10.9 People vs. Balisacan

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VOL.

17, AUGUST 31; 1966 1119


People vs. Balisacan

No. L-26376. August 31, 1966.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and


appellant, vs. AURELIO BALISACAN, defendant and
appellee.

Criminal procedure; Plea of guilty; Duty of court to impose


penalty fixed by law.·A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission
of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to
defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no
alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the
circumstances. (People vs. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563.) In the present
case, the defendant, who pleaded guilty. was only allowed to testify
in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for the purpose of
fixing the penalty. His testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a
trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
Same; Procedure in case accused asserts self-defense.·In view
of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the
court should have taken anew defendantÊs plea and then proceeded
with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule
119 of the Rules of Court. In deciding the case upon the merits
without the requisite trial, the court not only erred in procedure but
also deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be
heard.
Same; Rule on double jeopardy is applicable even if accused
fails to file brief or raise question of double jeopardy.·The provision
of Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which prohibits appeal
by the government if the defendant would be placed thereby in
double jeopardy, applies even if the accused fails to file a brief and
to raise the question of double jeopardy (People vs. Ferrer, 100 Phil.
124; People vs. Bao, L-12102, September 29, 1959; People vs. Golez,
L-14160, June 30, 1960).
Same; Existence of plea is essential requisite in order that
accused may be in jeopardy: When plea of guilty was vacated by
defendantÊs testimony.·The existence of a plea is an essential
requisite to double jeopardy (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People
vs. Quimsing, L-19860, December 23, 1964). Where the accused had
first entered a plea of guilty and subsequently he was allowed to
testify in order to prove mitigating circumstances and he said that
he acted in complete self-defense, said testimony had the effect of
vacating his plea of guilty, and the court should have required him
to plea anew on the charge, or at least it should have directed that a
new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This not having been
done, there was no standing plea at the time the court rendered its
judgment of

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1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Balisacan

acquital, and it follows that there can be no double jeopardy with


respect to the present appeal.
Same; Effect of failure to give prosecution opportunity to present
its evidence or rebut defendantÊs testimony.·Where the court
decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any
opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of
the defendant, the court acted without due process of law. In view of
the absence of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is null and
void, and the acquittal, being a nullity, is no acquittal at all, and
thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy
(People vs. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary vs.
Hudspeth, 124 Fed. 2d. 445).

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of


Ilocos Norte.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General I.C. Borromeo and T.M. Dilig for plaintiff and
appellant.
Rolando de la Cuesta for defendant and appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of


acquittal.
On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged
with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.
The information alleged:

„That on or about December 3, 1964, in the Municipality of Nueva


Era, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one, Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the
latter wounds that immediately caused his death.
„CONTRARY TO LAW."

To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a


plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At
his de oficio counselÊs petition, however, he was allowed to
present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances.
Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he
stabbed the deceased in self-def ense because the latter was
strangling him. And he further stated that after the

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People vs. Balisacan

incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police


authorities.
Subsequently, on March 6, 1965, on the basis of the
above-mentioned testimony of the accused, the court a quo
rendered a decision acquitting the accused. As stated, the
prosecution appealed therefrom.
This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals.
Appellant filed its brief on September 9, 1965. No appelleeÊs
brief was filed. After being submitted for decision without
appelleeÊs brief, the appeal was certified to Us by the Court
of Appeals on July 14, 1966, as involving questions purely
of law (Sec. 17, Republic Act 296). And on August 5, 1966,
We ordered it docketed herein.
The sole assignment of error is:

„THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED


OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE LATTERÊS PLEA
OF GUILTY WHEN ARRAIGNED."

AppellantÊs contention is meritorious. A plea of guilty is an


unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense
charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said
charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to
impose the penalty f ixed by law under the circumstances.
(People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563). In this case, the defendant
was only allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating
circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty. Said
testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the
merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony
of the accused, the proper course should have been for the
court a quo to take defendantÊs plea anew and then proceed
with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3
of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court:

„SEC. 3. Order of trial.·The plea of not guilty having been entered,


the trial must proceed in the following order:

"(a) The fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must


offer evidence in support of the charges.
"(b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support
of the defense.
"(c) The parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence
only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permit them
to offer new additional evidence bearing upon the main
issue in question.

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1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


People vs. Balisacan

"(d) When the introduction of evidence shall have been


concluded, unless the case is submitted to the court
without argument, the fiscal must open the
argument, the attorney for the defense must follow,
and the fiscal may conclude the same. The
argument by either attorney may be oral or written,
or partly written, but only the written arguments,
or such portions of the same as may be in writing,
shall be preserved in the record of the case.‰

In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite


trial, the court a quo not only erred in procedure but
deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be
heard.
This Court now turns to Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court, which provides that: „The People of the
Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed
thereby in double jeopardy.‰ The present state of
jurisprudence in this regard is that the above provision
applies even if the accused fails to file a brief and raise the
question of double jeopardy (People v. Ferrer, L-9072,
October 23, 1956; People v. Bao, L-12102, September 29,
1959; People v. De Golez, L-14160, June 30, 1960).
The next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed
the accused in double jeopardy. It is settled that the
existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double
jeopardy (People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People v.
Quimsing, L-19860, December 23, 1964). In the present
case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of
guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of
being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he
acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore·
as the court a quo recognized in its decision·had the effect
of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should
have required him to plead anew on the charge, or at least
direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This
was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no
standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its
judgment of acquittal, there 1can be no double jeopardy with
respect to the appeal herein.
Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided
the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution
any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut

_______________

1 Sec. 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court.

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People vs. Balisacan

the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted


without due process of law. And for lack of this
fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and
void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of
due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus can not
constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy
(People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235;
McCleary v. Hudspeth, 124 Fed. 2d. 445).
It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of
acquittal, the trial judge below already gave credence to the
testimony of the accused. In fairness to the prosecution,
without in any way doubting the integrity of said trial
judge, We deem it proper to remand this case to the court a
quo for further proceedings under another judge of the
same court, in one of the two other branches of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set
aside and this case is remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings under another judge of said court, that
is. for plea by the defendant, trial with presentation of
evidence for the prosecution and the defense, and judgment
thereafter. No costs. So ordered.

Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices J.B.L. Reyes,


Barrera, Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, concur. Mr.
Justice Regala took no part. Mr. Justice Makalintal did not
take part.

Judgment set aside; case remanded to lower court for


further proceedings.

Notes.·"A plea of guilty must be unconditional save to


explain mitigating circumstances‰ (People vs. Racaza, 82
Phil. 623, 632). Where the accused enters a conditional plea
in the sense that he admits his guilt provided that a certain
penalty be imposed upon him, he must be considered as,
having entered a plea of not guilty (People vs. Sabilul, 93
Phil. 567).
A defendant is legally placed on trial only when issue
upon the information has been joined after arraignment by
his plea of not guilty (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851, 853).

____________

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