2018 Book RevisitingMetaphorsInInternati

Revisiting Metaphors in
International Relations Theory
Michael P. Marks
Revisiting Metaphors in International
Relations Theory
Michael P. Marks
Revisiting Metaphors
in International
Relations Theory
Michael P. Marks
Willamette University
Salem, OR, USA
ISBN 978-3-319-71200-0 ISBN 978-3-319-71201-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71201-7
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For Brenda
Preface
This book is a sequel to my previously published work Metaphors in

International Relations Theory (2011). More than just a continuation of
the prior work, this volume represents an ongoing effort to critically inter-
rogate the role metaphors play in the study of international relations (IR).
My efforts to examine how metaphors influence the study of IR began in
yet a previous book, The Prison as Metaphor, published in 2004. Taken as
a whole, all three books constitute a trilogy on the role of metaphors in IR
theory and collect together a single intellectual journey to better under-
stand the way that IR theory is fundamentally influenced by a series of
conceptual metaphors.
The present volume in particular emphasizes the way that metaphors in
IR theory (and practice) tend to give priority to concepts at the expense of
the lives led by literal human beings who are affected by the way scholars
think about the world and the way political leaders conduct international
affairs. I have come to this conclusion in part through my teaching, spe-
cifically in a course I teach at Willamette University entitled Political
Metaphors. In that class, students write a semester-long research paper on
a topic of their choosing, focusing on how metaphors are deployed by
individuals inside and outside government to frame political issues, shape
policy debates, influence public discourse, and persuade government offi-
cials and the population at large to act in specified ways. One of the impor-
tant conclusions students arrive at in their writing is that the use of
metaphors to influence politics can have profound effects on the lives of
everyday people. The same is true for metaphors in IR theory. Conceptual
metaphors in the scholarly literature often privilege large analytical
vii
viii PREFACE
c ategories rather than the lived experiences of humans who are affected by
world affairs. This book asks scholars to contemplate how their reliance on
conceptual metaphors conceals important topics that often go unnoticed.
The book is an effort at interdisciplinary thinking, although it is under-
standable in an interdisciplinary work of this nature that there is an inher-
ent tension in trying to appeal to two distinct academic fields. Linguists
will be interested in the finer distinctions in metaphor analysis, while
scholars of IR will want to how metaphors shape the theory and practice
of world affairs. In an effort to maintain focus, the book maintains a pri-
mary emphasis on the theory and practice of IR while doing due diligence
and recognizing the fact that metaphors take a variety of forms which is
important to acknowledge.
To the extent that this book takes scholarship in linguistics more seri-
ously than the previous volume, it owes gratitude in part to the input
kindly provided by my fellow participants at the workshop, “Metaphors in
the Discourse of the National,” held at the University of Oslo in September
2016. I am particularly appreciative of how the workshop participants
have made me more attentive to the finer points of metaphor analysis
while also making me more aware of how metaphors work in various con-
texts and disciplines. The interdisciplinary nature of the work of metaphor
analysts from a variety of fields reinforces the conclusion that IR theory
can benefit from a wider scope than is presently the case. Toward that end,
it is my hope that specialists throughout both academia and the policy-
making world will benefit from the content and analysis presented in the
pages that follow.
Salem, OR, USA Michael P. Marks

Contents
1 The Significance of Metaphors in International

Relations Theory 1
2 Metaphors of International Political Economy 31
3 Metaphors of Democratization 91
4 Theoretical Reflections 137
5 The Role of Metaphors in International Relations Theory 193
Index 229
ix
CHAPTER 1
The Significance of Metaphors

in International Relations Theory
This book serves as a sequel to my previous work, Metaphors in International

Relations Theory (Marks 2011). In that volume I chronicle how metaphors
are integral to the study of international relations (IR). As is true in other
academic disciplinary and interdisciplinary pursuits, metaphors in IR frame
research and shape analysis throughout the field.1 Far from serving only as
linguistic devices to illuminate abstract ideas, conceptual metaphors con-
stitute the main categories in the study of IR. They form the ontological
bases that distinguish IR as a distinct area of academic inquiry, delineate
the epistemological practices that inform debates, and support the meth-
odological tools that are chosen by scholars who conduct research and
provide analyses of their findings.
Since the publication of Metaphors in International Relations Theory, I
have continued to investigate how metaphors guide scholarship in the
study of world affairs. I have come to the conclusion that virtually every
area of IR is understood with the use of metaphorical concepts.2 This
book expands the findings of the one that precedes it. It not only delves
into additional concepts that were not examined in the first volume but
also extends the analysis of how metaphors are essential elements in the
study of IR. Thus, the book is not only an appendix to my previous work,
but it also deepens the understanding scholars can have of how the meta-
phors they rely on inform every aspect of their work.
© The Author(s) 2018 1

M. P. Marks, Revisiting Metaphors in International Relations
Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71201-7_1
2 M. P. MARKS
Beginning Again with an Anecdote

In my previous book (Marks 2011, 7) I began with an anecdote which
illustrates the importance of IR metaphors in the form of a quote by former
United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who likened global
politics to the well-known metaphor of billiards balls on a pool table. The
purpose of including that quote was to show how metaphors in IR theory
make their way into mainstream discourse and thus influence how practitio-
ners and non-practitioners alike think about world affairs. Since the publica-
tion of the earlier volume I have continued to encounter how the metaphors
of IR theory frequently figure into the written and spoken words of all
manner of individuals who are not actively engaged in the scholarly study of
IR but who nonetheless play a part in framing and perpetuating the dis-
course that gives meaning to the empirical context of global interactions.
It thus seems appropriate to begin this book similarly to illustrate how
metaphors in the scholarly literature of IR theory often make their way
into how world affairs are understood. In this instance I take an article
from The New York Times about the death of North Korean leader Kim
Jong-il. In that article reporters from the newspaper referred to North
Korea metaphorically as a “failed state with nuclear weapons” (Landler
and Sang-Hun 2011, A1). Just as Madeleine Albright’s observations
about states as metaphorical billiard balls revealed something about her
view of the world, the Times reporters’ reference to North Korea as a
“failed state” highlights the ways in which metaphors in IR theory have a
wider impact for depicting world affairs. In academic writings a meta-
phorical “failed state” is one that is understood to lack institutionalized
political authority to the extent that the country is ungovernable using
conventional political structures. North Korea, by contrast, is what most
scholars would consider on the opposite end of the spectrum, that is, a
total state where all political authority is concentrated in governing insti-
tutions that affect every aspect of civic life. For The New York Times report-
ers, the metaphor of a “failed state” had a nice ring to it because it
seemingly depicts a country that does not live up to the standards
established by legitimate political authority as it is recognized in most
places around the world. For the authors of the article, North Korea had
“failed” in the sense that it did not succeed in rising to the standard of
governance that legitimate governments enjoy. However, it should be
obvious that this sense of the term does not adhere to standard scholarly
usage, which employs the notion of “failed” states to conceptualize the
absence of centralized political authority, a condition that clearly would
not apply to the North Korean state.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF METAPHORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS… 3
Why does this matter? Metaphors are integral to how IR scholars con-
ceptualize their field. They provide the narrative structure through which
facts are sorted into categories, assumptions are made, hypotheses are
derived, and theories are formulated. They thus encapsulate the core
ontological, epistemological, and methodological debates, which repre-
sent the main theoretical divisions within academic circles. As these meta-
phors make their way into other discursive contexts, for example the
journalistic field, they provide insight into the ways that these metaphori-
cal representations are not derived from an unambiguous reading of facts,
but rather are indicative of the various cognitive frames of reference schol-
ars bring with them to their work. That is to say, there is no “right” or
“wrong” way to convey what is meant by a “failed” state because the
concept itself is not a material category; it is instead a frame of reference
that reflects one of any number of ways of thinking about political author-
ity. Beyond their ability to guide empirical research to verify hypotheses
about patterns of causation, the “utility” of IR metaphors is that they
allow scholars to gain insight into those concepts that IR scholars deem
worthy of study and what they are intended to mean. There are no “failed
states,” only systems of government that exist in various states and which
can be conceptualized metaphorically as failed states (whatever that
means), or something else.
The New York Times reporters’ use of the term “failed state” in a way
that is different from its standard usage among scholars also highlights the
intellectual imprecision that is possible when metaphorical concepts are
reified to the point that their meanings become ambiguous. As in my pre-
vious book, this volume contains chapters that analyze metaphors as they
are used in a variety of theoretical approaches to the study of IR. As the
“failed state” metaphor illustrates, among the problems with metaphors in
IR theory is their imprecision and vagueness. A concept such as a “failed
state,” even when not misconstrued as it was in The New York Times arti-
cle, can be problematic because its imprecise nature makes it difficult to
associate the concept with a specific set of empirical criteria against which
it can be measured. Furthermore, hypotheses that follow from a vague
metaphor such as “failed states” can lead to non-falsifiable or tautological
claims because any evidence can be used to verify them. Part of the goal of
this book is to further interrogate the utility of IR metaphors and subject
them to additional analytical scrutiny beyond what was accomplished in
my previous work on this topic.3
4 M. P. MARKS
One of the main observations in Metaphors in International Relations

Theory is that research in the field of cognitive linguistics has established
that metaphors are an essential part of human cognition.4 In the conclu-
sion to my previous book I opined that because metaphors are a funda-
mental element in human reasoning, IR scholarship cannot be disentangled
from those metaphors that influence scholars’ view of the world. In recent
years, cognitive researchers have taken this line of reasoning one step fur-
ther. In a highly influential article in the journal Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber contend that human reasoning
has evolved not so much to acquire knowledge for knowledge’s sake, but
to foster the types of argumentation skills that are necessary for survival.5
The human brain has evolved not to recognize the veracity or factual accu-
racy of a statement, but rather, how persuasive it is. Mercier and Sperber
caution that this does not render human cognition “irrational.” Instead,
their thesis “puts such well-known demonstrations of ‘irrationality’ in a
novel perspective. Human reasoning is not a profoundly flawed general
mechanism; it is a remarkably efficient specialized device adapted to a cer-
tain type of social and cognitive interaction at which it excels” (Mercier
and Sperber 2011, 72). That is to say, humans have evolved successfully
because they have become proficient at convincing others to think in a
particular way.
Based on my findings in Metaphors in International Relations Theory I
would argue that Mercier and Sperber’s thesis extends to the role of meta-
phors in how academics persuade other scholars to accept particular argu-
ments and theoretical perspectives throughout academic inquiry including
in the field of IR. What qualifies as a good argument in scholarly discourse
includes the metaphors that persuade others to accept certain assump-
tions, follow certain hypotheses, and investigate certain types of evidence
leading to certain types of causal logic. Part of Mercier and Sperber’s the-
sis is that scholars are not immune to confirmation bias; scholars accept
particular findings because they fit within the theoretical arguments that
to date have been persuasive. My observation about IR in specific, although
one would surmise this is true in other disciplines as well, is that meta-
phors are part of the argumentation process that produces such analytical
bias. Scholars are inclined to accept conclusions that fit within the meta-
phorical frames to which they have become accustomed.
Foreign Policy by Metaphor: Barack

Obama’s “Red Line”
Much like the metaphor of “failed states,” foreign policy strategies such as
deterrence rest on conceptual metaphors and thus provide for political
leaders a way to think about foreign policy options. Such concepts, how-
ever, can constrain thinking and limit decision-makers’ choices. In 2012,
for example, United States President Barack Obama famously warned the
government of Syria that it would cross a “red line” if it used chemical
weapons against civilians or rebel forces.6 Obama, at a news conference at
the White House, declared: “We cannot have a situation in which chemical
or biological weapons are falling into the hands of the wrong people….
We have been very clear to the Assad regime but also to other players on
the ground that a red line for us is, we start seeing a whole bunch of weap-
ons moving around or being utilized.…That would change my calculus.
That would change my equation” (The New York Times, August 20, 2012,
A7, emphasis added).7 This statement was echoed later that year when
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton proclaimed: “This is a red line
for the United States” (The New York Times, December 4, 2012, A8).
Obama’s invocation of the “red line” as a metaphor for a limit that
could not be crossed both stymied his administration’s foreign policy and
provided fodder for political commentators who reflected on the stark
scenario presented by that metaphorical image.8 According to The
New York Times commentator Andrew Rosenthal, Obama “didn’t specify
what he would do [in the case of a Syrian government chemical weapons
attack], exactly, probably because ‘what the president said in August was
unscripted’—according to a senior official” (The New York Times, May 6,
2013, no page number). According to The New York Times, “with such an
evocative phrase, the president had defined his policy in a way some advis-
ers wish they could take back” (The New York Times, May 5, 2013, A1).
The issue became unavoidable for the president in August 2013 when
convincing evidence surfaced that the government of Syria had in fact
used chemical weapons against civilian populations. At that point, once it
became clear the “red line” deterrent had failed, the Obama administra-
tion found itself in a predicament of its own making, and commentators
outside the administration pounced on the failure of the metaphorical
“red line” deterrent threat to bring about the desired results. In fact, even
before evidence became available in August 2013, there were hints that
6 M. P. MARKS
the “red line” threat had failed to deter the Syrian regime. Writing in The
New York Times on May 5, 2013 (SR4), Daniel Byman observed, the “red
line has come to haunt Mr. Obama. Last week, the American intelligence
community assessed ‘with varying degrees of confidence’ that the Syrians
had used the chemical agent sarin in their attacks on the opposition.”
When evidence of the attacks was made public in August of 2013, a head-
line in The New York Times (August 29, 2013, A9) made reference to a
“‘red line’ that became blurred.” A subsequent headline in The New York
Times (September 1, 2013, SR5) asked if Obama was “tripping on his own
red line?” Moreover, a year earlier, when Israeli Prime Minister “Benjamin
Netanyahu…spell[ed] out a specific ‘red line’ that Iran could not cross in
its nuclear program,…Mr. Obama deflected Mr. Netanyahu’s proposal to
make the size of Iran’s stockpile of close-to-bomb-grade uranium the
threshold for a military strike by the United States against its nuclear facili-
ties” (The New York Times, September 14, 2012, A7).
Faced with the discrepancies in what his own conceptualization of what
the “red line” metaphor was meant to convey, the president was in a pre-
dicament. Obama tried to extricate himself from this dilemma when he
declared on September 4, 2013, that “I didn’t set a red line. The world set
a red line” (The New York Times, September 4, 2013, no page number).
By this Obama meant that the United States was merely upholding the
international norm against the use of chemical weapons. Yet metaphors
such as the “red line” are powerful in setting an agenda. Clearly, as the
headline to an opinion piece in The New York Times suggested, “Obama’s
red line [had come] back to haunt him” (The New York Times, September
2, 2013, no page number).9
Although many foreign policy experts warned about committing US
military resources to an increasingly complex and unstable civil war, in
many ways Obama had limited his own options by setting forth the meta-
phorical “red line” criterion for acting militarily in the Syrian conflict.
Once Obama set down a metaphorical marker, he either had to enforce it
or risk having his foreign policy be seen as not credible. Obama also based
elements of his foreign policy on such metaphorical principles as the
“pivot” to Asia, pushing the “reset button” in relations with Russia, and
the use of a “light footprint” in committing military assets abroad. This is
what Robert Dallek (2010) has deemed the “tyranny of metaphor” in US
foreign policy, which has continually constrained American international
actions even though leaders such as Obama have come to office pledging
fundamental change.
Dallek’s notion of the “tyranny of metaphor” played itself out in a

rather obvious way in the instance of Barack Obama’s “red line.” Once
Obama had framed the issue of Syrian chemical weapons in terms of a
metaphorical line which could not be crossed, subsequent choices were
limited by the options available to the president by virtue of the meta-
phorical nature of his deterrent threat. In this case, the situation was rela-
tively specific to the circumstances that prevailed during a short period of
time. The “tyranny of metaphor,” however, can have more lasting effects
when conceptual metaphors shape thinking about a large class of events.
How an issue is understood metaphorically can shape policy responses in
a fundamental and long-lasting way.
Metaphors and Public Policy

In light of notorious examples such as Barack Obama’s “red line,” it is not
surprising that a large body of literature has emerged which analyzes meta-
phors deployed in political discourse. Politicians, leaders, and a host of
political officials routinely utilize metaphors for the purposes of mobiliz-
ing individuals, articulating interests, advocating positions, or generating
support.10 However, before politicians and leaders use metaphorical
expressions to advocate for or justify their political objectives, the very
conceptualization of political issues involves processes associated with
prior metaphorical thinking. Moreover, metaphors often reflect political
differences that define what is at stake in a conflict of interests. As Murray
Edelman (1971, 68) observes: “Commonly accepted assumptions about
political reality and political cause and effect often consist of simplified or
distorted perspectives embodied in metaphors; once one is alert to the
hazard, each day’s reports of political speeches, statements, and new events
bring new and impressive examples. A politician more persuasively con-
veys a particular picture of reality when he simply assumes it in the terms
he uses rather than asserting it explicitly.”11
When citizens seek to make sense of confusing or complex political
issues, metaphors simplify political problems, make them more intelligi-
ble, and make proposed solutions to political problems more acceptable.12
Edelman (ibid., 71) opines: “The essence of metaphor is that a part evokes
a new whole. Political metaphors can vividly, potently, and pervasively
evoke a changed world in which the remedies for anxieties are clearly per-
ceived and self-serving courses of action are sanctified.” The preeminent
scholar on the nature of metaphors in cognition, George Lakoff, has
8 M. P. MARKS
argued that understanding the role of metaphors in foreign policy can help
frame policy issues.13 Metaphors can be incorporated into what Alister
Miskimmon, Ben O’Laughlin, and Laura Roselle (2013) refer to as the
larger “strategic narratives” that political leaders use to advance political
objectives.14 That political leaders employ metaphors in their public
appeals, therefore, is not surprising in part because scholars of metaphors
such as Lakoff have entered into policy debates.
Anthony Judge offers a number of examples of how metaphors frame
policy problems and suggest their solutions. Some examples given by
Anthony Judge (1989, 3–4) are as follows: Policy problems are frequently
posed in terms of geometrical principles (e.g., “areas” of activity, “spheres”
of influence, policy “levels”), positional characteristics (e.g., “stances” that
can be adopted, policymakers’ “positions”), tools (e.g., “umbrella,”
“shields,” “tridents”), or sports (e.g., “keeping the ball in play,” “scoring
points”), to name a few. These metaphors can influence how decision-
makers find solutions for the policy problems to which they respond.
Hence, the “solution” to a problem previously associated with metaphori-
cal images of aggression (e.g., finding a policy “target,” amassing “ammu-
nition” to solve a problem) might better be visualized through metaphors
associated with building support (e.g., “organizing” agenda items, creat-
ing a policy “project”) (ibid., 4–9).15 Similarly, in foreign policy discourse,
government actors routinely frame international conflict using sports met-
aphors or see war metaphorically as a “game.”16 As James Der Derian
(2003, 38) notes, the metaphor of war-as-a-game is not the same thing as
military exercises commonly known as “war games,” although the two
obviously are related. War thought of metaphorically as a game helps poli-
cymakers minimize what otherwise might be seen as the horrors of war.
Thus, war can be presented as a spirited and genial pastime or sport
(Shapiro 1989).17 Der Derian (2003, 38) notes that the “game” metaphor
for war has been used for centuries, for example, when the Prussians “suc-
cessively used Kriegsspiel (‘war play’) to defeat the Austrians at Sadowa in
1866.” Taking their cue from policymakers, scholars have then employed
the “game” metaphor in their own theorizing about war.18
A large number of foreign policy metaphors draw on, inform, or resonate
with the metaphors scholars use to conceptualize IR. The purposes to which
individuals deploy metaphors differ. Politicians are inclined to use framing
devices to garner support for their foreign policy objectives. Scholars tend
more to rely on metaphors to conceptualize abstract principles in the study
of world affairs. However, although policymakers and scholars draw on
metaphors for different reasons, the way they conceptualize IR often

involves similar or the same metaphorical frames. Moreover, the attachment
of metaphorical concepts to the roles states play in IR actually affects how
states behave toward each other (Holsti 1970; Teles Fazendeiro 2016).
Thus, understanding metaphors in IR can be aided by examining the con-
nections between metaphors in the foreign policy and scholarly realms.
Foreign policy metaphors provide a glimpse into how scholars conceptual-
ize IR, and vice versa.
Why Metaphors Matter

As in my previous book, my emphasis in this volume is on the metaphors
that inform the study of IR. However, while the language of IR in many
ways constitutes (as is true in other disciplines) a unique academic jargon,
it is also the case that the metaphorical concepts that shape IR are also part
of the discourse of practitioners of foreign policy.19 An example of this is
provided in Susanna Hast’s book Spheres of Influence in International
Relations (2014) in which the author elaborates on how the metaphor of
“spheres of influence” provides a normative basis by which states shape the
foreign policies of other countries by exerting direct and indirect control.
Hast provides a detailed historical review of the metaphorical bases of
spheres of influence as a concept that rationalizes, normalizes, and justifies
arrangements of IR such that it becomes second nature for governments
in some countries to legitimize the sway they have over other states in
their metaphorical “orbit.”
Such metaphors make their way into the overall conceptualization of IR
shared by policymakers, journalists, and the public alike. The “spheres of
influence” metaphor comprises part of the overarching metaphorical con-
ceptualization of the state as a “container,” which has been amply docu-
mented in the scholarly literature.20 Contained as they are within “orbits”
and “spheres,” relations among states are then depicted as existing among
a series of circular spaces. Thus, for example, when reporting on the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal, Keith Bradsher of The New York
Times describes Chinese fears of commercial “encirclement” given the
United States’ desires to keep countries in the country’s “orbit,” while the
TPP has “looped in” a range of countries in Southeast Asia (Bradsher
2015, B1). A complicated series of trade relationships is understood fun-
damentally by policymakers within foundational metaphors with which
policymakers perceive the world, in this case as part of an international
10 M. P. MARKS
system comprising self-contained political entities that populate a physical

environment in which spherical containers include or exclude other politi-
cal spaces.
With the knowledge that metaphors are essential elements in the con-
struction of foreign policy, foreign policy analysis that focuses on
conceptual metaphors is useful for understanding the discipline of

IR. Indeed, William Flanik (2011) suggests that incorporating metaphors
into what he calls cognitive foreign policy analysis (CFPA) can bridge
some of the theoretical divisions that have existed between foreign policy
analysis as a distinct approach in IR and other IR theories, in particular the
Constructivist paradigm. Most notably, Flanik observes that CFPA helps
resolve the agent–structure problem in IR theory by highlighting the links
between individual cognition and the cultural contexts in which they
exist.21 To the extent that IR scholars are agents located within the same
cultural space that frames foreign policymaking, the metaphors scholars
use to study the world are in many cases the same used by foreign policy
practitioners. An analysis of policy metaphors that are also part of the dis-
course of IR theory is therefore particularly salient for understanding the
ontological bases of the field.
Cases of metaphors solving problems in the realm of foreign policy are
many. Ann Tickner (1992, 48–49) explains that metaphors which cast the
periphery as possessing “feminine” qualities served as a justification for
European imperialism, as European leaders appointed themselves the job
of “civilizing” large regions of the world that became European colonies.
Simon Dalby (1998) points out that matters of international security often
are framed using ecological metaphors including notions of world politics
existing as a “biosphere” that is both complex and in need of maintaining
good “health.” During the Cold War the balance of power metaphor sug-
gested policies to maintain that “balance” (Bleiker 2000, 234; Akrivoulis
2008), the US leaders used metaphorical images such as “disease,” “fire,”
“darkness,” and “savagery” to advocate keeping the Soviet Union in check
(Ivie 1980, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1997, 1999),22 and successive policymak-
ers depicted the threat of communist expansion in terms of metaphorical
“falling dominoes” (Shimko 1994).23 On the other hand, the meanings of
public policy metaphors are in no way unambiguous. The term
“Balkanization,” for instance, conjures up images of political fragmenta-
tion, although, as discussed in a book by Balkan scholars (Bjelić and Savić
2002), the metaphor is far more complex and contested than it might at
first glance seem. Contestation over the meanings of metaphors, in fact, is

part of the process by which metaphors are injected into politics.24
Even before cognitive linguists such as George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson (1980) uncovered the experiential context of metaphors, scholars
of politics have intuited that human experience can manifest itself in lan-
guage (including metaphors), which then shapes political views of the
world. Writing about the “balance of power” metaphor in 1948, Alfred
Vagts observed: “Political ideas usually have no single ascertainable point
of origin; they only have origins, antedating first formulations in speech,
writing, or the pictorial expressions” (Vagts 1948, 87).25 This leads Vagts
to speculate that the desire for a balance of power in contemporary times
may very well reflect a felt affinity for similar experiences and wishes of
scholars and practitioners in Renaissance times who expressed their desires
in the metaphorical language of “balance.”
As mentioned, a prominent example of how metaphors can shape for-
eign policy thinking is the “falling dominoes” image that framed US Cold
War policy. The metaphor, coined by President Dwight Eisenhower, was
embraced by other members of the foreign policy establishment regardless
of partisan affiliation. Former US Secretary of Defense Robert
S. McNamara noted in a 1996 interview that President Eisenhower was
not alone in this thinking and that the falling dominoes metaphor came to
shape American foreign policy:
If Vietnam were lost, or if Laos and Vietnam were lost, the dominoes would
fall. That was a famous expression. It wasn’t just President Eisenhower who
believed it; I’ll call it the establishment in the U.S. It didn’t matter whether
you were Republican or Democrat, if you had been associated with foreign
relations and responsibilities in the postwar period and were dealing with
the Soviet threat to the security to the West [then you believed in the
“Domino Theory”]” (Kreisler 1996).
This is not necessarily to say that US foreign policy would have been sig-
nificantly different had the metaphor of “falling dominoes” never entered
the lexicon, but rather, the metaphorical image galvanized policymakers
across the political spectrum and provided a shared image, which informed
debates on how best to achieve American foreign policy objectives. Even
with the defeat of American Cold War objectives in Southeast Asia, iconic
metaphors that may or may not help public policy objectives persist in
policymaking debates.
12 M. P. MARKS
Metaphors persist in shaping policy debates, perceptions of opportuni-

ties, and threats to international stability, as the “falling dominoes” exam-
ple illustrates. The post-Cold War era provides additional examples of the
sorts of optimism and pessimism about IR embodied in metaphorical con-
cepts. The end of the Cold War heralded, for instance, the promise of a
metaphorical “peace dividend” that would result in greater global wealth
and prosperity. More than just monetary benefits, the “peace dividend”
served as a metaphor for an improved quality of life that would accrue to
large numbers of individuals around the world once the specter of super-
power conflict had been diminished. Within a short period of time, how-
ever, economists such as George Brockway (1990, 15) were cautioning
“don’t cash your peace dividend,” when the optimistic vision of a meta-
phorical post-Cold War payoff did not quickly materialize. More omi-
nously, the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States elevated
the metaphor of a “war” against not only terrorism but against a host of
potential threats to international security, with United States Representative
Dennis Kucinich (2008, no page number) writing that 9/11 was “the day
America embraced a metaphor of war.”26 The awareness of the influence
of metaphorical concepts on international affairs is shared among govern-
ment officials and scholars alike.
Conceptual Versus Linguistic Metaphors

Metaphor scholars make a distinction between conceptual metaphors and
linguistic metaphors. Quite simply, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) iden-
tify conceptual metaphors as cognitive processes, and linguistic metaphors
as the spoken manifestations of those thought processes. “The conceptual
metaphor underlies most of our use of metaphorical expressions, whereas
the linguistic coding is supposed to be only the final stage in the construc-
tion of metaphors” (Moura 2006, 82). Thus, for example, Lakoff and
Johnson (1980, 27) have determined that humans experience thought as
a mechanical process, leading to the conceptual metaphor the mind is a
machine.27 There are numerous linguistic metaphors that then serve as
manifestations of that conceptual metaphor, such as “My mind just isn’t
operating today” and “Boy! the wheels are turning now!” (ibid., italics in
the original).28 Thus, while all conceptual metaphors give rise to linguistic
metaphors, not all linguistic metaphors are concepts. Rather, they serve as
linguistic manifestations of those underlying metaphorical concepts.
For cognitive linguists and metaphor scholars, the distinction between

conceptual metaphors and linguistic metaphors is an important one. In
Lakoff and Johnson’s thesis, physical and sensory experiences give rise to
thoughts (conceptual metaphors), which then lead to linguistic expres-
sions (linguistic metaphors). Language follows thought, not vice versa.
This insight marks a critical turn in the field of linguistics. However, lan-
guage scholars acknowledge that the distinction between conceptual and
linguistic metaphors is not always so clearly defined. For example,
Heronides Moura (2006, 84) notes that certain metaphors in Brazilian
Portuguese originate in conventional linguistic use, not necessarily cogni-
tive frames: “It is difficult to see how these metaphors could be derived
strictly in conceptual terms, since it depends upon the usage and the social
context, linguistically expressed.” Moura then opines that it should be
possible to see an interdependence between conceptual and linguistic met-
aphor. Likewise, Hartmut Stöckl (2010, 197) argues that any theory of
metaphor must take account of at least four elements: “semantic features,…
conceptual metaphor and its mappings, encyclopaedic, symbolic and
socio-cultural knowledge, [and] sensory experience.”
In recent years, linguists have also highlighted the distinction between
deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors. While much of language involves
metaphors used in a reflexive, non-deliberate way, there are also meta-
phors used deliberately, often via analogy or simile, to alert audiences to
an overt comparison that is being made between one idea and another:
“When a metaphor is used deliberately, it instructs the addressee to
momentarily adopt another standpoint, in another frame of reference, and
to reconsider the local topic from that point of view” (Steen 2013, 58).29
In IR theory there are examples of both deliberate metaphors, which are
consciously deployed, and non-deliberate metaphors which are referenced
reflexively by IR scholars. Examples of the former include the wide range
of game theory metaphors such as Prisoner’s Dilemma which set up a
direct analogy between the predicament of criminal suspects and the stra-
tegic choices faced by governments. Examples of the latter include the
pervasive metaphor of a “balance of power,” which serves as a master
theoretical principle of Realist IR theory. Thus, as with conceptual and
linguistic metaphors, an investigation of metaphors in IR theory must
acknowledge the presence of deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors,
the distinction between which is obvious to linguists but mostly lost on IR
scholars.
14 M. P. MARKS
For the purposes of the present study, are the distinctions between
conceptual metaphor and linguistic metaphor, and deliberate and non-
deliberate metaphors, important for investigating metaphors in IR the-
ory? Obviously, even for scholars such as Moura and Stöckl who seek a
synthesis of conceptual and linguistic metaphor, the need to maintain ana-
lytical categories is necessary. Thus, over the course of this book I will
endeavor, where relevant, to indicate where conceptual and linguistic
metaphors are involved. For example, in the chapter on metaphors and
democratization, the underlying conceptual metaphor democratization
has a direction will be shown to manifest itself in a variety of linguistic
metaphors such as “waves of democratization.” However, as is true in any
interdisciplinary effort, certain disciplinary imperatives will take prece-
dence over others. Thus, linguists may note that at times conceptual and
linguistic metaphors may be discussed simultaneously inasmuch as schol-
ars of IR, not to mention practitioners of politics, are not necessarily
inclined to grasp the finer details of metaphor scholarship. For linguists
the difference between conceptual and linguistic metaphors is an essential
distinction, but for IR scholars that distinction is secondary to the way
that both conceptual and linguistic metaphors frame an understanding of
IR, shape its conduct, and have an impact on theoretical explanations.30
Similarly, scholars of IR will be more interested in the way deliberate and
non-deliberate metaphors influence subsequent theorizing than in defini-
tively determining when and in what ways each sort of metaphor prevails
within the scholarly community.
It is also worth noting that in IR theory and practice, the distinction
between conceptual and linguistic metaphors (as well as deliberate and
non-deliberate metaphors) is not always strictly maintained. For example,
in his investigation of the metaphors that shaped the development of a
national missile defense (NMD) system in the United States, William
Flanik (2011, 234–235) finds that these metaphors were a combination of
conceptual metaphors such as nmd is a shield and linguistic metaphors
such as the national metaphor defense system provides “cover.” Moreover,
IR theorists and policymakers alike speak in ways that make underlying
conceptual metaphors obvious, without the need to engage in analysis of
large amounts of language data to find underlying meanings. Even George
Lakoff (2013, no page number) noted with reference to Barack Obama’s
“red line” metaphor: “We cannot think about a situation as complicated
as Syria without conceptual metaphors and scenarios driving policy pro-
posals. In many cases, the conceptual metaphors are unconscious. But
with Syria, the policy-defining metaphors are being put into language and
are showing up front and center.” Much of what is examined in this book
involves a combination of obvious linguistic metaphors that are “up front
and center” as well as underlying conceptual metaphors that underlie
many theoretical propositions of IR theory. In this book, while every
effort will be made to distinguish conceptual and linguistic metaphors in
IR theory, emphasis will be placed on how both types of metaphors influ-
ence theories of IR and foreign policy conduct, that is, how metaphors
operate “further down the line” of theory and practice.
Governments and Metaphors
It has long been the case that governments, politicians, leaders, and politi-
cal officials have used metaphors to frame policy issues and advance policy
objectives. Scholars such as Murray Edelman have described how govern-
ments can systematically use metaphorical imagery to convince the mass
public to support an issue or form an opposition to political adversaries.
Increasingly, government officials are aware of the role of metaphors in
framing political discourse and thus shaping policy options. In this con-
text, a recent development is the effort by some governments to catalog
the metaphors used in political discourse for the purpose of advancing a
broad range of policy objectives. In an attempt both to gather intelligence
about the policy priorities of other countries and to tailor their own poli-
cies to receptive audiences, governments are engaging in research to sys-
tematize the collection of information regarding metaphorical discourse in
politics. Perhaps the most notable of these endeavors is the so-called
Metaphor Program currently being developed by the Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), an agency of the United
States government housed within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.31
The goal of the Metaphor Program is to develop computer programs to
decipher the metaphors that form part of the political discourse of selected
cultures so as to enable the US government to identify potential sources
of national security threats. A synopsis of the program is posted at IARPA’s
dedicated web page outlining the project:
The Metaphor Program will exploit the fact that metaphors are pervasive in
everyday talk and reveal the underlying beliefs and worldviews of members of
a culture. In the first phase of the two-phase program, performers will develop
16 M. P. MARKS
automated tools and techniques for recognizing, defining and categorizing

linguistic metaphors associated with target concepts and found in large
amounts of native-language text. The resulting conceptual metaphors will be
validated using empirical social science methods. In the second phase, the
program will characterize differing cultural perspectives associated with case
studies of the types of interest to the Intelligence Community. Performers
will apply the methodology established in the first phase and will identify the
conceptual metaphors used by the various protagonists, organizing and struc-
turing them to reveal the contrastive stances (IARPA 2011, 4).32
The aim of the Metaphor Program is to give government officials the abil-
ity to identify potential threats to national security by understanding their
cultural contexts through linguistic analysis. The IARPA overview of the
project states in part: “The Metaphor Program will exploit the use of met-
aphors by different cultures to gain insight into their cultural norms”
(ibid.). Researchers who are awarded contracts to develop the Metaphor
Program “will develop and test methodologies for the automated discov-
ery, definition and categorization of linguistic metaphors found in large
amounts of native-language text. These methodologies will produce con-
ceptual metaphors that capture aspects of the tacit knowledge of the cul-
ture” (ibid., 5).
It is clear from the Metaphor Program document summarizing the ini-
tiative that the project designers are well-versed in the scholarly literature
on cognitive linguistics and conceptual metaphors. The overview docu-
ment observes that “metaphors shape how people think about complex
topics and can influence beliefs. Metaphors can reduce complexity of
meaning associated with a topic by capturing or expressing patterns.
Metaphors are associated with affect; affect influences behavior” (ibid., 4).
What the project developers hope is that automated methods (i.e., com-
puter processing of large amounts of written text) will result in a “meta-
phor repository” that will then aid government researchers to identify
potential sources of threat to national security through examination of
communications that may contain within them indications of such threats.
Rather than relying on human resources in the form of intelligence agents,
the Metaphor Program is designed to automate textual analysis with the
assumption that conceptual metaphors in specific cultures can provide a
clue to the objectives of foreign governments and individuals.
Despite the obvious difficulties in implementing the Metaphor
Program, what is striking is the fact that individuals within the United
States government are aware of the role metaphors play in framing and
shaping policy. Government officials grasp the way that policy agendas are
situated within the conceptual metaphors scholars and policymakers alike
rely on to understand the world. It is also clear that government officials
comprehend how metaphor analysis can be used to identify the motiva-
tions of potential adversaries and try to persuade them to adopt alternative
positions.
However, as with all intelligence gathering, there is a fine line between
accumulating information and imputing motives behind that information.
Just as scholars often unwittingly imbue the study of IR with meanings
and narratives that reflect the metaphorical concepts with which they see
the world, so too policymakers can erroneously infer intent from behavior
in an unwarranted way as well as impute to themselves motives that mirror
deeply held beliefs. Concepts are metaphors and therefore metaphors cre-
ate realities. However, what is real is a set of shifting cognitive constructs,
which, because of the changing and contested nature of conceptual meta-
phors, are only imperfectly construed through metaphor analysis.
Government policy based on such metaphor analysis is inevitably fraught
with the same sorts of analytical problems that confront scholars who
study these same topics. It is therefore incumbent on scholars to be atten-
tive to the role metaphors play in their own research and analysis. The link
between scholarship and government policy begins in the academic realm
requiring scholars to be vigilant in examining the way metaphors concep-
tualize subject matters under investigation.
The Nexus Between Policy Metaphors

and Scholarship
Scholars have fully established that policymakers marshal metaphors to

frame political issues, shape policy debates, influence public discourse, and
persuade government officials and the population at large to act in specified
ways. Despite the inclination by scholars to separate themselves from poli-
cymakers by adopting a detached, objective perspective relative to the polit-
ical world, there is an inevitable sharing of metaphorical concepts between
the realm of politics and scholarly efforts to study it. That is to say, what
constitutes an area of study is not a set of self-evident, objectively arising
facts, but the very range of conceptual metaphors that policymakers articu-
late as they advance both an understanding of the world around them and
18 M. P. MARKS
their political objectives. The IARPA Metaphor Program discussed in the

previous section demonstrates that there is an awareness among policymak-
ers and other political officials that political discourse incorporates meta-
phorical concepts. The Metaphor Program solicits inputs from the scholarly
community indicating that there is a growing sense among policymakers
that research on metaphors is relevant to the formulation of policy frames.
As an example of the nexus between policy metaphors and academic
scholarship we can examine the work of Jerel Rosati and Steven Campbell
as they seek to understand the foreign policy objectives and practices of
the presidential administration of Jimmy Carter in the United States. In
their analysis of the two dominant metaphors that shaped the thinking of
Carter and his closest foreign policy advisers, Rosati and Campbell (2004)
identify a pair of contending metaphors that alternately influenced the
early and late foreign policy views of the Carter administration. In the
early years of the administration, Carter and his advisers subscribed to a
metaphorical view of the world expressed in terms of the “global commu-
nity.” As world events disrupted both the thinking and actions of the
administration, the “global community” metaphor was replaced with one
of a metaphorical “arc of crisis” (ibid., 220ff).
While Rosati and Campbell seek to remove themselves from historical
events as they endeavor to adopt the position of scholarly observers of the
Carter administration’s metaphorical thinking, an interesting connection
between scholarship and politics can nonetheless be observed. Interestingly,
both the administration and Rosati and Campbell alike situate the “global
community” and “arc of crisis” metaphors within a larger metaphorical
construct. Specifically, the Carter administration sought to develop a for-
eign policy that best suited “U.S. global leadership,” while Rosati and
Campbell similarly take as a fact the same metaphorical concept of “U.S.
global leadership.” In other words, Rosati and Campbell at once attempt
to detach themselves in a scholarly fashion from the “global community”
and “arc of crisis” metaphors so as to treat them as objects of study, while,
at the same time, both the Carter administration and Rosati and Campbell
alike treat as an objective fact what is actually a metaphor in and of itself,
that is, the idea that the United States exercises metaphorical global
“leadership.”
What constitutes “leadership” in global relations is not unambiguously
clear. The relationship between any two or more countries can and has been
conceptualized in any number of ways including notions of “alliances,”
“friendships,” “patron–client” relations, “partners,” and “neighbors,” just to
name a few. What it means for countries to “lead” or “follow” each other in
global affairs reflects a particular metaphorical understanding of one or more
states being “in front” of others in devising diplomatic, political, military, and
economic affairs. “Leadership” is not a self-evident fact but an understanding
of international politics played out in terms of states taking other states from
one place to another through deliberate and focused direction. That the
Carter administration tried to ascertain the contours of US “global leader-
ship” and that scholars accept that concept as a fact highlights the nexus
between policymaking and scholarship, a nexus held together by a common
and prior shared understanding of certain metaphorical “truths.” Indeed, as
Rosati and Campbell unpack the “global community” and “arc of crisis”
metaphors, they leave the metaphor of “U.S. global leadership” largely
unexamined.
Of course, Rosati and Campbell are not alone in the way they share
with the objects of their study a common metaphorical view. A large num-
ber of metaphors that are employed by policymakers to frame issues are
treated by scholars as objective categories of political phenomena. As
Richard Little (2007), for example, notes, the metaphor of the “balance of
power” has a long pedigree in the world of international diplomacy. First
used to justify the actions of rulers, the concept today is treated as a basic
fact of world affairs by a large body of scholars. More recently, political
leaders have spoken of arms “races,” power “vacuums,” and the danger of
“failed” states, all of which have also been treated by scholars as factual
elements of international affairs. Moreover, as William Flanik has observed,
the influence of the scholarly community on the metaphorical framing of
foreign policy concepts can be overt. Flanik (2011, 432) notes that the
metaphorical concept of the “rogue state” “was disseminated by a small
group of defense intellectuals during and shortly after the collapse of the
USSR.” As long as all thinking is metaphorical, it is impossible for scholars
to fully divorce themselves from the conceptual metaphors policymakers
rely on to shape discussions about IR.
More to the point, in recent years, some politicians, showing an aware-
ness of the role of metaphors in human communication, have reached
out directly to metaphor scholars for advice on formulating political
frames. Most notably, George Lakoff, one of the originators of the theory
of conceptual metaphor, has consulted with politicians of the Democratic
Party in the United States to advise on policy framing. Lakoff was one of
the co-founders of the now-defunct Rockridge Institute, which was cre-
ated to aid activists and politicians devise rhetorical arguments in favor of
20 M. P. MARKS
progressive causes. Lakoff also consulted with one-time presidential can-

didate and Chair of the Democratic National Committee Howard Dean
who wrote the Foreword to Lakoff’s book Don’t Think of an Elephant!
(Lakoff 2004). Lakoff’s work with Democratic Party leaders did not
escape the notice of detractors such as Rahm Emanuel who served as
Chief of Staff for President Barack Obama. In a chapter in a co-authored
book (Emanuel and Reed 2006), Emanuel excoriated Lakoff for trying
to convince party leaders that the key to electoral success was political
messaging.33 Criticisms of Lakoff notwithstanding, other progressive
Americans have spearheaded efforts to influence policy discussions by
formulating political messaging using metaphorical concepts, including
the creation of the Metaphor Project in 1997 (not to be confused with
the IARPA Metaphor Program discussed above).34 The debate over the
extent to which policymakers should overtly craft metaphorical messages
shows that a bridge between metaphor scholars and political officials has
been established.
That scholars have adopted as analytical categories certain metaphors
that policymakers have used for the purposes of advancing political objec-
tives begs the question of whether those scholars can truly exercise an
objective analysis of concepts that are not neutral in their implications for
understanding IR. As the foregoing discussion of post-Cold War concepts
such as the “peace dividend” and metaphors of “war” illustrate, meta-
phorical concepts can reflect and foster prevailing political sensibilities and
moods. While it is impossible for scholars to devise a vocabulary that is
entirely distinct from the agenda-laden terminology of policymakers,
scholars should nonetheless be vigilant when they seek to formulate theo-
retical explanations for world affairs. Among the things scholars can do is
exercise a critical interrogation of policy metaphors in ways that policy-
makers may be disinclined to do. Scholars can ask themselves not only
how metaphors shape policy, but how they shape the very study of policy.
In what ways are categories of policy created that complicate the study of
international affairs? Scholars cannot reasonably be expected to use a com-
pletely different vocabulary of terms, but in thinking about IR, they can
ask what more can be learned about world affairs by being conscious about
how issues are framed. Dissecting how policy is conceptualized can also
assist in determining how it is best explained.
The purpose of this book is precisely to continue the process of inter-
rogating metaphors in IR theory, which was initiated in my previous work
on this topic. The present volume in many ways is more attentive to the
ways that scholarly thinking, which involves conceptual metaphors, influ-

ences policymakers who engage in real-world international affairs.
Specifically, the book acknowledges the fact that theory and practice in IR
often rest on common metaphorical concepts, which have implications for
the ways people around the world pursue their lives. With some excep-
tions, IR theories often focus more on abstract concepts than the lived
experiences of individuals around the world. Moreover, in the same way
that IR theory in general often ignores real-world experiences of individu-
als, metaphors in IR theory often frame a view of the world which margin-
alizes everyday people. To the extent that government policy also is shaped
by metaphorical concepts that originate in the academic realm, and to the
extent that IR scholars are therefore partially complicit in this marginaliza-
tion, it is vitally important to subject metaphors in IR theory to critical
interrogation. The rest of this book is devoted to that task.
Notes
1. For a sampling of how metaphors inform scholarship in academic inquiry
see, for example, Black (1962, 1979), McCloskey (1985, 1995),
Henderson (1994), Klamer and Leonard (1994), Eubanks (2000), Brown
(2003).
2. Since the publication of Metaphors in International Relations Theory other
scholars have devoted research to understanding how specific metaphors
shape understandings of IR. See, for example, Susanna Hast’s (2014)
book-length examination of the metaphor of “spheres of influence.”
3. Mine is not the only method for critically interrogating the ontological
bases for the study of IR. See, for example, Acuto and Curtis (2014) for an
approach that uses assemblage thinking as a way for unpacking the concep-
tual bases of IR theory.
4. The role of metaphors in IR theory had interested scholars such as Hayward
Alker for a number of years. Analysis of metaphor could provide a way to
bridge the various epistemological traditions that were not fully reconciled
in the field. On Alker’s efforts in this endeavor, see Blanchard (2012).
5. “The main function of reasoning is argumentative: Reasoning has evolved
and persisted mainly because it makes human communication more effec-
tive and advantageous” (Mercier and Sperber 2011, 60).
6. The Oxford English Dictionary recognizes the phrase “red line” as meaning
a “limit” with origins in the image of “a mark on a gauge or dial indicating
a safety limit or critical point; spec. one denoting a maximum operating
speed.”
22 M. P. MARKS
7. Although the “red line” Obama laid down in the case of Syria provided the
basis for subsequent American foreign policy it was not the first time the
Obama administration had invoked that metaphor. In January 2102,
“senior Obama administration officials…said publicly that Iran would
cross a ‘red line’ if it made good on recent threats to close the [S]trait [of
Hormuz]” (The New York Times, January 13, 2012, A1).
8. For an analysis of Obama’s “red line” metaphor, see Lakoff (2013).
9. Reprinted from an essay by Albert R. Hunt in the International Herald
Tribune (September 2, 2013, no page number).
10. On the use of metaphors in the discourse of foreign policy leaders see, for
example, Andrews (1979), Ivie (1980, 1982, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1997,
1999, 2002, 2004), Lakoff (1991), Chilton and Lakoff (1995), Chilton
(1996), Milliken (1996), Mussolff (1996, 2001, 2004), Beer and De
Landtsheer (2004), Charteris-Black (2004), Slingerland et al. (2007),
Flanik (2008, 2011), Oppermann and Spencer (2013), Korkut et al.
(2015). Metaphors are frequently used among policymakers to frame
debates over the formation, implementation, and assessment of govern-
ment policy. See, for example, Paparone (2008, 2010), Poletti (2004).
11. Elliot Zashin and Phillip Chapman (1974, 309) concur: “Metaphors are
used, then, to persuade and to influence attitudes, as well as to assist in the
interpretation of experience.” See also Mio (1997), Schlesinger and Lau
(2000), Punter (2007, chapter 3), Charteris-Black (2005, 2009), Carver
and Pikalo (2008), De Landtsheer (2009), Neagu (2013).
12. For example, George Lakoff (1991) argues that during the Persian Gulf
War, members of the Bush administration invoked a series of metaphors
that were designed to depict Iraq as a villain, make Kuwait look like a vic-
tim, and characterize the United States as the savior of Kuwait.
13. Lakoff (2001, 1) writes that “the strategic framing of issues matters to
foreign policy” and therefore “an understanding of such framing, together
with a systematic reframing, is necessary for the Global Interdependence
Initiative,” a program he favors. Similarly, Arie Kruglanski et al. (2007)
suggest metaphors for how strategies for counterterrorism “should” be
framed.
14. “Strategic narratives are representations of a sequence of events and identi-
ties, a communicative tool through which political actors—usually elites—
attempt to give determined meaning to past, present, and future in order
to achieve political objectives” (Miskimmon et al. 2013, 5).
15. Metaphors also affect how citizens think about what is presented to them
as political “problems” and their “solutions.” Thus, for example, Paul
Thibodeau and Lera Boroditsky (2011) find that how members of the
public respond to issues of crime depends on how metaphors frame the
issue of crime either as a “beast” or as a “virus.”
16. On sports metaphors in political discourse, see Herbeck (2004).

17. For instance, in the Isreali–Palestinian conflict, Cathleen Bridgeman
(2002, 165) writes that policymakers and other interested parties depict
the conflict using a variety of metaphorical terms: “Examples of game met-
aphors include such references to ‘pawns in an increasingly dangerous
game’, ‘the rules of the game have changed’, ‘reminder of how easily the
prize could slip away’, ‘prize of a lasting peace’, ‘victory for peace’, etc.”
Likewise, George Lakoff (1991, no page number) points out that in the
first Persian Gulf War President George H. W. Bush used metaphors to
refer to “to strategic moves in the gulf as a ‘poker game’ where it would be
foolish for him to ‘show his cards’, that is, to make strategic knowledge
public.”
18. For instance, John Lewis Gaddis (1987, 237ff) uses the term “rules of the
game” to describe the mostly unstated tacit agreements the United States
and the Soviet Union abided by so as not to disrupt the “long peace” of
the Cold War.
19. As an example, with specific reference to the metaphor of the “war on ter-
ror,” Vincent Pouliot (2008, 34) argues that “the academic discourse on
the globalization of threats happens to coincide almost perfectly with the
rhetorical strategies of certain politicians.”
20. On the state as a container metaphor see, for example, Chilton (1996).
21. “Agents create new meanings by drawing on existing metaphors and apply-
ing them to new situations, by extending metaphorical entailments in
novel ways, and by articulating and sharing new metaphors…In sum, met-
aphorical frames constitute agents, and agents (re)produce social structure
in part through metaphorical framing” (Flanik 2011, 432). Flanik (436)
also points out that “by stressing the interdependence of cultural and
embodied meanings, metaphorical framing avoids the fallacy of reducing
decision making to social facts, on the one hand, or innate cognitive capac-
ities on the other.” See also Oppermann and Spencer (2013).
22. The “disease” metaphor has also been used to frame debates about immi-
gration in the United States. See Cisneros (2008). For a discussion of addi-
tional medical metaphors in political discourse, see Shogimen (2008).
23. However, as Shimko (665) points out, the “domino metaphor and the
imagery accompanying it [did] not offer much in terms of policy specifics.”
For more on the falling dominoes metaphor, see also Jervis and Snyder
(1991). On additional rhetorical uses of metaphors during the Cold War,
see Milliken (1996), Medhurst (1997), Hirschbein (2005). For the use of
metaphors in the post-Cold War era, in particular metaphors used to frame
US military interventions in the Persian Gulf, see Lakoff (1991), Pancake
(1993), Chilton and Lakoff (1995), Bates (2009), Blum (2009).
24 M. P. MARKS
24. Thus, for example, legal scholars in the United States have engaged in an
ongoing argument regarding the meanings and implications of the meta-
phor that judges should act as “umpires” (Weber 2009).
25. On the balance of power as a metaphor, see also Little (2007).
26. On the “war” metaphor, see Marks (2011, 116–118).
27. The convention in the field of linguistics is to indicate conceptual meta-
phors such as the mind is a machine with small capital letters.
28. While conceptual metaphors in the field of linguistics are indicated with
small capital letters, linguistic metaphors are denoted in regular typeface,
occasionally in italics or enclosed within quotation marks.
29. For additional works on deliberate versus non-deliberate metaphor see, for
example, Goatly (1997), Shen and Balaban (1999), Goddard (2004).
30. In fact, scholars of IR likely are unaware of the many metaphorical con-
cepts that permeate their field. Linguists, however, have developed ways
for identifying metaphors in academic discourse. See, for example, Steen
et al. (2010, chapter 6).
31. Information about the Metaphor Program can be found online at http://
www.iarpa.gov/solicitations_metaphor.html. For an analysis of the
Metaphor Program, see Madrigal (2011).
32. IARPA has solicited project proposals to develop the Metaphor Program.
The online solicitation is located at http://www.iarpa.gov/solicitations_
metaphor.html.
33. Emanuel’s criticisms of Lakoff were picked up by progressive commenta-
tors who echoed those themes. See Cooper (2005), Green (2005).
34. The website for the Metaphor Project is http://metaphorproject.org/.
References
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CHAPTER 2
Metaphors of International Political

Economy
In the theoretical narrative of IR, part of the story involves establishing

central and subordinate plot lines. In a novel, motion picture, or television
program, the attention of readers or viewers is drawn to the central story
line by how much significance is hanging on the resolution of a point of
tension. Subplots can bring to bear information involving central charac-
ters, but their resolution is less critical to the outcome of the central story
arc. In IR, the resolution of problems of international security, that is,
issues of war and peace, is central to the study of the field. Matters of inter-
national economics, while significant aspects of IR, typically are afforded a
lesser status. The order of chapters in introductory textbooks on IR illus-
trates this phenomenon; in almost every case, chapters on security precede
chapters on commerce and trade. As we will see in the following discus-
sion, the metaphorical separation of matters of security and economics
into hierarchically ordered realms of “high” and “low” politics is a key
linguistic cue in the unfolding of the IR narrative.
Metaphors in Economics1
Scholars have established that metaphors often serve as the basis for mod-
els and theories in the physical and natural sciences.2 Inasmuch as the
study of economics relies on formal modeling, it is not surprising that
metaphors figure prominently in the field of economics, although, ironi-
cally, as Deirdre McCloskey (1985, 74) points out, “non-economists find

32 M. P. MARKS
it easier to see the metaphors than do economists.”3 Furthermore,

economists’ acceptance of the practical utility of metaphors in developing
theoretical propositions has not always been forthcoming since many
economists have viewed metaphors as antithetical to their view of eco-
nomics as a science. Yet as Arjo Klamer and Thomas Leonard (1994) point
out, despite the resistance of some economists, it needs to be acknowl-
edged that many of the metaphors of the language of economics involve
core concepts in the field.4 For example, Willie Henderson (1994, 356)
observes that “the language of supply and demand is built on the transfer-
ence of the idea of balance and equilibrium, forces and pressures (leading
to the directional metaphors: ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’) on price and
equilibrium.” This point of view, Henderson argues, attributes economic
behavior to the metaphorical functions of mechanistic forces as opposed
to individual economic agents. “Thus, in the simple supply-and-demand
model ‘prices rise’ rather than ‘prices are raised’ by some active and delib-
erate economic agent” (ibid.). The reliance on metaphors of forces is
found elsewhere in the language of economics, as Henderson points out,
for example, in instances of watery images such as “liquidity, floating
exchange rates, flotation, flows, circulation, leakages, injections, [and]
trickle-down effects” (ibid., 358). McCloskey (1985, 76) adds to this list
economic terms such as “elasticity,” “depression,” “equilibrium,” “com-
petition,” and “velocity,” all of which are metaphorical in nature.
The origins of economic theory are in many ways founded in stories,
fables, and metaphors. In his fascinating study of the evolution of eco-
nomics as a field of inquiry, Tomas Sedlacek (2011) traces the historical
succession of parables and imagery that have guided economics theory. In
addition to the obvious metaphor of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” eco-
nomic transactions have been imagined via a variety of metaphorical frames
including the Epic of Gilgamesh, the theology of the Old Testament and
Christianity, and Descartes’ mechanistic view of humans’ place in nature.
Indeed, as Sedlacek hints at in the title of his book, economic metaphors
reside even in human conceptions of good and evil. Similarly, chapters in
Philip Mirowski’s edited volume Natural Images and Economic Thought
(1994) highlight the role of metaphors of nature and how they figure in
economic theory. Thus, for example, Geoffrey Hodgson (1994), Sharon
Kingsland (1994), Alexander Rosenberg (1994), and Margaret Schabas
(1994) highlight evolutionary metaphors in economic thought, Paul
Christensen (1994) discusses metaphors of energy, Michael Hutter (1994)
explains the notion of organism as a metaphor in German economic
METAPHORS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 33
thought, and Neil Niman (1994) explicates the role of biological analo-
gies in the theory of the firm, among other naturalistic metaphors for
economics laid out in Mirowski’s tome.
Biological metaphors appear frequently throughout economic thought.
Cristina Bicchieri (1988, 104) writes that “both the Physiocrats and Adam
Smith described the relations among the spheres of production, circula-
tion, and distribution in terms of functional relations among the parts of
the human body. Economic society was described as a ‘social body,’ from
which the division of labor and specialization of the parts naturally flow.”
Bicchieri (ibid.) notes that the consequences of such metaphors for eco-
nomic theorizing are not insubstantial: “It is precisely this ‘naturalness’ of
the economic sphere that directs one to find the underlying causes of such
regularities, to state the principles that account for the coordination of
economic activities.” Just as in IR theory, terms that are used in contem-
porary economics theory in a literal sense have metaphorical origins,
which, while perhaps concealed today, have served to shape economic
theorizing. For example, Bicchieri (105) notes that the term “equilib-
rium” in economics currently is “obviously taken to be literal,” but “two
hundred years ago, was taken to be figurative; it evoked an unspecified
gravitational process of prices toward their ‘natural’ values.”
Furthermore, the ontological bases of the field of economics itself,
while presumably straightforward and unambiguous, are subject to meta-
phorical conceptualizations. The American Heritage Dictionary (583)
defines economics as “the social science that deals with the production,
distribution, and consumption of goods and services and with the theory
and management of economies or economic systems.” While seemingly
straightforward, this definition presents to economics the challenge of
how to conceive of the constituent elements of the field, elements such as
“distribution” and “management,” that could imply any number of mech-
anisms by which economic transactions take place. This is part of the rea-
son why metaphors are as integral to the study of economics as they are to
the study of IR and why economists have disagreed on how to metaphori-
cally conceive of the field. To give an example, Klamer and McCloskey
point out that there have been disagreements among economists about
what metaphors should direct their inquiries. Klamer and McCloskey
argue that “accounting” has long served as the “master metaphor” of
economics, but other economists have suggested other metaphorical ways
of framing the discipline. In particular, the accounting metaphor, which
conceptualizes economics in the language of households and businesses,
34 M. P. MARKS
has contended with a metaphor (which Klamer and McCloskey argue was
advanced by the economist Paul Samuelson) that “persuaded economists
to think about economic processes as the outcome of maximization under
constraints. In [Samuelson’s] hands the individuals became abstractions,
imagined as rational calculators” (Klamer and McCloskey 1992, 151).
Despite Samuelson’s move, however, Klamer and McCloskey (152) argue
in favor of the “inescapability of the accounting metaphor,” which is to say
that “questions about the appropriateness of a set of accounts are ques-
tions about our use of language, constrained by the universe sitting out
there, to be sure, but matters of human decisions about human useful-
ness” (ibid., 154). What is clear is the fact that human experience serves as
the basis for the metaphors people use to think abstract concepts. This is
no less true for economics as it is for other academic disciplines.
Also significant, important strides in economic theorizing have had
their origins in metaphorical formulations. McCloskey (1985, 77) cites
the notion of “human capital,” a concept developed at the University of
Chicago by Theodore Schultz: “In the phrase ‘human capital’ the field in
economics treating human skills was at a stroke unified with the field
treating investment in machines. Thought in both fields was improved—
labor economics by recognizing that skills, for all their intangibility, arise
from abstention from consumption; capital theory by recognizing that
skills, for all their lack of capitalization, compete with other investments
for a claim to abstention.” The metaphorical humanizing of capital and
the metaphorical monetizing of labor led to a new set of assumptions
about capital investment and new theoretical propositions about macro-
economic behavior. McCloskey (79) asserts that mathematical theorizing
in economics is also metaphorical, giving as examples “aggregate capital,”
which relies on the metaphor of material addition to make assumptions
about labor, and “production function,” which employs the metaphor of
fabrication to theorize about mathematical multiplication.5 McCloskey
(82) thus cautions that the “metaphors of economics often carry in par-
ticular the authority of Science and often carry, too, its claims of ethical
neutrality” (“Science” capitalized in the original). Hence, McCloskey
(ibid.) stresses the importance of admitting “that metaphors in economics
can contain…a political message,” and therefore the need to examine
their implications.
Metaphors in economics theory range widely across rival schools of
thought. Combined with stories, McCloskey (1995, 216) opines, meta-
phors create allegories which frame the agendas of economic research:
“Marxism combines a metaphor of class struggle with a story of the pro-

letarian journey. Mainstream economics combines a metaphor of free
exchange with a story of the bourgeois journey.” Depending on which
allegory economists subscribe to, their hypotheses about relationships
between capital and labor will reflect their assumptions about which “jour-
ney” dictates the exchange of economic resources.6 Even “basic concepts”
are metaphorical in economic thought: “The rational-choice model is the
master metaphor of mainstream economics, enticing one to think ‘as if’
people really made decisions in this way” (ibid., 224). The economic con-
cept of a “market,” too, is metaphorical when used to describe the eco-
nomic activity that takes place in delineated or metaphorically “contained”
spaces (Eubanks 2000, 54).
In short, metaphors are integral not only to economic models but also
to the formulation of core economic concepts. Economics, preoccupied as
it is not only with the production and consumption of goods and services
but also with the nature of wealth and commercial exchange, draws on
abstract concepts of the valuation of material relationships among humans.
As such, economists, like all scholars engaged in theorizing about abstrac-
tions, theorize economic behavior with the aid of metaphorical concepts.
While economic models often generate hypotheses and theories in the
same way as models in the physical and natural sciences, just as those sci-
ences make use of metaphors, so too economic models have metaphorical
bases. Although IPE as an area of inquiry tends to involve less formal
modeling than economic theory, economic metaphors inform the scope of
inquiry that frames IPE.
Metaphors in the Study of Relations

Among International Actors of Unequal Wealth
Of all the areas of IPE that rely on metaphors to convey abstract ideas,
perhaps the most interesting is the study of relations among actors of
unequal wealth. As is always the case in any area of IR theory (or any field
of abstract study), one could approach inquiry in this area using as literal,
precise, and unadorned language as possible, keeping in mind that no
form of human communication is completely free from metaphors. Thus,
one could study matters in this realm using precisely the explicit term with
which this section is headed, namely, “relations among international actors
of unequal wealth.” Of course, at the very least this term is not devoid of
36 M. P. MARKS
linguistic metaphors by any means—“among” employs a spatial metaphor,

“unequal” uses a metaphor of measure, “actors” treats states and other
international entities as individuals—but it tries to spell out an empirical
subject matter without making reference to conceptual metaphors that
imply more judgments about the factual data in question than the rela-
tively straightforward linguistic metaphors that “among,” “unequal,” and
“actors” do.
Rather, as this section will suggest, the competing metaphors that are
involved in the definition of the empirical concepts at play involve a range
of metaphorical concepts, the meanings of which impart distinct judg-
ments about the nature of relations among international actors of unequal
wealth. Scholars face a number of choices when they theorize about any
abstract concept. The difference between this area and other areas of IR
theory is that scholars seem to have been unusually conscious about the
implications of whatever metaphor they choose to conceptualize the
relations at hand, and that consciousness may be driven by a desire not to
portray impoverished international actors in a negative light. As we shall
see, none of the choices that have been made about describing and explain-
ing relations among international actors of unequal wealth have been
entirely acceptable because of their potential to offer a negative picture of
those of lesser wealth.
Ordinal Worlds Metaphor

By the ordinal worlds metaphor I mean the terms “First World” and
“Third World” (and, to a much lesser extent, “Second World”) that are
used to refer to wealthy and less wealthy parts of the world. Numerical
metaphors (including ordinal metaphors) are not found widely in IR the-
ory, although they are used in other areas of theory and practice such as
physics and the law.7 The term “Third World” was coined in 1952 in an
article in L’Observateur by Alfred Sauvy. Sauvy based this term on the
French concept of the “Third Estate,” that is, the economic class compris-
ing the “commoners.” Having classified less economically advanced coun-
tries as “third” in rank, it was only natural that a “first” and “second” had
to be defined. The “First World” came to describe countries of advanced
economic development, while the “Second World” took on a somewhat
different meaning applied to the Soviet-dominated communist countries.
In this sense, the term implies both political difference and economic
characteristics.
The reason “First World” and “Third World” qualify as metaphors and
not literal expressions of how wealth and economic activity are distributed
throughout the world is that there is no way to “count” which parts of the
world come “first,” “second,” “third,” or anywhere else in a ranking of
where wealth and economic activity are concentrated. These are merely
convenient expressions meant to capture the way that, on a scale of eco-
nomic development, certain areas are more advanced than others (although
it should be noted that the concept of economic “development” itself is
fraught with its own problems, as will be explained). Obviously wealth is
unevenly distributed throughout the world, and economic activity takes
place to various degrees and in varying types of economic pursuits (e.g.,
agricultural production, industrial manufacturing, the provision of ser-
vices, and financial transactions); thus, it is convenient to come up with
some way of providing a scale that gauges these varying levels of wealth
and economic activity. As simplifying terms go, “First World” and “Third
World” appeal to people’s ability to think in terms of ordinal rankings.
However, it should not be surprising that such starkly oversimplified
terms such as “First World” and “Third World” can obscure and mask the
wide range and type of economic activity that results in unequal monetary
distributions. As with the other metaphors that will be dealt with in this
discussion (e.g., the “core” and “periphery” metaphors, “North–South”
relations), “First World” and “Third World” provide spatial imagery that
is at odds with the actual global distribution of wealth and economic activ-
ity. While the “First” and “Third” parts of the metaphor are ordinal in
nature, the “World” terminology evokes a geographic place, that is, a self-
contained universe or “world.” Yet, while wealth and economic activity
can take physical forms, they are also abstractions that defy geographic
boundaries. Money itself is simply an accounting principle—a store of
wealth—and banking and financial transactions, increasingly electronic in
nature as they are, are not constrained by physical borders. To speak of
distinct geographic “worlds” that are set off from each other on the basis
of the distribution of economic transactions is a gross oversimplification.
Additionally, like the “core” and “periphery” metaphors and the meta-
phorical images of “North” and “South” discussed further in the chapter,
“First World” and “Third World” also imagine as homogenized that which
actually is economically diverse. Within the seemingly coherent “First
World” are communities that are deprived of economic benefits, while in
the seemingly uniformly impoverished “Third World” there are areas of
quite appreciable wealth. We can acknowledge, as is true for “core” and
38 M. P. MARKS
“periphery” and “North–South” relations, that “First World” and “Third

World” are ideational conceptions of concentrations of economic activity,
but as metaphorical images they cannot help but lead scholars to focus
their analytical and research energies on literal parts of the world that are
meant to embody “First” and “Third” world characteristics. Thus, the
“First World” is commonly associated with places such as Europe and
North America, while the “Third World” is seen as large portions of the
rest of the world. A scholar who applied for research grants to study the
“Third World” by examining the economic life of impoverished immi-
grant communities in, say, Sweden, would likely have to offer a more con-
vincing justification for such a grant proposal than someone studying
similar “Third World” economic phenomena in Mozambique. Such is the
simplifying set of expectations that the “First World” and “Third World”
metaphors create.
Ordinal rankings also can have the effect of suggesting quality in addi-
tion to mere numerical classifications. Someone who comes in “first place”
in a contest obviously has done better than someone who has come in
third. This is not necessarily the connotation Alfred Sauvy had when he
coined the term “Third World” after the fashion of the French “Third
Estate.” Sauvy’s intention was to make an analogy between the economic
condition of certain countries relative to the wealthier and more industri-
alized countries to which they were compared. Nonetheless, proponents
of economic development in the “Third World” have objected that the
“Third World” label stigmatizes the regions and countries in question and
assigns to them a status of inferiority, or, at the very least, lagging to one
extent or another “behind” other places. As Mark Berger and Heloise
Weber (2014, 9) point out: “The association of development with the
third world was from the start conceived through the categorization of
individual nation-states (primarily post-colonial nation-states), based on
how they measured up in relation to the main (often economic) indicators
of development.” Berger and Weber (ibid.) continue, saying that “the
question of development, therefore, was in the past, and still is, firmly
grounded in relation to the idea of a Third World in perpetual need of
catching up to the developed world.” This is the nature of metaphors;
they bring meaning to a situation, but they can also problematize an issue
or frame a concept in such a way that it is in need of a solution. It is for
this reason that the “Third World” metaphor has been challenged in
recent years in favor of ostensibly less pejorative linguistic constructions
such as those focusing on “development.”
Concerns about the connotations (both overt and subtle) of the ordinal
world’s metaphor have been raised by scholars who specialize in this area.
In the inaugural issue of the journal Third World Quarterly, which debuted
in 1979, questions were raised in a forum about why the term “Third
World” was chosen for the journal’s name over other possible monikers.
As Leslie Wolf-Phillips (1979, 105) points out in that forum, when Sauvy
coined the term “Third World” in 1952, he did so in a Cold War context: “It
may be that in the 1950s the phrase tiers monde was used more in the sense
of ‘Third Force’ rather than ‘Third World,’ indicating ‘non-alignment’
rather than ‘underdevelopment.’”8 Wolf-Phillips continues that this sense
of the term has been verified by William Safire in his The New Language of
Politics (1972) in which Safire supplements the “force” metaphor in “third
force” with additional metaphorical imagery, implying a meaning of politi-
cal alignment rather than economic development. Safire defines tiers
monde as: “Third Force:…a weight added at the fulcrum of the balance of
power; a group of nations, or an ideology, between the communist and
the western camps” (Safire 1972, 67 quoted in Wolf-Phillips 1979, 106).9
Wolf-Phillips (106) observes that with the easing of some Cold War ten-
sions in the 1960s and the emergence of newly independent countries as a
result of European decolonization, tiers monde took on the new meaning
of poorer countries relative to the industrialized world. It is interesting to
note that as the shift took place from political alignment to economic sta-
tus, the metaphorical imagery associated with ordinal rankings also shifted
from that of “force” to that of “world,” perhaps conveying that people
associate politics with notions of physical capabilities as captured in the
word “force,” while the term “world” is associated more with notions that
economic activity is physically contained within metaphorically conceived
of spaces. Wolf-Phillips goes on to observe that as political alignment as
expressed in the phrase “third force” was replaced by economic conditions
as expressed in the phrase “Third World,” this led scholars and practitio-
ners to experiment with alternate language such as that involving the con-
cept of “development.”
Metaphors of “Development”
Metaphors in the study of relations among international actors of unequal
wealth include the metaphorical concept of “development” captured lin-
guistically with a variety of terms including “developed,” “less developed,”
“developing,” and “least developed” regions of the world, as well as the
40 M. P. MARKS
associated concept of “underdevelopment” associated with the theory of

the same name. In her historical review of terms referring to the “Third
World,” Leslie Wolf-Phillips (1979, 106) avers that the “phrase
‘under-developed’ was probably first coined ‘officially’ in the 1951 UN
document Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed
Countries”; however, the Oxford English Dictionary finds a reference in a
January 1949 speech by US President Harry S. Truman in which he pro-
claimed, “we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits
of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improve-
ment and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Oxford English Dictionary).
As a literal expression, and in its simplest sense, the verb “develop”
means “to bring from latency to or toward fulfillment” (American
Heritage Dictionary, 511). The term can be applied to any number of
processes, for example, it can refer to sexual maturity. In this sense, the
term connotes a process of completion, and thus the same American
Heritage Dictionary (ibid.) defines the adjective “developed” as “advanced
in industrial capability, technological sophistication, and economic pro-
ductivity.” Linguistically, then, the transition from the verb “develop” to
the adjective “developed” represents a metaphorical application of a
generic process to a specific quality associated with a discernible empirical
realm.10 The qualities of “fulfillment” associated with the verb “develop”
are metaphorically applied to the realm of industrial production where
they take on the new quality of “technological sophistication and eco-
nomic productivity” (ibid.).
The metaphorical translation of qualities from the realm of processes to
descriptors occurs with other definitions of “developed” as well. Secondary
and tertiary definitions of the verb “develop” include “to expand or
enlarge;” “to aid in the growth of; strengthen;” “to improve the quality
of; refine;” “to cause to become more complex or intricate; add detail and
fullness; to elaborate” (American Heritage Dictionary, 511). As with the
primary definition, these are largely generic processes. Yet when they are
translated as an adjective in the term “developed” (“advanced in industrial
capability, technological sophistication, and economic productivity”), a
metaphorical process has taken place such that the qualities of one realm
(processes of growing or coming to completion) are applied to a separate
realm of industrial production, and new meanings (“technological sophis-
tication and economic productivity”) are the result.
When it comes to researching the relationship between “developed”
and “less,” “under,” and “least” developed regions, the implications of
the metaphorical complications that arise when moving from verb to

adjective become apparent. Whereas fulfillment or completion as processes
can be value-neutral (the development from larvae to pupae in insects, for
example, represents little more than an organic transition), developing
“industrial capability, technological sophistication, and economic produc-
tivity” can be seen either as desirable or less desirable qualities. The
American Heritage Dictionary (511) defines “developing” as “having a
relatively low level of industrial capability, technological sophistication,
and economic productivity.” So, as an analytical concept, the metaphor of
a unit being “developed” or in the condition of “underdevelopment”
implies something about the desirability of certain qualities that the literal
processes of the verb “develop” largely leave out.
Because the metaphor of “development” brings to mind improve-
ments over some underdeveloped state of being, theories of development
and underdevelopment typically proceed on the assumption that develop-
ment is a more desirable state than underdevelopment. As has been dis-
cussed elsewhere in this book, metaphors in human language frequently
have the unintended effect of creating problems that must be solved.
With regards to the metaphors of “development,” clearly a state of devel-
opment is seen as preferable to what is deemed metaphorically as “under-
development.” Indeed, some scholars and practitioners have come to see
the metaphor of “under-development” as a pejorative, preferring instead
“developing” or “less-developed,” which implies the possibility of room
for improvement.11
Using more literal language (or as literal as is permitted given the ubiq-
uity of metaphors in human communication), one could describe the eco-
nomic conditions of areas of the world with lesser amounts of economic
activity and commodified wealth using any number of descriptive terms.
One could say, for example, that they are based on sustainable agricultural
production in which a variety of crops are grown and stored to maintain
the lifestyle and culture of self-supporting groups. Obviously this sounds
less like a problem for both practitioners and theoreticians alike than if the
situation is described metaphorically as “underdeveloped.” Likewise,
scholars and government officials probably would be far more alarmed
about communities whose economic structure is based on (using literal
description) unsustainable commodified manufacturing in which wealth is
expressed in terms of monetary instruments that are unequally distributed
throughout society than by a metaphorical description of a “developed”
42 M. P. MARKS
economy. As obvious as this observation sounds, it is worth reminding

oneself regularly that theories such as those that apply to “development”
can support only those hypotheses and predictions which can be imagined
by the metaphorical concepts that inform their very assumptions. This is
no less true for theories of “development” than any other area of study in
IR theory.
The implication that “development” follows a linear trajectory is per-
haps an inevitable result of what Patrick Breslin (2004, 2) identifies as the
mechanistic Newtonian metaphors that frame much of the theorizing
about economic development, particularly in areas of the world where eco-
nomic activity has not produced comparable forms of wealth as “more
developed” parts of the world: “Given the pervasive influence of Newton’s
paradigm, it was only natural that when attention turned, for a variety of
reasons in the 1950s, to the problems of poverty in the poor countries,
those problems, and assumptions about how to solve them, were under-
stood within a linear framework. This way of thinking was reinforced by
the success of the Marshall Plan—the first great experiment in fostering
economic development.” For Breslin, the problem is obvious: Economic
activity does not follow a linear logic of “development” which takes regions
in poverty and inexorably transforms them into regions of wealth by way
of a mechanical process of inputs and outputs, as would be suggested
through Newtonian metaphors of physics. Rather, what is more useful for
Breslin (4–5) are metaphors of “chaos” and “complexity,” which, while no
less grounded in theories of physics, reflect the multitude of variables that
can have an impact on outcomes. Breslin (6–7) writes: “To use the lan-
guage of the new sciences, a development project is an intervention in
nonlinear and complex adaptive systems. When it has been planned with
linear methods and expectations, chaos theory suggests what can happen…
What would a nonlinear development model look like? Metaphors from
chaos and complexity studies suggest that it would look very much like
what we call grassroots, participatory, bottom-up development.” Thus,
changing the language of development from metaphors of mechanical lin-
ear progression to chaos and complexity fundamentally alters scholars’
understanding of economic activity and the policies that bring it about.
A variation on the “development” metaphor is the metaphor of coun-
tries that possess high degrees of technological achievement or economic
activity as “advanced” industrial societies. “Advanced” in this context is
both a spatial and a temporal metaphor. As a spatial metaphor, “advanced”
implies something located further along a linear path (e.g., one can
“advance” a game piece in a board game with a beginning and an end;
pieces that are more “advanced” than others are closer to the end of the
game). As a temporal metaphor, “advanced” suggests a state of being that
has been around long enough to acquire qualities not possessed by actors
or processes that have not achieved the same state (e.g., one can speak of
“advances” in understanding about scientific principles; these advances
come with time since a new discovery advances a theory compared to what
the theory was able to say given a limited knowledge base in the past).
As with the metaphors of “development” and its variants, the metaphor
of “advanced” can lead scholars unwittingly to equate economic “advance-
ments” with some sort of improvement. Consequently, use of the term
“advanced industrial societies” can create the same sort of theoretical
propositions as theories that are based on the assumptions of desirability
of economic “development.” “Advancement” as a metaphor glosses over
the details of economic activity that characterize metaphorical “advanced”
industrial societies. Rather than being seen as spatially and temporally fur-
ther along, literal descriptions of these societies would demonstrate that
they simply have different characteristics than societies based on other
forms of economic activity. Comparing different types of economic sys-
tems rather than communities that are more or less “advanced” is a quali-
tatively different theoretical endeavor than one that relies on metaphorical
constructions for its starting point.
Lost in the “scaling” (“least” developed, “less” developed, “develop-
ing”) and directional (“advanced”) metaphorical conceptions of develop-
ment is the content of development which can become obscured by efforts
to think of development in metaphorical terms. As Ha-Joon Chang points
out, the policy and scholarly discourse has followed two distinct strands
that conceptualize development in starkly different terms. On the one
hand, Chang (2013, 129) identifies the “humanistic” dimension of devel-
opment that relies on measures “which try to incorporate non-income
dimensions of human welfare, such as education, health and gender equal-
ity.” On the other hand, there is the “productionist” view of development,
a perspective held by a wide range of scholars along the political spectrum
who at one time “shared the view that development is something centred
[sic] around a process of transformation in the productive sphere” (ibid.,
130). For Chang acknowledging these distinctions is important because
they help classify countries in terms of their relative development. Thus,
for example, one could speak of Germany after World War II as lying
within the developed world, because it had the ability to re-build its pro-
ductive capacity despite a precipitous drop in incomes. By contrast, the
44 M. P. MARKS
increase in income levels in today’s oil-rich states does not necessarily

translate into development when conceived of in terms of productive
capabilities (ibid.). Moreover, this is not a purely academic debate inas-
much as policy options directed toward bringing about development
depend in part on how the concept is conceived. Chang (131) argues that
discourses which “have a view of ‘development’ that lacks a vision of trans-
formation in productive structure…are, consequently, unable to promote
development” because they rely “upon uncoordinated individual initia-
tives.” Chang’s cautionary note about classifying countries such as post-
war Germany and contemporary petroleum-exporting states applies also
to additional metaphors which bring about systems of classification such as
the “core,” “center,” and “(semi)periphery.”
The Metaphors of “Core,” “Center,” and “(Semi)Periphery”

The metaphors of “core,” “center,” and “(semi)periphery” apply com-
mon spatial imagery to the study of relations among international actors
of unequal wealth.12 Literally, of course, countries and regions that repre-
sent the “core” or “center” of international economic interactions are not
located at some definable site that can be located geographically at a polar
point surrounded by a tangible “periphery.” Rather, what is meant by
these terms is that economic activity and wealth are concentrated within
certain communities that exert economic and political control over global
economic interactions.
The Oxford English Dictionary cites the first use of the term “periph-
ery,” meaning “the outlying areas of a region, most distant from or least
influenced by some political, cultural, or economic centre,” in Andre
Gunder Frank’s Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (1969,
227) in which Frank contrasts the “periphery” to the “metropolis,” which
“sucks capital out of the periphery and uses its power to maintain the eco-
nomic, political, social, and cultural structure of the periphery.” Frank’s
“metropolis,” a term invoking urban locations, was replaced by Immanuel
Wallerstein with “core,” for example, in Part I of Wallerstein’s The
Capitalist World Economy (1979), which focuses on “the inequalities of
core and periphery,” while other authors substitute “center” for “core”
(e.g., Cardoso and Faletto 1979).
The obvious problem of the “core” and “periphery” metaphors (and
their variations) is that clearly the world’s geography does not indicate
that there is any definable “center” of the world (leaving aside, of course,
the earth’s geological center within the planet’s core). Land, sea, and the
distribution of human populations simply do not form in such a way that
economic and political communities form in concentric circles. Another
issue involved with the imagery of these spatial concepts is the fact that
those individuals who possess concentrations of wealth typically associ-
ated with the “core” or the “center” are in fact spread out widely
throughout the world. Major urban areas associated with high levels of
economic activity and wealth accumulation, for example, also typically
harbor pockets of economic need. Likewise, countries that commonly are
associated with the “periphery” can be home to economic sectors that
are highly lucrative to those engaged in them. The so-called semiperiph-
ery presents the same problems of spatialization, as it is difficult to locate
portions of the world that are part- or half-way between the center and
the periphery.13
Obviously scholars who speak of “core,” “periphery,” and their varia-
tions are not so naive as to think that these terms refer to geographic loca-
tions. These are clearly metaphorical images meant to connote
concentrations of wealth, not clearly identifiable physical locations. These
scholars would be the first to point out, for instance, that poor people in
the richest and poorest countries of the world represent the global “periph-
ery” despite being scattered throughout the world (just as “core” eco-
nomic activity takes place in Paris and Dakar alike). So the purpose of this
discussion is not to “disprove” the core–periphery thesis. Rather, the point
is to recall that, like all metaphors, the metaphors of “core,” “periphery,”
and their variations bring to mind images that can invite misleading
conclusions. Despite the fact that world systems theorists are the first to
point out that “core” and “periphery” refer to instances of economic activ-
ity, the shorthand of the spatial images suggests avenues for research,
which involve empirical evidence of a geographically divided economic and
political universe. Thus, it is not surprising that when researchers set out to
study the “core” they focus on entire parts of the world (e.g., Europe,
North America, Japan) that certainly do contain high concentrations of
wealth but also pockets of poverty. Likewise, when scholars research the
“periphery” they tend to focus on parts of the world (e.g., Africa, Latin
America, large portions of Asia) that contain communities of little wealth
but also centers of intense economic activity. Thus, “core” and “periph-
ery” do tend to be associated with distinct geographic regions despite the
fact that they are meant only to refer to institutions and people involved in
economic activity and the concentration of wealth. In a world in which
46 M. P. MARKS
increasing number of economic transactions are conducted electronically,

the geographic implications of the “core” and “periphery” metaphors are
of decreasing relevance.
Additionally, as Paul Chilton (1996, 62) observes, the “core” or “cen-
ter” and “periphery” metaphors and their variations share some common
traits with the “container” metaphor and its variants that are typically asso-
ciated with states. The “container” metaphor envisions states as hard-
shelled entities that are set off from one another. If there are any interactions
among container-like states, they must take place across definable bound-
aries. “Core” and “periphery” also bring to mind the strict spatial imagery
associated with the “container” metaphor. The “core” or “center” is what
is on the inside of the global distribution of wealth while the “periphery”
lies at the outer reaches. There is a distinct sense of division between the
two. As is true for all metaphors, however, there can be multiple interpre-
tations. Thus, while Chilton sees synergies between the “core,” “periph-
ery,” and “container” metaphors that reinforce the fiction of state
sovereignty, Ian Clark (1989, 44) argues that, in conceptualizations of
hierarchy in IR, “outside a statist perspective, [hierarchy] may be analysed
in terms of centres or cores, semi-peripheries, and peripheries.” Thus, for
Chilton the core–periphery metaphor is evidence of statist thinking, while
for Clark this metaphor is an alternative to the statist point of view. These
different types of analytical conclusions highlight the imprecision of meta-
phors in the development of useful theories.
Metaphors of “North” and “South”

Interactions among international actors of unequal wealth also have been
deemed metaphorically as “North–South” relations. This term is meant to
refer to the fact that the majority of economic activity and wealth is located
above the equator, while lesser amounts of economic resources are allo-
cated to regions further south.14 In addition, the rhetorical division of the
world into one of a “North–South” divide was in some respects a purpose-
ful endeavor by leaders in the “South” to reorient the “East–West” con-
flict of the Cold War in order to rectify the economic exploitation and
political marginalization of former European colonial states (see Berger
2004). However, the expression also carries a metaphorical connotation
since scholars who use this term explicitly assert that they mean to convey
more than a literal geographic division of economic activity. Through this
metaphor, disparities in the global distribution of wealth are reduced to
and imagined as a binary opposition between two distinct geographic

poles.
As with the “core” and “periphery” metaphors and their variations, the
“North–South” metaphorical imagery oversimplifies the complexity of the
global distribution of wealth. Obviously, economic activity is unevenly
located around the world, and even within regions of relative economic
wealth or poverty there are great variations within close proximity to each
other. The terms “North” and “South” (curiously capitalized inasmuch as
map directions typically are denoted in lowercase letters) suggest the same
sort of compartmentalized images that the “core” and “periphery” meta-
phors imply in which there is little fluidity between two spatially separated
realms. Just as north and south are fixed directions on a map, the meta-
phors of “North” and “South” in IR theory suggest a permanent state of
economic affairs. Furthermore, as polar directions, “North” and “South”
imply a dyadic relationship quite possibly involving an oppositional com-
ponent. The imagery also suggests a one-dimensional dynamic in that the
relationship between “North” and “South” is defined on a linear axis.
Metaphor of “Dependency”
The American Heritage Dictionary (501) defines “dependent” as “contin-
gent on another; subordinate; relying on or requiring the aid of another for
support: dependent children.” The same dictionary (ibid.) defines “depen-
dence” as “the state of being dependent, as for support; subordination to
someone or something needed or greatly desired; trust; reliance,” and
“dependency” as “dependence; something dependent or subordinate.” Like
all metaphors, the metaphor of dependency (as found most prominently in
the theory of the same name) provides images with which to imagine a par-
ticular aspect of IPE. Generally speaking, and especially as depicted by
Dependency Theory, the condition of dependency in international politics
and economics is thought of as an exploitative relationship between interna-
tional actors of unequal wealth.15 If the terms “dependent,” “dependence,”
and “dependency” were used in their literal sense alongside additional
descriptive terminology, the connotation of exploitation would not necessar-
ily be implied. As these definitions indicate, conditions of dependence can be
desirable because of the supportive qualities they offer. A dependent child,
for example, is supported and sustained financially by his or her parents or
guardians in what many, if not most, people would describe as a relationship
of nurturing and care. In its most basic sense, something that is dependent
48 M. P. MARKS
on another is merely contingent on a certain set of circumstances. Therefore,

in the generic sense, to be dependent is simply to occupy a position along a
chain of cause and effect, as in a “dependent variable.” A “dependent vari-
able” in a causal chain of events is not being “exploited” by the independent
or intervening variables that precede it.
The negative connotations associated with dependency in the study of
IPE demonstrate, in part, one of the perils of metaphors in IR theory,
namely, metaphors that are broad and with the potential for suggesting
multiple meanings can be interpreted in any number of ways, some of
which reflect the personal perceptions of scholars themselves. Many of the
broadest metaphors in IR indicate this phenomenon. For example, the
metaphor of “system” is used throughout IR theory and differs in mean-
ing from paradigm to paradigm. Because a “system” can mean many
things, its suggestiveness as a metaphor is subject to multiple interpretations.
The same is true with the metaphor of “dependence,” the literal meaning
of which has a variety of definitions. Since the term can mean a range of
things literally, it is not surprising that its meaning as a metaphor is multi-
form. Obviously not all scholars are predisposed to see the relationship
between an international actor of limited wealth and an actor of greater
wealth as exploitative in nature, but since many do, the “dependence”
metaphor gives them an opportunity to theorize this exploitation in a sys-
tematic fashion.
As typically constructed, the dependency metaphor depicts a situation
in which international actors of lesser wealth are trapped in a permanently
subordinate position because their choices are contingent on the eco-
nomic advantages that international actors of greater wealth have over
them. Cardoso and Faletto (1979, 22), for example, depict dependence,
in part, as a situation in which local classes or groups in Latin America are
involved in “enforcing foreign economic and political interests.” In this
view, scholars are encouraged to quantify the extent of those economic
advantages as opposed to other ways of measuring the relationship between
the two sets of actors involved. For example, if a metaphorical picture of
dependence emerged that highlighted the trust or reliance elements of
dependence contained in the dictionary definition of this term, scholars
might put more effort into measuring confidence-building institutions
that make economic growth contingent on growing prosperity in both
sets of partners. This is not necessarily to say that the predictions of
Dependency Theory are wrong, but rather that with different metaphori-
cal sense attached to them, they would be based on analysis that triangulates
a range of ways in which relations between international actors of unequal

wealth are constituted and constructed. This requires examining the mul-
tiple ways that a broad metaphor such as dependence can be interpreted.
“Global Inequality”
Finally, we come to the concept of “global inequality,” which, when com-
pared to other frames discussed earlier, sounds less like a metaphor and
more like a literal expression to describe what scholars envision when they
use those terms. Etymologically speaking, however, even the literal-
sounding “global inequality” is a figurative expression in terms of what it
imagines. In particular, the term “inequality” is a metaphorical way of
expressing measurement for something that is hard to measure. As
counterintuitive as it may seem, equality (or inequality) of wealth is sub-
jective.16 Obviously, we can discern some absolute measures of wealth such
as the gross economic output of a country, per capita income, and distri-
bution of wealth throughout society. But beyond that, how people mea-
sure their economic well-being, and how they judge whether or not they
have achieved a certain standard of living, depends on custom, culture,
convention, and personal taste.17
Studies of global inequality often are built on the same assumption that
metaphorically frames investigations into “North–South,” “core–periph-
ery,” and “First World–Third World” relations, namely, the image of
undifferentiated regions possessing wealth that can be measured in an
absolute sense, irrespective of how that wealth is defined or locally distrib-
uted. The metaphor of “inequality” presumes an ability to quantify
amounts in ways that do not differentiate among different ways of measur-
ing prosperity. A wealthy person in the year 1000 would be considered by
the standards of the year 2000 to suffer a meager existence, such an exis-
tence lacking as it does the modern “luxuries” of electricity, indoor plumb-
ing, and mechanized transportation, not to mention modern medicine
and means for creating a reliably plentiful food supply. By the same token,
in the contemporary world, conceptions of global “inequality” make little
accommodation for differing standards of living that depend on custom,
culture, and choice, not to mention those imposed by a lack of options in
the international economy. As Berger and Weber (2014, 11) observe, “the
Third World and its ascribed condition, ‘underdevelopment,’ is separated
out from any account of the wider (global) power relations (of the colonial
and Cold War era) from which it originated.”
50 M. P. MARKS
Furthermore, there is a cognitive bias built into notions of equality as

applied to the social world. According to the Oxford English Dictionary,
the meaning of the word “equal,” as borrowed into English from the
Latin root æquā-lis, connotes magnitudes and numbers that are “identical
in amount; neither less nor greater than the object of comparison” and
things that have “the same measure; identical in magnitude, number,
value, intensity, etc.” The OED goes on to explain that in this sense, the
term “equal” often is expressed “with latent notion of ‘at least equal’;
hence not equal to means usually ‘less than’, ‘inferior to’.” Herein lies the
metaphorical notion of measure that frames the study of global “inequal-
ity.” In matters of the distribution of wealth among all individual and
corporate actors on Earth (including states, other political divisions, and
private organizations), equality is an impossibility and thus what frames
the issue for scholars is a focus on the metaphorically imagined condition
of those who have “less.”
After all, in mathematics, in the expression 2 + 2 = 4, what is on each
side of the equals sign may represent an equal amount, but it is not the
same. Two plus two may equal four, but two plus two is not the same as
four. Two plus two on the one hand and four on the other are separate and
distinct numerical quantities. On one side are two sets of two; on the
other is a single set of four. Cumulatively four equals the sum of two and
two, but one set of four is not the same collection of items as two sets of
two. For mathematicians this is not a “problem” as much as it is simply the
solution to an arithmetic question. There is no expectation that what is
equal is necessarily the same, let alone there be anything problematic
about two quantities that are unequal in their amount.
For scholars of global “inequality,” however, the impossibility of dis-
tributing wealth “equally” around the world is complicated by the “prob-
lem” that results from imagining that there can be equality, and the reality
that even if such equality could be achieved it would still appear “unequal”
since it is unrealistic to expect that equality of wealth would be experi-
enced the same on a global scale. “Inequality” thus becomes less a literal
substitute for metaphors such as “North” and “South” and more a meta-
phor itself for the lack of sameness in how individuals experience wealth.
However, as the math analogy earlier demonstrates, one does not neces-
sarily expect a sameness where there is equality. For example, at one time,
the United States and the European Union represented roughly equal
amounts of wealth. However, how that translated into economic opportu-
nity was not the same. The United States, comprised as it is of a single
economy, provides greater opportunity for the free movement of eco-

nomic assets, including human labor. Although the European Union
(EU) has made strides toward complete economic and monetary union, it
still comprises separate economies that complicate the free movement of
capital and labor. Thus, equality of wealth between the United States and
the EU does not necessarily mean that economic circumstances are the
same. “Inequality” is an invented “problem” just as “equality” does not
necessarily provide a “solution.”
To this, scholars of IR would ask, of course, what is the purpose of
studying something unless it is a “problem?” This is precisely the point.
Academics who study metaphors have long noted that one of the func-
tions of metaphors is to create in the minds of people “problems” that
need to be “solved.”18 It is therefore not surprising that in many introduc-
tory IR textbooks, the topic under discussion here is presented as the
“problem of global inequality.”19 As the etymology of the word “equal”
suggests, “inequality” is more than merely a numerical situation of two or
more sums not of the same value, but a condition in which one thing is less
than another.
However, the “problem” for most scholars of IR actually is not
“inequality” but economic deprivation, or better yet, poverty, and, as Paul
D’Anieri (2011, 305) points out, “poverty” and “inequality” are not the
same thing: “In contrast to ‘poverty,’ ‘inequality’ is inherently compara-
tive; in measuring inequality, the question becomes, ‘How much wealth or
income does one person have compared to someone else?’ It is very possible
that a person’s income is growing, but more slowly than that of others. As
a result, income is increasing but so is inequality. Does this mean poverty
is increasing or decreasing?” (emphasis added). D’Anieri’s observations
and rhetorical question are useful because they highlight the fact that
while poverty may be measured in an absolute sense, inequality is inher-
ently relative. Whether or not poverty or inequality is a “problem” depends
not only on one’s perspective relative to one’s own situation over time and
to other individuals’ condition at present but also on the perspective of
observers who make their own determinations about what is a “problem.”
The “problem” of poverty can be solved by providing individuals who lack
resources with additional resources that bring them out of poverty, while
the “problem” of inequality can only be solved not only by eliminating
poverty but also by providing individuals with the same amount of
resources, providing they value them in the same way.
52 M. P. MARKS
Used as a metaphor for conceptualizing any number of qualities of the

human condition, “inequality” implies an undesirable situation that
requires a solution which is unique from a separate undesirable situation—
“poverty”—which can be solved in distinct ways. There are no intrinsically
better ways for solving inequality versus poverty since they represent ana-
lytically distinct empirical questions. However, the metaphor of “inequal-
ity” privileges one way of thinking about a problem and thereby a set of
solutions that emanate from it. The metaphor of “inequality” presumes
what is missing from global economic interactions is an outcome of same-
ness as opposed to an outcome of improved economic conditions over
time for any one individual, which is suggested by the separate concept of
“poverty.” Thus, not even the seemingly literal term “global inequality”
resolves the dilemma of conceptualizing specific aspects of IPE that are
complicated by the other metaphors (e.g., “Third World,” global “south,”
“periphery”), which scholars employ in this area of investigation.
Additional Thoughts About Relations Among International

Actors of Unequal Wealth
In addition to these common metaphors, there have been other meta-
phorical images that have been attached to countries in terms of their
economic conditions relative to wealthier states. Although typically associ-
ated with political neutrality vis-à-vis the Western and Eastern blocs dur-
ing the Cold War, the term “non-aligned” also can refer to countries that
often are included among states possessing lesser amounts of economic
wealth. The term “non-aligned,” of course, is associated with the “non-
aligned movement,” that is, the “international anti-colonialist movement
founded in Belgrade in 1961 to promote the interests of neutral (especially
Third World) countries not aligned with the superpowers of East or West”
(Oxford English Dictionary).20 As is true for many metaphors in IR the-
ory, “alignment” is a spatial metaphor inasmuch as the process of “align-
ing” is to “to range, place, or lay in a line” (Oxford English Dictionary).
Metaphorically, in politics, “alignment” is to “bring into line with a par-
ticular tradition, policy, group, or power” (ibid.). In a metaphorical sense,
“non-aligned” countries occupy a physical space that is not associated with
states which possess economic wealth or power. Non-alignment implies a
sense of being set apart, either by choice or by circumstances, from
countries that, by virtue of wealth and ideology, have gotten into line with
each other or, to use yet another metaphor, have formed a “bloc.”21
Another term that has been advanced to describe countries of lesser

economic resources is “threshold” states or countries. In particular, the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (a United States government corpo-
ration) have instituted the Threshold Program designed to provide eco-
nomic assistance to poorer countries around the world. As the word
implies, “threshold” countries are those that, metaphorically speaking, are
on the verge of making reforms which would create greater levels of eco-
nomic prosperity. Originating in Old English meaning “the sill of a door-
way” (and hence metaphorical in its origins), a threshold in common
parlance is “the beginning of a state or action, outset, opening” (Oxford
English Dictionary). As applied to countries deemed worthy of economic
assistance, the metaphor of “threshold” implies that, with some help and
assistance, threshold countries, which are on the verge of improvement,
could commence on such a path. In light of its association with aid-
granting agencies, the metaphorical connotations of “threshold” coun-
tries seem particularly appropriate. It is somewhat surprising in this context
that this linguistic metaphor has not caught on with scholars as a concep-
tual category inasmuch as referring to countries on the “threshold” implies
the possibility for economic improvement more so than static metaphors
such as “periphery” or “dependent” states.
What the myriad of metaphors, either as theoretical concepts or simply
linguistic expressions referring to policy initiatives, indicates is that there is
no unambiguous way to think about relations among international actors
of unequal wealth. The futility of prevailing metaphors of global inequality
is not lost on journalist Dayo Olopade. Citing Bill and Melinda Gates in
the 2014 annual Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation letter, Olopade refers
to the metaphor of “development” as an example of a concept no longer
useful for describing global economic conditions.22 Olopade (2014b,
SR4) writes about just how misleading metaphorical terms describing
world economics can be:
Only when employing a crude “development” binary could anyone lump

Mozambique and Mexico together. It’s tough to pick a satisfying replace-
ment. Talk of first, second and third worlds is passé, and it’s hard to bear the
Dickensian awkwardness of “industrialized nations.” Forget, too, the more
recent jargon about the “global south” and “global north.” It makes little
sense to counterpose poor countries with “the West” when many of the big-
gest economic success stories in the past few decades have come from the
East. All of these antiquated terms imply that any given country is “develop-
ing” toward something, and that there is only one way to get there.
54 M. P. MARKS
Olopade’s alternative, which she elaborates on in her 2014 book, is to

refer to economies as either “fat” or “lean.” In countries with “fat” econo-
mies, that is, countries with large amounts of accumulated wealth, “plenty
is normal. Abundance is the average…Problem solving is well beyond the
basics of sanitation, vaccination, and electrification” (Olopade 2014a, 12).
Yet “fat” economies are plagued with the problems of being “fat,” such as
an inclination toward financial instability (as illustrated by the financial
collapse of 2008), hyper consumption, and a dependence on imported
sources of energy (ibid.).
By contrast, “lean” economies—those in places such as sub-Saharan
Africa—grapple with problems of disease, unemployment, lack of ade-
quate medical resources, and limited access to reliable sources of energy
(ibid.). Yet, “these difficulties obscure more than a few silver linings.
Individual Africans waste less food, owe less money, and maintain a
regional carbon footprint that is the lowest in the world” (ibid., 13). Thus,
for Olopade, the terms “fat” and “lean” are far more descriptive in high-
lighting the qualitative differences in economic practices and conditions
around the world than previous metaphors that seek to quantify a certain
economic standard to which countries strive. Such a standard fails, Olopade
argues, to acknowledge the different ways in which people live.
In fact, most of the metaphors that have been discussed have a sort of
finality to them that does not capture the processes of change which are
inherent in IPE. One of the natural qualities of metaphors is that they
provide terms of convenience. Yet convenience can have a price, in this
case to fix a meaning in place so that it can be referred to without the
necessity of repetition. Terms such as “Third World,” “periphery,” and
“South” may identify a set of economic conditions at a particular time, but
they are also terms of classification which, like other terms of classifica-
tion—for example, those found in biology to classify the various king-
doms, phyla, genera, and species—group together a class of items, objects,
or individuals, which are then hard to conceive of outside of those group-
ings. This obviously can be problematic in the realm of global economics
in which the economic conditions of regions, countries, and localities are
constantly changing relative to their prior conditions and to the condi-
tions of others. Metaphorical concepts, in their analytical convenience, are
resistant to the changing conditions of that to which they refer.
More to the point, the metaphors of global inequality—and more seri-
ously, debates over the best way to theorize global inequality—obscure the
absence of change that characterizes entrenched poverty in certain and

large parts of the world. Mark Berger and Heloise Weber (2014, 2) per-
haps say it best: “The framing of the problem of development is not
resolved by replacing the term Third World (or the wider imaginary of
Three Worlds distinguished by ‘stages of development’) by the use of
related terms such as ‘less developed countries’ (LDCs), ‘developing
countries,’ or even ‘the Global South’.” Rather, Berger and Weber (ibid.)
contend that what stymies both thinking about economic growth and
strategies for bringing it about is acceptance of “the nation-state as the
primary unit of development.” As long as the conditions of economic
inequality are left unchallenged (both in theory and in practice), changing
what they are called is quibbling around the edges.
On the other hand, Vicky Randall (2004, 43) warns us that “we should
not be too preoccupied with semantics. Obviously the specific phrase
‘Third World’ is largely anachronistic in the wake of the collapse of what,
in the original schema, was held to be the Second World, that is the Soviet
Union and its satellites, although a case could possibly be made for con-
tinuing to distinguish for the moment between the (former) Second and
First Worlds because of the enduring consequences of their very different
histories.”23 On the other hand, these terms persist and, as metaphors,
evoke the same sorts of responses and generate the same sorts of research
agendas when they are anachronistic as when they possessed some geopo-
litical relevance. In fact, as Randall (ibid.) concedes, a “Third World-type
category…draws attention to what continues to be a major axis of eco-
nomic and political inequality” and “Third Worldist ‘discourse’ potentially
provides a powerful rhetoric and rallying-point.”24 So the metaphorical
qualities of terms such as “Third World” continue to provide both analyti-
cal and political functions. Ironically, one of the terms to describe chang-
ing economic conditions around the world in recent years is also one of
the more literally descriptive, namely, the concept of “Newly Industrialized
Countries.” This term both describes the economic condition of the
countries in question in a fairly straightforward fashion and serves the
purpose of a metaphor in its abbreviated state—NICs—by providing a
succinct reference point that economizes on language by substituting lit-
eral language with an evocative term. To a certain extent, then, debates
over the metaphors of the international distribution of economic resources
and political influence can be circumvented with more literal terminology
designed to be analytically useful in the study of “global inequality.”
56 M. P. MARKS
Foreign “Aid”
At first glance, foreign aid is a seemingly straightforward concept. The
Oxford English Dictionary defines “aid” in the relevant context as “mate-
rial help given to a country or region by another country or an interna-
tional agency; esp. economic assistance to a poor or underdeveloped
country, or supplies of food and medicine given to alleviate the effects of
a natural disaster, war, etc.” This would appear to be a literal definition of
aid, one which describes an objective set of self-evident facts. However, as
with many conceptual metaphors, understanding of an issue reflects trans-
ferred meaning from a related realm. In this instance, the etymology of the
term “aid” reveals its metaphorical underpinnings. Specifically, “aid” has
its origins in the Latin adiuvāre, meaning “to help” or “assist.” Drawing
on the human experience of providing help or assistance, the concept of
aid in political relationships conveys the intent of providing succor and
relief.
As it shapes foreign policy in practice, this conceptualization of aid both
guides and constrains the policies that governments, international organi-
zations and agencies, and non-governmental organizations conceive of
when they contemplate means for bringing about productive economic
activity and increasing levels of prosperity in “aid”-receiving regions of the
world. The historical origins of the contemporary concept of foreign aid
are worth considering. The OED records the first English use of the term
“aid” in the aforementioned meaning of “material help given to a country
or region” in a 1940 article in The Economist in the context of United
States economic assistance to Great Britain. In the circumstances involving
the transfer of economic assets from the United States to Great Britain
during World War II, “aid” is meant precisely as it would seem, that is,
temporary help to assist a government in need.
Once framed as help, foreign aid has been institutionalized as a wide-
ranging set of policies aimed at less economically developed parts of the
world. Drawing on the World War II examples of US economic transfers
to Great Britain, policymakers and scholars alike had the expectation that
aid more broadly provided to poor regions of the world in the post-war
period would yield similar beneficial effects. Yet often policymakers and
scholars wonder why foreign aid so often does not work in the ways it is
imagined. There are any number of theories as to what why foreign aid
does not bring about the desired outcomes. Among the factors complicat-
ing foreign aid that have been hypothesized are government corruption,
inefficiency in aid provision, economic and political conditions attached to

aid, endemic poverty, globalization, structural inequalities in global capi-
talism, and the lending practices of international organizations.25 Yet,
regardless of competing theories for why foreign aid often does not cur-
rently work as intended, what remains largely unexamined is the notion of
“aid” itself.
That is to say, despite debates over the ultimate causes of economic
deprivation in many parts of the world, what is often overlooked is that the
very conceptualization of a range of economic transfer policies as foreign
“aid” limits how problems of economic deprivation can be addressed.
Notably, the conceptual metaphor of foreign “aid” prioritizes third-party
help over other economic and political approaches to poverty and
inequality. This political conceptualization of economic provision has

inadvertently framed subsequent efforts by governments, international
agencies, and non-governmental organizations such that the range of
options to promote economic growth is limited by the very conceptualiza-
tion of the problem that needs to be solved. Quite simply, it is thought
that the “problem” of regions experiencing lack of economic prosperity
can be “solved” not by attending to systemic economic conditions, but by
the provision of outside “help” and “assistance” in the form of metaphori-
cal “foreign aid.” Strategies that might emphasize indigenous or autono-
mous economic practices are marginalized by the emphasis on help and
assistance which are the consequences of thinking about the issue meta-
phorically in terms of aid.26
The conceptualization of economic conditions in terms of the need for
“foreign aid” has had long-term consequences for a large number of peo-
ple around the world. It is perhaps logical that humans’ desire to see others
enjoy increased prosperity should be expressed in terms of the experience
of providing help. As cognitive linguistics has shown, conceptual meta-
phors are cognitive manifestations of physical and sensory experiences.
Research in cognitive linguistics demonstrates that human thinking is a
process whereby physical experiences shape the way humans comprehend
the world. The most basic sensory perceptions gathered through sight,
hearing, smell, taste, and touch give meaning to abstract ideas by transfer-
ring meaning from one domain to another. In this instance, the experience
of providing help and assistance gives meaning to the abstraction of eco-
nomic need. Policymakers conceptualize monetary transfers as foreign
“aid” because they want to help. However, and ironically, this desire to
help nonetheless can constrain policy in potentially unhelpful ways.
58 M. P. MARKS
“Globalization” in Metaphorical Perspective

The Oxford English Dictionary gives as the first written reference to the
term “globalization” comments by W. Boyd and M. M. Mackenzie in the
1930 book Towards a New Education, which collected discussions of
curricular matters at the Fifth World Conference of the New Education
Fellowship held at Elsinore, Denmark.27 The concept of “globalization”
substitutes for a literal description of what the term is meant to describe,
namely, the economic, political, and cultural effects of increasing interac-
tions among individuals, institutions, and entities brought about by
advancements in transportation, communication, and commerce, no mat-
ter where these individuals, institutions, and entities physically reside.28
Naturally it is not efficient to utter or write literal expressions such as this
one in oral communication or prose, and thus the metaphor of “globaliza-
tion” has caught on as a convenient way to imagine the complex processes
it represents. Moreover, as Manfred Steger (2009, x) observes, “globaliza-
tion contains important ideological aspects in the form of politically
charged narratives that put before the public a particular agenda of topics
for discussion, questions to ask, and claims to make. The existence of these
narratives shows that globalization is not merely an objective process, but
also a plethora of metaphors and stories that define, describe, that analyse
that very process” (emphasis in the original).29 Timothy Luke (2004) thus
considers “globalization” one of the major “megametaphors” of the post-
Cold War age, that is, a rhetorical concept representing the opinions of
world elite that politics, economics, and social relations have been rede-
fined in terms of “omnipolitan” international order. For Luke, “globaliza-
tion” is not a self-evident fact, but a metaphorical interpretation of elite
“doxosophers” who have sought to conceptualize the post-Cold War
world in ways that accord with commercialized economic exchange.
The visual image created by the metaphor of “globalization” is, not
surprisingly, that of processes spreading around the “globe.” Like many
metaphors in IR theory, it is a spatial image that invites observers to imag-
ine the processes of globalization taking place within the confines of a
discernable place. In fact, as Jonathan Joseph (2012, 82) observes, the
discourse of globalization prioritizes and privileges conceptions of space
and time over the social aspect of world affairs.30 Wielding a Foucauldian
perspective, Joseph (87) argues that the discursive aspects of globalization
establish the “objects” and “boundaries” of a set of social and political
practices.
Taking a cue from Foucauldian analysis we could argue that the meta-
phorical element of globalization theory involves a set of processes, hence
“globalization,” and not some variant thereof such as “globalism,” which
has more of a sense of finality to it. One is tempted to think of the logo for
the United States paint manufacturer Sherwin-Williams—an upturned
paint can situated over the planet with paint pouring out of the can and
flowing over the contours of the globe with the slogan “Cover the Earth.”
“Globalization” evokes images of a spreading, moving, and extending
process that is diffused around the whole world. These images are consis-
tent with the metaphor of “liquid” (as opposed to “solid”) political
authority, which several scholars (Black 2017; Krisch 2017; MacDonald
and MacDonald 2017; Sending 2017; Zürn 2017) have suggested as a
way to conceptualize the dispersed nature of politics evident in emerging
forms of global governance. The direction from which the spread of glo-
balization flows, however, is contested. Richard Falk (1999) hypothesizes
metaphorical directionalities of globalization, a “globalization from
above” which emanates from the forces of market-based and statist corpo-
rate capitalism, and a “globalization from below” which has its origins in
democratic movements pressing for global solutions to issues of social jus-
tice. The globe itself may be a sphere, but metaphorically globalizing
influences can be located spatially “above” in the form of political author-
ity tied to global capitalism or “below” in the form of the mass base of
humanity.31
Given the images suggested by the globalization metaphor, much of
the theorizing about globalization focuses on the spatial scope of its pro-
cesses, namely, its reach throughout all areas of the world.32 Globalization
theory typically emphasizes economic, political, and cultural processes
that have the potential, through their ability to exploit modern informa-
tion technologies, electronic monetary transfers, transportation systems,
and so forth, to be implemented virtually anywhere in the world. The
image of the globe inherent in the globalization metaphor directs the gaze
of observers to the total worldwide experiences that can be manifest
through these means. Conversely, the metaphor of globalization also sug-
gests a coming together on a large scale, a global replication of local pro-
cesses. However, that image is not as simple as it seems. As Jan Blommaert
(2010, 1) is quick to point out, the metaphor of globalization as small-
scale interactions is misleading: “Sociolinguistically, the world has not
become a village. The well-matured metaphor of globalization does not
work…The world has not become a village, but rather a tremendously
60 M. P. MARKS
complex web of villages, towns, neighbourhoods, settlements connected

by material and symbolic ties in often unpredictable ways.” Even
Blommaert’s alternative metaphor of a “web” is problematic in that it
implies a specific way of thinking about the connections between locations
that collectively comprise what is known as “globalization,” that is, they
are connections of bidirectional links between spatially separated nodes of
activity. Thus, Blommaert (1–2) says what is “needed is a new vocabulary
to describe events, phenomena and processes, new metaphors for repre-
senting them, new arguments to explain them—those elements of scien-
tific imagination we call theory.”33
In fact, the notion of globalization as a contemporary phenomenon,
one that challenges state-centric conceptions of IR, is not at all new. As
Jens Bartelson (2010, 231) points out, “the construction of a global
sociopolitical space antedated the emergence of both sovereign states and
the international system.”34 Historically, “the prior existence of such a
global political space enabled the emergence of the international system of
states, insofar as the creation of early-modern states took place by means
of conceptual resources that had been distilled from Renaissance concep-
tions of single planetary space as the stage on which human affairs unfold”
(ibid., 231–232). Likewise, Jordan Branch (2011, 2) observes that the
advent of modern cartography contributed to changes in how Europeans
viewed political authority: “In particular, the treatment of political author-
ity exclusively in terms of homogeneous territorial areas separated by dis-
crete boundary lines, which is unique to the modern state system, resulted
from the development, distribution, and use of modern mapping.”35 In
many ways, this was a metaphorical mapping of the way in which
Renaissance actors experienced the world. Today, as humans’ experience
with a spherical earth reflects the ability to observe the planet in news ways
(e.g., in the air and from space), the globe metaphor is conceptualized
differently and thus is played out in IR in ways that are described as pro-
cesses of “globalization.” Branch (29) sums this notion up: “Today’s new
digital cartographies present at least the possibility of depicting more com-
plex nonstate forms of political authority. This offers a new focus for the
study of globalization, the information technology (IT) revolution, and
possible contemporary changes in political territoriality.” In particular, as
Bartelson (2010, 232) observes, the result is that “the relocation of
authority to territorialized states [that occurred in Renaissance times] is in
the process of being reversed, in favor of global governance institutions.”
While globalization is often conceived of as a new set of processes that

challenge state-centric notions of the territorialized state, some conceptu-
alizations of globalization, even what Aqueil Ahmad calls “new age” glo-
balization, rely on metaphorical images steeped in traditional theories of
IR. Thus, for example, the same Ahmad (2013, 1) who argues for a new
way to think about globalization draws on the metaphors of “structure”
commonly found in orthodox IR theory: “The term global society refers
to the architecture of this world order, while globalization is treated as its
process dimension. Global or ‘globalized’ structures refer to the institu-
tions, agencies, and organizations whose missions, mandates, networks,
and even the workforce, with its values and attitudes, are essentially global
rather than local in nature” (emphasis added). Ahmad’s emphasis on a
metaphorical architecture of globalized structures sustains a view of IR in
which even “new age” globalization emphasizes global interactions in
terms of the physical organization of politics on a grand scale.
The irony of the metaphorical imagery of globalization is that this
worldwide gaze directs the attention of scholars in one direction—the
entire world—while leading this attention away from other areas in which
the effects of “globalization” are felt. Globalization involves economic,
political, and cultural processes of increasing interactions among individu-
als, institutions, and entities brought about by advancements in transpor-
tation, communication, and commerce, no matter where these individuals,
institutions, and entities physically reside. Yet many of the effects of these
processes of globalization actually are local, not “global” in nature. It is
interesting to note that a literal description of what is metaphorically
referred to as “globalization” more readily directs one’s attention to the
immediate effects of said “globalization” than the “global” metaphor
does. Much like the aforementioned Sherwin-Williams company logo, the
metaphor of globalization evokes images of large systemic processes. The
more detailed, literal description of “globalization” emphasizes the means,
content, and targets of those processes that may have a global reach but
the effects of which are ultimately more localized in their impact.
Using literal language to emphasize the local effects of what is referred
to metaphorically as “globalization” is an endeavor similar to the studies
Cynthia Enloe carries out in her metaphorical-sounding but rather literal
text Bananas, Beaches, and Bases (1989). In that book (subtitled Making
Feminist Sense of International Politics) the “bananas,” “beaches,” and
“bases” in question are not metaphors for some aspect of IR, but rather
62 M. P. MARKS
literal expressions of the means, mechanisms, and locations in which inter-

national politics is played out. Enloe focuses on the everyday acts of every-
day people and encourages scholars to consider that these acts and
individuals are or should be the main focus of study in IR. Enloe’s project
is one of re-directing the attention of scholars away from what is in many
ways the superficial level of governments and international institutions and
onto the experiences of the individual people whose actions shape what is
referred to as international politics as well as the individuals who experi-
ence those effects. In both cases, those people include everyone who lives
in the world. Thus, Enloe’s emphasis on the local is, in many ways, a more
authentic study of “globalization” than what typically comprises scholar-
ship in the field.
One of the impetuses for the search for metaphors that capture the
dynamics of globalization is the notion that state sovereignty traditionally
conceived of in terms of bordered territoriality no longer captures the
extent, scope, and reach of political authority. As Stephen Krasner (1999,
2001) reminds us, sovereignty is an ideal type that takes on several forms,
which are overlapping and at no time are exercised fully or exclusively.36
More dramatically, L. H. M. Ling (2014, 20) suggests thinking about IR
using a “worldist” perspective informed by Daoist insights in which the
“Westphalian World-yang” is juxtaposed alongside a “Multiple Worlds-
yin” so that states and non-state actors are considered equally in the study
of global affairs.
Globalization metaphors are premised on the hunch that even the idea
of imperfect sovereignty is no longer useful for theorizing political author-
ity that exists beyond the reach of territorially defined state sovereignty.
The American Heritage Dictionary (219) defines “border” as “a part that
forms the outer edge of something…The line or frontier area separating
political divisions or geographic regions; a boundary.” In an age of global-
ization, political relationships defy notions of political authority that are
conceived of as stopping at a clearly demarcated “outer edge.” Political
authority is now exercised in multiple ways that, in many cases, ignore ter-
ritorial borders. People and corporate actors are subject to political rules
applied in a variety of jurisdictions. Electronic communication, although
perhaps the most obvious mechanism for subjecting people to political
rules across geographic space, is supplemented by the choices individuals
make about which rules to obey. Moving beyond territoriality is an IR
theory that sees the possibility of political communities based on voluntary
association and affinity grouping as a way to organize political authority.
This being said, as K. M. Fierke (2008, 226) observes, “many of the
metaphors [of globalization] reveal the tension between the ‘as if’ of glo-
balization and practices within a world of sovereign nation states. One
such tension is between a social desire to act for a global good and the
continuing pull of power politics between states.” Fierke (227) suggests
that the metaphors of globalization construct a world of multiple potential
worlds. Globalization thus is an incomplete process, and therefore many
of the metaphors of globalization skirt the line between reification between
what they reflect and what they re-imagine (Pouliot 2008, 35).37 Like
many other metaphors in IR theory, the metaphors of globalization are
borrowings from the policy world, which become core concepts in the
narratives that scholars then construct to make sense of the very same
world that then needs to be explained (Kornprobst et al. 2008, 245). The
reification of the globalization metaphor creates an entire category of the-
ories of IPE focused on an area of interactions that is imagined as a coher-
ent whole.
Some Metaphors of European Integration

In light of the relatively unprecedented nature of transformation of rela-
tions among the states of Europe, European integration has received spe-
cial attention from scholars of IR. However, much of the scholarship on
metaphors in European integration focuses on the conceptual metaphors
inherent in the discourse of policymakers as opposed to metaphorical
expression in the language of scholars who theorize about European inte-
gration. Thus, for example, Cris Shore (1997, 127) points out that “study-
ing discourses on European integration—particularly metaphors—can
reveal a great deal about the cultural differences and ideological rifts under-
lying current debates and disagreements between member states over the
future shape and direction of the European Union.”38 These debates and
disagreements are often played out discursively in metaphorical frames, for
example, as Mika Luoma-aho (2004) observes, in different agendas for
European policy which are implied by the contrasting metaphors of “arms”
versus “pillars” of European integration, or in the metaphors EU policy-
makers rely on to frame the EU’s role as “model,” “player,” or “instru-
ment” in the context of multilateralism (Barbé et al. 2014).39
Scholarship on the linguistic metaphors political officials use to frame
the discourse of European integration permits for distance between schol-
ars and policymakers: Policymakers conceptualize European integration
64 M. P. MARKS
using metaphorical frames; scholars make inferences about how concep-

tual metaphors guide the policymaking process. In this chapter I focus on
metaphorical expression in the scholarship on European integration
because my aim is not to make predictions about policy outcomes on the
basis of what discourse is adopted by policy practitioners but to indicate
how the metaphors scholars use to think about IR lead directly to the
hypotheses and theories they develop from these metaphors.40 It is not
unexpected that theories of European integration are replete with meta-
phorical images that aid scholars as they conceptualize this change. This
section explores how these metaphors and others reveal theoretical
assumptions underpinning the major schools of thought in the study of
European integration.
Early theories of European integration are notable in that they were
dealing with a metaphorical blank slate on which to imagine nascent pro-
cesses of political and economic convergence in Europe. When one thinks
about it, even the language to name and define what is now known as
European integration relies on metaphorical imagery. This is because these
processes were unfolding contemporaneously with efforts to identify and
explain them. Indeed, there is not one term to label these processes but
many, reflecting both rival theoretical schools of thought and policy posi-
tions. Many of the processes and even names European political leaders
have attached to the institutions of European integration themselves are
metaphorically inspired. Even to refer to European “integration” is to
invoke a metaphor inasmuch as other concepts could have been chosen to
define these processes. In fact, when the processes first were set in motion,
other metaphorical terms were brought to bear, including “amalgama-
tion,” “confederation,” and “unification,” as well as “harmonization” of
European social policy provision.41 Why scholars and practitioners settled
on “integration” in part reflects the power of this metaphor to transcend
theoretical debates in academia and political disputes in the political realm.
The same is true for naming the institutions of European integration them-
selves. Many of the metaphors of European integration have been exam-
ined in other forums.42 What follows is a look at otherwise unexplored
metaphors that shed light on the meanings of European integration.
Functionalism, Neofunctionalism, and “Spillover”

Functionalism and neofunctionalism, as some of the earliest concepts in
the study of European integration, incorporate a metaphorical frame,
implying as they do the transference of certain functions of governance

from the governments of European Community (later, European Union)
member states to the supranational institutions of European integration.
In one sense, the theory of functionalism is synonymous with the policy
prescriptions of early integration proponents. Scholars both predicted that
integration was an inevitable outcome of transferring government func-
tions to European-wide agencies and also tended to support such a process
since it was a logical byproduct of the agenda of individuals who favored
an integrated Europe as a bulwark against authoritarian forms of govern-
ment as well as armed conflict and economic deprivation.
The main theoretical device of the theory also relies on a vivid meta-
phorical image, specifically, the concept of “spillover.”43 As metaphors
designed to evoke a conceptual picture of a political phenomenon, the
spillover image is fairly straightforward. Quite simply, the term refers to a
process by which agencies of European integration are created to assume
the functions of government. The logic of integration dictates that such
governmental functions “spill over” to other areas of government, thus
necessitating the creation of additional agencies to coordinate European
integration.44 The image is one of water cascading over partitions, result-
ing in small bodies of water eventually forming one large pool. Ernst Haas
(1958, 298) sums up the image of spillover as follows: “Economic inte-
gration—with its evident political implications and causes—then becomes
almost a universal battle cry, making complete the ‘spill-over’ from ECSC
to Euratom and its promise of independence from oil imports, from sector
common markets to the General Common Market.”
An ironic aspect of the spillover metaphor is that some of the images it
brings to mind hardly suggest the positive qualities of European integra-
tion they presumably imply. The spillover metaphor typically is framed in
terms of the aforementioned imagery of water spilling over dams to create
a large body of government imagined as the emergent institutions of
European integration. However, one could also imagine water spilling
over levees flooding populated areas or water spilling over the tops of sup-
posedly water-tight compartments on ships causing the vessels to sink.
The early authors of the spillover metaphor could hardly have imagined its
relevance to events of the early twenty-first century in Europe when the
financial crisis manifested in countries such as Greece “spilled over” to the
rest of the EU threatening to “sink” the entire endeavor of European
monetary integration. Ironically, and contrary to the images evoked by the
“spillover” metaphor, Tana Johnson and Johannes Urpelainen have found
66 M. P. MARKS
that, in fact, “negative spillover,” that is, cooperation in one area that
undermines cooperation in another, actually leads to greater integration,
while “positive spillover,” that is, cooperation in one area that reinforces
cooperation in another, leads to less integration. Johnson and Urpelainen
(2012, 646) thus conclude: “States integrate not to exploit positive spill-
overs between issues but to mitigate negative spillovers. In short: negative
spillovers encourage integration; positive spillovers do not.” These are
findings that seemingly do not follow logically from what the spillover
image suggests.
The “spillover” image is also one of those conceptual metaphors that is
subject to multiple interpretation. Early functionalist theory imagined an
automaticity to the process by which functions of government would be
transferred from national governments to European supranational institu-
tions through what was imagined as “spillover.” Later neofunctionalists,
however, argued that the accretion of governmental functions by agencies
of European integration would require greater agency on the part of
European officials, national leaders, and transnational interest groups.
Stanley Hoffmann, who acted as a critic of functionalist theories of inte-
gration, imagined spillover metaphorically as actually leading back to state
sovereignty, not away from it. Hoffmann (1966, 909) invokes the meta-
phor of a spiral, arguing that “functionalism tends to become, at best, like
a spiral that coils ad infinitum,” leaving “the nation-state both as the main
focus of expectations, and as the initiator, pace-setter, supervisor, and
often destroyer of the larger entity” of supranational institutions. Ironically,
in opposition to critics such as Hoffmann, the “spillover” metaphor united
both functionalists and neofunctionalists despite what the image of spill-
over implies, that is, a series of steps by which government functions are
inexorably transferred from national governments to the institutions of
European integration. Neofunctionalists objected to the automaticity
assumption of early functionalist theory, yet even the halting, stop-go pro-
cesses they hypothesized and the requirement for political agency con-
tinue to rest on the assumption of inevitable transference of governmental
functions suggested by the “spillover” concept. Such is the pervasive influ-
ence of metaphors over the development of theory.
Another problem with the spillover metaphor is that it can lead to non-
falsifiable and ex post facto claims. The “theory” of spillover essentially
states that European integration will proceed when there is a demand for
European institutions that have competency over certain functions of gov-
ernment, which have been transferred to European institutions to include
additional functions of government in related economic and political

realms. To state this as a hypothesis, if there is a demand for spillover, then
European integration will spill over from one function of government to
another. The obvious problem with this formulation is that it relies on ex
post facto observations. When new institutions of European integration are
created, it can said to be because of spillover, but when new institutions of
European integration are not created, it can be said to be because the
conditions favorable to spillover were not in evidence. There is no way to
falsify such a claim.
This logical fallacy is created in part by the spillover metaphor itself.
There are any number of ways of hypothesizing the transfer of governing
authority from the member states of the EU and its predecessors to the
institutions of European integration. One way would be simply to use
more literal terminology to describe what is captured metaphorically
through the spillover image. Literal terminology would then lend itself to
a testable set of propositions. For example, one could assume that, like
state governments, agencies governing areas in which European countries
have chosen to cooperate efficiently rely on bureaucratic consolidation of
tasks. One could hypothesize that if cost savings are demonstrated, then
national governments would choose to support European-wide governing
agencies. This hypothesis could be tested by seeing if European agencies
are created in areas where efficiencies can be found. If they are, it would
serve as confirming evidence, and if they are not, it would provide discon-
firming evidence. By the same token, the hypothesis also would be discon-
firmed if European agencies were created even where no efficiencies are
obtained, but confirming evidence would be found if no European agen-
cies are created in areas where cost efficiencies cannot be demonstrated.
All of this poses a better way to test a theory of European integration and
does not rely on vague metaphors such as that found in the spillover
image.
The spillover metaphor also seems somewhat arbitrary and could have
been substituted with any number of other metaphors meant to illustrate
the notion that policies are transferred from the governments of European
countries to the institutions of European integration. Of course, any other
metaphor would be as arbitrary as the spillover metaphor and potentially
fraught with the same or similar analytical problems, but one could engage
in a thought experiment and examine how, say, the metaphor of a “ratchet”
would figure into theories of European integration. One could say that
each step by which European governments accede to European-wide
68 M. P. MARKS
agencies to coordinate policy formulation represents a “ratcheting up” of

European integration. As with the spillover metaphor, the ratchet meta-
phor contains within it implied assumptions about the sources of European
integration which inform the hypotheses that emanate from these assump-
tions. Thus, while the choice of a metaphor to illustrate European integra-
tion is to one extent arbitrary, it does reveal the starting assumptions
scholars make about the nature of integration, which shape the theoretical
propositions of the theory. In the case of a ratchet metaphor, unlike spill-
over, which implies a sort of organic and somewhat automatic process, the
ratchet metaphor implies intentionality inasmuch as usually a ratchet tool
depends on someone wielding the device. So a theory of European inte-
gration resting on a ratchet metaphor would tend to yield predictions that
depend on the presence or absence of agents with an interest in furthering
the processes of European integration as opposed to the automaticity
implied by the spillover image.
As mentioned, functionalists were both analysts and proponents of
European integration, and thus to some extent the metaphors they used
were reflected both in theoretical analyses and in policy preferences. It is
very difficult from a theoretical standpoint to disprove the predictions of
functionalist theory since the theory is a description of the integration
process itself seen as a logical process by which European countries cede
governmental authority to the institutions of European integration.
Policies “spill over” from one realm of governance to another when they
do. This assertion creates a situation in which predictions of when this
process will happen are hard to come by. The ex post facto nature of these
concepts renders them impervious to rigorous theoretical testing.
Yet even as neofunctionalism has enjoyed a resurgence of popularity in
European integration theory, the financial crisis that began in 2008
throughout the EU rendered the “spillover” metaphor problematic.
Inasmuch as opposition to further integration has emerged among both
political leaders and the public, the “physics” of “spillover” has seemingly
been replaced by an alternate metaphor borrowed from physics, that is,
the notion of European integration conceived of in terms of the outward
forces of expansion contending with the gravitational forces of contrac-
tion. This metaphor has been expressed in the scholarly literature in the
form of the so-called tensions of “push–pull” factors in European integra-
tion.45 In this view, European integration is not an inevitable process of
increased economic and political unification through the inexorable trans-
ference of authority from national governments to the agencies of the EU,
but a dynamic process akin to the very physical forces of the universe
which combine the outward expansion of mass and energy unleashed by
the Big Bang countered by the inward forces of gravity which threaten to
collapse the universe in on itself. Push–pull factors translated into theoreti-
cal models seemingly allow scholars to determine which set of forces exert
greater influence on political decision-making resulting in the ability to
predict whether European integration will continue to proceed or whether
efforts will be made to halt or undo that which has been accomplished by
the various treaties of European integration.
European Neighborhood Policy

The EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) also presents an inter-
esting metaphorical frame with which to conceptualize elements of
European integration. First proposed in 2003 and later developed in
2004, the ENP represents an effort by the EU to foster political ties and
economic relationships with the countries geographically close to the
EU.46 As described at the Europa Website of the EU, the ENP
offers our neighbours a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual

commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law,
good governance, market economy principles and sustainable develop-
ment). The ENP goes beyond existing relationships to offer political asso-
ciation and deeper economic integration, increased mobility and more
people-to-people contacts. The level of ambition of the relationship depends
on the extent to which these values are shared.47
Framed initially by the European Commission as an element of creating a

metaphorically “wider” Europe, the EU maintains that the ENP consti-
tutes a set of programs distinct from the enlargement process, which is to
say that the countries included in the ENP are not necessarily currently
slated as candidates for full membership in the EU, although public state-
ments about the ENP, such as those included in the policy’s Website,
point out that this does not prejudge future relationships between ENP
countries and the EU.
The “neighborhood” metaphor is interesting in several respects. First,
the changed language from a policy advocating a “wider” Europe to one
incorporating the EU’s “neighbor” states suggests that the leaders of the
EU seek to promote commonalities with geographically proximate states,
70 M. P. MARKS
albeit ones that at present are not necessarily assumed to share common
political and economic values with the EU. As a metaphor, “wider” merely
suggests a spatial visualization of Europe’s geographic limits, which has
been a preoccupation of European political leaders long before the advent
of modern-day European integration. By contrast, the metaphor of a
“neighbor” hints not only at geographic proximity but also inclusion in
the vicinity where a set of identities are shared. Among the definitions of
“neighborhood,” the Oxford English Dictionary includes the following:
“A district or portion of a town, city, or country, esp. considered in refer-
ence to the character or circumstances of its inhabitants” (emphasis added).
Applied as a metaphor to the entirety of the European subcontinent and
its bordering areas in southwestern Asia and northern Africa, the term
“neighborhood” apparently is intended to conjure notions of a common
character or set of circumstances of countries and individuals living in
proximity to each other.
Second, and from a contrary point of view, the metaphor of “neighbor-
hood” can have a distancing effect, especially when contrasted to another
prominent metaphor in the construction of European identity, that is, the
metaphorical notion of a common European “house” or “home.”48
Individuals who live in the same house typically are related in a closer way
than are those who merely reside in the same neighborhood. As framing
devices, the “house” and “neighborhood” metaphors help European
leaders shape the contours and limits of membership in the project of
European integration. Those who dwell inside the common European
“house” are already members of a community with shared values. Those
who reside in the European “neighborhood” share a common “character”
or set of “circumstances” with people inside the EU but are psychically
still outside of it.49
Third, and in a related sense, using a framing metaphor that situates
countries outside the EU but nonetheless includes them in the EU’s
“neighborhood” enables agencies of the EU to promote its values to its
“neighbors” much as individuals in a literal neighborhood might use their
proximity to advance commercial, political, mutual support, or religious
opportunities or initiatives by going “door-to-door.” As stated on the
EU’s ENP Website (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm),
“central to the ENP are the bilateral Action Plans between the EU and
each ENP partner…These set out an agenda of political and economic
reforms with short and medium-term priorities of 3 to 5 years.” Put more
bluntly, the EU offers a series of tangible incentives (largely in the form of
market access) to ENP countries that agree to political reforms and market
liberalization. The EU relies on its location as a geographically proximate
source of economic rewards to, in a sense, proselytize among its meta-
phorical “neighbors” in order to bring about certain desired results. The
“neighborhood” frame is a convenient metaphor to create positive feel-
ings among leaders and citizens alike in nearby countries, which can ben-
efit from closer economic ties to the EU but might otherwise resist
attempts to meddle in their internal affairs. One could argue that the dic-
tionary defines “neighborhood” in a literal sense as simply a categoriza-
tion of geographic proximity, which indeed it does.50 However, and
particularly when contrasted with the agenda for a “wider” Europe which
preceded it, the deliberate effort by agencies of the EU to promote an
active “European Neighborhood Policy” suggests that policymakers in
the EU crafted the term with an eye toward creating a sense of shared
values between those already in the “common European house” and those
living nearby who may one day be included in it.
The intent of the EU to use the “neighborhood” metaphor has not
been lost on scholars. Even before the European Commission had final-
ized its proposal for an ENP, a group of authors in an edited volume
(Dannreuther 2004) had identified in the EU’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) an effort to develop a “neighbourhood strategy.”
More to the point, Alun Jones and Julian Clark have analyzed the ENP
from the perspective of discourse analysis. Jones and Clark (2008, 546)
have observed that “Europeanisation is a legitimising process through
which the EU strives to gain meaning, actorness and presence internation-
ally.” Specifically with regards to the discursive role of EU agencies, Jones
and Clark (549) write:
While the European Commission not only has legitimate functions exter-
nally (for example, it represents the EU in external trade matters), it also
articulates, projects and appeals through the Europeanisation discourses.
This involves the careful definition and delimitation of external situations for
European intervention, the production of new systems of signification to
render logical, meaningful and appropriate this intervention, and the
deployment of a suite of tactics to ensure the survival of EU-brokered
Europeanisation discourses.
For Jones and Clark (552), the ENP specifically “represents a manifest
effort by the EU to structure European relations with a binary
72 M. P. MARKS
Mediterranean ‘other’.”51 They also point out that there was disagreement
within the European Commission about how to frame the discourse of the
EU’s “neighborhood: “In particular, Commission officials were worried
about the vagueness in socio-cultural terms of European neighbourhood
as a discursive construction” (ibid., 553). In the end, “the Commission’s
role was to define and enable ‘neighbourhood’ in such a way as to facilitate
its endorsement by Member States as a legitimate means for projecting
Europeanisation, and as an appropriate political mechanism for European
intervention” (ibid., 555).
What this meant discursively was that the concept of a European
“neighborhood” had to provide a logic for EU intervention in surround-
ing states but retain a separate logic by which the integrity of the EU
would not be jeopardized by uncontrolled immigration or exposure to
terrorist activity emanating from those states (ibid.). The need to demar-
cate the limits of the EU while at the same time discursively frame a geo-
graphic area subject to the EU’s scope of influence is summarized by
Rikard Bengtsson (2008, 598): “On the one hand, both EU representa-
tives and incoming members argue that the exclusivity of membership
needs to be upheld, while, at the same time, the foreign policy of the EU
deliberately embraces liberal ideas of advanced cross-border cooperation
and the merits of interdependence, aiming at reducing or mitigating the
difference between the inside and the outside.” How to discursively pres-
ent the ENP thus becomes a delicate balancing act in which the language
of “neighbors” is harnessed such that “the EU stresses that the policy
should reflect the mutual interests of the two sides, rather than the EU
imposing change” (ibid., 611). What comprises the EU’s “neighbor-
hood” thus represents political calculations supported by a metaphor that
is ambiguous by design. This was for the EU what Julien Jeandesboz
(2007, 387) deems a problem of “labelling the ‘neighbourhood’,” that is,
coming up with discursive strategies to manage the EU’s desire to have an
influence on surrounding states while protecting the EU from threats
emanating from those countries.52 Among those threats is economic vul-
nerability represented, for example, by the EU’s reliance on energy
resources, brought to the EU through a series of pipelines which John
Gault (2004, 182) describes as metaphorical “umbilical cords” tying the
EU to its neighbors in the east.
Given the inherent tensions within the EU with regards to defining the
meaning, scope, and implications of the EU’s geographic neighborhood,
it is not surprising that as a discursive trope utilized by agencies of the EU,
Europe’s metaphorical “neighborhood” is subject to multiple interpreta-

tions. Thus, for example, Katja Weber et al. (2008, i) ponder whether
those countries included in the ENP have been treated as “partners or
periphery” by the EU. Likewise, Päivi Leino and Roman Petrov (2009)
see in the creation of the ENP a debate between “common values” and
“competing universals.” Meanwhile, Bohdana Dimitrovova (2012, 249)
on the one hand sees in the ENP an “imperial re-bordering of Europe,”
but on the other hand Dimitrovova (2010, 463) acknowledges that the
Neighborhood Policy leaves room for framing ENP states as variously
“strangers” and “neighbours,” and potentially even “members” in a wider
Europe, depending on the spread of common values.
More pointedly, Ruben Zaiotti (2007, 143) employs a different meta-
phor to highlight what he sees as the exclusionary subtext of the ENP,
arguing that “despite its stated objectives, the ENP is actually reproduc-
ing—if not reinforcing—some of the existing barriers between the EU and
its neighbours and, more problematically, is creating new ones. This ten-
sion is a symptom of a pathological condition affecting the ENP that is
called here the ‘gated community syndrome’” (emphasis added). Freerk
Boedeltje and Henk van Houtum (2011, 142) echo these views: “The EU
seems to consciously produce a fuzzy space between inclusion and exclu-
sion. In so doing, it gives way to neo-colonial frontier-like aspirations in
defining the border both as a security and buffer zone as well as a zone to
ease up and construct the neighbours it desires.” Boedeltje (2012, 4) also
notes that “what is reflected in the ambiguous overlap between Europe
and the European Union is the tension between on the one hand the
‘top-down’script of Europe as reflected by the EU and the European
Neighbourhood Policy, and on the other hand the voices embodied in the
various pleas for a more ‘bottom-up’ vision of Europe.” These authors are
skeptical of what European leaders say when they assert an inclusive vision
of the EU’s “neighborhood.”53 This sentiment is reflected in the framing
of “building” a European security community by delineating that which is
“external” to the EU by virtue of it residing not within Europe, but rather
in its adjacent neighborhood (Rieker 2016).
As much as the metaphor of “neighbor” would seem to imply close-
ness, many critical analyses of the ENP point out that the metaphorical
connotations of Europe’s “neighborhood” involve drawing borders of
exclusion. Pertti Joenniemi (2012, 35) writes: “The moves of neighbour-
ing could hence…be viewed as efforts of portraying the newly nominated
neighbours as wholly external to the EU due to their inherent and not just
74 M. P. MARKS
acquired qualities…The neighbours do not stand, in this context, for a

mutated form of self but figure rather as an anti-thesis of the Union in
order to outline what the EU is not.” Ulrike Guérot (2012, no page num-
ber) offers a different view, arguing that the problem is not so much what
other countries include or exclude from Europe’s neighborhood, but
“putting the EU back into the European neighborhood,” that is, answer-
ing the question about how Europe can act as a responsible actor in light
of political upheavals in countries along Europe’s periphery (e.g., in coun-
tries that experienced the “Arab Spring”). Like other concepts that become
the subject of political analysis, the ENP started out as a metaphor used by
policymakers to frame a “problem” that needed to be “solved.” And, as is
common in such cases, the ambiguity in what the problem is and what
solution exists also creates ambiguity in what the metaphor implies for
conceptualizing the issue at stake. Scholars understandably have no choice
but to deal with the name of any given EU agency, policy, program, or
initiative. But by accepting that what the EU frames as its “neighbor-
hood” is a logical way of conceptualizing geographic proximity, scholars
also accept the notion that geography can be metaphorically constructed
in terms of the “character or circumstances of its inhabitants” as the afore-
mentioned dictionary definition of the term implies. For EU policymakers
this is a political strategy, yet for scholars it represents an analytical ques-
tion as to whether this is a logical way of thinking about things in the first
place.
In sum, the arguably unique nature of European integration in the
realm of IR makes it especially susceptible to attempts to use novel meta-
phorical formulations to help devise theoretical propositions about pro-
cesses that perhaps are qualitatively distinct from other areas of international
affairs. As discussed elsewhere in this book, metaphors are particularly use-
ful for theorizing in that they can provide a heuristic function. That meta-
phors are pervasive in theorizing about European integration demonstrates
the need to think creatively about an area of IR that is empirically distinct,
and in many ways unprecedented yet controversial in contemporary world
affairs.
Reflections on the Subplot of IPE

Metaphors which delineate the scope of IR also play a role in defining the
relative significance of specific issue areas in the narrative of scholarly anal-
ysis. Obviously matters of IPE are important in the study of IR, but the
relegation of economic matters to the metaphorical realm of “low” poli-

tics sets the tone for subsequent conceptual formulations. While interna-
tional security is characterized in rather dire terms through metaphorical
concepts such as the “distribution of power,” “brinkmanship,” and
“rogue” or “pariah” states, metaphors of IPE center on the nuances and
distinctions of “development,” “interdependence,” and “globalization.”
Scholars do not deliberately set out to diminish the study of international
economic affairs, but the metaphors of IPE imply a less pressing set of
issues than international security to be studied and addressed.
IPE thus represents a subplot of IR relative to the main story of war and
peace. It is no less interesting than international security, but perhaps
framed as just a bit less critical to the resolution of the story. This is not
necessarily by design, and no doubt not a conscious decision by scholars
of IR. Despite the fact that introductory contemporary IR textbooks
almost invariably place chapters on security before chapters on IPE, it is
unlikely scholars of IR deliberately endeavor to diminish its role. Rather,
as metaphors frame subjects of academic inquiry, they tell a narrative of
the cumulative attention that story lines receive. To date, the emphasis of
international economics relative to international security has been a sec-
ondary one.
Metaphors of IPE also are characterized by a great deal of ambiguity.
For example, scholars disagree about how best to describe relations among
actors of differing wealth, relying on a wide range of metaphors of global
inequality, with even the notion of “unequal” presenting a conundrum of
metaphorical conceptualization. Moreover, metaphorical concepts such as
“interdependence” and “globalization” contain within them politicized
connotations that have an impact on theoretical analysis. The irony is that,
from the perspective of political scientists, the field of economics might
appear at first to possess a more “scientific” quality, grounded as it is in
quantitative analysis, and thus would be less prone to the analytical prob-
lems that arise from a reliance on metaphorical concepts. However, as we
have seen, all academic disciplines rely in part or even in whole on concep-
tual metaphors, even the most “scientific” among them. Theoretical
abstractions depend on metaphorical conceptualizations to give meaning
to empirical facts. Matters of IPE are no less inclined in this direction.
In sum, at the intersection of economics and political science lies the
field of political economy, combining both disciplinary perspectives
and conceptual metaphors borrowed from both disciplinary traditions.
76 M. P. MARKS
The narrative of IPE in particular is the story of how the politics of

international economics fits into a larger preoccupation with the nature
of world political affairs. Seen as “low” politics, IPE is at once rele-
gated to a secondary role, but at the same time offers a wide range of
often imprecise and ambiguous ways of thinking about trade, com-
merce, and international monetary and financial affairs. Metaphors
determine what is important in this narrative, but also what is compli-
cated and problematic. In this sense, IPE is framed by metaphors in
ways that are similar to other aspects of IR.
Notes
1. IPE draws on metaphors from the field of economics, which are as com-
mon in that discipline as they are in political science. An examination
of metaphors in economics is beyond the scope of this study. On meta-
phors in economics, see, for example, McCloskey (1985, 1995), Henderson
(1994), Eubanks (2000), Bracker and Herbrechter (2005).
2. See, for example, Black (1962), Brown (2003).
3. The works of Deirdre N. McCloskey were previously published under the
name Donald N. McCloskey.
4. Klamer and Leonard caution that not all economics metaphors have equal
utility. Some provide only a pedagogical function (i.e., by illuminating
basic principles), while others have a heuristic role serving to “catalyze our
thinking, helping to approach a phenomenon in a novel way” (Klamer and
Leonard 1994, 32). Still other metaphors in economics are what Klamer
and Leonard refer to as constitutive of the very concepts under
investigation.
5. For more on metaphorical thinking in mathematics, see Núñez (2000),
Van Bendegem (2000).
6. McCloskey (1995, 225) writes: “The disagreements among economists
turn often on metaphorical choices, unexamined because
unselfconscious.”
7. In physics one can speak metaphorically of numbered dimensions (“first
dimension,” “second dimension,” etc.), while in the law certain crimes can
be imagined with ordinal metaphors such as murder in the “first” or “sec-
ond” degree.
8. Wolf-Phillips was challenged on her dating and origins of the term “Third
World,” but defends her findings in a later article in Third World Quarterly.
See Wolf-Phillips (1987). Mark Berger and Heloise Weber (2014, 3) back
up Wolf-Phillips’ claims.
9. On the history of Third Worldism as a political force in international affairs,
see Berger (2004), Prashad (2007), Berger and Weber (2014).
10. The American Heritage Dictionary defines the noun “development”

generically as “the act of developing” and “the state of being developed.”
11. Leslie Wolf-Phillips (1979, 106) refers to Gunnar Myrdal’s Asian Drama
(1968) in which he suggests that opting for “developing” or “less-devel-
oped” over “under-developed” represents a linguistic gesture to countries
in that category amounting to “diplomacy by terminology.”
12. The “core” metaphor is not limited to studies of relations between eco-
nomically disparate parts of the world. Samuel Huntington (1996) uses
the term in conjunction with his analysis of the “clash of civilizations.”
13. While the existence of a metaphorical “semiperiphery” seemingly acknowl-
edges the existence of a realm between the core and the periphery, this
semiperiphery is imagined more as an intermediate concentric circle than a
zone of fluidity between the periphery and the core.
14. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first written use of the
expression “north–south,” pertaining to relations between more and less
industrialized parts of the world, was in Franz Schurmann’s Ideology and
Organization in Communist China in which Schurmann (1966, 79) refers
to the “growing north–south gap between industrialized and nonindustri-
alized countries.”
15. Cardoso and Faletto (1979, xxiii) prefer the expression “situations of
dependency” instead of the “theory” of dependency.
16. As Debra Liebowitz and Susanne Zwingel (2014) observe, indications of
global gender equality also rely on subjective measures.
17. It is not for nothing that Patsy Cline sang “And yet the hand that brings
the rose tonight is the hand I will hold, for the rose of love means more to
me more than any rich man’s gold.” From the song “A Poor Man’s Roses
or a Rich Man’s Gold,” written by Bob Hilliard and Milton Delugg.
18. See, for example, Schön (1979).
19. See, for example, D’Anieri (2011).
20. While the OED includes a reference to the Non-Aligned Movement
founded in Belgrade in 1961, it notes that the first written use of the term
“non-aligned” was in 1957 in an article in the Journal of Asian Studies.
21. The term “bloc” is a variation of “block,” which in politics has its etymo-
logical origins in “block vote,” itself a metaphor for grouping together
votes into a “block” (Oxford English Dictionary).
22. Bill and Melinda Gates (2014, 6) write in the Gates Foundation annual let-
ter: “It is fair to say that the world has changed so much that the terms
‘developing countries’ and ‘developed countries’ have outlived their useful-
ness. Any category that lumps China and the Democratic Republic of Congo
together confuses more than it clarifies. Some so-called developing countries
have come so far that it’s fair to say they have developed. A handful of failed
states are hardly developing at all. Most countries are somewhere in the
78 M. P. MARKS
middle. That’s why it’s more instructive to think about countries as low-,
middle-, or high-income (Some experts even divide middle-income into two
sub-categories: lower-middle and upper-middle.).”
23. These trends, and the implications for the utility of the term “Third
World,” are also discussed in Randall (1992) and Berger (1994).
24. As the foregoing discussion shows, an ongoing debate in the journal Third
World Quarterly revolves around whether or not the term “Third World”
has any relevance in the study of international affairs.
25. On theories of foreign aid failures, see, for example, Calderisi (2006),
Easterly (2006, 2008), Lancaster (2007), Moyo (2009), Maurits van der
Veen (2011), Riddell (2007), Picard et al. (2015).
26. Additional metaphors emanate from thinking about differing levels of eco-
nomic prosperity in terms of the need for the provision of foreign “aid.”
For example, foreign aid has been proposed as a solution to the so-called
poverty trap from which less-developed regions of the world cannot
“escape.” On the “poverty trap,” see Easterly (2006).
27. Boyd and Mackenzie mention “globalization” among other words such as
“wholeness” and “integration,” “which would seem to be the keywords of
the new education view of mind” (Towards a New Education 1930, 350, as
referenced in the Oxford English Dictionary).
28. “The term globalisation denotes a set of inducing arguments and seductive
images rather than a stark and incontestable fact of life” (Pemberton 2001,
185). As Nicole Oke (2009) points out, much of the discourse surround-
ing globalization involves a vocabulary of time and space. In most respects,
this time/space language is used in a literal sense to involve the pace of
globalization and its geographic scope. See also Fairclough (2006).
29. Nisha Shah (2008) suggests that the metaphor of globalization itself has
been conceptualized metaphorically in three main ways, in the form of
“cosmopolis,” “empire,” and “network society.”
30. See also Rosenberg (2005).
31. Timothy Luke (2008, 132) suggests an alternative to Falk’s “globalization
from above” and “globalization from below” metaphors, suggesting
instead that the spread of technology allows for a “globalization-from-in-
between,” instantiating a “world that is more of the same, but never truly
universal.”
32. The American Heritage Dictionary (772) gives one definition of “global”
as “of, relating to, or involving the entire earth; worldwide.”
33. The metaphor of the world as a “global village” has been captured in the
expression “glocalization,” which implies that what globalization actually
entails is increased interactions between processes that occur globally,
locally, and in the form of some combination of the two. See, for example,
Sullivan (2008) who prefers the metaphor of a “rhizome” to conceptualize
the organization of “glocal” politics.
34. On sovereignty as a symbolic form, see also Bartelson (2014).
35. Branch (2) continues: “Because of changes in cartographic depictions and
their use, Europeans shifted from seeing the world as a series of unique
places to conceiving of the globe as a homogeneous geometric surface.
This shift had direct implications for how they understood political space
and territorial political authority.”
36. Krasner (3) points out that what typically is construed as “sovereignty”
actually comprises four forms of political authority: “International legal
sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interde-
pendence sovereignty.”
37. Fierke and Pouliot’s comments on reification convey the tensions in meta-
phors of globalization elaborated on in the edited volume by Kornprobst
et al. (2008) in which their chapters appear. The subtitle of Kornprobst
et al.’s edited book Metaphors of Globalization: Mirrors, Magicians and
Mutinies captures the multifaceted quality of metaphors as concepts that
can reflect, transform, and rebel.
38. Shore (140–145) notes that metaphors such as “Europe à la carte,” “vari-
able geometry,” “concentric circles,” “two-tier” integration, and “multi-
track” or “multi-speed” policy implementation reflect the prevailing ways
in which political leaders conceptualize European integration.
39. For additional studies of the metaphorical language of policymakers in
framing European integration, see Chilton and Ilyin (1993), Cattaneo and
Velo (1995), Musolff (1996, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008), Schäffner (1996),
Hülsse (2006), Carta (2014), Nitṃoiu and Tomić (2015).
40. On the distinction between conceptual metaphor and metaphorical expres-
sion in the study of European integration, see Drulák (2006) as well as a
critique of Drulák in Onuf (2010) and Drulák’s reply (Drulák 2010).
41. Article 117 of the Treaty of Rome introduces the concept of “harmoniza-
tion” of European social provisions: “Member States agree upon the need
to promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of
living for workers, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the
improvement is being maintained. They believe that such a development
will ensue not only from the functioning of the common market, which
will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but also from the proce-
dures provided for in this Treaty and from the approximation of provi-
sions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action” (Treaty of
Rome, 42, emphasis added). From a metaphorical perspective “harmoni-
zation” represents a lesser degree of coming together than “integration.”
80 M. P. MARKS
The former is defined in terms of “agreement,” while the latter is defined

in terms of “unifying” (American Heritage Dictionary).
42. See, for example, Musolff (1996, 2001, 2004), Schäffner (1996), Shore
(1997), Diez (1999), Drulák (2006).
43. “Spillover” should not be confused with the similarly sounding metaphor
of “tipping points” in international regimes. On tipping points, see
Vormedal (2012).
44. On functionalism, see Mitrany (1966).
45. On push–pull factors in European integration, see, for example, Farrell
et al. (2002), Künhardt (2009), Finke (2010).
46. The European Neighborhood Policy was proposed and developed in two
reports from the European Commission. See Commission of the European
Communities (2003, 2004). The 16 countries and political units included
in the ENP are Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine.
47. This description is posted online at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/
policy_en.htm.
48. On the common European “house” or “home” metaphor, see Chilton and
Ilyin (1993), Chilton (1996, chapters 8–9), Schäffner (1996), Fierke
(1997), Musolff (2004, 122–140).
49. On metaphorical constructions of areas outside the European neighbor-
hood, see Šarić et al. (2010), Silaški and Đurović (2014).
50. Among the definitions of “neighborhood” in the Oxford English Dictionary
is “the vicinity or surrounding area.”
51. Jones and Clark (552) quote Michael Smith (2004, 77) who writes that
the ENP produces a “Europe of boundaries in which a variety of geopoliti-
cal, transactional, institutional and cultural forces create a world of sepa-
rated spaces framing inclusions or exclusions. The resulting negotiations
are focused on inclusions and exclusions, across boundaries.” See also
Charillon (2004), Dannreuther (2004), Sedelmeier (2004), Comelli et al.
(2007), Cierco (2013).
52. Ambiguity in the meanings associated with the European Neighborhood
Policy created policy problems for the EU. As Karen Smith (2005, 769)
observes: “Yet ambiguity is not boosting the EU’s leverage: in fact, it is
forcing it into a reactive and defensive rather than a strategic mode. Thus
a policy based on ambiguity may not produce the effects the EU expects—
and will therefore probably not last very long.”
53. For a critical view of the ENP, see also Bialasiewicz et al. (2009), Scott
(2009).
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CHAPTER 3
Metaphors of Democratization
Metaphors in the Study of Democratization

While the study of democracy typically involves theories of comparative
politics, scholarship on processes of democratization also implies interna-
tional influences and hence engages, at least indirectly, theories of IR.1
Where democracy comes from, the stages by which it develops, the direc-
tion it takes, the efforts needed to build it, democracy’s density, and the
absence of democratic accountability, all involve conceptual metaphors
that imply theories of how democracy emerges and exists as a system of
governance. Scholars seeking to explain the formation of democracy fol-
lowing periods of non-democratic rule in particular rely on metaphorical
frames to develop explanations for the origins and development of democ-
racy around the world.
The influence of metaphors on theories of democracy has been noted
by attentive scholars. Laurence Whitehead, for one, argues that in modern
parlance democracy and its ongoing status often are framed using mechan-
ical metaphors. Thus, “democracies are ‘consolidated,’ or ‘built,’ advance
by ‘institutional engineering,’ sometimes suffer crises due to exogenous
‘shocks,’ or even ‘break down’ as a result of internal ‘pressures’”
(Whitehead 2011, 291). For Whitehead, these mechanical metaphors mis-
takenly imagine democracy as a thing as opposed to a process. To rectify
this error, Whitehead suggests approaching the study of democratization
with the aid of biological as opposed to mechanical metaphors. In the
biological view, democracy is not an end point, but is a “living practice

92 M. P. MARKS
permanently directed towards self-preservation and propagation” (ibid.,

292).2 In many ways, the contrast between mechanical and biological met-
aphors in the study of democracy and democratization is similar to the
debate between those same sets of metaphors in the study of IR writ large.3
In particular, mechanical metaphors imply a theory of linear cause and
effect, whereas biological metaphors suggest causation that involves evo-
lution and “life cycle” change (ibid., 293).4 Whitehead (293) seeks to
substitute the physicalist metaphors of “waves” and “snowballs” of democ-
ratization with metaphorical frames that incorporate ongoing biological
processes. Thus, for example, Whitehead (293–294) would replace meta-
phorical conceptions of “equilibrium” in democratization with metaphors
that envision change in terms of “homeostasis” and “autopoiesis” and
would supplant Samuel Huntington’s “snowballing” metaphor with the
metaphors of “contagion” and “viability,” which draw on biological views
of life cycle and change.5
For Whitehead (294), biological metaphors of democratization take as
their starting point the notion that democratic political systems can be
likened to living and evolving organisms: “The biological perspective
directs attention to the adaptive processes that can generate diversity
within a lifeline and explain the possible emergence of new organisms only
partially related to established types.” To extend this metaphor, political
systems imagined metaphorically as living organisms can also be compared
to healthy organisms that are susceptible to infection or disease (ibid.).
Furthermore, political systems are subject to evolutionary adaptation in
the current view understood in terms of punctuated change (ibid., 295).
Evolution can also bring about hybridization, which can be transferred
metaphorically to political regime type. Whitehead (296–297) is careful to
observe that biological metaphors of democratization should not be con-
fused with direct one-to-one analogies and therefore does not suggest, for
example, that Thomas Seeley’s (2010) study of “honeybee democracy” be
used as a scientific model to test levels of democratization in a human
political context. Rather, Whitehead’s point is that as a way to understand
political change, the evolutionary nature of change in democratic politics
is better understood by means of organic and biological metaphors than
the model of change entailing mechanistic cause and effect suggested by
prevailing metaphorical images of democratization.
Whitehead’s observations are only a start. It is important to acknowledge
that metaphorical conceptions of democracy and the processes of democra-
tization as mechanical or organic in nature have an influence on how democ-
METAPHORS OF DEMOCRATIZATION 93
racy is theorized. This acknowledgment also emphasizes the need to critically

assess the myriad ways that democracy has been subject to metaphorical
notions of politics. This chapter follows Whitehead’s lead by taking meta-
phors of democratization seriously. It examines a range of metaphorical
concepts and the ways in which they lead scholars to make certain assump-
tions about democracy, devise hypotheses about processes of democratiza-
tion, and contribute to theories that offer explanations for how democracy
develops over time. The chapter concludes that democratization is not an
unambiguous process, but, rather, is most often understood through the
same sorts of metaphors that frame the study of other aspects of IR.
Democratic “Transition” and “Consolidation”

While terms such as “transition” and “consolidation” sound as literal as
concepts get in the study of politics, as with other conceptual categories,
they convey metaphorical narratives—often subtle, but on occasion overt.
The following passage illustrates any number of metaphorical tropes that
have made their way into the study of democratization: “Originally, the
term ‘democratic consolidation’ was meant to describe the challenge of
making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond
the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian
regression, of building dams against eventual ‘reverse waves.’ To this origi-
nal mission of rendering democracy ‘the only game in town,’ countless
other tasks have been added” (Schedler 1998, 91, emphasis added). The
author of this passage includes two terms in quotation marks (“reverse
waves” and “the only game in town”) as a way of acknowledging their
metaphorical qualities, but, as I have indicated by adding italics to other
words in this passage, democratic consolidation has also been imagined
with a whole series of metaphorical frames. Democratic consolidation is
thought of metaphorically as something that can be made safe (by keeping
it “secure” behind “dams” designed to keep out the flood waters of
“reverse waves”), as having a form of biological life (with a “life expec-
tancy”) that represents a healthy form of politics (by making it “immune”)
and is part of a process of competition (“the only game in town”). As will
be made clear in the discussion that follows, despite the range of meta-
phorical images that are represented in the literature (as illustrated by the
afore-quoted passage), the dominant theme that emerges is that democra-
tization is marked off as a series of discrete processes as opposed to a con-
stantly changing process of “normal” politics in general.6
94 M. P. MARKS
Whitehead’s observations about the possibility of replacing mechanical

metaphors of democratization with metaphors based on biological images
of political behavior are prescient. As I discuss in Metaphors in International
Relations Theory, the dominant metaphors of transformation in IR con-
ceptualize change in terms of either “construction” or “evolution” (Marks
2011, 74–78). These represent, respectively, Whitehead’s mechanical and
biological categories of metaphors of democratization.7 Among the pre-
vailing mechanical metaphors that have served to frame processes of
democratization are the concepts of “transition” and “consolidation.”8
Unlike biological or evolutionary metaphors that imagine change as a
gradual process of adaptation, the mechanical metaphors of “transition”
and “consolidation” evoke images of transformation which involve clearly
demarcated processes set off from each other as part of a change that is
segmented and entails sequential steps, much like a process by which
something is “constructed” as opposed to how it “evolves.” Thus, for
example, although Guillermo O’Donnell (1989, 62) is careful to point
out that “transitions do not have inevitable outcomes,” the very notion of
an “outcome” suggests that transition is part of a segmented process
where the transition is followed by a distinct political result (i.e., the “out-
come”). Subsequent scholars affirm the notion of demarcated stages
implied in metaphors such as “transition.” For example, following the lead
of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Kathryn Stoner et al. (2013, 6)
define a political transition as “the interval between one political regime
and another” (emphasis added).9 In this formulation, politics is under-
stood not so much as a mix of practices but more as a system of classifica-
tion along a spectrum with strict distinctions drawn between different
types of governance.10
Dictionary definitions of “transition” and “consolidation” back up a
sense of these concepts, implying a metaphorically mechanical view of
political change. “Transition” is commonly defined as “passage from one
form, state, style, or place to another” (American Heritage Dictionary,
1901). It is worth noting that there is little to suggest in this definition a
gradual process of change. Rather, one thing becomes another through a
sequential process, with little intervening between these two states or
forms. Similarly, the dictionary defines “consolidate” as “to unite into one
system or whole; combine” (ibid., 403). As with “transition,” this image
of “consolidate” brings to mind a process of production or construction
whereby something is mechanically formed or shaped in a purposeful way.
Unlike “evolution,” which involves ongoing processes that have no clearly
identifiable end point, both “transition” and “consolidation” are meta-

phors of mechanistic change in which some set of operations lead to the
creation of distinct states of existence and which can end with the presen-
tation of a final product.
How do these metaphors of “transition” and “consolidation” frame and
influence the study of democratization? As the definitions of these terms
imply, analyses of democratic transition and consolidation focus on clearly
demarcated processes of change on the one hand and stasis on the other.
Thus, for example, in a classic statement on the subject, Guillermo
O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986, 6) define democratic “transi-
tion” as “the interval between one political regime and another.” This
interval is “delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of
dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation
of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule,
or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative” (ibid.). Hence, while obvi-
ously O’Donnell and Schmitter’s definition of “transition” involves dynamic
change, it nonetheless implies a process with a clearly discernible beginning
and end. Later, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996, 3) set out conditions
under which a democratic transition could be said to be “complete.”11
Although democracy itself is often understood as a dynamic form of
government, the metaphor of “transition” understood as an interval,
stage, or phase imputes to this aspect of democratic politics a closed-ended
process that is analytically distinct from other aspects of ongoing political
change. Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer (1998, 7)
say as much when they observe : “To describe new democracies as being
in transition is misleading; it implies that we know a society’s starting
point, we know where it is today, and where it is heading. The term is also
bland, suggesting that changes are virtually friction-free.” Questions also
can be advanced about the generalizability of metaphors, such as transi-
tion, which may not transfer well from one political context to another. As
Jordan Gans-Morse (2004, 324) writes: “The processes of change under
way in the post-communist region are fundamentally different from other
forms of transition that social scientists have previously encountered; some
analysts even raise the question of whether these processes are best
described as ‘transitions’ at all, or whether some other guiding metaphor,
such as revolution, institutional breakdown, or decolonization, might be
more apt.” As a metaphor of political change, “transition” may be limiting
in terms of its ability to capture regional variations as well as altered cir-
cumstances over time.
96 M. P. MARKS
Likewise, Linz and Stepan’s definition of “consolidation” implies a

static condition, which, as they state, could “at some future time…break
down,” but “would not be related to weaknesses or problems specific to
the historic process of democratic consolidation per se, but to a new
dynamic in which the democratic regime cannot resolve a set of problems”
or otherwise resist anti-democratic forces (Linz and Stepan 1996, 6).
Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman (1994, 6) define “consolidation”
as “processes through which acceptance of a given set of constitutional
rules becomes increasingly widespread, valued, and routinized.” In other
words, it is not the process of democracy itself that constitute political
change but a unique set of factors that are indicated by identifying an ana-
lytically distinct phase of political activity suggested by the “consolida-
tion” metaphor.
The irony is that behind the metaphors of transition and consolidation
that frame these periods as discrete processes set off from “normal” poli-
tics are in fact a range of political undertakings which would otherwise
render meaningless the notion of separate and distinct stages of demo-
cratic politics. For example, after pointing out the various ways in which
democratic consolidation is understood, Andreas Schedler (1998, 91–92)
observes that what is known as a distinct period of democratic “consolida-
tion” is in fact a host of processes, many of which can be found in other
political contexts:
The list of ‘problems of democratic consolidation’ (as well as the corre-

sponding list of ‘conditions of democratic consolidation’) has expanded
beyond all recognition. It has come to include such divergent items as popu-
lar legitimation, the diffusion of democratic values, the neutralization of
antisystem actors, civilian supremacy over the military, the elimination of
authoritarian enclaves, party building, the organization of functional inter-
ests, the stabilization of electoral rules, the routinization of politics, the
decentralization of state power, the introduction of mechanisms of direct
democracy, judicial reform, the alleviation of poverty, and economic
stabilization.
Schedler’s point is not that democratic consolidation is not worth study-

ing, but that because scholars associate with it so many different qualities
of political change, “the reigning conceptual disorder is acting as a power-
ful barrier to scholarly communication, theory building, and the accumu-
lation of knowledge” (ibid., 92).
What I would add to this is that metaphors are an integral reason for
why terms such as “democratic consolidation” have become problematic.
On the one hand, as Schedler observes, concepts such as “democratic
consolidation” have become vague and imprecise. On the other hand,
there seems to be some agreement that, as nebulous as the term may be,
it represents a distinct stage of political change to the extent that, when
the conditions promoting consolidation are removed, governments can
enter a phase of what Roberto Foa and Yascha Mounk (2017) refer to as
democratic “deconsolidation.” Metaphors that imagine democratic con-
solidation as something with a “life expectancy” that must be made
“immune” to anti-democratic forces or “secured” behind “dams” to keep
out “reverse waves” promote the idea that theories of “normal” politics
do not apply to stages of democratization. The metaphor of “consoli-
dated” democracy, for example, suggests that there is no opportunity for
political change. In some instances this may in fact be the case. But what is
conveyed with this concept is the assumption that different hypotheses
apply to stages of democratization than they do to periods of “normal” or
ongoing political activity.
Democratization Has a “Direction”

If democratic “transition” and “consolidation” suggest mechanical pro-
cesses, they also imply stages in some process moving from one state of
existence to another. The idea of transitory and consolidating stages is
closely related to the metaphorical conceptualization of democratization
as something that has a “direction.” More specifically, there is an idea that
democratization proceeds “forward” toward democracy from non-
democratic forms of government, but it can also suffer from “reversals”
away from democracy “back” toward non-democratic politics.12 As with
the notion of “progress” as articulated by political partisans, there is in the
“forward” direction of democratization (and “reversals” away from
democracy) a not-so-subtly implied preference for democratic forms of
government. Thus, for example, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe
Schmitter (1986, 65) write that “transition in regime type implies move-
ment from something toward something else” (emphasis added), while the
subtitle of Larry Diamond’s 1999 book Developing Democracy is Toward
Consolidation (bold added).13 The forward direction of democracy inher-
ent in metaphors such as the “wave” image (discussed later in the chapter)
also can be harnessed by those asserting the desirability of avoiding meta-
98 M. P. MARKS
phorical “reversals.” Thus, for example, President Thein Sein of Myanmar

commented in 2012 about processes of democratization in his country
and said that “the road to democracy in Burma is so narrow that you can-
not turn back” (Chongkittavorn 2012, no page number). The president’s
message, tinged with a political agenda such as it is, was designed to soothe
Western sensibilities by tapping into the notion, propagated in Western
scholarly circles, that democratization is a “forward moving” process
embraced even by those (such as the leadership of Myanmar) with suspect
commitments to democratic forms of government.
The metaphor of moving forward (which is reinforced by the opposite,
which is a “reversal” in the other direction) carries with it the connotation
of making progress in a desired direction. This is a language often picked up
by journalists and others in the news media. For instance, an article in The
New York Times describes the difficulties in maintaining democratic prac-
tices in directional terms: “After 50 years of independence, the path to
democracy does not follow an obvious straight line in this region, just as it
did not in the West…Across the region [Africa], democracy, even amid set-
backs, seemed to inch forward” (Nossiter 2012, A4, emphasis added). The
notion of forward and backward direction in the process of democratization
̇
is encapsulated in the title of Ilter Turan’s 2015 book on processes of
democratization in Turkey, Turkey’s Difficulty Journey to Democracy: Two
Steps Forward, One Step Back. Here, we find every aspect of the directional
metaphors used to conceptualize democratization—the idea of democracy
having a spatial “direction”; the notion that democratization represents a
sense of physical movement, in this case, an extension of the metaphor that
life is a “journey”; the understanding that journeys are traveled with physical
“steps” that can be measured metaphorically as human locomotion com-
plete with the idea of pacing (i.e., counting “steps” forward and backward);
and the concept of “forward” and “backward” direction in politics.14 While
Turan’s analysis is far-ranging, incorporating variables related to the role of
the military in politics, economic activity, party and electoral politics, the
composition and quality of civil society, and the ideological orientation of
political groups in Turkey, the general thesis of the book is that democracy
represents a point along what Turan (2015, 217), using the metaphor of
direction, calls “the road to a more democratic Turkey” (emphasis added).
Scholars who are skeptical of such facile imagery can still succumb to it.
For instance, while eschewing the simplicity of a vague term such as demo-
cratic “consolidation,” Andreas Schedler (1998, 92) nonetheless uses
forward-facing arrows to diagram democratization as progressing in
stages, from authoritarianism to electoral democracy to liberal democracy

to metaphorical “advanced” democracy, although regression can take the
form of metaphorical democratic “breakdown” or “erosion.” No one
wants to reverse direction away from the progress he or she has already
made toward a desired goal. Many, if not most, Western political scientists
likely accept that democracy is the preferred form of government for the
advancement of political freedoms and rights, but this is an ideological
assessment, not an analytical one. Furthermore, as Thomas Carothers
(2002, 15) points out, “the assumed sequence of stages of democratiza-
tion is defined by the record of experience.” Leaving aside my own biases,
which are predisposed toward democracy, political change that alters a
country’s form of government is a matter of evolving constitutive rules,
institutions, and forms of governance, not progress forward toward a pre-
ferred form of government (democracy) or backward toward something
else. The directional view of democratization thus frames political change
in terms of desired political forms and the problems associated with it.
Metaphors frequently are used to frame “problems” that need to be
“solved,” and the directional image of democratization is not immune to
this tendency. The directional metaphor in the analysis of democracy takes
a variety of forms, all of which frame the problem of non-democratic gov-
ernance as something that can be solved by moving in the right forward
direction toward democracy.
“Waves” of Democratization
The metaphor of “waves” of democratization was popularized by Samuel
Huntington in his book The Third Wave. Huntington (1991, 15) defines
a “wave of democratization” as “a group of transitions from nondemo-
cratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time
and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction dur-
ing that period of time. A wave also usually involves liberalization or par-
tial democratization in political systems that do not become fully
democratic.” A number of things are noteworthy in how this definition
fits with the metaphorical concept of democratic directionality. First, a
wave is conceived of as a singular process involving multiple units, that is,
a group of regimes undergoing political transition.15 When one thinks of a
wave, for example, in a body of water or as a cycle of radiation (as in fre-
quency waves in radio transmissions), what comes to mind is an identifi-
able physical shape or form that can be distinguished from its surrounding
100 M. P. MARKS
context.16 This image forces observers to focus on the coherence of the

phenomenon that takes shape as a wave as opposed to deviations from it.
So, for example, although an ocean wave might produce a spray of water
droplets that emerges from the motion of water that distinguishes the
wave, an observer will focus on the large shape of the wave as opposed to
the small drops of water that emanate from it. Hence, one implication of
the wave metaphor for the study of democratization is to emphasize the
group of regimes that comprise it, not individual regimes that may make
political transitions outside of the time frame specified when identifying
waves of democratization. The existence of outlier states that make
transitions to democracy outside of identifiable “waves” is minimized in
constructing a wave theory of democratization.
Second, the wave metaphor is mixed with the metaphor of “transition,”
which implies a shift from one thing to another as opposed to a gradual
process as might be imagined by the progress of a wave through physical
space. Third, the “wave” metaphor is also mixed with metaphorical imag-
ery of deliberate motion, specifically, by taking “steps”: “In one sense, the
democratization waves and the reverse waves suggest a two-step-forward,
one-step-backward pattern” (Huntington 1991, 25). One then wonders
if democratization is a wave-like force, beyond any one individual’s con-
trol, that carries countries “forward” and “backward,” or a deliberate set
of political interests in which people take “steps” to bring about one set of
political objectives versus others. The “wave” metaphor suggests processes
acting upon political actors, while the “step” metaphor implies volition
and purposiveness of action. Fourth, as Jean Grugel and Matthew Bishop
(2014, 58) point out, “used as a metaphor, the idea of the wave captures
quite graphically how democracy spreads spatially over time. But on closer
examination the waves turn out to be rather indistinct and even
overlapping.”
Fifth, and as alluded to in the previous paragraph, for Huntington a key
factor in waves of democratization is that they move in a metaphorical
space involving direction. Waves in nature, for example, in the ocean,
obviously have a direction, but for Huntington the significance of a politi-
cal “wave” is if it moves a regime “forward” toward democracy, or “back-
ward” toward undemocratic forms and practices.17 This is highlighted in
Huntington’s notion of “reverse waves,” which can shift a regime away
from democracy toward undemocratic forms of governance. Using the
concept of “complex adaptive systems,” Seva Gunitsky argues that demo-
cratic diffusion inevitably involves both metaphorical positive and negative
feedback “loops” such that democratization does not inexorably proceed

“forward.” Rather, “waves of democratic diffusion have nearly always been
followed by partial or total collapse of the waves” (Gunitsky 2013, 53).
Sixth, once the metaphorical concept of a “wave” of democratization
has been established, additional questions arise, for example, what causes
a wave to begin in the first place? Rather than being viewed as simply a
normal part of political life, conceptualizing a group of countries engaged
in political processes associated with the adoption of democratic practices
as a metaphorical “wave” opens space for additional metaphors with which
to conceptualize these processes. This prompts theoretical analysis, where
before there might not have been any. Thus, for example, confronted with
the phenomenon of “waves” of democratization, Seva Gunitsky engages
in a search for the source of these waves and arrives at the metaphorical
concept of “shocks” which unleashes those waves. Specifically, Gunitsky
(2014, 565) focuses on changes in the distribution of power among hege-
monic states creating a “hegemonic shock” defined as “a sudden shift in
the distribution of relative power among the leading states in the interna-
tional system.”18 Such shocks then create what Gunitsky (ibid., 567) refers
metaphorically as “wakes,” which then create “waves” rippling out from
hegemonic shocks.19 Were it not for Huntington’s invocation of a “wave”
concept, the search for a cause in the form of points of disrupture that
unleashes such waves might not have become a theoretical project.
Finally, for Huntington, the image of a “wave” is a blunt metaphorical
tool inasmuch as, admittedly, within the group of countries that comprise
a wave of democratization are countries that only partially succeed or even
fail to make the transition toward democracy. This is apparent to
Huntington (1991, 15–16) who notes that “political changes do not sort
themselves into neat historical boxes” and “it is often arbitrary to attempt
to specify precisely when a regime transition occurs.”20 Furthermore, the
amount of time that constitutes a wave is variable; hence, Huntington
(16) classifies historical time frames involving “short” and “long” waves.
Of course, the notion of “waves” of any particular phenomenon is not
new. Common terms expressing the concept of forward movement of an
idea, practice, or behavior include waves of culture, waves of innovation,
waves of feminism, and waves of modern terrorism, among other things.
The idea is that certain processes occur according to cyclical patterns
encompassing identifiable groupings of instances of those processes.
Cycles need not be of a regularly occurring frequency nor of equal size or
length, but they are discernible in terms of the grouping of cases that oth-
102 M. P. MARKS
erwise might appear randomly with no readily recognizable pattern. In

this sense, a metaphorical “wave” of democracy is a useful concept because
it alludes to some statistical regularity worthy of investigation. On the
other hand, the very notion of a wave or cycle creates the impression of a
statistically significant pattern even when outlying cases exist. A model of
democratization (or any other phenomenon) only takes the form of a the-
ory when it involves generalization across a number of comparable events,
so key to theory generation and testing is first establishing that such com-
parable events do occur in ways that are statistically significant. The meta-
phor of a “wave” is a framing device for accomplishing this task.
Democratization and Swings of the “Pendulum”

Another directional metaphor of democratization is the view that coun-
tries can “swing” like a “pendulum” back and forth between democratic
and non-democratic forms of government. In particular, as the metaphor
implies, with regard to Latin America, collectively, the countries of that
region have, at various times, experienced democratic and non-democratic
forms of government, but have done so almost as a group moving from
one system to another. Concerning the historical periodization of these
shifts, Robert Pastor (1989, 3) writes that in the 1960s in Latin America,
“democracy left as abruptly as it had arrived. The pendulum had swung
back to dictatorship,” but “in the 1980s, the pendulum made its most
majestic swing toward democracy.”21 For Pastor, the metaphor of the pen-
dulum is explicitly tied to how one theorizes the nature of political change.
Pastor, like many other scholars, seeks an explanation for why countries
adopt democratic or non-democratic forms of government. This endeavor
is not always realized: “In the case of democracy, theories have been more
effective in explaining the previous swing of the pendulum than in predict-
ing the next swing” (ibid., 7). The goal of Pastor and his fellow authors in
his edited volume is to use the pendulum metaphor to refine theories of
political change.
It is useful, however, to consider the following: The “pendulum” meta-
phor mimics the related image of a toggle switch that can be turned from
an on to an off position. Unlike such a switch, a pendulum seemingly can
occupy multiple positions as it swings from side to side, that is, there is
neither a definitive “on” nor “off ” position to a pendulum but many loca-
tions along the pendulum’s arc. The metaphor nonetheless suggests a view
of the political processes whereby countries can “swing” from one political
system to another, with gradations of democracy and non-democracy in

between. In this view, unlike in the “wave” metaphor, however, it is not
assumed that democratization “naturally” moves “forward” away from
non-democratic forms of government.22 What there is, however, is a ten-
dency to favor one system over the other, as is made explicit in the subtitle
of Pastor’s edited book—Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the
Pendulum (bold added).23 One can accurately surmise that the authors of
the volume do not want to stop the pendulum on the side of non-
democracy, but, rather, have a preference to cease the process by which
countries swing between democratic and non-democratic forms of govern-
ment by keeping democracy in place. This desirability of democracy is echoed
in secondary metaphors in Pastor’s edited book, for example, the chapter by
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1989, 41), who pointedly advance the meta-
phor of “political crafting,” which can help “consolidate” democracy in ways
that do not result in the “breakdown” or “destruction” of democratic forms
of government. The “breakdown” and “destruction” metaphors are further
reinforced by Laurence Whitehead (1989, 76) in the same volume in which
he suggests that democratic consolidation can be “fragile.”
The “pendulum” metaphor, unlike metaphors of “transition” and
“consolidation”—but similar to the idea of “forward” and “reverse” waves
of democratization—acknowledges bidirectional political change. The
“direction” of this change presumably can be detected by scholars; hence,
Guillermo O’Donnell (1989, 62) in his chapter in the Pastor volume sug-
gests some “navigation instruments” to discern the direction of that
change. Yet, the acknowledgment of bidirectional change is made only by
establishing a binary relationship between the categories of democratic
and non-democratic political systems, something not necessarily expressed
in the “waves” metaphor. Within democracy there are different institu-
tional arrangements that can exist (e.g., presidential vs. parliamentary sys-
tems, unitary vs. federal states, etc.), and among non-democratic systems
there are myriad forms governments can take. The “pendulum” metaphor
glosses over these nuances by imagining a two-dimensional spectrum
between ideal types of government, with only gradations of difference
between these two imagined extremes. The metaphor makes it hard to
imagine political change within democracies, let alone transformation
among political arrangements within the multiple forms of non-democratic
governance. Government in North Korea takes a far different shape than,
say, government in Apartheid era South Africa. Both could fairly be
described as non-democratic, and countries could conceivably make a
104 M. P. MARKS
transition from one non-democratic form to another without the “pendu-

lum” metaphor providing the analytical tools to predict and explain the
circumstances under which such change would take place. The swing is
only from the non-democratic to the democratic side of the spectrum,
with few theoretical clues as to what explains change within democracy
and non-democracy alike.
Directions of Democracy and “Modernization”

The metaphorical forward movement that is theorized to be associated
with democratization is closely related to the images suggested by the
metaphorical processes of “modernization.” As is the case with many
words in their contemporary sense, the etymology of the English word
“modern” reveals a conceptual metaphor, in this case, the metaphor of
temporal progression. The Oxford English Dictionary indicates that the
word “modern” has its roots in the Latin modernus, simply meaning “of
the present time” (modernus itself derives from the Latin modo meaning
“just now”). In its earliest usage in English in the fifteenth century, the
word “modern” conveyed this sense, meaning “being in existence at this
time; current, present” (Oxford English Dictionary). By the late sixteenth
century, however, “modern” had taken on additional meanings, reflecting
what cognitive linguists would see as a conceptual metaphor relating to
how humans physically experience time. Specifically, by the late 1500s,
“modern” had come to mean “of or relating to the present and recent
times, as opposed to the remote past; of, relating to, or originating in the
current age or period” (Oxford English Dictionary, emphasis added). That
is to say, as humans physically experience the present in relationship to the
past, what once meant only “now” became a conceptual metaphor for
“and not then” (i.e., the past). In other words, “modern” has become a
metaphor for the passage of time. Moreover, since humans physically
experience time as part of a time–space continuum, “modern” came to
mean a directional progression forward from times “back” in the past to
the present and “forward” into the future. Modernization, then, repre-
sents a physical direction through time and space.
It is hence not surprising that modernization theory as it is associated
with democratization similarly conveys a metaphorical forward direction
toward a desired political outcome. Modernization theory and democrati-
zation are closely linked in the theoretical literature. One of the earliest
studies linking modernization and democracy was conducted by Seymour
Martin Lipset (1959) who confirmed that economic development and

political democracy tend to be correlated, although Lipset was careful to
point out that democracy has existed in a variety of economic conditions
and therefore one should be cautious about positing a linear causal rela-
tionship from modernization to democracy.24 Samuel Huntington (1968),
too, cautions that while modernization precedes democracy, it does not
do so in an uninterrupted fashion, and non-democratic forms of
government can follow processes of economic modernization just as easily
as democratic ones depending on a variety of factors.
The relationship between economic modernization and democratiza-
tion thus is highly disputed. Using statistical analysis, Adam Przeworski
and Fernando Limongi (1997, 177) conclude definitively that “the emer-
gence of democracy is not a by-product of economic development.
Democracy is or is not established by political actors pursuing their goals,
and it can be initiated at any level of development.” Whether or not eco-
nomic development brings about democracy, however, is not the point. It
also does not matter if it is democratization that creates favorable condi-
tions for economic modernization, a hypothesis that also has been enter-
tained. What matters is that both processes are conceived of as representing
a metaphorical forward progression, a directional movement forward
through space and time.
This metaphorical image is supported by Ronald Inglehart and Christian
Welzel. Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 1) reject the hypothesis of a linear
relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy, argu-
ing that “industrialization brings rationalization, secularization, and
bureaucratization, but the rise of the knowledge society brings another set
of changes that move in a new direction, placing increasing emphasis on
individual autonomy, self-expression, and free choice” (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, Inglehart and Welzel (2) posit no less than what they call a
“unified theory of modernization, cultural change, and democratization,”
or what the subtitle of their book refers to metaphorically as the human
development sequence. Inglehart and Welzel’s addition of culture to the
relationship between modernization and democracy provides the previ-
ously missing element by which human development moves metaphori-
cally “forward.” The authors’ thesis is supported by what they see as the
fact that “to a large extent, culture is transmitted from one generation to
the next” (ibid.). This is the experiential context on which the metaphor
of movement forward through time and space is built. Sequentialism, as
highlighted in the book’s subtitle, is how humans come to conceptualize
106 M. P. MARKS
progress based on the physical experience of the passage of time in a physi-

cal plane. Furthermore, just as physicists tells us that humans experience
space and time as two dimensions that are seemingly felt as one, Inglehart
and Welzel (3) suggest that the human development sequence has three
dimensions, which are socioeconomic, cultural, and institutional in nature.
Moreover, in keeping with the notion that democratization can move
“backward,” the authors argue that the “sequence can also operate in the
reverse direction, with threats to survival leading to increased emphasis on
survival values, which in turn are conducive to authoritarian institutions”
(ibid., 4).
The important point is that whether they are early theories of modern-
ization, significant modifications of modernization theory such as those
advanced by Inglehart or Welzel, or challenges to modernization the-
ory such as those offered by Przeworski and Limongi, what these approaches
all share in common is the notion that economic modernization and
democratization represent the concept of progress that can move “forward”
in a desired direction or “backward” toward less desirable outcomes. The
notion that progress is desirable is deeply rooted in the human condition of
sensing the passage of time as a physical experience (Goatly 2007, 51ff ).
Progress “forward” seems almost a natural consequence of the space–time
continuum. Metaphors of progress are common in the human experience.
As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980, 1999) and Lakoff and Mark
Turner (1989) have observed, a pervasive metaphor in human thought is
life is a journey. It would appear that part of being human is to conceptu-
alize life as having a direction. Since what precedes any individual’s life is
non-existence, it seems natural that anything “forward” from nothingness
represents “progress.” Even death, which inspires almost universal dread, is
seen as an inevitable natural progression through life.
It should not be surprising then that scholarship on modernization and
democratization conceives of these processes as involving “progress”
toward desired ends, while other economic and political forms represent
“reverse” movement “backward” away those ends. Even scholars who
reject a causal relationship between modernization and democratization
nonetheless see parallel processes, each of which are imbued with forward
direction but with the possibility of moving in reverse. What is missing
from this conceptualization is the possibility that economic relationships
and politics, each on their own and in conjunction with each other, are
constituted by an infinite number of discrete interactions, which are vari-
ously interrelated yet independent of each other. Time and space may
indeed carry through them each of these individual interactions, and

humans may experience them as a progression (hence the conceptual met-
aphors of progress). But as analytical categories, there is nothing to sug-
gest an inevitable forward or backward movement through a range of
economic and political forms. Human development is not, as Przeworski
and Limongi will have it, sequential; it is only metaphorically conceptualized
as such, much in the same way “chaos” is made possible as a metaphorical
concept from the seeming randomness humans experience in other aspects
of their lives. Economic relations and political forms could be, and have
been, conceived of as chaotic (as in chaos theory), yielding a different set
of analytical propositions than modernization theory. Which set of theo-
retical propositions scholars choose to accept is to some degree arbitrary,
but, once accepted, these propositions determine the conclusions that are
drawn. As applied to economic relations and democracy, the metaphor of
directional progress has dominated the analysis to a significant degree.
“Advanced Democracies”
A corollary to the concept of democracy having a metaphorical “forward
direction” is the notion that once democracy is “consolidated” it meta-
phorically “advances” in that forward direction to the point that countries
can be classified as “advanced democracies.”25 It is not surprising that this
term has no universal definition. A review of the scholarly literature along
with textbooks, political science syllabi, as well as essays written by political
commentators demonstrates that individuals are free to define the concept
as they see fit. What unifies conceptions of “advanced” democracies, how-
ever, is the idea that political systems falling into this category can be
compared as a group to political systems that are “behind” somehow in
their political development. Thus, for example, Sheri Berman (2007, 31)
writes of the “political trajectories” that countries follow as they move in
the direction of advanced democracy. Moreover, Berman (28) writes that
“few serious observers today doubt that democracy is the best form of
modern political governance,” with the obvious implication that arriving
at the state of “advanced” democracy represents, as is clearly implied, an
“advance,” relative to other forms of government.26
About “advanced” democracies and “normal” politics, Andreas Schedler
(1998, 93) writes
108 M. P. MARKS
there are those “advanced democracies” that presumptively possess some

positive traits over and above the minimal defining criteria of liberal democ-
racy, and therefore rank higher in terms of democratic quality than many
new democracies. This term risks idealizing and reifying the wealthy Western
democracies, but even if we recognize that admiring references to “estab-
lished Western democracies” often rely on stereotypes, we have to acknowl-
edge that discursive constructs (such as “democratic normality”) are social
realities too.
The attribution of positive qualities to “advanced” democracies relative

to those that are, presumably, further “behind” is fully consistent with the
notion that democracy proceeds in a direction “away” from something
undesirable “toward” a state that is more fully desired. Even within the cat-
egory of democratic political systems the idea that some governments are
more “advanced” than others implies progress toward a state of completion
rather than the idea that democracy can take many forms, none of which is
necessarily superior to others. The directional metaphor of democratization
leaves little room for thinking about democracy as a dynamic process in and
of itself, which represents an ongoing process of multiform change.
Summary
In summary, we can construe the “directional” image of democratization
as part of a conceptual metaphor similar to linguistic expressions of for-
ward flow. For example, some theorizing about the international diffusion
of democracy has borrowed the metaphorical language of “dominoes”
that was employed at one time by politicians to frame the danger of the
spread of communism by way of states that succumbed to communist
expansion (i.e., “falling dominoes”).27 However, unlike the danger posed
to democracy by the image of “falling dominoes” inherent in Cold War
rhetoric, the literature on the diffusion of democracy conceives of domi-
noes toppling in a forward direction, much like “waves” of democracy
carrying the progress of democratic reform into a positive future. Thus,
for example, Harvey Starr (1991) writes of “democratic dominoes” that
fall “forward” toward democratization as process of a diffusion of demo-
cratic practices.28 As with “waves” of democracy, however, there can be
impediments to the diffusion of democracy, and thus Etel Solingen (2012)
also conceives of metaphorical “firewalls” that impede the diffusion of
democracy despite the trend of falling democratic dominoes, although
once democratic practices are diffused, they can be set in place wholly or
partially through processes of metaphorical “sedimentation.”
Similarly, in her examination of transitional justice and the spread of

human rights norms to nascent democracies, Kathryn Sikkink (2011, 5)
has dubbed the emergence, spread/diffusion, and impact of human rights
norms as part of the “justice cascade”: “Justice cascade means that there
has been a shift in the legitimacy of the norm of individual accountability
for human rights violations and an increase in criminal prosecutions on
behalf of that norm” (emphasis in the original). Following the convention
of thinking about progress in the transmission of democratic ideas in terms
of the forward movement of naturalistic phenomena such as “waves,”
Sikkink (ibid.) writes that the term “justice cascade” “captures how the
idea started as a small stream, but later caught on suddenly, sweeping
along many actors in its wake” (emphasis added).29 This evoking of
Huntington’s “wave” image as an aquatic “cascade” suggests that scholars
of democratization draw on a shared conceptual metaphor of political
change in terms of spatial direction, with progressive movement “for-
ward” in the direction of democracy and non-democratic practices thought
of as “regressive” or directionally “backward” toward the past.
Movement through space is a powerful physical experience for humans
and is the source of numerous conceptual metaphors that shape under-
standing of any number of aspects of existence and human relations such
as love and romance, work and careers, education and schooling, and eco-
nomics and commerce. There is a strong connection between the experi-
ence humans have of moving forward associated with the basic act of
locomotion. To walk forward is to progress toward something; to walk
backward is to lose forward momentum and hence move away from a
desired goal. This is not always the case, of course. When moving forward
is coerced, such as the forward march of prisoners of war, such forward
progression is negatively associated. Likewise, individuals moving back-
ward away from danger (e.g., away from a fire) associate such backing
away with the positive experience of survival. Nonetheless, the metaphor
of life as a process of forward movement is well documented and carries
over into numerous realms of human relations. The forward direction of
democratization is no exception. To the extent democracy is associated
with a desirable system of governance, democratization is metaphorically
conceived as having a forward direction, while transformation of politics
to undemocratic forms is seen as movement backward. This view sees poli-
tics not as a continuous process of dynamic change but as a directional
movement forward or backward through physical space.
110 M. P. MARKS
Reform/Democracy “From Above” Versus Reform/

Democracy “From Below”
While democratization is often said to move metaphorically in the direc-
tion “forward” toward democracy or “backward” away from it, political
change that brings about democracy is frequently hypothesized to come
metaphorically in the guise of reform either “from above” or “from
below.” As with many metaphors in political science theory, the concept of
political activity occurring spatially “above” and “below” corresponds to
other analytical metaphors such as the architectural metaphor of nation-
and state-“building.” To “build” a nation or state is to erect a metaphori-
cal edifice with structural activity “above” and “below.” This is noted by
Pål Kolstø (2000, 16), who writes: “The traditional, pre-modern state was
made up of isolated communities with parochial cultures at the ‘bottom’
of society and a distant, and aloof, state structure at the ‘top,’ largely con-
tent with collecting taxes and keeping order. Through nation-building
these two spheres were brought into more intimate contact with each
other.” To the extent a country’s political “structure” can be “built,” con-
ceptualizing the “top” and “bottom” of that structure in terms of the
“structure” of society is a logical metaphorical extension.
To think of politics in terms of politicians, policymakers, and govern-
ment leaders located “above” and society located “below” is of course
about as common a conceptual metaphor as one is likely to find in theories
of politics. In fact, it is politicians, policymakers, and government leaders
who are most likely to advance the notion that they rule “over” the citi-
zens “below.” Czar Alexander II of Russia is widely quoted as saying that
“it is better to abolish serfdom from above than to wait until it will begin
to abolish itself from below” (emphasis added).30 Political leaders, whether
they think of themselves as members of the “elite” or hailing from the
“common people” are nonetheless prone, in Alexander II’s image, to con-
ceive of a relationship with the rulers located “over” those whom they
rule. Spatial metaphors involving the vertical organization of society, of
course, are not new in conceptualizations of the politics, society, and law.
Politicians and law enforcement officials are often said to operate “above
the law” when they attempt to bypass established legal procedures.31 In
public administration, some managerial practices that ignore input from
“lower level” offices are frequently described as “top-down” in nature.32
Scholars are just as likely to perpetuate images of politics existing in a
vertically separated space through such analytical categories as reform
“from above” and reform “from below” in the process of democratiza-

tion. What makes the metaphor perhaps odd is that it relies on a spatial
juxtaposition of rulers “over” the ruled in theories of a political system,
democracy, that presumably is egalitarian in its ideal practice. In fact, early
appearances of the term “reform from above” in the scholarly literature do
not necessarily associate such reform with efforts to establish democratic
political institutions. For example, James Bill uses the term in a 1970 arti-
cle on political reforms in Iran, which, although presented as means for
modernizing Iranian economic institutions, nonetheless kept autocratic
political institutions intact. Bill (1970, 33) writes:
The White Revolution in Iran represents a new attempt to introduce reform

from above which, it is hoped, will preserve traditional power patterns.
Through land reform, the Shah has concentrated the aristocracy in the city
by severing their connection with the countryside. He has then moved to
ally himself with the peasantry against the professional middle class. The first
step is designed to buttress the Monarch’s position in the system by weaken-
ing the opportunity for upper-class challenger.33
Here, the metaphor of political leaders reforming “from above” makes

sense inasmuch as they sought to preserve their position “above” the citi-
zenry “over” which they ruled.
These types of early uses of the term “from above” often referred to eco-
nomic modernization more than political democratization. Echoing Bill’s
essay on Iran, for instance, James Petras and Robert LaPorte (1970) com-
pared “modernization from above” versus “reform from below” in their
article on US policy toward Latin American agricultural development. In
later formulations, however, the metaphor of rulers “above” the ruled
remained despite the term “reform from above” now pertaining to efforts
toward democratization as in the title of John Pevehouse’s (2005) book on
regional organizations and democratization, Democracy from Above.34 In
Pevehouse’s case, the “above” in question is even “higher” than the govern-
ments of states, that is, it represents international organizations. which, as
global-level governing organizations, are metaphorically “above” the gov-
ernments of countries in the process of democratization. Country-specific
case studies of “democracy from above” include the case of Bhutan where
Aim Sinpeng (2007, 27) argues that “the King’s decision to transform the
country governance…[was] a carefully planned and calculated decision”
that was imposed in a metaphorically top-down fashion as opposed to being
a function merely of “the country’s socio-economic development.”
112 M. P. MARKS
Even in the stages of reform in which such reform is said to be coming

from “above,” that is, during change in non-democratic political systems,
the spatial location of not only government officials but also individuals in
the opposition situated “above” the mass of regular citizens is a meta-
phorical concept that is rather revealing in its theoretical implications. The
term “reform from above” has been applied to countries experiencing
democratization in which some of the reformers were in fact not part of
the existing political system at all. For example, in the southern European
countries of Greece, Portugal, and Spain, which underwent democratiz-
ing processes in the 1970s, many of the reformers were in fact, not part of
the existing political systems but were vocal opponents, some of whom
had lived for decades in exile. These individuals have nonetheless been
seen as operating “above” average citizens in their reform efforts. While it
is true that some of these reformers were at one time in the past active
members of previous governments, for example in Greece, before democ-
racy was established, they held no political office and therefore, in terms of
rank, were no different from the average citizen presumably located
“below.” What made them metaphorically reformers “from above” was
that they were seen as not leading mass-based movements of regular
citizens but were members of the political “elite,” that is to say, select
members of society who occupy positions “above” others.35
What’s more, it is the position of reformers “from above” that renders
tenuous some processes of democratization, particularly in their early
stages. Thus, for example, referring to efforts toward democracy in Latin
America, Youssef Cohen (1987, 30) writes: “Because they are handed
down from above, such democracies are prone to polarization and radical-
ization. The particular tensions of these democracies work against their
transformation into stable democratic regimes. Instead, democracies from
above favor the emergence of modern forms of autocracy.” Whether or
not a democratic form of government remains in place over a certain
period of time is of course an empirical question. However, when making
predictions about the longevity of democratic governance, the categoriza-
tion of reform coming “from above” creates suspicion that such reform
may not be long-lasting because it emanates from political rulers and not
from the people “below.” This assumption is shared by political commen-
tators such as Tom Bentley (2002, no page number) who proclaimed that
“you can’t impose democracy from above,” that is to say, “political reform-
ers need to drop the idea that constitutional blueprints can transform the
culture of politics.” Instead, Bentley (ibid.) argues that “we should be
looking, not at the formal institutional structure but more at the informal
spread of relationships, conversations and ideas,” that is to say, change that
comes metaphorically “from below.”
Reform “from below” therefore represents political change brought
about by presumably regular or average people who in their collective
action force such change. As in “reform from above,” the term “reform
from below” can apply not necessarily to efforts toward democracy but
also economic modernization. Thus, for example, Stephan Haggard and
Marcus Noland (2009, 2) discuss economic liberalization in North Korea
that emanated not from state structures and institutions but from “oppor-
tunity entrepreneurship” on the part of individual citizens in the wake of
widespread economic hardship. In a totalitarian state such as North Korea,
it makes a certain sense to conceptualize the state as occupying a position
“over” the rest of society, which labors “under” the state’s rule. Similar
episodes of economic reform “from below” have been noted in China
(Liu 1992) where rural populations were given some room by the state to
experiment with market liberalization.
Democracy “from below,” in a fashion similar to democracy “from
above,” applies not only to economic modernization but also to efforts to
fundamentally alter systems of government.36 For example, Norrin
Ripsman (2016) posits that following periods of armed conflict, a two-
step process occurs, which involves “peacemaking from above,” whereby
state leaders orchestrate the cessation of hostilities followed by the estab-
lishment of “peace from below” wherein societal actors promote political
and economic stabilization. The way the elites and other citizens are con-
ceptualized retains the image that elites are in a position “over” the mass
base of the citizenry. Democracy “from below” is thus theorized in the
form of mass-based movements, for example, Elisabeth Jean Wood’s
(2000) study of democratization movements in South Africa and El
Salvador, which she frames as “insurgent” transitions coming “from
below.” The notion of an “insurgency” follows logically from thinking of
the mass base of a country’s population residing “under” those who rule
“over” them. In another sense, democracy “from below” makes a qualita-
tive distinction between the structures and institutions of formal gover-
nance and local systems of governance (e.g., the case of Ethiopia examined
in Zewde and Pausewang 2002).
However, the term “democracy from below” need not be limited to
insurgencies, mass-based movements, or local forms of governance. For
example, Stephen Jones (2000) applies the term to interest group politics
114 M. P. MARKS
in the Republic of Georgia, Ruud Koopmans (1995) harnesses the con-

cept to study social movements in the established democracy of West
Germany, and Liebert, Gattig, and Evas (2013) assert that civil society can
democratize governance in the EU from below. In other words, regardless
of the political context or the type of reform coming “from below,”
democracy emanating from that “direction” is conceptualized in this met-
aphor as pertaining to citizens who are “located” in a spatial sense under-
neath those who rule them, even in established democracies.
What the metaphors of reform “from above” and reform “from below”
have in common is a view of political relationship that distinguishes “nor-
mal” politics—in which agenda-setting, policy formulation, and policy-
making engage a range of members of society interacting in a variety of
ways—from the ostensibly “special” processes of democratization, at
which times there is an analytical distinction made between those who rule
or presume to rule “above” those who are ruled “below.” While this dis-
tinction is latent in much political theory, it becomes pronounced in theo-
ries of democratization, which see the democratization process as separate
and unique from presumably everyday politics that occur in democracies
and non-democracies alike. This dichotomy between democratization,
which represents a process of political change, and normal everyday poli-
tics, which represents a period of political stasis, is accentuated by the
metaphor that imposes a distinct way of conceptualizing relationships
among political actors when change is taking place. Of course, change is
ever present in all political circumstances. But thinking about reform
involving spatial relationships among political actors during periods of
democratization masks the varied relationships among political actors that
are obscured by imposing a special way of thinking about political actors
during times of change.
In addition, it is interesting to note that the spatial metaphor of reform
“from above” represents a bit of a mixed metaphor in the sense that such
reform is instigated by leaders of a country and “leaders” typically are
thought to lead from “ahead” in the “forward direction” of progress
toward democracy. Thus, scholars are presented with a mixed metaphor of
leaders at once spatially “above” the processes of democratization as well
as directionally “ahead” of society in the progress toward democracy. In
this sense, the spatial relationship of individuals being situated “above”
and “below” each other during periods of democratization often is accom-
panied by the spatial metaphor of democratization proceeding spatially in
a direction “forward” democracy or “backward” toward non-democratic
forms. In the “space” that politics occupies in human interactions, demo-

cratic change is multi-directional, moving in a variety of horizontal and
vertical directions. This is not surprising given the tendency to associate
politics with a physical “structure.”
Government Has “Density”: “Thick” and “Thin”

Political Authority
To the extent democracy and/or reform can come from “above” or from
“below,” an image appears of politics practiced in a vertically aligned
space. This notion of politics practiced up and down within a vertical space
leads to associated metaphorical constructions. Among the emergent met-
aphors in theorizing the nature of (democratic) governance within an up-
down environment is the notion that government has a “density,” that is,
it is characterized by varying degrees of “thick” and “thin” political
authority.37 That is to say, if scholars conceive of democratic politics as
comprising actors and relationships vertically arrayed relative to each
other, it is not surprising that the density of this space thought of in terms
of “thickness” or “thinness” would become part of the theoretical lan-
guage used to interpret democratic politics.
A government’s metaphorical “density”—its degree of “thickness” or
“thinness”—is thought of as relating to the number, extent of, and degree
of influence of political institutions such as its bureaucratic agencies, exec-
utive departments, legislative committees, judicial bodies, and formal and
informal practices such as those found in corporatist decision-making or
consociationalism. The metaphorical qualities of “thickness” and “thin-
ness” as applied to governments can be likened to how these qualities are
associated with cultures. William Mishler and Detlef Pollack (2003, 239)
conceive of “thick culture” as follows: “The essential idea of thick culture
is that societies are distinguished and structures (and individual behav-
iour) are fundamentally conditioned by a primordial force, unseen but
highly palpable, which contains the genetic code of all that is collectively
important and meaningful in that society.” For Mishler and Pollack
(239–240), thick culture is “essential,” “fundamental,” “exogenous,”
“holistic,” “externally bounded and internally homogenous,” represents
“a coherent cluster of orientations,” and is “durable.” “Thin” culture, by
contrast, for Mishler and Pollack (241), “might be better understood not
as the opposite end of the thick culture continuum but rather as a point
116 M. P. MARKS
somewhere in the middle of a continuum between thick culture and no

culture at all.” Mishler and Pollack (ibid.) contend that the concept of
“thin” culture represents an effort by political scientists (as opposed to
anthropologists) “eager to retain as much of the culture concept as they
can while diluting or discarding various aspects of thick culture which are
perceived to be incompatible with theory or inconsistent with observa-
tion.”38 In other words, while anthropologists see culture as constitutive
of people’s interests and therefore a “thick” element of their social and
political interactions, traditional approaches to political science prefer to
assume that individuals’ choices are dictated by interests. Culture in much
political science theory thus only plays a “thin” role in determining what
those interests are, assuming interests can otherwise be determined on the
basis of individuals’ rational calculations.
As with many metaphors, the quality of “thickness” and “thinness” of
political authority presumably exists along a spectrum. Describing the
institutions involved in European integration, Jeffrey Checkel (2001, 51)
writes: “For historical institutionalists, institutions get thicker, but only in
a long-term historical perspective. In the near-term here and now, they are
thin—structuring the game of politics and providing incentives for instru-
mentally motivated actors to rethink their strategies; they are a constraint
on behaviour.” Moreover, although largely unspoken, there would appear
to be an assumption that in gauging the health or viability of a democracy,
“thick” political authority is preferable to “thin” authority. This may
reflect a preference among scholars for governments that are poised to
provide tangible and intangible benefits to their citizens. That is to say,
“thick” political authority is associated with “positive” freedoms that only
accrue to polities once democratic governments have been fully institu-
tionalized enough to provide more than the negative freedoms, which
governments only enjoying “thin” authority can provide.
Yet what is “thick” and what is “thin” as they apply to politics is to a
large extent subjective, thus both limiting the utility of the density meta-
phor and revealing the theoretical predispositions of scholars.39 For exam-
ple, in his analysis of Hobbesian notions of absolutism, Shane Courtland
suggests a formulation by which what distinguishes “thick” versus “thin”
absolutism is the extent to which sovereignty is supplemented by addi-
tional aspects of governance. For Courtland (2009, 443, n. 25), “thin
absolutism” in the Hobbesian sense is comprised of three elements: “(i)
there is no legal limit placed on the sovereign authority; (ii) the subjects
have a political obligation to obey all laws of an effective sovereign; (iii)
the sovereign is the sole legal judge of whether he has violated the laws of
nature.” By contrast, “thick absolutism” is not an increase in the intensity
of the three aforementioned elements, but, rather, adds three additional
elements to government: “(a) monarchy, (b) strong control of doctrines
(to the point of indoctrination), and (c) total elimination of individual
freedoms” (ibid., n. 26). In other words, what distinguishes Hobbesian
absolutism for Courtland is not a greater extent of government control
but a more diverse set of institutions and practices for asserting that con-
trol. While some scholars may share this perspective, others may view the
“thickness” or “thinness” of political authority in terms of the degree to
which a set of defined governmental institutions and practices are exerted
over and throughout society. For Courtland, the degree of absolutism
resides in the various instruments governments possess, while rival con-
ceptions of political authority see absolutism as a function of the extent to
which those instruments are exerted.
Given the subjective nature of notions of “thick” and “thin” political
authority, of what utility are these concepts in theorizing about democ-
racy? Despite disagreements about how exactly to think about “thickness”
and “thinness,” these metaphors would seem to indicate that scholars per-
ceive of a metaphorical “density” in government and political authority. As
is true for virtually all metaphors, this is likely because scholars, like other
individuals, experience political authority in a physical sense in terms of
the extent to which they feel they are controlled by the institutions of
government. Cognitive linguistics tells us that metaphors are an expres-
sion of physical experiences. While political authority can, on the one
hand, be conceived of as an abstraction, it is, on the other hand, also
expressed in terms of the physical control that governments have on all
human beings. This can be expressed in extreme ways, for instance, in the
form of torture or imprisonment, but it can also be felt in more subtle
ways, for example, in the form of waiting in line for government goods or
services. Foucault (1978, 1988, 1995) has gone as far as to assert that
virtually all forms of political authority is expressed in the physical control
that governments exert over people’s minds, bodies, and sexualities. While
many political scientists would reject Foucault’s philosophical approach,
they nonetheless would likely agree that governments exerting political
authority have the ability to have an impact on what people physically
experience at various points of life.
That political authority therefore has a metaphorical density is not an
exotic notion, but it is not fully developed in the literature, with the result
118 M. P. MARKS
that it represents more a theoretical hunch than a set of useful analytical

tools. Ontologically, scholars have only suggested the ways in which
“thick” and “thin” political authority is expressed. Epistemologically,
scholars can thus merely hypothesize about how one might understand
such “thickness” or “thinness.” Methodologically, there is therefore no
agreed-upon way of identifying or measuring the “density” of political
authority. As it stands, disagreement notwithstanding, scholars nonethe-
less seemingly share with Foucault the notion that government physically
affects people’s lives, and it is worthwhile to formulate a means to study
the extent to which governments have this ability and the degree to which
such ability is exerted.
Lastly, in imagining the thickness or thinness of democracy, scholars
also frequently invoke the notion of “depth,” as in the concept of a meta-
phorical “deepening” of democracy.40 Ironically, imagining democracy in
terms of “depth” invites comparison with other ways of conceptualizing
the metaphorical spatial layers at which democracy exists, as illustrated by
the newly popularized notion of the so-called deep state, that is “shadow
governments” comprising elected and unelected officials, members of
security and intelligence agencies, bureaucrats, and individuals in busi-
nesses and in some cases criminal organizations who secretly control
ostensibly democratic governments.41 This irony only underscores the way
that seemingly straightforward concepts of governance such as density
actuality reveal deeply held views of politics that create ambiguity but also
reflect the experiential context in which scholarship takes place.
Metaphor of the Democratic Deficit

To the extent democracy and the processes by which countries adopt
democracy are conceptualized metaphorically, it is not surprising that once
democracy has been established the extent and degree to which it responds
to citizens’ expectations also is thought of in metaphorical terms. In
particular, the presence or absence of democracy relative to what society
expects is captured in the metaphorical concept of the so-called democratic
deficit. Although the concept of a democratic deficit has been applied to
other political contexts, it is perhaps most closely associated with the pro-
cesses of European integration.42 The Oxford English Dictionary contains
no citation to indicate the first usage of the term “democratic deficit,”
although Pieter Bouwen (2003, 3, fn. 4) and Yves Mény (2003, 8) claim
that the term was coined in 1979 by David Marquand in his book
Parliament for Europe, referring to the lack of direct elections for members
of the European Parliament, which, ironically, held its first direct elections
for members in June of that year. As Mény (ibid.) points out, linguistically
“democratic deficit is a powerful catchword, which can be easily manipu-
lated by all those who are not fully satisfied with the working of European
institutions.” Yet most scholars who have studied the democratic deficit
observe that there is no unanimous agreement about how to define it,
measure it, or even determine what it is.43
Mény and others have opined that the lack of a clear definition of
“democracy” renders a clear conception of the “democratic deficit” prob-
lematic.44 From a metaphorical point of view, the concept of interest in the
expression “democratic deficit” is “deficit.”45 The term “deficit” is bor-
rowed from the realm of accounting, which, in that context, represents the
difference between accounts received and accounts payable when the latter
exceeds the former. The accounting metaphor in the conceptualization of
the democratic deficit is captured by Pippa Norris (2011, 4–5) who writes:
It has long been thought that regimes are more likely to endure and flourish
where a balanced equilibrium exists between citizens’ aspirations for democ-
racy (measured by how much people value democratic ideals and reject
autocratic alternatives) and its perceived supply (monitored by public satis-
faction with the democratic performance of their own country). The gap
between aspirations and satisfaction is captured here by the concept of dem-
ocratic deficits. (emphasis in the original)
It is interesting to note that after using terms associated with finance

and accounting such as “balanced,” “value,” and “supply,” Norris refers
not to the democratic “deficit” in the singular, but democratic “deficits,”
almost as if to imply a running shortage in the accounting of democracy
on the national political books of any given country.46 Norris points out
that while the concept of the democratic deficit has been most associated
with public dissatisfaction with accountability of the institutions of
European integration, it can be applied to other political contexts where
public desire for democracy is not met with governmental institutions that
meet the public’s expectations.
What the term “democratic deficit” is meant to imply in the study of
democratic politics, therefore, is the lack of accountability on the part of
political institutions (e.g., as it would apply to the European Parliament,
the European Council, the European Commission, etc.) relative to the
expectations of democratic governance in which democracy is the standard
120 M. P. MARKS
form of government. Referring to European integration, Giandomenico

Majone (1998, 14) writes that “if the expression is taken literally—an
absence or incomplete development of institutions which we take for
granted in a parliamentary democracy—then a deficit of democracy is
indeed a distinctive feature of a process within which economic and politi-
cal integration not only move at different speeds but also follow different
principles—supranationalism in one case, inter-governmentalism in the
other.” Of course, in most discussions, “democratic deficit” is not taken
literally, a fact which Majone readily accepts, arguing that the term does not
capture the expectations of what are understood to be the accepted func-
tions of the agencies of European integration. Rather, Majone claims that
as long as the institutions of the EU operate as they are designed, that is,
that they are accountable in the administration of their functions, European
citizens will adjust their expectations accordingly.
Whether or not Majone’s claims in 1998 can be substantiated in light
of subsequent events, his and other scholars’ reference to “accountability”
as a measure of a metaphorical deficit is telling.47 Majone is right—what is
understood as the “democratic deficit” in Europe is not taken literally. The
concept of a democratic “deficit” is a metaphor that can have a broad
application, but most prominently has been applied specifically to the EU,
presumably because the politics of European integration are unique and
require a set of terms that reflect the distinctiveness of European integra-
tion relative to other realms of politics (both domestic and international).
To extend the metaphor, the implication is that there is a certain “amount”
of democracy that is not being fulfilled by the agencies of the EU; hence,
a “deficit” exists between what is “paid” (metaphorically) by the people of
Europe and what is “owed” back to them by the EU to make the
“accounts” of democracy come into “balance.”
One way then to measure the democratic “deficit” in any polity would
be to compare it “quantitatively” to comparable political systems. Indeed,
using this standard several scholars have argued that the so-called demo-
cratic deficit in the EU, at least, does not exist. Fritz Scharpf (1999,
10–11) uses the language of “inputs” and “outputs” to test for the exis-
tence of a “deficit” in democratic legitimacy in the EU: “The input per-
spective, deriving democratic legitimacy from a pre-existing collective
identity, emphasizes the irredeemable aspects of the European democratic
deficit. By contrast, the output perspective allows for the consideration of
a much wider variety of legitimizing mechanisms.” Contrary to many pop-
ular impressions, Scharpf goes on to argue that from an output perspec-
tive, the EU is not in deficit in terms of democratic legitimacy. Andrew

Moravcsik (2002, 621) concurs, asserting that “up till now there is little
evidence that these specific examples add up to a structural democratic
deficit in the EU. Any mature polity could point to areas in which such
democratic protections are stronger or weaker; in this regard the EU is
hardly exceptional” (emphasis added). Thus, to the extent there is a cer-
tain “amount” of democracy at any given time, one can, in Moravcsik’s
phrasing, “add up” the amount of democracy, compare it what is available,
and determine if the accounts are in deficit.
Moravcsik resurrects this quantitative notion of measuring a “demo-
cratic deficit” when he extends the discussion from European integration
to global governance writ large. Moravcsik (2004, 337) postulates the
ability to quantify democratic government: “Any democratic metric
derived from ideal theory must therefore be ‘calibrated’ in order to assess
whether the current arrangements are the best that are feasible under
‘real-world’ circumstances” (emphasis added). Moravcsik (ibid., 362)
concludes that if the so-called democratic deficit is to be measured, it
should adhere to the standards of social science in which outcomes can be
evaluated rigorously: “Any assessment of the democratic legitimacy of
regional and global governance must not just be philosophical, but empir-
ical and social scientific as well. Rather than comparing international orga-
nizations to idealized ancient, Westminster-style, or imaginary political
systems, the baseline should be the real-world practices of existing govern-
ments acting imperfectly under complex constraints.” For Moravcsik,
quantifying democracy allows one to determine definitively to what extent
it might be in deficit, assuming expectations of democracy can be similarly
quantified and measured.
The entire idea that democracy can be quantified and measured with
metrics is a somewhat odd metaphorical formulation since it implies some-
thing novel in the study of politics, namely, that there is a finite amount of
democracy at any given time and, presently, international organizations
such as the EU may or may not be delivering that sum to the people.
Moravcsik, for one, argues that there is not a democratic deficit in the EU,
a conclusion he arrives at precisely through social scientific means, not
philosophical introspection. What exactly is the correct amount of democ-
racy that should be supplied by the EU is subject to scholarly disagree-
ment, but in this metaphorical view, it can be systematically determined if
122 M. P. MARKS
the institutions of European integration are or are not in “deficit” relative

to what is owed back to the citizens of Europe.
This concept—the notion that international organizations such as the
EU may or may not respond to the wishes of the populace in the same way
as democratically elected bodies do in individual states—could be cap-
tured with any number of theories or metaphorical images, many of which
already exist when describing lack of accountability in the domestic poli-
tics of democratic states. That is to say, one could analyze the failure of
European governing institutions to respond to the will of the people in
terms of shortcomings in pluralist or corporatist political institutions, or
one could frame the issue using different metaphorical terms, for example,
democratic “accountability,” which is based on a metaphor that is similar
to democratic “deficit,” implying that leaders metaphorically “owe”
responsive government to the people. The attention paid by scholars to
the presence or absence of a democratic “deficit” thus reflects a specific
way of thinking about democratic politics, one which reveals scholars’
preference for thinking about politics as a system of interest inputs and
policy outputs. Inasmuch as politicians themselves often interpret voters’
interests revolving around “pocketbook issues,” that scholars should use
an economic metaphor to conceptualize citizens’ expectations indicates
that their perspectives parallel politicians’ views.
Narratives in the Metaphors of Democratization

Part of what metaphors used in theories of democratization reveal is that
scholars often conceive of democratization as a political process distinct
from the “normal” activities and process of politics within democracy or
in other political settings. The metaphorical language of “transition,”
“consolidation,” and “waves,” among other things, suggests distinct
aspects of governance that are set apart from the types of change that
occur as part of the regular processes of politics, which take place in the
normal course of political life. In particular, many, if not most, scholars
would acknowledge that one of the defining features of democracy is that
it is a dynamic system of governance which permits ongoing change in
large part because it is a form of government in which contestation is an
integral element.48 Even the most totalitarian political systems are charac-
terized by change as leaders move in and out of positions of authority and
government bureaucracies effect and implement new sets of policies over
time. One can speak of stages and phases of political change, but the
ongoing nature of politics makes it difficult to identify clearly demarcated

beginnings and ends.
The metaphorical language of scholarship on democratization, how-
ever, suggests political activity that is precisely characterized by starting
and ending points, even if they are not necessarily clearly discerned. For
example, Guillermo O’Donnell (1996, 39) reminds us that “there is no
theory that would tell us why and how the new polyarchies that have insti-
tutionalized elections will ‘complete’ their institutional set, or otherwise
become ‘consolidated.’” The notion that politics is discernible as change
is replaced by a language of periods with starts and stops. No doubt this is
part of scholars’ effort to create systems of classification, political catego-
ries, and typologies, which lend themselves to theories specifying the con-
ditions by which one analytical category of political processes leads to
another.49 Thus, for example, scholars such as Larry Diamond (1999, 65)
define “consolidation” in such ways that it represents the end phase in the
process of democratization, that is, consolidated democracy is a system of
government that is seen as “the only game in town.”50 This is precisely the
point, then, in unearthing the metaphorical concepts that inform such
theoretical endeavors. Political science is by its very nature an academic
enterprise preoccupied with identifying causal patterns that occur across
comparable circumstances. However, as with other academic undertak-
ings, it is the metaphors of inquiry that determine in part what causal log-
ics make intuitive sense and merit empirical research. The inherent ongoing
and changing nature of politics notwithstanding, the metaphors of theo-
ries of democratization determine a research agenda that assumes begin-
nings and endings of political cycles more than a view of politics that
incorporates unending and ongoing change.
Of course, as with any sets of metaphors in the study of politics and IR,
one can ask what alternatives there are to those that currently frame the
debate. For example, in response to Thomas Carothers’ 2002 article in
which he declares an end to “the transition paradigm,” Ghia Nodia (2002,
14) asks, “if ‘transition’ is no longer an apt metaphor for what these coun-
tries are experiencing, how should we conceptualize their condition? And
what, if anything, should we do differently because we have stopped call-
ing them by one name and are searching for another?” (emphasis in the
original). David Becker’s (1999, 139–140) solution is to “abandon the
classification of liberal democracies as ‘transitional,’ ‘consolidated,’ and
the like” and instead focus on the processes of politics that are ongoing
across political forms “by adopting an analytical focus that concentrates its
124 M. P. MARKS
attention on conflict and collaboration among social forces striving to use

structures of institutional authority to serve their own interests.”51 In
other words, rather than thinking about metaphorical democratic “transi-
tion” and “consolidation” as distinct phases, Becker suggests that democ-
ratization be seen as embodying the same processes of politics that apply
to (potentially all) other political contexts.
The need to think about democracy and democratization in the wider
context of politics as a dynamic process is highlighted by the failure of
political science to adequately explain or predict political change where
democratic governance is tenuous. In recent history, the advent of the so-
called the Arab Spring does not represent a neat “transition” “to” democ-
racy, but rather, involves a complex array of political practices and
institutions that are not easily classified nor defined. For instance, non-
democratic regimes in place in countries such as Egypt attempted to
orchestrate a variety of political changes in response to popular uprisings,
but these changes were not necessarily in the “direction” of democracy. By
the same token, those individuals agitating for change were not necessarily
demanding a “transition” to democracy as it is commonly practiced in the
West. Instead, what the world was seeing were movements for changes in
the political practices of these countries as well as efforts by existing gov-
ernments either to resist such change or accommodate it in ways that the
West would not necessarily understand as “democracy.”
It is not just the “Arab Spring.” The complicated nature of politics,
which cannot be measured through metaphorical concepts, is not limited
to regions where democratization is presumably on a linear path. A variety
of Central and Eastern European countries, for example, Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Romania have not necessarily made a full “transition” “to”
democracy, much to the consternation of other member-state govern-
ments in the EU. The expectation that democratization moves in forward
and backward directions, that it goes through stages with beginning and
end points, that it can be measured quantitatively in terms of its presence
or absence (i.e., in ways that result in a democratic deficit) ignores the
“messy” nature of politics in all its forms. Politics, after all, involves peo-
ple, and people engaged in human relations do not respond to change in
fully predictable ways. This is not to say that no patterns of political change
can be discerned, but only to caution that metaphors of democracy have
their limitations, particularly when they fail to acknowledge that what is
normal about politics is its ever-changing nature.
Notes
1. On the international aspects of democratization, see, for example,
Whitehead (1986), Levitsky and Way (2005), Pevehouse (2005).
2. Biological metaphors also are indicated by Larry Diamond’s (2011, 17)
examination of “why democracies survive” (emphasis added).
3. On the debate between mechanical and biological metaphors in the study
of IR, see Marks (2011, 74–78 and 162–169).
4. On the contrast between linear cause and effect and evolutionary change,
Whitehead references Leydesdorff (2000).
5. Organic, life cycle, and contagion metaphors are carried forward in theo-
ries of international diffusion of democracy. Thus, for example, Etel
Solingen (2012, 641) suggests that insights about democratization can be
gleaned from investigating the concepts of “contagion, firewalls, medium,
conductivity, sedimentation, and immunity,” which “connect seamlessly
with the natural sciences.” See also Rosecrance (2014), Solingen and
Börzel (2014), Wan (2014).
6. The notion that democratization represents processes that are analytically
distinct from “normal” politics is highlighted by Ghia Nodia (2002, 14):
“The most basic contention that lay at the basis of ‘third wave’ optimism
was the notion that democracy is now the only ‘normal’ political regime.”
Likewise, in distinguishing processes of democratization from the “nor-
mal” state of politics in Argentina, Steven Levitsky (2000, 57) writes that
the “turn toward ‘normalized’ democratic politics represents a major break
with the past,” while Larry Diamond (1994, 15) argues that democratic
consolidation “involves behavioral and institutional changes that normal-
ize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty” (emphasis added). See
also Michael Shafir’s 1997 article on “Romania’s Road to ‘Normalcy’.”
7. The role of mechanical and biological imagery in the study of IR is elabo-
rated at length by Harald Kleinschmidt (2000).
8. “Transition” and “consolidation” dominate the metaphors that conceptu-
alize stages of democratization, but there are others as well. Some com-
mentators (mostly journalists, although some scholars as well) refer to
“mature” democracy, which Karol Edward Sołtan (2009, 19) defines as “a
form of democracy with the greatest capacity to overcome difficulties.” On
mature and maturing democracies, see also Diamond and Shin (2014).
9. Stoner, et al. (6) also make distinctions between transitions that can be
considered “successes” or “failures,” with the latter stuck in political forms
that have not made the transformation from one type of governance to
another.
10. For additional thoughts on what is deemed “transitions” to democracy, see
the essays collected in Anderson (1999).
126 M. P. MARKS
11. Those conditions are when there is agreement about political procedures
for bringing about elected government, when free elections result in a gov-
ernment, when the new government has de facto authority to create poli-
cies, and when legislative, executive, and judicial bodies do not have to
share power with other de jure political entities (Linz and Stepan 1996, 3).
12. The “forward” direction of democratization understood normatively as an
“advance” and the “backward” direction as a reversal of political progress
are captured by a variety of scholars. Thus, for example, the subtitle to
Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring’s 2005 edited volume The Third
Wave of Democratization in Latin America is Advances and Setbacks, an
indication that movement toward democracy represents progress toward
the desired goal of democracy, while political changes in the opposite
“direction” constitute steps backward away from the ultimate goal (as the
term “setback” implies).
13. O’Donnell and Schmitter (70) supplement the metaphor of forward direc-
tion with the metaphor of democratization as a multilayered game of chess.
In this metaphor, direction is not necessarily forward: “Political democ-
racy, then, usually emerges from a nonlinear, highly uncertain, and immi-
nently reversible process involving the cautious definition of certain spaces
and moves on a multilayered board.” Thus, democratization is a direc-
tional process that can be reversed (ibid., 8).
14. “Forward” and “backward” movement “toward” and “away” from
democracy is not the same thing as another metaphor Turan (86ff ) uses to
conceptualize the politics of democratization in Turkey, that is, the idea of
alternating “cycles” of democratization.
15. Following Huntington’s convention, Andreas Wimmer (2013) conceives
of metaphorical “waves of war” brought on by the rise of nationalism and
nation-states.
16. Scott Mainwaring and Frances Hagopian (2005, 1) follow the oceanic
image of the wave metaphor to its obvious conclusion when they write
metaphorically that “a sea change has occurred in Latin American politics”
(emphasis added). Elsewhere in the same volume, Mainwaring and Aníbal
Pérez-Liñán (2005) invoke a different set of metaphors to frame reversals
in democratization, referring metaphorically to “breakdowns” and
“erosions.”
17. It is from this notion that “waves” of democracy represent movement
“forward” toward something that prompted the editors of the Journal of
Democracy to ask in the title of a 2007 forum, “Is East-Central Europe
Backsliding?” (Plattner and Diamond 2007, 5, emphasis added) and Merle
Goldman (1990, 9) to ponder “China’s Great Leap Backward” after the
Tiananmen Square massacre (emphasis added). For a critique of the direc-
tional metaphor for democratization, see Carothers (2002).
18. Gunitsky’s definition of hegemonic shocks relies on secondary conceptual

metaphors such as the “distribution” of power (a spatial metaphor), “lead-
ing” states (a metaphor of position), and the international “system” (an
organic and mechanical metaphor).
19. A sustained period of democratization then is conceptualized as a “pla-
teau” (Gunitsky 2014, 590).
20. It is interesting to note that Huntington switches metaphors when concep-
tualizing a group of countries making a transition to democracy; in one
sense those countries comprise a metaphorical “wave,” but in another
sense they can be situated within historical “boxes.” In both cases,
Huntington observes that the metaphorical image involved leaves outliers
that do not conform to historical patterns of regime type.
21. Outside the Latin American context, the “pendulum” metaphor has also
been applied to democratization in Myanmar. See Chongkittavorn (2012).
22. While Huntington clearly acknowledges that there can be “reverse” waves
of democracy, the “wave” metaphor nonetheless imparts a view in which
democratization is a natural process akin to a wave moving in toward the
shore, but there can be forces that stem the metaphorical “tide” of democ-
racy, which can direct the wave in the opposite direction. The forward and
backward movement of waves also has been expressed as “cycles” of democ-
ratization. For “cycles” of democratization see, for example, Turan (2015).
23. The desirability of democracy is evident in additional metaphors in Pastor’s
edited book, for example, in the section where suggestions are made for
“maintaining the momentum” of the pendulum in the direction of democ-
racy and in the way that democracy is described in the heading of part two
of the book in terms of its “decline” and “rise,” which, on one the hand,
could be merely the swing down and up of the metaphorical pendulum,
but which, on the other hand, also could be understood as the ascendance
of a political system that scholars would like to see emerge and its demise,
which is likened to the falling down of something that has been built.
24. Lipset (1959, 103) writes that the correlation between modernization and
democracy “does not justify the optimistic liberal’s hope that an increase in
wealth, in the size of the middle class, in education, and other related fac-
tors will necessarily mean the spread of democracy or the stabilizing of
democracy.” Lipset’s analysis draws on propositions in Lerner (1958).
25. The notion of “advanced” democracies is similar to the way scholars have
theorized democratization in terms of whether it corresponds metaphori-
cally to an “early” or “late” period of time. On “early” and “late” democ-
ratization, see, for example, Turan (2015).
26. Berman’s article appeared in a special issue of Journal of Democracy devoted
to the theme of “advanced democracies.”
27. On the metaphor of falling dominoes see, for example, Jervis and Snyder
(1991), Shimko (1994).
128 M. P. MARKS
28. See also Starr and Lindborg (2003).

29. The concept of a metaphorical “cascade” has been extended to how other
international norms emerge and are spread. See, for example, Fisk and
Ramos (2014).
30. Czar Alexander II’s statement on abolishing serfdom “from above” is
widely quoted. For one discussion of the Czar’s comment, see Skocpol
(1979, 85).
31. See, for example, the pointedly titled book Above the Law (Skolnick and
Fyfe 1993), which describes police action that violates legal prescriptions
in combating crime.
32. For more examples of political authority associated metaphorically with posi-
tions “above” or “high up” in position or rank, see Goatly (2007, 36ff ).
33. Even in the period just before the “Arab Spring,” when rulers in the
Islamic and Arab world advanced political changes, such changes were not
directed toward democratization and thus could be labeled as what under-
standably is known as “reform from above.” For such political reform in
the Arab world, see Ehteshami (2003).
34. Similar titles include Representation from Above (Esaiasson and Holmberg
1996), Revolution from Above (Gupta 2013), and Democratization from
Above (Bohlken 2016).
35. The term “elite” itself is connected to politics. Its origin is in the Latin
ēligere, meaning “to choose,” and therefore shares with the English word
“elect” roots in the political processes by which a group of individuals (the
“elite”) are chosen to govern.
36. The concept of democratization “from below” can be applied not only to
countries which currently do not have democratic forms of government
but also to political arrangements that ostensibly are democratic but seem-
ingly do not fully embody democratic accountability. See, for example, the
notion of democratizing the EU “from below” in Liebert, Gattig, and
Evas (2013). The concept of reform coming “from below” has been
applied to other areas as well, such as what Geoff Dancy and Verónica
Michel (2016) refer to as “human rights enforcement from below.”
37. Thick political authority is different from thick democracy, which John
Ryder (2008, no page number) defines in terms of a country’s “common
interests with those beyond its borders.”
38. In contrast to thick culture, Mishler and Pollack (243) see thin culture as
“empirical,” “constructivist and rational,” “endogenous,” “individualist,”
“relatively unbounded and diverse,” “heterogeneous and ambivalent,” and
“dynamic.”
39. For lay people too what is “thick” and “thin” in terms of political authority
is subjective. For example, a blogger for The Zimbabwean (Media Institute
of Southern Africa 2011) associates the “thinness” of political authority
with the ability of protesters during the “Arab Spring” to challenge
entrenched regimes.
40. On the “deepening” of democracy, see, for example, Turan (2015).

41. On the notion of “deep states,” see, for example, Ambinder and Grady
(2013).
42. The democratic deficit in the EU includes what Jürgen Neyer (2010)
terms the “justice deficit” in the EU. For an example of an analysis of the
democratic deficit beyond the case of European integration, see Ferguson
and Mansbach (2004, 324–329).
43. Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix (2006, 534) sum up the state of the art
succinctly, stating “there is no single meaning of the ‘democratic
deficit’.”
44. Furthermore, Mény (12) says the “problem might be more a question of
legitimacy than democracy.”
45. While most of the analysis of the democratic deficit has focused on deter-
mining qualities of democracy in the EU, Dorian Jano (2008) attempts to
construct a model operationalizing the deficit element. Jano does not,
however, examine the metaphorical aspects of the expression democratic
“deficit.”
46. Norris supplements her definition of the democratic deficit with a sche-
matic diagram showing the relationship between the “demand side” and
“supply side” for democracy.
47. Majone (14–15) writes “the expression ‘democratic deficit’ can also denote
a set of problems—technocratic decision-making, lack of transparency,
insufficient public participation, excessive use of administrative discretion,
inadequate mechanisms of control and accountability—that arise whenever
important policy-making powers are delegated to bodies operating at
arm’s length from government, such as independent central banks and
regulatory authorities” (emphasis added).
48. Thus, for example, Jorge Domínguez and Anthony Jones (2007, 3) write
that “the construction of a democratic polity is always a work in progress.”
49. Some of the analytical difficulties of theorizing about democratization that
are created by the inclination to categorize stages of the democratization
process are explored in Przeworski (1986).
50. Earlier, Diamond (1994, 15) defined “consolidation” as “the process by
which democracy become so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its
citizens that it is very unlikely to break down.”
51. Becker (146) elaborates on what he means by conflict and collaboration by
actors advancing their interests using structures of institutional authority:
“Political institutions and practices would be studied as venues and modes
of political action involving contending and collaborating social forces,
with the goal of discovering whether the institutional changes thereby
induced enhance or erode the moderate state or the legal or formal equal-
ity of citizenship.”
130 M. P. MARKS
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CHAPTER 4
Theoretical Reflections
Theoretical Aspects of Metaphors in Realism

Metaphors abound in Realist theory, perhaps because of the conscious
efforts of Realists to emphasize that the paradigm rests on a social scien-
tific foundation built of variables, testable hypotheses, and observable and
measurable facts. As ironic as it sounds, metaphors are integral to virtually
all theoretical endeavors despite the temptation to think of theories as
depending on a literal interpretation of material facts. That is, for social
scientists especially, to engage in a theoretical exercise is to try to mimic
scholars in the physical and natural sciences who deal with data that can be
unambiguously observed and quantifiably measured. In many ways, fields
such as physics and chemistry are the model even for social scientists not
undertaking quantifiable research since disciplines such as these presum-
ably eschew inventions of the human mind in favor of observable material
reality. In IR theory, Realists have drawn inspiration from theorizing in the
physical and natural sciences so as not to commit the errors of prior philo-
sophical approaches to the study of world affairs. This would seem to sug-
gest that metaphors have no place in a rigorous social science paradigm
such as Realism.
Yet, as language scholars have noted, conceptual metaphors not only
are inherent in all forms of human cognition, they are eminently in evi-
dence in all manner of scientific inquiry.1 Metaphors play an important
role in theorizing because they give visual form to abstract ideas. They
serve a heuristic function by transferring from one domain understanding

138 M. P. MARKS
about causal relationships to another domain in which causation is not

readily understood. Like models, metaphors replicate in miniature the
properties of a concept that is understood, which can then serve as a basis
for making hypotheses in another area about which knowledge is incom-
plete, imperfect, or not fully understood. In scientific theorizing, this
often involves making a metaphor out of something basic and simple (e.g.,
something as basic as a geometric shape) and using it to theorize about
something far more complex (e.g., the physical properties of atomic
elements).
For Realists, especially those seeking to distinguish themselves as more
“scientific” in nature than their predecessors, metaphors add an aura of
credibility since they play a role in modeling the hypothesized causal logic
of IR just as they do in other scientific endeavors. In establishing the nar-
rative plot of IR, it should therefore not be surprising that metaphors are
involved in theorizing the origins of actors’ motives. One of the most
immediately recognizable metaphors in Realist theory is the time-honored
“billiard balls” metaphor.2 The billiard balls metaphor models what
Realists see as the essential set of relationships among states in the interna-
tional system.3 The basic elements of the model are well known and can be
summarized succinctly. The international system is depicted as an unmov-
able physical structure in the form of a billiards table, which models the
finite geographic boundaries of the planet. States are imagined as billiard
balls, the interiors of which are irrelevant in terms of predicting the trajec-
tory of the balls as they careen around the table and collide with other
balls on the table. What does have an influence on the interaction of the
balls is their weight, size, and mass (not their color, nor other superficial
features) as well as their location and current trajectories relative to other
balls on the table. This picture is thought by Realists to be a good basis for
modeling the causal factors that explain how states interact with each
other, that is, their relative power as indicated by their capability to influ-
ence the position of other balls on the table. Balls that weigh more, are
larger, are moving more swiftly, or that have a location relative to other
balls which gives them more force are capable of knocking other balls
around. Power, as represented by these measures of force, is what explains
the patterns of movement of balls on the table and the direction balls take
when they collide with others.4
As countless observers have noted, the billiard balls metaphor encapsu-
lates the basic assumptions of Realism and its main theoretical propositions.
States are thought of metaphorically as “hard-shelled and impenetrable
THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS 139
territorially sovereign states” (Opello and Rosow 1999, 226), and are said
to have “interests [that] are defined exogenously” in a “process [that] is
characterized by intergovernmental bargaining and unlimited state interest”
(Sjursen 2001, no page number).5 This image imputes a structural element
to interstate relations.6 Since states are assumed to be functionally similar,
what differentiate them from each other are their external qualities and their
position relative to each other. By external qualities, Realists mean power
as expressed in terms of abilities to exert force including such things as size
of population, industrial capacity, economic resources, natural resources,
and military preparedness. Geography also becomes a measure of power
and includes not only natural defenses such as mountain ranges and bodies
of water but also proximity to other countries and geographic isolation.
The billiard ball metaphor focuses the mind on this set of propositions by
picturing states as opaque billiard balls and emphasizing the ways that the
balls differ from each other in terms of their size, mass, and location rela-
tive to each other and the physical structure of the billiard table itself.
The billiard balls metaphor also has a corollary in the so-called black
box metaphor, by which states are conceptualized as unitary actors.7 The
“black box” metaphor used for visualizing the state in Realist theory is
interesting because it represents a simplifying assumption as opposed to a
theoretical proposition. That is to say, as most scholars of IR know, Realist
predictions are based on the hypothesis that changes in the distribution of
power best explain outcomes in relations among states. In order to test
this hypothesis, virtually all other aspects of the international system and
its constituent parts must be held constant, otherwise they would serve as
confounding variables. It must be assumed that states are the only relevant
actors in the international system and that they are unitary actors pursuing
self-interest in a rational fashion. As simplifying assumptions none of these
things are demonstrable facts; they are merely assumed so that the causal
influence of changing distributions of power can be tested with regard to
their ability to predict outcomes in international affairs.
How then to visualize these concepts assuming they are not sufficiently
intelligible as expressed in literal terms? To some extent, the “black box”
metaphor responds to this question as an answer in and of itself. That is to
say, since that which might represent variability in states apart from their
power relative to each other resides inside the state (in the form of domes-
tic politics and foreign policy decision-making), the answer is to seal off
this information and make it opaque as seen from the perspective of the
international system. The black box metaphor dictates that what occurs
140 M. P. MARKS
within the state is, if not unknowable, then mostly irrelevant for the
purposes of Realist theorizing about the international distribution of

power. It is easy to imagine the state as a black box, the contents of which
are unseen. There are contents to the box, so in that sense the metaphor
acknowledges that holding constant things such as rationality and unity of
purpose is part of the simplifying assumptions of Realism, not a statement
of fact about the composition of the state. But it becomes easy to suspend
interest in the content of the state by hiding it behind the opaqueness of a
metaphorical “black box.” Once this metaphor and the simplifying
assumptions it represents are accepted, they have served their purpose for
establishing the essential bases of Realist theory and to some extent can
then be forgotten as attention is paid to what really matters for making
predictions in the Realist school of thought, that is, the changing distribu-
tion of power among states. This is the case for other aspects of Realist
theory discussed in the following section.
Metaphors and the Epistemology of Neorealism

Some scholars are particularly attentive to the role of metaphors in devel-
oping epistemological perspectives in the study of IR. One prominent
example of this is Kenneth Waltz and his elaboration of Neorealist theory.
Inasmuch as Waltz’s brand of Neorealism is a common point of departure
(as well as object of critique) within IR scholarship, it is instructive to
examine the role of metaphors in this particular school of thought.
Moreover, Waltz acknowledges that his theory is grounded in a method
that begins with abstractions, of which metaphors are a part. While Waltz
does not explicitly state that the sources of his theories are metaphorical
images, he does stress the need for starting the theoretical exercise with
abstract concepts, not literal empirical facts: “To construct a theory we
have to abstract from reality, that is, to leave aside most of what we see and
experience. Students of international politics have tried to get closer to the
reality of international practice and to increase the empirical content of
their studies. Natural science, by contrast, has advanced over the millennia
by moving away from everyday reality and by fulfilling Conant’s … aspira-
tion to lower ‘the degree of the empiricism involved in solving problems’”
(Waltz 1979, 68). Here we see that Waltz favors an approach that wel-
comes metaphorical allusions over observable facts at the beginning of the
theorizing process.
Two basic metaphorical elements in Waltz’s version of neorealism are

“system” and “structure,” which he defines concurrently: “A system is
then defined as a set of interacting units. At one level, a system consists of
a structure, and the structure is the systems-level component that makes it
possible to think of the units as forming a set as distinct from a mere col-
lection. At another level, the system consists of interacting units” (ibid.,
40). The logic Waltz applies makes it clear that he is dealing in the area of
metaphors, not literal facts. With regard to structure, for example, Waltz
(80) writes: “Structure is not something we see.” Furthermore, Waltz
(80) cites Meyer Fortes (1949, 56), who describes structure in a way that
it is obvious it is metaphorical, not empirical, in nature: “When we describe
structure, we are in the realm of grammar and syntax, not of the spoken
word. We discern structure in the ‘concrete reality’ of social events only by
virtue of having first established structure by abstraction from ‘concrete
reality’.” Relations among states lack a physical structure and therefore are
not literally structural in nature but merely metaphorically so.
Inherent in Waltz’s metaphors of system and structure is additional
metaphorical imagery based on spatial relations. Specifically, Waltz invokes
the metaphor of “levels”: “Any approach or theory, if it is rightly termed
‘systemic,’ must show how the systems level, or structure, is distinct from
the level of interacting units” (Waltz 1979, 40 emphasis added). The term
“level” must be understood as metaphorical inasmuch as interactions
among international actors do not literally take place on a distinct physical
plane from the actors themselves. Waltz reinforces the fact that he is deal-
ing with a spatial metaphor in a diagram that shows “International struc-
ture” in a box located above a separate box labeled “Interacting units.”
Since the international system is not literally “above” states and other
international actors, it can only be understood as a metaphorical represen-
tation of that which merely appears as in a separate physical place.
The spatial aspect of Waltz’s metaphorical treatment of IR also extends
to the actors in the metaphorical international “system.” Specifically, like
many scholars of IR, Waltz envisions an “inside” and an “outside” to
states which are, for Waltz, the relevant actors in the international system.
In a typical passage, Waltz writes: “Each state arrives at policies and decides
on actions according to its own internal processes, but its decisions are
shaped by the very presence of other states as well as interactions with
them. When and how internal forces find external expression, if they do,
cannot be explained in terms of the interacting parties if the situation in
142 M. P. MARKS
which they act and interact constrains them from some actions, disposes
them towards others, and affects the outcomes of their interactions”
(ibid., 65 emphasis added).
The ongoing use of spatial metaphors is found in the distinctions Waltz
makes between domestic and international politics. In the domestic
sphere, Waltz envisions political actors physically situated relative to each
other in a vertical fashion. The key term here is “hierarchy”: “Domestic
politics is hierarchically ordered. The units—institutions and agencies—
stand vis-à-vis each other in relations of super- and subordination” (ibid.,
81 emphasis added). The terms “hierarchy” and “stand” clearly are meta-
phors since political actors obviously are not physically above or below one
another as these terms would imply if they were taken literally. Rather,
Waltz’s imagery gives the impression of a spatial relationship among
actors, and this imagery then goes on to inform the theoretical deductions
that can be derived. Specifically, since “hierarchy” entails a relationship of
super- and subordination, as Waltz states, one would deduce a political
system where political authority is exercised in a metaphorical top-down
fashion. Were Waltz to use a different metaphor, the super- and subordi-
nate relationships would not be implied, and different theoretical proposi-
tions would be advanced. This does not mean that Waltz’s deductions and
conclusions are wrong, simply that how he arrives at these conclusions is
constrained to a certain extent by the metaphors he chooses for the theo-
retical project.
On certain basic elements, Waltz’s Neorealism shares metaphorical per-
spectives with classical Realism, in particular, that the relevant metaphor
with which to envision IR is that of “anarchy.” But before Waltz analyzes
the particulars of anarchy, he first engages in analysis by analogy, specifi-
cally, he makes an analogy between the structure of international politics
and the structure of the economic market.8 Technically speaking, a meta-
phor is a specific kind of analogy. Analogies highlight similarities across
domains. Typically, analogies are designed to highlight the similarities
among dissimilar realms that are nonetheless related in some way. Thus,
for example, a simple analogy would be “fingers are to hands as toes are to
feet.” Metaphors are analogies in that they highlight similarities across
potentially dissimilar realms, but they are specific kinds of analogies that
indicate similarities between the seemingly dissimilar across unrelated
domains. Thus, a simple metaphor would be of the sort “the teacher is the
head of the class.” The class is not literally a body and the teacher is not,
therefore, literally the “head.” Rather, a useful similarity is found between
the seemingly dissimilar realms of a school classroom on the one hand and
the unrelated domain of the human body on the other.
This distinction between analogy and metaphor is useful since, while
Waltz says that his comparison between international politics and the eco-
nomic market is an analogy, it is to some extent an analogy of the meta-
phorical sort. Economic relations involve to a large extent exchanges of
tangible commodities. By contrast, much of what constitute international
politics involves abstract concepts such as diplomacy. Thus, what is inter-
esting between Waltz’s comparison between economics and international
politics is not the analogical correspondences involved, but rather the
conclusions Waltz derives about international politics through the meta-
phor of the economic market.
The first lesson Waltz (1979, 91) derives from the market metaphor is
that “international-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by
the coaction of self-regarding units.” Second, Waltz (ibid.) concludes that
“international-political systems, like economic markets, are individualist in
origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended.” Thus, “both systems
are formed and maintained on a principle of self-help that applies to the
units” (ibid.). The economic metaphor is important because it is on the
basis of this metaphor that Waltz makes his foundational assumption,
which eventually leads to his full-blown theory of international politics.
Waltz’s assumption is that “states seek to ensure their survival” (ibid., 91).
This is a perfectly plausible assumption, one which, Waltz rightly points
out, he is permitted to make inasmuch “in a microtheory, whether of
international politics or of economics, the motivation of the actors is
assumed rather than realistically described” (ibid., 91). That is to say, the
rules of theorizing allow for a priori assumptions to be made.
What is relevant, and therefore open to debate, are the bases of founda-
tional assumptions in any theoretical endeavor. In Waltz’s case, those assump-
tions emerge from the economic market metaphor, which is the inspiration
for his theory of international political structures. If Waltz had started
with a different metaphor—for example, the metaphor of the family—he
likely would have been led to a different set of assumptions about inter-
national politics. Members of families typically are not self-regarding and
are not self-helping in the way they go about interacting with other
family members. That is to say, family members do not approach their
relations with other family members on the basis of survival of one family
member against another. Thus, and this is critical for understanding the
force of metaphors, if Waltz were to have chosen the family as a metaphor
144 M. P. MARKS
rather than the economic market, he would not necessarily assert the
assumption that “states seek to ensure their survival.” He might begin with
such an assumption, and it might be the right assumption to make. But it
would not necessarily be the assumption he would start with were he to
have arrived at his assumptions via a different inspirational metaphor. But
Waltz does begin with the metaphor of the economic market, and this leads
to his foundational assumption about international politics, an assumption
that leads to all of his theoretical deductions, and consequently the whole
of the conclusions that he derives, which eventually comprise the Neorealist
theory of international politics. Here we see the essential influence of the
economic market metaphor on the Neorealist school of thought.
The economic market metaphor also influences assumptions Waltz
makes about the relevant actors in international politics. Waltz (ibid.,
93–94) concedes that there are and have always been non-state actors in
the international system, just as there are actors other than firms in an eco-
nomic market. However, Waltz says that it is fair to emphasize states
because they are the most prevalent actors, just as firms are the most preva-
lent actors in an economic market. However, if Waltz were to have begun
with a metaphor that is more heterogeneous in terms of the actors that
comprise it, for example, a university, comprised such as it is of under-
graduate students, graduate students, professional students, professors, lec-
turers, administrators, service staff, researchers, administrative staff, and so
forth, he would perhaps be more inclined to apply that metaphor to inter-
national politics, in which case he would acknowledge and assign signifi-
cance to the various types of international actors Waltz already concedes
exist.9 Again, the metaphor is critical in terms of the assumptions that one
begins with in theorizing and the deductions that emanate from it.
As Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little point out in great
detail, many of these problems arise because Waltz clings to the notion that
he is treating economics as an analogy for international politics rather than a
metaphor, Thus, for example, Buzan et al. (1993, 194–195) observe that
Waltz’s attempts at analogy underspecify the relationship between anarchy
and the balance of power inasmuch as it is unclear whether the state, as a
political entity, creates the conditions of “market-like” relations in an unreg-
ulated or “anarchic” environment or, in fact, if the state is a creature of the
market. Instead, in chapter 11 of their book, Buzan, Jones, and Little suggest
that treating economics and international politics as metaphors for each other,
rather than one as an analogy for the other, allows for a more fruitful exchange
on the relationship between political and economic relationships in

establishing the context and constraints among domestic and international
political and economic actors.
In fact, Waltz unwittingly writes metaphorically (although as Buzan,
Jones, and Little observe, Waltz clings to the assertion that his analyses are
based on analogy), and in his utilization of metaphors (and as is common
when working with metaphors of any sort), Waltz borrows from related
(and not so related) disciplinary fields. In the area of systems, for example,
Waltz turns to the field of physics to help imagine aspects of IR. Specifically,
Waltz avers that systems exert a type of physical “force” on states: “Systems
theories, whether political or economic, are theories that explain how the
organization of a realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the
interacting units within it. Such theories tell us about the forces the units
are subject to” (Waltz 1979, 72 emphasis added).10 As in physics, Waltz
believes that once one knows the nature of these forces, one can make
predictions about the behavior of the actors on which the forces are
exerted.
Waltz’s analysis of systems and structures also contains secondary meta-
phors. While Waltz relies primarily on the field of physics in describing the
structural “forces” of systems, he also likens structures to the effects of
organs within the body, the influence of taxation, socialization among
individuals, and constraints of the economic market (ibid., 73–77). Among
secondary metaphors in Theory of International Politics is a rather ironic
one. Much has been made, by Waltz and his supporters, of Waltz’s asser-
tion that Neorealism, as a systemic (or as Waltz puts it, non-reductionist)
theory, does not start with the same assumptions about human nature that
characterize the classical strand of Realist thinking. Yet, on the first page of
the chapter entitled “Anarchic Structures and Balances of Power,” Waltz
refers to the most essential, Hobbesian metaphor of classical Realism:
“Among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (ibid., 102). This allu-
sion to the foundational metaphor of classical Realism turns out to be a
telling marker of the theoretical foundations of the Neorealist school of
thought. Waltz insists that Neorealism is a deductive theory, deriving its
conclusions only from the assumptions that inhere from observations
about the structural characteristics of the international system. One of
those structural characteristics is the oft-mentioned condition of anarchy.
On the one hand, Waltz and other Neorealists (and also many non-
Realists) seemingly define anarchy as merely the lack of an overarching
governing authority, that is, a mere void. Yet, in invoking the “state of
146 M. P. MARKS
nature” metaphor in defining anarchy, Waltz inadvertently incorporates

classical Realist assumptions into his supposedly systemic theory. Thus, in
the same paragraph in which Waltz refers to the “state of nature,” he
defines anarchy in a way that, while including the “void” quality of anar-
chy, also highlights the elements of human nature that are entailed in the
“state of nature” image: “Among men as among states, anarchy, or the
absence of government, is associated with the occurrence of violence” (ibid.,
102, emphasis added). This is critical for understanding how the meta-
phors Waltz uses imbue Neorealism with the same assumptions about
human nature as the classical Realist school of thought from which Waltz
seeks to distance himself. If anarchy were defined merely as the absence of
government—a void—it could be filled up with anything. But because
Waltz imagines states to be motivated in ways similar to humans, certain
assumptions about human nature have to be made.
Interestingly, in his discussion of anarchy, Waltz begins not with assump-
tions but with empirical observations. That is to say, Waltz (102) observes
that in human relations “contact without at least occasional conflict is
inconceivable.” From this observation, Waltz defines anarchy as a state of
nature. Waltz’s next step is to attach to anarchy the role of a structural
cause, or independent variable in the chain of events that brings about
international outcomes. Ultimately, Waltz will conclude that violence
among states is caused by anarchy. But since we have seen that Waltz
defines anarchy as involving violence, his theory, which states that anarchy
produces violence, is manifestly tautological. Thus, an examination of the
covert state of nature metaphor in Waltz’s definition of anarchy demon-
strates the utterly circular nature of the entire theoretical project of
Neorealism.
Waltz’s assumptions about human nature also influence his treatment
of states as he envisions them metaphorically as individuals. Neorealists
like Waltz are by no means alone in thinking of states-as-individuals as a
simplifying assumption of theory. So on this count there is nothing inher-
ently unique in the state-as-individual metaphor. Rather, it is the set of
assumptions that Neorealists make about states-as-individuals that is of
interest here. Specifically, Neorealists such as Waltz impute to states the
attributes they assume about humans in a state of nature. Thus, for
example, in explaining why states are functionally similar self-help units,
Waltz writes that “a state worries about a division of possible gains that
may favor others more than itself … A state also worries lest it become
dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of
goods and services” (ibid., 106 emphasis added). Obviously, states are not
individuals but instead the collective expression of citizens and political
leaders. As mentioned, the state-as-individual reification can be a useful
and simplifying assumption of theory. However, inasmuch as the actions
of even totalitarian states are the product of collective decision-making by
political officials, it is dangerous to assume that such states’ actions are
based on a singular expression of a motivation such as “worry.” The met-
aphor of the state-as-individual overemphasizes just one aspect of politi-
cal decision-making and does so in the case of Neorealism such that the
state-of-nature assumptions of the theory are given an outsized role.
Kenneth Waltz is by no means the sole source of Neorealism and obvi-
ously other scholars contribute to the theoretical project that constitutes
the Neorealist school of thought. The purpose of the foregoing discussion
is to illustrate how the foundations of Neorealism are firmly established in,
and by the conceptual metaphors that are set out by, the works of early
Neorealists such as Waltz. In many ways, as a theoretical perspective
Neorealism is not so different from other approaches in the physical and
natural sciences and the social sciences alike. It is “scientific” in the sense
that it tests its propositions through hypothesis testing using empirical evi-
dence in a quasi-experimental manner.11 It is also “scientific” in its reliance
on abstract concepts as a starting point just as are the disciplines in the
physical and natural sciences. Abstract concepts, frequently of a metaphori-
cal sort, allow assumptions to be made, and those assumptions form the
bases for testable hypotheses. Thus, in evaluating the propositions of
Neorealism, it is fair to periodically ask what concepts provide the assump-
tions on which its hypotheses rest. As is often the case with other scientific
approaches, metaphors are integral to concept-formation in Neorealism.
Whether or not these metaphors are useful is an important question to ask.
Metaphorical Aspects of Liberal Theory

As is true for Neorealilsm, Liberal theory—specifically, the Neoliberal
strand—has also focused on the international system as an important met-
aphor for conceptualizing IR. Following the Neorealist lead, Neoliberal
approaches to the international system begin with a prior metaphor, that
is, the metaphor of “levels of analysis” in IR theory. The “levels of analy-
sis” metaphor conceptualizes a vertically organized space in which the
international system is located at the “top” of political organization, the state
occupies a “middle” realm, and individual decision-makers are located at
148 M. P. MARKS
the “bottom.” Obviously Neorealism and Neoliberalism make divergent

assumptions about the motivations of states. Yet, in their approach to the
organization of IR, the metaphor of the international system figures
prominently. Shah Tarzi (2004, 121) summarizes the similarities and dif-
ferences between Neorealism and Neoliberalism succinctly: “Generally
speaking, international relations analysts, regardless of their paradigmatic
persuasion, incorporate various conceptions of an organized international
system into their work. The neorealists consider the inequality of resources
and power as the basic factor of system organization, while the neoliberals
view an international system steadily organized around various rules and
institutions.” Hence, despite very real paradigmatic differences, Neorealism
and the Neoliberal variant of Liberalism are similar in that they are prone
to conceptualize a metaphorical “system” as occupying a spatial position
as the “highest” level of analysis in IR.
Yet, differences between Neorealist and Neoliberal conceptions of a
metaphorical “system” at the top of a series of levels of analysis remain. As
Quddus Snyder (2013, 539) points out, Realist theory typically begins with
assumptions about the international system in order to develop a “top-
down” approach to the study of IR, while Liberal theory starts with obser-
vations about domestic politics in order to develop a “bottom-up” theory
of international affairs. Snyder (539–540) suggests that “defining theories
in terms of assumptions and content—and not top-down or bottom-up
theoretical form—opens the possibility for liberal systemic theory.”
Toward this end Snyder draws on additional metaphors to investigate
the role of the international system in the development of a Liberal theory
of IR. Specifically, Snyder refers to the mechanical and organic metaphors
that have figured prominently in IR theory from the period before IR
emerged as a modern academic field. Snyder (540) points out that in the
Neorealist theory developed by Kenneth Waltz, Waltz drew on
“Durkheim’s concept of mechanical social structure” in arguing that “the
international system was segmented” and that “it consisted of autono-
mous and autarkic units operating in a self-help environment.” By con-
trast, Snyder (ibid.) argues that a Liberal view of system is “more ‘organic’
and integrated in Durkheim’s language. The organic society differs from
the mechanical in that the former features a well-developed division of
labor.” Thus, in the organic view of system that Snyder borrows for the
purposes of developing a Liberal theory of system, “the system’s dominant
tendency is integration” (ibid.).
While Snyder’s review of the Durkheimian origins of Neorealist and

Liberal conceptions of system as rooted alternatively in mechanical and
organic metaphors of society is designed to locate the distinct theoretical
propositions of Neorealist and Liberal approaches to the study of IR, the
one thing that Snyder explicitly does not problematize is both paradigms’
assumption that the realm of the international system lies “above” the
level of the state. The levels of analysis metaphor is left intact leaving the
main distinction between Neorealism and Liberalism their origins in
mechanical and organic metaphorical views of society, respectively. Yet,
unlike the Neorealist approach, Liberal theory leaves theoretical space for
the “domestic” qualities of political organization. It is the “organic” con-
ception of politics that opens up the possibility of delving “below” the
international system and “inside” the state. As Snyder (547–549) observes,
an organic view of system includes the possibility for functional differen-
tiation. Thus, although one can theorize solely at the level of the system,
the acknowledgment of functional differentiation of organic units sug-
gests that such differentiation can be studied at “lower” levels of analysis.
This then forces Liberal theorists to examine that which lies “below” the
international system.
Liberalism and the Metaphor of “Domestic Interests”

Within some versions of Liberal theories of IR, the metaphor of “domes-
tic” interests exerts a powerful influence over the narrative that Liberals
advance to explain world affairs.12 Specifically, the idea that political activ-
ity can take place undisturbed by alien threats relies on a metaphorical
conceptualization of the state contained within the safety of a house or
home. This “inside–outside” view of domestic and foreign policy has been
chronicled by R. B. J. Walker (1993) who identifies the very logic of IR as
a distinct area of study originating in the separation of the domestic from
the international.13 Theories of “domestic policy” are thus taken up with
the politics of order and rule so as to keep safe that which is inside a shel-
tered area. Such theories place an emphasis on an anarchic international
system which serves as a threat to the safety of the state.14
As a metaphorical concept, “domestic” has its counterpart in the con-
cept of “foreign,” which manifests itself in the study of IR in the notion of
foreign policy. If “domestic” means that which lies inside the state, it
makes sense that what is “foreign” resides “outside” the state. This is
borne out etymologically in an examination of the word “foreign” in the
150 M. P. MARKS
English language. The Oxford English Dictionary notes that “foreign”

derives from the Latin forās and forı̄s meaning “outside.”15 Meaning spe-
cifically “dealing with matters concerning other countries,” the word was
recorded in the year 1611 and appeared in the form of forraine in the
writings of Thomas Coryate (OED).16 Furthermore, changing the linguis-
tic terms involved does not alter their conceptual origins, which are the
same across languages. In Spanish, for example, “foreign policy” translates
as “política exterior”—“outside policy”—which is the conceptual equiva-
lent of its English counterpart. What matters is not the idiom but the
metaphorical ideas of “inside” and “outside,” “domestic” and “foreign,”
which are conceptual foundations of IR theory as a scholarly and practical
enterprise.
Critics note, however, that the barrier between international and domes-
tic politics is artificial and theoretically suspect. The idealization of a domes-
tic space is supported through political discourse which relies on the
metaphor of the image of the nation as a home.17 Yet, “domestic” politics is
a metaphorical location, not an empirical fact. As Felicia Pratto et al. (2014,
127) maintain, international and “domestic” politics often are “inter-
meshed.” More to the point, Pratto, et al. (129) argue that “an accounting
of popular influence on foreign policy is especially important for nations
under the influence of ‘core’ nations (the so-called ‘periphery’), because for
them, there is no clear distinction between domestic and international poli-
tics. For low power nations, foreign policy involves dealing with and being
dependent on menacing dominant nations, a situation quite distinct from
that of ‘core’ actors.” Pratto et al. thus argue that the ability of the state to
isolate itself from the outside world is an ability that resides only with so-
called core nations. For those countries in the “periphery,” in which “core”
states interfere, the division between “inside” and “outside” barely applies.
When combined with the source of preferences that inform the politics
of a state, the metaphor of “domestic” takes on an even more salient
meaning for understanding the logic of metaphors of the state, in particu-
lar the source of state interests. Specifically, with regard to foreign policy,
Liberalism argues that domestic politics is relevant because it reflects the
articulation of domestic “interests.” Helen Milner (1997, 33) articulates a
view of domestic interests which would seem to be typical in Liberal IR
theory: “The policy preferences of actors in domestic politics derive from
their basic interests. Actors are assumed to have certain fundamental inter-
ests, captured by their utility functions, which they attempt to maximize”
(emphasis in the original). Consistent with the economic language of
“utility functions” in this definition, Milner (37) sees domestic agents

acting in a rational fashion with a rank-ordering of preferences. Milner
treats these assumptions as justifiable parts of the theory inasmuch as they
reflect a standard view of exogenously derived interests that are inherent
in orthodox theories of IR.
As with many seemingly straightforward terms in IR theory, the word
“interests” would appear to be a literal expression of basic concepts.
People and groups have interests and there is nothing mysterious in saying
so. However, two considerations present themselves in evaluating the role
that “interests” play in Liberal theories of IR. First, the term could be
substituted with any number of other words that ostensibly convey the
same meaning. “Interests” to some extent is synonymous with “prefer-
ences,” “wants,” “concerns,” “motives,” “partialities,” and “benefit.”
Although all of these words comprise in one sense or another synonyms
for “interests” (according to most standard thesauri), each one expresses a
subtly different meaning. Thus, not only is it relevant that among these
synonyms “interests” was elevated above the others to communicate a
specific assertion about the causal logic of domestic politics, but if any of
the other terms were the standard vocabulary for Liberal conceptions of
politics, it would be relevant to examine their origins and implications for
the Liberal approach to the study of politics and IR.18
Second, inasmuch as the idea of “interests” communicates an element
in the causal logic of Liberalism, its origins and role as a metaphor are
germane for what they reveal about Liberalism’s hypotheses about IR. The
English word “interest” derives from a combination of the Latin prefix
-inter, which of course means “to be between,” and the Germanic suffix
-esse meaning “to be” (American Heritage Dictionary, 940). Yet it is
worth noting that -inter also has a lesser known meaning as “take part in.”
So, one etymological interpretation of “interest” is that it is a metaphor
for taking part in one’s own being as illustrated by one definition of “inter-
est,” which is “regard for one’s own benefit or advantage” (ibid.).
Indeed, it is on this consideration that it becomes understandable why
“interests,” as opposed to any of its other synonyms, has emerged as a
means for expressing the assumptions Liberalism makes about politics.
Specifically, it is assumed that what individuals want is that which is “for
one’s own benefit or advantage” as opposed to wanting things that do not
necessarily imply a narrowly construed sense of individual advantage. As
Albert Hirschman explains, this narrow meaning of interests is a fairly
modern convention. According to Hirschman (1977, 32): “When the
152 M. P. MARKS
term ‘interest’ in the sense of concerns, aspirations, and advantage gained

currency in Western Europe during the late sixteenth century, its meaning
was by no means limited to the material aspects of a person’s welfare;
rather, it comprised the totality of human aspirations, but denoted an ele-
ment of reflection and calculation with respect to the manner in which
these aspirations were to be pursued.” Furthermore, Hirschman contrasts
the modern political and economic conception of interests with “pas-
sions,” which have been seen by political philosophers as tamed by
interests. To speak of interests as a tamer of passions is to make a metaphor
for the advancement and taking part in one’s own being as apart from “the
moralizing precepts and rules that had been the mainstay of pre-
Machiavellian political philosophy” (ibid., 33).
Expressed linguistically—“interests” combined with “domestic”—the
phrase “domestic interests” gives a potent metaphorical element to the
logic of Liberal theory. Liberalism starts with the assumption that actors
possess preferences which are directed at advancing individual benefit. The
individual in question is not a person, but rather a group, to which the
benefits that accrue do so within the “house” that is defined by what
qualifies as the “domestic” as opposed to international affairs. In sum, the
language of Liberalism defines the paradigm as one which hypothesizes
that IR is at its origins an affair of self-regarding entities which are enclosed
and separated from each other within the metaphorically contained domi-
cile of the state. This language distinguishes Liberalism from Realism,
which has a view of states as opaque entities, and it also demonstrates that
Liberalism is fundamentally distinct from Feminist theory (discussed later
in this chapter), which has a far more agnostic view of the nature of the
actors that participate in international affairs.
Metaphors of Norms and Taboos in Constructivist

Theory
“Norms” as a Metaphor
The concept of a norm in IR is seemingly fairly straightforward. The
Oxford English Dictionary defines a norm as it is used in politics, sociology,
social psychology, and other related disciplines as “a standard or pattern of
social behaviour that is accepted in or expected of a group.” Specific defi-
nitions in IR literature vary, but virtually all adhere to this basic standard.
Thus, as a concept in the study of IR, the notion of a norm would appear
to have a relatively literal and unremarkable meaning. However, as we
shall see, what is “standard” or “patterned” behavior depends on how
scholars understand what is meant by acceptable ways of acting.
Furthermore, in a surprising and unexpected way, as used throughout
much IR scholarship, the concept of a “norm” is remarkably metaphorical
in nature.
To begin, the very concept of norms contains what Megan MacKenzie
and Mohamed Sesay (2012, 147) call a “story.” This idea of a “story” of
norms is a notion in keeping with the broad thesis that metaphors, such as
the metaphor of “norms,” serve as a narrative by which the nature of IR is
understood. In the case of norms, the narrative is one of what is consid-
ered acceptable practice among states and other international actors. As
stated earlier, the definition of “norm” as offered in the Oxford English
Dictionary and other dictionaries presents a norm as something that is
part of standard or patterned behavior. This resides, of course, in a math-
ematical notion of numerical frequency or likelihood, and thus what recurs
regularly could be said to constitute a statistical norm. However, what is
neutral in terms of value judgments—the expected outcome given numer-
ical likelihood, that is to say, the statistical norm—inevitably takes on a
value-laden meaning when it is construed as standard behavior. That is to
say, what is “normative” becomes the basis for value judgments associated
with the acceptability of behavior because it conforms to standard behav-
ior for any given area of human existence. A “normative judgment” is not
simply a verdict that something conforms to statistical likelihood but that
it adheres to expected and acceptable behavior.
In the case of the aforementioned MacKenzie and Sesay (ibid.,) the
authors argue that “‘the story’ of international norms—or the dominant
account of norms—is primarily a white, Western version that largely disre-
gards or glosses over the intense contestations and controls associated
with norms.” I take no position on this particular account of the content
of international norms, but MacKenzie and Sesay make the important
point that norms understood metaphorically are not merely representative
of what is “standard” understood in terms of statistical likelihood, but
rather reflect acceptable behavior associated with specific value judg-
ments.19 The authors (ibid.) thus question the assumption that norms rep-
resent “mutual understanding at a supra-state level,” highlighting the
notion that what is “normative” is in fact one of any number of ways of
determining “acceptable” behavior. MacKenzie and Sesay’s analysis is
154 M. P. MARKS
echoed by Charlotte Epstein (2012, 137) who, in addressing the metaphor

of “socialization” in IR, questions the assumption that diffusion of inter-
national norms represents a process by which states are “bettered” by
being socialized in the international community: “Change, in analyses of
socialization, appears to be generally for the better; they rarely feature a
change that is negative or even neutral.”20 Thus, for Epstein (138), “in the
studies of norms through socialization, the line is thus rapidly blurred
between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ and the descriptive blends into the pre-
scriptive.” The notion of a norm as a statistical standard has become trans-
formed through metaphor into the concept held by IR scholars that norms
convey a positive value because they represent what is acceptable and thus
desirable behavior.
The base metaphor of norms conceptualized as prescribed behavior
also influences how IR scholars think about what norms do and what their
role is in IR. Thus, for example, one finds common organic metaphors in
the conceptualization of norms and change. Typical of this is the notion of
change and norms in terms of the metaphor of “evolution.”21 Ann Florini,
for instance, conceptualizes changes in international norms in terms of
their evolving nature. Changed norms are metaphorically seen as “genetic
inheritance,” and selection of norms as “the reproductive mechanism.”
Florini’s model contains three elements: “First, genes and norms have
similar functions as the instructional units directing the behavior of their
respective organisms … Second, genes and norms are both transmitted
from one individual to another through similar processes of inheritance …
Third, norms, like genes, are ‘contested’—that is, they are in competition
with other norms that carry incompatible instructions” (Florini 1996,
367, emphasis in the original).22 Unlike evolution as it takes place in the
natural world, that is, involving environmental shocks that bring about
genetic mutation, the metaphorical “evolution” of norms involves a pro-
cess of conscious behavior designed to bring about a desired end. This is
consistent with the base metaphor of norms understood in IR as a set of
practices that are desirable and thus understood as regularized behavior
that has emerged because it is seen as standard and therefore acceptable.
A related concept to the evolutionary image of norms is what has been
referred to as the norm “life cycle,” which Martha Finnemore and Kathryn
Sikkink (1998, 895) describe as a “three-stage process” involving norm
“emergence,” “norm cascades,” and “internalization” or norms.23 The
second of these terms was coined by Cass Sunstein, who envisions norms
as part of a process by which societies are formed and change. Specifically,
in social states, “norm entrepreneurs—people interested in changing social

norms—can … produce … norm bandwagons and norm cascades. Successful
law and policy try to take advantage of learning about norms and norm
change” (Sunstein 1997, 36, emphasis in the original). The stages of norm
emergence and norm cascades are separated by that which Finnemore and
Sikkink (1998, 895) call “a threshold or ‘tipping’ point, at which a critical
mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm.” As is the case of norms
understood in an evolutionary sense, the “life cycle” metaphor is merely
suggestive of an organic process but, in fact, implies human volition in the
form of norm entrepreneurs who set the cascade in motion. Again, norms
are seen in terms of their desirability for regularizing acceptable behavior.
The organic metaphorical imagery inherent in these conceptualizations
of norm change is not insignificant for developing theories of norms as
Finnemore and Sikkink (ibid.) observe: “The pattern is important for
researchers to understand because different social processes and logics of
action may be involved at different stages in a norm’s ‘life cycle.’ Thus,
theoretical debates about the degree to which norm-based behavior is
driven by choice or habit, specification issues about the costs of norm-
violation or benefits from norm adherence, and related research issues
often turn out to hinge on the stage of the norm’s evolution one exam-
ines. Change at each stage, we argue, is characterized by different actors,
motives, and mechanisms of influence.” As Harald Kleinschmidt (2000,
168) explains, while mechanistic metaphors of change typically assume
self-regulating and self-equilibrating processes designed to provide a spe-
cific function, organic and biological metaphors imply a dynamic interac-
tion with a body’s natural surroundings.24 While Finnemore and Sikkink’s
“tipping point” metaphor superficially sounds like a mechanistic image
involving a form of balance, the human element of norm “entrepreneurs”
in the “life cycle” of norms, along with the naturalistic image of a “cas-
cade” of change, entails a theory of norms that hypothesizes organic adap-
tation to environmental surroundings, as the overarch of norm “evolution”
would imply.
Furthermore, the process of ascribing qualities to norms is quite simi-
lar, if not identical, to how IR scholars imagine the process by which
norms themselves operate in world affairs. Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998,
897) depiction of the emergence stage of norm change is particularly tell-
ing: “Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence because they
call attention to issues or even ‘create’ issues by using language that
names, interprets, and dramatizes them. Social movement theorists refer
156 M. P. MARKS
to this reinterpretation or renaming process as ‘framing.’ The construction

of cognitive frames is an essential component of norm entrepreneurs’
political strategies, since, when they are successful, the new frames reso-
nate with broader public understandings and are adopted as new ways of
talking about and understanding issues.” Just as norm entrepreneurs
frame an issue in ways that are designed to create understanding of issues,
so too IR scholars have framed the concept of norm change in terms of
metaphorical “life cycles” to create an understanding that favors one theo-
retical approach over another. What is fascinating about the organic nature
of metaphors of norms is that it provides insight into the theoretical
hunches of IR scholars, namely, that norms in IR are an organic part of
social relations. Indeed, when given a choice among organic norms,
Finnemore and Sikkink (902) favor those that emphasize socialization, as
the choice between the metaphors of “contagion” and “socialization” in
the “cascade” stage indicates: “Empirical studies suggest that, at this
point, often an international or regional demonstration effect or ‘conta-
gion’ occurs in which international and transnational norm influences
become more important than domestic politics for effecting norm change.
Contagion, however, is too passive a metaphor; we argue that the primary
mechanism for promoting norm cascades is an active process of interna-
tional socialization intended to induce norm breakers to become norm
followers.” The process of socialization involves humans as biological
agents which fits neatly into the “evolution” and “life cycle” metaphors
which frame theories of normative change.
Despite Finnemore and Sikkink’s inclusion of norm entrepreneurs in
the process of spreading norms, Bernd Bucher argues that the metaphors
of norm diffusion pointedly minimize actor agency in the process. Bucher
(2014, 742) maintains that “insufficient attention is paid to the metaphors
describing norm propagation (diffusion, cascade, life cycle, etc.). These
metaphors are frequently employed in ways that point to mechanistic and
automatized processes of ‘norm diffusion.’” For Bucher (ibid.), meta-
phors of “diffusion,” “cascade,” and “life cycle” insufficiently account for
the deliberate way in which norms are used by powerful actors: “These
semantics create an ‘illusion of agency’ without accounting for the actual
processes through which norms are articulated, propagated, contested,
adapted, adopted, or rejected. Norm diffusion research subsequently
comes to be closely associated with self-actionist modes of thinking, which
focuses research on intrinsic qualities of norms, rather than on socially
embedded agency and power relations central to processes of diffusing
norms.” The role of powerful actors in the spread of international norms

further begs the question of how norms themselves are understood. Part
of the answer lies in a related metaphor, that is, the metaphorical concept
of “taboos.”
Metaphor of International “Taboos”

The origins of the current use of the word “taboo” in the English lan-
guage are, as is true for many words, metaphorical in nature. The English
understanding of “taboo” as a ban or inhibition has a wider application in
the various Polynesian and Melanesian languages in which it originates. In
these tongues, a taboo is used broadly to mean some thing or practice “set
apart for or consecrated to a special use or purpose; restricted to the use of
a god, a king, priests, or chiefs, while forbidden to general use; prohibited
to a particular class (esp. to women), or to a particular person or persons;
inviolable, sacred; forbidden, unlawful; also said of persons under a per-
petual or temporary prohibition from certain actions, from food, or from
contact with others” (Oxford English Dictionary). What is implied as a
total ban in English is a metaphorical application of an otherwise nuanced
term in its native languages and, more importantly, customs.
Prohibitions and bans of the sorts of weapons discussed in terms of
taboos are, in fact, enforced either by legally binding treaties or by national
legislation restricting governments in the time, manner, and place of their
use of the instruments of war. Richard Price (1997) famously traces a
genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo as far back as the moral pro-
scription against the use of poison in warfare, which has its origins in
antiquity. Yet although an ancient moral aversion to poison can be identi-
fied, the emergence of the contemporary chemical weapons “taboo” has
more modern origins in the Hague Peace Conferences of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries as well as subsequent political deci-
sions and institutional arrangements.25 In other words, the chemical
weapons “taboo” is a metaphorical way of referring to prohibitions based
on political calculation rather than on a direct application of an ancient
moral principle.
That the taboo against nuclear weapons is a metaphorical one is
acknowledged tacitly by Nina Tannenwald (2007, 3) who uses the term
with quotation marks: “This norm [against the first use of nuclear weap-
ons] is essential to explain why nuclear weapons have remained unused
even when it might have been militarily advantageous to use them, and in
158 M. P. MARKS
accounting for their special status as ‘taboo’ weapons.” Placing the word
“taboo” within quotation marks would be unnecessary if the word had
been used in a literal and straightforward sense. Instead, Tannenwald is
using the term metaphorically to indicate that the prohibition on the first
use of nuclear weapons resides in an informal custom even though there
may also be specific rules limiting their use. As with Price, Tannenwald
acknowledges the existence of formal treaties banning nuclear weapons,
but these types of formal governance establishing rules for behavior are
treated metaphorically as “taboo.”
Moreover, at least one study has found that the “taboo” against the use
of nuclear weapons is not held by average Americans (as opposed to politi-
cal leaders) who “appear to weigh the consequences of using nuclear weap-
ons in the narrow terms of immediate military effectiveness. As a result, the
public’s attitudes toward nuclear weapons lack the bright-line nature of a
taboo” (Press et al. 2013, 202). When it comes to weapons norms, Thomas
Dolan (2013, 59) shows that decision-makers, as well, may “in circum-
stances experienced as tragic … violate them without negative psychologi-
cal consequences.” Such studies suggest that the concept of a “taboo”
against certain types of weapons is in fact a metaphorical representation of
politically enforceable prohibitions, as durable as they may be.26
As a measure of human judgment, and not as simply statistical likeli-
hood, norms and taboos in IR theory have become an expression of
ormal.27 Normal can be considered regularized behavior not because it
n
occurs with predictable statistical frequency, but because it adheres to stan-
dards of acceptability. Whether having “evolved” or pursued an organic life
cycle, or come into regular practice because of socialization, IR scholars
understand norms as something states and other international actors seek
to establish because they bring about desired ends. The irony is that, under-
stood merely in terms of statistical likelihood, norms could be guides to
behavior that have no “normative” value. Conflict, for example, adheres to
regularized norms. However, scholars typically do not focus on norms of
conflict, having conceptualized norms as “evolving” toward or “socializ-
ing” cooperative behavior. This is because cooperation itself is seen as a
desirable solution to the essential anarchy problématique of world affairs.
Where Are the Metaphors in Feminist IR Theory?

A review of the index in Metaphors in International Relations Theory
reveals that there are many more references to the paradigms of Realism,
Liberalism, and Constructivism than there are to Feminist theories of
IR. Scholars (in particular, Feminist scholars) might wonder if Feminist IR

theory has yet again been marginalized in a theoretical investigation of the
field.28 However, an astute reader of the previous volume will note that
most discussions of the use of metaphors in Realism, Liberalism, and
Constructivism are framed in a critical context. Many of the most well-
known and widely disseminated metaphors in the dominant paradigms in
IR are fraught with analytical problems that complicate theorizing as
much as, if not more than, they facilitate it. The lack of metaphors in
Feminist IR theory is somewhat ironic inasmuch as Feminist theory is
premised on the notion that gender gives meaning to the material/biological
aspects of sex just as metaphors give meaning to the material world.29
Feminist theory is more prone to point out the hidden metaphorical ele-
ments of traditional IR theory, for example, the reification of a “patriar-
chal state” (Steans 1998, chapter 4), than to engage in metaphorical
conceptualizations of its own in its analysis of IR.30
A more fundamental issue of the surfeit of metaphors in Realism,
Liberalism, and Constructivism and the dearth of metaphorical imagery in
Feminist IR theory is this: The very scarcity of metaphors in Feminist IR
theory is in fact evidence of the marginalization of Feminist theory in IR
as a field of inquiry.31 As I observe in Metaphors in International Relations
Theory (Marks 2011, 186–188), metaphors constitute part of the canon of
the discipline of IR. As such, they represent a kind of orthodoxy that
defines the field and delimits its scope. Marysia Zalewski (2006, 51)
affirms this when she observes that “the legitimized methodological tools
appear to sponsor feminist failure, as tools and methods which feminists
use, and the ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies they insist are
credible and important, are not ones that conventional social science as
practiced in IR deem acceptable.” This “conventional social science” in IR
relies fundamentally on metaphors, which conceptualize problems as well
as ways of theorizing those problems. The conventional social science
approach grafted onto IR theory also creates a situation in which schools
of thought that do not embrace these core metaphors are automatically
relegated to the margins of mainstream IR theory.
This is a theme stressed by Feminist IR theory. Jill Steans (2003,
430–431) observes along these lines: “The acceptance of feminist scholar-
ship in IR and judgements about whether feminism has contributed sig-
nificantly to what is generally accepted as ‘knowledge’ in the field, have been
profoundly coloured by consensual understandings of IR as a distinctive
discipline held by a community of scholars.” Raluca Soreanu (2010, 381)
echoes this sentiment thus: “Disciplines themselves become complicated
160 M. P. MARKS
machineries of recirculating old content under the protective veil of

academic language.” In the case of IR, part of that protective veil are the
metaphors of Realist, Liberal, and Constructivist theory, which determine
what are “problems” in IR and how they can be “solved.” Thus, for exam-
ple, the metaphor of “anarchy” constitutes the central problématique of
IR, while the metaphor of “security” frames how anarchy can be solved.
Metaphors and the Ontology of Feminist IR Theory

One of the aspects of the shortage of metaphors in Feminist IR theory
involves the ontological priorities of Feminist theory. Feminist scholarship
emphasizes that what constitutes IR includes the everyday acts of everyday
people concretized by specific actions that cannot be summed up in the
form of large abstractions, which traditional IR theories label metaphori-
cally in terms of conceptual categories such as “systems” and “structures.”
Laura Sjoberg and J. Ann Tickner (2011, 2) have commented on the sub-
ject matter of IR observing that Feminist theory casts a wider net in speci-
fying the empirical material, which is relevant in the field of IR: “While IR
studies issues such as the effect of regime types on states’ propensity for
war, competitive power-balancing, and international trade and invest-
ment, feminist theories have shown that understanding global politics
relies as much on seeing the dynamics of marriages, of sexual relationships,
of masculine expectations of men and feminine expectations of women,
and of household-level political economies as it does on IR’s ‘traditional’
issues.” This has prompted Tickner (1997, 611) to observe that Feminist
approaches “do not fit comfortably with conventional state-centric and
structural approaches to IR theorizing, nor with the methodologies usu-
ally employed by IR scholars.”
While Tickner does not explicitly cite the metaphorical bases of tradi-
tional IR theorizing, I would argue that the metaphors used in much
orthodox IR theory does not square with the paradigmatic foundations of
Feminist IR theory. Tickner’s reference to the state-centric and structural
bases of traditional IR theory highlights how foundational metaphors
such as the state-as-individual and the primacy of structure set the stage
for much of what is theorized about IR, in particular, the emphasis on
unitary state actors in a hypothesized physical edifice of world affairs.
Steans (2003, 434) agrees, noting that in Feminist IR theory “the sover-
eign state could not be taken as an objective reality that [is] ontologically
privileged.”32 Feminist IR theory does not fit easily with analytical c ategories
such as the state that are reduced to neat metaphorical types.
By contrast, in Feminist theory there is an acknowledgment that the
performance of discrete instances of authority or resistance is not readily
articulated in the form of metaphors that evoke abstract categories of
human motivation and/or behavior. The narratives of IR also then are
implicated by an ontology which shifts the focus away from metaphorical
categories to the individual stories told by people who effect and are
affected by the individual acts which are collectively known as “interna-
tional relations.” Cynthia Enloe’s Bananas, Beaches, and Bases (1989) is
the classic statement along these lines. Unlike other tomes that use meta-
phors in their titles to suggest creative ways of thinking about IR, the
“bananas,” “beaches,” and “bases” in the title of Enloe’s work are literal
means and locations by which IR plays out. Specifically, individual humans
cause and are affected by the trade in commodities such as bananas, the
commerce associated with tourism in places such as those that feature
tropical beaches, and the activity that takes place at military bases. These
are not mere metaphors for abstract concepts of IR but literal expressions
of the way that world affairs is intimately caught up with the lived experi-
ences of everyday people. Thus, for example, Enloe (1989, 2–3) says that
“we would like to imagine that going on holiday to Bermuda rather than
Grenada is merely a social, even aesthetic matter, not a question of poli-
tics.” To this, Enloe answers that it is these sorts of mundane decisions by
real people that are the very stuff of IR.
Later reflecting on the contributions of Feminist theory’s emphasis on
the everyday acts of individuals, Enloe (2011, 447) remarks: “In asserting
that ‘the personal is political,’ feminist analysts were claiming that the
kinds of power that were created and wielded—and legitimized—in these
seemingly ‘private’ sites were causally connected to the forms of power
created, wielded and legitimized in the national and inter-state public
spheres—and, moreover, that state and economic elites each knew it, even
if they rarely openly admitted it” (emphasis in the original).33 Thus, in
order to get at the true sources of power, Enloe (ibid., 450) would have
to eschew a research agenda that was shaped by metaphorical categories
and instead focus on the discrete acts of individual persons: “If I were to
make feminist sense—that is, more reliable sense—of the international
politics of the trade in privatized goods and of states’ stake in that trade, I
would have to start giving serious thought to the gendered politics of
marriage, the constructions of femininities and masculinities, and the
strategies women use to avoid violence.”34
162 M. P. MARKS
Enloe’s research agenda is taken up by scholars such as Marysia Zalewski

(1995) who, when asked (as in the title of her article) “Well, What is the
Feminist Perspective on Bosnia?” responds that the answer lies not in
qualities of metaphorical concepts such as the “balance of power” or the
“structure” of the international “system,” but in how gender shapes per-
ceptions of armed conflict and in the specification of what combatants are
permitted to perpetrate which types of violence against which types of
victims and how this is not “simply a nasty side-effect” of war (ibid., 355).
This emphasis on everyday acts as opposed to analytical categories shaped
by metaphorical frames continues to shape Feminist IR research, but can
also influence other research agendas in the discipline. As Xavier Guillaume
(2011a, 446) notes: “Within the field of international studies, the every-
day can be read as a text that illuminates central practices at the heart of
the production of ‘international’ representations, the reproduction of
relations of domination—gendered, economic, social—at the interna-
tional ‘level,’ as well as the consumption of ‘international’ goods, ideas
and norms.”35 Thus, for example, Valerie Hudson et al. (2012, 17) intro-
duce the concept of what they call “gendered microaggression” which is
“composed of all those many choices and acts in the routine of day-to-day
existence that harm, subordinate, exploit, and disrespect women.”
Chronicling discrete instances of gendered microaggression allows
scholars to arrive at conclusions about the totality of organized violence
that is perpetrated among states and other international actors but which
originates in the routine individual acts of individual humans. Rather than
working from a set of metaphorical categories of international actors and
practices to specific instances of violent force, Hudson et al. start with
evidence of aggression at a micro level and then arrive at conclusions about
how such violence can be manifest on a global scale. Looking at the lives
of individuals allows for the ability, as Christine Sylvester (1994, 219–220)
puts it, to emphasize the “relations” over the “international” in “interna-
tional relations” (or “relations international” as Sylvester prefers).36
Metaphors and the Epistemologies of Feminist IR Theory

On an epistemological level, too, Feminist IR theory does not necessarily
lend itself readily to metaphorical formulations. As Tickner (1997, 615)
notes: “Coming out of literatures that are centrally concerned with indi-
viduals and social relations, and that are more explicitly normative, femi-
nist perspectives … demonstrate a preference for more humanistically
oriented methodologies.” Specifically, Feminist IR theory, far more than

orthodox theories of IR, employs an epistemology that takes seriously self-
referential perspectives prompting Brooke Ackerly et al. (2006, 4) to
observe that “the distinctiveness of feminist methodologies inside and
outside IR lies in their reflexivity, which encourages the researcher to re-
interrogate continually her own scholarship.” Such “‘talk of self’ is inti-
mately implicated in the construction of debate space, in multiple and
often puzzling ways that escape the eye” (Soreanu 2010, 382). What it
would take for orthodox theories of IR to acknowledge Feminist episte-
mologies would be to interrogate the metaphors of orthodox IR theory
and how they fail to leave open a space for self-referential perspectives.37
V. Spike Peterson (1992, 13) asserts “what feminists contribute to the …
conversation … about epistemological issues … is an insistence that gen-
der hierarchy is not coincidental to but in a significant sense constitutive
of Western philosophy’s objectivist metaphysics.” Adding gender narra-
tives to IR theory thus breaks this objectivist monopoly by placing the
experience of individuals affected by IR at the center of empirical research.38
These experiences are more likely to be told in literal terms than with the
metaphorical concepts inherent in orthodox theoretical approaches.
Critical inquiry of dominant IR metaphors thus becomes part of the
Feminist project. Just as metaphors make certain categories apparent and
relevant, interrogation of these metaphors represents part of the Feminist
effort, part of what Soreanu (2010, 382) says occurs when “through an
accumulation of (mundane) acts of rupture, the previously unimaginable
becomes imaginable” (emphasis in the original). Within this strategy, para-
digms of IR that might be identified with foundational metaphors are
replaced with, as Soreanu (392) opines, schools of thought associated with
individual scholars. As part of its stance of “reflexivity,” “most feminist
research insists that the inquirer be placed in the same critical plane as the
subject matter” (Tickner 2005a, 8). It is not surprising, then, that the
sorts of metaphors that abound in traditional IR paradigms are missing in
Feminist scholarship, which instead is constituted by contributions by
scholars who approach the field in a self-referential way.
The shortage of metaphors in Feminist approaches to the study of IR
can also be explained in part by the emphasis a gendered perspective places
on narrative over “theory.” “Narratives are essential because they are a
primary way by which we make sense of the world around us, produce
meanings, articulate intentions, and legitimize actions” (Wibben 2011,
2). Thus, when Annick Wibben assembles an analysis of security studies
164 M. P. MARKS
from a Feminist perspective, she relies on the narratives individuals offer in

their accounts of how they experience what has metaphorically been iden-
tified as “international security.”39 Wibben (100) writes: “Feminist secu-
rity narratives, based on personal narratives, challenge conventional
meanings for security not just because the referent of security is different
(i.e., because there is a deepening of the agenda) but because narratives
have the ability to capture a variety of concerns and events.” Rather than
reducing IR to a set of metaphorical analytical categories such as “sys-
tems,” “structures,” and “states,” a gendered narrative approach “starts
from women’s experiences of everyday life, [and therefore] has to
accommodate the varied contexts of women’s lives while also remaining
attuned to the contextual nature of ‘normality’” (ibid., 1–2).
This is not to say that all feminist approaches share the same method-
ologies, but epistemologically, in Feminist approaches typically there is an
emphasis on empiricism that eschews reliance on abstract metaphorical
frames.40 For Tickner (2005a, 4), part of what characterizes Feminist IR
theory is that it has the “goal of designing research that is useful” to indi-
viduals, that is to say, not preoccupied with abstract theory that answers
no useful questions about how IR affects individuals’ lives. Thus, for
example, Mary Caprioli (2000, 2003, 2004) counsels a Feminist process
that uses quantitative methods and emphasizes collection of empirical data
which broadens the research agenda of IR scholarship by including facts
about the role of gender so as to expand what is thought of as comprising
IR. In another twist on feminist theory, Sunju Park-Kang (2014) proposes
that fiction writing, which reconstructs historical events, can be used to
obtain a new perspective on understanding instances of IR.
These approaches, which prioritize the collection of empirical facts,
whether gathered as personal narratives, via quantitative means, or even
through constructing fictional narratives, rely less on metaphorical catego-
ries and more on the examination of the conditions by which IR can be
understood. In these approaches, the state, for instance, is not a meta-
phorical individual with narrowly defined parameters of security, but the
expression of a collective political will that comprises a variety of ways in
which individuals are concerned for physical, economic, social, and cul-
tural safety. Likewise, the empirical facts of IR do not so much suggest a
metaphorical “structure” as they do individual experiences of which gen-
dered identity is a contributing factor. Thus, as J. Ann Tickner and Laura
Sjoberg (2011, 22) write, “while social science IR strives for objectivity
and universality, feminist IR assumes contingency and subjectivity.” In
much of Feminist IR theory metaphors are constraining factors because

they create abstract theoretical categories that do not fully encompass the
empirical facts which comprise the totality of international affairs. A simi-
lar view is expressed by Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan (2013, 127–133)
who argue that with classification of IR into metaphorical “systems,”
“levels,” and “sectors,” IR theory overlooks the existence of a “social
whole” in which IR is just one part.
Reflections on Metaphors in Feminist IR Theory

In sum, Feminist theory calls out for what Gillian Youngs (2004, 87)
deems an “ontological revisionism” that challenges the primacy of pre-
cisely those conceptual categories that are privileged by the dominant
metaphors of IR. A review of Feminist approaches to the study of IR is
important for understanding the relative lack of metaphors in Feminist IR
theory. It is the very existence of metaphors in mainstream IR theory and
their absence in Feminist paradigms that help us understand the place of
Feminist schools of thought in the wider IR field. Mainstream IR thought,
including the metaphors that form its foundation, constitutes the discur-
sive community of mainstream IR scholars. Counterposed to this com-
munity are critical theorists, including IR scholars, who are recognizable
precisely because their ontological and epistemological perspectives do
not share with mainstream IR theory its main assumptions. Thus, for
example, Feminist scholars such as Laurel Weldon (2006, 67) who advo-
cate for a “standpoint epistemology” understand that “standpoint episte-
mology implies both the existence of a scientific community and the
creation of sub-communities or counter-publics of marginalized people.”
In other words, by taking account of the experiences of individuals ignored
by mainstream IR thought, Feminist approaches are identifiable precisely
because such individuals are not included in what is problematized by
metaphors in mainstream IR theory.
In some ways, Feminist IR theory has created an alternate discourse of
IR theory that departs from the standard vocabulary of metaphors found
in other schools of thought.41 Research agendas prioritized by the dominance
of abstract metaphorical concepts such as “systems,” “structures,” and
states seen as “individuals” are challenged by Feminist approaches that
emphasize a different empirical focus on how gender shapes discrete acts by
a variety of actors including, but not limited to, individuals whose so-called
private acts do not fit neatly within traditional theoretical perspectives.
166 M. P. MARKS
The epistemological and methodological strategies of Feminist IR

scholarship also do not follow the approaches that are prioritized by tradi-
tional schools of thought. Research on metaphorical “systems” and “struc-
tures” emphasizes positivist strategies to gauge the causal impact of shifts in
“power” or the articulation of interests wielded by actors that are integral to
such metaphorical categories. Feminist scholarship that investigates the con-
tributions of individuals, either within their narratives or aggregated using
quantitative tools (as Caprioli 2000, 2003, 2004 suggests), is overlooked
when the emphasis is on events that fall within the metaphorical categories
set forth by “mainstream” theories in IR. It is not so much that my previous
work on metaphors (Marks 2011) marginalizes Feminist theory, but that
Feminist theory itself is marginalized by those metaphors themselves, lead-
ing Feminist scholars such as Judith Squires and Jutta Weldes to examine, as
suggested in the title of their 2007 piece, how Feminist IR theory can move
“beyond being marginal.” I would argue that one answer to this question is
to continue to critically examine the metaphors that to date determine the
ontological and epistemological bases of the field.
While Feminist theory has so far largely eschewed reliance on meta-
phors for the purposes of theorizing the nature and practice of IR, there
are exceptions which may foretell a shift in Feminist theorizing that makes
greater use of metaphorical concepts than in the past. For example, the
pervasive practice of treating the state metaphorically as a person is given
a gendered twist by Jennifer Heeg Maruska (2010) who highlights situa-
tions in which the state-as-person can be “hypermasculine.” More force-
fully, Laura Sjoberg has advocated for adopting the long-standing
metaphor of “structure” as a tool in Feminist theory. Sjoberg (2012, 3)
argues that although Feminist theory to date has largely rejected the
notion of structure (and with it, theorizing at distinct metaphorical “levels
of analysis” including “third image” theorizing at the highest level of anal-
ysis), Feminist scholars should realize that “there is a structure to the
international system and that structure cannot be understood without
gender analysis.”42 In acknowledging the existence of “structure,” Sjoberg
has fully embraced some of the basic premises of Waltzian Neorealist
theory. In particular, Sojoberg (ibid., 11) embraces a “‘third image’

approach [which] asserts that gender of, within, and among states reflects
and reproduces the gendered nature of the international system structure,
rather than being an incidental property of units.” This international
structure entails hierarchies incorporating gender among other things.
Thus, “gender hierarchy is a key part of the structure of the international
system” (Sjoberg 2013, 102).43
In making this leap to graft a structural approach onto Feminist theory,

Sjoberg appears to accept the implications of treating structure as a meta-
phor. In particular, as I have argued previously (Marks 2011, 43), the
metaphor of “structure” in IR theory typically imputes qualities of physi-
cal construction to what otherwise might be seen as ideational phenom-
ena. Sjoberg’s concept of structure does not deviate from this common
practice of seeing structure metaphorically in terms of qualities associated
with physical construction. Sjoberg (2013, 15) describes gendered struc-
ture as follows:
1. State identity having gendered components (unit function); 2. States posi-

tions, allowed behaviors, locations in physical space, and power being distrib-
uted on the basis of perceived gender characteristics, and advantage,
meaning, control, and actions between states to be distributed on the basis
of association with masculinity and femininity (unit capability distribution);
and 3. Inter-state interaction being premised on the gender hierarchy
between states (production of political processes for unit interaction)
(emphasis added).
In this account, gender analysis succumbs to the metaphorical image of

structure that emphasizes the types of constraints which are implied by
seeing IR in terms of a physical edifice.
Whereas prior Feminist theory takes as its starting point the lived expe-
riences of individual human beings imbued with gendered meaning,
Sjoberg’s structural gendered approach prioritizes and privileges precisely
those constraining forces that are associated with a metaphorical view of
structure which sees IR in terms of physical forces acting upon individual
actors. Sjoberg’s effort is to make “third image” theorizing more consistent
with a theoretical approach premised on gendered meaning. But by adopt-
ing the third image view of structure as metaphorically involving physical
construction and constraints, Sjoberg has unwittingly imposed upon gen-
dered analysis the emphasis of traditional theorizing on and prioritizing of
constraints associated with paradigms that operate at the metaphorical
“systemic” “level of analysis.” Taken further, Sjoberg’s project may not
bring gendered theorizing to third-level systemic analysis, but might
impose on gendered theory the metaphorical priorities of systemic analysis
understood in terms of structure seen as physical construction.
In light of Sjoberg’s observations, Feminist IR theory may be at a
turning point in its relationship to metaphors as ways to conceptualize
168 M. P. MARKS
IR. For the most part, Feminist ontology and epistemology have rejected
abstract categories in favor of an empirical perspective which prioritizes
the contributions of individuals to world affairs and which emphasizes
research agendas highlighting individual experiences and narratives.
Shifting from these approaches may lead to a sort of mainstreaming of
Feminist theory in the sense that it adopts the abstract concepts of ortho-
dox IR paradigms resting as they are on metaphorical frames. By accepting
the categories of “systems,” “structures,” and other conceptual metaphors
that provide IR theories with ontological perspectives and epistemological
tools, Feminist theory may be able to present critical perspectives using
the same conceptual metaphors as those paradigms which are the targets
of Feminist critique. On the other hand, one must wonder if by embracing
the foundational conceptual metaphors of orthodox paradigms, Feminist
theory gives up some of its ability to present a critical interrogation of
traditional IR thought. That Feminist theorists may have to make this
choice further highlights the central role that metaphors play in defining
IR as a disciplinary field.
Metaphors and Paradigmatic Framing

As the foregoing discussion illustrates, conceptual metaphors are essential
features in distinguishing the major paradigms in the study of IR. Metaphors
do more than simply decorate the language of scholarly inquiry. Metaphors
provide the basic concepts from which paradigms derive their theoretical
propositions. Equally, the relative lack of metaphors in some theoretical
approaches, for example, Feminist theory, highlights the way these
approaches put more emphasis on empirical analysis than on abstract con-
cepts as starting points for explaining political outcomes. For this reason,
the relative presence or absence of metaphors in any theoretical school of
thought provides a guide for what sorts of ontological assumptions and
epistemological perspectives frame the analyses found in these approaches.
While paradigmatic differences are necessary to distinguish fundamen-
tal disagreements about how best to explain IR, these differences at times
unnecessarily suggest an incompatibility of theoretical schools of thought.
Competing conceptual metaphors, as framing devices for rival paradigms,
contribute to this perception. In recent years, there has been a great deal
of attention given to the need for eclecticism in theories of IR.44 Theoretical
eclecticism might be better encouraged if scholars were less inclined to
view paradigms as presenting fundamentally incompatible views on the
basis of the core conceptual metaphors that serve as framing devices and
which seemingly divide approaches from each other.
Among the ways that eclecticism can be fostered is by eschewing meta-
phors that encourage a static view of IR and embracing metaphors that
highlight the temporal qualities of change. For example, as I write about
in my previous book (Marks 2011, 36–44), typical uses of “structure” as
a metaphor conceptualize IR in mechanistic terms of constructed and
static edifices. By contrast, there are ways of conceiving of structure in
temporal terms that emphasize qualities of change. Thus, for example,
Peter Katzenstein (2000, 353) defines “structures” as “slow moving pro-
cesses.” Katzenstein’s formulation encourages thinking of structure not as
a fixed quality of IR that can be identified with regard to such metaphori-
cal qualities as “polarity,” but as dynamic interactions by which the char-
acteristic aspects of IR are continuously changed.
Obviously not even theoretical eclecticism can erase or overcome the
metaphorical concepts that delineate distinct explanatory frameworks in
the study of IR any more than such eclecticism could accomplish the same
role in other academic disciplines or, for that matter, transcend the meta-
phors that distinguish one academic discipline from another. Conceptual
metaphors are integral to human cognition and are found in all aspects of
the human experience including fields of scholarly inquiry. In this sense,
what is necessary is acknowledging the role conceptual metaphors play in
framing theoretical narratives and exercising vigilance that, given their
essential role, metaphors are properly interrogated with regard to how they
privilege certain assumptions while marginalizing or excluding others.
Stefanie Fishel (2017), for example, does an excellent job of questioning
the role of state agency in IR by investigating new metaphorical ways of
imagining the place of human beings in the natural world. It is also impor-
tant to exercise caution when treating metaphorical concepts potentially as
substitutes for the empirical subject matter which they represent. Conceptual
metaphors reflect ways of representing physical experiences through
thought. Not surprisingly, there are very real analytical problems and
potential logical fallacies in the use of metaphorical concepts in any field.
Metaphors and the Division of the “International”

from “Foreign Policy Analysis”
Just as metaphors help scholars “see” certain aspects of IR, they often lead
them to overlook others. Thus, for example, through the metaphor of
states-as-individuals (see Marks 2011, 47–51), states are seen as “agents”
170 M. P. MARKS
of IR. Much IR theory thus focuses on concepts associated with

states-as-individual agents. By contrast, the human beings who are involved
in the actual undertaking of the actions of states and other international
actors—diplomats, bureaucrats, elected officials, functionaries of interna-
tional organizations, and so forth—largely are relegated to the study of
“foreign policy analysis,” itself a distinct academic discipline.
The implication for IR theory is that schools of thought that accept the
state-as-individual assumption enjoy the status of “paradigms” in the study
of what is variously referred to as IR, international politics, world politics,
and so on. By contrast, approaches that focus on individual human agents,
that is, theories put to use in “foreign policy analysis,” are not elevated to
the status of a “paradigm” on par with theories of IR.45 Hence, in the
annual survey of IR scholars conducted by researchers at the College of
William and Mary (Maliniak et al. 2012, 12, 27, 47), theories of individual
decision-making are not included in the list of major IR paradigms but are
instead presumably relegated to the realm of the so-called foreign policy
analysis.46 By the same token, the International Studies Association (ISA)
publishes three journals that emphasize the overarching paradigms in the
study of IR (International Studies Quarterly, International Studies Review,
and International Studies Perspectives), while separating out the study of
“foreign policy analysis” into its own eponymously titled journal. The
articles that appear in Foreign Policy Analysis employ distinct theoretical
approaches that typically are not found in the ISA’s other official
journals.47
The division of scholarship into paradigms in the study of IR and theo-
ries of foreign policy analysis is the inevitable result of the distinction
imposed by treating states metaphorically as individuals versus human
beings treated as literal individuals. Ironically, novice students initiating
their study of IR are far more aware of the blurring between literal human
individuals and metaphorical states-as-individuals than are many estab-
lished scholars as illustrated ironically through students’ erroneous gram-
mar. In written essays in introductory IR courses it is common for students
to use the third-person plural when referring to states. A typical sentence
might be written something along the lines of, “France sought European
integration at the same time they were relinquishing their African colonies.”
Students know that countries are comprised of individual decision-makers
even if they are not accustomed to using the convention of using the third-
person singular when referring to corporate actors. This is quite possibly
because undergraduate students in introductory courses in particular have
not been initiated (indoctrinated?) into a scholarly tradition that treats

corporate actors as singular entities for the purposes of tracing out causal or
constitutive theories of IR. Of course, corporate actors are by definition
singular entities, but they are also comprised of individuals whose decisions
collectively constitute the deliberations and actions of the collective. This is
a distinction that has been debated ferociously by IR scholars (e.g., Ashley
1984; Wendt 1999, 2004, 2005; Neumann 2004; Wight 2004; Lomas
2005; Schiff 2008; Luoma-aho 2009); however, the result of the debate
frequently has been that scholars have been forced to take sides regarding
whether the state-as-individual is a metaphor or if it is a literal fact. The
reality is that it can be both, since states can behave as singular units or they
can behave in ways reflective of the diversity of positions taken by individu-
als within them.
The division of scholarly research and into theories of IR and foreign
policy analysis is also the inevitable result of thinking about the subject
matter at hand in terms of metaphorical “levels of analysis.” I have taken
up other aspects of the levels of analysis metaphor in my previous work
(Marks 2011, 58–64). What I did not explore was how the levels of analy-
sis metaphor create categories in theorizing the nature of IR itself. The
codification of the division between IR theory and foreign policy analysis
quite possibly took place in J. David Singer’s seminal 1961 article on the
levels of analysis problem. In that piece, Singer identifies two levels of
analysis in the study of IR: the level of the international system, and the
level of the “national state.” The level of the individual, while now com-
mon in the enumeration of levels of analysis in IR, is not included in
Singer’s typology.48 Singer entertains the possibility of theorizing at the
level of the individual but is cautious because doing so would hamper
prediction and the ability to formulate generalizable propositions. Singer
(1961, 79) notes, however, that scholars have in fact mapped out a strat-
egy for developing theories at the individual level, citing the contributions
of Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burron Sapin in their 1954 volume
Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics.
However, Singer is concerned that theories at the individual level lack
parsimony. Singer (ibid.) refers approvingly to a review of the Snyder,
Bruck, and Sapin volume by Herbert McClosky (1956, 291), who says the
following about decision-making theories: “Until a greater measure of
theory is introduced into the proposal and the relations among variables
are specified more concretely, [a decision-making model] is likely to
remain little more than a setting-out of categories and, like any taxonomy,
fairly limited in its utility.”
172 M. P. MARKS
More tellingly, in leaving out the individual level of analysis, Singer

seems to concur with latter-day theorists who see the difference between
theories of IR and foreign policy analysis as a choice to reify the state as a
metaphorical individual instead of viewing it as a political institution com-
posed of human agents. Singer (1961, 89) writes: “Those of us who think
of social forces as operative regardless of the actor’s awareness, who believe
that explanation need not include all of the steps in a causal chain, who are
dubious of the practicality of gathering phenomenal data, or who visualize
the nation as a distinct entity apart from its individual members, will tend
to reject the phenomenological approach.” The phenomenological
approach is one that treats individuals as discrete agents, which Singer
finds too unwieldy for the purposes of assembling a parsimonious theory
of cause and effect in order to explain IR.
Herein lies the key point—Singer’s taxonomy of levels of analysis which
divides the field into a study of IR on the one hand and foreign policy
analysis on the other. This division is part and parcel of the reification of
the state as a metaphorical individual. Singer (88–89) says as much: “In
other words, people are capable of experiences, images, and expectations,
while institutional abstractions are not, except in the metaphorical sense”
(emphasis in the original). Importantly, the classification system by which
IR theory is divided into levels of analysis, together with the reification of
the state-as-individual, is part of the same process by which metaphors
separate out individual human decision-makers in policymaking roles from
the state conceived of as an individual. This decision represents the key
ontological move that creates the division between IR theory and foreign
policy analysis. Metaphors therefore play an essential role in defining fields
of inquiry, what needs to be understood, and how it is to be studied.
While Singer’s examination of levels of analysis was not the first to tackle
this topic, and although dozens of investigations of the concept have
ensued, his emphasis on the systemic and state levels of analysis as repre-
sentative of IR theory, with the individual level relegated to secondary
status, has had a profound impact on the field, perhaps felt most deeply in
the ongoing division between theories of IR on the one hand and foreign
policy analysis on the other.49
Where Are the Metaphors in Theories of Foreign Policy

Decision-Making?
Inasmuch as theories of foreign policy decision-making are marginalized
and treated apart from theoretical paradigms in the study of IR, they share
a common trait with Feminist IR theory. Specifically, metaphors are

seemingly absent in theories of foreign policy decision-making.50 While
foreign policy leaders are inclined to deploy linguistic metaphors for
the purposes of framing an issue, for example, the image of “falling domi-
nos” in American discourse during the Vietnam War (Shimko 1994), theo-
ries of foreign policy decision-making are largely devoid of the sorts of
metaphorical images that are common in other paradigms in the study of
IR. The relative lack of metaphors in theories of foreign policy decision-
making suggests the following question: Does this shortage of metaphors
imply that there is no paradigm incorporating theories of foreign policy
decision-making because there are no conceptual metaphors that would
inform a coherent theoretical logic? As I have elaborated in this book and
my previous volume, the main paradigmatic approaches in the study of IR
are characterized by the analytical categories and causal arguments that are
framed by core conceptual metaphors. In many cases, these paradigms can
be distinguished from each other on the basis of those conceptual meta-
phors. Thus, for example, the metaphor of shifting “distributions” of
power frames Realist hypotheses about changed relations among states,
while the metaphor of “evolving” norms signifies a concept within the
Constructivist school of thought. Conceptual metaphors both denote an
internal coherence among different strands of thinking within paradigms
and differentiate each of the paradigms from the others.
Although Feminist theory demonstrates a lack of a consistent and system-
atic set of conceptual metaphors that unify individual strands of thought
within the paradigm, it nonetheless represents a distinct and coherent theo-
retical approach in the study of IR because of its emphasis on other funda-
mental analytical concepts. Can the same be said of theories of foreign policy
decision-making? On the one hand, what characterizes theories of foreign
policy decision-making as distinct from other approaches in IR is their treat-
ment as constants those factors that other paradigms treat as variables in
IR. Specifically, theories of foreign policy decision-making make simplifying
assumptions about prevailing structures at the systemic and state levels of
analysis for the purpose of asking what changed outcomes would occur as a
function of changes in the decision-making dynamics of individuals and
decision-making groups such as government organizations, agencies, and
bureaucracies. Scholars who practice these approaches hypothesize that vari-
ations in the rationality and non-rationality of decision-making will have an
appreciable impact on outcomes, all things being equal at the systemic
and state levels of analysis. What also characterizes theories of foreign
policy decision-making is the nature of the generalizability of their claims.
174 M. P. MARKS
Theoretical propositions about cause and effect are generalizable only to the
extent that there are similarities in circumstances from case to case. Since
there are far more decision-making dynamics among foreign policymakers
than there are variations in the structural conditions of the international sys-
tem or the governments of states, the ability to generalize across cases is less
comprehensive than it is in paradigms which theorize at the systemic or state
levels of analysis.
Given the limits on generalizability that are intrinsic to theories of for-
eign policy decision-making, the coherence of these theories into a unified
paradigm depends on the existence of analytical concepts which frame the
causal logic of these approaches. In Feminist theory, these analytical con-
cepts take the form of ontological claims about what constitutes the sub-
stance of IR, namely, an expanded notion of politics (beyond that which is
claimed by competing IR paradigms) informed by gender, corresponding
epistemological understandings that go beyond traditional approaches,
and a wider set of methodological tools so as to fully capture the wider
range of subjects that are suggested by Feminist ontologies and episte-
mologies. Is the relative lack of conceptual metaphors in theories of for-
eign policy decision-making evidence that these theories do not cohere
into an identifiable paradigmatic approach? The current state of the field
would seem to suggest yes. The biannual survey conducted by the Institute
for the Theory and Practice of International Relations asks IR scholars to
indicate what portion of teaching and research they estimate is devoted to
the major paradigms in the study of IR. Paradigms included for selection
in the survey are Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, Marxism, Feminism,
the English School, non-paradigmatic, and “other” (Maliniak et al. 2012,
12, 27, 47). This classification would seem to indicate that for the pur-
poses of delineating the major theoretical schools of thought in IR, theo-
ries of foreign policy decision-making are not included.
More importantly, while there are a small number of prominent meta-
phors in the study of foreign policy decision-making, for example, the con-
cept of deterrence examined with the metaphorical frame of “brinkmanship”
(Schelling 1966), these metaphors are for the most part limited in scope.
They apply not to core concepts and analytical puzzles that lead to the
essential causal logic of the main IR paradigms, but rather to limited situ-
ational circumstances. The hypotheses that are applicable to these situa-
tions and the predictions that emanate from them are unique to the
circumstances of these situations and tend not to apply to other decision-
making contexts. Thus, it is not so much the absence of metaphors in the
study of foreign policy decision-making as it is the limits on their

generalizability that leads scholars not to recognize theories of decision-
making as a comprehensive paradigm on a par with other IR schools of
thought. Once again we see that an examination of metaphors reveals
something about the nature of IR theory, in this case, the delineation of
what is included and excluded from the study of “international relations.”
Conceptual metaphors with limited scope such as “brinkmanship” denote
the contours of theories of foreign policy decision-making, but limited abil-
ity to generalize from them to the core concepts of “international rela-
tions” helps explain why scholars classify these theories differently from the
main paradigms in IR theory.
Metaphors and the Marginalization
of People in IR Theory
Also overlooked by the metaphorical lenses of IR theory are the actions of

everyday people.51 Whether it is IR or foreign policy analysis, divided as
they are by metaphorical levels of analysis, what qualifies as the subject of
research and analysis are the actions of what are deemed to be interna-
tional and/or narrowly defined political actors. The denomination of
political actors occurs by virtue of being included in the categories created
by conceptual metaphors which define the field. Excluded by the catego-
ries of IR and foreign policy analysis is the great mass of humanity not
occupying positions of political authority, tasked with foreign policy
decision-making, or serving as functionaries to implement these deci-
sions.52 Although, as I discussed above, Feminist theory does take up the
role of humans individually and collectively as agents in the practice of
global relations, the Feminist paradigm alone among IR schools of thought
seriously entertains the proposition that everyday people are active partici-
pants in the conduct of world affairs.53 One could argue that analyses of
non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations and transna-
tional activist networks incorporate the study of individuals who are not
part of the upper echelons of states’ foreign policy apparatuses. However,
even these analyses miss the involvement of the vast majority of human
beings whose actions affect global affairs and who are affected by what
goes on around the world.
The overlooking of everyday people in IR theory (aside from Feminist
theory) is a function of several conceptual metaphors that determine the
parameters of the field. In the first place, there is no level of analysis that
176 M. P. MARKS
incorporates the actions of individuals aside from those individuals who

are in positions of policymaking authority. Levels of analysis typically are
arrayed from “big” to “small,” with the “largest” level of analysis, that of
the international “system,” located on the “top” and the smallest level,
that of the individual, situated on the “bottom.” “Below” the level of the
individual, there is no space for individuals, that is, the collected i ndividuals
who make up the mass of humanity typically not considered relevant in the
practice or study of IR.54 Perhaps because the many individuals who com-
prise the majority of the world’s population are “larger” than the discrete
individuals who are in policymaking positions, there is no “place” for
them in the levels of analysis that are layered vertically from “big” to
“small.”
The reification of states and other corporate actors that gives them
“personhood” in IR is another metaphorical concept that redirects IR
theory away from the acts of everyday individuals toward more abstract
metaphorical concepts.55 Alexander Wendt (1999, 13–14) has suggested
“bracketing” levels of analysis in ways that permit for theorizing about the
state seen as an individual or person.56 The net result of such endeavors,
however, is to exclude the role of hidden human individuals and the effects
that international politics has on them. The consequences of this theoreti-
cal conceptualization of the state (as opposed to actual human beings) as
having personhood on the practice of politics can be frightening. As
Andreas Musolff (2010) eloquently argues, throughout history the state
has been conceived metaphorically as having a corporeal existence, most
notably in the notion of the “body politic.” Once endowed with this exis-
tence, the body politic can then be imagined as subject to disease and
infection. Musolff powerfully explains how throughout history political
efforts to cleanse the body politic of metaphorical disease, infection, and
parasitic infestation have ignored the lives of living people, culminating
horrifically in the most extreme example of efforts to maintain the health
of the body politic, that is, the Holocaust. The Holocaust, as Musolff
notes, demonstrates how political conceptions of the state as an individual
served to render real human beings expendable in the name of preserving
the health of the body politic.57 Scholars of IR should take note that to the
extent IR as a field of study is confined to the actions of a limited range of
international actors. IR theory leaves out the vast majority of the world’s
population who both influence world affairs by their actions and whose
lives are shaped by the actors at the center of IR theory, namely states and
other political institutions.
Feminist theory notwithstanding, IR theory mostly leaves out the

ersonal when examining the political. The focus on metaphorical con-
p
cepts, begs the question, as Christine Sylvester (2016, 258) puts it, “must
IR remain abstract in the future?” This volume and the one that precedes
it (Marks 2011) tell the story of IR narratives that center on conceptual
themes as frames of reference. IR as an academic discipline may involve the
humanities and social sciences, but as a scholarly field it pointedly excludes
the human and the social. The reason behind this is the influence of meta-
phors as the primary tool of analysis. These metaphors largely go unno-
ticed, although their importance in delineating the content and scope of
IR analysis cannot be overstated.
Notes
1. For examinations of the role of metaphors in scientific inquiry, see, for
example, Black (1962), Brown (2003).
2. The “billiard ball” metaphor in fact is not unlike elementary metaphors
found in physics. The image of states interacting on a billiard table resem-
bles physical relationships such as those visualized with the aid of “orbital”
metaphors used to study the structures and properties of atoms and sub-
atomic particles.
3. The “billiard ball” metaphor to describe power politics was first advanced
by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan. See Terence Ball’s (1975, 215ff) discus-
sion of the Hobbesian metaphor. For a detailed explication of the billiard
ball metaphor, see Burton (1972, 28–32). See also Deibert (1997,
167–169).
4. The conception of “power” in IR theory lends itself to any number of
metaphors. Power can also be metaphorically “soft” or “hard” (Nye 1990a,
b, 2004) and it can be metaphorically “tamed” (Katzenstein 1997), just to
name two of the many metaphorical ways in which power has been
conceived.
5. See also Roggeveen (2001, especially 30).
6. The “billiard ball” metaphor can be compared to the similar-sounding
albeit theoretically opposed “‘egg-box’ conception of international soci-
ety” whereby “the sovereign states are the eggs, the box is international
society and the purpose of the box is to ‘separate and cushion, not to act’”
(Wheeler 1996, 126). See also Vincent (1986, 123), Jackson (1990, 267).
7. The “black box” metaphor not only treats the state as a unitary actor, it
also privileges the state as an unproblematic realm mediating between the
presumed anarchy of IR and the relative tranquility of domestic politics.
See Walker (1990, 17–18).
178 M. P. MARKS
8. Waltz’s use of economic metaphors is found elsewhere in the study of poli-

tics. For an analysis of the pervasiveness of economic metaphors in political
science, see Ashcraft (1977).
9. Ironically, since Waltz recognizes that the international system is com-
prised of a diversity of actors, if he were to use international politics as a
metaphor for the economic market, and not vice versa, he would likely
assume that the economic market is comprised of more than just firms in
terms of relevant actors.
10. Waltz acknowledges his debt to physics: “A political structure is akin to a
field of forces in physics: Interactions within a field have properties differ-
ent from those they would have if they occurred outside of it, and as the
field affects the objects, so the objects affect the field” (Waltz 1979, 73).
11. I say “quasi-experimental” since Neorealism relies most heavily on histori-
cal case studies as its “laboratory” rather than on experimenting on human
subjects, which would be both practically challenging and ethically
problematic.
12. For a fuller elaboration of the significance of the metaphor of “domestic”
politics in IR theory, see (Marks 2011, 46–47).
13. Peer Schouten (2013) affirms Walker and notes additionally that the con-
cept of levels of analysis in IR theory posits the state as a social contract
which shields humans from the state of nature among individuals and anar-
chy among states. See also Marks (2004).
14. The inside–outside distinction which privileges the state as a source of pro-
tection also creates similar binary distinctions such as the contrast between
the state and the metaphor of “warlords,” which are associated with chaos
and anarchy. On the metaphors of state and warlord, see Goetze (2016).
15. The first appearance of the word in English was in the years 1292 and
1297 in the forms of foreyns and forene, respectively.
16. The Oxford English Dictionary cites Coryate’s book Coryat’s Crudities
(Coryate 1611) published in London in 1611 and quotes Coryate: “The
Obseruations of my trauels;..I hope..will be very delectable to euery Reader
that loueth to heare of forraine affaires.”
17. On the metaphorical rhetoric of homes and homelands, see Confino
(1993), Shelef (2016).
18. Of the terms that are synonyms with “interests,” the one that is used most
often in Liberal discussions of domestic politics probably would be domes-
tic “preferences.”
19. MacKenzie and Sesay (147) elaborate on their claim about norms betray-
ing the values of those with the power to disseminate them: “The value
laden discussions of norms as signals of ‘appropriateness’ and ‘community
and collective understandings’ should be viewed as practical sirens warning
of imperialism and beg several—seemingly obvious—questions:

Appropriate for whom? Who’s [sic] collective? What community?”
20. On the relationship between socialization, norms, and the variable role of
hegemonic actors, see Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990), Bower (2015),
Lantis (2015).
21. I explore the base metaphor of “evolution” at greater length in Marks
(2011, 71–72).
22. On evolutionary metaphors and international norms, see also Nadelmann
(1990) and Patrick (2001).
23. On norm life cycles, see also Krook and True (2012). On norm cascades,
see also Fisk and Ramos (2014). The end of a norm life cycle has been
imagined metaphorically with the image of norm “degeneration.” See
Panke and Petersohn (2012).
24. For a biological approach to the study of evolution in IR, see Falger
(2001).
25. As Price (1997, 43) notes: “The legacy of the initial manifestation of the
chemical weapons taboo…is a coming together of a genealogical appro-
priation of the poison taboo and a rereading of an institutionalized prohi-
bition formally produced for other reasons.”
26. For the relationship between terrorism and taboos, see Jackson (2015).
27. On “normality” in IR, see, for example, Lawson and Tannaka (2011).
28. The suspicion that mainstream theories of IR marginalize Feminist
approaches is taken up in Steans (2003). My purpose in the discussion that
follows is not to perpetuate this marginalization, but to point out how
metaphors in orthodox theories of IR contribute to this marginalization
and to suggest how an interrogation of metaphors in mainstream IR the-
ory can both highlight why Feminist theory has been relegated to the
margins and provide an avenue for providing Feminist theory a more
prominent place in theories of IR.
29. Thus, for example, just as Jill Steans (1998, 46) points out that
“International Relations is a gendered discourse” (emphasis in the origi-
nal), she might also agree that this gendered discourse is part of a larger
discourse imbued with metaphors that reflect a gendered view.
30. I am aware, as V. Spike Peterson (2004, 36) reminds us, that Feminist IR
theory is not monolithic in its approach to the study of IR. However,
Peterson also observes that there are unifying features of Feminist IR the-
ory, in particular, an emphasis on gender. It is these unifying features that
I argue below resist the tendency toward reliance on metaphorical frames
that are otherwise common in much of traditional IR theory.
31. Even the concept of a metaphorically spatial “marginalization” of Feminist
theory in IR is problematic for situating Feminist schools of thought
180 M. P. MARKS
within the larger discipline of IR. See Steans (2003, 428–431), Soreanu
(2010, 392–393).
32. For similar analyses, see Grant (1991), Peterson (1992).
33. Enloe’s agenda is echoed by other Feminist scholars. For example, J. Ann
Tickner (2005b, 2185) writes: “Feminists in IR are concerned with the
linkages between the everyday lived experiences of women and the consti-
tution and exercise of political and economic power at the state and global
levels.” For an empirical example, see Bianchi and Ludbrook (2016). See
also Enloe’s reflections on her own work in Enloe (2016).
34. Treating the experiences of individuals seriously does not preclude the abil-
ity of Feminist approaches to theorize about large-scale process of IR. Thus,
for example, Tickner (2001, 47) writes that “when we treat individuals as
the objects of security, we open up the possibility of talking about a tran-
scendental human community with common global concerns and allow
engagement with the broadest global threats.”
35. For more on the study of the everyday in IR, see the forum on this topic
in the December 2011 issue of International Political Sociology: Crane-
Seeber (2011), Enloe (2011), Guillaume (2011a, b), Salter (2011),
Seabrooke (2011). See also D’Costa (2006), Harel-Shalev and Daphna-
Tekoah (2016).
36. The importance of the impacts of everyday people on IR and vice versa,
and their significance for Feminist theory, is highlighted poignantly by Rai
(2016).
37. Among those pieces of information that become accessible through self-
referential modes of research are those that pertain to emotion and its role
in IR research. See the articles in the forum on “Emotion and the Feminist
IR Researcher” in the December 2011 issue of International Studies
Review: MacKenzie (2011), Marshall (2011), Parashar (2011), Saeidi and
Turcotte (2011), Sjoberg (2011), Sylvester (2011).
38. Moving away from objectivism means acknowledging the subjective expe-
riences of individuals affected by IR, not embracing Relativism as a theo-
retical approach. See Sylvester (2002, 313–314).
39. On the construction of “international security” as a metaphorical frame,
see Chilton (1996), Marks (2011, chapter 6).
40. Thus, J. Ann Tickner (2006, 21) notes that “feminists claim no single stan-
dard of methodological correctness or ‘feminist way’ to do research.” For
overviews of Feminist approaches, see, for example, Sylvester (1994,
2002), Steans (1998), Tickner (2001, 2005a, b).
41. Raluca Soreanu and David Hudson (2008) point out that the sociology of
Feminist IR theory indicates a citation map wherein Feminist scholars cite
a unique set of literatures, which then comprise the Feminist discourse of
IR theory.
42. Sjoberg is not necessarily the first scholar applying Feminist theory to
structural analyses of IR. For example, while pioneering Feminist theorist
J. Ann Tickner (2005a, 6) prioritizes the role of individuals in world affairs,
her work does nonetheless employ the metaphorical language of structural
analysis, arguing, for example, that “feminist ontologies are based on social
relations that are constituted by historically unequal political, economic,
and social structures” (emphasis added). See also Sjoberg (2013, 2014).
43. Although Sjoberg adopts a structural approach to incorporating Feminist
theory into IR, she adheres to many Feminist tenets, including the asser-
tion that elements of IR, especially war, are “lived and experienced” by
individuals, where gender plays a role (Sjoberg 2013, 252). See also
Sjoberg (2014).
44. On eclecticism, see Sil and Katzenstein (2010), Parsons (2015).
45. For a good summary on the divide between IR theory and foreign policy
analysis, see Kaarbo (2015, esp. 189–195).
46. In the William and Mary survey, the main IR paradigms listed are
Constructivism, English School, Feminism, Liberalism, Marxism, and
Realism (Maliniak et al. 2012, 12, 27, 47). Also listed are “Non-
paradigmatic” and “Other” which would allow scholars responding to the
survey to include theories of decision-making if they so choose. However,
“non-paradigmatic” implies no paradigm whatsoever (which would
exclude decision-making theories as a coherent paradigmatic approach),
while “other” might include decision-making theories although it could
include other approaches as well. The point is that survey respondents are
not given a choice of decision-making theories which would seem to indi-
cate that the authors of the survey do not consider it a paradigm in the
study of IR on par with other theoretical schools of thought. Rather, deci-
sion-making theories comprise approaches in the study of foreign policy
analysis.
47. The ISA describes Foreign Policy Analysis as “a peer-reviewed outlet for the
highest quality academic research into the processes, outcomes and theo-
ries of foreign policy.” The association’s other three flagship journals have
a different mandate, that is, to emphasize “international studies,” which
presumably is distinct from foreign policy analysis. The ISA also publishes
International Political Sociology described as “interdisciplinary journal
responding to the diversification of both scholarly interests and regional
concerns in contemporary international studies” and co-publishes
International Interactions described as “an interdisciplinary journal pub-
lishing original empirical, analytic, and/or theoretical research in the gen-
eral field of international relations.” Source: http://www.isanet.org/
pubs/journals.html.
182 M. P. MARKS
48. Singer ( 1961, 78) notes that Waltz (1959) includes the individual level of
analysis in his classic Man, the State and War. Meanwhile, Rosenau (1966)
lists as many of five levels of analysis of which the level of the individual is
but one. Scholars have identified varying numbers of levels of analysis and
typically include the individual level in their system of classification.
49. Without explicitly addressing the divide between IR theory and foreign
policy analysis, Charlotte Epstein (2011) suggests a discourse-based analy-
sis of subjects and subjectivities, which allows scholars to theorize across
levels of analysis by distinguishing the discourse of states from the dis-
course of individual agents of the state.
50. By this I do not mean that metaphors are absent in the foreign policy pro-
nouncements of politicians and political leaders. In fact, as has been well-
documented, individuals in charge of foreign policy decision-making are
especially prone to using metaphors to frame issues particularly for propa-
gandistic purposes but also simply to present an issue to the public at large.
On the use of metaphors in the discourse of foreign policy leaders, see, for
example, Andrews (1979), Ivie (1980, 1982, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1997,
1999, 2002, 2004), Milliken (1996), Beer and De Landtsheer (2004),
Slingerland et al. (2007), Flanik (2011), Oppermann and Spencer (2013).
51. For a brief but eloquent call for the inclusion of the quotidian in the study
of IR, see Rai (2016). On the need to broaden the scope of IR, see also
Dyvik et al. (2017).
52. The study of human beings is often confused with the study of human
nature in IR theory. On the latter, see Jacobi and Freyberg-Inan (2012).
53. For examples of the study of the everyday that does not derive from
Feminist theory, see Kessler and Guillaume (2002), Hobson and Seabrooke
(2007), Shim (2016).
54. One could argue that the domestic or state level of analysis leaves room for
everyday individuals who express themselves collectively in the form of
interest groups or social movements. However, these groups typically are
treated as the same sort of corporate actors as states themselves and there-
fore are given a metaphorical personhood that is abstracted from the
actions of people in their individual acts. The same could be said of mass
public opinion, which is treated as the aggregated sum of collected expres-
sions, not the effects of people engaged in individual behaviors.
55. On the state seen metaphorically as an individual, see Marks (2011,
47–51), Musolff (2016).
56. On the state as an individual or person, see also Wendt (2004, 2005).
57. “The victims [of the Holocaust] were treated as if they were agents of dis-
ease and parasites that threatened the German national body’s health and
therefore had to be annihilated” (Musolff 2010, 2, emphasis in the origi-
nal). See also Musolff (2016).
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CHAPTER 5
The Role of Metaphors in International

Relations Theory
In my previous work on metaphors in IR theory (Marks 2011) I observed

that the analytical categories by which empirical facts are understood origi-
nate in metaphorical concepts. The accumulation of conceptual metaphors
in IR also provides the basis for the narratives around which theories of IR
are constructed. By narratives I do not mean that IR scholars tell fictional
stories.1 In the study of any disciplinary field, determination of what con-
cepts are thought to be important, and how they are problematized, is not
based on an arbitrary identification of objective facts. Instead, the onto-
logical bases of academic inquiry are told through a series of concepts com-
prising an analytical whole. Scholars must tell each other what matters, that
is, construct a narrative, since facts do not present themselves in an unam-
biguous fashion to a group of individuals each of whom may understand
facts in different ways. Moreover, as Richard Ned Lebow (2014) has sug-
gested, since linearly causal arguments are of dubious value in social realms
where human agency is at play, explanations in IR are conveyed in part
through narratives that, as Lebow puts it, “construct causation.”2
The narratives of IR theory, as with the narratives in any academic dis-
cipline, constitute the language of the discipline’s ontological scope. These
narratives include metaphors as well as myths. As Berit Bliesemann de
Guevara (2016, 19) forcefully observes, as is true for metaphors, “myths
are one of the structuring elements of broader discourses which construct
political problems and legitimate policy solutions.”3 Bliesemann de
Guevara further notes (19) that “where narrative-focused approaches to

194 M. P. MARKS
the study of myth are used, such as in many interpretive policy analysis
works, they have contributed powerful insights into the cultural and social
constitution of politics.” Franziska Müller (2016, 111) concurs, arguing
that “IR can be conceptualised as a kind of ‘storytelling,’ structured by
certain narratives, tropes, protagonists, scripts, and tensions” of which
myth-production is one. Along with myths, metaphors are part of IR’s
larger process of storytelling. As noted, by narrative and strorytelling what
is not meant is what might be commonly understood as fiction or what
Müller (107) refers to as “false beliefs” or “wrong consciousness.” Rather,
attentiveness to narratives, myths, metaphors, and other discursive ele-
ments of IR theory is part of an interpretive move which demands that
attention be paid to how IR theory is constructed. As I have suggested in
this volume and my earlier works, conceptual metaphors are integral to the
understanding of the ontological bases of IR. However, there are still
some factors that must be taken into consideration to complete the analy-
sis of metaphors in IR theory.
Metaphors-as-Analogies Versus Conceptual
Metaphors
Differences exist in how metaphors make their way into theorizing about
IR just as they do in other fields of inquiry. One difference is between
metaphors as overt contrivances deliberately crafted to help visualize a
theoretical or empirical problem, and implied metaphors that are con-
tained in the language of theorizing but perhaps are not necessarily explic-
itly intended by theorists. This distinction is an example of the difference
language scholars have identified between deliberate and non-deliberate
metaphors discussed in Chap. 1.4 Many of the early metaphors in the study
of IR fall into the category of deliberate metaphors purposefully intended
to create an awareness or understanding of that which is being studied. In
this sense, these metaphors are only one step removed from analogies, a
related yet subtly distinct method for making the world intelligible.
Analogies take two related domains of understanding and make a direct
comparison between them so as to highlight their similarities. An analogy
might take the form of, for example, “the fluctuations of sound frequen-
cies are like waves on the ocean.” Metaphors take two seemingly unrelated
domains and highlight a key similarity which is then grafted from the
source domain onto the target domain as a way of understanding an
THE ROLE OF METAPHORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 195
abstract quality of the target domain, as in “waves of democratization.”5

Analogies thus operate in a similar fashion as models in that they are men-
tal replicas of two concepts with the purpose of using one concept to make
the other intelligible. Metaphors rely on the qualities of language to stim-
ulate the same mental connections as analogies, but instead of using ana-
logical models they draw on the brain’s ability to translate experiences via
words into cognitive connections.
The history of metaphors in IR theory to some extent represents an
alternation between metaphors resembling analogical models and meta-
phors that rely solely on references to conceptual mappings. Many of the
early metaphors in the study of IR resembled analogies in that they were
deliberate linguistic models.6 The imagining of a balance of power in bio-
logical or mechanistic terms is a good example of metaphors that emanate
from analogical reasoning. It is possible that theoretical concepts unfolded
in this fashion, given the project undertaken by early scholars. The man-
date was to provide to rulers knowledge of the world that would then
become useful for policymaking. Just as military strategists might present
political rulers with scale models of the battlefield on which war plans
could be plotted, early scholars of IR could present to political leaders
metaphors of how IR worked so that these leaders could make an analogy
between, say, a machine and relations among states (or other “interna-
tional” actors) so as to better calculate diplomacy and other foreign policy
plans with the aim of making the “machine” of the balance of power work
to their advantage.7
As the study of IR moved from statecraft to a more detached academic
endeavor, metaphors implied in language have become more common.
What this means is that instead of metaphors derived from analogical rea-
soning, basic concepts in the study of IR are thought of metaphorically in
an implied fashion by borrowing imagery from the language of unrelated
realms. Examples of these include the contextual metaphors of “anarchy,
“system,” and “structure.” These metaphors are seen as simply establish-
ing the setting in which IR take place, not necessarily analogies on which
the specific details of IR replicate corresponding features from nature or
the man-made world.
The transition from metaphors-as-analogies to conceptual metaphors
was well suited to the Behavioralist Revolution in the twentieth century,
which was based on a desire by scholars to graft scientific and positivist
methods onto the social sciences. As counterintuitive as it may sound,
scientific reasoning often rests on conceptual metaphors as a way of
196 M. P. MARKS
imagining the material world. Most theorizing begins with assumptions

based on observations made in a related realm to that which is being
explained. These assumptions generate hypotheses which are then tested
by way of experiments (or in the social sciences quasi-experiments) so as
to yield theoretical propositions, which then provide the bases for addi-
tional testing and on which predictions are made. As historians of science
have pointed out (e.g., Leatherdale 1974; Hallyn 2000; Brown 2003),
without metaphorical language to frame this process, the scientific
method could not yield new understandings.
To illustrate this point we can walk through the theoretical process of a
scientific theory to see how metaphors play a role. A good example of
metaphors in scientific theorizing can be found in the science of climate
change.8 Climatologists begin with observations of a related realm, namely,
the atmosphere of a greenhouse. This observation generates the first met-
aphor: it is assumed that the earth is like a greenhouse. From this assump-
tion a hypothesis is generated that builds on the metaphorical language: if
“greenhouse” gasses increase, the temperature of the earth’s atmosphere
will increase as well. To test this scientists can conduct a quasi-experiment,
taking samples of ice from glaciers and correlating glacial accretion or
retreat with the amount of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere. From
there a theory can be generated that as carbon dioxide levels increase, so
does the earth’s temperature and the attendant changes this brings.
Leaving aside the validity of the theory, the hypotheses, tests, and theo-
retical propositions of anthropogenic climate change depend on scholars
accepting the logic inherent in the metaphorical language of the earth-as-
greenhouse image.
For social scientists of the Behavioralist Revolution, the acceptance of
conceptual metaphors is not a lapse into the lack of rigor of normative
social inquiry, but rather an explicit embrace of the scientific method. Self-
consciously methodologically explicit schools of thought such as
Neorealism were formulated in ways in which metaphors provide a nam-
ing mechanism for the various components of the theory. For example,
Neorealists delineate the scope of their theory by specifying that it oper-
ates at the “systemic” “level of analysis.” Both “systemic” and “level of
analysis” are metaphors—the former casts relations among international
actors as akin to the functions of a self-contained set of operations, while
the latter imputes a spatial element to identifying the parameters of inter-
national politics relative to other sets of political relations. Neorealism also
hypothesizes that changes in the “distribution” of power help scholars
make predictions about changes in relations among states. Obviously

power is an abstract concept, but to speak of it metaphorically as something
that can be “distributed” implies that power can be quantified and mea-
sured. These and other metaphors are woven into the theoretical proposi-
tions of Neorealism just as metaphors are part of scientific reasoning as the
aforementioned “greenhouse” metaphor for climate change demonstrates.
Neorealists and other Behavioralists rely less on analogical thinking than
they do on a scientific method which incorporates metaphors as an ele-
ment in the heuristic process just as metaphors are a normal part of every-
day, routine human cognition.
There are major exceptions, however, to the conceptual metaphors
trend of the Behavioralist Revolution, the most obvious of which is the
field of game theory in IR scholarship. Of course, game theory is not
unique to the study of IR and is integral to any number of social sciences
as well as mathematics from which it originated. It is perhaps the origin of
game theory in mathematics that makes it “safe” for Behavioralists despite
its overt reliance on contrived metaphorical analogies utilized for the pur-
poses of generating theoretical insights.9 Virtually all of the games that
comprise game theory involve elaborate stories which presumably provide
analogies to problems encountered by strategically oriented agents. These
agents need not even be humans as the use of game theory in mathematics
and natural sciences such as biology and medical studies demonstrates
(again, this makes the metaphorical stories of game theory “safe” for
Behavioralist social scientists intent on replicating the scientific method
since game theory is also used extensively in the “hard” sciences). As is the
case for metaphorical analogies used in early theories of IR (e.g., the bal-
ance of power as machine), each game in game theory provides a model of
that which it helps elucidate. What happens in miniature in the model then
provides a basis for explanation and prediction in the problem under
investigation.
Any number of the games used in game theory illustrate the analogical
nature of the game theoretic approach in the study of IR. A brief example,
the game of Chicken, will suffice to demonstrate (more examples are
found in the chapter on game theory in Marks 2011). The story behind
the Chicken game is well known and straightforward: Two teenagers dare
each other to a test of courage to demonstrate their bravery. The teens
face each other behind the wheel of their respective automobiles and line
up on the center line of a deserted stretch of road. A group of fellow teens
assemble as audience to serve as witnesses for testing which driver is more
198 M. P. MARKS
courageous. The teens drive toward each other at high speed. If one teen
veers off to the side of the road to avoid a head-on collision, the teen who
continues down the center is deemed the braver of the two and the one
who veers off to avoid the crash is the “chicken.” If they both veer off,
they survive the contest, but each suffers a diminished reputation for brav-
ery. If both teens stay on the center line, they engage in a head-on colli-
sion; neither one wins, but neither of the two has lost reputation—they
have both simply demonstrated that they would rather die than live their
life as a coward when compared to the other.
As virtually all scholars of IR know, Chicken is presented in game the-
ory as an analogy for nuclear deterrence. Since the consequence of mutual
defection is mutual annihilation, the point of the game is to model strate-
gies for deterrence so that each actor can survive a confrontation with a
semblance of reputation intact. Game theorists experiment with strategies
of cooperation that they hope will allow states engaged in deterrence to
successfully employ a deterrent threat so that the stakes of the game never
lead any actor to tempt fate by undertaking preemptive nuclear attacks in
the hopes of emerging victorious in the battle. The similarity between this
sort of modeling and the analogical metaphors of early IR theory is in
evidence here. Scholars in both eras use metaphors-as-analogies to gener-
ate foreign policy strategies that might be of use to political leaders.
Analogical metaphors, as opposed to conceptual metaphors, vividly
illustrate the real-world implications of theoretical models and highlight
practical applications of theoretical conclusions. For example, with refer-
ence to the metaphor of “collapsed states,” William Zartman (1995, 267)
asserts that “we study how states collapsed in order to put them back
together.” The metaphor of “collapsed” states suggests that something
has gone wrong with a specific form of political authority (the state) that
must be fixed. Implied in this formulation is the notion that the state is
preferred over alternative forms of political organization.
The return to overt metaphors-as-analogies also characterizes newer
theoretical paradigms, most notably, the Constructivist approach. This is
not terribly surprising since, as a relatively newer approach in the study of
IR, Constructivism needs to highlight its basic theoretical propositions. It
can do this by making analogies between how IR is conceptualized in
Constructivism and the actual set of relations among international actors
themselves. This was my aim in my earlier book The Prison as Metaphor:
Re-Imagining International Relations (Marks 2004). In that volume I
detail a fairly elaborate analogical metaphor in which relations among
prison inmates is used as a device to conceptualize IR.10 As I explain in the

book, one of the main theoretical propositions of Constructivism is that
the world is constituted as a socially constructed realm in which rules and
norms shape actors’ identities and prescribe and proscribe roles and behav-
iors. One way to illustrate this assertion and trace out predictions that
follow from it is to examine an analogous area of socially constructed real-
ity. The area I chose for this (which by no means is the only one available
for this purpose) is the realm of prison inmate relations. Although at first
glance it seems counterintuitive that inmate relations could be governed
by anything other than the rules enforced by prison officials, studies by
sociologists and criminologists reveal that the daily life of prison inmates is
formed by the rules established among prisoners themselves. Furthermore,
the socially constructed world of inmates is not fixed. Rather, it changes
over time as inmates re-negotiate the terms of their society on an ongoing
basis. The point is that, as a metaphor for IR, the prison offers a good
opportunity to test the Constructivist proposition that socially constructed
meanings have a real and appreciable effect on the actions of actors inhab-
iting that world. Lessons from the prison can be applied to relations
among international actors to see if and how social meanings are trans-
lated into actors’ conceptions of appropriate behavior.
Over the course of the history of the study of IR, scholars have availed
themselves both of overt metaphors-as-analogies and conceptual meta-
phors. Metaphors-as-analogies often are used heuristically to highlight
new thinking or to advance new theoretical propositions. Conceptual
metaphors typically reflect efforts to incorporate scientific methods into
the study of IR by creating implicit or explicit hypotheses or models. In
many ways there is a dialectic between these two uses of metaphors, with
conceptual metaphors serving to elaborate the theoretical principles of
established schools of thought and metaphors-as-analogies acting as theo-
retical innovations which challenge mainstream ways of thinking. Scholars
seeking to contest established theories suggest metaphors based on
analogies to generate new knowledge, which, once accepted, becomes the
metaphorical language of prevailing theoretical paradigms. This alterna-
tion of metaphorical uses thus can give insight into the current state of
affairs in IR theory; if the dominant approach to metaphors is to incorpo-
rate them conceptually into theories, the field is likely in a period of stasis,
but if the prevailing use of metaphors is to advance them overtly based on
analogical imagery, the field is likely in a period of change.
200 M. P. MARKS
Metaphors and Categories
One of the things metaphors do in IR theory (as they do in other disci-
plines) is create analytical categories. Entire research agendas can be formed
around these categories. For example, in 1990, Joseph Nye coined the
term “soft power,” in which the tactile metaphor of “soft” (contrasted with
the metaphor of “hard”) defined an entirely new concept of power that was
heretofore unspecified (Nye 1990a, b, 2004). A recent search of books
that focus on analyses of soft power at a popular online retailer yields no
fewer than 35 titles published in recent years, not to mention numerous
articles in scholarly journals on the same topic.11 With the turn of a phrase,
Nye inspired a cottage industry dedicated to an analytical category that
reflects a metaphorical way of conceiving of certain dynamics of influence
in international affairs. States have always used the instruments and strate-
gies Nye identified in his initial work in this area, but before he conceptual-
ized these tools as “soft power” they were merely thought of by scholars to
be part of the repertoire of states’ foreign policy practices. The metaphori-
cal concept of “soft power,” now enshrined in IR theory by the label
attached to it, has become an analytical category in its own right. Soft
power is seen as worthy of study as a distinct aspect of IR, whereas before
the label was attached to it, what is now known as “soft power” included
policies that were thought of as simply part of IR as previously conceived.
Categories, of course, can have a useful function in IR or any other
discipline. However, it is helpful to distinguish categories that are
analytically useful from those that exist as categories for the sake of catego-
ries.12 Evolutionary biologists have long relied on the metaphorical cate-
gories of Kingdom, Phylum, Class, Order, Family, Genus, and Species to
group together organisms with similar physical characteristics. The meta-
phors of “Kingdom,” “Class,” “Order,” and “Family” in particular focus
the mind on seemingly obvious anatomical similarities or commonalities
that imply an evolutionary connection. We now know, however, through
genetic research that some organisms previously grouped together because
of physical similarities are not as related to each other on the genetic level
as previously thought. The metaphorical categories biologists used to clas-
sify organisms, from which inferences were drawn, were influenced by the
propensity to think about evolutionary connections conceptually with
metaphors providing the bases for those concepts.
Similarly, both political leaders and scholars alike have relied on meta-
phorical categories such as the “nation-state” to group together disparate
groups of actors, often with few commonalities. For political leaders, the
“nation-state” was a convenient fiction designed to convince people that a
group of individuals comprised a cohesive and unified whole—the
“nation”—fused together with political authority in the form of the
“state.” This was a useful tool of historical propaganda to try and create a
shared sense of identity subject to centralized political rule. Presently,
anthropologists, sociologists, and scholars in related fields more com-
monly view nations as groups of individuals with shared self-identified
traits which distinguish them from others. By this standard, the category
of “nation-state” exists only metaphorically as a group of disparate peoples
imagined as one by means of the conceptual term. This category of
“nation-state,” so useful to leaders trying to consolidate political authority
over disparate groups of people, found its way into political science where
scholars accepted the concept as a term of convenience to identify the
political units distinguished in terms of the territorial limits of formal gov-
ernance associated with the state. “Nation-states” exist not as literal state-
ments of the overlap between cultural identity (nation) and political
authority (state) but as metaphorical concepts. This category of the
metaphorical “nation-state,” while now in a process of obsolescence,

nonetheless shaped IR scholarship for many years.
And yet, despite the fact that “nation-state” has become a somewhat
antiquated term in the study of IR, the concept of a “nation” as a meta-
phorical group of people with shared traits continues to inform both polit-
ical science at large and the field of IR. A nation is by nature a subjectively
identified entity inasmuch as nations typically determine for themselves
what qualifies as the unifying characteristics of those people comprising
the nation. This does not stop scholars from reifying the concept so that it
takes on the appearance of objective fact. The reification of nations then
leads to a problematizing of political situations when nations lose their
cohesiveness to the point they become what any number of scholars have
characterized as metaphorical “divided” nations, that is, nations that pre-
sumably possess an inherent unity which for whatever reason has come
asunder.13 Nations can change in their composition because of organic
shifts in self-identification, armed conflict, demographic shifts, or migra-
tion, among other things. The metaphor of a “divided” nation reifies a
category of “nation” which groups of individuals define for themselves on
a subjective basis in the first place.
In the same vein, many scholars find very useful the analytical distinc-
tions between the categories of war, terrorism, and violent crime. All three
202 M. P. MARKS
phenomena involve the application of violence, but they do so for differ-

ent purposes and in different ways. War involves the use of wide-scale
violence by armed combatants pursuing a political purpose over an
extended period of time to force opponents to succumb to a desired end.
Terrorism involves sporadic violence by individuals not necessarily associ-
ated with coherent political units nor political aims using violence to ter-
rorize a target audience in the hopes it will bring about a desired end.
Violent crime involves individuals acting to achieve their own ends with-
out any benefit accruing to a wider group of people aside from those
associated with the criminal acts.14 Clearly there are overlaps among these
three categories. States waging war against each other can fuel their war
efforts by engaging in criminal acts. State-sponsored terrorism can also be
coupled with the instruments of war. Organized criminal syndicates can
terrorize specified audiences so as to consolidate their control of criminal
activities. However, the important thing is that we would not recognize
overlapping violent activity if we did not have distinct analytical categories
to begin with. The purpose of these analytical categories is to specify
actors, data, evidence, and a causal logic associated with competing theo-
retical explanations which seek to account for actions and outcomes asso-
ciated with these categories. Without categories there would be nothing
coherent to explain and no empirical basis by which to evaluate the merits
of rival theoretical schools of thought.15
The distinction that is to be made is between categories which are ana-
lytically useful and (metaphorical) categories for the sake of categories. It
is fair to ask, for example, what is the usefulness of making the distinction
between democratic “transition” and democratic “consolidation” as
unique analytical categories? As I discuss in Chap. 3, democratic transition
and democratic consolidation are controversial subjects in the theoretical
literature on democratization inasmuch as the line between the two is not
analytically clear. Scholars of democratization are not in agreement about
when a country crosses the line from “transition” to “consolidation” in
terms of the governmental institutions and practices which would distin-
guish one condition from the other. These conditions are also unclear as
to how they can be distinguished from “normal” democracies that exist
simply as such, not as ends along a continuum from transition to consoli-
dation and beyond. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the cat-
egories of “transition” and “consolidation” mask the fluid state of what
might be thought of as politics as usual. Even in “normal” democracies
(i.e., those that have moved into democratic normality beyond even “con-
solidation”) there is argument and dispute. No democracy is ever enshrined
in that condition without the potential for some form of change (even to
a non-democratic form of government).
Rather, the categories of “transition” and “consolidation” are given to
us by the propensity to metaphorically conceive of something unique unto
itself. It may be helpful to think of a spectrum from democratic “transi-
tion” to “consolidation” as a way of organizing one’s thoughts, but that
does not mean the categories are useful for identifying actors, data, evi-
dence, and competing sets of causal logic, for example, through the
categories of war, terrorism, and violent crime. For the purposes of theo-
retical analysis, the categories of democratic “transition” and “consolida-
tion” may not be useful aside from helping scholars begin to think about
the changing nature of politics in which change is multiform and/or con-
stant. At that point, it may be more useful to devise other ways of explain-
ing political change than ones that rely on the metaphorical categories of
transition and consolidation, which may end up being categories simply for
categories’ sake. The same could be said of the categories in IR theory that
are premised on metaphorical ways of conceptualizing the political world.
Some of the categories that enter the field of IR have their origin in
their etymology, yet their application to concrete issues is somewhat arbi-
trary. It is common, for example, to refer to an incident in IR as a “crisis.”
However, what qualifies as a crisis and what does not is not necessarily
self-evident. Readily identifiable events during October 1962 have become
known as the “Cuban Missile Crisis” as have events 11 years later, which
are now known collectively as the “Energy Crisis.” By contrast, there are
any number of points of high tension in IR that have never been tagged
with the moniker of “crisis.”16 The contemporary meaning of the term
“crisis” derives metaphorically from previous uses of the word. The Oxford
English Dictionary defines “crisis” in its current use in English as “a vitally
important or decisive stage in the progress of anything; a turning-point;
also, a state of affairs in which a decisive change for better or worse is
imminent; now applied esp. to times of difficulty, insecurity, and suspense
in politics or commerce.” The first recorded use of the word in this sense
in the English language is in 1659. Prior to and somewhat contemporane-
ous with this linguistic shift, “crisis” in English meant a “judgment” or
“decision.” Indeed, the English word “crisis” comes from the Greek
κρίνειν, meaning “to decide.” In other words, as a concept, “crisis” in its
current use as a turning point, especially in times of “difficulty, insecurity,
and suspense,” emerged as a metaphor for a period when a vitally impor-
tant decision had to be made.
204 M. P. MARKS
We can then see that as a concept in the study of IR there is some arbi-
trariness to those times of “difficulty, insecurity, and suspense” in which
decisions have to be made, which qualify or do not qualify as “crises.” All
crises require that decisions be made, but not all decisions qualify as crises.
The difference depends on whether or not scholars deem the times at
which decisions have to be made as constituting periods of “difficulty,
insecurity, and suspense.” A crisis is not a literal statement of fact but an
etymologically rooted conceptual metaphor that reflects scholars’ arbitrary
assessment of categories of foreign policy decision-making.
At the very least, it is worthwhile to contemplate how metaphors such
as the one associated with the concept of a “crisis” create potentially arbi-
trary categories which inform scholarly analysis. At a conference I attended
shortly after the publication of my previous book (Marks 2011), a scholar
informed me that he does not deal in metaphors, but rather he deals in
“concepts.” This seems a somewhat odd thing to say since as cognitive
linguists have determined through the conceptual theory of metaphors,
concepts come about precisely through metaphorical perception. The
human mind is cognitively predisposed to conceive of things through the
process of understanding metaphorical relationships between two or more
sets of facts. In this sense all metaphors are useful in making sense of the
world, but there is a difference between basic cognition and metaphorical
categories put to analytical use. David Armitage (2013, 21–22) writes that
intellectual history is full of spatial metaphors such as “‘localism’ and ‘pro-
vincialism’ as determinants of an idea’s position in a theoretical ‘field’.”
Yet these metaphors are “shorthand indications that ideas lack material
determinants and that they need to be placed into contexts construed
almost entirely as temporal and linguistic not physical or spatial” (ibid.,
22). Armitage’s point is well taken since all categories in IR theory are the
product of conceptual metaphors which represent a cognitive organiza-
tion of empirical facts.17
Metaphors in the Community of IR Scholars

In my previous work on the subject of metaphors in IR theory, I summa-
rized the scholarly literature on current thinking about the nature of meta-
phors. To review, cognitive linguists now believe that metaphors serve as a
primary way in which humans conceptualize the world and represent the
physical experiences of people individually and collectively. Conceptual met-
aphors are a main way in which lived experiences are manifest in thought.
These conceptual metaphors can be inferred by the language humans use to

convey these thoughts. Language scholars frequently denote conceptual
metaphors in small capital letters to distinguish them from linguistic meta-
phors, which are the discursive vehicles for conceptual metaphors. Thus, for
example, Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 58) can take linguistic formulations of
how people experience the passage of time, for example, “time flies,” and
represent them as a conceptual metaphor expressed as “time is a moving
object.” Conceptual metaphors such as the passage of time can be dis-
cerned by scholars through the dissection of linguistic metaphors that con-
vey them.
I have chosen not to use the convention of small capital letters in denot-
ing conceptual metaphors in IR theory, not only because I am a political
scientist and not a language scholar, but also for this simple reason: My
goal has been not so much to identify, but to interrogate the metaphors
used within the community of IR scholars. Furthermore, conceptual met-
aphors in IR theory often are used alongside the linguistic metaphors that
convey them. To put it another way, conceptual metaphors in IR theory
hide in plain sight. They are often one and the same, with the scholarly
discourse used to convey ideas about the world. This is a principle asserted
by Sabine Maasen (2000, 209) who argues that conceptual metaphors
need not lurk below the surface of academic discourses: “Metaphors do
not rule discourse ‘from below’ in a somewhat mysterious fashion. Rather,
metaphors perform their task on the surface of discourses.”18
A specific example will serve to demonstrate this point. In IR theory,
alliances are understood as binding commitments. One could express this
as a conceptual metaphor using the notation system of language scholars,
so that it is conveyed as alliances are binding. But what would be the
point? The word “alliance” as it is used in the English language has its
roots in the Latin alligāre, which means “to bind to.” The etymology of
the word gives us its present meaning as a conceptual metaphor, that is,
“alliances are binding.” The very notion of alliances in IR theory is the
concept of a binding relationship. The conceptual metaphor and its lin-
guistic representation are one and the same.
What then does become an interesting question is this: What experi-
ences of world affairs lead scholars to conceptualize IR in certain meta-
phorical ways? The question is not why, for example, are alliances binding
(how could they be otherwise, given the conceptual metaphor they repre-
sent)? Rather, the question is why are the binding relationships of states
(alliances) as constraints on their actions an important area of study for IR
206 M. P. MARKS
scholars? With regard to the alliance metaphor as an example, there is a

sense that binding alliances are a problem for states. This sense that alli-
ances pose problems for international politics has manifested itself, for
example, in depictions of the alliance system as a cause of World War I and
theories of alliances imagined as metaphorical “chain gangs,” which can
drag countries into conflicts they would otherwise seek to avoid.19 In these
instances, scholars start with the assumption that binding relationships
among states are problematic and then conceptualize these relationships
using the concept of alliances to express this proposition. What we discern
from an interrogation of the alliance metaphor is the notion that alliances
are problematic and therefore a theoretical puzzle to be solved.20
It is not entirely lost on scholars of IR that metaphors play a large role
shaping the way they think about both the ontological bases of their
research and their own epistemological perspectives. In a highly insightful
essay, Nicholas Onuf traces out a variety of metaphors that inform
Constructivist theoretical endeavors. Onuf (2016, 115–116) begins by
noting that Constructivists often think about their work in directional
terms, reflecting on the path forward and the speed by which Constructivist
thought progresses.21 Onuf (116) then notes that, following theories of
cognitive linguistics, metaphors represent conceptual thinking, that is to
say, “the journey starts in people’s heads. Here, a different set of meta-
phors works better—metaphors having to do with work, activities (acts
related by reference to some end), or operations. These metaphors link
faculties, powers or, in the parlance of the day, cognitive modules to skills
and practices.” Continuing with his reflection on metaphorical thinking in
Constructivism, Onuf (116) avers that Constructivists conceive of the
ontological bases of theory as “stuff” “that is either small, granular, and
slippery or large, shapeless, and gassy, but in both instances hard to grasp.
Either way, we grant materiality to appearances. Either choice has political
implications, as does going ahead, however slowly, with the construction
of moderate-sized dry goods.” In the end, Onuf (128–130) argues that
these metaphors help Constructivists see that they face a choice as they
move “ahead”; they can turn down the path, which pursues the study of
the “small” stuff of individual behavior, they can turn in the direction of
the path that emphasizes the “large” stuff of global processes, or they can
stay the course on and focus on the “moderate-sized dry goods” that “fur-
nish” Constructivist theory.22
Onuf’s introspection is welcome and suggests that more theoretical
interrogations of this kind are needed in the field. Scholarship on IR would
benefit from an examination of the experiences of IR scholars, individually

and collectively, that lead them to conceptualize IR in certain ways.
Metaphors can have such an influence over people’s thinking that psycho-
therapists have learned how to elicit metaphors in their patients’ thoughts
in order to uncover how those metaphors shape and influence their
patients’ behavior (Kopp 1995; Pearce 1996). Having said that, I am not
suggesting a psychoanalysis of IR theory as much as I am advocating for a
sustained interrogation of conceptual metaphors in IR theory along the
lines of what I have exercised in my previous work (Marks 2011) as well as
the present one. It may be facile, yet worthwhile, to point out that the
facts of IR, or any other discipline for that matter, do not present t hemselves
unambiguously to scholars. They are interpreted by scholars as metaphori-
cal concepts, just as IR scholars interpret anything and everything they
encounter as conceptual metaphors, or so cognitive linguists say.23
Assuming this is true, scholars cannot simply take metaphors in IR the-
ory for granted. They must acknowledge them as the collective experi-
ences of a community of scholars who comprehend the facts of IR in
certain ways. Part of this is reflective of the individual experiences of schol-
ars, and part of this is reflective of the community of scholars who collec-
tively come to agreement about the categories and causal patterns of
international affairs. Jim George (1994, 192) argues that the “great texts”
or dominant readings that comprise the collected knowledge of the com-
munity of IR scholars need not be dismissed, but he argues it should be
recognized that “they are, indeed, readings—that they can be read in dif-
ferent ways and that their status is derived not from any correspondence
with an essential (real) meaning but from a discursive strategy intrinsically
connected to the dominant form of (sociohistorical) knowledge and
power” (emphasis in the original).24
Thus, I would suggest, analytical categories in IR theory reflect the
dominant experiences of IR scholars.25 For example, a category such as
democratization is conceptualized metaphorically as involving forward
movement from one political form to another. This may reflect scholars’
own experiences of political change over time as involving “progress” inas-
much as most contemporary academics describe their own political beliefs
in terms of what is collectively referred to as “progressive” politics.26 Brian
Rathbun (2012) has found that there is in fact a correlation between the
epistemological and paradigmatic choices IR scholars make and their
political ideologies.27 It would not be surprising, then, if conceptual meta-
phors serve as the link scholars make between how they view politics and
208 M. P. MARKS
the theoretical perspectives they bring to bear on the objects of their study.
In essence, the categories and propositions about causation are subject to
change, but in their present form (depending on what present time is
under consideration), they are as much part of the study of IR as are the
empirical facts of IR themselves.
On the other hand, it is fair to ask if there is a danger in seeing meta-
phors everywhere in IR theory simply on the basis of linguistic expressions
that take metaphorical form. Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual
metaphor has been critically examined in recent years with some critics
arguing that it is non-falsifiable inasmuch as it relies on discerning concep-
tual thinking from metaphors used in language. That is to say, there are
any number of interpretations of linguistic representation, not all of which
lead back to ideas conceived of in metaphorical ways. Thus, in applying
Lakoff and Johnson’s thesis, researchers may be simply interpreting lan-
guage in unwarranted ways, As John Vervaeke and John Kennedy (1996,
276) note, “we should be very cautious in going from patterns we find in
language to the proper level of ascription of beliefs within individuals.”28
As an antidote to the potential circularity of Lakoff and Johnon’s concep-
tual metaphor theory, Gregory Murphy (1996, 179) suggests a “struc-
tural similarity” view of metaphors, whereby two related ideas are seen in
comparison, but neither is a metaphor for the other: “On this view, there
is no strong form of metaphoric representation—all concepts are directly
represented.” The purpose of critiques of conceptual metaphor theory is
to make sure that the role of metaphor in linguistic expression is not
overstated.
Another critique that might also be leveled is that the majority of what
is examined in this book focuses primarily on metaphors in IR theory as
found in the United States. In fact, understandings about IR and world
politics in theoretical traditions in other countries also highlight metaphor-
ical concepts. Many of the conceptual metaphors in other scholarly litera-
tures are similar to those found in IR scholarship in the United States, for
example, the notion of the state as a “container” (Charteris-Black 2006) or
the concept of national identities framed metaphorically in terms of the
“national body” (Wodak et al. 2009). Other works, however, highlight
metaphorical concepts that are unique to particular empirical problems or
analytical questions, for example, European analyses of borders in the con-
text of European integration (Šarić et al. 2010; Silaški and Đurović 2014).
Moreover, even where there is some overlap between IR scholarship and
the United States and other countries, seemingly subtle differences can
lead scholars to pursue different explanatory paths. For instance, in the

aforementioned concept of the state possessing a body, much US scholar-
ship emphasizes the notion of the state as a person (e.g., Wendt 2004).
However, in Europe, the metaphor of the national body involves themes of
family and familial relationships (A’Beckett 2012; Šarić 2015), suggesting
that theories of IR emphasize a more diverse set of interactions than the
state-to-state perspective suggested by some analyses that follow the logic
of dominant scholarship in the United States. Differing still from European
perspectives on the metaphor of the body politic, Takashi Shogimen (2008)
observes that in Japan the body metaphor in politics emphasizes curative
and healing forces, suggesting theories of government actions in prevent-
ing conflict as opposed to keeping out “disease,” which is more common
in European political thought (see Musolff 2010).
The point is that just as metaphors delineate important conceptual cat-
egories in IR theory in the United States, they also bring attention to the
fact that there is a certain parochialism in US scholarship inasmuch as
those conceptual categories are not necessarily prevalent in scholarly dis-
course in other countries. Such parochialism in US IR theory has been
commented on by numerous scholars in recent years, for example, Thomas
Biersteker (2009), who challenges scholars to critically examine the
unwarranted hegemony of American IR scholarship.29 Given space limita-
tions, this book necessarily is confined in its scope and therefore admits to
focusing primarily on metaphorical concepts as they prevail in the context
of scholarship in the United States. At the same time, the book acknowl-
edges how metaphors shape academic inquiry in other scholarly commu-
nities and adopts a position of modesty that insights garnered by utilizing
a more global approach could yield broader analytical insights about the
role metaphors play in IR theory.
In short, critical views of the theory of conceptual metaphor are well
taken, particularly with regard to the propensity to emphasize metaphors
in IR theory. Throughout this book, metaphorical concepts in IR theory
have been discerned often on the basis of linguistic metaphors that are
common in the scholarly discourse. An astute reader of a preliminary ver-
sion of this book asked why such one-word lexical items such as “devel-
opment” and “advanced” (discussed in the context of relations between
regions of unequal wealth in Chap. 2) are treated as metaphors, with
their metaphoricity taken for granted in a sort of commonsensical way.
This is a fair question since linguists (as opposed to political scientists and
other scholars of IR) would apply more finely tuned methodological
210 M. P. MARKS
tools to identify and classify metaphorical concepts. In the case of “devel-

opment” and “advanced,” the point made in Chap. 2 is that they are
examples of linguistic metaphors that cohere into a larger conceptual
metaphor in IR theory, which sees the unequal global distribution of
wealth in terms of spatial placement that is not necessarily coincident
with geographic location. Countries that are “less developed” or are not
as “advanced” as countries with more material wealth are thought of as
occupying a place “behind” wealthier nations. Many of the other meta-
phors that are used to theorize the situation of poorer countries dis-
cussed in Chap. 2, such as the metaphors of the “third world,”
“dependency,” and the global “periphery,” constitute additional lexical
terms that make up the master metaphor framing the topic of unequal
wealth. Linguists might represent this conceptual metaphor as poverty is
falling behind. Of course, the primary focus of this book is to under-
stand how metaphors in IR lead to certain theoretical conclusions, and
therefore methods employed in the field of linguistics are not fully
deployed such that the imperatives of language theory are subordinated
to some extent to the exigencies of theories of IR. The broader point is
that while there is a danger of overstating the case in terms of the preva-
lence of metaphors in IR theory, the risk is worth taking if it yields theo-
retical insights. Still, it is worthwhile to maintain a critical perspective,
particularly where the individual interpretations of scholars are involved,
which is the subject of the next section.
Personal Reflection
A fair question the reader may ask at this point is, if virtually all metaphors
are fraught with potential analytical pitfalls, can they all be faulted along
with the scholars who promulgate them? This is an especially poignant
question in light of the fact that I devoted an entire book to developing
an elaborate metaphor for the purpose of theorizing about IR. Specifically,
in my book The Prison as Metaphor: Re-Imagining International Relations
(2004) I suggest that a useful re-thinking about conceptions of IR could
be had by imagining IR and its inhabitants as a metaphorical prison. At
first blush, it would be hard to think of any two realms as dissimilar as that
of IR and the prison. Although most theories of IR posit world affairs as
existing in a climate of “anarchy,” they nonetheless see relations among
states, even if they are conducted under conditions of anarchy, as gov-
erned by civilized rules of politics and diplomacy. By contrast, most people
imagine the prison to be a world of constant violence, chaos, and danger.
Yet, by definition, metaphors highlight the similar in the seemingly dis-

similar. So for the prison metaphor to work, as is true for any metaphor,
the juxtaposition of two domains must immediately bring to mind con-
trasts, which is what comparing the prison and IR does.
The similarity between the dissimilar realms of the prison and interna-
tional politics that makes the former work as a metaphor for imagining the
latter is that both realms typically are thought of as places in which anarchy
structures actors’ identities, relationships, and behaviors. Just as global
relations take place in a seemingly anarchic void brought about by the lack
of a true world government, so too are prison inmates thought to be anar-
chic brutes whose interactions reflect the lack of civilized rules of conduct.
Yet, ironically, both actors in the international system and inmates in
prison find ways of constructing rules that govern their behavior.
Just as interesting, the prison metaphor forces a reexamination of the
assumptions that underpin many orthodox theories of IR. Many theories
begin with assumptions about actors’ interests that are based on observa-
tions of related areas of human interactions. Whether it is humans in a
“state of nature” or “economic man” in the market, the templates of tradi-
tional theories of IR provide the foundation for assumptions about states
and other international actors in world affairs. The prison metaphor is
notable in that an examination of real-world prison inmates reveals a variety
of interests that change over time as the socially constructed world of
inmate relations evolves. Studies by sociologists and criminologists reveal
that the identities, interests, and behaviors of prison inmates are not at all
fixed. Changes in the social world of inmate relations over time alter
inmates’ conceptions of themselves and others, leading to new interests
and altered inmate interactions. Among the chief lessons revealed by the
prison metaphor is that actors with seemingly fixed identities, interests, and
behaviors are subject to ongoing reconstitution of their world. In many
ways, actors and relations in international affairs follow a similar path.
Finally, the prison metaphor tells us something about how domestic
politics is situated relative to the presumed unchanging and dangerous
worlds of the prison and international politics. Here, the “levels of analy-
sis” metaphor enters the picture. The levels of analysis metaphor typically
imagines international politics as a distinct realm separated from the gov-
erned realm of domestic politics. Ironically, the same assumption is applied
to conceptions of the prison, which typically is thought of as an area of
human affairs that is not only set apart from civilized society but also com-
pletely ungovernable save for the strict oversight of prison authorities who
barely can control the “brutes” who dwell within the penitentiary walls.
212 M. P. MARKS
It is this notion of domestic politics as distinctly civilized and govern-

able that often provides the basis for the logic of state sovereignty. The
state is privileged in its sovereign status because it serves as an intermediate
“level” lying “between” dangers “above” and “below.” On the domestic
level, the sovereign state represents a divide between civil society and the
criminal world. The role of sovereignty is to maintain the legitimacy of
societal norms and values. Free society is legitimized as it is contrasted
with a separate world of criminal transgressors “below.” The metaphor of
the prison shows us that at the “below” level, the prison is seen as a place
apart from civil society.
With regard to international politics “above,” the presumably sover-
eign state serves a similar role as buffer between the safety of domestic
society and the reputedly dangerous realm outside the state’s borders. Just
as civil society is legitimized in contrast to the criminal element in prison,
it is also given legitimacy because it can be contrasted with an anarchic and
violent international system. The prison metaphor is useful because it
highlights the similarity in the seeming dissimilarity of inmates and states.
Both are set apart from civil society because state sovereignty in many ways
depends on this separation from the danger of international politics and
the prison world. State sovereignty as a historical invention makes sense if
the state serves some purpose to protect citizens from dangers from within
and without. The prison metaphor highlights the role of sovereignty and
the conceptualization of global anarchy as a dangerous and alien realm.
How does the prison metaphor work and in what ways does it aid in
thinking about IR without falling into the traps encountered by other
metaphors? First, the purpose of the metaphor is to prompt reflection on
the theoretical project of IR. It was not my purpose in elaborating the
metaphor to replace or supplant existing metaphors with a superior meta-
phorical device for theorizing. Rather, my goal was to highlight how met-
aphors suggest certain ways of thinking about IR and to do so in a
self-conscious fashion. Second, the metaphor invites a re-thinking about
certain categories of phenomena in the study of IR, for example, the
aforementioned reexamination of the concept of sovereignty and its role
in delineating the parameters of what constitutes legitimate actors in
world affairs. Third, the metaphor serves as a heuristic device for develop-
ing the theoretical propositions of a specific paradigm in the study of IR,
namely, the Constructivist approach. Theories such as Realism and
Liberalism have well-known metaphors that highlight key principles in
these paradigms’ analytical approaches. Metaphors such as billiard balls

(Realism) and economic markets (Liberalism) provide a basis for elaborat-
ing these theories’ theoretical propositions. Constructivism to date has
lacked metaphors of this nature, so the prison metaphor to some extent
fills this void. The prison metaphor’s contribution to Constructivist the-
ory is to allude to the social construction of reality by using inmate culture
as a model for international affairs. Prison inmates live in a dynamic world
in which the language of prison life and the meanings inmates attach to
their circumstances lead to changing conceptions of identity, relation-
ships, and behavior. This is an apt metaphor for how international actors
constantly re-make their reality by re-negotiating the reality of their
existence.
This does not mean that the prison metaphor is the be all and end all of
metaphorical thinking about IR. My intent in developing the prison meta-
phor was not to invent a new metaphor to replace all the existing ones in
the study of IR, but rather to demonstrate how a new metaphor can act as
an investigative device which prompts a reexamination of the propositions
of existing theories and new thinking about how to conceptualize and
theorize world affairs. One of the potential problems with metaphors in
any academic exercise is that they can become reified and stale. The prison
metaphor is meant to be malleable and subject to multiple interpretations,
and in that sense it is a metaphor itself for IR, which constantly undergoes
dynamic change.
If, in the realm of possibilities, one metaphor is as good as another in
identifying concepts in IR, then by the above logic, the decision to use one
metaphor or another necessarily involves some choice, whether consciously
or unconsciously, to use that metaphor in creating a theory of IR. Calling
unequal economic relations a matter of “core–periphery” versus “North–
South,” for example, is a decision to name a concept with a metaphorical
image. The same could be said of the decision to choose one way of inter-
preting a metaphor from competing interpretations of the same metaphor-
ical image. This is the case, for example, of the decisions scholars have
made to opt for one or another interpretation of the metaphor of the, or
an, international “system.” Does this mean that objective, detached, impar-
tial, and unbiased theorizing about IR is impossible? The inescapable con-
clusion is that the facts of IR do not present themselves unambiguously.
Scholars have to make calculations about what to call something and, just
as is true for naming a child, what to call or name something is a choice.
214 M. P. MARKS
Once a concept has been labeled, in virtually every case with a metaphor,
the implications of that labeling reflect the metaphors that are chosen. For
example, George Lakoff and Mark Turner (1989, 62) use the example of
the metaphor life is a journey to point out how, once the metaphor has
been accepted, it structures thinking about life in a way that would be dif-
ferent had some other metaphor been evoked: “Part of the power of such
a metaphor is its ability to create structure in our understanding of life.
Life, after all, need not be viewed as a journey. It need not be viewed as hav-
ing a path, destinations, or impediments to travel, or vehicles” (emphasis in
the original). However, once the metaphor life is a journey is embraced,
it dictates subsequent inferences about the nature of life: “For the same
reasons that schemas and metaphors give us power to conceptualize and
reason, so they have power over us. Anything that we rely on constantly,
unconsciously, and automatically is so much part of us that it cannot be
easily resisted” (ibid., 63). As the preceding chapters have shown, the theo-
retical propositions that emanate from metaphors have implications for the
conclusions that are drawn. Calling something a “global village” or a
“democratic deficit” leads to propositions and conclusions that are differ-
ent than if it had been called something else. This may not be a value judg-
ment, but it is a thought judgment.
Furthermore, metaphors in IR reflect scholars’ assumptions about how
the world works.30 Imagining the world metaphorically as “agents” and
“structures,” for example, reflects one set of starting assumptions as a
guide for imagining the world. Proposing a different metaphorical frame,
however, shakes up scholars’ theoretical propositions, as does Stefanie
Fishel (2017), who does precisely that when she suggests thinking about
IR metaphorically in terms microbes and how bodies and politics occupy
multiple places in the biosphere and the natural world. How scholars think
about the world before they have arrived at theoretical conclusions is part
of how they approach the subject from the start. This is an observation
that has been amplified in particular by Feminist theories of IR. With spe-
cific reference to the billiard ball and web metaphors, for example, Sandra
Whitworth (1994, 4) writes that “uncovering the ideas about sexual dif-
ference which inform different international activities…is a far cry from
either billiard-balls or cobwebs.” This is because a full accounting of IR
requires critical self-reflection concerning which metaphors inform the
theoretical project of IR.
What Should (Metaphors in) IR Theory Look Like?

Since the publication of Metaphors in International Relations Theory, the
most frequent question I am asked is what role should metaphors in IR
theory play? The book has been read by some people as an instruction
manual for how to employ metaphors in theorizing about IR. Contrary to
this view, I take no particular position about how metaphors should be
used in IR theory aside from the suggestion that when they are used
scholars be conscious about how they are utilizing them. As Theodore
Brown (2003) has observed, metaphors can serve a variety of roles in sci-
ence. Among other things, they can provide a heuristic function by sug-
gesting new ways of thinking about a problem, they can suggest ways to
model a concept, and they can supply a vocabulary to lay out a hypothesis
about cause and effect. Metaphors serve similar functions in the social sci-
ences, although, as I point out in Metaphors in International Relations
Theory, ironically IR scholars often rely on metaphors more unconsciously
than researchers do in the physical and natural sciences. That is to say, in
the so-called hard sciences, metaphors frequently are invoked more explic-
itly to suggest ways of conceptualizing a problem than they are in IR
theory. By contrast with the physical and natural sciences, in IR theory,
metaphorical ways of conceptualizing an issue often become reified as
empirical problems themselves. Therefore, my main suggestion for utiliz-
ing metaphors in IR theory is that they be used wisely.
More importantly, reflection on metaphors in IR theory prompts think-
ing about what IR theory itself should look like. In many ways this is a
back-to-basics moment. As J. David Singer (1961, 91) pointed out many
years ago, a good theory should be able to describe, explain, and predict.
In recent years, however, a gap has opened in IR scholarship between
researchers who are concerned with accounting for observed empirical out-
comes on the one hand and scholars who are preoccupied with abstract
concepts of meta-theory on the other. Using Singer’s categories as a guide,
the former—empirical researchers—could be called “descriptivists,” and
the latter—abstract theorists—might be named “explanationists.” For
Singer, scholars working at the domestic “level of analysis,” if they were not
careful, might drift too far in the direction of description of individual cases
without the ability to derive generalizable explanations. By contrast, Singer
warned that scholars who operate too far toward the international level of
analysis might be able to do little more than proffer explanations that have
216 M. P. MARKS
no empirical referents. My view of “descriptivists” and “explanationists”

rests on a different set of theoretical pitfalls. “Descriptivists,” taken up pri-
marily with empirical facts, risk losing the ability to see generalizable pat-
terns. “Explanationists,” focused primarily on abstract theory—often
framed with the explicit use of metaphors—face the danger of not being
able to account for empirical facts. Both camps then lack the ability to
undertake that which Singer presumably thought would be most useful to
scholars, practitioners, and lay people alike, namely, the ability to make
predictions about the future course of international affairs.
Many of the seminal events in world affairs were not widely predicted
by scholars of IR. Is this what most people want from specialists in IR, that
is, the ability to predict future events? If so, what would assist in making
such predictions? As Singer so presciently noted, prediction is aided by the
proper mix of description and explanation. A simple generalizable theory
of IR is one that specifies certain conditions that are variable in their inten-
sity as they recur across time and space. An example of such a theory
frequently advanced by Realist IR scholars takes the form of “bipolar dis-
tributions of power are more stable than multipolar distributions of
power.” The problem with this type of theory is that it is premised on
reified metaphors (“bipolar,” “distribution,” “stable”) that are not tied to
empirical referents except in an ex post facto and therefore non-falsifiable
manner. The solution to this problem is to define key terms more descrip-
tively using literal terms to substitute for metaphors such as “polarity” and
“stable.” The problem here is that of the descriptivists, that is, empirical
information is used to define analytical terms which can result in a mere
re-statement of the facts which is tautological and of little use in making
predictions.
The goal for scholars then is to arrive at analytical categories that can be
identified in ways which do not reduce them to vague and reified meta-
phorical abstractions but are subject to variability such that they are not
unique to specific empirical situations. Such theories would then be able
to specify conditions that could be predicted in the future based on the
accumulation of historical facts. It is not my purpose to suggest or develop
specific theories of one or more aspects of IR, but merely to remind schol-
ars of what makes their theories useful to themselves, to policymakers, and
to the world at large.
Beyond Metaphors in IR Theory

In my previous volume on metaphors in IR theory, I concluded that the
pervasiveness of metaphors reveals the difficulty of achieving what typi-
cally passes as “objectivity” in IR schools of thought. This, it turns out, is
not such a novel or revolutionary suggestion. Commenting on measure-
ment in political science, Andreas Schedler (2012, 26) opines that “non-
judgmental measurement is unreachable…Rules are never fully determinate
and never fully transparent.” Schedler (33) thus concludes that “to the
extent that we need to rely on judgmental elements in the collection of
political data (be it for epistemic, theoretical, or practical reason), we
should recognize that fact, rather than deny it.” Metaphors in IR theory
are part of the instruments of judgment scholars bring to bear on identify-
ing facts and creating analytical categories. Facts do not present them-
selves unambiguously. Moreover, analytical categories are conceptual tools
that rest on the metaphorical concepts scholars find convenient or useful.
Interpreting facts metaphorically and relying on metaphorical concepts to
create analytical categories are processes that inherently involve the
application not of objectivity as it is typically understood, but involve the
exercise of judgment.31
What might be useful here would be a return to Morton Kaplan’s
notion of Pragmatism (capitalized as a theoretical perspective). As sum-
marized by Inanna Hamati-Ataya (2012, 292), Pragmatism presents the
possibility to “transcend some of the main antagonisms that lie between
the respective ‘extremities’ of positivism and post-positivism.” Pragmatism
does this by offering an alternative to “the positivist view of truth as cor-
respondence” on the one hand, and “the post-positivist view of truth as
intersubjective agreement” (ibid., emphasis in the original) on the other.
Specifically, Pragmatism acknowledges that “the process of interpretation
is…embedded in a pre-existing cognitive structure that is constituted by
our neuro-physiological apparatus, and the mental, collective structures of
our understanding as they exist at a particular time in history” (ibid., 293,
emphasis in the original). This view is remarkably similar to current think-
ing about the role of metaphors in academic inquiry, that is, metaphors
serve as cognitive frames by which reality is comprehended. Hamati-Ataya
(294) argues that from the Pragmatist perspective “knowing is a situa-
tional process that depends upon the nature of the instruments and frame-
work of perception and interpretation” (emphasis in the original). Indeed,
to illustrate this, Hamati-Ataya (297) cites Kaplan’s (1992) discussion of
218 M. P. MARKS
the nature of reality highlighted with the example of light which has both
“wave-like” and “particle-like” behavior, two distinctly metaphorical ways
of cognitively apprehending, and hence conceptualizing, aspects of the
physical universe.
The Pragmatist approach to the study of IR thus offers another way in
which metaphors can be acknowledged as integral to how scholars
approach the subject matter of their investigation. Keeping in mind that
the metaphorical concepts used to study IR are every bit as much cogni-
tive frames—much as are “wave-like” and “particle-like” ways of concep-
tualizing light—these concepts then become useful to the extent that they
provide a common reference point for empirical research. The goal is not
to uncover “reality” as positivists might understand it in terms of “truth as
correspondence” or “intersubjective agreement” as post-positivists might
see it, but rather to promote agreement on what concepts provide a basis
for comparative analysis which Hamati-Ataya (297) views as “the only way
to accumulate knowledge without either reducing the object to its experi-
entially determined manifestations, or reifying the conceptual framework
that is constructed to make sense of it” (emphasis in the original; Hamati-
Ataya cites Kaplan 1992). Empirical research is premised on the accep-
tance that what is studied is neither perfectly knowable reality nor shared
meanings, but cognitive frames manifested as meaningful metaphorical
concepts.
The future of research in IR thus requires the exercise of judgment in
being aware of the role of metaphors in creating concepts, interrogating
these metaphors to determine their conceptual utility, acknowledging the
empirical categories that are suggested by conceptual metaphors, deciding
which categories correspond to observed facts, and collecting empirical
data in ways that further a better understanding of world affairs so as not
simply to reinforce existing metaphorical frames. The failure to predict
global changes at the end of the Cold War resides in part in the inability to
imagine facts in ways that did not conform to prevailing metaphorical con-
cepts and the categories of empirical information that followed. For exam-
ple, metaphors such as “balances of power” reinforced categories of
international actors, principally states, leading scholars to overlook, down-
play, or under-theorize non-state actors as agents of change. Thinking of
the world in terms of metaphorical “systems” and “structures” also obscured
actions taking place that were not theorized as “systemic” or integral parts
of the “structural” makeup of world affairs. It is not surprising that many
scholars missed empirical cues presaging changes in global relations in
the era immediately prior to, during, and following the end of the Cold
War, given the limited conceptual frameworks with which to identify rele-
vant facts.
With this in mind, scholars would do well to look beyond metaphors in
IR theory. This is not necessarily a call for a neoempiricist method which
prioritizes description over analytical theory. As noted earlier, J. David
Singer’s 1961 analysis of theoretical models that provide utility for schol-
ars was a call for approaches that contain a balance between description
and explanation so that the predictions which follow are neither so broad
as to ignore proximate change nor so specific as to descend into a mere
description of facts. Moving beyond metaphors in IR means creating cat-
egories which summarize observable facts so that those categories can be
used to discern patterns and detect change. Metaphors should not create
categories for categories’ sake, divorced from a literal description of
observable facts. Theories of IR should study something aside from the
metaphorical concepts themselves.
This book and the volume that precedes it represent one step in the
process of interrogating metaphors as theoretical concepts. If scholars are
to move beyond metaphors in IR theory, they must be self-aware about
the concepts that both shape and constrain thinking about world affairs.
Even after two forays into the field, there remain additional metaphorical
concepts that frame IR theory. Self-awareness about the concepts that
guide theory and research should be part of scholars’ research agenda. As
exhaustive as this book and its predecessor were, metaphors are ever pres-
ent in the field of IR. Toward this end, there is still additional work to be
done in identifying, evaluating, and revisiting metaphors in IR theory.
Notes
1. Recent scholarship, however, does suggest that much can be learned by
advancing alternate narratives for what is taken as accepted knowledge.
These alternate narratives can emerge through writing fictional accounts of
events in IR. See Park-Kang (2014). On alternative narratives in the repre-
sentation of issues in international affairs, see also Singh (2014).
2. Lebow (2014, 5–6) writes that inefficient causation “rests on the premise
that many, if not most, international events of interest are best described as
instances of what philosophers call singular causation. We can construct
causal narratives about these outcomes, but they cannot be explained or
predicted by reference to prior generalizations or narratives…Singular cau-
220 M. P. MARKS
sation understands cause as the glue that holds a story together; it is some-
thing akin to a plot line in a novel.” For a specific example of how narrative
complicates theorizing, see Spencer (2014).
3. Bliesemann de Guevara employs a definition of political myths suggested
by Chiara Bottici (2007, 14), who defines a myth as the “work on a com-
mon narrative by which members of a social group (or society) provide
significance to their…experience and deeds.” On myths in IR, see also
Cooke (2016), Dany and Freistein (2016), Loriaux and Lynch (2016),
Münch (2016). On the relationship between myth and metaphor, see
Kermode (1966), Denham (1990), Christensen and Cornelissen (2015).
4. On distinguishing metaphors used deliberately from those that are consti-
tutive of thought, see Steen (2013).
5. The reason why “the fluctuations of sound frequencies are like waves on
the ocean” is an analogy while “waves of democratization” is a metaphor is
that in the former the comparison is between two sets of physical forces
that take similar form while in the latter the relationship highlighted is
between an abstract idea (democracy) and an unrelated physical force
(cyclical movement). “Fluctuations” and “waves” are related realms; one
can make an analogy between the up and down movements of fluctuations
and waves. Democracy and cyclical movement are unrelated realms; how-
ever, a key similarity between them—the recurrent nature of political activ-
ity and the up and down movements in waves—can be highlighted by
using waves as a metaphor for political democracy.
6. On early theories of IR that draw on metaphorical imagery, see Kleinschmidt
(2000).
7. For more on the balance of power in the development of statecraft, see
Little (2007).
8. The discussion that follows draws on the work of Brown (2003).
9. Richard Ashcraft (1977) offers a somewhat different take on Behavioralism
and metaphors, arguing that the rational choice aspect of Behavioralist
pursuits is designed to infuse the study of politics with metaphors bor-
rowed from economic rationality. The goal for Behavioralists, Ashcraft
argues, is to maintain the hegemony of a view of liberal democracy rooted
in the dynamics of the capitalist system.
10. A similar effort to use a domestic analogy to re-think anarchy is set forth
by Zaheer Kazmi (2012), who draws on theories of anarchy to propose a
re-conceptualization of IR as constituted by practices of “polite anarchy.”
11. https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_ss_i_1_10?url=search-
alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=soft+power&sprefix=soft+power%2C
popular%2C263&crid=12S1LFE06KMPS.
12. At the extreme end, one could fairly ask if conceptual metaphors in the
social sciences (or even the physical and natural sciences) lead to inadver-
tent or even deliberate academic fraud because such conceptual metaphors

create categories into which researchers try to fit evidence and/or data.
When researchers strive to find evidence that fits into the categories created
by conceptual metaphors, what has been found is not entirely free of con-
firmation bias.
13. For a sample of works on “divided” nations, see, for example, Henderson
et al. (1974), Woodward (1976), Doyle (2002), Rowse and Goot (2007),
Fulbrook (2009), Goldin (2013), Mabry et.al. (2013).
14. In this definition of crime, it is not necessary that other people understand
the personal gain a criminal is pursuing, for example, in the case of a person
motivated by mental illness.
15. This point is made by Blagden (2016) when discussing the relationship
between deductive and inductive theorizing in IR.
16. Some examples of points of tension that scholars do not typically refer to
as “crises” include the period of imminent hostilities between Argentina
and Chile over control of islands and waterways in the Beagle Channel in
1978 and the mass wave of humans that fled Haiti in 1991 after the mili-
tary coup against President Jean Bertrand Aristide.
17. Metaphors are an interesting thing in terms of how they make people think
about a particular issue in different ways. A group of editors (Crocker et al.
1999) conceived of international mediation in a “complex” world as a
process of “herding cats,” while the same editors (Crocker et al. 2007)
later conceptualize a “divided” world metaphorically in terms of “leashing
the dogs of war.” Dogs provide a metaphor for war and aggression, while
cats, difficult to control as a group, provide a potential basis for coopera-
tion. These are suggestive linguistic metaphors only, to be sure, but it is
intriguing how scholars continue to rely on them to theorize about IR.
18. Maasen (211) continues: “Metaphors are sites and media of knowledge
transfer.”
19. On the “chain gang” metaphor, see Christensen and Snyder (1990),
Tierney (2011).
20. From a policy standpoint, ambiguity in the concept of “alliances” can have
serious implications for relations among states. In one example that was
provided by a foreign policy expert in Poland, deterioration in relations
between the United States and Poland in the early 2010s reflected in at
least small part different understandings between Americans and Poles
regarding what is meant by an “ally.” “Part of the problem…was that the
terms ‘partner’ and ‘ally’ were used interchangeably in describing the
countries’ relationship. But they are not the same thing, he said: An ally
offers international support and sheds blood in a crisis, while a partner
shares in the profits” (Lyman 2014, no page number).
222 M. P. MARKS
21. Onuf cites Adler (2002, 2012) regarding the metaphorical nature of
Constructivism’s journey forward.
22. Onuf (130) appears to favor the middle path: “A fully realized constructiv-
ism—one that is fully articulated as a framework and thus a moderate-sized
dry good—has many uses and (switching metaphors yet again) somewhere
to go, but only when it joins up with micro-physics or global sociology
(either works) and negotiates the space between them (both senses of
negotiate, both metaphors).”
23. Similarly, the methods scholars devise for studying IR and other disciplines
emanate in part from metaphorical conceptions of how the world works.
For example, Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel (2015) observe that the
method of process tracing in part grows out of metaphors of causation that
then become analytic tools. Theodore Brown (2003) has found likewise in
his study of metaphors in science.
24. On the importance of scholars reflecting on the subjectivity of knowledge
production, see Müller (2016).
25. That IR scholars base their theories on the experiences they encounter in
their own lives helps account for the plurality of theoretical approaches in
the field. On theoretical plurality in IR, see Van der Ree (2014).
26. The biannual survey conducted by the Institute for the Theory and Practice
of International Relations indicates that IR scholars regularly describe their
own political beliefs along the left side of the political spectrum, that is, in
the range of what is often described as “progressive.” In the 2011 survey,
for example, on social issues, among all scholars who responded to the
survey, 17% describe themselves as “very left/liberal,” 36% as “left/lib-
eral,” and 20% as “slightly left/liberal” for a total of 73% on the left end of
the political spectrum (just over 8% describe themselves on the right on
social issues with 19% in the middle). On economic issues, 12% describe
themselves as “very left/liberal,” 28% as “left/liberal,” and 23% as “slightly
left/liberal” for a total of 63% on the left end of the political spectrum
(16% describe themselves on the right on economic issues with 20% in the
middle; figures were rounded by the investigators and therefore do not add
up to 100%) (Maliniak et al. 2012, 39–40).
27. It must be noted that in no way does Rathbun imply that scholars’ political
ideologies bias them in one way or another toward certain findings. Rather,
Rathbun suggests that there is evidence to support the hypothesis that
scholars’ political ideologies lead them to find plausible the propositions of
certain epistemological and paradigmatic perspectives in the study of
IR. For a more explicit discussion of the normative aspects of theorizing
about IR, see Price (2008) as well as a forum in the journal International
Theory, Erskine (2012), Price (2012a, b), Rengger (2012), Snyder and
Vinjamuri (2012).
28. For critical interpretations of conceptual metaphor theory, see also Croft
(1998), Vervaeke and Kennedy (2004).
29. For additional comments on IR scholarship outside of a US context, see
Crawford and Jarvis (2001), Tickner and Wæver (2009).
30. For a critique of the role of metaphors in the social sciences in general, see
Shapiro (1985).
31. In this sense, acknowledging the role of metaphors in IR theory is part of
the interpretivist turn in IR. For a summary of interpretivist methods in IR,
see Lynch (2014).
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Index1
A B
Accounting metaphor Balance of power, 10, 11, 13, 19, 144,
in economics, 33 145, 162, 195, 218
Advancement Bartelson, Jens, 60
as a metaphor, 42, 210 Behavioralist Revolution, 195–197
relationship to democratization, Billiard ball metaphor, 2, 138, 139, 214
99, 107, 108 Biological classification system, 54, 200
Ahmad, Aqueil, 61 Black box metaphor, 139–140
Albright, Madeleine, 2 Brinkmanship, 75, 174
Alexander II, czar of Russia, 110 Brown, Theodore, 215, 222n23
Alliances are binding metaphor, Building as a metaphor, 73, 91, 110
205–206
Analogy
in Realist theory, 142–143 C
relationship to metaphor, 13, 142, Carter, Jimmy, 18–19
143, 194–199 Chain gang metaphor, 206
Anarchy, 142, 144–146, 158, 160, Chemical weapons, 5–7, 157
195, 210, 211 Chicken game, 197–198
Arab Spring, 124 Chilton, Paul, 46
Arc of crisis metaphor, Climate change, 196–197
18, 19 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 7
Note: Page numbers followed by “n” refer to notes.

1

Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71201-7
230 INDEX
Cognitive linguistics, 4, 12, 13, 57, Democratization has a direction

204, 205, 207, 209, 210 metaphor,
Cold War 14, 97–109, 124
metaphors in, 11, 12, 23n23, 52 forward and backward directions of
Collapsed states, 198 democratization, 94, 97–99,
Common European home/house, 101, 105–109, 114, 115, 207
70, 80n48 and modernization, 104–107
Constructivism pendulum metaphor, 102–104
metaphors in, 152–158, 198, 199, waves of democratization, 92,
206, 212, 213 99–103, 109, 122, 195
Core, center, and periphery as Density as a metaphor, 115–118
metaphors, 37, 44–46, 49, 150, Dependency as a metaphor, 47–49, 210
210, 213 Dependency Theory, 47, 48
Crisis as a metaphor, 18, 19, 203, 204 Deterrence, 198
Cuban Missile Crisis, 203 Development
Cycles as a metaphor, 92, 99, 102 as an economic phenomenon,
36, 37, 40–44, 53
as a metaphor, 35–44, 210
D relationship to underdevelopment, 41
Dean, Howard, 20 Distribution of power,
Democracy from “above” or “below”, 173, 196, 216
110–115 Domestic interests
See also From “above” or “below” as metaphorical aspects,
a political concept, 59, 73, 149–152, 211
110–115 Domestic politics, 120, 122
Democratic consolidation, 92–98, metaphorical aspects, 149–152
102, 103, 122–124, 202, 203 Durkheim, Émile, 148, 149
Democratic deficit
empirical measures of, 120–122
and European integration, 119–122 E
as a metaphor, 118–122, 214 Economics
origins and nature of the concept, metaphors in, 31
117, 120–122 Eisenhower, Dwight, 11
Democratic Party, 19, 20 Emanuel, Rahm, 20
Democratic transition, 93–97, 100, Energy Crisis, 203
103, 122–124, 202, 203 Enloe, Cynthia, 61, 62, 161, 162
Democratization European Community, see European
metaphors in, 108, 130–136 Union (EU)
narratives of, 107–109, 122–124 European integration
as a phenomenon, 92–95 and democratic deficit, 119–122
sequential aspects of, 93–96, 106, metaphors of, 63–74
107, 122, 123 scholarship on, 63, 64, 71, 74
INDEX
231
European Neighborhood Policy as a metaphorical concept, 106,

(ENP), 69–74 107, 207–209
and European integration, 71–74 relationship to human
metaphorical aspects, 70 locomotion, 109
European Union (EU), 50, 51, 63, relationship to progress as a
65, 69–74, 119–122 metaphor, 106, 107, 207, 208
Evolution as a metaphor, 91, 92, 94, See also democratization has a
154, 159 direction metaphor
Foucault, Michel, 58, 59, 117, 118
From “above” or “below” as a political
F concept, 59, 73, 110–115
Failed state metaphor, 2, 3, 19 Functionalism/neofunctionalism,
Falling dominoes metaphor, 10–12, 64–69
108, 173
Fat and lean economies, 53–54
Feminist theory, 61, 158–168, 214 G
epistemology, 162–165, 174 Game theory, 197–198
in international relations theory, Global community metaphor, 18–19
165–168 Global inequality as a metaphor,
metaphors in, 158–168, 175 49–52
narratives in, 161, 164 comparisons to poverty, 51–52
ontology, 160–162, 165, 174 Globalization
Firewall metaphor, 108, 125n5 as a metaphor, 58–60, 62, 63
Fishel, Stefanie R., 169, 214 as a set of practices, 60–62
Flanik, William, 10, 14, 19 Global village metaphor, 59, 214
Foreign aid
as a metaphor, 56–57
as a policy, 56–57 H
from the United States to Great Haas, Ernst, 65
Britain, 56–57 Hamati-Ataya, Inanna, 217–218
Foreign as a metaphor Hierarchy, 142, 163, 166, 167
implications for international High and low politics, 31, 76
relations theory, 150 Hirschman, Albert, 151
linguistic origins, 150 Holocaust, the, 176
Foreign policy analysis Human capital as a metaphor, 34
distinction from international Huntington, Samuel P.,
relations theory, 169–172 92, 99–101, 105
and foreign policy decision-making,
172–175
metaphors in, 172–175 I
theoretical aspects, 172–175 Inequality, 35, 36, 49–52
Forward/backward directions Inside–outside distinction in
elements of democratization, 92, international relations theory,
97–100, 105–110, 114, 207 141, 149, 150
232 INDEX
Intelligence Advanced Research L

Projects Activity (IARPA) Lakoff, George, 7, 8, 11–14, 19, 20,
Metaphor Program, 15–18, 20 106, 205, 208, 214
Interests as a metaphor, 149–152 Leadership as a metaphor, 18–19
International norms, see Norms Lebow, Richard Ned, 193
International political economy (IPE) Levels of analysis
metaphorical aspects, 31, 74–76 in Feminist theory, 166
International relations theory in foreign policy analysis, 171
analogies in, 142, 144, 145, 194–199 in Liberalism, 147–149
categories in, 200–204, 207, 209, 215 and the marginalization of people,
distinction from foreign policy 175–177
analysis, 169–172 and prison metaphor, 211–213
eclecticism in, 169 in Realist theory, 148, 149, 196
generalizability, 174, 216 Liberalism/neoliberalism
and the marginalization of people, compared to Realism, 148–149
21, 175–177 domestic interests in, 149–152
metaphors in, 1–3, 8–10, 19–21, metaphors in, 147–152
31, 74–76, 158–160, 168, 169, system in, 147–149
175–177, 194–204, 212–219 life is a journey metaphor,
myths in, 193 106, 214
narratives in, 3, 31, 75, 161, 177, Lipset, Seymour Martin, 104
193, 194
paradigmatic framing, 168–169
and pragmatism, 217–218 M
relationship to Feminist theory, Market metaphor, 142–144
165–168, 174 Mathematics, 50
scholars of, 8–10, 17–21, 51, 91, McCloskey, Deirdre, 31, 33–35
195, 204–210, 215, 219 Metaphors
social science methods, 159, 177, in academic inquiry, 19–21, 137,
195–197 138, 214–216
International Studies Association and analogies, 13, 142, 143, 194–199
(ISA), 170 biological, 33, 91, 92, 94, 154–156,
International taboos, see Taboos 159, 176, 195, 209
and categories in international
relations theory, 200–204, 207,
J 209, 216
Johnson, Mark, 11–13, 106, 205, 208 cognitive linguistics and, 4, 12, 13,
Justice cascade metaphor, 109, 154 57, 204, 205, 207, 209, 210
as concepts, 12, 173, 194–199,
204, 205
K conceptual theory of, 12, 13, 204,
Kaplan, Morton, 217, 218 205, 207, 209
Katzenstein, Peter J., 169 conceptual versus linguistic, 12–15
INDEX
233
in Constructivism, 152–157, 173, as a metaphor, 106–107

199, 206, 212, 213 relationship to democratization,
deliberate versus non-deliberate, 104–107, 114, 115
13–15, 194 See also democratization has a
and the division of the international direction metaphor
from foreign policy analysis, Musolff, Andreas, 176, 209
169–172 Myanmar, 97–98
in economics, 31–35 Myths, 193–194
in Feminist theory, 61, 158–160,
174, 175
in foreign policy analysis, 172–175 N
and governments, 15–17 National missile defense system, 14
how to denote, 24n28, 204, 205, Nation-state, 200–201
209, 210 Neoliberalism, see Liberalism/
in human cognition, 12, 57, 137, neoliberalism
197, 204 Neorealism, see Realism/neorealism
in international relations theory, Newly industrialized countries, 55
1–3, 8–10, 20, 21, 31, New York Times, 2, 3, 5, 6
74–76, 158–160, 175–177, Non-alignment, 52
193–219 Norms
in Liberalism/neoliberalism, cascades, 109, 154, 155
147–149 in Constructivist theory, 152–157
linguistic, 12, 13, 206–208 construed as judgment,
mechanical, 12, 91, 94, 155, 195 152–154, 158
and narrative, 8, 31, 161 entrepreneurs, 154–155
organic, 91, 92, 125n5, evolutionary view, 154, 158
154–156, 158 life cycle theory of, 154, 155, 158
and paradigmatic framing, 168–169 as a metaphor, 152–157
in partisan politics, 19–20 narratives of, 152–154
in politics and policy, 7–9, 19 spreading process, 154
in psychology, 207 as statistical likelihood, 153, 158
in Realism/neorealism, 13, “North” and “South” as metaphors,
137–140, 173, 196, 197 37, 46, 47, 49, 54, 55, 213
and relationship between politics North Korea, 2, 103, 113
and scholarship, 17–21 Nye, Joseph S., 177n4, 200
in scholarly discourse, 4, 8, 9, 14,
17, 19–21, 205–212
Microbes as a metaphor, 214 O
Mind is a machine metaphor, 12 Obama, Barack, 5–7, 14, 20
Modernization Olopade, Dayo, 53–54
as an economic phenomenon, Onuf, Nicholas, 206–207
104–106 Ordinal worlds metaphor, 36–39
linguistic aspects, 104 Organized crime, 201–203
234 INDEX
P Sherwin-Williams, 59, 61
Particle-like metaphors, 218 Sikkink, Kathryn, 109, 154–157
Peace dividend metaphor, 12, 20 Singer, J. David, 171, 172, 219
Pendulum metaphor, 102–104 Sjoberg, Laura, 160, 164, 166, 167
Persian Gulf War, 22n12, 23n17 Smith, Adam, 32
Poverty is falling behind metaphor, Soft power, 177n4, 200
51, 210 Soreanu, Raluca, 163, 180n31
Pragmatism, 217–219 Sovereignty, 46, 62, 66, 139, 160
Price, Richard, 157, 158 Spheres of influence metaphor, 9–10
Prison as a metaphor, 198, 199, Spillover
210–218 and European integration, 64–66,
Prisoner’s Dilemma, 13 68, 69
Progress and functionalist/neofunctionalist
as a metaphorical concept, 106, theory, 64, 66, 68, 69
107, 207, 208 as a metaphor, 64–69
relationship to forward/backward State as a container metaphor, 46,
directions, 106–107 208–210
relationship to human State as an individual/person, 146,
locomotion, 109 166, 170, 176, 210
State of nature, 145–147, 211
Structure, 138, 139, 169, 195
R in Feminist theory, 160, 165–167
Realism/neorealism as a metaphor, 61, 169, 195,
anarchy in, 142, 144–146 214, 218
epistemology, 140–147 in Realist theory, 140–143, 145
metaphors in, 13, 137–140, 196 Sylvester, Christine, 162, 177
social science methods, 137, 138, 147 Syria, 5–7, 14
structure in, 141–143, 145, 146 System, 138–140, 195
system in, 141, 142, 145, 146, 196 in Feminist theory, 160, 165, 168
Red line metaphor, 5–7, 14 in Liberal theory, 147–149
Reform from “above” or “below”, as a metaphor, 48, 195, 218
110–115 in Realist theory, 140–142, 145, 196
Relations among international actors
of unequal wealth, metaphors of,
42–43 T
Rogue state metaphor, 19, 75 Taboos
and chemical weapons, 157–158
in Constructivist theory, 157–158
S linguistic origins, 157
Safire, William, 39 as a metaphor, 157–158
Sauvy, Alfred, 36, 38, 39 Tannenwald, Nina, 157, 158
Schedler, Andreas, 93, 96, 217 Terrorism, 201–203
INDEX
235
Thick and thin W

in culture, 116 Walker, R. B. J., 149
as a metaphor, 115, 117, 118 Waltz, Kenneth, 140–147
in political authority, 115–117 War as a metaphor, 8, 12, 20
Third World, 36–38, 49, 54, 55 Waves of democratization, 14, 92,
as a metaphor, 36–39, 49, 210 99–103, 109, 122, 220n5
Threshold states, 53 See also democratization has a
Tickner, J. Ann, 10, 11, 160–164 direction metaphor
Time is a moving object metaphor, 205 Wendt, Alexander, 176, 209
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 9–10 Whitehead, Laurence, 91–94
Truman, Harry S., 40 Wibben, Annick,
Turner, Mark, 106 163, 164

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Revisiting Metaphors in

International Relations Theory

ISBN 978-3-319-71200-0 ISBN 978-3-319-71201-7 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017963276

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Cover image © Trifonov_Evgeniy / Getty Images

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

This book is a sequel to my previously published work Metaphors in

Salem, OR, USA Michael P. Marks

1 The Significance of Metaphors in International

2 Metaphors of International Political Economy 31

4 Theoretical Reflections 137

5 The Role of Metaphors in International Relations Theory 193

The Significance of Metaphors

This book serves as a sequel to my previous work, Metaphors in International

© The Author(s) 2018 1

Beginning Again with an Anecdote

One of the main observations in Metaphors in International Relations

Foreign Policy by Metaphor: Barack

Dallek’s notion of the “tyranny of metaphor” played itself out in a

Metaphors and Public Policy

metaphors for different reasons, the way they conceptualize IR often

Why Metaphors Matter

system comprising self-contained political entities that populate a physical

first glance seem. Contestation over the meanings of metaphors, in fact, is

Metaphors persist in shaping policy debates, perceptions of opportuni-

Conceptual Versus Linguistic Metaphors

For cognitive linguists and metaphor scholars, the distinction between

automated tools and techniques for recognizing, defining and categorizing

The Nexus Between Policy Metaphors

Scholars have fully established that policymakers marshal metaphors to

their political objectives. The IARPA Metaphor Program discussed in the

progressive causes. Lakoff also consulted with one-time presidential can-

ways that scholarly thinking, which involves conceptual metaphors, influ-

16. On sports metaphors in political discourse, see Herbeck (2004).

Dalby, Simon. 1998. Ecological Metaphors of Security: World Politics in the

Ivie, Robert L. 1980. Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War.

Metaphors of International Political

In the theoretical narrative of IR, part of the story involves establishing

© The Author(s) 2018 31

it easier to see the metaphors than do economists.”3 Furthermore,

“Marxism combines a metaphor of class struggle with a story of the pro-

Metaphors in the Study of Relations

linguistic metaphors by any means—“among” employs a spatial metaphor,

Ordinal Worlds Metaphor

“periphery” and “North–South” relations, that “First World” and “Third

associated concept of “underdevelopment” associated with the theory of

the metaphorical complications that arise when moving from verb to

economy. As obvious as this observation sounds, it is worth reminding

increase in income levels in today’s oil-rich states does not necessarily

The Metaphors of “Core,” “Center,” and “(Semi)Periphery”

increasing number of economic transactions are conducted electronically,

Metaphors of “North” and “South”

and imagined as a binary opposition between two distinct geographic

on another is merely contingent on a certain set of circumstances. Therefore,

a range of ways in which relations between international actors of unequal

Furthermore, there is a cognitive bias built into notions of equality as

economy, provides greater opportunity for the free movement of eco-

Used as a metaphor for conceptualizing any number of qualities of the

Salem, OR, USA Michael P. Marks

1 The Significance of Metaphors in International

2 Metaphors of International Political Economy 31

4 Theoretical Reflections 137

5 The Role of Metaphors in International Relations Theory 193