Consociationalism and Multi-Ethnic States:

Post-1971 Pakistan—A Case Study

By

MUHAMMAD MUSHTAQ
(HEC Scholar)

Supervised By

DR. SYED KHAWAJA ALQAMA

DR. AYAZ MUHAMMAD

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Department of Political Science & International Relations

Bahauddin Zakariya University

Multan, Pakistan
 Abstract

This study aims to enhance our understanding relating the utility of consociational

democracy for multiethnic states, analyzing the Pakistani case. So, the central concern

of this dissertation is whether or not consociationalism is a viable solution for the

multiethnic society of Pakistan.

To address this concern, three arguments have been presented in the thesis: First, the

political mobilization and ethnic strife in Pakistan is not caused by non-consociational

features of the federation but because of its relatively centralized settings. Second,

consociationalism is not a realistic option for Pakistan to manage ethnic diversity.

This conclusion is based on three observations: (a) with some exceptions, favorable

conditions for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy are

missing in the case of Pakistan, (b) the evaluation of Pakistani society illustrates that

it is not a case of deeply divided society, (c) and the past experiences of power-

sharing arrangements in Pakistan demonstrate the inaptness of these arrangements for

this case. Conversely, the study explores the underlying relevancy of federalism with

the Pakistani society. Third, the plurality of Pakistanis seems unconvinced by the

consociational arguments. A majority of interviewees demonstrated more support for

the decentralized federalism than the consociationalism.

The irrelevancy of consociationalism with the Pakistani case seems to suggest that

consociational democracy’s utility varies across case studies. Hence, it is not,

necessarily, a viable solution for all multiethnic societies. In addition, the thesis

argues that Pakistan needs a relatively more decentralized federal design to manage

ethnic diversity.

i
 Acknowledgement

My foremost praise goes to Almighty Allah, my Lord and Creator who empowered and

enabled me to complete this research. All my respect goes to the Holy Prophet Muhammad

(Peace be upon Him), who emphasized the significance of knowledge and research.

I am greatly obliged to my supervisors, Dr. Syed Khawja Alqama and Dr. Ayaz Muhammad

Rana for their support, guidance and feedbacks through out my PhD research work. I have

been exceptionally fortunate to work under their supervision. I appreciate Higher Education

Commission Islamabad for sponsoring my PhD studies. I am equally grateful to the teachers

and staff of the Political Science & International Relations, Bahauddin Zakariya University

Multan for their support. Particularly, Dr. Shahnaz Tariq and Fayyaz Ahmad Hussain from

whom I benefited a lot during my course work. I am thankful to Frances Stewart (QEH,

Oxford), Nancy Bermeo (Nuffield College, Oxford), Yunas Samad, Iftikhar H. Malik, and

Pritam Singh for their valuable academic support during my stay at Oxford University. I am

also obliged to the examiners of my thesis, Subrata K. Mitra (Heidelberg), Mathew Nelson

(SOAS), and Tahir Amin (QUA), for their helpful suggestions and comments. I am indebted

to Ian Talbot for reading the first draft of the thesis. I acknowledge the support provided by

the participants and teachers in Summer University (2008) at University of Fribourg,

Switzerland. I am thankful to all my friends at BZU who have been helpful and kind

throughout my stay at Multan. Particularly, Shahzad Hussain (Economics), Zamir Hussain

(Statistics), and Mehmood-ul-Hassan (Statistics) deserve appreciation for their support. I

would like to thank Obaid-ur-Rehman, Zafar Hussain Harral, and Malik Javed Iqbal Wains

whom have made, in their own way, my time at the campus enjoyable. My deepest gratitude

goes to my parents and family members; I could not have completed my work without their

love and encouragement. Finally, I would like to thanks Shagufta who shared the all

sufferings that I bear while completing this thesis.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract i
Acknowledgements ii
Table of Contents iii
List of Figures viii

Chapter No. 1: Introduction

1.1 Prologue 1
1.2 Objectives and Scope of study 4
1.3 Research Questions 6
1.4 Research Methodology 8
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 8

Chapter No. 2: Consociationalism: A Review and Critique

2.1 Introduction 14
2.2 Consociationalism 15
2.3 Development of the Consociational Theory 16
2.4 The Growth and Expansion of Consociational Democracy 18
2.5 Characteristics of Consociationalism 20
2.5.1 Grand Coalition or Executive Power sharing 20
2.5.2 Segmental Autonomy 23
2.5.3 Proportionality 25
2.5.4 Mutual Veto 26
2.6 Examples of Consociational Arrangements 27
2.7 The Favorable Factors for Consociational Democracy 33
2.8 Collected Critique 36
2.9 Consociationalism and Pakistan 41

Chapter No. 3: Ethnic Diversity: A Problem in Pakistan

3.1 Introduction 47
3.2 Movement of Indian Muslims for a Separate Homeland 47
3.3 Pre-1971 Pakistan: Constitutional and Political Development 50
3.4 Post-1971 Pakistan: an Overview of Ethnic Groups and their Locations 53
3.4.1 Punjab 54
3.4.1.1 Punjabi Speaking Region of Punjab 55
3.4.1.2 Siraiki Speaking Areas of Punjab 55
3.4.2 Sindh 55

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 3.4.3 North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP) 56
3.4.4 Balochistan 56
3.5 Grievances of Smaller Communities 59
3.5.1 Lack of Power-sharing 59
3.5.1.1 Distribution of Political Positions 60
3.5.1.2 Civil Bureaucracy 62
3.5.1.3 Distribution of Diplomatic Positions 65
3.5.2. Militarization 66
3.5.3 Uneven Development and Regional Disparities 69
3.5.4 Distributive issues 75
3.5.4.1 Allocation of Funds: NFC Award 75
3.5.4.2 Water Resources 75
3.5.4.2.1 Apprehensions of smaller units against the construction of
Kalabagh Dam 76
3.5.4.2.2 Responses to Kalabagh Dam campaign 78
3.6 Some Substantial Protests and Autonomy Demands of Political Parties 81

Chapter No. 4: Managing Ethnic Diversity and Federalism in Pakistan

4.1 Introduction 93
4.2 Historical Background 93
4.3 Federal Settings in the 1973 Constitution: Theory and Practice 95
4.3.1 Legislative Distribution between Federation and Provinces 95
4.3.2 Administrative Relations between Federation and Provinces 100
4.3.2.1 Emergency powers 102
4.3.2.2 Central Governments Intervention to Federating Units 103
4.3.3 Distribution of Revenues between Federation and Provinces 105
4.3.3.1 Fiscal Decentralization in Pakistan (1971-2006) 107
4.3.3.2. Comparative Fiscal Decentralization in Selected Federations 108
4.4 Politics of Identity in Pakistan 110
4.4.1 Pashtuns’ Separatism 110
4.4.2 Baloch Nationalism 113
4.4.3 Sindhi Regionalism 116
4.4.4 Mohajir Identity Politics 119
4.4.5 Siraiki Movement 124
4.5 Alternative Explanations of Ethnic Mobilization: A Matter of Non-consociational
Mechanisms or a Case of Centralized Federal Settings? 126
4.5.1 Pashtuns 128

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 4.5.2 Balochs 130
4.5.3 Sindhis 132
4.5.4 Mohajirs 135
4.5.5 Siraikis 138
4.6 Conclusion 139
Chapter No. 5: Consociationalism as a Realistic Option for Pakistan: an Assessment

5.1 Introduction 149

5.2 Favorable Factors for Consociational Democracy and the Multiethnic
Society of Pakistan 150
5.2.1 No Majority Segment 150
5.2.2 Segments of Equal Size 152
5.2.3 Small Number of Segments 152
5.2.4 Small Population Size 153
5.2.5 External Threats 154
5.2.6 Overarching Loyalties 155
5.2.7 Socio-economic Equality 156
5.2.8 Geographical Concentration of Segments 157
5.2.9 Tradition of Compromise and Accommodation 160
5.2.10 Comparative Analysis of Favorable Conditions in Selected Countries 161
5.3 Politics of Accommodation in Pakistan (1971-2008) 163
5.3.1 Power-sharing Arrangements under the Tripartite Accord 166
5.3.2 Coalition Politics of Post-Zia Era 168
5.3.3 Politics of Accommodation in Post-Musharraf Period 174
5.4 The Degree of Pluralism in Pakistani Case and Consociational Democracy 177
5.4.1 Identification of the Segments and Measurement of their Sizes 179
5.4.2 Composition of Political and Socio-economic Organizations 183
5.4.2.1 Awami National Party (ANP) 185
5.4.2.2 Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) 187
5.4.2.3 Pashtun Khawa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) 189
5.4.2.4 Baloch Nationalist Groups 190
5.4.3 Stability in Electoral Support 194
5.4.3.1 Index of Electoral Success (IES) 194
5.4.3.2 Electoral Stability: Coefficient of Variance 196
5.5 Conclusion 198

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Chapter No.6: Consociationalism as a Policy Recommendation for Pakistan:
A Survey of Public Opinion

6.1 Introduction 211

6.2 Methodology 212
6.2.1 Sampling 212
6.2.2 Questionnaire 213
6.3 Findings of the Survey 214
6.3.1 Findings concerning Existing Federal Settings 214
6.3.1.1 Perception about the Domination of Certain Ethno-linguistic
Groups 214
6.3.1.2 Findings about the two most Privileged Ethno-linguistic Groups 215
6.3.1.3 Findings about the two most Marginalized Ethno-linguistic Groups 216
6.3.1.4 Power-sharing Arrangements in Exiting Federal Settings 217
6.3.1.5 Alienation of Smaller Communities during Military Rule 217
6.3.1.6 Punjab as a Blockage in Smooth Running of Federalism 218
6.3.1.7 Recapitulation 219
6.3.2 Findings concerning the Proposed Consociational Governance 220
6.3.2.1 Level of Fragmentation in Pakistani Society 221
6.3.2.1.1 Pride for Ethnic Identity 222
6.3.2.1.2 Dislike the Settlement of other groups in Regional Base 222
6.3.2.1.3 Cultural grievances and survival of language 222
6.3.2.1.4 Exclusive Political, Social and Economic Organizations 223
6.3.2.1.5 Recapitulation 223
6.3.2.2 Support for Consociational Devices 225
6.3.2.2.1 Grand Coalition or Executive Power sharing 225
6.3.2.2.2 Proportionality 226
6.3.2.2.2.1 Proportional Voting System 228
6.3.2.2.2.2 Proportionality in Armed Forces 228
6.3.2.2.3 Minority Rights Protection 229
6.3.2.2.4 Segmental Autonomy 229
6.3.2.2.4.1 Right to Design Educational System 230
6.3.2.2.4.2 Homogenous Constituent Units 230
6.3.2.2.5 Recapitulation 232
6.3.3 Findings concerning Decentralized Federal Design 235
6.3.3.1 Provincial Autonomy 235
6.3.3.2 Extended Role for the Senate 236
6.3.3.3 Provincial Legislatures’ Role in Amending Constitution 236

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 6.3.3.4 Equitable Formula for National Finance Commission Award 237
6.3.3.5 Recapitulation 237
6.3.4 Comparison of Support for Consociationalism and (Decentralized)
Federalism 240
6.4 Interviews of some Experts and Political Leaders 240
6.5 Conclusion 242

Chapter No.7: Findings and Conclusion

Findings and Conclusion 248

Bibliography 258

Appendix 1: Summary of Interviews 272

Appendix 2: Acronyms 278

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 LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2-1: Expansion of Consociational Democracy 19
Figure 2-2: Lijphart’s List of Favorable Factors 35
Figure 3-1: Pakistan by Mother Language 54
Figure 3-2: Ethno-linguistic Groups in Pakistan: Some Comparative Observation 58
Figure 3-3: Distribution of Political Positions across ethno-linguistic Groups
(Ethnic Origins of Prime Ministers of Post-1971 Pakistan) 61
Figure 3-4: Distribution of Political Positions across ethno-linguistic Groups
(Ethnic Origins of Presidents of Post-1971 Pakistan) 62
Figure 3-5: Distribution of Political Positions in Various Groups: A Summary 62
Figure 3-6: Regional Representation of Federal Bureaucracy (1973-83) 64
Figure 3-7: Distribution of Diplomatic Positions 66
Figure 3-8: Administrative Division of Military Pensioners 68
Figure 3-9: Uneven Development (I) 72
Figure 3-10: Uneven Development (II) 74
Figure 3-11: Allocation Shares to Provinces under Various NFC Awards 75
Figure 3-12: Map of Kalabagh Dam 79
Figure 3-13: Some Instances of Substantial protest (1947-2006) 82
Figure 3-14: Political Parties’ Stand over Provincial Autonomy 83
Figure 4-1: Comparative Legislative Decentralization in selected Federal Countries 98
Figure 4-2: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis 99
Figure 4-3: Central Governments Intervention to Federating Units 105
Figure 4-4: Fiscal Decentralization (I) 108
Figure 4-5: Fiscal Decentralization (II) 108
Figure 4-6: Fiscal Decentralization in Selected Federations 109
Figure 5-1: Numerical Strength (%) of Ethno-linguistic Groups in Pakistan (1998) 151
Figure 5-2: Uneven size of ethno-linguistic groups in Pakistan 152
Figure 5-3: Population Size of Some Countries (2008) 154
Figure 5-4: Comparison of Population Size of Selected Countries 154
Figure 5-5: Socio-economic Inequality in Pakistan 157
Figure 5-6: Geographical Distribution of Ethno-linguistic Groups in Pakistan 158
Figure 5-7: Ethno-linguistic Composition of Pakistan 160
Figure 5-8: Rating Based on the Favorable Factors for Selected Countries 162
Figure 5-9: Favorable Factors and Pakistan 162
Figure 5-10: Degree of Pluralism and the Probability of Success for British and 178
Consociational Model of Democracy
Figure 5-11: Fragmentation Index for Selected Cases 183

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Figure 5-12: National Assembly Elections (1988-2008) in Pashtun Majority Region 186
Figure 5-13: National Assembly Elections (1988-2008) in Mohajir Constituency 188
Figure 5-14: Baloch Nationalist Parties: Percentage votes in National Assembly 190
(Baloch Majority Region: 1988-2008)
Figure 5-15: Electoral Performance of Ethno-regional Parties in Federal Elections 193
(% Vote at Regional Base: 1988-2008)
Figure 5-16: Descriptive Statistics: Federal Election in Pakistan (1988-2008) 193
(Electoral Support for Ethno-regional Parties in their Respective
Regional Base)
Figure 5-17: Index of Electoral Success (IES): Federal and Provincial Elections 195
(1997-2002)
Figure 5-18: Descriptive Statistics: Federal Election in Pakistan (1988-2008) 196
Figure 5-19: Comparative Study of the Stability of Electoral Support 197
(The Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and Pakistan)
Figure 6-1: Ethno-linguistic Break-up of Respondents 213
Figure 6-2: Perceptions about the Domination of Certain Groups 216
Figure 6-3: Perceptions about the Existing Federal Settings 219
Figure 6-4: Level of Fragmentation in Pakistani Society 221
Figure 6-5: Level of fragmentation in Pakistani society 224
Figure 6-6: Responses about the consociational devices 227
Figure 6-7: Responses about Consociational Devices 231
Figure 6-8: Responses about the homogenous constituent units 232
Figure 6-9: Support for consociational arrangements 234
Figure 6-10: Responses about the Proposals of (Decentralized) Federalism 238
Figure 6-11: Support for (Decentralized) Federalism 239
Figure 6-12: Comparison of Support for (Decentralized) Federalism and 241
Consociationalism

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Chapter No. 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Prologue

Management of ethnic diversity has remained problematic in Pakistan. It became the

first post-colonial state that suffered a successful secessionist movement that resulted

in the creation of Bangladesh, in 1971. The Post-1971 Pakistan has witnessed Baloch

insurgencies (1973-77; and 2002-to date); Pashtun separatism (1970s); Sindhi

regionalism (1980s); and Mohajir‟s mobilization along ethnic lines (1990s).

Since, political violence and mobilization along ethnic lines has resulted in political

instability, a number of remedies have been suggested for the Pakistani federation to

manage diversity. Samad (2007, p.128) has argued that “throughout Pakistan‟s sixty-

year-old history, Islamabad‟s approach to diversity has been cynically to co-opt or

coerce groups that have not been accommodative. This approach has often resulted in

considerable violence and sown deep distrust between the centre and the country‟s

ethnic groups”. He has suggested that Pakistan “needs to adopt accommodative

strategies that incorporate all groups”. According to him, this requires “the refinement

and enrichment of the concept and practice of federalism and a move away from the

present system”.

Malik (1997, p.168) has noticed that “the most serious threat to Pakistan since its

inception has been from the ethnic front, which is still in official parlance referred to

as provincialism or regionalism”. He argued that “the ruling elite have sought refuge

in administrative, ad hoc measures and no comprehensive plan has been undertaken to

co-opt such plural forces through bargaining and appropriate politico-economic

1
measures”. He opined that “there are strong prospects for a positive pluralism leading

to national integration and acculturation in Pakistan but only if unevenness in state-led

policies is removed and fully empowered democratic institutions are allowed to

function in the country” (Malik, 1997, p.171).

According to Feroz Ahmad (1998,pp. 271-72) , “the separation of East Bengal, the

repeated armed resistance in Balochistan, the upsurge in the interior Sindh, and the

recurrent violence in Karachi underline the explosive nature of Pakistan‟s ethnic

problems and the failure of the state to come to terms with the fact of ethnic diversity

and conflict”. He has suggested „modifications‟ in the federal structure of the Pakistan

to ensure „rights of the provinces‟.

Kennedy (1993) has also suggested substational changes in federal design to

accommodate various identities. Cohen (1987, p.327) has advised the Pakistani elites

to recognize the necessity of power sharing for effective institutions to manage ethnic

imbalances and diversity. Alqama (1997) has suggested a six-point strategy to

strengthen the federation. The crux of this strategy is the need of social and political

inclusion. Amin (1988, p. 255) has argued that „if the Pakistani state elite had pursued

a policy of sharing power, they could have been successful in containing the ethno-

national movements‟.

Briefly speaking, nearly all studies related to political mobilization and ethnic strife in

Pakistan have stressed the need for power sharing and political inclusion of excluded

communities in the power structures of Pakistan. Despite their explicit arguments for

power sharing, these studies have remained unable to offer any particular form or

mechanism of power-sharing for the case of Pakistan.

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Power-sharing is a broad concept and it covers different approaches 1. One of these

approaches is the consociational strategy of power sharing developed and advocated

by Arend Lijphart. Political scientists, since 1960s, have been arguing that a particular

form of government 2 can help to stabilize democracy in multi-ethnic states. Lorwin

(1971) labeled this approach as „segmented pluralism‟, Lehmbruch (1974) tagged it as

a „concordant democracy‟ and Lijphart called it a „consociational democracy‟. The

consociational model of democracy was developed by examining the smaller

European countries – the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria. Outside the

Europe, the model was extended to Lebanon, Malaysia, South Africa, Ghana and

India. Consociational democracy aims at power sharing. Lijphart has argued that

consociational democracy is the only possible solution for deeply divided societies to

practice democracy. He suggested that the constitutional engineers of developing

countries need to adopt the mechanism of consociational democracy to meet the

challenges of ethnic conflicts.

In this context, (a) power sharing was suggested as a remedy for Pakistan but no

particular form or mechanism of power sharing was specified and (b)

consociationalism was identified as a prominent mechanism of power sharing for

multiethnic states. So, there was a need for examining the relevancy of consociational

model of power sharing with the multiethnic society of Pakistan.

When this research proposal was approved for PhD dissertation in early 2006, there

was no systematic study available to examine the relevancy of consociationalism to

the multiethnic society of Pakistan. Lijphart acknowledged that he knew very little

about the Pakistan3. However, a year earlier the leading consociationalists McGarry

and O‟Leary had suggested that Pakistan “will need to adopt and maintain

3
consociational governance at federal centre” to “practice democracy 4 . Afterward,

Adeney (2007) coupled the relative political stability of India with its consociational

practices and the relative instability of Pakistan with the nonconsociational features of

polity. Subsequently, she asserted that Pakistani federation‟s incapacity to manage

ethnic diversity is the consequence of its nonconsociational features (Adeney, 2009).

It is pertinent to point out that these „parallel‟ studies are limited in their scope and

strength. McGarry & O‟Leary have neither focused exclusively on the case of

Pakistan nor have they substantiated their argument with empirical evidence.

Additionally, Adeney is selective in her approach. In her research article, she

„concentrates on the proportionality element of consociationalism, in particular

representation in the core institutions of state – namely, the bureaucracy and the army‟

(Adeney, 2009). She has not examined the relevancy of consociational devices in

totality. She has neither bothered about the absence of favorable factors for

consociationalism nor considered the relatively lesser degree of pluralism in Pakistani

society. This narration seems to suggest that this project is the only thorough study

that exclusively focuses on the relevancy of consociational democracy with the

multiethnic society of Pakistan.

1.2 Objectives and Scope of Study

At the outset, it is important to determine the scope and objectives of this study. The

study has explicit objectives and specified time period. The central objective of this

empirical investigation is to contribute an original analysis to the study of ethnic

conflict management in Pakistan. It is pertinent to point out that this research work is

not intended to falsify or validate the theory but aims to enhance our understanding

relating to the utility of consociational democracy for multiethnic states analyzing the

4
Pakistani case. Subsequently, the study seeks to explore the underlying relevancy of

an alternative option of consociationalism, namely the decentralized federalism.

Though it has been argued that a „single case can constitute neither the basis for a

valid generalization nor the grounds for disapproving an established generalization‟

(Lijphart, 1971), the findings of this project will be useful for policy makers and

constitutional engineers in Pakistan and elsewhere. This is because if the study

suggests consociationalism as a viable solution for the case of Pakistan, it can be

argued that consociational democracy is relevant to remote cases; out side its

empirical region of origin. Alternatively, if the case suggests that consociational

democracy is irrelevant to the Pakistani case, it will demonstrate that consociational

democracy‟s utility varies across case studies and it is not, necessarily, a viable

solution for all multiethnic societies. Therefore, in both ways, the study will

contribute to our understanding of the effectiveness or otherwise of consociational

democracy as a conflict resolution measure in plural societies like Pakistan.

The study covers a specified time period. It covers the time period between 1971 and

2009. Pre-1971 period has been excluded from this study because the existing state

structure of Pakistan differs significantly from that period. Post-1971 Pakistan

exhibits a different political scenario as well. The ethno-linguistic composition of the

state has been changed and a new constitution was enacted in 1973. The study has

been concluded in 2009; therefore, it is the closing point.

Religion matters and religious divisions 5 are important in Pakistan but this study is

limited to ethnic diversity. Furthermore, this study acknowledges six ethno-linguistic

groups6 i.e. Punjabi, Siraiki, Sindhi, mohajir, Pashtun, and Balochs. Additionally, the

study is limited to the four provinces of Pakistan, namely, Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and

5
Balochistan. The federal capital, Islamabad, and federally administered tribal areas

have been excluded from this study because of their minimal relevancy.

1.3 Research Questions

The central concern of this dissertation is whether or not consociationalism is a viable

solution for the multiethnic society of Pakistan. To answer this question, three

secondary questions have been designed. These questions provide the immediate

focus of the thesis and are discussed in the three core chapters of this work. The

questions are:

1. Why has federalism remained unable to manage ethnic diversity in Pakistan?

2. Whether or not consociationalism is a realistic option for Pakistan to manage

ethnic diversity?

3. Whether or not the majority of Pakistanis prefer consociational arrangements

for sharing power at the federal level?

I have presented three arguments in the thesis that are outcome of these questions.

First, the Pakistani federation fulfils minimum criteria of a federation but it operates

more like a unitary system. Therefore, the relative centralization of political power

and the discrepancy in theory and practice lessens its capacity to manage ethnic

diversity. This argument is based on the examination of federal settings and the

evaluation of ethnic mobilization in Pakistan. The evidence suggests that ethno-

nationalistic movements were protests against the centralizing policies of Islamabad.

It has also been observed that ethnic mobilization in Pakistan is not due to non-

consociational features of the federation but because of its relatively centralized

settings.

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Second, the empirical evidence seems to suggest that consociationalism is not a

realistic option for Pakistan. The proponents of consociationalism have recognized

certain favorable conditions for the establishment and maintenance of consociational

democracy. With some exceptions, these factors are missing in the case of Pakistan.

In addition, the evaluation of Pakistani society illustrates that it is not a case of deeply

divided society. Mutual hostility of certain groups is of the lower degree. These

groups are not organized on mutually exclusive social, political, and economic lines.

Multiethnic mainstream parties are overriding and enjoying popular electoral support

in all ethno-linguistic groups. Besides, the past experiences of power-sharing

arrangements in Pakistan demonstrate the inaptness of these arrangements for

Pakistan.

Third, the majority of Pakistanis seems unconvinced by the consociational argument

and do not prefer consociational arrangements in Pakistan. This argument is based on

the findings of a public opinion survey stratified by ethno-linguistic group, class, and

regional association. The people from different walks of life expressed their

reluctance to prefer consociational arrangements for Pakistan. The interviews of a

small group of experts on Pakistani politics and few political leaders also validate the

results of our survey and did not approve of the case of consociationalism for Pakistan.

As a result, the core work of this thesis seems to suggest that consociationalism is

neither a requirement nor a viable option for Pakistan. The majority of Pakistanis have

not lost their trust in federalism. However, Pakistan needs a relatively more

decentralized federal design that demonstrates the essence of federalism. That is the

combination of Self-rule and shared-rule.

7
1.4 Research Methodology

This thesis relies on a mix of primary and secondary sources of material. At its

beginnings, the author made careful readings of the published work on

consociationalism by Arend Lijphart and other academic proponents and opponents of

the theory. Secondary sources of material such as books, research articles published in

reputable journals, reviews, online published material, magazines, gazetteers,

newspaper, official websites, election results, and political parties‟ election manifestos

etc. were used for the study of Pakistani case. Some confidential reports of British

High Commission that were released after due time were accessed at National

Archive Center, London. These reports proved very useful.

The secondary sources were supplemented by some primary sources such as a survey

of public opinion, and some interviews of experts and political leaders. The

methodology adopted for the public opinion survey and the techniques used for

sampling have been discussed in the relevant chapter, the sixth chapter. The thesis is a

synthesis of qualitative and quantitative research. The qualitative analyses are

corroborated by quantification and analysis of data by the application of statistical

tools such as SPSS and Minitab software.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

The second chapter of the thesis reviews the theory of consociationalism. It briefly

surveys the development of theory discussing the original cases of consociational

democracy – the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland. The characteristics

of consociational democracy i.e. grand coalition, segmental autonomy,

proportionality, and mutual veto power have been also discussed in this chapter. As

8
consociational theory has attracted a variety of criticism and objections, a section of

this chapter is reserved for the collected critique. This section accentuates the flaws

and gaps in the consociational literature. The final section, briefly, reviews the

recommendations for the multiethnic society of Pakistan to practice consociational

democracy.

The third chapter is a scene setting chapter. After introductory paragraph, it starts with

a brief survey of the movement of Indian Muslims for a separate homeland - Pakistan.

The subsequent section is reserved for an overview of political and constitutional

developments in pre-1971 Pakistan. The next section illustrates the ethno-linguistic

composition of post-1971 Pakistan. Then the grievances and demands of smaller

communities have been discussed in some detail. The final section presents a brief

summary of some substational political mobilizations and the stands of various

political parties on autonomy issues.

The fourth chapter examines the role of federalism in managing ethnic diversity in

Pakistan. After a very brief historical background of federalism in subcontinent, this

chapter illustrates the federal design of Pakistan under the 1973 constitution. To

measure the relative centralization, a comparison with the other federations has been

provided in this chapter. The next section evaluates the ethnic mobilization in

Pakistan. Then it has been attempted to investigate the two alternative explanations

for this regional/ethnic/linguistic opposition in Pakistan. This section reveals that

centralization of political power is a key factor in the rise and fall of ethno-

nationalistic movements in Pakistan. The final section is reserved for some

concluding comments.

9
The fifth chapter attempts to answer whether or not consociationalism is a realistic

choice for Pakistan. This assessment is based on three variables: the presence of

favorable factors for consociationalism, the role of political leadership, and the degree

of pluralism in Pakistani society. These variables are discussed in three subsequent

sections. Then the chapter is concluded finally.

The sixth chapter attempts to gauge the public support for consociationalism as a

policy recommendation. This chapter is based on the findings of a public opinion

survey. After introduction, second section of this chapter describes the methodology

adopted to conduct the survey. Third section has detailed discussion of survey results.

Some important interviews and comments have been discussed in the fourth section.

The chapter has been concluded in the last section.

The seventh chapter summarizes the findings of the thesis. It reviews the relevancy of

consociational democracy with the multiethnic society of Pakistan. It also offers some

insights into the utility of consociationalism as a conflict management tool for plural

societies.

10
Endnotes

1
The two most prominent approaches of power sharing are consociationalism and centripetalism.
Consociationalism is developed and defended by Lijphart and centripetalism is advocated by
Horowitz. The next chapter presents a detailed discussion about the consociationalism. The
literature on centripetalism suggests four institutions to improve the chances for political stability in
multiethnic states. These institutions include the alternative vote electoral system, the formation of
centrist coalitions, the office of a president elected by regional distribution requirements, and
administrative federalism.
2
This form of government has been discussed in detail in the next chapter.
3
The author has frequently communicated with Arend Lijphart electronically. Lijphart reviewed my
synopsis and on the basis of his comments, Board of Research and Advanced Studies had approved
my case of PhD registration.

4
For detail of this point of view see, McGarry, J. & O‟Leary, B. (2005) Federation as a Method of
Ethnic Conflict Regulation. In S. Noel (Eds.), From Power-sharing to Democracy: Post Conflict
Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies (pp. 263–296). Montreal: McGill Queens University
Press.

5
There are religious divisions, even, among Muslims in Pakistan. For example Shi‟a, Sunni; Deobandi,
Barelwi, Ahl-e-Hadith.
6
Government of Pakistan has recognized six languages in its census reports as separate languages.
These languages include Punjabi, Siraiki, Sindhi, Urdu, Pashto, and Balochi. Therefore this study is
limited to the six ethno-linguistic groups that speak these languages.

11
 References

1. Adeney, K. (2007). Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and

Pakistan. New York: Palgrave.

2. Adeney, K. (2009).The Limitations of Non-consociational Federalism: The

Example of Pakistan. Ethnopolitics, 8(1), 87 -106.

3. Ahmed, F. (1998). Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University

press.

4. Alqama K. (1997). Federalism: Failure and Success. The Bi-Annual Research

Journal of Pakistan Study Centre, University of Balochistan, Quetta.

5. Amin, T. (1988). Ethno-national Movements in Pakistan: Domestic and

International Factors. Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies.

6. Cohen, S.P. (1987). State Building in Pakistan. In A. Banuazizi & M. Weiner

(Eds.), The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan

(pp.299-332). Lahore: Vanguard.

7. Kennedy, C. H. (1993). Managing ethnic conflict: the case of Pakistan. Regional

and Federal Studies. 3(1), 123-143.

8. Lehmbruch, G. (1974). A Non-competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in

Liberal Democracies: The case of Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon. In McRae,

Kenneth (Eds.), Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in

Segmented Societies (pp.90-97). Toronto: The Canadian Publishers.

9. Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. American

Political Science Review. 65(3), 682-693.

12
10. Lorwin, V. R. (1971). Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political

Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies. Comparative Politics. 3(2), 141-

175.

11. Malik, I. H. (1997). State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority,

Ideology and Ethnicity. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

12. Samad, Y. (2007). Pakistan: from minority rights to majoritarian. In Gyanendra, P.

and Y. Samad (Eds.), Fault lines of Nationhood (pp.67-138). New Delhi: Roli

Books Pvt. Ltd.

13
Chapter No. 2

CONSOCIATIONALISM: A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE

2.1 Introduction

Ethnic mobilization and conflicts are not a new phenomena but their contemporary

global manifestation in frequency and intensity is a development which needs careful

reflection and detailed examination. Since a large majority of the nation states are

heterogeneous and this heterogeneity is likely to increase as a result of global

migration patterns, ethnic conflicts and the resultant political tensions are likely to

accentuate in the coming years. The global manifestation of ethnicity has attracted

significant attention from the social scientists. The management of diversity in multi-

ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-faith societies is of a great interest – both from the

view point of theory as well as practice – in the current global situation.

The problem of political instability caused by ethnic conflicts seems to be more acute

in the developing countries. Empirical studies of these states suggest some

connections between political institutions and the proliferation of ethnic mobilization.

For management of diversity in these multiethnic states, policy recommendations

suggest a variety of federal and power-sharing arrangements.

Different areas of the world have approached the issue of diversity in different ways.

Certain European countries have managed diversity through consociationalism but

overall performance of such consociational arrangements remained mixed. An attempt

has been made in this chapter to review the concept of consociational democracy. The

development of consociational theory by Arend Lijphart and other political scientists

has been described in some detail. Furthermore, the characteristics of consociational

14
democracy i.e. grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and mutual veto

power have been discussed. These features of consociational democracy take different

forms in different case studies of consociational democracy. The original cases of

consociational democracy – the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland – are

discussed and analyzed. As consociational theory has attracted a variety of criticism

and objections, a section of this chapter is reserved for the collected critique. The final

section, briefly surveys the recommendations for the multiethnic society of Pakistan

to practice consociational democracy.

2.2 Consociationalism

The term of consociation or consociationalism is derived from the word “consociatio”

that was used by Johannes Althusius in 1603 to „denote a form of political union‟.

Then, the term of consociationalism, in late 1960s, was used by political scientists,

especially by Arend Lijphart, that identified a particular form of power sharing in

smaller Western European democracies that exhibit political stability despite their

highly fragmented societies (Clark & Foweraker, 2001, pp.91-92). Consociationalism

literally means “association between equals”. Despite having distinct cultures,

institutions and identities, ethnic groups in consociations evolve a system in which

they interact politically equally. They feel autonomous in their respective ethnic

groups and have feelings that they are enjoying equal partnership in the system. They

are politically organized, and a mechanism for their proportional representation is set-

up. Their elites that join together to form the national elite are intensively engaged in

the politics of accommodation and bargaining (Kuper, 1985, p. 270).

15
2.3 Development of the Consociational Theory

There has been a consensus that “the division of society into different ethnic groups

constitutes a formidable obstacle to stable and viable democracy” (Lijphart, 1995,

p.854). Some political scientists seem even more pessimistic about the democracy in

multiethnic societies and argue that “free institutions are next to impossible in a

country composed of different nationalities” (Mill, 1958, p. 230).

In this given situation, political scientists remained curious to find out a democratic

model to ensure stability in divided societies. This curiosity resulted into a number of

theories and writings that redefined the conventional connotations of democracy and

„system typologies‟.

Lijphart‟s “typologies of democratic system” in late 1960s was a sign of theoretical

independence from the prevailing political theories: “overlapping membership

theory”, the “numbers of parties” theories, and the “functionalist model of Almond

and Powel”. Each of these theories postulates a cause for stable democracy (Halpern,

1984).

The overlapping membership theory was articulated by, among others, Rousseau,

Tocqueville, Truman, Bentley and Lipset. This theory considers stability to be the

product of a nexus of crosscutting affiliations and interests in a population. On the

other hand, the “numbers of parties‟ theories”, articulated by Duverger, Neumann,

and Sartori, designates party system as the contributing agent of stability. According

to this theory, two-party systems are viewed as stable, and multiparty systems are

considered as unstable (Halpern, 1984). Then, Almond (1956) asserted that the

political stability and effectiveness of a particular political system is linked with its

16
political culture and the role structure. Based on this proposition, he presented his

„typology of political systems‟. Almond classified the political systems into three

broad categories:

1. Anglo-American systems: Almond attached the relative high stability and

effectiveness of the Anglo-American systems (Britain and United States) with

their homogenous secular political culture and highly differentiated role

structure.

2. Continental European systems: Almond linked the relative political instability

of Continental European democracies (Germany, France and Italy) to their

fragmented political culture, and separate sub-cultures.

3. Scandinavian and Low countries: Almond did not describe the Scandinavia

and Low Countries in detail. He contended only with the statement that “the

Scandinavian and Low Countries combine some of the features of the Anglo-

American and the Continental European types and stand somewhere in

between the two types”.

Lijphart (1969) challenged this typology of political systems presented by Almond,

and identified its limitation to not “deal satisfactory with the smaller European

democracies”. He asserted that “the political stability of a system can apparently not

be predicted solely on the basis of two variables of political culture and role

structure”. He challenged the theory of crosscutting cleavages. He asserted that

despite their subcultures, divided from each other by mutually reinforcing cleavages,

Switzerland and Austria display political stability. Though, according to the theory,

they should exhibit great immobilism.

17
Lijphart focused on the „Low Countries‟ to find out how do these plural societies

manage to operate as stable democracies despite having fragmented political culture .

During this study, he discovered that it was another variable (the behavior of political

elites) that accounted for the stability in these countries. He concluded that it was the

coalescent behavior of political elites that resulted into political stability despite the

presence of subcultures. He termed this particular form of government as a

consociational democracy; and these fragmented but stable cases as consociational

democracies. Lijphart described consociational democracy as, “a government by elite

cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable

democracy” (Lijphart, 1969, p. 216). He presented this theory in a research article, in

1969. The theory evolved through its application to the case of the Netherlands in

„Politics of Accommodation’ and its expansion in „Democracy in Plural Societies’.

Lijphart expanded the empirical cases beyond the Western European democracies,

and introduced some consociational, semi-consociational and few failed

consociational democracies. He advised the political leaders of plural societies to

become „consociational engineers‟ if they wish to establish or strengthen democratic

institutions in their countries. He argued that “for many plural societies of the non-

western world, the realistic choice is not between the British normative model of

democracy and the consociational democracy, but between consociational democracy

and no democracy at all” (Lijphart, 1977, p. 238).

2.4 The Growth and Expansion of Consociational Democracy

The consociational theory originated from the four copybook cases of Western

Europe, namely the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland. Beyond Europe,

the countries like Lebanon, Malaysia, Suriname, Cyprus and India were categorized

18
as consociations. The figure 2-1 shows that between 1980 to mid-1990s, the

consociational theory was at a stake. There was a clear-cut trend of its decline and the

number of consociations had fallen significantly. Africa, particularly, proved a

“graveyard” for consociational experiments and in country after country

consociationalism was pushed off the political agenda. The political scientists had

begun to express distrust in consociational theory and termed it as a „degenerative

program‟. But, recently, as the figure shows, consociational theory has been

regenerated. New consociational cases such as Macedonia, Afghanistan, Iraq and

Kenya have been identified. Therefore, it has been argued that though consociational

democracy has moved away “from its empirical region of origin”, but it has been

enjoying a high point of its development at the moment (Taylor, 2009, pp. 5-6).

Figure 2-1: Expansion of Consociational Democracy

Classic cases Past cases Contemporary cases

 Netherlands (1917-67)  Lebanon ( 1943-75)  Malaysia (1971 – )

 Belgium (1918 – )  India (1947-64)
 South Tyrol (1972 – )
 Switzerland (1943 – )  Netherlands Antilles (1950-85)
 Lebanon (1989 – )
 Austria (1945-66)  Suriname (1950-85)
 Luxemburg  Malaysia (1955-69) New wave
 Liechtensten  Nigeria (1957-66)  Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995– )
 Columbia (1958-74)
 Burundi (1998 – )
 Cyprus (1960-63)
 Fiji (1970-87)  Northern Ireland (1998 – )

 Northern Ireland (1973-74)  Macedonia (2000 – )

 Zimbabwe (1980-87)
 Afghanistan ( 2004 – )
 Czechoslovakia (1989-93)
 South Africa (1993-96)  Iraq ( 2005 – )

 Kenya (2008 – )

Source: (Taylor, 2009, p. 6

19
2.5 Characteristics of Consociationalism

Lijphart (1977, p. 25) has defined consociational democracy in terms of four

characteristics:

(a) A grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the

plural society;

(b) The mutual veto or „concurrent majority‟ rule as an additional protection of

minority interests;

(c) Proportionality as the principal standard of political representations, civil

service appointments, and allocation of public funds;

(d) And a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal

affairs.

These characteristics of consociationalism are described in following paragraphs.

2.5.1 Grand Coalition or Executive Power sharing

The first and the foremost characteristic of consociational democracy is a grand

coalition comprising the political leaders of all significant political parties. Grand

coalition is a device that provides „executive power-sharing‟ to various segments of a

society. Therefore, Lijphart has used the terms of „grand coalition‟ and executive

power-sharing‟ interchangeably.

Lijphart has used the term „grand coalition‟ loosely and not specified any particular

form of grand coalition or power-sharing. His grand coalition takes different forms in

various cases of consociational democracy. Consequently, the critics have termed the

Lijphart‟s concept of grand coalition as a „catch-all concept‟ (Halpern, 1986, p.190)

20
The rationale behind vagueness of this concept is understandable. The basic concern

of Lijphart (1977, p. 31) has remained „participation of the segmental leaders in

governing a plural society‟ and he has not focused on any „particular institutional

arrangements‟. During the exploration of various consociational cases, he has

identified a variety of institutional designs of grand coalitions.

The simplest form of grand coalition is the „cabinet of all significant ethnic, linguistic

or religious groups in a parliamentary system‟. Belgium and Malaysia were examples

of parliamentary grand coalition cabinets during their respective consociational

regimes. More or less, the Netherlands had experienced the similar coalitions between

1917 and 1967 – its multiparty cabinets remained representative of all segmental

parties. All segments in the Netherlands i.e. Catholics, Calvinists, Socialists and

Liberals had their representative political parties during the said period. In addition to

multiparty cabinets, some permanent or ad hoc councils or committees representing

all segments served the purpose of power-sharing in Dutch polity. Austrian grand

coalition of major parties (during 1945 and 1966) is another prime example of grand

coalition.

Power-sharing arrangements in consociational democracy are not limited to the

parliamentary systems; they can be found in the separation of powers systems as well.

The Swiss federal executive body is a classic example of executive power-sharing.

The federal council ensures the representation of all major linguistic and religious

groups and the major political parties. The distribution of government offices among

the significant groups on the pattern of Lebanon can also serve the purpose: in

Lebanon during the consociational governance (1943-75), presidency was reserved

for Christians, Prime Minister Ship for Sunni Muslims, and speaker ship of the

21
parliament for, Shi‟a Muslims and deputy speaker ship for the Greek Orthodox

community. Three-person presidency was set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina to

accommodate all the three communities (Bosnian Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats): one

seat for every community was reserved in this power-sharing arrangement.

The criteria for sharing power vary in various cases. In Belgium, equal representation

in executive has been granted constitutionally to Dutch and French-speakers. In

Cyprus, during a brief period of consociational arrangement (1960-1963), the

representation formula for Greeks and Turks, followed their numerical strength (7:3).

In Post-apartheid South Africa, the requirement to join cabinet was five percent of the

parliamentary seats. On the other hand, the requirement in Fiji to join the cabinet was

at least 10 percent of the seats (McCulloch, 2009).

Though, grand coalitions, normally, represent different political parties, Indian power-

sharing case provided an opportunity to various segments to share power within the

single party government: the Congress Party. According to Lijphart (1996, p. 260),

parliamentary cabinets in consociational India (in early decades) provided power-

sharing to all sections of society through “broadly representative and inclusive nature

of a single, dominant party, the Congress Party”.

The „anti competitive nature‟ of the grand coalition or executive power-sharing in

consociationalism raised the question: is consociational democracy sufficiently

democratic? O‟Leary (2005, pp.12-15) has responded to this question and has

reviewed the concept of grand coalition presented by Lijphart. O‟ Leary has asserted

that the „consociational executives need not to be all inclusive grand coalitions‟. He

has classified the consociational executives into three broad categories: the complete,

the concurrent and the weak democratic consociational executive.

22
O‟Leary‟s complete consociational executive is quite similar to the Lijphart‟s notion

of grand coalition composed of all significant political parties, even if voters of

particular groups split their votes among various parties. In concurrent consociation

“each significant segment has representation in the executive and that executive has at

least majority support in each significant segment. Unlike a complete consociational

executives, a concurrent consociational executive is one in which each significant

segment has over half of its voters supporting parties in the government”. In a weak

consociation, “one or more segment merely gives its plurality assent while other

segments give majority or higher level of support to the government”

2.5.2 Segmental Autonomy

The second primary characteristic of consociational governance is the segmental or

group autonomy. The group autonomy refers to the “group‟s authority to run its own

internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture” (Lijphart, 2002, p.

39). The concept of autonomy has been loosely defined by Lijphart. In various

consociational cases, autonomy has taken different forms.

Three types of arrangements for providing autonomy to religious and linguistic

groups in power-sharing democracies are more prevalent: these arrangements include

(1) a considerable autonomy to homogenous constituent units in a federal settings like

the linguistic autonomy provided in Switzerland, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia; (2) a

provision for minorities to establish and run their autonomous schools fully sponsored

by the government as in Belgium and the Netherlands; and (3) a provision of separate

personal laws for minorities related to family matters such as marriage, divorce,

inheritance etc. as were provided in Lebanon, Cyprus, and Indian case.

23
Segmental or group autonomy can take two forms: territorial and non-territorial form

(Lijphart, 1977, p. 43). According to Lijphart (2004, pp.104-105), federalism is the

best way to provide territorial autonomy if the various groups are geographically

concentrated and the groups‟ boundaries coincide with the boundaries of constituent

units. However, if the ethnic groups are dispersed and geographically intermixed,

autonomy must assume a non-territorial form‟. Cypriot consociational arrangements

provided this kind of autonomy to Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The 1960

constitution of Cyprus set up separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communal

chambers with exclusive legislative powers over religious, cultural and educational

matters (Lijphart, 2002, p. 856).

A combination of territorial and non-territorial autonomy has been used in the case of

Belgium. Belgian constitution has delegated political authority both to geographically

defined areas that are ethnically homogenous (Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-

speaking Wallonia) and to communities defined in non-territorial terms (French

speakers and Dutch speakers in bilingual Brussels).

The Canadian case reveals that segmental autonomy can be provided to selective

groups in special cases. In Canada, some linguistic and religious groups benefit from

autonomy in the area of education. McCulloch (2009, p. 41) has observed that the

certain linguistic groups (francophone communities) can set up their language schools

if necessitated and religious groups can set up religious schools (for example Catholic

in Ontario) with „public assistance‟.

Assaf (2004, p.14) has pointed out the “vagueness” of the concept of segmental

autonomy. He observed that Lijphart has not „made a clear distinction between issues

that are of common interest and issues that lie in the community domain‟. He

24
maintained that there is “imprecision” about the locus of decision making. That is, it

is not clear in Lijphart‟s concept of segmental or cultural autonomy “where decision-

making lies, or should lie, at the group level or at the elite cartel level concerning

some domestic issues, as well as regional and international matters”.

2.5.3 Proportionality

Proportionality is another key institutional feature of the consociational democracy. It

involves allocation of representation in political institutions and the distribution of

resources and jobs. The rationale behind proportional representation is to ensure the

„just representation‟ and „inclusion‟ of all segments of society in the power structure

of state.

Electoral system of proportional representation (PR), as Lijphart suggests, facilitates

the parliamentary proportionality in divided or plural societies. PR is an attractive

choice in plural societies, according to Lijphart (2004, p.100), because “in addition to

producing proportionality and minority representation, it treats all groups – ethnic,

racial, religious, or even non-communal groups – in a completely equal and

evenhanded fashion”.

Belgium and Switzerland use proportional electoral system to ensure proportional

representation. Sometimes, however, minority protection measures result into

overrepresentation. For example, the Belgian constitution provides equal

representation to the Dutch-speaking majority and the French speaking minority in the

national cabinet (Lijphart, 1995a, p. 857). In the same way, Turkish minority that was

less than 20 percent of the total population was granted 30 percent of the total seats in

the national legislature allotment in Cyprus‟s 1960 constitution.

25
It has been argued that Proportionality is a useful consociational device. Being “a

neutral and impartial standard of allocation, it removes a large number of potentially

divisive problems from the decision making process and thus lightens the burdens of

consociational government” (Lijphart, 1977, p. 39).

2.5.4 Mutual Veto

Consociationalists believe that the mutual or minority veto provides shelter to

minorities and guarantees that „it will not be out-voted by the majority when its vital

interests are at stake‟ (Lijphart, 1977, p.119). A grand coalition offers important

political protection for minority segments in consociational arrangements but it does

not provide reliable protection. Decisions, in the grand coalitions, are normally,

reached by majority vote; though the minority‟s presence in the coalition does give it

a chance to present its case as forcefully as possible to its coalition partners, it may,

nevertheless, be out-voted by the majority.

Lijphart is not precise, as usual, in defining the concept of mutual veto. He is reluctant

to „specify the form and forum mutual veto should take‟ (Halpern, 1986, p.190). It

may take different forms i.e. absolute veto or suspensive veto and informal veto or

formal veto. It may also be a general or a specific: it may be applied either to all

decisions or occasionally to only certain specified kinds of decisions, such as matters

of culture and education (Lijphart, 1995b, p. 279).

Practically, however, this device is usually restricted to the most vital and

fundamental matters and it is usually based on informal understandings rather than

formal legal or constitutional rules (Lijphart, 1995a, pp. 856-57)

26
Belgium, during its consociational arrangements, had provided veto powers to

linguistic groups regarding educational and cultural issues and also informally

guaranteed autonomy for the „familles spirituelles’. Dayton Peace Accord, in Bosnia,

devised a formula that at least one-third support from each of the three constituent

groups will be required for all decisions in House of Representatives.

Though Lijphart has argued elsewhere that a consociation conform to above-

mentioned four features, it has been asserted that a „government can have

consociational elements even if it does not conform to all Lijphart‟s stipulations‟

(Adeney, 2009).

2.6 Examples of Consociational Arrangements:

Lijphart has identified consociational regimes all over the world. He started from

Western Europe, with the case of Netherlands. He observed that the Netherlands has,

despite its deep social cleavages, experienced stable democracy more or less for a half

century (1917-1967). The two basic cleavages that divided the Dutch society in that

period were class and religion. In 1960, there were Roman Catholics, 40.4%, Dutch

Reformed, 28.3%, Orthodox Reformed, 9.3% and other minorities, 3.6%. The

remaining 18.6% had no religious affiliation. On the basis of a formal affiliation and

the degree of religious commitment, Lijphart has identified threefold division in

Dutch society: Roman Catholic, Orthodox Calvinist, and Secular. Regarding the class

cleavages, the Netherlands had three clearly identifiable classes – upper middle, lower

middle, and lower classes. The two cleavages partly intersect each other. The deep

class cleavage cuts through the Catholic, Calvinist, and Secular blocs. The

intersection had more impact on the secular bloc due to the absence of religious

cohesion in the bloc. So, the Secular bloc was divided into Liberal block (secular

27
upper middle and middle class) and Socialist bloc (secular middle and lower classes).

Hence, the Dutch society had fourfold division: Catholics, Calvinists, Socialists, and

Liberals (Lijphart, 1975, pp. 16-23). This fourfold division was evident in political

and social organizations and group affiliations. Each bloc had its own political party.

Socialists had the Labor Party, Liberals had the Liberal Party, Roman Catholic had

Catholic People‟s Party, and Calvinists had two representative parties i.e. the Anti

Revolutionary Party and the Christian Historical Union. The relative strength of five

parties, more or less, remained stable since 1918 and they received, together, nearly

90 % seats in the lower chamber during 1918-67 period. The dominant labor union

federations also represent the relevant bloc: the Socialist Labor Union, Catholic

Labor-union, Protestant Labor-union, and Netherlands Trade Association (dominated

by Liberals). Furthermore, the four-bloc model was apparent in organizational

memberships of newspaper and radio, in voluntary associations, and in educational

institutions also (Lijphart, 1975, p. 23). Around 1917, the relationships between the

four pillars came under pressure by three issues, (social issue, universal suffrage, and

schools issue). Concerning schooling, the issue was that the Catholics and the

Calvinists, together, demanded that they should be free to have their own schools

which, however, were to be paid mainly by the state. The social issue refers to the

serious social problems in the beginning of the twentieth century (poverty,

unemployment, disablement), problems that were mainly a lower-class affair. Since

suffrage had up to then been income and wealth related, the suffrage issue partly

coincided with the social issue. The three issues together not only widened the gaps

between the four pillars, dividing the nation even more than before, but also created

tensions within the Catholic pillar where the class cleavage had up to then been least

prominent.

28
Lijphart (1975) maintained that the Netherlands, in 1917, managed this religious-

communal conflict through the „politics of accommodation‟. The politics of

accommodation in Netherlands were characterized by the proportional electoral

system, comprehensive group autonomy concerning education, informal accords to

follow government by broadly representative coalitions, and by providing veto rights

to minorities on related sensitive political issues. This exploration led Lijphart to

examine the other Western European cases of consociational democracy.

Austria is another original case of consociationalism. After the First World War,

Austrian first republic was set up. However, extreme divisions within the Austrian

society resulted in a brief civil war, in 1934. This followed an authoritarian Catholic

regime, and eventually, an annexation into Nazi Germany in 1938. The second

Austrian republic was set up in 1945. Some lessons were learnt from the past

experiences and the political elite of Austria decided to adopt „the politics of

accommodation‟, despite the deep divisions within Austrian society. In April 1945, a

grand coalition government composed of the three parties (SPO, a Socialist party;

OVP, a Catholic party; and KPO, a Communist party) was set-up. However, KPO left

the coalition in 1947. The Catholics and Socialists decided to adopt power-sharing

arrangements. Hence, the SPO-OVP grand coalition lasted until1966.

Austria, between 1945 and 1966, has been considered as the copybook example of

consociational democracy. The consociational arrangements in Austria included grand

coalition, the proportionality, respect for group autonomy and informal accords to

guarantee mutual veto power. During this period, Austrian political system was

characterized by the perseverance of „encapsulated subcultures‟ that ensured very

stable and predictable voting behavior. While the political system became

29
consociational, Austria became known for its strong corporatism and labor peace,

institutionalized in various commissions and bodies.

Belgium is another example of consociational democracy. It seceded in 1931 from the

Netherlands. Linguistically, it was divided into Dutch speaking Flemish region,

French speaking Walloon region, and a bilingual Brussels. French, in the constitution

of 1831, was declared an official language. Soon, in reaction, the Flemish region

witnessed a political mobilization to advance language grievances. Despite a series of

language laws, linguistic concerns remained alive. Readjustment of territorial

boundaries by the parliament on the basis of population census transformed the

linguistic grievances into territorial claims (Hooghe, 2004).

“The Flemish movement was primarily concerned with cultural equality within the

existing institution, but it became gradually more nationalist and autonomist in

response to the slow adaptation of the Belgian-francophone institutions and growing

anti-Flemish sentiments among French-speaking politicians (Hooghe, 2004). Belgian

society was divided into three „families’ spirtuells’: Catholics, socialists, and liberals.

Despite these divisions, however, Belgium experienced political stability.

In the postwar period, the Belgian political settings were characterized by

proportional electoral system, separation of powers at national level, and widely

representative governments representing two or more pillars till 1950. This period

followed a majority government of Catholics. The Catholic regime adopted

conflicting policies that resulted in unrest and demands for autonomy. However, in

the coming years political leadership of Belgium managed to settle the issues

concerning the state financing of the religious schools etc (Jones, 2002).

30
The major political parties in Belgium finally replaced consociationalism with federal

rules because it “offered them an opportunity to curb the creeping separatism

embedded in consociational politics” and “traditional consociational devices appear

less effective in dealing with territorial conflict than federalism” (Hooghe , 2004,

p.80).

Switzerland is another West European country, which was classified as a consociation

by Lijphart. He asserted that power-sharing arrangements in Switzerland have been

exercised since 1943. A grand coalition, federal executive, of the four leading

political parties of Switzerland that represent all the linguistic and religious groups

was set-up. This executive power-sharing was added to the existing proportional

electoral system and decentralized federal settings providing strong segmental

autonomy (Lijphart, 1977).

Outside the Western Europe, Lebanon was identified by Lijphart as a case of

consociationalism. Lebanon is a plural society: a home country of Sunni Muslims,

Shia Muslims and Greek orthodox, along other minorities. This country remained

consociational since its independence in 1943 to 1975, when a war ended the politics

of accommodation. At the time of independence, an unwritten and informal

agreement designed a mechanism of executive power sharing. This consociational

arrangement provided: a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister, a Shi‟a chairmen

of the parliament, and a Greek orthodox deputy chairman and deputy prime minister

(Lijphart, 1977, pp. 147-150). The electoral system was so designed as to ensure

proportional share of seats to every religious group. Segmental autonomy was another

feature of Lebanese case. Each religious group had its own educational system,

schools, social and welfare organizations. Mutual veto, unwritten, was another feature

31
of the Lebanese case. In short, Lebanon had all the four consociational features of

consociationalism. The system survived and overcame various outbreaks of civil war

until 1975.

Malaysia (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 150-153) had, during the period of 1955 and 1969,

experienced consociational governance. It is a plural society with a majority of Malay

53% population, Chinese 30%, and Indian and Pakistanis 11%. In 1950, Malay and

Chinese leaders formed a coalition that was soon joined in by the Indians. This

alliance of Malay, Chinese and Indian political parties got more than eighty percent

votes polled in the general elections of 1955 and managed to get all but one seat in

national assembly. Cabinet positions were also distributed among the three groups

(Malay, Chinese, and Indian). The autonomy concerning internal, social and cultural

affairs was granted to all segments. This arrangement continued after independence in

1957. It also sustained after the „addition of the Bornean states of Sabah and Sarawak

(and briefly, Singapore) to the federation‟, renamed Malaysia, in 1963. Afterward, the

alliance was renamed national front when additional parties joined the coalition

(Lijphart, 1995a, p. 858).

Cyprus has been considered as a failure case of consociationalism. During the brief

Cyprus consociational period, Cypriot constitution provided power-sharing

arrangements to Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The „Cypriot constitution of

1960 provided for Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice president with

virtually equivalent powers, far reaching educational and cultural autonomy for the

two groups, a strong veto power for the Turkish Cypriot minority, and over

representation of this minority in the legislature and the cabinet‟. However, these

arrangements proved short-lived (Lijphart, 1995a, p. 858).

32
India was recognized as a case of consociationalism by Lijphart in 1996. Lijphart has

argued that India, especially during early decades, has displayed all four features of

consociational democracy. Lijphart has associated the success of electoral politics of

this period with power-sharing arrangements in India. However, in the post-Nehru

period, the power-sharing arrangements became less strong (Lijphart, 1996).

Moreover, the consociational democracy examples include Luxemburg , the

Netherlands Antilles , Suriname, Nigeria ,Columbia , Fiji , Northern Ireland ,

Zimbabwe , Czechoslovakia , South Africa , South Tyrol, Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Burundi , Macedonia , Afghanistan , Iraq , and Kenya.

2.7 The Favorable Factors for Consociational Democracy

The favorable factors for consociational democracy have been developed over time.

For the first time, the favorable factors appeared in Lijphart‟s comparative work in

1969. Then after a comparative study of four European cases of consociational

democracy and other western countries, Lijphart revised the favorable factors for the

establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy in 1977. Though he

admitted that favorable conditions for consociational democracy are „neither

indispensable nor sufficient in and of themselves to account for the success of

consociational democracy‟, they can improve the „explanatory and predictive power

of the consociational model‟ (Lijphart, 1977, p. 54). Lijphart assessed the probability

of success for consociational democracy in South Africa by quantifying the favorable

factors present in the South African society in 1985. The results of quantification led

Lijphart to argue that consociational democracy is a realistic option for south Africa

because the favorable condition for consociational democracy are not unusually

unfavorable in South Africa.

33
Favorable factors are important because they can help to determine how much

consociational democracy is suitable for a given society. As it has been mentioned

earlier, the favorable factors were not derived deductively but inductively after a

comparative study of consociational regimes. Therefore, with the expansion of

consociational universe, the favorable factors underwent significant modifications in

number and content over time. The following table has summarized four different lists

of favorable factors presented by Lijphart at different times.

34
 Figure 2-2: Lijphart’s List of Favorable Factors

Lijphart Lijphart Lijphart Lijphart

(1969, pp. 216-22) (1977, pp. 53-101) (1985, pp. 119-28) (1996, pp. 262-63)
Multiple balance of power among the Multiple balance of power among the No majority segment No solid majority
subcultures segments of plural society
A relatively low total load on the Small country size Small population size Small population size
decision-making apparatus
Distinct lines of cleavage Segmental isolation Geographical concentration of Geographical concentration of
between subcultures segments segments
External threats to the country Multiparty system External threats External threat
Internal political cohesion of the Tradition of elite accommodation Segments of equal size Segments of roughly equal size
subcultures
The length of time a consociational Overarching loyalties Small number of segments Small number of groups
democracy has been in operation
Widespread approval of the principle Crosscutting cleavages Tradition of elite accommodation Tradition of compromise and
of government by elite cartel accommodation
Representative party system Overarching loyalties Overarching loyalties
Socio-economic equality Absence of large socioeconomic
differences

Source: (Lijphart, 1969; 1977; 1985; 1996)

35
2.8 Collected Critique

Consociationalism has attracted a lot of criticism from many quarters. Van

Schendelen (1984) has argued that Lijphart‟s work about consociationalism is not

based on empirical research. He maintains that Lijphart‟s definitions of key concepts

like consociational democracy and plural society are fuzzy and not precisely

measurable. Therefore consociational theory violates common norms of scientific

research.

Halpern Sue is another harsh critic of the consociational theory. She argues that

consociational theory is composed of „imprecise, imperfect, and informal‟ concepts

that invite the researcher to engage in „creative stretching‟ to verify correspondence of

a case to the models. She maintains that the concepts of consociationalism seem too

stretchy to perform their necessary discriminating role. This flexibility of concepts

permits the „inclusion of diverse and disputable cases in the consociational universe‟.

Subsequently, these elastic concepts promote disorder rather than ordering the

consociational universe (Halpern, 1984).

Barry (1975, pp. 502-03) argued that consociationalism is not a panacea for every

divided society. It may work in societies divided along religious or ideological lines

but not in the ethnically divided societies. He continued that in the former case the

conflict is a conflict of organizations and in the latter situations conflict is a conflict of

solid groups. He concluded that consociationalism may resolve the conflict of

organizations but it may hardly be helpful in the conflict of solid groups.

Lijphart argues that consociational democracy is a viable solution for divided

societies. He maintains that the empirical cases of consociational democracy, namely,

36
the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, and Austria have experienced sub-cultural

hostility and democratic stability due to consociational governance. But, the critics

have challenged this argument and asserted that the consociational cases have not

experienced „sub-cultural hostility‟ in the sense in which the concepts of „fragmented

political culture‟ and „plural society‟ are employed (Halpern, 1984).

Another prominent critic, Horowitz (2002, pp. 19-23) objects that „consociational

approach is motivationally inadequate‟. He seems least impressed by the Lijphart‟s

argument that in consociational arrangements „leaders are motivated by a desire to

avert the danger of mutual destruction‟. He wonders how leaders of a majority group

would prefer consociational democracy to a majoritarian democracy. He maintains

that there are „some examples of motivation to accept consociational democracy but

these are idiosyncratic and can not be assumed to be widely distributed‟. He continued

that „ the assumption that elites in divided societies are likely to be more tolerant of

other groups or less inclined to pursue advantage for their own group is extremely

dubious‟.

Lijphart argues that a consociational model must entertain all four consociational

components, namely grand coalition or executive power sharing, segmental

autonomy, proportionality, and mutual veto. However, the consociational cases do not

demonstrate all the consociational features. There is no definite form of grand

coalition presented in the theory. He has „given no particular locus to grand coalition

in the theory and has left it open to interpret. The case of segmental autonomy is no

more different. Its presence is determined by a „solipsistic standard which is no

standard at all since segmental autonomy must be evinced only to the extent the

system will bear‟. „The confusion of segmental proportionality with the more

37
common electoral proportional representation leads to the erroneous classification of

multi-party system as consociational democracies‟. „The passing nature of mutual

veto, which according to consociational theory need not be codified in the daily life of

political system, enables its presence to be glossed over and its absence to be

disregarded‟ (Halpern, 1984).

Despite its theoretical application to numerous cases, the consociational model has not

been deployed successfully. Controversy surrounds the labeling of particular cases as

consociational democracies. Furthermore, the proper scope of the consociational

universe is subject to debate. Under the terms of this model, „virtually every case that

can be located within the consociational universe can also be located out of it‟.

Indeed, the „consociational literature is a compendium of such disputes‟ (Halpern,

1984)

The Netherlands case has been contested by Schendelen (1984) and Andeweg (2000).

It has been put forward that the Dutch society was not as fragmented as it has been

painted by Lijphart. The subcultures were cross-cutting, and there was relatively low

level of risk for political stability. Moreover, all inclusive grand coalition never

existed in Dutch politics. It has been stressed that Lijphart overstated the tripartite

Social Economic Council when he regarded it as a grand coalition.

The Lijphart‟s argument that Switzerland is a case of consociational democracy has

been challenged by his critics. Barry maintains that the Swiss case fails to fit in the

consociational model at every point. He also challenges Lijphart‟s argument that

federal council is a grand coalition, and representative of all linguistic and religious

groups. He maintains that the council‟s members are „thought of as individuals

administering departments rather than as party oligarchs reaching concordats binding

38
on their followers‟. Barry adds that referendum is a majoritarian rather than

consociational device, and hence the Swiss case lacks a pure case of consociational

institutions (Barry, 1975).

Barry has challenged the argument of Lijphart that conflicts are usually resolved by

cooperation in the federal council, in Switzerland. He has presented data concerning

the decision making process in expert committees, committees appointed by the

federal council, and the data does not support the argument presented by Lijphart. He

suggested that the decision making pattern, however, seems closer to majoritarian

pattern than consociational pattern (Steiner, 1987).

Though Barry acknowledges Austria as a case of consociational democracy in the

period of 1945 to 1966 „in the purely descriptive or non-theoretical sense‟ yet he

questions the „consociational democracies thesis in that the consociational devices

may have been necessary to keep conflict down to a manageable level‟ (Barry, 1975).

To sum up, Barry (1) asserts that the case of Switzerland does not offer any support

for the theory of consociationalism,(2) that the case of Austrian‟s consociationalism is

not so straightforward as it is generally assumed,(3) that the cases of Belgium and the

Netherlands as a consociational democracies , despite the reality that they are

reasonable supporting cases, „still fall short of fully bearing out the theory‟, and (4)

that the relevancy of the consociational democracy for the other plural societies is

logically uncertain than it is usually supposed (Barry , 1975).

Horowitz (2002, p. 21) challenges the optimism of Lijphart about the politics of

accommodation. He asserts that it is not easy for group leaders to make concessions

across ethnic lines in divided societies. The counter-elites emerge who challenge the

39
legitimacy of compromise. Horowitz presents the examples of Lebanon, Malaysia,

Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles, the consociational cases of developing world,

which experienced interethnic coalitions rather than grand coalitions in their

respective consociational regimes. Some of these cases, according to Horowitz, also

violated other core conditions of consociational theory, such as proportionality,

executive power sharing, and segmental autonomy.

Horowitz has analyzed the consociational experiences in Europe and beyond in a

recent paper. He categorized Belgium as a „fragile regime‟ because its federal center

is becoming weaker by the efforts to delegate more and more powers to its „ethnically

differentiated regions, in which ethnic outbidding proceeds with little restraint‟. The

case of Northern Ireland is also not a successful story. „Moderates‟ in Ireland are

gradually losing their support and the extremist parties are becoming stronger. At the

maximum, with some exceptions, violence has been controlled. The Bosnian

power-sharing arrangements have also made little advancement towards „conflict

amelioration‟ thus reducing the „influence of extremists‟ (Horowitz, 2008).

The role of consociational democracy in Africa is also not promising either.

Power-sharing arrangements in South Africa proved transitory. Both attempts of

Burundi, first in 1992 and second in 2000, at consociational democracy remained

unrewarding. Burundi on consociational arrangements lacked some consociational

elements but „Sudan‟s Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005‟ fulfilled all

requirements of consociational arrangements: the agreement contained a grand

coalition, minority rights protection, proportionality in the cabinet and substantial

autonomy for the south. However, there are serious doubts about the execution of

these arrangements. Horowitz asserts that in the Indian case there is sufficient

40
evidence to suggest that consociational devices did not contain violence. Even, the

period in which Indian political system experienced consociational devices witnessed

higher level of violence than the periods in which consociational elements were

missing. According to Horowitz, therefore, “the recent record of consociational

constitutions in divided societies is, at best, debatable” (Horowitz, 2008).

2.9 Consociationalism and Pakistan

Expansion in the consociational universe led Arend Lijphart to explore the Indian

case. Lijphart found out that „India is not a deviant case for consociational theory but

instead, an impressive confirming case‟ (Lijphart, 1996). However, the Pakistani case

appeared in consociational debates not before 2002. It remained overlooked in the

previous literature on consociationalism due to its chequred domestic history.

Adeney (2002) argued that the constitutional preferences of Indian National Congress

and All India Muslim League before partition were quite different. The Muslim

League was asserting for consociational devices to protect Muslim minority rights but

the approach of Congress was more majoritarian. However, after the creation of

Pakistan, the Muslim League changed its preferences and adopted majoritarian

constitutional formulas. While India reorganized its states boundaries along linguistic

boundaries, Pakistan amalgamated the provinces and states in the western wing into

the province of West Pakistan. It has been argued that the political instability in

Pakistan is the result of majoritarian design of its federal settings. Minorities are

excluded from the power structure and this exclusion creates a sense of alienation and

deprivation. This observation has led consociationalists to recommend that Pakistan

“will need to adopt and maintain consociational governance at federal centre” to

“practice democracy (McGarry & O‟Leary, 2005).

41
Adeney (2007) has analyzed the ethnic conflict regulation strategies of Indian and

Pakistan federations. She has concluded that the approach of Indian federation is

relatively more accommodative than the Pakistani federation. She has associated the

relative political stability of India with its relatively consociational leanings and the

relative political instability of Pakistan with its non-consociational governance.

In a recent paper in 2009, she reiterated that „it is the absence of consociational

mechanisms that has caused much of the conflict in Pakistan‟. She has suggested

„radical changes along the consociational lines‟ for Pakistani federation to manage

ethnic diversity and ensure political stability in Pakistan (Adeney, 2009).

This study attempts to analyze whether consociationalism can play any role in

managing ethnic diversity in Pakistan. The subsequent chapters have been reserved

for this purpose.

42
 References

1. Adeney, K. (2002) Constitutional centering: Nation formation and consociational

federalism in India and Pakistan. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 40 (3),

8-33.

2. Adeney, K. (2007). Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and

Pakistan. New York: Pal grave.

3. Adeney, K. (2009) .The Limitations of Non-consociational Federalism: The

Example of Pakistan. Ethnopolitics, 8(1), 87 -106.

4. Barry, B. (1975-A). The Consociational Model and Its Dangers, European

Journal of Political Research. 3(4), 393-412.

5. Barry, B. (1975-B). Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy.

British Journal of Political Science. 5(4), 477-503.

6. Assaf, N. (2004). Consociational theory and democratic stability a re-examination

Case Study: Lebanon (Unpublished PhD’s thesis). University of Warwick, UK.

7. Almond, G.A. (1956). Comparative Political Systems. Journal of Politics.18 (3),

391-409.

8. Lijphart, A. (1969). Consociational Democracy. World Politics. 21 (2), 207-225.

9. Lijphart, A. (1975). The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in

the Netherlands (2nd Ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.

10. Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration.

New Haven: Yale University Press.

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11. Lijphart, A. (1985). Power-Sharing in South Africa. Berkeley: Institute of

International Studies, University of California.

12. Lijphart, A. (1995a). Multiethnic democracy. In Seymour Upset, (Eds.), the

Encyclopedia of Democracy (pp. 853-65). Washington: Congressional Quarterly

Inc.

13. Lijphart, A. (1995b). Self-determination versus pre-determination of ethnic

minorities in power-sharing systems. In W. Kymlicka, (Eds.), The Rights of

Minority Cultures (pp. 275-87). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

14. Lijphart, A. (1996). The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational

Interpretation. American Political Science Review. 90, 258-268.

15. Lijphart, A. (2002).The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy. In A. Reynolds

(Eds.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict

Management and Democracy (pp. 37-54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

16. Lijphart, A. (2004). Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. Journal of

Democracy. 15(2), 96-109.

17. Clark, P & Foweraker, J. (2001). Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, (Eds.)

London: Rout ledge.

18. Hooghe, L. (2004). Belgium: Hollowing the Center. In Amoretti, U. M. and N.

Bermeo (Eds.), Federalism and Territorial Cleavages (pp.55-92). John Hopkins

University Press.

19. Horowitz, D. (2002). Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes. In A.

Reynolds (Eds.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict

Management and Democracy (pp. 15-36). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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20. Horowitz, D.L. (2008). Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in

Post-Conflict States. William and Mary Law Review. 49(4), 1213-1248.

21. Halpern, S.M. (1984). Consociational Democracy and the Dangers of Politics as

Science (Unpublished D. Phil. Thesis). University of Oxford, U.K.

22. Halpern, S. M. (1986). The disorderly universe of consociational democracy. West

European Politics. 9(2), 181-97.

23. Jones, E. (2002). Consociationalism, corporatism, and the fate of Belgium. Acta

Politica. 37, 86-103.

24. McGarry, J. & O’Leary, B. (2005) Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict

Regulation. In S. Noel (Eds.), From Power-sharing to Democracy: Post Conflict

Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies (pp. 263–296). Montreal: McGill

Queens University Press.

25. McCulloch, A. (2009). Seeking stability amid deep division: Consociationalism

and Centripetalism in comparative perspective (Unpublished PhD’s thesis).

Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

26. Mill, J. S. (1958).Considerations on Representative Government. New York:

Liberal Arts Press.

27. O’Leary, B. (2005). Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory

Arguments. In S. Noel (Eds.), From Power-Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict

Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies (pp.3-43). Montreal: McGill-Queen’s

University Press.

28. Taylor, R. (2009). Consociational Theory: McGarry & O’ Leary and Northern

Ireland Conflict. Rout ledge: London.

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29. Steiner, J. (1987). Consociational democracy as a policy recommendation: the

case of South Africa. Comparative Politics. 19(3), 361-372.

30. Schendelen, V. (1984). The views of Arend Lijphart and collected criticism. Acta

Politica .19(1), 19-49.

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Science. 2000(3), 509–36.

46
Chapter No. 3

ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A PROBLEM IN PAKISTAN

3.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to introduce the problem of ethnic diversity in Pakistan. The

second section of this chapter briefly introduces the movement of Indian Muslims for

a separate homeland. The third section overviews the history of a state formation.

Primarily, it surveys the constitutional and political developments in pre-1971

Pakistan. The fourth section reveals the ethno-linguistic composition of post-1971

Pakistan. The fifth section explores the grievances of smaller communities that

underpin the perception of Punjabisation of Pakistan. The sixth section summarizes

the substantial protests of smaller communities against the federal authorities. The

dissatisfaction of political parties toward the existing federal settings is exposed in the

next section by examining autonomy demands of various political parties in their

electoral manifestoes.

3.2 Movement of Indian Muslims for a Separate Homeland

Nationalist historiography lacks consensus about the development of Muslim identity

in the subcontinent. There is a variety of opinion on this issue. One school of thought

considers the emergence of Muslim nationalism as the result of British‟s policy of

divide and rule1; others argue that Islam was the single explanatory variable behind

this development 2; some others maintain that the emergence of Muslim identity was,

„both a consequence of British policies toward Indian society and fears of the North

Indian Muslim elite‟3. Actually, India experienced a great deal of nationalisms at the

47
same time and some of those nationalisms worked in opposition to others (Malik,

(1963).

Muslims entered in Indian subcontinent between seventh and eighth centaury. Slowly

but surely, they strengthened their rule in various parts of India. By 1290, almost all

of India was “under the loose domination of Muslim rulers”. Of the Muslim rulers,

Mughals were the most prominent. They “established an empire in early sixteenth

century that lasted until 1858” (Cohen, 2005, pp.15-16).

Religion‟s role as a symbol of identity remained limited during Mughals rule. There

were divisions within the courts of Mughals, but “this division was between Turkish

and Persian factions rather than between Hindus and Muslims”. Family was an

important source of identity during this period. Shi‟a and Sunni divisions were visible

and the “category of Muslim was not of overriding importance”. The Muslims who

were descended from converts to Islam, the vast majority of Muslims in India,

expressed themselves through the regional cultures and languages of India. However,

some Muslims, like Shah Wali Ullah, had a cultural and imaginative reach that went

well beyond the borders of south Asia (Robinson, 1974, pp.271-72).

The Muslim rule in India was finally eliminated in 1858. After having control of

India, British government introduced various constitutional formulas in India to

provide some space to Indians in government machinery. Though a limited access

was provided to the power and authority in theses constitutional proposals, they

proved of a great significance for the future of India. Muslims, a minority, were

worried about the majoritarian form of democracy. They began to defend their

interests. They were provided reserved seats in the parliament and the Muslim

leadership had to appeal only Muslim voters. Similarly, non-Muslim politicians did

48
not have to appeal to Muslims. These developments resulted in the consolidation of

political interests around communal lines. Therefore, the political environment was no

more conducive for the emergence of a genuine Indian nationalism.

In the late 1920s, All India National Congress and All India Muslim League offered

different constitutional proposals in their meetings for the prospective constitution of

British India. While Congress emphasized on a centralized federation, the League

stressed for a decentralized federation with a substantial minority rights protection.

Meanwhile, in 1930, an idea of a separate homeland for Indian Muslims was

presented by Iqbal, a famous poet-philosopher of India. The idea of a separate

homeland provided “a more potent objective to Muslim community of India than

constitutional rights and representation in the civil services” (Islam, 1981).

In the subsequent years, Jinnah emerged as a spokesman of Muslim nationalism. He

advocated the theory of two-nations, in India, based on religion. He stressed that

Muslims are a separate nation, and therefore they require a separate homeland. In his

speech at All India Muslim League‟s annual meeting, held in Lahore in 1940, he

reiterated that “the Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious

philosophies, social customs, and literatures. They neither intermarry, nor dine

together and they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on

conflicting ideas and conceptions” (Malik, 1990).

It was this point of time when “the political and religious themes of modern Pakistan

found together”. At the start, the Pakistan movement was more popular in the Muslim

minority provinces of India. But the Pakistan became a possibility only when the

Muslim League had captured Bengal and Punjab, Muslim majority provinces.

Therefore, when “the lines of partition were drawn and the imperial power withdrew,

49
it was chiefly the Muslims of Bengal and Punjab who found themselves on Pakistan

side of the line” (Page, 1974, p. 262).

3.3 Pre-1971 Pakistan: Constitutional and Political Development

While the Muslim League demanded a decentralized federal system in pre-partition

India, it adopted the policy of centralization in the newly established state of Pakistan.

Between 1947 and 1958, the system of government was set-up first under the

Independence Act of 1947 (an interim constitution) and then under the constitution of

1956. Under the interim constitution, a federal system of government was adopted.

Governor General had been provided extraordinary constitutional powers. Governor

General was granted the power to amend the constitution; to appoint and discharge

the council of ministers; and to look after the matters regarding Defense,

Ecclesiastical, External Affairs, Tribal Areas, maintenance of law and order, minority

rights etc (Sayeed, 1967, pp. 233-57).

The central government did not pay any respect to the constitutional norms of a

federation. It “very frequently dismissed and reformed the ministries in the provinces

playing off the differences between different rival groups which constituted those

provincial legislatures. Many times the central government appointed such persons as

chief ministers in various provinces who did not enjoy the support of the simple

majority in their respective legislatures” (Hussain, 1989, p.77).

Various provincial ministries were sacked by the central government in consequence

of political disputes. The Congress ministry of Dr. Khan Sahib in NWFP was

dismissed on 22 August 1947 by the Governor of the NWFP on direction of the

Governor General of Pakistan. Abdul Qaiyum Khan, who had not a majority in the

50
house, was installed as Chief Minister of NWFP. M. A. Khuhro, the Chief Minister

of Sindh, had support of majority in the house in 1948. But his ministry was

discharged, in April 1948, on the charges of “maladministration, gross misconduct

and corruption” (Hussain, 1989, pp.77-80). In the same manner, the Governors under

section 92-A of Provisional Constitution Order assumed powers in other provinces:

Punjab in1949, Sindh in 1951, and East Bengal in 1954.

The first major step towards constitution-making in Pakistan was the passing of the

Objective Resolution in 1949. The resolution laid down the principles that were to

guide the constitutional process in Pakistan. One of the key principles agreed was

that the system of the government in Pakistan would be federal.

However, there was disagreement among various constituent units over the nature and

kind of the federal design for Pakistan. The main issues included the nature and

composition of legislature, division of powers between the federation and the units,

and the role of Islam in the polity of Pakistan.

The constituent assembly appointed a Basic Principles Committee to work out a

federal constitution. The committee in its first report, in 1950, suggested a bicameral

legislature, more or less similar to U.S.A. model: the representation in lower house

was provided on the basis of population and an equal representation for all constituent

units was suggested in the upper chamber. Nearly, equal powers were suggested for

the both houses: cabinet was held responsible to both houses and in the case of a

dispute; a joint session of the Houses was to be summoned. It was a preliminary

report and the committee had not outlined the details. While the “report had a

favorable reaction in the Western Zone of the country, the East Bengal did not

51
approve the proposals”. Therefore, Committee was asked to reconsider its

recommendations (Hussain, 1989).

The Committee presented the revised report. This time the problem of representation

in parliament was attempted to solve through the distribution of equal membership to

both wings in both houses of the parliament: in the lower house of 400 members, the

allocation of 200 seats was suggested for Bengal and 200 seats were to be distributed

among the units and princely states of western wing. Similarly, a house of 120

members, 60 each from the two wings, was recommended as a federal chamber. The

spirit of a parliamentary system was apparent in the proposals as the upper house had

been provided minimal powers.

These proposals were also not approved by the members of various groups. It has

been argued that these proposals denied the smaller identities of western zone by

“ignoring the historical facts that they had differences and grievances in the past and

were apprehensive of domination by each other”. The Punjabis and Pashtuns had

mutual hostility; the “Sindhis had sought British help against the Punjab to save their

territory from the latter”; and “Balochistan had always been apprehensive of any

domination or subjugation from Sindh and Punjab” (Hussain, 1989, p.91).

The proposals of parity between eastern wing and the western wing led to the

unification of western wing into one province. Under the One-unit scheme, all

provinces and princely states of the western wing were amalgamated into one

province – the West Pakistan. The ministries that resisted unification in NWFP and

Sindh were dismissed. The states of Bahawalpur and Khairpur along the Balochistan

States union were forced to amalgamate their territories into a single province of West

52
Pakistan. This scheme resulted in Punjab‟s hegemony over the smaller identities of

the western zone within a unified West Pakistan4.

Finally, the constituent assembly passed the first constitution of the Islamic republic

of Pakistan in 1956 in the course of nine years. According to Chaudhry (1956), the

constitution had all the normal features of a federation: a written constitution, a dual

polity, distribution of powers between the federation and federating units, and a

supreme court. However, the constitution proved short-lived and martial law was

imposed in October 1958. Ayub Khan5, then chief martial law administrator, framed

the second constitution in 1962. A highly centralized system of government was set

up under this constitution (Khan, 2005). This constitution was abrogated with the end

of Ayub rule in 1969.

Pakistan experienced another Martial Law in post-Ayub era. Yahya Khan, the army

chief, remained in power until the break up of Pakistan in 1971. It is not within the

domain of this study to discuss the separation of East Pakistan in detail. However, it is

pertinent to point out that Bengalis were the opinion that they remained marginalized

and excluded from the power structure of Pakistan. This exclusion and inequitable

distribution underpinned the political mobilization that led to separation of Bengal

from Pakistan (Alqama, 1997). After partition, Bhutto replaced Yahya Khan, and

became civil martial law administrator. Martial law was lifted in 1972. Subsequently,

the National Assembly of Pakistan passed the constitution that was enforced on

August 14, 1973. The federal features of this constitution have been discussed in the

next chapter.

53
3.4 Post-1971 Pakistan: an Overview of Ethnic Groups and their Locations

Pakistan is one of the world‟s most ethnically complex states. Generally, each of it‟s

provinces is coupled with a certain linguistic group6; Punjab with Punjabis (75.2%);

Sindh with Sindhis (59.7%); Balochistan with Balochs (58.5%); and NWFP with

Pashtuns (73.9%).While ethno-linguistic boundaries do not coincide strictly with the

administrative boundaries, the bordering areas of each province of Pakistan have

significant minorities. The huge influx of migrants (Muhajireen), in 1947, restructured

the ethno-linguistic composition of the region. In addition, in-country migration and

the arrival of Afghan refugees in great number have turned Pakistan into a more

ethnically diverse state. A complete description of ethno-linguist composition of

Pakistan is given in the following table.

Figure 3-1: Pakistan by Mother Language

Language Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Pakistan

All Urban All Urban All Urban All Urban All Urban
Urdu 4.5 10.1 21.1 41.5 0.8 3.5 1.6 5.9 7.8 20.5
Punjabi 75.2 78.8 7.0 11.5 1.0 4.6 2.9 10.6 45.4 47.6
Pashto 1.2 1.8 4.2 11.5 73.9 73.5 23.0 19.7 13.0 9.6
Sindhi 0.1 0.1 59.7 25.8 - 0.1 6.8 6.9 14.6 9.3
Balochi 0.7 0.1 2.1 2.7 - - 58.5 46.7 3.5 2.6
Siraiki 17.4 8.4 1.0 1.7 3.9 3.1 2.6 4.1 10.9 5.5
Others 0.9 0.8 4.9 8.8 20.4 15.1 5.1 6.1 4.8 4.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: (Kennedy, 2002)

An overview of ethno-linguistic composition of various provinces of Pakistan has

been illustrated in the following sections.

3.4.1 Punjab

Punjab is the largest province of Pakistan in terms of population. It can be divided in

three well-known groups/regions on the linguistic/geographical basis – the Punjabi

54
speaking, central Punjab; the Pothowhari speaking, northern Punjab; and the Siraiki

speaking, southern Punjab. Officially, Pothowhari has been considered a dialect of

Punjabi. So, apart from Siraiki region, the Punjab is an overwhelmingly a Punjabi

speaking region. The detail of Punjabi and Siraiki speaking regions is provided in the

following sections.

3.4.1.1 Punjabi Speaking Region of Punjab

The central and northern parts of Punjab are entirely Punjabi speaking regions. Only

the neighboring districts to the province of NWFP – Mianwali (10%), Rawalpindi

(5.3%) and Attock (8.28%) – have some Pashtuns population. Some Urdu-speaking

population has presence in the urban centers like Lahore (10.2%) and Rawalpindi

(7.5%). Furthermore, few Siraikis reside in the nearby areas to Siraiki speaking region

– Mianwali (12%), Vehari (11.4%) and Khanewal (5.8%). The Balochs and the

Sindhis have no occurrence in this region (Census Reports, 1998).

3.4.1.2 Siraiki Speaking Areas of Punjab

Southern Punjab is a Siraiki speaking region. However, a considerable number of

Punjabis live in this region. The adjoining districts to the province of Balochistan –

Rajanpur (17%) and Dera Ghazi Khan (14.3%) – have some Balochi-speaking

population. Urdu-speaking population has quite significant presence in the urban

centers of the region. However, Pashtuns and Sindhis are in nominal numbers in this

region (Census Reports, 1998).

55
3.4.2 Sindh

Sindh is the most ethnically diverse province of Pakistan. In addition to the huge

influx of refugees in 1947, from northern and central India, plenty of Punjabis,

Pashtuns, and Balochs have also settled in Sindh. Karachi, the provincial capital, and

the largest city of the Pakistan is popularly called “Mini Pakistan” because of its

diverse ethnic composition. Sindhis are in majority in the rural Sindh. However, the

rural Sindh has absorbed a considerable number of Balochs, even ruling dynasties,

who adopted Sindhi language and culture. In addition, a considerable number of

Punjabis are residing in the districts of Mirpur Khas (10.73%), Umerkot (5.08%),

Badin (5.6%), and Sukkar (6.63%). Mohajirs are, generally, concentrated at district

headquarters of Sukkar (13.82%), Mirpur Khas (18.34), Sanghar (10.08), Thatta

(12%), Hyderabad (29.61%), Nawab Shah (8.72%), and Nausharo Feroz (5.69%). A

considerable number of Pashtuns live in Karachi but the number of Pashtun residing

in rural Sindh is very small (Census Reports, 1998). The ethnic division, mainly,

coincides with rural-urban division in Sindh. On the whole, Mohajirs are the largest

group in urban centers of Sindh; and Sindhis are the overwhelming majority in rural

Sindh.

3.4.3 North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP)

Generally, NWFP is considered as an overwhelmingly Pashtun dominated province.

However, the census reports of NWFP reveal that Pashtuns are a minority in the

districts of Haripur, Abbotabad, Dera Ismael Khan, Mansehra, Kohistan, and Chitral.

While Siraikis make up majority in the district of Dera Ismael Khan, smaller linguistic

groups (mainly Hindko-speaking population) dominate in the non-Pashtun belt of the

NWFP (Census Reports, 1998).

56
3.4.4 Balochistan

Balochistan is a multiethnic province with a few significant minorities. Pashtuns have

majority in the districts of Pishin, Killa Abdullah, Loralai, Killa Saifullah, Musakhel,

Zhob, and Ziarat. A considerable number of Sindhis and Siraikis are residing in the

districts of Jhal Magsi, Lasbella, Jaffar Abad, Nasir Abad, and Bolan. The Balochs are

a majority in remaining areas. This remaining region includes the districts of Chagi,

Kohlu, Dera Bugti, Kalat, Khuzdar, Awaran, Kharan, Kech, Gawader, and Panjgur

(Census Reports, 1998).

The following table presents a comparative analysis of various ethno-linguistic groups

of Pakistan. The table explores some key features of various groups that will be

helpful for our understandings toward the multiethnic society of Pakistan.

57
 Figure 3-2: Ethno-linguistic Groups in Pakistan: Some Comparative Observation

Enumeration Punjabis Siraikis Balochs Pashtuns Sindhis Mohajirs

Language(s) Punjabi Siraiki Balochi, Brahvi Pashto Sindhi Urdu
Religion Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam
Customs (with respect to majority) Majority group same Different Different Different Different
Regional base of groups Punjab Southern Punjab Balochistan NWFP Rural Sindh Urban Sindh
% of members in regional base >75% >75% 50-75% 50-75% >75% >75%
Urban/Rural distribution Mixed Mainly rural Mostly rural Mostly rural Mainly rural Mainly urban
Highest level of political grievance No political Separate province Autonomy status Autonomy status Autonomy status Autonomy status
grievances
Highest level of cultural grievance: No cultural Remedial Policies No cultural No cultural Remedial Policies No cultural
grievances grievances grievances grievances
Political Representation Adequate Under Under- Adequate Adequate Adequate
representation representation representation representation representation representation
Representation in civil bureaucracy Over Under Under- Adequate Under- Over
representation representation representation representation representation representation
Representation in military Over Under Under- Overrepresentation Under Adequate
representation representation representation representation representation
Representation in diplomatic positions Over Under Under- Under- Under- Over
representation representation representation representation representation representation

Sources: (Minorities at Risk Project, 2008; Mushtaq & Alqama, 2009)

58
3.5 Grievances of Smaller Communities

The Punjab‟s dominance over smaller constituent units of Pakistan is multidimensional.

It contains more than half population of the Pakistan; enjoys overrepresentation in

national institutions; and has relatively better socio-economic conditions. This relatively

advantageous position of the Punjabis has annoyed the people of deprived regions and

the marginalized communities (Mushtaq & Alqama, 2009). They argue that their

resources are being utilized for the development of the Punjab. Consequently, this

relative deprivation of the smaller units and predominance of the Punjab has been

perceived by the smaller units as the „Punjabisation’ of Pakistan (Talbot, 2000, p. 215).

Evidence suggests that the pre-dominance of the Punjabis in the civil-military

bureaucracy, the comparative development level of the Punjab, the „contentious‟

formula that regulates the distribution of funds to provinces, and disagreement between

Punjab and the smaller units over water issues underpins the perception of the

Punjabisation of Pakistan by the smaller units. Therefore, this section attempts to

evaluate these grievances of smaller units and marginalized communities, mainly,

against the Punjab.

3.5.1 Lack of Power-sharing

The basic grievance of smaller communities is about the lack of power-sharing. They

argue that they are not provided their due share in political, diplomatic and bureaucratic

positions. They also resent their under-representation in armed forces. These issues are

discussed in the following sections.

59
3.5.1.1 Distribution of Political Positions

One of the primary concerns of smaller communities is that they are excluded from the

power structure of Pakistan. Under the original 1973 constitution, Pakistan had a

parliamentary system of government. However, the constitution was amended by the

military rulers (Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf introduced 8th and 14th amendments

respectively) to shift the power from the office of prime minister to the president .

Consequently, in practice, the parliamentary system has operated more like a semi-

parliamentary system in Pakistan. Nonetheless, the ethno-linguistic groups believe that

larger share of political positions is advantageous for the concerned group. The evidence

does not, seemingly, corroborate the argument of the smaller communities. The

distribution of political positions (the offices of President and Prime Minister) among

various ethno linguistic groups, in post-1971 Pakistan, seems to suggest that there is no

single group that dominated this period. Sindhis are relatively overrepresented. Zulfiqar

Ali Bhutto became civilian chief martial law administrator after the separation of East

Pakistan in 1971. He occupied the office of presidency until August 14, 1973 when he

became prime minister of Pakistan. He remained prime minister up to 1977.

Subsequently, Muhammad Khan Junejo, another Sindhi, was elected as prime minister

by the National Assembly of Pakistan after the party-less elections of 1985. Yet again,

Benazir Bhutto, a Sindhi, became prime minister in 1988. She was replaced by Ghulam

Mustafa Jatoi, a caretaker prime minister from Sindh. Therefore, the all four prime

ministers were Sindhis. Meantime, Zia-ul-Haq, a Punjabi military officer, ruled the

country for a more than decade (1977-1988). Nawaz Sharif was the first Punjabi prime

minister elected in 1990, in the post-1971 Pakistan. He was replaced by Benazir Bhutto

in 1993. The two caretaker prime ministers, during this period, were from Siraiki and

Punjabi groups. Musharraf, a Mohajir military officer, exercised powers of the state,

60
exclusively, during the period of 1999 and 2008. Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Shujaat

Hussain and Shaukat Aziz were his nominees. Equally, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a Pashtun,

remained a powerful president during the period of 1988 to 1993 and removed elected

prime ministers from their offices. Another, Pashtun, General Muhammad Ayub Khan,

ruled the country form 1958 to 1969. Siraiki speaking Yousaf Raza Gillani and Farooq

Ahmad Khan Leghari have enjoyed the offices of prime minister and president

respectively. In 2009, when this study is concluding, Asif Ali Zardari, a Sindhi, has all

the presidential powers that Musharraf enjoyed during his rule. The figures 3-3 and 3-4

display that Punjabis have not overrepresentation; their share in key political positions

vis-à-vis their share in population is not shocking.

Figure 3-3: Distribution of Political Positions across ethno-linguistic Groups

(Ethnic Origins of Prime Ministers of Post-1971 Pakistan)
S. Name Duration Period Group Elected or
No Y- M- D Caretaker

1 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto August 14, 1973 to July 5, 1977 03-10-22 Sindhi Elected
2 Muhammad Khan Junejo March 24, 1985 to May 29, 1988 03-02-05 Sindhi Elected
3 Benazir Bhutto December 2,1988 to August 6, 1990 01-08-04 Sindhi Elected
4 Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi August 6, 1990 to November 6, 1990 00-03-00 Sindhi Caretaker
5 Nawaz Sharif November 6, 1990 to April 18, 1993 02-05-12 Punjabi Elected
6 Balakh Sher Mazari April 18, 1993 to May 26, 1993 00-01-22 Siraiki Caretaker
7 Nawaz Sharif May 26, 1993 to July 18, 1993 00-01-08 Punjabi Elected
8 Moeenuddin Ahmad July 18, 1993 to October 19, 1993 00-03-01 Punjabi Caretaker
9 Benazir Bhutto October19, 1993 to November 5, 1996 03-00-16 Sindhi Elected
10 Miraj Khalid November 5, 1996 to February 17, 1997 00-03-12 Punjabi Caretaker
11 Nawaz Sharif February 17, 1997 to October 12, 1999 02-07-25 Punjabi Elected
12 Zafarullah Khan Jamali November 21, 2002 to June 26, 2004 01-07-05 Baloch Elected
13 Shujaat Hussain June 30, 2004 to August 28, 2004 00-01-28 Punjabi Elected
14 Shaukat Aziz August 28, 2004 to November 15, 2007 03-02-17 Punjabi Elected
15 M. Mian Somoro November 15, 2007 to march 25, 2008 00-04-10 Sindhi Caretaker
16 Yousaf Raza Gillani March 25, 2008 to present* 01-09-06 Siraiki Elected

*Period has been calculated up to December 31, 2009.

 Note: Y = Years, M = Months, D = Days

61
Figure 3-4: Distribution of Political Positions across ethno-linguistic Groups
(Ethnic Origins of Presidents of Post-1971 Pakistan)
S. Name Duration Period Group Elected or
No Y- M- D Caretaker

1 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto December 20,1971-- August 13, 1973 01-08-23 Sindhi Non- elected
2 Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry August 13, 1973 – September 16, 1978 05-01-03 Punjabi Elected
3 Zia-ul-Haq September 16, 1978 – August 17, 1988 09-11-01 Punjabi Non- elected
4 Ghulam Ishaq Khan August 17, 1988 – July 18, 1993 04-11-01 Pashtun Elected
5 Farooq Ahmad Khan November 14, 1993 – December 2, 1997 04-00-18 Siraiki Elected
6 Muhammad Rafiq 01January, 1998 to June 20, 2001 03-05-19 Punjabi Elected
7 Pervez Musharraf June 20, 2001 to August 18, 2008 07-01-28 Mohajir Non- elected
8 Asif Ali Zardari September 9, 2008 to present* 01-03-22 Sindhi Elected

* Period has been calculated up to December, 31, 2009.

Note: (1). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, first took charge as civilian chief martial law administrator and the as
president under the interim constitution of 1972. (2). During the Zia-ul-Haq, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and
Farooq Leghari periods, the institution of presidency had vital powers. They had the powers under article
58(2) B, to dismiss the government, and they exercised this power. Conversely, Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry and
Muhammad Rafiq Tarar were ceremonial head of states. Pervez Musharraf took over the charge of chief
executive and then became president through referendum. He was also a powerful president and during
his rule the prime ministers ha nominal role in politics.

A summary of the distribution of political positions in various groups has been given in
the following table.

Figure 3-5: Distribution of Political Positions in Various Groups: A Summary

Serial Number Ethnic group President ship Prim minister ship
Y- M-D Y- M- D
1 Sindhi 03-00-15 11-04-27
2 Punjabi 18-05-23 08-10-12
3 Mohajir 07-01-28 Nil
4 Pashtun 04-11-01 Nil
5 Siraiki 04-00-18 01-10-28
6 Baloch Nil 01-07-05
Note: Y = Years, M = Months, D = Days

3.5.1.2 Civil Bureaucracy

Civil bureaucracy has a vital role in the politics of Pakistan. Weak political

organizations and turbulent situation of early years provided civil-bureaucracy a greater

role in the state-building process of Pakistan. Jinnah, the founding father and the first

governor general of the Pakistan, heavily relied on the bureaucracy. Equally, Liaquat Ali

62
Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan (1947-51), did not demonstrate any distaste

towards increasing influence of bureaucracy in the state affairs.7

Consequently, these early years designed a role of the bureaucracy for the subsequent

years. Although, in the coming years, the fairly increased role of military in the

Pakistani politics challenged this pattern, the bureaucracy had shown its potential to deal

with the changing circumstances. Nevertheless, the role of civil bureaucracy in the

Pakistani politics remained intact.

Before the separation of eastern wing in 1971, East-West dimension engaged the studies

of distribution and inequality in Pakistan. Despite their numerical strength, Bengalis had

meager representation in civil-military bureaucracy. In 1956, „only 51 out of total 741

top level policy-making positions were occupied by the Bengalis in the central

secretariat; and more or less „98 percent of the officer corps of the army, navy, and air

force was composed of West Pakistanis‟ (Islam ,1981). British recruitment policies and

the relative development of certain regions of British India were equally responsible for

this disproportion: out of “133 Muslims from the top layer of the bureaucracy who opted

for Pakistan, only one was Bengali and the rest were mainly the Mohajirs and the

Punjabis” (Samad, 1995, p.128).

Mohajirs and Punjabis retained their dominance in the early decades. Nevertheless, in

post-1971 Pakistan, the Punjab has emerged as the single leading group with

overrepresentation in civil-military bureaucracy. Perhaps, the Mohajirs are still slightly

overrepresented but since 1980s it seems that they are „no more in commanding position

in the higher echelons of the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan‟ (Rahman, 1995). Conversely,

“the Punjabi salariat tenaciously [has] asserted its dominance in the federation,

63
demanding that the interests of the majority should be a primary consideration for state

policy” (Samad, 2007, p.105).

Although, the quota system has made the Pakistani bureaucracy relatively more

representative, „the following table suggests that the urban Sindh and the Punjab has

continued to be over-represented in the federal bureaucracy.

Figure 3-6: Regional Representation of Federal Bureaucracy (1973-83)

Region Quota All Gazetted All Gazetted (1983)

(1973) (1973) (1983)
Punjab 50.00 49.20 53.5 54.9 55.80
Urban Sindh 7.60 30.10 33.50 17.4 20.20
Rural Sindh 11.40 3.01 2.70 5.4 5.10
NWFP 11.50 10.50 7.00 13.4 11.60
Balochistan 3.50 2.50 1.50 3.4 3.10
Northern areas 4.00 2.60 1.30 3.6 3.40
Azad Kashmir 2.00 1.80 0.50 1.9 0.90
Total 100 84,749 6,011 134,310 11, 816
Source: ( Kennedy, 1987)
Note: Quota roughly represents the %share of population8

General Zia‟s era (1977-88) not only „solidified Punjabi dominance‟ but also witnessed

a gradual emergence of Pashtuns as „the junior partners of the Punjabis in the civil-

military bureaucracy‟ (Ahmed, 1988). Nevertheless, the Balochs and the Sindhis

remained marginalized from the machinery of the state.

Apparently, the above-mentioned table shows that the Balochistan has obtained a

reasonable representation of 3.40% and 3.10% in the category of „all‟ and „gazetted‟

federal jobs against its quota of 3.50% in federal jobs. But it is worth mentioning that it

is the representation of Balochistan rather than the Balochs. To substantiate, of the civil

employees in Balochistan in 1972, only 5 per cent were Baloch. And they, usually,

occupied the lower positions in the state bureaucracy‟ (Ali, 1983, p. 117). The Sindhis –

64
based in rural Sindh – are improving their strength in the civil bureaucracy but at a

snail‟s pace.

To be brief, throughout Pakistan‟s history, the army and bureaucracy has played vital

role in the politics of Pakistan.

3.5.1.3 Distribution of Diplomatic Positions

The posts of senior diplomats are considered as privileges. The smaller ethno-linguistic

groups argue that they are not provided their due share in these key posts. A study

reveals that out of the total 72 ambassadors posted in 8 countries 9 during the period of

1971-97, 45 were Punjabis, 11were Mohajirs, 14 were Pashtuns, and 2 were Sindhis.

Siraikis and Balochs have no representation in these diplomatic positions in the

„selected‟ countries (Mushtaq & Alqama, 2009). The following graph demonstrates that

while three relatively dominant communities – Punjabis, Mohajirs, and Pashtuns – have

overrepresentation, the relatively marginalized communities – Sindhis, Balochs, and

Siraikis – have least representation in diplomatic positions in the selected countries.

Nevertheless, the study seems to approve the dominance of the Punjab in the diplomatic

positions, and this „dominance‟ of the Punjab strengthens the perception of the

„Punjabisation’ of Pakistan‟.

65
 Figure 3-7: Distribution of Diplomatic Positions

Ethnic Origins of Senior Diplomats posted abroad (1971-1997)

70

60

50

40

% Share in Positions
%Share in Population
30

20

10

0
Punjabi Siraiki Mohajir Sindhi Pashtun Baloch
Ethnic/Linguistic Groups

Source: (Mushtaq, 2009)

3.5.2. Militarization

Military is the most powerful, influential and prominent intuition in Pakistan. Therefore,

„the significance of Punjab‟s multiple relationships with the army is crucial to the

understanding of the Punjabisation process‟ (Samad, 2007, p. 113).

During the British rule, the recruitment policy for armed forces was rationalized by the

so-called theory of „martial races‟. South Indians and Bengalis were considered

unsuitable for the job, and it was „the politically backward rural hinterlands of the

Punjab and the NWFP which were to be the catchments area for the new-style army‟

(Ali, 1983, p. 63). This policy resulted in the overrepresentation of the Punjabis in

military and „by the beginning of World War II the largest single class in the Indian

army was Punjabi Muslims‟ (Cohen, 1987, p.316).

This recruitment pattern continued after independence and the Pakistani armed

personnel “continued to be largely recruited from those sections of the Punjab peasantry

that had traditionally provided artillery fodder for the British” (Ali, 1983, p.65).

66
Nonetheless, the Pashtuns of NWFP gained reasonable share and emerged as the second

largest group in the armed forces of Pakistan. A study reveals that almost „seventy–five

percent of all ex-servicemen come from only three districts of the Punjab (Rawalpindi,

Jehlum, and Attack (Cambellpur), and two adjacent districts of the NWFP (Kohat and

Mardan)‟ (Cohen, 1987, p. 318). This concentration of military personnel in a few

districts of the Punjab and the NWFP, substantiate the argument that „the military is

ethnically unrepresentative in Pakistan‟; and even some sections – the Siraikis of

southern Punjab and the Non-Pashtun communities of NWFP – within Punjab and

NWFP have least representation.

Although, there is no data available about the ethnic composition of the Pakistan army,

it is most likely that „the Balochs and especially the Sindhis have under-representation‟

in the military services (Cohen, 1987, p. 318). Consequently, the military rule in

Pakistan is equated with the Punjabisation of Pakistan by the smaller units and the

marginalized groups.

Pakistan repeatedly experienced direct military rules; and military periods10 are

imperative because of their significant impact on the relationship between the state and

the army11. Ayub‟s period is important because it provided to the military „political and

financial autonomy which gives it the confidence to retain its hold over the state‟

(Siddiqa, 2007, p. 72). Zia-ul-Haq remained more „dependent on the military‟ than Ayub

Khan and granted more benefits to the armed forces. During his rule, due to the

consistent and extensive distribution of rewards, the higher echelons of the military

„emerged as the most privileged caste in Pakistan‟. He raised the budgetary allocation

for the defense services, provided prized jobs to the retired armed personnel,

strengthened the Fauji Foundation12, extended assignments to serving and retired

67
military officers in Gulf States, and provided precious land for houses in cantonments

and urban centers to the military officers 13.

Musharraf‟s regime is also „known for providing greater opportunities to the military

through inducting serving and retired members of the armed forces into significant

public-sector positions‟ (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 110). He assigned the positions to military

personnel in „the Prime Minister‟s Secretariat, Civil Service Training Institutions, the

Ministry of Interior, the Establishment Division, Federal Public Service Commission,

the National Accountability Bureau, and Ministry of Information Technology‟.

Furthermore, „official state organizations such as the Pakistan Olympic Association,

Athletic Association of Pakistan, Pakistan Cricket Board, Pakistan Hockey Federation

and some universities have also had senior military officers running them‟(Samad ,

2007).

In addition, Musharraf has also provided military a „permanent role in decision making

and governance‟. The National Security Council Act14, passed in April 2004, has

enabled the military to find a permanent role in issues ranging from „national security

and sovereignty to the crises management‟. The act also ensures „the continued

protection of the defense forces interests and participation in molding the socioeconomic

and political future of the state‟ (Siddiqa, 2007, p.107).

Since military is a vital institution and it provides a welfare system for its serving and

retired personnel, the overrepresentation of the Punjab in this organization frustrates the

smaller units.

68
 Figure 3-8: Administrative Division of Military Pensioners

Administrative Division of Militrary pensioners

1.4

1.2
1

0.8
Ratio

Officer Cadre
0.6 JCOs & Other ranks

0.4
0.2

0
Punjab
Source: SindhSiddiqa, 2007:
Ayesha NWFP 216(9) Balochistan

According to Ayesha Siddiqa (2007, 216), „Approximately 72% of the military

welfare budget is invested in the Punjab, 13.21% in the NWFP, 2.64% in Sindh, 1.8% in

Balochistan, 8.92% in Azad Kashmir and 2.87%t in the Northern Areas‟. This uneven

distribution promotes a sense a marginalization and strengthens the perception of the

Punjabisation of Pakistan among smaller units and the deprived communities.

3.5.3 Uneven Development and Regional Disparities

The disparity across regions and communities in Pakistan is evident in the variation of

human development index of various provinces, the difference in the real GDP per

capita of different communities, dissimilarity in the unemployment and literacy rates,

disparity in health facilities, and variation in exposure of media to housing units of

certain regions.

The data shows the inequality in distribution of some aspects related to social life such

as the availability of better sources of drinking water, availability of electricity to

housing units, by the type of available residence, and exposure of media to housing

units. Whilst nearly 80% of the housing units of Pakistan have access to the relatively

69
healthier sources of drinking water – pipe and hand-pump – the remaining 20% uses

relatively primitive – well and other means – sources to meet their requirement of

drinking water. The figure illustrates the dissimilarity in available sources of drinking

water across regions. While more than 90% of the housing units in the Punjab have

access to relatively healthier sources of water, nearly one-half of the housing units of

NWFP and two-third of the Balochistan meet their requirement of drinking water

through relatively less healthy sources of drinking water. Overall, Sindh seems in a

better position. However, it is the urban Sindh, particularly Karachi, the provincial

capital of Sindh and the biggest city of the Pakistan which makes possible for Sindh to

be placed in a relatively better position. In terms of rural-urban, one-third housing units

of the rural Sindh are deprived of better sources of drinking water (Mushtaq & Alqama,

2009).

The variation in availability of electricity to housing units in various regions is another

indicator that illustrates the uneven distribution in Pakistan. The most terrible situation is

in the Balochistan where more than half housing units have no access to electricity.

Rural Sindh is equally backward with only 52.6% of the housing units‟ access to the

electricity (Mushtaq & Alqama, 2009).

The type of material used for the residence – pucca (house built with cement and

bricks), semi pucca (house built with bricks and mud), and kucha (house built with mud)

– suggests the status of the owner. More than 70% of the housing units of Balochistan

are Kucha. These numbers substantiate the underdevelopment of the Balochistan. On the

other hand, the Punjab is relatively in better position than the Sindh and the NWFP.

Exposure of media to housing units in a certain region is important for the judgment of

development level. „Its coverage determines the number of people exposed to new and

70
innovative ideas come through both print and electronic media. Balochistan is lagging

behind with smaller number of „housing units with exposure of media‟ (Mushtaq &

Alqama, 2009).

The disparity in availability of gas facilities is more evident in rural-urban dimension –

rural areas of all provinces have very limited access to the gas facilities. However, it is

most striking that despite providing gas for the whole country; Balochistan is lagging

behind in terms of percentage of housing units with gas facilities (Mushtaq & Alqama,

2009).

Education is the core and the development whether it is economic, social, or political

revolves around it. Evidence suggests the superiority of the Punjab in terms of literacy rate

and enrolment ratio. The provinces of NWFP and Balochistan are lagging far behind in

terms of educational facilities. Sindh is performing well, but it seems due to its relative

urbanization: Karachi, the provincial capital of the Sindh is the biggest and the most

developed city of Pakistan.

Measurement of health facilities, in this study, involves variables such as the number of

hospitals, the number of dispensaries, the number of maternity and child welfare centers,

and the numbers of beds in hospitals and dispensaries in public sector. The ratio of a facility

to the population of a certain province is calculated by dividing the percentage share of the

particular facility in Pakistan by the percentage share of population of concerned province in

Pakistan.

The graph shows that the Balochistan has the greatest value and the Punjab has the least

value in terms of health facilities. But it is imperative to note down the limitation of this

study: Punjab is the host of very well-established private sector hospitals that are out of the

jurisdiction of this study.

71
 Figure 3-9: Uneven Development (I)

Population by source of drinking water Population by source of lighting

Pipe (Nul) Hand Pump Well Other Electricity Kerosene Other

70 100

90
60
80

50
70
Percentage of Housing Units

Percentage of Housing Units

60
40

50
30
40

20 30

20
10

10

0
0
FP
ab

ad
an

n
h

ta
nd
nj

FP
st

ab

ad
W

ab

an

n
h
is

ta
Si

nd
Pu
ki

ch

nj
m

st

ab
is
Pa

Si
Pu
ki
la
lo

ch

m
Pa
Is
Ba

la
lo

Is
Ba
Population by type of Residence Population by Exposure to Media

Pucca ( bricks Semi.Pucca Kucha Television Radio New spaper

100 70

90
60
80

50
70
Percentage of Housing Units

Percentage of Housing Units

60
40

50

30
40

30
20

20
10
10

0 0
FP

FP
ab

ad

ad
ab
an

an
n

n
h

h
ta

ta
nd

nd
nj

nj
st

st
W

ab

ab
is

is
Si

Si
Pu

Pu
ki

ki
N

N
ch

ch
m

m
Pa

Pa
la

la
lo

lo
Is

Is
Ba

Ba

72
Moreover, Balochistan is the largest province in terms of area and the least populace, the
relative dispersion of population is equally responsible for the greater numbers of
hospitals and dispensaries in the Balochistan. Nonetheless, the Punjab and urban centers
of Sindh have relative better health facilities.

Unemployment is a common problem in developing world. Like many other developing

countries, the unemployment rate in Pakistan is unevenly distributed across regions and
communities. Nearly one-thirds of the Balochistan‟s labor force is suffering
unemployment. The unemployment rate is also relatively higher in NWFP. Sindh has
relatively performed well with the unemployment rate of only 14.43 %15. However,
another study explores that Sindh has the larger percentage of population below poverty
line than Punjab and NWFP (Jamal, 2005). Nevertheless, the two studies seem to
suggest that the Punjab has relatively better position with low unemployment rate
(19.1%) and lesser percentage of population (26%) below poverty line.

Ghaus (1996) has classified the 94 districts of Pakistan (1990-91) according to the level
of development using some twenty-seven variables16. Seven out of ten top districts with
respect to development level are located in the Punjab; the remaining three are the
provincial capitals of the smaller provinces. The „second quartile of the population with
regard to development level resides in twenty districts‟; and the Punjab dominates by
sharing „eleven out of these twenty districts‟. This seems to suggest that „Punjab is
ahead of the other provinces in terms of social development‟ (Ghaus, 1996).

The majority of NWFP‟s districts are ranked in 2 nd and 3rd quartile, and majority of
Sindh‟s districts in 3rd and 4th quartile. This ranking suggests that „NWFP has an
intermediate level of development‟ and „Sindh has the lower-middle to low level of
social development in the province‟. The majority of Balochistan„s districts (22 out of
25) are placed in the bottom quartile that verifies that Balochistan is „the most backward
province in terms of social development in the country‟ 17 (Ghaus, 1996). Overall, this
section confirms that there is uneven development in Pakistan. This uneven distribution
underpins the political mobilization in deprived regions.

73
 Figure 3-10: Uneven Development (II)

Population by Educational Attainm ent Ratio of Health Facilities (Ratio=% share in total No./%
Share in total Population)

Literacy Ratio% Enrolment Ratio% Hospitals

Dispenseries
Materinity and Child w elfare Centers
80 Beds in Hospitals and Dispenaries

70

60
Percentage of population

2.5
50

40 2

Value of Ratio
30
1.5

20
1

10

0.5

0
FP
ab

ad
an

n
h

ta
nd
nj
st

ab
is
Si
Pu
ki

0
N

ch

m
Pa

la
lo

Is

Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan

Ba

Population by Unem ploym ent Social Development Ranking of Districts

40
Top Q Second Q Third Q Bottom Q

25
35

30
20

25
% of Population

Number of Districts

15
20

15
10

10

5
5

0 0
Pakistan Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan

74
3.5.4 Distributive issues

The smaller units have been resenting against the inequitable distribution in Pakistan.

They have certain reservations against the formula of distribution of funds between

center and provinces and among provinces. They also have reservation against the

establishment of certain dams and the distribution of water. These reservations have

been discussed in the following sections.

3.5.4.1 Allocation of Funds: NFC Award

In Pakistan, the smaller units have been arguing that the formula of NFC Award benefits

the Punjab. NFC Award has remained a bone of contention among provinces and it was

only three times since 1973 that National Finance Commission announced its

recommendations (NFC Award has been discussed in detail in the fourth chapter).

Figure 3-11: Allocation Shares to Provinces under Various NFC Awards

Province NFC 1974 NFC 1990 NFC 1997
Punjab 60.25 (60.10) 57.87 (57.87) 57.88 (57.88)
Sindh 22.50 (22.62) 23.29 (23.29) 23.28 (23.28)
NWFP 13.39 (13.40) 13.54 (13.54) 13.54 (13.54)
Balochistan 3.86 (3.88) 5.30 (5.30) 5.3 (5.3)
Total 100 100 100

Source: (Jaffery & Sadaqat, 2006)18. Note: Figures in brackets are population shares according to the last
Census conducted prior to the Award

3.5.4.2 Water Resources

The disagreement over distribution of water is another bone of contention between the

constituent units of Pakistan. The difference of opinion lies over the construction of

Kalabagh Dam, Greater Thal Canal and the distribution of Indus water between upper

riparian and lower riparian.

75
Earlier, the dispute over water distribution was settled down between India and Pakistan

through the Indus Basin Water Treaty in 1960. This treaty gave exclusive right to use

the water of three eastern rivers (the Beas, the Sutlej, and the Ravi) to India and three

western rivers (the Chenab, the Jehlum, and the Indus) to Pakistan. However, the

distribution of water within Pakistan remained problematic. Various committees and

commission were constituted but „ad hoc sharing arrangements was followed up to

1990‟ due to lack of consensus19 . Finally, during Nawaz Sharif‟s premiership, in 1991, a

„unanimous Water Apportionment Accord (Rajput, 2005, p. 13) was signed by the four

provinces‟ and ratified by the Council of Common Interests (CCI)20.

Another water issue among the provinces is the Greater Thal Canal. The Indus River

System Authority Accord (Irsa) had provided the certification to the Greater Thal Canal

project with a 3-2 majority. This canal would irrigate some „1530000 acres in four

southern districts of Punjab, including Bhakar, Jhang, Layyah and Khushab, and would

have a total capacity of carrying 8,500 cusecs‟21.The Sindh has objected to the plan and

Sindh Assembly has „passed a resolution to stop the on-going construction of the Thal

Canal‟. 22

3.5.4.2.1 Apprehensions of smaller units against the construction of Kalabagh Dam

The most prominent water issue in Pakistan is the construction of Kalabagh dam.

Excluding Punjab, all the smaller units have certain reservations over the construction of

Kalabagh dam. The Pashtuns of NWFP believes that the „dam would benefit only

Punjab‟ and it „would submerge Peshawar, Nowshera, Mardan, Swabi and Charsadda

districts and thus ruin the economy of the entire province‟.23 The Pashtuns believes that

the construction of Kalabagh Dam will result into , (a) a displacement of considerable

number of its people ; (b) a submergence of its huge area of land under the reservoir or

76
rendered waterlogged; (c) a permanent threat of flooding to the Nowshera City, ( the

town will stand 24 feet below on the height of Kalabagh dam storage); (d) a certain

threat of failure to the Mardan and Swabi SCARP projects; (e) a more salinity and

infertility in Mardan and Charsadda areas; (f) and a threat of salinity and water logging

in the areas of Pabbi and Swabi24.

Equally, the Sindhis resent construction of Kalabagh dam and assert that „there is not

enough water in the Indus River System to justify a big dam‟. They are also suspicious

about the fair treatment of regulatory system in the post- Kalabagh dam scenario. They

argue that federation and the Punjab – the upper riparian – should respect the established

norms and should not interfere with the flow of river without the consent of the Sindh –

the lower riparian25. Sindhis also argue that due to the reduction in water flow, the

cultivation in Sindh will be affected, fish and shrimps production will be reduced, and

the live stock in Indus delta will be destroyed. Furthermore, drinking water supply to

area below Kotri will be reduced, forests in riverain area will be destroyed, and sea

intrusion will increase further (Rajput, 2005).

Though Balochistan is not a riparian in the strictest sense, it receives a considerable

amount of irrigation water through the Pat Feeder canal at Guddu Barrage. Balochistan

visualizes that in the post Kalabagh dam scenario, „its requests for more water from

River Indus will meet little successes‟ and even could result in a „further reduction in its

share of irrigation water usage‟.26

Conversely, there is a strong argument in favor of dam. The Punjab has been

continuously demanding for the construction of dam. Additionally, various technical and

parliamentary committees recommended its feasibility and viability. It is also argued

that the reservations of smaller units are mere exaggeration. The Water Accord of 1991,

77
evidently, acknowledges the need for storages, where ever possible on the Indus and

other rivers. While this accord favored Sindh, and the province of Sindh received a

larger share of water for cultivation, it seems that Punjab sacrificed to get favor for

Kalabagh dam in return.

3.5.4.2.2 Responses to Kalabagh Dam campaign

It is interesting to note that all civilian and military leaders who came into power in

Islamabad were „fully convinced of the usefulness of the project for the national

economy, and remained interested to ahead with the project but couldn‟t do so mainly

because of the severe opposition from the smaller provinces‟ (Ahmad, 2004, p.149).

The „debate‟ concerning Kalabagh dam remained the central point in the early 1988; „as

many as seven alternatives sets of modifications to the design of the dam‟ were

suggested to meet the raised objections of the smaller provinces. Since, the chief

ministers of Sindh and NWFP complained that they were not consulted and declared that

they will prefer to step-down rather than accept the plan. Balochistan agreed with the

argument of Sindh and NWFP against the construction of Kalabagh dam. The issue

came across the masses and the people with different backgrounds participated in the

anti Kalabagh dam conventions in Hyderabad (Sindh) and, Peshawar (NWFP). On the

contrary, the federal government and the Punjabi leadership continued their supportive

argument and considered the project as „vital for future energy needs of the country‟

(Ahmad, 2004, pp.151-56). During the 1st term of Benazir Bhutto as prime minister

(1988-90), a committee of foreign and national experts considered the project feasible

and recommended an early construction. While Benazir government was busy in

focusing the project, the provincial assembly of Sindh passed a resolution against the

construction of the dam. 27

78
Figure 3-12: Map of Kalabagh Dam

79
Meanwhile, as the Punjab assembly28 unanimously insisted for construction of the dam,

the provincial assemblies of the Sindh, the NWFP, and the Balochistan passed

resolutions against the construction of Kalabagh dam. 29

Shortly, after the Water Apportionment Accord (1991), another series of arguments in

favor of dam started in the Punjab, but the smaller provinces were not ready for any

compromise. PPP, the major opposition party, withdrew its earlier stand over the

construction of Kalabagh Dam30 and this move made more difficult for the government

to move ahead. In the following years, Benazir Bhutto (1993-96), Nawaz Sharif (1997-

1999, and Pervez Musharraf (1999-2007) remained unable to develop a consensus

among provinces over the construction of Kalabagh dam.

Recently, Musharraf‟s declaration about the construction of Kalabagh Dam received an

angry response by the smaller units again. The „nationalists‟ reiterated that „the

construction of Kalabagh Dam and Greater Thal Canal posed a threat to the integrity of

the federation‟.31

Mr. Asfandyar, head of the Awami National Party (ANP) warned that „the project could

spell doom for the country‟. He argued for the removal of „controversial projects‟ and

assumed that „the announcement to build the controversial dam would amount to waging

war against the three federating units‟.32 Equally, Arbab Ghulam Rahim, the Sindh Chief

Minister disapproved the Kalabagh dam and announced that he will never do anything

against the interests of Sindh‟ (Ghori , 2005). Altaf Hussain, the chief of Muttahida

Qaumi Movement, also discarded the project.33 Even so, the protest rallies were held

against the proposed construction of the Kalabagh dam in the districts of Hyderabad,

Sukkar, Nausharo Feroz, Khairpur, and Mirpur Khan. 34 It appears that there is a

80
consensus among Sindhis over the issue of Kalabagh dam35. Pir Pagara, the chief of

Pakistan Muslim League (Functional), was the only exception. He assured his support

for the dam. 36 Despite all this demonstration against the Kalabagh dam, President

General Pervez Musharraf reaffirmed that „Kalabagh dam would be constructed at all

costs because of the acute shortage of water in the country‟. 37

Musharraf government was replaced by PPP government. Contrary to earlier campaigns,

the current government has announced to abandon the construction of the Kalabagh

dam.

3.6 Some Substantial Protests and Autonomy Demands of Political Parties

The previous section has analyzed various grievances of smaller communities that

underpin a sense of marginalization and deprivation in these groups. The resentment

caused by this sense of marginalization and deprivation turned into political violence

and protests when the central authorities intervened in provincial or regional affairs at

various junctures of Pakistan‟s history. This section has summarized some substational

protests of these communities. Bengalis waged a successful secessionist war and were

separated in 1971. After that, Balochs have protested more frequently and markedly than

the other groups in post-1971 Pakistan. Sindhis have protested intermittently but less

violently. Pashtuns seem satisfied since Zia era (1977-88). However, Mohajirs are

mobilizing along ethnic lines since mid-1980s for the benefits of their community. The

ethno-nationalist movements are discussed in the fourth chapter in detail. The purpose of

providing this summary of some substational protests is to assist the reader to determine

the significance of the problem of ethnic diversity in Pakistan.

81
 Figure 3-13: Some Instances of Substantial protest (1947-2006)

Time Group Location Description

1947-48 Baloch Kalat and surroundings First Baloch insurgency of Abdul Karim Khan
against annexation of Kalat state into Pakistan
1947-48 Bengali Educational institutions Language riots : Bengalis asserted for Bengali as
of Bengal a lingua franca
1947-48 Sindhi Rural Sindh Protest against separation of Karachi from Sindh,
son of the soil movement against Mohajirs.
1947-48 Pashtun NWFP Reaction to dismissal of Dr. Khan‟s nationalist
government
1958-63 Baloch Baloch countryside Resistance against one-unit scheme, distant
identity
1950s Pashtun NWFP Resistance against one-unit scheme
1950s Sindhi Rural Sindh Resentment against one-unit scheme and
upcountry migration in Sindh
1950-70 Bengali Bengal Agitation against unfair distribution of resources,
representation, and opportunities.
1972-73 Mohajir Urban Sindh (Karachi Language controversy, resistance against Sindhi
and Hyderabad) language bill
1973-74 Pashtun NWFP Resignation of elected government as a protest
against central governments interference in
provincial matters of Balochistan and NWFP
1973-77 Baloch Baloch tribal areas of Baloch insurgency against central government on
Marri-Mengal the dismissal of nationalist regime
1980s Sindhi interior of Sindh Movement for restoration of Democracy During
Zia period in which at least 300 Sindhis were
killed
1980s, Mohajir Hyderabad, Karachi Ethnic clashes between Mohajirs and other
90s (urban Sindh) communities in urban Sindh
2002-? Baloch Baloch countryside Baloch resistance movement: a response to
marginalization, demands for distributive justice

Various political parties of Pakistan have recognized the problem of ethnic diversity. In

their electoral manifestoes, these parties have undertaken to address the grievances and

demands of marginalized communities and minority provinces. The political parties

have agreed to enhance the role of Senate, the upper chamber of legislature, to provide

more space to smaller units at federal center. Equally, they have agreed to abolish the

concurrent list to devolve more powers and to ensure self-rule at provincial level.

Almost, all parties have agreed to revise the formula for distribution of funds between

federation and provinces and among provinces to make it more acceptable for smaller

units. However, the ethno-regional parties of minority provinces are more vocal in their

demands than the mainstream parties. The autonomy demands of regional parties

82
suggest substational changes in the federal structure of Pakistan. Therefore, there is a

difference of opinion among the people of various regions about the constitutional

proposals and federal design of Pakistan. People of various provinces have different

opinion concerning the construction of Kalabagh dam, NFW Award, provincial

autonomy, and royalty issues.

Figure 3-14: Political Parties’ Stand over Provincial Autonomy

Political Party Stand
Party
PML To raise the degree of self-rule, PML suggested certain measures: Maximum provincial
autonomy within the framework of the 1973 constitution: functional autonomy to the
provinces i.e. the right to regulate and control the provincial natural resources, and to
decentralize the administrative and financial powers to provincial and lower levels. It also
recommended minimizing the central interference in the provincial matters. PML also
suggested measures to ensure shared-rule – an essence of the federal polity. It recommended
the Strengthening of the federal chamber (the Senate), abolition of concurrent list, and a
consensus based formula (NFC Award) for horizontal and vertical allocation of funds.
PPP The PPP has outlined more or less same provisions, as the PML, in its manifesto concerning
the Provincial autonomy and intergovernmental relations. It has also stressed on the
abolishment of the Concurrent list, multiple criteria for distribution through NFC award,
strengthening the Senate and a just Share for Provinces in their natural resources. It also
recommended an establishment of a federal Constitutional Court with equal representation
of federating units to resolve constitutional issues.
MMA MMA‟s program mainly focuses on the Islamization of society through Islamization of laws
and enforcement of Shari'ah. Having the support base in minority provinces, it has also
concerns regarding NFC Award, Gas royalty issue for Balochistan etc.
MQM MQM has introduced a bill in National Assembly of Pakistan that suggests more autonomy
for the provinces. It meant to confine the federation to three subjects namely defense,
foreign affairs, and currency. It also demands financial autonomy: Assignment of General
Sales Tax and Excise Tax to the provinces. Like other regional parties, it suggests a multiple
formula for allocation of funds in NFC Award. For promotion of harmony between
federation and provinces, MQM has suggested for the creation of an inter-provincial
council.
ANP ANP stands for the right to preserve and promote culture and language for all identities and
the right for the federating units to reorganize on the basis of cultural, linguistic and
geographical similarities. It is asserting for renaming the NWFP as Pukhtunkhwa. It
demands maximum autonomy and suggests that Federation should retain only the control of

83
Political Party Stand
Party
defense, foreign affairs, and currency. It intends to strengthen the senate, the federal
chamber, with the power to initiate the money bills and to approve the higher appointments.
PKMAP PKMAP insists for the recognition of Pashtuns as a separate nationality and that the
Pashtuns should form a separate province or be merged with Pashtun majority in NWFP.
Within the framework of 1973 constitution, and being a regional party of Balochistan it
demands that the decision making power regarding the Mega Project in Balochistan should
rest within province. It also demands that all income from the Mega Project in Balochistan
should go to the Provincial Pool. Like Baloch nationalist parties, it advocates the reversal of
the proposed new cantonments in Balochistan.
Baloch The Baloch nationalist parties resent Balochs under representation and interventionist
Nationalist policies of central government. They opposed the establishment of new cantonments in
Parties Balochistan and land allotments to outsiders near Gwadar port. Balochs resist against the
induction/settlement of outsiders on Mega Projects and assert for employment of locals in
all Mega Projects and Gas Fields. They recommend due representation in all the Federal
Government Departments for Balochs.

(1) All India Muslim League was founded in 1906 in Dhaka. It demanded a separate homeland for the
Muslims of India in 1940s. Its demand was fulfilled; and it was renamed as Pakistan Muslim League.
Then it was divided into various factions. Currently, three factions are notable: PML-N, PML-Q, and
PML-F. All factions have similar stands on various issues regarding the center-province relationships.
Therefore, they are treated as a single party: Pakistan Muslim League.
(2) MMA includes: Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F), Jamiat
Ulema-e-Islam Sami ul-Haq faction (JUI-S), Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (JAH),
and Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP)
(3) Manifestos are available at: www.pml.org.pk, www.mqm.org, www.ppp.org.pk,
www.awaminationalparty.org, www.pmln.org.pk

In this given situation, according to Samad (2007, p. 128), “alternative strategies need to

be considered that incorporate all groups and increase cohesion and affinity with the

centre”. He asserts that there is a “pressing need for the refinement and enrichment of

the concept and practice of federalism and a move away from the present system”. This

requires that academicians should examine the relevancy of various power-sharing

arrangements (including different variants of federalism and, even, beyond the

federalism) with the multiethnic society of Pakistan. This project is a humble effort in

this regard. Consociationalism has remained an influential theory of comparative politics

84
in the recent decades. It has been suggested and practiced in various parts of the world

including Northern Ireland, South Africa, Bosnia Herzegovina, Burundi, Malaysia,

South Tyrol, Lebanon, Nigeria, Columbia, Cyprus, Fiji, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Iraq

and Kenya etc. Keeping in view the popularity and utility of consociationalism in such

diverse societies, the author has attempted to examine whether consociationalism is a

viable solution or otherwise in the case of Pakistan.

85
Endnotes

1
For this point of view see: Seal, A. & Jalal, A. (1981). Alternative to Partition: Muslim Politics between
the Wars. Modern Asian Studies. 15(3), 415-54.
2
For this point of view see: Malik, H. (1963). Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan. Washington:
Public Affairs Press. ; Qureshi, I.H. (1965). The Struggle for Pakistan. Karachi : University of Karachi
Publications.; and Riaz-ul-Islam. (1976). the Religious Factor in the Pakistan Movement: A Study in
Motivation. Proceedings of the First Congress on the History and Culture of Pakistan, vol. 3
Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research.

3
See for this point of view: Robinson, F. (1974). Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the
United Provinces Muslims 1860-1923. London: Cambridge.

4
While analyzing why one unit scheme was introduced in West Pakistan, Fayaz Ahmad Hussain (1989, p.
99-100) comes to the following conclusions. “Firstly, that East Bengal was not prepared to accept the
principle of equal representation for all the units in the Upper House which should have actual powers
and effective control of the federal government. In 1953 as has been explained earlier, East Bengal
accepted the parity of representation between the rest of the federating units and itself, and made sure
that its total representation in the Lower and the Upper House must be equal to that of the
representation of the rest of the units in the two houses. In such a case, they denied the federal
principle and insisted on treating the units of the western zone as one block. The other alternative the
Bengalis offered was that the different units of the western zone should form a sub-zonal federation
and should come as a single entity at the federal level. This sub-zonal federation was by no means in
the interest of the Punjab as it had 63% of the population as against 37% of the rest of the three units in
the western zone and would have to share the seats on sub-zonal federation level equally with the other
units. Moreover, what would have been the share of seats for this sub-zonal federation at the zonal
federation level would have been divided equally among the different units of the West Pakistan sub-
zonal federation? So the Punjab would have suffered at both levels of such a federation. It appears that
there was some compromise between the Punjab and East Bengal and the latter agreed that the
provinces of the western zone should be done away with as it was none else but Suhrawardy himself
who introduced the One Unit Bill in the federal legislature and it was not possible that having a
majority in the Constituent Assembly any bill could get through without the blessing and support of
the Bengali Parliamentary group. The logical conclusion from the acceptance of equal representation
by East Pakistan and unified West Pakistan was the adoption of a unicameral legislature, a system in
which the smaller units of the western zone had lost their existence as well as their voice in the new
structure as West Pakistan had become one administrative district”.
5
Fayaz Ahmad Hussain has elaborated the 1962 constitution of Pakistan. He wrote that “Ayub governed
under Martial law for four years and in 1962 he gave his own constitution which introduced a quasi-
constitutional. Under the 1962 constitution, there was an indirect system of election. All the powers
were vested in the President. He was to be elected by an electoral college which was elected by the
people. The President and his ministers were not responsible to the legislature. The President could

86
 dissolve the legislature, could veto any bill passed by it and if the assembly would not approve the
annual budget presented by the government, the President had the power to validate the last year's
budget without the approval of the legislature. The legislature could not remove the President except
on the serious charges of treason or physical and mental incapacity. In the Provinces, the Governors
were appointed by the President without the approval of any elected body. The Governor worked as an
agent of the President and served during his pleasure. In spite of the fact that he was just a personal
servant of the President, he had the same powers in the province as the President had at the centre,
nevertheless, he had to exercise those powers with his approval and under his instructions. There is
hardly any need to go into the details that under the 1962 constitution whatever subjects belonged to
the provinces and the centre, the composition of the provincial government was such that whatsoever
its jurisdiction, if was subservient to the President. The provincial governors and their ministers were
responsible to the President and not to the provincial assemblies. Thus, it would be difficult to describe
Ayub's system as, even, quasi-federal” (Hussain, 1989, pp.105-106).
6
Officially, the government of Pakistan identified six linguistic groups in the 1998 census. These include
Punjabi, Siraiki, Sindhi, Pashto, Balochi, and Urdu .The remaining languages/dialects were
categorized as „other‟. The common source to locate ethnic groups in Pakistan is to use data about
language in census reports. The recent census report asked about the language usually spoken in
household rather than the mother tongue. Although, it seems tricky to equate language recorded with
ethnicity but there is no other data available.
7
Liaquat Ali Khan was a Mohajir, and it seems that the extraordinary representation of Mohajirs in the
higher echelons of civil bureaucracy was a source of contentment for him.
8
Islamabad is included in Punjab; urban Sindh is composed of Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkar.
9
The selected countries include USA, UK, USSR/Russia, China, India, Iran, Afghanistan, and Saudi
Arabia.
10
These periods include Ayub Khan 1958-69, Zia-ul-Haq 1977-88, and Musharraf 1999-2007.
11
Ayub‟s regime was „marked by two distinct phases. The first period (1958-62) was dominated by the
army: generals were the senior partners in the dictatorship, ably backed by the civil service. The years
that followed (1962-69), however, saw the bureaucracy reasserting its dominant role in the country‟s
politics‟ (Tariq Ali, 1983,p. 62).
12
This foundation was established in 1954. Currently its declared assets amount to Rs. 9.8 billions
(US$169 millions), with a total of 25 independent projects. Employing about 6000-7000 retired
military personnel, the foundation is run by a governing board that is predominantly controlled by the
army( Siddiqa, 2007, pp.119-20).
13
See for detail: Hasan-Askari Rizvi, H.A. (1984). The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan. Asian
Survey. 24(5).534-555.).
14
NSC is a consultative body comprising of thirteen members including the president, the prime minister,
the chairman of the senate, the speaker of the national assembly, the opposition leader in national
assembly, the chief ministers of four provinces, joint chief of staffs committee, the chiefs of army
staff, the navel staff, and the air force.

87
15
For detail see: Government of Pakistan, National Human Development Report, 2003.
16
Ghaus drew on „the principal components analysis (weighted factor score) and the Z-sum technique to
generate ranking‟. He classified relatively developed districts in which the top quartile of the
population lives. „Districts at the intermediate level are those in which the second and third quartile
lives while the relatively underdeveloped districts account for the bottom 25 percent of the
population‟.
17
This study involves twenty seven development indicators including crop cash value per capita,
industrial value added per capita , number of commercial bank branches, number of live stock units,
percentage of cultivated area irrigated, percentage of cropped area fertilized, percentage of farmers
using tractors, extent of commercialization of agriculture, percentage of the urban labor force in
industry, percentage of industrial employment in intermediate and capital goods industries, percentage
of dwelling units which are pucca, with inside water connections, with electricity, and with gas
connections, literacy rate, enrolment rate at primary , secondary and college level, doctors per 10,000
population, hospitals per 10,000 population, metalled road mileage per 100sq. miles of geographical
area , unmetalled road mileage per 100sq. miles of geographical area, railway mileage per 100sq.
miles of geographical area, passenger load carrying capacity per capita, telephone per 1000 population,
female to male literacy rate, and female to male primary and secondary enrolment rate.
18
See Jaffery, N.B. & Sadaqat, M. (2006). NFC Awards: Commentary and Agenda. Pakistan Economic
and Social Review. 44( 2), 209-234.
19
Rajput, M.I. (2005), Kalabagh Dam and Sindh: A View point. Karachi: Wahid Art Press, Karachi. (For
example: I. Akhtar Hussain Committee, in 1968, ii. Fazale Akbar Committee in October 1970, iii.
Halim Commission, in 1977 etc).
20
Under the article of 153 of the constitution of Pakistan, CCI is constitutional body comprising of the
Chief Ministers of the provinces and an equal number of members from the federal government to be
nominated by the Prime Minister from time to time. Under the article 155 of the construction of
Pakistan, the CCI may receive any complaint by the federation or any province regarding any
executive act or legislation taken or passed or proposed to be taken or passed, or the failure of any
authority to exercise any of its power with respect to the use and distribution or control of water. On
receiving a complaint, The CCI will consider the matter and shall give its decision or request the
president to appoint a commission. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary , but subject to the
provisions of clause(5) of article 154, it shall be the duty of the Federal Government and the Provincial
Government concerned in the matter in issue to give effect to the decision of the council faithfully
according to its terms and tenor.
21
For detail see: Faraz Hashmi, Irsa Okays Thal canal project: Decision taken on split vote, daily Dawn
May 8, 2002.
22
Syed Shahid Hussain, Standoff between Sindh and Punjab: Greater Thal Canal, daily Dawn April 7,
2003.
23
Zakir Hassnain, ANP blasts Kalabagh dam' Daily Times, December 02, 2005.

88
24
Visit for detail: (http://www.geocities.com/athens/forum/4147/Res-NWFP.htm; and also (Ahmad, S.
2004,pp. 96-111)
25
Visit for detail: see (http://www.geocities.com/athens/forum/4147/Rs-Sindh.htm
26
Visit for detail: see (http://www.geocities.com/athens/forum/4147/Balchstn.htm; and Ahmad, S. 2004,
134-137)
27
At that moment, Pakistan People‟s Party (PPP) had majority in the Sindh assembly. Sindh is the home
province of Benazir Bhutto and her party (PPP) mainly derives its support from this province.
28
For detail see: daily Dawn, January 4, 1989.
29
See for example (a) Resolution No.50, put by Akhtar Mengal and passed on 6-10-1994 2 by Balochistan
Assembly, (b) Resolution No 04, put by Begum Nasim Wali Khan and Passed Unanimously in the
Provincial Assembly of NWFP in the meeting held on 20-12.1988, (c) Resolution No 251, put by
Abdul Akbar Khan and Passed Unanimously in the Provincial Assembly of NWFP in the meeting
held on 30-5-1991, (d) Resolution No 26, put by Haji Muhammad Adeel and others and Passed
Unanimously in the Provincial Assembly of NWFP, in the meeting held on 18-11-1993, (e) Resolution
No 409, Put by Dr.Abdul Wahid Somoro, and Passed Unanimously in the Provincial Assembly of
Sindh, in the meeting held on 14-6-1994. The resolutions shared the text and demanded to abandon the
project of Kala Bagh Dam to „remove the misgivings‟ of the people of Pakistan.
30
See the statement of Nusrut Bhutto in National Assembly reported in Pakistan times, 8 June 1991.
31
For detail see: „Kalabagh dam a threat to national unity‟, daily Dawn June 24, 2005.
32
For detail see: ANP warns against Kalabagh dam, daily Dawn, August 8, 2005.
33
For detail see: Altaf reiterates stand on Kalabagh dam, daily Dawn May 4, 2006.
34
For detail see the report (Protest rallies held in districts of Sindh: Kalabagh dam) of daily Dawn ,
December 16 ,2005.
35
author‟s interviews with members of Rabta committee of MQM i.e. Mr. Aamer, Mustafa Aziz Abadi at
International secretariat of MQM, London, interview with Ghous Ali shah ex-chief minister of Sindh,
London, president of PML(N) Sindh ( for his views over the issue see also "The Exit of a Chief
Minister," Dawn Overseas Weekly, Apr.14, 1988. in addition, See also the Official Newsletter of the
World Sindhi Congress, the Sindh Perchar, December 2000, Vol.9, issue 3
36
Habib Khan Ghori , Pagara supports Kalabagh dam, Daily Dawn, December 23, 2005
37
For detail see: Kalabagh dam at all costs: President, a report of Dawn April 23, 2006.

89
 References

1. Ahmad, S. (2004).Water resources of Indus: Case study of Kalabagh Dam

(unpublished PhD’s thesis). Quaid-I- Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan.

2. Ali, T. (1983). Can Pakistan survive? : The death of a state. Harmondsworth:

Penguin Books.

3. Alqama, K. (1997). Bengali Elite Perception of Pakistan, the Road to

Disillusionment: Uneven Development or Ethnicity. Karachi: Royal Book

Company.

4. Chaudhry, G.W. (1956). The Constitution of Pakistan. Pacific Affairs. Vol. 29(3),

243-252.

5. Cohen, S.P. (1987). State Building in Pakistan. In A. Banuazizi & M. Weiner

(Eds.), The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan

(pp.299-332). Lahore: Vanguard

6. Cohen, S.P. (2005). The Idea of Pakistan. New Delhi: Oxford University press.

7. Ghaus, A. (1996). Social Development Ranking of Districts of Pakistan. SPDC

Research Report No. 12.

8. Ghori, H.K. Pagara supports Kalabagh dam, Daily Dawn, December 23, 2005.

9. Government of Pakistan. (1998). Census Reports of Various districts.

10. Hussain, F.A. (1989). The Problem of Federalism and Regional Autonomy in

Pakistan (Unpublished M. Phil’s Thesis). LSE, University of London, London.

11. Islam, N. (1981). Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and

Bangladesh. International Journal of Middle East Studies. 13(1), 55-72.

90
12. Jaffery, N.B & Sadaqat, M. (2006). NFC Awards: Commentary and Agenda.

Pakistan Economic and Social Review. 44(2), 209-234.

13. Jamal, H. (2005). In search of poverty predictors: the case of urban and rural

Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review. 44 (1), 37–55.

14. Kennedy, C. H. (1987). Bureaucracy in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University

press.

15. Kennedy, C.H. (2002). Pakistan: Ethnic Diversity and Colonial Legacy. In J.

Coakley (Eds.), The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict (pp 143-172).

London: Frank Cass.

16. Khan, H. (2005). Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. Karachi:

Oxford University Press.

17. Minorities at Risk Project. (2008). Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior

Dataset. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict

Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar on [July 27, 2009].

18. Mushtaq, M. & Alqama, K. (2009). Poverty Alleviation through Power-sharing in

Pakistan. European Journal of Social Science. 8(3), 459-468.

19. Page, D. (1974). Prelude to partition: All India Muslim Politics 1920-1932

(Unpublished D. Phil. Thesis). University of Oxford, U.K.

20. Rahman, T. (1995). Language and Politics in a Pakistan Province. Asian Survey.

35(11), 1005-1016.

21. Rajput, M.I. (2005). Kalabagh Dam and Sindh: A View point. Karachi: Wahid Art

Press.

91
22. Robinson, F. (1974). Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the

United Provinces Muslims 1860-1923. London: Cambridge

23. Samad, Y. (1995). Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan

1937-58. New Delhi: Sage.

24. Samad, Y. (2007). Pakistan: From Minority Rights to Majoritarian. In Gyanendra,

P. and Y. Samad (Eds.), Fault lines of Nationhood (pp.67-138). Roli Books Pvt.

Ltd. New Delhi.

25. Sayeed, K.B. (1967). The Political System of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford

University Press.

26. Siddiqa, A. (2007). Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. London:

Pluto Press.

27. Talbot, I. (2002). The Punjabisation of Pakistan: Myth or Reality? In C. Jaffrelot,

(Eds.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation (pp.51-62). London: Zed Books

Ltd.

92
Chapter No. 4

MANAGING ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND FEDERALISM

IN PAKISTAN

4.1 Introduction

Federations may vary at the level of centralization, and in the forms of governance.

On the basis of distinctive features, these can be categorized as centralized or

decentralized, and consociational or majoritarian federations. Some federations may

adopt multi-level system of authority and governance; and others may incline toward

centralized governance.

It is believed that federation‟s capacity to manage ethnic diversity varies across its

functions and distinct features. Few political scientists are of the opinion that „the

more a formal federal system operates as a unitary system; the less is system capacity

to accommodate territorial cleavages‟ (Kohli, 2004). The Pakistani case suggests that

constitutionally it is a federal state in all respects but practically it has operated like a

unitary system. The issue needs to be probed that despite having all constitutional

arrangements, one can find dissatisfaction between center and provinces and among

provinces. In the following chapter, this problem has been discussed.

The next section presents historical background of federalism in Pakistan. The

subsequent sections, in turn, would discuss the ethno-linguistic mobilization, and the

role of centralized federalism in the rise and fall of ethno-national movements in

Pakistan. The final section is reserved for some concluding comments.

4.2 Historical Background

Territorial autonomy has its roots in the governmental system of Mughal Empire;

even one can find it in the Arian period, in India. The British administration in India

93
followed this political norm of sub-continent and allocated a considerable autonomy

to the provincial governments. Adeney (2007) has rightly observed that „all the

constitutional plans proposed between 1916 and 1946 were drafted under the

assumption that there would be provincial governments with a certain amount of

autonomy‟.

More or less a formal federal system was introduced in the Government of India Act

1935. Legislative, administrative and financial powers were divided between the

center and provinces. However, the center had a commanding position vis-à-vis the

provinces. Governor General was a custodian of the imperial interests and had

extraordinary powers to regulate the British India. Provincial Governors, the agents of

Governor General in the provinces had also vital powers to dominate in the

provinces1.

Muslims of India demanded a separate homeland. Eventually, India was divided, and

the Muslims of India were granted a separate homeland - Pakistan, in 1947. Pakistan

inherited the colonial institutions and political practices. The new state adopted the

Government of India Act 1935 with certain amendments as interim constitution. The

constitution was repealed by the first constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan on

March 23, 1956. This constitution proved short-lived and was abrogated as a result of

martial law in 1958. Ayub introduced his constitution in 1962. He stepped down in

1969. He abrogated the constitution of 1962 and handed over the government to

Yahya, the then Commander-in Chief of the army. After the separation of East

Pakistan in 1971, the National Assembly of Pakistan enacted the 1973 constitution of

Pakistan. This constitution has been discussed in detail in the following sections.

94
4.3 Federal Settings in the 1973 Constitution: Theory and Practice

It has been argued that “constitutional distribution of the legislative and executive

powers and of financial resources between two orders of the government” is the key

feature of every federation in modern world (Watts, 1996, p.155). Thus, this section

will, primarily, focus on „the distribution of legislative powers, the administrative

relations between federation and provinces, and the distribution of financial resources

between federation and provinces of Pakistan.

4.3.1 Distribution of Legislative Powers between Federation and Provinces

The Distribution of legislative powers in the 1973 constitution is enumerated in two

lists:

a. The Federal Legislative List

b. The Concurrent Legislative List 2

There is no provincial legislative list. The parliament, as the federal legislature, has a

very vast legislative power. It can legislate with respect to any matters in the federal

and concurrent lists.

A close look at the Fourth Schedule seems to suggest imbalances in the distribution of

power between the federation and the provinces in Pakistan. The federal list includes

some 59 items ranging from defense and external affairs to the taxation and state

lotteries. In addition, the second part of the federal list has eight items like railways,

mineral oil and natural gas, and council of common interests etc. The content of the

concurrent legislative list is so detailed that the provinces are left with very little

power and not independent of the federal government. The concurrent list consists of

47 items including matters, which had conventionally been in the provincial realm,

95
such as the maintenance of public order, enforcement of criminal law, police forces

and education. The formal allocation by the constitution of legislative powers to each

level of government gives an indication of the scope of decentralized jurisdiction

(Watts, 1999). The constitution of Pakistan provides exclusive power to parliament to

make laws concerning federal legislative list3. Furthermore, in case of inconsistency

between the federal and provincial laws related to the concurrent list, pre-eminence

has been provided to the federal law over provincial law 4. Therefore, the parliament

has exclusive jurisdiction in federal list and shared jurisdiction in the concurrent list.

This „exclusive jurisdiction‟ and „the extent of concurrent or shared responsibilities‟

set out in the constitution is significant (Watts, 1999).

The abolition of the concurrent list was promised after ten years by the authors of the

1973 constitution. But, it exists even now. The continuation of this list is an adverse

indication for the state‟s federal character. Therefore, all prominent parties have

included the cancellation of concurrent list in their party manifestos to promote

provincial autonomy.

Pumphrey (1972) has noted that when the constitutional formula was under debate in

the National Assembly, Bhutto, then the president and leader of the leading party in

National Assembly, was aiming a strong centre and to limit the autonomy of

provinces. Wali Khan, then the opposition leader, and his friends knew that a strong

centre would be dominated by the Punjab, and so for the time being by Bhutto.

Therefore, they wanted to avoid this domination either by diminishing central power

or by ensuring that its exercise will be inhibited by a second chamber weighted in

favor of the smaller provinces5.

96
Finally, the National Assembly of Pakistan adopted the 1973 constitution with no

opposing vote and with the support of all but three of the members of the opposition

group. Then, the opposition had contested nearly every clause of the constitution in its

passage through the Assembly. Amendments that were introduced, as a result of the

talks between the opposition and the Government, satisfied enough of opposition‟s

demands to enable them to vote almost unanimously in favor of the constitution 6. But

this unanimity is missing today. Various regional parties, for example MQM, ANP,

and Baloch Nationalist Parties, are demanding to confine the federation to three

subjects namely defense, foreign affairs, and currency. Some other groups, for

example Sind-Baluch-Pakhtoon Front (SBPF), have been demanding for

confederation (Richter, 1986). Still, the Pakistan‟s Oppressed Nations Movement

(PONM) – a mixture of 28 ethno-nationalist groups and parties set up in 1990s – had

been criticizing the federal design and demanding the establishment of a decentralized

polity (Rizvi, 2000).

The review of constitutional provisions and the demands of some regional parties

seem to suggest that Pakistan is a highly centralized federation. But a comparative

study of the legislative decentralization in selected federations reveals that Pakistan is

not a deviant case. A cluster analysis has been used to classify the selected federations

in three groups on the basis of their distinctive features. The cluster analysis is based

on thirty variables in eleven federations. The scope of powers concerning thirty items

is given in figure 4-1. The author has classified these federations into three broad

clusters. Pakistan stands in the first cluster with Canada, USA, Australia, Germany,

India, Malaysia, and Belgium. The clusters are summarized in the figure 4-2.The

comparative results seems to suggest that Pakistan fulfills minimum criteria of

legislative decentralization.

97
 Figure 4-1: Comparative Legislative Decentralization in selected Federal Countries
Scope of powers Canada U.S.1789 Switzerland Australia Germany Austria India Malaysia Belgium Spain Pakistan
1867 1848/1999 1901 1949 1929 1950 1963 1993 1978 1973
Defense F FS F FS F F F F F F F
Treaty implementation F F FS F FS F F F F F F
Citizenship F F F F F FS F F F F F
Immigration C C C C F F F F F F F
Taxation: custom/excise F F/C F F F F FS F C F F
Taxation: corporate FS C F C C F F F C F F
Foreign borrowing FS FS FS C FS F F F FS FS F
Currency F F F F F F F F F F F
Banking FS C F C C F F F F F F
Bankruptcy F FS - C - F C F N - C
Insurance FS FS FS C C F F F F F FS
External trade F F F C F N F F S F F
Inter-state trade F F F C C N F F N - F
Roads & bridges S FS FS FS C FS FS FS S S F
Railways FS FS F FS FC F F F F S F
Air F F F FS F F F F S SF F
Telecommunications FS FS F C F F F F F F F
Postal services F F F C F F F F F F F
broadcasting F F F C SC N F F S F F
Agriculture C S F SC C F SC SC N S S
Fisheries FS S F FS C - FS FS S SF F
Nuclear energies F FS F C C F F - F F F
Education S S CS S S FS CS F S N S
Research & development N FS F FS SC FS FCS F FS N FS
Hospitals SF SF S FS C C S F S FS S
Unemployment insurance F FS C C C F S F F F C
Social services SF SF C C C S CS C S FS C
Pensions C C C C CS F C FS - F FS
Civil law S S F FS C FS C FS F F N
Criminal law F S F S C FS C F N N C
Source: Watts, RL. (1999)Comparing Federal Systems (2nd Ed.). London: McGill Queen‟s University Press. pp. 126-130. (ii).Constitution of 1973 of Pakistan.
Note: F = federal powers, S = state (provincial/ canton) power, C = concurrent power (but federal paramountcy), CS= concurrent power (but provincial
paramountcy), C= “community” power, R= “regional power”

98
 Figure 4-2: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis

Cluster 1: Similarity
1. Canada
2. U.S. 29.53

3. Australia
4. Germany
5. India 53.02

6. Malaysia
7. Belgium
8. Spain 76.51
9. Pakistan
Cluster 2:
1. Switzerland 100.00
Cluster 3: tr i
a er
l
an
y
U
S
tr a
li
si
a
ad
a di
a in ta
n
um
us i tz ay In pa is gi
m us al an S ak el
A S
w er A M C P B
1. Austria G

Variables
Note: Minitab software has been used for cluster analysis.

99
4.3.2 Administrative Relations between Federation and Provinces

The federal settings can take different forms. While „the combination of shared-rule

and self-rule in a single polity represents the essence of federalism‟ these two

elements may take different forms in different settings. Federations may differ from

each other by the „kind and degree‟ of self-rule they assign to the constituent units.

Similarly, the „structures and processes‟ of shared rule varies across the federations.

The degree of emphasis on a particular element (self-rule or shared-rule) may also

differ from federation to federation. For example, the more emphasis on provincial

self-rule is placed in Canada, and more emphasis is on shared federal decision making

in Germany (Watts, 2000).

All India Muslim League, in British India, demanded maximum autonomy for Muslim

majority provinces (self-rule), and substational representation (Muslims were almost

¼th of the Indian population and demanded for 1/3 rd representation in central

legislature) at the federal level to ensure power-sharing (shared-rule). But, after the

accomplishment of Pakistan, the centralization of political power remained the

anecdote throughout Pakistan political history. Minority provinces, in Pakistan, have

continuously been demanding provincial autonomy and power-sharing at federal level

(Adeney, 2002).

“The right of the provinces to constitutionally guaranteed self-rule or autonomy is key

stone of the federal-type of dispensation. This autonomy relates to (a) the right of

provinces to take and administer decisions without undue interference by the national

parliament, on those matters allocated to the provinces by the constitution; (b) the

right to have their institutional integrity respected, including their constitutional and

100
political structures, and government departments; and the right to have their territorial

integrity respected”( Villiers, 1996) .

The provisions regarding administrative relations between federation and provinces in

the 1973 constitution of Pakistan seem to pledge the pre-eminence of federation.

Article 149(1) states that “the executive authority of every province shall be so

exercised as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive authority of the

federation, and the executive authority of the federation shall extend to the giving of

such directions to a province as may appear to the federal government to be necessary

for that purpose.” This article of the constitution also authorizes federation to

intervene and extend directions to a province to

a. implement any federal law relating to the concurrent legislative list;

b. proceed regarding the „construction and maintenance of means of

communication‟;

c. prevent „any grave menace to the peace or tranquility or economic life of

Pakistan or any part thereof‟ (constitution of Pakistan, 1973).

Ethno-regional political parties object to these constitutional provisions. For example,

MQM has proposed omitting of the clauses of article 149 and recommended

supremacy of federal executive over executive authority of province only in the case

of preventing external aggression against Pakistan or any part thereof.7

Moreover, the constitution of Pakistan grants right to the federation for the acquisition

of land for federal purposes. This constitutional provision is also contentious. The

minority provinces in Pakistan have been disapproving the allotment of land to retired

military personnel and the acquisition of land for army cantonments8.

101
MQM has recommended substituting this clause and in its proposed substituted clause

has tied acquisition of land for federal purposes with the consent of the Provincial

Assembly or the District or City District Government 9.

4.3.2.1 Emergency powers

Emergency powers granted to the federation in the constitution of 1973 are imperative

to the intergovernmental relations in Pakistan. Various provincial governments have

been sacked by the federation using these emergency provisions. Voices have been

raised by the smaller units and marginalized communities to restrict the federal

government to intervene in provinces.

Part X of the 1973 constitution contains the emergency provisions. These provisions

authorize the president to issue the proclamation in case of

a. war or internal disturbance;

b. failure of constitutional machinery in a province;

c. and/or financial instability.

The emergency powers, however, remained a tool for federation to intervene in

provinces. Article 234 of the 1973 constitution authorizes the president to issue

proclamation of emergency in case of failure of constitutional machinery in a

province10.

This provision indicates that during the emergency period, the federation operates

more likely a unitary system. The smaller units, particularly has reservation about

the emergency powers of federal government and they have been arguing for

constitutional amendments. MQM, a regional party of Sindh, has proposed a

102
National Emergency Council – a body consisting of prime minister, federal

ministers and chief ministers – and has suggested that the Proclamation of

emergency should be subject to the recommendation of this body. These

suggestions seem to suggest distrust in federation.

Earlier, MRD (Movement for the Restoration of Democracy) in its declaration

concerning provincial autonomy suggested that „only in the event of an

extraordinary situation developing in a province would the federal authorities be

allowed to intervene, but if the Senate failed to endorse this intervention within

thirty days it would cease to have legal effect. Similarly, a state of emergency in a

province would be valid for only three months, unless the Senate approved its

extension for another three months‟. It also suggested that „during the state of

emergency, legislative authority for the province would be the responsibility of a

committee of senators from that province‟ (Rakisits, 1988).

4.3.2.2 Central Governments Intervention to Federating Units

In Pakistan, „the central government very frequently dismissed and reformed the

ministries in the provinces‟. In 1947, the Congress ministry in NWFP had „the support

of 33 members out of 50‟. But Despite the assurance of cooperation, it was replaced

by a Muslim League ministry (Hussain, 1989). The Sindh assembly opposed the

decision of central government to take Karachi out of the control of Sindh and passed

a resolution unanimously. The chief minister of Sindh had to pay for this resolution

and was dismissed soon.

During Ayub era (1962-69), the federal spirit was missing in Pakistan. All powers

were vested in the president. In provinces, governors were appointed by the president

103
without any approval or consultation by any other organ of the government. So they

worked as agents of the president and served during his pleasures. In practice,

federation operated as a unitary system in his period (Hussain, 1989).

This centralization alienated the Bengalis. Eventually, they broke away from the

Pakistan in 1971. The constitution of 1973 was introduced on August 14, 1973 in the

new Pakistan.

Bhutto (1973-77), dismissed Balochistan‟s provincial government and provincial

government of NWFP resigned as protest. Still, Bhutto managed to capture all

political power in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. He had overwhelming majority

in these provinces and did not assign any responsibility to local leadership at

provincial level. He replaced favorable ministries in Punjab. So under his rule, the

Sindh and the Punjab province were also denied their autonomy just like NWFP and

Balochistan (Hussain, 1989).

Zia removed Bhutto government in 1977. During his regime (1977-88), various

constitutional amendments changed the nature of the constitution. The amendments

resulted into a substantial departure from the parliamentary and federal principles laid

down in the 1973 constitution. To sum up, presidential unitary form of government

operated instead of the parliamentary federal form of government during this era

(Hussain, 1989).

In post-Zia era (1988-99), central interventions in provincial matters remained intact.

Various provinces experienced governor rule and replacement of ministries by central

authorities. The figure 4-3 shows some detail in this regard.

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Figure 4-3: Central Governments’ interference in Federating Units

Year Description
1947 Congress ministry in NWFP had „the support of 33 members out of 50‟. But it was
replaced by a Muslim League ministry.
1947 Despite of his majority in assembly, the Chief Minister of Sindh was dismissed.
1955 One-unit Scheme (amalgamation of provinces and states into the province of West
Pakistan.)
1962-69 During the Ayub‟s Presidential period, the federal system operated more like a unitary
system with a meager provincial autonomy.
1970-71 Military action in East Pakistan and its separation
1972-73 PPP government did not respect the tripartite accord. The central government dissolved
the Balochistan government. The government of NWFP resigned as a protest.
1977-88 Martial rule during this period undermined the spirit of a federal design.
1988-93 Dissolution of provincial assemblies ( 1988, 90, 93)
1994 Governor Rule in NWFP and installation of favorable government
1995 Governor rule in Punjab and installation of new government
1999 Removal of Nawaz Sharif government along provincial government

4.3.3 Distribution of Revenues between Federation and Provinces

In countries having federal structure, distribution involves vertical and horizontal

allocation of funds to make possible the state/provincial governments to carry out

their constitutional function. Since the promulgation of the constitution of 1973 in

Pakistan, National Finance Commission (NFC hereafter) has remained in charge to

make recommendations for the allocation of prescribed taxes between federation and

provinces and among provinces.

NFC, a constitutional body, under Article 160 of the constitution is required to make

recommendations to the president on the matter of distribution of tax revenues

between the federation and the provinces and amongst provinces after every five

years. It comprises the minister of finance of the federal government, the ministers of

finance of the provincial governments, and such other persons as may be appointed by

the president after consultation with the governors of the provinces.

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NFC award has remained a challenging job for the members of National Finance

Commission. The difference of opinion remained at two levels; (a) share of federal

government in divisible pool; and (b) the criteria of distribution among the provinces.

The last NFC award was adopted in 1997, and it was valid for five years term.

However, this award is still operating due to the disagreement between federation and

provinces and among provinces.

Although, federal government has agreed to raise the provinces‟ share from 37.5 per

cent under the fifth award to 47.5 per cent, and eventually to 50 per cent gradually,

this still falls short of the demand of the provinces that their share be increased to 50

per cent in the sixth NFC award11.

Distribution of revenues by the federation – the divisible pool – to provinces is the

major source of provincial revenues in Pakistan. Constitutionally, the federation must

announce the formula after every five years. But in practice, National Finance

Commission announced its recommendations only three times: 1974, 1990, and 1997.

NFC remained unable to find agreement among provinces over formula in 1979,

1985, 2000, and 2005.

There is no provision in the constitution about the distribution of divisible pool

between federal government and provinces, and the criteria of distribution among

provinces. Hence, the provinces have been arguing for favorable criteria.

Since 1974, population has been remained the only yardstick for distribution among

provinces. Being the populous, Punjab benefits and insists to carry out this criterion.

Sindh provides bulk of revenue collection and hence wants the revenue collection to

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be the key factor. However, being the poorer, NWFP and Balochistan argue for the

backwardness and underdevelopment to be considered in the distributive formula 12.

The disagreement of provinces on the criterion of distribution underpins the suspicion

of smaller units against Punjab and the federal government. The lack of consensus

among provinces has caused a „four-year delay in the announcement of sixth NFC

Award‟. The decision that has to be taken in 2002 lingered on till 2006 when

President General Musharraf announced an interim arrangement. Under the

“Makeshift Award”, the provincial shares in the divisible pool were raised to 41.5% in

fiscal 2006/07 and a gradual increase to 46.25% will be up to 2010/11.

4.3.3.1 Fiscal Decentralization in Pakistan (1971-2006)

The study of fiscal decentralization during 1971-2006 seems to suggest a gradual

trend towards fiscal decentralization. The author has attempted to quantify the fiscal

decentralization. Two variables have been used: ratio of provincial revenues to central

revenues and the ratio of provincial expenditures to central expenditures. The figures

4-4 and 4-5 show the gradual trends toward fiscal decentralization for these two

variables respectively.

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 Figure 4-4: Fiscal Decentralization (I)

Fiscal Decentralization

2001-02
1995-96
Years

1989-90
1983-84
1977-78
1971-72
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Value

Ratio of Prov. Rev. to central

Source: (Mushtaq, 2009)

Figure 4-5: Fiscal Decentralization (II)

Fiscal Decentralization

2001-02
1995-96
Years

1989-90
1983-84
1977-78
1971-72
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
Value

Ratio of Prov. Exp. To central

Source: (Mushtaq, 2009)

4.3.3.2. Comparative Fiscal Decentralization in Selected Federations

A comparative study of fiscal decentralization in selected federations seems to suggest

that Pakistan is not an unusual case with respect to fiscal decentralization. Though it is

relatively fiscally centralized, it is more decentralized than few other federations. In

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the ranking of total nineteen selected federations, it falls at number eight. The

following figure shows the degree of decentralization in selected federations.

Figure 4-6: Fiscal Decentralization in Selected Federations

Fiscal Decentrlisation in Selected Federations

Ethiopia
Venezuela
Belgium
Malaysia
Spain
Mexico
South Africa
Pakistan
Federations

Austria
Brazil Series1
Argentina
Russia
Australia
Germany
United states
India
Switzerland
Canada
Yugoslavia

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Value (Mean) of Fiscal Decentrlisation for Selected Years

Source: (Mushtaq, 2009)

Note: Data for 1972-2000 has been taken from World Bank website: http://www.worldbank.org/

The analysis of constitutional provisions and political developments in Pakistan seems

to suggest that although Pakistan is a formal federal system and fulfills minimum

requirements of the federalism, it operates more like a unitary system.

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4.4 Politics of Identity in Pakistan

Pakistan has been experiencing ethno-national movements since its inception in 1947.

Bengali nationalism, Pashtun separatism, Sindhi regionalism, and Baloch nationalism

have challenged federal character of state at various junctures of Pakistani history.

Since 1980s, the Mohajirs have been mobilizing along ethnic lines to protect their

interests. A modest assertion is also seen in the Southern Punjab.

Excluding Punjabis, the dominant group, all sub-national groups felt a certain sense of

marginalization and have been asserting against the centralization of political power.

Punjab is the most populous and relatively developed and prosperous region of

country. It has predominance in armed forces and to a lesser extent in the civil

bureaucracy. At the core of ethno-regional sentiments in Pakistan, there is perception

that „Punjabi community dominates the politics and society of the state‟ (Kennedy,

1993). As a result, they never feel the need to press for greater autonomy (Jones,

2002). The remaining groups have been involved in politics of identity that has been

described in the following sections.

4.4.1 Pashtuns’ Separatism

The Pashtuns of NWFP had a strong sense of distinctiveness. The „Khudai

Khidmatgar’ (servants of God) movement of Pashtun nationalists had a popular rural

base in predominantly Pashtun districts of the province of British India. It won both

the provincial elections of 1937 and 1946 and formed the provincial governments.

When the British decided to divide India into Pakistan and India, in 1947, the Pashtun

nationalists resisted against their inclusion in Pakistan and demanded an autonomous

Pakhtun (Pashtun) state. However, it was decided that the people of NWFP will

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decide through a referendum whether to join India or Pakistan. The Pashtuns tried to

persuade Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor General of India, to include a third

option in the referendum: a right to opt for Pashtunistan, a state for their own, next to

the options to join either Pakistan or India. On having a negative response from

Mountbatten, Abdul Ghaffar Khan made an appeal to the Congress working

committee for support (Azad, 1998). But Khan‟s demand was not considered by the

British government. Consequently, Khan and his followers boycotted the referendum.

In the meantime, Muslim League worked hard and managed to get 99% of the polled

votes.

„Pashtunistan (Pakhtunistan) means different things to different people, ranging from

demand for the formation of a new state incorporating Pathan ( Pashtun) areas on both

sides of Pakistan-Afghanistan border to mere change of nomenclature for the NWFP‟

(Kennedy, 1993). The Pashtuns stressed in early years (1947-55) that by

„Pashtunistan‟ they meant no more than regional autonomy for the NWFP (Amin,

1988). Furthermore, the temporal (April 1972- February 1973) sharing of power –

under the tripartite accord – directed Pashtun nationalist to leave the Pashtunistan

issue. Abdul Ghaffar Khan declared, „our demand for Pashtunistan has been fulfilled‟

(Amin, 1988). However, the Pashtun nationalism resurfaced when Islamabad

dismissed the NAP (National Awami Party) government in Balochistan. The coalition

government of NWFP resigned as a protest against the dismissal of Balochistan

government. The centre banned the NAP alleging that it was working against the

integrity of the country. Pashtuns pursued ban on NAP by challenging the decision in

the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Pashtun identity remained intact. On a

question whether he was, „a Muslim, a Pakistani or a Pashtun first‟, Wali Khan

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claimed that he was, “a six thousand years old Pashtun, a thousand years old Muslim

and 27 years old Pakistani”13.

Meanwhile, the gradual migration of Pashtuns into Karachi and urban centers of

Punjab has resulted in their „dominance in privately owned transport sector‟ and

larger share in employment. Despite the fact that the Pashtuns did not receive the

proportionate share in the industrial development‟, they „had their own industrial

capital class‟. This class has invested capital in „the sugar, textile, engineering,

pharmaceuticals and other industries in other provinces‟. As, they are more integrated

than Balochs and Sindhis with the national capitalists, they are less inclined towards

nationalist demands (Ahmad, 1998).

The Pashtuns have acquired share in the Pakistani power-structure and the „primary

source of incorporation is the army‟ (Noman, 1988). The majority of Pashtun soldiers

and officials, who got jobs, belong to the areas that had traditionally been „stronghold

of the Pashtunistan movement‟ (Jaffrelot, 2002). This incorporation and

accommodation of the Pashtuns in the power-structure has resulted in decline of the

Pashtunistan movement.

Recently, in the general election 2008, the Pashtun nationalist party (ANP) has

improved its electoral support in the NWFP and has set up its government in the

province. The Pashtun nationalists seem determined to rename their province as

„Pakhtunkhwa‟14: they regard it as a tribute for the Pashtun identity. All the same, the

Pashtun nationalists give the more impression of satisfaction over the removal of

Kalabagh dam project and the support for renaming the NWFP as „Pakhtunkhwa‟ by

the present governing coalition at Islamabad – it is the first time in Pakistan history

that a sitting government at Islamabad made such announcements.

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It has been concluded that “the Pashtun leadership that was initially reluctant to accept

Pakistan and among whom a vibrant Pashtunistan movement existed is today most

successfully integrated” (Ahmad, 1998, p. 278). This integration of the Pashtuns led

to the argument that „Pashtun movement had died down‟ (Amin, 1988). However,

this observation should not overlook the caution that “the Pashtunistan movement is

dormant, but not dead, and its re-emergence cannot be ruled out in the context of the

growing instability and disintegrative tendencies in both Pakistan and Afghanistan”

(Harrison, 2007).

4.4.2 Baloch Nationalism

The Colonial period Balochistan includes British Balochistan (Pashtun majority areas

and the Bugti-Marri tribal areas), Kalat state and the states of Kharan, Makran and

Lasbella. The British Balochistan joined Pakistan but the ruler of Kalat state, Mir

Ahmad Yar Khan, declared independence, on August 15, 1947, a day after Pakistan

was formally established. Both houses of the Kalat Assembly had approved this

decision and discarded accession with Pakistan. But, ultimately Khan had to signed

accession papers to join Pakistan15. The Baloch nationalists resisted against the

decision, and Prince Abdul Karim, younger brother of Khan started an armed

movement in the Jhalawan area as a protest (Breseeg, 2004). However, the

government of Pakistan overcame this rebellion soon.

Then, under the one-unit scheme, the government of Pakistan amalgamated Punjab,

Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan into one province. The second Baloch insurgency

started against this centralizing policy of the government. Mir Noroz Khan Zahri led

this resistance vigorously but finally agreed to surrender on an offer of safe conduct

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by the army. However, he was arrested with his colleagues and died in jail (Harrison,

1981).

Afterward, with the dissolution of one-unit scheme in 1970, Balochistan got the status

of a province. The Baloch and Pashtun nationalists contested in the first general

elections of the Pakistani history in 1970, under the banner of NAP. The Baloch

nationalists performed well and managed to install their government in Balochistan.

However, Attaullah Mengal‟s government was dismissed in February 1973 on the

grounds of lawlessness and failure to comply with central government directives. This

dismissal sparked a sharper confrontation with the centre and led to an insurgency that

remained at its peak from 1973 to 1977 (Jetly, 2004). According to Harrison (1981, p.

36), „there were around 55,000 Baloch fighters, including 11,500 organized

combatants, fighting against the over 80,000-strong military force that was called out

to quell the resistance‟.

After the removal of Bhutto government in 1977, Zia-ul-Haq adopted a relatively

softer approach by releasing the detained Baloch leaders. He extended positive

gestures toward nationalists by announcing a general amnesty for the guerrillas.

However, he did not fulfill the demands for the withdrawal of the troops from

Balochistan and the compensation for the victims of military action in Balochistan

(Shah, 1997).

During the interlude (1988-99) between Zia-ul-Haq and Musharraf‟s military rule, the

nationalist feelings, to some extent, were subsided because of the „participatory‟

democracy. However, since the military coup of 1999, a low-level insurgency again

challenges central control over the province. Although regional parties and leaders are

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still struggling to obtain political, economic and social rights within a democratic,

federal, parliamentary framework, militants have picked up the gun16.

Harrison (2007) has narrated that the recent Baloch uprising „still persisted‟ even with

the efforts to suppress it by “formidable Pakistani forces consisting of six army

brigades, plus paramilitary forces totaling some 25,000 men and air power that

included twenty U.S.-supplied Cobra helicopter gunships and four squadrons of U.S.-

supplied fighter planes”.

The account of four armed Baloch uprisings seems to suggest that the Balochs have

spearheaded the resistance by the minorities against the central government in

Pakistan. There is a sufficient evidence to substantiate the argument that the

centralization of political power and exclusion is the key to the Baloch uprisings.

Prior to 1970s only one Baloch tribesmen got a cabinet position at the centre17, and

from 1971-2007, of the 60 people who got „important‟ political positions only one

was Baloch. Balochs have enjoyed hardly any diplomatic position. They also have the

slightest representation in civil-military bureaucracy (Mushtaq & Alqama, 2009).

Within Balochistan, despite some mutual distrust, the Balochs and the Pashtuns have

agreement over the grievances and demands of Balochistan. More or less, they share

the demand that Balochistan should have the decisive role in decision making

regarding Gawader Mega Project – it is noteworthy that of the total eleven members

of the Board of Directors, only two belong to Balochistan in 2005-0618 . Moreover,

the Baloch leaders assumed that „Big Port and export processing zone at Gawader

shall attract people from up-country‟ and the influx of settlers shall „affect local

demographic structure‟19. Beyond the Gawader port, the leadership of Balochistan

demands that (a) the proposals for establishment of new cantonments in Balochistan

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should be withdrawn; (b) „gas royalty at par with the other provinces‟ should be

specified and the entire sum due, already, on the gas royalty must be given away to

the province; (c) the people of Balochistan should be given proper representation in

all the federal government departments; (d) only locals be offered jobs in all mega

projects and gas fields; (f) and the criteria of NFC Award relating to the distribution

of resources should not be based exclusively on population; and other parameters like

„area‟ and „level of development‟ must also be considered20. To sum up, nearly all the

reservations and demands of Balochistan relate to the „inequitable‟ distribution of

resources and centralization of political power.

4.4.3 Sindhi Regionalism

Sindh restored its provincial status in 1936, after its separation from Bombay. The All

India Muslim league, champion of the Muslim nationalism in British India, had a

limited support in this Muslim majority province. It did not find any candidate to

contest in the 1937 elections. However, G. M. Sayeed and Sheikh Abdul Majeed

members of the Sindh Assembly joined the party in 1938 and managed to pass a

resolution for a separate homeland for Muslims of sub-continent in the same year.

Finally, Muslim League succeeded to govern the Sindh in 1942 and Sindh Assembly

passed a resolution on March 3, 1943 favoring the Lahore Resolution 1940.

Subsequently, Sindh Assembly decided to join Pakistan by 33 votes to 20 (Chandio,

2007).

In 1947, the partition of India resulted in a huge transfer of population across the

borders. While Muslims from the East-Punjab (Indian Punjab) settled in the West-

Punjab (Pakistani Punjab), the migrants of Muslim minority provinces (Mohajirs),

mainly, entered into Sindh. Sindhis were reluctant to welcome Mohajirs in their

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homeland and resisted against the influx of „millions of well-educated, mobile and

resourceful Mohajirs‟ (Malik, 1997).

This settlement of Mohajirs in urban Sindh changed the „demographic, political and

economic contours of Pakistani Sindh‟ in Mohajirs‟ favors (Malik, 1997). Although

the pre-partition Sindh was not an „ethnically pure region‟, there was no substantial

antagonism by Sindhis against Baloch and Punjabi population. These people adopted

Sindhi language and were „assimilated into the Sindhi culture‟ (Cohen, 2005). On the

other hand, the Mohajirs remained determined to preserve their identity and did not

intend to learn Sindhi language. The rejection of Mohajirs to adopt Sindhi culture and

their relative dominant position in Sindh caused resentment in Sindhis toward

Mohajirs.

Moreover, the Sindhis resentment against the central government remained due to the

„inadequate representation in the legislature and government‟. In the early years, out

of the total 69 members of the Constituent Assembly, only 04 were from Sindh‟; and

the „province went unrepresented in Liaquat AIi‟s cabinet‟. In 1954, „Sindhis took a

common stand against the central government for the reunification of Karachi with

Sindh‟. Sindhis again remained united and „nearly three-quarters of the members of

Sindh Assembly opposed one-unit scheme‟ of central government (Samad, 1995,

p.150).

During one-unit period (1955-69), the Sindhis were further marginalized. The Sindhi

language was suppressed and many Sindhi medium schools were closed (Rahman,

1995). Chandio (2007) argues that, „the ignoring policy of the central authority toward

the Sindhi language created resentment among the people of Sindh‟. According to

him, „Sindhi writers were discouraged and Sindhi newspapers were denied to

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advertisements. Sindhi publications were suppressed and widely censored‟. Bhutto

used the „slogans chanted by Sindhi nationalists‟ in the election campaign of 1970 and

got land slide victory in Sindh.

While „exclusion from power fostered separatist tendencies‟ in the Bengalis,

symmetrically, „access to power made the national integration of Sindhis easier in

1970s‟ (Jaffrelot, 2002). Bhutto‟s PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party) managed to form its

governments at the center and in province of Sindh. Bhutto took up many Sindhis

grievances and his policies favored Sindhis substantially.

The Removal of Bhutto‟s government in 1977 rematerialized the nationalist feelings

in Sindh. These feelings gained momentum during the MRD‟s national campaign

against the military dictatorship of Zia-ul-Haq (the then president and chief marshal

law administrator) in 198321. The unrest spread at a wider scale and ferocity in the

interior Sindh. Soon, „radical students and groups of peasants and workers‟ joined the

movement and it „took the army four months to quell‟ (Noman, 1988). It is argued

that this struggle in Sindh was essentially for „the participation in government and

more equitable share in the economic progress of the province‟. The removal of the

first government favorable to Sindhis, and its replacement by Punjabi-Pashtun

dominated army, fuelled ethnic antagonism in the province. The articulation of

regional aspirations was formulated in the demand for a confederation, outlined by the

ex-governor of Sindh, Mumtaz Bhutto (Noman, 1988, p. 184).

In the Post-Zia democratic period (1988-99), Pakistan Peoples Party carried on its

political character again and Benazir Bhutto managed to defuse the nationalist

feelings in the wounded Sindhi community. While PPP dominated rural Sindh,

Sindh‟s nationalist parties remained unable to challenge its support. These parties

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„never attracted the support of more than 5-6% of the electorate nor have they ever

won any directly elected National Assembly seat‟ (Jones, 2002). Nevertheless, „the

PPP always espoused the cause of Sindhi nationalism at the provincial level,

(Waseem, 2006) and „many PPP candidates in Sindh appeared as nationalistic as their

counterparts in the parties devoted to Sindhi issues‟ (Jones, 2002). Despite their weak

organization, Sindhi nationalists have not given up their struggle and they have

continued to express resentment about Punjab‟s role in their affairs (Jones, 2002). The

Sindhis have resented once again at the murder of Ms Bhutto during election

campaign at Rawalpindi, a Punjabi town near Islamabad. But, Asif Ali Zardari (the

widower of Benazir Bhutto, and the president of Pakistan at the moment) and Nawaz

Sharif (the most popular leader in Punjab) managed the issue successfully.

Because of relatively underdevelopment and lack of distributive justice, the nationalist

feelings are always present in Sindh. Sindhis demand the withdrawal of Kalabagh

dam and a multiple criteria for NFC Award. They also resent their lesser

representation in civil-military bureaucracy. However, since the controversy over

Sindhi language in early 1970s, Sindhis had never prioritized the Sindhi language and

culture in their directory of grievances and demands. Equally, the sporadic political

incorporation and the relative accommodation of Sindhis in the power structure of

Pakistan is responsible for the lesser violent expression of the nationalist feelings of

the Sindhis vis-à-vis the Balochs.

4.4.4 Mohajir Identity Politics

The „ruling oligarchy‟ of Pakistan in 1947, very craftily, directed the refugees from

Northern and Central India on the way to Sindh. Additionally, the Sindhi Hindus, the

overwhelming majority of the urban population, were driven out by „deliberately

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instigated communal riots‟. In this manner, the population of Sindh was „radically and

irrevocably restructured‟ (Alavi, 1989, p. 240).

The new Sindhis – the Mohajirs – settled in the urban centers of Sindh: mostly in

Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkar. They remained „ardent supporter of state

nationalism until 1970s‟ and voted for Islamic parties. When Bhutto (1971-77) came

in power, he benefited Sindhis vis-à-vis Mohajirs. Consequently, Mohajirs began to

protest against the discriminatory policies of Bhutto. In 1984, they formed their own

political party – Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) – to assert Mohajir identity

(Khan, 2004). And since 1980s, MQM has remained successful to maintain its

electoral support in Mohajir constituency.

Previously, Punjabis and Mohajirs had dominated the politics of Pakistan. While

Punjabis remained over-represented in the army and administration, Mohajirs

dominated the civil bureaucracy and political decision making centers (Jaffrelot,

2002). This relative privileged position of Mohajirs led them to identify themselves

with Pakistani state and Islamic ideology‟. They remained hostile toward regional

ethnic movements (Alavi, 1989). However, „gradually they lost grounds to Punjabis‟.

In addition, the military coup of Ayub Khan in 1958 „initiated a new Pathan-Punjabi

axis‟ and the Mohajirs retreated to the background (Jaffrelot, 2002). Once their

supremacy was challenged by the other communities, they withdrew their earlier

support for Pakistani nationalism and began to assert for Mohajir identity (Samad,

2002).

Mohajirs opposed the discriminatory policies in Sindh during Bhutto era. Contrary to

the provincial assemblies of Balochistan and NWFP, the Sindh Assembly passed a

Language Bill in 1972. Under the law, learning of Sindhi language was mandatory for

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the provincial officials. The Mohajirs saw this discriminatory move as a denial of

their right to employment. Consequently, Karachi witnessed massive demonstrations.

Introduction of quota system to distribute government jobs and placement in

educational institutions in urban-rural (40%-60%) areas was also limited to the

province of Sindh. It has been argued that Sindhis benefited from this scheme at the

expense of Mohajirs.

During the period of 1973-86, Mohajirs‟ representations in civil bureaucracy declined

from 33.5% to 18.3% in senior positions and from 30.1% to 18.2% in overall official

positions. Still, the „ethnic composition of the military–bureaucratic oligarchy‟

gradually shifted even further in favor of Punjabis and Pashtuns at the expenses of

Mohajirs. This development „exacerbated age-old dissatisfaction‟ and consequently

the „sense of relative deprivation‟ set the stage for Mohajir identity politics (Samad,

2002).

At the outset, in 1980s, Mohajirs entered into an alliance with Sindhis against the

„outsiders‟ – the Pashtun, Baloch and Punjabi settlers. The aversion between Mohajirs

and Pashtuns turned into a series of ethnic clashes over the death of a Mohajir school

girl in an accident with a Pashtun-driven mini-bus. The Pashtuns collaborated with

Punjabis and the „Punjabi-Pashtun Ittehad‟ (Union) emerged in response to the

Mohajir politics, in March 1987 (Talbot, 2000).

The leadership of Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Mohajir National Movement) – „an

urban, youthful and organizationally well-knit party‟ – and its activists represent the

lower middle class who have experienced unemployment (Malik, 1997). The MQM‟s

„Charter of Resolutions‟ (Qarardad-i-Maqasid), mainly expressed the Mohajir

grievances against the outsiders. The „Charter‟ suggested that twenty years permanent

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residence must be the requirement to get Sindhi domicile – a certificate that classify

an individual as Sindh‟s resident to get the federal/provincial job on the basis of

prescribed quota; all non-Sindhi police officers serving in Sindh must be transferred

to their home provinces and only the people of Sindh should be recruited in future ;

the influx of workforce in Sindh must be blocked ; the local bus services in the urban

centers of Sindh should be given away to the concerned metro/municipal/city

corporations, and licenses should be issued to only literate drivers; Afghans refugees

must be constrained to the refugee camps in the NWFP and Balochistan; Biharis must

be allowed to settle in Pakistan; a revised federal quota, based on a fresh census,

should be executed in Sindh ; and the „outsiders‟ must not be allowed to buy property

in Sindh (Ather, 2006,pp. 107-121). The „Charter‟ suggests that the Mohajirs were

more worried about the „outsiders‟ than the Sindhis at that moment. However, by

1988, with the entrance into participatory politics, Mohajirs encountered with Sindhis;

and the Pashtun-Mohajir violence was largely replaced with Sindhi-Mohajir conflict

(Talbot, 2000, pp.233-34).

MQM achieved a remarkable electoral support in Karachi and Hyderabad and

emerged as a sole representative of urban Sindh. It entered into alliances and then left

alliances with governments of Ms Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif at federal level and in the

province of Sindh. Equally, Karachi witnessed the most terrible period in1990s when

its „level of violence invited comparison to Beirut and Mogadishu‟ (Christine, 2005).

The violence reached at its peak in the 1994-96 periods, claiming over 5,000 lives

according to official figures‟. Repeatedly22, successive governments were forced to

call army to maintain law and order situation in the city (Kennedy, 2003, pp. 154-55).

In short, the political violence in Karachi swallowed some 9000 lives during the 1985-

98 periods23. MQM resented against the alleged maltreatment of Mohajirs during

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military operations and their under-representation in national and provincial

institutions. In 1994, MQM devised another list of demands to guarantee Mohajirs‟

rights: Muhajireen Kay Ainein Aur Buniadi Huquq (the constitutional and

fundamental rights of Mohajirs). MQM demands included the termination of the

operation clean up initiated by the military in Karachi; the proportional representation

for Mohajirs in federal and provincial parliaments; an increase in the urban quota

from 7.6% to 9.5% and from 40% to 60% for federal and provincial jobs respectively;

the rotation of the posts of governor and chief minister of Sindh province between

Mohajirs and Sindhis; proportional share for urban Sindh in federal and provincial

development funds; settlement of Biharis in Pakistan ; the proportional share in

police jobs; an adequate share of admissions in educational and professional

institutions; an autonomy for Karachi metropolitan and Hyderabad municipal

corporation; the withdrawal of decisions regarding the division of Hyderabad

municipal corporation and the establishment of Malir district in Karachi and Liayri

development authority; and the rehabilitation and compensation for the affected

populace of Karachi (Nusrut, 1994, pp. 77-93).

Gradually Mohajirs distanced themselves from the earlier demand of being

recognized as the „fifth nationality‟ of Pakistan, along with Punjabis, Sindhis,

Pashtuns, and Balochs. Subsequently, Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Mohajir National

Movement) was renamed as Muttahida Qaumi Movement (Joint National Movement)

in 1997 ; and since then its leadership has „adopted a more inclusive outlook away

from Mohajirism‟ yet the voting pattern in Sindh suggests that „it relies essentially on

the Mohajir vote‟(Waseem , 2006).

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Regardless of its distinctive nature and tactics, the political violence in the urban

Sindh, seems to suggest – likewise its counterparts in rural Sindh and Baloch

countryside – that it is the quest for sharing power that underpins the political

mobilization along ethnic lines.

4.4.5 Siraiki Movement

Punjab is the largest province of Pakistan in terms of population (73.6 millions in

1998); and the internal differences in such enormous population are inevitable. Within

Punjab, three well-known groups/regions may be recognized on the linguistic and

geographical basis – the Punjabi speaking, Central Punjab; the Pothowhari speaking,

Northern Punjab; and the Siraiki speaking, Southern Punjab.

Central Punjab is the most developed region of Pakistan. It is the host of provincial

capital (Lahore) and is the most developed industrial zone in the country. It is the

„heart of Pakistan‟s agrarian economy, and its educational institutions produce

Pakistan‟s bureaucrats‟ (Shah, 1997, pp. 124-125). On the other hand, the Northern

Punjab has remained the „principal recruiting ground‟ of the Pakistan army. Thus, „the

civil-military officers, administrators and businessmen from the Central and the

Northern Punjab, together make „the Punjabi ruling group‟ (Shackle, 1977). And the

Siraikis of the Southern Punjab – a relatively poorer and marginalized region –

popularly term the Central and Northern Punjab “jointly” as the „Upper Punjab‟. The

term, perhaps, denotes the deprivation and marginality of Southern Punjab vis-à-vis

Upper Punjab. Samad (2007, p. 116) has rightly observed that „the Siraiki-speaking

areas have made a conscious and explicit attempt to distance themselves from the

dominant groups in Punjab‟.

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Siraiki identity is „still very new‟ phenomenon, and the people who are „deemed to be

Siraiki-speaking‟ had different history. The people of Bahawalpur belonged to a

princely state that became a part of Punjab in 1970. „Riyasti‟ remained the language

of majority in this region. Multan remained a part of earlier Sindh and „Multani‟ was

the language of the area. The people of Dera Ghazi Khan and the surroundings had a

language variety called „Derewal‟ and have historically „tended toward Baloch

identity‟ (Ahmed, 1998).

For a longer period, the demand for improved recognition of the Siraiki language

remained a vehicle for Siraikis to express their desire for a more equitable treatment.

And it was only in 1990s that they tied themselves with other „oppressed

communities‟ of smaller units and entered into an alliance called the Pakistan

Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM). This alliance supported the demand of

Siraikis for a separate province i.e. Siraikistan. Siraikis, with allies, demanded for

autonomy, adequate representation in defense forces, equivalence and parity in

representation for the people of all the federating units in the federal bodies, services

and other institutions24.

Siraiki political parties had no appeal for the majority of Siraiki speaking people.

Despite their efforts to build up support for Siraiki movement by stressing the

marginalization of Siraiki speaking community, they lacked electoral support and

performed badly in various general and local elections. Nevertheless, the Siraiki issue

is an important factor in the politics of region. In many areas there is tension between

local Siraiki speakers and Punjabi settlers. By comparing poling station results from

Punjabi settler villages with those from local Siraiki villages, it becomes obvious that

the former tend to support the PML-N and the latter the PPP (wilder, 1995).

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The local aristocracy of Siraiki region had prominent position in the mainstream

parties, and is well incorporated into Punjabi ruling class. This incorporation has led

to argument that Siraikis will become more and more amenable to resolving their

problems in multi-ethnic contexts (Ahmed, 1998, P. 276).

4.5 Alternative Explanations of Ethnic Mobilization: A Matter of Non-

consociational Mechanisms or a Case of Centralized Federal Settings?

After an overview of the ethno-nationalistic movements of Pakistan in the previous

section, it has been attempted here to investigate the two alternative explanations for

this regional/ ethnic/linguistic opposition in Pakistan. As it has been mentioned earlier

in this chapter, federations may vary at the level of centralization, and in the forms of

governance. On the basis of their distinctive features, federations can be branded as

centralized or decentralized, and consociational or majoritarian federations. It has

been argued that the “institutions matter” and “federations in ethnically divided

societies can either exacerbate or contain conflict” (Adeney, 2009). Hence, this

section evaluates two25 explanations of the ethnic mobilization in Pakistan. These

alternative explanations link ethnic mobilization with the federal structure of Pakistan.

The substitute explanations are that:

A. The absence of consociational mechanisms has caused much of the conflict in

Pakistan (Adeney, 2009).

B. A relatively centralized federal design undermines the capacity of Pakistani

federation to manage ethnic diversity (Mushtaq, 2009).

Both explanations are not, necessarily, mutually exclusive. But, the constitutional

features of a consociational federation differ from a majoritarian decentralized

federation. Adeney (2009) has argued that non-consociational features of a federation

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have greatly “influenced the identity formation and articulation in Pakistan”.

Consociational elements, as it has been already discussed in detail, include grand

coalition, proportionality, segmental autonomy, and mutual veto over vital issues. She

has asserted that the “tensions between different groups in Pakistan would be

lessened” by applying proportionality element of consociationalism. She has

substantiated this argument by narrating that “Pashtuns in NWFP possess a strong

sense of identity, but they have not seen this as incompatible with their membership of

Pakistan. One reason for this is their co-option in the core institutions of state”.

However, she acknowledges that “proportionality, on its own, would not solve all

conflicts” because some communities have tiny population. She maintains that

Sindhis and Mohajirs are more concerned about the “recognition of language and

education rights”. She concludes that the absence of consociational mechanisms has

caused much of the conflict. On the other hand, Mushtaq (2009) has argued that

though it has a formal federal system, the Pakistani federation operates relatively in a

unitary fashion. The centralization of power and intervention of central authorities in

provincial matters has been remained a norm of the polity. He maintained that the

Pakistan‟s history depicts centralization similarities between civilian regimes and

dictatorial periods. He asserts that “this political centralization caused a sense of

marginalization and alienation in smaller units”. Consequently, this sense of

marginality “set the stage for political violence and mobilization along ethnic lines”.

The following paragraphs attempt to investigate the relevancy of two explanations

with various ethno-nationalistic movements of Pakistan. In turn, this analysis will

expose the strengths and weaknesses of the proposals for consociational mechanisms

and decentralization.

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4.5.1 Pashtuns

Despite having a strong sense of distinctiveness, Pashtuns are not a cohesive group.

They are internally divided by religious factions, ideology, and political objectives.

The Pashtuns of NWFP and Balochistan have different representative political parties.

While, ANP is a popular Pashtun party in NWFP, PKMAP dominates in the Pashtun

belt of Balochistan. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that more Pashtuns polled

their votes for mainstream parties in various general elections of Pakistan (1988-2008)

than the Pashtun parties for federal and provincial assemblies 26. This pattern of

electoral support suggests that the Pashtun identity does not imply identity with the

ANP. ANP has some important contenders in the Pashtun constituency of NWFP. If

ANP is not a sole spokesman of Pashtuns, it would be unrealistic to stress over the

inclusion of ANP in every grand coalition at provincial and federal level. Same is the

case of PKMAP in Balochistan. Therefore, the grand coalition element of

consociationalism is not relevant to the representation issues of Pashtuns.

Adeney (2009) has observed that Pashtuns have overrepresented in military and due

to this overrepresentation; they have not “pursued a secessionist agenda despite their

strong sense of identity”. The available data on military confirms the relative

overrepresentation of Pashtuns in armed forces. But the representation of military is

unevenly distributed among various regions of Pashtuns. Cohen (1987, p.318) has

observed that almost “75% of all military ex-servicemen come from only three

districts of the Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jehlum, and Attack (Cambellpur), and two

adjacent districts of the NWFP (Kohat and Mardan)”. This evidence suggests that

Pashtuns of various regions have been unevenly represented in armed forces. Overall,

Pashtuns constitute absolute majority in eighteen districts of NWFP 27. Therefore,

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overrepresentation of only two districts of NWFP in armed forces can‟t be justified as

a single explanatory factor for the fall down of Pashtunistan movement.

Pashtuns have been remained least concerned about the recognition of their language

and culture than Sindhis and Mohajirs. Coalition government of NAP-JUI in NWFP,

in 1972, did not propose any substantial change in language and/or educational

policies. Similarly, the present ANP‟s government is also quiescent on these matters.

This reality indicates the irrelevancy of segmental autonomy for Pashtuns. Territorial

grievances of NWFP or Pashtun region, like NFC Award and Kalabagh dam project,

have been, more or less, met through inter-provincial dialogue. This development

makes the veto power element of consociationalism irrelevant for Pashtuns, at least, at

the moment. In this way, the all four elements of consociational mechanism seem

least relevant to the identity politics of Pashtuns. It is also important to mention that

ANP has not proposed proportional electoral system, a key element of

consociationalism, in its electoral manifesto.

Subsequently, it is important to note why the Pashtuns associated with Khudai

Khidmatgar Tehrik in 1947 and then with National Awami Party (NAP) in 1970s

resisted against the central authorities. Why Dr. Khan Sahib, the younger brother of

Ghaffar Khan and ex-chief minister of NWFP whose government was dismissed in

1947, agreed to become the chief minister of the West Pakistan after the introduction

of one-unit scheme in 1950s. Why Ghaffar Khan declared in early 1970s that their

demand for Pashtunistan has been fulfilled. The straight forward answer to these

questions is that this political group was driven out from office of the government in

1947 and 1973 by the central authorities but was provided an opportunity to join

government in 1955 and 1972. It was the installation of NAP-JUI government in

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NWFP that led Ghaffar Khan to declare that Pashtunistan issue has been ended. This

account seems to suggest that it is the interference of central authorities in provincial

or regional matters that influence the identity formation and articulation among

various groups of Pakistan.

ANP is asserting for greater autonomy28. It suggests that federation should retain only

the control of defense, foreign affairs, and currency. It intends to strengthen the

Senate, the federal chamber, with the power to initiate the money bills and to approve

the higher appointments. These proposals seem to suggest the trust of ANP in

federalism. ANP‟s demand for renaming the NWFP as Pukhtunkhwa has been

fulfilled. Thus, a relatively decentralized federal design can meet the requirements of

Pashtuns.

4.5.2 Balochs

Discussing the internal conflicts of various groups of Pakistan, Siddiqi (2010) has

observed that “though members of a single ethnic group have a common language,

culture, religion or other features, this is not necessarily a sign of unity and

commonness of purpose”. This notion is empirically verifiable in the case of Baloch

nationalism. Balochs are a tiny minority that constitutes 3.5% of the total population

of Pakistan (Census Report, 1998). Despite their small size of population, Balochs

have several political parties and groups29. In addition, more Balochs polled votes for

mainstream parties than the Baloch parties 30. The Baloch groups have different

objectives and goals over how to best achieve the goals of Baloch community.

Furthermore, various factions have joined coalition governments in Islamabad and

Quetta in recent past. In this given situation, it is hardly possible to determine which

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group should be provided compulsory membership of grand coalition at federal and

provincial level to ensure Baloch representation.

Adeney (2009) has admitted that proportionality is least concerned with Balochs

because they are a very small section of the population. The reserved quota of federal

jobs for Balochistan is 3.5%. The quota system worked well for Balochistan as its

representation in federal bureaucracy rose from 2.5% in 1973 to 3.1% in 1983. But, it

is noteworthy that it is the representation of Balochistan and not the Balochs. Pashtuns

of Balochistan dominates in the bureaucracy of Balochistan. Still, proportionality

seems misfit for up lift the Baloch representation in bureaucracy. However, the

distribution of Balochistan quota31 between Pashtun belt and Baloch countryside

could work.

Balochs are very touchy about their language and culture. But, the Balochi language is

a relatively less developed language yet. Consequently, various governments of

Baloch nationalists like Attaullah Mengal (1972), Akbar Bugti (1988), and Akhtar

Mengal (1997) did not introduce any substantial shift in their policies concerning

language and educational policies. Baloch‟s territorial grievances can also be met

within the framework of federal design. Therefore, consociationalism is not a

requirement to address the Baloch question.

Balochs have mobilized more frequently and more markedly against the central

authorities in post-1971 Pakistan. The most famous uprising of 1970s was a

consequence of central authorities‟ interference into the provincial matters. Mengal‟s

government in Balochistan was dismissed in February 1973 on the grounds of

lawlessness and failure to comply with central government directives. His removal

from the office resulted in a conflict between his supporters and the centre. This

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confrontation continued up to 1977. It is imperative to note the timings and

geographical scope of this conflict. This conflict started aftermath the removal of

provincial government and the Baloch tribal areas of Marri-Mengal tribes were the

real battle grounds. However, Akbar Bugti32agreed to hold the office of governor of

Balochistan during this conflict. This displays the internal divisions of Balochs. The

evidence shows that the Balochs entered into tripartite accord in 1972 and installed

their government at Quetta, but they entered into an armed conflict with the central

authorities after the removal of their government from office. Therefore,

centralization of political power is the key explanatory variable of this conflict. The

same is the case with other Baloch conflicts. Balochs have been remained quiescent

and had joined various coalition cabinets at Islamabad and Quetta during the civilian

period (1988-99) in post-Zia era. Balochs were marginalized during the Musharraf

period as a consequence of a coalition between MMA and PML-Q in Balochistan.

This marginality resulted in another armed conflict of Balochs with the central

authorities. This account seems to suggest that decentralization of political power

rather than consociational mechanisms have more relevancy and potential to manage

the Baloch issues.

4.5. 3 Sindhis

Sindhis are the second largest ethno-linguistic group of Pakistan that constitutes

14.6% population of Pakistan (Census Report, 1998). Despite the common language

and culture, Sindhis are a diverse society. Many settlers, particularly Balochs, have

been assimilated in the Sindhi culture. It has been argued that Sindhis are internally

divided, a division which is caused primarily by political differences (Siddiqi, 2010).

A large majority of Sindhis have supported the ideology and vision of PPP, one of the

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mainstream parties of Pakistan that believe in a federal Pakistan. Still, various factions

of PML have considerable electoral support in Sindhi-speaking regions. The

hardliners, like Jeay Sindh and Awami Tehrik, have very limited support. Although,

Sindhis are members of a single ethnic group, they have different political objectives

and goals over how best to achieve the goals of the Sindhi community. For example,

difference of opinion can be seen between Jeay Sindh 33 and Awami Tehrik. In fact,

the Jeay Sindh has also now splintered into more than half a dozen different factions

(Siddiqi, 2010). Nevertheless, Sindhis have been remained overrepresented in high

echelon of the state. Since 1971, Sindhis occupied the office of prime minister for

more than eleven years and the office of president for three years. PPP has remained

the vehicle of this inclusion of Sindhis at the federal centre. As Sindhis are majority in

the province of Sindh, they do not require any grand coalition to share power at

provincial level. Therefore, grand coalition element of consociationalism has no

relevancy with the case of Sindhis.

Sindhis have under-representation in civil military bureaucracy. However, they have

benefited from the rural-urban (60-40%) quota system introduced by Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto in Sindh. Their ratio in federal bureaucracy had risen from 3.01% in 1973 to 5.
34
4% in 1983 against their specified quota of 11.4% . This trend shows that they are

gradually acquiring their share in civil bureaucracy. It is pertinent to mention that

Sindh is the only province of Pakistan that divides its quota of federal jobs between

rural Sindh and urban Sindh. It has been discussed that Mohajirs are the largest group

in urban centers of Sindh; and Sindhis are the overwhelming majority in rural Sindh.

Therefore, the quota of federal jobs for rural Sindh, 11.4%, is in effect quota for the

Sindhis. For this reason, Mohajirs have been advocating for the removal of this quota

system. Furthermore, it has been reported that Pakistan army has decided to

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encourage Baloch and Sindhi youth to join the armed forces 35. Hence, it is hoped that

the current arrangements to strengthen the Sindhis‟ representation in civil military

bureaucracy will work and the disparity would be lessened with the passage of time.

Adeney (2009) has rightly observed that Sindhis are more concerned about the issues

of the recognition of language and education rights. Sindhi is the most advanced

regional language of Pakistan. In fact, it had been remained a medium of instruction

in Sindh during British rule. The provincial government of Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, a

Sindhi landlord, made an unsuccessful attempt to revive its earlier status. However,

Sindhis say that their language and culture is so rich that they are not worried about its

survival36. The territorial grievances of Sindhis such as NFC Award and Kalabagh

dam project have been met, recently. Thus, the mutual veto element of consociational

democracy is least concerned to the Sindhis case.

To sum up, this story seems to suggest that Sindhis have some concerns about their

representation and segmental autonomy. But, PPP has been, very successfully,

involved Sindhis in national politics. Therefore, the absence of segmental autonomy

or under-representation in military will not cause any horrible threat to the survival of

the federation.

Moreover, in post-1971 Pakistan, Sindhis have protested sporadically and mildly than

Balochs but strongly than Pashtuns. The substantial protest took place after the

removal of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto from government in 1977, by the military

establishment. While, Bhutto had violated the federal norms of polity during his rule

by intervening in Balochistan and NWFP, the formal federal parliamentary system of

Pakistan operated more likely a presidential unitary system during Zia regime

(Mushtaq, 2009). In 1983, PPP and allies launched the movement for restoration of

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democracy (MRD) all over the country. However, interior Sindh revolted vigorously.

It has been argued that MRD aimed at strengthening the federation by preserving and

protecting the genuine interests of four federating units. 37 MRD agreed that “after the

restoration of democracy, the 1973 constitution should be amended to effect that it

provided a four subject center leaving behind all the residuary powers for the

provinces” (Hussain, 1989, p.191). Hence, it can be argued that the popularity of

MRD movement in Sindh was underpinned by the Sindhis‟ desires for greater

autonomy. Finally, the Sindhi resentment subsided with the restoration of civilian rule

at the end of Zia regime in 1988. Since then, Sindhis have not challenged writ of the

state. It is important to note that Sindhis are more concerned about the provincial

autonomy. The evidence shows that PPP leadership from Sindh is more vocal over

autonomy issues than the Punjabi leaders of PPP 38.

Therefore, it can be argued that centralization of political power is a key concern of

Sindhis. So, relatively decentralized governance would manage the Sindhis

grievances.

4.5.4 Mohajirs

Mohajirs are also not a monolithic group. Siddiqi (2010) has elaborated the inter-

ethnic competition and ethnic conflict in Mohajir community in detail. He has

recognized three smaller parties of Mohajirs that are competing with the dominant

Mohajir party, MQM. These parties include Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Haqiqi) or

Mohajir National Movement, Mohajir Ittehad Tehrik (MIT) or Mohajir Unity

Movement, and Mohajir Rabita Council (MRC) or Mohajir Linkage Council.

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MQM-H is a splinter group of MQM. It resulted from the differences within MQM in

1990s when a debate started within MQM over the renaming of MQM from Mohajir

Qaumi Movement to Muttahida Qaumi Moment. The leadership of MQM was making

efforts to transform MQM from an ethnic to a multiethnic party. They intend to

broaden their constituency beyond the urban centers of Sindh, namely Karachi and

Hyderabad. There were also some personnel clashes among the various factions of the

party. Both groups, MQM and MQM-H, remained very hostile towards each other and

Karachi witnessed political violence in 1990s. During the Operation Clean Up, in

1990s, MQM-H‟s “youths were responsible for carrying out raids against the MQM

most often than not supported by the Army itself” (Siddiqi, 2010).

Though, Mohajirs are mainly settled in Karachi and Hyderabad, a considerable

number of Mohajirs is also settled in smaller urban centers and towns of Sindh. They

have a different state of affairs and vision. It has been argued that MIT has remained

more popular than MQM in these smaller urban centers when the “latter was allied

with Syed‟s Jeay Sindh” in 1980s. MRC is another competitor of MQM in Mohajir

constituency. Some Mohajir elders, in 1988, formed MRC to counter MQM‟s

inclinations toward ethnic identity. This group prefers the term “community” than

“nationality” for Mohajirs. It welcomed the army operation against MQM in 1990s

and “praised the army for its role and stated that the operation was indeed in the

benefit of the Mohajirs” (Siddiqi, 2010).

This account of internal divisions of Mohajirs seems to suggest that Mohajir identity

does not, necessarily, imply identity with the Muttahida Qaumi Movement. Siddiqi

(2010) asserts that “many Mohajirs do not identify with the politics of MQM and

Altaf Hussain and chose to remain neutral. Some of them are still drawn towards the

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politics of Haqiqi and MIT which implies the fact that MQM might be the most

dominant of Mohajir parties but it does not command the support and allegiance of all

Mohajirs”. This description challenges the argument that MQM should be provided

space in grand coalition at provincial and national level as a representative of

Mohajirs.

Mohajirs have been remained over represented in vital national institutions. Though

the introduction of rural-urban quota system in Sindh has undermined their earlier

position, they are still overrepresented in civil bureaucracy. They have reasonable

representation in military as well. They have benefited from the high echelon of

politics. For example, Musharraf (1999-2008) was himself a Mohajir and was

criticized for his ties with MQM. It is pertinent to not that Karachi that witnessed the

most terrible period in1990s have been remained remarkably quiescent in Musharraf

period. Therefore, representation is not vital issue for Mohajir case. Consequently,

proportionality element of consociationalism has no relevancy with the case of

Mohajirs.

Mohajirs are Urdu-speaking community and Urdu is the lingua franca of Pakistan.

Therefore, Mohajirs are not worried about the Urdu. However, their interests were

threatened when Sindh Assembly passed a Language Bill in 1972 stating that the

learning of Sindhi language would be compulsory for provincial officials. The

Mohajirs agitated against this move and the government had to withdraw this rule.

Therefore, currently Mohajirs have no linguistic or cultural concerns. So, segmental

autonomy is not a requirement of Mohajirs. Similarly, since 1990s, MQM is

advocating the territorial grievances attached with the province of Sindh and the

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Karachi. Most of the territorial issues have been already settled down. Thus,

consociational elements are extraneous to the Mohajirs.

It is noteworthy that MQM is asserting for its multiethnic outlook since 1990s. It has

been renamed to incorporate other communities. It has been advancing territorial

grievances of its province, Sindh, more vigorously. This suggests MQM‟s inclinations

to become a mainstream party of federal character39. MQM believes in federalism and

has been asserting for provincial autonomy40. Nevertheless, MQM has not suggested

any consociational element like proportional electoral system or segmental autonomy

in its proposed autonomy bill.

Therefore, it seems to suggest that a relatively decartelized federal set-up will satisfy

the Mohajir demands. Hence, decentralized federalism rather than consociationalism

is the best option for Mohajir case.

4.5.5 Siraikis

As it has been discussed in previous section of this chapter, the movement of Siraikis‟

is at its infancy stage and no substantial protest has been seen in the southern Punjab,

the Siraiki-speaking region. The main issue of this region, currently, is the demand for

a separate province. However, there is disagreement over the name and boundaries of

the proposed province. Some are arguing for a Siraiki province based on Siraiki

identity, namely Siraikistan. Others suggest a province on administrative basis,

namely Southern Punjab. Still, the people of Bahawalpur41 are asserting for

Bahawalpur province outside the proposed Siraiki province. Siraiki demands and

grievances are completely compatible with the federal design and require no

consociational mechanisms for their fulfillment.

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4.6 Conclusion

This chapter seems to suggest that Pakistan fulfills minimum requirements of a

federation. The 1973 constitution of Pakistan distributes legislative, administrative,

and financial powers between federation and federating units. The degree of

legislative and fiscal decentralization in Pakistani case, in comparison with the

contemporary federations, reveals that it is not a deviant case. However, it appears a

relatively centralized on the continuum. But, it is political centralization rather than

legislative or fiscal that matters in the Pakistani case. This chapter contends that

ethnic mobilization and political instability in Pakistan is the result of discrepancy in

the theory and practice of federal arrangements. Though, the Pakistani federation

fulfils minimum criteria of federalism but it operates more likely as a unitary system.

Various central governments intervened in provincial affairs, and these interventions

were justified by the Article 149 of the constitution that “authorizes the federal

government to intervene in a province to protect it from internal disturbance and to

ensure that its government is carried on in accordance with the constitution”.

Furthermore, the survey of the politics of identity in Pakistan suggests that

centralization of political power is the key factor connected with the political

mobilization in Pakistan. More mobilizations are protests against central interventions

in provincial or regional matters. But, these mobilizations were limited to the groups

that thought they were deprived of their right of self-rule. These protests were

prominent in particular regions. It has been also explored that these groups remained

internally divided.

Finally, it has been observed that it is not the absence of consociational features but

the centralization of political power that limits the capacity of Pakistani federation to

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manage ethnic diversity. However, the argument that Pakistan „need to adopt and

maintain consociational governance to practice democracy‟ needs a careful

examination. The next chapter will explore, whether or not consociationalism is a

realistic option for Pakistan to manage ethnic diversity.

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Endnotes

1
British introduced various constitutional formulas in India. These constitutional formulas include the
Indian Councils Act 1861, India Councils Act 1892, The Government of India Act 1909, India Act
of 1919, and Government of India Act 1935.
2
The concurrent list has been abolished through the eighteenth amendment of the constitution in 2010
after the submission of this thesis.
3
The article 142 states that “(a) Parliament shall have exclusive power to make laws with respect to
any matter in the Federal Legislative List; and (b) Parliament, and a Provincial assembly shall have
power to make laws with respect to any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List; and (c) Provincial
Assembly shall have and parliament shall not, have power to make laws with respect to any matter
not enumerated in either the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative
List”(Constitution of Pakistan, 1973) .
4
The article 143 illustrate that in case of inconsistency between federal and provincial laws with
respect to any matter enumerated in the concurrent legislative list, the act of parliament, whether
passed before or after the act of the provincial assembly shall prevail and the act of the provincial
assembly shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void” (Constitution of Pakistan, 1973).
5
J L Pumphrey to Sir Alec Douglas (Annual review of 1972). FCO 37/1332 .File was accessed at National
Achieve Center, London.
6
William Crawley (Constitution of Pakistan). FCO 37/1333. File was accessed at National Achieve
Center, London.
7
The autonomy bill proposed by MQM is available at its official webpage at www.mqm.org
8
the Federation may, if it deems necessary to acquire any land situate in a Province for any purpose
connected with a matter with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws, require the
Province to acquire the land on behalf and at the expense, of the Federation or, if the land belongs
to the Province, to transfer it to the Federation on such terms as may be agreed or, in default of
agreement, as may be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan”.
9
See autonomy bill at www.mqm.org
10
The article states that “If the President, on receipt of report from the Governor of a Province or
otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Province can not
be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the President may, or if a
resolution in this behalf is passed at a joint sitting shall, by Proclamation, (a) assume to himself , or
direct the Governor of the Province to assume on behalf of the President, all or any of the functions
of the Government of the Province, and all or any of the powers vested in, or exercisable by, any
body or authority in the Province, other than the Provincial Assembly; (b) declare that the powers of
the Provincial Assembly shall exercisable by, or under the authority of, [Majlis-e-Shoora
(Parliament)]; and (c) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President
to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including
provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of the Constitution
relating to any body or authority in the Province.”

141
11
For detail see: Editorial of the Daily Dawn, International Edition, May 2, 2005.
12
For detail see: Editorial of the Daily Dawn, International Edition, May 2, 2005.
13
For detail see: Government of Pakistan, (1975). Supreme Court judgment on dissolution of NAP.
14
The province of NWFP is renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through the eighteenth amendment in
the constitution of Pakistan in 2010 after the submission of this thesis.
15
The states of Kharan, Makran and Lasbella had already joined Pakistan.
16
For detail see: International Crisis Group, Asia Report, 2006.
17
Shaheen Mozaffar, „The Politics of Cabinet Formation in Pakistan: A study of Recruitment to the
Central Cabinets, 1947–1977‟, Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University, Ohio, 1980. Cited in Robert
G. Wirsing, The Baluchis and Pathans, Minority Rights Group Report no. 48 (Minority Rights
Group, London, 1981), p. 9.
18
Government of Pakistan, Report of Committee on Balochistan, November 2005.(Report no.7).
19
Government of Pakistan, Report of Committee on Balochistan, November 2005,.(Report no.7).
20
See views of the political parties on current issue of Balochistan in „Government of Pakistan,
Committee on Balochistan, November 2005, Report no.7
21
The MRD was composed of the following parties: the Pakistan People's Party, the Pakistan National
Party, the Pakistan Democratic Party, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Fazlur Rehman group), the Qaumi
Mahaz-i-Azadi, the Khaksar Tehrik, the Muslim League (Malik Qasim group), the Awami National
Party and the Pakhtoonkhtva NAP
22
military was called in Karachi to maintain law and order in1992; again in 1994 to 1996, ; and again
in 2000.
23
Zaffar Abbas cited in, Samad, Y. (2002). In and Out of Power but not down and Out: Mohajir
Identity Politics, In C. Jaffrelot, (Eds.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation (pp.63-84). London:
Zed Books Ltd.
24
Declaration of Oppressed Nations Movement. Adopted on 2 October 1998 at Islamabad Hotel,
Islamabad.
25
Only two explanations have been discussed here. It is partially for the reason of space and partially
because these are more relevant to this work.
26
Election results are available at the official website of Election commission of Pakistan and also have
been discussed in detail in the next chapter.
27
Ethno-linguistic composition of NWFP has been given in the figure 5-7 titled, “Ethno-linguistic
composition of Pakistan” in the next chapter.
28
ANP autonomy demands have been summarized in the figure 3-12 of the third chapter in this thesis.
29
For detail of Baloch parties see the figure 5-14 in the fifth chapter of this thesis.
30
For detail see the figure 5-14 in the fifth chapter of this thesis.
31
The quota of Sindh province has been distributed between rural and urban Sindh. Similarly, the
distribution of quota in Balochistan between Balochs and Pashtuns will lessened the disparity
between two dominant communities of Balochistan.
32
Recently, Akbar Bugti had led the Baloch rebellion during Musharraf period.

142
33
Jeay Sindh and Awami Tahreek are hardliner Sindhi nationalist parties that „never attracted the
support of more than 5-6% of the electorate nor have they ever won any directly elected National
Assembly seat‟ (Jones, 2002).
34
See figure 3-4 in the third chapter of this thesis.
35
This observation is based on the various statements published in daily news papers of Pakistan.
36
Interview of Ghous Ali Shah (November 2007), ex-chief minister of Sindh, at Pakistan Muslim
League office, London.
37
The member parties of MRD signed a four point declaration to cooperate with each other for the
achievement of (1) Lifting of the martial law immediately, (2) Restoration of the unanimously passed
1973 constitution with the amendments which had been made unanimously, (3) Holding of elections
according to the above constitution, (4) Guarantees to preserve and protect the genuine interests of the
four federating units of Pakistan (Hussain, 1989. p. 190).
38
This observation is based on the statements of various leaders of PPP from Sindh and Punjab,
published in daily newspapers.
39
However, despite its all efforts, MQM has remained unable to get some support outside the Mohajir
constituency of urban Sindh.
40
MQM‟s autonomy demands are available in the figure 3-12 of the third chapter in this thesis.
41
Bahawalpur had a provincial status before the one-unit scheme of 1955.

143
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148
Chapter No. 5

CONSOCIATIONALISM AS A REALISTIC OPTION FOR

PAKISTAN: AN ASSESSMENT

5.1 Introduction:

Despite the fact that the Pakistani nation is netted and bounded by the strong

sentiment of Islam, Pakistan has experienced numerous ethno-nationalist movements.

Soon after its creation, the nascent state had to face challenges of political

mobilization and ethnic strife. There are various explanations for this development.

Some experts have associated the rise and fall of ethno-nationalist movements with

the power sharing1. Others have tied it with exclusion, and suggested inclusion as a

remedy2. It is discussed in previous chapter that the management of ethnic diversity

has remained problematic in Pakistan because of the centralized federal system. It has

been asserted that though the Pakistani federation fulfills minimum criteria of a

federal system, it operates more like a unitary system. Conversely, some political

scientists have linked the inability of Pakistani federation to manage diversity to the

limitation of non-consociational federalism. These experts have suggested

consociational mechanism of power sharing to manage ethnic diversity in Pakistan.

Keeping in view the recommendation of consociationalists, this chapter attempts to

assess the relevancy of consociational democracy to the multiethnic society of

Pakistan. This assessment will enable us to learn whether or not consociationalism is a

realistic option for Pakistan to manage ethnic diversity.

Obviously, the central question of this chapter is: whether or not consociationalism is

a realistic option for the multiethnic society of Pakistan to manage diversity? To

address this question, author has applied the methodology used by Arend Lijphart

149
(1985) in case of South Africa. Inferring from the Lijphart‘s methodology, the broader

question of this chapter has been divided into three sub questions:

(a) Does Pakistani society encompass the favorable factors3 for consociational

democracy?

(b) Does the political leadership 4 of Pakistan seem capable of practicing power-

sharing arrangements?

(c) Is the degree of pluralism5 in the Pakistani case compatible with the

consociational arrangements?

These three sub-questions have been addressed in the subsequent three sections of this

chapter. The final section is reserved for some concluding comments.

5.2 Favorable Factors for Consociational Democracy and the Multiethnic Society
of Pakistan

The probability of an unstable democracy to become stable by adopting

consociational governance in a particular plural society can be estimated by

identifying the conditions that are conducive to the establishment and the maintenance

of consociational democracy. The author has attempted in this section to explore

whether or not favorable factors for consociational democracy are present in the

multiethnic society of Pakistan. Lijphart has included nine conditions in his revised

list of favorable factors for consociational democracy. These conditions are discussed

one by one in this section.

5.2.1 No Majority Segment

The first condition for establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy is

that there should not be any group having a dominant majority. The failure cases of

150
consociationalism like Cypriot (1963) and Ireland (1972) seem to suggest that Greek

Cypriots majority in Cypriot and the protestant majority in Ireland were responsible

for the breakdown of consociational arrangements. One can argue that Belgium and

Switzerland, the two original cases of consociationalism, have experienced

consociational democracy successfully despite substantial majorities: Flemish in

Belgium and German-speaking in Switzerland make clear majorities. However, it

should be noted that these segments remained ‗internally divided by religion and

ideology‘ (Lijphart, 1985, p. 120). Similarly, Hindus are in absolute majority in India

but they are ‗internally divided to such an extent that the country consists of

minorities only‘ (Lijphart, 1996). Therefore, according to Lijphart, India experienced

consociational democracy successfully in early ears. In the Pakistani case, Punjabis

make, nearly, a majority6. They have not been divided by religion, as Islam is the

dominant religion of the Punjabis. The class and ideology plays nominal role in the

political culture of Pakistan. Therefore, it can be argued safely that the relatively

dominant position of Punjabis in Pakistan is an obstacle for the establishment and

maintenance of consociational democracy. The figure 5-1 illustrates that the sizes of

various ethno-linguistic groups of Pakistan are dissimilar. The small sizes of

minorities make no match with the large size of Punjabis. This finding seems to

suggest that consociational democracy is not a viable solution for Pakistan.

Figure 5-1: Numerical Strength (%) of Ethno-linguistic Groups in Pakistan

(1998)
Language Punjabi Siraiki Sindhi Urdu(Mohajirs) Pashto Balochi Others
Overall 45.4 10.9 14.6 7.8 13.0 3.5 4.8
Urban 47.6 5.5 9.3 20.5 9.6 2.6 4.8
Source: (Kennedy, 2002)

151
5.2.2 Segments of Equal Size

Groups with roughly equal size are more likely to cooperate during the negotiations

for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1985).

Again, Pakistan does not fulfill this requirement. Pakistan is unevenly divided among

ethno-linguistic groups. It has a dominant Punjabi community on one hand and a

small minority of Balochs on the other. So this factor, also, suggests that the ethno-

linguistic composition of Pakistan is no more favorable for consociationalism.

Figure 5-2: Uneven size of ethno-linguistic groups in Pakistan

Urdu
Punjabi
Sindhi
Pashto
Balochi
Siraiki
Others

5.2.3 Small Number of Segments

The number of segments in a plural society is important for the establishment and

maintenance of consociationalism. According to Lijphart (1977, pp. 56-57), a society

with relatively few segments constitutes a more favorable base for consociational

democracy than the one with relatively few segments. He suggests that ‗cooperation

among groups becomes more difficult as the number of those participating in

negotiations increases‘. In previous work, he suggested that the presence of three or

152
four segments is conducive for consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1977). However,

in subsequent work, Lijphart (1985) suggested the number of segments from three to

five7. For the Pakistani case, as we have argued in the coming section, it is difficult to

discover the exact number of segments. However, the Government of Pakistan has

identified six ethno-linguistic groups in its census reports. As the number of segments

(ethno-linguistic groups) is close to the most favorable number, it seems to suggest

that the number of segments is not unfavorable for consociationalism.

5.2.4 Small Population Size

Modest and small size of population is always considered as a favorable condition for

consociational democracy. Lijphart (1977, p. 65) points out that all the European

consociational democracies are small countries. He argues that ‗small size has both

direct and indirect effects on the probability that consociational democracy will be

established and successful: it directly enhances the spirit of cooperativeness and

accommodation, and it indirectly increases the chances of consociational democracy

by reducing the burdens of decision making thus rendering the country easier to

govern‘. Moreover, he maintains that ‗ in small countries political leaders are more

likely to know each other personally than in larger countries, the decision making

process is less complex, and such countries generally do not conduct a very active

foreign policy‘ (Lijphart , 1985, p.123). These conditions facilitate power-sharing

process and ensure the successful operation of consociational democracy. Contrary to

smaller Western European consociational democracies, Pakistan is one of the world‘s

most populous states. Therefore, Pakistani case does not fulfill this requirement of

consociational democracy. Figures 5-3 and 5-4 demonstrate that Pakistani case has no

match, in terms of population size, with consociational democracies of the world.

153
 Figure 5-3: Population Size of Some Countries (2008)

S. No. World Ranking Country Population

1 6 Pakistan 171,852,793
2 25 South Africa 48,782,755
3 46 Malaysia 25,274,133
4 59 Netherlands 16,645,313
5 77 Belgium 10,403,951
6 91 Austria 8,205,533
7 94 Switzerland 7,581,520
8 126 Lebanon 4,038,024
9 157 Cyprus 1,066,817

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base available at: http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/broker accessed on August 2009

Figure 5-4: Comparison of Population Size of Consociational cases with Pakistan

Pakistan
South Africa
Malaysia
Netherlands
Belgium
Austria
Switzerland
Lebanon
Cyprus

5.2.5 External Threats

Lijphart (1996, p. 263) has argued that external threats to a state create cohesiveness

in the nation. Consequently, this cohesiveness promotes the prospects for a successful

consociational democracy. The development of consociational democracy in Holland,

Belgium, Austria and Switzerland during the First and Second World Wars seem to

suggest that the external threats in these countries strengthened the ties among the

subcultures at mass level and the ties between leaders and followers within the

154
subcultures. Experiences of these cases led the argument that ‗external dangers

promote internal unity‘.

Historically looking in Pakistan‘s case, the Muslims of India demanded a separate

homeland to escape Hindu domination. Therefore, during Pakistan movement, the

argument that ‗Islam is in danger‘ united the Muslims of majority provinces

overlooking regional tendencies. After partition, the Indian threat led Pakistan to

spend a lot on defense. Still, fear of Indian domination is a binding force within the

country.

According to Javed (2007), ―since its inception, Pakistan has been facing the

challenge of national security. Traditionally, the threat to Pakistan‘s security has been

external. However, today, it can be arguably asserted that the major threat to national

security in Pakistan emanates more from internal sources rather than external‖.

Currently, Pakistan is facing ‗the most unique, difficult and dreadful faces of

terrorism‘. Therefore, in given circumstances, Pakistan 8 seems to be getting more

favorable position for consociationalism on this account.

5.2.6 Overarching Loyalties

The presence of overarching loyalties is crucial for consociationalism. ―The divisive

and cohesive forces – cleavages and overarching loyalties – may operate

simultaneously, and the conflict potential of cleavages depends on the combined

effect of the two forces‖. Overarching loyalties may ―produce cohesion for the entire

society or for particular segments‖ (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 81-82). It has been argued that

overarching loyalties are supportive ‗for consociationalism if the divisions among the

155
segments are counterbalanced to some extent by an overarching sense of belonging

together‘ (Lijphart, 1985, p. 124).

Nationalism and religion may prove potentially cohesive forces. Pakistani

nationalism, based on Islam and Urdu langue, proved a unifying force after the

partition. Nonetheless, the common faith is a potential binding force for majority of

Pakistanis 9.

Pakistanis believes that ‗Islam is more vital to their identity than ethnicity or

nationality‘. A recent survey in Pakistan asked the respondents to choose which of

five identities –Pakistani, Muslim, individual, citizen of the world, and member of

your ethnic group – was ―most central to their sense of self or identity.‖ Some 61%

said that being a Muslim was the most central (another 31% said this was their second

choice.) The next most popular was, being Pakistani, which was the first choice of

29% (56% second choice). These findings substantiate the argument that Islam is a

binding force in Pakistani society (Fair et. al., 2008).

5.2.7 Socio-economic Equality

Socio-economic equality among individuals and groups has been considered essential

for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. Lijphart (1996,

p. 262) has considered it the second major factor for establishment and maintenance

of consociational democracy. It has been argued that relatively deprived segments in a

society may assert for ‗redistribution which constitutes the kind of zero-sum game

that is severe challenge for elite cooperation‘ (Andeweg, 2000, p. 522). Hence, the

grave disparities among segments may endanger the viability of consociation.

156
Although, socioeconomic differences within the all segments of Pakistani society are

evident, some poorer segments may easily be distinguished from the richer ones.

Greater regional disparities in Pakistan are no more conducive for the consociational

governance. The figure 5-5 shows regional disparities in Pakistan. Whereas, more or

less, the regional boundaries coincide with the boundaries of ethno-linguistic groups

in Pakistan, it is safe to say that socio-economic inequality lies among the various

groups.

Figure 5-5: Socio-economic Inequality in Pakistan

Indicator Pakistan Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan

HDI 0.541 0.557 0.540 0.510 0.499
Health Index 0.82 0.83 0.78 0.84 0.78
Educational Attainment Index 0.537 0.557 0.553 0.480 0.453
Literacy Ratio (% 1998) 45 46 51 37 36
Unemployment (% 1998) 19.68 19.1 14.43 26.83 33.48
Calculated and Compiled by Pakistan Statistical Year Book 2005, Census of Population 1998, and
Report of National Human Development 2003.

5.2.8 Geographical Concentration of Segments

Geographical concentration of segments is vital for the viability of consociation. It

has been argued that ―the clear boundaries between the segments of a plural society

have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the

chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility‖ (Lijphart,

1977, p.88). In the Pakistani case, apart from some dispersion of Punjabis and

Pashtuns, all ethno-linguistic groups are, more or less, geographically concentrated.

So, this relatively geographical concentration of segments suggests the compatibility

of consociational democracy with the multiethnic society of Pakistan. A complete

ethno-linguistic composition of Pakistan has been enumerated in the figure 5-6.

Figure 5-7 shows Regional bases of various ethno-linguistic groups of Pakistan.

157
Figure 5-6: Geographical Distribution of Ethno-linguistic Groups in Pakistan

158
 Figure 5-7: Ethno-linguistic Composition of Pakistan
Punjab NWFP Balochistan Sindh
District Punjabi Siraiki District Pashto Others District Balochi Pashto District Sindhi Urdu
Attack 87.2 0.1 Bannu 98.3 0.05 Kohlu 91.2 6.6 Jacobabad 94.1 0.5
Rawalpindi 83.9 0.4 Upper Dir 92.5 7.3 Chagi 93.7 3.1 Shikarpur 95.8 1.8
Jehlum 96.6 0.1 Lower Dir 99.4 0.5 Dera Bugti 95.9 0.7 Larkana 98.1 0.6
Chakwal 97.7 0.2 Swat 92.9 6.6 Barkhan 74.8 0.7 Sukkar 74.04 13.9
Sargodha 93.3 0.1 Shangla 95.4 4.3 Jaffar Abad 62.3 0.4 Ghotki 92.3 3.1
Khushab 96.8 0.6 Buner 96.6 3.1 Nasir Abad 54.9 0.2 Khairpur 93.9 1.4
Mianwali 74.2 12 Malakand 98.2 1.2 Bolan 58.0 1.0 N. Feroz 88.4 5.7
Faisalabad 97.5 0.6 Luki Marwat 99.3 0.0 Kalat 98.6 0.4 N. Shah 79.5 8.7
Jhang 95.9 0.1 Hangu 98.8 0.2 Mastung 80.1 5.9 Dadu 93.3 2.6
T.T.Singh 98.9 0.2 Karak 97.7 0.0 Khuzdar 96.7 0.4 Hyderabad 59.6 29.6
Gujranwala 97.3 0.1 Charsadda 99.4 0.1 Awaran 99.7 0.03 Badin 89.8 1.2
Hafizabad 98.7 0.1 Nowshera 91.0 3.7 Kharan 98.9 0.2 Thatta 95.7 12.0
Gujarat 98.0 0.0 Mardan 98.4 0.7 Lasbella 64.9 2.6 Sanghar 77.1 10.1
M.Bahudin 97.0 0.5 Swabi 96.4 2.8 Kech 99.2 0.1 M. P. Khass 61.7 18.3
Sialkot 97.1 0.1 Batgram 81.7 18.0 Gwadar 97.8 0.3 Umerkot 89.7 3.05
Norowal 98.0 0.1 Peshawar 85.6 8.8 Panjgur 99.6 0.04 Tharparker 99.0 0.09
Lahore 86.2 0.4 Tank 80.3 0.3 J. Magsi 68.8 0.06 Karachi-E 3.8 60.8
Kasur 88.2 0.7 Kohat 77.5 17.3 Quetta 27.6 29.9 Karachi-W 6.0 39.7
Okara 95.7 0.1 Haripur 8.9 88.5 Pishin 0.2 99.2 Karachi-S 11.4 25.7
Sheikhupura 98.0 0.3 Abbotabad 2.2 94.3 K. Abdullah 1.6 97.5 Karachi-C 1.6 73.6
Vehari 82.9 11.4 D.I. Khan 22.0 1.23 K. Saifullah 0.04 99.2 Malir 25.1 15.9
Sahiwal 98.1 0.1 Mansehra 26.6 72.9 Zhob 0.1 96.8 * * *
Pakpattan 95.9 0.0 Kohistan 3.9 95.9 Ziarat 0.07 99.5 * * *
Khanewal 81.2 5.8 Chitral 3.1 96.0 Loralai 3.4 92.1 8 * *
Bahawalnagar 94.6 1.2 * * * Musakhel 13.6 78.9 * * *
Multan 21.6 60.7 * * * Sibi 28.7 44.3 * * *
Lodhran 18.6 69.6 * * * * * * * * *
M.Garh 7.4 86.3 * * * * * * * * *
Bahawalpur 28.4 64.3 * * * * * * * * *
R. Y. Khan 27.3 62.6 * * * * * * * * *
D.G.Khan 1.3 80.3 * * * * * * * * *
Rajanpur 3.3 75.8 * * * * * * * * *
Layyah 32.6 62.3 * * * * * * * * *
Bhakar 17.5 73 * * * * * * * * *
Source: Collected & Calculated from District Census Reports of 1998. Note: Italics and Bold differentiates regions with different linguistic groups in a province.

159
5.2.9 Tradition of Compromise and Accommodation

Traditions of compromise and accommodation foster consociationalism (Lijphart,

1996, p. 263). It has been asserted that ‗plural societies may enjoy stable democratic

government if the political leaders engage in coalescent rather than adversarial

decision-making‘ (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 99-100).

A careful examination reveals that the traditions of compromise and accommodation

seem missing in political culture of south Asia. In 1947, India was divided partly due

to the failure of conflict resolution and disagreement over constitutional issues. Again

East Pakistan was separated in 1971 due to disagreement over the transfer of power

and autonomy issues. In post-1971 Pakistan, power-sharing arrangements through

tripartite accord between ruling party and opposition proved only short-lived in early

1970s. The post-Zia era (1988-99) also witnessed power politics and opportunism.

Only during Musharraf period, when it became evident that the military was not

inclined to surrender power to civilian leadership, the latter (especially the popular

leadership: Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) found themselves excluded from the

power-structure, and entered into an alliance (Mesaq-e-Jumhoriat).

We can even more strongly argue with supporting empirical evidence that Pakistan

lacks a tradition of compromise and political accommodation. But to avoid repetition,

we have to brief here because more attention has been devoted to this discussion in

another section of this chapter titled, ―Politics of Accommodation in Pakistan (1971-

2008)‖.

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Overall, evidence seems to suggest that compromise and accommodation is no more

an ingredient of Pakistani political culture. Therefore, Pakistan does not have

favorable settings for consociational governance.

5.2.10 Comparative Analysis of Favorable Conditions in Selected Countries

Lijphart has quantified the favorable conditions for consociational democracy in the

case of South Africa. Through a comparative judgment of selected cases, he argued

that favorable conditions are not unfavorable for South Africa. In this study, we have

expanded the comparison by including the cases of India and Pakistan in the

comparative analysis. The scores for the cases of South Africa, Belgium, Cyprus,

Lebanon, Malaysia, and Switzerland are borrowed from the Lijphart. The Indian case

has been assigned score in the light of Lijphart‘s notes on Indian case 10. For the

Pakistani case, scores for various favorable conditions have been assigned on the

findings of previous section. The comparative analysis reveals that Pakistan is at the

rear. Overall, it has scored - 3 (minus three); and only Cyprus, a famous failure case

of consociationalism, has more unfavorable rating than Pakistan. A complete account

of analysis is given in figure 5-8. Consociational arrangements were broken down in

Lebanon, though its score is + 2. Switzerland has the most favorable conditions and

its score is +8. South Africa and Belgium have the equal score of + 1. Consociational

arrangements proved short-lived in South Africa. Belgium has also experienced tough

times in the recent past. Majoritarian system of government is operating in India at the

moment. So, it seems not reasonable to suggest consociational arrangements for the

Pakistani case. In the next section, the selected cases have been classified on the basis

of their score in comparative analysis.

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 Figure 5-8: Rating Based on the Favorable Factors for Selected Countries

S. Conditions South Belgium Cyprus Lebanon Malaysia Switzerland India Pakistan11

No. Africa
1 No majority segment +2 -1 -2 +2 -1 -1 +1 -1
2 Segments of equal size +1 +1 -2 +1 -1 -2 +1 -2
3 Small number of segments -1 0 0 -1 +2 +2 -2 0
4 Small population size +1 +2 0 +2 +2 +2 -2 -2
5 External threats 0 0 -2 -2 0 0 0 +1
6 Overarching loyalties +1 0 -1 0 0 +2 1 +1
7 Socioeconomic equality -2 -1 -1 -1 -2 +1 0 -1
8 Geographical concentration of segments -1 -1 +1 -1 -1 +2 +1 +1
9 Traditions of accommodation 0 +1 0 +2 +1 +2 0 0
Total score +1 +1 -7 +2 0 +8 0 -3

Source: (Lijphart, 1985). Note: scores for the various favorable factors in cases of India and Pakistan have been assigned by the author

Figure 5-9: Favorable Factors and Pakistan

Hierarchical Clustering: Dendrogram
South Africa
Lebanon
Belgium
Malaysia
Cyprus
Pakistan
India
Sw itzer land
Note: this classification is based on the values of various cases in Figure 5-8

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Using the Minitab software, it has been attempted to classify the selected cases on the

basis of favorable conditions for consociational democracy. The software distributed

the eight cases into three clusters:

(a) South Africa, Lebanon, Belgium, and Malaysia are placed in the first cluster.

All cases of this cluster experienced consociational arrangements at some time

in their national history.

(b) Cyprus, Pakistan, and India are placed in the second cluster. Cyprus is a failed

case of consociational democracy; India experienced consociationalism but it

opted for some selective consociational measures in 1960s, and then turned to

the majoritarian democracy.

(c) Switzerland is the only case placed in third cluster. Switzerland has been

considered as a success story of consociational democracy.

This classification suggests that Pakistan is not coupled with a successful case of

Switzerland nor with the clear past cases of consociationalism. It has been placed with

a failed case of Cyprus and a ‗borderline‘ case of Consociationalism— India.

In brief, this section seems to suggest that Pakistan lacks favorable conditions for

establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. Therefore,

consociationalism does not seem a realistic option for Pakistan to manage ethnic

diversity. The next section is reserved to explore whether or not the political

leadership of Pakistan is too accommodative to practice consociational democracy.

5.3 Politics of Accommodation in Pakistan (1971-2008)

Consociationalism challenges the widely accepted proposition that it is difficult to

‗achieve and maintain stable democratic government in plural society‘. It asserts that

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‗the centrifugal tendencies inherent in plural society can be countered by the

cooperative attitude and behavior of the political leadership of different segments of a

society. Through this cooperative attitude, it is believed that democratic stability can

be achieved (Lijphart, 1977, p. 1). Lijphart (1985, p. 130) examined through the study

of South Africa that ―there are some hopeful signs that South Africa may have the

kind of strong and rational leadership required for consociational democracy‖. This

observation, along other favorable conditions, led Lijphart to suggest that

―consociationalism is a realistic option‖ for South Africa to experience stable

democratic governance. This argument demonstrates that the probability of success or

failure of consociational arrangements in plural societies may be assessed through

investigative ‗role of political leadership‘. The assessment of the attitude of political

elites towards power sharing-arrangements (their behavior with coalition partners and

respect for the mutual agreements) can establish a base for any policy

recommendation about consociational democracy.

Consociationalism is an empirical as well as a normative model. The empirical cases

of the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland witnessed ‗coalescent rather

than adversarial decision making‘ by the rational and cooperative leadership of those

countries (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 99-100).

The spirit of accommodation was an integral part of the Dutch politics and Lijphart

(1975, p. 103) has regarded it as ‗the secret of success of the Dutch politics‘. He has

used the term of accommodation in the ‗sense of settlement of decisive issues and

conflicts where only a minimal consensus exists‘. Dutch leadership successfully

managed to resolve conflictive issues and it was their desirability to preserve the

system. Catholic-Liberal coalition in Belgium and the post civil war grand coalition in

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Austria demonstrate the accommodative attitude of political leadership in these

countries.

That is the evidence of empirical cases that led Lijphart to predict that

consociationalism is a viable solution for plural societies having ‗rational and

cooperative leadership‘. The answer to the question whether consociationalism is a

viable solution for the multiethnic society of Pakistan, depends, along other favorable

requirements, on the role of political leadership. If the political leadership behaves

rationally and demonstrates accommodative attitude toward each other, it seems to

suggest that Pakistan can experience consociational governance. Though, it is not an

easier task to foresee the prospective behavior of human beings (behavior studies are

outside the scope of this study), the study of the past behaviors can help to trace the

leanings that might prevail in future. In this section, the author does not intend to have

an exhaustive analysis of the behavior of political leadership of Pakistan. At the best,

the purpose is to answer the question: is the political leadership of Pakistan so

accommodative to practice consociational arrangements?

To answer this question, the author has evaluated the responses of political leadership

toward power-sharing arrangement in the post-1971 Pakistan. To examine the role of

leadership toward power-sharing arrangements, three case studies 12 have been

selected for analysis: (1) the tripartite accord of 1972; (2) the coalition politics of

1988-99; (3) and the post-Musharraf power sharing arrangements between the two

leading political parties, namely, PML-N and PPP13. The case studies have been

discussed in the following sections.

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5.3.1 Power-sharing Arrangements under the Tripartite Accord

The first general elections of 1970 proved disastrous for Pakistan. Awami League of

Sheikh Mujib won almost all seats in East Pakistan and this landslide victory enabled

it to get an overall majority in the National Assembly. Bhutto‘s Pakistan People‘s

Party (PPP) emerged as a leading party in West Pakistan winning 85 out of 144 seats.

However, Bhutto‘s success in West Pakistan was almost completely confined to the

two majority provinces of the Punjab and Sindh. National Awami Party (NAP: mainly

composed of Pashtun and Baloch nationalists) and Jamiat-ul-Ulama Islam (JUI) got

victory in minority provinces of NWFP and Balochistan14. After the separation of

East Pakistan, however, Bhutto became the only elected choice for the people of what

was left of Pakistan. He took over the office of the President on 20 December 1971

and became the civilian martial law administrator.

Soon the opposition began to stress Bhutto to end martial law and transfer power to

elected governments. Bhutto responded to the mounting pressure and met the

opposition parties, NAP and JUI, on March 5 and 6, 1972. The meeting resulted in a

12-point tripartite accord. The important points of these were: (1) the President will

announce that Martial Law would be lifted on August14; (2) the governments both at

center and in the provinces to be formed on the basis of parliamentary majority; (3)

and till the forming of permanent constitution, the right to appoint provincial

governors to remain with the center, though governors of Balochistan and NWFP

would be appointed in consultation with the majority parties in the provinces

concerned. 15

Despite of this agreement, there were doubts concerning center-province relationship

and delegation of authority. Bhutto and Wali Khan (a Pashtun nationalist and leader

166
of the NAP), soon started their own interpretations of the most important clauses. A

second round of the meetings was held on April 8, 1972 at Peshawar to resolve the

issue. However, the meeting proved fruitless. Bhutto discarded the agreement and

formed an alliance with Qaiyum Muslim League in the NWFP16.

Subsequently, after several meetings, a new agreement was signed on April 27, 1972.

Two ministries at the centre were offered to NAP/JUI, and center agreed to appoint

governors on the recommendation of the NAP/JUI. The majority parties in NWFP and

Balochistan were invited to form governments in their respective provinces. Bhutto

appointed governors in NWFP and Balochistan on the recommendation of NAP/JUI.

But, Bhutto wrote letters to governors to ensure fair treatment for all inhabitants of

province, to preserve integrity of the state, to maintain law and order situation, and

not to interfere with the jurisdiction of the central government. Both governors

acknowledged the letters and accepted the content. The agreement and the letters to

governors were published expecting that it will endure the agreement. But, to

Paterson (1972) , ―whatever the reasons, the publication of these letters and the

general tone of the press conference do not contribute very much friendly relations

between the centre and provinces in the future‖.

The tripartite accord worked but for a brief period. The ‗politics of accommodation‘

was broken down soon. NAP‘s government in Balochistan was sacked by federation

on the grounds that it was working against the integrity of the state. The NAP/JUI

coalition government of NWFP resigned as a protest against this dismissal of

Balochistan government (Mushtaq, 2009).

Neutral observers, however, discarded the allegations of central government related to

anti state activities in minority provinces. Imray (1976) wrote that ―on Balochistan

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there was unanimous opinion that even the most extreme opponents of the

government were not separatists. They wanted to remain part of Pakistan but with

greater autonomy. The alternatives - joining Iran or Afghanistan or becoming

independent were never seriously considered‖.17

Similarly, there was no reality in the Pashtunistan issue in the province of NWFP. In

his annual report defense attaché of British embassy in Pakistan wrote,‖ the

Pashtunistan issue has caused no real difficulty. While it is always easy to find

Pathans (Pashtuns) who will decry Pakistan and the government, they are not so ready

to offer any real alternative and seem content to get as much as they can for their

people without sacrificing their traditional feelings for independence‖ 18.

In short, the tripartite accord came to an end, NAP was banned and Wali Khan was

jailed. Balochistan operation continued for years (1973-77), and no lessons were

learnt from the separation of East Pakistan. The mutual hostility of government and

opposition provided the military another opportunity to take over 19. In July 1977, the

Bhutto regime was ousted by a military coup, led by Zia-ul-Haq, the then chief of

army staff. The assemblies were dissolved, political parties were banned and the 1973

constitution was suspended.

5.3.2 Coalition Politics of Post-Zia Era

The political developments during Zia regime 20 fostered the polarization among

political elite that led to the demands of maximum autonomy by a small group of

Sindhi, Baloch and Pashtun nationalists. Many nationalists expressed that Zia has

widened the gulf between Punjab and the smaller provinces. It has aggravated the

suspicion, distrust and fear of domination among them. So, it is argued that Zia era

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has failed to advance the process of nation building, rather it seems to have reversed it

(Hussain, 1989, p.208).

The post-Zia era witnessed a variety of coalition governments. However, these

coalitions or alliances proved short-lived. Political parties with different backgrounds

entered into alliances for benefits and bounties skipping over their ideologies and

programs. The leading parties, however, remained unenthusiastic to share power with

the junior partners. Hence, the essence of accommodation remained missing

throughout this period.

Pakistan People‘s Party emerged as a leading party at federal level by securing 92

seats out of 207 (seats for Muslims) in the national assembly in general elections of

1988. Its leader, Benazir Bhutto ‗initiated conciliation with all the important political

groups in the country‘ (Rais, 1989). The PPP entered into an alliance with Mohajir

Qaumi Movement (MQM) at federal and provincial level in Sindh. This alliance was

imperative as the political and ethnic boundaries coincide strictly in the province of

Sindh. The PPP dominated in the Sindhi speaking rural Sindh by winning every

National Assembly seat in this region and the MQM won all but one seat in Mohajir

constituencies of Karachi. In Hyderabad the former won three and the latter won two.

This trend prevailed in the provincial results of Sindh as well (Kennedy, 1991). So the

cooperation between PPP and MQM was viewed as a success story of mediation

concerning the conflict of interests between urban and rural Sindh‘ (Rais, 1989). PPP

also managed to have a coalition government with ANP 21 in NWFP. However, IJI22

succeeded to install its government in vital province of Punjab. Initially, some

gracious gestures were exchanged between Benazir Bhutto (prime minister) and

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Nawaz Sharif (the then chief minister of Punjab) but soon this gesticulation turned

into inhospitable relations.

The 59-point MQM-PPP accord (also known as Karachi Declaration) that was signed

on December 2, 1988 proved short-lived. MQM alleged that PPP government had

dishonored the accord and had instituted pro-Sindhi and anti-Mohajir policies.

Eventually, MQM withdrew from the coalition and supported the IJI-led no-

confidence motion against Benazir Bhutto in October 1989. Though Benazir survived,

MQM‘s voting in favor of no-confidence motion added fuel to flames in Sindh. Then

MQM and IJI signed an accord. This accord had more or less similar clauses that had

its predecessor (Kennedy, 1991).

Nawaz Sharif not only drew support from both the Mohajir Qaumi Movement

(MQM) and the Awami National Party (ANP) but also won the mid-term elections

held in October 1990 from the IJI‘s platform.23 IJI, a nine-party coalition, installed its

governments at center and in the province of Punjab. ANP and MQM decided to join

IJI-led coalition governments in NWFP and Sindh respectively. A plethora of regional

parties joined IJI-led government in Balochistan. IJI had to install coalition

governments because it had won only a minority of seats in Sindh, NWFP, and

Balochistan. It has been observed that the regional parties 24 joined different alliances

at different times. Nevertheless, their decision to support a particular alliance/ party

remained ‗always qualified and based on self-interest‘ (Ziring, 1990).

Nawaz Sharif‘s period saw autonomist demands in smaller units of the federation. G.

M. Syed, a veteran Sindhi nationalist, reiterated his ‗call for Sindhu Desh‘: a

homeland for the Sindhis. The government arrested him when his ‗supporters took

over the Sukkar airport and burned the Pakistani flag‘. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, cousin of

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Z.A Bhutto and the leader of Sindh National Front, demanded more autonomy and

presented a 15-point formula that was closer to a confederal than federal set-up. More

or less in the same tune, Nawab Akbar Bugti, ex-governor and ex-chief minister of

Balochistan, stressed for the ‗need to establish Balochistan for the Balochs‘. Within

Punjab, a newly formed political party, the Siraiki Qaumi Movement, demanded a

separate province for the Siraiki speaking people of Southern Punjab (Ziring, 1990).

However, currently, by considering the complications of ethnic composition, the

Siraiki leadership has modified the demand from Siraiki province to the province of

Southern Punjab.

It was a difficult task to keep mutually hostile parties together as coalition partners for

Nawaz Sharif. Therefore, the IJI-led coalition government began to disintegrate and

Nawaz Sharif suffered the same fate of dismissal as his predecessor, Benazir Bhutto.

PML and ANP were strange bedfellows. JI and MQM were hostile to each other and

members of both parties were involved in mutual violent attacks in Karachi. Still, JI

and ANP had different vision over issues like foreign policy, Kashmir dispute, and

Pak-Afghan relationships (Waseem, 1992; Talbot, 2005). PML and PPP, the parties

that fought election in 1990 under the banners of IJI and PDF, emerged as the

mainstream parties in general elections of 1993 by winning 72 and 86 seats

respectively in the National Assembly of 207 seats. MQM boycotted the elections and

the remaining ethno-regional parties of Balochistan and NWFP suffered defeats in

these elections. The Islamic parties also suffered a humiliating defeat and managed to

capture only 9 seats in the National Assembly. Apparently, Pakistan was moving

toward a two-party system and PPP and PML-N made notable inroads into the

provinces (Amin, 1994).

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PPP succeeded in setting-up a coalition government at Islamabad and in the province

of Punjab with PML-J. PPP also installed its government in Sindh. PML-N and ANP,

on the other hand, succeeded in setting-up a coalition government in NWFP. While

MQM boycotted the National Assembly elections, it participated in provincial

assembly elections. It continued to maintain its electoral support in Karachi by

winning 22 of the 28 Sindh Assembly seats.

MQM was a coalition partner of PPP in Sindh during PPP‘s first government but this

time it was ‗waging an urban guerilla war‘ against the government. The political

violence in Karachi resulted in more than 6000 deaths between in two years prior to

1995(Shafqat, 1996). The relations between coalition partners in Punjab remained

problematic. PPP had to offer the office of chief minister to its junior partner, PML-J.

Later, however PPP attempted to install its own chief minister but could only manage

to replace Manzoor Watto by a much weaker figure of the same party, Sardar Arif

Nakai (Talbot, 2005). Meanwhile, Benazir government was discharge again but this

time by the president of her party, Farooq Leghari.

In the general elections of 1997, PML-N had a ‗crushing victory‘. Since 1985, it was

for the first time that a party possessed an absolute majority in the National

Assembly25. It was also for the first time that a Punjab based party made significant

inroads in rural Sindh - the stronghold of PPP. Ethno-regional parties‘ performance

remained mixed: ANP and MQM captured 9 and 12 seats respectively in the National

Assembly. BNP and JWP, the two Baloch nationalist parties, won 3 and 2 seats

respectively. The JUI-F was the only religious party with two members in the

National Assembly (Talbot, 2005). PML-N entered into alliance with MQM and ANP

at center and in the provinces of Sindh and NWFP respectively. PPP was the largest

172
party in the Sindh Assembly but MQM and PML-N coalition managed to keep it out

of the game. However, the coalition failed to work and did not provide ‗effective

governance‘ (Syed, 1998). Even, MQM occasionally ‗organized protest marches and

strikes to press the government for the implementation of the agreement of

cooperation they had signed in February 1997‘. Afterwards, MQM‘s ministers

resigned from the central and provincial cabinets (Rizvi, 1999).

ANP also withdrew its support and left the coalition as a protest against the PML-N‘s

refusal to rename NWFP as Pakhtunkhwa. Both parties, ANP and MQM, accused

―Nawaz Sharif of establishing Punjab‘s hegemony over the smaller provinces and

violating the latter‘s rights and interests‖ (Rizvi, 2000). This perception was

underpinned by the central government‘s unilateral decision to revive the Kalabagh

dam project. The provincial assemblies of Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan had passed

resolution against this project already.

The nationalist groups and parties from the smaller provinces vowed to defend their

right of self-rule. Some suggested a new constitution framed by a constituent

assembly with equivalent representation of all provinces (Rizvi: 1999).

Pakistan‘s Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM), a group of 28 ethno-regional

parties was launched during 1998 and this association continued to protest against

allegedly authoritarian rule and for ‗the establishment of a decentralized

polity‘(Rizvi , 2000).

Afterwards, Nawaz Sharif was removed by the military and Pervez Musharraf took

over the charge in October 1999.

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5.3.3 Politics of Accommodation in Post-Musharraf Period

After the general elections of 2002, the political parties were divided between two

camps: pro-Musharraf and anti-Musharraf camp. A pro-Musharraf coalition

government (PML-Q, National Alliance and MQM) was installed after the elections

in Islamabad. PML-Q installed its government in Punjab, and managed to form

coalition governments in Sindh and Balochistan with MQM and MMA respectively.

MMA, the leading party, formed its government in the province of NWFP. It was for

the first time in recent history of Pakistan that coalition governments completed their

specified parliamentary tenure. However, the regime‘s stability was possible because

of the Musharraf‘s active contribution in keeping the coalition intact.

Musharraf did not allow Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to play any role in

Pakistani politics. This attempt led the rivals of the past to come close to each other.

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif signed the ―Charter of Democracy‖ in London on

May14, 2006. It was a spectacular moment because leaders of the two most popular

mainstream parties agreed to join hands with each other for the promotion of

democratic rule in Pakistan. They aimed to struggle for the restoration of democracy

and proposed a number of modifications in the constitution.

Meanwhile, in a very controversial presidential election of October 2007, Musharraf

was reelected for second five-year presidential term. His election followed general

elections for the national assembly and the four provincial assemblies in February

2008. PPP and PML-N performed well in the general elections of 2008 by winning

88 and 67 seats respectively in the national assembly. The number rose up to 122 for

PPP and 91 for PML (N) after the allocation of reserved seats for women and joining

of independents to these parties. PPP won a clear majority in Sindh, and PML-N

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emerged as the leading party in Punjab. PML-Q, a pro-Musharraf party, appeared as a

largest party in Balochistan. ANP was the leading party in NWFP. MQM performed

well and won 25 seats of the national assembly. At the center, PPP-led coalition

government included PML-N, ANP, MQM, and MMA. This coalition was only one

of its kinds in Pakistan as it was ‗the broadest-ever coalition of political parties‘ in the

Pakistan‘s history (Rizvi, 2008).

PPP and PML-N decided to share power. Bhurban declaration was considered as a

great move towards conciliatory politics in Pakistan26. However, the analysts had real

doubts about the durability of these arrangements. The history of mutual party

animosity of PML-N and PPP in 1990s made the analysts ‗pessimistic that a PPP-

PML-N accommodation can last‘. Yousuf Raza Gillani, a PPP leader from Southern

Punjab, was the candidate for prime minister ship of the coalition partners. He became

prime minister on March 24, securing 264 of 306 votes polled for this election. The

cabinet ministries were distributed among the coalition partners. Of the total 24

cabinet ministries, 11 were given to the PPP, 9 to the PML-N, 3 to the junior coalition

partners (ANP and JUI-F), and 1 to an independent candidate (Kronstadt, 2008).

The rationale behind this coalition-building was that the mutual cooperation of the

leading parties will refurbish the civilian political rule in Pakistan. Apparently, the

political leadership seemed convinced that their split will benefit the non-democratic

powers (Rizvi, 2008).

It was a unique experience that the two mainstream political parties (PPP and PML-

N), two regional political parties (ANP and MQM), and an Islamic party (JUI-F)

entered into an alliance. Moreover, coalition governments were installed in all

provinces: in Punjab (PML-N and PPP along some independent members of Punjab

175
assembly), in Sindh (PPP, MQM, and ANP), in NWFP (ANP and PPP and some

independent members), and in Balochistan (PPP, PML-Q (forward block), ANP and

MMA, and independent MPA‘s) 27.

However, over the dispute of reinstatement of the deposed judges, PML-N ministers

quit the six-week old coalition cabinet on May 12, 2008 and submitted their

resignation letters to the Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gillani. 28

Nevertheless, PML-N announced that the party will continue its ‗issue-based support‘

to the government 29. Finally, PML-N decided to leave the governing coalition

completely and sat in the opposition.

At provincial level, it was reported that the ANP Sindh leadership was not contented

with the dealing of major coalition partners - PPP and MQM. ANP‘s provincial

leadership informed its central leadership about the PPP‘s policy of ignoring ANP in

Sindh while taking decisions30. In addition, PPP and MQM had also difference of

opinion concerning the future of existing local government system in Sindh.

Analysis of the power-sharing arrangements, in the above three case studies, seem to

suggest that political culture of Pakistan is no more conducive for such arrangements.

The failure of tripartite agreement in 1970s, the disappointing outcomes of coalition

cabinets in 1990s, and the collapse of PPP-PML-N alliance in the last year provide

sufficient evidence to conclude that politics of accommodation is not a political norm

in Pakistan. Political leadership is not too accommodative to practice consociational

democracy in Pakistan. Though there are some positive signs31, overall situation is not

conducive. Political accommodation like the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and

Switzerland is not a norm in the political culture of Pakistan. The next section of this

176
chapter has been reserved to investigate whether or not the degree of pluralism in the

Pakistani case is compatible with consociational democracy.

5.4 The Degree of Pluralism in Pakistani Case and Consociational Democracy

Lijphart (1977, p. 238) has treated the degree of pluralism as a variable. He asserted

that consociationalism is a panacea for societies having greater degree of pluralism.

He warned the plural societies of the third world that the ‗realistic choice for such

societies is not between the British normative model of democracy and the

consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at

all‘. Though not precisely, he has described the probability of success of the two

normative democratic models (the consociational model and the majoritarian model)

in plural states with a varying degree of pluralism. He asserted that the probability of

success is greater for the British model in lesser plural societies. Whereas, the

prospects for the success of British model gradually decreases as the degree of

pluralism in that particular society increases. Therefore, according to Lijphart, in

semi-plural cases, the consociational democracy has greater probability of success

than the British model. He maintained that in greatly plural societies, ‗consociational

model is the only choice‘ even with a lesser chances of success. Finally, in the ‗most

extreme plural societies neither model offers any hope‘ (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 237-38).

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 Figure 5-10: Degree of Pluralism and the Probability of Success for British and
Consociational Model of Democracy

Note: In this figure, Lijphart has divided the plural societies into four categories with subject to their
degree of pluralism: homogenous or lesser plural societies (the area between points A and B), societies
with medium degree of pluralism (the area between points B and C), the societies with high degree of
pluralism (the area between points C and D), and the extreme plural societies (the area between points
D and E).

Though Lijphart has attached the probability of success of the consociational and

majoritarian models of democracy with the degree of pluralism, he did not offer any

standard formula for the measurement of the degree of pluralism. He confessed that

‗the concept of pluralism is difficult to define precisely‘. However, he suggested four

principles to establish whether a society is completely plural or departs ‗greatly or

mildly from perfect pluralism‘. The four criteria ―include:

(a) Can the segments into which the society is divided be clearly identified?

(b) Can the size of each segment be exactly determined?

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(c) Do the segmental boundaries and the boundaries between the different

political, social, and economic organizations coincide?

(d) Do the segmental parties receive the stable elected support of their respective

segments (Lijphart, 1985, pp. 86-87)‖?

Though these criteria define the concept of plural society, it is still difficult to

measure the exact degree of pluralism in a particular society. However, using these

criteria it has been attempted to assess the degree of pluralism in Pakistani case. This

assessment in turn will enable us to judge the probability of success of

consociationalism in Pakistani society.

The assessment of the degree of pluralism in Pakistani case is based on criteria

suggested by Arend Lijphart. Three questions have been designed to estimate the

degree of pluralism in Pakistani society.

(a) Whether or not the identification and the exact measurement of the sizes of the

segments of society are possible in Pakistani case?

(b) Whether or not the segmental boundaries in Pakistani society coincide with

the boundaries of political parties, and the boundaries of socio- economic

organizations?

(c) Whether or not the electoral support of ethno-regional political parties of

Pakistan remained stable in their regional bases in recent general elections?

These questions have been dealt with one at a time in the following sections.

5.4.1 Identification of the Segments and Measurement of their Sizes

Language is major marker of identity and it plays key role in the ‗self-definition of the

ethnic groups in Pakistan‘ (Hurst, 1996). As earlier has been mentioned, the

179
government of Pakistan has documented six languages as a distinct language: Urdu,

Punjabi, Siraiki, Pashto, Sindhi, and Balochi (Census Report, 1998). The remaining,

relatively minor languages have been enlisted in the category of ‗others‘. The census

reports illustrate the number of speakers of each language. Usually, the statistics of

census reports are used for the numerical strength of each group. However, certain

groups have critical reservations regarding the statistics of the census reports32.

Though language has been considered as a key marker of ethnic identity in Pakistan,

it should not be overlooked that ethnicity is fluid in Pakistan as elsewhere. Identities

in Pakistan are more or less ‗compound‘. These are constructed and reconstructed at

different times. A primary example is the case of ‗Brahvi‘ identity in Balochistan.

Brahvi, a Dravidian language, has been dealt with as a separate language from

Balochi, an Indo-Iranian language. But gradually, the Brahvi speaking people seem

tending towards integration into Baloch identity by settling in ‗clan organization, with

those speaking Balochi alone, and have considered them nothing but Baloch‘

(Ahmed, 1998, p. 234). On the other hand, a considerable number of Balochs have

been assimilated in Southern Punjab and Northern Sindh (Cohen, 2005, p. 220). A

large number of Baloch in Pakistan live outside Balochistan itself. The Talpurs,

former rulers of Sindh and Mirs of Khairpur, who are still politically influential, are

Baloch. They have been assimilated in Sindhi culture and speak Sindhi language. In

Punjab, the Baloch families of Dastis, Gurmanis (Muzaffar Garh), and Jatois (Multan)

speak Siraiki. The Dera Ghazi Khan area is largely inhabited by the settled Baloch of

whom the Mazaris and Legharis are important tribes. The Khosas in Dera Ghazi Khan

and in Jacobabad are influential. The Baloch have, in fact, spread themselves in

various parts of Sindh and Punjab all the way up the Indus as far as Mianwali. And

there are plenty of them, of course, in Karachi 33.

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Balochs origins and affinities are still a matter of dispute about which few authorities

are in agreement, but it seems safe to say that they are people of extremely mixed

antecedents in whom it is possible to detect numerous parental strains - Dravidian,

Arab, Rajput, Iranian (including a number of Kurds), Turkomen and Mongol. This

racial diversity is the result of successive invasions and settlements from very early

times - coming mainly from the north-west and including successive waves of

Scythians, Mongols, Arabs and Persians 34.

A very similar case is about the Sindhi identity. Earlier, the population census reports

treated Brahvi, Balochi, Siraiki, and Rajhistani as dialects, in addition to Sindhi, being

spoken in Sindh. But with some exception in Karachi, now all these groups ‗identify

themselves as Sindhi‘. Development of Siraiki identity in Southern Punjab is a similar

case as well. Before its recognition as a separate language in the census reports of

1981, Siraiki was classified as a dialect of Punjabi in Punjab. And previously, during

British period, it was classified as a dialect of Sindhi in Sindh (Ahmed, 1998, p. 234).

The Pashtun identity in the NWFP seems a similar case. Though the people of Hazara

division and Kohat district have shared biological ancestry and history of economic

ties with Pashtuns, they have distant identity and speak Hindko. In the 1981 census, it

was reported that 18.1% of the provincial population speak Hindko that makes some

2.4 % of the overall Pakistan population. Still, there are Kohistani who assert a distant

identity. Kalash and Khowar (Dardic languages) speaking people of Chitral are ‗both

distinct ethnic communities. In addition, there are quite a few linguistic groups who

have ‗either not asserted their separate identity or whose presence has not received

much public attention‘ (Ahmed, 1998, p. 234).

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Mohajir identity is also an interesting case. Indian partition, in 1947, resulted in a

huge migration of population on both sides of the borders. The Muslim refugees who

arrived in Pakistan were labeled as Mohajirs. Almost 70% of these migrants came

from Indian Punjab and settled into Pakistani Punjab. As the migrant Punjabis shared

language and culture with the indigenous Punjabis, they were successfully

assimilated. Therefore, they shunned the Mohajir label. Contrary to Punjabi refugees,

the migrants from the other parts of India, mainly Urdu speaking, who settled mostly

in urban Sindh have ‗continued to maintain the Mohajir label for their group

identification‘ (Ahmed, 1998, p. 234).

Though Pakistan is ―essentially a plural and multi-ethnic society‖ (Ahmed et al.,

1989), it is difficult to identify all the ethno-linguistic groups. The measurement of

their size is also unworkable. For example, Dr. Amir Chandio, a professor of political

science, speaks Siraiki, he is Baloch by race, and he has been assimilated in Sindhi

culture. He is Baloch when he travels to Balochistan, in Khairpur he is Sindhi, and in

Multan he introduces himself as a Siraiki. Therefore, this compound nature of

identities in Pakistani case hinders the accurate measurement of various ethno-

linguistic groups.

However, using the census statistics religious and linguistic fragmentation of the

Pakistani society has been calculated by the author to assess the degree of pluralism.

The table demonstrates that in terms of religious fragmentation, the Pakistani society

is quite homogenous. A great majority (96.28%) of the population is Muslim. The

minorities include Christians 1.59%, Hindus 1.6%, and Qadianis .22% (Census

Report, 1998). The comparison of the Pakistani case with Western European

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consociational cases reveals that the value of linguistic fragmentation index is quite

higher.

Figure 5-11: Fragmentation Index for Selected Cases35

Enumeration Austria Belgium Netherlands Switzerland Pakistan

Religious fragmentation .19 .06 .64 .50 .072
Linguistic fragmentation .03 .48 .02 .40 .73
(Lijphart, 1977, p. 72) and for Pakistan calculated with the help of Lijphart
Note: (1).The index of fragmentation for Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, and Switzerland is borrowed
by Lijphart. (2). For the Pakistani case index of fragmentation is calculated by the author using the data
of the census report of 1998.

It is important to note that the index of linguistic fragmentation only illustrates the

numerical strength of the linguistic groups but it provides no information how

language divides the Pakistani society. This evidence seems to suggest that Pakistani

society does not fulfill the criteria of a ‗completely plural society‘; it is difficult to

discover precisely the segments into which the Pakistani society is divided and also to

state accurately how many people originate from each of the segments. Nevertheless,

Pakistani society is not a homogenous society. But the Pakistani society is not a

fragmented society like post-war Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Therefore, it

seems safe to categorize the Pakistani society as a case of moderately divided society

than a deeply divided society.

5.4.2 Composition of Political and Socio-economic Organizations

This section attempts to investigate whether the ethno-linguistic boundaries of various

groups in Pakistan coincide with the political boundaries and the boundaries of socio-

economic organizations. It is important to remember that the traditional societies of

developing world differ significantly from the societies of the developed world. The

social and economic organizations in the developing world are not completely based

on class or ideological lines. But ethnicity, language and religion plays a vital role in

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mobilization in the developing world. These organizations also play lesser role in the

politics than in the developed world. Workers‘ organizations in south Asia have been

provided but a limited role in the game of politics. These workers‘ organizations enter

in alliances with governments and some times are ‗incorporated into sate consultancy

machinery‘. But the Pakistani case is a different story. Despite a ‗considerable

influence through street and factory protest‘, the Pakistani workers have a meager role

in formal politics. The workers‘ representatives have remained members of

parliament and cabinet ministers in south Asia but not in Pakistan. The only cabinets

to include pro-working class politicians were the 1973–1975 cabinet, which included

Tariq Aziz, Mubashir Hasan, Miraj Khalid, and Miraj Mohammad Khan, and the

1999–2002 cabinet, which included Omar Asgar Khan. These were not

representatives of workers‘ organizations but did defend workers‘ rights (Candland,

2007). However, some trade unions are affiliated to political parties 36. Lawyers‘

organizations, however, have close connections with the political parties.

Nevertheless, generally, lawyers‘ associations do not tend to mobilize on the basis of

ethnicity, language, and religion. Teachers and professor associations are also not

based on ethnicity and linguistic bases. Same is the case with chambers of commerce.

Therefore, the focus in this section will be on the political parties. To deal with this

question, the author has attempted to trace whether ethno-regional parties of Pakistan

fulfill the established criteria in literature of ethno-regional parties.

In Pakistan, more than one hundred political parties have been registered by the

Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). But only a limited number of political

parties have parliamentary representation. Broadly speaking, political parties in

Pakistan can be classified into four groups: Mainstream parties (PPP and PML);

offshoots of the PPP (PPP-Sherpao, PPP-Shahid Bhutto and NPP), and factions of

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PML (PML-Q, PML-F); Islamic parties (JI, JUI, JUP); and ethno-regional parties,

such as, ANP, PKMAP, MQM, and Baloch nationalist parties. This plurality of

political parties displays the ideological difference and divergence of opinion in

Pakistani society.

Pakistan is a multiethnic state and it has experienced political violence and ethnic

strife in the past. Horowitz (1985, p. 291) argues that ‗the main element that ethnic

conflict introduces into party politics is ethnically based party‘. While, more or less,

ethnic boundaries coincide with the geographical boundaries in Pakistan, the

ethnically based parties dominate only in the regional base of their related ethnic

group. So, for this study, it seems more sensible to use the term of ‗ethno-regional

party, than ‗ethnic party‘ for the parties that represent the regionally based ethnic

groups of Pakistan.

Horowitz (1985, p. 291) suggests that an ethnic party ‗derives its support

overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group (or cluster of ethnic groups) and

serves the interests of that group‘. Therefore, the author has attempted in this section

to examine whether ethno-regional parties of Pakistan fulfill the criteria of being an

ethnic party.

5.4.2.1 Awami National Party (ANP)

Awami National Party (ANP) is a successor of NAP (National Awami Party) that was

banned by Bhutto regime (1971-77) due to its allegedly secessionist tendencies. It is a

Pashtun party with left-leanings. It derives its electoral support exclusively from

Pashtuns. Though the party has membership countrywide, its stronghold is the Pashto-

speaking region of NWFP.

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During the last six general elections of national assembly (1988-2008), it has touched

around 20-30% of the votes in Pashtun belt of NWFP 37. However, in non-Pashto

speaking region of the NWFP, its support remained marginal. This trend of electoral

support for ANP was repeated in provincial elections (1988-2008): ANP received

around 21-29% of the all votes polled in the Pashtun belt of NWFP. This seems to

suggest that the Pashtuns did not exclusively support the ANP; PPP‘s vote share in

Pashtun belt revolved around 10-27% in the national assembly elections (1988-2008).

PPP secured 28%, 25%, 19%, 14 %, 9% and 29% and ANP got 26%, 20%, 22%,

32%, 14%, and 27% in national assembly elections of 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002,

and 2008 respectively.

Figure 5-12: National Assembly Elections (1988-2008) in Pashtun Majority

Region (Vote percentages)

Party 1988 1990 1993 1997 2002 2008

ANP 26 20 22 32 14 27
PPP 28 25 19 14 9 29

Source: calculated by the author using results available at ECP

The evidence suggests that PPP got more support than ANP in the elections of 1988

and1990. The decline in its vote bank is the result of its split in NWFP (Sherpao, ex-

chief minister of PPP in NWFP broke away and formed PPP-Sherpao). PML is

another dominant competitor with ANP in Pashtun constituency; PML‘s vote share

rotated around 10-19% in provincial elections (1988-2008) and 10-26% in national

election (1988-2008). Still, Islamic parties are well-known for their roots in the

Pashtun constituencies, and MMA (an alliance of Islamic parties) scored more than

50% votes in Pashtun belt and left no room for ANP to enter national assembly in

2002. This account shows that ANP is not the only representative of Pashtuns; PPP,

PML, and Islamic parties did get substantial support from the Pashtun belt of NWFP.

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But this support to mainstream or Islamic parties in Pashtun region does not discard

the ANP‘s status of a Pashtun Party. In Horowitz‘s words, ―an ethnic party does not

have to command an exclusive hold on the allegiance of group members‘. And, the

key is ‗how a party‘s support is distributed‘ and not ‗how an ethnic group‘s support is

distributed‘ (Horowitz, 1985, p. 293).

It is important to note that ANP‘s boundaries stop at Pashtun constituency and this

reality that Pashtuns are represented by more than one party does not deny ANP from

being an ethno-regional party of Pashtuns.

5.4.2.2 Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM)

Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) was founded in Karachi, mainly a Mohajir

constituency, to represent the Mohajirs – Urdu-speaking community, who migrated

from India in 1947 and mostly settled in urban centers of Sindh. It was renamed as

Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and since then it has been asserting for being

more inclusive and its multiethnic character. However, despite the change of its name

and some efforts to expand its support across Mohajir community, it remained an

influential party only in urban Sindh, namely, Karachi and Hyderabad. Horowitz

(1985, p. 292) has identified the problem of such parties by narrating that ‗it is

difficult for an ethnic party, once established, to become multiethnic‘. An ethnic party

may get, he asserted, a ‗small fraction of support from another ethnic group‘ but this

little support can‘t divert a party from the interests of the group that provides it

overwhelmingly support‘. Horowitz‘s observation is relevant to MQM as its politics

revolves around the issues relevant to Karachi.

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Since its foundation in 1980s, Karachi and urban constituencies of Hyderabad have

remained a stronghold of MQM. Mohajir constituency (Karachi and Urban electorate

of Hyderabad) has voted overwhelmingly for MQM in national, provincial, and local

bodies‘ election since 1980s. Its voting share in Mohajir constituency remained

remarkable: during the last six general elections, its vote share in Mohajir

constituency remained between 40-70% in national and provincial elections. When it

boycotted the national assembly elections in 1993, the turn out in urban Sindh

remained substantially lower.

Prior to 1980s, Karachi was well-known for its support to Islamic parties. Even in

1971, the first general election of the Pakistan history, when PPP swept in Punjab and

Sindh, Karachi mainly voted (40-45%) for Islamic parties. But since 1980s, Islamic

parties are no more considered as a potential threat for the MQM‘s established

support. PPP and PML managed to get only 19%, 16%, 36%, 11%, 13%, 21% and

11%, 41%, 26%, 6%, and 5% in the general elections of national assembly in 1988,

1990, 1993, 1997, 2002, and 2008 respectively. Both parties, PPP (36%) and PML

(41%), performed well in 1993 election due to the boycott of the MQM.

Figure 5-13: National Assembly Elections (1988-2008) in Mohajir Constituency

(Vote percentages)

Party 1988 1990 1993 1997 2002 2008

MQM Not 68.95 Boycotted 43.03 40.30 70.94
applicable
PPP/ PDA 19.72 15.92 36.43 11.09 13.15 21.92

PLM/ IJI 10.71 6.21 41.22 26.47 2.311 2.38

Source: Calculated by the author using results available at ECP

Though MQM remained unchallenged in Mohajir constituency, its electoral support

in rest of the country remained meager: for example, its vote share in Sindhi-speaking

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region remained 5%, 4.5%, 3%, 3.4%, 2.2% contrary to 67.5%, 64.6%, 56.7%,

40.14%, 70.7% in Mohajir constituency in provincial elections of 1990, 1993, 1996,

2002, and 2008 respectively. This evidence indicates that MQM‘s boundaries stop at

group boundaries, the Mohajir constituency. Nevertheless, contrary to Pashtun

constituency of NWFP that was consistently represented by mainstream and Islamic

parties, along ANP, MQM is the sole representative of Mohajir constituency.

After NWFP and Sindh, let‘s turn to Balochistan, a home province of PKMAP (a

nationalist party of Pashtun belt) and a plethora of Baloch nationalist parties of

Baloch countryside.

5.4.2.3 Pashtun Khawa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP)

The Pashtun Khawa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) was formed in 1987 by Khan

Abdul Samad Khan. The party strives for Pashtun interests and it demands for a

separate province for the Pashtuns of Balochistan or the merger of Pashtun region of

Balochistan into the province of NWFP, a Pashtun majority province.

PKMAP has its roots in Pashtun belt of Balochistan. Its support remained

considerable in general elections of national and provincial assemblies during 1988-

2008 periods. It gained 11%, 16%, 26%, 13%, 19% and 6%, 18%, 20%, 16%, 18%

votes in Pashtun constituencies of Balochistan in national and provincial elections of

1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, and 2002 respectively. Outside the Pashtun belt, however,

its support shrunk markedly: it obtained 2.13%, 1.15%, 1.34%, 2.45, and 0.8% votes

in general elections of 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, and 2002 respectively in non-Pashtun

region. Its electoral support in provincial elections was very similar to the national

assembly elections. Like Baloch nationalist parties, it boycotted the general elections

of 2008. Islamic parties, particularly JUI-F, are crucial competitors for PKMAP in its

189
regional camp. JUI-F/MMA has performed well in this region and its vote bank

remained 15-25% (but 37% in 2002) in national assembly election and 15-29% in

provincial assembly elections during 1988-2008 period. Mainstream parties, PML and

PPP, at the best, have modest support in Pashtun constituency of Balochistan. While,

on the whole, PPP has upper hand in Pashtun belt of NWFP, PML has performed

slightly better in the Pashtun belt of Balochistan. As the electoral support of PKMAP

suggests, it is a regional party of Pashtun belt in Balochistan.

5.4.2.4 Baloch Nationalist Groups

Baloch and Pashtuns, mainly, participated in the first general elections of Pakistan, in

1970, under the banner of NAP. Baloch nationalists performed well and installed the

first provincial government of Balochistan (Balochistan got the status of a province

after the dissolution of one-unit scheme in 1969). Soon, NAP‘s government was

removed by central authorities and the party was banned. The general elections of

1977 remained controversial, and Balochs boycotted the elections. The third general

elections, in 1985, were party-less. So after 1970, Baloch factions contested the

national and provincial elections in 1988.

Figure 5-14: Baloch Nationalist Parties: Percentage votes in National Assembly

(Baloch Majority Region: 1988-2008)

General Election 1988 PNP (10) BNA (19) - -

General Election 1990 PNP (16) JWP (25) BNM (10.3)
General Election 1993 PNP (9) JWP (38.5) BNM-M (20) BNM-H (12.35)
General Election 1997 - JWP (15) BNP (27) BNM (17.5)
General Election 2002 BNDP (.80) JWP (14) BNP (6.91) BNM(15.4)
General Election 2008 BNP-A(9.55) Boycotted Boycotted NP

Source: calculated by the author using results available at ECP

Two Baloch nationalist parties participated in the elections of 1988: PNP of Ghous

Bakhsh Bizenjo and the Balochistan National Alliance of Atta Ullah Mengal (ex-chief

minister of Balochistan), Nawab Akbar Bugti (Ex-governor of Balochistan) and Dr.

190
Abdul Hayee. The alliance managed to form a coalition government in the province.

However, the alliance proved short-lived; Mengal founded BNM and Bugti formed

JWP. Both participated in the general elections of 1990 under the banners of newly

founded parties along PNP. BNM was further divided into BNM-M (Mengal group)

and BNM-H (Hayee group) before the next general elections of 1993. Therefore,

totally, four parties of Balochs participated in these elections. Then, Bizenjo and

Mengal amalgamated PNP and BNM-M and founded Balochistan National Party

(BNP). Then before the elections of 2002, a new political organization, BNDP,

surfaced. Later, BNDP and BNM were merged into National Party (NP). Therefore,

Baloch remained divided throughout the recent history of Pakistan. Due to the ‗first-

past-the-post‘ electoral system, this division proved very disadvantageous for

Balochs.

This polarization of Balochs makes it more difficult to analyze the electoral support of

Baloch nationalist parties. PNP secured 10%, 16%, and 9% in national assembly and

9%, 14%, and 11% in provincial assembly elections of 1988, 1990, and 1993

respectively. BNA received 19%, in national assembly and 15%, in provincial

assembly elections in 1988. Its offshoots, JWP and BNM scored 25% and 10.3%

votes in national assembly and 20% and 11.5% votes in provincial assembly in the

general elections of 1990 respectively. JWP scored 11%, 15%, and 14% votes in

national assembly and 15.6%, 13%, and 8.7% votes in provincial assembly in 1993,

1997, 2002 elections respectively. Mengal under the banner of BNM-M in 1993, and

under the banner of BNP in 1997 and 2002 scored 20%, 27%, 6.91% in national

assembly and 10%, 25%, and 3% votes in provincial assembly respectively in Baloch

region. Dr. Hayee under the banner of BNM in 1993, 1997, and 2002 scored 12.35%,

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17.5%, 15.4% votes in national and 9.3%, 16.5%, and 6.5% votes in provincial

assembly elections respectively.

At the best, the Baloch factions‘ boundaries coincide with Baloch constituency.

Nevertheless, the Baloch factions cannot claim that they are the sole heir of the

Baloch constituency. Mainstream parties, PML and PPP, along Islamic parties have

successfully made inroads in the Baloch constituency. PPP and PML, jointly, scored

23%, 19%, 26%, 16%, 28%, and 46% votes in national and 28%, 22%, 26%, 13%,

20%, 57% votes in provincial assembly elections during 1988-2008 period

respectively. Islamic parties have lesser support in Baloch constituency than Pashtun

belt of the Balochistan.

The case of Punjab, the dominant province that makes up nearly 55% of the

Pakistan‘s electorates, is a different story. It is a battlefield for the mainstream parties

and there is no room for any regional or ethnic group. Together, the mainstream

parties have scored between 65-90% votes in various elections between 1988 and

2008. However, the PML and PPP have their own strongholds: PPP has better

performed in southern Punjab; and PML in the central and northern parts of the

province. Similarly, PPP is more popular in rural areas and PML has an advantage in

the urban region.

A summary of the electoral performance of ethno-regional parties, in their regional

base, during federal elections of 1988-2008 has been presented in the following table.

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 Figure 5-15: Electoral Performance of Ethno-regional Parties in Federal
Elections (% Vote at Regional Base: 1988-2008)

Party 1988 1990 1993 1997 2002 2008

ANP 26.26 20.15 21.75 31.63 14.00 26.56
PKMAP 11.23 16.46 26.26 13.03 19.37 Boycotted
MQM * 71.88 Boycotted 43.04 40.31 70.94
BNP * * * 27.43 6.91 Boycotted
JWP * 24.68 38.53 15.20 13.86 Boycotted
BNM * 10.35 20.19 17.48 15.40 Boycotted
BNA 18.52 * * * * *
BNDP * * * * 0.80 Boycotted
PNP 9.92 16.70 8.59 * * *
BNM-H * * 12.36 * * *
BNP-A * * * * * 9.55
Source: calculated by the author using results available at official website of ECP

A descriptive statistics of the electoral performance of ethno-regional parties at their

respective regional base have been presented in the following table. The table

provides basic information about how many times a party participated in federal

election. It also shows the information about minimum and maximum score of a

party. The value of coefficient of variance shows the level of consistency of various

parties.

Figure 5-16: Descriptive Statistics: Federal Election in Pakistan (1988-2008)

(Electoral Support for Ethno-regional Parties in their Respective Regional Base)

Parties N Minimum Maximum Mean Median S. D C.V

JWP 4 13.86 38.53 23.07 19.94 11.38 49.33%
BNM-M/BNP 4 10.35 20.19 15.85 16.44 4.16 26.25%
PNP 3 8.59 16.70 11.73 9.91 4.35 37.08%
BNM-H 2 6.9 27.4 17.2 17.2 14.5 84.30%
BNA 1 18.52 18.52 18.52 18.52 * *
BNDP 1 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 * *
PKMAP 5 11.22 26.26 17.27 16.46 5.92 34.28%
ANP 6 14.00 31.63 23.39 24.00 6.12 26.17%
MQM 4 40.31 71.88 56.54 56.99 17.21 30.44%

Source: calculated by the author using Minitab software. The results are available at official website of ECP

193
5.4.3 Stability in Electoral Support

After having categorized the political parties of Pakistan, attempt has been made to

examine the ‗stability of electoral support‘ of ethno-regional parties. Two

measurements have been used to discover the level of electoral stability of various

parties: the index of electoral success; and the coefficient of variance. Statistical

measurements have simplified the description; and it will enable the author to draw

some conclusion by comparative analysis. The comparison has been made at two

levels: first, at the national level, and second, at international level. At international

level, the comparison of Pakistan‘s political parties has been made with the political

parties of four original cases of consociationalism, namely, the Netherlands, Austria,

Belgium, and Switzerland. Comparison with consociational cases will permit us to see

whether ethno-regional parties have the same level of support, strength, and stability

that pillarised parties of Western European consociational cases had during their

respective consociational periods. This comparison will determine whether or not

Pakistan has the same level of segmentation and polarization that consociational

regimes experienced earlier. The author will assess the degree of pluralism that will in

turn lead to answer whether or not consociationalism is a viable option to manage

diversity in Pakistan.

5.4.3.1 Index of Electoral Success (IES)

Gordin (2001) has used the ‗Index of Electoral Success‘ for assessment of the

performance of Ethno-regionalist Parties in Western Europe. He asserts that whereas

‗ethno-regional parties focus on a particular ethnic group or region, their performance

should be assessed within that particular ethnic group or region rather than at the

194
national level‘. The author has used IES to measure electoral strength and stability of

ethno-regional parties of Pakistan. The less prominent Baloch factions have been

excluded from the analysis. In the targeted electorate, IES weights ethno-regional

party‘s vote proportion against the size of the ethno-regional group.

% vote of ethno - regional party in targeted electorate

IES =
% vote of leading party in targeted electorate

Figure 5-17: Index of Electoral Success (IES): Federal and Provincial Elections
(1997-2002)

S. No Party Name Federal Provincial Federal Provincial

Election 2002 Elections 2002 Elections 1997 Elections 1997
1 MQM 1 1 1 1
2 ANP 0.26 0.51 1 1
3 PKMAP 0.52 0.72 0.65 0.68
4 BNP 0.40 0.20 1 1
5 JWP 0.80 0.61 0.56 0.53
Source: Data was retrieved from ECP.
IES: % Votes scored by an ethno-regional party in its regional base/ % Votes scored by the leading
party in that region. IES score has been calculated for two last elections. General elections of 2008
have been excluded from the analysis due to the boycott of three regional parties listed at serial
No. 3-5.

The maximum value for this index is on 1. The maximum index value (1) of a party

indicates that it is the leading party within a targeted electorate (related ethnic group is

a targeted electorate for an ethnically based party). The table illustrates that MQM is

the leading party within Mohajir constituency. The consistency of its index value

shows the stability of its electoral support. ANP remained a leading party in 1997, but

its electoral support is inconsistent markedly. BNP is a very similar case to the ANP.

Although JWP and PKMAP are not leading parties within their related constituencies,

their electoral support shows more consistency than ANP and BNP. Nevertheless,

MQM is the most dominant ethno-regional party of Pakistan. The remaining ethno-

regional parties have mixed results.

195
5.4.3.2 Electoral Stability: Coefficient of Variance

Coefficient of variance is a useful technique that statisticians use to measure

consistency. The table shows that, overall, mainstream parties (PMLs & PPPs) are

more consistent than the ethno-regional political parties or Islamic parties. This

finding indicates the tendency of political system towards a two-party system. It also

confirms that Pakistan is a less segmented society. The statistics reveal that both

parties have remarkable support, more than 70%. Interestingly, ANP is showing more

consistency than MQM in this table

Figure 5-18: Descriptive Statistics: Federal Election in Pakistan 38

(1988-2008)
Parties N Minimum Maximum Mean Median S. D C.V
JWP 4 0.021 0.612 0.313 0.310 0.243 77.63%
BNM-M/ BNP 4 0.190 0.654 0.328 0.234 0.219 66.76%
PNP 3 0.164 0.601 0.433 0.533 0.235 54.27%
BNM 2 0.238 0.379 0.308 0.308 0.100 32.46%
BNA 1 0.302 * * * * *
BNDP 1 0.0528 * * * * *
PKMAP/PM 5 0.121 0.487 0.300 0.307 0.135 45.00%
ANP 6 1.030 2.091 1.725 1.778 0.379 21.97%
MQM 4 3.182 7.400 5.032 4.774 1.856 36.88%
PMLs 6 30.16 49.37 40.47 40.60 6.83 16.87%
PPPs 6 23.75 38.52 32.34 34.02 6.42 19.85%
Islamists 6 1.97 11.00 4.76 3.35 3.56 74.78%
Independents 6 9.84 19.55 13.57 11.32 4.50 33.16%
Sources: ECP
Note: (a) PMLs include PML-N, PML-Q, PML-J, PML-F, PML-Z and IJI (1988 and 1990)
(b) PPPs include PPPP, PPP-Sherpao, PPP-Shahid Bhutto, and PDA (1990)
(c) Islamists include (Parties and Alliances between 1988-2008) JUI-F, JUI-D, JUI-S, JI, JUP, PIF,
IJM, TNFJ, MDM, and MMA. (d) Italics= ethno-regional parties. (e) Bold= Multiethnic/
Mainstream Parties
(f) Coefficient of variance has been used to assess the electoral stability: lesser the score a political
party has, the more its electoral support is consistent.

Comparison at the international level has been summarized in the figure 5-19. This

figure provides us an opportunity to compare the stability of electoral support of

Pakistan‘s political parties with political parties of consociational regimes of Western

Europe.

196
 Figure 5-19: Comparative Study of the Stability of Electoral Support 39
(The Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and Pakistan)
S. No. Country Party C.V
1 The Netherlands CHU 5.02%
2 The Netherlands SGP 6.63%
3 The Netherlands KVP 7.20%
4 Switzerland FDP 8.85%
5 The Netherlands ARP 10.10%
6 Belgium PSB/BSP 10.62%
7 Switzerland SP 11.17%
8 The Netherlands PvdA 11.63%
9 Austria SPO 12.87%
10 Belgium PSC/CVP 13.17%
11 Switzerland CVP 13.52%
12 Switzerland EVP 14.06%
13 The Netherlands VVD 16.03%
14 Pakistan PMLs 16.87%
15 Austria OVP 19.29%
16 Pakistan PPPs 19.85%
17 Pakistan ANP 21.97%
18 Austria Green 22.04%
19 Austria LF 27.67%
20 Pakistan BNM 32.46%
21 Pakistan MQM 36.88%
22 Switzerland SVP 38.41
23 Belgium PLP/PVV 39.27%
24 Pakistan PKMAP/PM 45.00%
25 Austria KPO 50.52%
26 Austria VDU 53.68%
27 Pakistan PNP 54.27%
28 Pakistan BNM-M/ BNP 66.76%
29 Belgium PCB/KPB 69.37%
30 Pakistan JWP 77.63%
31 Pakistan Islamists 74.78%

Source: Election results for Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland is available in ―Siaroff,
A. (2000). Comparative European Party Systems: An Analysis of Parliamentary Elections since 1945.
London: Garland Science‖. Data was calculated and tabulated by the author.

197
A careful examination reveals that, at the minimum, the comparison confirms that:

(a) Pakistan‘s political parties have lesser consistency in their electoral support

than the Western political parties;

(b) In the western case, the pillarised parties are more consistent in their

electoral support than the non-pillarised political parties ;

(c) In the Pakistani case, mainstream parties are more consistent in their electoral

support than the ethno-regional parties;

(d) Pakistani mainstream parties are nearer to pillarised parties in terms of their

electoral support than the non-pillarised parties;

(e) Pakistan‘s ethno-regional parties are nearer to non-pillarised western parties

than the pillarised parties.

This analysis shows that the cases, Pakistan and the western consociational regimes

have different set-ups. It is established that both have different nature of society and

political culture. While the western consociational regimes were segmented, divided,

and markedly plural societies, Pakistan is not a segmented, not so divided, and not a

markedly plural society. While the Western cases have managed to experience stable

democracy under consociational arrangements, Pakistan needs no special power-

sharing arrangements to practice democracy. It can achieve stable democratic

governance through other measure.

5.5 Conclusion

It seems quite difficult to find even a single plural society that accomplishes the four

criteria of an ideal plural society presented by Arend Lijphart. The societies deviate

from the ideal type, and the degree to which they deviate can be used as an indication

of their degree of pluralism (Steiner, 1987).

198
The first criterion that the segments into which the society is divided be clearly

identified seems quite easy test for the seemingly plural societies. But most of these

societies do not pass it. Though Pakistan is a plural society, there is a considerable

ambiguity about the number of segments into which it should be divided. For

example, is there one Baloch segment or it should be broken down into Baloch and

Brahvi segments? Is the Balochs who have been assimilated in the Sindhi or Siraiki

culture and speak Sindhi or Siraiki should be considered a part of Baloch segment or

otherwise? Similarly, is the Pothowhari or Hindko speaking segment, a variant of

Punjabi, should be considered a separate segment or a part of Punjabi segment? For

instance, if the segments of the Pakistani society have been identified, even then it is

difficult to determine precisely the size of each segment to pass the second criterion of

a plural society presented by Lijphart. Still, if we take the census reports‘ figures for

granted, the Pakistani case seems reluctant to pass the remaining two criteria.

The situation is even more ambivalent with reference to the third criterion. There is

hardly any social or economic organization whose boundary coincides with the

linguistic boundaries in Pakistan. Some political organizations of Pashtuns and

Balochs may be regarded as ethnically exclusive, but largely there are no

linguistically based parties in Pakistan. All the efforts of Sindhi and Siraiki

nationalists in this direction have been complete failures. Punjabi segment

overwhelmingly votes for the mainstream parties. MQM has changed its name from

Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Mohajir National Movement) to Muttahida Qaumi

Movement (United National Movement) and its leadership has adopted a more

inclusive outlook away from Mohajirism.

199
As earlier mentioned, there are no numerous linguistically-based parties; therefore the

fourth criterion is not relevant to the Pakistani case.

The stable electoral support for the ethno-regional parties can provide evidence of the

degree of pluralism only if parties are linguistically based and the suffrage is free and

universal.

When the findings are mixed for a case, it depends on everyone‘s impression to

categorize a society as a plural or a homogenous one (Steiner, 1987). The same is the

case with Pakistan. This ambiguity may lead different authors to different

conclusions. However, it is safe to say that the Pakistani society has lesser degree of

pluralism than the Western European cases of consociational democracy. It is neither

a deeply divided nor a fragmented society. Ethnic and linguistic loyalties exist but are

not too strong. Mainly, political parties, trade unions, bar councils, professors and

teachers associations, chambers of commerce, and other social and economic

organization are not sufficiently ethnically or linguistically exclusive.

To sum up, (a) Pakistan lacks favorable conditions for establishment and maintenance

of consociational democracy; (b) the political leadership is not too accommodative to

practice consociational democracy in Pakistan; (c) and the Pakistani society is neither

a deeply divided nor a fragmented society. Therefore, consociationalism is not a

realistic option for Pakistan to practice democracy.

While the evidence shows that consociationalism is not a good match for Pakistan, it

would be interesting to use the same evidence to test the ‗fit‘ for decentralized

federalism. It has been argued in this chapter that Pakistan has a large population and

ethno-linguistic groups are, more or less, geographically concentrated. In this given

200
situation, federalism is the best option to provide autonomy to geographically

concentrated communities. Similarly, the evidence revealed that mainstream parties

like PML and PPP have received considerable electoral support from all ethno-

linguistic groups in the recent past. Contrary, the ethno-regional parties‘ have

displayed very limited and wavering electoral support. This pattern of support for

mainstream and ethno-regional parties seems to suggest that ‗majoritarian‘ rather than

‗consociational‘ system of government is the best option for Pakistan. While it has

been argued that Pakistan is not a case of deeply divided society, federal settings

under the British model of democracy are more relevant than the consociational

model of democracy. A relatively decentralized federal system can address the

grievances of smaller communities like autonomy, representation in jobs, more funds

for development, allocations of funds in NFC Award, and water issues. These

grievances have ‗territorial‘ character and are not community or group concerns.

Federalism is the best option to manage grievances of territorial character.

Furthermore, the rights of minority provinces have been respected in the recent past in

Pakistan. A revised NFC Award for distribution of funds has been approved with a

complete consensus. The project of Kalabagh dam has been abandoned due to the

reservations of smaller provinces. A huge fund has been allocated for the

development of Balochistan. Army has relaxed some requirement to incorporate

Balochs in armed forces. The concurrent list of 1973 constitution has been abolished

to provide more autonomy to the provinces. In short, Pakistan seems moving toward a

decentralization and devolved governance. Therefore, at this point of time,

consociationalism it is not a realistic choice for Pakistan.

201
Endnotes:

1
Tahir Amin has argued that the groups that were excluded from the power structure mobilized along
ethnic lines; and the groups that were provided power-sharing left the secessionist leanings. For
detail see: Amin, T. (1988). Ethno-national Movements in Pakistan: Domestic and International
Factor. Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies.
2
For this point of view see Alqama, K. (1997). Bengali Elite Perception of Pakistan, the Road to
Disillusionment: Uneven Development or Ethnicity. Karachi: Royal Book Company.
3
Favorable factors for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy have been
discussed in the second chapter of thesis. The favorable factors were not derived deductively but
inductively after a comparative study of consociational regimes. Therefore, with the expansion of
consociational universe, the favorable factors underwent significant modifications in number and
content over time. In this study, the list of favorable factors has been used that was presented by
Lijphart in 1985 in the case of South Africa.
4
The concept of ‗leadership‘ is not clearly defined by Lijphart. However, the survey of literature on
consociationalism reveals that Lijphart has used this term for ‗political elites‘ of various states who
mattered in the politics of respective societies. Therefore, for the purpose of this chapter, we have
used the term of ‗political leadership‘ for the ‗political elite‘ of Pakistan who joined various power-
sharing arrangements and coalition cabinets in the post-1971 Pakistan.
5
As we have discussed in the second chapter, one the primary challenges to consociationalism lies in
defining the underlying meanings of core concepts. Lijphart has acknowledged this problem in
setting the basic standard of measurement for the concept of ‗Degree of Pluralism‘. This analysis
does not intend to present an additional clarity of the concepts presented by Lijphart. But, it will
follow the criteria for the measurement of degree of pluralism used by Lijphart.
6
Punjabis and Siraikis are viewed as Punjabis by the smaller communities of minority provinces.
Siraiki was considered as a dialect of Punjabi until 1981. Both communities share social norms and
cultural activities. Zulfiqar Khosa, ex-governor of Punjab, has asserted that Siraiki is a language
and not a nation. He disapproved the division of Punjab and the suggestion of a Siraiki province.
(Daily Jang, April 20, 2010.)
7
Two segments are unfavorable for consociationalism, according to Lijphart (1977) because it would
result into minority-majority split.
8
See also for detail: K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan and Terrorism: A summary, CRS Report for
congress .specialist in Asian affairs
9
See also: Smruti S. Pattanaik, Islam and the Ideology of Pakistan, strategic analysis, Vol. 22, Issue 9,
December 1998, pp: 1273-1295.
10
See for detail: Lijphart, A. (1996). The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation.
American Political Science Review. 90, pp. 258-268.
11
On the first factor, Pakistan receives most unfavorable rating because it has a dominant Punjabi
community. On the second factor, it also receives most unfavorable rating due to unequal size of its
segments. On the third factor, it gets neither favorable nor unfavorable scores because it has six

202
 segments. On the fourth factor, it gets most unfavorable rating because it is one of the world‘s most
populous countries. On the fifth factor, it receives a favorable rating because of its security
concerns. On of the sixth factor, it receives a favorable rating because Islam is a unifying force in
Pakistan. On the seventh factor, it receives an unfavorable rating due to huge regional disparities.
On the eighth factor, it gets a favorable rating because more or less ethno-linguistic groups are
geographically concentrated. On the ninth factor, it obtains neither favorable nor unfavorable scores
12
It is important to note that these three cases are not simply selected because they failed to show a
‗consociationalism-friendly‘ type leadership and would provide the author an easy evidence for
argument. But, these are the only democratic /civilian periods available for the analysis of post-
1971 Pakistan: Bhutto‘s civilian rule (1972-77), post-Zia civilian period (1988-99), and post-
Musharraf civilian period (2008-09). During their rule, Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) and Pervez
Musharraf (1999-2007) remained in military uniform.
13
Three cases are selected from the periods when the Pakistan was experiencing a participatory civilian
rule after military regimes of Ayub Khan [Ayub period (1958-69) and then Yahya Khan (1969-71),
Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88), and Musharraf (1999-2007) respectively.
14
Results are available at the website of election commission of Pakistan
15
Memorandum: J L Pumphrey (British ambassador at Islamabad) to secretary of state for foreign and
commonwealth affairs, (diplomatic report number 282/72), April 24, 1972. FCO 37/1136, File No p
¼. File was accessed at National Achieve Center, London.
16
Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan was a harsh critic of Wali Khan.
17
Report sent to A R Murray (Islamabad) by Mr. Imray about his visit of Karachi 16-24 February,
dated February 23, 1976: File: FCO 37/1772. File was accessed at National Achieve Center,
London.
18
FCO 37/1790, file No P 062/548/2 Annual Report: Defense Attaché‘s Report (31 December 1974 to
31 December 1975) Titled ‗Internal situation‘. File was accessed at National Achieve Center,
London.
19
Note on Bhutto‘s personality: Laurence Pumphrey, a British ambassador, analysis Bhutto‘s
personality and asserts that ―His weakest suit, perhaps, is the delegation. He is a remarkable man. I
am not sure that there is a single Pakistani outside his immediate family that actually likes him. Few
would deny his energy-, his courage, his tenacity. Many would give him exceptionally high, marks
for intelligence and far-sightedness. But almost all would agree that his qualities, as opposed to his
abilities, are a bewildering mixture. His two (or more) personalities do not operate alternately but
rather concurrently. He can be attractive and repulsive, tolerant and vindictive, democrat and
fascist, all in the same breath. He reacts on at least three levels - those of emotion, of reason and of
expediency - in the same split second. His weakest suit, perhaps, is delegation, using other men's
talents: he is jealous and authoritarian and wants no one to approach him in public esteem or to be
in a position to ignore or question his wishes. This may be seen to be his greatest disservice to.
Pakistan - and particularly when it comes to the succession. It detracts of course, to put it mildly,
from the reality of Pakistan's democratic institutions - the Constitution, Parliament, some would say

203
 the Courts, the Cabinet. He has expended enormous effort on establishing or reasserting these
bulwarks of democracy: even if there may be at present some lack of substance in some of them he
is deeply committed to their continuance. But they must, please, work according to his pleasure.
Where he has failed, and shows no signs of succeeding, is in finding an acceptable way to handle
the opposition in a multi-party system. It is hard to be sure whether the opposition in Pakistan is so
hopeless because Bhutto is so beastly to it or whether he is so beastly to it because it is so hopeless.
It will be most interesting to see how he proceeds after (and indeed during) the imminent general
elections: most observers agree that he could, if he wished, with support from the section of the
Muslim League allied to him, win practically every seat; but this would surely be an embarrassment
to him. In spite of his tendency towards overkill, quite probably he would like to see a moderately
coherent opposition, pursuing a rational, constructive role in debate and committee: with his
experience and intellect and with the backing of the intelligence and security forces he could run
rings round it in any probable circumstances. But moderation, coherence, reason and
constructiveness are hard to find in this violent, factious, bigoted and inward-looking people‖. A
letter to Rt Hon Anthony Crosland LLP Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs by
Laurence Pumphrey dated June 11, 1976 .British embassy. File: FCO 37/1772, File was accessed at
National Achieve Center, London.
20
The Pakistan was governed by military rule until December 1985. But before lifting the martial law,
Zia had managed to hold a referendum for his election as president, and amended the constitution
through its new elected national assembly in party less election of 1985.
21
ANP is a successor of NAP that was ‗on a collision course‘ with PPP during Z.A. Bhutto period and
was banned because of it‘s allegedly secessionist leanings.
22
Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance) was a nine-party alliance comprising Pakistan
Muslim League , Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (Pakistan Islamic Party), Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam
(Darkhasti Group) (Party of the Scholars of Islam), Khakshar Party, Markazi Jamiat Ahle-Hadith,
Azad Group, Nizami-i-Mustafa Group, Hizbe Jihad, and Jamiah Masheikh.
23
Benazir government was dismissed in August 1990 by the president on the charges of corruption and
maladministration. The communal violence and unrest in her home province, Sindh, was the
leading contributing factor in president‘s decision to remove her government (Kennedy, 1991).
24
for example ANP, MQM, and BNA.
25
It won 135 of the 204 seats contested in the elections. Election was postponed in three constituencies
for certain reasons.
26
Note on Bhurban Declaration: ―PML (N) leader Mian Nawaz Sharif and co-chairman PPP Asif Ali
Zardari signed a declaration in Bhurban. The declaration states that (a) Allied parties, the Pakistan
People‘s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (N) resolve to form a coalition government for
giving a practical shape to the mandate, which was given to the democratic forces by the people of
Pakistan on February 18, 2008; (b)This has been decided in today‘s summit between the PPP and
the PML (N) that the deposed judges would be restored, on the position as they were on November
2, 2007, within 30 days of the formation of the federal government through a parliamentary

204
 resolution; (c) The parties agreed that all allied parties would fully support the candidate for the
position of the prime minister, nominated by the PPP. The PML (N) suggested that the candidate
for prime minister should be such person who can take ahead the common agenda of the allied
parties; (d) The parties agreed that the speaker and the deputy speaker of the national assembly
would be from the PPP while the speaker and the deputy speaker of the Punjab assembly would be
from the PML (N) ; (e) Both the parties agreed that the PML (N) would be a part of the federal
government while the PPP would be a part of the Punjab government. 6-This is the solid opinion of
the leaderships of both the parties that the allied parties are ready for forming the governments and
the sessions of the national and provincial assemblies be summoned immediately‖ (The News
International, Sunday, March 09, 2008).
27
Baloch nationalist parties and PKMAP, a Pashtun Nationalist party boycotted the election. These
parties have sound support in Balochistan. The boycott of these parties enabled PPP and PML-Q to
extend their support. The grand coalition in Balochistan has the support of 64 out of 65 members in
the provincial assembly. Only Yar Mohammad Rind, a PML-Q leader, is out of this PPP-led
coalition government of Aslam Raisani. It is the mutual hostility of the Rind and Raisani tribes that
has led Yar Mohammad Rind to not support Raisani‘s government.
28
The PPP and the PML-N has signed an agreement to reinstate the sacked judges on the position of
November 2, 2007, within thirty days of the formation of the federal government through a
parliamentary resolution. Musharraf has removed these judges on November 2, 2007 from the
courts.
29
For detail see: The Daily Dawn, May 13, 2008.
30
For detail see: The Nation, October 23, 2009.
31
For example, the conflictive issue of NFC Award has been resolved now.
32
Even, the census was delayed in 1991(due date as per fixed interval of ten years) and it was only
possible in 1998 to have census.
33
N J Barrington: 1967, letter of British embassy. A memorandum by Middle East Section: 1967, FCO
37/ 784. File was accessed at National Achieve Center, London.
34
N J Barrington: 1967, letter of British embassy. A memorandum by Middle East Section: 1967, FCO
37/ 784. File was accessed at National Achieve Center, London.
35
The index defines fragmentation as the probability that a randomly selected pair of individuals in a
society will belong to different groups. The index can vary between 0 and 1. The value is zero for a
complete homogenous society and the other extreme is the hypothetical case of a society where
each individual belongs to a different group.
36
Pakistan‘s union landscape features trade unions that are affiliated to political parties as well as
traditional, autonomous, centrist union organizations. The most prominent of the former class is the
right-wing National Labor Federation (NLF) which is allied with the conservative Jamaat-e-Islami
(JI) political party. The NLF‘s power base is the steel and railroad industries, Pakistan International
Airlines (PIA) and the Karachi port. The other politically connected trade unions are the NWFP-
based Democratic Labor Federation (DLF) affiliated to the Awami National Party (ANP), the

205
 Pakistan People‘s Party (PPP)‘s People's Labor Bureau (PLB), and the labor wing of the Mohajir
Qaumi Movement
37
The vote percentages for different parties in various elections are calculated by the author. The all
constituencies of Pakistan for national and provincial elections were divided along ethno-linguistic
lines: the Pashto speaking belt, the Baloch countryside, Urdu speaking Mohajir constituency,
Sindhi-speaking region, Siraiki belt and Punjabi speaking region. The boundaries of various ethno-
linguistic groups were drawn using the information available in 1998 census report about the
language composition of Pakistan. The detailed election results of each constituency are available at
website of election commission of Pakistan. The vote percentages for different political parties in
particular region were calculated by dividing the total votes of a particular party by the total valid
votes of that particular region. The percentages were calculated for the national assembly and
provincial assemblies‘ elections for the period of 1988-2008.
38
The analysis is limited to election results of parliamentary parties only.
39
The data used in this analysis is from 1950s and 1960s, instead of the most recent available. The
Netherlands (1948-67), Austria (1945-94), Belgium (1946-65), and Switzerland (1960-2003) when
these countries were at their high point of consociationalism around 1970, the significant national
Belgian political parties have split into distinct representations for each community‘s interests
besides defenders of their ideologies. Therefore data here has been selected before 1970 to avoid
ambiguity. The high point of consociationalism began to shatter and since late 1960s; the process of
depillarization was started.

206
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32. Waseem, M. (1992). Pakistan's Lingering Crisis of Diarchy. Asian Survey. 32(7),

617-634.

33. Ziring, L. (1990). Pakistan in 1989: The Politics of Stalemate. Asian Survey. 30(2),

126-135.

210
Chapter No.6

CONSOCIATIONALISM AS A POLICY RECOMMENDATION

FOR PAKISTAN: A SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we have examined the compatibility of consociational

democracy with the multi-ethnic society of Pakistan. The findings revealed that

consociationalism is not a realistic option for Pakistan to manage ethnic diversity. In

addition, this chapter attempts to explore the support for consociational devices in the

multiethnic society of Pakistan through a public opinion survey of the members of

various ethno-linguistic groups. The survey draws on a sample of 1013 people from

every walk of life. Such surveys have certain limitations in the developing states like

Pakistan due to meager resources, poor literacy rates, and unfortunate law and order

situations. . It is quite possible that the results from this sample might differ, slightly,

from a larger sample. The author has also no hesitation to acknowledge that the

survey is capturing a moment in time. The results of this survey may differ if it had

been taken at a different time 1. But, the survey is still important. Despite the shortage

of resources and uncomfortable situation during 2008-09 in Pakistan, it is more or

less, a nationally representative sample. Ethnicity, language, class and region have

been accorded importance in the stratification. At the minimum, as a part of this

project, the survey has accomplished its goal. It has substantiated the argument that

consociationalism is not relevant to the multiethnic society of Pakistan by exploring

that majority of Pakistanis are not inclined toward the consociational arrangements.

The central question to be answered in this chapter is that whether or not a plurality

of Pakistanis prefers to add in consociational devices in political system of Pakistan.

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Three secondary questions have been designed to address this central question. The

secondary questions include:

(a) Whether the majority of Pakistanis seem satisfied with the existing federal
settings?
(b) Does the plurality of Pakistanis favors consociational arrangements in
Pakistan?
(c) Does the majority of Pakistanis prefer consociational arrangements to
decentralized federalism?

Second section of this chapter describes the methodology adopted to analyze the

public opinion. Third section is reserved for detailed discussion of survey results.

Some important interviews and comments have been discussed in the fourth section.

The chapter has been concluded in the last section.

6.2 Methodology

This section describes briefly about methods and procedures used for sampling the

population and construction of questionnaire for survey of public opinion to

determine the support for consociationalism as a policy recommendation.

6.2.1 Sampling

This opinion survey was conducted during 2008-09 in different areas of Pakistan. The

sample was stratified by ethno-linguistic representation and provincial distribution of

population. People from every walk of life were interviewed. The survey strata

included various regions of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan. The minimum

number of respondents for each ethno-linguistic group was 100. However, for larger

ethno-linguistic groups, the numbers of interviewees were extended to make the

survey more representative. Similarly, the number of respondents for Balochs and

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Pashtuns were relatively higher relating to their share in population of Pakistan

because the both communities are well-known for their autonomy demands and

nationalistic feelings. Punjabis constitute the largest group. Therefore, a sizeable

number of Punjabis were interviewed to make the survey representative. The smaller

groups (4.8%) that are not recognized by the government of Pakistan as a separate

group were excluded from the study. The breakup of respondents was as under:

Figure 6-1: Ethno-linguistic Breakup of Respondents2

S. No. Ethno-linguistic group Population percentage (1998) Number of Respondents

1 Baloch 3.5 107
2 Mohajir 7.8 100
3 Pashtun 13.0 171
4 Punjabi 45.4 372
5 Sindhi 14.6 150
6 Siraiki 10.9 113
7 Other groups 4.8 Excluded from the survey
8 Overall --- 1013

The survey covered various regions of Pakistan. A total of 1013 interviews were

conducted throughout the country, in Urdu and English. Some interviews were carried

out electronically, the rest were conducted face-to-face by the author or on author‟s

behalf by the interviewers. The questionnaire was codified and SPSS software was

used for the statistical analysis of data.

6.2.2 Questionnaire

A questionnaire was designed to gather public opinion regarding the central question

that whether or not consociational devices should be introduced in the political system

of Pakistan. It was composed of two sections:

(a) The first section of the questionnaire aimed to collect some basic information

of the respondents. The required information of respondents included their

213
 names, qualifications, professional affiliations (if any), household languages,

home district and province.

(b) The second section of the questionnaire was comprised of a three sets of close-

ended questions, endeavors to get respondents‟ opinion related to the existing

federal settings of Pakistan and the support for proposed solutions to manage

ethnic diversity i.e. consociationalism and (decentralized) federalism.

The findings of three sets of questions designed to address the central question have

been enumerated in the following section.

6.3 Findings of the survey

Findings of the each set of questions have been discussed in the three subsequent

sections.

6.3.1 Findings concerning Existing Federal Settings

This section deals with a set of six questions that aim to evaluate the perceptions of

various ethno-linguistic groups related to the current federal design of Pakistan. The

findings of the first three questions are tabulated in the figure 6-2. These questions

intend to discover the perceptions of various ethno-linguistic groups about the

domination of certain groups; and to determine the dominant and dominated groups.

The next three questions are related to the perceptions about existing federal settings.

Findings of these questions are summarized in the figure 6-3.

6.3.1.1 Perception about the Domination of Certain Ethno-linguistic Groups

It has been argued that certain communities dominate in the politics and society of

Pakistan and this domination causes a sense of alienation and resentment in the

214
marginalized communities. This resentment in turn underpins the political

mobilization in Pakistan (Mushtaq & Alqama, 2009). To assess the public opinion

about this argument, the respondents were asked whether or not certain ethno

linguistic groups dominate in the multiethnic society of Pakistan.

The results show that a large majority of Baloch (93.5%), Mohajir (95%), Pashtun

(89.5%), Punjabi (89.2%), Sindhi (88%), and Siraiki (96.5%) respondents have agreed

that certain ethno-linguistic groups dominate in the politicos and society of Pakistan.

The detailed findings are presented in the figure 6-2.

6.3.1.2 Findings about the two most Privileged Ethno-linguistic Groups

After the findings established that certain groups dominate in the politics and society

of Pakistan, the survey attempts to find out the two most privileged ethno-linguistic

groups. The interviewees were asked whether or not their group is one of the two

most privileged groups. With the exception of Punjabis, majority of the respondents

of all ethno-linguistic groups asserted that their group is not one of the two relatively

privileged groups. A large majority of Punjabis (83.9%), however, agreed that they

belong to the privileged group. Two-third respondents of Mohajir (66%) and Sindhis

(67.3%) communities do not agree to be a part of privileged groups. A vast majority

of Siraikis (78%), Pashtuns (88%), and Balochs (98%) respondents also do not agree

that they belong to a privileged group.

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 Figure 6-2: Perceptions about the Domination of Certain Groups

The domination of certain The two most privileged The two most marginalized
ethno-linguistic Groups ethno-linguistic Groups ethno-linguistic groups
Group Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Baloch No 7 6.5 105 98.1 11 10.3
Yes 100 93.5 2 1.9 96 89.7
Total 107 100.0 107 100.0 107 100.0
Mohajir No 5 5.0 66 66.0 69 69.0
Yes 95 95.0 34 34.0 31 31.0
Total 100 100.0 100 100.0 100 100.0
Pashtun No 18 10.5 150 87.7 52 30.4
Yes 153 89.5 21 12.3 119 69.6
Total 171 100.0 171 100.0 171 100.0
Punjabi No 40 10.8 60 16.1 336 90.3
Yes 332 89.2 312 83.9 36 9.7
Total 372 100.0 372 100.0 372 100.0
Sindhi No 18 12.0 101 67.3 98 65.3
Yes 132 88.0 49 32.7 52 34.7
Total 150 100.0 150 100.0 150 100.0
Siraiki No 4 3.5 88 77.9 40 35.4
Yes 109 96.5 25 22.1 73 64.6
Total 113 100.0 113 100.0 113 100.0

1. The domination of certain ethno-linguistic Groups: Do you think that certain ethno- linguistic
groups dominate in the multiethnic society of Pakistan?
2. The two most privileged ethno-linguistic Groups: Do you think that your group is one of the
two most privileged groups of Pakistan?
3. The two most marginalized ethno-linguistic groups: Do you think that your group is one of the
two most marginalized groups of Pakistan?

6.3.1.3 Findings about the two most Marginalized Ethno-linguistic Groups

The next question aims to find out the two most marginalized ethno-linguistic groups

of Pakistan. The interviewees were asked whether or not their group was one of the

two most marginalized groups. Majority of the Baloch (90%), Pashtun (70%), and

Siraikis (65%) respondents asserted that they belonged to relatively most

marginalized communities. A considerable number of Sindhis (35%) and Mohajirs

(31%) also enlisted their community in the two most marginalized communities.

216
Surprisingly, nearly 10% Punjabi respondents insisted that they belong to one of the

two most marginalized communities.

The results of first three questions reveal that the smaller communities feel themselves

at a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis Punjabis. However, Balochs, Pashtuns, and

Siraikis seem more discontented than Mohajirs and Sindhis.

6.3.1.4 Power-sharing Arrangements in Exiting Federal Settings

The findings of previous sections reveal that certain communities of Pakistan

perceived themselves as deprived and marginalized groups. The resentment of these

communities is also linked to their exclusion from power structure of federal center.

To discover public opinion about this perception, the interviewees were asked

whether or not they agree that ethno-linguistic groups based in smaller provinces have

been provided sufficient power-sharing in the current federal settings of Pakistan. The

findings seem to suggest a consensus among various groups that the ethno-linguistic

groups based in smaller provinces have not been provided sufficient powers sharing.

A majority of Baloch (77.6%), Mohajir (66.0%), Pashtun (60.2%), Punjabi (58.3%),

Sindhi (66.0%), and Siraiki (61.1%) respondents agreed that ethnic minorities are not

provided sufficient power sharing in Pakistan.

6.3.1.5 Alienation of Smaller Communities during Military Rule

One of the key factors for deficient power sharing in Pakistan is the vital role of

military in the politics. It has been argued that Punjabis dominate in military; and the

military rule has been equated with Punjabi rule by the smaller communities of

Pakistan (Talbot, 2002; Samad, 2007).

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To find out public opinion about this observation, the interviewees were asked

whether or not their respective ethno-linguistic group feels more alienation during

military rule than the participatory politics in Pakistan. Surprisingly, the results show

that majority of the respondents from each ethno-linguistic group do not approve this

observation. A majority of Baloch (56.1%), Mohajir (81.0%), Pashtun (59.1%),

Punjabi (91.7%), Sindhi (66.7%), and Siraiki (67.3%) respondents do not agree that

they feel more alienation during military rule than the participatory politics in

Pakistan.

6.3.1.6 Punjab as a Blockage in Smooth Running of Federalism

The relative size of the Punjab has been considered as a blockage for the smooth

running of federalism by the ethnic minorities of Pakistan (Adeney, 2007). To gauge

the public opinion about this perception, the interviewees were asked whether or not

they think that the relative size of one province (Punjab) is blockage in smooth

running of federalism in Pakistan.

The results of survey suggest that majority of all ethno-linguistic groups agreed with

this observation. A majority of Baloch (92.5%), Mohajir (57.0%), Pashtun (80.7%),

Punjabi (50.0%), Sindhi (68.0%), and Siraiki (58.4%) respondents seem convinced

that the relative size of the Punjab is an obstacle in smooth running of federalism in

Pakistan.

218
 Figure 6-3: Perceptions about the Existing Federal Settings

Power-sharing Arrangements More Alienation during Punjab as a Blockage in

in Exiting Federal Settings Military Rule smooth running of Federalism
Group Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Baloch No 83 77.6 60 56.1 8 7.5
Yes 24 22.4 47 43.9 99 92.5
Total 107 100.0 107 100.0 107 100.0
Mohajir No 66 66.0 81 81.0 43 43.0
Yes 34 34.0 19 19.0 57 57.0
Total 100 100.0 100 100.0 100 100.0
Pashtun No 103 60.2 101 59.1 33 19.3
Yes 68 39.8 70 40.9 138 80.7
Total 171 100.0 171 100.0 171 100.0
Punjabi No 217 58.3 341 91.7 186 50.0
Yes 155 41.7 31 8.3 186 50.0
Total 372 100.0 372 100.0 372 100.0
Sindhi No 99 66.0 100 66.7 48 32.0
Yes 51 34.0 50 33.3 102 68.0
Total 150 100.0 150 100.0 150 100.0
Siraiki No 69 61.1 76 67.3 47 41.6
Yes 44 38.9 37 32.7 66 58.4
Total 113 100.0 113 100.0 113 100.0
Overall No 61.63 39.31
Yes 38.37 60.69
Total 100.0 100.0

1. Power-sharing Arrangements in Exiting Federal Settings: Do you think that that ethno-
linguistic groups based in smaller provinces have been provided sufficient powers sharing in the
current federal settings of Pakistan?
2. More Alienation during Military Rule: Do you think that your ethno-linguistic group feels more
alienation during military rule than the participatory politics in Pakistan?
3. Punjab as a Blockage in smooth running of Federalism: Do you think that the relative size of
the Punjab is an obstacle in smooth running of federalism in Pakistan?

6.3.1.7 Recapitulation

The findings of this section seem to suggest that Punjabis are a relatively

advantageous community. As a result, the remaining communities assert that they

belong to the marginalized communities. The survey shows that smaller communities

of minority provinces assert that they are not provided sufficient power sharing in the

existing federal settings. However, the majority of smaller communities do not feel

219
more deprivation during military rule than the participatory democracy. Furthermore,

the smaller communities view the relative size of Punjab as an obstruction in the

smooth running of federalism in contemporary Pakistan.

6.3.2 Findings concerning the Proposed Consociational Governance

Consociational democracy has been prescribed for divided societies to ensure political

stability and to avoid inter-group conflict. Consociational theory assumes that each

group, in deeply divide societies, has its exclusive political party, student union, trade

union voluntary association, and educational institutions. Therefore, it suggests a grand

coalition of all political parties and leaves no space for opposition in the government. It

recommends proportional electoral system to ensure proportional representation in

parliament and coalition cabinets. It also proposes proportional distribution of

resources and jobs. For non-federal societies, segmental autonomy is an optimal

solution presented by the consociationalism. In federal settings, territorial autonomy is

a choice for geographically concentrated communities. Consociationalism, essentially,

suggests homogeneous constituent units. It advocates division of boundaries on

linguistic rather than administrative basis. It recommends constitutional safeguards

where minorities are worried about the survival of their language and culture. This

survey aims to evaluate the public support in Pakistan for the above-mentioned

consociational devices.

This section has been divided into two parts. The first part attempts to determine the

level of fragmentation in Pakistani society by analyzing the results of the survey. This

estimation, in turn, will reveal whether or not the Pakistani society is a deeply divided

one and requires consociational arrangements to practice democracy. The second part

assesses the support for proposed consociational devices.

220
6.3.2.1 Level of Fragmentation in Pakistani Society

The findings reveal that multiethnic society of Pakistan is not as fragmented as were

the consociational cases of Western Europe. The centripetal feelings seem dominating

over centrifugal feelings: majority of people feel more pride for national rather than

ethnic identity; they do not dislike settlement of other groups in their regional base;

they suggest that they have not exclusive political, social, and economic

organizations; and they propose that they have no cultural and linguistic grievances.

However, majority of some ethno-linguistic groups deviate from the overall

perception of Pakistanis. A detail of perception regarding each dimension has been

elaborated in the figure 6-4.

Figure 6-4: Level of Fragmentation in Pakistani Society

Group Response Feel more pride for Dislike settlement Cultural grievances Exclusive
ethnic identity in regional base organizations
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Baloch No 24 22.4 28 26.2 61 57.0 31 29.0
Yes 83 77.6 79 73.8 46 43.0 76 71.0
Total 107 100.0 107 100.0 107 100.0 107 100.0
Mohajir No 73 73.0 75 75.0 85 85.0 42 42.0
Yes 27 27.0 25 25.0 15 15.0 58 58.0
Total 100 100.0 100 100.0 100 100.0 100 100.0
Pashtun No 107 62.6 142 83.0 77 45.0 104 60.8
Yes 64 37.4 29 17.0 94 55.0 67 39.2
Total 171 100.0 171 100.0 171 100.0 171 100.0
Punjabi No 322 86.6 355 95.4 330 88.7 329 88.4
Yes 50 13.4 17 4.6 42 11.3 43 11.6
Total 372 100.0 372 100.0 372 100.0 372 100.0
Sindhi No 104 69.3 98 65.3 66 44.0 81 54.0
Yes 46 30.7 52 34.7 84 56.0 69 46.0
Total 150 100.0 150 100.0 150 100.0 150 100.0
Siraiki No 104 92.0 106 93.8 75 66.4 109 96.5
Yes 9 8.0 7 6.2 38 33.6 4 3.5
Total 113 100.0 113 100.0 113 100.0 113 100.0
1. Feel more pride for ethnic identity: Do you think that the members of your group feel more pride for
their ethnic identity than the Pakistani identity?
2. Dislike settlement in regional base: Do you think that the members of your group dislike the settlement
of members of other groups in the regional base of your group?
3. Cultural grievances: Do you think that the members of your group have cultural grievances and are
worried about the survival of their language and culture?
4. Exclusive organizations: Do you think that the members of your group have exclusive political party,
student union, trade union voluntary association, and educational institutions?

221
6.3.2.1.1 Pride for Ethnic Identity

To determine the level of fragmentation in Pakistani society, the interviewees were

asked whether or not they feel more pride for their ethnic identity than Pakistani

identity. The results show that only a majority of Balochs (77.6%) acknowledged that

they feel more pride for Baloch identity than the Pakistani identity. One-third of

Sindhi (30.7%) and Pashtun (37.4%) interviewees declared that they feel more pride

for their respective ethnic identity than the Pakistani identity. The percentage of

interviewees from Mohajir (27.0%), Punjabi (13.4%) and Siraiki (8.0%) communities

who prefer ethnic identity to national identity are lower.

6.3.2.1.2 Dislike the Settlement of other groups in Regional Base

Another indication of fragmented societies is that the people of certain group dislike

the settlement of other groups in their regional base. To assess the level of

fragmentation in Pakistani society, the respondents are asked whether or not they

dislike settlement of members of other groups in the regional base of their group. The

findings reveal that majority of Baloch (71.0%) respondents acknowledged that

Balochs dislike the settlement of other groups in their regional base. One-third of

Sindhi (34.7%) respondents also agreed that Sindhis dislike the settlement of outsiders

in interior Sindh. However, only a small number of Mohajirs (25%), Punjabis (4.6 %),

Siraikis (6.2 %), and Pashtun (17.0 %) respondents agreed that their respective groups

dislike the settlement of other groups in their particular regional bases.

6.3.2.1.3 Cultural grievances and survival of language

To judge the level of fragmentation, the interviewees are, further, asked whether or

not they have cultural grievances and are worried about the survival of their language

and culture. The findings show that a majority of Sindhis (56 %) and Pashtuns (55%)

222
interviewees seem worried about the survival of their language and culture. A

considerable number of Balochs (43%) and Siraikis (33.6 %) also shared this

perception with the Sindhis and Pashtuns. Mohajirs (15%) and Punjabis (11.3 %),

however, seem satisfied to having no cultural grievances.

6.3.2.1.4 Exclusive Political, Social and Economic Organizations

In fragmented societies, normally, each group organizes its exclusive political, social

and economic organizations. To explore the Pakistani society, interviewees were

asked whether or not their groups have exclusive political party, student union, trade

union voluntary association, and educational institutions etc.

A majority of Baloch (71%) and Mohajir (58%) respondents declared that they have

exclusive political, social and economic organizations. A considerable number of

Sindhis (46%) and Pashtuns (39.2%) also claim that they have exclusive

organizations. However, a small number of Punjabi (11.6%) and Siraiki (3.5%)

respondents asserted that their communities have exclusive political organizations.

6.3.2.1.5 Recapitulation

The findings of this section seem to suggest that Pakistani society is not a fragmented

society. A plurality of Pakistanis, and a considerable number of all groups, affirms

that ethnic identity has no more primacy; no exclusive political, social and economic

organization of ethno-linguistic groups exists; and there is no more aversion among

the members of different ethno-linguistic groups. However, some cultural grievances

exist in smaller communities. Level of fragmentation has been summarized in the

following figure. The figure 6-5 reveals that Balochs, tiny minority, are relatively

more discontented. On the other hand, Punjabis, the largest group, seems quite

satisfied. The remaining groups fall, somewhere, in the middle.

223
 Figure 6-5: Level of Fragmentation in Pakistani Society

Level of Fragmentation in Pakistani Society

80
60
(%) Respondents
40
agreed
20

0
Baloch Pashtun Mohajir Sindhi Siraiki Punjabi
Ethno-linguistic Groups
Feel more pride for ethnic than National Identity Exclusive Political, Social and Economic organizations
Dislike settlement of other groups in regional base Cultural Grievances

224
6.3.2.2 Support for Consociational Devices

This part attempts to assess the support for the proposals of consociational

arrangements in Pakistan. To gauge the public support, the relevant responses have

been grouped under respective four elements of consociational democracy – grand

coalition or executive power-sharing, proportionality, autonomy, and minority rights

protection. The findings related to each element have been discussed in the

subsequent sections.

6.3.2.2.1 Grand Coalition or Executive Power-sharing

The most famous form of executive power-sharing in consociational regimes has been

remained a „grand coalition‟ of all significant political parties. Consociationalists

believe that grand coalition ensures political participation of all groups in multiethnic

states. Even, beyond consociationalism, the need for power-sharing in multiethnic

states has been recognized.

Horowitz ( 1985, p.365) asserts that when a party of one group retains power for an

indefinite period and the party of other group remains in opposition indefinitely, this

situation promotes the „feelings of exclusion‟ in the latter group. He has maintained

that the violence in Pakistan, Guyana, Congo, Sierra Leone, Zanzibar, and Guinea,

among others, can be traced as the consequence of dominance of one ethnic party

over others. However, Horowitz suggests multiethnic coalitions rather than grand

coalitions. Multiethnicity that Horowitz refers to as ties across ethnic lines requires

moderation and mutual accommodation. In divided societies, conciliatory governance

225
and the politics of compromise may emerge and the „feelings of exclusion may give

way to a sense of power-sharing‟. In this survey, the interviewees were asked whether

or not they suggest a grand coalition at the federal and provincial level to ensure

power-sharing in Pakistan.

The results of the survey suggest that majority of Pakistanis (55.96%) do not approve

of the suggestion of grand coalition at federal and provincial levels. However, a

majority of Mohajir (58.0%) respondents approved the suggestion for coalition

cabinets at central and provincial level. Sindhis were equally divided and there was

equivalent support for and against this suggestion. Though, a majority of the

respondents of other groups do not approve this suggestion, a considerable support is

available for this proposal among Baloch (44.9%), Pashtun (42.7%), Punjabi (40.6%),

and Siraiki (41.6%) respondents. The findings are summarized in the figure 6-6.

6.3.2.2.2 Proportionality

Proportionality is the primary characteristic of consociational democracy.

Consociationalism, through proportionality, guarantees proportional representation in

parliament, cabinets, jobs, and resources. It has been argued that consociationalism

“accommodates groups by promoting proportionality throughout public

administration, including the electoral system, security systems, and the courts”

(McGarry & O‟Leary, 2009). In this survey, two questions were asked by the

interviewees to assess their support for proportionality. The first question is related to

the proportional electoral system that ensures proportional representation and the

226
second question is related to the proportional representation in the vital institution of

armed forces. The results of these questions are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Figure 6-6: Responses about the consociational devices

Grand coalition or Proportional Electoral Just Representation in

Executive Power sharing System military
Group Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Baloch No 59 55.1 62 57.9 23 21.5
Yes 48 44.9 45 42.1 84 78.5
Total 107 100.0 107 100.0 107 100.0
Mohajir No 42 42.0 51 51.0 41 41.0
Yes 58 58.0 49 49.0 59 59.0
Total 100 100.0 100 100.0 100 100.0
Pashtun No 98 57.3 98 57.3 54 31.6
Yes 73 42.7 73 42.7 117 68.4
Total 171 100.0 171 100.0 171 100.0
Punjabi No 221 59.4 286 76.9 291 78.2
Yes 151 40.6 86 23.1 81 21.8
Total 372 100.0 372 100.0 372 100.0
Sindhi No 75 50.0 85 56.7 53 35.3
Yes 75 50.0 65 43.3 97 64.7
Total 150 100.0 150 100.0 150 100.0
Siraiki No 66 58.4 68 60.2 36 31.9
Yes 47 41.6 45 39.8 77 68.1
Total 113 100.0 113 100.0 113 100.0
Overall No - 55.96 66.10 - 53.87
Yes - 44.04 33.90 - 46.13
Total - 100.0 100.0 - 100.0

1. Grand coalition or Executive Power sharing: Do you suggest a grand coalition at the
federal and provincial level to ensure power-sharing in Pakistan?
2. Proportional Electoral System: Do you prefer proportional electoral system to the first-past-
the-post electoral system for Pakistan?
3. Just Representation in military: Do suggest substantial remedial policy to ensure just
representation of all ethno-linguistic groups in military?

227
6.3.2.2.2.1 Proportional Voting System

Electoral systems are important because they “provide the means by which votes cast

by people are translated into the offices won by the politicians” (Schneider, 2006).

Currently, first-past-the-post electoral system is operating in Pakistan. The

interviewees were asked whether or not they prefer proportional electoral system to

the first-past-the-post electoral system for Pakistan. The findings unveil that a

majority of Pakistanis (66.10%) do not prefer proportional electoral system to the

first-past-the-post electoral system. However, a considerable number of Mohajir

(49.0%), Baloch (42.1%), Pashtun (42.7%), and Sindhi (43.3%) respondents favor

proportional electoral system to first-past-the-post electoral system. The proportional

electoral system has lesser appeal in Punjabi (23.1%) and Siraiki (39.8%)

respondents.

6.3.2.2.2.2 Proportionality in Armed Forces

In addition to proportional electoral system, proportionality involves allocation of

representation in vital institutions and distribution of resources and jobs. The rationale

behind proportional representation is to ensure the „just representation‟ and

„inclusion‟ of all segments of society into the power structure of the state. Military is

the most powerful, influential and prominent intuition in Pakistan. Punjabis dominate

this vital institution and the remaining communities resent Punjabis‟

overrepresentation. The smaller communities of Pakistan assert for their „just‟

representation in the armed forces. To gauge the public opinion for this assertion, the

interviewees were asked whether or not they suggest substantial remedial policy to

ensure just representation of all ethno-linguistic groups in military .The results show

228
that majority of Baloch (78.5%), Pashtun (68.4%), Sindhi (64.7%), Mohajir (59.0%),

and Siraiki (68.1%) respondents approved of this suggestion. Conversely, a majority

of Punjabi (78.2%) respondents do not agree with this suggestion. Overall, a majority

of Pakistanis do not approve this proposal.

6.3.2.2.3 Minority Rights Protection

Consociationalism aims to protect minority rights through veto power concerning the

vital issues. Responding to the question whether or not minorities should be provided

minority rights protection, a majority of Pakistanis (53.84%) agreed that minorities‟

rights should be protected by the constitutional safeguards. A majority of Baloch

(58.9%), Pashtun (60.8%), Mohajir (54.0%), and Sindhi (72.0%) respondents agreed

that minorities should be provided protection. Conversely, a majority of Punjabi

(51.6%) and Siraiki (58.4%) respondents do not agree with this suggestion. The

results are summarized in the figure 6-7.

6.3.2.2.4 Segmental Autonomy

This section endeavors to judge public support for two proposals: (1) the right for

every ethno-linguistic group to design its educational system and (2) the re-

demarcation of provincial boundaries along linguistic borders. The results of the

survey for these proposals are discussed in the subsequent sections respectively.

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6.3.2.2.4.1 Right to Design Educational System

Segmental autonomy is one of the primary characteristics of consociationalism.

According to Lijphart (2002, p.39), the group autonomy refers to the “group‟s

authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and

culture”. To measure the public support, the interviewees were asked whether or not

they approve the case that every ethno-linguistic group should have right to design its

educational system and to decide the medium of instruction in educational

institutions. A plurality of Pakistanis (71.78%) does not approve this proposal. A

majority of Mohajir (69.0%), Sindhi (58.0%), Siraiki (61.1%), Pashtun (59.1%) and

Punjabi (86.0%) respondents rejected the suggestion. Only a modest majority of

Baloch (52.3%) respondents approved this suggestion. The results are summarized in

the figure 6-7.

6.3.2.2.4.2 Homogenous Constituent Units

The design of constituent units „fits into the category of segmental autonomy through

creating an institutional space for territorially concentrated groups. Within this

territorial space the group‟s leaders control decisions relating to their community‟s

well-being, such as education or the language of the state‟ (Adeney, 2002).

There is no consensus among the constitutional engineers about the principle of

demarcation of constituent units in a federal polity. Some argue for homogeneous

units (Watts, 2000, pp. 32-34; Adeney, 2007) and others for heterogeneous

constituent units (Vile, 1982, p. 222; Horowitz, 1985). While consociationalism

230
suggests homogenous units, the centripetalism stresses for heterogeneous units. Some

experts have suggested homogenous constituent units for Pakistan (Adeney, 2007).

Figure 6-7: Responses about Consociational Devices

Minority rights protection Segmental autonomy

Group Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Baloch No 44 41.1 51 47.7

Yes 63 58.9 56 52.3
Total 107 100.0 107 100.0
Mohajir No 46 46.0 69 69.0
Yes 54 54.0 31 31.0
Total 100 100.0 100 100.0
Pashtun No 67 39.2 101 59.1
Yes 104 60.8 70 40.9
Total 171 100.0 171 100.0
Punjabi No 192 51.6 320 86.0
Yes 180 48.4 52 14.0
Total 372 100.0 372 100.0
Sindhi No 42 28.0 87 58.0
Yes 108 72.0 63 42.0
Total 150 100.0 150 100.0
Siraiki No 66 58.4 69 61.1
Yes 47 41.6 44 38.9
Total 113 100.0 113 100.0
Overall No - 46.16 - 71.78
Yes - 53.84 - 28.22
Total - 100.0 - 100.0

1. Minority Rights protection: Do you suggest that ethnic minorities should be provided rights
protection in Pakistan?
2. Segmental autonomy: Do you suggest that every ethno-linguistic group should have right to
design its educational system and to decide the medium of instruction in educational
institutions?

This survey has attempted to evaluate the public support for this proposal. The

interviewees were asked whether or not they suggest division of provinces; and if they

agreed with the division what should be the principle of division i.e. division on

administrative basis or division on linguistic basis. The results seem to suggest that a

231
 majority of Baloch (92.6%), Mohajir (61%), Pashtun (84.2%), Punjabi (64%), and

Siraiki (83.2%) respondents agreed with the argument of division of province(s).

However, a majority of Sindhi (51.3%) respondents rejected the division of provinces

as a mean to strengthen federation. The striking finding, however, is that a majority of

Mohajir, Pashtun, Siraiki, and Punjabi respondents proposed division of the provinces

on administrative basis. Only, Baloch respondents prefer division of provinces on

linguistic basis. A complete description of findings has been presented in the

figure 6-8.

Figure 6-8: Responses about the homogenous constituent units

Enumeration Baloch Mohajir Pashtun Punjabi Sindhi Siraiki

Responses Freq. % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %

No Division 8 7.5 39 39.0 27 15.8 134 36.0 77 51.3 19 16.8

Division on 51 47.7 12 12.0 35 20.5 49 13.2 27 18.0 14 12.4

linguistic basis
Division on
administrative 48 44.9 49 49.0 109 63.7 189 50.8 46 30.7 80 70.8
basis
Total 107 100 100 100 171 100 372 100 150 100 113 100

Note: Freq. denotes frequency in this table

6.3.2.2.5 Recapitulation

The findings of this section seem to suggest that the support for consociational

proposals varies across ethno-linguistic groups. Punjabis, the largest group, appear

more reluctant to propose consociational democracy. Even the majority of smaller

groups do not approve the all proposed devices. The proposals of proportional

electoral system, segmental autonomy, and division of provinces on linguistic basis

do not receive approval of the various ethno-linguistic groups. However, the

suggestions for minority rights protection and „just‟ representation of all ethno-

232
linguistic groups in armed forces get substantial support. The support for the proposal

of grand coalition remained mixed. Therefore, the findings demonstrate that there is

an appeal for some consociational devices in Pakistan, but the majority of the

population does not wish to incorporate these devices in the constitution of Pakistan.

In the next section, it has been attempted to measure the public support for

decentralized federalism.

233
 Figure 6-9: Support for consociational arrangements

Support for Consocitional Arrangements

100
80
60
40
20
0
Pakistan Punjabi Siraiki Mohajir Sindhi Pashtun Baloch

Proportional Electoral System Grand Coalition

Military Representation Division of Provinces on Linguistic Bases
Segmental Autonomy Minority Rights Protection

234
6.3.3 Findings concerning Decentralized Federal Design

Federalism believes in the combination of „self-rule‟ and „shared-rule‟. It provides

power-sharing at the federal center and offers autonomy to constituent units in

regional matters. Whereas the federal chamber provides adequate representation and

executive power-sharing to smaller constituent units at the federal level, the

legislative and administrative decentralization ensures provincial or state autonomy.

Many federations, in addition, provide a role to regional assemblies in the

constitutional amendments.

Consociationalism, as we have discussed in the earlier section, believes in

homogenous constituent units. However, the centripetalism 3 suggests administrative

boundaries of the constituent units and does not assert for homogenous constituent

units.

In Pakistani case, the political parties are demanding for a more decentralized federal

design. An overview of parties‟ stand over provincial autonomy illustrates that the

political parties are asserting for a more autonomous provinces, an extended role of

Senate, a multiple formula for distributing funds, and a federal constitutional court.

Some are arguing for revising provincial boundaries also. Therefore, this section

attempts to measure public support for these proposals.

6.3.3.1 Provincial Autonomy

The smaller provinces of Pakistan are asserting for provincial autonomy. Therefore,

the first question of this section asked the interviewees whether or not provinces

should be provided more autonomy. A large majority of Baloch (95.3%), Mohajir

(79.0%), Sindhi (96.0%), Pashtun (88.3%), Punjabi (74.7%), and Siraiki (85.0%)

235
respondents agreed that provinces should be provided more autonomy. This finding

seems to suggest a complete consensus among various ethno-linguistic groups over

the issue of provincial autonomy. A summary of findings is given in the figure 6-10.

6.3.3.2 Extended Role for the Senate

More than one-third (36%) of the world legislatures are reported as bicameral, in

2003. In these bicameral legislatures, majority of the „upper‟ houses are symbolic and

only a handful of constitutions provide equal powers to the both chambers. In

comparison, lower houses, usually popularly elected, have been provided stronger

roles (Schneider, 2006, p. 160). However, federations provide an important role to the

upper chambers. For example, American Senate has been provided a key role in the

governmental affairs. Irrespective of their size of population, all provinces of Pakistan

are provided equal representation in the Senate. Therefore, the smaller units have been

asserting for a more vital role of Senate to ensure power-sharing at federal level. To

quantify the public support for this proposal, the interviewees were asked whether or

not they approve the suggestion for an extended role of senate in Pakistan.

A large majority of Baloch (67.3%), Mohajir (73.0%), Pashtun (83.6%), Punjabi

(69.9%), Sindhi (82.0%), and Siraiki (72.6%) respondents approved the proposal that

the Senate should be provided more active role in legislative and administrative

sphere. A summary of findings is given the figure 6-10.

6.3.3.3 Provincial Legislatures’ Role in Amending Constitution

Some federations have provided a role to the provincial or state legislatures for the

constitutional amendments. The interviewees were asked whether or not they approve

this proposal for Pakistani case. A majority of Baloch (86.0%), Mohajir (69.0%),

236
Pashtun (80.7%), Punjabi (71.2%), Sindhi (83.3%), and Siraiki (69.9%) respondents

approved the proposal that provincial legislatures should have some role in

constitutional amendments. The results are summarized in the figure 6-10.

6.3.3.4 Equitable Formula for National Finance Commission Award

Distribution of funds has been a bone of contention between the center and provinces

and among provinces in Pakistan. The minority provinces have been arguing for a

multiple formula for distribution of funds between center and provinces and among

provinces. To gauge the public support for this suggestion, the interviewees were

asked whether or not they suggest a multiple criteria for the formula of distribution of

funds between center and provinces and among provinces. A majority of Baloch

(92.5%), Mohajir (72.0%), Pashtun (80.7%), Punjabi (59.4%), Sindhi (80.7%), and

Siraiki (63.7%) respondents approved the proposal that there should be a multiple

criteria for the formula of distribution of funds between center and provinces and

among provinces. A summary of findings is available in figure 6-10.

6.3.3.5 Recapitulation

The findings of this section seem to suggest a consistency in support for

(decentralized) federalism across ethno-linguistic groups. The majority of all ethno-

linguistic groups approve the all proposed devices for decentralization. The findings

reveal that there is a great appeal for decentralized federalism in Pakistan.

237
 Figure 6-10: Responses about the Proposals of (Decentralized) Federalism
More autonomy Extended role for Senate Provincial assemblies role NFC Award
Group Frequency Percent Frequency Frequency Percent Percent Frequency Percent
Baloch No 5 4.7 35 8 7.5 32.7 15 14.0
Yes 102 95.3 72 99 92.5 67.3 92 86.0
Total 107 100.0 107 107 100.0 100.0 107 100.0
Mohajir No 21 21.0 27 28 28.0 27.0 31 31.0
Yes 79 79.0 73 72 72.0 73.0 69 69.0
Total 100 100.0 100 100 100.0 100.0 100 100.0
Pashtun No 20 11.7 28 33 19.3 16.4 33 19.3
Yes 151 88.3 143 138 80.7 83.6 138 80.7
Total 171 100.0 171 171 100 100.0 171 100.0
Punjabi No 94 25.3 112 151 40.6 30.1 107 28.8
Yes 278 74.7 260 221 59.4 69.9 265 71.2
Total 372 100.0 372 372 100.0 100.0 372 100.0
Sindhi No 6 4.0 27 29 19.3 18.0 25 16.7
Yes 144 96.0 123 121 80.7 82.0 125 83.3
Total 150 100.0 150 150 100.0 100.0 150 100.0
Siraiki No 17 15.0 31 41 36.3 27.4 34 30.1
Yes 96 85.0 82 72 63.7 72.6 79 69.9
Total 113 100.0 113 113 100.0 100.0 113 100.0

1. More autonomy: Do you agree that provinces should be provided more autonomy?
2. Extended role of Senate: Do you suggest an extended role for the Senate to play in the legislative and administrative affairs of Pakistan?
3. Provincial assemblies’ role: Do you suggest some role for the provincial assemblies in the process of constitutional amendments?
4. NFC Award: Do you suggest a multiple criteria for the formula of distribution of funds between center and provinces and among provinces?

238
 Figure 6-11: Support for (Decentralized) Federalism

120

100 More Autonomy for Provinces

Support (%)

80 Extended Role for Senate

60
Provincial Legislatures Role in
40 Constitutional Amendments
Multiple Formula for NFC Award
20

0 Division of Provinces on
Administrative Bases
i

ch
hi
i

n
ir
n

ab

ik

aj

tu
ta

nd
ra

lo
nj

oh

sh
kis

Ba
Si

Si
Pu

Pa
Pa

Ethno-linguistic Groups

239
6.3.4 Comparison of Support for Consociationalism and (Decentralized)
Federalism

The comparative analysis of support for the two proposed solutions i.e.

consociationalism and decentralized federalism seems to suggest that the majority of

interviewees demonstrated more support for the decentralized federalism than the

consociationalism. The support for proposals related to the decentralized federalism

range from 60% to 80% in all ethno-linguistic groups. But, the support for proposals

related to consociationalism range from 40% to 50% percent. As the support for

proposals related to decentralized federalism manifests in all ethno-linguistic groups,

it is safe say that the majority of Pakistanis prefer decentralized federalism to the

consociational arrangements. A comparative exploration has been enumerated in the

figure 6-12.

6.4 Interviews of some Experts and Political Leaders: A summary of Results

Interviews are a primary source of research. Therefore, in addition to the survey of

public opinion, interviews of some experts 4 and political leaders 5 have been

conducted to substantiate the survey results. The interviews aim to evaluate the

opinion of experts and political elite of various ethno-linguistic groups related to the

proposed solutions i.e. consociationalism and decentralized federation. The results of

interviews 6 suggest that majority of the interviewees do not propose proportional

electoral system for Pakistan. However, majority of the interviewees recommended

coalition cabinets at national and provincial levels to share power with substantial

ethnic minorities. Similarly, a majority of the interviewees suggested division of

provinces on administrative grounds rather than division on the linguistic bases.

240
 Figure 6-12: Comparison of Support for (Decentralized) Federalism and Consociationalism

120
MAP
100 ERS
PLR
80
Support (%)

RNFC
DOA
60
MRP
40 PR
GC
20 MR
DOL
0
SA
Pakistan Punjabi Siraiki Mohajir Sindhi Pashtun Baloch
Ethno-linguistic Groups

Decentralized Federalism Consociational Arrangements

1. MAP: More Autonomy for Provinces 1. MRP: Minority Rights Protection
2. ERS: Extended Role for Senate 2. PR: Proportional Electoral System
3. PLR: Provincial Legislatures Role in Constitutional 3. GC: Grand Coalition
Amendments 4. MR: Military Representation
4. RNFC: Multiple Formula for NFC Award 5. DOL: Division of Provinces on Linguistic Bases
5. DOA: Division of Provinces on Administrative Bases 6. SA: Segmental Autonomy

241
Nevertheless, more or less a complete consensus lies among the interviewees about

the proposal of constitutional safeguards to protect ethnic minority rights and the

suggestion for a remedial policy to ensure just representation of all groups in armed

forces. Therefore, the support of interviewees for consociationalism, at the best,

remained mixed.

Quite the opposite, the results of interviews seem to suggest a consensus among

interviewees related to the constitutional proposals for a decentralized federalism in

Pakistan. A majority of respondents approved the suggestions for provincial

autonomy, extended role for the Senate, provincial legislature role in constitutional

amendments, and for a multiple formula of distribution in NFC Award.

The comparison of support for consociational devices and decentralized federalism

proposes that the interviewees display more keenness for decentralized federalism

than the consociational arrangements in Pakistan.

6.5 Conclusion

The results of public opinion survey and the findings of interviews seem to suggest

that some consociational proposals get considerable support of the respondents. A

majority of interviewees approved the proposal of remedial policies to ensure just

representation of all ethno-linguistic groups in armed forces. The interviewees also

acknowledged the need of constitutional safeguards for minority rights protection.

The idea of a grand coalition, also, seems getting some acceptance in minorities. But,

a large majority of the respondents disapproved the proposals of proportional electoral

system, homogenous constituent units and the segmental autonomy. In addition, the

survey suggests that Pakistan is not too fragmented to shift from majoritarian model

of democracy to consociational democracy. Though the findings reveal that there is a

242
sense of discomfort toward existing federal settings, it appears that people desire

autonomy and power-sharing within the framework of federalism. To sum up, the all-

embracing support for the proposals of decentralized federalism shows the trust of

people in federalism. This trust in federalism, in turn, leads to the argument that a

plurality of Pakistanis does not recommend consociationalism as a policy

recommendation.

243
Endnotes:

1
For example, the developments in Balochistan during Musharraf period have exceedingly annoyed the
Balochs. Conversely, Mohajirs may have seen military rule in a different light, if this survey had
been taken in a different circumstances. Musharraf, himself a mohajir, was criticized for his ties
with MQM. Furthermore, the government of ANP in NWFP was more concerned than the previous
governments of NWFP about the issues around provincial autonomy.
2
Note: Overall opinion was calculated by adding wait-age of each community. The formula for the
purpose of this study is designed as under: Overall Pakistan: 100 (Baloch = 5% + Mohajir = 8% +
Pashtun = 14% + Punjabi = 46% + Sindhis = 15% + Siraiki = 12%)
3
Centripetalism is a power sharing approach presented by Horowitz to bring stability in deeply divided
societies. It is based on the design of political institutions. Centripetal institutions include the
adoption of an executive coalition restricted to moderate parties; a model of decentralized
government that disperses power to multiple points, but that does not focus on promoting
ethnically-based autonomy; and a stress on majoritarian electoral system to reward moderates
(McCulloch, 2009).
4
It was planned to get a representative academic opinion on issues raised in the public opinion survey.
Therefore, more than fifty national and international experts on Pakistani politics were contacted
electronically for interviews. However, only seven experts provided their responses. Though, the
number of experts is very small but they are prominent due to their scholarly work on Pakistan.
They include (1) Ayesha Jalal, a Director of Center for South Asian and Indian Ocean Studies at
Tufts University , (2) Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed is, a Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of
South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore and a Professor of Political Science
at Stockholm University, (3)Dr. Claude Rakisits, a Senior Lecture at School of International and
Political Studies, Deakin University, Australia [His principal research interest is Pakistan], (4)
Theodore P. Wright, Jr. , a Professor Emeritus at Department of Political Science, University at Albany
[He has published more than 80 journal articles on various aspects of Indian and Pakistani politics],
(5) Dr. Moonis Ahmer, chairman of the Department of International Relations, university of
Karachi, (6) and Mansoor Akbar, the Vice Chancellor of the Gomal University Dera Ismael Khan,
Pakistan.
5
It was intended to incorporate the opinion of all parliamentary parties in this section. Therefore,
representatives of all parliamentary political parties were contacted for their parties‟ stand on
various issues raised in the questionnaire. A number of political parties were reluctant to express
their opinion on paper. Most of the parties advised to consult their parties‟ opinion in their parties‟
electoral manifestoes. The situation of law and order in Islamabad and surroundings was not good
in those days as well. Only six political figures were available for interviews. These political
leaders followed their parties‟ line strictly. The leaders include (1) Sana Ullah Baloch, a former
Member of Parliament of Pakistan who served as the Member Senate of Pakistan (2003-2008) and
as Member National Assembly (1997-1999) [He is a leader of Baloch Nationalist Party], (2)
Naveed Qamer , a federal minister and key leader of PPP, (3) Ghous Ali Shah, the ex-Chief Minster

244
 of Sindh and the president of PML-N Sindh, (4) Mr. Aamer , a member of the Rabta committee of
MQM, (5) Mr. Mustafa Aziz Abadi, a member of the Rabta committee of MQM, (6) and Dr. Nasir
Dushti, a UK-based Baloch Nationalist.
6
Detailed results of the interviews are provided in the Appendix.

245
 References

1. Adeney, K. (2002) Constitutional centering: Nation formation and consociational

federalism in India and Pakistan. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. 40 (3),

8-33.

2. Adeney, K. (2007). Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and

Pakistan. New York: Pal grave.

3. Horowitz, D. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of

California Press.

4. Lijphart, A. (2002).The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy. In A. Reynolds

(Eds.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict

Management and Democracy (pp. 37-54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

5. McGarry J. & O’Leary. (2009). Power shared after the deaths of thousands. In R.

Taylor (Eds.), Consociational Theory: McGarry & O’ Leary and Northern Ireland

Conflict (pp. 15-85).London: Rout ledge.

6. Mushtaq, M. & Alqama, K. (2009). Poverty Alleviation through Power-sharing in

Pakistan. European Journal of Social Science. 8(3), 459-468.

7. Samad, Y. (2007). Pakistan: from minority rights to majoritarian. In Gyanendra, P.

and Y. Samad (Eds.), Fault lines of Nationhood (pp.67-138). New Delhi: Roli

Books Pvt. Ltd.

8. Schneider, A. (2003). Decentralization: Conceptualization and Measurement.

Studies in Comparative International Development. 38(3), 32-56.

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9. Talbot, I. (2002). The Punjabisation of Pakistan: Myth or Reality? In C. Jaffrelot,

(Eds.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation (pp.51-62). London: Zed Books

Ltd.

10. Vile, M. (1982). Federations and Confederations: the Experience of United States

and the British Commonwealth .In P. Rea (Eds.), Political Cooperation in Divided

Societies(pp. 216-28). Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.

11. Watts, R.L. (2000). Federalism in Asia: The potential and limits. L. R. Basta

Fleiner (Eds.), Rule of Law and Organization of the state in Asia: The

multicultural Challenge (pp.01-04). Geneva: Helbring.

247
Chapter No.7

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

The review of consociational theory suggests that it has attracted a lot of criticism

from elsewhere. There are flaws and gaps in the consociational literature. The review

explores that the proper scope of the consociational universe is subject to debate.

Additionally, the results of consociational experiences, since late 1960s, have been

remained mixed. Hence, its recommendation for the multiethnic society of Pakistan

requires an exhaustive scrutiny.

The creation of Pakistan was a result of Indian Muslims‟ demand for a separate

homeland skipping over their ethnic identities and cultural differences. But, after

independence, they were engaged in the politics of identity. The difference of opinion

that surfaced during the constitution making process in early years, eventually,

resulted in the break-up of the country. The post-1971 Pakistan differs considerably

from the Jinnah‟s Pakistan. But, despite the significant change in its ethno-linguistic

composition, still it is an interesting case of multiethnic states. Though, apparently,

each of its provinces is associated with a certain ethno-linguistic group, the evidence

shows that there are significant minorities in every constituent unit. Another notable

feature of the Pakistani society is that, almost, every ethno-linguistic group has its

own regional base. Besides, thanks to colonial legacy, Pakistan is a classic example of

uneven-development. There is a great disparity, in terms of socio-economic

development, among various regions of Pakistan. The socio-economic indicators

seem to suggest that Punjab is ahead of the other provinces in terms of social

development. But the Southern Punjab is much poorer than the Central Punjab.

NWFP has an intermediate level of development. Sindh has the lower-middle to low

248
level of social development. Balochistan is the most backward province of Pakistan in

terms of social development. The evidence shows that boundaries of certain

communities and deprived regions coincide in the case of Pakistan. Balochs, Sindhis,

and Siraikis reside in relatively less developed regions contrary to Punjabis, Mohajirs,

and Pashtuns that reside in relatively developed areas. In addition, the former

communities remained relatively marginalized and underdeveloped and the latter

remained over represented in national institutions. These circumstances are at the core

of the resentment of deprived groups. But, it is the province of Punjab that has been

perceived by smaller units as a dominant contender. This perception is, partly,

because of Punjab‟s huge population; and, partly, on account of its overrepresentation

in national institutions and relatively better socio-economic conditions. It has been

argued that this relative advantageous position of the Punjabis has annoyed the people

of deprived regions and the marginalized communities.

The grievances of smaller communities are of the two kinds: group concerns and the

territorial grievances. Some groups resent their inadequate representation in national

institutions. Similarly, the groups based in smaller units advocate the interests of their

respective units. The grievances of ethnic minorities and/or smaller units include the

pre-dominance of Punjabis in the civil-military bureaucracy, the comparative

development level of Punjab, the „contentious‟ formula that regulates the distribution

of funds to provinces, and distribution of water between Punjab (upper riparian ) and

the smaller units. The ethnic minorities and/or smaller units insist that these

grievances are caused by the centralization of political power in Pakistan. Therefore,

the ethno-regional parties of smaller units such as ANP, MQM, PKMAP, and Baloch

factions are asserting for more autonomy. The mainstream parties have also

acknowledged the requirement of decentralization and have adopted various demands

249
of ethnic minorities in their programs. The proposals to strengthening the federal

chamber (the Senate), abolition of concurrent list, and a consensus based formula

(NFC Award) for horizontal and vertical allocation of funds are part of their electoral

manifestoes. However, the regional parties are more vocal in their demands than the

mainstream political parties. This evidence seems to suggest that there is some

resentment against the existing federal settings of Pakistan.

The constitutional provisions of the 1973 constitution reveal that Pakistan fulfills the

requirements of a federation. The legislative, administrative and financial powers

have been distributed between the center and provinces. However, the Pakistani

federation vis-à-vis the contemporary federations appears a relatively centralized.

The evidence shows that it operates relatively in a unitary fashion. The central

authorities have been remained involved in the provincial affairs. The experience

displays centralization similarities in democratic/civilian and dictatorial/military

regimes. It has been argued in this thesis that it was the centralization of political

power that, in turn, led the federal authorities to intervene in provincial matters. They

often destabilized the rival provincial governments. Even, some times, they managed

to install their own favorable governments by removing the elected cabinets that were

enjoying majority in the respective houses. The evidence suggests that more of the

political mobilizations in the post-1971 Pakistan were protests against these

interventions and the centralization of political power.

This thesis has, empirically, challenged the argument of Adeney (2009) that “the

absence of consociational mechanisms has caused much of the conflict in Pakistan”.

The irrelevancy of consociationalism with the politics of identity in Pakistan has been

established through the rigorous analysis of various ethno-nationalist movements.

250
The analysis argues that the ethno-linguistic groups of Pakistan are internally

divided. Though, they have a have a common language, culture, religion or other

features, this is not necessarily a sign of unity and commonness of the purpose. It has

been argued that the Pashtun identity does not imply identity with the ANP or

Mohajir identity with MQM. The results of federal and provincial general elections in

Pakistan disclose that the ethnic minorities polled more votes in favor of mainstream

parties than the ethno-regional parties. Thus, there is no single representative party of

any ethno-linguistic group of Pakistan. So, it does not seem reasonable to reserve

membership of a grand coalition for the ethno-regional parties having a limited

electoral support. In addition, the ethno-regional parties of Pakistan had never

demanded the proportional electoral system for representation. Similarly, the

nationalist regimes in smaller units did not demonstrate their concerns relating to

segmental autonomy. The provincial governments of nationalist parties have never

seen the requirement to shift their policies concerning the recognition of language

and the educational policies. The mainstream parties of Pakistan have a considerable

electoral support in all ethno-linguistic groups. The reason behind this support is that

they respect the interests of ethnic minorities and smaller units. Despite its great

importance, the civilian as well as military regimes in Islamabad did not ignore the

objections of smaller units over Kalabagh dam. This reality shows that ethnic

minorities are not threatened by the Punjabi majority. Therefore, there is no

requirement for the provision of mutual veto. This account seems to suggest that the

political mobilization and ethnic strife in Pakistan is least concerned with the non-

consociational mechanisms of Pakistani federation.

Then, this thesis attempts to find out whether or not consociationalism is a realistic

option for Pakistan to manage ethnic diversity. The empirical evidence seems to

251
suggest that consociationalism is not a realistic option for Pakistan. This conclusion

is based on three observations.

First, the proponents of consociationalism have recognized certain favorable

conditions for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. With

some exceptions, these factors are missing in the case of Pakistan. Consociationalists

believe that the absence of a solid majority, the small population size of a country,

roughly equal size of the segments, and a small number of ethno-linguistic groups

facilitates the execution of consociational arrangements. These all factors are absent

in the case of Pakistan. The sizes of various ethno-linguistic groups of Pakistan are

dissimilar. It has a dominant Punjabi community on one hand and a small minority of

Balochs at the other. Contrary to smaller Western European consociational

democracies, Pakistan is one of the world‟s most populous states. The case of

Pakistan also does not fulfill the requirement of the absence of large socio-economic

differences and the presence of traditions of compromise and accommodation.

However, it can be argued that some factors that might be supportive for

consociational mechanisms, such as the geographical concentration of the segments,

overarching loyalties and external threats to the stability of the state, are present in

the case of Pakistan. Consociationalists have quantified the favorable conditions and

on the basis of this quantification have predicted about the success or failure of

consociationalism in particular cases. In this study, through a comparative judgment

of selected cases, the author has found that the favorable conditions are absent for the

case of Pakistan. The selected cases of consociationalism have been classified on the

basis of favorable conditions for consociational democracy in this thesis using the

statistical tools. This classification suggests that Pakistan is not coupled with a

successful case of Switzerland nor with the clear past cases of consociationalism. It

252
has been positioned with a failed case of Cyprus and a „borderline‟ case of

consociationalism, India.

Second, the analysis of power-sharing arrangements in Pakistan seems to suggest that

political culture of Pakistan is no more conducive for such arrangements. The failure

of tripartite agreement in 1970s, the disappointing outcomes of coalition cabinets in

1990s, and the collapse of PPP-PML-N alliance recently provides sufficient

evidence to conclude that politics of accommodation is not a political norm in politics

of Pakistan. The political leadership of Pakistan is not too accommodative to practice

consociational democracy in Pakistan. Though, there are some positive signs, overall

situation is not conducive. Political accommodation like the Netherlands, Austria,

Belgium, and Switzerland is not very common in Pakistan.

Third, the evaluation of Pakistani society illustrates that it is not a case of deeply

divided society. The degree of pluralism has been assessed using the criteria

suggested by Arend Lijphart.

It quite understandable that it is difficult to locate a plural society that carries out the

four criteria of an ideal plural society that is mentioned by Arend Lijphart. But, the

Pakistani case seems reluctant to fulfill, even, the first criteria. The first criterion that

the segments into which the society is divided be clearly identified does not seem

easy test for the case. Though, Pakistan is a plural society, there is a considerable

ambiguity about the number of segments into which it should be divided. For

instance, if the segments of the Pakistani society have been identified whether it is

possible to determine precisely the size of each segment to pass the second criterion

of a plural society presented by Lijphart? Even, if we take the census reports‟ figures

for granted, the Pakistani case seems reluctant to pass the remaining two criteria. The

253
situation is even more ambivalent with reference to the third criterion. There is hardly

any social or economic organization whose boundary coincides with the linguistic

boundaries in Pakistan. Some political organizations of Pashtuns and Balochs may be

regarded as ethnically exclusive, but largely there are no linguistically based parties

in Pakistan. All the efforts of Sindhi and Siraiki nationalists in this direction have

been complete failures. Punjabi segment overwhelmingly votes for the mainstream

parties and MQM has changed its name from Mohajir Quami Movement (Mohajir

National Movement) to Muttahida Quami Movement (Joint National Movement) and

its leadership has adopted a more inclusive outlook away from Mohajirism. Again,

the elections results show inconsistency in the electoral support of ethnic parties.

Conversely, the evidence shows that mainstream parties are more consistent in terms

of their electoral support. In this situation, it is very difficult to determine the degree

of pluralism in Pakistani society. The vagueness of the criteria suggested by Lijphart

to determine the degree of pluralism may lead different authors to different

conclusions. However, it is safe to say that the Pakistani society has lesser degree of

pluralism than the Western European cases of consociational democracy. It is neither

a deeply divided nor a fragmented society. Though, ethnic and linguistic loyalties

exist but are not too strong.

Since, it has been observed that (a) Pakistani society lacks favorable conditions for

the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy; (b) the political

leadership is not too accommodative to practice consociational democracy; (c) and

the Pakistani society is neither a deeply divided nor a fragmented society and is

incompatible with the consociational democracy, therefore consociationalism is not a

realistic option for Pakistan to practice democracy. Conversely, these findings

display the underlying relevancy of federalism with the Pakistani case. The features

254
of Pakistani society concerning the geographical concentration of ethno-linguistic

and large population size are compatible with the federal theory. In addition, the

stability in electoral support of mainstream parties suggests majoritarian rather than

consociational governance.

Once, the empirical analysis, using the secondary sources, established that (a) it is not

the absence of consociational mechanisms that have caused much of the conflict in

Pakistan but relatively centralized federal settings and (b) consociationalism is not a

realistic option for Pakistan, the author has attempted to use primary sources by

consulting the people of Pakistan. The thrust behind this attempt was to find out

whether or not a majority of Pakistanis prefer consociational devices. It was not an

easy task to consult the people for such a survey. However, despite the all limitations

and terrible situation of law and order, a sample of 1013 people stratified by

language, race, region, and class was conducted.

The survey explored that the ethnic minorities perceive Punjabis as the dominant

group. They believe that relative size of the Punjab province is an obstacle in the

smooth running of federalism in Pakistan. They insist that the existing federal

settings are inadequate to provide them power-sharing in the existing power structure

of Pakistan. However, the findings concerning the inter-ethnic tensions and pluralism

are hopeful for the Pakistani society. The survey explore that Pakistan is not a

fragmented society. A plurality of Pakistanis, and a considerable number of all

groups, affirms that ethnic identity has no more primacy; no exclusive political,

social and economic organization of ethno-linguistic groups exists; and there is no

more aversion among the members of different ethno-linguistic groups. However,

some cultural grievances exist in smaller communities. These findings suggest the

255
irrelevancy of consociational mechanism for Pakistan because consociationalism is a

therapy for the fragmented and deeply divided societies. Though, there is some

variation in support for consociational devices among various groups of Pakistan, the

majority of Pakistanis have disapproved these proposals. Punjabis, the largest group,

appears more reluctant to propose consociational democracy. Even, the majority of

smaller groups do not approve the all proposed devices. The proposals of

proportional electoral system, segmental autonomy, and division of provinces on

linguistic basis do not receive approval of the various ethno-linguistic groups.

However, the suggestions for minority rights protection and „just‟ representation of

all ethno-linguistic groups in armed forces get substantial support. The support for

the proposal of grand coalition has remained mixed. Therefore, the findings

demonstrate that there is an appeal for some consociational devices in Pakistan, but

the majority of the population does not wish to incorporate these devices in the

constitution of Pakistan.

Conversely, the findings of the survey seem to suggest a consistency in support for a

(decentralized) federalism across ethno-linguistic groups. The majority of all ethno-

linguistic groups approved the all proposed devices for decentralization. The

comparative analysis of support for the two proposed solutions i.e. consociationalism

and decentralized federalism seems to suggest that the majority of interviewees

demonstrated more support for the decentralized federalism than the

consociationalism. The support for proposals related to the decentralized federalism

range from 60% to 80% in all ethno-linguistic groups. Contrary, the support for

proposals related to consociationalism range from 40% to 50% percent. As the

support for proposals related to decentralized federalism manifests in all ethno-

linguistic groups, it is safe to say that the majority of Pakistanis prefer decentralized

256
federalism to the consociational arrangements. The interviews of a small group of

experts on Pakistani politics and few political leaders also validate the results of

survey and did not approve the case of consociationalism for Pakistan.

Though, some findings reveal that there is a sense of discomfort toward existing

federal settings, it appears that people desire autonomy and power-sharing within the

framework of federalism. To sum up, the all-embracing support for the proposals of

decentralized federalism shows the trust of people in federalism. This trust in

federalism, in turn, leads to the argument that a plurality of Pakistanis does not

recommend consociationalism as a policy recommendation.

As a result, the core work of this thesis seems to suggest that consociationalism is

neither a requirement nor a viable option for Pakistan. The majority of Pakistanis

have not lost their trust in federalism. However, Pakistan needs a relatively more

decentralized federal design that demonstrates the essence of federalism. That is the

combination of self-rule and shared-rule. This deserves an additional study to outline

the design of such federal settings for Pakistan.

As, the basic objective of this empirical investigation was to contribute an original

analysis to the study of ethnic conflict regulation in Pakistan, it is up to the reader to

decided whether or not the author remained successful in this attempt. It was clarified

in the start that this research work does not intend to falsify or validate the theory but

aims to enhance our understanding relating the utility of consociational democracy in

diverse societies. As, the case suggests that consociational democracy is irrelevant to

the Pakistani case, it demonstrates that consociational democracy‟s utility varies

across case studies and it is not, necessarily, a viable solution for all multiethnic

societies.

257
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271
 Appendix 1: Results of Interviews

Q.1: Proportional Electoral System: Do you suggest a proportional electoral system

for Pakistan?

Opinion of the Interviewees

S. No. Expert/ Political Leader Opinion

1 Ayesha Jalal1 No
2 Ishtiaq Ahmad2 No
3 Rakisits3 Yes
4 Wright4 Proportional representation tends to fragment the parties and give
disproportionate power to small but disciplined minorities. It also
weakens responsibility of legislators to their constituencies if a party list
system is used.
5 Anonymous No comments
6 Monis Ahmer5 No, because such an option may open a Pandora box in the country's
political scenario
7 Mansoor Akbar6 It will disturb the status quo and setting based on 1973 Constitution.
Only fair elections and continuity is needed which will make us
democratic and satisfied.
8 Sana Baloch7 No comments
9 Naveed Qamer8 No. people need greater direct access to their representatives
10 Ghous Ali shah9 No
11 Mr. Aamer 10 No comments
12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi11 No comments
13 Dr. Nasir Dushti12 No comments
14 No comments

Summary of Answers: It appears that majority of the experts do not recommend

proportional electoral system for Pakistan. Only one expert suggests proportional
electoral system and another does not reply the answer. However, majority of the
politicians do not answer the question. The representative of the two leading parties,
PPP and PML-N, do not approve the suggestion. Overall, with the exception of one
expert, interviewees do not approve the suggestion of proportional electoral system
for Pakistan.

Q. 2: Segmental Autonomy: Do you suggest that every ethno-linguistic group should

have right to design its educational system and to decide the medium of instruction in
educational institutions?

Opinion of the Interviewees

S. No. Expert/ Political Leader Opinion
1 Ayesha Jalal No
2 Ishtiaq Ahmad No
3 Rakisits No
4 Wright Yes
5 Anonymous Yes
6 Monis Ahmer No comments
7 Mansoor Akbar Kundi No
8 Sana Baloch Yes
9 Naveed Qamer No
10 Ghous Ali shah No
11 Mr. Aamer (MQM) No
12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi (MQM) No
13 Dr. Nasir Dushti (Baloch) No comments

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Summary of Answers: The results reveal that two experts suggested that ethno-
linguistic should have the right to devise their educational system. Four not agreed
with this suggestion, and one does not answer the question. Majority of the politicians
rejected this proposal. Overall, out of total thirteen interviewees, eight disapproved
the suggestion.

Q.3: Minority Rights Protection: Do you suggest constitutional safeguards to

protect (ethnic) minority rights in Pakistan?

Opinion of the Interviewees

S. No. Expert/ Political Leader Opinion

1 Ayesha Jalal Yes
2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Yes
3 Rakisits Yes
4 Wright Yes
5 Anonymous Yes
6 Monis Ahmer Yes, by providing equal opportunities to minorities and preventing a sense
of sense among such groups
7 Mansoor Akbar Guarantee the rights in Constitution and Courts to protect it. Plus,
Provincial Legislatures should not pass any law contrary to their rights.
Minority rights are in large threatened at the hands of Islamist political
Parties in government.
8 Sana Baloch Yes
9 Naveed Qamer Yes. All religious, ethnic minorities be given protection through special
laws, more representation and more affirmative action
10 Ghous Ali Shah Yes
11 Mr. Aamer Yes
12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Yes
13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes

Summary of Answers: the findings seem to suggest a complete consensus among the
interviewees that constitutional safeguards are required to protect ethnic minority
rights in Pakistan.

Q.4: Redesigning the Constituent Units: Do you suggest the division of province(s)
for the smooth running of federalism; and if you suggest division, what should be the
principle of division i.e. division on administrative basis or division on linguistic
basis?

Opinion of the Interviewees

S. No. Expert/ Political Leader Opinion
1 Ayesha Jalal No division
2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Division on administrative basis
3 Rakisits Division on administrative basis
4 Wright Division on linguistic basis
5 Anonymous Division on linguistic basis
6 Monis Ahmer Yes, I suggest that the divisions of Pakistan should be upgraded as
provinces so as to provide administrative space to those divisions which
feel marginalized.
7 Mansoor Akbar Division on administrative basis
8 Sana Baloch Division on linguistic basis
9 Naveed Qamer No division, tinkering with historical entities will create further tensions.
No division
10 Ghous Ali Shah Division on administrative basis
11 Mr. Aamer Division on administrative basis
12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Division on linguistic basis
13 Dr. Nasir Dushti

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Summary of Answers: The results show that majority of the interviewees suggested
division of provinces as a policy recommendation to strengthen the federation.
However, the majority approved the case for the division on administrative grounds.

Q.5: Grand Coalition: Do you suggest grand coalition cabinets in Pakistan at federal
and provincial levels?

Opinion of the Interviewees

S. No. Expert/ Political Opinion
Leader
1 Ayesha Jalal Yes
2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Yes
3 Rakisits Yes
4 Wright No
5 Anonymous Yes
6 Monis Ahmer No comments
7 Mansoor Akbar No comments
8 Sana Baloch Yes
9 Naveed Qamer No comments
10 Ghous Ali Shah No comments
11 Mr. Aamer Yes
12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Yes
13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes

Summary of Answers: The results show that majority of the interviewees

recommended coalition cabinets at national and provincial levels to share power with
substational ethnic minorities.

Q.6: Remedial Policy to Ensure Just Representation in Military: Do you suggest

substational remedial policy to ensure just representation of all ethno-linguistic groups
in military?

Opinion of the Interviewees

S. No. Expert/ Political Opinion
Leader
1 Ayesha Jalal Yes
2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Yes
3 Rakisits No
4 Wright Yes
5 Anonymous Yes
6 Monis Ahmer No comments
7 Mansoor Akbar No comments
8 Sana Baloch Yes
9 Naveed Qamer No comments
10 Ghous Ali Shah Yes
11 Mr. Aamer Yes
12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Yes
13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes

Summary of Answers: The results show that, overall, the interviewees seem
approving this suggestion unanimously.

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Q.7: Provincial Autonomy: Do you agree with the argument that the provinces in
Pakistan must be ‘autonomous’ in line with the Lahore resolution?

Figure 6-21: Opinion of the Interviewees

S. No. Expert/ Political Opinion
Leader
1 Ayesha Jalal Yes
2 Ishtiaq Ahmad No
3 Rakisits Yes
4 Wright No
5 Anonymous Yes
6 Monis Ahmer No comments
7 Mansoor Akbar No comments
8 Sana Baloch Yes
9 Naveed Qamer No comments
10 Ghous Ali Shah No comments
11 Mr. Aamer Yes
12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Yes
13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes

Summary of Answers: The results shows that majority of the interviewees suggest
that the provinces in Pakistan should have been provided more autonomy and this
autonomy should be in accordance with the suggested in the provisions of Lahore
resolution.

Q.8: Extended Role for the Senate: Do you suggest more legislative and
administrative functions for the Senate to provide more space to smaller provinces?

Opinion of the Interviewees

S. No. Expert/ Political Opinion
Leader
1 Ayesha Jalal Yes
2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Yes
3 Rakisits No
4 Wright No
5 Anonymous Yes
6 Monis Ahmer Yes, Senate's role should not be ceremonial but must encompass
vital policy matters
7 Mansoor Akbar Yes
8 Sana Baloch Yes
9 Naveed Qamer Greater role in matters in part two of federal legislative list and
concurrent list , if it survives
10 Ghous Ali Shah No comments
11 Mr. Aamer Yes
12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Yes
13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes

Summary of Answers: The findings reveal that, with some exception, the
respondents have unanimously suggested that the senate should have been provided
more active role in functions of the government.

275
Q.9: Role of Provincial Legislature in Constitutional Amendments: Do you
suggest that the provincial assemblies should have some role in constitutional
amendments?

Opinion of the Interviewees

S. No. Expert/ Political Opinion

Leader
1 Ayesha Jalal Yes
2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Yes
3 Rakisits Yes
4 Wright Yes
5 Anonymous Yes
6 Monis Ahmer No, only national assembly and senate because these two bodies
represent the whole of Pakistan
7 Mansoor Akbar Yes, subject to simple approval of the bill by Provincial
Assemblies. Plus, Senate to approve by 2/3 which already exists.
8 Sana Baloch Yes
9 Naveed Qamer No. that would be chaotic
10 Ghous Ali Shah No
11 Mr. Aamer No comments
12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi No comments
13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes

Summary of Answers: A plurality of the respondents approved the suggestion that

provincial legislature should have been provided some role in the constitutional
amendments.

Q.10: Multiple Formula of NFC to Distribute Funds: Do you suggest that the
present formula of National Finance Commission for allocation of resources to
provinces (that is solely based on population) should be changed?

Figure 6-24: Opinion of the Interviewees

S. No. Expert/ Political Opinion
Leader
1 Ayesha Jalal Yes
2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Yes
3 Rakisits Yes
4 Wright Yes
5 Anonymous Yes
6 Monis Ahmer Yes. It should be changed so to make it more rational
7 Mansoor Akbar Yes
8 Sana Baloch Yes
9 Naveed Qamer Yes. A consensus exists to include backwardness, inverse
population density. collection should also be included
10 Ghous Ali Shah Yes
11 Mr. Aamer Yes
12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Yes
13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes

Summary of Answers: The results suggest an absolute consensus among the

interviewees that there should be a multiple formula for distribution in NFC Award.

276
Endnotes

1
Ayesha Jalal is Director of Center for South Asian and Indian Ocean Studies at Tufts University
2
Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed is a Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies
(ISAS), National University of Singapore and a Professor of Political Science at Stockholm University.
3
Dr. Claude Rakisits is Senior Lecture at School of International and Political Studies, Deakin
University, Australia. His principal research interest is Pakistan.
4
Theodore P. Wright, Jr. is a Professor Emeritus at Department of Political Science, University at Albany
(state university of New York). He has published more than 80 journal articles on various aspects of
Indian and Pakistani politics.
5
Dr. Moonis Ahmer is chairman of the Department of International Relations, university of Karachi.
6
Mansoor Akbar is the Vice Chancellor of the Gomal University Dera Ismael Khan, Pakistan.
7
Sana Ullah Baloch is former Member of Parliament of Pakistan, served as the Member Senate of
Pakistan (2003-2008) and as Member National Assembly (1997-1999). He is a leader of Baloch
Nationalist Party.
8
Naveed Qamer is federal minister and key leader of PPP
9
Ghous Ali Shah is the ex-Chief Minster of Sindh and the president of PML-N Sindh.
10
Mr. Aamer is the member of the Rabta committee of MQM
11
Mr. Mustafa Aziz Abadi is a member of the Rabta committee of MQM
12
Dr. Nasir Dushti is a UK-based Baloch Nationalist.

277
 Appendix 2: Political Parties (Acronyms)

Country Abbreviation Political Party

Switzerland SVP Swiss People's Party
Switzerland SP Social-Democratic Party
Switzerland FDP Free Democratic Party
Switzerland CVP Christian Democratic People's Party
Switzerland EVP Evangelical People's Party
Austria SPO Socialist democratic party
Austria OVP Austrian people’s party
Austria KPO Communist party
Austria VDU League of independents
Austria Green Green alternative
Austria LF Liberal forum
The Netherlands KVP Catholic people’s party
The Netherlands PvdA Labour party
The Netherlands VVD Liberal party
The Netherlands ARP Anti revolutionary party (protestant)
The Netherlands CHU Christian Historical union (protestant)
The Netherlands SGP Political Reformed party
Belgium PLP/PVV Belgian Christian democratic party (before 1972)
Belgium PSC/CVP Christian people’s party(before 1968)
Belgium PSB/BSP Belgian socialist party( until 1978)
Belgium PCB/KPB Belgian communist party
Pakistan JWP Jamhoori Wattan Party
Pakistan BNP Balochistan National Party
Pakistan PKMAP Pashtoonkhawa Milli Awami Party
Pakistan ANP Awami National Party
Pakistan MQM Muttahida Qaumi Movement Pakistan
Pakistan PPP Pakistan Peoples Party
Pakistan JUI Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam
Pakistan JI Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan
Pakistan PML-N Pakistan's Muslim League-Nawaz
Pakistan PML-Q Pakistan's Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam
Pakistan MMA Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal

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