G.R. No.

191425               September 7, 2011

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review 1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30

September 2009 as well as the Resolution 3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court
of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court affirmed the 19
November 2007 Decision4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial
court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.

The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused
Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

The Facts

The appellate court recited the facts as follows:

On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an
Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino")
for the crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA
PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second
marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and
agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a
married man, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT
NOLLORA."

Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to
enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused
Geraldino, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14,
2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was held and both the prosecution and defense
entered the following stipulation of facts:

"1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa
Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte;
 2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena P.
Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;

3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he

contracted the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;

4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of

Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001;

5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as

admitted in her Counter-Affidavit."

The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTC’s resolution is whether or not
the second marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the
case was set for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Evidence for the Prosecution

As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution
witnesses were as follows:

"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah
Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999, they got
married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan
(Exhibit ‘A’). While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has
another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and
returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the
Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted
a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit ‘B’)
when she secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit ‘C’)
from the National Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in November 2003.

Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at
the latter’s workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage
between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly
affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors and childhood friends.
Private complainant also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano
O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. at the latter’s residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr.’s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a friend
and she heard everything that they were talking about.

Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work as
a Staff Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in the amount of ₱34,000.00 a month,
more or less. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that what
happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide.
She added that because of what happened to her, her mother died and she almost got
raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in Saudi Arabia.
However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she
just asked for the return of her money in the amount of ₱50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005,
pages 4-14).

Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the
private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in
said wedding. Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private complainant to
accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila.
She declared that the private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation
and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she (Rowena) knew of the first
marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private complainant but she still went on to
marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much (TSN, October 24, 2005,
pages 3-5).

Evidence for the Defense

The defense’s version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:

"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with
private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however,
claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he
contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is
allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.

To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private complainant,
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by
one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it
is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19,
1992 (Exhibit ‘2,’ ‘3’ and ‘4’). Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of
Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and
approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit ‘7’).

He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their
marriage because she [sic] told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the
reason why said private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having
learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that
Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant and
he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not
want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.

He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a
‘Catholic Pentecostal’ but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said
contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion ‘Catholic’ was
also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does
not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first
marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).

Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueño testified that he is the founder and president
of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as such president, he has the
power and authority to convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He alleged that
sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was then
going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit ‘14’) and after
receiving the application, said accused was indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a
Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He was
then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development.

In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification because of
the filing of the instant case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion
wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10, 1992.
Apart from the above-mentioned document, their ‘Imam’ also issued a Pledge of Conversion
(Exhibit ‘7’). He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the
Holy Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that
the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there
is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October 9, 2006, pages 2-12).

During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in
accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim
faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them
equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the
second. Since his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance with
the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in
accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered as a
true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).

Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of
bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know the private complainant Jesusa
Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case was filed. She insists that she is
the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since
December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage
with the private complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the said marriage.
Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and the latter
responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to their
marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a
Muslim convert. She also claimed that after learning that her husband was a Muslim
convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in accordance with the Muslim
rites. She also belied the allegations of the private complainant that she was sought by the
private complainant and that they had a confrontation where she admitted that she knew
that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married to the private complainant and despite this
knowledge, she went on to marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted that
she only came to know the private complainant when she (private complainant) filed this
case (TSN, August 14, 2007, pages 2-8)."5

The Trial Court’s Ruling

In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted
Geraldino.

The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article
417 of the Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180 8 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited
Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the
qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim male can
have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just
treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases."

In convicting Nollora, the trial court’s Decision further stated thus:

The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to
meet urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to
have a second wife subject to certain requirements. This is because having plurality of
wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on
Personal Status in the Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998
First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to
contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the Shari’a Circuit Court of the
place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or
wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted.
If said council fails to secure the wife’s consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall,
subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines).

Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino,
did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even
declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In
his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can
just marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant. What is clear, therefore,
is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody the second, third or
fourth time. There are requirements that the Shari’a law imposes, that is, he should have
notified the Shari’a Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice should be
furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since
she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon
accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Shari’a law. It is the Shari’a
Court that has this authority.

In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage
in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability
that has already been violated.

The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr.,
only. There is no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down.
The evidence presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of
the first marriage between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,]
being open to several interpretations. Private complainant alleged that when she was
brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latter’s house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P.
Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their conversation. From this
incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she
and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could
not be reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands what was going on
between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that "(E)very circumstance favoring
accused’s innocence must be taken into account, proof against him must survive the test of
reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment" (People vs.
Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for
failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
This court hereby renders judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum
of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.

b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for

failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

SO ORDERED.9

Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under
the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nollora’s motion.

Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:

The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged
despite the prosecution’s failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 10

The Appellate Court’s Ruling

On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nollora’s appeal and affirmed the
trial court’s decision.11

The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in
lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Qur’an. The appellate court
denied Nollora’s invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-
Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws.1avvphi1 Nollora’s two
marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence
the Family Code of the Philippines should apply. Nollora’s claim of religious freedom will
not immobilize the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.

In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nollora’s motion for
reconsideration. The allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of
Nollora’s earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to modify its
30 September 2009 Decision.

Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy.

The Court’s Ruling

Nollora’s petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial
court.

Elements of Bigamy

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married.

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code.

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.13

The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is
legally married to Pinat;14 (2) Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved
prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second
marriage to Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage. 16

The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinat’s marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were
married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on
6 April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the
ceremony. The marriage certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage states that Nollora
and Geraldino were married at Max’s Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro
Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.

A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:

We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22,
1968 from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National
Indices of Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following information:

Date of Marriage Place of Marriage

   
a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN
a) December 08, b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd
2001 District)19
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense.
He alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that
Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, 20 Nollora
cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:

Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to
stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property
relations of the spouses.

Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following
essential requisites are complied with:

(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;

(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent
persons after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and

(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent
persons.

Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age
and any Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any
impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed
to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.

x x x.

Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but
the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set
forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said
witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to
the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer
who shall keep the third.

Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:

(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;

(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under
Muslim law to solemnize marriage; or

(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit Court or any person

designated by the judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to
authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque,
office of the Shari’a judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali,
or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.

Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the
contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If
the amount or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall,
upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social standing of the
parties.

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a
marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No.
209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nollora’s religious affiliation is
not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according
to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption
from liability for the crime of bigamy.21

Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is "single."
Moreover, both of Nollora’s marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although
the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one’s religion in the marriage certificate is not
an essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora’s
liability for bigamy. Nollora’s false declaration about his civil status is thus further
compounded by these omissions.

[ATTY. CALDINO:]

Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your
religion, Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are
already a [M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim
convert since January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat,
there is no indication here that you have indicated your religion. Will you please go over
your marriage contract?

[NOLLORA:]

A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didn’t know why they did not
place any Catholic there.

xxx

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage
contract with your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please
tell us, Mr. Witness, considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert
on January 10, 1992, why in the marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you
indicated there your religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?

A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a
secret my being my Balik-Islam, that’s why I placed there Catholic since I know that
the society doesn’t approve a Catholic to marry another, that’s why I placed there
Catholic as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you indicate there that you’re
single, Mr. Witness?

A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married. 22 (Emphasis supplied)

xxx

[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]

Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as
Catholic when in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage
contract?

xxx

[A:] I don’t think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married
under the Catholic rights [sic] because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim
rights [sic], your Honor.

xxx

Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith
to secure the permission of your first wife to get married?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?

A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the
start, she was always very mad, ma’am.23

In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage to
Geraldino.1avvphi1 Nollora may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate
himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals:24

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal
laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise
of futurity and commitment.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR

No. 31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23
February 2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and one day of  prision
correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum of his
indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided by law.

G.R. No. 169766               March 30, 2011

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB
AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent
marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the
legitimate union of a married couple.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated August 17, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution 2 dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage
to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.

Factual Antecedents

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under
the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City 3 and, subsequently, under
a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,
1993.4 In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’

Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s
wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and
her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, 5 filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City
for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being
bigamous. The complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May
31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married
Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:

11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated
under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of
the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with
Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior
 marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared
as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced
Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because
divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;

11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant
Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with
Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one
contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they
(deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus
covered by this law;7

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the
court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4,
1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court
granted.10

Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss 11 on
February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims
who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latter’s disbarment
complaint against Sen. Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving
Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts.

The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for
declaration of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this
Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred
the petition to the CA14 which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.

During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since
there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent
failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing
parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to adduce evidence, the
hearings set for such purpose15 were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court,
on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings 16 in view of the CA’s temporary restraining
order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the case. 17

Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated
September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate court’s judgment to this Court
by way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603. 19

Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present
her evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was
reset to July 9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a
postponement.22

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit
the case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita
opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the
outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24

On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City, 25 stating as one of
the reasons that as shari’a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in
cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court
of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our
Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s motion for reconsideration 27 with
finality.

A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the
aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab
initio.28

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed,
declared Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being
bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.29 The court said:

A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second
marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his
first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very
beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in
any way affect the void character of the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction,
divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the
effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was solemnized
under the Civil Code or Family Code.30

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as

the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to
file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano
is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is
governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of legal standing to
question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.

In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004, 32 the CA held that Estrellita
can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard
but simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer
despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules.
It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher
courts since, as an independent and original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in
the trial court.

As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s marriage to Sen.
Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and
Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce.
It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent
Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal
standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamano’s wife and, hence, the injured party in the
senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.

In its September 13, 2005 Resolution, 33 the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the
additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public
prosecutor’s report on the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of
the Rules of Court34 and Article 48 of the Family Code 35 will not invalidate the trial court’s
judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been adversarial, negating the
existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the RTC, the
same is attributable to Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded
Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to
our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603
pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the
validity of Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.

The Parties’ Respective Arguments

Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred
in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the
opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against
the validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias 36 laid down the rule
that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an
answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with
finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial
court’s assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the
High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction and yet, the RTC
violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months
before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11,
1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of
whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could be
held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as
the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She
asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased
without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims
whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano
married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of
the deceased.38

Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because
only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39

Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA’s reasoning and
stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an
original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the
RTC.

As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol
Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in
the suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private
respondents’ legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellita’s purported marriage with
Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally
a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as they are the
ones prejudiced by the marital union.

Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.

Issues

The issues that must be resolved are the following:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even though the
latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without
waiting for the Supreme Court’s final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R.
No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process;
and c) the public prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was
collusion;

2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous;
and

3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage
declared void ab initio.

Our Ruling

Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and
her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion
to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the
principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.

Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She
was never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her
interest.

Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias 40 to justify the suspension of the period to file an
answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for  certiorari questioning
the validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said
case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellita’s basis
for her argument, to wit:

However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an
Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her
Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with
finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the
merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the ‘Motion to
Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
[now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the
said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service on her of the
aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x
x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)

Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court
is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed
before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its
proceedings should the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be
raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in
the course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied the wife’s motion to dismiss,
it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved
the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time
to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she
filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial court
after she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.

Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have
waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently,
before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency
of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An
application for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the
trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of." 42 Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case." 43 In fact,
the trial court respected the CA’s temporary restraining order and only after the CA
rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.

Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any
order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her
numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an
answer or to present her evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial
court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer
and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not
be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans
her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after
it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither should
the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor
should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves
strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.

The Public Prosecutor issued a report as

to the non-existence of collusion.

Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor
in cases involving void marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his
investigation report to determine whether there is collusion between the parties:

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one month after receipt of
the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall
submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies
thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof
in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of
collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the
report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss
the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State
at the pre-trial.

Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the
required report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City
Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995, 46 wherein he
attested that there could be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence
because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.

Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is
a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we
held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate
the proceedings in the trial court:

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the
annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties.
There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any
of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal
to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court. 48

The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage
was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void
ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under
the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. 50 Under the marriage
provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed
by way of divorce under PD 1083, 52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However,
PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies
to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party
is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in
any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD
1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and
Muslim rites."53

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage
of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application
of its provisions unless otherwise provided:

Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code
shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein
except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to
extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.

It has been held that:

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate
prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably
expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against
the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the
Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force
and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil acts
that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment.54

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:

A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance
with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the
spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be
considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent
between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose
marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already
settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of
the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted
at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the
CA as void ab initio.

Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration
of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife
the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the
prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.

Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines, 55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section
2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the
validity of their own marriage.

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy.

In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the
exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on
Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable
marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be
filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section
3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief
that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other
hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. 57

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to
the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita’s interpretation is employed, the prior spouse
is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.

The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if
the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should
be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly
the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the
infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected
by the Constitution.

Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the
subsequent marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal
personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs
marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in application and does
not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003. 58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s marriage in
November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can
file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has
been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the
source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the
deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in
interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit.60

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted
in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous
marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on
September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126603 June 29, 1998

ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI
ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano.

On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private
respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage
supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his
death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano
(Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.

On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib)
filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullify of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the
ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented
themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage
contract false and fraudulent.

Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita was
not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with
Romeo C. Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance with publication
requirements.

Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was
without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party
to the marriage" could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other
spouse, 1 hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their
marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both
Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case
was vested in the shari'a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was
properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and
Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in
accordance with PD No. 1083 2 or the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant petition with
this Court seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 order of respondent presiding judge
of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and the 22
August 1995 order denying reconsideration thereof.

In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case to the Court of Appeals
for consolidation with G.R. No. 118371. Zorayda and Adib A. Tamano however filed a
motion, which the Court of Appeals granted, to resolve the Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other consolidated cases.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of shari'a  courts only when filed in places where there are shari'a court.
But in places where there are no shari'a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case
could properly be filed before the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is the shari'a court
and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of
the action.

Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 3 Regional Trial Courts have

jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations. 4 Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of the  plaintiff.  5 There should be no question by now that
what determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff  in this case. 6 In the
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it
was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were
married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in
her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That
she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in
her Motion for Reconsideration.

Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try
the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that
Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's
jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a
motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations
of the complaint. 7 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from
the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. 8

Petitioner argues that the shari'a courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit
pursuant to Art. 13, Title II, PD No. 1083, 9 which provides —

Art. 13. Application. — (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to

marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only
the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance
with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.

(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized

not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the
Philippines shall apply.

(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential

requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and
filiation, guardianship and custody of minors, support and maintenance,
claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to
marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and
obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and the
property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this
Code and other applicable Muslim laws.

As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with
the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is
applicable in the instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were
likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.

Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari'a courts are not
vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated
under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not
divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129
which provides —

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise

exclusive original jurisdiction: . . . (6) In all cases not within the exclusive
 jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions . . .

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court —
Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is
AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be immediately remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings until terminated.

SO ORDERED.