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Mid-term Essay
Question: 2. Heidegger claims that understanding is “thrown projection”. What does

he mean by this? What conclusions does he draw from this for interpretation? Do

you agree with his views?

By claiming that understanding is “thrown projection” in his seminal work, Being

and Time (1927, p. 243), Heidegger recasts understanding and the interpretive processes it

involves as a fundamental existentiale of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. With this

phenomenological ontology, Heidegger draws several morals about the nature of

interpretation, namely that it is always radically situated, ongoing in everyday perception,

and that it takes the form of making explicit that which is already understood. However,

Heidegger’s conclusions do give rise to objections about the inescapability of the

hermeneutical circle, and the lack of practical applicability of what seems to become a

very abstract idea. I, however, agree with Heidegger’s views, and will thus refute these

objections and defend his position from these concerns, offering responses to the issues

raised.

In order to grasp Heidegger’s claim that understanding is “thrown projection”, we

must first present the aspects of his fundamental ontology that gives rise to this notion.

Central to Heidegger’s phenomenological project is his conception of “Being-in-the-

world” as the “essential state” of Dasein (Heidegger’s term for the human mode of Being)

(p. 80). “Being-in-the-world” is described as a “unitary phenomenon”, directly opposing

the traditional objectivist conception, dominant in common sense and natural science, that

a detached observer with an internal isolated ego interacts with an independent external

reality (p.78). Dasein is now construed as being essentially relational, in which the world

“discloses” or presents itself to us in terms of our dynamic practical engagement with it in

“present-at-hand”, which takes on the traditional model of vision, in which the world

consists of fixed, stable substances and properties, allowing us to access objects

independent of us; and the “ready-to-hand”, in which objects present themselves in terms

of the possibility of how we might “use” them, so to speak (p.100). Heidegger’s primary

example for this new notion is a hammer, which discloses a series of potentialities for

practical interaction that we non-reflectively grasp in perceiving the hammer, relating to

its “serviceability, its usability, and its detrimentality” (p. 184). Dasein similarly, should

not be viewed as something “present-at-hand” but rather as “ready-to-hand”, and is thus

essentially defined in terms of its “potentiality-for-being”, or its openness to possibility.

In §31 then, Heidegger formally defines understanding in relation to this ontology as, “the

existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being” (Ibid.). Understanding is now

conceptualised as the very openness to possibility that is essential for Dasein, and thus a

primordial function of Being-in-the-world, rather than a reflective cognitive function as it

is conceived in common sense. This sense in which understanding by its nature will

“press forward” into possibilities is what Heidegger means when he identifies the

existential structure of “projection” in understanding (Ibid.). We should note that this

“projection” is not towards some thought-out project or end, but rather the projection

itself is “possibility as possibility” which simply is as such (p.185). However, this

openness to possibility is not total and unconstrained, or in Heidegger’s words, it does not

grant us a “liberty of indifference” (p. 183). This is because Dasein is, at all times,

“existentially surrendered to thrownness”, a notion that captures the idea that we have no

control over the “totality of involvements” or the network of practical possibilities

available to us in a given (not chosen) situation. Indeed, it is precisely because we are

thrown that we have a capacity for projection to something “more” that the factual
situation. As such, understanding forms the existential structure of “thrown projection”

which allows us to “see” the possibilities of Being-in-the-world.

This new, and in many ways, revolutionary conception of understanding leads

Heidegger to draw several conclusions about the nature of interpretation. Interpretation is

now canvassed as a broad and global process that is characterised as the “development of

the understanding” (p. 188). Importantly, interpretation does not change the understanding

or produce new information, it instead allows the “possibilities projected in

understanding” to be “grasped explicitly” or “taken apart” (pp. 189-191). This process of

making the understanding explicit takes the structure of “something as something”, in

which the field of the ready-to-hand is understood as something else, for example, “a

table, a door, a carriage or a bridge” (p. 189). We should note again that Heidegger is not

talking about a cognitive reflective process here, in that perception is always interpreting

even if the “as” structure is not obvious. Returning to the hammer example, we non-

reflectively know how to handle the hammer as something that can secure a nail (one of

many possible interpretations), and this process of interpretation is inherent in merely

encountering the object. In Heidegger’s words, “the mere seeing of the Things which are

closest to us bears in itself the structure of interpretation” (p. 190). What is particularly

important for this conception of interpretation is the notion that interpretation is only

possible in terms of what is already understood. A good metaphor to clarify this idea is

that, if understanding is our “sight”, or our general capacity for a field of vision,

interpretation would be something like attention, that singles out or perceptually “brings

close” a particular aspect of the ready-to-hand. This new framework for interpretation has

radical implications for the scope of the hermeneutical circle, which is now completely

all-encompassing as an existential structure that gives us access to the world. This is a

significant departure from previous theorists like Schleiermacher, who was interested in
part-whole interdependence of understanding texts, or Dilthey, who believed scientific

knowledge escapes this circle. More specifically, Heidegger emphasises that

“interpretation will be founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-

conception”, which he identifies as structures of our initial understanding, in that we have

background assumptions that we take for granted, our sight is always from a specific and

given perspective, and that we always come with particular conceptual frameworks and

expectations about the world (p. 191). As such, interpretation is always radically situated

in virtue of the “thrownness” of understanding and is never “a presuppositionless

apprehending of something presented to us” (Ibid.). In sum, from his notion of

understanding as “thrown projection”, Heidegger concludes that interpretation is the

ongoing process of making explicit the possibilities already grasped by our understanding,

meaning that all experience and knowledge in interpretation is bound up in this new

existential hermeneutical circle.

Having outlined Heidegger’s notions of understanding and interpretation, we are

now in a position to canvas some concerns and objections that may arise in response to

this revolutionary view. The first obvious concern with interpretation considered in this

existential sense is that we now seem to be trapped in the hermeneutical circle in every

aspect of experience and knowledge. In particular, the claim that, “Any interpretation

which is to contribute understanding must already have understood what is to be

interpreted,” on the surface certainly appears trivial (p. 194). It has the worrying

implication that we are trapped in our initial understanding and limited to making explicit

our own uncritical assumptions. It does not help that Heidegger’s solutions to this

problem seem to be a bit vague and cryptic, suggesting that, “What is decisive is not to

get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way” (p. 195). However, Heidegger has

just emphasised how we are “thrown” into this hermeneutical circle with no definitive
starting point, and that the processes within it are ongoing, primordial, and existential,

which seems to contradict the idea that we might somehow “come into it” from a position

of not being in it. The criteria for what the “right way” of coming into the circle might be

also remain concerningly vague. One could argue that, in light of this vagueness,

Heidegger’s conception of interpretation is restricted in its applicability, and can have no

practical use in the common practice of interpretation. This is also in virtue of the fact that

the conceptions of understanding and interpretation provided do not seem to be easily

applicable to texts, where the interpretation of text is really the paradigmatic aim of

hermeneutics as a discipline. We can question whether Heidegger has deflated the

meaning and practical use of the terms “understanding” and “interpretation” in his

existential generalisation of these concepts. For example, the idea that understanding is a

general openness to possibility that “always pertains to the whole basic state of Being-in-

the-world” seems to be too broad a conception for us to meaningfully access and employ.

It does not seem that we have gleaned any insight on how we practically might go about

interpreting texts, which throws into doubt the relevance of Heidegger’s claims. What, for

example, would be the criteria for whether our interpretations are valid or accurate?

Heidegger does not offer us easy answers. Habermas offers a critique along these lines,

that the radicality of Heidegger’s thought renders his insights inaccessible, requiring a

“bridge” across this gulf between him and the reader (Profiles, p. 190). Indeed,

Gadamer’s motivation to construct this bridge between Heidegger’s ontology and the

interpretation of texts speaks to this concern. As such, we can see how Heidegger’s

conclusions raise concerns about how we might actually employ his ideas and how we

can improve understanding in the face of an all-encompassing hermeneutical circle.

Despite these concerns, I maintain that Heidegger can adequately respond, and

thus, on the whole, I fundamentally agree with his views, and argue that they remain
valuable in the face of these critiques. Taking up Habermas on the notion that Heidegger’s

radicality renders him inaccessible, I do not find that the difficulty of a text should

undermine its value. Heidegger must be radical, and thus potentially difficult, precisely

because his ideas are so revolutionary, particularly in terms of his “Being-in-the-world”,

which aims to target head-on the long-standing objectivist tradition. It is this radicality

that gives the work its value as a corrective for the idea that we are passive receptors of

knowledge, instead framing understanding as an active and situated process that has been

largely accepted and expanded upon in contemporary fields of study. One example is

Gibson’s (the founder of ecological psychology) Theory of Affordances, which is

essentially a scientific account of Heidegger’s notion of the ready-to-hand (The Senses

Considered as Perceptual Systems, 1966). This vindication gives weight to the value of

Heidegger’s insights. In terms of concerns about the scope of Heidegger’s hermeneutical

circle, I believe Heidegger’s conception of it is actually more viable than that of

Schleiermacher or Dilthey, primarily because we are now no longer concerned with the

vague and slightly incoherent notion of “getting out” of the circle in order to gain new

knowledge. Rather, Heidegger argues that hermeneutical investigation is only possible

precisely because humans are existentially interpretive in the way Heidegger describes.

As such, I believe he clarifies what is being sought after in the interpretation of a text,

namely that the questions asked in interpretation target “the most primordial kind of

knowing” of the very nature of our existence (p. 195). Indeed, Heidegger himself tells us

that if our aim is to “look out for the ways of avoiding” the hermeneutical circle in pursuit

of new knowledge, “then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the

ground up” (p. 194). If we are still concerned about his idea of getting into the circle in

the “right way”, Heidegger actually demonstrates what this might look like in the very

methodology of his text, which acts as a kind of hermeneutic spiral that unveils the deep
structures of the phenomena of experience (Wheeler, 2020). I argue that, with Heidegger,

we can reconceptualise the hermeneutical circle, not as a flat and one-dimensional

limitation of our understanding, but rather as a spiral that provides new depth of insight as

Heidegger has demonstrated in his text. Finally, with regard to the practical use of

Heidegger’s ideas, we can speak more broadly about the overall phenomenological and

hermeneutical aim to “clear the way”, so to speak, for interpretation free of the prejudice

created by conventional narratives or pre-conceptions that we are all subject to. I would

argue Heidegger is profoundly successful in this project. He says that we should never

allow our fore-structures to be accepted from “fancies and popular conceptions” if we aim

to understand and interpret “in terms of things themselves” (p. 195). The practical use of

these ideas, then, is fundamentally to avoid dogmatism and any unfounded acceptance of

principles that might obscure a pure and accurate understanding of things themselves. The

political value of such a sentiment cannot be understated. As such, I support Heidegger’s

views and maintain that, despite the concerns raised, he is successful in providing a

valuable account of understanding and interpretation.

Heidegger’s claim that understanding is “thrown projection” is based on his

fundamental ontology that Dasein is essentially Being-in-the-world, defined by its

openness to situated possibility. From this, Heidegger concludes that interpretation serves

the function of making explicit that which is apprehended by understanding and is thus an

ongoing existential process that exists in an all-encompassing hermeneutical circle. While

some may voice concerns about the implications and practicality of this idea, I argue that

Heidegger can adequately respond to such objections, and thus I fundamentally agree with

his anti-dogmatic phenomenological project.

Word count: 2195

Dreyfus, H. L. (1991), Being-in-the-world: a Commentary of Heidegger’s Being and Time,

Division 1., Cambridge (Mass.) MIT Press.

Gibson, J. J. (1966), The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, Greenwood, Westport.

Habermas, J (1983), Philosophical-Political Profiles, MIT Press, viewed 12 April 2023,

<https://philpapers.org/rec/HABPP-2>.

Heidegger, M 1962, Being and Time, Blackwell, Oxford.

Wheeler, M 2020, Martin Heidegger, in EN Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy, Fall 2020, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, viewed 12 April

2023, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/#Rel>.