THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 176022. February 2, 2015.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CECILIA GRACE L.
ROASA, married to GREG AMBROSE ROASA, as herein
represented by her Attorneys-in-Fact, BERNARDO M. NICOLAS,
JR. and ALVIN B. ACAYEN, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J :
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Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated December 13, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No.
85515 which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No. TG-930.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The instant petition arose from an application for registration of title over a parcel of
land led by herein respondent, represented by her attorneys-in-fact, Bernardo M.
Nicolas, Jr. and Alvin B. Acayen. The application was led on December 15, 2000
with the RTC of Tagaytay City. The subject lot was denominated as Lot 2 of the
consolidation/subdivision plan, Ccs-04-000501-D, being a portion of Lots 13592 and
2681, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre.
In her application, respondent alleged, among others, that she is the owner in fee
simple of the subject lot, having acquired the same by purchase as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 2, 1994; that the said property is an
agricultural land planted with corn, palay, bananas, coconut and coee by
respondent's predecessors-in-interest; that respondent and her predecessors-ininterest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and
occupation of the land under bona fide claim of ownership since the 1930's and that
they have declared the land for taxation purposes. The application, likewise, stated
the names and addresses of the adjoining owners.
Subsequently, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Oce of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application contending that the muniments of title,
such as tax declarations and tax payment receipts, did not constitute competent and
sucient evidence of a bona de acquisition of the land applied for nor of the
alleged open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest as owners for the period required by law. The OSG also
argued that the subject lot is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines which is not subject to private appropriation.
TIaEDC

Thereafter, respondent presented three witnesses to prove her allegations. She,

then, led her formal oer of evidence. The Republic, on the other hand, did not
present any evidence to support its opposition to respondent's application for
registration.
On June 21, 2004, the RTC admitted all the exhibits of respondent and considered
the case submitted for decision.
On December 8, 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying respondent's
application. The trial court held:
xxx xxx xxx
Perusal of the records show that the subject land . . . is not classied as
forest land prior to March 15, 1982; . . . .
It bears stressing at this point in time that before one can register his title
over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that he, by himself or by his
predecessors-in-interest, had been in notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land under a "bona de" claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier; and further, the land subject of application is alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain. . . .
The evidence adduced by the applicant [herein respondent] particularly
Exhibit "U" shows that the subject land applied for registration was declared
as not part of the forest land of the government before March 15, 1982, or
short of more or less seven (7) years of the required adverse possession of
thirty (30) years.
xxx xxx xxx.

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, herein respondent filed an appeal with the CA.
On December 13, 2006, the CA rendered its assailed Decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 8, 2004 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case
No. TG-930, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one issued,
GRANTING the application for conrmation of imperfect title. The Register
of Deeds of Tagaytay City is hereby DIRECTED to issue Title in the name of
applicant for Lot 2 of Consolidated Subdivision Plan CCs-04-000501-D, being
a portion of Lot 13592 and 2681, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, consisting of
1.5 hectares.
SO ORDERED.

The CA held that:

xxx xxx xxx
Applicants for conrmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the
following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable

agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona de claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since
June 12, 1945.
IaHCAD

There are two parts to the requirements of the law. As to the rst part,
there is no doubt that the subject property, irregardless of the date, was
already made alienable and disposable agricultural land.
As to the second requirement, there is a specic cut-o date of possession:
June 12, 1945. The cut-o date of possession of June 12, 1945 only applies
to the requirement of possession. It does not have any bearing as to when
the land became alienable and disposable.
When the property was classied as alienable and disposable, specically on
March 15, 1982, does not have any bearing with the second requirement of
possession so that despite the fact that the property became alienable and
disposable only in 1982, the possession requirement since June 12, 1945
stands so that, as in this case at bench, when the possession was since
1930, which is before June 12, 1945, the requirement of possession has
been met.
xxx xxx xxx

Hence, the instant petition anchored on the sole ground, to wit:

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIRED 30-YEAR ADVERSE
POSSESSION SINCE THE SUBJECT LAND WAS DECLARED ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ONLY ON MARCH 15, 1982
PER CENRO CERTIFICATION, AND THE APPLICATION WAS FILED ONLY ON
DECEMBER 12, 2000. ANY PERIOD OF POSSESSION PRIOR TO THE DATE
WHEN THE SUBJECT LAND WAS CLASSIFIED AS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE IS INCONSEQUENTIAL AND SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM
THE COMPUTATION OF THE 30-YEAR PERIOD OF POSSESSION. 5

Section 14 (1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides as follows:

Section 14.
Who may apply. The following persons may le in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1)
Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

In the same manner, Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known
as The Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, states:
Sec. 48.

The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying

lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
conrmation of their claims and the issuance of a certicate of title therefor
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the
ling of the application for conrmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Based on the above provisions, an applicant for original registration of title based on
a claim of exclusive and continuous possession or occupation must show the
existence of the following:
CaDSHE

1.

Open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession,

themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, of land;

by

2.

The land possessed or occupied must have been declared alienable

and disposable agricultural land of public domain;

3.

The possession or occupation was under a bona de claim of

ownership;

4.

Possession dates back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.

In the instant case, petitioner's sole contention is that the possession of the subject
lot by respondent and her predecessors-in-interest before the establishment of
alienability of the said land, should be excluded in the computation of the period of
possession for purposes of registration. Petitioner argues that respondent's
possession of the disputed parcel of land, prior to its re-classication as alienable and
disposable, cannot be credited as part of the required period of possession because
the same cannot be considered adverse.
The Court does not agree.
The Court's disquisition in the recent case of AFP Retirement and Separation
Benets System (AFP-RSBS) v. Republic of the Philippines , 7 as it retraces the
various rulings of this Court on the issue as to when an applicant's possession
should be reckoned and the resulting prevailing doctrine, is instructive, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

Republic v. Naguit [409 Phil. 405] involves the similar question. In that case,
this court claried that Section 14(1) of the Property Registration

Decree should be interpreted to include possession before the

declaration of the land's alienability as long as at the time of the
application for registration, the land has already been declared
part of the alienable and disposable agricultural public lands. This
court also emphasized in that case the absurdity that would result in
interpreting Section 14(1) as requiring that the alienability of public land
should have already been established by June 12, 1945. Thus, this court said
in Naguit:
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would
be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which
were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would
not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation
renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it eect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet
even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is led. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition,
the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been classied as alienable
and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention
on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
However, in the later case of Republic v. Herbieto [498 Phil. 227] that was
cited by respondent, this court ruled that the period of possession before
the declaration that land is alienable and disposable cannot be included in the
computation of the period of possession. This court said:
HIDCTA

Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the

land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject
Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any
period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were
classied as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such
possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had
been classied as alienable and disposable, the rules on conrmation
of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. It is very apparent then that
respondents could not have complied with the period of possession
required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to

acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be

judicially confirmed or legalized.
This Court claried the role of the date, June 12, 1945, in computing the
period of possession for purposes of registration in Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines [605 Phil. 244] . In that case, this
court declared that Naguit and not Herbieto should be followed. Herbieto
"has [no] precedential value with respect to Section 14(1)." This court said:
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is
that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in
Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the
provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands
actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even
if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under a bona de claim of
ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a
bona de claim of ownership to avail of judicial conrmation of their
imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This
balancing fact is signicant, especially considering our forthcoming
discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura
has any precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other
hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it
precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive
possession under a bona de claim of ownership prior to 12 June
1945. The Court's interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive
to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit
or Herbieto provides the nal word of the Court on Section 14(1) is
now settled in favor of Naguit:
Moreover, in the resolution of the motions for reconsideration of this
court's 2009 decision in Heirs of Malabanan, this Court explained that
there was no other legislative intent that could be associated with the
date, June 12, 1945, as written in our registration laws except that it
qualies the requisite period of possession and occupation. The law
imposes no requirement that land should have been declared alienable
and disposable agricultural land as early as June 12, 1945.
Therefore, what is important in computing the period of
possession is that the land has already been declared
alienable and disposable at the time of the application for
registration. Upon satisfaction of this requirement, the
computation of the period may include the period of adverse
possession prior to the declaration that land is alienable and
disposable. 8 (Emphasis supplied)

Although adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an

owner is a conclusion of law to be determined by courts, it has more to do with a
person's belief in good faith that he or she has just title to the property that he or
she is occupying. 9 It is unrelated to the declaration that land is alienable or
disposable. 10 A possessor or occupant of property may, therefore, be a possessor in
the concept of an owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable
and disposable agricultural land. 11
aHCSTD

Respondent's right to the original registration of title over the subject property is,
therefore, dependent on the existence of (a) a declaration that the land is alienable
and disposable at the time of the application for registration and (b) open and
continuous possession in the concept of an owner through itself or through its
predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 12
In the present case, there is no dispute that the subject lot has been declared
alienable and disposable on March 15, 1982. This is more than eighteen (18) years
before respondent's application for registration, which was led on December 15,
2000. Moreover, the unchallenged testimonies of two of respondent's witnesses
established that the latter and her predecessors-in-interest had been in adverse,
open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner even before
June 12, 1945. 13
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated December 13, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 85515 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Villarama, Jr., Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.

Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justices Josefina

Guevara-Salonga and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring, Annex "A" to Petition,
rollo, pp. 43-51.

2.

Id. at 52-53.

3.

Id. at 18. (Emphasis in the original)

4.

Id. at 16-17.

5.

Id. at 32-33.

6.

Republic v. Sese, G.R. No. 185092, June 4, 2014; Republic v. Zurbaran Realty and
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 164408, March 24, 2014.

7.

G.R. No. 180086, July 2, 2014.

8.

Id.

9.

AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) v. Republic of the

Philippines , supra note 7.

10.

Id.

11.

Id.

12.
13.

Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines , G.R. No. 179987, September 3,

2013, 704 SCRA 561, 580.
See TSN, January 17, 2002, pp. 3-14; TSN, September 15, 2003, pp. 3-9.