INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

Q. Define Interpretation. Explain the system of Interpretation.

Q. Discuss the necessity, salient features and purpose of interpretation of statutes.
Q. What do you understand by interpretation of statutes ? What are its main ingredients ? Explain.
Interpretation of statutes refers to the process of determining the meaning of a statute or law.
It involves analyzing the text of the statute, as well as its context and purpose, to determine the intended meaning and
application of the law.
The necessity of interpretation of statutes arises from the fact that legislative language is often broad and general in nature,
and may not provide specific guidance on how the law should be applied in particular circumstances.
In addition, different provisions of a statute may conflict with each other, or the statute may be ambiguous or unclear.
Interpretation of statutes is therefore necessary to ensure that the law is applied in a consistent and fair manner.
It helps to clarify the intent of the legislature in passing the law, and to ensure that the law reflects changing social,
economic, and political values and needs.
The main ingredients or the salient features of interpretation of statutes are:
1. Text of the statute: The text of the statute is the starting point of the interpretation process. Courts must examine the
language used in the statute and consider the meaning of the words and phrases to determine what the statute says.
2. Context of the statute: The context of the statute includes factors such as the purpose of the statute, the historical
background of the law, and the legislative history of the statute. Examining these factors can help to provide a more
complete understanding of what the statute was intended to achieve.
3. Legislative intent: The courts may examine the intent of the legislature when enacting the statute. This includes considering
legislative history, committee reports, and other materials related to the enactment of the statute.
4. Presumptions: There are several presumptions that courts apply when interpreting statutes. For example, there is a
presumption that the legislature intended the statute to be consistent with the Constitution and other laws.
5. Judicial precedents: Courts may also consider past decisions on similar statutes when interpreting the meaning of a statute.
This can help to provide guidance on how to interpret the law and what it is intended to achieve.
6. Address ambiguities: Statutes are often written in technical legal language that may be open to different interpretations. The
purpose of interpretation is to resolve any ambiguities in the language used in the statute.
7. Public Policy: Judges may also consider public policy concerns when interpreting statutes. This means considering the
practical implications of a particular interpretation and weighing the potential benefits and drawbacks of different
interpretations.
8. Resolve disputes: Finally, interpretation of statutes can help to resolve disputes that arise over the meaning or application of
a particular law. This is important because it helps to ensure that the law is applied fairly and consistently.

Overall, the interpretation of statutes is a complex process that involves considering a range of factors to determine the
meaning and application of a law or statute. By examining the text of the statute, its context and purpose, legislative intent,
presumptions, and judicial precedents, courts can determine how the statute should be applied in specific situations.

Q. What is the meaning of Interpretation ? Discuss the purpose of interpretation of statutes.

Q. What do you mean by Interpretation ? Explain its purpose.
Interpretation is the primary function of a court. Interpretation is a process through which one arrives at the true and correct
intention of the law-making body which is laid in the form of statutes. The purpose of interpretation of statutes can be
described as follows:
1. To give effect to the intent of the legislature: The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of
the legislature that passed the statute. The goal is to determine what the legislature intended the law to mean and how it
should be applied in different situations.
2. To resolve ambiguities and uncertainties: Statutes are often written in broad and general terms, which can lead to
ambiguities and uncertainties in their meaning and application. Interpretation helps to resolve these ambiguities and
uncertainties and to clarify the meaning of the law.
3. To ensure consistency and predictability: Consistency and predictability are essential to the rule of law. Interpretation of
statutes helps to ensure that the law is applied consistently and predictably, by establishing a framework of principles and
rules that can guide judges and other legal professionals in their decision-making.
4. To accommodate changes in society and technology: As society and technology evolve, new legal issues arise that may not
have been foreseen by the legislature when the statute was enacted. Interpretation helps to accommodate these changes
by applying the principles and rules of the statute in a manner that is appropriate to the current circumstances.
5. To promote fairness and justice: The interpretation of statutes is also important for promoting fairness and justice, by
ensuring that the law is applied in a way that is consistent with the principles of equity and justice.
In summary, the purpose of interpretation of statutes is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, resolve ambiguities and
uncertainties, ensure consistency and predictability, accommodate changes in society and technology, and promote fairness
and justice. By achieving these goals, statutory interpretation helps to ensure that the law serves its intended purpose and
benefits society as a whole.

Q. What do you understand by Statute ?

 A statute is the will of the legislature.
 A statute is a formal act of the legislature in written form.
 We all know that 'the law' tells us what we can and can't do, and that 'the law' is enforceable by the government.
 A statute, is a law that has been enacted by a legislature, which is the body that has been granted the power by a
constitution to enact legislation, or laws.
 When a statute is passed, it becomes law and therefore part of statutory law.
 Interpretation of any data generally means to analyze the available data and come out with an opinion which is
certain and clear.
 This increases the ability of an individual to understand and explain it in his/her own way.
 This helps to find out the ways to understand and analyse the statute, where it leads the interpreter to the whole
new meaning which is completely different from the general meaning.
 The fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that the words of a statute be read in their entire context.

Q. What are the basic rules of interpretation of statutes ? Discuss.

 Interpretation is the primary function of a court.
 we all know that our government is divided into three important wings which are: Legislature, Executive and
Judiciary.
 Legislature: To make laws and govern the country.
 Executive: To implement and execute laws and policies for the functioning of the country.
 Judiciary: To interpret and uphold the laws of the land and settle legal disputes.
 This helps in maintaining checks and balances between the three branches of the Indian Government.
 The court interprets the legislature whenever a dispute comes before it.
 Since the will of the legislature is expressed generally in the form of a statute, the prime concern of the court is to
find out the intention of the legislature in the language used by the legislature in the statute. The court interprets
the legislature whenever a dispute comes before it.
 The court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily.
 There have to be certain principles which have evolved out of the continuous exercise by the courts.
 These principles are sometimes called rules of interpretation.
 The expression intention of the legislature is a shorthand reference to the meaning of words used by the legislature
objectively determined with guidance furnished by the accepted principles of interpretation. If a statutory provision
is open to more than one interpretation the Court has to choose that interpretation that represents the true intention
of the legislature in other words the ‘true meaning’ or a ‘legal meaning’.

Q. Explain the interpretation and construction.

Q. Distinguish between interpretation and construction.
Words used in legal texts aren’t always clear and comprehensible, be it acts, statutes, provisions or in legal documents.
Hence, courts aim to determine the clear and explicit meanings of words and phrases used in such legal texts. Interpretation
precedes construction when it comes to the explanation of a statute, act or any legal text. On one hand, interpretation is
about exploring the written legal text while on the other hand; construction helps in determining the explanation of the legal
text along with its legal effects. Therefore, construction is used in a broader sense.
Sl. # Interpretation Construction
1 Interpretation refers to the understanding of words Construction refers to the drawing of conclusions of the
and the true sense of a legal text. legal text that lie beyond the direct expression of the legal
text.
2 Interpretation takes place when the meaning of the Construction takes place when the meaning of the text is
legal text is clear and unambiguous so that it can be
unclear, ambiguous and is challenged.
interpreted.

3 Through interpretation, one can find out the linguistic Through construction, one can discover the legal effect of
meaning in the context of a legal text.
the legal text. Therefore, construction is used in a broader
sense.
 4 Interpretation rules out ambiguity. Construction creates additional rules to resolve the
vagueness.
5 Literal interpretation. Functional interpretation.
6 Letter of law. Spirit of law.
7 Looks at verbal expression of law. Looks beyond verbal expression of law.
8 Tries to find meaning of words given in the Tries to find true intention of the legislature.
legislature.
9 The popular or dictionary meaning of the term is Check the circumstances under which law was written.
referred.
10 It gives the plain sense. It looks for inherent sense.
Sl. # Interpretation Construction

The General Principles or The Basic Principles of Interpretation are:

1. Error: Reference source not found
2. Mischief Rule of Interpretation
3. The golden rule of Interpretation
4. Rule of Harmonious Construction
5. The Statute should be read as a whole
6. Rule of Reasonable Construction or Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat
7. Identical expressions to have the same meaning
8. Construction Noscitura sociis
9. Construction ejusdem generis
10. Construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius
11. Construction Contemporanea expositio est fortissima in lege

Q. Explain the literal or grammatical rule of interpretation.

1. Literal Rule – the literal or grammatical interpretation:
 The first principle of interpretation is the literal or grammatical interpretation which mean that the words of an
enactment are to be given their ordinary and natural meaning
 If such meaning is clear and unambiguous, effect should be given to a provision of a statute whatever may be the
consequences.
 The basis of this principle is that the object of all interpretations being to know what the legislature intended,
whatever was the intention of the legislature has been expressed by it through words which are to be interpreted
according to the rules of grammar.
 There ought to be no augmentations or replacement of words in the development of rules and their interpretation.
 The essential principle of interpretation is to decipher words as they are.
 Similarly, the court should give technical meaning to a technical word.
 The cardinal rule for the construction of Act of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the
intention expressed in the Act themselves.
the Fisher v Bell case (1960)
 Under the offensive weapons act of 1959, it is an offence to offer certain offensive weapons for sale.
 Bristol shopkeeper, James Bell displayed a flick knife in his shop window.
 When brought to trial it was concluded that Bell could not be convicted given the literal meaning of the statute.
 The law of contract states that having an item in a window is not an intention of sale but is an invitation to treat.
 Given the literal meaning of this statute, Bell could not be convicted.
The R v Harris case (1836)
 where the defendant bit the nose off the victim. The statute stated the offence was ‘to stab or wound’.
 Under The Literal Rule, biting is not stabbing, cutting or wounding (implying the use of an instrument).
 The defendant was proven not guilty.
In Maqbool Hussain vs The State Of Bombay, AIR 1953, SC325,
 the appellant, a citizen of India, on arrival at Bombay’s Santa Cruz airport from Jeddah on the 6th of November
1949, did not declare that he had brought 107.2 tolas of gold with him.
  Gold, found in his possession during search in violation of Government notification, was confiscated under Section
167(8), Sea Customs Act, 1878.
 He was charged under Section 8, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 also.
 The appellant pleaded that his trial under the Act of 1947 was violative of Article 20(2) of the Constitution
relating to double jeopardy as he was already punished for his act by way of confiscation of his gold.
 It was held by the Supreme Court that the Sea Customs Authority is not a court or a judicial tribunal and the
adjudging of confiscation or the increased rate of duty of penalty under the Sea Customs Act was not a
prosecution.
 Consequently, his trial under the Act of 1947 was valid.
In Ramavatar Budhaiprasad Etc vs Assistant Sales Tax Officer, AIR 1961,
 the question before the court was whether sale of betel leaves was subject to sales tax.
 The appellant contended that no such tax could be levied as betel leaves were vegetables on the sale of which no
tax could be imposed under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 as amended by Act 16 of
1948.
 For this, the appellant relied on the dictionary meaning of vegetable which says that a vegetable is that which is
pertaining to comprised or consisting of, or derived, or obtained from plants or their parts.
 The Supreme Court while rejecting the contention, held that betel leaves could not be given the dictionary,
technical or botanical meaning when the ordinary and natural meaning is clear and unambiguous.
 Being a word of everyday use it must be understood in its popular sense by which the people are conversant with it
as also the meaning which the statute dealing would attribute to it.
 Held, that the use of two distinct and different items i.e., "vegetables" and "betel leaves" and the subsequent
removal of betel leaves from the Schedule were indicative of the Legislature's intention of not exempting betel
leaves from taxation.
 The word "vegetable" must be interpreted not in a technical sense but in its popular sense as understood in
common language.
 Vegetables are grown in a kitchen garden or on a farm and are used for the table.
 Therefore, in our view, betel leaves are not exempt from taxation. Its sale is, therefore, liable to sales tax.
In M/S. MOTIPUR ZAMINDARY CO. (P) LTD. Vs THE STATE OF BIHAR, AIR 1962
 the question was whether sugarcane fell within the term green vegetables in Entry 6 of the Schedule and
as such no sales tax could be levied under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 on its sale.
 The Supreme Court held that while dealing with a taxing statute the natural and ordinary meaning of a
word should be the correct meaning.
 In the present instance, the word vegetables should be interpreted in its natural and popular sense and
that dictionary meaning is not of such help here.
 Vegetables as the normal people mean by it are those which can be grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm
and were used for the table, that is to say, to be eaten during lunch or dinner.
 Sugarcane definitely does not fall under this category.
 In our opinion the appeals and the petitions under Art. 32 are without merit.
In Ranjt Udeshi Vs State of Maharashtra, AIR 1964,
 Ranjit D. Udeshi was one of the four partners of a firm that owned a book-stall.
 The partners were convicted by the High Court under section 292 of the IPC (Sale, etc., of obscene books, etc)
for selling copies of an allegedly obscene book, Lady Chatterley’s Lover, by DH Lawrence, the sale of which was
banned by the Government of India.
 The appellant contented before the Supreme Court that mens rea of the accused had always to be proved to
maintain conviction under criminal law.
 Since the prosecution had failed to prove mens rea, the conviction was unjustified.
 He further argued that there are such a large number of books these days in book-stalls and their contents so
different from each other that a book seller cannot possibly know and is not expected to know the contents of each
book and cannot, therefore, be convicted in the absence of a guilty mind.
 The Supreme Court held that knowledge of obscenity was not an essential element of the offence under Section
292, Indian Penal Code.
 The section is plain and its meaning unambiguous. The court must give natural meaning to the words used in the
section and on this count the contention of the appellant held no water.
  Section 292 does not define “obscenity.” Therefore, the Supreme Court had to differentiate between what was
obscene and what was artistic.
 The Court proceeded to examine the test of obscenity that should be employed to determine what falls within
constitutional limits, as mere sex and nudity do not amount to obscenity.
 The Court used the Hicklin test, which examines whether the impugned matter tends to “deprave and
corrupt person, who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter
contained or embodied in it.”
 This test was found not to violate article 19 of the Indian Constitution( Protection of certain rights regarding
freedom of speech, etc.).
 Under Hicklin, a work should be viewed as a whole, but the obscene matter should also be separately considered
to see if it violates the test. Where art and obscenity coexist, “art must so preponderate as to throw the obscenity
into a shadow or the obscenity so trivial and insignificant that it can have no effect and may be overlooked.”
 Where a work substantially transgresses public decency and morality, the rights to free speech and freedom of
expression must give away.
 In India, “obscenity without a preponderating social purpose of profit” is not protected.
 Treating “sex in a manner appealing [or tending to appeal] to the carnal side of human nature” is offensive to
modesty and decency and is obscene.
 But the extent of such appeal must be examined in each case.
 The Court examined the text of Lady Chatterley’s Lover and concluded that it was obscene under Hicklin.
The appeal against conviction was thus dismissed.

Section 292 in The Indian Penal Code - Sale, etc., of obscene books, etc.—
(1) For the purposes of sub-section (2), a book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any
other object, shall be deemed to be obscene if it is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect, or (where it
comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of any one of its items, is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave
and corrupt person, who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or
embodied in it.
(2) Whoever—
(a) sells, lets to hire, distributes, publicly exhibits or in any manner puts into circulation, or for purposes of sale, hire,
distribution, public exhibition or circulation, makes, produces or has in his possession any obscene book, pamphlet, paper,
drawing, painting, representation or figure or any other obscene object whatsoever, or
(b) imports, exports or conveys any obscene object for any of the purposes aforesaid, or knowing or having reason to
believe that such object will be sold, let to hire, distributed or publicly exhibited or in any manner put into circulation, or
(c) takes part in or receives profits from any business in the course of which he knows or has reason to believe that any
such obscene objects are for any of the purposes aforesaid, made, produced, purchased, kept, imported, exported,
conveyed, publicly exhibited or in any manner put into circulation, or
(d) advertises or makes known by any means whatsoever that any person is engaged or is ready to engage in any act which
is an offence under this section, or that any such obscene object can be procured from or through any person, or
(e) offers or attempts to do any act which is an offence under this section, shall be punished on first conviction with im-
prisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and with fine which may extend to two thousand
rupees, and, in the event of a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to five years, and also with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees.
(Exception) —This section does not extend to—
(a) any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure— (i) the publication of which is proved to
be justified as being for the public good on the ground that such book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting,
representation or figure is in the interest of science, literature, art or learning or other objects of general concern, or (ii) which
is kept or used bona fide for religious purposes;
(b) any representation sculptured, engraved, painted or otherwise represented on or in— (i) any ancient monument within
the meaning of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (24 of 1958), or (ii) any temple, or
on any car used for the conveyance of idols, or kept or used for any religious purpose.

Q. Discuss the rule of interpretation as laid down in Heydon’s case. Explain in detail with the help of Indian cases.
Q. What is Mischief rule ? Discuss in detail with the help of some decided cases.
2. Mischief rule
 The mischief rule of interpretation originated in Heydon’s case in 1584.
 It is called as mischief rule because the main target is on curing the mischief.
 Heydon's Case (1584) 76 ER 637 is considered a landmark case as it was the first case to use what would come
to be called the mischief rule for statutory interpretation.
 In Heydon’s case, it was held that four things have to be followed for true and sure interpretation of all the statutes
in general, which are as follows-
i. What was the common law before the making of an act ?
ii. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide ?
iii. What remedy did the Parliament seek or had resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth?
iv. The true reason for the remedy.
The purpose of this Mischief rule is to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.

What is the Heydon's rule?

 The rule directs that the courts must adopt that construction which shall suppress (reduce) the mischief and
advance remedy.
 The rule in Heydon's case is applicable only when the words used are ambiguous and are reasonably capable of
more than one meaning.
What happened in the Heydon's Case?
 The court concluded that the purpose of the statute was to cure a mischief resulting from a defect in the common
law.
 Therefore, the court concluded, the remedy of the statute was limited to curing that defect.
Why is it called mischief rule?
 The mischief rule of statutory interpretation is the oldest of the rules.
 The mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that attempts to determine the legislator's intention. Its main
aim is to determine the “mischief and defect” of the statute. The mischief rule was established in Heydon's Case in
1584.
 The main advantage of The Mischief Rule is that it closes loopholes in the law and allows laws to develop
Introduction:
Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 ER 637, Pasch 26 Eliz, plea began 20 Eliz Rot 140,
 is considered a landmark case as it was the first case to use what would come to be called the mischief rule for the
interpretation of statutes.
 The mischief rule is more flexible than the Golden or Literal rule, in that the mischief rule requires judges to look
over four tasks to ensure that gaps within the law are covered.
Facts of the case
 This is a construction of leases, life estates, and statutes.
 Ottery, a religious college, gave a tenancy in a manor also called “Ottery” to a man (named in the case report
simply as “Ware”) and his son, also referred to as Ware.
 The tenancy was established by copyhold, an ancient device for giving a parcel of a manor to a tenant, usually in
return for agricultural services, which was something like a long-running lease with special privileges for each
party.
 Ware and his son held their copyhold to have for their lives, subject to the will of the lord and the custom particular
to that manor.
 The Wares’ copyhold was in a parcel also occupied by some tenants at will.
 Later, the college then leased the same parcel to another man, named Heydon, for a period of eighty years in
return for rents equal to the traditional rent for the components of the parcel.
 Less than a year after the parcel had been leased to Heydon, Parliament enacted the Suppression of Religious
Houses Act, 1535 (the Act for Dissolution of the lesser monastries).
 The statute had the effect of dissolving many religious colleges, including Ottery College, which lost its lands and
rents to Henry VIII.
 However, a provision the Act kept in force, for a term of life, any grants made more than a year prior to the
enactment of the statute.
 The Court of Exchequer found that the grant to the Wares was protected by the relevant provision of the Act of
Dissolution, but that the lease to Heydon was void.
Judgment
 The ruling was based on an important discussion of the relationship of a statute to the pre-existing common law.
  The court concluded that the purpose of the statute was to cure a mischief resulting from a defect in the common
law.
 Therefore, the court concluded, the remedy of the statute was limited to curing that defect.
 Judges are supposed to construe statutes by seeking the true intent of the makers of the Act, which is presumed to
be pro bono publico, or intent for the public good.

Heydon's Case, 1584 was a landmark English court case that established the doctrine of "implied terms" in contract law. The case involved a
dispute between William Heydon and his tenant, John Croke. Heydon had leased some land to Croke for an annual rent of £10, with no other
specified terms. When Croke failed to pay the rent on time, Heydon sued him for breach of contract. The court found in favor of Heydon and
held that there were implied terms in the agreement requiring Croke to pay the rent on time and keep the property in good condition. This
ruling set a precedent for future cases involving implied terms in contracts and is still cited today as an important legal principle.

Smith v. Huges, 1960 WLR 830,

 in this case, the prostitutes were soliciting in the streets of London and it was creating a huge problem in London
and this was causing a great problem in maintaining law and order.
 So to prevent this problem, Street Offences Act, 1959 was enacted.
 After the enactment of this act, the prostitutes started soliciting from windows and balconies and the prostitutes
who were carrying on to solicit from the windows and balconies were charged under section 1(1) of Street
Offences Act, 1959.
 But the prostitutes pleaded that they weren’t solicited from the streets.
 The court held that although they were not soliciting from the streets yet the mischief rule will be applied to prevent
the soliciting by prostitutes and shall look into this issue.
 By applying this rule, the court held that the windows and balconies were taken to be an extension of the word
street, and the charge sheet was held to be correct.
In Ranjt Udeshi Vs State of Maharashtra, AIR 1964 - (PLEASE REFER TO PAGES 4, 5 FOR THE COMPLETE CASE.)
The Court examined the text of Lady Chatterley’s Lover (by DH Lawrence) and concluded that it was obscene
under Hicklin. The appeal against conviction was thus dismissed......................
Pyarali K. Tejani vs Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange And ... on 31 October, 1973
 The petitioner before us is the active partner of a firm, Gits Food Products (India), Poona, which, among other
things, deals in scented supari. The accused in this case, was prosecuted for selling the sweeten supari which
was sweetened with the help of an artificial sweetener.
 He was prosecuted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
 It was contended by Pyarali Tejani that supari is not a food item.
 The court held that the dictionary meaning is not always the correct meaning, thereby, the mischief rule must be
applicable.
 The interpretation which advances the remedy shall be taken into consideration.
 Therefore, the court held that the word ‘food’ is consumable by mouth and orally.
 In a country where consumerism as a movement has not developed, the common man is at the mercy of the
vicious dealer.
 And when the primary necessaries of life are sold with spurious admixtures for making profit, his only protection is
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Court.
 If offenders can get away with it by payment of trivial fines, as in the present case, it brings the law into contempt
and is enforcement a mockery.
 Thus, his prosecution was held to be valid.
Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC 871.
 Issues of the case were as follows- section 418 of Delhi Corporation Act, 1902 authorised the corporation to
round up the cattle grazing on the government land.
 The MCD rounded up the cattle belonging to Kanwar Singh.
 The words used in the statute authorised the corporation to round up the abandoned cattle.
 It was contended by Kanwar Singh that the word abandoned means the loss of ownership and those cattle which
were round up belonged to him and hence, was not abandoned.
 The court held that the mischief rule had to be applied and the word abandoned must be interpreted to mean let
loose or left unattended and even the temporary loss of ownership would be covered as abandoned.
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Sri Krishna Manufacturing Company, AIR 1962 SC 1526,
 Issue, in this Case, was that the respondent concerned was running a factory where four units were for
manufacturing.
 Out of these four units one was for paddy mill, other three consisted of flour mill, saw mill and copper sheet units.
 The number of employees there were more than 50.
  The RPFC applied the provisions of Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952 thereby directing the factory to give
the benefits to the employees.
 The person concerned segregated the entire factory into four separate units wherein the number of employees had
fallen below 50, and he argued that the provisions were not applicable to him.
 It was held by the court that the mischief rule has to be applied and all the four units must be taken to be one
industry, and therefore, the applicability of PFA was upheld.

3. The golden rule of Interpretation

It is known as the golden rule because it solves all the problems of interpretation.
The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning.
It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, and where the
literal rule of statutory interpretation renders an absurd or inconsistent result, the judge can substitute a reasonable meaning
in the light of the statute as a whole.

 The Golden Rule was applied in the Adler v George case (1964).
 Under section 3 of the official secrets act (1920) it was an offence to obstruct HM Forces in the vicinity of a
prohibited area.
 Adler was arrested for obstructing forces whilst in a prohibited area (Marham Royal Air Force Station)..
 If the literal rule was applied, the defendant did not infringe the terms of the act.
 Under The Literal Rule, Adler was not in the VICINITY of the area – he was IN the area – and so was not infringing
the terms of the act.
 Under the golden rule of statutory interpretation, where the literal rule of statutory interpretation renders
an absurd or inconsistent result, the judge can substitute a reasonable meaning in the light of the statute
as a whole.
R v Allen [1988] Crim LR 698
Facts
 Mr Allen consumed homemade wine that unknowingly to him was much stronger than he initially thought.
 As such, it had a much stronger effect on him than he anticipated.
 He sexually assaulted a person while under the influence of alcohol.
 He relied on the defence of involuntary intoxication and pleaded that he could not be responsible for his actions.
Issue
Whether Allen’s consumption of alcohol could be considered involuntary.
Decision / Outcome
 It was held that Allen’s drinking had been a voluntary act and that ignorance as to the strength of the alcohol being
consumed was no defence.
 As he had chosen to drink alcohol, he should have known or ought to have known the risks of consumption.
 Even if the alcohol had done away with Allen’s inhibitions subsequently causing him to commit the offences, it was
still not enough to negative the necessary mental element required to do the crimes.
 He would have been aware of what he was doing and the nature of his conduct, however drunk. Drunkenness was
reinstated as being no defence to a crime.
 The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.
In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs Azad Bharat Finance Company, AIR 1967, SC 276,
 the respondent’s truck was being used for carrying contraband opium without the respondent knowing about it.
 An order of confiscation of the truck was passed under section 11, Opium Act, 1878 as modified by Opium
(Madhya Bharat Amendment) Act, 1955.
 Under the Act of 1955, the words used are ‘shall be confiscated’ whereas the Section 11 of the Opium Act, 1878
provided the words ‘shall be liable to be confiscated.’
 The Supreme Court held the confiscation unlawful and ordered release of the truck.
 It said that there are numerous instances where the word ‘shall’ has been interpreted as ‘may’, that is to say, as
permissive and not obligatory on the ground that the context of an enactment so desires.
 In the present context also a mandatory confiscation leads to absurdity, hardship and injustice because the
respondent did not know that the truck was being used for such a purpose.
In Lee Vs Knapp, (1967) 2 QB 442,
 interpretation of the word ‘stop’ was involved.
 Under Section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960 a driver causing an accident shall ‘stop’ after the accident.
  In this case, a driver stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then moved away.
 Applying the golden rule, the court held that requirement of the section had not been followed by the driver as he
had not stopped for a reasonable period requiring interested persons to make necessary inquiries from him about
the accident.
In U. P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore, the Apex Court held that the meaning of the term 'landless person' under
Section 14 of the Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953, signified 'landless labourers' only, and not 'landless businessmen'. The
object of the Act was to provide land to labourers engaged in agriculture, and not to businessmen.

Q. Discuss the rule of Harmonious construction with the help of decided cases.
4. Rule of Harmonious construction
 The doctrine of harmonious construction is followed when there arises an inconsistency between two or more
statutes or sections of a particular statute.
 The fundamental principle behind this doctrine is, a statute has a legal purpose and should be read in its totality
and after that, the interpretation that is consistent with all the provisions of that statute should be used.
 In a situation where harmonizing all clauses is unlikely the court’s decision on the provision then takes
precedence.
Landmark Judgments on Doctrine Of Harmonious Construction:
In Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. Vs State of Mysore & Ors., AIR 1958 SC 255,
 The petitioners contended that, it was an age-old practice of Gowda Saraswath Brahmins to conduct all the rituals
and ceremonies in relation to the temple, in accordance with a Scheme framed in a suit under Section 92 of the
Code of Civil Procedure
 After the passing of the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act, 1947 which had for its object the removal of the
disability of Harijans from entering into Hindu public temples, the trustees made a representation to the
Government.
 That the temple was a private one, a denominational institution (Religious or denominational institution means an
institution which is operated for religious purposes or is operated, supervised or controlled by religious or
denominational organizations.) and, therefore, outside the operation of the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation
Act, 1947.
 Therefore, the temple and its devotees constitute a religious denomination and hence has independence in
religious administration which confers upon them the right to decide who can enter the temple.
 Upon hearing the parties to the case the Court affirmed the view of the HC and held that, a complete exclusion of
general public will amount to violation of Article 25.
 Therefore, the temple authorities may be permitted to exclude general public only in those ceremonies which are
integral in nature which are performed by the members of Gowda Saraswath Brahmins alone. Further the Court
applied the principle of harmonious construction to resolve the dispute between Article 25(freedom of
conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion) and 26(freedom to manage religious
affairs).
 the Supreme Court applied the Rule of harmonious construction
 in resolving a conflict between Articles 25 (2)(b) and 26 (b) of the Constitution of India

 The doctrine’s conception can be tracked all the way back to the first amendment to the Constitution of India, 1951,
in the landmark judgement of Sri Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India (1951).
 The disagreement between the Fundamental Rights (Part III) and the Directive Principles (Part IV) of the
Constitution of India was the subject of the case.
 Constitutional law is mainly concerned with the creation of the three great organs and the distribution of
governmental powers among them, that is the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.
 The Apex Court, in this case, made use of the rule of harmonious construction and held that Fundamental Rights
are granted against the State and they may be revoked only under certain circumstances and even modified by the
Parliament to comply with the constitutional provisions.
 The Supreme Court gave preference to both and said that the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of
State Policy are two sides of the same coin, and it is beneficial that they must work together.
 The Supreme Court further held that the Fundamental Rights enforce limitation over both the legislature and
executive power.
 They are not sacrosanct and the Parliament can amend them to bring them in conformity with the Directive
Principles.
  The Supreme Court articulated the doctrine of harmonious construction in the case, Re Kerala Education Bill
Case (1957).
 The court added that there was no inherent conflict between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles
of the State Policy and they together constitute an integrated scheme and a comprehensive administrative and
social programme for a modern democratic state.
 The court called them supplementary and complementary to each other.
 Therefore, effort should be put to construe them harmoniously, so that the courts avoid any conflict among the
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.
 They basically run parallel to each other and neither one is subordinate to the other.

In Ishwari Khaitan Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1980, SC 1955,
 State Government proposed to acquire sugar industries under U.P Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971.
 This was challenged on the ground that these sugar industries were declared to be a controlled one by the Union
under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, and the State did not have the power of
acquisition or requisition of property which was under the control of the Union.
 The SC held that the power of acquisition was not occupied by the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act,
1951, and the State had a separate power under Entry 42 List III (Acquisition and requisitioning of property).

In State of Bombay Vs F.N.Balsara, AIR 1951, SC 318

 This case mainly focused on the ambit of the Bombay Prohibition Act 1949 and whether alcohol-infused drugs and
toiletries are also covered under the above-mentioned Act, and should their sale, distribution and production be
prohibited.
 while deciding upon the constitutionality of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, enacted by the Bombay Legislature,
whereby restrictions on production and sale of liquor were put, the Supreme Court observed that the expression
‘possession and sale’ occurring in Entry 31 of List II (the Provincial Legislatures had the power to make laws in
respect of "intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and
sale of intoxicating liquors") are to be read without any qualification.
 The constitutional validity of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, in so far as it restricted the possession and sale
of foreign liquors was impugned on the ground that it was an encroachment on the field assigned to the Dominion
Legislature under entry 19 of List I of The Government of India Act, 1935. (the Dominion Legislature had the
power to make laws with respect to "import and export across customs frontiers").
 The word ‘import’ in Entry 19 of List I standing by itself does not include with sale or possession of the article
imported into country by a person residing in the territory into which it is imported.
 The state legislature has the power to completely prohibit the keeping, selling and using intoxicating wine under
the Entry 31 of List II of The Government of India Act, 1935.
 There is hence, no question of the dispute between the jurisdiction of the state and the centre.
 If any act passed by the state legislature, prohibits or controls the export of the things mentioned in Entry 27 and
29 of the List II, outside the boundaries of the state, then the Act is illegal.
 But this Act has been passed under Entry 31 of List II, hence Section 297(1)(a) does not apply to it.
 The exemption allowed to the soldiers of Army, the messes of the Land Forces and Water Ships can therefore, not
be declared illegal under Section 37.
 The Supreme Court declared illegal those provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act which were regarding keeping
alcohol-mixed medicines and toilet goods, selling and buying them and also using them etc as violative of Article
19(1)(g) of the Constitution and the rest of the provisions, legal.
 It was also decided that an Act, by declaring certain provisions thereof as illegal, cannot be wholly declared as
illegal.
 Section 297(1)(a) of the impugned Act does not apply as the said Act was passed under Entry 31 of the List II and
not under Entry 27 or 29. And hence the Act was not illegal.
 There is, therefore, no real conflict between Entry 31 of List II and Entry 19 of List I.
 Consequently, the Act of 1949, in so far as it purports to restrict possession, use and sale of foreign liquor, is not
an encroachment on the field assigned to the Federal Legislature.
 the Court had held the Bombay Prohibition Act 1949 valid because the pith and substance of the Act fell under
Entry 31 of List II, and not under Entry 19 of List I, even though the Act incidentally encroached upon the Central
power of legislation.
Latin maxims related to the doctrine of Harmonious Construction
Generalia specialibus non derogant ( "things general do not derogate from things special")
Where there is a special provision specifically dealing with a subject, a general provision, howsoever widely worded must
yield to the former.
This principle is expressed by the maxim Generalia specialibus non derogant.
This maxim has been widely used in cases, where there is a conflict between general and special provisions of an act or
different acts. It has helped our judiciary in the interpretation of statutes.
Example: Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I
There are 2 acts that provide for impounding of passports:
 Criminal Procedure Code;
 Passports Act.
In this case, the petitioner lost access to his license as the result of the procedures of a case in which he was the accused.
His passport was seized by C.B.I., thus, he couldn’t travel.
In this case, there was a conflict between section 104 of CrPC and section 10(3) of the Passport Act.
The court decided that: Since impounding of passports are governed by special legislation namely the passports act, normal
CrPC provisions concerning impounding shall not be attracted, the courts or the police can at best seize a passport, but for
impounding (which is far more enduring and continuous possession) passport authority would have to be approached– and
the authority can take a decision on whether it would be impounded or not.
In this case, the scope of the law under CrPC was defined by saying that the courts or the police cannot impound but can
only seize a passport. As impounding a passport has far-reaching and permanent consequences, special law provisions will
prevail to provide a better remedy to the petitioner.
Example: State of Gujarat v. Patel Ranjibhai
Conflict arose with respect to section 33(6) and section 35 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act,1959. It was decided that with
respect to unregistered dealers 33(6) will prevail over 35 as it was considered a special provision and dealt with their
interests in a better manner.

Generalibus specialia derogant (Special things derogate from general things. )

Special things derogate from general things. If a special provision is made on a certain matter, the matter is excluded from
the general provisions. Applying this rule, the Supreme Court held in its judgment in South India Corpn. (P.) Ltd. v.
Secretary, Board of Revenue AIR 1964 SC 207 that the general provision under Article 372 of the Constitution regarding
continuance of existing laws is subject to article 277 of the Constitution which is a special provision relating to taxes, duties,
cesses, or fees lawfully levied at the commencement of the Constitution. In Vinay Kumar Singh v. Bihar State Electricity
Board [2003] 8 ILD 318, the Patna High Court observed that article 351 of the Constitution of India is a general provision
regarding development of Hindi all over India, whereas article 348 is a specific provision with regard to the language to be
used in the Supreme Court and the High Courts and that, therefore, the applicability of article 351 of the Constitution is
entirely obviated.

5. The Statute should be read as a whole (or construction ex visceribus actus)

 One of the important general principles of interpretation is that the statute should be read as a whole and all parts
of it taken together while construing a provision.
 The meaning of the maxim Ex Visceribus Actus is that every part of the statute must be construed within the four
corners of the Act.
 No provision should be interpreted in isolation.
 A provision cannot be interpreted in isolation.
 The elementary rule states that the intention of the Legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole.
 Every clause needs to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, to make a
consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter.
 It is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute.
 The conclusion that the language is plain or ambiguous can only be truly arrived at by studying the statute as a
whole.
 How far and to what extent each component influences the meaning of the other, would be different in each given
case.
 Each word, must however, be allowed to play its role, however significant or insignificant it may be. in achieving
the legislative intent.
 Each section must be construed as a whole, whether or not one of the parts is a saving clause or a proviso. They
may be interdependent, each portion throwing light, if need be on the rest.
  A question of construction only arises when one side submits that a particular provision of an Act covers the facts
of the case and the other submits that it does not or it may be agreed it applies, but the difference arises to its
application.
Sultana Begum vs Prem Chand Jain on 10 December, 1996
 Appellant is the landlady of the premises, "Pink City Hotel", Mumtaz Bagh, Jaipur, which was in occupation of the
respondent as a tenant against whom a suit for eviction on various grounds including default in payment of rent,
sub-letting, as also for bona fide requirement was filed, which ultimately ended in a compromise on 16.9.1991.
 The compromise decree which was passed on that date provided that the respondent would vacate the premises
and hand-over its possession to the appellant or to her attorney, Ramesh B. Sharma, by 10th of February, 1992,
and that he would pay rent @ Rs.3,100/- per month from the date of the suit till the date of delivery of possession.

 Since the premises were not vacated by the respondent and its possession was not handed over to the appellant
in terms of the compromise decree, she filed an application for execution.
 The appeal is allowed, the judgment and order passed by the executing court as also by the High Court are set
aside and the objections filed by the respondent under Section 47 CPC are dismissed with a direction to the
executing court to proceed with the execution of the decree and deliver possession to the appellant.
 The appellant shall be entitled to her costs throughout from the respondent.
The rule of construction ‘ex visceribus actus’ helps in avoiding any inconsistency either within a section or between two
different sections or provisions of the same statute. The following principles are clearly discernible:
 It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the Act.
 The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat the other provisions unless the court, inspite of
its efforts, finds it impossible to effect reconciliation between them.
 It has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the time that when there are two conflicting provisions in an Act,
which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given
to both. This is the essence of the rule of harmonious construction.
 The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a “dead letter”
or useless lumber is not harmonious construction.
 To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose (serving no practical purpose or result.).
In Aswini Kumar Vs Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952, SC 369, the petitioner who was an advocate of the Calcutta High Court
and the Supreme Court filed in the Registry in the Original side a warrant of authority executed in his favour to appear for his
client. On the ground that under the High Court Rules and Orders, Original Side, an Advocate could not act but only plead,
the warrant of authority was returned. The petitioner argued that being an Advocate in the Supreme Court, he had a right to
act and plead all by himself without any instructions from an Attorney. The Supreme Court accepted this contention by a
majority. One of the minority judges held that to find out the true intention of the legislature, it was necessary to take all the
parts of a statute together for interpreting any provision in it.
Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose AIR 1952 SC 369
 the petitioner was an Advocate of the Calcutta High Court and also of the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme
Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951 is an Act to authorize Advocates of Supreme Court to
practice as of right in any High Court.
 When he filed in the Registry on the original side of the Calcutta High Court a warrant of authority executed in his
favour to appear for a client, it was returned, because under the High Court Rules and Orders, Original side, an
Advocate could only plead and not act.
 The Advocate contended that as an Advocate of the Supreme Court he had a right to practice which right included
the right to act as well as to appear and plead without being instructed by an attorney.
 The contention was accepted by the majority.
 The Supreme Court observed that the non obstante clause can reasonably be read as overriding ‘anything
contained’ in any relevant existing law which is inconsistent with the new enactment, although the draftsman had
primarily in his mind a particular type of law as conflicting with the new Act. The enacting part of a statue must,
where it is clear, be taken to control the non obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously;
 While it may be true that the non obstante clause need not necessarily be co-extensive with the operative part,
there can be no doubt that ordinarily there should be a close approximation between the two.”
 It was further observed that It should first be ascertained what the enacting part of the section provides on a fair
construction of the words used according to their natural and ordinary meaning, and the non obstante clause is to
be understood as operating to set aside as no longer valid anything contained in relevant existing laws which is
inconsistent with the new enactment.
6. Rule of Reasonable Construction or Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat – that things may be more profitable than
lost
 This is a Latin maxim that means a thing should affect than being made void.
 It is a rule of construction which means the construction of a rule should give effect to the rule rather than
destroying it
 When there are two constructions possible in a provision such that one gives effect to the provision and the other
renders the provision inoperative, the former which gives effect to the provision is adopted and the latter is
discarded.
Case- K.P. Varghese v. ITO[1981] The court should as far as possible avoid that construction that attributes irrationality to
the Legislature and prefers a construction that renders the statutory provision constitutionally valid rather than the one which
makes it void.
In Avtar Singh Vs State of Punjab, AIR 1965, SC 666, the appellant who was convicted for theft of electricity under
Section 39 of the Electricity Act, 1910 argued that his conviction should not be maintained because the process against
him had not started as per the directions of Section 50 of the Electricity Act, 1910 as the proceedings against him were
not initiated by anyone mentioned therein. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that theft of electricity though not a
theft within the meaning of Section 378, IPC was made so by Section 39 of the Electricity Act, 1910 and thus punishment
under the Indian Penal Code must be imposed. The Supreme Court applied the principle of interpretation Ut Res Magis
Valeat Quam Pereat and held that since the crime is against the Act and not against the Code, the requirement of Section
50 of the Act must have been followed. However, an accused found guilty under Section 39 of the Electricity Act, 1910 has
to be punished under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code because Section 39 of the Act creates a fiction to the effect that
an offence under this section will be deemed to be an offence under the Code.
Section 39 in The Indian Electricity Act, 1910 Theft of energy.—Whoever dishonestly abstracts, consumes or uses any
energy shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which shall not be
less than one thousand rupees, or with both: and if it is proved that any artificial means or means not authorised by the
licensee exist for the abstraction, consumption or use of energy by the consumer, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is
proved, that any abstraction, consumption or use of energy has been dishonestly caused by such consumer.
Section 50 in The Indian Electricity Act, 1910 - Institution of prosecutions.—No prosecution shall be instituted against any
person for any offence against this Act or any rule, license or order thereunder, except at the instance of the Government or
a State Electricity Board or an Electrical Inspector, or of a person aggrieved by the same.
Section 379 in The Indian Penal Code - Punishment for theft.—Whoever commits theft shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
D. Saibaba vs Bar Council Of India & Anr on 6 May, 2003, SC 2502 –
 the petitioner who was a physically challenged (handicapped) advocate was also running a STD booth in his
name.
 He failed to surrender the booth within the time given by the Bar Council of India which directed the State Bar
Council to delete his name from the roll of advocates.
 The petitioner surrendered the booth subsequently.
 His review petition against the order of the Bar Council of India was dismissed on the ground of limitation as ‘sixty
days from the date of that order’ as provided under Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, 1961 had elapsed.
 The Supreme Court set aside the order and restored the enrolment of the petitioner.
 The Court ruled that this expression must mean and be construed as date of communication or knowledge, actual
or constructive, of the order sought to be reviewed.
In R v. Ewens [1966] 2 WLR 1372 (CCA) -
 interpretation of Section 1(1)(a) of the Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1964 was in question.
 The accused had to prove he had been issued a valid prescription for the drinnamyl tablets found in his
possession.
 It was a defence for an accused person to show that the scheduled substance found in his possession was by
virtue of a prescription given to him by a Medical Doctor who was treating him of an ailment.
 Applying the construction Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat, the court held that it was for the accused to prove
the defence.
 Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat, is a rule of construction which literally means the construction of a rule should
give effect to the rule rather than destroying it. When there are two constructions possible from a provision, of
 which one gives effect to the provision and the other renders the provision inoperative, the former which gives
effect to the provision is adopted and the latter is discarded.
 The Crown was not obliged to adduce(cite as evidence) any evidence to show that the exception was not available
to him.

7. Principle that Identical expressions to have same meaning - There is a presumption that if the same words are used
in the same statute in the same context, they bear the same meaning. But if there is a change of language, such change
indicates the change in the intention of Legislature. According to LORD SHAW, “In the absence of any context indicating a
contrary intention, it may be presumed that the Legislature intended to attach the same meaning to the same words when
used in a subsequent statute in a similar connection.’’
It is reasonable to assume that when the legislature has used a particular expression in a statute many times, the
expression must bear the same meaning everywhere. To call the same thing by the same name is a very safe proposition.
But the courts should be very careful while applying this principle because the same expression expressed in a different
context than the earlier one may have been intended by the legislature to have a different meaning. To find out, therefore,
whether the same word should have the same meaning or not is a very difficult task for the court. The courts while
interpreting the same expression differently generally give the reason that their context is different. Another reason for doing
so may be that the word exists in a consolidating statute where it has been derived from two distinct enactments.
In D.D. Rego v. Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences, AIR 1999, karn 2023, the Karnataka High Court held that it
is settled law that in matters relating to educational institutions if two interpretations are possible, the courts would be
reluctant to accept that which would upset and reverse the decision of the educational authorities and would accept the
interpretation made by such institutions. Thus, when examination regulations for the purpose of declaration of results were
notified by the University and the candidates knew about the procedure to be adopted by the University fully well, they
cannot turn around to say that the University regulations are contrary to regulations framed by the Medical Council of India.
In Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, AIR 1957, SC 23 - interpretations of the word ‘statement’
under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and of the words ‘the grounds on which the order has been made’
under Sections 3(3) and 7(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 were involved. The Supreme Court held that the word
‘statement’ has been used in Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 32, 39, 145 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and in all
these sections it has been used in the same sense, that is to say, ‘something that is stated’. Therefore, where a prosecution
witness who while recording his conversation with other witnesses had prepared notes, these notes could be used for
corroboration under Section 157 as these were ‘something that is stated’. But, on the contrary, the Supreme Court also held
that the words ‘the grounds on which the order has been made’ under Sections 3 (3) and 7 (1) of the Preventive Detention
Act, 1950 did not have the same meaning because the authority could withhold facts on ground of public interest under
Section 7 (2) while stating the grounds of detention to the detenu under Section7 (1), but those facts could be stated to the
State Government while reporting to it the grounds of detention under section 3 (3).
In Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1976, SC 2608 - the word ‘vest’ was being interpreted. The State
Government was authorised under Section 117 (1) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
1951 to declare hats, bazars and melas which ‘vested’ in the State shall ‘vest’ in the Gaon Sabhas. The Supreme Court held
that whereas vesting in the state was absolute vesting in the Gaon Sabhas was only for the limited purpose of possession
and management.
Similarly, the Supreme Court observed in M. Ismail v. Union of India, that even when the word ‘vest’ has been used in a
section only once, in the context of one property it could mean only vesting of management while in the context of another
property it could mean vesting of ownership.

8. Construction Noscitur a sociis –

 “Noscitur a sociis” is a Latin maxim which means that “the term in a statute is to be recognized by the associated
words”.
 It is also used for interpreting questionable words in statutes.
 When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the statute.
 It is one of the rules of the language used by the courts that helps to interpret legislation.
 For the case with “noscitur a sociis” the questionable meaning of a word or doubtful words can be derived from its
association with other words within the context of the phrase.
 The principle of Noscitur a Sociis is a rule of construction.
 It is used by the court to interpret legislation.
 This means that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase must be determined by the words that surround it.
  In other terms, the meaning of a word must be judged by the company that it keeps.
 The questionable meaning of a doubtful word will be derived from its association with other words.
 It is used wherever a statutory provision constitutes a word or phrase that is capable of bearing more than one
meaning.
For Example, in the case of Foster v. Diphwys Casson, a defendant had conveyed explosives in a cloth bag, where the
law necessitated that they be conveyed within a ‘case or canister’. By interpreting the meaning of ‘case’ by the words around
it (explicitly, the words ‘or canister’), the court presumed that a cloth bag could not be within the statutory definition, as ‘case’
was intended to allude (hint at) to an option to a canister, that essentially could give protection and structural integrity like
what a canister could.
Important Case Laws
1. In Mangoo Singh v. Election Tribunal, AIR 1957, SC 871 - there was a charge of more than one year’s demand for taxes
of Municipality on litigant when he filed the nomination for contesting an election. Before the date of the poll, he settled up all
taxes and was also chosen. However, his election was set aside. His contentions in front of the Court were that the
significant date was not the date of filing nomination but the date of the poll and further, no notice of demand was served
upon him. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and held that the relevant date was the date of nomination and not the
date of the poll. It was stated the word demand is to be interpreted with reference to the collocation of words in which it has
been used. So interpreted it must mean municipal tax or other dues.
2. In Alamgir v. State of Bihar, AIR 1959, SC 436 -
 the construction of Section 498 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was involved. (Section 498 says – enticing or
taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married woman)
 In this case, a wedded lady left her husband deliberately and began to live with the appellant straightforwardly.
 The Appellant was charged under Section 498 of IPC, 1860, and the case was instituted against him.
 His plea was that he had neither taken nor tempted away the lady nor had he concealed or detained her.
Therefore, charge against him must be taken back.
 The Supreme Court held that the word detains normally implies confinement against will;
 The word detains is to be interpreted with reference to the words used ‘takes’, ‘entices’, and ‘conceals’ used in
Section 498 - and therefore it would mean detention without the consent of the husband.
 The rights of a husband have been protected under Section 498 of IPC, 1860 who has been deprived of the
company of his wife without his permission.
 The consent of a woman under section 498 is of no value.
3. In Devendra M. Surti v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1969, SC 63 - the word ‘profession’ under Section 2(4) of the Bombay
Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 had to be interpreted by the court. The private dispensary of a clinical specialist was
not included under the word ‘profession’ by referring other related words ‘business’ and ‘trade’ connected with it.
4. In Pradeep Agarbatti, Ludhiana v. State of Punjab, AIR 1998, SC 171 - the word ‘perfumery’ was interpreted by a court
applying the principle of Noscitur a sociis that it can mean cosmetics and toilet goods but doesn’t include ‘dhoop’ and
‘agarbatti’ under entry 16 schedule A of Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948.

Q. Describe the rule of ejusdem generis with the aid of relevant cases.
Q. What do you understand by the principle of ‘Ejusdem’ generis ? Discuss with the help of decided
cases.
9. Construction ejusdem generis –
 The term Ejusdem Generis in other words means words of a similar class.
 The rule is that where particular words have a common characteristic (i.e. of a class) any general words that follow
should be construed as referring generally to that class; no wider construction should be afforded.
 The Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis provides that when a list of specific words are being followed by the general
words, the general words are interpreted in a way so as to restrict them to include the items or things which will be
of same type as those of the specific words,
 For example, if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles, and other motor-powered
vehicles, a court might use ejusdem generis to hold that such vehicles would not include airplanes,
because the list included only land-based transportation.
In the Old English case of Evans v. Cross the words 'other devices' had to be interpreted in Section 48 (9) of the
Road Traffic Act, 1930 which defined a 'traffic sign' to include 'all signals, warning sign posts, direction posts,
signs, or other devices'. Applying the rule of Ejusdem Generis the Court held that a painted white line on a road
could not be called a traffic sign because devices are things, which a painted line on road is not.
In re Latham Deceased, the words 'or other person' in the expression 'trustee, guardian, committee or other person'
in Section 8 (4) of the Finance Act, 1894 was 'interpreted Ejusdem Generis to mean a person in a similar position to
a trustee etc. and as such a person who was beneficially interested could not be included within it. Where the
preceding words do not belong to a distinct genus, the rule of Ejusdem Generis does not apply.
In Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1965, SC 1167 -
 through the Fruit Products Order, 1955, issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, it
was made obligatory that the percentage of fruit juice in fruit syrup should be twenty-five.
 The appellant argued that the order did not apply to its product Rooh Afza even though it contained fruit juices.
 This because clause 2 (d) (v) of the Order includes squashes, crushes, cordials, barley water, barrelled juice and
ready-to-serve beverages or any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp.
 The expression any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp should be construed Ejusdem Generis.
 The Supreme Court rejected the contention and held that the rule had no application here because the things
mentioned before the general expression any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp did not fall under
a determinable genus. Further, the context makes it clear that all beverages containing fruit juice are intended to
be included.
In M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills Private Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1989, SC 1019 –
the Supreme Court observed that the expressions 'bleaching, mercerizing, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising,
shrink-proofing, organdie processing, which precede the expression 'or any other process' in Section 2 (f) (v) of the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944 contemplate processes which import a change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the
addition of some chemical into the fabric or otherwise.
'Any other process' in the section must share one or the other of these incidents. The expression is used in the context of
what constitutes manufacture in its extended meaning and the expression 'unprocessed' in the exempting notification draws
its meaning from that context.

Q. Explain the concept of “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

10. Construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius –
 The maxim Expressio unios exclusio alterius means that “to express one is to exclude others; therefore mention of
one or more specific things may be taken to exclude others of the same type.”
 The legal maxim simply means that if one of the two possibilities of an event is talked about expressly, then the
second possibility is kicked out by default.
 For example, “weekends and public holidays” excludes ordinary weekdays.
 If a Statute refers to Lions and Tigers, it only refers to Lions and Tigers and will not include Leopards’ or any other
wild animals.
 That which is expressed is included and that which is not is excluded; a rule of statutory interpretation that says
that if something is mentioned as being included, then anything that is not mentioned is by implication meant not to
be included.
 The doctrine is useful not only in determining the extents of contracts but also plays an important role in the
construction of statutes.
 It can be interpreted as- Where certain persons or things are specified in the law, contract or will, an intention to
exclude all others from its operation shall be inferred.

Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius Case Laws

Calcutta Tpt. Society vs State of Punjab, 1962 - The court held that this rule may be applied only when the contrast between
what is provided and what is left out leads to an inference that the latter was intended to be excluded. It may accordingly be
held inapplicable if there exists a plausible reason for not mentioning what is left out.
R.V. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1988 AC 958,
it was held that to exclude the father of an illegitimate child from rights under immigration law at the time, because the
definition section specifically mentioned the mother alone.
R v Inhabitants of Sedgely (1831) 2 B & Ad 65
A statute raised taxes on 'lands, houses and coalmines'. The court held that it did not apply to limestone mines as these
were not specifically mentioned nor did the statute suggest that it would apply to other types of mines.
Tempest v/s Kilner -
The court had to rule whether the statute of frauds 1677 applied to the sale of stocks and shares. The act required contracts
for the sale of ‘goods, wares and merchandise’ to be evidence in writing if they were above a specified value.
The Court decided that stocks and shares were not covered by the act as the specific words ‘goods, wares and
merchandise’ were not followed by general words.
This will not be strictly applied in the event that the act mentions that the words listed are illustrative by the use of the word.

11. Construction Contemporanea expositio est fortissima in lege

meaning Contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law.
It is said that the best exposition of a statute or any other document is that which it has received from contemporary
authority.
If the authority is an enactment or a judicial decision, it has a binding force.
Where an exposition has been done by a long usage, that should be accepted even though it is different from the ordinary or
the popular sense.
When a statute was passed, the persons who were living then or thereabout may be presumed to know the circumstances
under which the statute was passed and the prevailing circumstances at the time of its passage better than persons of the
later generations. While interpreting old statutes high regard must be paid to the meanings given to them by judges of that
time since they were in a better position than the present day judges to judge the intention of the legislature at that time.
This principle of ‘contemporanea exposito’ was applied by the Supreme Court in National and Grindlays Bank v Municipal
Corporation for Greater Bombay, AIR 1969 SC 1048 while construing Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. The apex
court also referred to the actual practice in the matter of appointment of judges of Supreme Court and High Court in the
context of interpreting Articles 74 and 124 of the Constitution and observed that the practice being in conformity with the
constitutional scheme should be accorded legal sanction by permissible constitutional interpretation. (Supreme Court
Advocates on Record Association v Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268.)
Article 74 in The Constitution Of India 1949 - Council of Ministers to aid and advise President
Article 124 in The Constitution Of India 1949 - Establishment and constitution of Supreme Court
JK Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd and another v Union of India and Others AIR 1988 SC 191. The appellant JK
Cotton Spinning and weaving Mills Ltd, has a composite mill where it manufactures fabrics of different types. In order to
manufacture the said fabrics, yarn is obtained at an intermediate stage. The yarn so obtained is further processed in an
integrated process in the composite mill for weaving and the same in to fabrics. The appellants have to pay the excise duty
on the different kinds of fabrics, which are removed from the factory. The Collector Central Excise issued a notice under
rule 9(1) of the central excse rules to the appellants demanding to pay central excise on the yarn accumulated at the factory
at intermediate stages. The appellants contented that they would be held liable to pay central excise only when the yarn
would be removed from factory, but not at intermediate stages, the appellants pleaded contemporanea exposito. The
supreme court interpreted the central excise rules and gave judgement against the appellants and dismissed the appeal.
The learned counsel relied on support from the decision in KP Varghese v the Income tax officer, Ernakulam (AIR 1981 SC
1922) for which the court observed that in the relied case there was ambiguity and a word was capable of two construction
hence the maxim contempranea expositio was applied, but in this case there is no ambiguity and hence the maxim cannot
be imported.

National Textile Corporation, New Delhi and another v Swadeshi Mining and manufacturing Co Ltd, Lucknow and others AIR
1988 SC 782. In the instant case the question, whether 10,00,000 shares in Swadeshi polytex Ltd and 1,71,834 shares in
swadeshi mining and manufacturing co Ltd held by Swadeshi cotton Mills vest in the central Govt under section 3 of the
swadeshi cotton Mills co Ltd act 1986 came up for consideration before Supereme Court. The Appellants contented that
production of certain documents were necessary for the said vesting of the shares with Central govt. But Supreme Court
held that such production of documents were not necessary under the provisions of the act. The question can be resolved
by interpretation of the relavant provisions of the act it self and there is no ambiguity hence the well settled principle of
contemporanea expositio is not applicable here and is relavant only in construing old statutes.
N Suresh Nathan and another v Union of India 1992 1 SCC 584, the case relates to service maters. The question of law
arose in this case was about promotion to the post of Assistant engineers in PWD, junior engineers pocessing degree in civil
engineering with 3 years service in the grade are eligible for promotion as assistant engineers. Diploma holder junior
engineers obtaining degree while in service were not entitled to count their service prior to obtaining the degree for
computing the period of three years for the purpose of promotion. The administrative tribunal gave judgement against the
diploma holders and later Supreme court reversed the decision. Here the principle laid was, construction is in consonance
with long standing practice prevailing in the concerned department to be preferred.

Q. Discuss the following rules giving relevant illustrations:

Q. Explain the following: Define with example the following:
Q. Write short notes on the following :
1. Delegatus non potest delegare
2. Generalia special bus non derogant
3. Jure naturae sunt immutabilia
4. Expressum facit cessare tacitum
5. In pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis
6. Ut res valeat potior quam pereat
7. Reddendo Singula Singulis
1. The legal maxim 'Delegatus Non-Potest Delegare'
 does not lay down a rule of law.
 It merely states a rule of construction of a statute.
 The maxim "delegatus non potest delegare" which means a delegated authority cannot be redelegated The rule
that a person to whom a power, trust, or authority is given to act on behalf, or for the benefit of, another, cannot
delegate this obligation unless expressly authorized to do so.
 Generally, sub-delegation of legislative power is impermissible, yet it can be permitted either when such power is
expressly conferred under the statute or can be inferred by necessary implication.
 This is so because there is a well-established principle that a sub-delegate cannot act beyond the scope of power
delegated to him.
 For instance, an auditor who has been appointed to audit the accounts of a company cannot delegate the task to
another unless expressly allowed to do so. If express authorization has not been granted the auditor will have
acted ultra vires.
Express power
There is no difficulty as regards the validity of sub-delegation where the statute itself authorises the administrative agency to
sub-delegate its powers because such a sub-delegation is within the terms of the statute itself.
Thus in Central Talkies v. Dwarka Prasad, under the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, it was provided that
no suit shall be filed for the eviction of a tenant without the permission of either a District Magistrate or any Officer authorised
by him to perform any of his functions under the Act. The Additional Magistrate to whom the powers were delegated made
an order granting permission.
In Allingham v. Minister of Agriculture, under the Defence Regulations, 1939, the Committee was authorised by the
Minister of Agriculture “to give such directions with respect to the cultivation, management or use of land for agricultural
purposes as he thinks necessary.” The committee sub-delegated its power to its Subordinate Officer, who issued a direction,
which was challenged. Holding the direction ultra vires, the Court ruled that the sub-delegation of power by the committee
was not permissible.
Implied power
The point is not clear as to what would be the position if there is no specific or express provision in the statute for sub-
delegation of power. In Jackson v. Butterworth, it was held that the method of sub-delegating power to issue circulars to
local authorities was convenient and desirable but the power to sub-delegate was absent. However, the other view is that
although there is no provision enabling Act authorising sub-delegation of power by the delegate, the same may be inferred
by necessary implication.

2. Generalis Specialibus non Derogant : It is a maxim used for statutory interpretation.

It means erstwhile special law is given superiority over later general law.
Or, in other words “where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without
extending to subjects specially dealt with by the earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier or special legislation.
Example: Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I, AIR 2008
There are 2 acts that provide for impounding of passports:
 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973;
 Passports Act, 1967.
In this case, the petitioner lost access to his license as a result of the procedures of a case in which he was the accused. His
passport was seized by C.B.I., thus, he couldn’t travel.
Section 104 of CrPC, 1973 says – Any court may, if it thinks fit, impound any document or thing produced before it
under this code.
section 10(3)(b) of the Passport Act, 1967 - The passport authority may impound or cause to be impounded or revoke a
passport or travel document, if the passport or travel document was obtained by the suppression of material information or
on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the passport or travel document or any other person on his
behalf:
Provided that if the holder of such passport obtains another passport, the passport authority shall also impound or cause to
be impounded or revoke such other passport.
Provided that if the holder of such passport obtains another passport, the passport authority shall also impound or cause to
be impounded or revoke such other passport.
In this case, there was a conflict between section 104 of CrPC, 1973 and section 10(3) of the Passport Act, 1967.
The court decided that: Since impounding of passports are governed by special legislation namely the passports act, normal
CrPC provisions concerning impounding shall not be attracted, the courts or the police can at best seize a passport, but for
impounding (which is far more enduring and continuous possession) passport authority would have to be approached– and
the authority can take a decision on whether it would be impounded or not.
In this case, the scope of the law under CrPC was defined by saying that the courts or the police cannot impound but can
only seize a passport. As impounding a passport has far-reaching and permanent consequences, special law provisions will
prevail to provide a better remedy to the petitioner.
Azad Transport Co. v. State of Bihar (2016)
Tax is a specialized field. VAT is a special provision and rules in CrPC are considered to be of a general nature. The
government made law with respect to a particular field thus, the specific law gains superiority over general laws.

3. Jura naturae sunt immutabilia ... Natural laws are unchangeable or immutable. A maxim meaning that natural law,
being universal and eternal, does not evolve with changing social, political, or other conditions.
"Jure naturae sunt immutabilia" is a Latin phrase that means "the laws of nature are immutable." This phrase suggests that
there are certain fundamental laws or principles that govern the natural world and the universe that are unchangeable and
eternal. These natural laws are believed to be universally applicable and not subject to human intervention or modification.
In legal terms, the phrase may be used to refer to the concept of natural law, which is the idea that there are certain
universal principles of justice and morality that are inherent in human nature and that can be discovered through reason and
observation. Natural law is considered to be superior to man-made laws, and it is often used as a basis for arguing against
unjust laws or practices.
Overall, the phrase "jure naturae sunt immutabilia" emphasizes the idea that there are certain enduring truths or principles
that exist outside of human institutions and that can provide a foundation for ethical and legal decision-making.
The two Indian cases, Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala and Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, are not explicitly
connected to the principle of "jure naturae sunt immutabilia." However, both cases do involve the application of fundamental
legal principles that are rooted in the idea of natural law.
In Kesavananda Bharati, the Court relied on the principle of "basic structure doctrine," which holds that certain features of
the Constitution are so fundamental that they cannot be amended without undermining the Constitution's integrity and
identity. This principle is based on the idea that there are certain inherent limitations on the power of government that are
grounded in natural law or fundamental principles of justice.
Similarly, in Vishaka, the Court relied on the principle of gender equality and the right to a dignified life to support its
decision. These principles are grounded in the idea of natural law, which holds that all human beings are entitled to certain
inherent and inalienable rights that are based on their dignity and worth as human beings.

4. Expressum facit cessare tacitum : Expressum facit cessare tacitum is a legal maxim that means “what is expressed
makes what is implied silent.” This form of construction is used while interpreting statutes, contracts and deeds. When a
matter is clearly provided in a document, the clear and precise meaning is to be adopted.
Expressum Facit Cessare Tacitum
Expressum facit cessare tacitum is a legal maxim that means “what is expressed makes what is implied silent.” This form of
construction is used while interpreting statutes, contracts and deeds. When a matter is clearly provided in a document, the
clear and precise meaning is to be adopted. The implied meaning need not be adopted when a clear meaning is provided.
For example, when a condition is provided that a contract should be fulfilled on a certain date, the tactic construction that the
contract should be fulfilled within a reasonable time need not be adopted. When an express date is provided for repayment
of a debt, the creditor cannot demand payment before that date.
In this context, a reference mayalso be made to the maxim Expressum Facit Cessare Taciturn [Expressum facit cessare
tacitum-Expression precludes implication] which means that ‘where there is express mention of certain things then anythings
not mentioned is excluded’.

This doctrine has been applied by this Court in various cases to enunciate the principle that expression precludes
implication. In the Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 case, the Supreme Court applied the maxim while
interpreting the provisio of Article 311 [2] of the Constitution of India. It is always safer to apply plain and primary rule of
construction. The first and primary rule of construction is that intention of the legislature is to be found in the words used by
the legislature itself. The true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by construing the meaning of the word in the light
of the discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which an enactment is directed.
It is always important for the Court to keep in mind the purpose which lies behind the statute while interpreting the statutory
provisions. This was stated by this Court in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T. N. AIR 2002 SC 1334 case as under- The
first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature
itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. “Statutes should be
construed, not as theorems of Euclid”, Judge Learned Hand said, “but words must be construed with some imagination of
the purposes which lie behind them. The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De
Gama AIR 1990 SC 981. The maxim, expressum facit cessare tacitum (when there is express mention of certain things,
then anything not mentioned is excluded) applies to the case. As pointed out by this Court in B. Shankara Rao Badami v.
State of Mysore (AIR 1969 SC 453). This well-known maxim is a principle of logic and common sense and not merely a
technical rule of construction. Of his argument, learned Advocate General Mr. Kundu took this court to visit Union of India v.
Tulsiram Patel case wherein their lordship discussed about the maxim [when there is express mentioned certain things, then
anything not mentioned is excluded]. Explaining the doctrine Mr kundu again contended that when in the order itself the
petitioner was given three months extension which he has excepted without any further benefit including the pensionary
benefits and also when neither in the Act nor in the rules, there is any provision for extension of service it has to be
considered by the court that the petitioner is not entitled to any other benefits which is not mentioned in the order as the
same is excluded.

5. In pari delicto (potior/melior est conditio possidentis), Latin for "in equal fault (better is the condition of the
possessor)", is a legal term used to refer to two persons or entities who are equally at fault, whether the malfeasance in
question is a crime or tort. The doctrine is subject to a number of exceptions, including that the plaintiff must be an active,
voluntary participant in the wrongful conduct, the plaintiff's wrongdoing must be at least substantially equal to or greater than
that of the defendant, the "adverse interest" exception, and the "innocent insider" exception.

6. The maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’ is an important principle of interpretation of statutes which literally
means: “It may rather become operative than null”. The effect of this maxim is that an enacting provision or a statute has to
be so construed to make it effective and operative.
As mentioned above, the maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’ means that it is better for a thing to have an effect than
for it to become void. While interpreting any provision, the courts should not lean towards a construction that renders any
provision or the statute void or futile. Hence, whenever the words used in a provision are imprecise, uncertain, and
ambiguous thereby leading to the possibility of alternative constructions, then the courts should construe the provision in
such a manner that none of the provisions of the statute is turned inoperative.
Application of ut res magis valeat quam pereat in Indian case laws
Avtar Singh v. the State of Punjab (1965) SC
In this case, the question arose regarding the interpretation of Section 39 of the Electricity Act, 1910. The appellant was
convicted for theft of electricity from the Punjab State Electricity Board under Section 39 of the Electricity Act and the
respondent proceeded against him under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In the appeal filed by the appellant,
he did not challenge the finding that he had committed the theft but only raised a question of law that his conviction was
illegal in view of certain statutory provisions.
Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 provided that, “Whoever dishonestly abstracts, consumes or uses any energy
shall be deemed to have committed theft within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code”. Hence, as per Section 39, an
accused found guilty shall be punished under Section 379 of the I.P.C.
Section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 provided for the procedure for conviction in the following terms: No prosecution
shall be instituted against any person for any offence against the Act…. except at the instance of the Government or an
Electrical Inspector, or of a person aggrieved by the same.
The appellant contended that he could not be convicted under Section 39 as the procedure for conviction as required by
Section 50 was not followed. According to the appellant, his prosecution was bad and incompetent as it was not at the
instance of the Government or an Electrical Inspector or a person aggrieved by the theft.
The Supreme Court held that since the offence is against the Electricity Act and not the I.P.C., the procedure provided under
Section 50 must have been followed. The conviction of the appellant was set aside. Thus, the Court, in this case applied the
maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat and avoided the construction that would have rendered Section 50 inoperative and
futile.
D. Sai baba v. the Bar Council of India (2003) SC
The question of interpretation of Section 48AA of the Advocates Act 1961 (Review.—The Bar Council of India or any of its
committees, other than its disciplinary committee, may of its own motion or otherwise review any order, within sixty days of
the date of that order, passed by it under this Act.) came before the Supreme Court in this case. The petitioner, a physically
challenged advocate, was also running an STD booth allotted to him in the handicapped person’s quota. A complaint was
filed against him alleging professional misconduct. On 20.2.2001, the Bar Council of India directed him to surrender the
booth but he failed to do so within the specified time period. The Bar Council of India gave an order dated 31.3.2001
directing the State Bar Council to delete the advocate’s name from the roll of advocates. The advocate subsequently
surrendered the booth and filed a review petition against the order of the Bar Council. His petition was dismissed on
26.8.2001 on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The advocate filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Section 48AA of the Advocates Act provides for the review of the decision/order of the Bar Council of India within 60 days of
the date of that order. While construing Section 48AA, the Supreme Court held that the expression ‘ sixty days from the date
of that order’ must be read so as to mean the date of communication, knowledge, actual or constructive, of the order, sought
to be reviewed. While applying the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat, the Court thus interpreted Section 48AA to
make it truly effective. We have no reason to form any opinion other than this that the Bar Council, if only it had exercised its
review jurisdiction, would have formed no opinion other than the one of condoning the innocuous lapse on the part of the
appellant who permitted the allotment of STD booth to continue in his name though he had actually discontinued the
operation of the STD booth by himself. The Bar Council would certainly have taken a sympathetic view and would not have
deprived the appellant of the source of his bread and butter and nipped in the bud the opportunity of blooming into an
independent advocate to an apprentice.
In our opinion, all the appeals filed by appellant deserve to be allowed and are allowed accordingly. The impugned orders of
the Bar Council are set aside. The enrolment of the appellant as an advocate shall stand restored.

7. Reddendo Singula Singulis is a Latin term that means by referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to
its corresponding object. In simple words “reddendo singula singulis” means that when a list of words has a modifying phase
at the end, the phrase refers only to the last. It is a rule of construction used typically in distributing property.
The best example of reddendo singula singulis is quoted from Wharton’s law Lexicon, “If anyone shall draw or load any
sword or gun the word draw is applied to sword only and the word load to gun only, the former verb to former noun and latter
to latter, because it is impossible to load a sword or to draw a gun, and so of other applications of different sets of words to
one another.” The reddendo singula singulis principle concerns the use of words distributively. Where a complex sentence
has more than one subject, and more than one object, it may be the right construction to provide each to each, by reading
the provision distributively and applying each object to its appropriate subject. A similar principle applies to verbs and their
subjects, and to other parts of speech.</p><p>Thus, Reddendo singula singulis is a Latin term that means by referring each
to each; referring each phrase or expression to its corresponding object.

Q. Distinguish between harmonious and beneficial construction.

Q. Explain the principle of Harmonious construction with the help of relevant decided cases.
Q. What do you mean by Beneficial Construction ? Explain with the help of decided cases.
Q. What do you understand by Beneficial Construction ? Explain it with reference to some decided cases.
Q. Discuss the rule of Harmonious construction with the help of decided cases.
Harmonious and Beneficial Construction.
These are basic rules of Interpretation of law. They follow the principle of statute shall be read as a whole and should confer
benefits to the people.
Rule of Harmonious Construction
When there is a conflict between two or more statues or two or more parts of a statute then the rule of harmonious
construction needs to be adopted. The rule follows a very simple premise that every statute has a purpose and intent as per
law and should be read as a whole. The interpretation consistent of all the provisions of the statute should be adopted. In the
case in which it shall be impossible to harmonize both the provisions, the court’s decision regarding the provision shall
prevail.
The rule of harmonious construction is the thumb rule to interpretation of any statute. An interpretation which makes the
enactment a consistent whole, should be the aim of the Courts and a construction which avoids inconsistency or repugnancy
between the various sections or parts of the statute should be adopted. The Courts should avoid “a head on clash”, in the
words of the Apex Court, between the different parts of an enactment and conflict between the various provisions should be
sought to be harmonized. The normal presumption should be consistency and it should not be assumed that what is given
with one hand by the legislature is sought to be taken away by the other. The rule of harmonious construction has been
tersely explained by the Supreme Court thus, “When there are, in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled
with each other, they should be so interpreted, that if possible, effect should be given to both”. A construction which makes
one portion of the enactment a dead letter should be avoided since harmonization is not equivalent to destruction.
Harmonious Construction should be applied to statutory rules and courts should avoid absurd or unintended results. It
should be resorted to making the provision meaningful in the context. It should be in consonance with the intention of Rule
makers. Rule of Harmonious construction is applicable to subordinate legislature also.
The Supreme Court laid down five principles of rule of Harmonious Construction in the landmark case of CIT v Hindustan
Bulk Carriers:
1. The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and they must construe the contradictory
provisions so as to harmonize them.
2. The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in another unless the court, despite all its
effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile their differences. When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in
contradictory provisions, the courts must interpret them in such as way so that effect is given to both the provisions as much
as possible.
3. Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to a useless number or dead is not
harmonious construction.
To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it fruitless.
Cases on Harmonious Construction
1. Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore
In this case the Supreme Court applied the rule of harmonious construction in resolving a conflict between Articles 25(2)(b)
and 26(b) of the Constitution and it was held that the right of every religious denomination or any section thereof to manage
its own affairs in matters of religion [Article 26(b)] is subject to a law made by a State providing for social welfare and reform
or throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus [Article 25(2)(b)].
2. Calcutta Gas Company Pvt. Limited v State of West Bengal
The Legislative Assembly of WB passed the Oriental Gas Company Act in 1960. The respondent sought to take over the
management of the Gas Company under this Act. The appellant challenged the validity of this act by holding that the state
Legislative Assembly had no power to pass such an under Entries 24 and 25 of the State List because the Parliament had
already enacted the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 under Entry 52 of the Central List dealing with
industries. It was observed by the Supreme Court that there are so many subjects in three lists in the Constitution that there
is bound to be some overlapping and it is the duty of the courts in such situation is to yet to harmonise them, if possible, so
the effect can be given to each of them. Entry 24 of the State List covers entire Industries in the State. Entry 25 is only
limited to the Gas industry. Therefore Entry 24 covers every industry barring the Gas Industries because it has been
specifically covered under Entry 25. Corresponding to Entry 24 of the State List, there is Entry 52 in the Union List.
Therefore, by harmonious construction it became clear that gas industry was exclusively covered by Entry 25 of the State
List over which the state has full control. Therefore, the state was fully competent to make laws in this regard.
3. Commissioner of Sales Tax, MP v Radha Krishna
Under section 46 (1) c of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, criminal prosecution of the respondent partners
was sanctioned in this case by the Commissioner when even after repeated demands the assesse did not pay the sales tax.
The respondent challenged this provision on the ground that there were two separate provisions under the Act, namely,
section 22 (4 – A) and section 46 (1) c under which two different procedures were prescribed to realize the amount due but
there was no provision of law which could tell that which provision should be applied in which case. According to the
Supreme Court, the provision prescribed u/s 46 (1) c was more drastic. It was held that by harmonious construction of these
two provisions, the conclusion drawn is that the Commissioner had a judicial discretion to decide as to which procedure to
be followed in which case. Whenever the Commissioner will fail to act judicially, the court will have the right to intervene.
However, in this case, the Commissioner had correctly decided that the more drastic procedure under section 46 (1) c
deserved to be followed because of the failure of the assesse firm in paying sales tax despite the repeated demands by the
sales tax officer.
4. Sirsilk Ltd. v Govt. of Andhra Pradesh
An interesting question relating to a conflict between two equally mandatory provisions, viz., ss 17(1) and 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is a good illustration of the importance of the principle that every effort should be made to give
effect to all the provisions of an act by harmonizing any apparent conflict between two or more of its provisions. Section
17(1) of the Act requires the government to publish every award of a Labour Tribunal within thirty days of its receipt and by
sub – section (2) of section 17 the award on its publication becomes final. Section 18(1) of the Act provides that a settlement
between employer and workmen shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. In a case where a settlement was arrived
at after the receipt of the award of a Labour Tribunal by the Government but before its publication, the question was whether
the Government was still required u/s 17(1) to publish the award. In construing these two equally mandatory provisions, the
Supreme Court held that the only way to resolve the conflict was to hold that by the settlement, which becomes effective
from the date of signing, the industrial dispute comes to an end and the award becomes infructuous and the Government
cannot publish it.
Rule of Beneficial Construction
Beneficent construction involves giving the widest meaning possible to the statutes.
When there are two or more possible ways of interpreting a section or a word, the meaning which gives relief and protects
the benefits which are purported to be given by the legislation, should be chosen.
A beneficial statute has to be construed in its correct perspective so as to fructify the legislative intent. Although beneficial
legislation does receive liberal interpretation, the courts try to remain within the scheme and not extend the benefit to those
not covered by the scheme.
It is also true that once the provision envisages the conferment of benefit limited in point of time and subject to the fulfillment
of certain conditions, their non-compliance will have the effect of nullifying the benefit.
There should be due stress and emphasis to Directive Principles of State Policy and any international convention on the
subject.
There is no set principle of construction that a beneficial legislation should always be retrospectively operated although such
legislation such legislation is either expressly or by necessary intendment not made retrospective.
Further, the rule of interpretation can only be resorted to without doing any violence to the language of the statute.
In case of any exception when the implementation of the beneficent act is restricted the Court would construe it narrowly so
as not to unduly expand the area or scope of exception.
The liberal construction can only flow from the language of the act and there cannot be placing of unnatural interpretation on
the words contained in the enactment.
Also, beneficial construction does not permit rising of any presumption that protection of widest amplitude must be deemed
to have been conferred on those for whose benefit the legislation may have been enacted.
Beneficial Construction of statutes have enormously played an important role in the development and beneficial
interpretation of socio–economic legislations and have always encouraged the Indian legislators to make more laws in
favour of the backward class of people in India.

Q. What do you mean by Beneficial Construction ? Explain with the help of the decided cases.
Rule of Beneficial Construction
 Beneficent construction involves giving the widest meaning possible to the statutes.
 When there are two or more possible ways of interpreting a section or a word, the meaning which gives relief and
protects the benefits which are purported to be given by the legislation, should be chosen.
 A beneficial statute has to be construed in its correct perspective so as to fructify the legislative intent. There
should be due stress and emphasis to Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV of the Constitution of India) and
any international convention on the subject.
 Laws which are enacted with the object of promoting the general welfare and facing urgent social demands receive
beneficial legislation.
 Examples of statutes include Factories Act, 1948; Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 etc.
 Another example of beneficial construction of a statute is the Juvenile Justice Act.
 The earlier act of 1986 was replaced with a new act in 2000.
Cases on Beneficial Construction
Hindustan Lever Ltd v Ashok Vishnu Kate
In this case, the court held that in a case which is related to the prevention of unfair labour practices, it should be made
completely in accordance with the labour point of view as they are benefitting people here and while interpreting Social
Welfare Legislation also they should consider the benefitting people of the society.
Noor Saba Khatoon v. Mohammad Quasium
The supreme court held that the rights of maintenance of children below two years old and the mother under Section 125 of
the code of civil procedure 1973 are independent of each other and any other and subsequent legislature regarding
maintenance of children below two year and mother that maybe Muslim women (Protection of rights on Divorce) Act, 1986
could not affect the same in absence of clear provision to the effect.
B. Shah vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore and others, AIR 1977 - The Supreme Court was asked
whether Sundays, which are wage-less holidays, could be excluded while calculating maternity benefits for the period
covered by Section 5 of The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961.
The Apex Court in holding that Sundays must also be included, applied the beneficial rule of construction in favour of the
woman worker and observed that the benefit conferred by the Act read in the light of the Article 42 of the Constitution was
intended to enable the woman worker not only to subsist but also to make up her dissipated energy, nurse her child,
preserve her efficiency as a worker and maintain the level of her previous efficiency and output.
She is unable to work during this time and requires additional funds to cover her medical expenditures.
The law provides for maternity benefits to enable the woman worker to survive and maintain her health throughout this time,
enabling her to perform her productive and reproductive tasks effectively.
Supreme Court had to decide whether, in light of the Law on Maternity Pay (Law LIII of 1961), the calculation of maternity
benefits should include Sundays.
When embarking on an analysis of the case the Court cited section 5 of Law LIII, which stipulates that the maximum period
for which a woman has the right to receive maternity pay is 12 weeks: six weeks before the birth and including the day of the
birth and six weeks from the day after the birth.
The Court then analysed the word “week” in linguistic terms, examining its various dictionary definitions, and reached the
conclusion that the weeks in question did include Sundays i.e. for 84 days on the plea that a week consisted of seven days.
On these grounds, the Court held that if the legislator had wanted maternity pay to exclude Sundays, they would have
written the law in a different way.

Manohar Lal vs The State Of Punjab on 11 November, 1960

Equivalent citations: 1961 AIR 418, 1961 SCR (2) 343
The appellant who was a shopkeeper was convicted for the second time by the Additional District Magistrate for
contravening the provisions of Section 7(1) of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940, under which he was required to keep
his shop closed on the day which he had himself chosen as a " close day ".
He raised the plea that the Act did not apply to his shop as he did not employ any stranger but that himself alone worked in
it.
And that the application of section 7(1) to his shop would be violative of his fundamental rights under Arts.14,19(1)(f) and (g)
of the Constitution.
And also that the restriction imposed was not reasonable within Art. 19(6) as it was not in the interest of the general
public.
The High Court dismissed his application.
On appeal on a certificate of the High Court,Held, that the main object of the Act was the welfare of the employees.
And to protect their as well as the employers's health by preventing them from over work.
Such a restriction being in the interest of the general public was reasonable within the meaning of Art. 19(6) ofthe
Constitution.
The provisions of Section 7(1) were constitutionally valid and were justified as for securing administrative convenience
and avoiding evasion of those provisions designed for the protection of the workmen.

Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs Shibu Metal Works on 9 November, 1964

Equivalent citations: 1965 AIR 1076, 1965 SCR (1) 72
The respondent firm, which ran a factory manufacturing brass utensils, filed a Writ Petition for the issue of a mandamus,
restraining the appellant from recovering contributions alleged to be due under Section 1(3), read with Schedule 1, of the
Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952, contending, inter alia, that the manufacture of brass utensils did not fall within the
relevant entry in Schedule 1, i.e. it was not an industry engaged in the manufacture of 'electrical, mechanical or general
engineering products'.

HELD : In construing the relevant entry in Schedule 1, it was necessary to bear in mind that this entry occurred in an Act
which was intended to serve a beneficent purpose. The Supreme Court while giving an extended meaning to the
expression held that any industry engaged in the production of these products would come within the benefit of the
Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952.

Kamla Kanyalal Khushalani v. State Of Maharashtra And Another, Supreme Court Of India, January 6, 1981:
This petition has been filed by the sister of the detenu praying that the detenu be released because the safeguards provided
by the Article 22(5) of the Constitution(Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases – When any person is
detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order
shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him
the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order) have not been complied with.
The detenu was arrested on October 20, 1980 when only the grounds of detention were served on him.
On November 5, 1980 the documents and materials on the basis of which the order of detention was passed were supplied
to the detenu.
On November 18, 1980, the detenu made a representation to the Government which was disposed of as late as December
15, 1980.
If this requirement of clause (5) of Article 22 read with section 3 sub-section(3) of the COFEPOSA Act, is not satisfied, the
continued detention of the detenu would be illegal and void.”
Section (3) For the purposes of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in
pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after
the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in
writing not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention
This court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 1978 1 SCC 248 has widened the horizon of Article 21 and added new
dimensions to various features of and concept of liberty enshrined in Article 21. In view of the decision in the aforesaid
case,Article 22(5) of the Constitution assumes a new complexion and has to be construed liberally and meaningfully so as to
permit the legislature to impose the minimum possible curbs on the precious rights of a citizen, by virtue of preventive
detention. If a procedure under Article 21 has to be reasonable, fair and just, then the words “effective representation”
appearing in Article 22(5) must be construed so as to provide a real and meaningful opportunity to the detenu to explain his
case to the detaining authority in his representation. If the words “effective representation” are interpreted in an artificial or
fanciful manner, then it would defeat the very object not only of Article 22(5) but also of Article 21 of the Constitution.
Thus, we are of the opinion that in view of what has been laid down in Maneka Gandhi case and in a number of other cases
following the aforesaid decision, the law of preventive detention has now to satisfy a two fold test: (1) that the protection and
the guarantee afforded under Article 22(5) is complied with, and (2) that the procedure is just and reasonable. In this view of
the matter unless the materials and documents relied on in the order of detention are supplied to the detenu along with the
grounds, the supply of grounds simpliciter would give him not a real but merely an illusory opportunity to make a
representation to the detaining authority.
It is well settled that the court frowns on preventive detention without trial because the detenu is deprived of the right of
proving his innocence in a trial by a court of law.
It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that all the necessary safeguards laid down by the Constitution under Article 21 or
Article 22(5) should be complied with fully and strictly and any departure from any of the safeguards would void the order of
detention.
This is so because in a civilised society, like ours, liberty of a citizen is a highly precious right and a prized possession and
has to be protected unless it becomes absolutely essential to detain a person in order to prevent him from indulging in anti-
national activities like smuggling, etc.
For the reasons given above, we hold that the continued detention of the detenu is void.
We allow the petition and direct the detenu to be released forthwith.

Mangilal vs Suganchand Rathi on 24 October, 1963; Equivalent citations: 1965 AIR 101, 1964 SCR (5) 239
Civil Appeal No. 307 of 1963; Decided On, 24 October 1963; At, Supreme Court of India
This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissing the defendant's
appeal in which he had challenged the decision of the courts below ordering his ejectment from certain premises which are
in his occupation as the tenant of the plaintiffs.
ACT: Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (23 of 1955), section 4(a)-Notice-Whether tenant should in
arrears on the date of suit-Acceptance of arrears-If right under notice waived-Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882),
section 106.
It is common ground that the defendant was a tenant of the plaintiffs and the rent of the premises in his occupation was Rs.
110 p.m. It is not disputed that the defendant was in arrears of rent from April 1, 1958 to March 31, 1959 to the extent of Rs.
1, 020. On April II, 1959 the plaintiffs served a notice on the defendant bringing to his notice the fact of his being in arrears of
rent for 12 months and requiring him to remit to them Rs. 1, 020 within one month from the date of service of notice and
stating that on his failure to do so, a suit for ejectment would be filed against him. In addition to this the notice called upon
the defendant to vacate the premises by April 30, 1959 upon two grounds: (1) that the premises were required by the
plaintiffs "genuinely for business"; and (2) that the defendant had sublet a portion of the premises to two persons without the
permission of the plaintiffs and without having any right to sublet the premises. This notice was received by the defendant on
April 16, 1959. On June 25, 1959 the defendant sent a reply to the notice enclosing with it a cheque for Rs. 1, 320. It may be
mentioned that this amount consisted of the rental arrears as well as the rent due right up to June 30, 1959. The plaintiffs
accepted the cheque and cashed it on July 4, 1959 and gave a fresh notice on July 9, 1959 requiring the defendant to
vacate the premises by the end of the month of July. In their notice the plaintiffs also stated that they had cashed the cheque
under protest. The defendant did not vacate the premises and, therefore, the present suit for eviction was instituted on
 August 14, 1959.The plaintiffs claim for eviction on the grounds that the premises were required by them bona fide for the
purpose of their business and that the defendant had illegally let them out was negatived by the courts below and, therefore,
must be left out of question. The only question is whether the plaintiffs are entitled to eject the defendant upon the ground
that the latter was in arrears of rent for one year and had failed to pay the arrears within one month of the service of the
notice dated April 11, 1959 upon him. The tenancy being from month to month it was open to the plaintiffs to terminate it by
giving 15 days' notice expiring at the end of the month of the tenancy as provided for in s. 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882. The premises are, however, situated in Jabalpur in which the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955
(No. 23 of 1955) (herein referred as the Accommodation Act) is in force. Section 4 of the Act provides that no suit shall be
filed. in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds set
out in that section. One of the grounds set out in that section is that the tenant has failed to make payment to the landlord of
any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a written notice of demand from the landlord. It is because of
this provision that before the plaintiffs could succeed it was necessary for them to establish that the defendant had failed to
pay rental arrears within one month of the receipt by him of a notice of demand. From the undisputed facts it is clear that the
defendant was in fact in arrears of rent and had failed to pay it within the time prescribed by cl. (a) of section 4.
According to the learned Additional Solicitor-General, however, in spite of these circumstances the plaintiffs' suit could not
have been decreed because:
(1) the notice of April 11, 1959 was invalid for the purpose of s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as the
defendant did not have 15 clear days notice expiring by the end of the month of tenancy;
(2) that the notice as well as the default were both waived by the plaintiffs by reason of- (a) acceptance of the cheque for Rs.
1, 320, which included rent up to June 30, 1959; (b) giving a fresh notice on July 9, 1959 and (c) filing of a suit on August 14,
1959 in which reliance was placed only on the second notice.
(3) that the second notice was not valid with reference to the Transfer of Property Act and the Accommodation Act; and
(4) that there was no cause of action for the suit on August 14, 1959 under s. 5 of the Accommodation Act because no rent
was in arrears on that date.
Sheela Barse vs Union Of India & Ors on 29 August, 1988; Equivalent citations: JT 1988 (3) 15
Court: The Supreme Court of India.
Citation: 1986 SCC (3) 596.
Case No.: 1451 of 1985.
Case Type: Writ Petition (Criminal).
Judgement Date: 13/08/1986.
Petitioner: Sheela Barse & Anr.
Respondent: Union of India & Ors.
Bench:
 Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati.
 Justice Rangnath Misra.
Statutes Referred:
 Constitution of India.
 Children’s Act.
Facts:
 The petitioner filed a petition in the Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India asking for –
1. The release of children below the age of 16 who were detained in jails of different states of the country,
2. Production of complete information regarding the children in jails,
3. Information related to the existence of juvenile courts, homes and schools,
4. Direction to the District Judges to visit the jails and sub-jails in their jurisdiction to ensure that the children are properly looked
after,
5. Direction to State Legal Aid Boards to appoint duty counsel to ensure legal assistance to the children whenever required.
 The Union of India and all States and Union Territories were impleaded as Respondents.
 On 24th September 1985, the Court issued a notice to all the respondents based on the application and a few respondents filed
counter-affidavits in response to the notice.
 However, the matter was adjourned from 31st March 1986 to 15th April 1986 to allow all the respondents to file their
affidavits.
 On 15th April 1986, the Court directed the District Magistrates to thoroughly inspect all the jails, detention centres, remand
homes, observation homes, etc. and present a report on the inspections.
 The Superintended of each jail in the districts was ordered to provide complete assistance to the District Magistrates.
 The report was to be submitted to the Court within ten weeks.
 Each State Government was ordered to file an affidavit in Court stating how many remand homes, children’s homes and
observation homes for children existed in their respective states and how many inmates were kept in such homes.
 The State Legal Aid & Advice Board in each state was ordered to send two lawyers to each jail once every week to provide
legal assistance to children below the age of 16.
 The writ petition was adjourned to 17th July 1986.
 On 24th April 1986, the Court issued a fresh notice mentioning that even though the issue was adjourned until 17/07/1986, the
Court felt it would be more appropriate to take up the issue when the Court sits on vacation, and therefore, it was stated that
the issue would be placed for final disposal before a Bench of this Court on 24/08/1986.
 The writ petition was thereafter listed on 12th July 1986, during the long vacation for hearing. The Court found that though
reports from several District Judges had come in response to the earlier direction, yet several District Judges had not sent their
reports.
 The Court ordered that every District Judge who had not submitted the report must invariably do so by August 1986. The
Court also ordered the High Courts and the Registrar of High Courts to make sure that the District Judges complied with the
order of the apex court.
Issues:
 Were the children below the age of 16 years adequately treated and looked after in jails?
Contentions by Petitioner-
 A large number of children below the age of 16 were confined to jails across the country.
Obiter Dicta:
 It is an elementary requirement of any civilised society. It had been so provided in various statutes concerning children that
children should not be confined to jail because incarceration in jail has a dehumanising effect. It is harmful to the growth and
development of children. The petitioner had undertaken real social service in bringing this matter before the Court. She had
stated to the Court that she intended to visit different parts of the country with a view to gathering further information relevant
to the matter and verifying the correctness of statements of facts made in the counter-affidavits filed by the respondent States.
Judgement:
 All states must ensure that a Children’s Act should be brought into force as soon as possible.
 States where a Children’s Act already exists must ensure that the same is administered.
 The Jail Manuals should be strictly complied with.
 Every District and Sessions must visit the district jail at least once every two months to ensure that everything is up to code.
 The Union Government must deposit an amount of ten thousand rupees within two weeks in the Registrar of the Court, which
the petitioner can draw to meet her expenses.
Conclusion:
 The children are the future of the country. The governments and courts must ensure that even those who have had run-ins with
the law are properly looked after. 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 is one of the most important amendments to the Indian
Constitution which incorporated amended Directive Principles of State Policy - To secure opportunities for the healthy
development of children (Article 39f)

Q. What do you mean by Strict Construction of Taxing Statutes ? Explain with the help of the decided cases.
Q. Fiscal (tax) laws must be strictly interpreted. Explain.
STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF TAXING STATUTES
 Statutes imposing taxes or monetary burdens are to be strictly construed.
 The logic behind this principle is that imposition of taxes is also a kind of imposition of penalty which can only be
imposed if the language of the statute unequivocally so says.
 A person cannot be taxed unless the language of the statute unambiguously imposes the obligation without
straining itself.
 Intention of the legislature to tax must be gathered from the natural meaning of the words by which it has
expressed itself. Any kind of intendment or presumption as to tax does not exist. Nothing can be drawn by
implication. The language must be explicit.
 If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship
may appear to the judicial mind to be.
  On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the
subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.
 If the words of a taxing statute are clear, effect must be given to them irrespective of consequences.
 Statutes imposing pecuniary burdens are interpreted strictly in favour of those on whom the burden is desiredto be
imposed.
In Ramavatar v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, AIR 1961, SC 1325 – the question was whether betel leaves are vegetables
and, therefore, except from imposition of sales tax. The dictionary meaning of vegetable was sought to be relied on wherein
it has been defined as pertaining to, comprised or consisting of, or derived or obtained from plants, or their parts. The court
was requested to apply the rule of strict interpretation with reference to the taxing statute and since the word could have
more than one reasonable meaning, the meaning favouring the subject was to be accepted. The Supreme Court refused to
apply any technical or botanincal considerations. It was observed when the legislature uses a particular word of everyday
use in a statute, the presumption is that, it has been used in its popular sense unless there are compelling reasons for the
Court to think otherwise. Such being not the case here, there is no doubt about the meaning of the term. Therefore, sale of
betel leaves is subject to the sales tax law.

In Motipur Zamindary Company Private Limited v State of Bihar, AIR 1962, SC 660, the question was whether
sugarcane fell within the term green vegetables in entry 6 of the schedule and as such no sales tax could be levied under
the Bihar Sales Tax, 1947 on its sale. The appellant sought the diligence of the Court to the dictionary meaning of the word
as well as to the principle of strict construction of taxing statutes. The Supreme Court held that the principle of strict
construction of taxing statutes means that an assessee cannot be taxed unless he falls within the letter of the law and in
case of a reasonable doubt or ambiguity in the meaning of an expression, the doubt has to be resolved in favour of the
assessee. In the present case, there is no reasonable ambiguity in the meaning of the term green vegetable. The term
means those vegetables which can be grown in a kitchen garden and used for the table, that is to say, used for eating lunch
or dinner. Sugarcane does not fall under this category. The word should, therefore, be given that connotation with which
the people are familiar. The popular meaning of the term is, therefore, the correct meaning and the sale of it is
consequently not outside the purview of sales tax law.

In Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. S.R. Brothers, AIR 1973, SC 78 – the question was whether food colors are dyes and
colours and syrup essences are scents and perfumes within the meaning of items 10 and 37 respectively of the notification
issued under Section 3A of the UP Sales Tax Act, 1948. The Supreme Court, following the decision of the High Court, held
that meaning of a word may depend on the context in which it has been used. Dictionary gives all the meanings of a word.
Some of them may be correct in a particular context and some incorrect. In a taxing statute, meaning should not be found
by doing violence with the words. It is a presumption that the words have been used in that sense in which they have been
known in common parlance unless contrary is proved. By no stretch of imagination, therefore, can the term food colours be
included within dyes and colours and the term syrup essences within scents and perfumes in the context of the Act. The
expressions dyes and colours and scents and perfumes have been used in the statute in a particular context and they bear
the same meaning as the people know them to mean generally.

In State of Uttar Pradesh v Kores (India) Limited, AIR 1977, SC 132 – the question was whether carbon paper was paper
within the meaning of a notification issued by the appellant under Section 3A of the UP Sales Tax Act, 1948. The Supreme
Court held that carbon paper was not a paper within the meaning of the notification. The term paper should be understood
in its popular sense. Its ordinary and natural meaning is that it is used for writing, printing or packaging purposes. The
context of the Act and the notification issued thereunder do not indicate any other meaning, The carbon paper is used for
making carbon copies of written or typed matter and has to be manufactured through a different complicated process. The
meaning is quite clear and there is no need of interpreting it in favour or against anyone.

In Dunlop India Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1977, SC 597 – the question was whether the commodity known as
V.P.Latex comes within the meaning of rubber. The Supreme Court said that while using a word in a taxing statute, the
legislature always keeps in mind the popular meaning of that word as understood in trade and commerce circles. So
interpreted, there is no doubt that V.P. Latex is rubber. The natural and popular sense of the term has no ambiguity and the
legislature while using the term had this meaning in mind.

In Alladi Venkateswarlu v Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1978, SC 945 – the question was whether
the word rice used in entry 66(b) of the first schedule of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 includes parched
rice (Atukulu) and puffed rice (Muramuralu) both. The Supreme Court observed that there is nothing wrong in taxing a raw
product and a finished product separately. The only condition to be fulfilled in such cases should be that the raw material
should be taxed in one form and the finished product should have assumed another form. In other words, the identity of the
raw material should have changed. Paddy as mentioned in item 8 of the second schedule and rice as described in item 66
of first schedule are different. But separate entries do not exist for rice and rice reduced into an edible form by heating or
parching without any addition of ingredients or appreciable changes in the chemical composition. The word rice should be
given such a meaning as the people generally give it and this consequently includes all forms of rice, edible and inedible.
Rice is a very common article of food and its commonly accepted meaning should prevail. Commercial parched rice and
puffed rice may be two different varieties of rice but they do not cease to be rice. Further, whenever there is any reasonable
ambiguity in the meaning of a word, it should be so resolved in a taxing statute as not to put the assessee in a
disadvantageous situation, Therefore, since rice has not been changed into another thing, it cannot be taxed again.
Consequently, the sale of the same commodity, viz., rice, cannot be subjected to double taxation.

Q. What do you mean by Strict Construction of Penal Statutes ? Explain with the help of the decided cases.
While construing a provision in a penal statute, if there appears to be a reasonable doubt or ambiguity, it shall be resolved in
favour of the person who would be liable to the penalty. If a penal provision reasonably be so interpreted as to avoid the
punishment, it must be so construed. If there can be two reasonable constructions of a penal provision, the more lenient should
be given effect to. Punishment can be meted out to a person only if the plain words of the penal provision are able to bring that
person under its purview. No extension of meaning of the words is permissible.
According to Maxwell, the strict construction of penal statutes seems to manifest itself in four ways:
 In the requirement of express language for the creation of an offence;
 In interpreting strictly words setting out the elements of an offence in requiring the fulfilment to the letter of statutory
conditions precedent to the infliction of punishment;
 Punishment can be imposed only if the circumstances of the case fall clearly within the words of the enactment;
 and in insisting on the strict observance of technical provisions concerning criminal procedure and jurisdiction.
Unless the words of a statute clearly made an act criminal, it shall not be construed as criminal.
If there is any ambiguity in the word which set out the elements of an act or omission declared to be an offence so that it is
doubtful whether the act or omission in question in the case falls within the statutory words, the ambiguity will be resolved
in favour of the person charged.
The Court will inflict punishment on a person only when the circumstances of a case unambiguously fall under the letter of
the law.
Legislations which deal with the jurisdiction and procedure relating to imposition of penalties will be strictly construed.
Where certain procedural requirements have been laid down by a statute to be completed in a statute dealing with
punishments, the Court is duty bound to see that all these requirements have been complied with before sentencing the
accused.
In case of any doubt in such cases, the benefit has to go to the accused even up to the extent of acquitting him even on some
technical ground.
In Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953, on offence under an act punishable with imprisonment or fine or both was
committed by the appellant in 1947. The Act was amended and the punishment in the form of fine was enhanced to the tune of
an amount equivalent to the amount procured by the offender through his offence. The Supreme Court held that this enhanced
punishment could not be meted out to the offender in view of clear provisions of Article 20(1) of the Indian Constitution.
In State of Punjab Vs Ram Singh, 1992, SC 2188 a heavily drunk Constable gunman was seen roaming in the market with
service revolver while he was on duty. When he was sent to the Doctor for medical examination, he abused the medical officer
on duty which shows his depravity or delinquency due to his drinking habit. The Supreme Court held that his conduct would
constitute gravest misconduct warranting dismissal from service. The authorities, therefore, were justified in imposing the
penalty of dismissal.
In Sajan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964, the interpretation of Section 5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was
in question. The Supreme Court held that this being a special provision, onus of proof must be construed in favour of the subject
in case of two possible reasonable constructions. However, addition of words by Courts is not justified to dilute a provision of
law from what the legislature intended.
In Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965, In this particular case, a boy who was 16 years old was held liable for committing
trespass and tried to outrage the modesty of a 7-year-old girl. He was ordered to rigorous imprisonment by the magistrate
and a certain amount of fine was also imposed upon him. However, later on, the legislation known as the Probation of Offenders
Act, 1958, came into force, in which it was stated that any person below the age of 21 should not be imprisoned. The Court in
this case held that any legislation could be operated in a retrospective manner for the benefit of that person to reduce the
punishment. Hence, any form of ex-post facto law which is required for the benefit of the accused is not prohibited from being
introduced retrospectively under Article 20(1) of the Indian Constitution.
In State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, AIR 1965, the Supreme Court was seized with the interpretation of Sections
8(1) and 23(1A) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. It was held by a majority that a specific guilty mind was not an
essential requirement to be proved under the provisions by the prosecution because mere bringing of gold into the country
constitutes an offence. The only thing necessary is that the bringing must be a voluntary bringing. There was no other way of
construing Sections 8(1) read with Section 23(1A) because the language was unambiguous.
In Ranjt Udeshi Vs State of Maharashtra, AIR 1964 - (PLEASE REFER TO PAGES 4, 5 FOR THE COMPLETE CASE.)
The Court examined the text of Lady Chatterley’s Lover (by DH Lawrence) and concluded that it was obscene
under Hicklin. The sale of book was banned by the Government of India. On a plain reading of Section 292, it is clear that
proof of mens rea is not required for conviction under this section. Mere selling or keeping for salean obscene literature has
been made punishable. The appellant is guilty on the basis of a plain reading of the enactment and, therefore, his appeal
must not succeed. The appeal against conviction was thus dismissed......................

Q. State the nature of statutes and their classification.

Q. Explain the classification of statutes.
A. Meaning of Statutes
 Typically Statutes command or prohibit something, or declare Policy.
 A statute is a law enacted by a legislature.
 Statutes are also called acts.
 The Indian Constitution does not use the term "Statute" but it uses the term "law".
 A Statute is the will of the Legislature.
 It may have the following particulars- Short title, Long Title, Preamble, Marginal notes, Headings of a group of
sections or individual sections, Definition of interpretation clauses, Provisos, Illustrations, Exceptions and saving
clauses, Explanations, Schedules, Punctuation.
1) Classification with reference to object
a) Declaratory Statutes
 Declaratory Statute may be defined as an Act to remove doubts either in the common law or in the statutory law.
 In such case, the legislature may pass a declaratory statute declaring the correct meaning of that expression
thereby setting aside the controversy regarding the correct meaning of the expression.
 Generally, a declaratory statute contains a preamble and also the word ‘declared’ as well as the word ‘enacted'.
 Example – The Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1985 which added explanation 2 to section 40 of the Income
Tax Act, 1961
b) Codifying and consolidating Statutes
i) Codifying Statutes
 A Codifying Statute is a Statute which purports to state exhaustively the whole of the law upon a given subject i.e.,
one which codifies the law.
 Example – Civil Procedure Code 1908; The Hindu Marriage Act 1955; The Hindu Succession act 1956.
ii) Consolidating Statutes
 The main purpose of the consolidating statute is to present the whole body of statutory law on a subject in
complete form repealing the former statute.
 Example – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974; Arbitration and conciliation act 1996,
c) Remedial statute
 Remedial Statutes are those statutes which provide the remedy for a wrongful act in the form of damages or
compensation to the aggrieved party but do not make a wrongdoer liable for any penalty.
 In many remedial acts, the words “for remedy whereof” have been used immediately before the language of the
enactment.
 Examples – Workmen’s Compensation Act 1923; Maternity Benefits Act 1961; Consumer Protection Act 1986;
Industrial Dispute Act 1947.
d) Enabling statute
 Enabling statute is a Statute Which enables something to be done.
  It basically gives the power to do something.
 An enabling statute is one which enlarges the common law where it is narrow.
 It makes doing of something lawful which would not be otherwise lawful.
 Example – Sections 49A(1) and 49A(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961 enabling ‘Power of Central Government to
make rules’ .― is an illustration of this kind.
e) Amending Statute
 A law is amended when something is added to or taken away to make it suitable to accomplish the purpose for
which it was made.
 Example – The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975
f) Repealing Statute
 Repealing Statute is a Statute which repeals Statute which already exists.
 Example – Criminal Procedure Code 1898 repealed and re-enacted as The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
g) Taxing Statute
 A taxing statute is one which imposes taxes on income or certain other kinds of transaction.
 It may be in the form of Income tax, Wealth tax, Sales tax, Gifts tax etc.
h) Penal Statute
 A penal statute is one which punishes certain acts or wrongs.
 Examples – Criminal Procedure Code, Indian Penal Code etc.
Q. What do you mean by mandatory and directory statutes ? Explain.
2) Classification with reference to method
i) Mandatory, imperative or obligatory Statute
 A mandatory statute is one which compels performance of certain things or compels that a certain thing must be
done in a certain manner or form.
 It is a statute which leaves nothing to the discretion of the Court in respect of compliance with its terms. Mandatory
statute relates to matters of substance, affects substantial rights and is very essence of the thing required to be
done.
 A Mandatory statute may be defined as one whose provisions or requirements, if not complied with, will render the
proceedings to which it relates illegal and void.
ii) Directory or permissive Statute
 A directory statute is an enactment of a legislative body that indicates only what should be done, with no provision
for enforcement.
 The provisions of a directory statute are matter of form only and do not affect any substantial right, and do not
relate to the essence of the thing to be done, so that compliance is a matter of convenience rather than substance.
 The strict fulfillment of directory statute is not necessary to the validity of a proceeding, but with which there is a
duty to comply as nearly as practicable.
 A directory statute is one where noncompliance will not invalidate the proceedings to which it relates. Substantial
compliance of a directory provision is enough – the neglect of them involving nothing more than liability to a
penalty.
INTERPRETATION OF DIRECTORY AND MANDATORY STATUTES
In DA Koregaonkar v State of Bombay AIR 1958 Bom 167
it was held that, one of the important tests that must always be employed in order to determine whether a provision is
mandatory or directory in character is to consider whether the non-compliance of a particular provision causes
inconvenience or injustice and, if it does, then the court would say that, the provision must be complied with and that it is
obligatory in its character. The legislature can incorporate in a statute or in the Constitution a provision mandatory in
character by expressing it in the form of a positive injunction rather than in the form of a negative injunction. For example, if
the legislative intent is expressed clearly and strongly, such as the use of ‘must’ instead of ‘shall’, that itself will be sufficient
to hold the provision to be mandatory, and it will not be necessary to pursue the inquiry further.
RULES FOR DETERMINATION OF MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTE:
Intention of the legislature:
In Hari Vishnu Kamath v Ahmad Ishaque AIR 1955 SC 233,
the Supreme Court observed that the various rules for determining when a statute might be construed as mandatory and
when directory are only aids for ascertaining the true intention of the legislature which is the determining factor, and that
must ultimately depend upon the context. An enactment, mandatory in form, might in substance be directory. The use of
word ‘shall’ does not conclude the matter.
PURPOSE BEHIND THE STATUTE:
In Chandrika Prasad Yadav v State of Bihar (2004) 6 SCC 331,
it was held that, the question as to whether a statute is directory or mandatory would not depend upon the phraseology used
therein. The principle as regards the nature of the statute must be determined having regard to the purpose and object the
statute seeks to achieve.
If an object of the enactment is defeated by holding the same directory, it should be construed as mandatory; whereas if by
holding it mandatory, serious general inconvenience will be created for innocent persons of the general public without
furthering the object of enactment, the same should be construed as directory.
In Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
the Supreme Court held that whenever a power is exercised, it is obligatory to state the reasons so that transparency could
reveal whether the power has been rightly exercised or it has been misused in which case courts could easily intervene. It
was observed that natural justice demands that a party should be heard, and if a prior hearing has not been possible, at
least a post hearing could always be given.
MANDATORY AND PERMISSIVE WORDS:
In Sidhu Ram v Secretary Railway Board AIR 1973 Punj 383-84,
the Court had to consider the import of Rule 1732 of the Railway Establishment Code. The relevant portion of the Rule read
thus—
“where the penalty of dismissal , removal from service, compulsory retirement, reduction in rank or withholding of increment
has been imposed, the appellate authority may give the railway servant either at his discretion or if so requested by the latter
a personal hearing, before disposing of the appeal”
The Court has to consider whether the obligation to give a personal hearing was mandatory or directory.
On plain reading of the Rule, the Court held that if the expression ‘may’ were to be read as ‘must’, it would impose a duty on
the appellate authority to give a right of personal hearing in each case. In the opinion of the Court, if that was the intendment
of the legislature, it would have expressed it in much simpler and explicit terms. Hence, the Court held that the provision was
directory and not mandatory.
In arriving at this decision, the Court observed “Ordinarily the words ‘shall’ and ‘must’ are mandatory and the word ‘may’ is
directory although they are often used interchangeably.
In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs Azad Bharat Finance Company, AIR 1967, SC 276,
 the respondent’s truck was being used for carrying contraband opium without the respondent knowing about it.
 An order of confiscation of the truck was passed under section 11, Opium Act, 1878 as modified by Opium
(Madhya Bharat Amendment) Act, 1955.
 Under the Act of 1955, the words used are ‘shall be confiscated’ whereas the Section 11 of the Opium Act, 1878
provided the words ‘shall be liable to be confiscated.’
 The Supreme Court held the confiscation unlawful and ordered release of the truck.
 It said that there are numerous instances where the word ‘shall’ has been interpreted as ‘may’, that is to say, as
permissive and not obligatory on the ground that the context of an enactment so desires.
 In the present context also, a mandatory confiscation leads to absurdity, hardship and injustice because the
respondent did not know that the truck was being used for such a purpose.

3) Classification with reference to duration

i) Temporary Statute
 This type of statutes are Statutes which are in existence for a known period.
 Example - The Finance Act is a Temporary Act and is required to be passed every year.
ii) Permanent/ Perpetual Statute
 When no time period is fixed, the statute is permanent in nature.
 These Statutes come to an end only when they are amended or abolished by the legislature itself by way of
enacting another Statute.

Q. Explain “interpretation of statutes in Pari Materia” with the help of decided cases.
 The term "in pari materia" is a Latin term which means "upon the same subject matter" or "in the same category."
 The principle of in pari materia is used to interpret a statute by considering it in the context of other statutes that
deal with the same subject matter.
  This principle is based on the idea that statutes dealing with the same subject matter should be read and
interpreted together in order to determine the legislative intent behind them.
 The interpretation of statutes in pari materia is a legal principle that requires courts to interpret two or more laws
that relate to the same subject matter in a consistent and harmonious manner.
 When multiple laws are in pari materia, they should be read together and interpreted in a way that gives effect to
each of the laws while avoiding any inconsistencies or conflicts between them. This means that if there are any
doubts or ambiguities in the meaning of one law, the court should look to the other related laws to help clarify the
meaning and intention of the legislation.
 The doctrine helps in harmonizing the aim and subject of the legislation.
 Where there are various statutes in pari materia, however, made at various occasions, or even lapsed and not
alluding to each other, they shall be taken and construed together, as one system and as explanatory to each
other.
 In respect of definitions it has been observed “Where a term is used without definition in one Act, but is defined in
another Act which is in pari materia with the first Act, the definition may be treated as applicable to the use of the
term in the first Act. This may be done even where the definition is contained in a later Act.”
Rationale behind the rule
 It is to be inferred, that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by one spirit and policy and,
intended to be consistent and harmonious in its several parts and provisions.
 It is therefore an established rule of law, that all Acts in pari materia are to be taken together as if they were one
Law, and they are directed to be compared in the construction of statutes, because they are considered as framed
upon one system, and having one object in view.
 The rationale behind this rule is based on the interpretative assumption that words employed in legislations are
used in an identical sense.
Case Laws
In Hari v Deputy Commissioner of Police, AIR 1956, the petitioner attempted to prove with the help of some judicial
decisions that the terms of Section 57 of the Bombay Police Act were not within the permissible limits of Article 19(5) of
the Constitution. It was held by the Supreme Court that it was not proper to interpret the provisions of one Act with
reference to judicial decisions under other Acts, especially when they are not in pari materia.
In Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957, the Supreme Court held that Section 5, Bombay Land Requisition Act,
1948 could not be interpreted with the help of Section 4(1), Indian Electricity Act, 1910, as the two statutes were not in
pari materia. It is well settled that observations made with reference to the construction of one statute cannot be applied
with reference to the provisions of another statute which is not in pari materia with the statute which forms the subject-matter
of the previous decisions.
In J.K. Steel Ltd. vs. Union of India and Ors., the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while holding that the Excise and Salt Act and
the Tariff Act were in pari materia, observed that the two acts formed one Code and must, therefore, be taken together as
forming one system and as interpreting and enforcing each other.

Another important aspect of such interpretation is that the socio-legal aspect of legislations is also considered before the
acts are considered to be pari materia. Acts such as the Ceiling Act and the Tenancy Act which have been implemented
with the intention of achieving various socio-economic plans have to be read in a complementary manner. Any interpretation
to the contrary can create contradiction and it would become impossible to achieve the goals set out in the legislations. It is,
therefore, necessary to take a constructive attitude in interpreting provisions of these types and determine the main aim of
the particular Act in question for adjudication before the Court.
Say for example, Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 was to be
read along with other labour legislations like Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 as they strived to achieve the same socio-legal aspect of welfare of labour force.
In Employees State Insurance Corporation, Madras v. S.M. Sriramulu Naidu , it was held that this doctrine could not be
used to say that the Factories Act and the Employees State Insurance Act are, in pari materia, though they were enacted in
the same year and both of them were intended to benefit the wage earners. The Court said that the Factories Act was
essentially concerned with the regulation of the factory in the interests and for the safety of the worker, a person employed in
the manufacturing process or in any work incidental thereto. Whereas the Factories Act was essentially concerned with the
regulation of the factory in the interests and for the safety of the worker, a person employed in the manufacturing process or
in any work incidental thereto. Thus, both could not be treated to be in the same genre.
In the case of State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, (1955) 2 SCR 893, the question before the court was whether the term
"arrears of land revenue" as used in Section 26-B of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, included a sum of
money that was payable to the landowner by a tenant for use of the land.
The court applied the principle of in pari materia and examined other statutes that dealt with the same subject matter,
namely land revenue. The court looked at the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, and the
Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900. The court found that the term "arrears of land revenue" had been used in these
statutes in a narrow sense, to refer only to amounts that were payable to the government as land revenue.
Based on this analysis, the court held that the term "arrears of land revenue" as used in Section 26-B of the Punjab Security
of Land Tenures Act, 1953, did not include the amount payable by a tenant to the landowner for use of the land. The court
observed that the legislative intent behind the statute was to provide security of tenure to tenants, and not to create a new
liability on the tenants for payment of arrears of rent to the landowners.

Q . What are the internal aids of interpretation ? Explain.

Q. Explain the role of internal aids in the interpretation of statutes.
Q. Discuss the internal and external aids in interpretation of statutes.
An Aid, is a device that helps or assists.
For the purpose of construction or interpretation, the court has to take recourse to various internal and external aids.
Internal aids mean those materials which are available in the statute itself, though they may not be part of enactment.
These internal aids include
1. short title,
2. long title,
3. preamble,
4. marginal notes,
5. headings of a group of sections or individual sections,
6. provisos,
7. illustrations,
8. explanations,
9. schedules,
10. punctuation,
11. transitory provisions, etc.
When internal aids are not adequate, court has to take recourse to External aids.
External Aids may be
1. parliamentary material,
2. historical background,
3. reports of a committee or a commission,
4. official statement,
5. dictionary meanings,
6. foreign decisions, etc.
The Supreme Court enjoys advisory jurisdiction as per Article 143 of the Indian constitution.
Similarly, High Courts are often referred to when a substantial question of law is involved in a case. Judiciary uses these
aids to solve the ambiguity related to the interpretation of statutes.
Internal Aids under Interpretation of Statute
1. Title

i. Short Title
It addresses the name of the act followed by the year of its enactment. Such titles do not include any description. They do
not play any role in the interpretation of the act. These are just the names of the acts.
Example: Indian Contract Act 1872, Indian Penal Code 1860, Indian Evidence Act 1872 etc.
ii. Long Title
 Such titles address the name of the Act along with its short description.
 It addresses the general object of that Act.
 Long titles could be used for the interpretation of the provisions under them.
 These serve as crucial internal aids interpretation.
 They are used for resolving the conflicts arising out of ambiguous terms in that Act.
 However, if the words in the statute are unambiguous, long titles serve no help.
Example:
a. ‘The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – An Act to amend the laws relating the transfer of property by Act of parties’.
 b. ‘The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of
corruption and matters for connected therewith’.
c. ‘The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973’ - An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to Criminal Procedure
In Popat Lal Shah vs. State of Madras (AIR 1953 SC 274) – In this case, the ‘Long title’ of the Madras General Sales Tax,
1939, was used to address the general object of the Act.
Exceptions:
 Title could not be used as an internal aids to interpretation if the words in the provisions of that Act or statute are
unambiguous.
 The content of the Act/provision is primary, while the title is secondary. The label cannot prevail against the precise
meaning of the statute.
 The title must not narrow the scope of the content in the statute.
2. Preamble
 A preamble is an introduction or a preface to any Act or statute. It explains its purpose(s). The preamble contains
the aims and objectives of the Act.
 However, the preamble is also secondary in nature if the words of the provisions in the Act are unambiguous.
 The modern trend generally is not to have a preamble in an Act.
 As a consequence, the importance of preamble as an aid to construction is declining.
In Re: Kerala Education Bill, 1957, it was held that the policy and purpose of the Act could be derived from its preamble.
In Kesavananda Bharati vs. the State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461– The Supreme Court strongly recommended that the
Preamble of the Constitution of India for deciding the power of the Parliament to amend the constitution under Article 368
was not unlimited. It could not disturb the basic structure of the constitution.
In Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh V NTC (South Maharashtra Ltd.), the Supreme Court while interpreting certain provisions
of the Textile Undertakings (Takeover of Management) Act, 1983 held that when the language of an Act is clear, preamble
cannot be invoked to curtail or restrict the scope of an enactment.
3. Marginal Notes
 These are the side notes to the sections in the Act.
 It expresses the effect of the section.
 Mostly, marginal acts are not added to the sections, by the legislators themselves.
 Instead, they are added by the drafter later.
 Hence, marginal notes cannot be used as an aid to interpretation unless the legislators have added them as in the
Constitution of India.
In Tara Prasad Singh vs. Union of India, the court held that marginal notes are secondary in nature. The general content of
the provision(s) is primary in nature.
In S.P. Gupta vs. President of India, the apex court decided that if any conflict between the content and the marginal notes
of a provision arises, then the marginal note is to be yielded. However, they may be looked into as an aid to interpretation in
case of ambiguity. Marginal notes must not disturb the effect of explicit provisions of the legislature.
4. Headings
Headings are attached to every section or to a group of sections of an Act or statute.
These are generally treated as preambles to the group of sections or the individual section to which they are appended.
For instance, the heading before sections 53 to 75 of the Indian Penal Code reads : “Of Punishments”.
Headings and the preamble are treated in a similar fashion.
It is used as an aid to interpretation when the content of the provisions create ambiguity.
However, if the general meaning of the enactment is clear, headings must not be used.
But if there is more than one conclusion of any provision, its heading should be used to derive a true meaning to the
provision.
In N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India, the court held that the heading could be relied upon to conclude a clear meaning of a
provision if more than one conclusion is derived from the wordings of that provision.
In Union of India v. ABN Amro Bank, the court said that in a situation where there is no ambiguity in the interpretation of the
content, headings must not be relied upon for deriving a different conclusion.
5. Definition or Interpretation Clauses
 Definition or Interpretation Clauses are generally included in a statute with the purpose of extending the natural
meaning of some words, by assigning them the meaning given in the definition clause.
 Generally, the meaning given to a particular word in the interpretation clause will be given to that word wherever it
is used in that statute.
 The only exception to this rule is that if the court feels that in the context of a particular provision the definition
clause, if applied will result in an absurdity, the court will not apply the definition clause while interpreting that
provision.
  Similarly, the definition clause of one Act cannot be used to explain the same word used in another statute.
 However, if both the statutes are in pari materia (on the same subject or matter) and the word has been defined in
one Act, the same meaning may be assignedto the word in the other Act also.
In Ardeshir Vs Bombay State, AIR 1962 SC 29, the appellant on being prosecuted for working a salt works without obtaining
a licence as per Section 6 of the Factories Act, 1948 and rules made thereunder, argued that his salt works is not a factory
as it was an open space of land with only tin-shed and no building.
The Supreme Court referred to Section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 which reads : Factory means any premises including
the precincts thereof......and held that it being an inclusive definition does not delimit the meaning of the word premises but
enlarges its scope.
It was not always necessary, therefore, that premises must always have precincts.
In Mahalakshmi Oil Mills Vs State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1989 SC 335, interpretation of the definition ‘tobacco’ under
Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 was in question which said :
"Tobacco means any form of tobacco, whether cured or uncured and whether manufactured or not and includes the leaf,
stalks and stems of the tobacco plant, but does not include any part of a tobacco plant while still attached to the earth."
The Supreme Court held the definition to be exhaustive and refused to include tobacco seeds in it as they were not
mentioned in the inclusive part.
ACT:
Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957: Section 8 and Fourth Schedule Entry 7--`Tobacco or any form of
tobacco'--Whether includes `tobacco seeds'--Whether exempted from tax.
6. Provisos(a condition or qualification attached to an agreement or statement.)
 “provided that __” is considered to be or is referred to as the proviso of the concerning section. The proviso is
added to the clauses in order to limit the applicability of the said clause.
 The court can add words to the ‘proviso’ clause in order to enlarge its scope and in case of conflict among both
proviso and the main provision, the view of the jurist shall be prevailing as it is considered to be the intention of the
legislature or the law makers.
 For instance, the proviso clause of Section 376DB (punishment for gang rape of a minor under 16 years of age) of
the Indian Penal Code beginning with the words “Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the
medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim.”
7. Illustrations
An illustration is appended to a section with the purpose of illustrating the provision of law explained therein.
For instance, 16 illustrations have been appended to Section 378 of the Indian Penal Code which illustrate various aspects
of the offence/theft.
In Mahesh Chand Sharma vs. Raj Kumari Sharma, the apex court held that illustration is an essential part of any section.
Hence, it could be used in deriving the meaning of the provision(s).
In Mudliyar Chatterjee v. International Film Co., it was observed that an illustration could not be ignored while interpreting a
provision.
However, it cannot be used to defeat the content of the provision or modify the provision’s language.
8. Exceptions and saving clauses
 Exceptions depict the conditions under which the following Act shall not be applicable. For example – The ten
exceptions to Section 499 of the Indian Penal code, 1860, marks the conditions under which the act shall not
amount to defamation.
 Similarly, five exceptions are marked for Section 300, which address the situations under which the act causing the
death of a person shall not amount to the crime of murder.
 Exceptions are generally added to enactment with the purpose of exempting something which would otherwise fall
within the ambit of the main provision.
9. Explanation
 These address the meaning of any provision.
 These help in removing the doubts which may otherwise arise due to complex terminologies used in the Act.
 Most of the Indian statutes have explanations attached to them.
 These serve to be an important aid to interpretation.
 However, these could not be used to manipulate the language of the main content of the provision.
 For example, one explanation is attached to Section 377 of The Indian Penal Code(Unnatural offences)which will
justify penetration as ‘carnal intercourse’ against the order of nature.
10. Schedules
 Schedules attached to the Act/Statute deal with as to how powers conferred under it are to be exercised.
Schedules are an essential part of any statute.
  Hence, these can be relied upon for interpreting any provision in case of a dispute with regard to the meaning of
the terms used in them.
 Seventh Schedule of The Constitution of India contains certain subjects in the form of lists – the Union list(97
subjects); the State list(66 subjects); the Concurrent list(47 subjects);
11. Punctuation
 Whenever a matter comes before the courts for interpretation, the courts first look at the provision as they are
punctuated and if they feel that there is no ambiguity while interpreting the punctuated provision, they shall so
interpret it.
 However, while interpreting the provision in the punctuated form, if the court feels repugnancy or ambiguity, the
court shall read the whole provision without any punctuations and if the meaning is clear, it will so interpret it
without attaching any importance whatsoever to the punctuations.
In Ashwini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952, it was held, punctuation is a minor element in the construction of a
statute. Only when a statute is carefully punctuated and there is no doubt about its meaning, can weight be given to
punctuation. It cannot, however, be regarded as a controlling element for determining the meaning of the statute.

Q. Describe the external Aids such as Dictionaries, Text Books, Historical facts, Legislative History under
Interpretation of Statutes, with case studies ?
Q. Describe the external Aids under Interpretation of Statutes, with case studies ?
Q. Write an essay on External Aids to interpretation and explain it with the help of decided cases.
External aids are the aids which are not available inside the statute but outside the statute, the court may seek help to the
external aids in case of repugnancy or inconsistency in the statutory provision which are as follows:
Dictionaries
 When a word used in the statute is not defined therein or if defined but the meaning is unclear only in such
situation, the court may refer to the dictionary meaning of the statute to find out meaning of the word in ordinary
sense.
 The meaning of such words shall be interpreted so to make sure that it is speaking about the particular statute
because words bears different meaning in different context.
In Motipur Zamindary Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1953, - the question was whether sales tax could be levied upon
sugarcane. The appellant argued that since sugarcane is a green vegetable, it should be exempted from tax, and stated the
dictionary meaning of ‘vegetable’ as something which is derived from plants. The Supreme Court rejected this contention
and held that under common usage, a vegetable is something that is grown in a kitchen garden and is used to consume
during lunch or dinner. It further held that sugarcane was not a vegetable, and was thus, liable to sales tax.
Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC 871.
Issues of the case were as follows-
section 417 of Delhi Corporation Act, 1902 authorised the corporation to round up the cattle grazing on the government land.
The MCD rounded up the cattle belonging to Kanwar Singh.
The words used in the statute authorised the corporation to round up the abandoned cattle.
It was contended by Kanwar Singh that the word abandoned means the loss of ownership and those cattle which were
round up belonged to him and hence, was not abandoned.
The court held that the mischief rule had to be applied and the word abandoned must be interpreted to mean let loose or left
unattended and even the temporary loss of ownership would be covered as abandoned.
Text Books: The court while construing an enactment, may refer to the standard textbooks to clear the meaning. Although,
the courts are not bound to accept such views, the courts time and again referred to Manu, Yajnavalkya, Mulla, Kautiliya.
In Kesavananda Bharthi v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973, a large number of text books were quoted but most of the judges of
the Supreme Court deciding this case were of the opinion that in view of many opinions and counter-opinions, it was not
desirable to follow the opinions and that the safest course for the court was to interpret keeping in mind always the whole
context of the issues.
Textbooks present the subject matter in an explanatory form, and it becomes easier and relevant to consider textbooks over
questions of interpretation. However, they also carry only persuasive value and the courts are not bound to follow any
particular book or author.
In John Vallamattom & Anr v. Union Of India on 21 July, 2003 - The Priest from Kerala, John Vallamatton filed a writ
petition in the year 1997 stating that Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 was discriminatory against the
Christians as it imposes unreasonable restrictions on their donation of property for the religious or charitable purpose by will.
The bench comprising of Chief Justice of India V.V Khare, Justice S.B Sinha and Justice A.R. Lakshmanan struck down the
Section declaring it to be unconstitutional.
It may be true that the Indian Parliament is not bound to take note of and amend its statutory enactments keeping in view the
amendments made in England.
But there cannot be any doubt that while interpreting a restrictive statute, one may consider not only the past history of the
concerned legislation but manner in which the same has been dealt with by the legislature of its origin.
Legislative History - In the past, the courts used to look at the legislative history of a statute occasionally to know its true
context. But the modern views seem to be that it is not permissible as an aid to interpretation. The Legislative Debates on
the floor of the Houses, Reports of the Select Committees and the Statements of Objects and Reasons are, therefore,
inadmissible as aids to interpretation.
The basis of the rule seems to be that whatever was in the mind of the legislators has already been epressed through words
and further, that any attempt on the part of the legislators to influence courts with their individual views must be resisted.
In Ashwini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952, the then Chief Justice of India, Patanjali Shastri, stated that the
Statements of Objects and Reasons should not be taken as an external aid to interpretation because it is presented during
the course of the processing of the bill, and during that period the bill undergoes several changes, meaning thereby the
Statements would also be liable to amends. The Statement of Objects and Reasons can be referred only for understanding
the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the state of affairs, and the evil
which the statute has sought to remedy.
The statement of objects and reasons as well as the “Notes on clauses of the Bill” can be made use of in the interpretation
of statutes, if the same have been adopted by the Parliament without any changes in enacting the bill.
In Kesavananda Bharthi v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973, Sarv Mittra Sikri (the 13th Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
India from 22 January 1971 until his retirement on 25 April 1973) said that speeches made by members of a legislature in
the course of debates relating to an enactment of a statute cannot be used as aids for interpreting any of the provisions of
the statute. He quoted with approval the famous lines that those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did;
and those who spoke might differ from each other.

Custom is the best interpreter of the law - ‘Optima Legum interpres est consuetude’
This maxim means that the customs are the best interpreters of law. A custom is an unwritten law introduced by the
continuous acts of the faithful with the consent of the legitimate legislator. In order for custom to become a source of law, it
must be approved by the competent legislator. Custom in canon law is not simply created by the people through their
constant performance of a certain act, but it is the constant performance of a certain act, with the intention of making a
custom, which is approved by the competent legislator, thereby acquiring the force of law.
Hira Lal Ghosh v. King-Emperor, 1924 SCC OnLine Cal 83
In this case Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J observed about maxim Optima est legum interpres consuetude that he did not agree
with the view, for the custom indicated by the learned Judge could not alter the plain words of the Act.
Jagdish Amritlal Karia v. Bombay municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 1650
The reason is that in a case where the meaning of an enactment is obscure, the Court may resort to contemporary
construction that is the construction which the authorities have put upon it by their usage and conduct for a long period of
time. The principle applicable is Optima est legum interpres consuetude.
National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay (AIR 1969 SC 1048)
In this case the interpretation of S. 146(2) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act (3 of 1888) came up for consideration
and the following view was expressed:—“Even upon that assumption we think that the view of the law expressed by the
Bombay High Court in this case ought not to be interfered with. The reason is that in a case where the meaning of an
enactment is obscure, the Court may resort to contemporary construction that is the construction which the authorities have
put upon it by their usage and conduct for a long period of time. The principle applicable is Optima est legum interpres
consuetude.

John Vallamattom & Anr vs Union Of India on 21 July, 2003

Introduction
Uniform Civil Code has been defined in the Indian Constitution in Article – 44 of Directive Principles of State Policy. It says
that State has a duty to secure a Uniform Civil Code in India for the citizens of India. One can say that it means one country
one law.
Uniform Civil Code includes a set of laws which will govern personal issues of all Indian citizens irrespective of religion. The
present case shows that absence of a uniform civil code in the country has made the Christians suffer discrimination for
more than five decades.
The Priest from Kerala, John Vallamatton filed a writ petition in the year 1997 stating that Section 118 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 was discriminatory against the Christians as it imposes unreasonable restrictions on their donation of
property for the religious or charitable purpose by will. The bench comprising of Chief Justice of India V.V Khare, Justice S.B
Sinha and Justice A.R. Lakshmanan struck down the Section declaring it to be unconstitutional. Further, Khare stated that;
“Article 44 provides that the State shall endeavour to secure for all citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout the territory of
India. It is a matter of great regrets that Article 44 of the Constitution has not been given effect to. Parliament is still to step in
for framing a common civil code in the country. A Common Civil Code will help the cause of national integration by removing
the contradictions based on ideologies”.
Facts of the case
The facts of the case state that John Vallamattom is a Christian priest from Kerala and the other petitioner is also a
Christian. They have filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution in 1997 stating that Section – 118 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 discriminates the Christians because it imposes arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions on them
related to donation of their personal property for various religious or charitable purposes through will. It stated that a
Christian having a nephew/niece or any other near relation is not eligible to bequeath the property for religious or charitable
purposes unless a prescribed procedure is followed. That procedure was complicated, harsh and rigorous. So, the
petitioners sought that the section 118 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 be declared as unconstitutional.
Issues and Fact of law
Whether Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is constitutionally valid?
Judgement
The Supreme Court held that Section – 118 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is unconstitutional as it violates Article 14 of
the Constitution. The rigorous procedure mentioned under Section 118 of the said Act for testamentary disposition of
property for religious or charitable purposes is applicable to Christians only and not to a person belonging to any other
religion.
Also, the classification of Christian testators and other religion testators is extremely reasonable. Testators constitute a
homogenous category and they cannot be divided arbitrarily on any vague basis of classification.
Section 118 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925 - Bequest to religious or charitable uses.—No man having a nephew or
niece or any nearer relative shall have power to bequeath any property to religious or charitable uses, except by a Will
executed not less than twelve months before his death, and deposited within six months from its execution in some place
provided by law for the safe custody of the Wills of living persons: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a Parsi.
Illustrations A having a nephew makes a bequest by a Will not executed and deposited as required— for the relief of poor
people; for the maintenance of sick soldiers; for the erection or support of a hospital; for the education and preferment of
orphans; for the support of scholars; for the erection or support of a school; for the building and repairs of a bridge; for the
making of roads; for the erection or support of a church; for the repairs of a church; for the benefit of ministers of religion; for
the formation or support of a public garden; All these bequests are void. comment Section 118 comes within the purview of
articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India and it is, therefore, necessary that all testators who are similarly situated
should be subjected to the same rule of procedure. There cannot be any unusual burden of Christian testators alone when
all other testators, making similar bequests for similar charities and similar religious purposes are not subjected to such
procedure. Therefore section 118 is anomalous, discriminatory and violative of articles 14, 15, 25 and 26 of
Constitution. The Court in exercise of its jurisdiction and to remedy the violation of fundamental rights, declared
this section as invalid and unconstitutional;

National Legal Service Authority vs Union Of India & Ors on 15 April, 2014
Case Summary – National Legal Services Authority Vs Union of India – NALSA case
Introduction
India as a society has always lacked gender awareness, and the same is reflected not only in the general attitude of the
society but the law of the land too. Specific legislation and provisions are needed that will safeguard the rights of the
individuals who do not identify as either male or female. The story of people who are generally referred to as transgender is
a story of perpetual pain, misery, and agony. Just because they do not fit with the “norms” that society has generally
accepted, they have had to face not only the denial of rights but also constant physical and mental violence. They are
considered to be outcasts and kept far away from participation in various societal activities be they social, religious, or
political. They are considered not only as untouchables, but also a curse on the society they live in.
 In India, the rights of these individuals mainly arise out of various Articles of Part III of the Constitution due to
the lack of specific legislation to safeguard their rights.
  However, at the international level, their rights are well established in various international legal documents
which include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (UNCAT), the Convention for Protection of Human Rights, the Yogyakarta Principles and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention of Human Rights).
Background
Two writs were filed to protect and safeguard the rights of individuals that belong to the transgender community.(A
transgender woman was labeled as male at birth but has the gender identity of a female. A transgender man was assigned
female sex at birth but identifies as male. Some transgender people don’t identify with one gender exclusively. Their gender
identity may combine both female and male elements, for instance, or they may not feel like either gender. These
transgender people are often described as being “non-binary.” Transgender people may be gender non-conforming,
meaning that they adopt customs and habits that are not typically associated with their assigned birth sex. That is, they may
express their gender identity through the way they talk, act, dress, style their hair, and other behaviors. Choosing a new
name that better suits one’s gender identity is common, too. Transgender people may be Heterosexual or straight, gay or
lesbian, or bisexual.)
 The National Legal Services Authority, which is constituted under the Legal Services Authority Act, 1997, filed
a writ petition (writ petition no. 400 of 2012).
 It was followed by another writ petition (No. 604 of 2013) which was filed by Poojya Mata Nasib Kaur Ji
Women Welfare Society, a registered association for the protection of the rights of the Kinnar (Transgender)
community.
 Laxmi Narayan Tripathi, who considered himself to be Hijra, also approached the court and was also
impleaded in the present case. He claimed that being a hijra, his rights as guaranteed by Article 14 and 21
were being denied and the Court had to intervene so that he and other members of his community are not
discriminated against anymore.
Issues involved
1. At the core of the current petitions were the issues that revolved around gender identity and the protections that
were necessary to safeguard the rights and interests of persons who identify themselves with the third gender.
2. Another question was whether a person who is born male but has female orientation has the right to be identified
as a female; the same question arises when an individual uses surgery to change his/her sex.
3. One more issue that the petitioners raised was whether a person who does not identify either as a male or a
female has the right to be categorized in a “third gender”.
Petitioners’ arguments
The petitioners through their counsels vehemently argued that the concept of binary genders strikes at the core of the Right
to Equality (Article 14), Right to Life and Personal Liberty (Article 21), and Freedom of Expression (Article 19). The
normalization of binary genders has further victimized and alienated individuals that do not identify with either of the
genders. They further argued that due to non-identification as the third gender, the basic human dignity of such individuals is
violated which marginalizes them and forces them to live on the fringes of society for no fault of theirs.
Respondents’ arguments
The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the state had set up an “Expert Committee on Issues Relating to
Transgender” which is considering all kinds of opinions to help transgender individuals live a more prosperous and dignified
life. They also contended that the Committee will also consider the views of the petitioners so that a more robust policy is
framed in this respect. Several states and union territories argued that they have taken a significant number of steps for the
betterment of the lives of the transgender community.
NALSA Case Judgement
The judgement was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising of Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan and Justice A.K. Sikri on
15th April 2014 although Justice Sikri gave a different opinion with some additional comments.
 The court in its landmark judgement relied on various judgements from foreign courts like New Zealand, Australia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and England.
 The Court made a distinction between Biological sex and Psychological sex.
 The Court said no to gender identification based on biological sex and gave full importance to identification based
on psychological sex.
 The Court ruled that all provisions in the international conventions including the Yogyakarta Principles must be
recognized and followed provided they align with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.
  The Court held that transgenders fall within the purview of the Indian Constitution and thus are fully entitled to the
rights guaranteed therein.
o Article 14 guarantees equality to “any person” which means man, woman, and transgender, and as such,
they are also guaranteed equal protection of the law.
o They have equal rights in employment, health care, education, and civil rights.
o Discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity represents inequality before the
law and unequal protection of the law and violates Article 14.
o The Court further added that transgender individuals have freedom of expression under Article 19
whereby they can talk, dress, act, and behave in a manner they like.
o They also have a right to live a life of dignity under Article 21.
 The Court held that the State and Central governments must grant transgenders full recognition in the eyes of the
law so that they can get education and healthcare without being subjected to any kind of discrimination.
 The Court also decided that Hijras, Eunuchs are to be treated as the “third gender”.
 It made various declarations and directions to the Centre and State Governments such as to operate separate HIV
Zero-Surveillance Centres, provision for separate public toilets, and appropriate medical care in hospitals for
transgenders.

Q. What is the principle of utility called?

The principle of utility states that actions or behaviors are right in so far as they promote happiness or pleasure, wrong as
they tend to produce unhappiness or pain. Hence, utility is a teleological principle (one which affirms that some ethical,
extra-logical purpose is fulfilled in the structure of the laws of nature).
Utilitarian Theory
 According to utilitarian theory, we punish people because doing so creates a good in the world.
 Jeremy Bentham is associated with the utilitarian theory of punishment. According to him, punishment is evil, and we
should do it only to the extent necessary that it can produce benefits in the world.
i. Utilitarian Rationales
a. Specific Deterrence
 If we punish someone, this will deter them from committing crimes in the future.
b. General Deterrence
 If we punish someone, this will make other people decide not to commit crimes in the future.
c. Incapacitation
 If we put someone in prison, they won’t be able to harm anyone out in the public.
d. Rehabilitation
 Punishing someone may make them a better person.

Explain and discuss the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of I. C. Golaknath &
Ors vs State Of Punjab & Anrs.(With ... on 27 February, 1967. Equivalent citations: 1967 AIR
1643, 1967 SCR (2) 762.
The Case: A certain family in Punjab – Henry and William Golaknath owned 500 acres of farmland. However, in 1953, the
Punjab government came up with the Punjab Security and Land Tenures Act. As per the Act, a person can own only 30
Standard acres (or 60 ordinary acres) of land. Hence the Golaknath family was ordered to forgo the excess land and was
allowed to keep only 30 acres of the said land (a few acres apart from the 30 acres of land would go to the tenants).
The Golaknath family went to court, challenging the validity of the 1953 Act. The family’s main argument was-
 The 1953 law obstructed their right to own property as enshrined in Article 19(1)(f).
 The law further prevented them from going ahead with a profession of their choice.
 The law threatened their right to get equal protection, as stated in Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.
On top of that, the family also urged the court to declare the 17th Amendment( through which the 1953 law came into being)
as unlawful.
The Judgement:
Justice Subba Rao came to the conclusion that the 17th Amendment violated the fundamental rights of acquiring any land
and indulging in any lawful profession granted to the Indian citizens by the Constitution. However, since he used the
Doctrine of Prospective Overruling, the Supreme Court’s ruling did not affect the validity of the 17th Amendment and hence
the 1953 law. However, Justice Subba Rao added that from then on, the Parliament would have no power to make any
amendment to Part III of the Constitution that deals with the fundamental rights of the citizens.
The questions, in this case, were whether the amendment is a law; and whether Fundamental Rights can be amended or
not. SC contented that Fundamental Rights are not amenable to the Parliamentary restriction as stated in Article 13, and
that to amend the Fundamental rights a new Constituent Assembly would be required. Also stated that Article 368 gives the
procedure to amend the Constitution but does not confer on Parliament the power to amend the Constitution. This case is
also sometimes cited as an example of Judicial Activism.
Limitations of Judicial Review
There are some limitations on the judiciary on exercising its power of judicial review. In fact, when the judiciary crosses its
threshold and interferes in the executive’s mandate, it can be called judicial activism, which when furthered can lead to
judicial overreach. Some of the limitations of judicial review are mentioned below.
 Judicial Review limits the functioning of the government. It is only permissible to the extent of finding if the procedure
in reaching the decision has been correctly followed but not the decision itself.
 The judicial opinions of the judges once taken for any case become the standard for ruling other cases.
 It is designated only to the higher courts like the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
 Repeated interventions of courts can diminish the faith of the people in the integrity, quality, and efficiency of the
government.
 The judiciary cannot interfere in political questions and policy matters unless absolutely necessary.
 The judgments can be influenced by personal or selfish motives, hence, Judicial review can harm the public at large.
 It violates the limit of power set to be exercised by the constitution when it overrides any existing law.
o In India, a separation of functions is followed rather than the separation of powers.
o The concept of separation of powers is not adhered to strictly in the judicial review. However, a system
of checks and balances has been put in place in such a manner that the judiciary has the power to strike
down any unconstitutional laws passed by the legislature.

Article 368 Vs. Article 13

Article 368 and Article 13 of the Indian Constitution is deeply tied with the Golaknath Case. Article 368 gives the Parliament
the constituent power to amend any part of the Constitution by means of adding new provisions or repealing or modifying
existing provisions.
On the other hand, Article 13 states that any law that violates the fundamental rights of the citizens shall be declared void.
However, Article 368 states that no provision mentioned in Article 13 would affect the provisions mentioned in Article 368. In
short, as far as the Constitution is concerned, Article 368 is more powerful than Article 13.
The Golaknath Case in Detail
Until this case, amendments via the power granted to the Parliament by Article 368 were considered final and outside the
ambit of Article 13. However, in the Golaknath case, the Supreme court observed that an amendment to the Constitution
was an ‘ordinary law’ and not a constituent law. Hence, amendments, being ordinary laws, needed to pass the test of Article
13. The court, thus, stated that any amendments that violated the provisions of Article 13 would be void. In short,
the Supreme Court of India, in the Golaknath case, gave the judgment that constitutional amendments would not have the
power to curtail the fundamental rights of Indian citizens.
The Doctrine of Prospective Overruling
Although the Supreme Court declared constitutional amendments that violated the rules laid down by Article 13 as void, in
this particular case, the old rule was followed. The Punjab Security and Land Tenures Act remained valid.
The doctrine of prospective overruling states that the court is duty-bound to announce a “new and better” rule in place of an
old, unscientific or condemned rule. However, the doctrine also states that the new rule would not affect any past court
judgments. This is exactly the reason why despite the judgment, the 1953 Act remained valid.
It is to be noted that the Doctrine of Prospective Overruling and the overall judgment were accepted with a thin majority of
6:5. Many dissenting judges were against this doctrine.

What Happened after the Golaknath Case?

After the case, the Parliament came up with the 24th Amendment (1971) that explicitly stated that Article 368 could curtail
even the fundamental rights. From then on, Article 13 lost the power to nullify anything written under Article 368.
Later in Kesavananda Bharati v. the State of Kerala, the Supreme court ruled that the Parliament could not change the basic
structure of the Constitution. In most cases, curtailing the fundamental rights of the citizens would change the basic structure
of the Constitution. So, in a round-about way, this judgement protected the citizens fundamental rights.

Q. Explain and discuss the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of Kesavananda
Bharati ... vs State Of Kerala And Anr on 24 April, 1973
Case Summary – Kesavananda Bharati & Others (Petitioners) V State of Kerala (Respondents)
 Kesavananda Bharati & others Versus State of Kerala is certainly one of the leading cases in the constitutional history
of India if not the most important judgement of post-independent India and is popularly known as the Fundamental
Rights case.
 The majority judgement in the case was pronounced by S.M.Sikri C. J., Hegde J, Mukherjea J, Shehlat J, Grover J,
Jaganmohan Reddy J, Khanna J, and was dissented by Ray J, Palekar J, Mathew J, Beg J, Dwivedi J and
Chandrachud J.
 It is rightly said that the judgement in the instant case brought an end to the conflict between the executive and the
judiciary and proved to be a saviour of the democratic system and set up in the country. The resultant judgement in
the case was a hard-fought legal battle between the two constitutional stalwarts and legal luminaries namely N.A.
Palkhivala (who represented Petitioners) and H.M. Seervai (who represented the State of Kerala). The hearing in the
case took place for sixty-eight long days and finally, a voluminous 703-page judgement was pronounced on 24th April
1973.
Brief Facts
Kesavananda Bharati was the chief pontiff of the Edneer Mutt, a monastic religious institution located in Kasaragod district,
Kerala. Bharati had some land in the Mutt which he owned. The Kerala state government passed the Land Reforms
Amendment Act in 1969. As per this Act, the government could acquire some of the lands that belonged to the Mutt. In
March 1970, Bharati moved the Supreme Court (under Section 32 of the Constitution) to enforce the rights that were
guaranteed to him under:
 Article 25: Right to practice & propagate religion
 Article 26: Right to manage religious affairs
 Article 14: Right to equality
 Article 19(1)(f): Freedom to acquire property
 Article 31: Compulsory acquisition of property
The Kerala state government enacted another law, the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 even as the petition
was under the court’s consideration.
The contentions made by the petitioners brought to the fore the validity of various amendments that were brought in by the
Parliament to nullify the effects of Golaknath v State of Punjab. The petitioners challenged, in particular, three constitutional
amendments – 24th Amendment, 25th Amendment and 29th Amendment and their validity.
Issues before the Court
 Whether the following are constitutionally valid?
o 24th Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1971
o 25th Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1972
 The extent to which the Parliament can exercise its power to amend the Constitution.
 The question underlying the case also included: Was the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution unlimited?
In other words, could Parliament alter, amend, abrogate any part of the Constitution even to the extent of taking
away all fundamental rights?
Contentions of the Petitioners
 Petitioners contended that the Parliament can’t amend the Constitution in a manner they want as their power to do
this is limited. The Parliament cannot make an amendment to the Constitution to change its basic structure as was
set forth by Justice Mudholkar in the Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan case.
 They argued that the 24th & 25th Constitutional Amendments were violative of the Fundamental Right provided in
Article 19(1)(f).
Contentions of the Respondents
 The State said that the Parliament’s supremacy is the Indian legal system’s basic structure and hence, it has
boundless power to amend the Constitution. The respondents stressed that in order to fulfil its socio-economic
obligations the unlimited power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution must be upheld.
Kesavananda Bharati Case – Judgement
 The landmark judgement was delivered on 24th April 1973 by a razor-thin majority of 7:6 wherein the majority held
that any provision of the Indian Constitution can be amended by the Parliament in order to fulfil its socio-economic
obligations that were guaranteed to the citizens as given in the Preamble, provided that such amendment did not
change the Constitution’s basic structure. The minority, however, in their dissenting opinion, were wary of giving
the Parliament unlimited amending power.
 The court held that the 24th Constitutional Amendment was entirely valid. But it found the first part of the
25th Constitutional Amendment to be intra vires and the second part of the same ultra vires.
Doctrine of Basic Structure
The basic structure doctrine states that the Parliament has limitless power to amend the Constitution subject to the condition
that such amendments should not change the Constitution’s basic structure. The bench did not mention the basic structure
of the Constitution and it was left to the interpretation of the courts. This was subsequently laid down in several other
judgements by the SC.
The court contended that the term ‘amend’ mentioned in Article 368 doesn’t imply amendments that can alter the
Constitution’s basic structure. If the Parliament intends to make an amendment with respect to a constitutional provision,
such an amendment would necessarily have to undergo the ‘basic structure’ test.
Conclusion
The case of Kesavananda Bharati vs the State of Kerala as mentioned supra had been heard for 68 days, the arguments
commencing on October 31, 1972, and ending on March 23, 1973. The hard work and scholarship that had gone into the
preparation of this case were breathtaking. Literally hundreds of cases had been cited and the then Attorney-General had
made a comparative chart analysing the provisions of the constitutions of 71 different countries.
The majority of the bench wished to safeguard the Constitution by preserving its basic features. The judgment was based on
sound reasoning and it was given after a careful analysis of multifarious aspects. The bench opined that if the Parliament
were to get unfettered power to amend, there were chances of that power to be misused, and that governments would
change it as per their own preferences and whims. Such limitless powers vested in the hands of the government would
mean that the basic features and also the very essence and spirit of the Indian Constitution could be changed. There was a
need for a doctrine which could protect the rights of both the Indian Parliament and Indian citizens; the bench met this need
halfway and came up with the basic structure doctrine, that protects the rights of both camps. It is to be noted that while in
the US, only 27 amendments have been made, India has seen over one hundred amendments since independence. Despite
this big number, the spirit of the Constitution and also the ideas of the Constitution-makers have not been tampered with. It
is because of the bench’s decision that the identity and spirit of the Constitution have not been lost. This landmark case has
given our Constitution stability. Even though the petitioner lost this case partially, the SC ruling in the Kesavananda Bharati
case turned out to be a saviour for Indian democracy, and also prevented the Constitution from losing its spirit.

Q. Discuss the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of I.R. Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu.
Case Summary – I.R. Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu - Citation: (2007) 2 SCC 1: AIR 2007 SC 861
Also known as the Ninth Schedule Case, this unanimous judgement delivered by a 9-judge bench led by Chief Justice
Sabharwal upheld the validity of the Doctrine of Basic Structure propounded in the Kesavananda Bharti case. Moreover, the
Court also upheld the power of the Judiciary to review any such law which in its opinion would in any way destroy the basic
structure of the Constitution. Thus in effect, this case put an end to any controversy that was left behind regarding the
validity and implementation of the basic structure doctrine.
The case arose because of the reference made by a 5-judge Constitution Bench in 1999 after the Gudalur Janmam Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969 was struck down by the Supreme Court in Balmadies Plantations Ltd. &
Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu.

The I.R Coelho case played a vital role in determining the power of judiciary when it comes to judicial review. This case drew
a distinction and limited the arbitrary actions of the legislature under the guise of Article 368. The court in this case laid down
that any law or acts infringing upon fundamental rights or violating the basic structure of our constitution would not be
exempted from judicial review. Also known as the Ninth Schedule Case, this unanimous judgement delivered by a 9-judge
bench led by Chief Justice Sabharwal upheld the validity of the Doctrine of Basic Structure propounded in the Kesavananda
Bharti case. Moreover, the Court also upheld the power of the Judiciary to review any such law which in its opinion would in
any way destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. Thus in effect, this case put an end to any controversy that was left
behind regarding the validity and implementation of the basic structure doctrine.
Political Background:
9th schedule and Article 31-B: The 9th schedule was added in the constitution by the 1st amendment of 1951. It was
created by Article 31-B which along Article 31-A aimed at protecting laws related to agrarian reform and to abolish the
zamindari system. The parliament by provision of Article 368 enacted various laws and acts which were arbitrary and
violative of fundamental rights. These laws were placed under the umbrella of 9th schedule which backed by Article 31-B
allowed them to escape the judicial purview. Initially, the purpose behind Art.31-B was to remove the difficulties in the
constitution. But this power was misused to enact laws under 9th Schedule which could not be challenged in courts. For
instance, the Tamil Nadu government by way of [76th amendment] Act,45 of 1994 amended 9th schedule and inserted 257-
A. It calls for 69% reservation in government.
The case arose because of the reference made by a 5-judge Constitution Bench in 1999 after the Gudalur Janmam Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969 was struck down by the Supreme Court in Balmadies Plantations Ltd. &
Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu.
 The Constitution Bench, in its referral, noted that according to the Waman Rao Case, insertion of amendments in
the Constitution after the Kesavananda Bharti case by inserting new laws into the Ninth Schedule, can be
challenged on the ground that they are violative of the fundamental rights provided in Articles 14, 19 and 31.
 Therefore, the referral asked the 9-judge bench to relook into the Waman Rao judgement and determine whether it
needs to be overruled or not.
Issue before the Court
 The basic issue before the Court was whether it was permissible for the Parliament to insert laws into the Ninth
Schedule post-Kesavananda Bharati case in order to make them immune from judicial review on the basis of the
basic structure doctrine.
 It is pertinent to mention here that since the Ninth Schedule was inserted, various pieces of agrarian reform
legislation were placed in it but with the advent of time, various other pieces of legislation were arbitrarily and
indiscriminately placed in the Ninth Schedule to make them immune from judicial review despite the fact that most
of them had nothing to do with the agrarian or socio-economic reforms.
 It was amply clear that the legislature in the guise of the Ninth Schedule was trying to escape not only the
limitations imposed by the basic structure doctrine but also bypass the judicial review of legislation that were
manifestly ultra vires to the Constitution.
Ruling
The Court unanimously held that it was not permissible for the legislature to escape the scrutiny of the Basic Structure
doctrine by finding manifestly cunning ways to get around it.
 The basic structure doctrine is the very essence of the Constitution and any acts, rules and regulations that violate
its essence cannot be allowed to continue in this brazen manner.
 If any laws in the Ninth Schedule were inconsistent with Part III, they are liable to be struck down by the Court.
 The Ninth Schedule was a part of the Constitution and as such any alterations made to these parts which bypass
the restrictions that are in place cannot be allowed to continue to the detriment of well-established principles.
 These insertions into the Ninth Schedule are an attempt to invade into the sphere of fundamental rights and as
such these invasions have to be dealt with in order to preserve inherent rights.
The Court also delved upon the importance of the Power of Judicial Review – the importance of which was made abundantly
clear by the Court in Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain.
 Any new amendment or alteration in the Constitution is to be tested on its own merits in order to determine
whether such a change is violative of the basic features of the Constitution.
 The fundamental rights chapter was added in the Constitution in order to keep a check on the powers of the State
and make sure that the State does not fiddle with the individual rights in a manner that is contrary to the basic
setup of the fundamental rights.
 The power of judicial review bestowed upon the Courts is a check on the aforesaid attempts of the State to chip
away at the fundamental rights in the Constitution.
Coelho Case Judgement Criticism
This judgement was criticised for further solidifying the concept of basic structure which has no textual basis in the
Constitution.
 Critics argue that such judgements are chipping away at the power of the legislature to enact laws in order to
further their legitimate policies.
 Every now and then the Court keeps on adding new principles as a part of the basic structure, thus hampering not
only the legislature but also paving the way for new litigation which only adds to the vagueness and confusion that
has always surrounded the basic structure doctrine.
 Till date, the judiciary has neither given any exhaustive definition of the basic structure nor has it given an
exhaustive list which constitutes the basic structure of the Indian Constitution.
 Justice Mathew, in the Indira Gandhi case, had perceptively stated that ‘the concept of basic structure as a
brooding omnipresence in the sky apart from specific provisions of the Constitution is too vague and indefinite to
provide a yardstick for the validity of an ordinary law.’
Conclusion
The I R Coelho case has further strengthened the hold of the basic structure doctrine in the constitutional setup of the
country by emphasising that all amendments, depending on its impact and consequences if violative of the doctrine of the
basic structure, need to be struck down. Judicial review is the most effective way to deal with laws that infringe upon the
fundamental rights of the citizens. The legislatures cannot act with impunity by using concepts of federalism and welfare
state to bring in legislation to fulfil their ulterior motives of invading upon fundamental rights. The Parliament and the
executive need to be kept in check lest we see occurrences similar to those that took place in the emergency period.
In Coelho case, popularly known as 9th schedule case, the nine judges’ bench, headed by the then Chief Justice of India Y
K Sabharwal, delivered a unanimous verdict on January 11, 2007, upholding the authority of the judiciary to review any law,
which destroy or damage the basic structure as indicated in fundamental rights, even if they have been put in 9th schedule.
The Ninth Schedule contains a list of central and state laws which cannot be challenged in courts. It was created by the new
Article 31B, which along with 31A was brought in by the government to protect laws related to agrarian reform and for
abolishing the Zamindari system.

Explain and discuss the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of A.K. Gopalan vs The State Of
Madras.Union Of ... on 19 May, 1950. Equivalent citations: 1950 AIR 27, 1950 SCR 88.
The case of AK Gopalan v State of Madras gave chance to the Indian judiciary to interpret the Fundamental Rights of the
Constitution extensively. After this Judgement Courts in India started approaching the Fundamental Rights of citizens and
non-citizens in a wider and comprehensive manner, and not constructed the Fundamental Rights in a restrictive manner as
to accumulate all
rights of persons under Fundamental Rights. Such as the Right to Privacy, Right to Health, Right against the custodial death
etc.
Facts
The petitioner AK Gopalan, a communist leader, was detained under the Preventive Detention Act 1950 in Madras Jail. The
petitioner challenged the validity of the Act on the ground that it is violating the freedom of movement under Article 19 (1) (d)
and personal liberty under Article 21 through writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.
In the petition, he has given various dates showing how he has been under detention since December 1947. He had been
sentenced to imprisonment but the convictions were set aside. While he was under detention under one of the other orders
of the Madras State Government, he was served with an order made under Section 3 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act,
1950.
Issues
 Whether Preventive Detention Act 1950 is in violation of Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution?
 Whether ‘procedure established by law’ under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution is same as ‘due process of law’
under US Constitution?
 Whether is there any relation between Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution or they are independent in nature?
Arguments
 It was argued that the word “personal liberty” includes freedom of movement under Article 19(1) (d), therefore
Preventive Detention must satisfy the reasonable restriction under Article 19(5) of the Constitution.
 It was that Article 19 also confers personal liberty as a Fundamental Right and it is being violated of the detainee
by the impugned order.
 It was argued that Article 19 and Article 21 should be read together as implementing each other.
 It was argued that Article 19 gave substantive rights to citizens while Article 21 prescribed that no person can be
deprived of his life and personal liberty except by procedure established by law, which is procedural law.
 It was argued that under Article 21 ‘procedure established by law’ means ‘due process of law’ of US Constitution
which includes the principle of natural justice and since the impugned law does not satisfy the requirement of due
process of law, therefore it is an invalid law.

Judgement
Majority judgement
Rejecting the contentions of AK Gopalan, the majority bench held that the ‘personal liberty’ which is enumerated under
Article 21 of the Constitution means nothing more than the liberty of the physical body, that is freedom from arrest and
detention without the authority of law.
According to Prof. Dicey, Personal liberty means freedom from physical restraint and coercion which is not authorised by
law.
The word ‘liberty’ is a very comprehensive word and if interpreted it is capable of including the rights mentioned under Article
19. The court narrowed down the meaning of ‘personal liberty’ as it is given under English law.
Article 21 is a guarantee against deprivation (total loss) of personal liberty while Article 19 afford protection against
unreasonable restriction (which is only partial control). Freedom guaranteed by Article 19 can be enjoyed by a citizen only
when he is a freeman and not if his personal liberty is deprived under a valid law.
Court went on to enumerate that ‘procedure established under law’ is not as same as ‘due process of law’ under US
Constitution. The word law interpreted by US Supreme Court does not allow the same interpretation of the law under Article
21.
This is clear from the Drafting Committee of the Constitution in the respect of Article 21, that Constituent Assembly formerly
used the term ‘due process of law’ and later dropped it in the favour of ‘procedure established by law’. The expression
‘procedure established by law’ must mean procedure prescribed by the law of the State.
The interpretation put on the ‘due process of law’ by US Supreme Court has been characterized as utmost vagueness. If the
Constitution-makers wanted to preserve in India the same protection as given in US Constitution, there was nothing to
prevent the Constituent Assembly from adopting that phrase.
The Prevention of detention Act followed the valid procedure, as it is enacted by State legislation, therefore the Act does not
infringe Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution. Therefore, the said act was held valid and the court dismissed the writ petition.
Minority Judgement
Justice Fazal Ali in his dissenting judgement held that the Act was liable to be challenged as violating Article 19. He gave
wide and comprehensive meaning to the word ‘personal liberty’ as consisting of freedom of movement and locomotion.
Therefore, any law which deprives the person of his personal liberty must satisfy the requirements of Article 19 and 21.
Conclusion
In the AK Gopalan case, the Court had interpreted Article 21 extremely literally and went on to affirm that the expression
procedure established by law meant any procedure which was laid down in the statute by the competent legislature that
could deprive a person of his life or personal liberty.

Q. Discuss the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India
AIR 1978 SC 597.
Introduction:
The Maneka Gandhi case is very important in the history of the Indian legal system. It is a landmark case in which the court
widened the scope of Article 21 of the constitution which provides the right to life. It impacted the judicial attitude towards the
protection of personal liberty given in Article 21. Since then, the courts have shown a lot of care and sensitivity towards the
protection of fundamental rights. After this case, the court was named the watchdog of democracy.
Background:
The first major case that was filed in the Supreme court related to violation of Article 21 of the constitution is Ak Gopalan vs
State of Madras (1950). In this case, the petitioner was detained under Preventive Detention Act 1950. The petitioner
challenged this in the Supreme court by saying that it is violating Article 14, 19, 21 of the Indian constitution. The petitioner
stated that “law” in the constitution also refers to principles of natural justice and the expression “procedure established in
law” also means that the law is reasonable and not arbitrary. But the Supreme Court rejected the plea of the petitioner by
stating that “law” in the Constitution cannot be read as rules of natural justice, it only means the enacted laws. The court also
said that Article 19 and Article 21 are connected as “personal liberty” in Article 21 should not be included with freedom from
arrest and detention and other freedoms guaranteed by Article 19.
The court also rejected the contention that “due process of law” in the American Constitution and ” procedure established by
law” is in any way similar, the court stated that first of all the word ” due” was absent from Article 21 and secondly, the
expression “procedure established by law” means enacted laws by legislation and nothing less. So it can be said that
whether the law is arbitrary or fair or reasonable does not matter at all, if legislation enacts any law then it will always be a
valid procedure. After the Ak Gopalan case, Article 21 did not provide any protection against the arbitrary laws of legislation.
Article 21 only protected arbitrary executive action. For example: if an individual has been detained or deprived of his liberty
by an executive arbitrarily without their being supported by valid law then the court protected that individual. After this came
to the case of Maneka Gandhi in which the Supreme court overruled its Ak Gopalan judgement by giving a wider
interpretation of fundamental rights of citizens provided by the Constitution
Facts:
Maneka Gandhi, the petitioner who was a journalist, her passport was issued on June 1 1976. However, in the year 1977,
the passport authority issued a letter to the petitioner to surrender her passport under section 10(3)(c) of the Passport act
1967 a week after receiving the letter. After receiving the letter, the petitioner responded by asking the authorities for specific
reasons behind this order, but the authorities responded by saying that in its “interest of sovereignty and integrity of the
state” and petitioner’s passport was revoked. Then, the petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 in the Supreme court
for violation of fundamental rights under Article 14, 19,21 of the Indian constitution. She stated that the order of revoking her
passport was void as she was not given the opportunity of being heard in her defence.
Issues before the Court:
 Are the provisions under Articles 21, 14 and 19 are anyway connected or they are mutually exclusive??
 Whether Section 10(3)(c) of Passport Act 1967 is a violation of Article 14 and Article 19 of Constitution??
 Whether the power of passport authority to impound or revoke any individual’s passport is arbitrary??
 Is “Right to travel abroad” included in Article 21 of the constitution??
 What is the scope of “procedure established by law” given in Article 21 of the constitution??
 Whether the word ” law” in Article 21 of the constitution can also be read as rules of natural justice??
Important Provisions related to the case:
 Article 14 – Article 14 of the Indian Constitution defines equality before the law. It states that the state should
discriminate against citizens on the basic grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, everyone is equal
before the law
 Article 19 – Article 19 of the Indian constitution provides certain rights regarding freedom of speech
 Article 19(1)(a) – Article 19(1) (a) of the Indian Constitution states that all citizens have the right to freedom of
speech and expression
 Article 21 – Article 21 of the Indian Constitution states that no one is deprived of life except the procedure
established by life. It protects life and personal liberty of the citizens
 Article 32 – Article 32 of the Indian Constitution provides the right to citizens to seek justice from the supreme court
if their fundamental right has been violated.
Passport act 1967
 Section 10(3)(c) – Section of 10(3)(c) of the Passport act 1967 gives the right to the passport authority to revoke
the passport of any individual to protect the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India
 Section 10(5) – Section 10(5) of Passport Act 1967 states the passport authority shall record a brief statement of
the reasons for invoking an individual’s passport and provide it to the passport holder.
Arguments presented by petitioner side in court:
 The petitioner was not given the opportunity of being heard by the passport authority. “Audi Alteram Partem”
means the chance to be heard is an important ingredient of natural justice and proper legal.
 Article 14, Article 19, Article 21 are not mutually exclusive. They are connected as these three articles together
constitute principles of natural justice.
 Section 10(3)(c) of the passport act violates Article 21 that is right to life and personal liberty
 The passport authority’s order to revoke the petitioner passport has infringed her right to freedom of movement.
 The scope of “procedure established by law” should be widened. “procedure established by law” should be free
from arbitrariness and should be free, reasonable and fair.
Arguments presented by Respondent in court:
 The petitioner had to appear before the government committee for a hearing but she failed to do so and that is the
reason the petitioner passport was revoked
 Section 10(3)(c) is not a violation of Article 14 as it is a procedure established by law
 The “law” does not mean rules of natural justice in the Indian constitution as opined by the court in Ak Gopalan
case. Hence Article 14, Article 19, Article 21 are mutually exclusive
 Indian constitution does not have “Due process of law” unlike American constitution instead there is “procedure
established by law, therefore a law need not have to comply with Article 14, 19.
 The Right to travel abroad is not included in Article 21 of the Indian constitution
Judgement by the court:
 The court gave the expression “personal liberty” in Article 21 a wide interpretation. Personal liberty includes a
variety of rights “which go to continue the personal liberty of man”. Personal liberty cannot be read in a narrow
restricted sense. The right to travel abroad is also included in Article 21 of the Indian constitution.
 The court rejected the plea of the petitioner that Section 10(3)(c) of Passport act 1967 is the violation of article 14,
19, 21 of the Indian constitution as impounding an individual’s passport on grounds of ” interest of sovereignty and
integrity of the state” is not at all vague and wrong.
 The court stated that Article 14, 19 and 21 of the Indian constitution are not at all mutually exclusive. There is a
unique relation or nexus established between these articles. Any law prescribing a procedure to deprive an
individual’s liberty and life has to comply with all the requirements of Article 19. Similarly, any procedure of law
established in Article 19 has to meet up the requirements of Article 14. Justice Krishna Iyer said “No article in
constitution pertaining to Fundamental right is an island” He gave an example that “a man is not dissectible into
separate limbs, cardinal rights in an organic constitution have a synthesis”.
 The court said that the “law” in Article 21 does not only mean enacted law but also refers to rules and principles of
natural justice.
  The court overruled its judgement in the Ak Gopalan case and reinterpreted the expression “procedure established
by law” used in Article 21. Any law prescribed under ” procedure established by law” should be fair and
reasonable. According to Justice Bhagwati ” The procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable”. Any
procedure which is not right or fair and is arbitrary does not meet the requirements of Article 21 of the constitution
and is no procedure.
Analysis of Judgement:
 This Judgement by the Supreme court sets a benchmark for all coming generations. Unlike in the Ak Gopalan
case, this time the court gave a quite liberal and progressive interpretation of fundamental rights, mainly Article 21
of the Indian Constitution. Widening the scope of “procedure established by law” was most appreciated as it
provided the citizen’s protection against any arbitrary laws. After this judgement, there was no difference between
“procedure established by law” in the Indian Constitution and “due process of law” used in the American
constitution. This judgment also helped to secure the fundamental rights of citizens provided in the constitution.
The court gave Article 21 of the Indian constitution an expansive interpretation. Justice Krishna Iyer said, ” The
spirit of a man is the root of Article 21. Personal liberty makes for the worth of the human person”. Over the years,
Article 21 has become the most essential right of citizens provided by the Indian constitution. The “Golden Triangle
Test” was introduced by the court that any law which is depriving a person’s liberty must not only answer Article 21
but meet also the requirements of Article 14 and Article 19 of the Indian constitution.
Impact of Judgement:
 This judgement by the Supreme court had a great and positive impact on the Indian legal justice system and
constitutional law in India.
 It had a significant impact on administrative law in India.
 It impacted the administration of criminal justice in India. After this, the judgement only, the courts started providing
some rights to prisoners and tried to humanise and regulate the administration of prison and criminal justice.
 This judgement helped Article 21 to be bright back to life. Article 21 had a deep and great impact on constitutional
jurisprudence. Article 21 has now become the source of many substantive and procedural laws.
Conclusion:
 Overruling of the Ak Gopalan case was appreciated by the public where the court gave quite a regressive decision.
The decision in Maneka Gandhi’s case restored people’s trust in the Indian judiciary and legal system. By this
decision, there was no differentiation left between “procedure established by the court” in the Indian constitution
and “due process of law” in the American Constitution. Widening the scope of Article 21 was much praised by
citizens. After this, Article 21 became the most important and essential fundamental right provided by the
constitution. Principles of natural justice were also recognised. Overall, it can be said this case is very important in
the Indian legal system regarding the protection of fundamental rights and will be also considered and referred to
by future generations whenever there will be a violation of fundamental rights.

Q. Explain and discuss the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of Unni Krishnan, J.P. And Ors. Etc. ...
vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors. ... on 4 February, 1993.
Unni Krishnan, J.P. & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Cited as: 1993 AIR 217, 1993 SCR (1) 594, 1993 SCC (1)
645, JT 1993 (1) 474, 1993 SCALE (1)290
Equivalent citations: 1993 AIR 2178, 1993 SCR (1) 594
BENCH: Sharma, L.M. (CJ), Pandian, S.R. (J), Jeevan Reddy, B.P. (J), Mohan, S. (J), Bharucha S.P. (J)

Constitutional challenge querying whether the “right to life” in Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees a
fundamental right to education to citizens of India; role of economic resources in limiting right to education; interplay
between Directive Principles and State Policy in the Constitution and Fundamental Rights; whether the right to education
includes adult professional education.
Date of the Ruling: Feb 4 1993
Forum: Supreme Court of India
Type of Forum: Domestic
Summary:
The case involved a challenge by certain private professional educational facilities to the constitutionality of state laws
regulating capitation fees charged by such institutions.
The Supreme Court held that the right to basic education is implied by the fundamental right to life (Article 21) when read in
conjunction with the directive principle on education (Article 41). The Court held that the parameters of the right must be
understood in the context of the Directive Principles of State Policy, including Article 45 which provides that the state is to
endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of the Constitution, for free and compulsory
education for all children under the age of 14. The Court ruled that there is no fundamental right to education for a
professional degree that flows from Article 21. It held, however, that the passage of 44 years since the enactment of the
Constitution had effectively converted the non-justiciable right to education of children under 14 into one enforceable under
the law. After reaching the age of fourteen, their right to education is subject to the limits of economic capacity and
development of the state (as per Article 41). Quoting Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the Court stated that the state's obligation to provide higher education requires it to take steps to the
maximum of its available resources with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the right of education by all
appropriate means.
Background
The case was a string of Writ Petitions and Civil Appeals filed before the Apex Court of the country. The matter under
debate was on the determination of the extent of Article 21 i.e., the 'Right to Life and Personal Liberty' under the Constitution
of India. The Appellant's arguments were presented with the prayer that professional education must also be an integral part
of the 'Right to Education' granted under the constitution. The major contentions from the side of the Petitioner were that
since the Right to Education applies to primary education, the same should also be made applicable to professional
education. The bench consisting of Justice M. Sharma C.J, R. Pandian, Mohan, P. Jeevan Reddy, and P. Bharucha of the
Supreme Court disapproved, and the Petition was dismissed. The case was based on the judgment which was given in
Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, where the verdict held that the citizens are having the Fundamental Right to Education.
But the specific question that the 'Right to Primary Education' as mentioned in Article 45 of the Constitution of India is a
Fundamental Right under Article 21 is not discussed in the above case.
Thus it becomes pertinent on the part of the Supreme Court to clarify the issue. The case comes into subsistence through
Petitions filed by the private educational institutions challenging the State laws. These State laws were enacted to regulate
the fee charges in the states of Tamilnadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra. Some educational institutions in
the above-mentioned States had resisted and took matters to the Court. It also questioned the precedent established in the
case of, Mohini Jain v. the State of Karnataka. Moreover, Article 21 of the Constitution of India was discussed with its
extension to the Right to Education. The important question posed before the bench was whether the Right to Education
under Article 21 extends to professional courses.
Issues
Whether the Fundamental Right to Education also extends to medical, engineering, or other professional courses?
Whether the Indian constitution guarantees a Fundamental Right to Education to all its citizens?
Whether establishing a private educational institution fall under the ambit of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution?
Does recognition or affiliation make the educational institution an instrumentality?
Arguments by parties
Petitioner
It is the bound duty of the State to provide education to all immaterial of the social and economic background of the student.
Moreover, the Petitioners' challenge was based on the Mohini Jain case which broadened the scope of the right to
education. They further argued that the State has no absolute monopoly in providing education to its citizens and it is at
loggerheads with Article 19 (1) (g) of the Indian constitution as imparting education can also be considered as a business.
The Learned Counsel further contended that they have the Right to establish a self-financing educational institution where
the autonomy is given to collect fees and money from the students seeking admission.
Respondent
The Respondents in reply filed an affidavit to show the efforts taken by the government in implementing Article 45. They
argued that the state has the duty only to provide primary education to the children as Article 45 mandates only providing
free and compulsory primary education for children of 14 years age or less. Moreover, the cost incurred in higher education
is huge, and making it mandatory for the State to extend the Right to Education would be a farce and not logically
maintainable. The accessibility to all primary schools has also been increased which makes the children approach schools
easily within commutable distance. It was also contended that there would be large financial mismanagement in providing
education in medicine. It was also noted that 3.2% of the total financial share was given to the health sector and was given
to medical education. Priorities were given to the health sector dealing with issues like promotions of primary health and
hospital services.
Judgment
After hearing the arguments by both the parties the distinguished bench noted that every citizen of this country has a
Fundamental Right to Education granted by the Constitution of India. The said Right comes from Article 21 of our
Constitution. This Right is, however, is not absolute. Its content and parameters have to be determined under the lights of
Article 45 and Article 41 of our Constitution.
In other words, every citizen of this country has a Right to Free Education until he completes the age of fourteen years.
Thereafter, his Right to Education is subject to the limits of economic capacity and development of the State. The Court
further ruled that a citizen of this country may have a Right to establish an educational institution but no citizen, person, or
institution has a Right much less a Fundamental Right, to affiliation or recognition or grant-in-aid from the State. The
recognition and/or affiliation shall be given by the State subject only to the conditions set out in, and the only accordance
with the scheme continued in Part-Ill of this Judgment. No Government/University or authority shall be competent to grant
recognition or affiliation except following the said scheme. The said scheme shall constitute a condition of such recognition
or affiliation, as the case may be, in addition to such other conditions and terms which such Government, University, or other
authority may choose to impose. Those receiving aid shall, however, be subject to all such terms and conditions, as the aid-
giving authority may impose in the interest of the general public. Thus, the Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the
Petitioner.

Q. Explain and discuss the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of Miss Mohini Jain vs State Of
Karnataka And Ors on 30 July, 1992. Equivalent citations: 1992 AIR 1858, 1992 SCR (3) 658
CASE ANALYSIS: MOHINI JAIN V. STATE OF KARNATAKA
PETITIONER: MISS MOHINI JAIN
RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT30/07/1992
BENCH: KULDIP SINGH, SAHAI, R.M.
FACTS
In the case of Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, Mohini, a resident of Meerut had applied for admission for a medical course
at Sri Siddhartha Medical College, Karnataka, under the quota of government seats in the year 1991. However, the college
management informed her that she could only be admitted if she pays the tuition fee of sixty thousand rupees for the first
year and also had to produce a bank guarantee for the remaining four. Such an amount was not feasible to be paid by
Mohini and her family due to their poor economic background. Moreover, She also complained that the college management
board had further asked her the capitation fee of rupee Four and a half lakhs, which was later refused by the college.
Considering the facts above she took matters to the Court and filed a Writ Petition under Article 32 challenging the
notification of the Karnataka Government permitting the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka to charge very
high tuition fees from the students other than those admitted via “Government seats”. She also asked for an explanation of
the “Right to Free Education” granted by the constitution for the citizens of India and its limitations.
ISSUES IN THE PRESENT CASE:
 Whether the Constitution of India guarantees the Right to Education?
 Whether private institutions charging higher fees violate the Right to Education?
 Whether charging a capitation fee in educational institutions violate Article 14 which guarantees equality before the
law?
SUBMISSION OF ARGUMENTS OF PARTIES:
 The Petitioner contended that the imposition of such huge fees for education by the private college is against the
various articles under the Indian Constitution.
 In this case, the Respondent contended at first that the criteria which have been followed in the private college
regarding the capitation fees are not chargeable from those students who were qualified for the Government seats
but only from those students who were from different classes.
 They also argued that as they were following such classification of seats in the college under merit list or under
nonmeritorious list, which implies that Government seats for candidates who were under merit list and others who
were not. Therefore, the management board of the college has the right to charge fees from those who did not
come under the merit list.
 Another argument by the Respondent was that as they were a private medical college and there was no financial
aid which was provided from the government Karnataka or the central government and also practically these
private medical colleges used to incur 5 Lakh Rupees as expenditure for MBBS course.
  Lastly, they also contended that the private medical colleges have always followed the Rule of law and abide by all
the laws for the smooth functioning of the administration and also were justified in charging the capitation fees.
JUDGMENT OF THE CASE:
After hearing the arguments from both the parties the Apex Court held that though the Right to Education is not expressly
mentioned as a Fundamental Right, Article 38, 39(a), (f), 41, and 45 of the Indian Constitution make it clear that the
constitution makes it obligatory for the State to provide education for its citizens. Article 21 of the constitution reads “No
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law”. Under Article
21 of the constitution and an individual’s dignity cannot be assured unless he has a Right to Education and educated
himself. Further, the Court took into consideration the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by the United Nations and
several cases that held that the Right to Life encompasses more than “life and limb” including necessities of life, nutrition,
shelter, and literacy.
Charging huge fees restricts access to education to the lower strata of society and makes it available only to the richer
section of the people. Poor deserving candidates can not get admission due to the inability to pay the prescribed fees and as
a consequence, in educational institutions, a citizen’s “Right to Education” gets denied. Further, allowing the charging of a
very high capitation fee violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the Court noted. The only method of admission to
medical colleges should be based on merit alone. The court also said that the judgment cannot be applied retrospectively
and cases previous to this cannot reap the benefit of the judgment. Finally, the Court held that the fees charged by the Sri
Siddhartha Medical College under the government notification were capitation fees, and not tuition fees. Therefore, the
charging of the fee was also in violation of the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act.
Commentary
The significance of this case is also in the court’s holding that private educational institutions act as agents of the State in
carrying out the latter’s duty to fulfil the right to education. Private schools therefore have duties alongside the government in
delivering educational services in accordance with constitutional rights. As a result, because the State has an obligation to
ensure equal access to higher education, private institutions have the same obligation. This does not necessarily mean that
private institutions must provide free higher education, but that they must ensure that higher education is equally accessible
and that there is no unfair discrimination.

Q. Describe the facts, judgement and the principle of law laid down in the case of Mithu Singh vs The State
Of Punjab on 27 March, 2001
Subject:The judgment revolves around the question of whether section 303 of the Indian Penal Code is constitutionally
valid?
FACTS: The petitioners in the instant case challenged the validity of Section 303 of IPC stating that it violated right to
equality under the Constitution.
Important provisions
The Indian Constitution
Article 14: The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the
territory of India.
The Indian Penal Code:
Section 303: Whoever, being under sentence of imprisonment for life, commits murder, shall be punished with death.
Issues:
Whether section 303 of the Indian Penal Code is constitutionally valid?
Judgment
The petitioners contended that, as per section 302 IPC if a person commits murder, he is either given life imprisonment or
death sentence depending upon the gravity of the offence but for a similar offence committed by a life convict under section
303 IPC the Court is not given an option but to award death sentence alone. Therefore, section 303 IPC makes an
unreasonable classification among persons who commit murder without considering the gravity of the offence. Further the
provision has no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation in question.
The respondents contended that, the validity of death sentence is upheld by the SC in the case of Bachan Singh v. State of
Punjab, therefore the punishment prescribed is valid.
Upon hearing the parties, the Court held that, section 303 IPC makes an unreasonable classification of persons who commit
murder when under life sentence and persons who commit murder when not under life sentence as the resultant act is the
same in both categories. Motive behind the offence might vary from convict to convict but does not depend on the fact if he
is awarded with life imprisonment or not. A mandatory award of death sentence under section 303 IPC disregarding the
 gravity of the offence committed has no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation therefore
Court declared section 303 IPC as unconstitutional.

Q. Describe the facts, judgement and the principle of law laid down in the case of Reg v. Govinda (1877) ILR
Bom 342
Case Brief: Reg v. Govinda (1877) ILR Bom 342 - Sections 299 & 300 IPC Analyzed. The Lordship had brought forward
the differences between Section 299 and 300 of the IPC. The court had stated that there was absence of intention. In both,
Section 299 and 300, the key element is that there should be an intention of causing death.
Jurisdiction: Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction: Bombay High Court
Case Filed (in years): 1876
Case Decided (in years): 1877
Judges: Justice Melvill, Justice Kemball, N Haridas
Introduction:
One of the most important concepts or theories under criminal law is the principle of concurrence. It requires that any
offence committed should satisfy the Principle of concurrence. Concurrence in the law is the requirement that a guilty
mental state and guilty act occur in unison. For there to be a crime, actus reus and mens rea must work together in
concurrence. The law requires that at the moment the guilty act occurs, the person must also have a guilty mind for that act.
In other words, the principle of concurrence means that a mere act would not amount to offence in a general scenario unless
there is an exception mentioned to the same. Thus, one such example can be seen through this case brief, where the court
stresses the importance of section 300 and interprets the meaning of the same.
There are general elements of every crime that are external to the written law but are just as necessary to prove. They are:
 Actus reus (Latin for ''guilty act''): the voluntary act that is at the core of a crime.
 Mens rea (Latin for ''guilty mind''): the evil state of mind of the person committing the guilty act.
 Concurrence: the guilty act and the guilty mind need to be in concert for a crime to have been committed.
 Causation: the act must have been the cause of the harm expressed in the crime.
This case is an exception that is, culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Facts of the case:
 The accused Govinda was a young man of eighter years. He kicked his young wife of twelve or thirteen years of
age and struck her several times by his fists on the back.
 The injuries on the back were not that serious. However, after she fell on the ground, the accused put one knee on
her breast and struck her two or three times on the face.
 One or two of these blows, the medical evidence showed to be violent and had effect on the left eye of the wife,
producing confusion and dislocation.
 Although the skull was not fractured, the blow caused by extravagance of blood on the brain and the girl died in a
short span of time afterwards.
With these facts and shreds of evidence in hand, the sessions judge and the assessors of this case found the accused
prisoner guilty of the offence of murder under section 300 and was later sentenced to death.
Issues:
 Whether the accused-the prisoner had the required intent to commit the offence of murder specified under section 300 of the
Indian Penal Code?
 If so, can be held guilty of murder?

Petitioner's Contentions:
 The learned Counsel for the petitioner did not dispute the position that the Magistrate's action on 6-10-1958 amounted to an
implied discharge in respect of the alleged offence Under Section 322. Indian Penal Code. Some of their criticisms against
the proceedings of the learned Sessions Judge were based on a misconception of the facts. It was urged that the entries in
the docket of C.R.P. 13 of 1958 did not mention, that the records were called for from the Magistrate and that the question
arises whether a Sessions Judge has jurisdiction to make an order Under Section 436. Cr.PC. without calling for the records
 The main contention of Sri M. Lakshman-Rao on behalf of the petitioner was that under the new procedure specified in
Section 251-A, Criminal Procedure Code for warrant cases instituted on police reports, there is no inquiry but only a trial by
the Magistrate that any order purporting to remand such a case Under Section 436 for further inquiry can only amount to an
 order for a retrial of the case and that such an order is without jurisdiction as the Sessions Judge has no power Under
Section 436 to direct a retrial.
 The petitioner had also stated that in no way the respondent was unaware of the damages that will happen.
Respondent's Contentions:
 The contention of the respondent was that there was no intension to cause death nor the bodily injury intended to be inflicted
was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The counsel that had represented the respondent referred to
Clause (1) and Clause (3) of Section 300.
 The respondent also stated that he had n knowledge that such an injury could amount to the death of the victim.

Laws involved:
Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code
Section 300 of IPC deals with a culpable homicide that will amount to murder if the act to cause death was done to cause
death or the act is done to cause bodily injury and the offender has the knowledge that such injury will cause death or thirdly,
the offender had the intention to cause death and mere bodily injury would suffice as the cause of death during the ordinary
course of nature.
The section is as follows,
“Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, the culpable homicide will be murder, if the act by which the death is caused is
done to cause death, or
Secondly.—If it is done to cause such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to
whom the harm is caused, or
Thirdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or—
Fourthly —If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause
death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of
causing death or such injury as aforesaid”
Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code:
Section 299 of the Indian Penal code defines Culpable Homicide. It states that
 whoever causes the death by doing any act with the intention of causing death or
 with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or
 with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
Analysis of Decision:
The court analyzed the difference between culpable homicide not amounting to murder and murder under section 300.
It referred to clause (a) and subsection (1) and stated that, in order to prove the offence of murder,
the intention to kill should be present as per the two clauses mentioned above.
That is to say that if A is charged with murder, both clauses should be proved to ensure his guilt.
In the same way, clause (c) and (4) was interpreted to mean that there will be no intention to cause death or bodily injury.
A few examples of such clauses include the Furious driving, etc.
Also
In such cases, whether the offence committed is culpable homicide or murder is fully dependent on the degree of risk to
human lives.
It is noted that if death is a likely result then it would be a culpable homicide, and if death is the most probable result then
such would be decided as murder.
Court also analyzed that the essence of subsection 2 of section 300 is that if the person who commits the offence knows
that there will be a death due to an injury that can easily cause the death of the victim, then such an act and result in death
would directly fall under the definition of murder.

Finally, the court opined that they found neither the evidence that is, the presence of evidence to cause the death of the
victim nor the bodily injury which would suffice the death in the ordinary course of nature.
In the ordinary course, there would not be a death, but in this case, the court stated that two or more later blows on her
chest and face were noted to be violent by the medical evidence and the resultant concussion or extravasations of blood
from the brain which appeared on the surface showed that how death could occur due to mere blow on the head area.
Conclusion:
In this case, the court held that the accused, who was sentenced by the sessions court should be punished for his guilt for
culpable homicide not amounting to murder as they did not find the intention part for the conviction under section 300. The
accused was sentenced to transportation for seven years, under Part I of Section 304 I.P.C and not under Section 302 of the
IPC.

Q. Describe the facts, judgement and the principle of law laid down in the case of Sakshi vs Union of India.
Case Name- Sakshi vs Union of India - Citations– AIR 2004 SC 3566, 2004 (2) ALD Cri 504
Background
There is an NGO called Sakshi which gives aid with legal, medical, residential, and many other kinds of help to women
primarily to those who were victims of sexual abuse or harassment or any other offences. This case is a PIL filed by the
NGO to reconsider the meaning of ‘rape’ under section 375 of Indian Penal Code where penetration is only considered to be
penile/vaginal penetration and not the other kinds like penile/oral, penile/anal, finger/vaginal. This was made with special
mention of child sexual abuse which has become widespread. The petition also speaks about constitutional rights and
international conventions in this regard. Writ Petition filed under Sakshi under article 32 through PIL. The defendants are
Union of India, Ministry of Law and Justice and Commissioner of Police, New Delhi. The petition claimed for certain reliefs
like to widen the view of the term rape, and issue of direction based on the facts and circumstances of the case.
It is set out in the writ petition that the petitioner has noticed with growing concern the dramatic increase of violence, in
particular sexual violence against women and children as well as the implementation of the provisions of Indian Penal Code
namely Sections 377, 375/376 and 354 by the respondent authorities. The existing trend of the respondent authorities has
been to treat sexual violence, other than penile/vaginal penetration, as lesser offences falling under either Section 377 or
354 of the IPC and not as a sexual offence under Section 375/376 IPC. It has been found that offences such as sexual
abuse of minor children and women by penetration other than penile/vaginal penetration, which would take any other form
and could also be through use of objects whose impact on the victims is in no manner less than the trauma of penile/vaginal
penetration as traditionally understood under Section 375/376, have been treated as offences falling under Section 354 of
the IPC as outraging the modesty of a women or under Section 377 IPC as unnatural offences.

Section 354. Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty.—Whoever assaults or uses criminal
force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Section 375. Rape.—A man is said to commit “rape” who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse
with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six descriptions described in the section
Section 376. Punishment for rape.
Section 377. Unnatural offences.—Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man,
woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal
intercourse necessary to the offence described in this section.
Issue and resolution
The court refused to include any other kinds of penetrations except forcible vaginal penetration in the ambit of Section 375.
Observation by the court
The decision made by the court was based on the legal principle of stare decisis i.e., the court is required to follow
previous decisions when no special circumstances arise. Altering the current definition of rape under section 375 of the
Indian Penal Code would lead to ambiguity and confusion and will be against the interest of people.
The contention by the petitioner
The learned counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, urged that the Indian Penal Code should be interpreted
according to the present needs and the interpretation should be purposive. She submitted that section 375 of the Indian
Penal Code should be interpreted regarding the alarming proportion of child abuse in today’s world. She submitted that
section 375 I.P.C should not be understood in the traditional sense but should include all types of penetrations. She
emphasizes the fact that there is no proper definition of the words ‘sexual intercourse’ in the Penal Code and hence the
court can give it a wider meaning so that the offenders of child abuse may come within the ambit of Section 376 of the Indian
Penal Code (punishment for rape). In this regard, she also referred to the Convention of the United Nations in 1979, on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and also Convention On the Rights of the Child on 20th February
1989, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. A special reference was made to Articles 17 and 19 also.
Article 17
The important function performed by the mass media is duly recognized by the State parties and they make sure that the
child should have access to information and materials from all the diverse sources whether national or international,
especially those aimed at the promotion of physical and moral well being. For this, state parties shall encourage the
development of guidelines to protect the child from material that might be injurious for his or her development, keeping in
mind the provisions included in articles 13 and 18.
Article 19
1. All the appropriate legislative, administrative, educational, and social measures should be taken by the state parties to
protect a child from any form of injury or harm, mental and physical violence, negligent treatment, exploitation, maltreatment,
or sexual abuse while in the care of legal guardian’s or appearance or any other person who is taking care of the child.
2. Such measures for the protection of children should include protective procedures to establish programs to provide the
necessary support to the child and for his or her guardians, as well as to protect him from other forms of prevention,
investigating, reporting, referral, and follow up of instances of the maltreatment of children and also for judicial involvement.
The contention by the respondent
The learned counsel for the respondents, R.N. Tiwari, has submitted that to frame guidelines to enforce fundamental rights,
International Treaties ratified by India can be taken into account but only in the absence of municipal laws. This was held in
Vishaka vs State of Rajasthan 1997. It was also submitted by him that when there are already existing laws, they cannot
be held ultra vires after the subsequent ratification of international treaties. In such instances, the state legislators have the
power to modify the laws according to the treaties. It was held that such matters came under the realm of State policy and
could not be enforced in court.
Conclusion
"Thus, the Trial Chamber finds that the following may be accepted as the objective elements of rape :
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight :
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator, or
(b) of a mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator.
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person."

The petition is disposed of by the court with the following directions-

In addition to subsection 2 of section 327 of the criminal procedure Code, an inquiry or trial of offenses shall also be made
under sections 354 and 377 of the Indian penal code.
While holding a trial for child abuse or rape, some arrangements shall be made where the witnesses or victims do not see
the body of the accused because the site of the accused may induce fear in the mind of the victim. The questions which are
to be put in cross-examination should be submitted to the presiding officer of the court in writing, who may put them in a
clear language that is not embarrassing.
The victims of such cases shall be allowed with breaks when required while testimony.

The judgement regarding the child sex abuse or rape is that a screen or something of the kind is to be provided by the court
and the victim must be given intermissions as and when needed. Also, questions of cross examination must be given to the
judge. The rest of the matter must be taken by the parliament and a proper legislation must be passed in the regard.

Q. Describe the facts, judgement and the principle of law laid down in the case of Vishaka & Ors vs State Of
Rajasthan & Ors on 13 August, 1997
Right against sexual harassment at workplace
1. In the case of Vishakha vs. the State of Rajasthan, the court declared that sexual harassment of a working
woman workplace amounts to a violation of rights under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. The
guidelines have been laid down in order to protect the rights of a woman at workplace.
2. Following which the Sexual Harassment of woman at Workplace (prevention, prohibition, and Redressal) Act,
2013 was passed.
Vishaka & Ors. V/S State of Rajasthan (Air 1997 Sc 3011) - Sexual Harassment Landmark Case
Bench Of Judges: CJI, Sujata V. Manohar, B. N. Kirpal
Vishaka & ors. v/s state of Rajasthan is a case which deals with the evil of Sexual Harassment of a women at her workplace.
It is a landmark judgment case in the history of sexual harassment which as being decide by Supreme Court. Sexual
Harassment means an uninvited/unwelcome sexual favor or sexual gestures from one gender towards the other gender. It
makes the person feel humiliated, offended and insulted to whom it is been done. In many of the cases, it has been
observed that homosexual labor harass an employee belonging to the same sex to which he belongs.
Sexual harassment is also termed as “Eve Teasing” in India, and it can be determined from the following acts like- passing
of indicative or typical comments or jokes, uninvited touching, making appeals for sex, sexually blunt pictures or text
messages or emails, discredit person because of sex. Accordingly, Sexual Harassment violates the fundamental right of the
women of gender equality which is codified under Article 14 of Indian Constitution and also the fundamental right to life and
to live a dignified life is violated/infringed under Article 21 of constitution of India. Even though there has been no provision
for sexual harassment at workplace under Indian Constitution.
Justice Arjit Pasayat beholder from his beautiful thought that- “ while a murderer destroys the physical frame of the victim, on
the other hand the rapist defiles the soul of a helpless female”.
Sexual harassment is one of the social evil faced by the fragile portion of the society. Now at this point of time the high
society people or the people who commits sexual harassment should become aware about the vital needs or rights of
women or either when this tranquil volcano of anger will erupt will cause immense danger and shattering which would have
equal consequences which is cause from the burst or eruption of an inactive volcano.
Facts
The facts of this case are given below:-
# Bhanwari Devi who was a social activist/worker in one of the Rajasthan’s village.
# She worked under a social development program at rural level which was about to stop child marriage in a village and this
social program was administered/ initiated by the Rajasthan’s state government.
# Bhanwari Devi en-devoured to stop the marriage of the Ramkaran Gujjars (thakurs) daughter, who was merely less than
one year old i.e. she was an infant only.
# As a part of her duty, Bhanwari Devi tried to terminate the marriage of her infant daughter.
# Even of her vain-full efforts to stop the marriage, it happened, but Bhanwari devi was not excused or pardoned for her’s
this fault.
# She was exposed to or put forward to social punishment or boycott.
# September 1992, she was been gang raped by Ramkaran Gujjar and his five friends in front of her husband.
# The male doctor at normal primary health center declined to survey her and the doctor at Jaipur only made confirmation of
her age without any recommendation of her being raped in her medical report.
# At police station too she was been continually taunted by the women countable for the whole of the midnight.
# In past midnight she was been asked by the policeman to leave her lehnga as the evidence of that incident and go back to
her village.
# After that, she was only left with the bloodstained dhoti of her husband to wrap her body, as a result of which they had to
spend there whole night in that police station.
# The Trail Court made the discharge of the accused people for not being guilty.
# The High Court in his judgement propounded that –“ it was a case of gang rape which was conducted out of revengeful
situation.
# All these statement and judgement, aroused women and NGO’S to file pitition (PIL) in Supreme Court of India.
Issue Raised In This Case
# Whether, the enactment of guidelines mandatory for the repudment of sexual harassment of women at workplace.
Judgement-
The judgment of Vishakha's case was conveyed by Chief Justice J.S Verma as a representative of Justice Sujata Manihar
and Justice B.N Kripal on account of writ petition which was file by Vishakha the victim of this case. The court observed that
the fundamental rights under Article 14[2], 19[3](1)(g) and 21[4]of Constitution of India that, every profession, trade or
occupation should provide safe working environment to the employees. It hampered the right to life and the right to live a
dignified life. The basic requirement was that there should be the availability of safe working environment at workplace.

The Supreme Court held that, women have fundamental right towards the freedom of sexual harassment at workplace. It
also put forward various important guidelines for the employees to follow them and avoid sexual harassment of women at
workplace. The court also suggested to have proper techniques for the implementation of cases where there is sexual
harassment at workplace. The main aim/objective of the Supreme Court was to ensure gender equality among people and
also to ensure that there should be no discrimination towards women at there workplace.
After this case, the Supreme Court made the term Sexual harassment well defined, accordingly any physical touch or
conduct, showing of pornography, any unpleasant taunt or misbehavior, or any sexual desire towards women, sexual favor
will come under the ambit of sexual harassment.
Critical Analysis
In the case of Vishakha & others v/s the state of Rajasthan[5], the Supreme Court specifically underlined the definition of
Sexual Harassment[6],which conveys any unwanted or uninvited physical touch or conduct or showing of pornography or
any definable sexual comments or texts will come under the ambit of Sexual Harassment. According to me any such
conduct done directly hampers the right of women to life and it also affects there dignity to live. It also hinders the mental
and physical health of women. Sexual harassment shall be avoided and the equality between the genders shall be
established at workplace.
The Supreme Court held out guidelines that, the person-in-charge of the particular institution, organisation or office whether
be it private or public, will be responsible in taking effective steps to prevent sexual harassment. Penalties shall be charged
from the accused people for conducting sexual harassment. It had became a very crucial topic to act upon for the prevention
of sexual harassment women at workplace. In case of private companies the strict rules regarding the punishment of sexual
harassment shall be included. In case the sexual harassment is conducted by the outsiders, the person-in charge of that
institution must take strict action for the conduct of such crime.
Conclusion
Sexual Harassment of women at workplace happens at a very frequent rate in India. If any strict action will not be taken
towards this crime, it will directly hamper the working ration of the women in India and on other hand it will hamper the
economic situation of India. Government should make strict laws regarding the aversion of sexual harassment at workplace,
because it should realize that, women also constitute the working population of our country. It should be abolished to
prevent the dignity and the respect of the women. Various new approaches and skills shall be implemented by the
institutions, organisations to prevent there women employees from such a social evil. The main objective behind the
stabilization of this right is to promote gender equality at workplace without any kind of discrimination and discernment
among the workers of an organisation.

Q. Explain the facts and principles of law laid down in The State Of Madras vs Srimathi Champakam ... on 9 April,
1951; Equivalent citations: 1951 AIR 226, 1951 SCR 525.
This ruling of the Supreme Court proved to be a historic event and decision. It resulted in the 1st Amendment to the
Indian Constitution, which addressed the country's reservation programme. Clause 4 was added to Article 15 as
part of the revision.
The Supreme Court of India’s landmark judgement is State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (AIR 1951 SC 226). As a
result of this decision, India’s Constitution was amended with the First Amendment. It was the Republic of India’s first
important ruling on reservations. The Supreme Court affirmed the Madras High Court’s decision, which had knocked down
the Government Order (G.O.) issued in the [Madras Presidency] in 1927. The ruling is based on the contested Communal
Government Order, which was enacted prior to independence and remained in effect long after the Constitution was
enacted. This edict established a quota policy in state-run college institutions based on the caste system.
The court ruled that the government directive was null and invalid. This decision is significant because it addresses the
contradiction between fundamental rights and state policy directive principles.

FACTS
There was a quota system in place for college entrance in Madras in 1950. Four medical institutions and four engineering
colleges were supported by the state. Non-Brahmins were allotted six seats for every fourteen seats available, two for
backward castes, two for Brahmins, two for Harijans, one for Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians, and one for Muslims. This
was based on the Communal Government Order issued by the Province of Madras or Madras Presidency in 1927, just
before independence (Communal G. O.). Reservations based on a person’s caste were used to admit people to government
universities and employment. The State of Madras claimed that they were allowed to keep and enforce the Communal
Government Order because it was established under Article 46 of the Directive Principles of State Policy to promote the
educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and other weaker sections of society.
Shrimathi Champakam Dorairajan, a Brahmin, filed a suit in the Madras High Court under Article 226 (power of High
Court to issue certain writs) alleging that her basic right to admission to the college had been violated. She said that despite
her good grades, she was unable to gain entrance to the Medical College.

Conclusion:
State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan is a historic Supreme Court of India decision (AIR 1951 SC 226). India’s
Constitution was altered with the First Amendment as a result of this ruling. It was the Republic of India’s first major
reservation decision. The Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the Madras High Court, which overturned a Government
Order (G.O.) issued in the [Madras Presidency] in 1927. The G.O had provided caste based reservation in government jobs
and college seats. The Supreme Court's verdict held that providing such reservations was in violation of Article 29 (2) of the
Indian Constitution. Here, the court held that Directive Principles of State Policy have to conform to and run as subsidiary to
the Chapter of Fundamental Rights. Chapter on Fundamental Rigjhts are sacrosanct, and DPSPs as in article 37 are
expressly made unenforceable by a Court, hence, cannot override the provisions found in Part III which, notwithstanding
other provisions, are expressly made enforceable by appropriate writs, Orders or directions under article 32. DPSP can only
be implemented as long as there is no infringement of Fundamental Rights under Part III, subject to limitations to legislative
and executive powers provided under different parts of the Constitution.

Q. Write short notes on the following:

 Doctrine of repugnancy
 Doctrine of Occupied field
 Doctrine of Territorial nexus
 Doctrine of pith and substance
 Doctrine of eclipse
 Doctrine of colorable legislation
 Doctrine of severability
Article 254 of the Indian Constitution (inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act) establishes the doctrine of
repugnancy in India.
The doctrine of repugnancy
is basically when two pieces of legislation have a conflict between them and when are applied to the same facts but they
produce different outcomes or results.
The doctrine of repugnancy, in accordance to Article 254, states that if any part of State law is repugnant or conflicting to
any part of a Central law which the Parliament is competent to enact, or to any part of a law of the matter of List III, then the
Central law made by the Parliament shall prevail and the law made by the State legislature shall become void, to the extent
of its repugnancy.
While considering this doctrine, whether the central law is passed before or after the State law is immaterial.
For the application of the doctrine of repugnancy, two enactments must contain provisions that are so inconsistent that they
cannot stand together in the same field.
When provisions of 2 laws are so contrary and disconfirmed that it becomes difficult to do one without opposing the other,
this is a situation where repugnancy arises.
One of the landmark judgments concerning this doctrine is M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, AIR 1979 - In this case, a
constitutional bench of the Apex court considered the question of repugnancy between a law made by the Parliament and a
law made by the State legislature.
After the study of this case and Doctrine of repugnancy, it can be concluded that the repugnancy generally arises when
 there is a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act,
 such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable and
 the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of such nature as to bring the two Acts into direct
collision with each other and a situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the
other.

 Article 254 of the Indian Constitution (Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the
Legislatures of States) establishes successfully the Doctrine of Repugnancy in India.
 There is a very thin line of difference between doctrine of Repugnancy and Doctrine of Occupied Field.
 As we know that repugnance arises only if there is an actual conflict between two legislations, one enacted by the
State Legislature and the other by Parliament, both of which were competent to do so.
 Doctrine of Occupied Field has nothing to do with the conflict of laws between the state and the centre.
 The doctrine of Occupied Field simply refers to those legislative entries of State List, which are expressly made
‘subject’ to a corresponding Entry in either the Union List or the Concurrent List.
 When an entry is attached to a corresponding entry in the Union List, it means that the Parliament will have
exclusive jurisdiction over it.
 Where an entry is attached to a corresponding entry in the Concurrent List, even though the state government can
legislate on matters of the Concurrent List, the law made by the Parliament will be given supremacy, if exclusive
jurisdiction not already rests with the Parliament.
  It is merely concerned with the ‘existence of legislative power’ whereas repugnance is concerned with the ‘exercise
of legislative power’ that is shown to exist.
 Doctrine of Occupied Field comes into picture even before the Union Law or the State Law has commenced.
 Under Article 254, as soon as a Union law receives assent of the President, it is said to be ‘a law made by the
Parliament’.
 Actual commencement of the law is not important for the purpose of attracting doctrine of Occupied field.
 The doctrine of occupied field is found in Entry 52, List I, Entry 24, List II(Industries subject to the provisions of
entries 7 and 52 of List I), which when read together, state that the Parliament can make laws to exercise control of
certain industries in public interest, which would render those industries out of the legislative power of the State
Legislatures.
 The doctrine of occupied field is often confused with the doctrine of repugnancy, and the latter finds its place in
Article 254(1) of the Indian Constitution. Where the doctrine of occupied field talks about existence of legislative
power, the doctrine of repugnancy signifies the exercise of such legislative power. The two are not mutually
exclusive, but the latter is an extended form of the former.

The Curious Case of State of Kerala & Ors vs M/S. Mar Appraem Kuri Co.Ltd. & Anr on 8 May, 2012
 Let us understand this doctrine with the help of a famous case.
 In the case of State of Kerala & Ors v. M/S. Mar Appraem Kuri Co.Ltd. & Anr., the Centre enacted the Chit Funds
Act (Central Act).
 For the Law to become operative in any state, the Central Government would have to issue a notification under
Section 3 of the Central Act.
 In the meantime, the State of Kerala enacted a separate act on ‘Chit Funds’ called as Kerala Chitties Act.
However, the Central Act did not get notified in Kerala resulting into a situation wherein there was only one Act in
force in the State of Kerala i.e. the Kerala Chitties Act.
 It was contended that the Kerala Chitties Act was repugnant to the un-Notified Central Act.
 The Supreme Court held that even an un-notified Central law attracts Article 254.
 The reasoning given by the Supreme Court was that the Central Enactment covered the entire ‘field’ of ‘Chit
Funds’ under the Concurrent List.
 Even though the Central Chit Funds Act was not brought in force in the State of Kerala, it is still a law ‘made’,
which is alive as an existing law.
 The Court emphasized that Article 254 uses the verb ‘made’ and the ‘making’.
 Thus, the ‘making’ of a law is complete, even before that law is notified.
 The court also said that:
 “The verb ‘make’ or the verb ‘made’ is equivalent to the expression ‘to legislate’.
 The importance of this discussion is to show that the Constitution framers have deliberately used the word ‘made’
or ‘make’ in the above Articles.
 Our Constitution gives supremacy to the Parliament in the matter of making of the laws or legislating with respect
to matters delineated in the three Lists.
 The principle of supremacy of the Parliament, the distribution of legislative powers, the principle of exhaustive
enumeration of matters in the three Lists are all to be seen in the context of making of laws and not in the context
of commencement of the laws.”
 Thus, the State Legislature is denuded of Legislative Competence as soon as the Parliament, by enacting the
Central Act, intended to occupy the entire field of ‘Chit Funds’ under the Concurrent List.

 According to the Doctrine of Territorial Nexus, laws made by a state legislature are not applicable outside that
state, except when there is a sufficient nexus between the state and the object.
 This doctrine derives its authority from Article 245 of the Indian Constitution(Extent of laws made by Parliament
and by the Legislatures of States).
 The state legislature has the jurisdiction to make laws within its territorial jurisdiction.
 Territorial nexus is one such exception which allows the state to make laws for extraterritorial operations if it shows
that there exists a nexus between the object and the state.
 The Nexus must be legitimate in nature
 The liability must be related to the territorial connection.
In the case of Wallace vs. vs The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay, Wallace Brothers And Co. Ltd. was registered in
England and was a partner in a firm which was situated in India. The authorities of the Indian income tax attempted to tax
the entire income which was made by the company. In this case the Privy Council applied the doctrine of territorial Nexus
and it was held that the tax levied was valid as it was said that a major part of the income was taken from British India and
this was a sufficient ground to establish a nexus.
The Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd vs The State Of Bihar on 19 February, 1958
 The appellant company, carrying on business as manufacturer of iron and steel, with its factory and works at
Jamshedpur in Bihar.
 The appellant company was assessed to sales tax for two periods prior to the Constitution, under the Bihar Sales
Tax Act, 1947 (No.XIX Of 1947), enacted by the Bihar Legislature in exercise of its exclusive power under the
Government of India Act, 1935.
 The company used to send its goods from Jamshedpur to various parts of India.
 In the railway receipt the company itself figured as the consignee.

 It paid the freight and the receipt was sent either to its branch offices or bankers to be handed over to the

purchaser when he paid the price.

 From the amounts shown as gross turn-over in the two returns for the two periods, the company claimed

deduction of certain amounts, being the valuable consideration for the goods manufactured in Bihar but sold,

delivered and consumed outside, on the ground that in none of the transactions in respect of the said sums did

property in the goods pass to the purchasers in Bihar.

 The appellant claimed further deductions on account of the railway freight paid by it.
 The Sales Tax Officer disallowed both the claims and added the amounts of sales tax realised by the appellant
from its purchasers to the taxable turnover.
 The company appealed against the orders of assessment, but the Commissioner of Sales Tax dismissed its
appeals.
 The Board of Revenue, in revision, confirmed the orders of the Commissioner with certain modifications and
remanded the matters to the Sales Tax Officer.
 On the appellant's application for reference of certain questions of law, the Board referred them to the High Court.
 One of them related to the legality of adding the Sales Tax to the turn-over and was answered in favour of the
appellant and the respondent did not appeal.
 The other questions decided by the High Court against the appellant related to the vires of the Act and the
validity of retrospective levy of sales tax under Section 4(1) of the Act.
 The appellant's contentions in the appeals were that the tax levied under Section 4(1) read with Section 2(g)
second proviso, clause (II), of the Act, was not a sales tax within the meaning of Entry 48 in List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935.
 It was in the nature of excise duty which a provincial legislature had no power to impose, that the theory of
territorial nexus was inapplicable to sales tax and, in any case, there was no real or sufficient nexus in the present
cases and that retrospective levy of the sales tax under Section 4(1) Of the Act destroyed the indirect nature of
the tax, thus making it a direct tax on the dealer which could not be passed on to the consumer:
Held, the Supreme Court observed that the principle of territorial nexus does not impose the tax but whenever a tax is
imposed by a law passed by the legislature, it only indicates the circumstances in which it shall be enforced in a particular
case. The presence of the goods on the date of the agreement for sale in the taxing State or the production of the goods in
that State shall play an important role in deciding the application of this principle. This is obvious because in a sale of goods
the property will pass in the goods. The Supreme Court thus extended the principle to cases of sales tax also.

What is the Doctrine of Pith and Substance?

 The doctrine states that within their respective spheres the state and the union legislatures are made supreme,
they should not encroach upon the sphere demarcated for the other.
  However, if one among the state and the Centre does encroach upon the sphere of the other, the courts will apply
the Doctrine of Pith and Substance.
 If the pith and substance i.e., the true object of the legislation pertains to a subject within the competence of the
legislature that enacted it, it should be held to be intra vires although it may incidentally encroach on the matters
not within the competence of the legislature.
The Privy Council applied this doctrine in Profulla Kumar Mukherjee v Bank of Khulna.
 In this case, the Bengal Money Lenders Act of 1947 enacted by the State Legislature was challenged with the
contention that parts of the legislation dealt with promissory notes; a central subject.
 The Privy Council while upholding the validity of the impugned legislation stated that the Bengal Money Lenders
Act was in pith and substance a law relating to money lenders and money lending – a state subject even though it
incidentally trenches upon Promissory note – a central subject.
In State of Bombay v FN Balsara, the Bombay Prohibition Act was challenged on the ground that it accidentally encroaches
upon import and export of liquor across custom frontier – a central subject. The court while upholding the impugned
legislation declared that the Act was in pith and substance a State subject even though it incidentally encroached upon a
central subject.
Important ingredients that constitute the Doctrine of Pith and Substance
 The Doctrine is applied when the subject matter of List I of the Seventh Schedule is in conflict with the subject
matter of List II.
 The reason behind adopting this doctrine is that otherwise every law will be declared invalid on the ground that it
encroaches upon the subject matter of another sphere.
 The doctrine examines the true nature and substance of the legislation in order to determine which List it belongs
to.
 It takes into consideration whether the State has the power to make a law that encroaches on a subject matter
from another list.
 The doctrine was first applied and upheld by the Supreme Court in the FN Balsara case.
 The doctrine of pith and substance has provided the Indian constitutional scheme with much-needed flexibility
because in the absence of this doctrine, every other law would have been declared invalid because it incidentally
encroaches upon the sphere of another legislature.
 Apart from its applicability in cases related to the competency of the legislature as mentioned in Article 246, the
Doctrine of Pith and Substance is also applied in cases related to Article 254, which deals with the repugnancy in
laws made by Parliament and laws made by the State Legislatures.
 The doctrine is employed in such cases to resolve the inconsistency between laws made by the Centre and the
State Legislature.

What is the Doctrine of Eclipse?

The Doctrine of Eclipse states that any law which is inconsistent with fundamental rights is not invalid.
It is not totally dead but overshadowed by the fundamental right.
The inconsistency (conflict) can be removed by constitutional amendment.
Doctrine of Eclipse
 The Judiciary is the guardian of the rights provided for in the Constitution of India.
 It is the job of the judiciary to restrain the actions of the Legislature and the Executive where they are infringing
upon these rights.
 When the Constitution was adopted on January 26, 1950, with it came, the fundamental rights that are guaranteed
to the citizens.
 There were several existing laws at the time when the Constitution was adopted, some of which were in direct
conflict with fundamental rights.
 In order to determine the validity of these laws the Supreme Court came up with certain principles/doctrines, one of
which was the Doctrine of Eclipse.
 This doctrine emanates directly from Article 13(1) of the Constitution that is a part of the fundamental rights, which
states, “all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution in so far
as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, i.e. Part III, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be
void.”
 The doctrine of eclipse envisages fundamental rights as prospective in nature.
 It states that a pre-constitutional law inconsistent with the fundamental rights is not a nullity or void ab initio but
only remains unenforceable, i.e., remains in a dormant state.
 They exist for all past transactions, i.e., for rights and liabilities that were acquired before the Constitution came
into being.
  These laws also remain applicable to individuals who have not been given fundamental rights, for example, non-
citizens.
 Therefore, the impugned law remains hidden behind the fundamental rights and can become operative again if and
when the fundamental right it is inconsistent with is amended.
Court Rulings related to Doctrine of Eclipse
The Doctrine of Eclipse has evolved through various Supreme Court rulings after the adoption of the Constitution.
In the Keshav Madhav Menon v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 case,
 the petitioner was prosecuted under the provisions of the 1931 act, the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, for
publishing a pamphlet with no permission.
 The case was still pending when the Constitution came into force and thus raised questions regarding the
prospective and retrospective nature of Article 13(1) and the word “void”. The question before the Court was
whether the impugned Act was violative of Article 19(1) (a) and if so whether it should be declared void.
 The Court answered the first part in affirmative adding that the Act is void only to the extent of the violation and that
the word “void” used in Article 13 does not mean that statutes or provisions shall be repealed altogether.
In the case of FN Balsara, the Court declared Section 13(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act of 1949 as void because it
violated Article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. The Court again held that only the part of the statute that is violative of Part III is
inoperative and not the whole Statute.
 It is generally agreed, however, that the actual genesis of this doctrine occurred in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State
of Madhya Pradesh. In this case, the C. P. and Berar Motor Vehicles Amendment Act of 1947 was challenged for
being violative of Article 19(1) (g). This amendment act was a pre-constitutional law. Thus, the Doctrine of Eclipse
was applied and the Act’s provisions were made inoperative.
However, in the year 1951, by virtue of the 1st Constitutional Amendment Act, Article 19(1) (g) was amended and the
eclipse was removed, rendering this law enforceable against citizens and non-citizens. According to the Court, “the effect of
the amendment was to remove the shadow and to make the impugned Act free from all blemish or infirmity”.
The Doctrine of Eclipse – Salient Features
 The doctrine only applies to pre-constitutional laws that were valid at their inception.
 The doctrine is not applicable to post-constitutional laws since they are invalid from the very inception because of
being inconsistent with Part III; the same was held by the Supreme Court in Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh.
However, non-citizens can’t take any advantage of the rule as the violation doesn’t impact them.
 The impugned law must be violative of the fundamental rights, and then only can it be hidden or eclipsed.
 The law that turns out to be violative of Part III does not become a nullity but just remains unenforceable &
defective.
 If the fundamental right that is violated by the impugned law is amended in the future, the law automatically
becomes operative.
The judgments of Bhikaji and Deep Chand were upheld in the cases of Mahendra Lal Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, State of
Gujarat v. Ambica Mills, Sagir Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh and P. L. Mehra v. D. R. Khanna.
Conclusion
The Doctrine of Eclipse is one of the fairly subtle principles of the rule of law that has helped the pre-constitutional laws from
being wiped out altogether. It is imperative to mention here that the applicability of this doctrine to post-constitutional laws is
still somewhat of a grey area. However, this doctrine has been effective in harmonizing the pre-constitutional and post-
constitutional positions with respect to various laws, such harmonization has ensured the triumph of constitutionalism in
every sense of the word.

Doctrine of colorable legislation

 Doctrine of Colorable Legislation means that if a legislature lacks the jurisdiction to enact laws on a specific subject
directly, it cannot make laws on it indirectly.
 In simple words, the doctrine checks if a law has been enacted on a subject indirectly when it is barred to legislate
on that topic directly.
 This is designed to prevent the legislature from doing anything that has been explicitly forbidden from being done
indirectly or secretly.
 The Doctrine of Colourable Legislation is founded on the Latin maxim “Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo,
prohibetur et per obliquum” which states that whatever is unable to be done directly, cannot also be done
indirectly.
Concept of Doctrine of Colourable Legislation
 In India, 'colorable legislation doctrine' simply means limiting the legislature's ability to make laws.
 The doctrine of colorable legislation is used to determine whether or not they are qualified to implement the
specific law.
 Separation of powers entails the division or sharing of power. The Constitution states that each of these organs
should exercise diverse powers in order to prevent the misuse of authority by any of the government's organs.
  As a result, a system of checks and balances emerges. With respect to their respective subjects, the Constitution
has split powers between the federal government and the states.
 Article 246 of the Indian Constitution deals with subject matter legislation, which refers to who has the authority to
create laws in relation to particular subject matter.
 However, the legislative body occasionally passes laws that are outside of its purview. This signifies it has
overstepped its bounds and done something indirectly that could not have been done directly.
 This is known as a colourable legislation of legislative power or establishing laws indirectly while doing so directly
is illegal.
 As a result, the theory of colourable legislation was created to prevent legislative authorities from abusing their
powers.
 For example, the constitution provides reservation to only social and educationally backward communities.
 So any attempt to declare the socially forward communities as backward communities and extend the reservation
becomes coloured legislation.
 One of the ideas included in the Indian Constitution is colorable legislation. It essentially implies coloured
legislation that isn't its genuine colour.
 As a result, anytime the Union or a state exceeds their respective legislative competence and passes such
legislation, colorable legislation enters the picture to assess parliamentary culpability for that law.

Doctrine of Colourable Legislation - Significance

 The doctrine of colorable legislation firmly bans doing things indirectly when doing so directly is prohibited.
 It determines whether or whether the legislature passed a statute within its authorised competencies.
 The idea of colorable legislation functions as a check on them, and if it discovers incompetence, the law becomes
invalid without the need to determine its need and criteria.
 It only examines the competence of the legislative body and limits overstretching power.
 When the ability of a certain legislation to pass a particular law is called into question, colorable legislation arises.
 It questions the correctness of an adopted legislation in relation to the legislative body that approved the law and
examines whether the legislative body has the authority to make laws on that subject or not.
 Colorable legislation develops anytime legislative bodies lack the authority to enact legislation on an issue because
it was not included in the Schedule 7 list or because of the constraints of Part III of the Constitution or any other
provision of the Constitution.
Limitations of Doctrine of Colourable Legislation
 Subordinate legislation is exempt from the doctrine. It is based only on the question of a legislative body's
competence to adopt a certain legislation.
 It has no application when there is no constitutional limit and where the powers of a legislature are not restricted by
any limitation.
 It is unconcerned about whether the legislation is relevant or irrelevant.
 The notion is unrelated to the legislature's good or bad intentions. It merely considers whether the adopted law falls
within the jurisdiction of the legislature.
Supreme Court Judgements in which doctrine of colorable legislation is used
K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa
 In this case, the constitutional validity of the Orissa Agricultural Income Tax (Amendment) Act,1950 was
challenged as colorable legislation.
 The reason behind this was its real objective was to reduce the Net income of intermediaries to keep the
compensation paid to a minimum.
 The court felt that it is not a colorable piece of legislation as agriculture income is a state subject and it had the
authority to enact the law and reducing the compensation is another part of it.
M.R. Balaji v. The state of Mysore 1962
 In this case, the Mysore government has passed a law stating all communities except the Brahmin community are
socially and educationally backward communities.
 It left only 32 % of seats for the merit pool and reserved nearly 68% in state medical and engineering colleges.
 The court held that it violated Article 15(4) and therefore is invalid. Article 15 dealt with ‘prohibition of discrimination
on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.’
In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh,
 the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 was enacted to remove the landlord custom from the state.
 The State gave half of the arrears of rent due as compensation to the landlord.
 The compensation for property acquired comes under Concurrent List’s Entry 42.
 So, here it was to be determined whether the Act is for a public purpose or not.
 The Supreme Court held that the Act instead of determining the compensation, indirectly removes the petitioner
from his property without any compensation.
 In reality the Act purported to lay down a principle for determining compensation and indirectly deprived the
petitioner of claiming compensation.
  Thus, the Act was colourable legislation and was held invalid.
In the case of K.T. Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala,
 the petitioner was the owner of a 25,000-acre forest land.
 Due to the Preservation of Private Forest Act,1949 the yearly income of petitioners was only 3,100 Rs per year.
 Then the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955 came into existence and Section 4 of the Act imposed yearly tax
liability of Rs. 2 per acre and as a result, the petitioner had to give a tax of Rs. 50,000 per year. Also, Section 7
exempted 78 types of land from the operation of this Act after notification.
 Then through an amendment Section 5A came which was the Provisional Assessment of the basic tax in respect
of land which had not been surveyed and no time for the conduct of the survey was fixed.
 In this case, tax liability was greater than the petitioner’s income.
 It held that Section 4 and Section 7 of the Act violated Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Indian Constitution. The
Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act,1955 was held to be invalid on the ground that the Act apparently purported to be
a Taxing Act but in reality, it was not Taxing Act but was confiscatory in nature.

Conclusion
Colourable legislation means that the legislative power has been encroached upon. When something is not allowed to be
done directly, the idea of colourable law firmly bans doing it indirectly. It determines whether the legislature has enacted a
statute within its authorised authority. So, if there is a limitation on the ability to enact laws, the legislature must adhere to it,
or it will be considered excess vires of legislative power.

Doctrine of severability
The idea of severability is also known as the separability doctrine.
The doctrine of severability states that where a specific component of legislation violates a constitutional limitation but is
severable or separable from the remainder of the statute, the Court will declare only that offending provision
unconstitutional, not the entire statute.

Doctrine of Severability
 When only a piece of a challenged statute or law violates fundamental rights, and in such cases, the Doctrine of
Severability is used.
 Article 13 of the Constitution establishes the Doctrine of Severability’s legitimacy, which states that “All laws in
force in India, before the commencement of the Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions
of fundamental rights shall to the extent of that inconsistency be void.”
 The Doctrine of Severability, which is an extension of Article 13, asserts that where a certain section of legislation
infringes or breaches fundamental rights but is severable from the remainder of the act, the courts will declare only
that portion unconstitutional, not the entire statute.
 The concept basically states that if violative and non-violative provisions are separated to the point that the non-
violative provision may survive without the violative provision, the non-violative provision will be recognized as
legitimate and enforceable.
The doctrine of Severability – Cases
The case of Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company Ltd, 1876, was one of the first to use the
Doctrine of Severability.
The appellant, Thorsten Nordenfelt, was a Swedish gun manufacturer with a valuable, world-wide business. He sold the
business to a company, the respondents, and agreed to enter into a restrictive covenant
1. That for 25 years, he would not engage in the similar business (i.e. Manufacturing of quick firing Guns) except on behalf
of the company. (In simple, not to carry on similar business except on behalf of the company for a period of 25 years) and

2. That he would not engage in any business, whatever, likely to compete in any way with the business carried on by the
company (not to engage any business, which may compete in any way with the respondents)

Later, he worked for a rival business. The respondents brought an action to enforce the covenant by injunction.
The appellant argued that clause was a restraint of trade clause and had to be reasonable to be upheld. He argued that a
worldwide geographical limitation was unreasonable. The respondents argued that the restraint was only such as was
necessary to protect themselves.
Lord McNaughton said a clause by which someone restrains themselves from the exercise of his trade was prima
facie unlawful. It was a principal of English law all trade should be free. However, it would discourage trade if someone who
has built up a valuable business could not dispose of it to his best advantage. Therefore, restraint of trade clauses would be
upheld if they were reasonable.
The court threw down the violative section of a contract but upheld the rest of the contract after disconnecting the violative
component.
The Court considered the first condition (covenant) as reasonable, since the appellant had sold the business for a huge
amount. But, the second condition, which prevents the appellant from engaging in any other competing business, was
regarded unreasonable (as the restraint/condition would not protect the proprietary interest of the plaintiff Company).

R.M.D.C v. the State of Bombay

The court explored the law of severability in-depth, and the court established the following principles:
 The legislature's intent is the decisive factor in evaluating whether the legitimate sections of legislation may be
separated from the invalid parts. If the legislature had realized that the rest of the Act was illegal, it would have
enacted the valid section.
 If the lawful and invalid provisions are so intricately intertwined that they cannot be separated, then the invalidity of
a component of the Act must result in the Act's whole invalidity. On the other hand, if they are sufficiently different
and separate that, after striking out the invalid, what remains is a full code in and of itself, it will be upheld even if
the rest is no longer enforceable.
 Even though the lawful provisions are different and distinct from the invalid provisions if they all constitute part of a
single scheme that is meant to be operational as a whole, the invalidity of one portion will result in the failure of the
entire scheme.
 The separability of a statute's valid and invalid provisions is not determined by whether the law is enacted in the
same section or in separate sections; what matters is the substance of the matter, which must be determined by
examining the act as a whole and the setting of the relevant provisions therein.
 If the remaining section of the act cannot be enforced without making changes and adjustments, the entire statute
must be declared void, since it would otherwise constitute judicial legislation.
 It will be reasonable to consider the history of legislation, its goal, title, and preamble in evaluating legislative intent
on the matter of separability.
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras
 The Supreme Court ruled that if the challenged Act violates the Constitution, only the section that violates the
Constitution would be unconstitutional, not the entire act, and that every effort should be taken to salvage as much
of the action as possible.
 It is severable if the invalid part's deletion does not affect the essence or structure of the legislature's goal.
 The Supreme Court of India concluded in State of Bombay v. FN Balsara that the violative portions of the Bombay
Prohibition Act, 1949, do not impact the constitutionality of the whole Act, and hence the legislation does not need
to be declared illegal.
 Sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act were deemed unlawful by the Supreme Court
because they went beyond the Constitution's amending powers, while the remainder of the Act was upheld.
 The Tenth Schedule was maintained by the Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillu, however, paragraph 7 was struck
down for breaching the restrictions of Article 368 (2).

In AK Gopalan v. State of Madras, the Court found Section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act to be violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution. The Court added that striking down Section 14 will not change the object of the Act and thus only the
impugned provision will be struck down and not the act as a whole. A similar observation was made in DS Nakara v. Union
of India.
In State of Bombay v. FN Balsara, it was held that the violative provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, do not affect
the validity of the entire Act and thus there was no need to invalidate the statute altogether.
The Supreme Court declared Sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act invalid, for being beyond the
amending powers of the Constitution but held the rest of the Act valid.
In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillu, the Court upheld the validity of the Tenth Schedule while striking down its paragraph 7 for
violating the provisions of Article 368(2).

Conclusion
The notion of severability paves the path for judicial review to be used. Individuals' basic rights are infringed upon by bylaws
that are invalidated by the courts through judicial review. When an individual claim that a piece of legislation is infringing on
his or her basic rights and seeks judicial review of the decision, he or she has the burden of evidence for demonstrating how
the law in question has harmed his or her rights.
In the Indian constitutional system, the Doctrine of Severability is a key fundamental and is the yardstick by which the
legality of legislation is judged. It serves as a check on the legislature's unrestricted powers, which, if left to its own devices,
may go wild and infringe on citizens' most basic rights.

Doctrine of territorial nexus

Doctrine of Territorial Nexus means that laws passed by a state legislature are not applicable outside of it unless there is an
adequate connection between the state and the object. Article 245 of the Indian Constitution serves as the foundation for its
power. In this doctrine of territorial nexus, the term "territorial" simply means "related to territory, region, or location," and the
term "nexus" simply means "related to people, things, or events." Additionally, the idea of territorial nexus serves as a
framework for interstate extraterritorial operations.
Concept of Doctrine of Territorial Nexus
 According to the Doctrine of territorial nexus, laws enacted by state legislatures apply only within the state and not
elsewhere unless there is a proper relationship between the object and the state.
 According to the doctrine of territorial nexus, the Indian parliament has the authority to enact laws pertaining to
Indian territory, extraterritorial territory, or causes that have an impact there.
 States are subject to the Territorial Nexus Doctrine, which is frequently used in situations involving tax regulations.
 According to this idea, it's critical for governments and objects to have a sufficient geographical nexus.
 States collect taxes on individuals, things, and things located inside their borders, but according to the doctrine of
territorial nexus, states are also permitted to charge taxes on territory outside their borders if there is a sufficient
and legal nexus.
 This theory governs taxation on non-Indian citizens.
Doctrine of Territorial Nexus and Constitutional provisions
Article 245 of the Indian constitution mentions that
 Parliament has the authority to enact laws for extraterritorial operations as well as legislation for the entire country
or any part of it.
 The state legislature has the authority to enact laws that apply to the entire state or just a portion of it.
 Thus both the Union as well as the states have their own territorial jurisdictions.
Article 246 of the Indian constitution mentions that
 Parliament has the exclusive authority to enact legislation on the topics listed in the union list (list I of the 7th
schedule)
 The state has authority to enact laws on the topics included in the state list (list II of the 7th schedule)
 Both the state and the union government have the authority to enact legislation on the topics included in the
concurrent list (list III of the 7th schedule)
 Therefore, the legislative power is distributed by territory and list of items in the Schedule 7 of the constitution.
 Whenever a state makes laws beyond this, to keep it valid the court will check for territorial nexus between the
state and the law beneficiary.
 For instance, a state can impose restrictions on a company that manufactures in its territorial jurisdiction and
transacts in another state jurisdiction. A territorial nexus is present which enables the state to regulate it.
Doctrine of Territorial Nexus and the State Legislature
 According to our Constitution, each state has the authority to enact laws that apply to its whole territory.
 The state legislature has the authority to enact legislation to further its own agenda. Only in the instances listed
below is the notion of geographical connection relevant.
 The following are the circumstances:
o The linkage needs to be legal.
o The geographical relationship must be a factor in the culpability.
 These criteria demonstrate that the link was lawful, and the court would not cast doubt on its legality.
 The geographical limitations of a state have not been found to constitute an impediment to the sale and purchase
of commodities in a number of taxation law issues.
 A viable justification for preserving the state's ability to impose taxes would be the buying and selling of products.
Doctrine of Territorial Nexus - Significance
  The goal of the nexus doctrine is not to prevent a state from exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, but in order to do
so, a state must first assess if an appropriate, adequate, or legal territorial connection between the state and the
subject of the affair exists.
 According to the doctrine of territorial nexus set down in Article 245 of the Indian Constitution, state legislation may
have extra-territorial nexus if there is a territorial nexus, or relationship, between the subject matter and the
enacting law.
 According to the idea of territorial nexus, the Indian parliament has the power to pass laws that are relevant to
India's territory, extraterritoriality, or issues that have an impact on the nexus of the nation.
 States are subject to the territorial nexus doctrine, which is frequently applied in tax matters.
 According to this idea, it's critical for governments and objects to have a sufficient geographical nexus.
 States collect taxes on individuals, things, and things located inside their borders, but according to the doctrine of
territorial nexus, states are also permitted to charge taxes on territory outside their borders if there is a sufficient
and legal nexus.
Supreme Court Judgements in which doctrine of territorial nexus is used
State of Bombay vs R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala 1957
 A non-resident of Bombay had published a crossword puzzle competition in a newspaper that is circulated in
Bangalore. However, the newspaper was widely published in Bombay as well.
 This invited many people to enrol by paying a fee.
 The State government levied a tax on these fees, but the organizer challenged in the Supreme Court stating he is
residing outside Bombay.
 However, the Supreme Court ruled that the tax levy is valid as there is sufficient territorial nexus and asked the
organizer company to pay the tax.
Tata Iron And Steel Company vs. Bihar State Tax Act 1958
 The State of Bihar taxed all the sales of Tata Iron and Steel company inside and outside the state.
 Since the goods are manufactured in the state of Bihar the Supreme Court felt there is a clear case of territorial
nexus between the state and Tata Iron and Steel Company which can be taxed by law.

In Wallace v. Income-tax Commissioner, Bombay a company that was registered in England was a partner in a firm in India.
The Indian Income-tax Authorities sought to tax the entire income made by the company. The privy council applied the
Doctrine of Territorial Nexus and held the levy tax valid.

State of Bihar v. Charusila Dasi

In the instant case, the state of Bihar passed a legislation which dealt with the motive to safeguard the properties relating to
the Hindu religious trusts. This act consists of all the trusts within the territorial limits of Bihar. So the respondent Madea trust
deed several of her properties in situated in Bihar and Calcutta, and the trust was inside the territorial limits of Bihar. Several
questions were raised about the scope of this act.
It was held that the act passed by the state of Bihar could have the effect over the property situated outside the territorial
limits of Bihar keeping in mind that the trust must be situated with the limits of the state and there exist the sufficient nexus.
Shrikant Bhalchandra Karulkar v. State of Gujarat
The hon’ble supreme court in this instant case of Shrikant Bhalchandra Karulkar v. State of Gujarat held that the state
legislature is conferred with the power to enact legislation for extra-territorial operations complying with the provisions
enshrined under article 245 and 246.The laws made by the state legislature is applicable to a person and his acts within the
territorial limits of a state is not considered as extra territorial.
Conclusion
In a nutshell, the constitution under Articles 245 and 246 restricts the jurisdiction of the state. However, there is one
exemption that allows the state legislature to pass legislation for extraterritorial purposes provided the object and the state
are sufficiently connected. It implies that the object is located outside of the state's geographical bounds but has a territorial
relationship to the state. The territorial nexus has a broad application and can be used outside of India's borders. The idea of
territorial linkage allows the force of law to extend beyond a nation's borders.

Scope of Amendability in Indian Constitution

The present position is that the Parliament under Article 368 can amend any part of the Constitution including
the Fundamental Rights but without affecting the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court is yet to
define or clarify as to what constitutes the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution.
From the various judgements, the following have emerged as ‘basic features’ of the Constitution:
 1. Supremacy of the Constitution
2. Welfare state (socio-economic justice).
3. Principle of equality
4. Sovereign, democratic and republican nature of the Indian polity.
5. Judicial review
6. Free and fair elections
7. The secular character of the Constitution.
8. Freedom and dignity of the individual
9. Independence of Judiciary
10. Separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.
11. Parliamentary system
12. Limited power of Parliament to amend the Constitution
13. Federal character of the Constitution
14. Rule of law
15. Effective access to justice
16. Unity and integrity of the nation
17. Harmony and balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles
18. Reasonableness

Q. Write upon the ‘effect of repeal’, ‘commencement’ and ‘citation of enactments’ under the General Clauses Act,
1897.
Objects of the the General Clauses Act, 1897— The purpose of the General Clauses Act is to place in one single statute
different provisions as regards interpretation of words and legal principles which would otherwise have to be specified
separately in many different Acts and Regulations.
The objects of the Act are several, namely,
(1) to shorten the language of Central Acts;
(2) to provide, as far as possible, for uniformity of expression in Central Acts, by giving definitions of a series of terms in
common use;
(3) to state explicity certain convenient rules for the construction and interpretation of Central Acts; and (4) to guard against
slips and oversights by importing into every Act certain common form clauses, which otherwise ought to be inserted
expressly in every Central Act. Of course, in the above statement, when we refer to Central Acts, we also include
Regulations and Ordinances, and statutory instruments made under Central Acts, Regulations and Ordinances.
Section 6 in The General Clauses Act, 1897 - Effect of repeal.
The effect of the repeal is to obliterate the statute repealed as completely as if it had never been passed, and it must
be considered as a law which never existed, except for the purposes of those actions or suits which were
commenced, prosecuted and concluded while it was an existing law.
INTRODUCTION
Repeal means to revoke, abrogate or cancel particularly a statute. Any statute may repeal any Act in whole or in
part, either expressly or impliedly by enacting matter contrary to and inconsistent with the prior legislation. Thus a
statute frequently states that certain prior statutory provisions are thereby repealed. The courts will treat matter as
repealed by implication only if the earlier and later statutory provisions are clearly inconsistent. When a repealing
provision is itself repealed, this does not revive any provision previously repealed by it, unless intent to revive is
apparent, but it may allow common law principles again to apply. Under General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 6
"Repeal" connotes abrogation or obliteration of one statute by another, from the statute book as completely "as if it
had never been passed." When an Act is repealed "it must be considered (except as to transactions past and
closed) as if it had never existed." Just as the Legislature has the power to enact laws, similarly it has the power to
repeal laws. The efficacy of the Legislature depends upon the possession of the power to repeal the existing law,
for without this attribute the power to enact would be a nullity, and the body of the law a series of contradictory
enactments. Consequently the legislative power to repeal prior laws is not inhibited by any constitutional
prohibitions, but exists as a necessary part and increment of the legislative power and function. No statute can
make itself secure against repeal. There is nothing to prevent any Parliament from enacting that a particular statute
shall never in any circumstances be altered or abrogated. It is within the power of any Parliament to repeal any of
the Acts passed by its predecessors and that it is not within the power of any Parliament to prevent the repeal of
any of its own Acts, or to bind its successors. Repealing and amending Acts have no legislative effect, but are
designed for editorial revision, being intended only to excise dead matter from the statute book and to reduce its
volume .Mostly, they expurgate amending Acts, because having imparted the amendments to the main Acts, those
Acts have served their purpose and have no further reasons for their existence. At times, inconsistencies are also
removed by repealing and amending Acts. The only object of such Acts, which in England are called Statute Law
Revision Acts, is legislative spring-cleaning and they are not intended to make any change in the law.
A statute is either perpetual or temporary. It is perpetual when no time is fixed for its duration, and such a statute
remains in force until its repeal which may be express or implied. A perpetual statute is not perpetual in the sense
that it cannot be repealed; it is perpetual in the sense that it is not abrogated by efflux of time or by non-user. A
statute is temporary when its duration is only for a specified time, and such a statute expires on the expiry of the
specified time unless it is repealed earlier. Simply because the purpose of a statute, as mentioned in its preamble,
is temporary, the statute cannot be regarded as temporary when no fixed period is specified for its duration. The
Finance Acts which are annual Acts are not temporary Acts and they often contain provisions of a general
character which are of a permanent operation. The duration of a temporary statute may be extended by a fresh
statute or by exercise of a power conferred under the original statute. When the life of a temporary Act is merely
extended, it cannot be said that a new law has been enacted; but if the extension is accompanied by any
substantial amendment, it would not be a case of mere extension. It appears that after a temporary statute expires,
it cannot be made effective by merely amending the same. The only apt manner of reviving the expired statute is by
re-enacting a statute in similar terms or by enacting a statute expressly saying that the expired Act is herewith
revived.
NEED FOR REPEAL
A debate on the need to repeal obsolete laws has been set in motion in India with the government taking various
steps to look into the matter. Even our erstwhile coloniser, Great Britain, initiated the process of repealing 38 such
laws in the year 2013, which were passed between the years 1849 and 1942, pertaining to the construction and
maintenance of the Indian Railways. Meanwhile, our own post-independence efforts to weed out obsolete laws,
through a process of spring cleaning, remain pending.
Section 3(13) “commencement” used with reference to an Act or Regulation, shall mean the day on which the Act
or Regulation comes into force. If not provided, a Central Act comes into force on the day it receives Presidential
assent.
Section 3(19) “enactment” shall include a Regulation (as hereinafter defined) and any Regulation of the. Bengal,
Madras or Bombay Code, and shall also include any provision contained in any Act or in any such Regulation as
aforesaid(same as afore-mentioned, denoting a thing or person previously mentioned);
Section 5. Coming into operation of enactments.—
(1) Where any Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come into operation on
the day on which it receives the assent,—
(a) in the case of a Central Act made before the commencement of the Constitution, of the Governor-General, and
(b) in the case of an Act of Parliament, of the President.* * * * *
(3) Unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or Regulation shall be construed as coming into operation immediately
on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement.
Section 28. Citation of enactments
(1) In any Central Act or Regulation, and in any rule, bye-law, instrument or document, made under, or with reference to any
such Act or Regulation, any enactment may be cited by reference to the title or short title (if any) conferred thereon or by
reference to the number and year thereof, and any provision in an enactment may be cited by reference to the section or
sub-section of the enactment in which the provision is contained.
(2) In this Act and in any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, a description or citation of a
portion of another enactment shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as including the word, section or other
part mentioned or referred to as forming the beginning and as forming the end of the portion comprised in the description or
citation.

Q. Explain the following under the General Clauses Act, 1897:

 Magistrate
 State Government
 Recovery of fine
 Gender and number
 Service by post
 Measurement of distances
Section 3(32) “Magistrate” shall include every person exercising all or any of the powers of a Magistrate under the Code of
Criminal Procedure for the time being in force;
Section 11. Measurement of distances.—In the measurement of any distance, for the purposes of any Central Act or
Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, that distance shall, unless a different intention appears, be measured
in a straight line on a horizontal plane.

Section 13. Gender and number.—In all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
context,—
(1) words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females; and
(2) words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa.

Section 25. Recovery of fines.—Sections 63 to 70 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and the provisions of the 1Code
of Criminal Procedure for the time being in force in relation to the issue and the execution of warrants for the levy of fines
shall apply to all fines imposed under any Act, Regulation, rule or bye-law, unless the Act, Regulation, rule or bye-law
contains an express provision to the contrary.

Section 27. Meaning of service by post.—Where any 2 [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this
Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression “serve” or either of the expressions
“give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to
be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless
the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.

Section 3(60) “State Government”,—

(a) as respects anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, shall mean, in a Part A State, the Provincial
Government of the corresponding Province, in a Part B State, the authority or person authorised at the relevant date to
exercise executive government in the corresponding Acceding State, and in a Part C State, the Central Government;
(b) as respects anything done after the commencement of the Constitution and before the commencement of the
Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean, in a Part A State, the Governor, in a Part B State, the
Rajpramukh, and in a Part C State, the Central Government;
(c) as respects anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956,
shall mean, in a State, the Governor, and in a Union territory, the Central Government; and shall, in relation to functions
entrusted under article 258A of the Constitution to the Government of India, include the Central Government acting within
the scope of the authority given to it under that article;

Latin maxims and their translation = लैटिन मैक्सिम और उनका अनुवाद

यह नष्ट होने से अधिक मूल्य का है I
Ultres valet potior Quam pereat = It is worth more than perishing =

Reddendo Singula Singulis = Paying each individual = प्रत्येक व्यक्ति को भुगतान करना I

Ejusdem generis = The same kind = उसी तरह I

Delegatus non potest delegare = A delegate cannot delegate = एक प्रतिनिधि प्रतिनिधि नहीं कर सकता

I
Generalia specialibus non derogant = Generalities do not derogate (deviate from) from specifics = सामान्यताएँ

विशिष्टताओं से अलग नहीं होती हैं I

Expressum facit cessare tacitum = He makes a silent stop = वह एक मूक पड़ाव बनाता है I
Jura naturae sunt immutabilia = The law of nature are immutable = प्रकृ ति के नियम अपरिवर्तनीय हैं I
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat = That things should be worth more than perishing = वह चीजें नाश होने से

अधिक मूल्य की होनी चाहिए I

Ut res valeat potior quam pereat = It is better for things to be valuable than to perish = चीजों के लिए नाश होने

से मूल्यवान होना बेहतर है I

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius = Expression of one is the exclusion of another = एक की अभिव्यक्ति दूसरे

का बहिष्करण है I

In pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis = In the case of an equal offence, the condition of the possessor is more

important = एक समान अपराध के मामले में, मालिक की स्थिति अधिक महत्वपूर्ण होती
है I
http://www.bareactslive.com/LCR/LC060.HTM

Q. Write notes on General Clauses Act, 1897. What is the scope of General Clauses Act, 1897 ? Write about the
applications of this Act to ordinances.

The General Clauses Act, 1897

CHAPTER 1
Preliminary
1.1. Subject-matter of the Report.—This Report deals with an enactment which is not confined to a particular branch of the
law, but applies to all its branches. It is concerned with the General Clauses Act, 1897.
1.2. Reference to the Commission.—Revision of the General Clauses Act was referred to a previous Law Commission in
1959 by the Ministry of Law (Legislative Department). The Commission commenced a study of the subject, and had to
consider one important preliminary question relating to the effect of revision of the Act on the operation of Article 367(1) of
the Constitution. This question was, after considerable discussion, settled, and the way was cleared for proceeding with a
revision of the Act. In due course, a draft Report containing tentative proposals on the subject was prepared, and approved
for circulation, and circulated by the previous Commission for comments to State Governments, High Courts, Bar
Associations and other interested persons and bodies.
But the work of finalising the draft Report was not concluded and so, the report on this subject was not forwarded by the
Commission to the Government.
Since this problem has remained with the Commission for quite some time, we thought that we should now take up the task,
as the more urgent matters, which claimed our attention during the last two years or more, have now been dealt with, and
our Reports in respect of them have been forwarded to the Government.
The Member-Secretary to the Commission prepared for our consideration a fresh draft Report, after a study of the Act and
also after taking into account the comments received on the proposals of the earlier Commission. This draft Report was
treated by us as a working paper for our discussion.
We ought to add that we have examined the Act section by section, and have considered the question whether any section
requires to be amended or revised, or any new provision requires to be added.
1. 28th September, 1959.
2. Paras. 1.27 to 1.31, infra.
1.3. Objects of the Act.—The objects of the Act are several, namely, (1) to shorten the language of Central Acts; (2) to
provide, as far as possible, for uniformity of expression in Central Acts, by giving definitions of a series of terms in common
use; (3) to state explicity certain convenient rules for the construction and interpretation of Central Acts; and (4) to guard
against slips and oversights by importing into every Act certain common form clauses, which otherwise ought to be inserted
expressly in every Central Act. Of course, in the above statement, when we refer to Central Acts, we also include
Regulations and Ordinances, and statutory instruments made under Central Acts, Regulations and Ordinances.
1.4. Importance of the General Clauses Act.—The General Clauses Act, thus, makes provisions as to the construction of
General Acts and other laws of all-India application. Its importance, therefore, in point of the number of enactments to which
it applies, is obvious.
Much more, however, can be said about the importance of an interpretation Act, which has been called the "Law of all laws".
In so far as certainty in the application of the law is a desideratum itself, an interpretation Act seeks to introduce that
certainty, in the limited sphere in which it operates.
1.5. Importance of uniformity.—One of the objects of the Act, as already pointed out above, is to shorten the language of
statutes and to achieve, as far as possible, uniformity of expression in such language. Its importance is evident from what
Bentham said1:
"The language of error is always obscure and indefinite. An abundance of words serves to cover a paucity and a falsity
of ideas. The often terms are changed, the easier it is to delude the reader. The language of truth is uniform and
simple. The same ideas are always expressed by the same terms."
But for the control exercised by the General Clauses Act over statutory language, it would have been a "free for all" affair so
far as the use, meaning and interpretation of words and language in our statute law are concerned.
1. Bentham Theory of Legislation, (Hildreth's Ed.), (1904), p. 87.
1.6. Importance of statute law today.—It is desirable, in this context, to emphasise the importance of statute law today. It
was towards the end of the last century, that the present General Clauses Act was enacted; statute law did not then
possess, in its volume and range, the importance which it now possesses, though, of course, much of the lawyer's law had
been codified in India by that time. Since 1897, the number of statutes and statutory instruments has multiplied every year.
As the position stood towards the end of 1971, there were about 700 Central Acts of permanent duration, and the number of
statutory instruments issued under these Acts would run literally into thousands. Litigation involving questions of statutory
construction, constitute now the bulk of the total litigation in India. It is, therefore, obvious that an enactment which is
intended to deal with the process of interpretation of statutes, is now of much greater importance than it could have been in
the last century.
1.7. Legislation as principal means of growth.—Pound has called attention to the fact that legislation is the principal
characteristic and means of growth in mature legal systems1. As has been observed2 National development, as we
understand it in the world today, involves a vast amount of governmental planning "and programming, not only to expedite
the process of development, but to direct their course along desired lines. A great volume of legislative enactments is
required to validate plans and programmes and the actions necessary for their implementation. For these reasons, enacted
or statutory law has acquired predominant importance in modern developing nations."
"Taken by itself, statutory law, that is, law consciously and purposely adopted to meet social needs as they arise, is
certainly a higher stage of legal development than customary law Not a few of us may look forward to a time when
with us, as with most other Western Nations, practically all law shall be statutory3."
The importance of increase in the tempo of legislative activity was stressed, in the United States, by the late Justice Felix
Frankfurter. He pointed out that the proportion of cases coming before the United States Supreme Court which did not
involve statutory issues, had fallen from 40 per cent. in 1875 to 5 per cent. in 1925, and almost to zero in 19474.
1. Pound Sources and Forms of Law, (1946) 22 Notre Dame Lawyer 1, cited in Sands Statutory Construction and National
Development, (1969) 18 ICLQ 206.
2. Sands Statutory Construction & National Development, (1969) 18 ICLQ 206, 210.
3.Ernest Bruncken The Common Law and Statutes, (1920) 29 Yale LJ 516, 522.
4. Frankfurter Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, Sixth Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture delivered before the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, March 18, 1947; (1947) 2 Record of the Association of the Dar of the City.of
New York, No. 6 (1947): 47 Columbia L Rev 527; quoted by Sands Statutory Construction and National Development,
(1969) 18 ICLQ 206, 210.
1.8. It should be pointed out that legislation has not been regarded always as a mere supplement to, or taking out of
common law or customary law. On the contrary, an older view was that enacted law was the normal type, and customary
law a mere makeshift to which men resorted, for want of enactment, to prevent a failure of justice. Roman law after Justinian
was a body of enactments, and this idea is very prominent from the sixth century to the rise of the school at Bologna in the
twelfth century.1
The Roman Jurist Gaius2 classified statutes as one form of "law", and Justinian's Corpus Juris was, as legislation of the
Emperor, regarded as binding statute law for centuries on the continent. For some time, even a view prevailed that the rules
of the common law had their origin in forgotten statutes.3 It was the rise and development of vigorous body of judge-made
law in the King's courts, and the paucity of legislation from the time of Henry the 2nd until Henry the 8th, which rendered
legislation unimportant in the growing period of the English legal system.4
1. Pound Common Law and Legislation, (1907-1908) 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 388.
2. Gaius I. 2.
3. Janka Law and Politics in the Middle Ages, p. 1.
4. See Pound Common Law and Legislation, (1907-1908) 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 389.
1.9. The tide has now turned again. In any modern society with an aspiration for the improvement of the conditions of the life
of the people, legislation is par excellence the source of law. Therefore, importance of the General Clauses Act, having
regard to the growing importance of legislation in society, is obvious.
Maine put the matter lucidly when he stated1:
"The capital fact in the mechanism of modern states is the energy of legislatures." As the development of law goes on,
the function of the judges is confined within growing limits; the main source of modifications in legal relation comes
to be more and more exclusively the legislature.2
We are making these observations in order to emphasise the importance of the General Clauses Act.
1. Maine Early History of Institutions, Lect. xiii, cited by Pound Common Law & Legislation, (1907-1908) 21 Harvard Law
Review 383, 402.
2. Sidgwick Elements of Politics, 2 ed.
1.10. Act not intended to codify rules of interpretation.—It is not, of course, implied that the General Clauses Act, or, for that
matter, the Interpretation Act of any other country, codifies all the 'rules' of statutory interpretation. The so-called rules of
interpretation are really in the nature of guidelines,1 and are not to be treated as mathematical formula. In fact, even the
definitions contained in the General Clauses Act (and many of the general rules of construction which are incorporated in it)
apply only where the context does not otherwise require. This shows that the Act itself does not purport to treat rules of
construction as categorical imperatives.
1. See also para. 2.8, infra.
1.11. Shortening the language.—Even so, the value and utility of the General Clauses Act is considerable, because it not
only constitutes the reference book of the judge when dealing with statutes, but serves as the draftsman's labour-saving
device. It lays down rules which would have been tedious to repeat in every statute, thus shortening the language of
legislative enactments.
The aspect of shortening the language has been emphasised again and again in the speeches relating to the General
Clauses Act, 1868 and General Clauses Act, 1897, in the course of the legislative proceedings. It has also been referred to
by the Supreme Court.1
1. Subramaniam v. Official Receiver, AIR 1958 SC 1.
1.12. Simplification in language—Importance of.—The importance of simplification in language should not be under-
estimated. As has been observed by the Canadian Law Commission:1-2
"A part of the task (of Law reform) involves making the laws more understandable and more meaningful to the average
citizen. Thus, a specific effort must be made, not only to improve law in its substance, but to reduce legal complexity
and technicality. This will require a study of topics that, on the surface, may appear technical, but that, in fact, affect,
in telling ways, the realisation through law of the aspirations of the average man and woman for fair treatment for
themselves and for others."
1. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Research Program 1, (March 1972), p. 7.
2. See also para. 2.6, infra.
1.13. History.—A few other points of a general nature may now be dealt with. It may be convenient to begin with the history
of the Act. It would appear that the idea of having a device for shortening statutes could be traced to Bentham and to those
who took up the criticism of the legal system made by Bentham.1
1. Carr The Mechanics of Law-making, (1951) Current Legal Problems, p. 122.
1.14. Historical background—English Act.—In England, the first interpretation Act, known as Lord Brougham's Act, was
passed as far back as 1850. In 1889, the Act was replaced by the Interpretation Act. This Act is the source of subsequent
Interpretation Acts, not only in England, but also in other countries of the Commonwealth.
1.15. Historical background—Indian Act 1 of 1868.—The provisions of Lord Brougham's Act,1 with a few additions, were
adopted in India, and enacted as the General Clauses Act, 1868 (1 of 1868). A Bill on the subject had been conceived of
much earlier, but it could not be prepared for various reasons, chief among them being the impression that such a Bill might
possibly be suggested by the Indian Law Commissioners2 Ultimately, the Bill leading to the Act of 1868 was drafted by
Whitley Stokes. In drafting the Bill, Stokes drew not only upon the earlier English statutes on the subject, but also upon the
illustrations of rules of construction prepared by Arthur Symonds.3
The Act of 1868 was of a measure of a limited character. It was incomplete; but, in so far as the ground covered was
concerned, it worked "fairly well". It considerably shortened the language of subsequent Central Acts. Its utility made the
legislative Department think of making useful additions to it. A supplementary General Clauses Act was later enacted as the
General Clauses Act, 1887 (1 of 1887). This Act was drafted by Sir C. Ilbert. Ilbert described the process by which he arrived
at the list of additions proposed, in the following words:4
"The additions which I propose to make are based on personal experience during the last few years. I have had a list
prepared of the special definitions inserted in Acts of Council and I find on examination of this list that there are
some dozen or so of these definitions which might with advantage be generalised and added to the list contained in
the Act of 1868.
I also propose to generalize certain provisions which have so frequently recurred in recent Acts as to have become
what conveyancers call 'common form' ".
1. Para. 1.14, supra.
2. Gazette of India, August 24th, 1867, p. 1220.
3. Whitley Stokes Anglo Indian Code, (1887), Vol. 1, p. 485
4. Legislative proceedings, (1886), p. 305
1.16. Act of 1889 and Act of 1897 (Present Act).—In 1889, a comprehensive and consolidating Act on the subject was
enacted in England. Our General Clauses Act, 1897, is largely modelled on that Act. It consolidates the two earlier
enactments of 1868 and 1887, and includes a few new provisions taken from the (English) Interpretation Act, 1889.
1.17. State Acts.—Every State has its own General Clauses Act,1 which applies to State Acts. The lead in this matter was
taken by the former Presidencies of Bombay, Bengal and Madras. The earliest Act on the subject was Bombay Act 10 of
1866. The first General Clauses Act in Madras and Bengal was enacted in 1867 (Madras Act 1 of 1867 and Bengal Act 5 of
1867).
1. See para. 1.33, infra also.
1.18. Utility of the present Act.—The Central Act of 1897 has stood the test of time. Its value in avoiding superfluity of
language in statutes has been commended by courts. There can be no better testimony of its utility than the fact that courts
have, on considerations of equity, justice and good conscience, thought fit to extend its principles not only to subordinate
legislation1, but also to private documents2 The Act has also served as a model for all States General Clauses Acts. Lastly,
the Act has been expressly applied to the interpretation of the Constitution3 by Article 367 of the Constitution.
1. Paras. 12.22 to 12.26, infra.
2. Paras. 6.21A and 6.22, infra.
3. Article 367 of the Constitution, para. 1.27, infra.
1.19. Need for change.—Since the passing of the Act, however, far-reaching changes have taken place in this country. The
constitutional set-up has altered completely after the attainment of independence, and the volume of legislation has
increased considerably. The range and variety of the new legislation has given rise to substantial changes in legislative
practice. The quantity of subordinate legislation has also assumed large proportions. Some provisions of the Act of 1897
have come up for judicial consideration. A few of them have given rise to conflict of views.
No large-scale revision of the General Clauses Act has so far been undertaken. Certain minor amendments were made by
the amending Acts of 1903 and 1936. In addition, by various Adaptation Orders, the Act was, from time to time, amended to
bring it in conformity with Government of India Act, 1935 and with the Constitution. But the scope of such amendments was
necessarily limited. Time has come when the Act should be completely reviewed, so as to bring it in line with the
fundamental constitutional changes and the new trends in legislative practice.
1.20. Whether there should be one Act or two Acts.—Before making our detailed recommendations for revision of the Act,
we consider it necessary to examine a few preliminary questions. One such question relates to the form which the proposed
changes should take. The basic question is whether there should be one Interpretation Act, or whether there should be two
Interpretation Acts. Need for making a choice in this respect arises because a view has been put-fourth that the present
General Clauses Act should continue for the interpretation of the existing Central Acts etc. and a new full-fledged
Interpretation Act should be proposed for the interpretation of Central Acts etc. to be enacted hereafter.
In this connection, we may note that in the proposals for revision of the Act, circulated by the earlier Commission1, one
suggestion was that there should be two-Acts, the Present Act may be preserved for existing Central Acts etc. and a new
Interpretation Act may be enacted to apply to new enactments. But it should be added that the Commission had no
opportunity of taking a final decision in the matter; and, in fact, because of its pre-occupation with urgent work, the matter
remained undisposed of when the term of the Commission came to a close.
1. Para. 1.2, supra.
1.21. One Act preferred.—We have carefully considered the matter in all its aspects, and are inclined to take the view that
the simultaneous existence of two interpretation Acts is likely to create unnecessary complications. Citizens as well as
lawyers will be required to make themselves familiar with both the Acts, for a considerable time to come, because it is
unlikely that all the existing Central Acts will be removed from the Statute Book within a reasonably foreseeable future.
Diversity of judicial interpretation in respect of two sets of identical provisions may also create problems, and such diversity
will harm the uniformity of the law. It would, thus, be a serious anomaly if the Statute Book were to have two General
Clauses Acts for the interpretation of Central Acts.
No doubt, the initiation of a totally new interpretation Act (with only prospective effect) has an advantage inasmuch as the
radical changes will not apply to existing Acts. But the same object could, in a fair measure, be achieved by suggesting new
provisions for incorporation in the present Act, at the same time making those new provisions prospective1. The proposals
for having two Acts does not, in this respect, have any peculiar merit.
1. See Para. 1.22, infra
1.22. Homogeneity of Central Acts passed since 1868.—It may be stated that though, during the period since 1868, there
were different Constitution Acts in force at different times, yet Central Acts passed since 1868 have a certain amount of
homogeneity. Hence, it is logical to have one Act for their interpretation. As regards the new provisions to be inserted in the
Act, care is being taken to ensure that such of them as are likely to create any difficulty will be prospective only. For all these
reasons, we think that the alternative of having one Act, is not likely to create any serious practical difficulty. In any case, the
advantage of having one Interpretation Act for all Central Acts far outweighs the slight disadvantage that certain difficulties
may possibly arise in a few odd cases in discerning which provisions apply to which Central Act.
1.23. Form of the proposed legislation.—There is another preliminary question to be considered. Assuming that there is to
be one Interpretation Act1 what should be the form which the proposed legislation should take?
The new legislation can possibly take one of the following forms:—
(i) An amending Act; or
(ii) A new Act which will apply to all Central Acts, whether passed before or after the commencement of the new Act.
1. Para. 1.22, supra
1.24. Amending Act preferred.—We prefer the first course, namely, an amending Act. The General Clauses Act, 1897,
already makes a distinction between (a) Central Acts made after the 3rd January, 1868 (the date of commencement of the
General Clauses Act, 1867); (b) Central Acts and Regulations made after the 14th January, 1887; and (c) Central Acts made
after the 11th March, 1897 (the date of commencement of the Act of 1897). To these categories will be added one more
category, namely, Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of the amending Act. This may appear to be
complicated; but it cannot be avoided. The complicated structure is already there in the existing Act. What the amending Act
will do is only to add one more category.
1.25. Broad considerations borne in mind when revising the Act.—This disposes of the preliminary questions. So far as the
revision of individual sections of the Act is concerned, we have borne in mind a few broad considerations which we may now
mention. In the first place, where a particular section of the Act has led to a conflict of decisions, or other difficulties of
interpretation, we have tried to settle the law. Secondly, apart from such conflict or difficulties, where the particular provision
was found to be juristically wrong1, we have tried to set right. Thirdly, we have recommended the addition of new
provisions2 where the gap in the existing law was found to cause difficulties in practice.
1. E.g., section 3—"affidavit".
2. E.g., the proposed provision as to temporary Acts, Chapter 7, infra.
1.26. It will be apparent from the following Chapters of this report that the recommendations that we have made are not
numerous or radical. This is a tribute to the draftsmanship of the present Act, which has stood the test of time for three
quarters of a century. On the whole, the provisions of the Act have caused no serious difficulty1. No doubt, a certain amount
of technical language is bound to recur in an Interpretation Act, as the subject-matter deals with abstractions familiar to
lawyers but not to laymen. One cannot, therefore, expect here the excellence of limpid language found in, say, continental
Codes, and in some of our own laws.
However, at some places, the legislative style was tortured2 and left scope for improvement. We hope that in the
recommendations made by us, we have been able to arrive at a statement of law which, on the whole, can be described as
clear, simple and precise.
1. See para. 1.18, supra.
2. E.g. section 6A, para. 6.10, infra.
1.27. Interpretation of the Constitution.—There is a constitutional question which we would like to dispose of at the outset. It
concerns the interpretation of the Constitution, and can be appropriately mentioned in connection with the revision of this
Act. The question1 arises, mainly, from the language of Article 367 of the Constitution, which reads as follows:—
"Unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations and
modifications that may be made therein under Article 372, apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it
applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India."
Since this article refers to "an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India", the query tnay be raised if it is permissible to
modify or revise the General Clauses Act, lest such modification or revision should introduce complications in the literal
application of Article 367. In other words, the question is whether amendments concerning the existing General Clauses Act,
in so far as the Act applies to Central Acts, would, in any manner, dislocate the operation of that Act in relation to the
Constitution. That is the question to which we address ourselves.
1. At a very early stage of consideration of this Act before a previous Law Commission, this query was dealt with.
1.28. No difficulty likely.—It appears to us that there should be no such difficulty. Any amendments, additions or deletions
which may be made in the General Clauses Act, 1897, would not affect the Constitution. Interpretation of the Constitution
will continue to be governed by the General Clauses Act, as in force immediately before the Constitution.1 The Act cannot
be so repealed or modified as to affect the interpretation of the Constitution.
1. Subject to adaptations made under Article 372 of the Constitution.
1.29. Debates in the Constituent Assembly.—It may be stated that the concluding words in Article 367—"as it applies for the
interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India",—were added in the Constituent Assembly, by an
amendment moved by Dr. Ambedkar, who thus explained their utility1:
"The point is this, that the General Clauses Act applies to Acts, Regulations and Ordinances. It is, therefore, necessary
to say to which class of these laws this will apply. That is the reason why the amendment is proposed."
Shri T.T. Krishnamachari made the position clear:
".......what we want is that only those particular portions which refer to Acts should apply, so far as this particular clause
is concerned."
The concluding words of Article 367 do not, therefore, mean that the General Clauses Act should be preserved for all times
in its pre-1950 form. The Act can be revised or modified; but the unmodified Act will continue to govern the interpretation of
the Constitution.
1. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, Pt. III, pp. 1641-1642, discussion relating to Article 303(2).
1.30. Effect of section 8 on Article 367.—Will section 8 of the General Clauses Act, which provides that when an enactment
is repealed and re-enacted, references to the old enactment will be construed as references to the, re-enacted one, make
any difference? We do not think so. It should be noted that the words "unless the context otherwise requires" (in Article
367)1 mean that the General Clauses Act, section 8, is to be excluded. Even by its terms, section 8 of the General Clauses
Act will not apply to the Constitution, because expression "enactment" (which occurs in section 8) would not take in the
Constitution, which is not an "enactment". The Constitution is supreme and is, in fact, the foundation of all enactments.
1. Para. 1.27, supra.
1.31. Conclusion.—Our conclusion, therefore, is that the revision or amendment of the General Clauses Act, 1897, will not,
in any way, affect the operation of Article 367; and the General Clauses Act, 1897 as it stood immediately before 26
January, 1950 (subject to adaptations made under the Constitution) will continue to apply.
1.32. Title of the Act.—In many countries, Acts similar to the General Clauses Act are called Interpretation Acts. But, as the
provisions of the General Clauses Act (whether relating to definitions and meanings of words and terms or dealing with
construction and interpretation) are, so far as may be necessary, common to every Central Act, the title "General Clauses
Act" is not less appropriate than the title "Interpretation Act". For this reason, and also because this title has been in vogue
for more than a century, we do not recommend any change therein. The Supreme Court had perhaps, this in mind when it
observed in the case of Chief Inspector of Mines v. K.C. Thapar, (1961) 2 SCA 86 (89): AIR 1961 SC 838 (843) (Das
Gupta).
"Whatever the General Clauses Act says, whether as regards the meanings of words or" as regards legal principles,
has to be read into every Act to which it applies."
1.33. State laws.—It may also be noted that though Act does not, in terms apply to State laws, it is evident that the State
General Clauses Acts should conform to the General Clauses Act of 1897, for, otherwise, divergent rules of construction and
interpretation would apply, and as a result, great confusion might ensue. Thus, excepting a few provisions in the Central Act,
such as those contained in section 5, nearly all its remaining provisions are as appropriate for State Act and Ordinances as
for the Central Acts and Ordinances and have, in fact, been adopted in all the State General Clauses Acts. The result has
been that a certain amount of uniformity has been achieved in the language of the entire body of statute law of this country.

Q. What do you understand by Presumptions ? What is their importance in interpretation of statutes ?

Q. What is the importance of Presumption in the interpretation of statutes ? Discuss the main presumptions.
Presumptions are legal rules that allow courts to make assumptions about certain facts in the absence of direct evidence.
These assumptions are made based on the common experience of human behavior or on legal policies and principles.
Presumptions are important in the interpretation of statutes because they help courts to resolve ambiguities and gaps in the
language of the law.
Jurisdiction:
There is a presumption that, an interpretation that takes away the jurisdictions of the courts, must not be given effect, unless
the words of the statute provide so in clear and explicit terms.
There is strong presumption that civil courts have jurisdiction to all cases which are civil in nature. The exclusion of
jurisdiction of civil courts is not to be readily inferred. Same is true with criminal cases.
The basis of this presumption is that courts should be accessible to all those who want justice and the status quo about the
state of law should be maintained. Unless the jurisdiction of the court is ousted by the legislature in clear words or by
necessary implication, the courts should be presumed to have jurisdiction. The construction of statute that takes away the
jurisdiction of the superior courts or extends or jurisdiction by giving right to appeal, should be avoided.
Strict construction should be given to the statutes that confer jurisdiction on the subordinate courts, tribunals, or government
agencies. If a construction of an act does not clearly say that the intention of the legislature is to oust the jurisdiction of the
court, then the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of judicature is not taken away. When the jurisdiction is conferred by the
statute, it is implied that the act has also given power to do all such acts as necessary for its execution.
Special powers granted by an Act must be limited to the purpose for which it is granted. The power of control by the superior
courts, cannot be taken away except by the express provision of the Statute. Unless the words of a statute provide for it can
be inferred from the words of a statute, there is a presumption that neither new jurisdiction of the courts are created, nor the
existing jurisdiction enlarged.
Since the legislation gives the jurisdiction to the courts, it is only the legislation which can take away the jurisdiction. If the
interpretation of an act gives two constructions, one giving jurisdiction to the court and the other taking away the jurisdiction,
then the construction which gives the jurisdiction to the court, must be given effect. If there is a dispute between two parties,
then by mutual consent they can neither create a jurisdiction, nor can they take away the same, from the court in which their
dispute can be tried.
There is a general presumption that civil courts have the jurisdiction to try all the civil matters. The exclusion of civil
jurisdiction of the court must be in express terms or by clear implication. The general rule is that, there exists a jurisdiction in
a court to try all the civil matters. The burden of proof to prove that the jurisdiction of civil courts is excluded is on the person
who alleges such an exclusion. In the cases where the jurisdiction of the courts is excluded, the civil courts have power to
examine whether the provisions of the statute are complied with. Also the civil courts have power to ascertain that the
prescribed procedure of the law has been followed by the tribunal created by the statute. If the provisions of the statute or
the necessary judicial procedure is not complied with, then such non-compliance can be challenged in the court of law. This
principle is based on the presumption that a remedy in the ordinary civil courts must always be available to the aggrieved
person. In addition to the remedies provided by the statute, ordinary remedy must also be available, except if it is excluded
by the express language of the statute or by necessary implication.
Case laws-
Provincial government of Madras (now Andhra pradesh) V. J.S. Bassappa-
The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court must not be construed readily. If the provisions
of an act gives the finality to the orders of the Authority as enacted, civil courts still have the jurisdiction in the matter, if the
provisions of the Act are not complied with ot the statutory tribunal has failed to follow the principles of judicial procedure.
Bhimsi V. Dundappa-
The Supreme Court held that, if the revenue court is given the exclusive jurisdiction to try certain matters and the jurisdiction
of the civil court is totally excluded, then the civil court should transfer such matters to be tried and adjudicated by the
revenue court only.
Presumption against violation of international law:
Basically, the presumption against the violation of international law means that countries are expected to follow international
laws and rules.
This is important because it helps to make sure that countries act in a fair and predictable way with each other.
If there is a conflict between a country's own laws and international laws, the presumption is that the country should follow
international law unless they have a good reason not to.
Supreme Court in its recent judgment in the case of Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India stated that:
It needs to be celebrated for reaffirming the rights of persons with disabilities to live with dignity.
This case arose from a public interest litigation that was filed when Spice Jet forcibly de-boarded Jeeja Ghosh because of
her disability.
The court held the airline’s action illegal and ordered it to pay Rs. 10 lakh to the petitioner.
In reaching this conclusion, the court also referred to international law to underline the rights of persons with disabilities.
For instance, para 13 of the judgment says: “The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1963 requires India’s internal
legislation to comply with international commitments.
Article 27 states that a “State party, may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty.”
According to this principle, given in Article 26 of the VCLT, every treaty signed by a country is binding on it and the
obligations imposed by treaties must be performed by the country in good faith.
Therefore, a clearer understanding of international law and its interface with domestic law is of paramount importance.
Unlike some countries, where international law, even without transformation to national law, is considered part of the law of
the land (i.e. the principle of monism), international law does not become binding under the Indian constitution until an
appropriate domestic legislation is enacted to give effect to it.
This is the principle of dualism and is reflected in Article 253, which gives parliament the power to make laws that implement
international law.
Article 253 in The Constitution of India 1949:
Legislation for giving effect to international agreements notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter,
Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty,
agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference,
association or other body.
Territorial in Operation:
The general rule for an act of parliament is that it is applicable only within the territories of the Country in which it is enacted,
unless otherwise provided.
Thus, the statutes passed, will bind within boundaries of the country in which it extends. The extra-territorial operation is
forbidden. But according to Article 245(2) of the constitution of India, No act made by the Parliament shall be deemed to be
invalid on the ground that it would have extra territorial operation. Courts are bound to enforce such legislation. For example,
“The Indian penal Code, 1860” is extra territorial in nature. According to section 3, any person bound by Indian Law,
committing any offence outside India, shall be tried in India, As if he has committed that offence in India,
Section 4 says that, IPC applies to any offence committed by any citizen of India in any place without or beyond India, and
by any person on any ship or air-craft registered in India, wherever in the world it may be.
Various state-legislatures in the country are empowered to enact a law for the6 whole of the state or any part of the
state. The laws passed by the state legislatures, are for the purpose of that state only such law, in the absence of any
territorial connection, cannot have any extra-territorial operations.
In order that a territorial connection is sufficient, two things are to be considered, they are-
i) the territorial connection should be real and factual, and not illusory
ii) The liability under the Act sought to be enforced, must be related to that territorial connection only.
Case laws-
Ajay Agarwal V. Union of India-
The supreme court held that the offence of criminal conspiracy is in the nature of continuing offence. Therefore, the acts
which constitute criminal conspiracy whether committed in Dubai or Chandigarh, is immaterial. The offence can be tried in
India under Section 4 of the IPC.
K.K. Kochari V. The state of Madras-
The Supreme court held that the laws made by the state legislature apply within the boundaries of the concerned state. It
can be challenged for its extra-territorial operation, because Article 245(2) of the constitution of India empowers only the
Union parliament to make extra-territorial laws.
It is presumed that statutes are valid.
The legislature does not intend to enact a law which ultra-vires the Constitution. The acts which are either passed by the
Parliament, or by the State legislature or by their subordinate bodies, should not cross the constitutional boundaries. No
laws can be enacted which are against the provisions and spirit of the constitution. If there are two interpretations, one that
saves the Act from becoming unconstitutional and the other that makes the statute void, then in such a case, the
interpretation that renders the Act constitutional should be followed.
There is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an Act. one who alleges against the constitutionality of an
enactment, must show that there is a transgression of the constitutional boundaries.
When the validity of the statute made by the competent legislature is challenged, the court must presume that the statute is
valid.
The constitutional validity of “the Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act” in the case Govindlalji V. State of Rajasthan- was
challenged. Under Section 16 of the said Act, words “affairs of temple” were construed as restricted to the secular affairs,
and as such had to be constitutionally valid. If a wider construction would have been given to the said Section, it would have
violated Articles 25 and 26 of the constitution.

Prospective in Operation of Statutes:

The dictionary meaning of the word prospective with reference to statutes shows that it is concerned with or applying the
laws in future or at least from the date of commencement of the statute. It is to be noted that the Doctrine of Prospective
overruling was evolved by the Supreme Court for the first time in India in I.C. Golak Nath Vs. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1967
SC 1643. In this case the Supreme Court held that the Parliament had no power to amend the fundamental rights. Chief
Justice Subba Rao posed the questions as to when Parliament could not affect fundamental rights by enacting a bill under
its ordinary legislative process even unanimously, how could it then abrogate a fundamental right with only a two third
majority and while amendment of less significant Articles of the Constitution require ratification by a majority of States of the
Union, how could a fundamental right be amended without this requirement being fulfilled. The learned judge was of the
view that the word ‘law’ Art. 13 (2) means both ordinary law as well as constitutional law. Consequently, the state was not
empowered to make any constitutional amendment which takes away or abridged fundamental rights as ‘law’ includes
‘amendment’ as well. Thus, while holding that the Parliament was not empowered to amend fundamental rights, the five
learned judges jointly declared that the principle would operate only in future and it had no retrospective effect. Therefore,
the name ‘prospective overruling’. The effect of the decision was that all amendments made with respect to the fundamental
rights till the day of the decision in the case would continue to remain valid and effective, and after that date the Parliament
would have no power to amend any of the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution.
Penal statutes have prospective operation. Article 20 of the Constitution of India restricts the retrospective operation of the
Penal statutes. An act which is legal when it was done, cannot be made illegal by enacting a new statute.
Case laws:
Gramma V. Veerupana-
Section 8 of “The Hindu Succession Act, 1956” provides that, if a Hindu male dies intestate, his property will devolve as per
the provisions of the Act.
The Supreme Court held that the Act is not applicable to those successions which opened before the Act came into
operation (i.e. successions prior to the year 1956). Thus, it has only prospective operation.
Govind Das V. Income Tax officer-
“The income tax act, 1961” came into force on 1st april, 1962. Section 171(6) of the Act imposes the joint and several liability
on the members of the HUF to pay tax assessed on the HUF property, if the assessment is already completed and it is
found that the family has already affected partition.
The Supreme Court held that section 171(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 will not apply to assessments which were made
prior to 1st April, 1962.
Exceptions to Prospective operation of statutes:
Procedural statutes are also known as adjunctival statutes. They do not confer any rights or create any new rights.
Statutes dealing with procedural matters are presumed to have retrospective operation.
Retrospective operation of statutes means a statute will have effect on the matters prior to the date on which the Act has
come into force. Retrospective means it will be effective from the date previous to the date on which the statutes come into
force. A statute may be expressly declared retrospective or it may be implied by the court as retrospective. When the statute
explains or supplies an omission in an earlier enactment, it is presumed to be retrospective. A retrospective operation should
not be given to an act that will impair an existing right or an obligation. If an enactment gives two interpretations, one
retrospective and the other prospective, then it must be construed as prospective only. This rule is based on the
presumption that the legislature never intended what is unjust. Every new Act should affect only the future and not the past.
There is a presumption that a statute applies to acts or circumstances which came into existence after the Act came into
existence, unless the legislature intended to apply it retrospectively.
When the procedural law is amended, the amendment has a retrospective effect. A declaratory Act is given a retrospective
operation, because a declaratory act removes the doubts as to meaning and effect of the statute. The intention behind
passing the declaratory Act, is to set aside the Judicial error.
The rule that, generally the statutes will not give a retrospective operation, is a rebuttable presumption. It can be rebutted
with strong contrary evidence. A statute should not be given greater retrospective operation than what is intended by the
legislature in the words of the statute.
If a court declares an Act as void, then the parliament can pass the validating act having retrospective effect to revive the
void Act. Retrospective operation of penal law is prohibited. It has to be prohibited expressly by Article 20(1) of the
constitution of India. But if the Penal law benefits the accused, it can be given retrospective effect.
Case laws:
1. Balumar Jamnadas Batra V. State of Maharashtra-
Section 123 of the customs Act, 1962, dealt with the burden of proof. The Supreme Court held that section 123 deals with
matters of procedure, and therefore, it will have retrospective operation.
2. Reliance Jute and Industries limited V. Commissioner of Income Tax-
The Supreme Court held that while the Taxing statute is interpreted, the law in force in the relevant assessment year, has to
be applied, unless there is an express contrary provision or contrary intention that appears from necessary implications.
3. Collector of Central Excise, Ahmedabad V. Ashoka Mills Limited-
The supreme court held that, the date on which the goods are cleared, the rate at which the excise duty is prevalent on that
date, is to be applied. If after the goods are cleared, there is any change in the rate of excise duty, then the changed rate of
excise duty cannot be applied to the goods which have been already cleared i.e. it will not have retrospective effect.
4. Union of India V. L. Ramaswamy-
The Supreme Court held that if a rule “x” is substituted by rule “y”, then the old rule “x” which is substituted by a new rule “y”
will not be applicable under any circumstances from the date on which it ceased to have forced a law.
5. Punjab Traders V. State of Punjab-
The Supreme Court held that if in any statute the meaning of an existing provision is already implied, and such implied
meaning is subsequently clarified by the legislature by amending the statute, then the amending statute will have
retrospective operation.
 Landmark judgments:
The Supreme Court repeatedly made it clear that in order to give effect to an amendment retrospectively, it should be clearly
mentioned in the enactment that the Act is supposed to have retrospective operation. In the case of P.Mahendran and
Others v. State of Karnataka and others, the apex court observed that the amended set of Recruitment Rules, 1987 was
not of a retrospective nature and was instead of a prospective one. Therefore, the Karnataka Public Service Commission
was not supposed to make any kind of regulation or determination of selection of members on the basis of the rules after the
commencement of the same. If such selection was made, the same would be declared as illegal. The court made its
judgment on the grounds that there were no provisions for making a retrospective effect in the Rules, 1987.
In the absence of similar provision, the Rules were to prospective effect only. In the recognised case of CIT Mumbai v. M/s
Essar Teleholdings Ltd, the Supreme Court mentioned that the legislature wing of the government has been vested with
plenary powers to decide whether an amendment is to operate prospectively or retrospectively. Further, in general
observation, the legislature considers any statute prima facie to be prospective only unless the statute has been expressly
by necessary implication made to operate retrospectively.
In National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India v Union of India, the Supreme Court was of the
opinion that retrospective amendments will amount to be unconstitutional if there is less clarification on the part of the
enactment which intends to overturn the previous decisions of the court or bring in a change in the existing law.
In the case of Rohtas Bhankhar and Others v. Union of India and Another, the court declared that whenever a
retrospective amendment is to be made, it should be taken into concern that the amendment does not have an adverse
effect on the public at large. In this case, a relaxation was provided to the candidates belonging to the category of
 Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe for a competitive exam giving a retrospective effect to an existing statute.

Q. What are the differences between common law and statutory law ?
Common law and statutory law are two different types of law that exist in many legal systems. Here are some simple differences
between them:

1. Definition: Common law refers to the body of law that has developed over time through judicial decisions in individual cases, while
statutory law refers to the body of law created by legislative bodies.
2. Source: Common law is based on court decisions and legal precedent, while statutory law is based on written laws passed by
legislative bodies.
3. Flexibility: Common law is more flexible than statutory law, as it allows judges to interpret and apply the law to specific cases based
on the facts and circumstances. Statutory law is less flexible because it is written in a more general way and may not account for all
the different situations that can arise.
4. Uniformity: Statutory law is more uniform across a jurisdiction, as it applies to everyone in the same way. Common law can vary
depending on the decisions made by different judges in different cases.
5. Creation: Common law is created through the decisions made by judges in individual cases, while statutory law is created through
the legislative process.
6. Modification: Common law can be modified or overruled by a higher court or by legislative action, while statutory law can be
amended or repealed by the legislative body that passed it.

Common law
 is a type of law based on judicial precedent, or prior courts’ decisions, rather than on statutes enacted by
legislatures.
 In other words, common law is derived from judges’ opinions rather than from legislative action.
 The concept of common law originated in England, where it was used to settle disputes between citizens.
 In 1215, the Magna Carta, one of the first examples of common law, was signed into effect.
 This document guaranteed certain rights to English citizens and limited the king’s power.
Statutory law
 is a written body of rules enacted by a legislature.
 Statutes are passed by US Congress or state legislatures and signed into law by the president or governor.
 Once a statute is enacted, it becomes binding and must be followed by everyone in the jurisdiction.
 Statutes are created to address specific issues and problems.
 For example, US Congress may pass a statute to regulate the sale of firearms. State legislatures may pass
statutes to establish speed limits on highways.
o In general, common law is used to fill in gaps when no statutory law applies to a specific situation.
o For instance, if a new type of crime is committed, common law can be used to prosecute the offender.
o Similarly, if there is a dispute over an issue not addressed by statute, common law may be used to
resolve the issue.
o In some cases, common law may even take precedence over statutory law.
o For instance, if a statute is found to be unconstitutional, it will be struck down by the courts, and common
law will take its place.
o Common law and statutory laws are followed by most nations in the world.
o A combination of both is necessary for justice to be served.

Common Law Statutory Law

Creation of The law evolves with new decisions made by judges in New laws are issued by various government
new laws courts. agencies.

Operational Procedural Substantive

Level

Also known Case law Written law

as
 Common Law Statutory Law

Nature Instructive Prescriptive

Origin Precedent or judiciary Government or legislature

Q. Describe the rules for ascertaining the meaning and intention of parliament.
In India, the rules for ascertaining the meaning and intention of legislation are primarily governed by the principles of
statutory interpretation as laid down by the courts. Some of the key rules are:
1. Literal Rule: The courts will first look at the plain and literal meaning of the words used in the legislation.
2. Golden Rule: If the literal interpretation leads to an absurd or contradictory result, the court will use the Golden
Rule to interpret the legislation in a manner that avoids such a result.
3. Mischief Rule: If the literal and golden rules fail to resolve an ambiguity in the legislation, the court may use the
Mischief Rule to determine the underlying problem that the legislation was intended to address, and interpret the
legislation accordingly.
4. Harmonious Construction: The court will interpret different provisions of a legislation in a manner that harmonizes
them and avoids any conflict.
5. Contextual Interpretation: The court will take into account the legislative history, purpose, and surrounding
circumstances when interpreting the legislation. In other words, the courts will look beyond the literal text of the
law and take into account the broader context in which it was passed, to determine what the lawmakers meant
when they passed the law.
6. Rule of Reasonable Construction or Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat – that things may be more profitable than
lost
 This is a Latin maxim that means a thing should affect than being made void.
 It is a rule of construction which means the construction of a rule should give effect to the rule rather than
destroying it.
 When there are two constructions possible in a provision such that one gives effect to the provision and the other
renders the provision inoperative, the former which gives effect to the provision is adopted and the latter is
discarded.
Construction Noscitur a sociis
 “Noscitur a sociis” is a Latin maxim which means that “the term in a statute is to be recognized by the associated
words”.
 It is also used for interpreting questionable words in statutes.
 When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the statute.
 It is one of the rules of the language used by the courts that helps to interpret legislation.
 For the case with “noscitur a sociis” the questionable meaning of a word or doubtful words can be derived from its
association with other words within the context of the phrase.
 The principle of Noscitur a Sociis is a rule of construction.
 It is used by the court to interpret legislation.
 This means that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase must be determined by the words that surround it.
 In other terms, the meaning of a word must be judged by the company that it keeps.
 The questionable meaning of a doubtful word will be derived from its association with other words.
 It is used wherever a statutory provision constitutes a word or phrase that is capable of bearing more than one
meaning.
Construction ejusdem generis
 The term Ejusdem Generis in other words means words of a similar class.
 The rule is that where particular words have a common characteristic (i.e. of a class) any general words that follow
should be construed as referring generally to that class; no wider construction should be afforded.
 The Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis provides that when a list of specific words are being followed by the general
words, the general words are interpreted in a way so as to restrict them to include the items or things which will be
of same type as those of the specific words,
  For example, if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles, and other motor-powered vehicles, a
court might use ejusdem generis to hold that such vehicles would not include airplanes, because the list included
only land-based transportation.
Construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius
 The maxim Expressio unios exclusio alterius means that “to express one is to exclude others; therefore mention of
one or more specific things may be taken to exclude others of the same type.”
 The legal maxim simply means that if one of the two possibilities of an event is talked about expressly, then the
second possibility is kicked out by default.
 For example, “weekends and public holidays” excludes ordinary weekdays.
 If a Statute refers to Lions and Tigers, it only refers to Lions and Tigers and will not include Leopards’ or any other
wild animals.
 That which is expressed is included and that which is not is excluded; a rule of statutory interpretation that says
that if something is mentioned as being included, then anything that is not mentioned is by implication meant not to
be included.
 The doctrine is useful not only in determining the extents of contracts but also plays an important role in the
construction of statutes.
 It can be interpreted as- Where certain persons or things are specified in the law, contract or will, an intention to
exclude all others from its operation shall be inferred.
Construction Contemporanea expositio est fortissima in lege
 meaning Contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law.
 It is said that the best exposition of a statute or any other document is that which it has received from
contemporary authority.
 If the authority is an enactment or a judicial decision, it has a binding force.
 Where an exposition has been done by a long usage, that should be accepted even though it is different from the
ordinary or the popular sense.
 When a statute was passed, the persons who were living then or thereabout may be presumed to know the
circumstances under which the statute was passed and the prevailing circumstances at the time of its passage
better than persons of the later generations. While interpreting old statutes high regard must be paid to the
meanings given to them by judges of that time since they were in a better position than the present day judges to
judge the intention of the legislature at that time.
Presumption against Retroactivity: The court will generally presume that legislation is not intended to have a retroactive
effect, unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. The presumption against retroactivity is a principle of statutory
interpretation that means that, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, a court will presume that a law is not
intended to have a retroactive effect.
In simpler terms, it means that a law will generally apply only to future events and not to past events. This is because it is
generally unfair to hold someone responsible for something that was not prohibited by law at the time they did it.
For example, if a law is passed in 2023 that makes a certain activity illegal, the law will apply only to actions taken after
2023, and not to actions taken before 2023. This means that if someone engaged in that activity in 2022, they cannot be
prosecuted for it after the law is passed in 2023.
However, if a law is specifically intended to have a retroactive effect, this will be clearly stated in the law. In such cases, the
court will apply the law to past events.

Q. Describe the rules for ascertaining the meaning and intention of parliament.
INTRODUCTION
A Statute is the will of the legislature.
The legislature will follow the procedure laid down or prescribed in the enactment of laws. If there is any procedural defect in
the legislative process, it may be cured immediately by appropriate legislative action i.e., by amendment to the existing
provision or inserting a new one in its place.
The court will involve in interpretation or construction when it simply can’t understand the meaning and context of any word
used and it will look into the intention of legislature and try to derive the words from statute.
In certain cases, the courts have gone beyond the words of the statute and they have interpreted various statutory
provisions in a manner as to be morally sound.
MEANING OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE
Interpretation means the art of finding out the exact meaning and true sense of an enactment passed by the legislature by
looking into the words of the enactment and find out their natural and ordinary meaning.
It is the process of determining the true meaning of words used in the statute.
The courts follow certain procedure and principles for construction and these are principles are called ‘Rules of
Interpretation’
SIGNIFICANCE OF INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE
In the Indian context, judges have often gone beyond the words of the statute and interpreted statutory provisions in a
manner as to be socially and morally sound and based on the real intention of legislature.
For this reason, judicial activism has been praised and the slight circumvention of the canons of interpretation has been
ignored because the role of legislative intent in statutory construction has over the years, dwindled considerably.
The purpose behind framing any statute is mainly for the public benefit.
The legislature is presumed to have a certain meaning of the words of any statute.
Any statute framed should be in accordance with such meaning.
During any interpretation of any statute, an advocate or a judge should always go by the rules of interpretation and all these
rules are used to gathering the facts and they are processed to clear the ambiguity and vagueness of the statute and will
give a clear meaning to the word.
The process of interpretation is done going by the words of these statutes which is open to more than one interpretation.
In this case, the court will have to choose the intention of the legislature which is used in enacting a statute representing the
true intention of the legislature.
So in this case, the court will look into the legal meaning or true meaning of all the statutory provisions.
It is the duty of the judicature to act upon the true intention of legislature –the mens or sentential legis - The maxim Sententia
legis or mens means that the essence of the law lies in the spirit, and not in its letter, the letters are just the way to express
the intentions of the law makers. The words are the external manifestation of intention that it involves.
TWO ASPECT OF INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE
The intention of the legislature is essentially constructed of two aspects:
1) The concept of meaning and
2) The concept of purpose and object.
The former connotes an understanding derived from the literal meaning of the words of a statute. The latter points to the
spirit and reason pervading through the statute. The courts have to keep these aspects in mind while reading a statute; and
are aided in this task by certain sources of legislative intent. These popularly include:
1. The text of the statute as proposed to the legislature.
2. Proposed amendments to the statute, whether accepted or rejected, with reasons thereof.
3. The record of hearings on the topic.
4. Legislative records or journals.
5. Speeches and parliamentary debates made prior to the vote on the bill.
6. Legislative subcommittee (such as Standing Committee) minutes, factual findings, and/or reports
7. Other relevant statutes that can be used to understand the definitions in the statute on question; for example
the General Clauses Act, 1897.
8. Other relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in question; such as previous statutes on the
same matter.
9. Legislative files of the executive branch, such as the governor or president.
10. Case law prior to the statute or following it which demonstrates the problems or issues the legislature was
attempting to tackle with the statute.
11. Constitutional determinations (Would Congress still have passed certain sections of a statute had it known
about the constitutional invalidity of the other portions of the statute?)
12. Legislative intent, which is the reason for passing the law

Q. What do you mean by Inquiry commission reports and Law commission reports ?
What is the Law Commission?
Law Commission of India is neither a constitutional body nor a statutory body, it is an executive body established by
an order of the Government of India. Its major function is to work for legal reforms.
The Commission is established for a fixed tenure and works as an advisory body to the Ministry of Law and Justice.
Its membership primarily comprises legal experts.
The Law Commission has taken up various subjects on references made by Department of Legal Affairs, Supreme
Court and High Courts and submitted 277 reports.
The Law Commission of India provides excellent thought provoking and vital review of the laws in India.
What is the History of the Law Commission in India?
 Law Reform has been a continuing process particularly during the last 300 years or more in Indian history. In
the ancient period, when religious and customary law occupied the field, the reform process had been ad
hoc and not institutionalised through duly constituted law reform agencies.
 However, since the third decade of the nineteenth century, Law Commissions were constituted by the
Government from time to time and were empowered to recommend legislative reforms to clarify, consolidate
and codify particular branches of law where the Government felt the necessity for it.
 The first such Commission was established in 1834 under the Charter Act of 1833 under the
Chairmanship of Lord Macaulay which recommended codification of the Penal Code and the Criminal
Procedure Code.
 Thereafter, the second, third and fourth Law Commissions were constituted in 1853, 1861 and 1879
respectively which, during a span of fifty years contributed to enrich the Indian Statute Book with a large
variety of legislations on the pattern of the then prevailing English Laws adapted to Indian conditions.
 The Indian Code of Civil Procedure, the Indian Contract Act, the Indian Evidence Act, the Transfer of
Property Act. etc. are products of the first four Law Commissions.
 The Government of India established the First Law Commission of Independent India in 1955 with the then
Attorney-General of India, Mr M. C. Setalvad, as its Chairman. Since then twenty one more Law
Commissions have been appointed, each with a three-year term.
What are the Functions of the Law Commission?
 The Law Commission, on a reference made to it by the Central Government or suo-motu, undertakes research
in law and review of existing laws in India for making reforms therein and enacting new legislations.
 It also undertakes studies and research for bringing reforms in the justice delivery systems for elimination
of delay in procedures, speedy disposal of cases, reduction in the cost of litigation etc.
 The other functions of the Law Commission include:
o Review/Repeal of obsolete laws: Identification of laws which are no longer relevant and
recommending for the repeal of obsolete and unnecessary enactments.
o Law and Poverty: Examines the Laws which affect the poor and carries out post-audit for socio-
economic legislations.
o Suggesting enactment of new legislation as may be necessary to implement the Directive Principles and
to attain the objectives set out in the Preamble of the Constitution.
o Judicial Administration: Considering and conveying to the Government its views on any subject
relating to law and judicial administration that may be specifically referred to it by the Government
through the Ministry of Law and Justice (Department of Legal Affairs).
o Research: Considering the requests for providing research to any foreign countries as may be referred
to it by the Government through the Ministry of Law & Justice (Department of Legal Affairs).
o Examine the existing laws with a view of promoting gender equality and suggesting amendments
thereto.
o Examine the impact of globalization on food security, unemployment and recommend measures for the
protection of the interests of the marginalized.
o Preparing and submitting to the Central Government, from time to time, reports on all issues, matters,
studies and research undertaken by it and recommending in such reports for effective measures to be
taken by the Union or any State.
o Performing such other functions as may be assigned to it by the Central Government from time to time.
 Before concretizing its recommendations, the Commission consults the nodal Ministry/Departments and such,
other stakeholders as the Commission may deem necessary for the purpose.
What are the Reports of the Law Commission?
 The law commission of India has submitted 277 reports so far on various issues, some of the recent reports
are:
o Report No. 277 – Wrongful Prosecution (Miscarriage of Justice): Legal Remedies
 o Report No. 276 – Legal Framework: Gambling and Sports Betting Including in Cricket in India
o Report No. 275 – Legal Framework: BCCI vis-à-vis Right to Information Act, 2005
o Report No. 274 – Review of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
o Report No. 273 – Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Torture
o Report No. 272 – Assessment of Statutory Frameworks of Tribunals in India
o Report No. 271 – Human DNA Profiling
o Report No.270 – Compulsory Registration of Marriages
 The recommendations of the commission are not binding on the government. They may be accepted or
rejected. Action on the said recommendations depends on the ministries/departments, which are concerned
with the subject matter of the recommendations.
In an era of globalisation and constantly evolving societies, Law Commission identifies the laws which are not in
harmony with the existing climate, and laws which require change. It suggests suitable measures for quick
redressal of citizens’ grievances, in the field of law and takes all necessary steps to make the poor benefit out of
the legal process. Its presence has become even more relevant in recent times.

Commission of inquiry
To enable the administration to discharge effectively the multifarious functions entrusted to it, it needs to exercise broad
powers of conducting the investigations and inquiry into various matters. The primary purpose of this technique is to
collect information with a view to decide upon a further course of action to meet a given situation, or to find correctives to a
given problem.
The policy maker or the administrator can initiate effective remedial measures to deal with specific problems only when he
is in full possession of the relevant information, facts and figures and to collect these, inquiries and investigations become
an inevitable tool in the hands of administrators.

Inquiries and investigations are thus important methods of acquiring information. Such information is needed as feedback
for policy making by the government. It is also a source of information for people. Parliament enacted the Commissions of
Inquiry Act, 1952, which authorises the central and state governments to appoint inquiry commissions to make inquiries in
the definite matters of public importance. This is a central legislation enacted under the constitution, Schedule VII, List I
and III.

The commissions of inquiry act gives powers to the central government to appoint a commission of inquiry, to make inquiry
into any matter relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List I and III. The Act empowers the state governments to
appoint inquiry commissions, to make inquiry into any other matter relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List II or III
of Schedule VII.
An Inquiry Commission Report refers to an official document that presents the findings and recommendations of a
government-appointed commission tasked with investigating a particular issue or incident. These reports often contain
detailed information about the facts surrounding the incident, as well as an analysis of the causes and consequences of
the events in question. They are typically used by government officials, lawmakers, and other stakeholders to inform
policymaking, legal action, or other measures aimed at addressing the issues identified in the report.
Appointment object and scope
An inquiry commission can be appointed by an appropriate government when it is of the opinion that it is necessary so to
do, or if a resolution is passed by the house of people (lok sabha) or a state legislative assembly as the case may be. The
appointment of the commission is to be made by a notification in the official gazette. Where a resolution of the house of
people or of a state legislative assembly is passed asking for the appointment of a commission of inquiry, government is
bound to make such appointment.
Article 14 (Equality before law) Ram Krishna Dalmia v Justice Tendolkar:
Decided On: 28.03.1958
Statues Referred-
 Constitution of India
 Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952
The government of India appointed a commission of inquiry to enquire into and report on some affairs of some Dalmia Jain
companies, and acts of fraud and irregularities of certain persons who controlled these companies. The commission was
further required to report the action which should be taken as and by way of securing redress or punishment or to act as a
preventive in future cases. The appointment of commission was challenged on a number of grounds.
Introduction
Ram Krishna Dalmia was an Indian businessman who was born into a poor family in Rajasthan. The Dalmia Bharat Group
(DBG) is an Indian conglomerate whose roots can be traced back to the businesses founded by Ramkrishna and Jaidayal
Dalmia. In the first half of the twentieth century, the Dalmia brothers formed a corporate conglomerate in eastern India. On
11 December 1956, a notification was published in the gazette of India by the Central Government. Large and renowned
companies and firms which were under the control of people like Sarvarshi Ramkrishna Dalima, Jaidayal Dalmia, Shanti
Prasad Jain, Sriyans Prasad Jain, Shital Prasad Jain and others who were either relatives, employees or basically were
connected to these people, were included in this gazette and large amounts of money were subscribed by the investing
public in the shares of these companies. It was alleged that these people were misusing the money for their personal
benefits which were raised by public funding or public shares, and this was the reason why people who had invested in the
company were facing losses. Through this proclamation, the central government established a Commission of Inquiry,
chaired by Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, Judge of the High Court of Bombay. The panel was requested to investigate and
report on 11 different clauses. The names of the companies that had defaulted were disclosed, and an investigation would
be conducted. Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952 gave the central government the authority to publish this
notification.
Facts of the case
Six appeals were filed against a Bombay High Court Division bench’s shared judgment and order in three miscellaneous
cases filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioners sought a suitable direction or decision under section 226
quashing and setting aside the notification issued by the Union of India on December 11, 1956, in exercise of powers
bestowed on it by Section 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act 1952. The four individuals named filed three applications
with the Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, disputing the legitimacy of the Act and the notification and
requesting writs to have them quashed. Except for the last section of cl. 10, the High Court dismissed the claims and ruled
that the notification was legitimate and valid.
Issue
1. Defaulting persons filed case alleging mainly that the notification has gone beyond the act and the Act itself
is ultra vires the constitution.
2. Whether the case was in violation of article 14
3. If Ram Krishna Dalmia and people related to the companies were isolated
4. If Sarvarshi Ramkrishna Dalima, Jaidayal Dalmia, Shanti Prasad Jain, Sriyans Prasad Jain, Shital Prasad
Jain and others who were either relatives, employees or basically were connected to these people were
misusing the money for their personal benefits
5. The notification is bad as the action of government in issuing it was mala fide and amounted to an abuse of
power and also as it violates Article 23 of the constitution.
Contention by Parties
Appellant’s Arguments:
 Government in appointing the Commission and Parliament in authorizing the same has assumed to
themselves judicial powers.
 The powers should be well within the legislative and executive domains respectively.
 It was submitted that Parliament cannot function as a court until and unless there has been a breach which
fundamentally affects its own privileges for which it may penalize the offender for contempt or of
proceedings by way of impeachment.
 In consideration of criminal prosecution, the preliminary investigation to be taken should be in accordance
of Code of Criminal Procedure.
 It was urged that any legislature shall not assume its power to start the investigation and thereby divest the
citizen of the standard protection afforded to him by the provisions envisaged under the Code of Criminal
Procedure
Respondent’s Arguments:
 Solicitor-General on behalf of the respondents submitted that the section was sufficient enough to make a
classification that the matter is of public importance and the same can be called for an inquiry by a
Commission.
  It was further submitted that the section also ascertains that the Parliament has the authority to provide for
the appointment of Commissions so as to carry out the Inquiry in consideration of a matter of public
importance.
 It is impossible to forecast all the societal eventualities and therefore the duty of taking the necessary action
shall be vested with the appropriate Government.
In Conclusion it could be said that in this case the Supreme Court through its judgement has laid an observation that
the principle to be remembered while determining if the statute is valid or is in violation of Article 14 is that Article
14 nowhere forbids any reasonable classification. However, it prohibits discrimination in both substantive as well as
law of procedure.

Q. Describe the prospective and retrospective operation of statutes.

Q. Explain retrospective and prospective operation of statutes.
Coke Maxim: “A new law ought to be prospective, not retrospective in its operation.”
When a statute is enacted, it must apply prospectively, regulating future conduct.
But when a court issues a decision, the presumption is that it applies retroactively to include past conduct.
This is a result of the traditional belief that legislatures create new law but courts merely declare what the law is.
In India, the retrospective operation of any statute is prohibited for any civil offence. The Constitution of India doesn’t permit
a retrospective operation of any given act unless there is any implication in law stating that the law that is there has to be
retrospective in nature.
Any Act that is introduced in India that is held to be retrospective but has not been specifically implied in the act, is said to be
unconstitutional as well as void.

There are various examples of retrospective legislation in India.

Though these laws primarily deal in the field of taxation, there have been several other laws introduced in India.
One of the examples of such legislation is the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prohibition of Transfer of
Certain Lands) Act, 1978, which was retrospective in nature. This Act aimed to prohibit the transfer of land granted by the
government to people belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. This law was also applicable on the
land under the ownership of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes before the enactment of this law. Nobody was
even allowed to purchase the land owned by the people belonging to SC and ST communities.
Another major legislation was the Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition (Revival of Operation, Amendment, and Validation) Act,
2019, whose constitutional validity was recently upheld by the Supreme Court, which was going to be applied retrospectively
till the year 2013. The reasoning behind this decision of the Supreme Court was that the basic principle of the legislature is
to protect the public interest at large. The legislature is at the helm of protecting the rights of the people and ensuring a
democratic polity among the people. Hence, any step taken towards achieving this purpose is considered to be lawful, and
the contention raised by the petitioner that it violated the principle of the separation of powers is completely invalid. For the
public good, any law can be operated retrospectively without any stoppage since the law doesn’t completely prohibit the
same.
However, if any retrospective law is to be introduced, it is only allowed for criminal matters and not in the case of civil
matters.

Ordinarily, a legislature has power to make prospective laws, but Art.20 of the Indian Constitution, 1950 provides certain
safeguards to the persons accused of crime and so Art. 20(1) of the Indian constitution imposes a limitation on the law
making power of the constitution. It prohibits the legislature to make retrospective criminal laws however it does not prohibit
a civil liability retrospectively i.e. with effect from a past date. So a tax can be imposed retrospectively.

Retrospective and retroactive effect are often used interchangeably, but they have different meanings.
Retrospective effect refers to a law that applies to events that occurred before the law was passed, but changes the legal
consequences of those events going forward. In other words, a retrospective law changes the effects of past events from the
time of its enactment into the future, but it does not criminalize or impose liability for past actions that were legal when they
were taken.
On the other hand, a law that has a retroactive effect applies to events that occurred before the law was passed, and
changes the legal consequences of those events from the time they occurred. In other words, a retroactive law imposes new
criminal or civil liability on past actions that were legal when they were taken.
 In Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, 1957 - the SC stated that "The golden rule of construction is that, in the
absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have
the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was passed." The Court held that the
Civil Procedure Code is not retrospective in operation.
Rattan Lal vs State Of Punjab on 10 April, 1964: In this particular case, a boy who was 16 years old was held liable for
committing trespass and tried to outrage the modesty of a 7-year-old girl. He was ordered to rigorous imprisonment by the
magistrate and a certain amount of fine was also imposed upon him. However, later on, the legislation known as
the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, came into force, in which it was stated that any person below the age of 21 should not
be imprisoned. The Court in this case held that any legislation could be operated in a retrospective manner for the benefit of
that person to reduce the punishment. Hence, any form of ex-post facto law which is required for the benefit of the accused
is not prohibited from being introduced retrospectively under Article 20(1) of the Indian Constitution.
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (1992) - This case defined the scope of the amendment brought in an Act
and whether it should be allowed to operate retrospectively. The Court laid down that if any given law affects the substantive
rights of any individual, then it should not be allowed to operate retrospectively. Substantive rights are legal rights that
confer a benefit or protect an interest, such as the right to life, liberty, property, and due process of law. These rights can be
enforced in a court of law and are typically derived from constitutional, statutory, or common law sources.
These are some of the major differences between the retrospective and prospective operation of the statutes.
Retrospective operation of statutes Prospective operation of statutes
Such a statute focuses on the events of the past, and the Such a statute focuses solely on events resorting to wrongful acts after
new laws introduced are applicable to those past events. the introduction of the act or the amendment.
Any statute introduced, unless expressly stated otherwise, is
No statute is presumed to ever be retrospective in nature.
considered to be prospective in nature.
Any statute, whether concerned with civil or criminal matters, is
Criminal matters can only have a retroactive operation.
presumed to have prospective operation.
Retrospective statutes are generally criticized by society and The prospective statutes enjoy acceptance from the general public and
not recommended by governments because of their being the governments are also mostly in favour of such statutes. These
unfair and unjustified toward the citizens. uphold the democratic values of justice and the rule of law.
The retrospective operation of statutes is still not recognized
All countries generally accept all the new laws to be applicable for
in most countries. In several other countries, these can be
future events, i.e., prospective operation of the laws.
introduced with several restrictions.

Q. Explain the difference between literal rule and golden rule of interpretation.
The Literal Rule and the Golden Rule are both methods used by courts to interpret the meaning of statutes or laws. The
difference between the two is as follows:
1. Literal Rule: The Literal Rule is a method of statutory interpretation which involves giving words their plain, ordinary, and
literal meaning. Under this rule, the court is required to apply the literal or plain meaning of the words in a statute, regardless
of whether the result is absurd or not. This rule is based on the idea that the legislature is presumed to have intended the
ordinary meaning of the words they used in the statute. The Literal Rule is the most basic rule of statutory interpretation, and
it is often the starting point for judges when interpreting statutes.
2. Golden Rule: The Golden Rule is a method of statutory interpretation which involves interpreting words in a statute in such a
way as to avoid absurdity or to give effect to the overall purpose of the statute. This rule is used when the Literal Rule would
produce an absurd result, or when it is clear that the legislature did not intend the literal meaning of the words in the statute.
The Golden Rule allows the court to modify or extend the meaning of a word or phrase in order to make sense of the statute.
Here are some examples of cases where the Literal Rule and the Golden Rule were applied:
Literal Rule example: R v. Maginnis (1987) – In this case, the defendant was charged with “being found in an enclosed
premises with intent to steal”. The court applied the Literal Rule and held that the defendant could not be convicted because
he was found outside the premises, not inside, which is what the plain meaning of the words in the statute required.
Golden Rule example: Adler v. George (1964) – In this case, the defendant was charged with “obstructing a member of
the armed forces in the execution of his duty”. The court applied the Golden Rule and held that the word “obstructing” should
be given a narrower meaning in this case, as a broader interpretation would lead to absurd results. The court reasoned that
if the word “obstructing” was given its literal meaning, anyone who inadvertently got in the way of a member of the armed
forces would be guilty of the offence.
Golden Rule example: Re Sigsworth (1935) – In this case, the court applied the Golden Rule to avoid an absurd result.
The case concerned the inheritance of property by a son who had murdered his mother. The literal meaning of the statute
would have allowed the son to inherit the property, but the court held that the Golden Rule required the statute to be
interpreted in such a way as to avoid this absurd result.
Some more cases that illustrate the difference between the Literal Rule and the Golden Rule of interpretation:
Literal Rule example: State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (1957) - In this case, the question before the court
was whether the game of rummy could be classified as gambling under the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act. The court
applied the Literal Rule of interpretation and held that the game of rummy did not fall within the definition of gambling as per
the Act, as it involved skill and not just chance.
Golden Rule example: State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) - In this case, the question before the court was whether
the word "house" in Section 457 of the Indian Penal Code would include a tent. The court applied the Golden Rule of
interpretation and held that the word "house" should be interpreted broadly in this case, so as to include any structure that
provides shelter to human beings. The court reasoned that a narrow interpretation of the word "house" would lead to an
absurd result, where a thief who broke into a tent would not be guilty of the offence under Section 457.
Golden Rule example: Tata Power Company Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2001) - In this case, the question before the
court was whether the word "person" in the Maharashtra State Tax on Professions, Trades, Callings and Employments Act
would include a company. The court applied the Golden Rule of interpretation and held that the word "person" should be
interpreted broadly in this case, so as to include a company. The court reasoned that a narrow interpretation of the word
"person" would lead to an absurd result, where a company would not be liable to pay the tax under the Act.

Q. Distinguish between ‘Ejusdem generis’ and ‘Noscitur a sociis’

"Ejusdem generis" and "Noscitur a sociis" are two legal principles used to interpret statutes or contracts.
Ejusdem Generis is a Latin term which means "of the same kind or nature."
It is a principle of statutory interpretation that applies when a general term is followed by a list of specific terms.
Under this principle, the general term should be interpreted to include only things of the same kind or nature as the specific
terms.
In other words, where a list of specific words is followed by a general word, the general word should be interpreted to be
limited to the same kind of items as the specific words.
For example, if a statute refers to "vehicles such as cars, buses, and trucks," then "vehicles" should be interpreted to include
only things of the same kind or nature as cars, buses, and trucks, such as other types of motorized vehicles, rather than
non-motorized vehicles like bicycles.
On the other hand, "Noscitur a sociis" is a Latin term which means "known by its associates."
It is a principle of statutory interpretation that applies when a word or phrase is unclear or ambiguous. Under this principle,
the meaning of a word or phrase should be determined by the context in which it is used.
The surrounding words and phrases should be examined to determine the meaning of the unclear word or phrase.
For example, if a statute refers to "apple, orange, and fruit vendors," the term "fruit vendors" may be ambiguous. However,
the context suggests that "fruit vendors" should be interpreted to mean vendors who sell fruits like apples and oranges,
rather than vendors who sell all kinds of fruits like strawberries and bananas.
In summary, "ejusdem generis" applies when a general term follows a list of specific terms and should be interpreted to
include only things of the same kind or nature as the specific terms, while "Noscitur a sociis" applies when a word or phrase
is unclear or ambiguous and should be interpreted by the context in which it is used.

Q. Write an essay on delegated legislation.

Delegated legislation, also known as subordinate legislation, refers to laws or regulations made by government bodies or
officials other than the legislature (such as ministers, departments, or agencies), under the authority of a statute or an Act of
Parliament. These laws are usually created to provide detailed regulations, guidance, or rules on how a particular statute or
law should be implemented.
In the interpretation of statutes, delegated legislation can be used to provide clarification or elaboration on the meaning of
certain provisions. This is because the language of statutes can often be ambiguous or imprecise, leaving room for
interpretation or uncertainty.
 For example, if a statute sets out a broad principle or objective, such as "to protect the environment," delegated legislation
may be used to specify the particular actions or measures required to achieve this objective, such as setting emission
standards for factories or prohibiting certain types of waste disposal.
Delegated legislation can also be used to update or modify existing legislation to reflect changing circumstances or to
address practical problems that were not foreseen at the time the original legislation was enacted. For example, a ministerial
order or regulation may be issued to amend the criteria for granting a particular license or permit.
Overall, delegated legislation can play an important role in the interpretation of statutes by providing additional guidance and
detail to help ensure that laws are implemented effectively and consistently. However, it is important to ensure that
delegated legislation is created in accordance with proper procedures and safeguards to maintain accountability and
transparency in the legislative process.

Q. What are the key differences between retrospective and prospective operation of statutes
Retrospective and prospective operation of statutes refer to the timing of when a law takes effect and the way it affects past
and future events. The key differences between retrospective and prospective operation of statutes are as follows:
1. Definition: Retrospective operation of statutes means that the law is effective from a date before it was enacted. In contrast,
prospective operation of statutes means that the law is effective from the date it was enacted or a future date specified in the
law.
2. Application: Retrospective operation of statutes applies to events that have occurred in the past, while prospective operation
of statutes applies to events that will occur in the future.
3. Purpose: Retrospective operation of statutes is intended to change the legal consequences of events that have already
taken place. Prospective operation of statutes is intended to govern future events and regulate conduct going forward.
4. Limitations: Retrospective operation of statutes is subject to constitutional limitations, such as due process and retroactive
punishment. Prospective operation of statutes are not subject to such limitations.
5. Interpretation: Retrospective operation of statutes is often viewed with suspicion, and courts will generally interpret
ambiguous language in favor of a prospective operation of statutes. Prospective operation of statutes are generally
interpreted based on the plain language of the statute.
6. Effect: Retrospective operation of statutes can have a significant impact on the rights of individuals and businesses by
changing the legal consequences of past events. Prospective operation of statutes will only affect future events and conduct
going forward.

Q. Explain the theory of utilitarianism in interpretation

Utilitarianism is a moral theory that is concerned with maximizing overall happiness or well-being. According to utilitarianism,
an action is morally right if it produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.
In interpretation, utilitarianism can be applied in a number of ways. For example, a utilitarian approach might suggest that
the best interpretation of a text is the one that produces the greatest amount of happiness or well-being for the greatest
number of people. This could involve interpreting a text in a way that is most likely to promote social harmony or that is most
likely to promote the well-being of the majority of people.
Alternatively, a utilitarian approach might suggest that the best interpretation of a text is the one that produces the greatest
amount of happiness or well-being for the individual reader. This could involve interpreting a text in a way that is most likely
to provide the reader with a sense of satisfaction or fulfillment.
In either case, a utilitarian approach to interpretation would focus on the consequences of different interpretations, rather
than on any intrinsic qualities of the text itself. This means that the "correct" interpretation of a text would be the one that
produces the most positive outcomes, regardless of whether or not it is faithful to the author's original intentions or the text's
historical context.
Critics of utilitarianism argue that it can be difficult to determine what actions or interpretations will produce the most
happiness or well-being, and that it may be impossible to weigh the well-being of different individuals or groups against each
other. Additionally, some argue that utilitarianism can lead to the oppression or marginalization of minority groups, as the
happiness or well-being of the majority may be prioritized over the needs or desires of the minority.
One example of an Indian case law that involves utilitarianism is the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1986). This case
involved the closure of industries in Delhi that were contributing to air pollution and posing a threat to public health.
The Supreme Court of India ordered the closure of these industries, despite objections from the industries and some
members of the public who argued that the closure would result in economic hardship and job losses.
In its decision, the Supreme Court applied a utilitarian approach, balancing the potential economic harm against the public
health benefits of the closure. The court noted that the health of the public was of paramount importance, and that the
industries could not be allowed to continue operating if they posed a threat to public health.
The court also considered alternative measures that could be taken to address the air pollution problem, but ultimately
concluded that the closure of the industries was the most effective and efficient solution.