Intelligence officer from PRT Zabul listens to villagers from Khleqdad Khan, Afghanistan

U.S. Air Force (Brian Ferguson)

“Left of Bang”
The Value of Sociocultural Analysis in
Today’s Environment
BY MICHAEL T. FLYNN, JAMES SISCO, AND DAVID C. ELLIS

H
ard lessons learned during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
counterterrorist operations across continents, and the Arab Spring all contributed to
a growing recognition within the Intelligence Community (IC) 1 of the importance
of understanding the “human terrain” of operating environments. The Department of Defense
(DOD), its Service branches and combatant commands, and the broader IC responded to the
demand for sociocultural analysis (SCA) by creating organizations such as the Defense Intelligence
Socio-Cultural Capabilities Council, Human Terrain System, and U.S. Central Command’s Human
Terrain Analysis Branch, among others. For large bureaucracies, DOD and the IC reacted agilely
to the requirement, but the robust SCA capabilities generated across the government over the
last decade were largely operationally and tactically organized, resourced, and focused. What
remains is for the IC to formulate a strategic understanding of SCA and establish a paradigm for
incorporating it into the intelligence process.
Simply stated, the lesson of the last decade is that failing to understand the human dimen-
sion of conflict is too costly in lives, resources, and political will for the Nation to bear. Once a
conflict commences, it is already too late to begin the process of learning about the population
and its politics. The optimal condition is for our leaders to have the ability to influence bud-
ding conflicts “left of bang,” that is, before tensions turn violent. Left of bang, policy options
are more numerous, costs of engagement are lower, and information flows more freely to more
actors. After bang, options decrease markedly, the policy costs rise rapidly, and information

Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, USA, is Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and
Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance. Lieutenant Commander James Sisco, USN, is an Intelligence Officer currently serving
in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Dr. David C. Ellis joined U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) in 2009 as a Human Terrain Analyst and is the lead for USSOCOM’s Socio-
Cultural Awareness Section.

PRISM 3, no . 4 FEATURES | 13
 Flynn, sisco, and ellis

becomes scarce and expensive. More than influence left of bang. As a first step toward
ever, military, intelligence, and diplomatic building a population-centric social radar, this
professionals recognize this reality. article explains why integrating SCA remains
A tremendous opportunity now exists for counterintuitive to the IC, describes how social
the Intelligence Community to build upon its amplifiers compound the difficulty, offers a
world-class analytical foundation. Complex framework for inexpensively and proactively
social phenomena such as population growth capturing sociocultural information, and sug-
and demographic change, economic globaliza- gests a paradigm for converting sociocultural
tion, and the information and communication information into intelligence production.
revolutions demand even greater attention.
Unfortunately, the IC struggles to integrate
Old Structure, New Threats
sociocultural analysis into traditional collec- That we are largely uninformed about popu-
tion and analysis because its structures remain lations and ill-prepared to understand them
rooted in the state-centric context of the Cold is a natural consequence of the IC being
built upon the edifice of Cold War politics.
the lesson of the last decade is that failing Much of the IC was established to detect,
to understand the human dimension of understand, and maneuver against adver-
conflict is too costly in lives, resources, and saries’ actions and intentions by employing
political will for the Nation to bear all methods of national inf luence, includ-
ing military assets, economic strength, and
diplomatic skill. Sovereignty as a core prin-
War. The evolving nexus of threats among ter- ciple of international order meant that states
rorist groups, transnational criminal organiza- would not generally concern themselves
tions (TCOs), cyber-criminals, humanitarian w it h how ot he r gove r n me nt s ma naged
crises, and pandemics is merely symptomatic their populations.2 Yet in many parts of the
of the need to reconceptualize the way popula- world, weakening or eroded state sovereignty
tions, political systems, and geography inter- enables many of the above threats against
sect. A new concept should seek to explain our national interests to grow. Under condi-
how populations understand their reality, why tions of meaningful sovereign state author-
they choose either to support or resist their ity, these issues are manageable. However,
governments, how they organize themselves failed and failing states create circumstances
socially and politically, and why and how their whereby aggrieved populations and nonstate
beliefs transform over time. actors can assert themselves in ways that are
In contrast to the IC’s typical state-centric not easily comprehensible to the IC. To frame
analysis, which seeks to determine how states the challenge ahead, the Failed States Index
can or do impose stability, the IC must develop asserts that approximately 20 percent of the
a sensory capability to better detect the precur- world’s states are now considered to be failed
sors to political change, a “social radar” with a states or are at severe risk of failing.3
level of granularity, understanding, and con- While our current intelligence architec-
fidence that enables policy leaders to make ture proved successful in the context of the
informed decisions that maximize national Cold War, it has been much less successful in

14 | Features PRISM 3, no . 4
 “left of bang”

the world of weak and failed states unleashed are now taking advantage of popular discon-
by the collapse of governments whose sur- tent with governments and asserting military
vival was, ironically, predicated upon the dominance over valuable tracts of territory,
largesse provided by the United States and often at the expense of the population itself.6
Soviet Union. In a recent Center for Strategic When amplified by social tensions (discussed
and International Studies report, Anthony below), populations as subnational actors can
Cordesman and Nicholas Yarosh reinforce have greater political inf luence than in the
this point: past, with many of them threatening or rais-
ing the costs of maintaining the international
countries, intelligence experts, mem-
political and economic order.
bers of international institutions, NGOs
[nongovernmental organizations], and
area experts need to do a far better job
the state-centric “order” the West enjoyed during
of developing basic data on the causes of
the Cold War is in today’s world assessed by
instability. . . . Far better data are needed
many populations to be illegitimate and
in ke y areas like unemployment and
worth their sacrifice to change
underemployment, income distribution,
the efficiency of the state sector, barriers
to growth and economic development, the
Amplifiers and Accelerators
size and function [of] security forces and
Population Growth. Global population has
police, and quality of governance.4
doubled since the early 1950s, predominantly
Equating sovereign authority with sta- in parts of the world where institutions of
bility is no longer analytically appropriate. state are least able to create the conditions
As Cordesman and Yarosh indicate, today’s for social order and stability. Despite a trend
conf licts are more about ideas and gover- toward slower rates of population growth on
nance than they are about invasion by a for- the global scale, through 2050 more than 95
eign government. percent of future world population growth
T he s t at e - c e nt r ic “orde r ” t he We s t will occur in developing nations. By 2050,
enjoyed during the Cold War is in today’s the populations in some of the world’s least
world assessed by many populat ions to developed countries—many of which are
be illegitimate and worth their sacrifice to experiencing or recently emerging from con-
c hange. Many states formed af ter World f lict—will be at least double their current
War II and during the 1960s era of decolo- size including Afghanistan, the Democratic
nization are dissolving or losing functional Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Niger,
sovereignty because their regimes have been Somalia, and Uganda. These countries are
unwilling or unable to govern legitimately also home to some of the world’s poorest
on behalf of many—or even most—of their and youngest populations, where continued
people. Their populations are organizing in high rates of population growth have created
social movements or around insurgencies a large youth bulge.7
to change their circumstances. 5 Even worse, These disenfranchised youths struggle for
narco-traffickers and other resource warlords limited resources, employment opportunities,

PRISM 3, no . 4 Features | 15
Flynn, sisco, and ellis

sense of belonging, and upward mobility in inequality within nations, environmental

their communities, tribes, and villages. In degradation, the income gap between devel-
many cases, the very states of which they are oped and developing nations, and fears of
“citizens” proactively deny them opportu- cultural decay. The increasingly competitive
nity.8 With limited options, the allure of quick and interconnected world raises the poten-
wealth associated with illicit activities and the tial for conflicts and crises to escalate in mul-
sense of purpose preached by radical move- tiple domains.12 Ethnic, racial, and religious
ments are sufficient to mobilize enough of stratifications correlated with differences
them to threaten many states’ integrity. in opportunity and wealth often reinforce
Even important demographic changes existing tensions within countries, creating
within allied nations should be of interest fertile ground for exploitation by nonstate
to the IC. For example, significant aging in actors such as TCOs and extremist groups.
Europe in concert with growing Muslim pop- Individuals no longer accept the status quo
ulations could alter the economic capacity or from their governments and are demanding
political calculus of governments to support a better way of life for themselves, their fami-
the United States in foreign affairs. On the lies, and communities, especially when they
other hand, corresponding aging trends in know alternatives exist.
China might prohibit future military adven- The Communication Revolution. The
turism due to the high costs associated with explosion in communications technology,
an expansive welfare state. 9 Whether driven social media in particular, has dramatically
by youth bulges, deprivation, or aging, demo- increased a population’s ability to organize
graphic changes now matter more analytically and communicate. Whereas state govern-
than they have in the past. ments could effectively limit association and
Economic Globalization. Globalization information exchange in the past, the mod-
entails the qualitative and quantitative increase ern Internet and cell phone coverage make
in the scope and intensity of “interactions and this objective more difficult. For example, as
interdependencies among peoples and coun- of December 2011, there were over 2.1 billion
tries of the world.”10 The progressive erosion Internet users with 3 billion email addresses,
of barriers to trade—whether based on policy, 152 million blog sites, and 276 million Web
geography, or transportation—has enabled a sites with 45 percent of users under the age
rapid expansion of trade and contact among of 25. Facebook has more than 800 million
previously distant populations. Economic glo- active users who log in 175 million times every
balization has resulted in an incredible degree 24 hours, 65 million through mobile devices,
of prosperity and rising incomes at an unprec- sharing over 30 billion pieces of content each
edented rate for those able to participate.11 month. Traditional closed societies around the
The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and world are also beginning to use these media
China) demonstrate the amazing advances that to rapidly disseminate information. In China,
accrue with freer markets, substantive technol- Wiebo—a micro-blogging Web site equivalent
ogy transfers, and low policy barriers to trade. to Twitter—has more than 250 million users,
However, economic globalization also most of whom are educated and white col-
amplifies vexing challenges such as income lar, and it is becoming a major influence in

16 | Features PRISM 3, no . 4
 “left of bang”

Chinese society. Grassroots social movements, small part of the type of sociocultural analysis
as evidenced during the Arab Spring, are using available to the IC, but it can be an insightful
these capabilities to organize demonstrations, component if properly utilized.
spread messages to large audiences, and even
overthrow governments. what social media do provide populations is
While the sociocultural and research com- a virtual organizing capability in the face of
munity has been interested in social media and physical repression by regimes
how to leverage it for intelligence purposes for
years, the Iranian Green Revolution and Arab
Spring have given rise to a new fascination Integrating SCA within the Conflict
with it. However, the use of social media was Continuum
incidental, not causal, to these popular upris-
ings. Discontent existed before the explosion To proactively build a social radar capable of
of social media and was identifiable and mea- sensing important impacts on populations
sureable even in social media’s absence. What and political systems like the ones above, it
social media do provide populations is a vir- is first necessary to conceptualize how the IC
tual organizing capability in the face of physi- can come to know them, particularly in the
cal repression by regimes. Unfortunately, there coming era of constrained budgets. Unlike
is a tendency to view the geospatial depiction state-centric analysis that is often reduced to
of Facebook and Twitter feeds or ethno-reli- quantitative metrics, such as gross domestic
gious human terrain maps to be the sum total product or mechanized infantry battalions,
of sociocultural analysis. In fact, this is but a SCA requires deep, qualitative understanding

U.S. Marine Forces Africa

Members of Royal Moroccan Army conduct terrain analysis during intelligence staff training as part of
exercise African Lion 2010

PRISM 3, no . 4 Features | 17
Flynn, sisco, and ellis

about populations. Though such a task seems political decisionmakers of possible uprisings
daunting at first, the conflict continuum in the or conflicts so they can avoid them. At this
figure illustrates how the IC can inexpensively stage in the conflict continuum, deeper socio-
and proactively integrate SCA with traditional cultural understanding results in a broader
collection and analysis. range of policy options available to the nation
Prior to conflict, or left of bang, the IC and its allies to prevent conflict.
has a great deal of access to various informa- As tensions rise and move toward conflict,
tion sources. The universe of information the potential for violence increases the risk and
sources includes partner nations, academia, cost of available responses while constrain-
private-sector companies, and social media, ing policy options and access to information.
all of which often enjoy unfettered access By conducting SCA in Phase 0 and having a
to the population and generate information baseline, the IC will be able to inform mili-
about it as a normal activity. These informa- tary planners of potential threats and recom-
tion sources can provide a wealth of informa- mend sound policy options consistent with
tion, enabling analysts to develop baseline the population’s worldview and attitudes. Such
assessments of populations, cultures, behav- an approach puts policy and national interests
iors, and social narratives. more in line with the needs of the population
When SCA methodologies and techniques to generate common achievable outcomes.
are applied, strategic indications and warning This can prevent poor decisions based on
can be derived from deviations in the base- a lack of information and understanding of
line. These deviations can inform military and social dynamics.

Figure. The Conflict Continuum

18 | Features PRISM 3, no . 4
 “left of bang”

As conflict concludes, reconstituting a resulting in significant errors. The IC can orga-

sustainable, legitimate polity becomes more nize its resources and processes to ingest SCA
likely if the new institutions of state reflect into intelligence with the right framework.
the values, norms, and organizing principles
of the population. In addition, reduced vio-
Integrating SCA through RSI
lence results in greater access to the popula- The Intelligence Community has the oppor-
tion through NGOs and humanitarian efforts. tunity to meet growing demands for socio-
This will allow the IC to reestablish baseline cultural analysis, but requires a paradigm
understandings of the population in the new describing how to resource this capability and
context. This reestablished baseline allows explaining its value to foreign and military
the IC to develop realistic recommendations policy. This article asserts that today’s threat
informing actions to include forming a govern- environment, in which subnational actors and
ment, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction complex social trends persistently undermine
efforts, infrastructure development, reintegra- the state system, requires addressing budding
tion and reconciliation programs, and estab- conflicts before they turn violent. Doing so
lishing military and police forces. These initia- will allow the United States to better respond
tives are extraordinarily complex, so the more with a wider range of policy options at lower
data and knowledge that are available before cost. The conflict continuum is offered to con-
a conflict, the more likely the right questions ceptualize the value of conducting SCA before
and interests will be addressed after it.
U.S. Special Operations Command knowledge about populations has a long shelf
(USSOCOM) Commander Admiral William life given that cultures, norms, and values
H. McRaven, whose forces must be culturally change only gradually
attuned in the fight against extremists, recently
stated, “Clearly, we need to continue to improve
our understanding and respect for other cul- crises manifest. Additionally, the reconnais-
tures, improve our language capability and sance, surveillance, and intelligence (RSI)
cultivate our ability to build relationships.”13 framework is suggested to integrate whole of
Hard lessons over the past decade demonstrate nation resources for understanding threats
the costs associated with building govern- to populations, their states, and national
ment institutions that fail to coincide with and interests.15 RSI is a paradigm codeveloped by
take into account the population’s ontology USSOCOM’s Matthew Puls and U.S. Army
(worldview, identity, norms, and narratives). Training and Doctrine Command G2’s Dr.
As Admiral McRaven notes, “Enduring suc- Kira Hutchinson for incorporating existing
cess is achieved by proper application of indi- sociocultural analysis resources into the intel-
rect operations, with an emphasis in building ligence process.16 In contrast to intelligence,
partner-nation capacity and mitigating the con- surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), which
ditions that make populations susceptible to is generally perishable (find, fix, finish), RSI
extremist ideologies.”14 But discovering when, suggests that a long-term research perspective
where, how, and why to apply that influence is necessary for learning about populations
cannot occur in the midst of conflict without (understand, analyze, engage). Populations

PRISM 3, no . 4 Features | 19
 Flynn, sisco, and ellis

are, under normal conditions, easily discover- 0 environments. Social scientists will be par-
able and available, so national, international, ticularly important given their innate desire
allied, and private-sector resources can come and skill sets. The IC will have to employ its
to know them at relatively low cost. Moreover, own professionals in order to ask the right
knowledge about populations has a long shelf questions and translate the professional jar-
life given that cultures, norms, and values gon into digestible intelligence.
change only gradually. The RSI paradigm provides the IC with a
In the notional RSI process, the recon- means of conceptualizing how to efficiently
naissance phase is dedicated to understand- integrate population-centric information into
ing the world as seen, experienced, valued, the intelligence process. It also suggests the
and practiced by the population. Long-term types of personnel and relationships that will
reconnaissance allows a sense of what is “nor- need to be cultivated to address new threats.
mal” to be assessed for a population. During With a deeper understanding about popula-
the surveillance phase, changes in the baseline tions, the IC will be able during the surveil-
can be detected through a multitude of social lance and intelligence phases to more accu-
science methods. When the changes are deter- rately analyze how contemporary threats will
mined to merit further attention, intelligence likely impact populations and identify means
activity can begin to clarify what the changes for counteracting them when they are poten-
indicate, determine whether a threat appears tially harmful. But the process begins with a
likely, and suggest how national assets might robust reconnaissance capability before threats
shape events. manifest themselves.

Conclusion
sociocultural analysis is now an indispensable
component of intelligence, and the Intelligence Sociocultural analysis is now an indispens-
Community can improve upon its already able component of intelligence, and the
impressive gains Intelligence Community can improve upon
its already impressive gains. The qualified
character of sovereignty in many countries is
As the conf lict continuum illustrates, rendering the IC’s traditional mechanisms and
the lowest costs and greatest opportunities processes for developing information on pop-
associated with generating knowledge about ulations and nonstate actors inadequate. The
populations occur well before conflict or ten- task ahead, therefore, is to develop the social
sions rise. The reconnaissance phase fits per- radar to warn policymakers of and inform
fectly with this perspective, but it requires them how to keep potential crises left of bang.
integrating professional population research- Due to looming budget constraints, some
ers into the information-collection process. in the IC believe it is time to focus on core
Using nontraditional collections and analy- competencies, while others believe it is time
sis avenues such as academia, polling, cen- for a paradigm shift to effectively address the
sus data, and international marketing firms, complexities of globalization. These perspec-
it is possible to generate the baseline under- tives are not mutually exclusive; rather, the
standing of a population, especially in Phase objective is to integrate those scholarly and

20 | Features PRISM 3, no . 4
 “left of bang”

investigative assets with the right expertise and in the New Millennium (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
skill sets into the overall intelligence process in Hall, 2002), 131–136.
3
“The Failed S tates Index 2011,” Fo re i g n
order to understand cultures and populations. Policy, available at <www.foreignpolicy.com/arti-
An intelligence enterprise that fails to adapt cles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_
to the qualified nature of state sovereignty map_and_rankings>.
4
Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas S. Yarosh,
cannot generate the personnel, expertise, and
The Underlying Causes of Stability and Unrest in the Middle
processes to comprehend the problems ahead. East and North Africa: An Analytic Survey (Washington,
The Intelligence Community must DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May
develop and mature innovative capabilities 20, 2012), 2.
5
Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed
that address the challenges of this new threat
Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946–
environment to provide nonlinear, holistic 2004,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (September
intelligence to decisionmakers and advance 2005), 623–635.
6
its analytic tradecraft. The social sciences, Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New
Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Metropolitan
international marketing companies, polling Books, 2001), chapter 8.
firms, and others possess the data, knowledge, 7
United Nations (UN), State of the World
and expertise on foreign populations that the Population 2011 (New York: UN Population Fund, 2011),
3–6.
Intelligence Community lacks. By harness- 8
UN, Arab Human Development Report 2009:
ing these assets more effectively and leverag- Challenges to Human Security in Arab Countries (New
ing the capabilities of allies, the IC can in a York: UN Development Programme, 2009), 2–7.
9
relatively short period come to understand Mark L. Haas, “A Geriatric Peace? The Future
of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations,”
the key sociocultural constructs of relevant
International Security 32, no. 1 (Summer 2007), 112–
populations. By delving into critical questions, 147.
pathways, and indicators for those major and 10
Theodore H. Cohn, Global Political Economy:
minor countries relevant to U.S. national secu- Theory and Practice, 3 rd ed. (New York: Pearson
Longman, 2005), 10–11.
rity, the Intelligence Community can advance 11
Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest
its own analytic transformation, deliver more Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It
powerful insights to customers, and better (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
12
Mission Command White Paper 3, April 2012;
avoid strategic surprise. This will enable more
Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC:
effective diplomacy and better focused military The Joint Staff, 2011).
activity to keep many budding conflicts left of 13
“Q&A with Admiral William H. McRaven,”
bang or to more adeptly navigate the reconsti- Special Warfare 25, no. 2 (April–May 2012), 11, avail-
able at <www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2502/
tution of societies torn by conflict or natural
SW2502QAAdmiralWilliamMcRaven.html>.
disaster. PRISM 14
Ibid., 10.
15
Matthew Puls and David C. Ellis, “Socio-
Cultural ISR for Counterinsurgency and Stability
Notes Operations,” USSOCOM JICSOC: SCA Section Concept
Paper, July 21, 2011.
16
Ibid.; Kira Hutchinson and Matthew Puls,
1
For purposes of brevity, the Intelligence “Mobile Computing Dev ices for Socio- Cultural
Community (IC) also encompasses the Defense Intelligence in Urba n a nd Unconvent iona l
Intelligence Enterprise in this article. Environments,” USSOCOM JICSOC: SCA Section
2
Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond, Concept Paper, February 21, 2012.
Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia: Building World Order

PRISM 3, no . 4 Features | 21