Case 3:16-cv-00489-CWR-BWR Document 237 Filed 12/02/22 Page 1 of 13

____________________

No. 3:16-CV-489-CWR-BWR

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.
HINDS COUNTY, ET AL.
Defendants.
____________________

ORDER DENYING STAY

____________________

Before CARLTON W. REEVES, District Judge.

Hinds County, Mississippi and Sheriff Tyree Jones
(collectively, “the County”) have filed a Motion to Stay
Receiver Orders Pending Appeal. Docket No. 227. The United
States opposes relief. Docket No. 231. On review, the motion
will be denied.
I. Introduction
It’s been a long year of litigation. And after nearly 10 years of
investigation into the conditions at Hinds County’s Raymond
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Detention Center (RDC), one might say it’s been a long

decade, too.1
The Court saga started on June 23, 2016, when the United
States filed this lawsuit to end unconstitutional conditions of
confinement at RDC and two other facilities that comprise the
Hinds County jail system. The parties immediately entered
into a freely negotiated Consent Decree – and later, a
Stipulated Order – to correct the problems.
The County’s efforts to transform one of the facilities (the
Work Center) into a functional jail for the citizens of Hinds
County was eventually realized. But the story was not the
same at RDC.
Despite promises to comply with the Consent Decree, the
County continually failed to follow its provisions. Conditions
at RDC remained fundamentally unchanged. So, in
November 2021, after a record seven in-custody deaths in that
year, with the most recent death having occurred October 18,
the Court issued an Order to Show Cause directing the
County to “explain why it should not be held in civil
contempt and why a receivership should not be created to
operate RDC.” Docket No. 100.
The County responded with more promises. This time, it
vowed to correct the unconstitutional conditions of
confinement at RDC if only the Court would extend the
compliance deadline to July 1, 2022. See Docket No. 105 at 5.
Quoting Robert Frost, the County declared “we ‘have
promises to keep and miles to go before we sleep.’” Id. at 4.

1If this has been a long year for the lawyers involved in this case, imagine
how difficult a year it has been for the detainees living in RDC’s A-Pod.

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The County recorded zero miles on its journey. Rather than

work to remedy the situation at RDC, the County moved to
terminate or modify the Consent Decree under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). And while it slept, RDC
continued to register assaults, fires, and other imminent risks
of physical danger to the innocent detainees housed there.
Consequently, the Court issued its First Order of Contempt
and identified “more than two dozen provisions [of the
Consent Decree] where the County was non-compliant with
a Court Order.” Docket No. 126.
On February 14, 2022, the parties commenced a two-week
trial regarding the appropriate remedy for the finding of
contempt against the County, and to address the County’s
PLRA motion. The United States urged for appointment of a
Receiver, arguing that “[c]ontinuing remedial efforts short of
a receivership will only lead to further confrontation, delay,
and serious harm to the people confined to the Jail.” Docket
No. 138 at 89. Taking the opposite position, the County
contended that the Consent Decree should be “terminated
and dissolved in its entirety.” Docket No. 140 at 29.
After the February 2022 proceedings, the Court again found
the County in contempt. Docket No. 165. The Second Order
of Contempt centered on the County’s decision to house
detainees in A-Pod, in violation of the Stipulated Order. See
Docket No. 165. The Order emphasized that “[i]mposition of
‘an appropriate sanction for that contempt’ is again reserved
pending the PLRA termination motion.’” Id. at 18 (citing
Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford Enters., 826 F.2d 392, 398 (5th
Cir. 1987) (collecting cases)).
Next came the Court’s Order on the PLRA motion. In April,
the County’s motion to modify or terminate was substantially

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granted. Docket No. 168. This Order revised the Consent

Decree, excising those provisions that exceeded the
constitutional minimum, and collecting the necessary
remainder into a New Injunction. See Docket No. 169. The
New Injunction removed the Work Center from the scope of
remedial relief and dramatically scaled back the provisions
applicable to RDC.
The County asked the Court to reconsider that Order. Docket
No. 171. The United States opposed reconsideration. Docket
No. 176.
Having given the County until July 1, 2022 to purge itself of
contempt, per the County’s request, the Court held a final
mitigation hearing on July 19, 2022. The Court invited the
County to argue its motion for reconsideration and welcomed
any evidence that would ameliorate its record of non-
compliance. After the better half of a day, the parties rested.
On July 29, 2022, the Court determined that a Receiver was
warranted to operate RDC and remedy its ongoing
unconstitutional conditions. Docket No. 204. The parties then
submitted to the Court names of potential Receivers.
On October 31, 2022, after weighing the candidates’
professional experience, the Court appointed Wendell M.
France, Sr., a member of the National Institute of Corrections
and American Correctional Association, to be Receiver.
Docket No. 215. In a separate Order issued that same day,
after weighing the parties submissions, Docket Nos. 209 and
210, the Court outlined the scope of the Receiver’s Duties and
Responsibilities. Docket No. 216. The Court noted that Mr.
France would begin his transition into the receivership on
November 1, 2022 by cultivating relationships with County

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officials and developing a draft Plan of Action to achieve

constitutional conditions of compliance with the Court’s
Orders. To effectuate a smooth transition, the Receiver’s
operational control over RDC would not take effect until
January 1, 2023.
The present Motion to Stay followed.
II. Law
“A stay is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of
administration and judicial review, and accordingly is not a
matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise
result to the appellant.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Texas
Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389, 397 (5th Cir. 2020).
Whether to grant a stay is “left to the court’s discretion,” and
“is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.”
Nken, 556 U.S. at 433. “The party requesting a stay bears the
burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise
of that discretion.” Id. at 433-34.
When exercising this discretion, courts look to four factors:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the
merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the
other parties interested in the proceeding; and
(4) where the public interest lies.
Id. (citation omitted); accord E.T. v. Paxton, 19 F.4th 760, 764
(5th Cir. 2021) (citing Nken in noting that the “the factors we
consider in determining whether to grant a stay are by now
axiomatic.”).

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III. Discussion
A. Success on the Merits
Under the traditional four-factor test, the movant must first
demonstrate a strong showing of likelihood of success on the
merits. The County advances several arguments in this
portion of its stay application.
First, the County contends that the Receiver Orders exceed
the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard because
they are remedies for the violation of a now-inoperative
Consent Decree.
To determine whether a remedy is appropriate under the
PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard, the
question is not which governing Order appears most recently
on the docket. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Rather, the
question is whether the remedy is “necessary, narrowly
drawn, and extend[s] no further than necessary to correct
ongoing constitutional violations.” See Docket No. 168.
The County implies that unconstitutional conditions of
confinement at RDC ceased once the Court replaced the
Consent Decree with the New Injunction. And because the
New Injunction became the operative order, the County
contends, any violation of the Consent Decree is now moot.
The County further argues that the Court’s analysis of the
Plata factors was deficient. The County’s reasoning assumes
two premises. First, that the Consent Decree and New
Injunction are two entirely distinct Orders outlining uniquely
drawn provisions to ensure constitutional compliance at
RDC. And second, that the erasure of the Consent Decree
marks a new beginning and thus absolves the County of any
alleged violations concerning either Order.

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Both premises are flawed.

Though different in name, the New Injunction is a
substantially pared down version of the Consent Decree. The
Consent Decree contained 167 provisions; the New Injunction
contains just 33 – all of which can be directly traced back to
their original place in the Consent Decree itself. With
congruence in mind, the Court arrived at the New Injunction
by eliminating many of the Consent Decree provisions it
found exceeded the constitutional minimum. For example,
the New Injunction reduced the requirements imposed on the
County from 64 pages to 10 pages and removed the Work
Center and Henley-Young facilities from judicial oversight.
Docket No. 169.
There is an obvious through-line between the County’s failure
to comply with the constitutional minimums in the Consent
Decree and its failure to comply with the constitutional
minimums in the New Injunction. Consider, as an example,
the problem of inadequate staffing at RDC.
Paragraph 42 of the Consent Decree required the County to
“[e]nsure that the Jail has sufficient staffing to adequately
supervise prisoners, fulfill the terms of this Agreement, and
allow for the safe operation of the Jail.” Docket No. 126 at 20.
The County was non-compliant with this critical requirement.
Id.
The New Injunction contains the exact same requirement. See
Docket No. 169 at 2. Yet, as the Court has emphasized, the
County continues to be non-compliant with this provision. See
Docket No. 204 at 9-10 (”[S]ince the release of the Thirteenth
Monitoring Report, the number of staff members has steadily
decreased. In fact, the current staffing levels are the lowest

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they have ever been. . . . The staffing crisis affects nearly every
facet of operations at RDC.”). The below chart illustrates the
declining trajectory – a trajectory, it is worth mentioning, that
has occurred under the present County leadership:

Jail System Staffing Over Time

500

400

300

200 Staff Needed

Staff in Place
100

0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Monitoring Report

This is not a situation where the Court imposed new

conditions on the County, only to then measure its efforts to
comply using an entirely different metric. Rather, the Court’s
decision to impose a receivership stems from a long timeline
of worsening Constitutional violations. See Depriest v. Walnut
Grove Corr. Auth., No. 3:10-CV-663-CWR-FKB, 2015 WL
3795020, at *12 (S.D. Miss. June 10, 2015) (highlighting that the
inquiry into whether violations are “current and ongoing” for
remedial purposes under the PLRA do not exist in a temporal
vacuum). That timeline only codifies the County’s failure to
comply with the 2016 Consent Decree, including with
provisions retained in the New Injunction, and the 2020
Stipulated Order. It also paints a familiar picture: that the
County is not determined to correct the ongoing
constitutional harms at RDC.

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The record in its entirety, coupled with the current and

ongoing constitutional violations at RDC, render it less than
likely that the County will prevail on the merits. This factor
does not weigh in favor of issuing a stay.
B. Irreparable Injury to the County
The County next contends that it will suffer irreparable harm
because the Receiver will remove “all of the County’s
authority and fiscal control over RDC and vests it in the
Receiver.” Docket No. 228. Invoking George Orwell’s 1984,
the County hypothesizes that the Receivership could impose
financial burdens on “limited County funds,” “bankrupt the
County,” “force the County to defund” other legitimate
programs, “or raise taxes.” Docket Nos. 228 and 234.
The County cleverly glosses over several “checks and
balances” designed to ensure a reciprocal working
relationship between the Receiver, the County, and the Court.
These checks include but are not limited to: 1) “the Receiver’s
budget, staff compensation, staff terms of service, and other
significant financial agreements subject to approval by the
Court before they may take effect”; 2) the Receiver shall send
the draft and final Plan of Action designed to achieve
constitutional conditions of confinement “to the parties for
comment”; and 3) the Court’s recognition that because the
Receiver position is “significant in its scope and dimension,”
the Receiver’s Duties and Responsibilities “may be modified”
as necessary from time to time in accordance with federal law,
“including by motion of the parties or at the Receiver’s
written request.” Docket No. 216.
Each of the above provisions was deliberately crafted by the
Court with the twin goals of 1) ensuring that the County’s

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voice, as representatives of the people, was not lost and 2)

ensuring meaningful opportunities for the County to contest
the Receiver’s decisions when it disagrees. The appointment
of a Receiver, bestowed with tailored powers to remedy the
ongoing unconstitutional harms at RDC, does not cast the
County a phantom in its ability to exercise its own powers and
meaningfully voice its concerns. The County is and will
remain an active player, whose involvement and commitment
to remedying the unconstitutional conditions at RDC is
necessary to compliance.
Furthermore, the County’s doomsday prediction that the
receivership will impose extreme financial burdens on the
County is premature. The Receiver is developing a draft Plan
of Action to achieve Constitutional conditions of compliance.
That draft has not yet been circulated to the parties.
Consequently, the parties have not yet had the opportunity to
provide any comment or feedback on Mr. France’s draft plan.
With no information related to the Receiver’s projected initial
operating fund, no information related to RDC’s projected
annual budget, and no information related to any proposed
interim measure to improve the conditions of confinement at
RDC, the County’s fears are mere theoretical assertions not
supported by any evidence in the record. That the County
may incur financial burdens because the Court has appointed
a Receiver to oversee the operations at RDC fails to satisfy the
second factor.
C. Injury to Interested Parties and the Public Interest
What remains are the third and fourth factors of the
traditional stay inquiry: assessing the harm to interested
parties and weighing the public interest. Because the United

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States is the party opposing the stay, these factors are merged.
See Nken, 556 U.S. at 435.
Focusing on injury to others, the County contends that
because the United States is the only plaintiff, and “individual
relief is not at issue,” a stay will not injure the United States.
But the County fails to understand that the United States,
acting in its official capacity, represents both the public
interest and the ongoing harm endured by incarcerated
persons that would flow from the delay of the Receivership.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq.; Docket No. 231. Detainees at RDC
are persons presumed to be innocent. Unless the County is
held accountable, those persons will only continue to suffer
substantial harm. Pretrial detainees should not be left to
endure such dangerous conditions at RDC, including serious
bodily harm, assault, and even death as they await the
disposition of their charges.
Next, the County argues that the Receiver’s “carte blanche”
authority over RDC is contrary to the public interest because
the Receiver is not accountable to the people of Hinds County.
The County fails to recognize its own lack of accountability to
the people of Hinds County. In June 2016, detainees Malcolm
Landfair and Gerome Moore escaped using a hole they made
in the wall of a jail cell at RDC. In March 2019, detainees
Marcell Martin and John William Gray escaped from RDC
through a crawl space. And just this past month, detainee
Preston Hart escaped from a RDC courtroom after being
given access to an unsecured area at the facility. To the
County, these escapes are merely the result of inadequate
staffing. But to the people of Hinds County, every escape
poses a real and substantial threat to public safety.

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There is another element to the public interest that the County

has not considered. In this case, a Receiver will provide more
stability and accountability for the people of Hinds County,
rather than less. In recent memory alone, the County has
cycled through County Administrators Carmen Davis,
Jennifer Riley-Collins, Scherrie Prince, and now Kenny
Wayne Jones. Docket No. 168 at 16. The Jail Administrator
position has passed from Mary Rushing, to Ric Fielder, to Kat
Bryan, to Anthony Simon, to Frank Shaw, and now back to
Anthony Simon. It should not be overlooked that the
problems have been systemic and have not been cured by any
sheriff, whether elected or appointed. The Board of
Supervisors, meanwhile, cannot even decide who its own
President is.
The County plainly has a strong interest in the administration
of jails. But the County has shown a clear lack of urgency and
competency since this action was initiated in 2016. And there
is no indication that the County, if left to its own devices, will
remedy the ongoing constitutional harms at RDC anytime
soon.
IV. Conclusion
Again, “[a] stay is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of
administration and judicial review, and accordingly is not a
matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise
result to the appellant.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 427 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Hinds County has not
met the high standard necessary to secure such extraordinary
relief.

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For the foregoing reasons, the County’s Motion to Stay is

denied.
SO ORDERED, this the 2nd day of December, 2022.
s/ CARLTON W. REEVES
United States District Judge

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