The Italian Parlamentary Form of Government: A Review Essay

The most important political job for the “legislature” in parliamentary system is thus not
legislating at all, but making and breaking governments (Laver, 2006 pp. 122)

Bismarck J. Arevilca Vasquez1

I.- Introduction

The relationship of parliament to government is fundamental to each political system. In the case of
Europe, the parliamentary form of government is the norm in most of western european
democracies (Norton, 1998; Blondel, 2005; Laver, 2006). Governments derive their legitimacy from
parliamentary elections.

In this essay, we aim to understand the performance of Italian parliamentary form of government
and especially the relations between Parliament and the executive in order to understand the
stability/instability in the political system. The essay preceeds as follows. In the next section, we
define some important concepts of the form of the state and form of government. Section III we
confront the Westminster vs the Western European parliamentary systems and explores in some
details the last one. Then we analyze the Italian parliamentary systems in detail. We, here, include
the function of the parliament especially on the Comittees and the fragmentation and how this
influence in the stability of the political system. Finally in Section IV presents the main
conclusions.

II.- Form of the State and Form of Government: Concepts and Definitions

According to Max Weber a form historically determined of organization of the power or the
structures of the authority holds the legitime monopoly2 of the physical constraint. In other terms,
the State <modern> it is characterized for the political monopoly, for which he can also speak of an
identity between the State and the political one. (Matteuci, 2005 pp. 9)

The term State, in his ancient meaning of imperium or modern of dominion (Herrschaft), it makes
only road in Five hundred and it affirms with extreme slowness. In the political language it initially
spoke of status publicus or of status rei publicae, where the word at times status meant the condition
of the republic, others the constitution, other still the form of government or the species politiae
(status regalis, optimatorum, popularis; is regal, of few popular). (Matteucci, 2005 pp. 23)

The State differentiates from other forms of organization of the power3, for example the Greek Polis
not only for the extension of their own territory, but also because the direct democracy of the
ancient ones didn't know that weak and exiles vertical structures of power. For Amato (2006), State
is the feudal arrangement, Absolute State, Liberal State, Fascist State, Socialist and Democrat-
social State. So, when we analyze the State we have to see from the historical context and the way
how the functions of law are exercized. This basically are : a) the repression of the socially
dangerous behaviors; b) the allocation of good and services ; c) the institution and the allocation of
the public powers and finally d) the rights and the liberties of the guaranteed citizens to forehead of
all this.

1 Email. bismarck.arevilca@gmail.com
2 Questo monopolio viene escercitato attraverso procedure e mezzi razzionali : da un lato il diritto, che stabilisce
norme astrate, generali e impersonali, per evitare ogni forma di arbitrarioe, dall'altro, un'amministrazione
burocratica, basata sulla gerarchia e sulla professionalità : tutto questo garantisce la legalità, cioè l'obiettività e la
prevedibilità del proceso politico-amministrativo. (Matteucci, 2005)
3 It differences from the Res publica romana, whose government was constituted by a multiplicity of collegial
magistracies with specific assignments, limited in the time, free and responsible, with guarantees for the citizen
offered by provocatio ad populum.
Following this idea the form of the state is “the resultant of the ways and the aspects in which the
four functions of the right manifest it, on break down in some general historical reasons that turns
at times they determine it” (Amato, 2006 pp. 13). In the other hand, Form of Government is “a
typology of the institutional organizations, relative not to everybody, but to an alone of the
functions of the law, especially, that of the institution and of the allocation of the public powers..”.
The notion of Form of Government4, their constituent elements are the supreme organs of the State
and the relationship between them, in relation to the allocation of political power.

With basic but important concepts we can distinguish the typologies and the different classification
for example: constitutional monarchy and parliamentary government; the assembly government,
cabinet and presidential government5; we can speak besides of forms of government moniste and
the dualists form. (Amato, 2006 pp. 15). Motta, Della Porta and Morlino (2001) tried to
differentiate the diverse form of models of democracy based on Lijphart (1984; 1999) they focus
the attention on two important principles: the majoritarian and the consensual principle. This two
type of institutional models are characterized by converge towards the concentration of political
power in the majority and the second one converged in the diffusions and distribution of power.

III.- Westminster vs Western European Parliamentary Model

Parliamentary systems usually have a clear differentiation between the head of government and the
head of state, with the head of government being the prime minister6 or premier, and the head of
state often a President (elected either popularly or by the parliament, Parliamentary government) or
a hereditary monarch represented by the King, in the case of constitutional monarchy.7
In the case of Parliamentary government, there are two types of vote in the legislature – the
confidence/no confidence vote8 and the investiture vote. The rules of parliamentary government
mean that any incoming government is immediately exposed to an implicit motion of no
confidence. (Laver, 2006)

It is important to highlight that is in the division of powers (legislative actions9, government actions,
judicial function) where the birth of the form of government born (Amato, 2006). For example in
the case of England after the phase of absolute monarchy began to be organized in parliamentary
groups that creates a political force that opposite the King's power. Amato (2006) defines this
phenomenon as the “political homogeneity between government and parliamentary majority”,
which gives place to the beginning of the vote of trust in the House of Commons10. This model is
4 It is also important to differentiate the form of government and the political system, the former one includes all the
subjects that organize social interest, for instance also do the mediation and compensation in the social interest
groups.
5 According to some scholars, presidential system characterized by a legislature and an executive structurally
independent of each other is a guarantee of policy-making inefficiency and politically unstable. Others believe that it
depends more on the presence of a majority party. In the case of no majority and a fragile governing coalition the
introduction of a semi-presidential government may enhance policy-making efficiency. (Mezey, 2005)
6 In Rose (2005) explained the different abilities between the Prime Ministers and Presidents comparing with different
countries experience. Two relevant criteria for comparing the careers of national leaders are: previous experience of
government, and previous experience of party and mass electoral politics. Rose (2005) put the example of the
American presidents who are experience in political campaigns for mass support in confront to French presidents
that are more prior knowledge of government experience. In the case of British prime ministers are a mix of both.
7 Scholars like Arend Lijphart divide parliamentary democracies into two different systems, the Westminster and
Consensus systems (Lijphart 1999 cited by Wikipedia)
8 If such a provision is not in the constitution, then the country concerned does not have a parliamentary government
system (Laver, 2006 pp. 122).
9 The notion of “legislature” is thus located firmly in the classical view of a separation of powers between legislature,
executive and judiciary (Laver, 2006).
10 It is the attenuation in the King's political power that the Prime Minister's figure, as mediator arises between the
House of the Common and the Government. This effect generates a change at level in government's way, passing
defined as Westminster, and is usually found in Commonwealth of Nations countries. These
parliaments tend to have a more adversarial style of debate and the plenary session of parliament
is more important than committees. Some parliaments in this model are elected using a plurality
voting system (first past the post), such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and India, while others use
proportional representation, such as Ireland and New Zealand. (see Cotta, Della Porta and Morlino,
2001).

III.1.- Western European Parliaments in Comparative Perspective

Using Lijphart (1994) definition, the Consensual Model are governments form by more parties and
big coalitions; equilibrium of power between the executive and the legislative; multy-party system;
proportional electoral system; concertate interest system and neo-corporativism; decentralization
and federalism; strong bicameralism and minority representation; rigid constituency and power of
veto for minority; constitutional control; Central bank independence. Within this typology are the
so-called “Western European parliamentary model” (e.g., Spain, Germany). Also is important to
cited the Hybrid Model, the semi-presidential system, drawing on both presidential systems and
parliamentary systems, famous especially with the beginning of the French Fifth Republic11.
Most of the old problems have dissapear in western european cabinet but new ones emerged in the
1960s and 1970s. (Blondel, 2005)12. In most of the Constitutions there is no specific text about the
structure and the operations of the executive. In terms of Blondel (2005), “constitutions at best
recognise a problem rather that provide a solution”. Following Blondel and Battegazzore (2003) we
present the four types of parliamentary democracies: “these are a “bare majority
adversarial”quadrant, a “bare majority cooperative” quadrant, a “large majority adversarial”
quadrant and a “large majority cooperative” quadrant”13. (see Figure N°1).

Source: Blondel and Battegazzore (2003 pp.10)

from a Constitutional Monarchy to a Parliamentary Government. (Amato, 2006)

11 Most of the studies refers the Fifth French Republic as a mixed form of parliamentarianism and presidentialism but
according to Lijphart (1994) is only an alternated model depending if the president's party have the majority in the
parliament.
12 a) the size, when the cabinets become from more and more members it is difficult that they can take decisions in a
truly collective manner. b) the role of the Primer Ministers, whose status has been felt to contribute to a demotion of
other cabinet members. c) there have been misgivings about the rate at which the turnover of ministers has
weakened their ability to be effective heads of their departments. d) the competence of ministers as managers of
very large organisations which often deal with highly technical issues
13 “the first of these quadrants corresponds to what might be referred to as “true Westminster” parliamentary
governments. The second corresponds to governments, such as those of Scandinavia, of Finland in most cases, and to an
extent of Germany, in which the “bloc” in power does attempt (or has) to build a degree of consensual arrangement
with the forces of the opposition. The third and the fourth quadrants correspond to what are usually referred to as
“consociational” governments: power-sharing is substantial but, in one case, there is a posture of imposition on the part
of those in power, while in the second, the mode is at least more cooperative. Belgium, pre 1992 Italy and Austria,
especially after 1986, are typically regarded as examples of the first of these two “consociational” types, while the
Netherlands is typically regarded as corresponding to the second. One can therefore see that consociational
governments are indeed part of a sub-set which has its place in the model” (Blondel and Battegazzore 2003, pp. 9-10)
The increased size of cabinets is perphaps the most obvious development of the last decades, and
also it has contributed to change the nature of government meetings and the organisation of the
cabinet. According to Blondel (2005) the members of the cabinet has stabilized as a consequence of
the reduction of the collegiality. Eventhought Primer Ministers have become a central element in
the cabinet system, their influence to decide in many political issues are limited. Another important
aspect is the Cabinet life which is affected by the way the government relates to the main actors –
parliament, the parties, the groups and the bucreaucracy- of the political system. The role of the
parliaments differs between countries. It is the role of the parties through the parliament that
determines if a government can continue or not. (Mezey, 2005)

The strenght of a nation's political party system is the key variable explaining the prominence of its
legislature. In the case of Eastern and Central Europe these are single-party systems and therefore a
minimal legislature with virtually no autonomy existed. (Mezey, 2005). In the case of two-party
systems – post-war period in the United Kingdom and Scandinavia- these legislatures are certainly
more autonomous than minimal legislatures. When there is the multi-party systems, with no party
holding a majority in the legislature, parliamentary prominence inevitably increases, for example
the postwar Italy. No matter how many parties are functioning, when party discipline decreases, the
power of the legislature increases.

The connection between changes in the party system and the enhanced prominence of parliament is
evident in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In these countries they moved from majority to minority
governments, they experience increases in virtually every indicator of legislative activity. In Great
Britain, parliamentary activity has increased comparing the 1980s with the 1970s. The Netherlands
in the 1970s but some scholars also believe that the activity has increased but that the parliament
continues to have no real influence. In the Spanish parliament after the end of Franco period and
finally in Austria, “ the parliaments groups have become less disciplined and that the parliament
itself has achieved greater importance in the policy making process”. However, the deterioration of
party power and the consequence enhancement of legislative power has not been uniform across
Europe.

III.- Parliament, Committee System and Stability: The Case of Italy

Parliament becomes central in a decision-making system in contemporary Italy14. According to

Cotta, Mastropaolo and Verzechelli (2000) the Italian parlamentary history started in 1848, thirteen
years before the creation of the Kingdom of Italy15. Based on the Republican constitution of 194816,
established a system of two chambers (Camera dei Deputati and Senato) - both directly elected and
with the same powers – and the reintroduction of proportional representation (PR) system for both
chambers and lasted until 1993 when a mixed plurality and PR system (for 75% and 25% of the
seats respectively) was adopted17.

14 The Parliament of Italy ( Parlamento Italiano) is the national parliament of Italy. It is a bicameral legislature with
946 elected members (parlamentari). The Chamber of Deputies, with 630 members (deputati) is the lower house.
The Senate of the Republic is the upper house and has 315 members (senatori).
15 The Constitution was granted by the Kingdom of Sardinia covering regional states: Piedmont, Savoy, Genoa and the
Island of Sardinia. (for a historical point of view about the parliamentary elite transformation, see Cotta,
Mastropaolo and Verzichelli 2000)
16 The Constituent Assembly (CA), which drafted the constitution for the republic in 1946-1947, was characterized by
an agreement that post-war reconstruction include a democratic constitutional order that would prove durable and
prevent a return of fascism.
17 The Constitution of a country will stipulate the relationship between the different parts of the political system at both
the horizontal level (presidential vs parliamentary system) and vertical level (federal vs unitary state). It also
determine the form of the legislature (unicameral or bicameral), the type of electoral system, the method of election
(secret or open ballot etc.), the extent of election (one or both chambers, the president alone or the president,
vicepresident and other officers), and the role of judicial branch. (Norton 1998 pp. 6)
Comparing to other public institutions the Italian Parliament have a privileged position not only
from the administrative point of view - both Chambers are free to organize their own internal
layout- but also in terms of budget and salaries 18 (see table 1). Verzechelli (2004) showed that in
1992, the percentage of parliamentary newcomers increased to its highest rate since the first
democratic election following the end of the Second World War. However when he analyzed the
elite profile – 2001 elections – it seems that the political expertise returned to the levels of the early
1980s19.
Table N°1

Source: Capano and Giuliani (2004)

According to Della Sala (1998), externals factors created the opportunity for the legislature to
emerge as a central decision-making site in the 1970s20. Capano and Giuliani (2004) pointed out the
necessity of reform this important institution as a cause of its “assemblearism and fragmentation,
together with the interna corporis, have been amongst the major factors perceived as underlying the
immobility of the first 40 years of the Italian Republic”. Its important to hightlight that after the
Fascist period, the Constitution tried to promote the “garantismo” and give more strong decision-
making capacities in italian terms “decisionismo”.

But as we are going to explore in advanced, the reality between the written constitution and the real
one was different21. Della Sala described this phenomenon as the “incomplete democracy”
especially until the mid-1970s. The pressure for the diffusion of power rose with the mounting
social tensions and political instability22. Capano and Giuliani (2004) evaluated the function of
parliament based on Bagelot's four functions: a) the electoral function ; b) the oversight function, c)
the expressive function, d) legislative function.

When we analyzed the electoral function has not changed very much - the average needed to set up
a government were 44, 26 and 39 days- despite the different context. The implicit assumption is that
the efficiency of the parliamentary electoral function is higher the more it contributes to a rapid
selection of a lasting government. Another important issue is the duration of the government. Using
an index23 Capano and Giuliani (2004) stated that the first eight legislatures normally scored

18 This include the recruitment, selection and pay of staff. This indipendence can explained why the salaries of
parliament staff are about 30 per cent higher than those of other public service employees. Capano and Giuliani (),
pointed out that the more than the 66 per cent of the total annual budget for the Chamber and 72 per cent for the
Senate goes just to expenditure on personnel. Moreover, if we can measure as a percentage of the total public
expenditures it is shown that this has increased from 0.38 in 1979 to 0.69 per cent by 2001. In the case of the
Chamber from 0.79 per cent in 1979 to 1.74 per cent in 2001.
19 “ all novice politicians who emerged during the transitional phase were quickly replaced by more experienced
people.. After the 2001 elections, about 70 per cent of deputies and senators were former members of (at least) one
the parties from the First Republic“ (Verzechelli, 2004 pp. 45)
20 For Norton (1998) the most important variables are : cultural, constitutional and political.
21 The Constitution moves toward to a majoritarian direction and there were some attempts to change the electoral law
in 1953.
22 The implementation of regional governments and referenda, and to changes in parliamentary rules in 1971 that
aimed to diffuse political power and favoured a more consensual approach to decision-making.
23 This is calculating the ratio of their actual duration to the respective maximum potential which means that 100 per
between ten per cent and 30 per cent24.

Another important funcion is the Oversight . This has increased – until the mid-1980s, Mps adopted
30-40.000 oversight act each legislature- in the 1990s exceeded the level of 50.000 for the first
time. However as Capano and Giuliani (2004) explained us “.. what grew most was the use of
questions requiring a written answer, one of the weakest instruments of control, whereas most
control and guidance methods followed the same pattern”. Finally the expressive function is the
most important function because parliament represents more than legislation and accountability to
the government. What reveals the data is that people in Italy doesn't trust in the parliament and this
double the european average of discontent.

III.1.-Parliament's role in the legislative process: The case of the Committees

In order to understand parliament's capacity – in terms of Jean Blondel “viscosity of legislatures” -

to remain as central site in decision-making one must take into consideration legislative activity,
especially the work of legislative committee. Since 1948 there is no significant change in the
structure of the permanent committees. (Della Sala, 1998)25. The committee are asked to assume
most of the functions normally assigned to legislatures: scrutiny of legislation, deliberation and
approval of legislation, and oversight of the executive. The committee must report back, in normal
circumstances, to the assembly within four months, within two months when the chamber has
claimed an emergency and within 15 days for decrees. It is important to note that the
multifunctional nature of the committees was only formally recognized with the 1971 reforms,
which allowed for oversight and investigative functions. (Della Sala, 1998 pp. 85).

The electoral system26 is one of the key variables to regulate the conduct of parties. (Norton, 1998).
The 1971 changes27 signaled to governments that they had lost control over the legislative
timetable; not only did government-sponsored bills not have any priority on the agenda, but the
executive was unable to control where and under which procedure its bills would be decided.
Governments now had to enter into negotiations with all parliamentary forces if they wanted to
place issues directly onto the agenda. Alternatively, they could resort to decrees, a power they had
under Article 77 of the Constitution28. It is until the early 1980s29 that were some changes in order to
return some control of the agenda to the government, or at least to the leadership offices in
parliament30. Capano and Giuliani (2004) suggested there were not radical modification31. In their
cent is equivalent to the whole five year legislative, while 50 per cent half and so on.
24 Craxi, in the Ninth legislature, attained the still unequalled record of 61 per cent, but then the indicator dropped to
13 per cent with Goria (Tenth legislature), 17 per cent (Amato, Eleventh) and 13 per cent (Berlusconi, Twelfth),
before moving to Prodi in the last legislature (49 per cent). (Capano and Giuliani, pp. 18)
25 In the first two legislature (1948-1958), the number of permanent committees was 11. This was raised to 14 in the
third legislature, and was to stay that way until the committees were organized in 1987 to the present total of 13.
(Della Sala, 1998 pp. 84)
26 For example the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, are believe to facilitate a two-party or predominant two-party
system. In the case of the proportional list system this encourages the multy-party competition.
27 The most important of these changes was Article 23 of the new parliamentary rules, which stated that the
parliamentary agenda would be determined by a unanimous vote in the capigruppo, the committee of representative
of all groups in parliament.
28 However the decrees expired if they were not converted in law within 60 days.
29 The most importants changes were the following: a) restrictions on speech times, b) power to select amendments
given to the speakers, c) power to decide on the planning of the agenda given to the speakers, d) introduction of
planning of the discussion time spent in the Chamber of the Deputies, e) Introduction of a special session to deal
with the budgetary law, f) drastic limitations to the use of the secret ballot.
30 The most important change, introduced in 1990, gave the President of the Chamber of Deputies the power to impose
a legislative timetable for up to three months if unanimity is not attainable among the capigruppi.
31 The reforms introduced still are not sufficient to make more effective parliament especially with regard to the
legislative process: a) real agenda power still lies in the hands of the parliamentary leaders and speakers. b) the basic
role of the specialised permanent committees has not been undermined. c) no restrictions to the presentation of
private member's bill have been introduced, d) government has not been furnished with adequate powers to lead the
words: “... 20 years of reform of internal procedures had proven incapable of substantially affecting
the historically rooted consensual style that characterizes parliamentary life”.

Table N° 2
What the date shows us is the stagnation of
parliament's legislative role in contra position
of governments.When the government party or
parties do not themselves control a
parliamentary majority, there is a “minority”
government32(Norton, 1998). This is reflected
by the steady decline of bills to law and the
increasing percentage of government
legislation that is approved is decree
legislation especially after the beginning of the
Sixth legislature (1972-76) as is show in the
table N°2. (Della Sala, 1998; Capano and
Giuliani, 2004).

Source: Capano and Giuliani (2004)

III.2,- Parliament's Fragmentation and Stability

One of the promises to implement the majority system was that it could bring more stability through
the party discipline. Pelizzo and Cooper (2002) characterized Italy as a country with legislative
stability with government instability. Their findings indicate that the relationship between
legislative and government stability is best seen as curvilinear.

In order to understand the parliament's stability one need to look what Verzechelli (2004) called
“..the nature of the partyness of parliamentary institutions”. In order to measure the fragmentation
of the legislative party system, he used the effective number of parliamentary groups. What the
results showed is the sharp increase of fragmentation between 1992 and 2001. During the twelfth
and thirteenth legislature (1994-2001), more than 20 per cent of the parliaments in both the Lower
Chamber and the Senate shifted from one group to another or were forced to dissolve their group
because the desertion of other members had reduced the number of affiliates below the legal
minimum. Verzechelli (2004) stated some factors of the increasing fragmentation: a) the traditional
concentration of seats in the hands of the two major parties had been seriously challenged. b)
materialization of some small parliamentary players challenging the traditional structure of the
legislative party system.

IV.- Conclusions

In order to understand contemporary Italy, one needs to understand the role of the parliament. As we
see along the essay the relationship between parliament and the government is not a love story, in
spite of significant changes in the electoral system in order to give more stability to the political
system. However, these changes can be explained also some how to the the European Union as is
explained by Della Sala (1998 pp 82), “ the most important factors that has helped shift the balance
towards system effectiveness and away from garantismo in Italy's “democratic dilemma” has been

discussion, e) the amendment system is still unbalanced in favour of Mps with respect to government.
32 When no single party commads a parliamentary majority, any government must nonetheless rely on a majority
legislative support coalition in order to win votes of confidence.
European Integration”.

It seems that Italy's system of proportional representation contributed to the fragmentation of

representation within the legislature and secured access for a wide range of parties, while making it
difficult to find stable, cohesive parliamentary majorities.

The other important point to hightlight is the role of parliamentary parties who do not created clear
incentives to party discipline and therefore the results show us how the law-decrees become the
only tool that government used in order to aproved laws. In the case of the Committees these have
moved in the direction of greater emphasis on policy making and oversight, and their deliberative
role has been marginalized.

In order to instability there should be at least some conditions: a) further reform of the normative
concerning the electoral system, from a possible adjustment of the current mixed system. b) the
stabilization of the new party organizations and leaderships. c) the establishment of a new balance
between local politicians, interest groups and the national party elites.

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