Fe Yusay Vs City of Mandaluyong

Ignacio, Rudy Jr.
G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011
SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY,
Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts:
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated between
Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half
of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families.
Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of income.
On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution

No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the
necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of
developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.
The petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC,
praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory,
improper, and without force and effect.
The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to
initiate the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase
the property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature.
RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition, opining that certiorari did not lie
against a legislative act of the City Government, because the special civil action of certiorari was
only available to assail judicial or quasi-judicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
Issue:
Whether or not the action for certiorari and prohibition commenced by the petitioners in the RTC
was a proper recourse of the petitioners.
Ruling:
No. Based on the foregoing, certiorari did not lie against the Sangguniang Panglungsod, which
was not a part of the Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and
enforceable rights when it adopted Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making body
declaring its sentiment or opinion.
The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that prohibition was not available to the petitioners
as a remedy against the adoption of Resolution No. 552, for the Sangguniang Panglungsod, by
such adoption, was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but only
expressing its collective sentiment or opinion.
To demonstrate the absence of abuse of discretion, it is well to differentiate between a

resolution and an ordinance. The first is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while the
latter is a law that is permanent in character. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from
a resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in the
light of attendant circumstances. In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the
resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of all
gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally protected right.
A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may
delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may
therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress
and subject to the latter’s control and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power
or in other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the
power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise.
We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary
for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members.
The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for
expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing
the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed
no reversible error in affirming the trial court’s Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit.
In view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance authorizing and providing for the
expropriation, the petition for certiorari filed in the RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of
action.

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Ignacio, Rudy Jr.

G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners,

On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution

To demonstrate the absence of abuse of discretion, it is well to differentiate between a

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