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FINAL FLIGHT EVALUATION REPORT
APOLLO 10 MISSION
AUGUST 1969

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

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 02-117017-7
FLIGHT EVALUATION REPORT - APOLLO 10 MISSION

• CONTENTS

PAGE NO.
SECTION
ILLUSTRATIONS ii

ABSTRACT iv

1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 CARRY-OVER ANOMALIES FOR SUBSEQUENT FLIGHT 1
READINESS REVIEWS

1.2 MISSION SUMMARY 2

1.3 APOLLO PROGRAM IMPACT 7

1.4 SUMMARY OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT 8

ANOMALY LISTING 15
2.0
2.1 LAUNCH VEHICLE (MSFC) ANOMALIES 17

2.2 SPACECRAFT (MSC) ANOMALIES 31

2.3 GROUND SUPPORT (KSC) ANOMALIES 120

3.0 REFERENCES 121

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ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE PAGES

2.1.1-1 RTG COOLING DUCT/NOZZLE INSTALLATION 18

2.1.1-2 IU AIR/GN2 PURGE DUCT DETAILS 19
2.1.2-1 S-IVB SECOND BURN LONGITUDINAL AND LATERAL OSCIL-
LATIONS 21
2.1.2-2 APOLLO 10 (AS-50S) AND APOLLO 8 (AS-S03) SECOND
BURN VIBRATION COMPARISON 22
2.1.3-2 PRESSURE COMPENSATOR ASSEMBLY 25
2.1.3-1 S-IVB HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 26
2.1.4-1 S-IVB APS HELIUM BOTTLE MASS 30
2.2.1-1 CM RCS SCHEMATIC 32
2.2.2-1 CM RCS OXIDIZER SUPPLY 34
2~2.3-1 PRIMARY WATER GLYCOL EVAPORATOR CONTROL 36
2.2.3-2 WATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 37
2.2.4-1 WATER/GAS SEPARATION BAG 39
2.2.4-2 WATER/GAS SEPARATION MEMBRANE 40
2.2.5-1 WATER GUN 42
2.2.6-1 FORWARD HATCH THERMAL COATING 44
2.2.7-1 TUNNEL VENT SYSTEM 46
2.2.9-1 RENDEZVOUS RADAR TRANSPONDER CONTROL CIRCUITRY 49
2.2.10-1 MAGAZINE INTERLOCK SWITCH 51
2.2.11-1 POWER VARIATIONS AT PUMP FAILURE 54
2.2.12-1 TYPICAL FUEL CELL 2 BEHAVIOR AFTER FUEL CELL
1 REMOVED 56
2.2.13-1 HYDROGEN PRESSURED DURING APPARENT FAILURE OF
AUTOMATIC PRESSURE CONTROL 58
2.2.13-2 HYDROGEN TANK PRESSURE CONTROL 59
2.2.14-1 FLOW RATE AND PRESSURE AFTER PURGE 61
2.~.l4-2 FUEL CELL HYDROGEN SYSTEM 62
2.2.1S-l LAMP ASSEMBLY 64
2.2.17-1 VHF RECOVERY BEACON ANTENNA DEPLOYED 67
2.2.18-1 CHARGE HOLDER RETENTION 70

ii
 ILLUSTRP.TIONS (CONT'D)

FIGURE PAGES

2.2.20-1 STABILIZER USAGE 73

2.2.21-1 STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM 76
2.2.23-1 DIGITAL EVENT TIMER 79
2.2.25-1 WATER/GAS SEPARATION MEMBRANE 82
2.2.28-1 LUNAR MODULE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM THRUST
CHAMBER SWITCH 88
2.2.28-2 CASK TEMPERATURE 89
2.2.30-1 SIGNAL STRENGTH FROM STEERABLE ANTENNA 92
2.2.31-1 GIMBAL DRIVE ACTUATOR OPERATION 94
2.2.31-2 DESCENT ENGINE TRIM CONTROL 95
2.2.33-1 ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS 100
2.2.33-2 MODE CONTROL SWITCH OPERATION 101
2.2.33-3 LUNAR MODU~£ GUIDANCE SWITCH LOCATIONS 102
2.2.34-1 OPTICS RETICLE DIMMER 105
2.2.34-2 ALIGNMEN~ OPTICAL TELESCOPE 106
2.2.36-1 MEASURED CABIN PRESSURE DURING JETTISON 110
2.2.36-2 PRESSURES AND VENT AREAS DURING SEPARATION
SEQUENCE 111
2.2.36-3 LUNAR MODULE HATCH LATCH 112
2.2.37-1 FAILURE OF 70-MM CAMERA 114
2.2.37-2 MAGAZINE INSTALLATION IN 16-i-iM CAMERAS 115

iii
 ABSTRACT

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE FINAL FLIGHT EVALUATION REPORT FOR THE APOLLO 10 MISSION. IT INCLUDES
DATA FROM THE NASA CENTER 5-DAY, 30-DAY AND 60~DAY REPORTS, AND THE APOLLO 11 FLIGHT READINESS
REVIEW. THE REPORT INCLUDES A SUMMARY OF THE MISSION, A SUMMARY OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENTS,
AND THE ANOMALIES ENCOUNTERED DURING THE MISSION. THE ANOMALIES ARE LIS'rED IN A SEPARATE SEC-
TION ACCORDING TO LAUNCH VEHICLE SPACECRAFT, AND GROUND SYSTEMS.

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE BOEING COMPANY WOC/TIE UNDER NASA/APO MAT-l TECHNICAL
DIRECTION; CONTRACT NASW-1650, TASK NO. 10.0.

KEY WORDS

ANOMALY

APOLLO 10

FLIGHT EVALUATION

MISSION REPORT

iv
,~f

1. 0 INTRODUCTION

APOLLO 10 WAS THE THIRD MANNED SATURN V FLIGHT, THE SECOND FLIGHT OF A MANNED LUNAR MODULE,
AND THE FIRST MISSION TO OPERATE THE COMPLETE APOLLO SPACECRAFT AROUND THE MOON. THIS
MISSION PROVIDED ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE FOR THE CREW, SPACE VEHICLE, AND MISSION-
ORIENTED FACILITIES DURING A SIMULATED LUNAR LANDING MISSION.

APOLLO 10 (SA-505/CS-I06/LM-4) WAS AN "F" TYPE MISSION DESIGNED TO DUPLICATE CONDITIONS OF

THE LUNAR LANDING MISSION (APOLLO 11) AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT ACTUALLY Lru~DING.

1.1 CARRY-OVER ANOMALIES FOR SUBSEQUENT FLIGH'l' READINESS REVIEWS

FAILURE OF IU AIR/GN P'JRGE DUCT (PG 17)

2
TWO RETAINING SPRINGS ON TUNNEL CHARGE (PG 68)
HOLDER RING DID NOT CAPTURE

DROP IN SIGNAL STRENGTH ON S-BAND STEERABLE ANTENNA (PG 91)

LARGE LM ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS DURING STAGING (PG 97)

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...-.~--- ~ .... -~~.
1.2 MISSION SUMMARY

FIRST PERIOD
THE APOLLO 10 WAS SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED FROM LAUNCH COMPLEX 39A AT KENNEDY SPACE CENTER,
FLORIDA ON MAY 18, 1969 AT 12:49 P.M. EDT, WITH NO UNSCHEDULED HOLDS. THE CREW WAS COM-
POSED OF LT. COL. THOMAS STAFFORD, CDMR. JOHN YOUNG AND CDMR. EUGENE CERNAN. THE LAUNCH VEHICLE
PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY, ACHIEVING AN EARTH PARKING ORBIT OF 102.6 x 99.6 NhUTICAL .
MILES (NM) AT 00:11:52.8 (HRS:MIN:SEC) GET (GROUND ELAPSED TIME). TRANSLUNAR INJECTION (PRE-
TLI) CHECKOUT WAS CONDUCTED AS PLANNED. THE TLI BURN LASTED 5 MINUTES 43 SECONDS WITH ALL
SYSTEMS OPERATING SATISPACTORILY AND ALL END CONDITIONS BEING NOMINAL FOR THE TRANSLUNAR
COAST, FREE REWRN CIP.(;UMLUNAR TRAJECTORY.
AFTER CSM SEPARATION FROM THE LMjSLAjIUjS-IVB AT 3:02:51 (HRS:MIN:SEC) GET, CSM TRANSPOSITION
AND DOCKING WEP~ COMPLETED BY 3:17 GET. EXCELLENT QUALITY COLOR TELEVISION COVERAGE OF
THE DOCKING SEQUENCES WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE GOLDSTONE TRACKING STATION AND WAS SEEN ON WORLD-
WIDE COMMERCIAL TELEVISION. EJECTION OF THE CSMjLM FROM THE S-IVB WAS SUCCESSFULLY
ACCOMPLISHED AT 3:56:24 GET, AND A 2.5-SECOND SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM (SPS) EVASIVE MANEUVER
WAS PERFORMED AS PLANNED AT 4:39:09.8 GET.

ALL LAUNCH VEHICLE SAFING ACTIVITIES AND THE S-IVB LIQUID OXYGEN AND LIQUID HYDROGEN LEAD
TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT EXPERIMENTS WERE PERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY AS SCHEDULED. THE SUBSEQUENT
PROPEL~~T DUMP WAS SUCCESSFUL AND SUFFICIENT IMPULSE WAS PROVIDED TO THE S-IVB FOR A
"SLINGSHOT" MANEUVER TO EARTH ESCAPE VELOCITY. AUGMENTATION OF THIS IMPULSE BY THE S-IVB
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM ULLAGE ENGINE BURN WAS TERMINATED BY GROUND CO~MAND I~~DIATELY
AFTER IGNITION. THE CLOSEST APPROACH OF THE S-IVB TO THE MOON WAS 1752 NM AT 78:54 GET.

SECOND PERIOD

MIDCOURSE CORRECTION BURN NUMBER 1 (MCC-l), ORIGINALLY PLANNED AT 11:30 GET AS A 47 FOOT-PER-
SECOND (FPS) SPS MANEUVER, WAS NOT CONDUCTED. MIDCOURSE CORRECTION MANEUVER NUMBER 2 (MCC-2)
WAS PER?ORMED AT 26:32:56.8 GET BY A 6.7-SECQND FIRING OF THE SPS RESULTING IN ~ VELOC1TY
CHANGE OF 48.9 FPS (48.7 FPS PLANNED). ALL PARA1-lETERS APPEARED NOMINAL AND THE RESUL'fING
PERICYNTHION WAS 60.9 NM. CONSEQUENTLY, MIDCOURSE CORRECTION MANEUVERS NUMBERS 3 AND 4 WERE
NOT REQUIRED. BECAUSE OF THE CHANGE IN PLANNED MIDCOURSE EVENTS, ALL LUNAR EVENTS WERE
ACCOMPLISHED APPROXIMATELY TWELVE MINUTES AHEAD OF SCHEDULE. FIVE COLOR TV TRANSMISSIONS
TOTALING 72 MINU'l'ES WERE MADE DURING TRANSLUNAR COAST.

2
THE LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION MANEUVER (LOI-l) WAS PLANNED IN REAL TIME FOR 75:55:54 GET AND
WAR ACCOMPLISHED ON SCHEDULE. THE SPS ENGINE BURNED FOR 356 SECONDS RESULTING IN AN
INITIAL OP,'3IT OF 170.6 BY 60.2 NM. THIS COMPARES VERY WELL WITH THE PRELAUNCH-PLANNED
ORBIT OF 170 BY 60 NM, AND THE REAL-TIME-PLANNED ORBIT OF 170.7 BY 59.7 NM. THE SPS BUIDI
DATA APPEARED TO BE NOMINAL, WITH FUEL TANK PRESSURE AND OXIDIZER INTERFACE PRESSURE
SLIGHTLY ON THE HIGH SIDE OF NOMINAL, BUT WELL WITHIN EXPECTED TOLERANCE.

THE LUNAR ORBIT CIRCULARIZATION MANEUVLR, LOI-2, WAS PLANNED IN REAL TIME FOR 80:25:07
GE'i' AND WAS ALSO ACCOMPLISHED ON SCHEDULE. THE SPS ENGINE BURNED FOR 14 SECONDS RESULT-
ING IN AN INITIAL OI~IT OF 61.9 BY 59.2 NM. THIS COMPARES WELL WITH ?HE PRELAUNCH-
PlANNED ORBIT OF 60 BY 60 NM AND THE REAL-TIME-PLANNED ORBIT OF 60.1 BY bO.l NM. ALL SPS
Pl~TERS WERE NOMINAL.

It 29-MINUTE SCHEDULED COLOR 'rELEVISION TRANSMISSION OF THE LUNAR SURFACE WAS CONDUCTED
AT 80:45 GET (21:34 EDT, 21 MAY). LUNAR LANDMARK TRACKING ON TWO TARGETS WAS ACCOMPLISHED
AND INDICATIONS ARE THAT THESE LANDMARKS WERE WELL SPACED AND OF GOOD QUALITY.

THE LUNAR MODULE PILOT TRANSFERRED Tv THE LM AT 81:55 GET FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS OF SCHEDULED
"HOUSEKEEPING" ACTIVITIES AND SOME LM COMMUNICATIONS TESTS. THE TESTS \iERE TERMINATED
AFTER THE LM RELAY COMMUNICATIONS TESTS BECAUSE OF TIME LIMITATIONS. RESULTS OF THE
COMPLETED TESTS WERE EXCELLENT AND THOSE TESTS REMAINING WERE CONDUCTED AT A LATER TIME TN
THE MISSION.

THIRD PERIOD

THE COMMANDER AND LUNAR MODULE PILOT ENTERED THE LM AT 95: 02 GET AND PERFORMED THE PRE-
PLANNED CHECKS OF ALL SYSTEMS. THE RENDEZVOUS EXERCISE WAS BEGUN ON TIME WITH UNDOCKING
AT 98:22 GET. THE SERVICE MODULE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM (SM RCS) WAS USED TO SEPARATE
THE CSM ABOUT 30 FEET FROM THE LM. SUBSEQUENTLY THE LM LANDING GEAR WAS DEPLOYED.
STATIONKEEPING WAS INITIATED AT THIS POINT WHILE THE COMMAND MODULE PILOT ItJ THE CSM
VISUALLY INSPECTED THE LM. THE SM RCS WAS THEN USED TO PERFORM THE SEPARATION MANEUVER
DIRECTED RADIALLY DOWNWARD TOWARD THE MOON'S CENTER. THIS MANEUVER PROVIDED AN LM/CSM
SEPARA'l.'ION AT DESCENT ORBIT INSERTION (DOl) OF ABOiJT 2 NAUTICAL MILES. THE DOl WAS
PERFORMED BY AN LM DES,:;ENT PROPULSION SYSTEM (DPS) BURN lHORIZONTAL, RETROGRADE), SUCH
THAT THE RESULTING PER:,-CYNTHION (LOWEST POINT IN ORBIT) OCCURRED ABOUT 15° PRIOR TO
LUNAR LANDING SITE NUMBER 2. THE LOWEST ALTI'l'UDE ABOVE THE MOON I ~ SURFJl.CE ACHIEVED BY
THE LM WAS 8.4 NM. NUMEROUS PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE LUNAR SURFACE WERE TAKEN; HOWEVER, SOME
CAMERA MALFUNCTIONS WERE REPORTED. ALTHOUGH SOME COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICU£TIES WERE

3
 EXPERIENCED, THE CREW PROVIDED 1'~ CONTINUOUS COMMENTARY ON THEIR OBSERVATIONS. '):HE LM
Lru~DING RADAR TEST WAS EXECUTED DURING THE LOW ALTITUDE PASS OVER THE SURFACE. EARLY
DATA INDICATES INITIAL Jl.CQUISI'IION OCCURREC AT A HEIGHT OF 65,000 FEET. INDICATED
PERICYNTHION ALTITCDE AS MEASUI~D BY THE LANDING RADAR DURING THE FLY-BY WAS 47,000
FEE'J' •

THE SECOND LM MANE,OVER. THE DPS PHASING BURN, ESTABLISHED AT THE RESULTING LM PERICYNTHION,
A CSM LEAD ANGLE EQUIVALENT TO THAT WHICH WOULD OCCUR DURING THE LUNAR LANDING MISSION.
THf~ A?OCYNTHION ALTITtiDE OF THE PHASING ORBIT WAS 190.1 NM •

.ABOUT 'l'EN MINU'l'ES PRIOR TO PERICYNTHION, THE LM DESCENT STAGE WAS JETTISONED. THE LM
REACTION CONTR0L SYSTEM (LM ReS) SEPARATION ¥ANEu\~R AT STAGING WAS ACCOM~LISHED USING
'rHE ABORT GUID1~CE SYSTEM (AGS) AS PRESCRIBED IN PREMISSION PLANS. INADVERTENTLY, THE
MODE CONTROL S'f;ITCH WAS LEFT IN "AUTO" RATHER THAN THE REQUIRED "ATTITUDE HOLD" MODE.
IN AUTO, THE hGS A'l'TEMP'l'ED TO POINT THE LM Z AXIS TOWARD THE CM. THE COMMANDER TOOK
OVER MANUAL CONTRO'L TO REESTl~BLISH THE PROPER LM ATTITUDE. THEN, AT PERICYNTHION, THE
INSERTION lA.ANI-;UVER WAS PERFORMED ON TIME USING THE LM ASCENT PROPULSION SYSTEM (APS).
THIS BURN EST1\.BJ.. ISH!::D THE EQUIVALENT OF THE STANDARD LM INSERTION ORBIT (45 BY 11. 2 N~n
OF A LUNAR LA..~DIUG MISSION.

THE LM COASTED FROM INSERTION IN THE 45.3 NM BY 11. 2 NM ORBIT FOR ABOUT J.~N HOUR. CON-
CENTRIC SEQUENCE INITIATION (CSI) WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT APOCYNTHION. A SMAI,L CONSTANT
DELTA HEIGHT (CDH) MANEUVER WAS REQUIRED (AS EXPECTED) TO NULL OUT MINOR CISPERSIONS.
THE TERMINAL ~~EUVER OCCU~D AT ABOU~' THE MIDPOINT OF DARKNESS. BRAKING DURING THE
TERMINAL PHASE FINALIZATION (TPF) WAS PERFORMED MANUALLY AS PLANNED.

THE f~NDEZVOuS WAS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL AND ALL PARAMETERS WERE VERY CLOSE TO NOMINAL. CSM-
ACTIVE DOCKING WAS ACCOMPLISHED SMOO'fHI.Y .M.ND EXPEDITIOUSLY AT 106: 22: 00 GET.

ONCE DOCKED TO THE CSM, THE TWO LM CRE~ffiN TRANSFERRED WITH THE EXPOSED FILM PACKETS AND
THE I,M HASSEU3LAD CAMERA TO THE CS!'4. THE LM MAURER SEQUENCE CAMERA. AND PRIMARY LITHIUM
HYDROXIDE C]\!~NISTER (BOTH OF WHICH J NCURRED INFLIGHT PROBLEMS) WERE :'.~,.':;'J TRANSFERRED TO
THE CSM SO THESE ITEMS COULD BE INS~)ECTED POSTFI.IGHT. THE CSM VJAS SEPARATED FROM THE
LM AT 108:43:30 GET USING THE SM ReS.

u
FOURTH PERIOD

ABOUT ONE REVOLUTION AFTER DOCKING, THE LM APS BURN TO DEPLETION WAS COMMANDED BY THE
MANNED SPACE FLIGHT NETWORK (MSFN), UTILIZING THE LM ASCENT ENGINE ARMING ASSEMBLY.
THIS BURN PLACED THE LM IN A SOLAR ORBIT. LM/MSFN COMMUNICATIONS WERE MAINTAINED UNTIL
LM ASCENT STAGE BATTERY DEPLETION AT ABOUT 12 HOURS AFTER CSM/LM SEPARATION.
DURING THE REMAINING LUNAR ORBITAL PERIOD OF OPERATION, 18 LANDMARK SIGHTINGS AND
EXTENSIVE STEREO STRIP AND OBLIQUE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN. TWO SCHEGULED TV PE~IODS
WERE DELETED BECAUSE OF CREW FATIGUE. THE CREW SIGHTED THE LM DESCENT STAGE ON SEVERAL
OCCASIONS. AT 137:36:28 GET, THE SPS INJECTED THE CSM INTO A TRANSEARTH TRAJECTORY
AFTER A TOTAL TIME IN LUNAR ORBIT OF 61.5 HOURS (31 ORBITS). THE TEl BURN WAS TARGETED
FOR A TRANSEARTH RETUI~ TIME OF 53 HOURS.

FIFTH PERIOD

THIS PERIOD COMMENCED WITH A LIVE TELEVISION THANSMISSION THROUGH THE HONEYSUCKLE TRACK-
ING Sl'ATION AND INTELSAT III COMr.-~UNICA~lONS SATELLITE, SHORTLY AFTER TEl AT 137:51 GE'r.
FOCUS AT ALL ZOOM LENS SETTINGS WAS EXCELLENT. ANOTHER COLOR TELEVISION TRANSMISSION
NAS RECEIVED AT 139:27 GET.

FOLLOWING A SLEEP PERIOD, STAR ~UNAR LANDMARK NAVIGATION ?IGHTI~GS WERE TAKEN AT 151:00
GET.

THE ACCURACY OF THE TRANSEARTH I.~JECTION (TEl) MANEUVER WAS sun~ THAT THE FIRST TRANS-
T'ARTH MIDCOURSE CORRECTlm; U·k"'~- ~) ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOn 1.52: 00 GET WAS NOT NECESSARY.
THE WASTE WATER DUMP CONDUC'l'e[, i. . ~· j 53: 50 GET WAS ORIENTED TO ~DUCE 'hiE PROBABILI'I'Y OF
MIDCOURSE CORRECTIONS. CHECKcr.::',,7 THe ENTRY MONITOR SYSTEM WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT
154: 35 GET TO ENSUP.E ITS READ H-i';", : :'r' -, THE EN'rRY PHl\SE.

A TEN-MINUTE COLOR TELEVISION BROAOCA;' 1. ',J:,~; : ::\ ,';'=: t.T APPROXIMATELY 14"7: ~D GET. A TWENTY-
NINE-MINUTE BROAOCAST OF THE MOON, EAi<TH, "'.l~£' SPACECRAFT INTERIOR WAS RECEIVED AT 152: J
GET. A NUMBER OF STAR-EARTH HORIZON NAVIGATION SIGHTINGS WERE TAKEN. THE CSM S-BAND
HIGH-GAIN REFLECTIVITY TEST WAS CONDUCTED AT 168:00 GET. AN UNSCHEDULED LIVE COLOR
TELEVISION TRANSMISSION OF THE EARTH AND THE COMMAND MODULE INTERIOR WAS RECEIVED AT
137:27 GET. THE SECOND TRANSEARTH MIDCOURSE CORRECTI~N (MCC-6) ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR
176:50 GET WAS NOT NECESSARY.
SIXTH PERIOD

THE CREW WAS AWAKENED AT 185: 00 GET AND INITIATED ENTRY PREPARA':!'IONS. THE FINAL LIVE
COLOR TEI,EVISION TRANSMISSIOt.1 WAS RECEIvr.D A~' 186:50 GET. MCC-7 WAS PERFORMED AT
188:49:57 GET. ENTRY INTERF.~~E WAS REACHED AT 191:48:54 GE'X WITH SPLASHDOWN IN THE
MID-PACIFIC. AT APPROXIMATELY 15°S AND 165°W. FLIGHT CREW PERFORMANCE WAS OUT8TANDING.
ALL THREE CREW MEMBERS REMAINED IN EXCELLENT HEALTH THROUGHOUT THE MISSION.

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 1.3 APOLLO PROGRAM IMPACT.

SINCE THE FIRRT SATURN FLIGHT, THE APOLLO PROGRAM HAS BEEN BUILDING FOR A LUNAR LANDING AND
~XPLORATION OF THE LUNAR SURFACE. EACH SUCCESSIVE FLIGHT HAS EVALUATED THE PERFORMANCE AND
OPEJ<AT:IONAL CM>ACITY OF SPECIFIC PIECES OF HARDWARE AND OPERl'.'rING PROCEDURES. THE FIRST
APO:i:..LO FLIGHTS, AS-201 THROUGH APOLLO 6, WERE LAUNCH VEHICLE AND SPACECRAFT DEVELOPMENT.
l!'I.IGHTS. APOLLO 7, THE FIRST MA.~NED APOLLO FLIGHT, DEMONSTRATED CSM/CREW PERFORMANCE AND CSM
RENDEZVOUS CAPABILITY. THE APOLLO 8 MISSION PROVIDED THE NEXT PHASE IN THE APOLLO PROGRAM
BY SUCCESSFULLY DEMONSTRATING CSM OPERATIONS AND SELECTED BACKUP LUNAR LANDING MISSION ACTIV-
IT ... ES IN LUNAR ORBIT.. APOLLO 9 WAS AN EARTH-ORBITAL MISSION WHICH DEMONS'l'RA'l'ED CSM/LM OPERA-
TIONS &~D LM/CREW PERFORMANCE CF SELECTED LUNAR LANDING MISSION ACTIVITIES IN EARTH ORBIT.
THE PURPOSE OF THE APOLLO 10 MISSION, A LUNAR-ORBI'l'AL MISSION, WAS TO EVALUATE LM PERFORM-
ANCE IN THE CISLUNAR AND LUNAR ENVIRONMENT AND TO DUPLICATE THE LUNAR LANDING PROFILE AS
CLOSELY AS rOSSIBLE WITHOUT ACTUALLY LANDING.

SUFFICIENT DATA WERE OBTAINED TO VERIFY THAT ALL PRIMARY OBJECTIVES WERE MET. NO MA,JOR ANO~.­
LIES WERE ENCOUNTERED WHICH WOULD IMPOSE A CONSTRAINT ON FUTURE MISSIUclS.

THE SUCCESS OF THE APOLLO 10 MISSION VERIFIED THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SPACE VFHICLE AND SUPPORT
SYSTEMS ENABLING THE PROGRAM TO PROCEED WITH THE ACTUAL LUNAR LANDING MISSION, APOLLO 11.

.&_.F'---::-------.. . -" " " .-. . ~---.-----.--.,-~- . ,. . . . . _.

~',..,..,_
 1.4 SUMMARY OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES

o DEMONSTRATE CREW/SPACE VEHICI.E/MISSION SUPPORT FACILITIES PERFORMANCE DURING A MANNED

LUNAR MISSION WITH CSM AND LM.

o EVALUATE LM PERFORMANCE IN THE CISLUNAR AND LUNAR ENVIRONMENT.

ALL OF THE APOLLO 10 MISSION PRIMARY OBJECTIVES WERE OBTAINED. ONE ~)F 'l'T-{E SECONDARY DETAIL
TEST OBJECTIVES (6.-9) WAS CANCELLED AND ANOTHER (20.80) EXPERIENCED SOME COMMUNICATION PROBLr~,
BUT DID NOT IMPACT THE MISSION.

TABLE I IS A LIST OF EVENT TIMES COMPARING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRE-MISSION PLANNED EVENT
TIMES AND ACTUAL MISSION TIMES. A DELAY OF THE FIRST MIDCOURSE CORRECTION TO THE MCC-2 OPTION
CAUSED THE TRANSLUNAR TRAJECTORY TO BE LONGER THAN PLANNED THUS DELAYING LUNAR ORBIT EVENTS
APPROXIMATELY 12 MINUTES. A LISTING OF LAUNCH VEHICLE AND SPACECRAFT DETAILED TEST OBJECTIVES,
ALONG WITH THE RESPECTIVE DEGREE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT FOLLOWS:

LAUNCH VEHICLE ACCOMPLISHMENT

OBJECTIVE
1. (~: VERIFY J-2 ENGINE MODIFICATIONS. NO PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED

2. (S) CONFIRM J-2 ENGINE ENVIRONMENT IN S-II AND NO PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED
S-IVB STAGES.

J. (S) CONFIRM LAUt.:CH VEHICLE I~ONGITUDINAL OSCILLATIONS THIS OBJEC'I'IVE WAS SUCCESSFULLY
ENVIRONMENT DURING S-IC STAGE BURN PERIOD. DEMONSTRATED.

4. (S) VERIFY THAT MODIFlCATICN INCORPORATED IN THE S-IC THIS OBJECTIVE WAS SUCCESSFULLY
STAGE SUPPRESS LOW FREQUENCY LONGITUDINAL OSCILLA- DEMONSTRATED.
TIONS.

5. (S) CONFIRM LAUNCH VEHICLE LONGITUDINAL OSCILLATI0N THIS OBJECTIVE WAS SUCCESSFULLY
ENVIRONMENT DURING S-II STAGE BURN PERIOD. DEMONSTRATED.

_ _- - - - -_____ ___.'_ "" _ _ _ ...... _f _ ___ ·_,.,.. .. ·..·. ·......·,_

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OBJECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMF;NT

6. (S) ~EMONST&\TE THAT EARLY CENTER ENGINE CUTOFF SATISFACTORILY DEMONSTRATED. EARLY
FOR S-II STAGE SUPPRESSES LOW FREQUENCY SHUTDOWN SUCCESSFULLY ELIMINATED
LONGITUDINAL OSCILLATIONS. THE PROBLEM.

SPACECRAFT
OBJECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT

P(20.78) DEMONSTRATE CSM/LM RENDEZVOUS CAPABILITY THIS OBJECTIVE WAS SATISFACTORILY

FOR A LUNAR LANDING MISSION. DEMONSTRATED.

P(16.10) PERFORM MANUAL AND AUT0MATIC ACQUISITION, COMPLETED SATI8FACTORILY, SOME

TRACKING, AND COMMUNICA"rIDNS WITH MSFN DIFFICULTIES DURING REV. 13.
USING THE STEERABLE S-BAND ANTENNA AT
LUNAR DISTANCE.

P(20.121) PERFORM LUNAR LANDMARK TRACKING FROM THE THIS OBJECTIVE WAS SATISFACTORILY
CSM WHILE IN LUNAR ORBIT. PERFORMED.

P(20.91) PERFORM LUNAR LANDMARK TRACKING IN LUNAR THIS OBJECTIVE WAS SATISFACTORILY
ORBI~ FROM THE CSM WITH THE LM ATTACHED. PERFORMED.

P(16.14) OPERATE THE LANDING RADAR AT THE CLOSEST THIS OBJECTIVE WAS COMPLETED
APPROACH TO THE MOON AND DURING DPS BURNS. SATISFACTORILY.

P(20.66) OBTAIN DATA ON THE CM AND LM cru~w PROCE- THIS DATA WAS OBTAINED.
DURES AND TlMELINE FOR THE LUNAR ORBIT
PHASE OF A LUNAR LANDING MISSION.

P (11.15) PERFORM PGNCS/DPS UNDOCKED DESCENT ORBIT THIS OBJECTIVE WAS PERFORMED.
INSERTION (DOl) AND A HIGH THRUST MANEUVER.

'C I
 OBJEC'I'IVES ACCOMPLISHMENTS

3(16.17 DEMONSTRATE LM/CSM/MSFN COMMUNICA~IONS DATA OBTAINED SOME PROBLEMS DUE TO

AT LUNAR DISTANCE. PROCEEDUAL ERRORS.
S(16.12) COMMUNICATE WITH MSFN USING THE LM·- DATA OBTAINED, SOME PROBLEMS DURING
S-BAND 0MNIANTENNAS AT LUNAR DISTANCE P~V. 13.

S(16.15) OB~AIN DATA ON THE RENDEZVOUS RADAN PER- DATA OBTAINED.

FORMANCE AND CAPABILITY NEAR MAXIMUM
RANGE.
S(13.14) OBTAIN SUPERCRITICAL HELIUM SYSTEft.! PRESSURE DATA OBTAINED ,.
DA~A ~HILE IN STANDBY CONDITIONS AND
DURING ALL DPS ENGINE FIRINGS.
S(12.9) PERFORM AN UNMANNED AGS-CONTROLLED APS THIS OBJECTIVE WAS PERFORMED SATIS-
BURN. FACTORILY.
S(20.77) OBTAIN DATA ON THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATA OBTAINED.
OF VHF RANGING DURING A LM-ACTIVE RENDEZVOUS.
S(20.86) OBTAIN DATA ON THE EFFECTS OF LUNAR ILLUMINA- DATA OETAINED.
TION AND CONTRAST CONDITIONS ON CREW VISUAL
PERCEPTION WHILE IN LUNAR ORBIT.

S7.26) OBTAIN DATA ON THE PASSIVE THERMAL CONTROL DATA. OBTAINED.

(PTC) SYSTEM DURING A LUNAR ORBIT MISSION.
S(20.79) DEMONSTRATE CSM/LM PASSIVE THERMAL CONTROL DATA OBTAINED SATISFACTORILY.
MODES DURING A LUNAR ORBIT MISSION.
S (12. A) DEMONSTRATE RCS TRANSLATION AND ATTITUDE THIS OBJECTIVE WAS SATISFACTORILY
CONTROL OF THE STAGED LM USING AUTOMATIC DEMONSTRATED.
AND MANUAL AGS/CES CONTROL.

10
 OBJECTIVES ACCOMPLISHMENTS
S(12.10) EVALUATE THE ABILITY OF THE AGS TO COMPLET' ~D.
PERFORM A LM-ACTlVE RENDEZVOUS.
S(20.82) MONI~OR PGNCS/AGS PERFORMANCE DURING DA'fA OBTAINED.
LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS.

S(20.80) DEMONSTRATE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FOR A SOME COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS.

CSM/LM LUNAR ORBIT MISSION.

S(13.13) PERFORM A LONG DURATION UNMANNED APS BURN. THIS OBJECTIVE WAS PERFORMED SATIS-
FACTORILY.
S(20.117) PERFORM LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION USING SPS
GNCS-CONTROLLED BURNS WITH A DOCKED CSM/ THIS OBJECTIVE WAS PERFORMED SATIS-
LM FACTORILY.
S(11.17) OBTAIN DATA TO VERIFY IMU PERFORMANCE DATA OBTAINED.
IN THE FLIGHT ENVIRONMENT.
S(6.9) PERFORM A REFLECTIVITY TEST USING THE CANCELLED WHILE DOCKED.
CSM S-BAND HIGH-GAIN ANTENNA WHILE DOCKED.
S(20.46~ PERFORM CSM TRANSPOSITION, DOCKING, AND COMPLETED.
CSM/LM EJECTION AFTER THE S-IVB TLI BURN.
S(20.95) PERFORM TRANSLUNAR MIDCOURSE CORREC~IONS. COMPLETED-ONLY ONE OF FOUR MIDCOURSE
CORRECTIONS REQUIRED.
S(12.6) OBTAIN AGS PERFORMANCE DATA IN THE FLIGHT
ENVIRONMENT. DATA OBTAINED.

S(1.39) PERFORM STAR-LUNAR LANDMARK SIGIITINGS DURING DAl'A OBTAINED.

THE TRANSEARTH PHASE.

S(20.83) OBTAIN DATA ON LM CONSUMABLES FOR A SIMULATED DATA OBTAINED.

LUNAR LANDING MIBSION, IN LUNAR ORBIT, TO
DETERMINE LUNAR LANDING MISSION CONSUMABLES.

11
 TABLE I APOLLO 10 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

~VENT ACTUAL TIME PLANNED TIME DIFF

(HR:MIN:SEC) (HR:MIN:SEC) (MIN: SEC)

Liftoff 0:00:00 0:00:00 0:00

Pitch and Roll Start 0:00:13 0:00:12 + 0 :01

Roll Complete 0:0~:32 0:00:30 + 0 :02

S-IC IBECO 0:02:15 0:02:15 0:00

Begin Tilt Arrest 0:02:37 0:02:37 0:00

S-IC OBECO 0:02:42 0:02:40 + 0 :02

S-IC/S-II Separation 0:02:42 0:02:41 + 0: 01

S-II Engine Start 0:02:43 0:02:42 + 0: 01

S-II Second Plane Separation 0:03:12 0:03:11 + 0: 01

LE'l' Jettison 0:03:18 0:03:16 + 0: 02

S-II Cutoff 0:09:13 0:09:14 -0:01

S-II/S-IW Separation 0:09:13 0:09:15 -0:01

S-lW Engine Start 0:09:14 0:09:15 -0:01

S-IW Cutof r 0:11:44 0:11:44 0:00

Insertion 0:11:54 0:11:54 0:00

TLI (S-IW) 2: 39 : 21 2:39:17 +0:04

12
 - 'oF--

TABLE I APOLLO 10 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

EVENT ACTUAL TIME PLANNED TIME DIFF

(HR:MIN :SEC) (HR: MIN: SEC) (MIN:SEC)

Evasive Maneuver (SPS) 4:39:10 4:28:48 +0:22

MCC-l (SPS) Not Required 9:38:46

MCC-2 (SPS) 26:32:57 26:39:17 -7:40

MCC-.3 (SM RCS) Not Required 53:45:43

MCC-4 Not Required 70:45:43

LOI-l (SPS) 75:55:54 75:45:43 +lC:ll*

LOI-2 (SPS) 80: 25: 0 7 80: 10: 46 +14:21

Undock (SM RCS) 98:22:00 98:05:16 +16:44

CSM/LM Separation Maneuver 98:47:16 98:35:15 +12:00

(SM RCS)

DOl (LM DPS) 99:46:01 99:33:57 +12:04

Phasing (LM DPS) 100:58:25 100:46:21 +12:04

Staging (LM RCS) 102:45:00 102:33:18 +11:42

Insertion (LM APS) 102:55:01 102:43:1a +11:43

CSI (LM RCS) 103:45:55 103:33:46 +12:09

COH (LM RCS) 104:43:52 104:31:42 +12:09

* Omission of MCC-l delayed lunar orbit event times.

13
 1;,> ,\ I

TABLE I APOLLO 10 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

E\ENT ACTUAL TIME PLANNED TIME VIFF

(HR:MIN: SEC) (HR:MIN :SEC) (MIN: SEC)

TPI (LM RCS) 105:22:55 105:08:57 +13: 58

Docking (SM RCS) 106:22:08 106:15:00 + 7: 08

APS Depletion (LM. APS) 108:51:01 108:38:57 +12: 0 4

TEl (SPS) 137:36:28 137:20:22 +16:06

MCC-5 Not Required 152:20:22

loCC-6 Not Required 176:50:32

MCC-7 188:49:57 188:50:32 -00:35

Entry Interface (400,000 feet) 191:48:54 191:50:32 -01:38

Splashdown 192:03:23 192:04:27 -01:04

14

• •
2.0 ANOMALY LISTING

~IlIS SECTION CONTAINS A LISTING OF ANOMALIES OR PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE MISSION. THEY
ARE LISTED ACCORDING TO LAUNCH VEHICLE AND SPACECRAFT (COMMAND/SERVICE MODULE AND LUNAR
MODULE) • ThE GROUND SYSTEM SUPPORTING THE APOLLO 10 COUN?DOWN AND LAUNCH PERFOR!-1ED SATIS-
FACTORILY AND THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT ANOMALIES.

LAUNCH VEHICLE (MSFC)

2.1.1 FAILURE OF IU AIR/GN PURGE DUCT

2.1. 2 S-IVB OSCILLATIONS 2
2.1. 3 S-IVB AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP ABNO~UlT, OPERATION
2.1. 4 S-IVB APS MODULE HELIUM LEAK

SPACECRAFT - COMMAND/SERVICE MODULE (MSC)

2.2.1 CM RCS HELIUM LEAK

2.2.2 CH Res OXIDIZER LINE BURST DIAPHRAGM FAILURE
2.2.3 PRIMARY ECS EVAPORATOR DRIED OUT
2.2.4 WATER PROBLEM
2.2.5 LOW PRESSURE FROM WATER GUN
2.2.6 THERMAL COATING ON FORWARD HATCH F~ED OFF
2.2.7 TUNNEL WOULD NOT VENT
2.2.8 SIMPLEX-A NOT OPEP~TING
2.2.9 eM P~NDEZVOUS RADAR TRANSPONDER FAILED TO OPERATE
2. 2.10 CM SEQUENCE CAMERA
2.2.11 ~_~L CELL 1 AC CIRCUIT BP~~~ER OPEN
2.2.12 CONDENSER EXIT TEMPERATURE FLUCTUATIONS - FUEL CELL 2
2. 2.13 CRYOGENIC HYDROGEN AUTOMATIC HEATER CONTROL FAILURE TO TURN OFF
2. 2.14 OVERPRESSURE OF &~CTANTS IN FUEL CELL 1 WHEN PURGE VALVE CLOSED
2. 2.15 EDS MODULE LIGHT BULBS FAILED INTERMITTENTLY
2. 2.16 ENTRY MONITOR SYSTEM STOPPED SCRIBING WHEN INITIALIZED
2.2.17 VHF BEACON ANTENNA DID NOT DEPLOY
2. 2.18 TWO RETAINING SPRINGS ON TUNNEL CFARGE HOLDER RING DID NOT CAPTURE
2. 2.19 SLOW-DOWN OF ONBOARD TAPE RECORDER DURING ENTRY

15
 2.2.20 EVA STRUT BRACE NOT IN STOWED POSITION FOR LAUN~H
2.2.21 GYRO DISPL~Y COUPLER PERFOP~CE
2.2.22 CHLORINE AMPULE LEAKAGE
2.2.23 DIGITAL EVENT TIMER MISCOUNTS
2.2.24 SUIi' HEAT EXCHANGER WICK DIFFICULT 'ro SERVICE

LUNAR MODULE

2.2.25 CREW REPORTED Ll-l WATER CONTAINED AIR

2.2.26 HIGH NOISE L~VEL IN LM CABIN
2.2.27 YAW RATE GYRO OUTPUT ERROR
2.2.28 INSTRUMENTATION DISCREPANCIES
2.2.29 BACKUP VOICE NOISE ON OMNI IN REVOLUTION 13
2.2.30 DROP IN SIGNAL STRENGTH ON S-BAND STEERABLE ANTENNA
2.2.31 DPS GIMBAL DRIVE PITCH ACTUATOR FAILED
2.2.32 COMMANDERS OXYGEN PURGE SYSTEM HEATER LIGHT DID NOT COME ON
2.2.33 LARGE LM ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS DURING STAGING
2.2.3~ OPTIC~ SYSTEM PROBLEMS
2.2.35 ABNORMAL RISE IN CO INDICATIONS ON PRIMARY LIOH CARTRIDGE
~. ~. 16 LM CABIN DEPRESSURI~ED AT FINAL SEPARATION
2.2.37 CAMERA FAILURES
2.2.38 FAILURE TO GET ADEQUATE DATA DUMPS
2.2.39 APS LOW LEVEL INDICATIONS
2.2.40 LEFT-HAND HEAD STRUT LOCKOUT HANDLE
2.2.41 FLASHING LIGHT FAILURE

GROUND SYSTEMS

NONE

16

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, _ - - . - -....
~- '5tD--_ _ _ _ _ ' ....._..._-=_ _ _
..... !. . . . .
*~~1iI~_ ....
'\.W~~..-. .. ,... - . . . ' ,
 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.1.1 TITLE: FAILURE OF IU AIR/GN 2 PURGE DUCT

SYSTEM: IU MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: ECS E.VENT TIME: T-B: 57

PROBLEM: ~FTER SWITCHOVER FROM AIR TO GN , A REDUCTION WAS OBSERVED IN PRESSURE IN THE IU/S-IVB
PURGE GASES. THE PRESSURE TRAN~DrrCER READING ON THE RTG COOLING NOZZLE DECREASED FROM
0.)7 PSIG AT T-9:00 TO ALMOST ZERO GAGE PRESSURE AT T-B:30. THE CORRESPONDING GROUND
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (GSE) FLOWRATE INCREASED FROM AN INITIAL VALUE OF 200 LB/MIN TO AN OF~­
SCALE VALUE OF MORE THAN 225 LB/MIN. THE UPSTREAM INLET PRESSURE DECREASED FROM 2.15 PSIG
TO 1. 66 PSIG. THE LOW PRESSURE AT '1'HE INLET TO THE RTG NOZZLE INDICl'TED LOSS OF FLOW
THROUGH THE NOZZLE. THE INCREASE IN FLOWRATE FP.OM T3E GSE WITH i\ CORRESPONDING DECREASE
IN INLET PRESSURE INDICATED THAT AN OPENING HAD OCCURRED SOMEWHEHE IN THE PURGE DUCTING.
THE ECS PURGE SYSTEM CONTINUED TO FUNCTION ADEQUATELY AS INDICATED SO{ A STABLE COMPARTMENT
TEMPERATURE; THE DUCT FAILURE WAS ASSESSED AS NON-CRITICAL FOR THE APOLLO 10 LP.UNCiI, AND
THE COUNTDOWN PROCEEDED.
MSFC TESTS INDICATE THE ECS AIR/GN PURGE DUCT HAD A MASSIVE GAS LEAK AT THE DUCT JOINT
APPROXIM;.TELY 4 INCHES INSIDE THE §TAGE SKIN. THIS JOINT CONSIS~ED OF A FIBERGLASS DUCT
WHICH FIT OVER A SHORT METAL DUCT STUB ATTACHED TO THE IU SKIN. THE FIBERGLASS DUCT WAS
RETAINED BY A MARMAN CLAMP, WHICH WAS ~nRQUED TO 7~1 INCH-POUNDS.

ACTION: AS A RESULT OF THE MSFC TESTS, A SECOND MARMl\N CLAMP WILL BE ADDED, AND BOTH CLAMPS WILL
BE TORQUED TO 20+2INCH-POUNDS. THIS CONFIGURATION HAS BEEN TESTED TO 9 TIMES TIlE NORMAL
OPERATING PRESSU'RE WITH NO FAILURES. THIS CHANGE (IrlH ECP 1905) HAS BEEN COMPLETED ON
APOLLO 11, AND IT WII.L BE ACCOMPLISHED ON ALL Sl1BSEQUEN'l' LAUNCH \EHICLES.

ORGArUZATION: 5-2490
RErEREHCES: MSFC 5-DAY REPORT, PP. 4,5 RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:
APOLLO 11 :FRR
REV:

) .
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMALY 2.1.1

TITLE: FAILURE OF In AI'R/GN., PURGE DUCT

RTG
CAS1~

LH
NEW DUCTING
, ~REFLIGHT AIR/GN2 PURGE SYSTEM
FLEX TUBING ASSV
( ENV 1RONt£NT AL
CONTROL Dl!CTS)

~~~':.:_:',-:::'.~i.~;
NOZZLE TAPE,
~:- - - ----- .~ 1I,
NOZZr;a SUPPORT
STRUCTURE
J
~--;'1/' ' ..-;.s.-_~
c-~~~"::~- .:--:.----

_=~___ -- .~=~ ___ ~9-~ic~~~:~LE==---_-__

J-.-:...::-:;;:;:::;.;.-:;";:;:;;~:;';
• •- s; -124-M3 LAUNCH VEHI CLE
ACCELEROf£TER E~ECTRONIC PLAlr-ORK DIGITAL COff'UTtR
GAS 8EARING ASSY ASSY AC POWER
HEAT SUPPL Y
EXCHAHGER
FIGURE 2.1.1-1
RTG COOLING DUCT/NOZ.li&_ INSTALLATIO":'

:is
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL V 2 • 1. 1

TITLE; FAILURE OF IU AIR/GN PURGE DUCT

2

f'IGURE 2.1. ~-2 IU AIH/GN PURGE DUCT DETAILS

2

JOINT WHICH ACCESS

APPARENTLY FAILED ----~~~~--~OO~O~R--·:I~~~~;S~~~7'j~~~~~

COOLANT PUMP
A~)SEMBL V

19

···_,._--n--------
 I C'.

ANOMAL Y RE PORT

NO. 2.1. 2 TITLE: S-IVB OSCILLATIONS

SYSTEM: S'-IVB MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: PROPULSION EVENT TIME: 0: 09 AND 2: 39

PROBLEM: DURING THE FIRST S-IVB BURN, 19 HERTZ LONGITUDINAL OSCILLA1'IONS OF APPROXINATELY
+0.25 G WERE OBSERVED AT THE ENGINE GIMBAL BLOCK. A SLIGH'r CHANGE IN OSCILLATORY
THRUST, DERIVED FROM CHAMBER PRESSURE, WAS ALSO EVIDENT DU.RING THIS TIME PERIOD.
A REVIEW OF THE APOLLO 8 FLIGHT DATA SHOWED SIMILAR THRUST OSCILLATIONS AS ON
APOLLO 10, BUT AT APPROXIMATELY 1/2 THE G LEVEL. THIS ACTIVI1'Y IS WITHIN THE NORNAL
J-2 ENGINE UNCOUPLED THRUST LEVEL , AND IT DOES NOT REPRESENT CONCEPN FOR FUTURE
APOLLO MISSIONS.

LOW FREQUENCY, LOW AMPLITUDE VIBRATION WAS ALSO PRESEN'l' THROUGHOUT 'rHE SECOND BURN.
SHORTLY AFTER STEP PRESSURIZATION, A PREDOMINANT HIGH FREQUENCY OSCI~LATION OF 46
HER'l'Z OCCURRED AND REMAINED UNTIL CUTOFF. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE WAS SEQUENTIA:G
VENTING OF THE DUAL VENT VALVES IN THE FORWARD SKIR'l' AREA, ~vHICH TENDS TO EXCITE THE
FORWARD SKIRT RING MODE. TESTS WERE RUN AT AEDC TO ATTEMPT TO DUFi..ICATE THE FLIGHT
DATA. APOLLO 11 WAS NOT CONSTRAINTED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON EITHER
THE STRUCTURE OR THE VEr~TING SYSTEM DURING THE APOLLO 10 MISSION.

ORGArUZATION: 5-2490
REFERENCES: RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:
MSFC 5-DAY REPORT, PP. 5, 6
APOLLO 11 FRR
REV:

20

------~--~.. --~~--- --- --~

 ,".., < 1 l'

DETAil SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 1. 2

TITlF: S-IVB OSCILLATIONS

• IIOT, • 1IUI ~. Cf'IOSITE ,M.utS

• IMlAL Melt LOIIGITUOINAl

..
...
.1 I.
!G." • It 12·"•

• DlDING. fORI/ARC SK IItt • 'ITCH

M" w. TI~:
11-83
SiCOl!DS 1
'U4

FIGURE 2.1. 2-1 S-IVB SECOND BURN LONGITUDINAL AND LATERAL OSCILLATIONS

21
 DETAIL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 1. 2

TITLE: S-IVB OSCILLATIONS

FIGURE 2.1. 2-2

APOLLO 10 (AS-50S) AND APOLLO 8 (AS-503) SECOND BURN VIBRATION COMPARISON
-
-
I
,"
, \ 9 at 45 HERTZ f 9 at
13 - 15 HERTZ -

.. I
r277 SEC, TO CUTOFF ~321 SEC. TO CUTOFF ~ 321 S::C 344 SEC
. MEASUREHENT 503 505 503 505 505

Spacecra ft longi tudi na1

--
*
..
!<l.OS *
I

* .
Spacecra it Pi tch .
. ... * ,* * iO.04 to.OS
Spacecra.ft Yaw * .. *
i ;It
!O.05 .

•*
IU longitudinal * . * * ..
*
IU Pitch
IU Yaw .
*
* . .* .
.'
fT-
I
I
*
* .. ..
. .
• .
fol'Yclro Ski rt Pi tch
Forward Ski rt Yaw
.. :
*
*
to=.2
to· 04
-±0.27
+0.24 *
*
*
.
t . .
Gimbal Block longitudinal
. -
*
:
:!O.Ol +0.07
.
;!0.12
..
fO· 10 -1 I
! , G.1mb.al~.B.l.o~X..f..i_t.efl Pl ..... * ** . .-- ... * ... ... r.-..~ ..** .
:.. .. .. **
-1
" ....

i Gimbal Block Yaw * . * *

~~*

""ata
~
in noise floor.
• **Data questionable • 22
~
.

~: ME --------------~--~- ... - .
~
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 1. 2

TITLE; S-IVB Of,CILLATIONS

Di,;SCRIPTION ~
THE CREW Rt;PORTED A LOW FREQUENCY LATERAL AND LONGITUDINAL OSCILLATION DURING BOTH S-IVB
BURNS, WITH A HIGHER FREQUENCY VIBRATION SUPERIMPOSED ON IT BEGINNING 4 MINUTES AND 40
SECONDS iNTO THE SECOND BURN. LONGITUDINl.L 19 HZ OSCILLATIONS WERE EXPERIENCED DURING
THE FI&~T BURN AT A MAXIMUM AMPLITUDE OF +0.25 G ON THE LONGITUDINAL GIMBAL BLOCK
ACCE:UE:i~OMETER. A FREQUENCY ANALYSIS OF 'lHF CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SHOWS A CHANGE IN THE
TH:F'Sr::: OSCILLATIONS DURING THE SAME TIME OF FLIGHT. THE AS-503 S-IVB DATA SHOWED 19 HZ
LOAGITUDINAL OSCILLATIONS SIMI~~R TO AS-50S AT ABOUT ONE-HALF THE AMPLITUDE. S-IVB-201
~JD S-IVB-204 THRUST DATA SHOWED 18-19 HZ OSCILLATIONS EQUAL IN AMPLITUDE TO AS-50S.
LONGITUDINAL VIBRATIONS WHICH ARE RESPONSES TO UNCOUPLED THRUST OSCILLATIONS ALSO
OCCURRED DURING S-IC AND S-II ~~INSTAGE BURNS. THE AMPLITUDE OF THE 19 HZ THRUST
OSCILLATIONS CALCULATED FROM Pc IS WITHIN THE NORMAL J-2 UNCOUPLED THRUST LEVELS (NOISE
LEVEL THRUST OSCILLATIONS). THE OSCILLATIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE ENGINE NOISE LEVEL
THRUST OSCILLATIONS AND THEY ARE OF NO CONCERN FROM STABILITY CONSIDERATIONS. SIMILAR
VIBRATION LEVELS WERE ALSO PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE SECOND BURN. 8N INCREASE IN THE PITCH
& YAW VIBRATION LEVEL OCCURRED DURING THE SECOND BURN 4 SECONDS BEFORE THE ASTRONAUT
COMMENT. THE PREDOMINANT FREQUENCY WAS 46 HZ WHICH REMAINED UNTIL ENGINE CUTOFF. THE
FUEL STEP PRESSURIZATION AND VENT SEQUENCE OCCURRED 3 SECONDS BEFORE THIS VIBRATION
LEVEL INCREASE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS THE PROXIMITY (0.1 PSI) OF THE DUAL VENT VALVE
SETTINGS.

IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE 19 HZ LONGITUDINAL VIBRATION IS A LOW LEVEL RESPONSE TO
ENGINE THRUST OSCILLATIONS, SIMILAR TO THE VIBRATIONS EXPERIENCED BY OTHER SATURN STAGES
DURING POWERED FLIGHT. THE 46 HZ OSCILLATION IS OF NO CONCERN WITH REGARD TO THE
STRUCTURE OR THE VENTING SYSTEM. TESTS WERE PERFORMED AT AEDO TO ATTEHPT TO DUPLICATE THE
46 HZ RESPONSE. COMPLETION OF THIS TESTING WAS NOT A CONSTRAINT FOR APOLLO 11.

23

~-- ----------~-,-.---
 ANOMALY REPORT

NO.2. 1. 3 TITLE: S-IVB AUXILIARY HYD~,ULIC PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATION

SYSTEM: S-IVB MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: HYDRAULIC EVENT TIME: 2: 37

PROBLEM: DURING THE TLI BURN AND THE PROPELLANT DUMP, THE AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP OPERATED
ABNORMALLY. THE PUMP ~:AS CAVITATING, HEATING UP, PRESSURIZING THE SYSTEM TOO SLOWLY,
AND DRAWING 19 AMPS INSTEAD OF THE EXPECTED 40 AMPS. DURING THE PRESSURIZATION rYCLE
AFTER SECOND BURN AND DURING THE PROPELLANT DUMP, THE PUMP CURRENT WAS 15 TO 16 AMPERES
AND THE SYSTEM PRESSURE WAS LESS THAN THE 1500 PSI LOWER LIMIT OF THE MEASURING SYSTEM.
THERE WAS ENOUGH PRESSURE AVAILABLE, HOWEVER, TO CENTER THE J-2 ENGINE DURING THESE
PERIODS.

ACTION: TESTS WITH A FAILED :OMPENSATOR SPRING GUIDE REPRODUCED THE FLIGHT DATA. THE SPRING
GUIDES WERE REDESIGNED SOY~ TIME AGO, BUT IT IS SUSPECTED THE OLD DESIGN FLEW ON AS-50S
THE COMPENSATOR SPRING GUIDE ON S-IVB-506 WAS REPLACED BEFORE CDDT TO INSURE ADEQUATE
PERFORMANCE DURING THE ~~OLLO 11 MISSION.

ORGAfUZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED

REFERENCES: MSFC 5-DAY REPORT, PP. 2-4 DATE: 8/ r /69
APOLLO 11 FRR
REV:

124
!
 DETA Il SHEET
ANOMAL V 2. 1. 3

TITLE: S-IVB AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATION

FIGURE 2.1.3-2 PRESSURE COMPENSATOR ASSEMBLY

25

-------
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 1. 3

TITlE; S-IVB AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATION

FIGURE 2.1. 3-1. S-IVB HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

UUltVOI.
(OIL)
... TeM ACTU .. TOIl

ACOMI (OIL)

""
1tIL'1'
VAL 'II
_ .. ItI"LTRATIOM'IAl.VI
,~IIC1\JAn. PIll. TI.
,/
"'11'16.'1'
VAL 'lIE ___
--J

,r-CYL ., ....15
,/ 'I Al. 'II

SOVO'tAL'I1

'1If"
'!GUT'OII

- T • ...,T

26

------------------------_._._ - ... _.. -

 DETA IL SHEET
2.1. 3
ANOMALY
---
TITLE: S-IVB AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP ABNORM~L OPERATION

BACKGROUND: THE AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP IS A FIXED ANGLE, VARIABLE DELIVERY P::JMP WITH A RATED
FLOW OF 1.5 GPM AT A MINIMUM OF 3,500 PSIA. THE PUMP IS DRIVEN BY A 56 VDC MOTOR
REQUIRING EITHER A GROUND SERVICE POWER OR STAGE POWER. THE MOTOR CAVITY IS FILLED
w~rH DRY AIR. THIS AIR MAINTAINS A POSITIVE PRESSUPE WITHIN THE MOTOR TO PREVENT
EXCESSIVE BRUSH WEAR; IT ALSO TRANSFERS MO'I'OR-GENERATED HEAT TO THE HYDRAULIC FLUID.
THE HEAT THERMALLY CONDITIONS THE FLUID DURING PRELAUNCH PROPELLANT LOADING OPERATIONS
AND DURING THE ORBITAL COAST PHASE. FOR THE COAST PHASE, THE PUMP TURNS ON AT PRE-
PROGRAMMED INTERVALS FOR HEATING AND CIRCULATING THE FLUID.

DESCRIPTION: HYDRAULIC PUMP OPERATION WAS NORMAL DURING PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES, BOOST, FIRST BURN,
AND THROUGH SECOND BURN RESTART PREPARATIONS.

THE AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP WAS TURNED ON 6 MINUTES PRIOR TO SECOND BURN. THE ACTUA-
TORS CENTERED THE J-2 ENGINE IN RESPONSE TO THE 3635 PSIA SYSTEM PRESSURE. AT ENGINE
IGNITION, THE ACTUATORS RESPONDED NORMALLY TO THE APPLIED GUIDANCE SIGNALS. THE
AUXILIARY PUMP RESPONDED BRIEFLY WITH HIGH FLOW TO MEET THIS DEMAND WHILE THE ENGINE
DRIVEN PUMP WAS BhOUGHT UP TO S~EED. SHORTLY AFTER ENGINE IGNITION, THE ENGINE DRIVEN
PUMP OUTPUT PRESSURE EXCEEDED THE NORMAL 3635 PSIA BY 3 PERCENT. THE AUXILIARY PUMP
RESPONDED TO THIS EXCESS PRESSURE BY FEATHERING TO THE NO-FLOW CONDITION WITH A CORREf-
PONDING DROP TO A COl-4'fINUOUS 21 Al-tPERE DEMAND. AT ABOUT 2:37 GET, THE AUXILIARY PUMP
CURRENT DECREASED UNEXPECTEDLY TO 19 AMPERES. THE CURRENT REMAINED AT THIS LEVEL DURiNG
THE 4.1 SECOND INTERVAL FOLLOWING ENGINE CUTOFF INSTEAD OF RIS.eNG TO 'fHE ~ORMAL 40 TO
70 AMPERES.

27
 DETAil SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 1. 3

TITLE: S-IVB AUXILIARY HYDr~ULIC PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATION

ONE PRESSURIZATION ~;AS PROGRAMMED BETWEEN ~;ECOND BURN AND THE CHILL DOWN EX1?E~I­
MENT/PASSIVATION EVENT. NO MEASURABLE SYS~'EM PRESSUPB WAS OBSERVED (TRANSDUCER
RANGE AND SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS DO NOT ALLOW DETECTION BELOW 1500 PSI). HOWEVER,
THE ACTUATORS CENTERED THE ENGINE WHICH INDICATES THAT THE AUXILIARY PUMP PRODUCED
SOME PRESSURE AND FLOW.

THE LOX LEAD EXPERIMENT AND PASSIVATION WERE CONTINUED USING 'I'HE AUXILIARY PUMP TO
CENTER THE J-2 ENGINE. DURING THIS PERIOD THE ENGINE REMAINED CENTERED, THE ENGINE
DRIVEN PUMP INLET TEMPERATURE DECREASED STEADILY, AND RESERVOIR TEMPERATURE
INCREASED. THESE EVENTS INDICATE THAT FLUID FLOW WAS BEING PRODUCED. THE AUXILIARY
PUMP MOTOR CURRENT DRIFTED IN THE 15 TO 16 AMPERE RANGE DURING OPERATION UNTIL THE
PUMP TURNED OFF BY GROUND COMMAND AT ABOUT 4948 SECONDS INTO TIME BASE 8.
AN AUXILIARY PUMP GROUND TEST WAS RUN IN AN ATTEMPT TO DUPLICATE THE FLIGHT DATA '3Y
INTRODUCING KNOWN FAILl~ES. THE PRIME SUSPECT, STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE COMPENSATOR
SPRING GUIDE, DID PRODUCE SIMILAR DATA. ADD!TIONAL FAILURE TESTS (COMPENS_\TOR
SPRING BREAKAGE, VALVE PLATE TORSION SPRING FRACTURE, AND STOP PIN FAILURE) DID NOT
DUPLICATE FLIGHT DATA.

THERE IS NO INDICATION OF ANY MISSION OR PROG~~ IMPA~T •

28
 ~. " '

ANOMALY REPORT

INO. 2.1. 4 TITlE: S- IVB APS MODUL1~ HELIUM LEAK

SYSTEM: S-IVB M1S<;ION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: APS EVENT TIME: 6: 30

PROBLEM: THE OPERATIONS OF THE APS PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM WAS SATISFACTORY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF
A HELIUM LEAK IN MODULE NO.1. 'rHE LEAK STARTED APPROXIMATELY 6.5 110URS AFTER LIFTOFF
AND EXTENDED THROUGH LOSS OF DATA (10:54:00). THE LEAK RATE AT LOSS OF DATA WAS
APPROXIMATELY 3278 SCCM (200 SCIM).

ACTION: AS A RESULT OF A SIMILAR LEAK WHICH OCCURRED ON AS-504 (APOLLO 9), FIVE "0" RINGS IN
THE HIGH-PRESSURE HELIUM PLUMBING WERE CHANGED ON APOLLO 10 AND SUBSEQUENT. THE LEAKAGE
RATES EXPERIENCED ON APOLLO 9 AND APOLLO 10 WOULD NOT IMPAIR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE
S-IVB PORTION OF THE APOLLO 11 MISSION.

ORGAfH ZATION: 5- 2 49 0
REFERENCES: APOLLO 11 FRR RESOLUT IOtl: CLOSED DATE:
FLIGHT EVALUATION REPORT - AS-50S
APOLLO 10 MISSION MPR-SAT-FE-69-7 REV:
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 1. 4

TITLE: S-IVB APS MODULE HELIUM LEAK

-1--- =~-~~T=:{,~

:~::~---+·~:~~-~=-~~~·~-·----=:~-~=+~--i~'"
~--- .
.......
i C.lO ~----I-----+--.--+-----~..::....---I~-
I---r-
... .
'....
I- .0

.,;
v,
;E
II
.... ~---.j_---___ ---+----+-__-.-_ "_'_"'~~-+--Jr-~_~:.....C:.....UL~E_N_'l_! e~ ...
~ ~,,~ \.
0
-'"--
<:>

~ 0.25 I-----+-----+----+----.}------+--.-.-~~--- --------l :E

~ -.---~---_4----- ____~-.---+------~--', ~
-=
~

%
'" G."

O."C L-_ _ _-J.-._ _ _- ' -_ _ _.L-_ _ _L_

10.800 H.400 18.000 21.600 :S.?OO

·_-=~=-r-- j:=':J '"
28.800 32,~JO 36,000 39,600
R~NG< 11"£. SECll/IOS
3:00:00 400:00 5:00:)0 6'00:00 7' ('').
I
00 8 DO' 00 9 O~ OC 1C ~o 00 '1 00 :0
1 _ _ _ ---'-'_ _ _ _, ' - -_ _- - - ' ,
, ' - -_ _.-L.. • 1

~A~ t TI"'E, H(l'JRS:"l~I:TES:SECONDS

FIG. 2.1. 4 . 3-IVB APS HELIUM BOTTl.E :·1ASS

30

--------- ---_ .. - .- .-.---~-- _ ...

 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.1 TITLE: CM RCS HELIUM LEAK

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSyc-~iM: RCS EVENT TIME ~ PRELAUNCH

PROBLE,I: THE HELIUM MANIFO!.D PRESSURE IN CM RCS SYSTEM 1 BEGAN TO DECAY AT A PATE O}' 0.13 PSIA/HR
FOLLOWING HELIUY SERVICING 3.5 DAYS PRIOR TO LAUNCH. AFTER 2.5 DAYS, 'fHE PRESSURE
!iAD DROPPED FROM 45 TO 37 PSIA. "J"BE PRESSURE IN THE HELIUM MANIFOLDS BETWEEN THE
PROPELLANT TANKS AND THE CHECK VALVt:;:;, WAS CHECKED; THE OXIDIZER SIDE WAS AT THE INITIl'.L
PRESSURE, BUT THE FU1::L SIDE WAS LOW. NEI'rHER A HELIUM LEAK NOR A FUEL LEAK COULD BE
DETECTED; HOWEVER, A FUEl.. LEAK OF SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE TO CAUSE THE PRESSURE DROP
DEFINITELY WOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED. THE CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE Lm'l PRESSUru:::: HELIUM
MANIFOLD IN THE FUEL LP-G WAS LEAKING SLIGHTJ.. Y BU'l' AT A RATE ACCEPTABLE FOR THE MISSION.
THE SYSTEM WAS THEN REPRESSURIZED TO 49 PSIA. THE LEAK RATE DECREASED AS THE MISSION
PROGRESSED, REACHING o. o~ PSIA/HR BY THE END OF THE. MISSION. ONLY PART OF THIS DECREASE
RESULTED FROM THE REDUCED SYSTEM PRESSURE; THUS, THE LEAK CORRECTED ITSELF TO SOME EXTENT
AND/OR THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HELIUM CHANGED AS IT BECAME DI:LUTJ<;D BY PROPELLANT
PERMEATING THE BLADDER.

ACTION: POSTFLIGHT TESTING OF THE COMMAND MODUEL INCLUDED A VERY 'l'HOROUGH HASS SPECTROME~ER LEAK
Ii CI~CK ON SYSTEM 1, AT BOTH 50 AND 285 PSI~. NO LEAKS WERE DETECTED; HOWEVER, DURING THE
POSTFLIGHT DECONTAIUNATION PROCEDURES, CERTAIN TYPES OF LEAKS COULD BE ELIMINATED.

FOR FUTURE MISSIONS, THE SYSTEM WILL BE PRESSURIZED TO 100 PSIA ABOUT 30 DAYS PRIOR TO
FLIGHT TO INSURE THAT ANY LEAKS CAl~ BE DETECTED AND APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN
PRIOR TO START OF THE LAUNCH COUNTDOWN.

ORGANIZATION: 5-2490
REFERENCES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, P. 9 RESOlUTIOrl. CLOSED DATE:
MSC FAILURE AND &~OMALY LISTING
REV:

31
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 1

TITLE CM RCS HELIUM LEAK

I
_.- _0-_..
.........
NOn
MIU,._a

CllIIICII-..s
"'IIOL
.z
......
_1IICI ......
CII~-ssn.z
'--"TOII
n .. _...
. ....cs
-< yHEATERS Cal NEG
VALVU • .-.oRT'AD
TO T. 42 SEC
CLOSURII:

FuEL
OI0U't4RAGM
BURST
1~
I

H1LllllANf. \.!;;~~:tI~:I
1
:TOR TN1
TO_- .LICT • - - - - -
_To.,.,.O
IOOCATOII
COl RCS'
.... c:oo_,
.UCT.m:M

.......
IOOCATOII
STATlIS
IIIDICA'' '
1ICIC2 AClW1 INJECTOR
...:1.--'... v .. LVES

ao_
TO_
_TOIl
"LIIAIII'
TONes
INOICA~· --
.LICT~CM

....... U.UCT OXIDU"!:"

~~~_~:.:msd
...,C.IIICI.z SWITCH AND
vALVE.
CW"CS2

--""
IIIDOtATOIl

........
"""'.
ITATUS

.:x: J. CIW 2
PllUIUIOI
VA.LVE
OXIDIZER
12 ~LACESI CfUlll'T
Y!.NT TP1.c OXIDlU .. SOUle ~~y'V'.'-___ ~~~
IJPUaII .-wAaVAl.'W.
QPUCD, $1M TeHU (l'2n.'

.,
I 32
~I
;!
'i
i ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.2 TITLE: CM RCS OXIDIZER LINE BURST DIAPHRAGM FAILURE

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: RCS EVENT TIME: T-9:26

PROBLEM: DURING THE FI~AL SWITCH LIST VERIFICATION, WHEN THE PROPELLANT ISOLATION VALVES OF THE
COMMAND MOD~LE RCS SYSTEM WERE OPENED, THE PRESSURE IN TtiE CM RCS HELIUM SYSTEM 2 DROPPED
FROM 44 P~IA TO 37 PSIA. THIS INDICATED THAT THE OXIDIZER PROPELLANT BURST DIAPHRAGM WAS
RUPTURED, ALLOWING OXIDIZER TO FLOW FROM THE TANK INTO THE MANIFOLD WHEN THE ISOLATION VALVE
WAS OPENED. THE OXIDIZER ISOLATION VALVE BACKED UP BY THE ENGINE VALVES PREVENTED LOSS OF
OXIDIZER, AND THE SYSTEM WAS VISUALLY VERIFIED TO BE LEAK-TIGHT; THEREFORE, IT WAS DECIDED
THAT ~HE SYSTEM WAS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. THE ISOLATION VALVES WERE CLOSED AFTER ORBITAL
INSErtTION. THE ENGINE VALVES WERE THEN OPENED BY MEANS OF THE REACTION CONTROL HEATER
CIRCUITS, AND THE OXIDIZER WAS VENTED FROM THE MANIFOLD FOR 25 MINUTES. FOUR PERCENT OF THE
OXIDIZER IN SYSTEM 2 WAS LOST, HOWEVER, THE MAXIMUM PREVIOUS PROPELLANT USAGE DURING A
MISSION WA~ 35% OF ONE SYSTEM. AFTER THE MISSION, THE OXIDIZER AND FUEL BURST DISCS WERE
SIMIlAR IN PHYSICAL APPEARANCE, INDICATING THAT THE OXIDIZER BURST DISC HAD FAILED BECAUSE
OF PRESSURE.

ACTION: CAU7.:'ION NOTES HAVE BEEN ADDED TO rHE PRELAUNCH CHECKOUT PROCEDURES IN THE PLACES WHERE THE
ALLOWABLE LIMITS ON THE BURST DISC (241 +16 PSID IN THE FLOW DIRECT~ON AND 10 PSID IN THE
REVERSE DIRECTION) COULD BE EXCEEDED. TO ALLOW EARLY DETECTION OF ANY SIMILAR PROBLEM IN
THE FUTURE, A LEAK CHECK OF THE BURST DISC HAS BEEN ADDED AFTER REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM
PROPELLANT SERVICING.

ORGAfHZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED

REFE. RENCES : MSC 5-DAY REPORT, PP. 9, 15 DATE:
APOLLO 11 FRR
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING, P. 1 REV:

33
 DETA II. SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2-.2.2

TITLf: CM RCS OXIDIZER LINE BURST DIAPHRAGM FAILURE

Figure 2.2.2-1. CM RCS OXIDIZZR SUPPLY

OXIDIZER NOTE: ONLY SYSTEM 2 IS SHOWN

SQUIB
HELIUM INTERCONNECT DUMP
SQUIB VALVE (2 PLACES) VALVE
OXIDIZER
....tIi!'!-SQUIB
.....--- INTERCONNECT
VALVE

TO OTHER
r==:=:=========:::u==~ ~ ENGINES
PROPELLANT OXIDIZER
ISOLATION VALVE
VALVE OXIDIZER r=~
(2 PLACES)
DIAPHRAGM
BURST CR2116T
\ISOLATION TO MDC-10l
OXInIZER SQUIB
VALVE ROTARY
BYPASS VALVE
(2 PLACES) (4 PLACES) SWITCHES

THE BURST DII\PHRAGfoiS CONFINE THE PROPELLANTS TO AS SMALL AN

AREA AS POSSIBLE. THEY ASSURE AGAINST DOWNSTREAM LEAKAGE OF
PROPELLANT IS')LATION VALVES, ENGINE INJECTION VALVES OR PLUMBING.

34
 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.3 TITLE: PRIMARY ECS EVAPORATOR DRIED OUT

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: ECS EVENT TIME: 0: 08 AND 78: 38 GET

PROBLEM: THE PRIMARY EVAPORATOR IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM BEGAN OPERATION SOON AFTER
LIFT-OFF BUT DRIED OUT AFTER ONLY A FEW MINUTES. THE SECONDARY COOLING SYSTEM WAS ACTIVATE
AND FUNCTIONED NOMINALLY. THE PRIMARY EVAPORATOR WAS DEACTIVATED AND WAS NOT RESERVICED
WITH WATER UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION. IT DRIED OUT AGAIN DURING THE
SECOND LUNAR ORBIT. JUST PRIOR TO ENTRY, THE EVAPORATOR WAS SERVICED AGAIN. DURING
ENTRY, IT FUNCTIONED NORMALLY, BUT INFORMATION IS NOT AVAILABLE TO INDICATE WHETHER oa
NOT ADDITIONAL WATER WAS AUTOMATICALLY PROVIDED TO THE EVAPORATOR.

ACTION: A CHECK OF THE SWITCH ASSEMBLY REVEALED TfffiT THE ACTUATOR MOVED AS LITTLE AS 0.0008 INCH
BEYOND THE POINT AT WHICH THE SWITCH SHOULD HAVE OPENED. WITH CHANGES IN ENVIRONMENT, THE
ACTUATOR TRAVEL WAS AT TIMES NOT SUFFICIENT TO OPEN THE SWITCH. ACTUATOR RIGGING PROCE-
DURES WlLL BE MODIFIED TO ASSURE PROPER OV£RTRAVEL.

ORGAIUZATION: 5-2490
RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:
REFERENCES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, P. 10
FRR-APOLLO 11 JUNE 17, 1969
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING, REV:
JUNE, 1969

••_ _ _ ,_~----------- _ _ _._'._,., .-....wr--.-~~"""<,,-..>~_'_ .. h_~ .. _-,.; ~

 "'.> ',' • .r ,

DElATe SHEET
ANOMAl Y 2 • 2 • 3

TITLE: PRIMARY ECS EVAPORATOR DRIED OUT

• BACK PIIESStIilE
YALYE ' ....

I STEM nllCT

STEAM
PRIMMY
GlYCOl
£~A1
PRES~
Gl YCOl EYAP-. TRMSOOCER
l1SYAC r STEAM PRESS ,
J,17 r.lI:~ I.,:)" WlrK
TEMP
A~O I I I , I
IUS 1 I • I " II' SENSOR
ECS GLYCOl
....s
• I'
, ., 1" /I, •
I
•I " I I I
I .1/1' I I
~Ct/~
Cl9
; ...) ' I I
C O.---co:.--- YALVE
I 1'_ I I
(2A)
IUS 2 C810 I
I
A
(2A)
.... I
r
_ _ _ _ _ .J1 I
I ~ WIG AtOM
• H2O flOW
AUTO
_____ •I II
r- -
RAIl

_ _ _ _ ....JI mw
I I 'N YAI Y[
I I
I 28 YOC BUS -AM
"20 ACC~ (111ft
o I
--------..1 I
I
WIG FROM
PUMP

0.------00 1_ ____ I
(SA) ....1 I IWIUAL
I OYERR1O[

m
'0
I
~T -------00 I
lit r- GlYCOl £YAP
ECS Gl Y PtlMPC; I TEMP IN
8115 , AUTO
CR1
A~----------------------~~~
.0--------- ---04

,
(2A) ~

FIG. 2.2.3-1 PRI MARV WA lER GL veOl EVAPOR~ TOR CONTROL 36

. ,
____________ _ _ _ _" .......... ~_'''H _ _ '_ _..._.-. _ __....... ..... _''''':. ..... ..........
~ 'p "''''''''''~
 DETAil SHEET
Ar,OMAL Y 2.2.3

TITLE: PRIMARY ECS EVAPORATOR DRIED OUT

I Evaporator

-.----1="-'-- Glycol
I Back-pressure valve
I
I
I

~ Motor
~ WII:k
: Microswitch sensor
; - Motor cam I (c loses whl"1 u. '-' .
rSet screw
t
~
'~~~~,~=*--= ....... - 0.0008 in.
overtravel
(0.002 req)
Switch
• 1~!g~~~9t=======ft
I~
0.003 in •
overtravel
.
,
I

Glycol
recommended
sensor

Open microswitch allows control unit

to supply water to the evaporator
depending on temperatures sensed
microswitch
closes)

FIG. 2.2.3-2 WATER CONTROL CIRCUIT

37
 ANOMALY REPORT

til. 2.2.4 TITLE: WATER PROB ..... EM.

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: ECS EVENT TIME:

~-----------------------------------------------
PROBLEM:
------------------------------------------------.-
DURING THE INITIAL PHASES OF THE FLIGHT, THE CREW 'TATED THAT THE GROUND-SERVICED POTABLE
WATER CONTAINED GAS. THE TANK IS SERVICED WITH ALi{ATED WATER WHICH IS FORCED INTO
THE SYSTEM BY NITROGEN AT APPROXIMATELY 20 PSIA. WHEN THE WATER, WHICH WAS SATURATEv WITH
GAS AT 20 PSIA, IS DRAWN FROM THE TANK IUTO THE CABIN AT 5 PSIA, SOME GAS IS RELEASED
FROM SOLUTION BUT RBMAINS MIXED WITH THE WATER. TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEMS, A TWO-COMPART-
MENT BAG WITH A HANDLE FOR WHIRLING THE BAG IN A CIRCULAR MOTION WAS PROVIDED. THIS BAG
HAD BEEN DEVELOPED rtAPIDLY WITH INSUFFICIENT TI~£ FOR A COMPLETE TEST PROGRAM. IT DID
NOT FUNCTION AS INTENDED In FLIGHT.

ACTION: NEW BAG DESIGNS BEING DEVELOPED SHOW MUCH IMPROVEMENT IN TESTS. A MEMBRANE DEVICE; WHICH
ATTACHES TO THE EXIT PORT OF THE WATER GUN AND ALLOWS THE GAS TO PASS INTO THE CABIN SHOWS
PROMISE. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES ARE BEING PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE uSE ON APOLLO 11.

ORGANIZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED

REFERENCES: MSC 5-:>AY REPORT PP. 10, 14 DATE:
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY REV:
LISTING JUNE 1969

_ _ _----------------_.~_....._e~....,H aM 'W'#t'f,-""..,bla , . " ...... ..... ~~ •••. ~..t- ... .."

 DETAil SHEET
ANOMAL y_2_"_2_o 4

TITLE: WATER PROBLEMS

Food bag/
drinking port 1 Handle \ ,--Wat€r gun
inlet port

Inner
compartment
THIS KIND USED ON
APOLLO 10

Slit

Outer

,..... ----
compartment

, / Location of "\
......... FIG. 2.2.4-1 WATER/GAS
SEPARATION BAG
( bubble after I
" bag spun ./
"'----
39

------- ------'. ----_..._._..............

' -~.,.- - ---
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL v 2•2•4

TITLE: WATER PROBLEM

Hydrophobic membrane, Gas out

Teflon, 5 to 10 microns

o
o o o
1-ounce J 0
~-
storage
volume ()
[I I,..-.,..,.._
0
'----
-----.: -
I,)

.."."1 ~
--
0
Water/gas~
mixture
~
J u
-~.-.........

tT-

0
0

0
-
------- - ~ Water out

0 0
~
u ()

~ Hydrophi lic membrane,

stainless steel, 5 microns

FOR USE ON APOLLO 11 I~D SUBS.

FIG. 2.2.4-2 WATER/GAS SEPARATION MEMBRANE.

40

-------------- --------,-----_._-"'---' '.--

~

iIJ r--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _A_N_OM_A_L_Y_R_E_PO_R_T_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

j,' NO.2. :Y~:EM: CSM TITlE: LOW PRESSURE FROM WATER GUN
MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: CREW SYSTEM EVENT TIME:

•
PROBLEM: FOR ABOUT 2 HQURS ON THE SEVENTH DAY OF THE FLIGHT, THE FLOW FROM THE COMMAND MODULE
WATER DISPEN~ER APPEARED TO BE LESS THAN NORMAL. AN O.O)-INCH ORIFICE WITHIN THF
I DISPENSER NORMALLY LIMITS FLOW TO APPROXIMATELY 6 CC/SEC (SEE FIG. 2.2.5-1). A REDUCTION
IN FLOW AT r~HE FOOD PREPARATION PANEL COULD NOT BE VERIFIED. THE DRIVING FORCE FOR
THE WATER IS OXYGEN AT 20 PSIA, AND THIS PRESSURE WAS NORMAL. THE LUBRICANT IS THE
MOST LIKELY SUSPECT FOR THE CLOGGING.

ACTIC'N: PROCESSING SPECIFICATIONS ARE BEING REVIEWED TO ASSURF TI~T EXCESS LUBRICANT IS NOT USED.
, SHOUL:) THE ~;UN BECOME CLOGGED IN FLIGHT, SEVERAL ALTF,. ArJ.'IVES ARE AVAILABLE FOR DRINKING
WATER. TWO GUNS ARE CARRIED ABOARD THE LUNAR MODULI, D COULD BE USED. ALSO, WATER IS
AVAILABLE AT 'rHl: FOOD P'qEPARATION PANEL OF THE COMML . .., MODULE, AS WELL AS AT THE FIRE-
FIGHTING NOZZLE ON THE GUN (THE NOZZLE IS UPSTREAM OF THE METERING ORIFICE) .
•

~~~~~----------------------------------------------------------------.----------------.------,---
ORGAJUZATION: 5-2490
REfEREHCl::S: MSC FAILURE AND AiJOMALY
RESOLUTION: CLOSt"' DArt:
LISTING JUNE 1969
REV:
 DETA IL SHEET
rlNOMAL Y 2. 2 • 5

TITLE: LOW PRESSURE FROM WATER GUN

- - - . - - - - - - - - . .- .

I
I --------~--

/
1//
I / I
1"
,,~/, ----
hjtJ" Metering

• ~
I .
I .I
I /
,
orifice 0.03 in.

./'"" Fire-fjghting
.:
f,i , nozzle
..
I' t-++-+- - - -

l• I
~

II I

"

FIG. 2.2.5-1 WATER GUN •

1 42

__
. .- .- --- - .
 " I 'I'

ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.6 TITLE: THEru.fAL COATING ON FORWARD HATCH FLAKED OFF

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO .... 0

SUBSYSTlM: STRUCTURE eVENT TIME: 3: 54

PROBLE1·f: WHEN THE LUNAR MODULE CABIN WAi FIRST P~ESSURIZED THE THEl<MAL COATING ON THE C(jI-'..MAND
MODULE HATCH CAME OFF IN PIECES. THE INSTTLATION BLANKET VENT HOLES WERE PLUGGED, PRO-
DUCING THE DAMAGE. ONE POSSIBILITY IS TRA'l' THE PREFLIGHT BAKING OF THE HATCH AT 900°F
FOR 15 HOURS WEAKENED THE INSULATION TO THE EXTENT THAT INTERNAL PIECES OF INSULATION
BROKE LOOSE AND PLUGGED THE HOLES DURING TUNNEL DEPP~~SUR!ZATION. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY
IS THAT THE VENT HOLES WERE INADVERTENTLY SEAl.ED WHEN TH~ TNSULATION BLANKET WAS POTTED
WITH RTV OR WHEN THE H-FILM TAPE WAS INSTALLED ON THE HATCH ~rTRFACE.

ACTIO~l: ON THE APOLLO 11 COMMAND MODULE, ThE IN3ULATION HAS BEEN DELETED BECAUSE OF THE EFFECTS
NOTED AND B~CAUSE A REEVALUATION OF THEfu~ CONDITIONS HAS SHOWN THAT THE INSULATION IS
NOT NECESSARY. HOWEVER, T'J MINIMIZE CONDENSATION, A SINGLE LAYER OF H-FILM TAPE HAS BEEN
APPLI~D OVER THE EXTERIOR SUR!ACE OF THE HATCH ABLATOR. SOME WATER AND ICE CAN BE EXPECTE
ON APOLLO 11 BUT TO A LESSER DEGREE THAN OBSERVED ON A~OLLO 10.

ORGAIHZATlON: 5-2490
REfERENCES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, 1:-'. 6 RESOLUTllm: CLOSED DATE:
FRR-APOLI.O 11 JUNE 17, 1969
MSC FAILURE AND ~&OMALY REV:
LISTING JUNE 1909
43

-------.... .Iiio
 DETAIL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 6

TITLE: THERMAL COATING ON FORWARD HATCH nAKED OFF

Vent holes through RTV

t
Tunnel
• H-film
RTV
Insulation
cllmmand
module

Lunar modu Ie
pressurization valve
~
Lunar modu Ie
honeycomb
pressurization
valve

Steel Lunar module

Forward hatch
honeycomb pres~.urization
44

FIG. 2.2.6-1 FORWARD HATCH THERMAL COATING .

............... ------------~-- --------------- - - '-----.. _-,--,- ....
 ANOMALY REPORT
NO.2. 2. 7 TITLE: TUNNEL WOULD NOT VENT

SYSTEM: CSM/LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

S'l'RUCTURE
SUBSYSTEM: EVENT TIME: 96:27

PROBLEM: THE PRESSURE IN THE TUNNEL BETWEEN THE COMMAND MODULE AND THE LUNAR MODULF COULD NOT
BE LOWERED TO AMBIEN'l' PRESSURE 'l'HROUGH 'l'HE TUNNEL VENT SYSTEM. POSTFLIl";!i'.' INSPECT ION OF
THE \'ENT SYSTEM REVEALED THAT AN INCORRECT FITTING HAD BEEN INSTALLED ON THE VENT. THE
PROPER PART WAS SPECIFIED IN THE INSTALLATION PROCEDURES.

ACTION: FOR APOLLO 11 AND SUBSEQUENT FLIGHTS, AN END-TO-END TEST WILL BE PERFORMED TO VERIFY
THE SYSTEM. ON APOLLO 10, THIS TEST HAD BEEN WAIVED.

ORGArUZATION: 5-2490
RESOLUTION: CLOSED
REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY DATE:
LIS~ING JUNE 1969
REV:

45
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 7

TITLE: TUNNEL WOULD NOT VENT

Tunnel pressurization

/ ~/
" ~---
"," .----- -- _-,'
p=zt

... ...
.......
I
,I
./( ( / /
----- ~ \
--~,
, '
,

~ \/ ~
', ,' r'"=~~
',,-
1~'0:--.
/"" o
Installed Should haY ,I
II ~~en insta~l-I
<,J~~'-.'- ----/ ,
~, - ,\ .:~-.'"
\\'-. -. -. ' " -.
/ \~~-:--
( \

I
I
I /"/ ,,-,-
,:/ - .......---'. / "" - - '

:;l,\
/ To tunnel
pressurizati

--~
port on
I
I I _ _ -,,'--::
I I I ' - ---//: ---..

I
II
I ~'"
\~ r'--
~
\' ,\
Tunnel vent
po,t
\ Lunar module/
c~mmand modu I
differential pre~sure
e

~"'
\
,:!II I ," I '\\
©
\ \ ••..J, I ____ • , /
.'
..... -.,
-. .....
--- --
-. ...........
I \ \, /,I I
\t.I'
,\ ........
//

, Tunnel vent
-
" selector \/alve

----=----~~"
-- ' "" ... ....
-- ~,\.".

FIG. 2 . 2 . 7 -1
....
conllllam: Illodu
TUNNET. . . VE NT SYSTEM.
• Ie pressure
46
 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2 • 2 • 8 TITLE: SIMPLEX-A '.mT OPERATING

SYSTEM: CK/LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: COMMUNICATIONS EVENT TIME: 94:46 AND 95:16

PROBLEM: AT 94 HOURS 46 MINUTES, THE COMMAImER ATTEMP'fED A TRANSMISSION ON SIMPLEX-A; HOWEVER,

THE CIRCUIT BREAKER SUPPLYING POWER FOR THE KEYING RELAY WAS OPEN, RENDERING VHF
SI~~LEX-A INOPERATIVE. TRANSMISSION ON SIMPLEX-A WAS ATTEMPTED AGAIN AT 95 HOURS 16
MINUTES. A CHECK OF SWITCH POSITIONS FOR BOTH SPACECRAFT WAS PERFORMED. BOTH LUNAR
MODULE CREWMEN ATTEMPTED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO TRANSMIT ON SIMPLEX-A. THE COMMANDER THEN
TRI:::::D SIMPLEX-B WITH NO SUCCESS: HOWEVER, HIS SIMPLEX-B SWITCH HAD BEEN LEFT IN THE
"RECEIVE" POSITION FROM THE PREVIOUS CHECK, AND HE COULD NOT TRANSMIT AT THAT TIME.
THE COMMANDER THEN SWITCHED ~['Q "TRANSMIT/RECEIVE" AND SIMPLEX-B PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY.
WITH THE PRESS OF TIME, THE CREW DECIDED TO USE SIMPLEX-B. :iOWEVER, DURING THE BACKSIDE
PASS OF REVOLUTION 11, VHF SIMPLEX-A WAS TRIED AGAIN, AND IT PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY.
THE CAn TRANSMITTER WAS USED FOR BOTH VOICE AND RANGING FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLIGHT.

ACTION: THE MOST PROBABLE CA!JSE FOR THE APPARENT FAILURES OF VHF SIMPLEX·-A WAS THE NUMEROUS SWITCH
CONFIGURATION CHANGES IN BOTH VEHICLES. THE TWO VEHICLES WE~E NOT CONFIGURED SIMULTAN-
EOUSLY FOR COMMUNICATIONS ON SIMPLEX-A.

ORGANIZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUiION: CLOSED

RUERENCES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, PP. 4,11 DATE:
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY
LISTING JUNE 1969 . REV:

47
 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.9 TITLE: CM RENDEZVOUS RADAR TRANSPONDER FAILED TO OPERATE

SYSTB1: CSM MISSION: JI...POLLC 10

SUBSYSTEM: RENDEZVOUS RADAR EVENT TIME: 98: 51

PROBloEM: FOLLOWING UNDOCKING, THE REnDEZVOUS RADAR TRANSPONDER IN THE COMMAND .f.10DULE WOULD NOT
OPERATE. AN EARLIER SELF-TEST HAD BEEN CONDUCTED SUCCESSFULLY. THE COMMAND NODULE
PILOT CHECKED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AND INITIATED THE SELF-TEST; ALL READINGS WERE L;ERO.
THE THREE-POSITIO~ PWR-OFF-HEATER SWITCH WAS CYCLED TO OFF AND BACK TO PWR. THE
TRANSPONDER THEN WORKED ~ROPERLY FOR THE REMAINDER OF ITS USE.

ACTION: DURING POSTFLIGHT TESTS OF THE 3WITCH AND WIRING, NO DEFECTS WERE FOUND, AND THE
ANOMALY CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO ANY CM HARDWARE.

ORGANIZATION: 5-2490
RESOLUTION: CLOSED
I ~UERENCES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, P. 14
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING, P. 2
DATE:

REV:

I 48
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 9

TITLE: CM RENDEZVOUS RP~DAR TRru~SPONDER FAILED TO OPERATE

FIGURE 2.2.9-1 RENDEZVOUS RADAR TRANSPONDER CONTROL CIRCUITRY

• Ir
s.. I
I
eM
."'_ .... --..
I
•• ••• :, .
~----------------~~~~---------------~
.--~--------------------, -------------~
........,...._,
.-11:...... '-... _,
a.f~.J'_swa

-.
t ·""Q\.at.'.~_)

•..-1$ ....___
_

I
I
:
~ @t~
~
~ .
•••
.: r:
."O.~IS

...cwaurc._

:~
I~---+I---I: ~ I
.~ i ~:!
II I•
II",et u'•
~----------------------~

·e.:. ...I
!LEalll
~---------------
SIt

_r_ •

!!I:
RENDEZVOUS
RA

v~~-4~-+--~~~ __________ ~
""".
La,. I'.
V_ ,------_-....::.1

49
 ANOMALY RE PORT

NO. 2.2.10 TITLE: CM SEQUENCE CAMERA

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: CAMERA EVENT TIME: 173

:.?ROBLEM: AT APPROXIMATELY 173 HOURS, DURING TP~SEARTH COAST, THE CO~~ND MODULE 16-MM CAMERA
CEASED TO OPERATE ~N THE PULSE MODE BECAUSE THE MAGAZINE INTEFLOCK MICROSWITCH FA.ILED.
THE SWITCH WAS NOT A HIGH RELIABILITY ITEM AND FAILED BECAUSE OF INTErNAL CONTAMINATION
AND A F}!,ULTY PLUNGER.

ACTION: HIGH RELIABILITY MICROSWITCHES HAVE BEEN INSTALLED IN THE CAMERAS FOR APOLLO 11 AND
SUBSEQUENT.

ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 RESOL;JTION: CLOSED

RE::FEREr~CES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY DATE:
LISTING JUNE 1969
REV:

50

-.---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - -_ _ _ _ Me. j , • . -. . . _ _' ._ _ _ _ _ <_.. .

 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 10

TITLE: CM SEQUENCE CAMERA

--------------------------------- ------- ------ ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - --

Contamination on contacts
same as plunger material.

Plunger corners broken,

exposing rough surface.

I
Material continued to break..

51
FIG. 2.2.10-1 MAGAZINE INTERLOCK SWITCH.

-- -. ---"--------- ,-,
 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.11 TITLE: FUEL CELL 1 AC. CIRCUI'r BRJo~AKER OPEN

SYSTEM: SM MISSION: APOLLO 7

SUBSYSTEM: ELECTRIC POWER EVENT TIME: 120:47

~--,--------------------------------------------------------------------.--------------------------~
PROBLE1-!: AT 120 HOURS 47 MINUTES, A SHORT CIRCUIT IN THF AC PUMP PACKAGE OF FUEL CELL 1 CAUSED
THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER TO TRIP. FUEL CELL 1 PERFO~~NCE WAS NORMAL UP TO THIS
TIME. FIG. 2.2.11-1 SHOWS THE OBSERVED CURRENT AND VOLTAGE VARIATIONS. THE BREAKER COULD
NOT BE RESET: THEREFORE, FUEL CELL 1 WAS REMOVED FROM THE BUS BECAUSE BOTH THE HYDROGEN
AND THE COOLANT PUMPS WERE INOPERATIVE. THE FUEL CELL WAS THEREAFTER PLACED ON THE BUS
ONLY WHEN ~~E SKIN TEMPERATURE DECREASED TO 370°F; THIS PROCEDURE ,LL~ THE FUEL CELL
OPERATIVE.

ACTION: CIRCUIT ANALYSIS &~D INVERTER TESTING INDICATED THAT THE FAILURE WAS A PHASE-TO-PhASE
SHORT EITHER IN THE HYDROGEN PUMP OR IN THE GLYCOL PUMP. GLYCOL PUMPS, WHJ~H HAVE
CANNED STATORS, HAVE NEVER FAILED ELECTRICALLY. EXCEPT FOR A MAJOR REDESIGN OF THE
HYDROGEN PUMP, NO PROCEDUR1~ OR DESIGN CHANGES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIE0 WHICH WOULD FURTHER
IMPROVE THE RELIABILITi OF THE HYDROGEN PUMP.

ORGArHZATION: 5-2490 .
REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AN~ ANOMALY RESOLUT ION: CLOSED DATE:
LISTING JUNE 1969
R:::V:

52

'------~- .. ~---.-----.~...-..-..-..- .......... -.- ,--

 DETAIL SHEET
MOMAl Y 2. 2 • 11

TITlE: FUEL CELL 1 AC CI~CUIT B~~AKER OPEN

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------- -- ----

FAILURES OF THIS NATURE HAVE BEEN OBSERVED ON HYDROGEN PUMPS DURING ENDURANCE TESTING
UNDER NO~~ OPERATING TEMPERATURES. OF FIFTEEN DEVELOPMENT POWER PLANTS THAT EXHIBITED
AN INSULATION RESISTANCE EQUAL TO OR LESS THAN THE APOLLO 10 UNIT, SIX HAD SHORTS IN THE
HYDROGEN PUMP STATOR WINDINGS. FOUR OF THESE SIX WERE PHASE-TO-PHASE, AND THE O'l'HER TWO
WERE PHASE-TO-GROUND. THIS KIND OF FAILURE IS CAUSED BY THE HOT, MOIST HYDROGEN FLOWING
ACROSS THE WINDINGS; THE INSULATION IS DEGRADED AND PHASE-TO-PHASE-TO-PHASE SHORTS
RESULT. IN THE3E TESTS, NO STATOR FAILED IN LESS THAN 1000 HOURS, AND ~HE ~~XIMUM TIME
TO FAILURE WAS 3960 HOURS. THE UNIT FLOh"'N ON APOLLO 10 HAD OPERATED APPROXIMA'rELY 300
HOURS.

53

------------"---- "'-- ... -

 DETAIL SHEET
ANOMALY 2. 2 • 11
------- ---.----.~

TILE; FUEL CELL 1 AC CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN

.--------------- - - -

['-r
I
i
II , I
I
100 "' -- -

f---
I 1\
90
~ [\..,.
c
i I
~- -
..t
',0 ,
~ -, ,'- "-J_~ -. -

~
..1~ \1
1
t· 7~

flO
r- . :
~

- . J __ •

120·"fI:C l .:
,
-
i
i
L
120:47:00
I"::::

I U
120:47:30
T_. :V:mll :sec

"~~~'''''''.............m""~"""~,~~~"""""""""""""""",,,,.m....--
FIG. 2.2.11-1 POWBR VARIAT!ONS AT PUMP FAILURE.

54

_ . , 2m· ' 'W' t.I'-------_ .

 ANOMALY REPORT

MO. 2.2.12 TITLE: CONDENSER EXIT TEMPERATURE FLUCTUATIONS - FUEL CELL 2

SYSTEM: SM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: ELECTRIC POw"ER EVENT TIME: 134

PROBLEM: AT 134 HOURS, ~HE CREW REPORTED THAT THE CONDENSER EXIT TEMPERATURE ON FUEL CELL 2
HAD BEEN CYCLING BETWEEN 149° AND 168°F AT THE RATE OF 2 CYCLES/MINUTE FOR 30 TO 40
MINUTES WHILE THE SPACECRAFT WAS BEHIND THE MOON AND THAT THE CAUTION 1.ND WARNING
ALARM FOR LOW TEMPERATURE HAD BEEN TRIGGERED ABOUT EVERY TENTH CYCLE. THE NORMAL
RANGE OF OPERATION IS 155° TO 165°F. THIS DATA SHOWS CYCLING EARLIBR AND LATER IN
THE FLIGHT, BUT THE TEMPERATURE REMAINED WITHIN THE CAUTION AND WARNING LIMITS.

THE FUEL CELL 2 TEMPERATURE VARIED PERIODICALLY BEFORE AND AFTER FUEL CELL 1 WAS
REMOVED FROM THE BUS. THIS INDICATES THAT PERFORMANCE WAS ABNORMAL WELL BEFORE
THE SUSTAINED OSCILLATIONS.

AC'l'ION: THE OBSERVED BEHAVIOR, ALTHOUGH ABNORMAL, IS NOT DETRIMENTAL TO FJEL CF~L COMPONENT
LIFE OR PERFORMANCE BUT DOES REPRESENT A NUISANCE TO THE CREW BECAUSE THE CAUTION
AND WARNING MUST BE RESET MANUALLY.

ORGAIUZATION: 5-2490 RESOI_uTION: OPEN

REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY DATE:
LISTICC JUNE 1969 REV:

1 55
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 12

TITLE: CONDENSER EXIT TEMPERATURE FLUCTUATIONS - FUEL CELL 2

----------.------
164

I /" f-
Fuel cell 2 condenser
exit temperature
\)'
t--
I I I ~-~

-
-- r-- f~ n ~
h
r
/ .... M n fVl J\, W- ~
'" ~ ~lfV.lA

u ~I Fuel cell 2
r
i]
I
c'!'T! .-

IS I 1
A I
120:45:30 120:46:00 120:46:30 " 120:51:00 120:51:30 lZ!l:52:00 120:52·30 120:5);00 120: 53:3() lZO:~4:00

Time, hr:min:slC

o IYU' ~ Typical fuel cell 2 behavior pri~r to fuel cell 1 remov,'CI.

-----------.~----=-~--~==========
-' -_.
. _. - - -
.. ,........
" ,- l¥
• _162

~
'5 ~h
I \V
/ ["-....
- ~ 1
I
Fllel cell 2
cond~nser ~.i~~~~1
f--

I L__,
-
~
~lsa

...
- ! I
T
-- -- ,---
!
I
r~-
T
n----
Fuel cell 21
!
..
~40 --
n . current

i, '--rI... C ---c-~
M
:::J
U
(,l ~[ 1...1
)6 '---
" LL-l I
, ~--- - ~- - '----
12l:l 9, 10 121,20:00 121:20:10 121:21:00 121:21:30 121:22:00 121:22:10 121:23:00 121: 23:30 121:2~:OO

Time, hr:min:sec
56
FIG, 2.2.12-1 TYPICAL FUEL CELL 2 BEHAVIOR AFTER FUEL CELL 1 REMOVED.

- - - - - - - - - . - _.-t--_... - .....
 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.13 TITLE: CRYOGENIC HYDROGEN AUTOMATIC HEATER CONTROL FAILURE TO TURN OFF

SYSTEM: SM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: ELECTRIC POWER EVENT TIME: 170: 56

PROBLE''': DURING THE 3-HOUR PURGE OF FUE:':' CELL 1, THE AUTOMATIC PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM WAS
BELIEVED TO HAVE FAILED TWICE TO TURN THE HYDROGEN TANK HEATERS OFF (FIG. 2.2.13-1). AFTER
170-1/2 HOURS, THE HEATERS WERE SWITCHED ON AND OFF MANUALLY.

FOR AUTOMATIC OPERATION, THE PRESSURE SWITCi-IES IN BOTH TANKS MUS'r CLOSE IN ORDER TO
ACTUATE THE HEATERS, BUT ONLY ONE PRESSURE S~ITCH MUST OPEN TO DEACTIVATE THEM
AS SHOWN IN FIG 2.2.13-2THEHEATERS IN TANK 1 WERE IN AUTO AND THOSE IN TANK 2 WERE IN
OFF BEFORE THE PURGE WAS STARTED. ALSO, THE :?RESSURE SWITCH FOR TANK 1 WAS OPEN AND THAT 01
TANK 2 WAS CLOSED. SHORTLY AFTER THE PURGE l'lAS STARTED, THE HENrERS IN ':i'ANK 1 WERE
SWITCHED TO OFF AND IN TANK 2 TO AUTO: THIS CHANGE WAS MADE TO BALANCE THE QUANTITY IN
THE TWO TANKS. AFTER 5 MINUTES OF PURG1NG, THE PRESSURE SWITCH IN TANK 1 CLOSED AT 236
PSIA, ACTIVATING THE HEATERS IN TANK 2 AND AFFECTING PRESSURES IN THE MANNER EXPECTED.
SINCE THE PRESSURE IN TANK 1 CONTINUED TO DROP AND A MASTER ALARM WAS RECEIVED, THE HEATERS
IN TANK 1 WERE TURNED TO AUTO. AS SHOWN IN FIG 2.2 .13-l,THE PRESSURES WERE AT A MAXIMUM OF
8 PSIA ABOVE THE SWITCHING LEVEL WHEN THE HEATERS WERE MANUALLY ~:URNE~ OFF.

ACTION: THE TRANSDUCERS ON APOLLO 10 WERE SUBJECTED TO TEMPERATURES BETWEEN MINUS 100 0 A~D MINUS
140°F DURING THE EXTENDED PURGE; THE TRANSDUCER OUTPUT DRIFTED UPWARD AND CREATED AN
APPARENT LOSS OF AUTOMATIC PRESSURE CONTROL. LONG-DURATION PURGES WILL NOT BE PERFORMED
ON FUTURE FLIGHTS. THE APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK HAS BEEN Ca~NGED APPROPRIATELY.

ORGAIHZATION: 5-2490 RESO~UTIOrj: CLOSED

REFERENCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING DATE:

REV:
J
I 5, J
 DETAIL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 13

TITLE: CYROGENIC HYDROGEN AUTOMATIC HEATER CONTROL FAILURE TO TURN OFF

I Purge
,
~

270
r •J I I
EMaster alarm I
.110.

2&0
Deactivate 2 ~- 1-- ..... - f - -
. / "
~---
"'-
-~ ~
V
... --~
rTank 2
V~
~
.-
I
- l-

~Io.=.- '"
I
.......
~ "~r-- I
I I
DeactIvate 1 -- -- --.L .. h. ~ "-,

,
250
r---. 'I
i/ ' ......
.~
!oo... - r--
[,7 I
I i\. .. l)-Tank 1 7
\ / t"
"
'"a. 100.
~ 240 ,
r---...- { !
!::
;;;
'"
Activate 1 and 2 -- '-'.. l- f- -- !
I

IV
r----..
/ ~
ct
r--.....
230
Tank 1 AUTO
·;OFF ......
:AUTO
·~OFF lAUTO
!
lOFF'
I I
Tank 2 OFF
i I n
A.UTO
! I
10FF lAUTO
I :I
lOFF !
.
lAUTO
220

· · .
210 · · . i I
165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173
Time, hr

FIG. 2.2.13-1 HYDROGEN PRESSURES DURING APPARENT FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC PRESSURE CONTROL
58

•_ _ _ _ _ _~_._._ . . . ._ .. ! 'Met. t .... _ ., ...... _ .......... ~~""~. '~-"

 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 13

TITLE: CYROGENIC HYDROGEN AUTOMATIC HEATER CONTROL FAILURE TO TURN OFF

dc bus A
Manual

• •
o Off
..-(t
Auto
I
dc bus B
Auto I

• • Off
Manual Pressure
tra!1sducer

• I
• t---------,,~ r-----I
I I
I

I Pressure
I
I I switch

[] Q
Tank 1 Tank 2

59
FIG. 2.2.13-2 HYDROGEN TANK PRESSURE CONTROL
 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.14 TITLE: OVERPRESSURE OF REACTANTS IN FUEL CELL 1 WHEN PURGE

VALVE CLOSED
MISSION: APOLLO 10
SYSTEM: SM
EVENT TIf.1E: 169:56
SUBSYSTEM:

PROBLEl4: AT 166 HOURS 49 MINUTES, THE SKIN TEMPERA'I'URE OF FUEL CELL 1 \iAS 420 0 F, AND A CONT INUOU S
HYDROGEN PURGE WAS INITIATED TO REDUCE THE CONCENTRATION OF WATER IN THE ELECTROLYE.
r.'HREE HOURS LATER, THE FUEL CELL WAS SUFFICIENTLY DRY AND HOT, THE PURGE WAS TERMINA'!'ED,
AND THE HEATER FOR THE HYDROGEN VENT LINE WAS TURNED OFF. HOWEVER, HYDROG~N FLOW TO rHE
FUEL CELL DECAYED VERY SLOWLY (FIG.2.2.14-1),NORMALLY,FLOW DECAYS TO ZERO IN LESS THAN 1
MINUTE. THE PURGE VALV~ WAS REOPENED, AND THE FLOW RATE INCREASED TO THE UPPER LIMIT,
INDICATING THAT THE PURGE VALVE WAS FUNCTIONING. THE VALVE WAS CLOSED AGAIN BUT THE
FLOW DECREASE WAS STILL VERY SLOW. AS THE FLOW RATE WAS APPROACHING ZERO AFTER ABOUT
3D MINUTES, THE REGULATED HYDROGEN PRESSURE FOR THE FUEL CELL BEGAN TO INCREASE
REACHING A MAXIMUM 'OF 72 PSIA BEFORE SLOWLY DECAYING TO THE NORMAL 6~ PSIA.
AS SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.14-2 ,THE REGULATOR OPEPATION DEPENDS rlN A REGULATED NITROGEN REFEREN( E.
PRESSURE. THE NITROGEN PRESSURE DID NOT CHANGE DURING THE HYDROGEN PRESSURE EXCURSION,
NOR DID THE REGULATED OXYGEN PRESSURE, ELIMINATING THE POSSIBILITY OF A REFERENC~ PFESSURE
CHANGE.

ACTION: GROUND TES~S DEMONSTRATE THAT THE EXTENDED HYDROGEN P~RGE IN FLIGHT CREATED LOW TEMPERATUREE
ON THE REGULATOR; THE CONSEQUENT REGULATOR LEAKAGE EXPLAINS THE CONTINUED FLOW. WITH THE
HEATER OFF, TIm VENT LINE BECAME BLOCKED, LEADING TO THE INCREASE IN REGULATED HYDROGEN
PRESSURE.

FOR FUTURE MISSIONS, EXTE~DED HYDRGGEN PURGlNG FROM CRYOGENIC TANKS WILL NOT BE PERFORMED.
FOR A GREATER MARGIN OF OPERATIONAL ASSURANCE, THE VENT LINE HEATER WILL BE LEFT ON FOR
10 MINUTES AFTER TERMINATION OF A HYDROGEN PURGE. THIS CHA~lGE HAS BEEN INCGRPORATED INTO
THE APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK.

ORGAIHZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:

REFERENCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING
REV:
J
160 I

------------ - - " - ------_._.- -~-'"

 DETA Il SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 14

TITLE; OVERPRESSURE OF REACTANTS IN FUEL CELL 1 WHEN PURGE VALVE CLOSED

80
~
'",
-
Q.

..
u
...... 70 : ~ """'-
.
:J

..
D.. , ./
V ~
"'"........ 1000...,
l"....ooo"
60 I i

0.24
Stop' purge ~
• T
i Cycle purge switch I
I'

-=..
~

~
u
,
..
;;
0.16
"i\ , ..-

~
.2 0.08 ~
14.
~
...........
o r--.. ' - i I
169:30 169:42 169:54 170:06 170:18 170:30 170:40 170:54 171:06
Time, hr:min

FIG. 2.2.14-1 FLOW RATE AND PRESSURE AFTER PURGE

61

------ ~ ...-.-" .
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 14

TITLE: OVERPRESSURE OF REACTANTS IN FUEL CELL 1 WHEN PURGE VALVE CLOSED

- - - - - - - - --. -.

Nitrogen
reference
Hydrogen
Glycol regulator

Hydrogen
inlet
Hydrogen Fuel
Hydrogen vent -_w cell
pr£-heater

Glycol pump Purge valve

Overboard

62

FIG. 2.2.14-2 FUEL CELL HYDROGEN SYSTEM

---------------------- ------_ ....... ---

 ANOMAl Y RE PORT

NO. 2.2.15 TITLE: EDS MODULE LIGHT BULBS FAILED INTERMITTENTLY

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: EDS EVENT TIME: PRE-LAUNCH

PROBLEl.. : DURING SPACECRAFT TESTING PRIOR TO LAUNCH, THE LAUNCH VEHICLE ENGINE WARNING INDICATORS
OPERATED INTERMITTENTLY. THE INDICATOR FOR EACH OF THE FIVE ENGINES HAS TWO REDUNDANT
MINIATURE LAMPS, AND ONE LAMP IN FOUR OF THE INDICATORS WAS INTERMITTENT.

POSTFLIGHT, ONLY THREE OF THE FOUR LAMPS WERE INTERMITTENT. THE ANNUNCIATOR WAS REMOVED
PROM THE SPACECRAFT AND DISASSEMBLED. ON SIX OF THE TEN LAMPS, INCLUDING THE FOUR INTER-
MITTENT ONES, COLD-SOLDER JOINTS WERE FOUND WHERE THE L~~P LEAD WAS ATTACHED TO THE PRINTED\
CIRCUIT BOARD. THE COLD-SOLDER JOINT WOULD HAVE CAUSED INTERMITTENT LAMP OPERATION.

THERE ARE ALSO THREE OTHER STATUS LIGHTS IN EACH ANNUNCIATOR: LAUNCH VEHICLE OVERRATE,
S-II SEPARATION, AND LAUNCH VEHICI.E GUIDANCE FAIL. THE SIX BULBS IN THESE LIGHTS WERE
NOT INTERMITTENT PRIOR TO LAUNCH NOR WEf'E ANY FAULTS FOUND IN THEM DURING POSTFLIGHT
EXAMINATION.

ACTION: THE UNITS FOR APOLLO 11 AND SUBSEQUENT VEHICLES HAVE BEEN SCREENED, WHEREAS THE APOLLO 10
UNIT HAD NOT BEE~.

OPGAfU ZATlON:
kHERENCES:
5- 2 4 90
APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING
RESOLUTIOtl: CLOSED DATE: I
REV:
I
[63j

--~--------.----.- ----~.--- .. .. -
 -~-. .-.,. ,,- ...... , ,

DETAIL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 15

TITLE: EDS MODULE LIGHT BULBS FAILED INTERMITTENTLY

------------ .--.--

I/J.._- RTV-ID2

i\"'-- \," ..
Terminal post - . / \ Lamp leads~~~

64
FIG. 2.2.15-1 LAMP ASSEMBLY

1I... ~7 =#-~-------
__
.,.. ""'__ 'l"""""I!f,.·"""i1It

ANOMALY REPORT

......
un 2.2.J6 TITLE: ENTRY MONITOR SYSTEM STOPPED SCRIBING WHEN INI~IALIZED

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: EMS EVENT TIME: 190:30

PROBLEM: THE S'l'YLUS OF THE ENTRY MONITOR STOPPED SCRIBING WHILE THE SCROLL WAS BEING DhIVEN TO THE
ENTRY PATTEF..N FOLLOWING Pc SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE PRE-ENTRY 'I'ES'l'S. THE SCROLL
WAS SLEWED BACK AND FORTH, A~D 'l'HE STYLUS BEGAN TO CUT THROUGH THE EMULSION ON THE
SCROLL. THE TFACE OF ACCELERATION VERSUS VELOCITY WAS NORMAL THROUGHOUT ENTRY.

THE EMULSION USED ON THE SCROLL FILM IS A LATE;: RUBBER/SOAP BASE. THE FORMULATION OF
THE SOAP, MilCH WAS COMMERCIALLY PROCURED, WAS RECENTLY CHANGED WITH URIC ACID BEING
ADDED. THIS .;U)DITION CAUSES THE EMU:'3~ON TO HARDEN BY A CHEMICAL REACTION WITH THE
GELATINOUS FILM ON THE MYLAR SCROLL.

~CTIOH: NO CHANGE WAS PLANNED FOR APOLLO 11 OR 12, HOWEVER, FOR SUBSEQUENT VEHICLES, EITHER
THE SCROLL EMULSION BASE WILL BE MADE USING THE ORIGINALLY FORMULATED SOAP OR PRESSURE-
SENSITIVE PAPER WHICH WAS RECENTLY QUAI,IFIED WILL BE USED FOR TliE SCROLL.

ORGAlUZATION: 5-2490
REFERENCES: APOLLO! 0 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:

REV:

65
 ANOMALY REPORT

HO. 2.2.17 TITLE: VHF BEACON ANTENNA bID NOT DEPLOY

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: TELECOMMUNI':;ATIONS EVENT TIME: 192:03

PROBLEM: THE VHF RECOVERY BEACON ANTENNA DID NOT PROPERLY DEPLOY. RECOVERY PHOTOGRAPHS SHOW
THAT THE RADIATING ELEMENT AND THREE GROUND-PLANE RADIALS WERE NOT PROPERLY DEPLOYED.
HOWEVER, RF SIGNALS FROM THE BEACON WERE RECEIVED BY THE RECOVERY FORCES.

THE ANTENNA DID NOT DEPLOY BECAUSE ONE RADIAL WA.S CAUG3T UNDER THE OUTBOARD EDGE OF
RAMP SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.17-1.

ACTION: NO CHANGE IS REQUIRED FOR APOLLO 11; HOWEVER, AN ENGINEERING S'rUDY HAS t.-EEN INITIATED
TO CONSIDER MODIFICATION OF THE RAMP.

ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 ESC

REFERENCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANO~lALY LISTING R ILUTION: CLOSED DATE:
REV:

I 6G j
-------------- ------ --
 DETA Il SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 1 7

rITLE: VHF BEACON ANTENNA DID NOT DEPLOY

IT Radiating
Uelement

\
Rotate entire assembly
down 90° for stowage

67

FIG. 2.2.17-1'VHF RECOVERY BEACON ANTENNA DEPLOYED

-.11_-------'-' ___ I _ _ _ _ --~u-~-- .. -'--..-- ,- - --.

 ANOMALY RE PORT

NO. 2.2.18 TITLE: 'I'WO RETAINING SPRINrs ON TUNNEL CHARGE HOLDER RING DID NOT CAPTURE

SYSTEM: eM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: STRUCTURE E"ENT TIME: 108:24

PROBLEI~:
THE MINUS Y CHARGE H0LDER RING WAS NOT CAP'r~JRED BY THE RETENTION SPRINGS, WHILE THE
PLUS Y HOLDER WAS CAPTURED (FIG. 2. 2.18-1). ALTHOUGH THE HOLDER vIAS NOT CAPTURED, IT REMAINEL
IN A POSITION ABOVE THE GROOVE, RESTING ON TOP OF THE SPRINGS WITHIN A NONHAZARDOUS EN-
VELOPE AREA.

EVEN THOUGH THE TWO CHARGE HOLDER SEGMENTS ARE RESTRAINED AT ONE END, THERE IS A REMOTE
POSSIBILITY OF A FREE CHARGE HOLDER DAMAGING THE FABRIC COMPONENTS OF THE EARTH LANDING
SYSTEM. AS A RESULT OF ONE OF THE HOLDERS ON APOLLO 9 COMING FROM THE GROOVE AND BEING
IN THE HAZARDOUS ENVELOPE, FOUR SPRING RETENTION DEVICES WERE INSTALLED ON l~OLLO 10 TO
INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF CAPTURING THE CHARGE HOLDERS.

A MARGINAL SITUATION EXISTED ON APOLLO 10 SINCE TWO OF THE SPR1NGS CAPTURED AND THE OTHER
TWO DID NOT. A MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT PRESSURE IN THE TUNNEL AREA WILL MAKE
THE RING FOLLOW THE TUNNEL. ALTHOUGH THE PRESSURE WAS WORSE ON APOLLO 10 TlmN IT WILL BE
FOR A NORMAL SEPARATION, THE MATH MODEL ITSELF DOES NOT INDICA'I'E 'I'HAT THE SI'l'UAT10N WILL
BE MARKEDLY IMPROVED. TESTING WITHOUT ANY PRESSURE IN THE TUNNEL HAS SHOWN THAT THE SPRINGS
WILL WORK.

ORGAfUZATION: 5- 2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED

REFERE'iCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING DAlE:
REV:
,
'--\6-8-1
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 18

TITLE: TWO RETAINING SPRINGS ON TUNNEL CHARGE HOLDER RING DID NOT CAPTURE

ACTION: BASED ON THE APOLLO 10 FLIGHT EXPERIENCE, GROUND TESTS, AND PJ~ALYTICAL RESULTS, THERE IS
STILL A PROBABILITY THAT THE SPRINGS WILL NOT CAPTURE. THE PROBABILI'rY OF CAPTURE MAY BE
HIGHER ON APOLLO 11 THAN IT WAS ON APOLLO 10. IN ANY EVENT, ~HE RISK OF A CATASTROPHIC
FAII.URE IS EXTREMELY SMALL. THE CHARGE HOLDERS ARE UNLIKELY TO DETACH COMPLETELY l.ND,
THEREFORE, CANNOT CAUSE MAJOR DAMAGE TO THE PARACHUTES. THE POSSIBILITY OF }\•.3RASION OF A
RISER LINE EXISTS; BUT, BASED ON ANALYSIS AND THE EXPERIENCE OF APOLLO 9 AND APOLLO 10,
THIS ALSO IS SMALL.
ON IN-LINE VEHICLES, A BETTER MEANS OF RETAINING THE CHARGE HOLDER IS BEING STUDIED.

69
 DETAIL SHEET
ANOMALY 2. 2 • 18

TITLE : TWO RETAINING SPRINGS ON TUNNEL CHARGE HOLDER RING DID NOT CA~TURE

70
S! a --
FIG. 2.2.18-1 CHARGR HOLDER RETENTION

------::------------~----------- ---- _ ..
 ,.

ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.19 TITLE: SLOW-DOWN OF ONBOARD TAPE RECORDER DURING ENTRY

SYSTEM. CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION EVENT TIME: RE-EN'I'RY

PROBLEM: THE DATA STORAGE EQUIPMENT EXPERIENCED LOSS OF DATA THREE TIMES DURING ENTRY, WHICH RESULTED
IN A LOSS OF APPROXIMATELY 33 SECONDS OF RECORDED PCM DATA AND 2 SECONDS OF RECORDED VOICE
DATA.
TESTING OF THE RECORDER HAS REVEALED THAT AN OUTSIDE-TO-INSIDE PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL OF 2.25
PSI IS SUFFICIENT TO DEFORM THE COVER, CAUSING IT TO CONTACT THE TAPE REELS.

THE RECORDER VENT VALVE IS SPECIFIED TO OPERATE AT 2.0 +0.5 PSI DIFio'ERENTIAL PRESSURE. AC-
CEPTANCE TEST DATA ON THE APOLLO 10 VENT VALVE SHO~S A CRACKING PRESSUP~ OF 2.40 PSID.
HOWEVER, THIS PRESSURE DEFORMED THE COVER SUFFICIENTLY TO CONTACT THE REEL AND SLOW IT.

ACTION: AN IN-LINE CHANGE WILL BE IMPLEMENTED TO SELECT VALVES THAT CRACK ON THE LOW SIDE OF THE
SPECIFICATION TO INSURE NO RECURRENCE OF THIS PROBLEM.

ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED

REFERENCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING DATE:

REV:
J
I 71

.-...
----------~---.-.-~.. --.
 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.20 TIRE: EVA STRUT BRACE NOT IN STOWED POSITION FOR LAUNCH

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: EVA EVENT TIME: LAUNCH

PROBLEM: THE STABILIZER,.WHICH MAINTAINS COUCH POSITIONING WHEN THE FOOT STRUT OF THE CENTER COUCH
IS REMOVED, WAS CONNECTED DURING THE LAUNCH (FIG.2.2.20-1). THE STABILIZER SHOULD HAVE BEEN
IN THE STOWED POSITION TO ALLOW STROKING OF THE COUCH STRUTS FOR AN ABORT LANDING. THE
CREW PROPERLY STOWED THE STABILIZER PRIOR TO ENTRY.

ACTION: A SPECIFIC MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE PREINGRESS CHECKLIST FOR SUBSE-
QUENT MISSIONS.

ORGA'UZATION5-2490
REFERENCESMSC SUMMARY OF MISSION PROBLEMS RESOLUTION: CLOSED LJATE:
TECHNICAL DEBRIEFING
APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING REV:
I
I 72 I
 DETAIL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 20

TITLE ;
EVA STRUT BRACE NOT IN STOWED POSITION FOR LAUNCH

Stabilizer stowed

Stabilizer
connected

All couches during launch,

boost, entry, landing

D
Extravehicular activity

73
FIG. 2.2.20-1 ~TABILIZER USAGE

--- - - ---- --
 ANOMALY REPORT

NO.2. 2.21 TIRE: GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER PERFORMANCE

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMEN'l'ATION EVENT TIME: MISSION

PROBLEM: THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER WAS REPORTED TO DRIFT EXCBSSIVELY IN ROLL AND YAW (APPROXIMATELY
5 DEGREES IN 20 MINUTES). ATTITUDES DISPLAYED BY THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER AND THE INERTIAL
MEASUREMENT UNIT WERE COMPARED AFTER EARTH ORBITAL INSERTION, INDICATING DIFFERENCES OF
LESS THAN 0.1 DEGREES IN ALL AXES. THESE VALUES AND CREW COMMENTS INDICATE PROPER PERFOR-
MANCE EARLY IN THE MISSION.
A SIMPLIFIED BLOCK DIAGRAM OF THE STABILIZATION AND COPTROL SYSTEM SHOWING THE FUNCTIONS
OF THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER AND THE SPACECRAFT CONTROL LOOPS IS SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.21-1. ON~
OF THE TWO GYRO }$SEMBLIES PROVIDES ONLY RATE INFORMATION AND IS NOR~LY USED TO DRIVE
THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER. THE OTHER GYRO ASSEMBLY CAN PROVIDE EITHER RAT~ OR ATTITUDE
ERROR, AT CREW OPTION, AND CAN BE SELECTED TO DRIVE THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER.

-THE APOLLO 10 GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER WAS DRIVEN BY BOTH GYRO ASSEMBLIES, AND THE CREW
REPORTED SIMILAR INDICATIONS FROM EACH, THEREFORE ISOLATING THE CAUSE OF THE DRIFT TO THE
GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER.

THE SPECIFICATION FOR THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER CONTAINS ALLOWABLE ATTITUDE DISPLAY DEVIA-
TIONS FOR AT~ITUDE AND TRANSLATION MANEUVERS, FOR ASCENT, AND FOR ENTRY. IT DOES NOT
CONTAIN AN ALLOWABLE VALUE FOR LONG-TERM CONSTANT ATTITUDE DRIFT. A VALUE OF 10 DEG/HOUR
IS CONSIDERED REASONABLE FOR THE SYSTEM.

ORGANIZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUT ION: CLOSED

REFERENCES: MSC SUMMARY OF MISSION PROBLElotS DATE:
TECHNICAl- DEBRIEFINGS
CREW BRIEFI:~G REV:
APOLLO 10 ~ISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING
74

------------------. --.----.-----~-~ . ., .. - -- '-''' .

 DETAIL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 21
----"--------------------------------
TITLE: GYRO DISPLAY COUPLE~ PERFORMANCE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACTION: THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER IS NOT USED TO CONTROL ANY SPACECRAFT MANEUVERS. IF THE INERTIAL
ME.I'SUREMENT SYSTEM IN THE PRIMARY GUIDANCE FAILS, THE CREW CAN MANUALLY MANEUVER TO THE
DESIRED INERTIAL ATTITUDE AND THEN ALLOW THE STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM TO AUTO-
MATICALLY MAINTAI~ ATTITUDE. TO MINIMIZE DRIFT EFFECT WHEN THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER IS TO
BE USED FOR A MANEUVER, IT SHOULD BE ALIGNED AS NEAR IN TIME TO THE MANEUVER AS IS PRACTICABLE

THE TWO GYRO ASSEMBLIES AND THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER WERE REMOVED FROM THE SPACECRAFT
AND RETURNED TO THE VENDOR FOR INDIVIDUAL ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND A SYSTEM TEST.

ALL THREE UNITS PASSED INDIVIDUAL TESTS WITH NO DISCREPANCIES WHICH COULD HAVE CAUSED
THE REPORTED INFLIGHT PERFORMANCE. THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER WAS THEN OPERATED ALONE WITH
THE INPUTS SET AT ZERO. i'RIFT RATES WERE 2, 4, AND 1 DEG/HR FOR PITCH, YAW, AND ROLL,
RESPECTIVELY. A GYRO PACKAGE WAS THEN CONNECTED, AND THE SYSTEM WAS OPERATED ON A TEST
STAND. UNDER QUIESCENT OPERATION, WITH NO GYRO INPUTS, THE PERFORMANCE WAS THE SAME AS
THAT RECORDED ABOVE. FINALLY, A RUN WAS MADE SIMULATING PASSIVE THERMAL CONTRC', IN WHICH
A 20 DEG/HR ROLL RATE WAS INTRODUCED. THE DRIFTS RECORDED w"'ERE 5. 1 AND 5. 0 DEG/HR FOR
PI~CH AND YAW, RESPECTIVELY. THE DRIFT RATES EXPERIENCED DURING THESE TESTS ARE NOT
INDICATIVE OF THE PERFORMANCE REPORTED INFLIGHi'. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ACTUAL DIVERGENCE
OF THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR WAS NOT AS RAPID AS IT APPEARED BECAUSE NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO
MEASURE DRIFT ACCURATELY.

"75

-----_._-- ------ -----

 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAl Y 2 • 2 • 21

TITLE: GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER PERFORMANCE

-------

I
Gyro
assembly r...... _ Rate Gyro
Flight director
2 - -, display
coupler attitude indicator

Rate Service propulsion

Gyro ~
eng i ne servo
Control
assembly
1 -• -- electronics
Reaction control
• Attitude
error
engines

BMAG mode switch

------~-------------------------.
FIG. 2.2.21-1 STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM
76
 ANOMALY REPORT

r«l.2.2.22 TInE: CHLORINE AMPULE LEARAGE

SYSTEM:CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT EVENT TlME:

PROBLEM: DURING ONE CHLORINE INJECTION, CHLORINE SOLUTION LEAKED FROM THE FITTING AND THE BUFFER
AMPULE WOUY.D NOT BACk-FILL WITH WATER WHEN THE PLUNGER WAS UNSCREWED.

ACTION: THE FLIGHT Al-'PULES USED AND UNUSED, WEFE EXAMINED FOt{ DEFECTS, AND NO ANOMALOUS CONDI'frONS
WERE FOUND.

THE PROBLEM WAS PROBABLY CAUSED BY A PROCEDURAL ERROR; THE NEEDLE WAS No'r FULLY INSERTED
INTO THE RUBBER GLAND AND DID NOT PENETRATE INTO ThE WATER. THIS COULD ACCOUNT FOR BOTH
THE LEAKAGE OF THE CHLORINE AND FAIl.URE TO OBTAIN WATER .£oN THE BUFFER AMPULE.

ORGAJHZATlON: 5-2490
RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:
REFEREHCES:APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOr-:.::u,y LISTING
MSC 30-DAY REPORT
MSC SUMMARY OF MISSION PROBLEMS REV:

77

----------------.-------- ................ ""'..-..-""----~'--.-

 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.23 TITLE: DIGITAL EVENT TIMER MISCOUNTS

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: EVENT TIME:

PROBLEM: THE DIGITAL EVENT TIMER ON PANEL 1 ADVANCED A TOTAL OF 2 MINUTES DURING THE COUNTDOWN
FOR FIRST MIOCOURSE CORRECTION. AT OTHER TIMES, THE TENS OF SECONDS FAILED TO ~VANCE.

THE INCREMENTS OF TIME ARE ELECTRICALLY ADVANCED THROUGH A CIRCUIT ACTIVATED WHEN A CON-
DUCTOR SEGMENT CONTACTS A BRUSH IN EACH REVOLUTION OF THE UNITS WHEEL.

THE TENS OF SECONDS PROBLEM WAS DUPLICATED POSTFLIGHT IN THE COUNTUP AND THE COUNTDOWN
MODES. I~SPECTION DISCLOSED THAT THE UNITS WHEEL HAD BEEN RUBBED BY THE MOTOR GEAR: PAINT
HAD FLAKED AND CONTAMINATED THE UNITS TAB AND BRUSH ASSEMBLY (SEE FIG.2.2.23-1) .CONTAMINATI0
BETWEEN THE TAB AND-BRUSH WOULD HAVE PREVENTED ELECTRICAL CONTACT.

ACTION: THE 2-MINUTE JUMP WAS NOT DUPLICATED, AND NO CONDITION WAS FOUND IN THE TIMER THAT COULD
HAVE PRODUCED THE JUMP. SINCE THIS TIMER IS SENSITIVE TO ELECTRICAL NCISF., THF MOS~
PROBARLE CAUSZ WAS A SPURIOUS MOISE INPUT.

A SCREENING TEST HAD BEEN DEVELOPED FOR THE TIMERS INSTALLF.D IN FUTURE SPACECRAFT: HOWEVER
THE CAPABILITY OF THE TEST TO ISOLATE UNRELIABLE TIMERS HAS NOT YET BEEN PROVEN.

ORGAJUZATION: 5- 2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED

REFERENCES: MSC 1:'AILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING, DATE-
JUNE 1969
RL

78

----,--_._------'........... ........ .... ...

.-: .-~.~-... --~- .... "'-.-
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMALY 2.2.23

TITLE: DIGITAL EVENT TIMER MISCOUNTS

T
1 I 1
I

S! I I
I; : :;)
\;:1tj "

,..~

r
I
0;:::
11
I
(c » (u; -4
11)
::l
\I>

J
--.
J
I
~
F;
I-

Dr
I
rJg ~ ~'g I~I=\
0
,·-T
f
11111111 II" 11"11 liP /' ~iI

\'
_ L
~
UII f " I
\. I \
~I
1/ ~
I \ "- 1
\ I ..... O-u
'l

==5_. 20
::r c-
~ ~ 11)
c- ~
11)
1 OJ 0 OJ
C-::l _.
OJ ..... ::l
::lOJ .....
a. ~.
::l
II
a.
79

FIG. 2.2.23-1 DIGITAL EVENT THiER

 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.24 TITLE: SUIT HEAT EXCHANGER wICK DIFFICULT TO SERVICE

~YSTEM: CM MISS ION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: ECU EVENT TIME: T-3 8: 45

PROBLEI-t: BETWEEN T-38: 45 AND T-20: 11 AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF WATER WAS REQUIRED DURING THE WICK ~vETTn;(
PROCEDURE FOR THE SUIT HEAT EXCHANGER OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL UNIT. DIFFICULTY WAS
EXPERIENCED IN OBTAINI'·.~ COMPLETE WETTING OF THE "AIR-BLOCKING SINTERED PLATE", IN THE SUIT
HEAT EXCHANGER. FOLLOI ~NG EACH ATTEMPT, UNACCEPTABLE GAS LEAKAGE OCCURRED. A SERVICING
WITH WATER INJECTION F':",),:SSURE HIGHER THAN NORMAL WAS SUCCESSFUL IN PREVENTING GAS BREAK-
THROUGH. THE TIME REQUIRED FOR RESERVICING OPERATIONS CAUSED THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SUIT
LOOP PURGING AND SAMPLING, FINAL CREW CHECKLIST, AND COMMUNICATION TESTS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED
DURING THE BUILT-IN HOLD AT T-9:00.

ACTION: TEST CHANGE NOTICE CS-219 ~S BEEN ISSUED WHICH CONTAINS SERVICING PROCEDURES. THE WICK
WILL BE LEFT WETTER AFTER THE ALTITUDE CHAMBER TESTS, AND THE WICK BREAKTHROUGH PRESSURE
WILL BE DETERMINED.

ORGArnZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED

REFERENCES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, P. 10 DATE:
APOLLO 11 FRR
REV:

80

.-~----------.--.-.-.----~-
 .. < ""'N'

ANOMALY RE PORT

NO. 2.2.25 TITLE: CREW REPORTED LM WATER CONTAINED AIR

SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: CREW SYSTEM EVENT TIME:

PROBLE!-!: THE cmw REPORTED THAT THE LUNAR MODULE DRINKI~G WATER CONTAINED GAS. THE NITROGEN USED
TO PRESSURIZE THE WATER SYSTEM PERMEATES THE TANK BLADDER, AND THE WATER BECOMES SATURATED
WITHIN 100 HOURS AFTER SERVICING. AS THE ABSOLUTE PRESSURE IS REDUCED THE DISSOLVED NITROGEN
IS RELEASED. THE FIRST WATER WI'l'HDRAWN SHOUJ... D HAVE CONTAINED ABOUT 12 PERCENT OF GAS. AT
STAGING, THE MIXTURE SHOULD HAVE CONTAINED 6.3 PERCENT NITROGEN BECAUSE OF THE REDUCED WATER
TANK PRESSURE AT THAT TIME. THE WATER HOSE, WATER GUN, AND CONNECTING PLUMBING WERE NOT
SERVICED AND THIS ENTRAPPED AIR WOULD INITIALLY ADD TO TIlE PROBLEM.

ACTIO.J: PRELAUNCH PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO INCLUDE SERVICING THE WA'l'ER HOSE AND CONNt.:C'l'ING
PLUMBING.
CONSIDERlLTION IS BEING GIVEN TO EMPLOYING A GAS SEPARATOR WHICH FITS IN THE DRINKING LINE.

ORGAIU ZATION5-2490 RESOLUTIOtI: CLOSED

REFlRErKESMSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY LI')'rli;:~ DATE:
JUNE 1969
REV:

[yT--1
--------------------------------------
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 25

TITLE: CREW REPORTED LM WATER CONTAINED AIR

Hydrophobic membrane, Gas out

Teflon, 5 to 10 microns

~----t
o
,. . ;- . : o
.....

o o o
I-ounce J ____ . L.)
I
I storage
()
::::::::~~J
Water/gas
mixt··re

-----~
~
volume

.,,;I r:::;i1Y 0
_- ...........
IT
0
c.)
0

0
,-------.

-
-

~ ---- -
~ Water out

o 0 g
o u CJ

~ Hydrophilic men-,brane,
stainless steel, 5 microns

FIG. 2.2.25-1 WATER/GAS SEPARATION MEMBRANE. 82

--------------------"'----- _ .. _ - - -..._ .. ,,_.<>- ... _ •• " ,

 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2,2.26 TITLE: HIGH NOISE LEVEL IN LM CABIN

SYSTEM: LM
MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: STRUCTURE EVENT TIME:

PROBLEl.f: THE NOISE LEVEL WAS HIGH IN THE LM.

1. THE S-BAND ANTENNA SOUNDE~ AS IF IT HAD BAD BEARINGS AND IT SHOOK THE LM WHENEVER IT
WAS MOVED.
THE STEERABLE ANTENNA WAS PARTICULARLY NOISY IN THE SLEW MODE DURING ALTITUDE
CHAMBER TESTS; THE LM-4 ANTENNA IS NOT PECULIAR IN THIS RESPECT. THIS WAS NOT NOTICED
ON LM-3, BECAUSE THE ANTENNA WAS NOT USED IN FLIGHT.
2. THE CABIN AIR FANS WERE EXCESSIVELY NOISY; THE CREW TURNED THEM OFF AFTER 30 MINUTES.

THE CREW STATED THAT THE CABIN FANS WERE NOT NEEDED.

3. THE GLYCOL PUMPS WERE EXCESSIv~LY NOISY.

TESTS WERE PER~ORMED ON LUNAR MODULE 8 TO VERIFY THE USE OF FLEXIBLE HOSES
TO ISOLATE THE PUMP FROM THE TUBING AND ACT AS AN ATTENUATORi.HOWEVER, NOISE WAS
ONLY SLIGHTLY REDUCED. FURTHER MODIFICATION TO THE LUNAR MODULE HARDWARE DOES NOT
APPEAR PRACTICAL. THEREFORE, EAR PLUGS WILL BE OBTAINED FOR THE CREW TO USE DURING
SLEEP PERIODS.

ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:

REFERENCES: MSC-FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING
JUNE 1969 REV:
J
1 83
 ANOMAL Y RE PORT

NO. 2.2.27 TITLE: YAW RATE GYRO OUTPUT ERROR

SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION EVENT TIME: 98: 47 GET

PROBLEM: THE OUTPUT FROM THE YAW RATE GYRO DID ~OT ALWAYS CORRESPOND TO ACTUAL VEHICLE YAW RATE
DURING THE 50 SECOND PERIOD PRIOR TO STAGING AND SEVERAL SECONDS AFTER STAGiNG. FOR
EXAMPLE IN ONE 12 SECOND PERIOD, THE GYRO APPEARED TO HANG UP AT MINUS 1.7 JLG/SEC.
DURING THIS PERIOD, THE ACTUAL VEHICLE RATE WAS 0.2 DEG/SEC. THE GYRO OUTPUT APPEARS
NORMAL BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE PERIOD OF ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS ON ABORT GUIDANCE SYSTEM
AROUND STAGING.

ACTIOH: THE HISTORY OF THE GYROS ON APOLLO 11 WAS ANALYZED AND FOUND TO HAVE NO DISCREPANCIES.
THE POSSIBILITY OF PERFORMING ADDITIONAL TESTS ON FOLLOW-ON UNITS AFTER INSTALLATION IS
BEING CONSIDERED.

ORGArUZATION: 5-2490
REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:
LISTING, JUNE 1969
REV:

84

----------
 Ii "~_ • • • ' ,.

DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 27

TITLE: YAW RATE GYRO OUTPUT ERROR

- - - - - -----

PRIOR TO INSTALLATION, EACH GYRO IS SUBJECTED TO "STIC'rION" AND CROSS-COUPLING TESTS WHICH
EXERCISE IT WELL BEYOND THE RATES NORMALLY EXPERIENCED IN FLIGHT. ONCE INSTALLED, THE ONLY
TESTS PERFORMED ARE ELECTRICAL TORQUING TESTS USING THE BUILT-IN TEST CIRCUITS.

A MECHANICAL CAUSE OF THE TROUBLE APPEARS MORE LIKELY, SINCE CLEARANCES OF 0.0002 TO 0.0003
INCH EXIST BETWEEN THE FLOAT AND CASE. IF A PARTICLE OF CONTAMINATION BECAME LODGED IN
THIS SPACE, IT COUL.D CAUSE A TEMPORARY uFFSET AND COULD HAvE BEEN REMOVED DURING THE HIGH
RATES FOLLOWING STAGING.
NO GYRO FAILURES CAUS~D BY CONTAMINATION HAVE OCCURRED AFTER ACCEPTANCE; HOWEVER, EIGHT
REJECTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH CONTAMINATION HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCED BY ~HE VENDOR. ONE OF THOSE
OCCURRED ON THIS GYRO DURING BUILDUP WHEN IT FAILED A "STICTION" TEST. THE UNIT WAS REBUILT
BUT AGAIN FAILED BECAUSE OF A BELLOWS LEAK. FINALLY, AFTER A SECOND REBUILDING, IT PASSED
ACCEPTANCE. BECAUSE OF THIS HISTORY, THE SUSPECTED CAUSE OF THE t·1ALFtlNCTION IS CONTAMINATION ~

85

- - - - - - - - -_.
 ANOMAL Y RE PORT

NO. 2.2.28 TITLE: INSTRUMENTATION DISCREPANCIES

SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: EVENT TIME:

PROBLEM: CI~ER PRESSURE SWITCHES. - CHAMBER PRESSURE SWITCHES IN THE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM
FAILED CLOSED. SWITCH B3D FAILED CLOSED DURING THE INITIAL HOT-FIRE CHECKOUT. SHORTLY
AFTER UNDOCKING, SWITCH B4U FAILED FOR APPROXIMATELY 2 HOURS, THEN LATER FAILED CLOSED
PERMANENTLY. DURING THE ASCENT PROPULSION FIRING TO DEPLETION. SWITCH B2U FAILED CLOSED
FOR APPROXIMATELY 2 MINUTES, THEN RECOVERED AND OPERATED PROPERLY. AFTER THE ASCENT
PROPULSION FIRING TO DEPLETION, SWITCH A2D FAILED CLOSED FOR 13 SECONDS, AND LATER, SWITCH
A1U BECAME ERRATIC.

GLYCOL TEMPERATURE. - DURING THE FIRST MANNING, THE WATER/GLYCOL PUMP SWITCH WAS IN THE
PUMP 2 POSITION, AND "THE INDICATED GLYCOL TEMPERATURE WAS ZERO. AT 94 HOuRS, THE SELECTOR
SWITCH WAS SET TO PUMP 1, AND THE TEMPERATURE READING WAS NORMAL.

REACTION CONTROL MANIFOLD PRESSURES. - AT 103 HOURS, THE INDICATED FUEL MANIFOLD PRESSURE IN
REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM - A DROPPED FROM 181 TO 168 PSIA AND THEN RETuRNED TO 181 PSIA AT
106-1/2 HOURS. AT 108-1/2 HOURS, THIS MEASUREMENT DROPPED TO ZERO. SATISFACTORY OPERATION
OF THE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM INDICATES A MEASUREMENT ANOMALY. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE
OF THIS ANOMALY IS EITHER A DEFECTIVE SPLICE IN THE 26-GAG~ WIRING ASSOCIATED WITH THE TRANS-
DUCER OR AN INTERMITTENT CONNECTION INTERNAL TO THE TRANSDUCER.

CASK THERMAL SHIELD TEMPERA'rURE. - THE TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT OF TrlE THERMAL SHIELD FOR THE
RADIOISOTOPE THERMAL GENERATOR CASK READ UPPER LIMIT THROUGHOUT THE LUNAR MODULE PORTION OF
THE FLIGHT. THE TELEMETRY IS SWITCHED TO THIS MEASUREMENT FROM CASK TFMPERATURE BY A BARO-
SWITCH AT 10000 FOOT ALTITUDE (FIGURE 2.2.28-2).

ORGArnZATION: 5-2490 RESOLurON: CLOSED

REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY DATE:
LISTING, JUNE 1969
REV:

.. __._--------_.
 DETAil SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 28

TITLE: INSTRUMENTATION DISCREPANCIES

CHAMBER PRESSURE SWITCHES. - THE B2U AND A2D FAILURES ARE UNIQUE, IN THAT THE SWITCHES CLOSED
WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF CHAMBER PRESSURE, WHEREAS ALL THE OTHER FAILURES WERE INITI~TED BY
ENGINE FIRINGS. THE FORMER FAILURES OCCURRED WHEN THE ENGINE CLUSTERS REACHED qIGH HEAT-SOAK-
BACK TEMPERATURES AFTER THE EXTREMELY HIGH FIRING ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE ASCENT PRO-
PULSION FIRING. THE FAILURE MODE FOR THESE FIVE SWITCHES IS BELIEv~D TO BE THE SAME AS THAT
OF ONE LM-3 UNIT AND SEVERAL OTHERS DURING GROUND TESTING. PARTICULATE CONTAMINATION AND/OR
PROPELLANT RES IDUE IS FORCED UNDER T!-!E SWITCH DIAPHRAGM BY CHAMBER PRESSURE AND HOLDS THE
DIAPHRAGM DEFLECTED AND THE ELECTRICAL CONTACTS CLOSED (SEE FIGURE2.2.28-1). THE SMALL STROKE OF
THE DIAPHRAGM (0.007 INCH) AND THE LOW DIAPHRAGM RESTORING FOP.CE GENERATED BY THE RETURN SPRING
MAKE THE SWITCH EXTREMELY SUSCEPTIBLE TO FAILURE BY CONTAMINATION, REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM
PERFORMANCE WAS UNAFFECTED BY THESE SWITCH FAILURES. THE ONLY CONSEQUENCE WAS THE LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO DETECT AN ENGINE FAILED OFF. NO CORRECTIVE AC'iI('~~ P'OR RESOLUTION OF THE CHAMBER
PRESSURE SWITCH FAILURES IS PLANNED.

GLYCOL TEMPERATURE. - THE COOLANT PUMP SWITCH IS USED TO ROUTE EITm~R THE PRIMARY OR THE SECON-
DARY COOLANT TEMPERA'rURE TO THE DISPLAY. A JUMPER ACROSS THE PUMP 1 AND PUMP 2 CONTACTS
ALLOWS DISPLAY OF THE PR~Y TEMPERATURE WHEN THE S~TITCH IS IN EITHER POSITION. THEREFORE,
THE MOST LIKELY CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM WAS A BROKEN JUMPER OR A~ INCCMI-'LE'l'E CONTACT IH THE PUMP
2 SWITCH POSITION.
CASK THERMAL SHIELD TEMPERATURE. - THE PROBABLE CAUSES OF THE FAI~URE WERE A BROKEN WIHE
IN THE SHIELD TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT, A FAILED TRANSDUCER, OR A F'AILUR.E OF THE BAROSWITCH
TO TRANSFER. THE TRANSDUCER AND BAROSWITCH WERE TESTED PRIOR TO INSTALLATION AT THE LAUNCH
SITE. AFTER I NSTAL'LAT ION , WORK WAS PERFORMED IN 'I'HE AREA, AND r) FURTHER CHECKOUT WAS PER-
FORMED. FOR FUTURE MISSIONS, THE INSTRUMENTA'l'ION WIRING WILL BE CHECKED AFTER F'INAL INSTALLA-
TION. THE MEASUREMENT IS NOT MANDATORY FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS, hND NO FURTHER CHANGFS WILL
BE MADE. COOLING AIR IS FURNISHED TO THE CASK FROM THE LAUNCH VrHICLE INS~RUMENT UNIT THROUGH
A 5-INCU DUCT. PRELAUNCH, INDICATIONS WERE THAT AIR WAS NOT BEING SUPPLIED. SINCE TrlE CASK
ON THIS MISSION WAS NOT ACTIVATED, THE REQUIREMENT WAS WAIVED AND NO CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.
TESTS AT MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER INDICATE THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE WAS A RUPTURE OF THE
DUCT AT THE UMBILICAL INTERFACE INSIDE THE INSTRUMENT UNIT W.~L. DESIGN CHANGES TO CORRECT
THE PROBLEM HAVE BEEN MADE BY MARSHALL.

87

'----_.-....--.-_ _--- - - ,
.... ,- --_.
 DETA Il SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 28

TITLE: INSTRUMHNTATION DISCREPANCI:E:S~__________~_______________________________________________

Cont.llftiRllion buildup under

diaphrlCjm holds switch actuated I
ContKts

'---------=__ Pressure
inlet II
!.

Oiaphragm

--------------~~~~--~'I
FIG. 2. 2.28-1 LUNAR MODULE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEi-1 THRUST CHAMBER SWITCJ.
88

-------------------------------------------- -------- .....

 DETAil SHEET
ANOMAl Y 2. 2 • 28

TITlE: INSTRUMENTATION DISCREPANCIES

I
T
..........._ _ _.....I--. emperatutel
Baroswitch
I
Signal PCM
Radioisotope conditioner
thermal
generator
cask

Thermal
shield

FIG. 2.2.28-? CASK TEMPERATURE

89

_1Loa"ltllll----. . ----,-------.......____ .'rl1.'_._. «1m ••7 S_!·,.-..tww.~_,,-- ..,,·""-"" .. ,.1 -- >

 ·1

ANOMALY REPORT

~. 2.2.29 TITLE: BACKUP VOICE NOISE ON OMNI IN REVO:'UTION 13

SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: S-BAND EVENT TlME:

PROBLEM: DURING LUNAR REVOLUTIGN 13, THE BACKUP DOWNVOICE RECEIVED FROM THE LUNAR MODULE AT THE
M1SSION CONTROL CENT6R WAS UNUSABLE BECAUSE OF LOW SPEECH LEVELS. PLAYBACK OF THE VOICE
'l'APE RECORDED AT THE GOLDSTONE STATION SHOWED TI-Lz\T EXCELLENr QUALITY BACKUP VOICE WAS
RECORDED AT THE OUTPUT OF THE DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM. HOWEVER, THE SPEECH LEVELS ON THE
GOLDSTONE LUNAR MODULE A1R-'I'O-GROUND AND NETWORK 1 LOOPS WHICH INTERFACE WITH THE LINES
~O THE MISSION CONTROL CENTER WERE EXTREMELY LOW.

ACTION: INVESTIGATION SHOWED THAT THE ONLY WAY THE PROBLEM COULD BE DUPLICATED WAS BY SIMULTANEOUSLY
REMOTING BOTH NORMAL AND BACKUP DOWNVOICE FROM GOLDSTONE TO THE MISSION CONTROL CENTER. THIS
IS NOT A STANDARD CONFIGURATION. THUS, THE INVESTIGATION RESULTS I~DICATE THAT THE RECEIPT
OF UNUSABLE BACKUP VOICE WAS CAUSED BY AN OPERATOR ERROR WITHIN THE GOLDSTONE STATION.

ORGANIZATION: 5-2490
REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:
LIS~ING, JUNE 1969
REV:
 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.30 TITLE: DROP IN SIGNAL STRENGTH ON S-BAND STEERABLE ANTENNA

SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: S-BAND EVENT TIME: 13TH REV.

PROBLEl"': DURING THE BEGINNING OF REVOLUTION 13, THE S-BAND STEERABLE ANTENNA DID NOT PROPERLY TRACK.
AT ACQUISITION OF SIGNAL, THE RECEIVED SIGNAL STRENGTH AT THE GROUND STATION INDICATED
NEAR-BORESIGHT CONDITION FOR THE ANTENNA. OVER THE NEXT 13 MINTJTES, THE SIGNAL STRENGTH
GRADUALLY DECREASED 20 DB. A PLOT OF' EXPECTED SIGNAL STRENGTH (FIG.2.2.30-1), CONSIDERING
SPACECRAFT ATTITUDE CHANGES AND ANTENNA GAIN PATERNS, SHOWED THAT THE ANTENNA WAS NOT
MOVING AT THIS TIME. THE ANTENNA PERFORMED WELL BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THIS PERIOD.
THE POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR FAILURE OF THE ANTENNA TO MOVE WERE EITHER THAT THE SERVO SYSTEM
CIRCUIT WAS OPEN OR THE ANTENNA TRACK-MODE SWITCH WAS IN THE SLEW OR OFF POSITION.

ACTION: THE TRACK-MODE SWITCH FOR THE STEERAB~E ANTENNA IS A THREE-POSITION SWIrCH (DOWN-SLEW;
CENTER - OFF; UP - AUTO). THE CREW REPORTED THAT THE SWITCH MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY
BEEN SWITCHED TO OFF INSTEAD OF TO AUTO AT THE TIME ACQUISITION HAD BEENffiTABLISHED.

ORGANIZATION: 5-2490
RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:
REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY
LISTING JUNE 1969
REV:

91
 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAl Y 2. 2 • 30

TITLE : DROP IN SIGNAL STRENGTH ON S-B~~D STEERABLE ANTENNA

r:
-95

r
predicti~n based
on boreslght
I 1 I l
~-'I::---:l, -- --1--r---1--- ---~-- r--l---,--t---t--1--
cO
"0 -105
.: \.A. \ :
.. --,--+ --__ 1__ i
::... I " : I \ I I ,
::
0 1 \ "'~ ..J:--~_ ,,\ 1 \r 18 -:Jegrees off boresight
c. -115
...
...
tJ

.~

~
u
(J
>
CI.I
-125
Measured data Y Prediction based on
Madrid look-angle -V
/ "-i --~I
l
-- -~" :
I \ "'"
11

1\
<.J --+\---1
Col -135
~

-145
1\ \
100:26 100:28 100:30 100:32 100:34 100:36 100:38 100:4
Time, hr:min

FIG. 2.2.30-1 SIGNAL STRENGTH FROM STEERABLE ANTENNA

92
 - ....... --~ ,,,,, ... -
-" , . '~ .-

ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.31 TITLE: DPS GIMBAL DRIVE PITCH ACTUATOR FAILED

SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: DPS EVENT TIME: 100: 58

PROBLEl~: A MASTER ALARM AND ASSOCIATEiJ ENGINE PI'J?CH GIMBAL FAIL WARNING WERE RECEIVED DURING TdE
PHASING MANEUVER. "COASTING", AN UNCOMl1ANDED GIMBAL MOVEMENT WHICH RESULTS vlHEN THE
SPRING-LOADED BRAKE FAILS TO ENGAGE AFTER REMOVAL OF DRIVE SIGN.~S, HAD OCCURRED DURING
CHECKOUT OF THIS GIMBAL. A RECURRENCE OF THE COASTING, WHICH IS NOT DETRIMENTAL, WAS
NOT UNEXPECTED. THE TELEMETRY DATA INDICATE THAT THE PITCH AND YAW ACTUATORS BOTH DROVE
AS EXPECTED. THE SMALL NUMBER OF THR~STER FIRINGS ALSO DEMONSTRATE THAT THRUST VECTOR
CONTROL WAS MAINTAINED USING THE ACTUATORS. DURING THE MANEUVER, THE GIMBAL FAIL WAS IN-
DICATED AT THE TIME OF A REVERSAL IN PITCH GIMBAL MOTION.
BECAUSE OF THE SAMPliE RATE OF THE TELEMETRY DATA, THE TIME OF THE GIMBAL FAIL INl :CATION
CANNOT BE PRECISELY ESTABLISHED, BUT THE DATA ENCOMPASS A PERIOD DURING WHICH THE GIMBAL
COMMAND REVERSED (FIG.2.2.31-1)THUS,THE COASTING COULD HAVE ALLOWED GIMBAL MOVEMENT FOR
0.25 SECOND WITHOUT A COMMAND WHICH CAUSES THE FAIL INDICATION. FIGURE 2.2.31--2, SHOWS THE
DESCENT ENGINE TRIM CONTROL FAILURE DETECTION LOGIC.

ACTION: FOR APOLLO 11 AND SUBSEQUENT, THE BRAKE MECHANISM HAS BEEN REDESIGNED, AND TqE ALLOWABLE
TIME FOR MOVEMENT WITHOUT COMMAND HAS BEEN INCREASED TO 0.50 SECOND.

ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED

REFEREr~CES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, P. 12 DATE:
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMAJ~Y LISTING
JUNE 1969 Rtv:

93

.u_--------------------------~- ..---.---." ~'" ... ""~" ... ~ ..

 DETAIL SHEET
ANOMALY 2. 2 • 31

TITt F : DPS GIMBAL uRIVE PITCH ACTUATOR FAILED

- - - ------ --------------- -----------------

~-----------------------------------------

L-_______
"-
n=LOW-Ievel In,-Gimbal fail
~~
~fa
onr
Off I
I
fa
.D
E;:
.- "'
~
onr ___________:~!I·r!-La-tc-h-ed-S-ig-n-a'---------------'"'L
CJ_ Off
Gi
>
-t~
~ ~
o ..
-Jolt
o~;L Latching si:JIlal

0.4
Pitch
/

.5:
0.2 !I
....c
,
I
..
E
>
0
0
\
E

"'
.D
.§
CJ -0.2
Engine
ON
-0.4
100:58:24 58~28 58:32 58:36 58:40 58:44 58:48 58:52 58:56 59:00 59:04 59:08
Time, hr:min:sec

94

' ......--------------- FIG. 2.2.31-1 GIMBAL DRIVE ACTUATOR OPERATION

 DETAIL SHEET
ANOMAl Y 2 • 2 • 31

TITLE: DPS GIMBAL DRIVE PITCH ACTUATOR FAILED

Torquing { +
commands Motor
(1) ----t--..,--------L_.-J
Position
sensor
+
Malfunction conditions L-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- Telemetry

T+ and T- rorque rate Threshold

or T+ and no t+
or T- and no t-
.
(1) comparator
or t+ and no T+ 0.06 to 0.12 deg/ sec
or t - and no T - :::: malfunction

Telemetry
Engine
Reset 0.28 to 0.44 sec
gimbal IIJ--tt I delay ~~--~--,~
enable I
I Latching
I I
I I
O ......-e~ ~
Pitch
OFF 1. Telemetry
Master
alarm
28 V

t
From roll 1 L Caution anlJ warning 95

FIG. 2.2.31-2 DESCENT ENGINE TRIM CONTROL

 -' ",'1:

ANOMALY REPORT

NO.2. 2. 32 TITLE: COMMANDERS OXYGEN PURGE SYSTEM HEATER LIGHT DID

NOT COME ON
SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION EVENT TIME:

PROBLEM: DURING CHECKOUT OF THE COMMANDER'S OXYGEN PURGE SYSTEM, THE HEATER LIGHT DID NOT COME ON.
COMPONENT AND CIRCUIT ANALYSES DO NOT INDICATE A DESIGN DEFECT. ALSO, COMPONENTS WERE
VIBRATION-TESTED TO FAILURE AND THE SYSTEM WAS VIBRATION TESTED USING FLIGHT TYPE BRACKETS,
BUT THESE TESTS DID NOT DUPLICATE THE FAILURE. ANALYTICAL STUDIES HAD INDICATED THAT
WITHOUT THE HEATERS, THE MINIMUM TEMPERATURE OF THE GAS AT THE HELMET WILL BE ABOUT MINUS
10° F. MANNED TESTS INDICATE THAT THIS TEMPERATURE IS ACCEPTABLE FOR COMFORT AND THAT THE
HEATER IS NOT NEEDED.

ACTION: WITHOUT THE HEATERS, NO MECHANICAL PROBLEMS WITHIN 'l';:i... .L :)r~~M WERE ENCOUNTERED. NO HARD-
WARE CHANGE IS REQUIRED FOR APOLLO 11.

ORGAIHZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED

REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE A.~D ANOMALY DATE:
LISTING, JUNE 1969
REV:

r 96

- - - - - - ------------ "--"--"-"",.,, . ,. ,
 ..., .1'

ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.33 TITLE: LARGE LM ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS DURING STAGING

SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: STABILIZATION & CONTROL EVENT TIME: 102: 42 GET

PROBLEr.. : LARGE ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS OCCURRED PRIOR TO AND DtJl<.ING STAGING (FIG. 2.2.33-1). BODY RA'l'ES
OF 19 DEG/SEC IN PITCH AND GREATER THAN 25 DEG/SEC IN ROLL AND YAW WERE RECORDED. SMALL YAW
ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS OCCURRED APPROXIMATELY 40 SECONDS PRIOR TO STAGING. THE MODE SWITCHING,
TELEMETRY, AND ASSOCIATED ATTITUDE COMMANDS INDICATE THAT THE ABORT GUICANCE MODE CHANGED
FROM"ATT HOLD"TO"AUTO"COINCIDENT WITH THE VEHICLE GYRATIONS. THE ATTITUDE CONTROL SWITCHES
ON PANELS 3 AND 4 ARE bHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.33-3 AND A SIMPLIFIED FUNCTIONAL SWITCHING
DIAGRAM IS SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.33-2. APPROXIMATELY 4 MINUTES BEFORE STAGING, WITH THE
GUIDANCE SELECT SWITCH IN AGS AND THE ATTITUDE CONTROL SWITCHES IN PULSE, THE CREW VERIFIED
THAT THE ABORT GUIDANCE MODE CONTROL SWITCH WAS IN"ATT HOLD"SINCE THE INTENT WAS TO PERFORM
STAGING IN AGS"ATT HO·LD." AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, THEY SELECTED MAX DEADBAND TO SAVE PRO-
PELLANT.

ACTION: THE ANOMALY WAS PROCEDURAL. THE CREW, IN DIAGNOSING THE EARLIER YAw RATE GYRO PROBLEM, AND
IN REACTING TO IT, TRANSFERRED THE ABORT GUIDANCE MODE SWITCH TO THE AUTO POSITION. THIS
RESULTED IN THE HIGH VEHICLE RATES EXPERIENCED.

ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 RESaLllTION: CLOSED

REFEREr~CES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, P. 12 DATE:
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING
JUNE 1969 REv:

97

._----------_._---------- -_ .. _- - ---_.__.. _._.

 O( "

DETAIL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 33

TITLE: LARGE LM ATT~TUDE EXCURSIONS DURING STAGING

THE ABORT GUIDANCE SYSTEM STEERING LOGIC WAS SET TO Z-AXIS STEERING THROUGHOUT THE STAGING
SEQUENCE. IF AUTO MODE IS SELECTED, Z-AXIS LOGIC WILL PRODUCE THE STEERING COMMA!-lDS REQUIRED
TO POINT THE Z-AXIS AT THE COMMAND MODULE. IF THE GUIDANCE SELECT SWITCH IS IN AGS AND
ATTITUDE CONTROL SWITCHES IN"MODE CONT,"TH:'" ;-AXIS STEERING COMMANDS ARE ACCEPTED AND ACTED
UPON BY THE CONTROL SYSTEM.
THE ATTITUDE CONTROL SWITCHES WERE SEQUENTIALLY THROWN TO "MODE CONT:' AS SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.33-3,
51 SECONDS BEFORE STAGING. FIV3 SECONDS AFTER THE SELECTION OF"MODE CONT;' THE MODE CONTROL
SWITCH INDICATION CHANGED FROM"ATT HOLD TO AUTO: REMAINED IN AUTO FOR 3 SECONDS, THEN RETURNED
TO·A~~ HOLD~ DURING THIS PERIOD, THE VEHICLE MOVED IN ALL THREE AXES IN RESPONSE TO Z-AXIS
STEERING COMMANDS. AFTER THE MODE INDICATION RETURNED TO "ATT HOLD:' THE DYNAMICS AGAIN RETURNED
TO NORMAL FOR WIDE DEADBAND. (NOTE: THE YAW RATE GYRO OUTPUT WAS INCORRECT DURING THIS PERIOD,
AS SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.33-1).THE GRYO PROBLEM WAS PROBABLY DIAGNOSED BY THE CREW AFTER A NUMBER OF
HAND CONTROLLER OPERATIONS.) AF~ER APPROXIMATELY 40 SECONDS, THE MODE INDICATION AGAIN RETURNED
TO .AUTO, AND THE VEHICLE RESPONDED TO Z-AXIS STEERING COMMANDS. THE VEHICLE WAS STAGED 4
SECONDS LATER, AND THE DYNAMIC RESPONSE INCREASED ABRUPTLY. THE DATA INDICATE THAT STAGING
WAS COINCIDEN~ WITH A MINUS X TRANSLATIO~ AND THAT THE PRIMARY GUDIANCE SYSTEM MODE CONTROL
SWITCH WAS THROWN TO AUTO 7 SECONDS LATER. BECAUSE OF THE RELATIVE SCALING OF THE HAND
CONTROLLER, RATE GYROS, AND ATTITUDE ERRORS, ATTEMPTS TO MANUALLY CONTROL THE MOTION WERE
lNEFFECTIV~, AND THE VEHICLE STABILIZED WITH THE Z-AXIS POINTING TOWARD THE COMMAND MODULE.
APPROX!HATELY 24 SECONDS AFTER STAGING, THE ATTITUDE CONTROL SWITCHES RETURNED TO "DIR~' AND THE
TWO MODE CONTROL SWITCH INDICATIONS RETURNED TO "ATT HOLD!'

98

.---~----------------..--~--'.-----.-.-,-.-- -,
 .: .

DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 33

TITLE: LARGE LM ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS DURING STAGING

THREE CONDITIONS DURING THE STAGING SEQUENCE WERE APPARENTLY ABNORMAL:

1. ~HE ABORT GUIDANCE MODE CONTROL TRANSFERRED FROM ATTITUDE-HOLD AUTOMATIC.

2. THE YAW RATE GYRO WAS INDICATING MINUS 1.7 DEG/SEC.

3. NO INDICATION OF DIRECT FIRING OF REACTION CONTROL ENGINES WERE RECEIVED. (THE CREW
RECALLED ENABLING THE DIRECT FUNCTION AND ACTUATING THE HAND CONTROLLER TO THE HARD
STOPS. )
IT IS, THEREFORE, CONCLUDED THAT THE ANOMALY WAS CAUSED BY THE INADVERTENT CYCLING OF THE
ABORT GUIDANCE MODE CONTROL SWITCH, FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY AN INCORRECT OUTPUT OF THE YAW
RATE GYRO. IN DIAGNOSING THE YAW RATE GYRO PROBLEM, AND IN REACTING TO IT, THE ABORT
GUIDANCE MODE CO~~~OL SWITCH WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE AUTO POSITION, RESULTING IN HIGH VEHICLE
RATES DURING THE STAGING SEQUENCE.

99

---------- --- - --------._-----_._---_._-_.-_. _ .. '--

 DETAIL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 33

TITLE: LARGE LM ATTI~UDE EXCURSIONS DURING STAGING

______~F=I~G~._=2~.=2~.=3=3_-~1__~A~T~T~I~T~U~D~E EXCURSIONS
~----------------------------------------------
"i." 9uidinu
AIIort guidince AUTO
-- Auro
"1 II L
ALttJ

Pitch Aft HOto Xl! .,OLD "Tl HULD

RoIl-
y,. _YORE cor.r
i 25 - Lx"II I
'I 50
...¥ Hind a.tIlrolier --""" 1
Tr.nsler to 1
lTninSfer to Transfer to.
I ,
• ' .. XI
I
--
IATTHOlO
- t.; AUTO model ,
lmode
AUTO mode'
I
Stage,
,
.. I
II I
•
- Pitch rate
- Pitcll rMe
,- ;
"
0 -~ " I -. --:....,....."...-------.._ _ _ _ _
-- 0 ! ,
• , ~ I· ,-
~
1 I· 1 ...... 1
J:I 1 1 I 11 ...1,
Pitcll itti:ude error 1
- -
~

L 1 . - ----- ,!! -...... -

-- -50 -25 . _.---
_._-- ------::-:-:-----
-.. -
1 ~
- -----,----"
Pilch attllude error
-~--------------------
. ..- .- -- . r-------. --=-
---------~~--:~--::-:::-------
=-.----====-:-.:.:-.---"-'---~---
, -- ,

t----:-,-- - - -
: -
---------------~-----­
II I _----===-.---------------

- -----:
1
I ... 1
1 I .. I ,,~ '.
I I
I .~""... /1 -",
. 0
Roll rat.
I
I
f
,
- 1
...
II
, "
-.....~._ '~'-~'-
Roll rate

.... ~
,
I 'III .- .-----
= 1
1 1 1 : II I :- "V" Roll attitude error
I 1 1 I II
,._.-
i 1
....... 1
I 1 II
I
I
--
==--.-----
-
.-
---- - _..
,
"
.
-.".----, I I .. I

.. ------------
~--------------------.~----"---- ._--
25~------------------------
-- ------------,-------~---~ . ,- --
1 - - - -1- - - - . ----:-,--:-:..
- ---
",- - --------
"

I ...
~ 1

-------_--
1 I • , 'I I
t.; 0 t-_ _ _....,.;
..-..:.;:;....,t......_ __ 1 1 y.." rale gyro response
I
1 incorrect here-: :: :' Offset • -1. 1 deglsec " ~
--
- -.
Yaw :lyro respo'l~e
correct t,erealte r
I~---------------------, I----·-i~, :: :
I
'! I
...,r'
,~,..
- -
...
! 1 1
I
~ I " , ..... I.!.- I, " --_.--- Yaw attitude error
1 ~ I -',',1 ,
I 1
_._----, -------1.. I .. '.~~
----==,------.--=-~ -------- ~ ,---~ - -- --'-'-==:--
_____--=-------- ______- ~ 1-----:::= _ _ -_-_.-_ _ _-_----
-----------------:_'--- ----.
_____________________..:::---=-=::::-------:,,-,:-~__
-----------,~ - - -- -':-'-=-==--
-.;..-_-_-_-_-_-.::_-, t - - - ---
- .. --::----- . , , - ---- -------- --------
r-;:===========;;~==-=:=::.-========~:;.=-===-==--=====-....:- ~
':-:
10l:44c1l 102:44:~) 102:44:40
----.-------- . - -.,---:-r=-::c==:.-.::======--===r=====
_-L-___ _ _ _
102:<15: 10
--
102 45: 20 1!!2:45:30
100
 , """" " - ..... ,

DETA IL SHEET
, .NOMAl Y 2. 2 • 33

TITLE: LARGE LM ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS DURING STAGING

AUTO

_---.? I . .ATT HOLD

~ To abort guidance computer
L
~ : 0 OFF
I
1-
I I
I
i
_--_y
.. :
: AUT(,

OATTHOLD 1 To te lemetry

~ ; ·OFF
I
I
I
: AUTO

~/ .ATT HOLD
28Vdc _ _ _ ... :
I
1 J Thruster power
I • OFF
I

FIG. 2.2.33-2 MODE CONTROL SWITCH OP~RATION

101

----_ .._------------ --------------- ---------------_.- --

 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMALY 2.2.33

lARGE LM ATTITUDE FXCURS10NS JURING STAGING

TITlE:

DEAD BAND
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__________ ,./'110._ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

FIG. 2.2.33-3 LUNAR MODULE GUIDANCE SWITCH LOCATIONS 102

--------~ -- -- - - - - ------- -- - - - --------- .-.--

 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.34 TITLE: OPTICAL SYSTEM PROBLEMS

SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: OPTICAL SYSTEM EVENT TIME:

PROBLEM: THREE OPERATIONAL ANOMALIES IN USE OF THE LUNAR MODULE OPTICAL SYSTEM WERE REPORTED BY THE
CREW.
RETICLE CONTAMINATION. - THE CREW REPORTED HAIR-LIKE OBJECTS ON THE RETICLE OF THE ALIGNMENT
OPTICAL TELESCOPE. SEVERAL MECHANICAL CLEARANCES IN THE TELESCOPE CAN PROVIDE PATHS FOR
CONTAMINATION. THE FIXED REDIRECTIONAL MIRROR AT THE ELBOW OF THE TELESCOPE (FIG.2.2.34-2)H1S
AN AIR GAP OF 0.0005 TO 0.0007 INCH TO ALLOW THE~L EXPANSION OF THE MIRROR. OTHER POS-
SIBLE PATHS ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE CABIN AND WOULD REQUIRE THAT PARTICLES FILTER THROUGH
LUBRICATED BEARINGS TO REACH THE FOCAL PLANE OF THE TELESCOPE.

COMPUTER CONTROL AND RETICLE DIMMER. - THE CREW REPORTED MECHANICAL DIFFICULTY WITH THE
DIMMER CONTROL OF THE COMPUTER CONTROL AND RETICLE DIMMER. THE RHEOSTAT CONTROL KNOB
(THUMBWHEEL) WOULD PHYSICALLY FALL FORWARD FROM THE BRIGHT POSITION TO MAXIMUM BRIGHTNESS,
THUS REQUIRING MANUAL HOLD TO MAINTAIN THE DIMMER CONTROL IN POSITION. THE OPERATION
DESCRIBED BY THE CREW IS NORMAL.

STAR DISAPPEARANCE. - THE CREW REPORTED THAT AT APPROXIMATELY SIX STAR DIAMETERS FROM THE
CENTER OF THE RETICLE, STARS DISAPPEARED FROM VIEW. NO IMPERFECTIONS EXISTED IN THE RETICLE
OR OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE OPTICAL TRAIN THAT WOULD CAUSE THE PROELEM. HO~~VER, THE SURFACE
OF THE PRISM MAY HAVE BEEN CONTAMINATED (SUCH AS A FINGERPRINT SMUDGE) DURING FINAL INSTALLA
TION OF THE TELESCOPE SUNSHADE.

ORGANIZATION: 5-2490
REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:
LISTING, JUNE 1969
REV:

J
I 103

_ _-------------------..;.;.-----.-~-..-..... -.. .. -.c .....

 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 34

TITLE: OPTICAL SYSTEM PROBLEM

ACTION:
RETICLE CONTAMINATION. - PREFLIGHT RECORDS SHOW THAT THE TELESCOPE WAS ASSEMBLED, TESTED, AND STORED
IN A CLASS 10 CLEAN ROOM (PARTICLE SIZE ALLOWABLE IS O.OOOOl-INCH DIAMETER PER 10 000 CUBIC FEET
OF VOLUME) UNTIL INSTALLED IN THE VEHICLE. ONCE INSTALLED, COVERS WERE PROVIDED AND THE TELESCOPE
WAS INSPF.CTED AND CLEANED PERIODICALLY. THE LAST CLEANING WAS ON THE DAY BEFORE LAUNCH, AND AT THAT
TIME, THE FIELD OF VIEW WAS NOT CONTAMINATED.
COMPUTER CONTROL AND RETICLE DIMMER. - THE THUMBWHEEL OPERATES A VARIABLE RESISTOR THROUGH A SHAFT/
CAM MEc~mNICAL INTERFACE (FIG.2.2.34-1). FRICTIONAL FORCE GENERATED BY ~HE ARM OF THE MICROSWITCH IS
PRESENT FROM THE FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE POSITION (FULL DIM) THROUGH 270 DEGREES OF CLOCKWISE RO'.I.'ATION
(80 PERCENT BRIGHTNESS). THE TYPICAl TORQUE REQUIRED TO OVERCOME THE FRICTIONAL FORCE IN THE 270-
DEGREE SECTOR IS 1.5 INCH/OUNCES. WHEN THE MICROSWITCH DEPRESSES INTO THE GO-DEGREE DETENT AREA OF
THE CAM, THE FRICTIONAL FORCE DECREASES. ALTHOUGH THE THUMBWHEEL CAN ROTATE THROUGH AN ADDITIONAL
60-DEGREES, RETICLE BRIGHTNESS IS NOT CHANGED, SINCE THE MICROSWITCH HAS BYPASSED POTENTIOMETER CONTROL
OF THE CIRCUIT AND HAS APPLIED FULL VOLTAGE TO THE RETICLE LAMPS (FIG. 2.2.34-1). IN THE DEPRESSED AREA
OF THE CAM, ANY MOTION IMPARTED TO THE ~HUMBWHEEL WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE MECHANICAL STOPS OF THE
VARIABLE RESISTOR ARE REACHED. THIS FEATURE INCREASES 7HE RELIABILITY OF THE RETICLE LAMP CONTROL
BY INCLUDING A MECHANICAL OVERRIDE THAT WILL ASSURE RETICLE BRIGHTNESS IF AN ELECTRICAL COMPONENT
FAILS.

STAR DISAPPEARANCE. - THE LM-S PRISM AND RETICLE WERE CLEANED AND INSPECTED WHEN THE SUNSHADE Wl~
INSTALLED. A TEST CHANGE NOTICE IS BEING WRITTEN TO REQUIRE A SIMILAR CLEANING FOR SUBSEQUENT V2HICLES.

104

- = I,
 DETAil SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 34
------------------------------- -------

TITLE: OPTICAL SYSTEM PROBLEM

Microswitch Microswitch

Thumbwheel

)
Brighten

Dim position 80 percent I)f foJ /I bright

(full counterclockwise) (270 deg clockwise)

1~5vacI
5V

400 Hz
~-+--~

Microswitch
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ To Jamos
Microswitch closes at
270 deg of thumbwheel
travel from full dim

105
FIG. 2.2.34-1 OPTICS RETICLE DI~~ER

- ------ ------- ------ ---- - -------

 DETAIL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 34

TITLE: OPTICAL SYSTEM PROBLEM

-------- -------

~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .P~r~is·m. .
en·d~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .~

Optics

Glass vacuum seal-+---

Air gap
(0.005 to 0.007 in.
maximum) - - - - -.....

Redirectional
Eyepiece end
mirror ----~~

FIG. 2.2.34-2 ALIGNMENT OPTICAL TELESCOPE 106

_________________'________.,-------.-1It-'."_. . . . . ~ -'<'I>.-..... ".

 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.35 TITLE: ABNORMAL RISE IN CO INDICATIONS ON PRIMARY

2
LIOH CARTRIDGE
SYSTEfr',: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

EVENT TIME: 97-106 GET

SUBSYSTEM: ECS

PROBLEM: TWO ASPECTS OF THE INDICATED CARBON DIOXIDE LEVEL WERE CONSIDERED ANOMALOUS. FIRST, THE
RATE OF CARBON DIOXIDE INCREASE FROM 97 TO 101 HOURS EXCEEDED THE PREDICTED BY A FACTOR
OF APPROXIMATELY 8. SECONDLY, THE LEVEL REMAINED CONSTANT FOR THE NEXT 5 HOURS.

ACTION: LITHIUM HYDROXIDE CARTRIDGE VARIATIONS, COMBINED WITH CARBON DIOXIDE SENSOR TOLERANCES,
COULD AC~--:':JNT FOR THE FLIGHT PERFORMANCE. THE PREDICTION FOR FUTURE FLIGHT WILL BE
MODF.LE~ AkOUND ~~RE REALISTIC OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS.

ORGAIUZATION: 5-2490 RESOLunON: CLOSED

REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY DATE:
LISTING, JUNE 1S69
REV:

----------------------------_. ---"-'~'~--~--
 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.36 TITLE: LM CABIN DEPRESSURIZED AT FINAL SEPARATION

SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: STRUCTURE EVENT TIME: 108:23

PROBLEM: WHEN FINAL LM/CSM SEPARATION OCCURRED, THE LM CABIN PRESSURE DROPPED FROM 4.8 PSIA TO
0.7 PSIA WITHIN A 12-SECOND PERIOD. THE DECAY RATE WAS MUCH GREATER THAN THE CABIN
PRESSURE RELIEF CAPABILITY OF ANY OF THE CABIN OVERBOARD DUMP vALVES. THE LM
SEPARATED FROM THE CSM SO RAPIDLY THAT THE CREW LOST SIGHT OF IT. THE CREW ALSO
REPORTED "A LOT OF SNOW n OUTSIDE AT SEPARATION. SEPARATION VELOCITY WAS 4.8 FT/SEC.
ALONG THE X AXIS, WITH ESSENTIALLY NO MOTION ALONG OR ROTATION ABOUT THE OTHER AXES.

ACTION: THE ANALYSES INDICATE THAT THE LOADING ON THE LUNAR MODULE HATCH AT SEPARATION
EXCEEDED THE CAPABILITY OF THE LATCH. THE HATCH THEN OPENED AND CLOSED RESULTING IN
A CABIN PRESSURE DECAY AS SHOWN IN FIGURE Z.2.36-2 AND SEPARATION DISTANCE.

NO CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQUIRED SINCE THE CONDITIONS AT SEPARATION WERE NOT NORMAL.

ORGAIU ZAnON: 5-2490

REFERENCES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT; PP. 11, 14 RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY
LISTING, JUNE 1969 REV:

loyj
 DETA Il SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 36

TITLE: LM CABIN DEPRESSURIZED AT FINAL SEPARATION

MOTION PICTURES OF THE FINAL SEPARATION WERE TAKEN FROM THE COMMAND MODULE. A BROWN MATERIAL
WAS SHOWN PROJECTING PROM THE TUNNEL AND FLAPPING; THIS WAS THE INSULATION AROUND THE COMMAND
MODULE DOCKING RING. THE LUNAR MODULE HATCH WAS CLOSED IN THE FIRST FRAME IN WHICH IT WAS
VISIBLE. THIS FRAME WAS TAKEN 2 SECONDS AFTER INITIATION OF SEPARATION.

THE IMPULSE FROM DOMPING THE CABIN THROUGH THE HATCH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE DIRECTION AND
MAGNITUDE OF THE LUNAR MODULE VELOCITY CHANGE (5 FT/SEC IN MINUS X DIRECTION) NOTED FROM
THE FLIGHT DATA. FURTHER, THE ONLY ITEM ON TOP OF THE LUNAR MODULE THAT COULD OPEN AND CLOSE,
ALLOWING THE CABIN TO VENT WHILE SATISFYING THE PRESSURE HISTORY, IS THE UPPER HATCH. THE
HATCH HAS A MAXIMUM AREA OF Ina SQUARE INCHES, WHICH IS MORE THAN ENOUGH TO VENT THE CABIN
FROM 4. a TO LESS THAN 1.0 PSIA IN 0.3 SECOND.

THE MECHANISM POSTULATED TO VENT THE CABIN IS AS FOLLOWS. THE PYROTECHNIC DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE
BROKE THE HATCHLATCH TO ALLOW THE CABIN TO VENT TqROUGH THE DOCKING TUNNEL. THE OUTFLOW
CLOSED THE HATCH 0.3 SECOND AFTER SEPARATION BUT DID NOT SEAL IT COMPLETELY. THE GAP REMAINING
(ABOUT 1~4 SQUARE INCHES) ALLOWED A SLIGHT PRESSURE DECREASE, AS INDICATED BY CABIN PRESSURE
DATA.

ON APOLLO 9, THE CABIN PRESSURE WAS MAINTAINED AFTER SEPARATION. T ~ ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
APOLLO 9 AND 10 WAS THAT THE APOLLO 10 TUNI.~1::L COULD NOT BE VENTED i.~~CAUSE THE VEN'r LINE WAS
CAPPED. AT THE TIME SEPARATION PYROTECHNICS WERE FIRED ON APOLLO 9, THE TUNNEL PRESSURE WAS
LESS TfY.AN THE LUNAR MODULE CABIN PRESSURE; THUS, THE DYNAMIC PRESSURE IN THE TUNNEL WAS NOT
SUFFICIENT TO FAIL THE HATCH LATCH. ON APOLLO 10, \IITH THE TUNNEL PRESSURIZED TO 4.86 PSIA,
THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE WHEN THE PYROTECHNICS WERE FIRED WAS ENOUGH TO FAIL THE LATCH.

109

- ---- - - - - - - - '------- -- -- ---- - .

 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 36

TITLE: T.M CABIN DEPRESSURIZED AT FINAL SEPARATION

5 .....
I
~I>, ---"- LTA-8 test data with valve open

.~
4
~l.a" bef~~ ~
po;",
-L ---- ~
2
(equivalent area: 2.0 in. )
I

tOt
a.
!!-
;;;
r----..
III 3
~
c:
:D
III
(.)

2 -
Flight data
(equivalent area: 1.4 in. 2 )-,
r
I 1
First point after dropuu~

"- I ....
T(' lemetry dropout
I I

..........................................................................-
,~
o 2 4

FIG.
6 8
Time from jettiSon, sec

2.2.36-1
10 12 14 16

MEASURED CABIN PRESSURE DURING JETTISON

110
 DETAIL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2.2.36
-------~---~

TiTLE: LM CABIN DEPRESSURIZED AT FINAL SEPARATION

---------

12
,.
.. J

I Sonic area shifts from the vehicle-separation

I distance to the luna" module hatch ~
1000r- 10

~
I
I
I

801 \/
- Hatch pressure
} V-
8 '" \
I \l Lunar module
vent area-"l. 1/7 \
"
I /J~ \,
.!!
III
\
Q.
, \ \
N

...
.5
600 !
~
III
III
u •
, ~/
)7 ~vehiCI~-separalion 1\
III
ct "' vent area . .J

~
~
c
400 I ~/'
\
,
\
4
'- Cabij pressure
/// ~ I.--Cabin and hatch pressure \
I \

z
I /' Z ~
........ \
,
\

~y ,
" "- ---
\

I. ~
V ,,
1

o 0.04 0.08 u.12 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.28

Time from separation, sec
III

FIG. 2.2.36-2 PP~SSURES AND VENT AREAS DURING SEPARATION SEQUENCE

 DETA IL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 36
------------- -------
TITlE; LM CABIN DEPRESSURIZED AT FINAL SEPARATION

Failure points

Ii
II

,
I I-
•• \,,

r•• )
L- ___-..--+---' --+-"T"""- - - - - J
•

t.

112
Fr-;. ':.2.36-3
LUNA~ MODULE P~~CH TATes

--------~----.-------
 I '

ANOt\'Al Y REPORT

NO. 2.2.37 TI~~E:CAMERA FAILURES

SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: GOVERNMENT-Ft'RNISHED EQUIPMENT EVENT TIME:

PROBLEr.,: DURING THE LOW-ALTITUDE LUNAR PASS, THE HASSELBLAD 70-MM CAMERA, WHICH I1A!1 THE IJAST
MAGAZINE INSTALLED, STOPPED BECAHSE OF FILM BINDING IN THE M~GAZINE. THE BINDING
RESULTED FROM INTERNAL DAMAGE TO THE FILM-ADVANCE MECHANISM, INCLUDING BURRS ON THE
FILM GUIDE (SEE FIG. 2.2.37-1). rHE EMULSI N SCRAPED FROM THE FILM BY THE BUPRS BUILT
UP ON THP. ROLLERS, DECREASIN~ THE ~LEARANCE. THIS CONDITION CONTINUOUSLY OVERLOADED
THE DRIVE MOTOR UNTIL THE MOTOR FAILED AP~ROXI~\TELY FIVE FRAMES FROM THE END OF FILM.
THE 1.6-AMPERE FUSE IN THE CAMERA WOULD HAVE PR)TECTED THE MOTOR AGAINST A DI:lliCT SHORT,
PUT NOT AGAINST A CONTINUOUS OVErLOAD.

ACTION: FOR FUTURE MISSIONS A HIGH-RELIABILITY, 1.2 AMPERE FUSE3 WILL BE INSTALLED (EACH CAMERA
WILL HAVE ONE FJJSE AND SLUG).

PROBi.EM: DURING THE LOW-ALTITUDE PASS, THE ~UNAR MODULE 16-MM CAMERA FAILED TO OPERATE WITH
MAGAZINE F INST~LL~D. MAGAZINE F WAS REPLACED IMMEDIATELY WITH MAGAZINE G, AND THE
CAMERA OPERATED SATISFACTORILY. MAGAZINE F WAS REINS'l:ALLED LATER FOR STAGING AND THE
TE~IN.~ PHASE OF THE RENDEZVOUS! ~.ND THE CAMERA OPERATED SAT I SFAC']'ORI LY .

ACTION: ALL MAGAZINES FOR SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS WILL BE SELCTED FOR ADEQUATE CLEARANCE Od THE
INTERFACE EDGES FOR ~ SATISFACTORY FIT TO ~ITHER CAMERA.

ORGArH lArIm:;
kEFlRENCE!;:
5-'-490
MSC 5-DAY REPOkT
RESOLUTION. CLOSE..) DATE: I
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMAI·Y LI3TING, JUNE 1969
REV:
I
1113 j
-- • .,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ -!-.. . .-.-. - -. . .-. . -.. . . - . . . .
. .,....I _ _ ~"-,- ---<"'" . ., ........
 I-:~·--'·~!·
.,-t-_ _, ,

DETAIL SHEET
--- '~i ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 37
!!
------------------------------_.--_._- - . - - -
:
f ! TITLE: CAMERA FAILURES
r---------------------------------------------------------------
;

Bearing plate assembly ciamaged

t
'.

~
!

Emulsion scraped from film _-..V

on surfaces of large and

small rollers Small burr on inner <film side)
surface of each guidir- "im.
Emulsion deposits on burrs.

114

FIG. 2.2.37-1 FAILURE OF 70-MM CAMERA

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _1_
• .,.,.-----------.-
.. --.,. . .- - ~'''''''''-.- -' -- ,.c
 DETAIL SHEET
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 37

TITLE: CAMERA FAILURES

-------------- ---------

Radii on edges to be large enough to relieve

corner for easy insertion into either camera

FIG. 2.2.37-2 115

I~GAZINE INSTALLATION IN 16-MM CAMERAS

'1
___ __________ _'_______
---.-. ~ ........ ... _" ... _____ "' ....., ..
 ANOMALY RE PORT

NO. 2.2.38 TITLE: FAILURE TO GET ADEQUATE DATA DUMPS

SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: COMMUNICATIONS EVENT TIME: 99 39 GET

PROBLEM: THE DUMP OF THE LUNAR MODULE LOW-BIT-RATE PCM DATA RECORDED IN THE COMMAND MODULE CEASED
ABRUPTLY AT 99:38:52. THE DATA SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED THROUGH THE DESCENT ORBIT INSERTION
MANEUVER AT APPROXIMATELY 99:46:00. A REVIEW OF THE DATA FROM 99:35:10 TO 99:38:52
VERIFIED THAT THE COMMAND MODULE WAS CONFIGURED FOR VHF SIMPLEX-A VOICE AND VHF SIMPLEX-R
DATA. THE FLIGHT PLAN REQUIRED THAT THE COMMAND MODULE BE RECONFIGURED FRO~ THIS
MODE TO VHF/AM DUPLEX-B/RANGING AT APPROXIMATELY 99:37:00.

ACTION: SINCE THE FLIGHT PLAN TIMES WERE INCORRECT BY APPROXIMATELY 12 MINUTES, '.rEE RECONFIGURA'lION
SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT 99:49:00.

ORGAfH ZAliON: 5-2490

. REFERENCES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:
MSC FAIWRE AND ANOMALY
LISTING, JUNE 1969 REV:

_.-----00:---.------------------------..-.-. --._._- -.. _.- .-

 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.39 fITLE: !,~p::; Lew LEVEL INDICATIONS

SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM~ APS EVENT TIME: 102: 55
PROBLEM: THE APS WARNING LIGHT INDICATING LOW PROPELLANT LEVEL CAME ON APPROXIMATELY ONE SECOND
AFTER THE START OF THE FIRST APS FIRING AND TRIGGERED A MASTER ALARM. THE LOW-LEVEL
LIGHT WENT OU,!, ONE SECOND LATER, AND THE MASTER ALARM WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RESET. DATA
INDICATE THAT THE LOW-LEVEL LIGHT AND MASTER ALARM WERE TRIGGERED BY THE OXIDIZER
SENSOR. EAC8 OF THE TANKS, OXIDIZER AND FUEL, CONTAINS ONE SENSOR. ONE LOW-LEVEL
WARNING LIGHT MONITORS BOTH SENSORS, AND THIS LIGHT IS ENABLED ONLY WHILE THE ASCENT
ENGINE IS FIRING. NEITHER THE SENSORS NOR THE LOW-LEVEL WARNING LIGHT ARE LATCHING,
SO THE WARNING LIGHT WILL COME ON WHEN THE SENSOR IS UNCOVERED AND WILL EXTINGUISH WHEN
THE SENSOR IS RE-COVERED WITH PROPELLANT. DATA INDICATE THAT THE SENSORS FUNCTIONED
PROPERLY FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE MISSION. BOTH LOW-LEVEL INDICATIONS CAME ON AT THE
CORRECT TIME DURING THE SECOND ASCENT ENGINE FIHING, THE FIRING TO DEPLETION. THIS
INDICATES THAT THE FIRST WARNING WAS VALID AND CAUSED BY THE SENSOR BEING UNCOVERED
BY A GAS BUBBLE. THE ASCENT P~OPELLANT TANKS WERE FILLED APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT.
THE +X TRANSLATION REQUIRED TO SETTLE THE PROPELLANTS TO PREVENT HELIUM INGESTION INTO
THE ENGINE WAS CALCULATED TO BE 3 SECONDS. BASED ON THE APOLLO 10 DATA, THE PREDICTION
TECHNIQUE WILL BE REVISED, AND THE +X TRANSLATION FIRING TIME WILL BE INCREASED TO
PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THE LOW-LEVEL MASTER ALARM AT IGNITION.

ACTION: NO CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQUIRED FOR APOLLO 11 AND SUBSEQUENT. FOR NOMINAL MISSIONS,
ONLY ONE ASCENT ENGINE FIRING IS PLANNED. THIS WILL OCCUR FROM THE LUNAR SURFACE
(1/6-9 FIELD), AND THE PROPELLANTS WILL BE WELL SETTLED.

ORGAIU ZATI ON: 5- 2490

REFEREf~CES : APOLLO 10 MISSION REPORT, AUGUST 1969 RESOLUTIOtl: CLOSED DATE:

REV:

117
 ANOMALY REPORT

NO. 2.2.40 TITtE: LEFT-HAND HEAD STRUT LOCKOUT HANDLE

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: STRUCTURE EVENT TIME: POSTFLIGHT

PROBLEM: POSTFLIGHT, THE LEFT-HAND HEAD STRUT LOCKOUT HANDLE WAS IN THE READY (LOCKED) POSITION.
DURING LEVER FORCE CHECKS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE LEVER SPRING DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT
FORCE TO PREVENT THE HOOD FROM RETURNING TO THE LOCKED POSITION. DISASSEMBLY SHOWED
THAT THE SPRING HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY INSTALLED. A REVIEW OF MANUFACTURING RECORDS
INDICATED THAT THE LOCKING MECHANISM HP~ BEEN MODIFIED AND THAT NO INSPECTION OR TEST
BAD BEEN PERFORMED SUBSEQUENT TO THIS MODIFICATION.

ACTIOH:A MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS TO ASSURE PROPER
ASSEMBLY. THE APOLLO 11 AND 12 SPACECRAFT AT THE LAUNCH SITE HAVE BEEN INSPECTED.

ORGArUZATION: 5-2490
REFERENCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION REPORT, AUGUST 1969 RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE:

REV:

£
, ,
 - .,.,.,.

ANOMALY REPORT

NO·2. 2. 41 TITLE: FLASHING LIGHT FAILURE

SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10

SUBSYSTEM: ELS EVENT TIME: LANDING

PROBLEM: THE RECOVERY FORCES OBSERVED THAT THE FLASHING LIGHT WAS OPERATING WHILE THE SPACECRAFT
MAS DESCENDING ON THE MAIN PARACHUTES BUT NOT AFTER THE SPACECRAFT LANDED. POSTFLIGHT,
THE GLASS TUBE WHICH CONTAINS THE FLASHING ELEMENT WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED. THE BULB
ASSEMBLY, PART OF THE FLASHING RECOVERY BEACON, WAS REPLACED, AND THE BEACON OPERATED
PROPERLY. FURTHER ANALYSIS IS BEING PERFORMED.

ACTIOH:

ORGANIZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: OPEN

REFERENCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION REPORT, AUGUST 1969
DATE:
REV:

119

= , , -
 2.3.0
THE GROUND SYSTEMS SUPPORTING THE APOLLO 10 COUNTDOWN AND LAUNCH PERFORM.ED SATISFAC-
TORILY. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT FAILURES OR ANOMALIES. SEVERAL SYSTEMS EXPERIENCED
COMPONENT FAILURES AND MALFUNCTIONS, BUT THESE PROBLEMS DID NOT CAUSE ANY HOLDS OR
SIGNIFICANT DELAYS IN THE SCHEDULED SEQUENCES OF LAUNCH OPERATIONS. SOME OF THE NOTABLE
FAILURES WERE:
o LOSS OF RP-1 FAST FILL VALVE OPEN INDICATION

o RP-1 LEVEL ADJUST VALVE CLOSE COMMAND WAS ISSUED LATE. \

o LOX LOADING WAS DELAYED APPROXIMATELY 50 MINUTES DUE TO A BLOWN FUSE IN THE
4160-VAC PUMP MOTOR STARTER CIRCUIT.

o SERVICE ARM NUMBER 1 UMBILICAL CARRIER WITHDRAWAL TIME WAS 0.43 SECONDS GREATER
THAN SPECIFIED MAXIMUM.

o SERVICE ARM NUMBER 8 UMBILICAL HAS NOT WITHDRAWN.

120

-----
, '
-_.- - - - --- .- ---._ .._.- --.
 REFERENCES

1. APOLLO 10 (AS-50S) QUICK LOOK ASSESSMENT REPORT, NASA-KSC LETTER, MAY 22, 1969.

2. MISSION DIRECTOR'S SUMMARY REPORT-APOLLO 10, NASA-APO LETTER NO. MAO, MAY 26, 1969.

3. APOLLO 10 MISSION S-DAY REPORT, NASA-MSC REPORT NO. MSC-PT-R-69-14, M~Y 1969.

4. APOLLO 10 ANOMALIES WHICH COULD AFFECT APOLLO 11 AND SUBS., NASA-MSC TWX NO. PF2-0/37S-
69, MAY 28, 1969.

5. SATURN AS-50S M+S DAY REPORT, t-''''SA-MSFC REPORT, JUNE 3, 1969.

6. CSM-107 FLIGnT READINESS REVIEW: NASA-MSC, NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORP. REPORT NO.
AP69-24, JUNE 9, 1969.

7. APOLLO 11 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW, NASA-APO LETTER NO. MAT, JUNE 17, 1969.

8. APOLLO/SATURN V GROUND SYSTEMS EVALUATION REPORT: APOLLO 10, AS-50S; JULY 11, 1969.

9. APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING JUNE 1969; MSC-00127.

, r::
10. SATURN V LAUNCH VEHICLE FLIGHT EVALUATION REPORT AS-50S APOLLO 10 MISSION; JULY ~J, 1969.

11. APOLLO 10 MISSION REPORT (6C-DAY) AUGUST 1969: MSC-00R6.

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