The document discusses a case where a defendant initially pled guilty to homicide but then testified in his defense, asserting self-defense. The court found that this testimony vacated his initial guilty plea. The court also ruled that it erred by not requiring the defendant to enter a new plea and by deciding the case without allowing the prosecution to present evidence. As there was no valid plea, double jeopardy did not apply to allow the prosecution's appeal.
The document discusses a case where a defendant initially pled guilty to homicide but then testified in his defense, asserting self-defense. The court found that this testimony vacated his initial guilty plea. The court also ruled that it erred by not requiring the defendant to enter a new plea and by deciding the case without allowing the prosecution to present evidence. As there was no valid plea, double jeopardy did not apply to allow the prosecution's appeal.
The document discusses a case where a defendant initially pled guilty to homicide but then testified in his defense, asserting self-defense. The court found that this testimony vacated his initial guilty plea. The court also ruled that it erred by not requiring the defendant to enter a new plea and by deciding the case without allowing the prosecution to present evidence. As there was no valid plea, double jeopardy did not apply to allow the prosecution's appeal.
The document discusses a case where a defendant initially pled guilty to homicide but then testified in his defense, asserting self-defense. The court found that this testimony vacated his initial guilty plea. The court also ruled that it erred by not requiring the defendant to enter a new plea and by deciding the case without allowing the prosecution to present evidence. As there was no valid plea, double jeopardy did not apply to allow the prosecution's appeal.
appellant, vs. AURELIO BALISACAN, defendant and appellee.
Criminal procedure; Plea of guilty; Duty of court to impose
penalty fixed by law.·A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. (People vs. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563.) In the present case, the defendant, who pleaded guilty. was only allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for the purpose of fixing the penalty. His testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Same; Procedure in case accused asserts self-defense.·In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the court should have taken anew defendantÊs plea and then proceeded with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court not only erred in procedure but also deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard. Same; Rule on double jeopardy is applicable even if accused fails to file brief or raise question of double jeopardy.·The provision of Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which prohibits appeal by the government if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy, applies even if the accused fails to file a brief and to raise the question of double jeopardy (People vs. Ferrer, 100 Phil. 124; People vs. Bao, L-12102, September 29, 1959; People vs. Golez, L-14160, June 30, 1960). Same; Existence of plea is essential requisite in order that accused may be in jeopardy: When plea of guilty was vacated by defendantÊs testimony.·The existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People vs. Quimsing, L-19860, December 23, 1964). Where the accused had first entered a plea of guilty and subsequently he was allowed to testify in order to prove mitigating circumstances and he said that he acted in complete self-defense, said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty, and the court should have required him to plea anew on the charge, or at least it should have directed that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This not having been done, there was no standing plea at the time the court rendered its judgment of
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acquital, and it follows that there can be no double jeopardy with
respect to the present appeal. Same; Effect of failure to give prosecution opportunity to present its evidence or rebut defendantÊs testimony.·Where the court decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant, the court acted without due process of law. In view of the absence of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is null and void, and the acquittal, being a nullity, is no acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy (People vs. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary vs. Hudspeth, 124 Fed. 2d. 445).
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General I.C. Borromeo and T.M. Dilig for plaintiff and appellant. Rolando de la Cuesta for defendant and appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of
acquittal. On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The information alleged:
„That on or about December 3, 1964, in the Municipality of Nueva
Era, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter wounds that immediately caused his death. „CONTRARY TO LAW."
To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a
plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At his de oficio counselÊs petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-def ense because the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after the
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incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police
authorities. Subsequently, on March 6, 1965, on the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the accused, the court a quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused. As stated, the prosecution appealed therefrom. This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant filed its brief on September 9, 1965. No appelleeÊs brief was filed. After being submitted for decision without appelleeÊs brief, the appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on July 14, 1966, as involving questions purely of law (Sec. 17, Republic Act 296). And on August 5, 1966, We ordered it docketed herein. The sole assignment of error is:
„THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED
OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE LATTERÊS PLEA OF GUILTY WHEN ARRAIGNED."
AppellantÊs contention is meritorious. A plea of guilty is an
unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty f ixed by law under the circumstances. (People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563). In this case, the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the proper course should have been for the court a quo to take defendantÊs plea anew and then proceed with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court:
„SEC. 3. Order of trial.·The plea of not guilty having been entered,
the trial must proceed in the following order:
"(a) The fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must
offer evidence in support of the charges. "(b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support of the defense. "(c) The parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permit them to offer new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question.
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"(d) When the introduction of evidence shall have been
concluded, unless the case is submitted to the court without argument, the fiscal must open the argument, the attorney for the defense must follow, and the fiscal may conclude the same. The argument by either attorney may be oral or written, or partly written, but only the written arguments, or such portions of the same as may be in writing, shall be preserved in the record of the case.‰
In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite
trial, the court a quo not only erred in procedure but deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard. This Court now turns to Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides that: „The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.‰ The present state of jurisprudence in this regard is that the above provision applies even if the accused fails to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy (People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956; People v. Bao, L-12102, September 29, 1959; People v. De Golez, L-14160, June 30, 1960). The next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People v. Quimsing, L-19860, December 23, 1964). In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore· as the court a quo recognized in its decision·had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead anew on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there 1can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut
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1 Sec. 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court.
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the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted
without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy (People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary v. Hudspeth, 124 Fed. 2d. 445). It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge below already gave credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness to the prosecution, without in any way doubting the integrity of said trial judge, We deem it proper to remand this case to the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of the same court, in one of the two other branches of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of said court, that is. for plea by the defendant, trial with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, and judgment thereafter. No costs. So ordered.
Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices J.B.L. Reyes,
Barrera, Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, concur. Mr. Justice Regala took no part. Mr. Justice Makalintal did not take part.
Judgment set aside; case remanded to lower court for
further proceedings.
Notes.·"A plea of guilty must be unconditional save to
explain mitigating circumstances‰ (People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil. 623, 632). Where the accused enters a conditional plea in the sense that he admits his guilt provided that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, he must be considered as, having entered a plea of not guilty (People vs. Sabilul, 93 Phil. 567). A defendant is legally placed on trial only when issue upon the information has been joined after arraignment by his plea of not guilty (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851, 853).