Madeja Vs Caro

G.R. No.
L-51183 December 21, 1983
CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.
a. CRIME - homicide through reckless imprudence
b. ISSUE – Whether or not a civil action may be filed independent of a criminal action.
c. RULING - Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil
Code is the applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted herein below: Sec. 2.
Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."
(Rule 111, Rules of Court.) Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,) There are at least two things about
Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely: 1. The civil action for damages which
it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto -
This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and
"criminal prosecution. The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow
the citizen to enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the
State attorney. In a criminal prosecution, while the State is the complainant in the criminal case,
the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He
should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. GR:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced,
no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted.
d. IMPORTANT FACTS - An information for homicide through reckless imprudence for the
death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy was filed by the widow of the deceased, Carmen
L. Madeja, against Dr. Eva A. Japson in the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar.
The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a
separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.) While the criminal case still pending, Carmen
L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil Case in the same court alleging that her
husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. Japzon filed a motion to dismiss
which was granted by Judge Felix Caro invoking Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but
after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
e. CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED - According to the respondent judge, "under the

foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted
only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."
d. CONTENTION OF THE STATE - Article 33, CC creates an exception to this rule when the
offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries. In these cases, a civil action may be filed
independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured
party. The law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not given the right
to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action
has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the result of the civil
action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.]) 2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense.
It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not
only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. The Article in
question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are
used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code
using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and
fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the
Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that
the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in
the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used
terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense. Therefore, the
term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical
injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

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G.R. No.

L-51183 December 21, 1983

CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,

a. CRIME - homicide through reckless imprudence

e. CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED - According to the respondent judge, "under the

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