Salcedo v. Mendoza
Salcedo v. Mendoza
Salcedo v. Mendoza
FACTS: Leopoldo Salcedo was charged with reckless imprudence. The trial was scheduled but it was postponed
upon motion of the prosecution. Then the trial was again postponed due to the absence of Salcedo. The trial
was again was reset but again, no trial proceeded because no fiscal was present. This time, the accused,
through Atty. Edgardo Aceron, invoking the right of the accused to speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the
case against Salcedo which was then granted by the respondent Judge. On the same day, the prosecution filed
a motion for reconsideration but was denied. The prosecution filed a 2nd motion for reconsideration and the
judge set the hearing. After trial, the trial judge issued an order directing both parties to submit their
respective pleadings within 5 days. Both parties failed to comply with such order. Nevertheless, Judge
Mendoza issued an order setting aside its previous order dismissing the criminal case against Salcedo. Hence,
Salcedo appealed before the SC saying that the dismissal of the case against him is considered as an acquittal
and thus the revival of the case would place him in double jeopardy. This contention was supported by the
OSG.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VIOLATUON OF SALCEDO’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
RULING: Yes. The respondent Judge dismissed the case, upon the motion of the petitioner invoking his
constitutional right to speedy trial, because the prosecution failed to appear on the day of the trial after it had
previously been postponed twice. The effect of such dismissal is a dismiss predicated on the right of the
accused to speedy trial upon his own motion or express consent, amounts to an acquittal which will bar
another prosecution of the accused for the same offense. This is an exception to the rule that a dismissal
upon the motion or with the express consent of the accused will not be a bar to the subsequent prosecution
of the accused for the same offense as provided for in Section 9, Rule 113 of the ROC. The moment the
dismissal of a criminal case is predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial even if it is upon his own
motion or express consent, such dismissal is equivalent to acquittal and any attempt to prosecute the
accused for the same offense will violate the constitutional prohibition that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
THE PETITION IS GRANTED BECAUSE THE REVIVAL OF THE CASE AGAINST HIM PLACED HIM IN DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.