooperation to include emergency preparedness, early warning,
risk management and slow onset events. The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and
Damage is the UNFCCC-mechanism to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects
of climate change. Paris Agreement, supra note 3 at art. 8 (3).
217 Of note, the Paris Climate Accord does not address security concerns directly, referring only to
the problem of climate change’s impact on food security as one of its adverse impacts and highlights
the need for “an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change.” See
Paris Agreement, supra note 3, pmbl. (2015); see also Mark P. Nevitt, The Commander in Chief’s
Authority to Combat Climate Change, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 437 (2015).
40


Threats, Challenges, and Change found what amounts to an “implementation gap”
in environmental treaties between what is written as a legal obligation and how
those environmental obligations are implemented and enforced.218 Such treaties
are “undermined by inadequate implementation and enforcement by the Member
States.”219
Relying upon the Framework Convention, ECOSOC, and the General
Assembly alone to provide the international legal framework to address climate
change ignores stark security realities. Climate change is a super-wicked problem
with super-wicked security effects.220 In the face of massively disruptive climactic
change, I propose an “institutional risk allocation” approach that takes into
account the respective competencies of all relevant international organs, to include
the Council.221
An institutional risk allocation approach better allocates governance risk
across a wide spectrum of competent international institutions and governance
frameworks. As such, the Council can play a legal gap-filling role that
complements the concurrent efforts of the Framework Convention and other
international climate efforts. Even in the best-case scenario—the United States
rejoins the Paris Accord in 2021 and global emission begin a steady march
downward—past GHG emissions stay in the atmosphere for decades, thus ensuring
a steady increase in global temperatures and climate disruption. Advances in
climate science and climate change’s corresponding impacts on international
peace and security make clear that we must take massive action to both lower our
GHG emissions and prepare for climate change’s destabilizing effects today.222
Of course, the Council may never be the central venue to address climate
change’s multivariate impacts. But each day of delay presents enormous climate

218 High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, 27 U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Our
Shared Responsibility].
219 Id.
220 Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009).

221 The United States’ announcement that it intends to walk away from the Paris Accord showcases
the danger of the over-reliance on putting all our eggs in one “climate basket.”
222 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL WARMING
OF 1.5°C (2018), https://perma.cc/47ET-FU47 [hereinafter IPCC 1.5 Report]; See also WALLACE-
WELLS, supra note 72 (summarizing the leading scientific evidence governing climate change).
41


opportunity costs that must be taken into account. They will increasingly be felt
by SIDS and poorer, developing nations that are most vulnerable to climate
change’s effects. Irrespective of Council action, efforts must be intensified across
all relevant U.N. organs. 223 Doing so is consistent with past Security Council
practice and the role envisioned by earlier Council efforts to adopt a broad strategy
of conflict prevention.224 The Council plays the central role in the maintenance of
international peace and security. 225 Implicit in this mandate is upholding and
protecting the sovereign equality of all Member states from all threats, however
defined.
C. Principles for Council Climate Action
Prior to taking any Council action on climate, I propose three principles that
the Council should follow, with a brief discussion of how this might work in
practice.
1. Work in Governance Harmony with Ongoing International
Climate Efforts
First, the Council must act in “governance harmony” with an increasingly
complex web of international climate efforts, scientific advances, and legal
frameworks. As a legal matter, the Council does not have to take a backseat to
other international agreements—the Council’s authority is preeminent—but a
governance harmony approach should initially be followed to bolster the
legitimacy and acceptability of Council climate action.
We already have a potential climate governance overlap between the Paris
Climate Accord and the Council. For example, the Paris Climate Accord has a loss
and damage provision that relates to the Council’s security mandate.226 This loss
and damage provision specifies several possible areas for cooperation to include
emergency preparedness, slow onset events, and community resilience.227 Yet it
remains unclear how the loss and damage measures will be fully implemented and

223 Climate Security 2009, supra note 8, para 7 (1).
226 Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 8.1-8.5.
227 Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at ¶ 8.4. Under the loss and damage report, “Parties recognize
the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the
adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the
role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage.” Id. at 8.1
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incorporated within the existing Framework Convention structure. Taking a
“governance harmony” approach disfavors Council action on matters that are
already being addressed by the Framework Convention, such as mandating that
the Paris Accord’s provisions be followed. But harmonizing the Council with
existing efforts leaves substantial room for Council action. This could include
addressing particularly pernicious climate activities from climate rogue states and
assist developing nations with climate adaptation investment and aid.
The Council’s response to the Ebola health crisis may offer some insights in
navigating existing governance efforts. Professors Dena Adler and Daniel Esty
have analogized climate change to public health threats, arguing that a multi-tiered
governance approach is required to both pandemics and climate governance.228
After all, both climate change and public health threats require coordinated,
international action and goal setting. Professor Esty argues that the Framework
Convention has structural shortcomings where “climate change could demonstrate
the value of a new international legal architecture for the twenty-first century . .
.”229 Thankfully, the Ebola crisis abated shortly after the Council took action, and
a multi-tiered governance approach was not required. But one could imagine a
scenario where the Council—having already declared the Ebola crisis a threat to
the peace—would seek to take more prescriptive measures in response to a
worldwide health epidemic.
2. Striking a Legitimacy Balance Between Action & Inaction
Second, any Council action must attempt to strike a “legitimacy balance”
where the Council must act in accordance with both its understood area of
expertise while not shirking away from its responsibilities for the maintenance of
international peace and security. Critics of any prospective Council climate action
will assert that the Council is overstepping its mandate, and climate change is best
left to the ECOSOC and the Framework Convention. Within the Council, both
Russia and China have leveled those critiques. The Council must ultimately find

228 Dena P. Adler & Daniel C. Esty, Changing International Law for a Changing Climate, 112 AM.
J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 279, 281 (2018).
229 Id. at 284.
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the right “Goldilocks” approach that walks a precarious “legitimacy tightrope”
between action and inaction.
While the Council has broad authority to take action, it must act in
accordance with the “Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” in
discharging its duties.230 In taking proactive measures to safeguard the nations
facing existential crisis, the Council is upholding the principle of sovereignty in
accordance with these core U.N. Charter principles. 231 Under customary
international law predating the U.N. Charter, states are prohibited from knowingly
allowing their territory to cause harm to other states.232 If the Council cannot save
nations from the scourge of climate change, this may undermine the Council’s
legitimacy in maintaining international peace and security. Climatizing the
Council breathes life into the Council’s role in protecting the sovereign equality of
all its members.
3. Define Climate Change’s Causes and Security Effects with
Precision
Third, the Council must take the necessary steps to define both climate
change’s contributing causes and impacts with precision. After all, climate change
is caused by a wide variety of human activity, but some activities are particularly
harmful—the creation of new coal-fired power plants and deforestation efforts in
Brazil and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are two examples of egregious
climate behavior. While declaring climate change a threat to international peace
and security may raise international awareness, it could engender follow-on
paralysis if the precise impacts are not defined with sufficient clarity and
understanding. By focusing on a clear linkage between climate change and its
tangible impacts, the Council could fashion a more precise and actionable remedy
that bolsters the credibility of the action.233

232 See Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905
(1941). The Trail Smelter principle is reiterated in the Framework Convention on Climate Change:
“States have in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of international
law. . . the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”
Framework Convention, supra note 21, at ¶ 9.
233 To be sure, in the United States and elsewhere, there is a vocal climate-denial community that
dismisses human activity and anthropogenic climate change. Scholars such as Wharton’s Professor
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
In what follows, I provide six specific recommendations for the Council to
take on climate security, arguing that the Council should affirmatively determine
that climate change is a threat to international peace and security under Article
39.234 Doing so is aligned with earlier Council efforts to address the underlying
cause of threats to international peace and security. It also reflects a mature
acknowledgement that climate change destabilizes human security and unlocks
the Council’s awesome Chapter VII authorities. If this is politically untenable, the
Council should take the initial step—similar to its COVID-19 response—to declare
that climate change is likely to endanger international peace and security. 235
Regardless, the Council must remain engaged on climate security matters.
Outside of a threat to the peace determination, there are several actions that
the Council should take today. If the Council political paralysis takes over,
international governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and
climate activists alike should welcome and advocate for continual Council climate
engagement to close the governance gap.
A. Recommendations for Council Climate Action Outside of a Threat to the
Peace Determination
1. Synchronize Council Climate Efforts with the Framework
Convention’s Work
First, the Council should build upon its efforts to host high-level discussions
on climate security matters that are within its zone of competence and mandate.
International organizations and non-governmental organizations should push for
continued Council climate engagement, and the Conference of Parties (COP)
should embrace a Council role on climate security matters. Right now, Council
climate discussions occur in an ad hoc, reactive manner, and are highly dependent
on who holds the Council Presidency. At a minimum, Council-led climate security

Sarah Light have argued that linking climate change with national security may assist in bridging a
highly partisan issue. See Sarah Light, Valuing National Security: Climate Change, the Military,
and Society, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1772 (2014). For a similar argument, see generally Mark P. Nevitt,
On Environmental Law, Climate Change and National Security, 44 HARV. ENVT’L L. 321 (2020).
234 See U.N. Charter art. 39.
235 S.C. Res. 2532, UN Doc. S/RES/2532 (Jul. 1, 2020) (emphasis provided).
45


discussions and forum should take place in a more systematic manner. It makes
sense to synchronize all climate efforts in coordination with the Framework
Convention, the work of the IPCC, and broader scientific community. In a hopeful
sign, the Council invited the World Meteorological Organization to its January
2019 climate open debate. Such science-security dialogues should be built upon.
Thankfully, the Conference of Parties (COP) already meets annually in
accordance with Article 7 of the Framework Convention. 236 Why not establish
follow-on “Security-COPs” that tap into the Council’s expertise and authority?
These Security COPs should work in governance harmony with the Framework
Convention?237 Doing so will facilitate information flow and allow the Framework
Convention members to pose climate-security questions and issues directly to the
Council. This allows the Council to be better integrated and placed within the
central international climate governance process. It also alleviates concerns that
the Council is encroaching on the work of other U.N. organs—a “Climate-Security
COP” reaffirms the Framework Convention’s central role in international climate
governance while tapping into Council expertise and authorities.
Regardless of the precise manner that future Council climate engagement
unfolds, it should be open, transparent, routine, and integrated within existing
governance efforts. Climate response measures—to include climate change’s
security impacts—have yet to be fully addressed within the Framework
Convention’s body of work, leaving ample space for Council action and input.238
As nations report on their emissions reductions via routine global stocktakes under
the Paris Agreement, we will be better able to assess our collective progress (or
failure) to keep our GHG emissions below the critical two-degree Celsius
threshold. A follow-on “Security COP” would also provide enough periodicity to

236 The next COP is scheduled for Glasgow, Scotland in 2021. “ . . . ordinary sessions of the
Conference of the Parties shall be held every year unless otherwise decided by the Conference of
the Parties.” Framework Convention, supra, note 21, at art. 7, para. 4.
237 Alternatively, Council climate discussions could follow the release of key IPCC climate reports.
The Sixth Climate Assessment is scheduled to be released in 2022.Doing so would also eliminate
the need for a second round of air travel, sending a message about the importance of reducing GHG
emissions.
238 Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at ¶ 10. The Paris Accord already references climate change’s
adverse effects on food security and hunger, an issue that directly relates to the Security Council’s
work
46


shine light on what nations are falling short of their commitments to reduce GHG
emissions and would engage with the most recent climate science.
In sum, by remaining seized of climate change in a systematic and routine
way, the Council can facilitate information sharing, bring in its own expertise, and
fuse the latest national security, intelligence, and scientific expertise on climate. It
would also likely build trust across governance structures. Follow on Security
COPs can help inform the Council follow-on actions, setting the stage for future
potential enforcement measures.
2. The Council Should Adopt Ex Ante, Risk-Based Measures on
Climate Security
Second, the Council should also play a greater role, ex ante, in addressing
the role that climate change will have in future conflicts. The Council has recently
demonstrated a willingness to address climate change’s adverse effects within
existing Security Council Resolutions in the context of violent conflict in both 2017
(Lake Chad Basin)239 and 2018 (Somalia).240 Future Security Council resolutions
should not shy away from making similar pronouncements ex ante, outside of
active conflict, highlighting future areas where there is a clear linkage between
climate change and security matters (e.g. food and water security).241 In taking
such ex ante measures, the Council could play an important, early-warning role in
addressing climate-related conflict prevention by coordinating climate security
concerns across U.N. organs. This could potentially include the development of an
early climate warning system or the formal development and incorporation of
climate change into United Nations planning and strategy.242
The Security Council should also build upon its earlier efforts to squarely
address climate change’s impacts in Security Council Resolutions and reports.
Climate change has been briefly referenced in Security Council Resolutions since
2017. But a single, climate change-focused resolution would elevate climate
change on the international agenda and highlight the widespread connection

239 S.C. Res. 2349, S/RES/2349 (October 14, 2017).
240 S.C. Res. 2408, S/RES/2408 (March 27, 2018).
241 For a similar argument, see Moztfeldt Kravik, The Security Council and Climate Change — Too
Hot to Handle?, EUR. J. INT’L L. TALK!, Apr. 26, 2018

242 Conca et.al., supra note 11, at 6-8.
47


between conflict and climate change. This is aligned with the Council’s historic
role in taking action to prevent conflicts and a renewed recognition of the need to
address the root cause of armed conflict.243
Relatedly, the Council should establish an early warning information-
sharing “clearinghouse” system or institutional home to assist the U.N. in
responding to climate crisis.244 Such a system could help identify the emergent
“climate hotspots,” facilitating the U.N.’s ability to deliver aid and resources
rapidly. Council action could be further expanded, for example, to address the
unique climate security challenges outside of “hot” conflict zones, such as the
climate impacts felt by small island nations. The Council could invest in better risk
assessment tools, resources, information sharing, and strategies. Why not adopt a
proactive, risk-based approach to climate, rather than waiting for disaster and
conflict to strike?
Of course, a proactive Council on climate change requires political will. But
doing so acknowledges the existing scientific evidence that ties climate change to
deteriorating security situations. The Council should work with leading IPCC,
climate scientists and the proposed “Security COPs” to issue highlight climate
change’s security implications and move resources to future climate hotspots.245
3. Employ the Council’s Chapter VI Investigatory Authorities
Third, the Council should turn to its Chapter VI investigatory powers to
investigate climate change’s impacts on developing nations, to include the four
atoll nations facing imminent climate danger. Under Chapter VI, the Council can
investigate any situation that may endanger the maintenance of peace and
security.246 For example, the Council could investigate and apply resources to the
SIDS climate crisis, address the scope and scale of food security hotspots, or
changing, climate–driven migration patterns. In exercising its investigatory

244 Karl Mathiesen and Natalie Sauer, UN Security Council Members Mount New Push to Address
Climate Threat, CLIMATE HOME NEWS, Jan. 25, 2019.

245 For example, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a report acknowledging
the global human security challenge posed by climate change. See, e.g., DANIEL R. COATS, DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD: WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE
U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 21-23 (Jan. 29, 2019)
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf
48


authority, the Council could work with other international institutions in
developing options for the citizens of these atoll nations.
As it relates to the small island crisis, I envision two ways that this comes
before the Council. First, under Article 99, the U.N. Secretary General “may bring
to the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security.”247 Alternatively, under Article
35, any Member Nation can bring any dispute to the Security Council (or General
Assembly) “which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute.”248
This provides the legal pathway for the plight of these island nations to be formally
placed before the Council.249
Consider a realistic scenario that draws upon the Council’s Article VI
investigatory authorities. Under Article 35 the Republic of the Marshall Islands
requests that the Council investigate climate change’s impacts on the loss of its
territory and other core habitability-related concerns.250 The Council decides to
investigate the scope and scale of the crisis, turning to the world’s leading climate
scientists, policymakers, academics, and others with expertise in addressing
climate impacts at developing nations. This science-based investigation would be
Council-led but could collaborate with IPCC scientists, other international
governance entities, and academic institutions. The Council may take a page from
the Ebola-playbook to call on Member Nations to assist the most vulnerable island
nations in adapting to climate change. This could take many forms—the Council
could call on Member Nations to offer aid and assistance, accept vulnerable
populations into their own population, or even ask the worse climate offenders to
carve out territory for these new climate migrants.251

247 U.N. Charter art 99.
249 U.N. Charter art. 35. Recall that in the Security Council’s response to the Ebola crisis, the
Presidents of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea requested that the UN Secretary General take action
to coordinate and respond to the Ebola outbreak. S.C. RES. 2177, supra note 135, at ¶ 28-31 (2014).
In September 2011, Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands announced plans to seek an
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice to determine “whether state have
obligations under international law to ensure activities in their territory do not harm other states.”
Davies and Riddell, supra note 18, at 70.
251 This idea was proposed by Professor Michael Gerrard of Columbia Law School’s Sabin Climate
Center. See Michael Gerrard, America is the worse climate polluter in the world, we should let
climate change refugees settle here, WASH. POST., June 25, 2015,
49


Alternatively, the Council could investigate the extent of dangerous climate
activities that have a particular devastating impact on peace and security. Brazilian
President Bolsonaro’s failure to enforce environmental regulations is one likely
candidate, although there are many others. The investigation’s conclusions would
highlight the scope of the climate destruction and provide the impetus for follow-
on enforcement action.
At the Chapter VI investigation’s conclusion, the Council could recommend
concrete steps that Member Nations should take to assist the Marshall Islands.252
For example, the Council could call on nations to assist the Marshall Islands
financially or through the provision of scientific or technical expertise.
Nevertheless, such action could raise awareness of the plight of atoll nations and,
more importantly, serve as a building block for future action. 253 The Council’s
earlier response to the Ebola crisis may serve as a helpful playbook, as it called
upon Member Nations to assist in aid and support to vulnerable nations suffering
the worst consequences of the outbreak.
Chapter VI’s soft law approach works hand in glove with Chapter VII’s
awesome—and legally binding tools—that are always at the Council’s disposal.
Indeed, merely keeping alive the possibility a Council Article 39 determination
may serve as a prod for international action—a successful strategy in other
contexts. 254 As discussed below, making a threat to the peace determination
would highlight climate change’s threat to the international community and would
be aligned with prior Council efforts to address non-traditional, underlying threats
to international peace and security.
B. Recommendations for Council Climate Action Via an Article 39 Threat
to the Peace Determination
In what follows, I argue that the Council should declare climate change a

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-the-worst-polluter-in-the-history-of-the-
world-we-should-let-climate-change-refugees-resettle-here/2015/06/25/28a55238-1a9c-11e5-
ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html
252 Some scholars have intimated in other contexts that Chapter VI measures can be binding. See,
e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are Binding
under Article 25 of the Charter? 21 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 270 (1972).
253 See Camilla Born, A Resolution for a Peaceful Climate: Opportunities for the UN Security
Council, SIPRI POLICY BRIEF, (Jan. 2017).

254 Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of
Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011).
50


threat to international peace and security, squarely elevating climate change and
its security impacts as an before the Council and setting the stage for broader
Chapter VII enforcement action.
1. Affirmatively Declare Climate Change a Threat to International
Peace & Security Under Article 39
In light of the overwhelming science and direr predictions of our
destabilized climate century, the Council should formally declare climate change
a threat to international peace and security.255 In the event of Council paralysis,
Small Island Developing States, developing nations, and international activists
should advocate that the Council to make an explicit Article 39 threat to the peace
determination. Doing so acknowledges the state of the current science and likely
future security impacts, setting the stage for follow-on enforcement action under
Chapter VII.
Indeed, the Council could simply declare climate change a threat to
international peace and security under Article 39 without activating its follow-on
authorities. Certainly, there is rhetorical value in this, as it places climate change
squarely on the Council’s agenda. And doing so is not without precedent—the
Council declared the Ebola health crisis a threat to international peace and security
in 2014 without fully flexing its Chapter VII authorities.256 This elevates the issue
to the broader international community, provides an opportunity to “test the
legitimacy waters” and set the stage for follow-on action
How might an Article 39 determination come about? Ideally, climate
change would be brought to the Council’s attention via a formal process such as a
small island nation formally seeking Council action. This request could help
alleviate legitimacy concerns that the Council is exceeding its mandate. Despite
current political challenges and intransigence, the Council remains a powerful,
agenda-setting venue with tremendous delegated legal authorities. Any issue
before the Security Council gains immediate international exposure. So even non-

256 See supra Part II.A.
51


binding Council resolutions, debates, and proclamations may serve as a prod for
action.257
Alternatively, the Council could work with ongoing Framework Convention
efforts in adopting a “name and shame” approach for states that engage in
particularly harmful climate activities. This has already occurred in the
environmental security context: The Council condemnation of Iraq’s
environmental destruction is but one notable example. 258 Once an Article 39
determination is made, what explicit Chapter VII actions should follow? I turn to
that below.
2. Article 40: Taking “Such Provisional Measures”
Article 40, UN Charter, authorizes the Council to “call upon the parties
concerned to comply with such provisional measure as it deems necessary or
desirable.”259 Historically, the Council has relied upon Article 40 authorities when
calling on member states to withdraw armed forces, cease hostilities, and observe
ceasefires.260 In the climate change context, the Council could use Article 40 to
urge states to accept climate migrants, assist developing nations in adaptation
efforts, or stop the destruction of GHG sinks and reservoirs—such as Brazil’s
decimation of the Amazon rainforest. Once again, these are non-binding, soft
compliance measures. While its applicability to climate change remains untested
the Council has used Article 40 as a compliance tool prior to imposing sanction or
using force. 261 It also sets the stage for Article 41 economic sanctions or diplomatic
measures against climate rogue states, individuals, or corporations.
3. Article 41: Carefully Constructed Economic Sanctions Against
“Climate Rogue Actors”262
In conjunction with the proposed follow-on “Security COPs,” the Council
should take action under Article 41 under its “partial disruptions of economic

257 Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of
Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011).
258 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. ¶ 16 S/RES/687 (1991).
260 Warren, supra note 149, at 10.
261 Id.
262 I borrow this term from Professor Craig Martin and his work on “atmospheric intervention.” See
generally Martin, supra note 10.
52


relations” provision.263 Doing so could target states that are flagrantly violating
their climate change legal obligations in a manner that recklessly increases the
threat to international peace and security. The framework of what activities
amount to a “reckless disregard” of climate change should be the subject of an
aforementioned Security COP.264 Ideally, the proposed Security COP or Chapter
VI investigation into climate-wrongdoing should help inform the decision-making
process. This could include the banning of particularly pernicious goods that
contribute to global warming or the sanctioning of nations that fail to provide
adequate climate oversight.
Saudi Aramco, for example, is the world’s largest oil and gas producer and
has contributed more GHG emissions than any one corporation over the past fifty
years.265 Unlike other investor-backed oil companies—such as the privately-held
Exxon and Chevron—the nation of Saudi Arabia owns Aramco. Saudi Arabia, a
member of the United Nations, has aggressively underwritten Aramco’s fossil fuel
extraction with devastating consequences for developing nations. The Council
could investigate Saudi Arabia’s domestic climate change laws and policies to
inquire whether Saudi Arabia is encouraging destructive climate activities to the
detriment of international peace and security. Following this investigation, the
Council could consider instituting targeted economic sanctions against Saudi
Arabia to better reflect the climate harm caused by Aramco’s massive carbon
release.266
Article 41—or the threat of its invocation—could once again serve as a
powerful tool to address climate change through the use of targeted sanctions to
punish particularly destructive climate actions by nations. This coercive authority,

264 At least one commentator has proposed a five-prong analytical framework for determining when
the Application of Article 41 is appropriate and legal. Knight, supra note 117, at 1571-84.
265 According to the Climate Accountability Initiative, Aramco has produced 4.38% of worldwide
GHG emissions from 1965-2017. Matthew & Jonathan Watts, Revealed: The 20 Firms Behind a
Third of all Carbon Emissions, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 19, 2019.
266 Council action could also include targeted sanctions could also be imposed against individuals
and private entities; this occurred in both the terrorism context and against individuals associated
with Iran’s nuclear program. S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (December 23, 2006)
(imposing targeted sanction on individuals associated with Iran’s nuclear program). To be sure,
there are no shortage of states, corporations, and entities that are engaging in harmful climate
behavior. I highlight Saudi Aramco based upon its aggregate GHG emissions, weak Saudi
environmental laws, and its unique nature as a state-owned corporation.
53


of course, must be employed carefully. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
comprehensively address the normative implications of economic sanctions, but
studies suggest that they often harm the most vulnerable citizens, and the often
run into enforcement challenges. 267 Short of an Article 41 determination the
Council could use its position to condemn nations engaging in particularly
egregious behavior, such as Brazilian President Bolsonaro’s destruction of the
Amazon basin in Brazil.
Alternatively, the Council could use its platform to shine line on
corporations that operate with little international scrutiny and engage in
particularly harmful climate activities. Some commentators have suggested that
such an approach could prod states toward compliance.268
To be clear, I do not support the Council specifically using its authorities to
enforce the Paris Agreement’s provisions at this time. For one, the 2015 Paris
Agreement is a process-oriented, bottom-up agreement, a marked contrast from
the more hierarchical 1997 Kyoto Protocol that faced immediate resistance, leading
to its failure. The Paris Accord relies upon voluntary nationally determined
contributions that ratchet up over time.269 Independent Council action that seeks
to enforce pre-existing Paris Accord climate mitigation commitments would
exceed the legal commitments agreed to by the Paris parties. While Council action
offers an appealing and expeditious venue on climate action, it must walk a
“legitimacy tightrope” that acts takes into account other climate efforts.270
In sum, by making an explicit Article 39 determination, the Council is
setting the stage for future action under Chapter VII. It is also aligned with
underlying security concerns and is accord with precedent in addressing non-
traditional security threats. In responding to the Ebola crisis made an explicit
Article 39 determination. The Council’s role on climate can expand or contract to

267 See, e.g, Devon Whittle, The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security Council:
Applying the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action, 26 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 671 (2015).
268 See Christina Voigt, Security in a “Warming World”: Competencies of the U.N. Security
Council for Preventing Climate Change in SECURITY: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY NORMATIVE APPROACH

297, 310 (Cecilia M. Baillet ed., 2009).
269 Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 4, para. 2. “Each Party shall prepare, communicate and
maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve.”

270 Dan Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596 (1999).
54


match developments in climate science and the corresponding international action
(or inaction) to reduce global GHG emissions.
C. Chapter VII Actions that the Council Should Not Employ at This Time
Let’s consider what actions may be considered by the Security Council in
the not-too-distant future but should be treated with immense caution. To be
clear, I am not advocating that the Council take any military action to address
climate change, nor do I envision this as a particularly fruitful or helpful path in
the near future.
1. A Robust Climate-Legislative Council
The Council may consider taking legislative action, akin to earlier Council
action on terrorism and combatting the spread of weapons of mass destruction.271
The Council’s 2001 resolution, for example, ordered states to take specific actions
to counter the threat of terrorism.
While legislative action on climate may look appealing, it would be
enormously controversial and strike at the core of the Council’s legal legitimacy.
The 2001 and 2004 Resolutions remain controversial with some scholars arguing
that the Council was acting ultra vires.272 Imagine a scenario where the Council
took action requiring nations to pass legislative action to implement the Paris
Accord’s emissions targets. This option may be considered if the forthcoming 2023
“stocktake” falls far short of commitments. Such an action would be open to
criticism that the Council is exceeding both the scope of the Paris Agreement and
is not sufficiently related to the maintenance of peace and security. Action outside
the Paris Agreement—such as requiring nations to accept climate migrants from
the most vulnerable nations fleeing environmental crisis—may be perceived as
more legitimate because it is in response to a widening gap in international law
and climate migration has a more direct linkage to the maintenance of peace and
security. Still, the Council could stop short of transforming into a robust Climate-

271 See discussion, infra Part II.A.
272 See, e.g., Daniel Joyner, Non-Proliferation and the United Nations System: Resolution 1540
and the Limits of the Power of the Security Council, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 489 (2007); see also Paul
C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L. L. 901 (2002) (describing the
debate about the Council’s legislative authority under international law).
55


Legislative Council absent a greater acceptance of the Council’s role in addressing
climate change.
2. Article 42: Military Measures
It is only when Article 41 measures are inadequate to meet the threat, that
Council may use its awesome Article 42 military authorities. Here, the Security
Council possesses the authority to use “air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security.” In a crisis, the Security
Council could turn to this authority to provide humanitarian assistance or evacuate
displaced persons from their homeland.
This authority could be employed to encompass military-assisted
humanitarian assistance missions to protect citizens vulnerable to climate change
when its own government fails to act or is incapable of protecting its citizens.273
But just as the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”) doctrine remains enormously
controversial, so too will any expansion of Responsibility to Protect that
specifically takes into account climactic conditions. 274 Yet it is difficult to imagine
a situation requiring such a dramatic step in the foreseeable future. Besides being
politically difficult, this would open a “legitimacy Pandora’s box” that would be
difficult to close. 275 Underlying concerns about the “militarization” and
“securitization” of climate change would be rekindled, distracting from the climate
crisis at hand.276 Using Article 42 authorities to address climate change is simply
too blunt an instrument that is fraught with too many legitimacy concerns at this
time. Yet the mere potential for Chapter VII action could serve as a prod for

274 It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a thorough discussion of the Responsibility to
Protect Doctrine as applied to climate change, but for a thorough discussion of Responsibility to
Protect (R2), its embrace by the human rights community and its evolution from Kosovo to present,
see generally SAMANTHA POWERS, EDUCATION OF AN IDEALIST (2019); see also MARTIN, supra note 9,
at 37-41 (discussing humanitarian intervention in the event of “atmospheric intervention”).
Professor David Luban has separately argued for a “Responsibility to Humanity” (R2H). David
Luban, R2H and Threats to Peace: An Essay on Sovereign Responsibilities, 37 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. ___ (2020)(forthcoming).
275 The military also releases an enormous amount of GHG emissions. See Neta C. Crawford,
Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change, and the Costs of War, Brown University Watson Institute for
Int’l and Public Affairs 2 (Nov. 2019) (highlighting that the U.S. military alone ranks as the
#55th largest emitter of GHG, larger than many European nations).
276 Critics of Security Council action on climate change date back until at least 1991. See Tinker,
supra note 91.
56


international action, akin to common law nuisance lawsuits that have served as a
prod for environmental action within the United States.277
In sum, Security Council climate action should proceed in a principled,
manner in accordance with the governing principles outlined in Part III. As a
forum to address climate change, the Council has several structural advantages
that allow for expedient action, if necessary. If the gap continues to widen between
climate change’s threat to international peace and security and international
action, the Security Council’s authorities and competencies will likely look
attractive. In the table C below, I highlight various options for prospective Security
Council action on climate change.
Table C: Potential UN Security Council Climate Actions
Action278 Charter-Based Legitimacy
Legal Authority? Concern?279
Follow-On Security Council Conference of Article 24 Low
Parties (COPs)
Integration of Climate Security Matters into Article 24 and 34 Low

Security Council Resolutions
Implement Ex Ante, Risked-Based Climate Article 24 Low-Medium

Measures280

277 Cf. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of
Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011). See also Mark P. Nevitt & Robert V. Percival, Could
Official Climate Denial Revive the Common Law as a Regulatory Backstop?, 96 WASH. U. L. REV.
441 (2019).
278 I use the term “action” here but also note that there is likely a legitimacy concern for UNSC
inaction based upon its Article 24 authorities.

279 For the legitimacy concern, I use a five-part ranking (Low, Medium-Low, Medium, Medium-
High, and High). I base my ranking by looking to any record of past practice on the specific UNSC
action, public pronouncements from both UNSC Members and non-Members on the UNSC action,
and underlying principles of international law. The actual legitimacy concern will depend heavily
on the precise nature of the Council’s action.
280 Ideally, the development of this early warning system and risk analysis would be integrated into
the Paris Accord’s Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage, which may include early
warning systems, emergency preparedness, slow onset events, events that may involve irreversible
and permanent loss and damage, comprehensive risk assessment and management, climate risk
insurance facilities, non-economic losses, and resilience of communities, livelihoods, and
ecosystems. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 8 (4)(a)-(h). The Pacific Island President from
Nauru requested the Appointment of a “Special Representative of the Security General on Climate
& Security” in Dec. 2018 in order to fill a “critical gap in the United Nations system and provide
the Council with the information it needs.” UNITED NATIONS PRESS COVERAGE, Addressing Security
Council, Pacific Island President Calls Climate Change Defining Issue of Next Century, Call for
Special Representative on Issue, Dec. 17, 2018
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13417.doc.htm
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Formal Council Investigation on Threats Chapter VI, Article Medium281
Posed by Climate Change 34
Declare Climate Change a “Threat to the Article 39 Medium

Peace” under Article 39282
Article 40 “Provisional Measures” Article 40 Medium283
Imposition of Targeted Economic Sanctions Article 41 Medium-High
Climate-Legislative Council Article 24, 48(1) High
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) on Climate Article 42 Extraordinarily

Change – Use of Military Force High
Conclusion
This “climate-security century” will increasingly demand bold and
innovative legal solutions. 284 We will need to think boldly about all the legal,
policy, and technological tools at our disposal to address climate change’s
multifaceted international peace and security challenges. 285 Due to current
political realities the Council may not take immediate, legally binding action on
climate change today. But it can no longer ignore advances in climate science that
show a clear linkage between human-caused climate change and threats to peace
and security. A logical first step is to simply acknowledge what the science
demonstrates: climate change is a threat to international peace and security,
similar to pronouncements on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and Ebola.
The Council is the international forum to address security matters—fully
averting its eyes to non-traditional security threats such as climate change is an
abdication of its responsibility that it exercises on behalf of all 193 Member
Nations. As such, the Council must play a measured role that walks a legitimacy
tightrope” that balances its authority while ensuring that it does not stray from its
governing security mandate. As a scientific and policy matter, we already know

281 This may depend, in part, on the impetus for the investigation and its subject matter.
282 This could also entail declaring a specific climate impact a threat to the peace. I assess this
action to be medium based upon historica practice (The Ebola determination that it is a threat to
the peace).
283 The legitimacy of this action depends heavily upon the nature and scope of these measures.
284 See generally Lazarus, supra note 2.
285 Mark Nevitt, Military Planning for the Climate Century, JUST SECURITY, Oct. 19, 2017,
https://www.justsecurity.org/46109/planning-climate-century-u-s-worlds-militaries/
58


that climate change threatens international peace and security; whether the
Security Council remains seized of the matter and makes a similar legal
determination with follow-on actions remains to be seen. The Security Council has
demonstrated its capacity tackle non-traditional security threats to include
terrorism and global health epidemics.286 This suggests a greater potential role for
the Council on matters of climate security. Indeed, the UN Charter already places
a special trust and responsibility in the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security — regardless of its source.
Yet re-conceptualizing climate change as a security issue worthy of Council
attention and action will not be without controversy: any potential Security
Council action must walk a fine “legitimacy tightrope” that balances its inherent,
delegated authority with its understood mandate. Straying too far from its
mandate could prove disastrous. Yet ignoring climate change’s security costs and
threat to individual state’s existence comes with its own legitimacy costs.
Climate change remains a “super-wicked problem” regardless of what legal
approach is followed. It will result in mass migration, starvation, pandemics and
cascading levels of armed conflict. The rise in armed conflict will require Council
engagement and is squarely within the Council’s legal mandate to address. Why
not take proactive steps today to ameliorate future human suffering and conflict?
The Security Council has powerful and unique delegated authorities to
restore peace and security on behalf of all other Member nations. We are running
out of time to take international climate action. In doing so, the Security Council
can fulfill a gap-filling role, plugging an ever-widening climate-security hole.
Traditional international environmental laws are proving to be increasingly
inadequate in substance (lacking a security mandate) and implementation (free-
riding and enforcement of existing provisions). After all, addressing matters that
undermine international peace and security are the ultimate responsibility of the
Security Council. After all, the earth continues to warm regardless of how we
address (or fail to address) climate change.

286 S.C. Res. 2177 (2014).
59

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Is Climate Change a Threat to International Peace and

I address these questions, and others, proceeding in four parts. I first

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The climate-security century is here. Both the United Nations

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Christine Parthemore, National Security and Climate Change in Perspective in CLIMATE

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to 8.1 degrees Fahrenheit).

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Yemen, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 2018.

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CLIMATE CHANGE 13-18, 39 (2007), available at https://www.cna.org/reports/climate (noting that

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Perspective, available at: https://www.ametsoc.org/ams/index.cfm/publications/bulletin-of-

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Change as an Emerging "Threat to International Peace and Security”, 7 INT’L ENVIRON

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CLIMATE HOME NEWS, (Jun. 6, 2020) https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/06/10/greta-

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The Council may take action on disputes by “recommending appropriate

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“Purposes and Principles.” U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2.

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nations that engage in egregiously destructive environmental behavior with a disproportionate

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disparate security impacts on women).

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robust Chapter VII authorities—such as the military-sponsored delivery of humanitarian assistance

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Coronavirus Response, NPR News, Jun. 9, 2020 https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-

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B. Security Council Climate Debate & Resolutions: A Stepping-Stone for

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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Jul 31, 2018.

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A/64/350 (Sept. 11, 2009).

S/PV.6587 (July 20, 2011).

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This dialogue between the security and scientific communities represents a

its impact on peace, Jan. 25, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1031322 (quoting

as a “Threat Multiplier”, U.N. Security Council Debates its Role on Peace,

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or more informal sessions.

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C. Nation Extinction: A Growing International Climate Governance Gaps