Southern Luzon State

University Dual Training and

Livelihood Center Lucena Campus
Lucena City

PROF.
EDGARDO E. CEDEÑO
First Semester 2020-2021
 MODULE IN GEC 09 ETHICS
COURSE ORIENTATION
COURSE SYLLABUS
Southern Luzon State University
Dual Training and Livelihood
Center Lucena Campus
Lucena City

VISION STATEMENT
Southern Luzon State University as an excellent academic hub in its curricular
programs, transdisciplinary researches, and responsive extension services.

MISSION STATEMENT
The University commits to develop a sustained culture of delivering quality
service and undertaking continuous innovations in instruction, research and extension in
its relevant curricular programs supportive of national and global development goals.

GOALS
1. Center of teaching excellence.
2. Premier research university that generates S&T – based innovations.
3. Training institution that promotes gender-responsive climate-resilient and community-
driven development for all.
4. Wider platform for student and personnel development.
5. Facilities that support student learning enhancement and personnel’s healthy working
environment.
6. Strengthened local and international academe-industry and alumni linkages.

Core Values
Go God-loving
S Service-Oriented
L Leadership by Example
S Sustained Passion for Excellence
U Undiminished Commitment to Peace and Environmental Advocacy

General Education Objectives

The general education program primarily aims to enable graduates to assert their identities in
the community and the world amidst the forces of globalization. Specifically, it enables the
students to:
1. develop their identity as persons, conscious of their talents, rights and responsibilities
towards their selves and others;
2. allow them to discover a sense of awareness of their collective identity and contribute to
the development of Filipino society at local and national levels: and
3. create a global community, where they recognize and respect the fundamental humanity
 of all, respect and appreciate diversity, and care about the problems that affect the world

General Education Objectives Goals and

Objectives
1 2 3
1 Develop their identity as persons, conscious of their talents, rights and / / /
responsibilities towards theirselves and others
2 Allow them to discover a sense of awareness of their collective identity and / / /
contribute to the development of Filipino society at local and national levels
3 Create a global community, where they recognize and respect the / / /
fundamental humanity of all, respect and appreciate diversity, and care about
the problems that affect the world

COURSE SYLLABUS

1. Course Code: GEC09

2. Course Title: Ethics

3. Prerequisite: None

4. Co-requisite: None

5. Credit/Class Schedule:

6. Course Description: Principles of ethical behavior in modern society at the level of the
person, society and in interaction with the environment and other shared
resources.

7. General Education Outcomes and Relationship to General Education Objectives:

In consonance with the CHED’s requirements for general education, the following outcomes
are conceptualized, which are categorized as intellectual competencies, personal and civic
competencies and practical responsibilities:
General
General Education Outcomes Education
Objectives
1 2 3
A understand basic concepts across the domains of knowledge; / / /
 B apply different analytical modes (quantitative and qualitative, artistic / / /
and scientific, textual and visual, experimental, observation, etc.) in
tackling problems methodically;

C view the contemporary world from both Philippine and global / / /

perspective; and

D learn basic work-related skills and knowledge / / /

8. Course Objectives and Relationship to General Education Outcomes:

General
Education
Course Objectives Outcomes

a b c d

Describe and explain the fundamental

1. moral theories.

Learn how to apply a variety of decision

2. making based on the fundamental moral
theories.

Develop the sense of being moral and

3.
recognize the role of morality.

9. Course Outline and Timeframe

Week Topics
1-2 Preliminary Notions
a. Ethics
b. Value
c. Source of Authority

3-5 Virtue Ethics

a. Happiness and Ultimate Purpose
b. Virtue as Excellence
c. Moral Virtue and Mesotes

6 Preliminary Examination
7-8 Natural Law
a. Thomas Aquinas
b. The Greek Heritage
 c. The Essence and Varieties of Law
9-11 Deontology
a. Duty and Agency
b. Autonomy
c. Universalizability
12 Midterm Examination
13-15 Utilitarianism
a. The Principle of Utility
b. Principle of the Greatest Number

16-17 Synthesis: Making Informed Decisions

a. The Moral Agent and Contexts
b. Moral Deliberation
c. Self, Society and Environment
18 Final Examination
10. Suggested Readings and References:

Bulaong, O. et. al. (2018). Ethics: foundation of moral valuation. Manila: Rex Bookstore.

Gualdo, R., Placido, D., & Dagwasi, C. (2012). Ethics: basic concepts and contemporary
moral issues. Malabon City: Mutya Publishing House, Inc.

Mac Kinnon, B. (2012). Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues. (7th ed.). United
States of America: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.

Shafer-Landau, R. (2013). Ethical theory:an athology. (2nd ed.). United Kingdom: John
Wiley&Sons, Inc.

Thiroux, J. (2012). Ethics: theory and practice.(11th ed.). Engelewood Cliffs:

Prentice Hall.

11. Course Requirements:

a. Quizzes/ Examinations
b. Group and individual case analysis
c. Final Paper

12. Grading System:

Course work is weighted as

follows: Major Examination 30

%
Quizzes 15
%
Recitation 15
 %
Performance Outcome 40
%

100%

13. Classroom Policies:

1. Attendance is checked regularly (during online classes). Late comers will not be
admitted after 10 minutes (during online classes). This is due to the limitation of time
in this mode of teaching and learning.
2. Proper dress code should be observed during online classes.
3. Requirements for the subject should be submitted on time, unless there are
circumstances that may delay the submission. Online and offline submissions will be
accepted. Courier may also be used in the submission of requirements.
5. Students who are cheating or plagiarizing materials in the course will not receive
credit for the assignments, projects or tests, which will likely lead to failure in the course.
6. Students are not allowed to do any other activities (eating, sleeping, etc.) that
may distract the teacher and other students during online classes. In case of
emergency, kindly notify the teacher about the situation.

14. Consultation Hours:

Consultations will be scheduled upon meeting the students to determine the availability of
online resources.

15. Course Outcomes and Relationship to Course Objectives/General

Education Outcomes:

Student Outcomes Course General Education

At the end of the course the student must be Objectives Outcomes
able to: 1 2 3 a b c d
1. Differentiate between moral and
nonmoral problems
2 Describe what a moral experience is as
it happens in different levels of human
existence
3. Explain the influence of Filipino culture
on the way students look at moral
experiences and solve moral dilemmas
4. Describe the elements of moral
development and moral experience
5. Use ethical frameworks or principles to
analyze moral experiences
6. Make sound ethical judgments based
on principles, facts and stakeholders
affected
 7. Develop sensitivity to the common good
8. Understand and internalize the
principles of ethical behavior in modern
society at level of the person, society,
and in interaction with the environment
and other shared resources

COURSE OVERVIEW

This course will provide students an introduction to ethics. It will survey ethical theories
that some philosophers established as they tried to answer the questions: How do we
decide what is right action and what is not? How character affects decision making?
How do we measure the intrinsic rightness/wrongness of action? Can we determine
rightness/wrongness of action depending on the results of action? The course will
examine four of the major theories in ethics: Virtue Ethics, Natural Law Ethics,
Deontology and Utilitarianism.

COURSE STUDY SCHEDULE

1. Course Orientation Week 1

2. MODULE 1 – Preliminary Notion Week 1-2

3. MODULE 2 – Virtue Ethics Week 3-6

4. MODULE 3 – Natural Law Ethics Week 7-9

5. MODULE 4 – Deontology Week 10-12

6. MODULE 5 - Utilitarianism Week 13-16

7. Synthesis Week 17-18

COURSE GUIDE

Welcome to GEC09 Ethics. This course will focus on determining the rightness or wrongness of
action based on the four major theories in ethics: Virtue Ethics, Natural Law Theory, Deontology
and Utilitarianism. This section of the module will walk you through the structure of the course
so that you can maximize the experience. It will help you learn diligently and independently.
1. Read the module. Read it thoroughly. Read it over and over until you understand. Take
your time and don’t worry so much because this course is asynchronous.

2. Manage your time wisely. Be conscious of the study schedule. Be mindful of the
deadlines.

3. There are announcements, discussion and activities that will be posted, so check course
site, and group chat or text messages.

4. Before you start doing the tasks, read and be mindful of the assessment tool and the
instructions. Always aim for the highest standard. All your task must be submitted
typewritten.

5. Do not plagiarize. It is a crime you will be penalized. Do not copy and paste. Quote your
sources.

6. Lastly, if you have problems, questions and feedback don’t be shy to tell it to your course
facilitator. You can send it through our course site, through email:
ogadznei2030@gmail.com or through text: 0942393951. I will be available for your
queries every MWF 8:00-11:00 AM and TTH 1:00-4:00 PM
 MODULE 1: PRELIMINARY NOTIONS

This module makes you feel what ethics is about. The discussion starts
with the etymological definition of ethics. Major parts of this module are
dedicated to understanding what ethics is and what is not. Ethics talks about good and bad. But
you must remember not all good and bad are part of ethics. This module will help you make the
valuation of actions based on reason not based on emotion, legal, cultural, and religious claims.
In the latter part of the module, there are cases that you will analyze. It will make you feel what
ethics is. Lastly, follow the sequence of the module. Don’t skip.

OBJECTIVES: At the end of this module, you should be able to:

1. explain what ethics is;

2. differentiate ethics from technical, societal, and aesthetic and recognize what are ethical
problems;

3. apply the concepts on actual life experience from news, events, and everyday
experience.

ETHICS

Ethics etymologically comes from the Greek word ethos. It means custom, usage,
character. The Latin equivalent of ethos is mores which in turn is the etymological word of
“moral”, “morality”, “morals”. Many people tried to make distinctions on the words ethics and
morality. According to Bulaong, et al. (2017), the word morals may be used to refer to specific
beliefs or attitudes that people have to describe acts that people perform. An Individual’s
conduct is referred to as his morals, and if he falls short behaving properly, it is immoral. For
example: When a man returned a lost wallet to the owner, his action is considered moral. But
when a man kept the lost wallet and has no intention to return it to the owner, his action is
considered as immoral. On the other hand, Ethics can be spoken of as the discipline of studying
and understanding the ideal of human behavior and ideal ways of thinking. It could be
acceptable or unacceptable behavior or describe as ethical or unethical. This term is mostly
used on ways of behaving in a given field, this is popularly known as “professional ethics”
(Bulaong, et al, 2017). For example, a policeman arresting a man bribing him, the action is
considered as ethical. But if the policeman accepts the bribe and sets the man free, his action is
considered as unethical.
 The distinction between ethics and morals could clarify different dimensions of our lives.
But in our discussion, we will be using the terms ethical and moral interchangeably. According to
Reyes (2009), “ethics and morals are ordinarily used as equivalent terms in Western language
that refers to traditional manners, customs, habits, systems of values or character of the
community.”

Value

We can easily say that ethics is about what is good or bad actions, right or wrong,
acceptable or unacceptable. It is doing what is good and avoiding what is bad. In ethics, we are
putting a value on our actions. For example, An elected official helps the poor to battle the
pandemic that we are experiencing. We say that the value of his action is good. But an elected
official takes advantage of the situation by placing his relatives to be the first recipient of the
government’s social amelioration is valued to be as bad. Here we can see that the primary
concern of ethics is good and bad or right and wrong. But we must be able to clarify that not all
that is valued to be good and bad are part of ethics. For instance, Ben and Ben's songs are
good because of their vibe. The movie I watched is bad because of the storyline. It is right to dip
my fried chicken on the gravy. It is wrong to wear basketball shorts during formal events. In the
examples, we can see that there are valuations of what is good and bad or right and wrong.
However, the valuation is not part of ethics rather it is part of aesthetics. The word aesthetic
comes from the Greek word aesthesis which means sense or feeling. The judgments are based
on what we see, hear, smell, or taste. It is leaning towards our taste. When we talk about taste it
is subjective. Take this as an example, Pedro sports a neon pink socks and neon shorts. Many
will say it is not good because it was not good for our taste. The valuation of its goodness or
badness is more on personal aesthetic preference and it is not the case in ethics.

Besides aesthetics, there is another way we can value judgment on the goodness and
badness of actions and it is what we call etiquette. This is telling us what is proper to do in
specific situations. Take these examples: When a young boy talks to an elder, he say “po” or
“opo”. When we eat, we don’t talk when our mouth is full. These actions will receive our
approval. But if the bus is full and the young guy did not offer his seat to an old lady, it is
disgust. This will get our disapproval. Many people have a connotation that ethics and etiquette
are the same but they are not. Yes, etiquette is indeed concerned with what is right and wrong
actions but to a certain degree, it is not enough to be in parallel with ethics. Let us clarify it, we
may be displeased when somebody interrupts us when we are speaking (etiquette), and it will
be much of greater offense when this man starts to curse us and utter libelous words towards us
(ethics).

The technique is another thing that has the notion of good and bad or right and wrong but
is not part of ethics. Technique comes from the Greek word “techne” which means the proper
way of doing things. Take the example of cooking bacon, there is a technique when we cook
bacon. The proper way to cook it is by not putting oil in the pan. The bacon will produce its oil
and when we put oil the bacon will shrink. But it only makes sense in cooking and it does not
have any connection of whatever in ethics. Hence, it is not part of ethics.

Now it is clear that aesthetics, etiquette, and technique is not part of ethics. So, every
problem raised on aesthetics, etiquette, and technique cannot be considered as ethical
problems. When we see a person not dressing up properly for the occasion does not violate any
ethical norms because it is not an ethical problem. Same as when a person barges into one’s
room without knocking is not an ethical problem. Recognizing ethical problems will greatly help
us understand what ethics is all about. There seems to be a certain degree that can qualify an
event or action to be ethical problems. Many ethicists believe that matters concerns the life or
matters concerns about man’s well-being are considered part of ethics. Issues like the death
penalty, corruption in the government, and the inequality are part of ethics, thus they are
considered to be ethical problems.

This discussion clarifies that not all kinds of valuation belong to ethics. You must be able
to remember that ethics is not dependent on taste to be able to classify what is good and bad
action. Ethics does not value good or bad actions based on its acceptability and unacceptability
in the community. Lastly, ethics does not classify good and bad actions based on technique or
the proper way of doing things.

Activity 1: Recognizing Ethical Problems

Name five events in past months, weeks, or days that can be qualified as ethical
problems. Give your reasons. You can use stories or events published in newspapers or aired
on televisions.
Please give proper acknowledgment of the source. You don’t need to get the whole story. This
activity is meant to assess whether you can recognize ethical problems. It will be graded and
categorized as a performance outcome.
Source of Authority

It is clear to us that ethics is about good and bad actions. But how can we determine
good and bad action? Let us take the action lying. We can say that lying is bad or wrong. But
what is the basis? Why do we value lying as a bad action? What is the source that will tell us
why lying is bad? Many of us will certainly go on the obvious sets of standards that we have, like
law, religion, and culture. We will say that lying is bad because it is against the law. Others will
say that it is prohibited in our religion. Some would even declare that it is not acceptable in their
culture. Now, can law, religion, and culture be the source of authority in ethics? Let us try to
analyze them.

Can a law be a source of authority in ethics? On the surface, we can easily say that law
can be the source of authority in ethics. Law guides every country in this world. It prohibits
things that should not be done. It does not allow bad actions. Law can easily claim that actions
like stealing or murder are unethical because it is prohibited by law. An action is considered
good if it is not prohibited by law. Very simple. Law seems to be a good source of authority in
ethics. But let us analyze it further. In the Philippines, Family members who steal from you may
not be criminally liable. According to Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines:
states that persons exempt from criminal liability in the event of the crimes of theft, swindling or
malicious mischief include spouses of relatives by affinity in the same line, the widowed spouse
with respect to the property that belonged to the deceased spouse, and brother and sisters or
brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law. So, this means that stealing is permitted only to your family
members. You can steal from them. Now imagine, if the law will be the source of authority in
ethics. Will you agree with it? Perhaps we should think that ethics does not simply identify it with
obedience to the law. Remember the cliché: “What is legal is not necessarily moral”.

Now, can religion be a source of authority in ethics? In religion, it talks about what is
pleasing and not pleasing in the eyes of God. It tells us that if it is pleasing in the eyes of God
then it is good and if it is not pleasing then it is bad. Religion greatly contributes to molding their
faithful to be good. We members of particular religions are guided by God’s commandment, to
be specific it is the Ten Commandments. This commandment gives us the guiding principle on
how to be a good person. It simply tells us that to become a good person we must avoid the
following do not kill, steal, lie, and commit adultery. When we look closer, we will realize that
most of our laws are patterned on the precepts of God’s Ten Commandments. Now for us
believers, we can see that religion has a strong case to be the source of authority in ethics. Let
us analyze it further. Let us assume that religion is the source of authority in ethics. If this is
true, it will just lead us to more confusion. Why? Because of the multiplicity of religion. There are
thousands of religions in the world. The problem lays on which among these thousands of
religions is the ultimate source of authority on ethics. One religion may say that they are the
ultimate source of authority but definitely, other religions have the same claim. Here in the
Philippines, you can already see the conflicts of religions. This kind of problem could clarify that
religion cannot become the source of authority in ethics. Another problem it may bring is the
reality that there are people who are atheists, persons who do not believe in deities (God), who
do good actions. So how can we say that religion is the source of authority in ethics if there are
persons who do not have religion and yet do good actions? This is why we do not bring religion
into the arguments of ethics.

Lastly, can culture be the source of authority in ethics? Culture sets standards in our
community. It tells the community what we should do and not to do. Philippine culture for
example sees that it is moral for a man and woman to live together after they get married. It
seems that culture could be a source of authority in ethics. But with the great number of different
cultures in this world, there will be different standards. Take the example of the Namibian tribes,
the Ovahimba and Ovazimba tribes have a unique culture. When a man visits the tribe and
knocks on the door, the husband gives him the Okujepisa Omukazendu treatment. This means
that his wife is given to his guest to spend the night while the husband goes out of the house. In
other cultures, this kind of practice is unacceptable. But we are not in the position to say that it is
unacceptable. We cannot deny the fact that culture is something relative to us. It means that we
can say it is good or bad depending on one’s culture. This brings us to the same criticism that
religion face. Due to the multiplicity of culture which culture is the standard in ethics. We must
bear in mind that the standards of ethics must be universal. It must be acceptable for you and
me even we have a different culture. That is why culture cannot be the source of authority in
ethics.

So what is the source of authority in ethics? Ethicists would confer that the source of authority in
ethics must be common to all. It must be something universal. So let us try to see what is
common to all men that makes him unique from other creatures. All of us would agree that what
is common to all men is our ability to reason. There is no other creature that can reason out.
The reason is the source of authority in ethics. Let us see how reason works in ethics. Have you
ever asked yourself: Why I am not stealing goods? Our initial answer would be: “I do not steal
because I am afraid I can get punish and I don’t like to be punished”. But this reason is to
shallow. So man realizes that we must be able to give a good reason that will be acceptable to
all something that would make sense. A better answer is that stealing is wrong because it
violates the principle of fairness and the respect of other’s property. This principle becomes the
ground of our judgment that justifies our decisions. This moral principle is established in moral
theory. This theory is a system of ideas which is used to evaluate our valuing of actions and
concludes decision on a certain action. The moral theory will be the center of this course. The
succeeding modules will be centering on moral theories.

Quiz 1: Keywords to remember and contrast.

1. Define ethics.
 2. What is the difference between ethics and morals?

3. Differentiate ethics from aesthetics, etiquette, and technique.

Activity 2: Analyzing Case

Last June 11, 2020, the Lucban Municipal Police Station (LMPS) posted on their
Facebook page: “Mahalin natin ang mga kababaihan at huwag nyo abusuhin ang kanilang
kabaitan. Kayo naman mga ghErlsz, wag kayo magsuot ng pagkaikli-ikling damit at pag naman
nabastos ay magsusumbong din sa amin. Isipin nyo rin!” This post became viral on the world-
wide-web. Comments on this post flooded the different social media platforms. This particular
post tells women to avoid wearing certain clothes.

You need to analyze this case. There are conflicting thoughts on the post of LMPS. Are
clothes just a matter of aesthetic? or Can clothes become an ethical problem? Explain your
answers. Explain it in 7 to 10 sentences.

For me clothes are just a matter of aesthetic and it is not an ethical problem because
everyone of us especially the woman can wear clothes where they can be comfortable. Also it is
one of a way where they can express themselves. To be dressed in a way you prefer is a right.
The ethical problem in this case is the one who look and have a malicious intention to a woman
wearing a short skirts. Having a lewdness mind when seeing legs of a woman is unethical. It is
wrong to force a woman women to wear a certain kind clothes because everyone of us have the
right to choose and not to be dictated. Yes,we have the right to be dressed in any clothes that
they wanted but they should also be responsible and be aware to the effect that they can give in
wearing a certain clothes as a respect to themselves.
Reference:

Bulaong, O. et. al. (2018). Ethics: foundation of moral valuation. Manila: Rex Bookstore.
Reyes, R. (2000 Ground and norm of morality: ethics for college students. Quezon City: Ateneo
de Manila University Press.

MODULE 2 VIRTUE ETHICS

Do you remember the last part of Module 1? It discussed the source of authority
in ethics. It is said that a good source of authority in ethics is moral theories. So
what are we going to do in module 2 is to discuss one of the moral theories,
Virtue Ethics. This theory is a product of Aristotle's intuitive mind. We will start
on the background on how Aristotle arrived in conceptualizing Virtue Ethics. The
module would also focus on the important concepts in Virtue Ethics like telos, eudaimonia,
arete, mesotes and phronimos. We will characterize actions as virtuous acts or non-virtuous
acts. Then we will try to apply the concept of virtue ethics in a real-life setting. You will analyze a
case for you to experience how virtue ethics work.

OBJECTIVES: At the end of this module, you should be able to:

1. explain the important concepts and principles of virtue ethics;
2. differentiate virtuous acts from non-virtuous acts;
3. use the principles of virtue ethics in real-life situations.

Historical Background
Aristotle lived from 384-322 BC. He was a student of Plato in Academia in Athens. Most of the
time Aristotle was in an intellectual dispute with Plato. Due to these disputes with Plato, he
founded his school, the Lyceum. Aristotle made a good account of himself. He was able to
create different works in different fields. Some of the notable works of Aristotle were
Metaphysics, De Generatione et Corruptione (biology), De Anima (psychology), Nicomachean
Ethics, and the Organon (logic). Some historians claimed that Aristotle was greatly influenced by
his father who was a physician. Aristotle was very observant of the surrounding like a physician
who tries to observe his patients. He had a son and named him Nichomachus. The book of
Aristotle in ethics was named after his son and it was called Nichomachean Ethics.

Nichomaen Ethics
Aristotle establishes his ideas in Ethics using the Platonic understanding of reality and its
concept of good as his springboard. He abandons the idea of Plato about reality and good.
Aristotle particularly contests the separation of matter and form. If you are going to look at
Plato's understanding of reality and its concept of good it is quite ideal. He believes that everything outside
the world of forms or ideas are not true. Take this example: Juan is a good boy. Plato argues that Juan is
not a good boy. Because he is in a world of matter. Everything in the world of matter is not true because
they are subject to change. Plato would claim that Juan's goodness is just a copy of the real goodness that
is found in the world of forms or ideas. But Aristotle did not agree with this. He contests that we will not be
able to understand a thing without having matter and form. We will not understand that Juan is a good boy if
there is no matter and form. We will not be able to know Juan is a good boy if we don't see the body
(matter) of Juan, his looks, and his built, and if we don't have the idea (form) of what is a good boy. When
we say that Juan is a good boy, it means that being good does not exist independently of Juan. Our
experience dictates when we say that Juan is a good boy, we are referring to Juan in his totality as a
composition of matter and form, not as a separate entity.

TELOS
As we establish the ground of Aristotle's ethical framework, we now look at how it works.
Aristotle's ethical framework starts with observing what is there in nature. Aristotle is keen on
looking for what is common in nature. In his observation, he sees that when you throw a stone
upward it will go down. It will not suspend in the air. If you throw it up ten thousand times, it will
go down ten thousand times. Similar to a ball place on a slope. If you put a ball on a slope, it
has nothing to do but to roll downwards. When a person performs actions, it is always directed
towards something. It is directed towards a purpose. A person can't perform actions without a
purpose. Aristotle sees that there in common in all of these. He concludes that everything in this
world including a person has "telos". The word telos means end, goal, or purpose. When we go
back to our example, a stone thrown upward will end downward, a ball place in the top of the
slope will end on the lower part of the slope and a person jumps into action because of the goal
or purpose.
We already know that a person acts towards a goal or purpose. We cannot deny the fact that
there is a purpose why we do something. Now a person will perform an act when she sees the
purpose as good. No person will do something if she sees the purpose as bad. We eat because
we know that it is good. It will give much-needed sustenance to our bodies. You enroll in this
course because you see good on it. You believe that it will provide you a good future. So it
means that the telos or the purpose is always good. A person performs an act because she
sees that the telos or the purpose as good. But you may ask why are there some people who do
bad acts. Let us take the example of a drug dependent. She takes an illegal drug because she
believes that it will solve all her problems. Here you will find that the purpose is good, to solve all
her problems. The problem lies in the action she has taken. It is bad. Taking illegal drugs is bad.
We do not say that taking illegal drugs can become good what we are showing is that the telos
or purpose is good. It is what all of us seek to achieve.
In our experience, we act because we seek to achieve a specific purpose. But we cannot also
deny that this purpose is used to attain a higher goal or purpose. Let's have the example of a
student. We all know that you are here to study so you can earn a degree. You are moved to
study because of the purpose of earning a degree. But it does not end there. You want to earn a
degree so you can find a job. Because Filipinos believe that if you have a degree you can find a
job easily. But it does not end there. You want to find a job so that you can earn money. You
want to earn money so you can buy things you want. There seems to be a hierarchy of telos,
goal, or purpose.
EUDAIMONIA
In the hierarchy of telos, goal, or purpose there must be the highest purpose, this must be
ultimate. It is the ultimate good of a human being. Now let us see what is the ultimate purpose of
a person. When we say ultimate it means that it is last and final. Nothing follows. According to
Aristotle, to consider the telos to be ultimate it must fit the criteria. The first criterion says that it
must be final. It means that it is the final end or purpose and it is not used to attain any other
higher ends. Unlike the examples in the earlier discussion, we can see that the end is used to
attain another end. Studying to earn a degree and earning a degree to find a job. So these goals
cannot be considered as ultimate telos because they are not final. The second criterion of the
ultimate telos is that it must be self-sufficient. Meaning that when we attain it nothing else will be
sought. It will completely satisfy our desires to attain something once we attain the ultimate
telos. The last criterion of the ultimate telos is that it must be attainable. It is non-sense if the
ultimate telos of a person is not attainable. It is absurd to say that the ultimate telos of a person
cannot be attained.
So what is the ultimate telos of a person? According to Aristotle the ultimate telos of a person is
"eudaimonia". It means happiness. But mind you the happiness that Aristotle is telling is not an
emotion. Like the happiness that we experience when we receive gifts during our birthdays. This
kind of happiness is on the level of feelings. Aristotle is not referring to this kind of happiness
because it is temporary. He argues this happiness is permanent and it is what everybody
desires to attain. Eudaimonia being the ultimate telos makes every person desires it.

ERGON
We already established that the ultimate telos is eudaimonia or happiness, but how can we
attain it. According to Aristotle, we can achieve eudaimonia by fulfilling a person's "ergon". The
word ergon means function. So, it only means that we can attain the ultimate telos by fulfilling
our function. But what is the function of a person? A function is what distinguishes or
characterizes the thing from other beings. Example: key, it is used to lock or unlock doors,
cabinet, etc. This makes the key unique from other things. Again, what is the function of the
person? What distinguishes a person from other beings? What sets a person apart from other
beings? The function of a person is the ability to reason. This ability distinguishes a person from
other beings. There is no other being that can reason. To be a person is to act in accordance
with reason. Aristotle argues that we can attain eudaimonia by performing our ergon which is
the ability to reason but it is not enough by just performing it. He would say that we should
perform our function well. We must perform it in a good or excellent way.

ARETE
In Greek, performing in a good or excellent way is "Arete". The word arete is equated to the
word virtue. The word virtue is associated with the words good, excellent, and noble. Now, how
do we attain virtue? According to Aristotle, virtue cannot be accomplished in a single act. Virtue
is accomplished through repetitive actions. It is acquired through habits. But remember that
habit is not always good. That is why Aristotle distinguishes what habit we need to have. Habit is
essential to the formation of one's character. So to be able to have a good character, we need
to habitually do the good, thus we will acquire virtue. But acquiring virtue is not that easy. The
test is on how to act out the right feelings and passions. It is how we can control our feelings
and passions because they are neither good nor bad. According to Aristotle, virtue is the
excellent management of one's feelings and passions. Let us take an example. We all know that
anger is an example of feelings and passions. It is neither good nor bad. To be a virtuous
person, we must have excellent management of anger. We can get angry for the right reason,
time, manner, and to the right person. Which is something difficult to attain. The difficulty lies in
finding the mesotes (mean) according to Aristotle. "Hence it is hard work to be virtuous since in
each case it is hard work to find what is the mean (mesotes)...So also getting angry, or giving
and spending money, is easy and anyone can do it, but doing it to the right person, in the right
amount at the right time, for the right end, and in the right way is no longer easy, nor can
everyone do it. Hence, well is rare, praiseworthy, and fine. " (Nichomachean Ethics Bk. II,
1109a24) To become a virtuous person, we need to find the mesotes. Aristotle believes that
when a person is already habituated on finding the mesotes she will be called "phronimos". This
phronimos is a virtuous person who does not have to control oneself because one's resolution
has been habituated to always do the right act, self-possessed.

VIRTUE
"Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with a choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean
relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, by that principle by which the man of
practical wisdom would determine it". (Nichomachean Ethics Bk. II, 1106b36-1107a2) It simply
means that virtue is the mean between two vices. It is the mean between excess and deficiency.
Vices are either excess or deficiency. Let's have an example. Let us see what is the mean
(mesotes) of fear and confidence. The mean is courage, the excess is rashness and the
deficiency is cowardice. The mean (mesotes) is always exact or as the maximum act, not an
excess nor a deficiency. It is not good if the person is "sobrang bait, sobrang tapang at medyo
palakaibigan" because this is not exact. You must also be careful on genaralizing that all actions
have mesotes. Many actions do not have mesotes and they are considered as wrong actions.
Examples would be stealing, committing adultery and killing. Can you find their mesotes? None,
there is no such thing as stealing the right amount of money. No matter what a person steals,
whether it is in a small amount or a big amount they are both stealings.

Activity 1: Recalling Terms

Define the following concepts in virtue ethics:
1. Telos –
Telos is our purpose why are we doing things. The one drive us to pursue and keep on
moving. Everyone of us has a goal or purpose that wanted to achieve in life. This purpose is
the one that give us meaning in life.
2. Eudaimonia-
It means happiness.This is not the happiness that we feel when we receive recognition of
gift.It is beyond that feeling.It is the ultimate desires of everyone of us .
3. Ergon- It is means function.In order to achieve our happiness we must have our function. As
a human being our ability to reason is our function. This is what makes us unique from other .
4. Arete – It is means performing in a good or excellent way.It is also called virtue.
5. Mesotes – It is the best decision in a particular situation that is supported by an excellent
judgement.

Activity 2 Filipino Virtues

We have lists of Filipino Virtues on the table. The word virtue is translated as birtud. While
deficiency is pagkukulang and excess is pagmamalabis. What are you going to do is to list the
pagkukulang and pagmamalabis of each birtud.

Pagmamalabis Birtud Pagkukulang

Pakikisama
Utang na loob
Kayabangan Hiya Duwag/takot
Relihiyoso
Magalang sa Matanda Walang respeto

Activity 3: Wait or Marry? You will analyze the case using virtue ethics. You will analyze a case
about the virtue of prudence. Don't use your feelings. Analyze it well. Read the rubric so that
you will be guided in answering the case.
A piece of news broke out that Juan, a soldier was killed in an encounter with the rebels. But
the news on the death of Juan was sketchy. There are no clear details about Juan's death. The
sketchy news reached Maria, Juan's wife. Due to this, there is uncertainty on the part of
Maria. Years had passed and there is no certain news about Juan. The long years of waiting
allowed Pedro to court Maria. True enough Pedro's perseverance made Maria fall in love. Pedro
had found that it is the right time to propose to marry Maria. Now if you are Maria will you give in
to Pedro's proposal or wait for the confirmation on the death of Juan? What if you already
married Pedro and Juan was alive and ready to come home, what will you do?
Rubrics

4 - Abov e 3 - Meet s 2 - 1 - Belo w

CATEGO Standards Standards Approaching Standards Score
RY Standards
Position The position The A position There is no
Statemen statement position statement is position
t provides a clear, statement present, but statement.
strong statement provides a does not make
of the author\'s clear the author\'s
position on the statement of position clear.
the
topic.
author\'s
position on the
topic.
Evidence All of the Most of the At least one of Evidence
and evidence and evidence and the pieces of and
Examples examples are examples are evidence and examples
specific, relevant specific, examples is are NOT
and explanations relevant and relevant and relevant
are given that explanations has an AND/OR are
show how each are given that explanation
not
piece of show how that shows how
 evidence each piece of that piece of explained.
supports the evidence evidence
author\'s supports the supports the
position. author\'s author\'s
position. position.
Accuracy All supportive Almost Most supportive Most
facts and all facts and supportive
statistics are supportive statistics are facts and
reported facts and reported statistics
accurately. statistics are accurately. were
reported inaccurately
accurately. reported.
Sequenci Arguments and Arguments A few of the Many of the
ng support are and support support details support
provided in a are provided or arguments details or
logical order that in a fairly are not in an arguments
makes it easy logical order expected or are not in an
and interesting that makes it logical order, expected or
to follow the reasonably distracting the logical order,
author\'s train of easy to follow reader and distracting
thought. the author\'s making the the reader
train of essay seem a and making
thought. little confusing. the essay
seem very
confusing.
Closing The conclusion The The author\'s There is
paragrap is strong and conclusion is position is no
h leaves the recognizable. restated within conclusion -
reader solidly The author\' the closing the paper
understanding position is paragraph, but just
the writer\'s restated within not near the ends.
position. the first two beginning.
Effective sentences of
restatement of the
the position closing
statement paragraph.
begins the
closing
paragraph.

References:
Aristotle (350 BCE). Nicomachean Ethics (W.D. Ross, Trans.)
Bulaong, O. et. al. (2018). Ethics: foundation of moral valuation. Manila: Rex Bookstore.
Thiroux, J. (2012). Ethics: theory and practice.(11th ed.). Engelewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall

MODULE 3 NATURAL LAW THEORY

This module deals with the Natural Law Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas.
It defines law and discusses the different kinds of law. The module clarifies the
difference between Natural Law from Eternal Law, Divine Law, and Human
Law. In this module, you must read the text, Summa Theologica by Thomas
Aquinas which is provided. Lastly, the module challenges you to apply the precepts of the
natural law to contemporary moral issues.

OBJECTIVES: At the end of this module, you should be able to:

define what is a law and its kinds;

distinguish natural law from the eternal law, divine law and human law, and;

apply the precepts of natural law to contemporary moral issues.

LET’S READ

You must read Summa Theologica by Thomas Aquinas. You will find it in the readings
section of the module. After reading it, you must answer the following questions:

1. What is the law?

 2. What is Eternal law?

3. What is Divine law?

4. What is Human law?

NATURAL LAW

There are different kinds of law. We have seen it in the readings and you have defined it clearly.
We now turn our attention to natural law. When we talk about natural, it brings more questions
rather than answers. How might one commonly define what is “natural” or “unnatural”? Persons
are having difficulty in differentiating what is natural and unnatural. Let us test your
understanding of what is natural and what is not. We have here some list and tell us whether it
is natural or unnatural. After finishing the module we go back to your answers and test it if you
got it right.

Natural or Unnatural

eating insects

natural
picking one’s nose (pangungulangot)
 natural
mixed martial arts (combat sports)

plastic surgery

eating raw beef

cross-dressing

IUD (intra-uterine device)

incest

male on male sex

male infidelity (pambababae)

According to Thomas Aquinas:

The Natural Law

Summa Theologiae 1-2, Question 94, Article 2

Since however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a
contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination
are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects
of purs uit, and their contraries as evil, and object of avoidance. Wherefore
according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of
the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in
accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances
inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being,
according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means
of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the
natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him
more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other
animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the
natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals“ … such as sexual
intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an
inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is
proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about
God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this
inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to
avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things
regarding the above inclination.

ORDER OF THE PRECEPTS OF NATURAL LAW

According to Thomas Aquinas, God created the world according to natural law. It is a
goal driven system whereby life is sustained and everything function smoothly. God created a
good thing for His creatures. Like meat that is good for dogs and cats or water that is good for
plants. God being the creator, Thomas Aquinas argues that God instills in creatures an intuitive
desire or inclination to seek what is best for them. We, creatures, are designed to seek basic
goods. Now, what are the basic goods? There are seven basic goods: self-preservation,
procreation, educate offspring, seek God, live in society, avoid offense, and shun ignorance.

The first basic good is self- preservation. We cannot deny the fact that the drive to
sustain life is very visible to all creatures. It is common to all beings. Have you noticed it? There
are certain trees when they are cut they release a certain foul odor that shoos away threats.
Animals fight back or run away when they feel that their lives are in danger. In the same way
that persons have that natural inclination to preserve their being. When we hear a gunshot like
sounds we duck or stop to process what we think is a potential threat.

The second basic good is reproduction. It is a desire to do sexual intercourse. This

process makes us feel good. Similar to other beings that periodically engage in this kind of
activity. Reproduction leads to the third basic good, which is the education of offspring. It is good
to take care of the offspring. We need to feed, give them shelter, and educate them. Similarly,
persons and animals do educate their offspring. Persons do bring their offspring to school while
animals teach their offspring how to hunt or protect themselves from predators.

The first three basic goods are a commonality of person to other beings but the
remaining four basic goods are exclusive to a person. It is exclusive because it uses reason.
The fourth basic good is to seek God. It is a natural inclination to seek God. We seek the truth
about God because of reason. People tend to think that there is a greater good. It does not end
there. We want to be part of the community. This leads us to the fifth basic good and that is to
live in the community. Persons are social animals and we have this inclination to live in the
community. Thomas Aquinas would argue that we basically pack animals, our desire for love
and acceptance, and our susceptibility to peer pressure are all evidence of this desire. So, to be
accepted in the community, we need to avoid offense, which is the sixth basic good. We must
avoid alienating others. Our reason tells us that it is not good to alienate others. Like stealing
something from them or spreading gossip about others. The last basic good is to shun
ignorance. There is no denying that persons are knowers. We think that knowledge promotes
survival. Thomas Aquinas argues that knowledge promotes survival and ignorance can mean
starving to death. This very inclination pushes us to study to shun ignorance. Have you noticed
it? Parents will always tell that the only inheritance they can give their children is education.
They do not like that their children become ignorant. Being ignorant is not a good thing.

Thomas Aquinas believes that from these seven basic goods, the natural law is derived.
Our inclination shows us basic good and reason allows us to derive natural law from them. This
brings us to the understanding that the right acts are in accordance with natural law. How thus
this system of Natural law works? Let us take the obvious inclination, self-preservation. We all
see that our lives are valuable. It is the reason why we do not do stupid or dumb acts that will
put our lives in danger. However, we cannot deny the fact that others’ lives are also valuable the
same as ours. The reason will tell us that killing is wrong because it is a violation of natural law.
From here, we will be able to create prohibition: “do not kill”. In turn, it will bring to a positive
injunction which promotes life.

TIME TO THINK

You need to answer this problem using the principle of utilitarianism. Limit your answer
from 10 to 15 sentences.

Tensions have been rising between the U.S. and Iraq. Now Iraq has succeeded in smuggling an
atomic bomb into New York and exploding it. First reports indicate that over a million people are
dead and more will die from radiation. You are the president of the U.S., you have enough
atomic weapons presently aimed at Iraq to destroy every city in the country. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff are awaiting your decision. Can you ethically authorize a retaliatory strike and basically
destroy Iraq?

If I am the president of the U.S. I will not strike back on Iraq .I will not compromise the lives of my
people just to have revenge on Iraq. If I strike back they will strike back too and it will continue . There
will be many implication on lives and casualties. Instead, I will talk to the government of Iraq in order to
peacefully rebuild the relationship with each other. Although I will not tolerate what Iraq have done to my
people .
Also if I will have my revenge there are many things to consider .First it’s a waste of money. The fund
that my country that will needed just to strike back such bombs, guns and other military equipment are so
expensive. Second, I will not let the peace that my people are enjoying now to disappear in my country
and sacrifice the bright future of my people just to strike back on Iraq and prove that we are greater than
them. Also there are no winners in every war because both party have casualties and big destruction. I
will always make a way that produce the greatest good for the greatest number of my people.

References:
Bulaong, O. et. al. (2018). Ethics: foundation of moral valuation. Manila: Rex Bookstore.
Thiroux, J. (2012). Ethics: theory and practice.(11th ed.). Engelewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall

4 - Abov e 3 - Meet s 2 - 1 - Belo w

CATEGO Standards Standards Approaching Standards Score
RY Standards
Position The position The positio n A position There is no
Statemen statement statement statement is position
t provides a clear, provides a present, but statement.
strong statement clear does not make
of the author\'s statement of the author\'s
position on the the position clear.
topic. author\'s
position on the
topic.
Evidence All of the Most of the At least one of Evidence
and evidence and evidence and the pieces of and
Examples examples are examples are evidence and examples
specific, relevant specific, examples is are NOT
and explanations relevant and relevant and relevant
are given that explanations has an AND/OR are
show how each are given that explanation
not
piece of show how that shows how
evidence explained.
each piece of that piece of
supports the evidence evidence
author\'s supports the supports the
position. author\'s author\'s
position. position.
Accuracy All supportive Almost Most supportive Most
facts and all facts and supportive
statistics are supportive statistics are facts and
reported facts and reported statistics
accurately. statistics are accurately. were
reported inaccurately
accurately. reported.
Sequenci Arguments and Arguments A few of the Many of the
ng support are and support support details support
provided in a are provided or arguments details or
logical order that in a fairly are not in an arguments
makes it easy expected or are not in an
logical order
and interesting logical order, expected or
that makes it
to follow the distracting the logical order,
reasonably
author\'s train of reader and distracting
easy to follow
thought. making the the reader
the author\'s essay seem a and making
train of little confusing. the essay
thought. seem very
confusing.
Closing The conclusion The author\'s There is no
paragrap is strong and The position is conclusion -
h leaves the conclusion is restated within the
recognizable. paper just
reader solidly the closing
The author\' ends.
understanding paragraph, but
position is
the writer\'s not near the
restated within
position. the first two beginning.
Effective sentences of
restatement of the
the position closing
statement paragraph.
begins the
closing
paragraph.

MODULE 4 DEONTOLOGY

This module tackles deontology of Immanuel Kant. It shows how Kant establish
his ethical system using pure reason. This pure reason bring us to the idea of
imperatives. There are two kinds of imperatives, hypothetical and categorical
imperatives. The emphasis of this module is on categorical imperative that has
three formulations: universalizability, autonomy and kingdom of ends. There are
ethical problems you are going to resolve. You are task to resolve them using the test of
universalizability.

OBJECTIVES: At the end of this module, you should:

1. discuss Kant's ethical system based on pure reason,

2. apply the concepts of the formulations of categorical imperatives, and;
3. evaluate actions using the universalizability test.

BACKGROUND

Deontology is the study of the nature of duty and obligation. The word deontology comes from
the Greek word "deont" which means being necessary. Immanuel Kant's ethical system is found
in Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. He never called it as deontology. C.D. Broad coin it
as deontology in his book Five Types of Ethical Theory.

PURE REASON

Immanuel Kant is in search of the supreme principle of morality. He sees that previous moral
theories could not give exact answers to moral problems. Kant believes that morality is
constant. It is similar to simple arithmetic that 1 + 1 = 2. Even we interchange the position of the
numbers it brings the same answer. When we say that an action is good, it is good no matter
what the situation is.

“Since my aim here is directed properly to moral philosophy, I

limit the question proposed to this: is it not of the utmost necessity to work out for
once a pure moral philosophy,
completely cleansed of everything that may be only empirical and that
belongs to anthropology? [...] Everyone must grant that a law, if it is to hold
morally, that is, as a ground of an
obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity [...] [...] that, for
example, the command “thou shalt not lie” does not hold
only for human beings, as if other rational beings did not have to heed it, […]
the ground of obligation here must not be
sought in the nature of the human being or in the
circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori

According to Immanuel Kant to determine what is good we need to use reason. He simply in
the concepts of pure reason [...]” (4:389) understands that reason is a unique faculty of a person
that sets her a -part from animals. Persons use their reason, which gives us the capacity to act
accordingly to the principles that we determine ourselves.
IMPERATIVES
Reason determines what is good. We use our reason to determine what we ought-to-do. It is a
self-ordained task. However, we must be able to distinguish that there are things that we ought-
to-do morally and there are non-moral. According to Kant, most of the time, whether or not we
ought to do something that is not really a moral choice-instead, it is contingent on our desires.
Let us take the desire for money. Many of us desire to have money and there is nothing bad
about it. To have money we ought to have job or business. Same as when student desires to
have a good grade, you ought to study hard. These are examples that Kant calls as hypothetical
imperatives. It is putting conditions. Hypothetical imperatives are command you should follow if
you want something. It is putting premium in options. You may do it if you want to and you may
not do it if you don’t want it.

Hypothetical imperative is not a concern in ethics. Kant argues that we cannot view morality
through hypothetical imperative. Rather, we should view morality through categorical imperative.
What is categorical imperative? It is a command you must follow regardless of your desires and
moral obligations are derived from pure reason. It does not matter whether you want to be moral
or not. The moral law is binding on all of us. Right and wrong is totally knowable by using your
intellect.

FORMULATIONS OF CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

Categorical imperative is best understood through various formulations. We will enumerate the
different formulations of categorical imperative:

1. Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can
at the same time will that it become a universal law (4:421).

2. “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or
in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a
means” (4:429).

3. Act so that [your] “will is thus not solely subject to the law, but is subject in such a way that it
must be regarded also as
legislating to itself, and precisely for this reason as subject to
the law (of which it can consider itself as the author)” (4:431).
Among these three
formulations of categorical imperative, we will focus on the first one: “Act only in accordance with
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”. This is
popularly known as the “universalizability principle”.

UNIVERSALIZABILITY

The formulation of universalizability principle focuses on two important terms, maxim and
universal law. Maxim refers to rule or principle of action while universal law refers to something
that must always be done in similar situation. Let us read Kant’s work on his demonstration of
universalizability principle:

Another man finds himself urged by need to borrow money. He

well knows that he will not be able to repay it but sees also
nothing will be lent him unless he promises firmly to repay it
within a determinate time. He would like to make such a promise,
This
 but he still has enough conscience to ask himself, is it not
forbidden and contrary to duty to help oneself out of need in such
a way? Supposing that he still decided to do so, his maxim of
action would go as follows: when I believe myself to be in need
of money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even
though I know that this will never happen.
[...]

[...] Now this principle of self-love or personal advantage is

perhaps quite consistent with my whole future welfare, but the
question now is whether it is right. I therefore turn the demand of
self-love into a universal law and put the question as follows:
how would it be if my maxim became a universal law? I then see
at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature and
be consistent with itself, but must necessarily contradict itself. [...]

[...] For, the universality of a law that everyone, when he believes

himself to be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with
the intention of not keeping it would make the promise and the
end one might have in it itself impossible, since no one would
believe what was promised him but would laugh at all such simplified
could
expressions as vain pretenses (4:422). what
be
throu others
gh 0. identify the action to be tested
call
as
universalizability test:
1. formulate the maxim (personal rule: “When I ..., I shall ...”)

2. test for universalizability:

imagine the maxim as a
universal law, is there a self-
contradiction?

3. conclude by articulating the duty

What we do here is we start with zero (0). It is where we identify the action to be tested. In one
(1) we formulate the maxim and it always have the template: “When I…, I shall…”. Two (2) is
where we imagine that it is universal law and test if there is a self-contradiction. Lastly, Three (3)
conclude by articulating duty. To clarify it further let us take an example of Kant, which we read
earlier. We will try to simplify using the universalizability test.
 1.
borrow money without intending to pay [false
promises]

2.
“When I need money, I shall borrow it from someone
without intending to pay it back.”

3.
Suppose everyone were obligated to follow this
maxim, as if it were a universal law: Everyone ought to
borrow money without intending to pay, when they
need money.

No one will lend money, “who are you fooling, you

ought not pay it back”, money-lending loses its
meaning, self-contradictory

What then is the resulting duty?

4.
Therefore, do not borrow money without intending to pay.

REMINDERS

1. Consistency from step 0 to 3.

2. Kant provides a maxim that has a specific formulation: When [situation], I shall [action].

3. Universalized maxim is not imagined as done by everyone, but an obligation for

everyone.

4. Test involves not consequences, but internal validity of the universalized maxim.

UNIVERSALIZABILITY TEST

You are going to perform universalizability test of the following:

1. stealing someone’s valuables

2. lying about credentials on curriculum vitae (CV)

3. refusing to give a bribe, taking a ticket

 4. studying test leakage for aboard exam

ANALYZE IT

1. National Telecommunication Commission(NTC), a government regulatory office, handed

ABS-CBN company a cease and desist order stopping its broadcast. It is due to the
company's expired franchise. The company's franchise expired May 4, 2020. Many
people are saddened. ABS-CBN's top official contested the stoppage of their broadcast.
They would argue that it is wrong to hand down the order of stoppage because it will
greatly affect their eleven thousand employees (11,000). Arguments could go as far as
saying that the stoppage will be against the interest of the Filipino because of the
pandemic we are experiencing. They would even claim that it clear violation of press
freedom.

Let us analyze this. Is it unethical for NTC to issue stoppage of ABS-CBN because of
their expired franchise to operate? or it is unethical for NTC to issue stoppage of
ABSCBN because of their expired franchise but it is pandemic and greatly affects
11,000 employees?

Analyze it using Kant's Universalizability Test.

1. Test the morality of the case using Kant's Universalizability Test.

2. Explain the morality of the cases. Explain it in 5 to 7 sentences.
3. Send your questions or feedback on atmaguyon@slsu.edu.ph or on 09189510456
 References:
Kant (2016). Fundamental principles of metaphysics of morals. (T.K. Abott, Trans.)
Bulaong, O. et. al. (2018). Ethics: foundation of moral valuation. Manila: Rex Bookstore.
Thiroux, J. (2012). Ethics: theory and practice.(11th ed.). Engelewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. RUBRICS

4 - Abov e 3 - Meet s 2 - 1 - Belo w

CATEGO Standards Standards Approaching Standards Score
RY Standards
Position The position The A position There is
Statemen statement statement is no
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MODULE 5 UTILITARIANISM

This module tackles principles of Utilitarianism. It differentiates Jeremy

Bentham’s utilitarian concept and John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian concept. The
module tries to see the different types of utilitarianism. You need to apply the
principles of utilitarianism in different situations.

OBJECTIVES At the end of this module, you must be able to:

1. discuss the basic idea of utilitarianism,

2. distinguish Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism from John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism, and;

3. apply utilitarianism in evaluating community scenarios.

UTILITARIANISM

Utilitarianism is a normative ethical theory that places the locus of right and wrong solely
on the outcomes (consequences) of choosing one action/policy over other actions/policies. As
such, it moves beyond the scope of one's own interests and takes into account the interests of
others. It is about the “the greatest happiness for the greatest number”. When we talk of
utilitarianism, two names will appear instantly, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mills.

JEREMY BENTHAM
 Jeremy Bentham is an English philosopher who introduces the principle of utility. He
recognizes the fundamental role of pain and pleasure in human life. He argues that the approval
or disapproval of an action is based on the amount of pain or pleasure brought about by the
consequences. Bentham equates good with pleasure and evil with pain, and asserts that
pleasure and pain are capable of quantification (and hence 'measure').

In measuring pleasure and pain, Bentham introduces the following criteria: INTENSITY,
DURATION, CERTAINTY (or UNCERTAINTY), and its NEARNESS (or FARNESS). He also
includes its "fecundity" (will more of the same follow?) and its "purity" (its pleasure won't be
followed by pain & vice versa). In considering actions that affect numbers of people, we must
also account for its EXTENT.

HOW IT WORKS

Your task is to explain how the criteria of Jeremy Bentham works. You need to research it on
books or through the world-wide-web.

JOHN STUART MILLS

John Stuart Mills is also an English philosopher. He adjusted to the more hedonistic
tendencies in Bentham's philosophy by emphasizing. According to Mills, it is not the quantity of
pleasure, but the quality of happiness that is central to utilitarianism, He would add that the
calculus is unreasonable and qualities cannot be quantified (there is a distinction between
'higher' and 'lower' pleasures). Mills argues that utilitarianism refers to "the Greatest Happiness
Principle" -- it seeks to promote the capability of achieving happiness (higher pleasures) for the
most amount of people (this is its "extent").

EXPLAIN IT

Please explain “The Greatest Happiness Principle”.

ACT AND RULE UTILITARIANISM

We can apply the principle of utility to either PARTICULAR ACTIONS or GENERAL RULES.
The former is called "act-utilitarianism" and the latter is called "rule-utilitarianism."

Act-utilitarianism -- The principle of utility is applied directly to each alternative act in a situation
of choice. The right act is then defined as the one which brings about the best results (or the
least amount of bad results).

Rule-utilitarianism -- The principle of utility is used to determine the validity of rules of conduct
(moral principles). A rule like promise-keeping is established by looking at the consequences of
a world in which people broke promises at will and a world in which promises were binding.
Right and wrong are then defined as following or breaking those rules.

THINK OF THIS

You need to answer this problem using the principle of utilitarianism. Limit your answer from 10
to 15 sentences.

It is noticeable before the pandemic that most of the elected officials have made projects. The
most common infrastructure projects are basketball courts. Because most Filipinos are fans of
basketball elected officials realized that building basketball court is more productive in
promoting health than building hospital. So, is it justifiable to build basketball court because
there are many basketball fans, than to build a hospital because there are fewer sick people?
References:
Bulaong, O. et. al. (2018). Ethics: foundation of moral valuation. Manila: Rex Bookstore.

Thiroux, J. (2012). Ethics: theory and practice.(11th ed.). Engelewood Cliffs:

Prentice Hall.

RUBRICS

4 - Abov e 3 - Meet s 2 - 1 - Belo w

CATEGO Standards Standards Approaching Standards Score
RY Standards
Position The position The A position There is no
Statemen statement statement is position
t provides a position present, but statement.
clear, strong statement does not make
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SYNTHESIS

Search online source to come up five ethical issues. List the issue down, cite your sources, and
provide explanation for each issue and moral argument. Choose one moral principle that is
applied to support your claims. Pay attention that the topics must relevant to the Philippine
context. If you have questions message me on my email: atmaguyon@slsu.edu.ph.

Template:

1. Ethical Issue
 2. Source

3. Explanation

4. Position/stand on the issue

READINGS
The Summa Theological

of St. Thomas Aquinas

Questions 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, and 95

Question 90. The essence of law

1. Is law something pertaining to reason?

2. The end of law
3. Its cause
4. The promulgation of law

Article 1. Whether law is something pertaining to reason?

Objection 1. It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says
(Romans 7:23): "I see another law in my members," etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the
members; since the reason does not make use of a bodily organ. Therefore, law is not something
pertaining to reason.
Objection 2. Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act. But law is not the
power itself of reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason are the
intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above (Article 57). Nor again is it an act of reason:
because then law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep.
Therefore, law is nothing pertaining to reason.

Objection 3. Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. But it belongs properly to
the will to move to act, as is evident from what has been said above (Question 9, Article 1). Therefore,
law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const.
Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law."

On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to
command, as stated above (Question 17, Article 1). Therefore, law is something pertaining to
reason.

I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from
acting: for "lex" [law] is derived from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and
measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident from what
has been stated above (1, 1, ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first
principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle
in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the
first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently, it follows that law is something pertaining to
reason.

Reply to Objection 1. Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways.
First, as in that which measures and rules: and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way,
law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all
those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a
law, may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the
members to concupiscence is called "the law of the members."

Reply to Objection 2. Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the work done, for
instance the work of building and the house built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself
of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. With regard to the
speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or
argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be done,
as stated above (13, 3; 76, 1) and since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find in the
practical reason something that holds the same position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative
intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like universal propositions of the practical
intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are sometimes under
our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.
Reply to Objection 3. Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above (Question 17,
Article 1): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards
things ordained to the end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of
law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying
that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of
lawlessness rather than of law.

Article 2. Whether the law is always something directed to the common good?

Objection 1. It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good as to its end. For
it belongs to law to command and to forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods.
Therefore, the end of the law is not always the common good.

Objection 2. Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions are concerned with particular
matters. Therefore, the law is directed to some particular good.

Objection 3. Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason
will be a law." But reason is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also of
that which is directed private good. Therefore, the law is not only directed to the good of all, but also to
the private good of an individual.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the
common benefit of the citizens."

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts,
because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there
is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this principle chiefly and
mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of
the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above
(2, 7; 3, 1). Consequently, the law must
regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as
imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must regard properly
the relationship to universal happiness.
Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the
body politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters "just, which are adapted to produce
and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic": since the state is a perfect community, as he
says in Polit. i, 1.

Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong
to that genus in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat
in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the
law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work, must
needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good. Therefore, every
law is ordained to the common good.

Reply to Objection 1. A command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated by the law. Now
the order to the common good, at which the law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way
commands are given even concerning particular matters.

Reply to Objection 2. Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular
matters are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common
final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end.

Reply to Objection 3. Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which
is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical
reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the common good: and whatever stands to reason in
this sense, has the nature of a law.

Article 3. Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?

Objection 1. It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says
(Romans 2:14) that "when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the
law, . . . they are a law to themselves." Now he says this of all in general. Therefore, anyone can make a
law for himself.

Objection 2. Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii. 1), "the intention of the lawgiver is to lead
men to virtue." But every man can lead another to virtue. Therefore, the reason of any man is
competent to make laws.

Objection 3. Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every father of a family
governs his household. But the sovereign of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore, every father
of a family can make laws for his household.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v. 10): "A law is an ordinance of the people, whereby something
is sanctioned by the Elders together with the Commonalty."

I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now to
order anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the
viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or
to a
Reply to Objection 1. Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God, inasmuch as they are
foreknown and preordained by Him, according to Romans 4:17: "Who calls those things that are not, as
those that are." Accordingly, the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character of an eternal law,
in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him.

Reply to Objection 2. Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in both ways the
eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life are
eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads.

Reply to Objection 3. The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to
the end; but not passively--that is to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end--except accidentally, in
a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end
of the Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Wherefore the
eternal law is not ordained to another end.

Article 2. Whether there is in us a natural law?

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by
the eternal law: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i) that "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all
things should be most orderly." But nature does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in
necessaries. Therefore, no law is natural to man.

Objection 2. Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated above (Question 90,
Article 2). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in
irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by
his reason and will. Therefore, no law is natural to man.

Objection 3. Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man is freer than all
the animals, on account of his free-will, with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since
therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a natural law.

On the contrary, A gloss on Romans 2:14: "When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those
things that are of the law," comments as follows: "Although they have no written law, yet they have the
natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what is evil."

I answer that, As stated above (90, 1, ad 1), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two
ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and
measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore,
since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated
above (Article 1); it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely,
from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends.
Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in
so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore
it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this
participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after
saying (Psalm 4:6): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of
justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth us good things?" in answer to which question he says: "The
light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying that the light of natural reason,
whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing
else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else
than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.

Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold, if the natural law were something different from
the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation thereof, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2. Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature, as
stated above (Question 10, Article 1): for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known
naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect
of the last end. Accordingly, the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the
natural law.

Reply to Objection 3. Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the
rational creature does. But because the rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational
manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is properly called a law,
since a law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above (Question 90, Article 1). Irrational
creatures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the
eternal law in them, except by way of similitude.

Article 3. Whether there is a human law?

Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation of the
eternal law, as stated above (Article 2). Now through the eternal law "all things are most orderly," as
Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore, the natural law suffices for the ordering of all human
affairs. Consequently, there is no need for a human law.

Objection 2. Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above (Question 90, Article 1).
But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no
law can emanate from human reason.
Objection 3. Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3. But the dictates of
human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, according to Wisdom 9:14: "The thoughts of mortal men are
fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore, no law can emanate from human reason.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other
temporal, which he calls human.

answer that, As stated above (90, 1, ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be
observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason: for each
proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly, we conclude
that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the
conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired
by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and
indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination
of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws,
provided the other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above (90, A2,3,4). Wherefore Tully
says in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source in nature; thence certain things came
into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were
approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law."

Reply to Objection 1. The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the Divine
Reason, but according to its own mode, and imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative
reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the knowledge of certain general
principles, but not proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom;
so too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, according to
certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases, which are,
however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction
them by law.

Reply to Objection 2. Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles impressed on
it by nature, are general rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural
reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things that are from nature.

Reply to Objection 3. The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular and
contingent: but not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human
laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it
necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its
own particular genus.

Article 4. Whether there was any need for a Divine law?

Objection 1. It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because, as stated above (Article 2),
the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as stated
above (Article 1). Therefore, there was no need for a Divine law in addition to the natural law, and
human laws derived therefrom.

Objection 2. Further, it is written (Sirach 15:14) that "God left man in the hand of his own counsel."
Now counsel is an act of reason, as stated above (Question 14, Article 1). Therefore, man was left to the
direction of his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated above (Article 3).
Therefore, there is no need for man to be governed also by a Divine law.

Objection 3. Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational
creatures have no Divine law besides the natural inclination impressed on them. Much less,
therefore, should the rational creature have a Divine law in addition to the natural law.

On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before him, saying (Psalm 118:33): "Set before me for a
law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord."

I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to
have a Divine law. And this for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform
his proper acts in view of his last end. And indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is
proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction of the
part of his reason, besides the natural law and human law which is derived from it. But since man is
ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is m\disproportionate to man's natural faculty, as stated
above (Question 5, Article 5), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man
should be directed to his end by a law given by God.

Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and
particular matters, different people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and
contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and
what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for
it is certain that such a law cannot err.

Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not
competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and
yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts.
Consequently, human law could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was necessary for
this purpose that a Divine law should supervene.

Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil
deeds: since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and
would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse. In order,
therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to
supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.

And these four causes are touched upon in Psalm 118:8, where it is said: "The law of the Lord is
unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin; "converting souls," because it directs not only exterior, but
also interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the certainty of what is true and
right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.

Reply to Objection 1. By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity
of human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the
additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law.

Reply to Objection 2. Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed from some principles. Nor is
it enough for it to proceed from principles imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural law,
for the reasons given above: but there is need for certain additional principles, namely, the precepts of
the Divine law.

Reply to Objection 3. Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is
proportionate to their natural powers: consequently, the comparison fails.

Article 5. Whether there is but one Divine law?

Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where there is one king in one
kingdom there is but one law. Now the whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according
to Psalm 46:8: "God is the King of all the earth." Therefore, there is but one Divine law.

Objection 2. Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he
makes the law. But God intends one and the same thing for all men; since according to 1 Timothy 2:4:
"He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Therefore, there is but
one Divine law.

Objection 3. Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the
natural law, according as the revelation of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge. Therefore,
much more is the Divine law but one.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Hebrews 7:12): "The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that
a translation also be made of the law." But the priesthood is twofold, as stated in the same passage, viz.
the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore, the Divine law is twofold, namely the
Old Law and the New Law.
I answer that, As stated in the I, 30, 3, distinction is the cause of number. Now things may be
distinguished in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether specifically different, e.g. a horse and
an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a boy and a man: and in this way the
Divine law is divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle (Galatians 3:24-25) compares the state of
man under the Old Law to that of a child "under a pedagogue"; but the state under the New Law, to that
of a full grown man, who is "no longer under a pedagogue."

Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with the three
conditions pertaining to law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the
common good as to its end, as stated above (Question 90, Article 2). This good may be twofold. It may
be a sensible and earthly good; and to this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: wherefore, at the
very outset of the law, the people were invited to the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans (Exodus 3:8-
17).
Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the New Law.
Wherefore, at the very beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying
(Matthew 4:17): "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Hence Augustine says (Contra
Faust. iv) that "promises of temporal goods are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is
called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament."

Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the order of righteousness (4): wherein
also the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to Matthew 5:20:
"Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the
kingdom of heaven." Hence the saying that "the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls
the mind" ( Sentent. iii, D, xl).

Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear
of punishment: but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed
in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence Augustine says (Contra Adimant.

Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little difference [The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words 'timor' and
'amor'--'fear' and 'love.'] between the Law and the Gospel--fear and love."

Reply to Objection 1. As the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the
adults, so also the one King, God, in His one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet
imperfect, and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had been led to a greater
capacity for Divine things.

Reply to Objection 2. The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through Christ,
according to Acts 4:12: "There is no other name . . . given to men, whereby we must be saved."
Consequently, the law that brings all to salvation could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But
before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law
containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him.

Reply to Objection 3. The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts, common to both
the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man
also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not stand in the same relation.
Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold, as already explained.

Article 6. Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no law of the "fomes" of sin. For Isidore says (Etym. v) that
the "law is based on reason." But the "fomes" of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it.
Therefore, the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.

Objection 2. Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey it are called transgressors. But
man is not called a transgressor, from not following the instigations of the "fomes"; but rather from his
following them. Therefore, the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.

Objection 3. Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated above (Question 90, Article 2). But
the "fomes" inclines us, not to the common, but to our own private good. Therefore, the "fomes" has not the
nature of sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Romans 7:23): "I see another law in my members, fighting against
the law of my mind."

I answer that, As stated above (2; 90, 1, ad 1), the law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and
measures; but, by way of participation, in that which is ruled and measured; so that every inclination or
ordination which may be found in things subject to the law, is called a law by participation, as stated
above (2; 90, 1, ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a twofold inclination from the
lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly inclines his subjects to something; sometimes indeed different
subjects to different acts; in this way we may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law.
Secondly, indirectly; thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter
passes into another order, so as to be under another law, as it were: thus if a soldier be turned out of the
army, he becomes a subject of rural or of mercantile legislation.

Accordingly, under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various natural inclinations, so that what
is, as it were, a law for one, is against the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in a way,
the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another meek animal. And so the law of man, which,
by the Divine ordinance, is allotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is that he should act
in accordance with reason: and this law was so effective in the primitive state, that nothing either beside
or against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back on God, he fell under the
influence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each one individually, the more he deviates
from the path of reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of
sensuality, according to Psalm 48:21: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been
compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them."

So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the "fomes," in other animals has simply the
nature of a law (yet only in so far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a direct
inclination. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this way, rather is it a deviation from the law of
reason. But since, by the just sentence of God, man is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft
of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the
Divine law depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law.

Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the "fomes" in itself, as an incentive to evil. It is not thus
that it has the nature of a law, as stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the Divine
law: it is as though we were to say that the law allows a nobleman to be condemned to hard labor for
some misdeed.

Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers law in the light of a rule or measure: for it is in this
sense that those who deviate from the law become transgressors. But the "fomes" is not a law in this
respect, but by a kind of participation, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the "fomes" as to its proper inclination, and not as to its
origin. And yet if the inclination of sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained
to the common good, namely, to the preservation of nature in the species or in the individual. And this
is in man also, in so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called "fomes" in so far as it strays
from the order of reason.

Question 92. The effects of law

1. Is an effect of law to make men good?

2. Are the effects of law to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish, as the Jurist states?

Article 1. Whether an effect of law is to make men good?

Objection 1. It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For men are good through virtue,
since virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6 is "that which makes its subject good." But virtue is in man from God
alone, because He it is Who "works it in us without us," as we stated above (Question 55, Article 4) in
giving the definition of virtue. Therefore, the law does not make men good.
Objection 2. Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the very fact that a man obeys
a law is due to his being good. Therefore, in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore, the
law does not make men good.

Objection 3. Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above (Question 90, Article 2). But
some behave well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves.
Therefore, it is not the business of the law to make men good.

Objection 4. Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does
not intend the good of his subjects, but considers only his own profit. Therefore, ,law does not make men
good.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the "intention of every lawgiver is to make good
citizens."

I answer that, as stated above (90, 1, ad 2; A3,4), a law is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler
by whom his subjects are governed. Now the virtue of any subordinate thing consists in its being well
subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible
faculties consists in their being obedient to reason; and accordingly "the virtue of every subject consists
in his being well subjected to his ruler," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). But every law aims at being
obeyed by those who are subject to it. Consequently, it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead
its subjects to their proper virtue: and since virtue is "that which makes its subject good," it follows that
the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good, either simply or in some particular
respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on true good, which is the common good regulated
according to Divine justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good simply. If, however,
the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to
himself, or in opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good simply, but in respect
to that particular government. In this way good is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a
man is called a good robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to his end.

Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is twofold, as explained above (Question 63, Article 2), viz. acquired and
infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an action contributes to both, but in different ways; for it
causes the acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it when it already
exists. And since law is given for the purpose of directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to
virtue, so far does law make men good. Wherefore the Philosopher says in the second book of the
Politics (Ethic. ii) that "lawgivers make men good by habituating them to good works."

Reply to Objection 2. It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue that one obeys the law, but
sometimes it is through fear of punishment, and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, which is a
beginning of virtue, as stated above (Question 63, Article 1).
Reply to Objection 3. The goodness of any part is considered in comparison with the whole; hence
Augustine says (Confess. iii) that "unseemly is the part that harmonizes not with the whole." Since then
every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good, unless he be well proportionate to the
common good: nor can the whole be well consistent unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently,
the common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be virtuous, at least those whose
business it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of the community, that the other citizens be so far
virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "the
virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen is not the
same as that of a good man."

Reply to Objection 4. A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely
speaking, but rather a perversion of law; and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it aims at the
citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature of a law consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior
to his subjects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is to make them good, not simply, but with respect to
that particular government.

Article 2. Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned?

Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably assigned as consisting in "command,"
"prohibition," "permission" and "punishment." For "every law is a general precept," as the jurist states.
But command and precept are the same. Therefore, the other three are superfluous.

Objection 2. Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to be good, as stated above (Article 1). But
counsel aims at a higher good than a command does. Therefore, it belongs to law to counsel rather than to
command.

Objection 3. Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so does reward. Therefore, if to
punish is reckoned an effect of law, so also is to reward.

Objection 4. Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good, as stated above (Article 1). But he
that obeys the law, merely through fear of being punished, is not good: because "although a good deed
may be done through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done well," as Augustine says (Contra
duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore, punishment is not a proper effect of law.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): "Every law either permits

something, as: 'A brave man may demand his reward'": or forbids something, as: "No man may ask a
consecrated virgin in marriage": or punishes, as: "Let him that commits a murder be put to death."
I answer that, Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason asserting something, so is a law a dictate of
reason, commanding something. Now it is proper to reason to lead from one thing to another. Wherefore
just as, in demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us from certain principles to assent to the conclusion,
so it induces us by some means to assent to the precept of the law.

Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the law directs, as stated above (90,
A1,2; 91, 4). Again there are three kinds of human acts: for, as stated above (Question 18, Article 8),
some acts are good generically, viz. acts of virtue; and in respect of these the act of the law is a precept
or command, for "the law commands all acts of virtue" (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts are evil generically, viz.
acts of vice, and in respect of these the law forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect
of these the law permits; and all acts that are either not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called
indifferent. And it is the fear of punishment that law makes use of in order to ensure obedience: in which
respect punishment is an effect of law.

Reply to Objection 1. Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so a prohibition is a kind of
precept: and accordingly, taking precept in a wide sense, every law is a kind of precept.

Reply to Objection 2. To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be within the competency even of
a private person, who cannot make a law. Wherefore too the Apostle, after giving a certain counsel (1
Corinthians 7:12) says: "I speak, not the Lord." Consequently, it is not reckoned as an effect of law.

Reply to Objection 3. To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to punish pertains to none but
the framer of the law, by whose authority the pain is inflicted. Wherefore to reward is not
reckoned an effect of law, but only to punish.

Reply to Objection 4. From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what is good, through fear
of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do so likewise, with delight and of one's own accord.
Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads men on to being good.

1. What is the eternal law?

2. Is it known to all?
3. Is every law is derived from it?
4. Are necessary things subject to the eternal law?
5. Are natural contingencies subject to the eternal law?
6. Are all human things subject to it?

Article 1. Whether the eternal law is a sovereign type [Ratio] existing in God?
Objection 1. It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type existing in God. For there is only
one eternal law. But there are many types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii,
qu. 46) that God "made each thing according to its type." Therefore, the eternal law does not seem to be a
type existing in the Divine mind.

Objection 2. Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word, as stated above (Question 90,
Article 4). But Word is a Personal name in God, as stated in the I, 34, 1: whereas type refers to the
Essence. Therefore, the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.

Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a law above our minds, which is
called truth." But the law which is above our minds is the eternal law. Therefore, truth is the eternal law.
But the idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore, the eternal law is not the same as the
sovereign type.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is the sovereign type, to which
we must always conform."

I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made by his art, so too
in every governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by those
who are subject to his government. And just as the type of the things yet to be made by an art is called
the art or exemplar of the products of that art, so too the type in him

who governs the acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the other conditions be
present which we have mentioned above (Article 90). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all
things in relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as stated in the I, 14, 8.
Moreover He governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, as was also
stated in the I, 103, 5. Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are
created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to
their due end, bears the character of law. Accordingly, the eternal law is nothing else than the type of
Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and movements.

Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types which regard the proper
nature of each single thing; and consequently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality,
according to their different relations to things, as stated in the I, 15, 2. But law is said to direct human
acts by ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Question 90, Article 2). And things, which
are in themselves different, may be considered as one, according as they are ordained to one common
thing. Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type of this order.

Reply to Objection 2. With regard to any sort of word, two points may be considered: viz. the word
itself, and that which is expressed by the word. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth
of man, and expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same applies to the human
mental
word, which is nothing else that something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts
mentally. So then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the Father is the name of a Person: but
all things that are in the Father's knowledge, whether they refer to the Essence or to the Persons, or to the
works of God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other
things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the
eternal law is a Personal name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship
between type and word.

Reply to Objection 3. The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the same relation to things, as the
types of the human intellect. For the human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is
not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with things, since "an opinion is true or
false according as it answers to the reality." But the Divine intellect is the measure of things: since each
thing has so far truth in it, as it represents the Divine intellect, as was stated in the I, 16, 1. Consequently
the Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself.

Article 2. Whether the eternal law is known to all?

Objection 1. It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. Because, as the Apostle says (1
Corinthians 2:11), "the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal
law is a type existing in the Divine mind. Therefore, it is unknown to all save God alone.

Objection 2. Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the eternal law is that by which it is right
that all things should be most orderly." But all do not know how all things are most orderly. Therefor,e
all do not know the eternal law.

Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the eternal law is not subject to the
judgment of man." But according to Ethic. i, "any man can judge well of what he knows." Therefore,
the eternal law is not known to us.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted
on us."

I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some
likeness of that thing is found: thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its rays.
So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence.
But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a
kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says
(De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common
principles of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more,
some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law.
Reply to Objection 1. We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in themselves; but they
are made known to us in their effects, according to Romans 1:20: "The invisible things of God . . . are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."

Reply to Objection 2. Although each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity, in the
way explained above, yet none can comprehend it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects.
Therefore, it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in the way aforesaid, knows also the
whole order of things, whereby they are most orderly.

Reply to Objection 3. To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First, as when a cognitive power
judges of its proper object, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that
eateth, the taste?"

It is to this kind of judgment that the Philosopher alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of
what he knows," by judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true. In another way we speak of a
superior judging of a subordinate by a kind of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and
such or not. And thus none can judge of the eternal law.

Article 3. Whether every law is derived from the eternal law?

Objection 1. It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law. For there is a law of the
"fomes," as stated above (Question 91, Article 6), which is not derived from that Divine law which is the
eternal law, since thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh," of which the Apostle says (Romans 8:7),
that "it cannot be subject to the law of God." Therefore, not every law is derived from the eternal law.

Objection 2. Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, because, as stated above (2,
Objection 2), "the eternal law is that, according to which it is right that all things should be most
orderly." But some laws are unjust, according to Isaiah 10:1: "Woe to them that make wicked laws."
Therefore, not every law is derived from the eternal law.

Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law which is framed for ruling the
people, rightly permits many things which are punished by Divine providence." But the type of Divine
providence is the eternal law, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore, not even every good law is derived
from the eternal law.

On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says (Proverbs 8:15): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just
things." But the type of Divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore, all
laws proceed from the eternal law.
I answer that, As stated above (90, A1,2), the law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end.
Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must needs be
derived from the power of the first mover; since the second mover does not move except in so far as it is
moved by the first. Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of
government is derived by secondary governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be
done in a state flows from the king's command to his inferior administrators: and again in things of art
the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the under-crafts-men, who
work with their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, all the
plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of
inferior governors are all other laws besides the eternal law. Therefore, all laws, in so far as they partake
of right reason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "in
temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the eternal law."

Reply to Objection 1. The "fomes" has the nature of law in man, in so far as it is a punishment resulting
from Divine justice; and in this respect it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far
as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine law, and has not the nature of law, as
stated above (Question 91, Article 6).

Reply to Objection 2. Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is
clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is
called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence. Nevertheless, even an unjust law, in
so far as it retains some appearance of law, though being framed by one who is in power, is derived from
the eternal law; since all power is from the Lord God, according to Romans 13:1.

Reply to Objection 3. Human law is said to permit certain things, not as approving them, but as being
unable to direct them. And many things are directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to
direct, because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause. Hence the very fact that
human law does not meddle with matters it cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the eternal law.
It would be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns. Consequently, it
does not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect
equality with it.
Article 4. Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law?

Objection 1. It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law. For whatever
is reasonable is subject to reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore, it is subject
to
(the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the Divine reason. Therefore, God's will is subject to the
eternal law. But God's will is eternal. Therefore, eternal and necessary things are subject to the eternal
law.
Objection 2. Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the King's law. Now the Son, according
to
1 Corinthians 15:28-29, "shall be subject . . .

to God and the Father . . . when He shall have delivered up the Kingdom to Him." Therefore, the Son,
Who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law.

Objection 3. Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But many necessary things are
subject to Divine providence: for instance, the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly
bodies. Therefore, even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.

On the contrary, Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and consequently need no restraining.
But laws are imposed on men, in order to restrain them from evil, as explained above (Question 92,
Article 2). Therefore, necessary things are not subject to the eternal law.

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the eternal law is the type of the Divine government.
Consequently, whatever is subject to the Divine government, is subject to the eternal law: while if
anything is not subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the eternal law. The application
of this distinction may be gathered by looking around us. For those things are subject to human
government, which can be done by man; but what pertains to the nature of man is not subject to human
government; for instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or feet. Accordingly, all that is in things
created by God, whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: while things
pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself.

Reply to Objection 1. We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as to the will itself: and thus,
since God's will is His very Essence, it is subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal
law, but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of God's will, as to the things
themselves that
God wills about creatures; which things are subject to the eternal law, in so far as they are planned by
Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things God's will is said to be reasonable [rationalis]: though
regarded in itself it should rather be called their type [ratio].

Reply to Objection 2. God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born of God. Consequently,
He is not subject to Divine providence or to the eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law by a
kind of appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi). But He is said to be subject to the
Father by reason of His human nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be greater than He.

The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary things that are created.
Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some necessary things have a cause
of their necessity: and thus they derive from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And
this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is restrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it
cannot do otherwise than it is allowed to.

Article 5. Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law?

Objection 1. It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the eternal law. Because
promulgation is essential to law, as stated above (Question 90, Article 4). But a law cannot be
promulgated except to rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore,
none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; and consequently natural contingents are not.

Objection 2. Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason," as stated in Ethic. i. But
the eternal law, is the supreme type, as stated above (Article 1). Since then natural contingents do not
partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that they are not subject to the
eternal law.

Objection 3. Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural contingent defects occur. Therefore,
they are not subject to the eternal law.

On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 8:29): "When He compassed the sea with its bounds, and set a
law to the waters, that they should not pass their limits."

I answer that, We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the eternal law which is the law of God.
For the law of man extends only to rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law
directs the actions of those that are subject to the government of someone: wherefore, properly speaking,
none imposes a law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things
subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving those things, for these irrational creatures do
not move themselves, but are moved by others, as stated above (Question 1, Article 2). Consequently,
man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to him. But he can
impose laws on rational beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or pronouncement of any
kind, he imprints on their minds a rule which is a principle of action.

Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward principle of action on the man that
is subject to him, so God imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so, in
this way, God is said to command the whole of nature, according to Psalm 148:6: "He hath made a
decree, and it shall not pass away." And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are
subject to the eternal law. Consequently, irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, through being
moved by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine
commandment.
Reply to Objection 1. The impression of an inward active principle is to natural things, what the
promulgation of law is to men: because law, by being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle
of human actions, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2. Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are obedient to human reason: whereas
they do partake of the Divine Reason by obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over
more things than human reason does. And as the members of the human body are moved at the command
of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since they have no apprehension subordinate to reason; so
too irrational creatures are moved by God, without, on that account, being rational.

Reply to Objection 3. Although the defects which occur in natural things are outside the order of
particular causes, they are not outside the order of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e.
God, from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the I, 22, 2. And since the eternal law is
the type of Divine providence, as stated above (Article 1), hence the defects of natural things are subject
to the eternal law.

Article 6. Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?

Objection 1. It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to the eternal law. For the Apostle says
(Galatians 5:18): "If you are led by the spirit you are not under the law." But the righteous who are the
sons of God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God, according to Romans 8:14: "Whosoever are led by
the spirit of God, they are the sons of God." Therefore, not all men are under the eternal law.

Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Romans 8:7): "The prudence [Vulgate: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an
enemy to God: for it is not subject to the law of God." But many are those in whom the prudence of the flesh
dominates. Therefore, all men are not subject to the eternal law which is the law of God.

Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is that by which the wicked
deserve misery, the good, a life of blessedness." But those who are already blessed, and those who are
already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore, they are not under the eternal law.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades the laws of the most-high
Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace of the universe is administered."

I answer that, there are two ways in which a thing is subject to the eternal law, as explained above (Article
5): first, by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and passion, i.e.
by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward motive principle: and in this second way, irrational
creatures are subject to the eternal law, as stated above (Article 5). But since the rational nature, together
with that which it has in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational,
consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because while each rational creature has some
knowledge of the eternal law, as stated above (Article 2), it also has a natural inclination to that which
is in harmony with the eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted to the recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii,
1).

Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed, in the wicked; because in them the
natural inclination to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of good
is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But in the good both ways are found more perfect: because in
them, besides the natural knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom; and
again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added motive of grace and virtue.

Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as always acting according to it: whereas
the wicked are subject to the eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their
knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are imperfect; but this imperfection on the part of
action is supplied on the part of passion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning
them, according as they fail to act in harmony with that law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15):
"I esteem that the righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech. Rud. xviii): Out of the just
misery of the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation with
most suitable laws."

Reply to Objection 1. This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two ways. First, so that a man is said
to be under the law, through being pinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the same
passage a gloss says that "he is under the law, who refrains from evil deeds, through fear of punishment
threatened by the law, and not from love of virtue." In this way the spiritual man is not under the law,
because he fulfils the law willingly, through charity which is poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost.
Secondly, it can be understood as meaning that the works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are the
works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost is not under the law, as
neither is the Son, as stated above (4, ad 2); it follows that such works, in so far as they are of the Holy
Ghost, are not under the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when he says (2 Corinthians 3:17): "Where
the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."

Reply to Objection 2. The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of God as regards action;
since it inclines to actions contrary to the Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards
passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law of Divine justice. Nevertheless, in no
man does the prudence of the flesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and
consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in accordance with the eternal law. For we have
seen above (Question 85, Article 2) that sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature.

Reply to Objection 3. A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the end by one and the same
cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved
thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law that some deserve happiness, others
unhappiness, so is it by the eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an unhappy
state. Accordingly, both the blessed and the damned are under the eternal law.

Question 94. The natural law

1. What is the natural law?

2. What are the precepts of the natural law?

3. Are all acts of virtue prescribed by the natural law?
4. Is the natural law the same in all?
5. Is it changeable?
6. Can it be abolished from the heart of man?

Article 1. Whether the natural law is a habit?

Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5),
"there are three things in the soul: power, habit, and passion." But the natural law is not one of the soul's
powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going through them one by one. Therefore, the
natural law is a habit.

Objection 2. Further, Basil [Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22 says that the conscience or "synderesis" is
the "law of our mind"; which can only apply to the natural law. But the "synderesis" is a habit, as was
shown in the I, 79, 12. Therefore the natural law is a habit.

Objection 3. Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be shown further on (6). But man's
reason, which the law regards, does not always think about the natural law. Therefore, the natural law is
not an act, but a habit.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit is that whereby something is done
when necessary." But such is not the natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act
by it. Therefore, the natural law is not a habit.

I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, properly and essentially: and thus the
natural law is not a habit. For it has been stated above (90, 1, ad 2) that the natural law is something
appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now that which a man does is not the
same as that whereby he does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then
a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially.
Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit: thus faith may mean that
which we hold by faith. And accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered
by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural law
may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the habit itself
whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles the habit of which we possess.

Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of virtue; and since it is
evident that virtue is a principle of action, he mentions only those things which are principles of human
acts, viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in the soul besides these three: there are
acts; thus "to will" is in the one that wills; again, things known are in the knower; moreover, its own
natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like.

Reply to Objection 2. "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the
precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human actions.

Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that the natural law is held habitually; and this is
granted.

To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes a man is unable to make use
of that which is in him habitually, on account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is
unable to use the habit of science. In like manner, through the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use
the habit of understanding of principles, or the natural law, which is in him habitually.

Article 2. Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?

Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law contains, not several precepts, but one only. For law is a
kind of precept, as stated above (Question 92, Article 2). If therefore there were many precepts of the
natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws.

Objection 2. Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But human nature, as a whole, is
one; though, as to its parts, it is manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of nature,
on account of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are many, by reason of the number of parts of
human nature. The result would be that even things relating to the inclination of the concupiscible faculty
belong to the natural law.

Objection 3. Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above (Question 90, Article 1).
Now reason is but one in man. Therefore, there is only one precept of the natural law.
On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in relation to practical matters, as the first
principles to matters of demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles. Therefore,
there are also several precepts of the natural law.

I answer that, As stated above (Question 91, Article 3), the precepts of the natural law are to the
practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both
are selfevident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in
relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the
notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that such
a proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its very
nature, selfevident, since who says "man," says "a rational being": and yet to one who knows not what a
man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain
axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms
are known to all, as, "Every whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are
equal to one another." But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the
meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is
self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not evident to the unlearned, for
they cannot grasp it.

Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which,
before aught else, falls under apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things
whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that "the same thing
cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is based on the notion of "being" and "not-
being": and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as "being" is the
first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the
apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under
the aspect of good. Consequently, the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of
good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good
is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon
this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the
precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.

Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those
things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and
consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore
according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in
man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common
with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its
nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding
off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain
to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue
of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all
animals" [Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly,
there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to
him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this
respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to
avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.

Reply to Objection 1. All these precepts of the law of nature have the character of one natural law,
inasmuch as they flow from one first precept.

Reply to Objection 2. All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature, e.g. of the
concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are
reduced to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of the natural law are many in
themselves, but are based on one common foundation.

Reply to Objection 3. Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all things regarding man; so that
whatever can be ruled by reason, is contained under the law of reason.

Article 3. Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?

Objection 1. It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law. Because, as stated
above (Question 90, Article 2) it is essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some
acts of virtue are ordained to the private good of the individual, as is evident especially in regards to acts
of temperance. Therefore, not all acts of virtue are the subject of natural law.

Objection 2. Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore all acts of virtue are
prescribed by the natural law, it seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies to
certain special sins.

Objection 3. Further, those things which are according to nature are common to all. But acts of virtue are
not common to all: since a thing is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore, not all acts of virtue
are prescribed by the natural law.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues are natural." Therefore, virtuous
acts also are a subject of the natural law.

I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as
such and such acts considered in their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as
virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has been stated (2) that to the natural law
belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined
naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat.
Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to
act according to reason: and this is to act according to virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of
virtue are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act
virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in their proper species, thus
not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which
nature does not incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be
conducive to well-living.

Reply to Objection 1. Temperance is about the natural concupiscence of food, drink and sexual matters,
which are indeed ordained to the natural common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the
moral common good.

Reply to Objection 2. By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man--and in this
sense all sins, as being against reason, are also against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30):
or we may mean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and in this sense, certain special
sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is
unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime. Reply to Objection 3. This
argument considers acts in themselves. For it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts
are virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as
being out of proportion to them.

Article 4. Whether the natural law is the same in all men?

Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals
(Dist.
i) that "the natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this is not common to
all men; because, as it is written (Romans 10:16), "all do not obey the gospel." Therefore the natural law
is not the same in all men.

Objection 2. Further, "Things which are according to the law are said to be just," as stated in Ethic. v.
But it is stated in the same book that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard
to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men.

Objection 3. Further, as stated above (2,3), to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is
inclined according to his nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things; some to
the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to other things. Therefore there is
not one natural law for all.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common to all nations."
I answer that, As stated above (2,3), to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined
naturally: and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process
of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is
differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied
chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like
the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied
with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is
necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we
encounter defects. Accordingly, then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to
principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but
only as regards the principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or
practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and
where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.

It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason,
truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the
speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that
the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as
to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor,
where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason:
and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be
restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case
that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they
are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the
more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should
be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of
conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to
restore or not to restore.

Consequently, we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to
rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of
those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to
knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just
as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle), and
as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of
nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered
wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).

Reply to Objection 1. The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law
and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that
whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them. Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the
natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way of example, "by which
everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done by."
Reply to Objection 2. The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things that are naturally
just, not as general principles, but as conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of
cases, but failing in a few.

Reply to Objection 3. As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the natural
inclinations belonging to the other powers must needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is
universally right for all men, that all their inclinations should be directed according to reason.

Article 5. Whether the natural law can be changed?

Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because on Sirach 17:9, "He gave them
instructions, and the law of life," the gloss says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order
to correct the law of nature." But that which is corrected is changed. Therefore, the natural law can be
changed.

Objection 2. Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft are against the natural law. But we
find these things changed by God: as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Genesis
22:2); and when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians (Exodus 12:35);
and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a wife of fornications" (Hosea 1:2). Therefore, the
natural law can be changed.

Objection 3. Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the possession of all things in common, and
universal freedom, are matters of natural law." But these things are seen to be changed by human laws.
Therefore, it seems that the natural law is subject to change.

On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural law dates from the creation of the
rational creature. It does not vary according to time, but remains unchangeable."

I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In
this sense nothing hinders the natural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of
human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the Divine law and by human
laws.

Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of subtraction, so that what previously
was according to the natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable
in its first principles: but in its secondary principles, which, as we have said (4), are certain detailed
proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that what it
prescribes be not right in most cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence,
through some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as stated above (Article 4).
Reply to Objection 1. The written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural law, either
because it supplies what was wanting to the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the
hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed those things good which are naturally
evil; which perversion stood in need of correction.

Reply to Objection 2. All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of nature: which death of nature
is inflicted by the power of God on account of original sin, according to 1 Samuel 2:6: "The Lord killeth and
maketh alive." Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent,
without any injustice whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife; who is allotted to
him by the law emanating from God. Consequently, intercourse with any woman, by the command of God,
is neither adultery nor fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the taking of another's property. For
whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its
owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human things, that whatever is commanded
by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as stated in the
I, 105, 6, ad 1.

Reply to Objection 3. A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First, because nature
inclines thereto: e.g. that one should not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in
the contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural law, because nature did not give
him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense, "the possession of all things in common and universal
freedom" are said to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the distinction of possessions and slavery
were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly,
the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition.

Article 6. Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?

Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the heart of man. Because on
Romans 2:14, "When the Gentiles who have not the law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness,
which sin had blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by grace." But the law of
righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore, the law of nature can be blotted out.

Objection 2. Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is
blotted out by sin. Much more therefore can the law of nature be blotted out.

Objection 3. Further, that which is established by law is made just. But many things are enacted by
men, which are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore, the law of nature can be abolished from the
heart of man.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity
itself effaces not." But the law which is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore, the
natural law cannot be blotted out.

I answer that, As stated above (4,5), there belong to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts,
that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which are, as it were,
conclusions following closely from first principles. As to those general principles, the natural law, in the
abstract, can nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a particular
action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice,
on account of concupiscence or some other passion, as stated above (Question 77, Article 2). But as to
the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by
evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by
vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle
states (Romans 1), were not esteemed sinful.

Reply to Objection 1. Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not universally, except
perchance in regard to the secondary precepts of the natural law, in the way stated above.

Reply to Objection 2. Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature is more essential to
man, and therefore more enduring.

Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the natural law, against which
some legislators have framed certain enactments which are unjust.

Question 95. Human law

1. Its utility
2. Its origin
3. Its quality
4. Its division

Article 1. Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?

Objection 1. It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. Because the purpose of
every law is that man be made good thereby, as stated above (Question 92, Article 1). But men are more
to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws.
Therefore, there was no need to frame laws.
Objection 2. Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as to
animate justice." But animate justice is better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws.
Therefore, it would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to the decision of
judges, than to frame laws in addition.

Objection 3. Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, as is evident from what has
been stated above (90, A1,2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number,
matter pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a
wise man, who looks into each one of them. Therefore, it would have been better for human acts to be
directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore, there was no need of human
laws.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in fear thereof human audacity might
be held in check, that innocence might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of
punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But these things are most necessary to
mankind. Therefore, it was necessary that human laws should be made.

I answer that, As stated above (63, 1; 94, 3), man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of
virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe that man is helped
by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from
nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, to whom
nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for
himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man
from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more
capable of being trained. Consequently, a man needs to receive this training from another, whereby to
arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by their
good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is
by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to
words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they
might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in
this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous.
Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws.
Therefore, in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as
the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he
the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise
means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to do.

Reply to Objection 1. Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished
better than by coercion: but men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are
compelled.
Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better that all things be regulated by
law, than left to be decided by judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few
wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be necessary to judge aright
of each single case. Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to
make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for
man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one solitary
fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas those who sit in
judgment of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity;
wherefore their judgment is perverted.

Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be deflected,
therefore it was necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few
matters to be left to the decision of men.

Reply to Objection 3. Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law "have necessarily to
be committed to judges," as the Philosopher says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning
something that has happened or not happened," and the like.

Article 2. Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?

Objection 1. It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference."
But those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference. Therefore, the
enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural law.

Objection 2. Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the
natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above (Question 94, Article 4). Therefore, that which is
established by human law does not belong to the natural law.

Objection 3. Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that
"the natural just is that which is equally valid everywhere." If therefore human laws were derived from
the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all: which is clearly false.

Objection 4. Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law.
But "it is not possible to give the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist says
[Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.]. Therefore, not all human laws are derived from
the natural law.
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from nature and were approved by
custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not just seems to be no law at all":
wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to
be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature,
as is clear from what has been stated above (91, 2, ad 2). Consequently, every human law has just so
much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the
law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.

But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a
conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like
to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second
mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the
craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape. Some things are
therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. that "one
must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no man":
while some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer
should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature.

Accordingly, both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in
the first way, are contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force
from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second way, have no other force
than that of human law.

Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by way of determination
or specification of the precepts of the natural law.

Reply to Objection 2. This argument avails for those things that are derived from the natural law, by
way of conclusions.

Reply to Objection 3. The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same
way on account of the great variety of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among
various people.

Reply to Objection 4. These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in
determining particular points of the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and
prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they see at once what is the best thing to
decide.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we ought to pay as much attention to the
undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their
demonstrations."
Article 3. Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?

Objection 1. It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is not appropriate,
when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of
the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to
misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit, but for the common good." Because he had previously
expressed the quality of law in three conditions, saying that "law is anything founded on reason, provided
that it foster religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common weal." Therefore, it was needless
to add any further conditions to these.

Objection 2. Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De Offic. vii). Therefore, after
saying "honest" it was superfluous to add "just."

Objection 3. Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10).
Therefore, it should not be stated in the definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the
country."

Objection 4. Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be necessary simply, because it
cannot be otherwise: and that which is necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment,
wherefore human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing may be necessary for an
end: and this necessity is the same as usefulness. Therefore, it is superfluous to say both "necessary" and
"useful."

On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore.

I answer that, Whenever, a thing is for an end, its form must be determined proportionately to that end; as
the form of a saw is such as to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that is ruled
and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and measure. Now both these conditions are
verified of human law: since it is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure ruled or
measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz. the Divine law and the natural
law, as explained above (2; 93, 3). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the jurist states
[Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit. iii; De Leg. et Senat.]. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of
law, lays down, at first, three conditions; viz. that it "foster religion," inasmuch as it is proportionate to
the Divine law; that it be "helpful to discipline," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law; and
that it "further the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind.
All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three. For it is called virtuous because it
fosters religion. And when he goes on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according to the
customs of the country, adapted to place and time," he implies that it should be helpful to discipline.
For human discipline depends on first on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying "just":
secondly, it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline should be adapted to each one
according to his ability, taking also into account the ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not
laid on children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since man cannot live alone in
society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he
says, "adapted to place and time." The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean that law should
further the common weal: so that "necessity" refers to the removal of evils; "usefulness" to the
attainment of good; "clearness of expression," to the need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law
itself. And since, as stated above (Question 90, Article 2), law is ordained to the common good, this is
expressed in the last part of the description.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Article 4. Whether Isidore's division of human laws is appropriate?

Objection 1. It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes or human law (Etym. v, 4,
seqq.). For under this law he includes the "law of nations," so called, because, as he says, "nearly all
nations use it." But as he says, "natural law is that which is common to all nations." Therefore, the law of
nations is not contained under positive human law, but rather under natural law.

Objection 2. Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ not formally but only
materially. But "statutes, decrees of the commonalty, senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions
(Etym. v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore, they do not differ, except materially. But art takes no
notice of such a distinction: since it may go on to infinity. Therefore, this division of human laws is not
appropriate.

Objection 3. Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests and soldiers, so are there other human
offices. Therefore, it seems that, as this division includes "military law," and "public law," referring to
priests and magistrates; so also it should include other laws pertaining to other offices of the state.

Objection 4. Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over. But it is accidental to law
that it be framed by this or that man. Therefore, it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names
of lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian" law, another the "Falcidian" law, etc.

On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (Objection 1) suffices.

I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something contained in the notion of that
thing. Thus a soul either rational or irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal is
divided properly and of itself in respect of its being rational or irrational; but not in the point of its being
white or black, which are entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human law, many
things are contained, in respect of any of which human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in
the first place it belongs to the notion of human law, to be derived from the law of nature, as explained
above (Article 2). In this respect positive law is divided into the "law of nations" and "civil law",
according to the two ways in which something may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above
(Article 2). Because, to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from the law of nature,
as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buying and selling, and the like, without which men cannot live
together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved in
Polit. i, 2. But those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination,
belong to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is best for itself.

Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the common good of the state. In
this respect human law may be divided according to the different kinds of men who work in a special
way for the common good: e.g. priests, by praying to God for the people; princes, by governing the
people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of the people. Wherefore certain special kinds of law are
adapted to these men.

magistrates; so also it should include other laws pertaining to other offices of the state.

Objection 4. Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over. But it is accidental to law
that it be framed by this or that man. Therefore, it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names
of lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian" law, another the "Falcidian" law, etc.

On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (Objection 1) suffices.

I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something contained in the notion of that
thing. Thus a soul either rational or irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal is
divided properly and of itself in respect of its being rational or irrational; but not in the point of its being
white or black, which are entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human law, many
things are contained, in respect of any of which human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in
the first place it belongs to the notion of human law, to be derived from the law of nature, as explained
above (Article 2). In this respect positive law is divided into the "law of nations" and "civil law",
according to the two ways in which something may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above
(Article 2). Because, to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from the law of nature,
as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buying and selling, and the like, without which men cannot live
together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved in
Polit. i, 2. But those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination,
belong to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is best for itself.
Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the common good of the state. In
this respect human law may be divided according to the different kinds of men who work in a special
way for the common good: e.g. priests, by praying to God for the people; princes, by governing the
people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of the people. Wherefore certain special kinds of law are
adapted to these men.

Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that one who governs the community of
the state, as shown above (Question 90, Article 3). In this respect, there are various human laws according
to the various forms of government. Of these, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10) one is

"monarchy," i.e. when the state is governed by one; and then we have "Royal Ordinances." Another form
is "aristocracy," i.e. government by the best men or men of highest rank; and then we have the
"Authoritative legal opinions" [Responsa Prudentum] and "Decrees of the Senate" [Senatus

consulta]. Another form is "oligarchy," i.e. government by a few rich and powerful men; and then we
have "Praetorian," also called "Honorary," law. Another form of government is that of the people, which
is called "democracy," and there we have "Decrees of the commonalty" [Plebiscita].There is also
tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, which,therefore, has no corresponding law. Finally,
there is a form of government made up of all these, and which is the best: and in this respect we have law

sanctioned by the "Lords and Commons," as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4,seqq.).

Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions. In this respect, according to the
various matters of which the law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named after
their authors: thus we have the "Lex Julia" about adultery, the "Lex Cornelia" concerning assassins,

and so on, differentiated in this way, not on account of the authors, but on account of the matters to
which they refer.

Reply to Objection 1. The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to man, in so far as he is
reasonable being, because it is derived from the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very
remote from its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless, it is distinct from the

natural law, especially it is distinct from the natural law which is common to all animals.

The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been said.