Intelligent Leadership

Alistair Mant was born and raised in Sydney.
He attended Sydney Grammar School

and the University of Sydney, where he shone in Arts and failed abysmally in Law.
His educational breakthrough occurred on the Snowy Mountains Scheme, where he
started work at the age of nineteen as a ‘fitter’s assistant’. This was his first and
most important exposure to big, complicated and important systems. He worked also
as an account executive in advertising before the IBM Corporation transferred him
to Europe. Subsequently, he carried out research at the Tavistock Institute of Human
Relations and was elected Dean of Faculty at the South Bank University, also in
London.
Intelligent Leadership follows the critical acclaim of Leaders We Deserve, The
Rise and Fall of the British Manager and The Experienced Manager, for which he
was awarded the British Institute of Management’s Bowie Medal.
Alistair divides most of his time between Australia and Europe, helping public
and private organisations to develop strategies which are people-friendly and
therefore likely to work in practice. His wife is a developmental psychologist and his
daughters are, respectively, a musician/musicologist and a theatre director.
ii
For my father
Gilbert Mant 1902–1997
INTELLIGENT
LEADERSHIP
ALISTAIR MANT
ALLEN & UNWIN

iv
Copyright © Alistair Mant 1997
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval
system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.
First published in 1997

This edition 1999
Allen & Unwin
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National Library of Australia

Cataloguing-in-Publication entry:
Mant, Alistair.
Intelligent leadership.
2nd ed.
Bibliography.
Includes index.
ISBN 1 86508 052 7.
1. Leadership. 2. Leadership—Case studies. 3. Organizational change. I. Title.
658.4
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Contents
PREFACE VII
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 1
INTRODUCTION 1
PART I INTELLIGENT LEADERSHIP: NO OXYMORON 19
REDEFINING LEADERSHIP 22
REDEFINING INTELLIGENCE 39
THE FROG AND THE BICYCLE: LOOKING AT SYSTEMS 51
PART II A GALLERY OF INTELLIGENT LEADERS 63
SIR WILLIAM HUDSON: AN IDEAL ROLE MODEL 70
MARY PARKER FOLLETT: A (NEARLY) LOST LEADER 92
THE INTELLIGENT LEADER’S QUALITIES 100
BOB CLIFFORD: THE INGENIOUS ‘DUNCE’ 132
ROBERT KEEP: FROM SPY TO GURU 146
ALLAN COMAN: AN EDUCATOR OF GENIUS 157
JOHN LATHAM OF IBM: THE HOUSETRAINED ‘IMO’ 182
BOYS, GIRLS, ROLE MODELS AND PARENTING 197
LIZ O’SHAUGHNESSY AND NOEL WAITE: RELATIONSHIP
BUSINESSES AND THE 21ST CENTURY 210
WEAVING THE THREADS 235
PART III NURTURING INTELLIGENT LEADERSHIP 251
HELPFUL HINTS ON ORGANISATIONAL LEADERSHIP 262
POSTSCRIPT 301
BIBLIOGRAPHY 303
INDEX 307
Preface
This book is primarily about intelligence—not the sort of ‘intelligence’ measured by

IQ tests or formal examinations, but the kind of practical intelligence which creates
opportunities and steers around potential cockups and blunders. The presumption of
the book is that all of us are grateful for leadership which is possessed of useful
intelligence. Leaders have to do many things but if they are stupid, we are sunk.
It is hard to see how to write about practical cleverness without discussing its
obverse—operational stupidity. The problem with this is that most of us are very
sensitive about the subject of stupidity, I think because most of us have been made
to feel personally stupid at some time in our lives by parents, siblings, teachers,
officials and bosses. This is the moment to assert that I am not trying to be clever or
superior about this. I have to deal with the subject, but the focus is always on
systemic stupidity—the way that otherwise smart people can be rendered apparently
stupid by dysfunctional or amoral systems. Of course, those responsible for such
systems are not, collectively, exactly brilliant.
Every single human being possesses some kind of cleverness or other but we
delude ourselves if we assume that we are all equal in this respect. Leaders of great
enterprises, and that goes for countries like Australia too, need to be highly
Intelligent Leadership viii
intelligent. The book assumes that we all need to be clearer about what kinds of
intelligences (plural) they need.
The year of publication, 1997, happens to include two highly significant fiftieth
anniversaries for me and for the book’s contents. The first of these is the fiftieth
birthday of the Snowy Mountains Scheme, where I worked for a while in a very
lowly manual role in 1958–59. This book is not an autobiography but I can say that
my involvement in that great national enterprise set me firmly on the path to
understanding the special demands of leadership in Australia. I live overseas these
days and this is the first book I have written initially for an Australian audience. My
other writings have migrated to Australia from Europe; this book is designed as an
Australian export, after suitable improvements have been made by those who love
and/or hate what it has to say. Sir William Hudson, the first Commissioner of the
Snowy Scheme is my first example of intelligent leadership.
The other fiftieth birthday is that of the Tavistock Institute in London, where I
worked for some years, in a slightly less lowly role, in the 1970s. The Tavistock was
the outgrowth of the extraordinary ingenuity stimulated by the Second World War.
Great emergencies sometimes unleash great creativity. ‘Socio-technical systems’
theory—one of the ‘Tavi’s’ main exports—represented a revolutionary way of
connecting technical and operational systems with human nature. The problems the
Institute addressed are perennial—each new generation of leaders has to learn how
to make organisations purposeful and congenial for people.
Accordingly, there are numerous references in these pages to the great names at
the Tavistock, some of them now dead of course—Wilfred Bion (on the
psychodynamics of groups), Ken Rice, Harold Bridger and Eric Miller (on
experiential leadership learning), Elliott Jaques (on stratified systems theory and the
time-span of discretion) and perhaps most significant of all, Eric Trist and Fred
Emery (on socio-technical systems theory). The glory days of the Tavistock as an
organisation are long past but we forget the lessons at our peril. (Fred Emery died in
April 1997 but his wife Merrelyn, from a Canberra base, continues to address the big
questions concerning representative, participative democracy.)
The two fiftieth birthdays symbolise for me firstly the peculiar genius of
Preface ix
Australia and secondly those unchanging realities about the human condition which
every generation has to learn. Put the two together and you have a powerful engine
for change. I firmly believe that this country has unique assets which equip it for
world leadership in some arenas. The coming of the millennium, and the Olympics,
and the remaking of the Constitution all symbolise the opportunities to be seized.
But we could miss the chance if we fail to mobilise all the latent intelligence and the
leadership potential. This is a good time for the ‘clever country’ to re-examine the
kind of cleverness it needs.
Bryce Courtenay tells the apocryphal story of a conversation between President
Clinton and that great Australophile Edward de Bono. The President asks: ‘What
would be the elements of an ideal country in the twenty-first century?’ De Bono is
supposed to have replied: ‘Well—it would have to have a population of less than
twenty-five million people, it would have to use the English language, it would have
to be located on the Pacific rim, it would have to possess a well-entrenched
democracy, and it would have a strong tertiary education system. Oh—by the way—
it exists already—it’s called Australia!’
Alistair Mant
April 1997
Acknowledgments
There are far too many people to thank by name for my recent re-education in
Australian political and managerial life. They know who they are. Let me single out
my two daughters, Eleanor and Isabel, each of whom has travelled around Australia
with me recently and whose half-Australian insights, shaped by their mother’s keen
eye, have been extraordinarily helpful to me. I want to mention also my publisher
Joshua Dowse, a publisher who understands writers. I recommend this. I am also
grateful for the extended hospitality of the Maple-Brown family in Sydney and my
old friend Angela Nordlinger, in whose homes I have met an amazing array of
creative eccentrics, some of them installed in the book.
Charles Handy, the doyen of the management writers, advised on the text and
made one crucially important structural suggestion for which I am very grateful. My
old friend Alan Walker has done a superb job of indexing very complex material.
Finally, and most important, I am indebted to the outstanding Australian
entrepreneurs who have lent their personal and professional stories to this little
enterprise. They are, as they say, part of the solution rather than part of the problem.
Introduction
I want to be the leader!

I want to be the leader!
Can I be the leader?
Can I? I can?
Promise? Promise?
Yippee! I’m the leader!
I’m the leader!
OK, what shall we do?
Roger McGough, b. 1937
There goes the mob! ... I am their leader—I must follow them!
French revolutionary leader (in cafe), circa 1848
As the millennium approaches, there is evidently some kind of problem about

‘leadership’. The evidence suggests that confidence in political leaders is
diminishing, to the point where the democratic process itself is threatened. If very
substantial numbers of people (as in the United States) don’t bother to vote at
elections, something must be seriously wrong. It is not just politics. Confidence in
the morals and capability of business leadership has also diminished. The
‘Tomorrow’s Company’ movement is dedicated to the idea that if the free-enterprise
limited liability public corporation doesn’t reform itself, it will surrender
Intelligent Leadership 2
all legitimacy. It doesn’t stop there. Confidence in public administrators, trade

unions, senior military officers, church leaders, teachers and even parents has been
shaken by the manifest failure of all kinds of institutions to cope intelligently with
change.
This book begins from the assumption that there is a good deal of stupidity
about. You can make an argument that most of the problems confronting society are
ethical problems. I don’t want to deny the importance of the moral dimension,
merely to stress the intelligence angle and to say something helpful about
intelligence—what it really is and how it can be tweaked to good effect. The great
psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion argued that arrogance and stupidity were pretty much
the same thing, because the one invariably causes the other. I think he was right. Just
now there are many excellent books coming out on the subject of business ethics and
morals. I don’t want to add to the pile and, anyway, I think we are more likely to
make progress if we focus on practical operating intelligence. In other words, the
main reason why leaders fail is that those who do are often not up to the job—they
lack the intellectual firepower (a concept explained fully later on) needed to cope
with the complexity. They may have parallel failings, but this is the real killer when
blunders and cockups occur.
This doesn’t mean that I will neglect the ethical dimension. It crops up
repeatedly in these pages because it would be stupid to ignore the issue. How you
approach this depends, I think, on your belief system. Believers, in the religious
sense, look on human intelligence as a function of the moral universe. The higher-
order system is God and He determines the nature of intelligence. Skeptics, on the
other hand, argue that our ethical beliefs are a function of our intelligence, which is
all we have to call on in coping with a naughty world. We invent gods to help allay
our fears about the imponderable. I am not taking sides. I hope that anybody who
cares about quality and standards and human compassion and enduring success will
find it helpful to focus on the intellectual aspect of leadership, whatever their
starting point. The real enemies are those who don’t care—those whose survival
needs cut them off from thoughtfulness. They don’t read books anyway.
Margaret Thatcher’s great project for Britain, presented as a moral crusade
against ‘socialism’, was to make it more like the United States, a country she
uncritically admires. Unfortunately, she succeeded in replicating the worst of the
United States, the bits that threaten its long-term prosperity—the brutal,
Introduction 3
tooth-and-claw, materialistic fractiousness, rather than the wonderful folksy

generosity and community spirit. An Australian writer, Robert Hughes, has
described this aspect of American culture much more succinctly than any of the
locals (in The Culture of Complaint). He paints a picture of a permanently
infantilised population, wanting gratification now but unwilling to pay the long-term
costs; always needing someone to blame for life’s reverses. This is the well-known
‘dumbing’ of America—he widespread loss of capacity to see the connection
between the immediate and the longer term. If all politics is driven by competing
interest groups squabbling in a marketplace, what is the place for long-term vision or
for intelligent leadership?
In both the United States and the United Kingdom there has been a huge
widening of the gulf between the richest and the poorest in society. A new book,
Robert Frank’s The Winner-take-all Society, suggests that the top few per cent of the
American wealthy are now sucking out nearly half of the disposable wealth each
year. This is not only morally dubious, it is also inefficient because it makes society
very expensive to manage. The United States, for the first time, now has more of its
citizens in jail or on remand than in college. This is very expensive. The same drift
to splitting rich and poor is apparent in Australia but, as yet, things have not gone so
far. On 6 November 1996, the Australian Financial Review revealed that the chief
executives of Australia’s top fifty companies had, in the space of a decade, increased
their average salary from thirty-six times the average salary of employees in their
own firms to forty-nine times the average. That was before taking account of fancy
new stock options, partly paid shares and other perks. The top fifty CEOs’ A$35 000
per week now equals the annual average Australian wage. Even within big firms, the
winners are increasingly taking out a disproportionate share of the spoils. At the
bottom end of those firms, the staff are likely to exist precariously on short-term,
part-time contracts, or casual work.
In the old days, the CEO’s rewards were often fixed by the chairman—
frequently the ex-CEO and quite interested in protecting his own reputation vis-à-vis
the interloper. Nowadays, a ‘remuneration committee’ comprising other inner circle
top dogs and ‘remuneration consultants’ (also in the loop) ratchets up the figures,
to mutual advantage. In Britain and Australia, prime ministers wring their hands
and publicly disapprove of ‘fat cats’, especially in recently privatised
public utilities. In Japan, the average employee vs CEO multiplier tends to be much
smaller; in the United States, it can run into the hundreds, except in certain
principled organisations (like the office design firm Herman Miller, where the
CEO’s salary is pegged to twenty times average earnings in the firm). With luck and
good management, Australia may preserve its traditional values of egalitarianism,
fairness and sympathy for the underdog. All this is a question of leadership (and, of
course, intelligence). Australia doesn’t have to copy the United States and the
United Kingdom, even though there are worrying signs that some political leaders
can’t think what else to do.
POWER, AUTHORITY AND MODES OF THOUGHT

AND OPERATION
In 1977 I published a book called The Rise and Fall of the British Manager. This
was an attempt to say something helpful to the English, in whose midst I had been
living for ten years or so. By that time, I had discovered that the Scots, the Irish, the
Welsh and the citizens of the north of England were the salt of the earth. These were
the people who provided the best of the original Australian immigrant population
stock. But the people who called all the shots in Britain—the financiers and captains
of industry—clustered around London and, surrounded by flatterers and chatterers,
were in my judgement mostly bad news. They were charming and witty and
altogether seductive. Most of them were crooks, but in a very gentlemanly way.
They had a mindset so distinctive that I had to coin a term to describe it. The word
was ‘binary’. Their kith and kin provided Australia with the worst of its bad habits.
The so-called ‘bottom of the harbour’ financial scams of the 1980s always remind
me of the ‘South Sea Bubble’ and other spectacular English ripoffs. Nick Leeson, of
Barings Bank infamy, is just a modern Francis Drake.
One beauty of the word ‘binary’ was that it could be expressed graphically,
thus: . It described a relationship characterised and dominated by
interpersonal influence. Binary meant: if I win, you lose; or if we scratch each
other’s backs, we can screw the rest—as in on-off binary notation. Its fundamental
assumption is of Darwinian survival. Its most obvious manifestation was the 19th
century capitalists’ abuse of power, an abuse that bedded-in the fear and
Introduction 5
resentment that was to characterise British industrial relations thereafter. The Scots
always understood the principle of industrial democracy—creating a three-cornered
constitutional framework (you versus me but within the constitution) to give the
workers some say, usually via representation, in the policy formulation process. This
diminishes the sense of a feudal ‘master vs servant’ relationship. The Scots are
engineers at heart, and value the real ‘masters’—the work outputs and the
constitutional framework. The English genius is for money and power, and true
democracy always threatens vested interests.
The other form of binary relationship was characterised by seduction rather than
the naked abuse of power. In fact the main subject of The Rise and Fall of the
British Manager was the emergence of the highly seductive ‘management’
movement—an English invention which did much harm in Britain and seeped out
damagingly to all the other English-speaking economies, including the United States
and Australia. The main role of ‘management’ was to separate respectable owners
from the dreadful depredations visited on 19th century workers. The Germans,
without a management movement, or management ‘profession’, or management
education industry, or even a word in the language for ‘management’, prospered by
focusing on the outputs the customers needed and the rights the workers merited.
After World War II, Mercedes-Benz built their reputation for safety and integrity
by crash-testing hundreds and hundreds of cars, when all the British and American
manufacturers cared about was styling and salesmanship. Of course, both
engineering and salesmanship are important; the trick is to get the balance right. The
English got to be brilliant at salesmanship—the ultimate binary skill—but they
needed to, as the engineering got progressively worse. Increasingly, the boards of
British companies were dominated by the money men; on German boards, the
engineers still held the balance of power. From the middle of the 19th century, the
Germans also began to embrace the principles of industrial democracy—an idea
they mainly picked up from Scots writers and businessmen. Luckily for us Anglo-
Saxons, the virus of ‘management’ is now seeping into German language and
culture. In time, it may sap their vitality.
The opposite mindset to the binary I dubbed ‘ternary’, borrowing this use of the
term from the anthropologist Gregory Bateson. He used it to describe certain kinds
Figure 1 Modes of operation

In the binary mode of thought somebody always comes out on top. In the ternary
mode the product or purpose or ideal comes out on top. The central binary question
is: ‘Will I win?’ The central ternary question is more intelligent: ‘What’s it for?’
of three-cornered relationships, where absolute power is softened or governed by the

authority of particular roles like non-commissioned officer or nanny. The idea of the
ternary relationship was that it was governed by the purpose or Object of the
relationship or by its constitutional representation, rather than by
interpersonal power. This too could be expressed graphically, thus:
Mercedes was a ternary organisation because all its human relationships were
governed by the ambition to make perfect motor vehicles. Its main bankers were on
the board and committed to very long-term investment in the future. The British
motor industry (which effectively no longer exists, now that BMW has acquired
Rover, the last British-owned volume manufacturer) was binary because its
relationships were dominated by greed, ambition and flashiness. The short-term
imperatives of the stock market drove the enterprise. The honest engineers were
there of course (many of them Scots), but were underrecognised, underpaid and
undersupported by long-term development resources.
The simplest way to illustrate the binary/ternary distinction is to refer back to the
democratic process. If you vote according to what you take to be your
Introduction 7
own or your family’s best interests, you are voting binary—if you gain, somebody
else is bound to lose. If you vote according to what you take to be best for your
country, even if you expect to disadvantage yourself in the short term, then you are
voting ternary—the relationship of everybody to the higher-order ideal takes
precedence over the win/lose relationships between people or sectional interests. By
the way, the ternary route is more intelligent; it demands more thought. It requires
the citizen to connect personal desire with the duties of citizenship. Not voting at all
is binary by definition.
Doctors and health service managers found the binary/ternary idea particularly
helpful because it explained why they kept having the same kinds of repetitive
arguments without ever making any progress or arriving at an agreed conclusion.
Doctors see themselves as ternary (dedicated to a precious ‘third corner’—the
sanctity of human life) and managers as binary (dedicated only to bean-counting).
The managers, on the other hand, are often outwitted by senior consultants, who
have cunning and highly political (binary) ways of securing their own clinical
interests. The unfortunate manager, who knows that funds are not unlimited, usually
aims merely to optimise health expenditure for maximum equity. That is his or her
‘third corner’. So long as both sides believe themselves to be absolutely in the right,
there can be no progress.
Paul Keating’s 1996 election slogan, ‘You don’t have to like him but you’ve got
to respect him! ‘, played on the binary/ternary tension. Liking is interpersonal, hence
binary. If they are pretty sure their candidate is unlikeable and disliked, the spin
doctors’ trick is to shift the ground to the ‘third corner’ by focusing on task and
destination. Respect is gained through effort and dedication to a purpose. If the
public believe that the purpose is to better the nation, then they may respect a leader
who is perceived as ‘tough but fair’ in pursuit of the purpose. I did my best to
persuade my Conservative friends in the United Kingdom that they could usefully
adapt the Keating slogan for John Major: ‘You can’t respect him but you can’t help
liking him!’ This idea did not go down well.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the ternary idea was that it focused
attention away from the behavioural angle of leadership and put the weight on the
purpose of organisations. Once you accept the idea that managerial authority (as
opposed to naked power) flows from the third corner, then you have to ask: what
Figure 2 This illustrates the potential usefulness of the binary/ternary idea in practice.
When doctors and health service managers habitually disagree, each side is
always ‘in the right’. The diagram shows how this arises with each side thinking
of the other in binary mode. So long as this binary state persists there can be no
intelligent progress—all arguments are low grade arguments that go nowhere
fast. Once both sides see and appreciate the meaning of the diagram they may be
able, and prepared, to ascend to the ternary position in order to have a high grade
argument—that is, a realistic one. Thus a diagram on the binary/ternary idea can
have the effect of helping to convert binary behaviour into ternary intelligence.
does this organisation exist to do? If the purpose of the organisation is essentially
frivolous (as in most parts of the perfumery business) or pernicious (as in tobacco),
then a ternary focus is likely to be embarrassing. In such organisations, ‘leadership’
is bound to be defined in terms of (binary) persuasiveness. If, on the other hand, the
output or purpose of the organisation is manifestly useful, as in most parts of public
service, then the personal aspect of leadership doesn’t have to be persuasive because
the overall purpose is good (or persuasive) enough. It isn’t quite so simple, however.
Some organisations supply outputs that are intrinsically valuable (life insurance, for
example) but the way in which the product is distributed turns out sometimes to be
reprehensible. The simple matrix in Figure 3 sets out the possible combinations.
The Rise and Fall of the British Manager was a surprise success in Britain,
Introduction 9
Figure 3 Possible output value/delivery process combinations

Real (inner) motivation flows from commitment or attachment to a valuable
purpose. The authority of the ternary leader flows from the purpose. If the
purpose is frivolous or pernicious, it follows that the leadership is likely to
revert to binary. Even if the purpose is intrinsically good, the delivery process
may still be naughty. Life insurance, for example, is fundamentally useful but
the practices of some life companies and sales representatives are tainted.
You can locate any organisation’s purpose and mode somewhere on the grid.
considering its subject matter. Possibly, many of its readers were Scots or other such
honest folk, or women, whose orientation tends to be ternary, for reasons explained
in Chapter 11. The binary/ternary idea evolved as a simple but powerful way of
describing some of the issues mentioned above. It is not a ‘theory’, nor is it
essentially new—merely a reframing of ideas which have been with us since Plato,
and before. You could say that binary relationships channel power, and ternary
relationships create and depend upon authority. The authority derives from the
common ‘third corner’. The full flowering of the idea came with the publication of a
subsequent book, Leaders We Deserve.
This book first came out in 1983. By then, I had enjoyed many discussions and
arguments about the meaning of the binary/ternary split. It had become clear that it
was a pretty good way of thinking and talking about leadership. By the early 1980s
an increasing number of political and industrial leaders were being exposed as
corrupt or incompetent or, very frequently, both. Business leadership in the Anglo-
Saxon world was beginning to look a little shaky in comparison with the Asian
‘tigers’ and, more relevantly, the exemplars of so-called ‘Rhineland’ or ‘Rhenish’

capitalism—the Swiss, the Germans, the Dutch, the Scandinavians—all those
economies which had taken care to preserve a measure of state control over the
operation of markets and which were characterised by strong local sub-economies in
which intercompany competition coexisted with regional collaboration. By this time,
Professor Michael Porter of Harvard had drawn attention to the existence of regional
clusters of economic activity where fierce competition and farsighted collaboration
seemed to reinforce each other. The north Italian tile industry was perhaps the best
known example.
In his original presentation of the binary/ternary notion, Bateson wrote:
There is a very profound contrast between such (symmetrical)

competitive systems of behaviour and complementary dominance-
submission systems—a highly significant contrast for any discussion of
national character. In complementary striving [what I would call binary]
the stimulus which prompts A to greater efforts is the relative weakness
in B; if we want to make A subside or submit, we ought to show him
that B is stronger than he is. In fact, the complementary character
structure may be summarized by the phrase ‘bully-coward’, implying
the combination of these characteristics in the personality. The
symmetrical competitive systems [what I would call ternary]...are an
almost precise functional opposite of the complementary. Here the
stimulus which evokes greater striving in A is the vision of greater
strength or greater striving in B.
This was what Michael Porter described in northern Italy—the coexistence of binary
competitiveness and ternary collaboration. If your competitor is strong, it makes you
strong too—and your region.
Note that Bateson was writing about, amongst other matters, national character.
You don’t have to spend too long in the ‘Rhineland’ economies to realise that,
although business activity is highly competitive, both within and between nations,
these are highly civilised places in which to live and work. In these countries, the
bosses are not exactly softies. The point is that, generally speaking, they are invested
with authority by the existence of proper constitutional working relations. When
most people are asked to describe past bosses they recall with respect and
gratitude—’good bosses’—they come up with the same two words repeatedly:
Introduction 11
Figure 4 The good boss
When most people recall past good bosses (or teachers, or parents) it is
surprising how often they spontaneously come up with: ‘Tough (or firm)
but fair’. You don’t necessarily have to like a boss who is intelligent
enough to insist on high standards and to create fair systems, at least at
the time. But, afterwards, you are likely to remember that (ternary) boss
with gratitude and affection and to think of him or her as a ‘leader’.
‘tough’ (or firm) but ‘fair’. This has very little to do with personality or ‘leadership
style’ and everything to do with concern for standards and respect for fairness. As
Figure 4 shows, these are ternary elements. If the boss is consistent in these matters,
sooner or later he or she will come to be regarded as an admirable person and as a
‘leader’.
By contrast with the Rhineland economies, the United States, particularly in the
Reagan/Bush period, went Darwinian, on the very dubious assumption that markets,
left to themselves and utilising supposedly perfect knowledge, will operate in the
short term with the same kind of ‘efficiency’ as evolutionary processes which
generally take millions of years to wreak their effects. Natural selection was tough
on more species than we know about. The difficulty is to know, in the short term, if
you (or your species, or your corporation, or your model of economics) are doomed.
As long as it lasted, the full-blown American Darwinian period favoured the binary
type of person. The flavour of the month was Gordon Gekko, the anti-hero of the
cult film Wall Street and the archetype of the hard-driving, money-oriented jungle
fighter and—above all—a bully. In the 1980s, the key weapon was the corporate
ambush. The hostile (binary) takeover replaced the thoughtful, long-term nurturing
of talent, resources and innovation as the determinant of ‘leadership skills’. A
number of observers began to worry that the shortsightedness could kill off the
valuable, long-term (ternary) outcomes on which all of society depends.
Dick Morris, ‘triangulation’ and the ternary election

Dick Morris, President Clinton’s disgraced former electoral strategist,
provides a near-perfect example of the relationship between the binary and
ternary modes, at both the personal and the institutional level. His 1996
book Behind the Oval Office reveals how his relationship with the President
veered from mutually seductive backscratching to an impressively detached
shared understanding of American history. The personal relationship, in
other words, flipflopped between binary and ternary. Because Dick Morris
got caught trying to impress a Washington prostitute with his presidential
connections, he will probably go down in history merely as a binary fixer.
He certainly was a master of binary fight/flight psychology, as all good spin
doctors are. The complication is an independent variable—he is also a
highly intelligent man. This means that, when he needed to, he could
ascend to the ternary, and take the President with him.
At the start of the campaign Clinton ought to have been a lame duck,
trailing a string of scandals behind him. Morris addressed the problem by a
strategy of what he dubbed ‘triangulation’. The Republicans’ greatest error,
in his view, was the mistaken binary belief that in order to beat Clinton
they had to destroy him. The Morris stratagem was to flood the media with
a continuous drip-drip of TV advertisements during the slack eighteen
months before the campaigning got going in earnest. Every single
advertisement addressed the ‘values agenda’—issues like welfare reform,
tuition tax credits, family leave, the environment, tobacco and so on.
Clinton’s role was to stay aloof from all the attacks on his reliability as a
man: the Gennifer Flowers/Paula Jones sex scandals, Whitewater,
‘travelgate’, the draft, post-smoking, etc. The President’s aides discussed
these matters with the media—the President himself, never. Morris’s
mantra was: ‘Public values defeat private character attacks’.
The point was that most of Clinton’s indiscretions were in the distant
past. The trick was to position the President’s current achievements
Introduction 13
alongside the already securely established ‘values agenda’. According to

Morris, ‘verbs always beat adjectives’. By the time the Republicans
mounted a serious offensive, after the party conventions, the attack was
almost entirely adjectival—condemning Clinton and praising Dole. By then
the public had absorbed the message that the President had apparently been
doing something about the issues that most concerned them (according to
Morris’s polling). Morris understood that at that stage the only effective
Republican counter to his strategy would be to steal or appropriate the
‘values agenda’ so carefully nurtured over the previous year and a half.
General Colin Powell would have been the Republican secret weapon,
were he to gain the nomination, because he was already associated in the
public mind with ternary values. When the news came through that Powell
had failed to get the support needed (this was a whole year before polling
day), Morris announced: ‘The election is now over!’ Turning to the
President, he said: ‘Congratulations, you’ve won!’ The twelve people
around the table in the White House met this with an astonished silence,
then derisive laughter. In his book Morris wrote: ‘The President remained
silent. He looked up at me over his reading glasses. Then, having silently
calculated that I was probably right, he resumed reading his agenda book
without saying a word. The outcome of the election, if not our actual
margin of victory, was established that day and was never seriously in
doubt afterward.’
The Democrats’ success in 1996 may be an important harbinger of
things to come. Because of Morris’s strategy, and the failure of the
Republicans to counter it intelligently, the election was won largely on the
basis of higher-order ternary values—the ‘values agenda’. That is how
democracy is supposed to work—the people voting for longer term
collective advantage rather than for selfish gratification of immediate
appetites. In that sense, it was the most ternary election in recent American
history. Maybe we shall see the same shift elsewhere; for example in
Australia in 1999? The point is not that American politics has suddenly
gone all mushy and sentimental—the 1996 battleground was as tough and
binary as in any election in history. It was just that the binary battle was
won by the intelligent application of a ternary agenda. No person, not even
a spin doctor like Dick Morris, is either binary or ternary. Intelligence
dictates which of the two makes more sense, and when.
ABOUT THIS BOOK

In 1993 and 1994 I was spending much more time back in my homeland, working
directly with clients or through the major business schools and the Leadership
Consortium of blue-chip Australian firms. As a result, I got wind of a number of
individuals who were exercising, it seemed to me, a peculiarly Australian, and
effective, form of leadership. Any one of them would have been worthy of a full-
scale biography. It was an attractive idea to use these stories to illustrate some
important general themes about leadership in Australia. The main point about the
people described in this book is that they all demonstrate the particular quirky or
maverick kind of intelligence that Australia will need to make use of if the country
is to prosper in the next century. ‘Intelligence’ takes many forms; these people help
us to appreciate the intelligence of the future, whilst acknowledging the contribution
of other kinds of ‘brightness’ in the past.
The book’s essence
I encourage the reader to read the whole book because all the stories and diagrams
are woven into the central argument. A rough navigational route map is provided
below.
The following seven basic elements represent the main features to be taken in
along the way. They are arranged in a causal sequence; that is, each element plays a
part in causing the others. Taken together, they add up to the cause of successful
leadership. Like the geographical features seen on a journey, the fact that they hardly
change doesn’t reduce the pleasure of seeing them afresh. This book exists partly to
remind us of the basic truths which don’t change.
1. Authority
Successful leadership depends on the leader acting with authority or authoritatively.
This has nothing to do with autocracy or authoritarianism. It just means that the
people authorise the leader to get on with it because they trust him or her. We need
to understand what causes that kind of trust.
2. Purpose
The ternary symbol appears at the top of every page as a reminder that,
while leaders need all kinds of skills, their authority derives ultimately
from the useful purpose. If the purpose is good enough and the leader can
Introduction 15
see how to get to it, he or she doesn’t need ‘charisma’—that will come in time.
3. Judgement
No one can define good judgement, but most of us know it when we see it. It is the
sine qua non of effective leadership. Essentially, it is the mental ability to grapple at
speed with complexity. There are wellproven methods for identifying this capacity
and predicting its development in people.
4. Systems (‘frog’) thinking
The evidence suggests that sound judgement is mainly a function of ‘systems
thinking’—the ability to focus on the particular whilst holding the context in mind.
The particular task in hand is what to do; the context supplies the why. If you
understand why, you can exercise judgement and thus provide a lead towards a new,
more intelligent direction.
5. Sanity
This book devotes a lot of attention to psychological damage because this is the
most significant source of interference into otherwise sound judgement. When the
complexity gets too much for the leader, that is when any lurking psychopathology
is likely to erupt.
6. Broad—band intelligences
If we examine the childhoods of the leaders described in this book, we see
intelligence developing in a broad way, stimulated by a wide variety of influences
and activities. This has implications both for infant education and for broadening the
thinking/doing range of adults.
7. The virtuous circle
Individual leaders who are clever and sane in the pursuit of valuable goals create
circumstances which encourage a critical mass of other people to develop in the
same way. In time, this may imbue whole institutions and societies with a sense of
purpose. In this setting, new generations of purposeful and resourceful leaders
emerge quite naturally.
How to navigate the book
Because leadership and intelligence are such complex and subtle subjects, the road
ahead (for the reader) is a winding one. I apologise in advance for any time
the reader may spend in the undergrowth, just off the road. Because the ‘leadership’
route is so interesting, I think the undergrowth is interesting too. But be warned.
The basic structure of the book is as follows.
Part I deals with meaning and interpretation. What do we mean by the central
concepts of ‘intelligence’ and ‘leadership’? And what is the place of ‘systems
thinking’? I wouldn’t have bothered to write this book if I hadn’t felt that we need,
urgently, to look at these concepts from a new angle—from a number of new angles,
as it happens. It is easy to say, as people do, ‘He’s a natural leader!’ or ‘She’s really
bright!’, but what does this mean? One person’s ‘bright’ may be another’s airhead.
Some people distrust, even detest, leaders that others will follow to the ends of the
earth. In this part of the book I look at the key issues from a number of different
angles because I know from experience that different people construct things
differently. Accordingly, I employ a number of metaphors—from monkeys, via
leprechauns, to rugby scrums.
Part II—the ‘engine room’ of the book—comprises the stories, along with
reflections on related matters. Each story concerns a real, flesh-and-blood ‘leader’—
most of them Australians. These stories are deliberately longer than the cameos that
usually illustrate leadership in books. The reason for this is that leadership must
involve a powerful personal dimension if it is to make any sense. Leadership as a
concept is too woolly unless you can get to grips with the formation of the leader-
follower process inside and between people. I hope the reader will share with me the
excitement of meeting these remarkable people. I am much in their debt. They do
not represent a comprehensive or exhaustive list of outstanding leaders—they are
merely interesting. Three are dead (including the monkey), one (I think) is in jail,
and the three women show the way forward to the ternary future.
Part III contains a number of ‘helpful hints’ about how to nurture and sustain the
kind of intelligent leadership celebrated in the book. This isn’t a how-to-do-it sort of
book, but it would be churlish not to share a few tricks of the trade that have worked
for me and my colleagues around the world. There is nothing fancy here; just a few
practical methods which grow directly out of the concepts outlined in Part I.
That is the basic structure, but the book isn’t quite as neat as that. The stories run
throughout the book and there are a great many cross-references and anticipations
Introduction 17
of themes yet to come. This is deliberate. I find much of the management literature
pretty unreadable, on the grounds that most of the popular books contain just one big
idea padded out to a couple of hundred pages. The exceptions amongst the big
names, like Tom Peters and Charles Handy, grapple with complexity and offer
pretty good stories. As my central thesis on intelligence concerns making
connections, the sensible way to write about it is to make multiple connections in the
text. The sensible way to read this book is therefore to jump about a bit. When I get
letters from readers, I find they often pick up on what seem to me (but not to them)
to be minor themes. That is fine by me—the world is a complicated place and not to
be understood via simple formulae. Some readers may even prefer to dip into the
stories before tackling the logic of intelligent leadership.
This page intentionally blank
PART I
Intelligent leadership:
no oxymoron
21
Much has been written about leadership. I have tried to read most of it, from
inspirational stories about generals and admirals to convoluted accounts of
psychological experiments. I have come to the conclusion that the subject needs to
be examined from a variety of angles. That is the intention of this first part of the
book. My hope is that at least some of these perspectives, if not all of them, will
make sense to my readers. The experience of leadership and followership is
powerful and simple—almost primitive. Understanding the meaning of it all and
working out what to do about it is not so simple.
It is easy to be distracted by the ‘great leaders’ of history, most of whom come
under immense pressure and some of whom fall from grace spectacularly. A good
many of the best known have been tyrants. The point is that intelligent leadership is
exercised, day by day, by thousands of humble people in modest roles—using their
ingenuity to surmount problems and running calculated risks when it seems right to
do so. For them the possession of intelligence and the exercise of leadership are
certainly not contradictory.
Redefining leadership
The psychologists say, turning logic on its head, that every victim requires a
murderer. This is the principle of reciprocity. So it is that every follower—and that
means all of us some of the time—requires a leader sometimes. When we consider
leadership, we are dealing with two quite separate aspects: the process that goes on
between leader and follower (which is mainly emotional, although there is an
intellectual aspect as well); and the context of the leadership (this concerns the
destination towards which the leader points, which is usually rational but may
contain highly emotional elements too).
It is surprising how many books and articles on leadership fail to draw this
distinction clearly. If we view leadership as a human process, deeply rooted in our
instinctual nature, then we can say that leadership exists whenever the human
instinct to follow is triggered. Leadership, as a phenomenon, is thus defined by
followership. There may, or may not, be a defensible purpose to it. Adolf Hitler was
an extraordinarily successful leader because he succeeded in persuading many
millions of devout German citizens to turn away from their cherished beliefs and
values. Together with his stage manager, Dr Goebbels, he was arguably the first
political leader fully to understand the black art of combining communications
Redefining Leadership 23
technology with theatre in order to affect mass psychology. The process was
managed brilliantly. ‘The destination was crazy.
Long ago, that great populariser Robert Ardrey, in The Social Contract, said
something very wise about the human instinct to follow a lead, however primitive:
A mob transcends its leaders, becomes a single wild happy thing

satisfying identity, stimulation, the following response, xenophobia,
australopithecine joys of the hunt and the kill, a thing that through
delirious social self-approval discards all neocortical inhibition. To
describe a mob as sub-human is incorrect; it simply ceases to behave
like individuals. To regard it as a storm of disorder is equally incorrect,
for a mob is as orderly a human phenomenon as one will ever encounter;
let a single voice of rational dissent be raised within it, and observe what
happens to the dissenter.
It is a good description of the primitive behaviours sometimes observable in

boardrooms and on factory floors. Some people love it. If you think the context,
purpose and destination are important too, then you could say that it is the task of
leadership to express that rational dissent whenever necessary, at whatever risk.
THE LEADERSHIP PHENOMENON AS PHYSICS OR

CHEMISTRY?
The leadership field has always been dogged by trait theory. Most learned studies of
‘leaders’ adopt this line. This is the physics approach to the subject: if you collect
together all the right elements—courage, dedication, vision, confidence, energy,
perseverance, etc.—it must work, just like an experiment in the laboratory. The
trouble is that the followership angle makes the process chemical—when it works,
somehow the chemistry works between the followers’ needs and the ‘leader’s’
capacity (or need) to channel them. This is very complicated and unpredictable.
Some of the most powerful leaders in history have broken all the ‘rules’, which
makes predicting leadership success very difficult. By the way, adolescent boys
usually fall into the trap of adopting physics assumptions in their approach to girls—
in the hope that the dogged application of formulae will get them somewhere. The
girls generally know better—the trick is in the mutual chemistry; you can’t invent
a relationship—you have to discover it! Boys should be taught these things in

school.
With honourable exceptions, much of the American literature on leadership is
based on physics principles. Even ‘contingency theory’, which asserted that
situations differ and different folks require different strokes, managed to come
across as a technical trick—first figure out the contingency and then apply the rules.
The most honourable exception of all is the great American political scientist (and
biographer of F. D. Roosevelt), James McGregor Burns. In his magisterial
Leadership (first published in 1978) he drew the distinction between ‘transactional
leadership’, which was all about interpersonal influence and persuasiveness, and
‘transformational leadership’, which concerned destinations as well. The archetype
of the transactional was LBJ, who was described by Godfrey Hodgson (in In Our
Time) thus:
...a legislator whose vote was needed would find himself literally
surrounded by a one-man army of Lyndon Johnson. His birthday would
be remembered, his vanity flattered, his shoulder squeezed. He would be
reminded, subtly or brutally according to the estimate made of his
temperament, of his political problems at home or of his hopes of
advancement on Capitol Hill. Every scrap of information would be
retrieved, every tactic used, until the wretched man did what was wanted
of him; then he would be overwhelmed by signs of the majority leader’s
gratitude and admiration.
McGregor Burns’ transactional/transformational leadership paralleled my own

invention of the binary/ternary idea at about the same time. The latter is explained in
the Introduction. Its principal advantage is that it can be expressed visually
vs ;this makes it easier to understand for people whose intelligence leans
towards the spatial. You can see by looking at it that the left-hand symbol might be
two people simply interacting and the right-hand symbol might be the same two
interacting (in role) in a particular context or for a particular purpose. McGregor
Burns’ ‘transformational’ leadership was likewise focused on the destination to
which the leader points. His ideas were copied by many imitators, most of whom
turned them into slick (binary) consultancy packages.
LEADING FROM BEHIND

The leaders celebrated in this book are all ‘natural’ leaders in the sense that people
are generally prepared to follow them. But none of them has learned the techniques
of leadership as such. What distinguishes them is that they leave things different—
like the dramatic hero in the play—not just the relationships but the whole situation.
I will return to the theatrical metaphor later on because it is a good way of
explaining the occasional impact of superficially ‘uncharismatic’ people. However,
most of the books on leadership lean uncomfortably towards the ‘Johnson treatment’
in their assumptions about learning how to lead. President Truman famously said:
‘A leader is a man who has the ability to get other people to do what they don’t want
to do and like it!’ That is the essence of leading from the front. My leaders have the
capacity to absorb themselves in something so interesting and valuable that other
people begin to take notice after a while. This seems to me to be an attractive model
of leadership for a culture like Australia which values the unconventional and the
underdog. My leaders are not very ‘clubbable’ in the ordinary sense and none of
them was really designed by nature for the executive suite of the big corporation.
They are too impatient.
One of the more interesting of the new books about leadership comes from
Professor Howard Gardner—Leading Minds. He distinguishes between ‘direct’ and
‘indirect’ leadership, which allows him to put politicians and scientists together as
leaders, on the grounds that both sometimes leave the national or world stage
different. Margaret Thatcher is listed as a ‘direct’ leader because the political
process affects people directly and J. Robert Oppenheimer as an ‘indirect’ leader
because it was his scientific works that did the affecting, long after his passing. In
my terms, Thatcher was almost the ultimate ‘binary’ (persuasive/interpersonal)
leader and Oppenheimer the classic ‘ternary’ (attached to task and role). This book
(mine) proposes that ternary leadership is more interesting and, in the future, more
important. Some of my leaders are ‘direct’ and some ‘indirect’, but they are all
basically ternary (much more concerned about the important thing to be done than
about influencing people), though all of them can turn on the ‘Johnson treatment’
when they have to.
Margaret Thatcher is an interesting and important case when ‘strong’ leadership
is the subject. She performed a crucially important service for Britain in taking
on and defeating the over-mighty trade union bosses. Their role was supposed to be
a ternary one (improvement of industrial relations), but most of the big boys played
it as a binary exercise in boss-bashing. In Thatcher they encountered a super-binary
and came off second-best. That battle was inevitable and it was necessary that she
win it.
The point is that this was a major set-piece battle in a long war to rescue the
British socio-economic system. Sometimes, the war historians tell us, the best
battlefield commanders don’t translate well to strategic leadership, where the
problems are more complex and the time-spans longer. Many of Thatcher’s admirers
now wish she had withdrawn from the fray at the top of her form, in the mid-to late-
1980s. She would have gone down in history as one of the great prime ministers.
As things turned out, she went on to make the kinds of mistakes that
overstretched CEOs are prone to—the application of too-simple formulae to too-
complex problems. Perhaps the most damaging of these was the slavish adherence to
monetarist economic theory (or dogma). In the end these ideas were quietly dropped
by her successors but, by then, the damage had been done in the form of an
emasculated manufacturing base and destabilising boom/bust cycles. Margaret
Thatcher was a strong political leader but, as this is a book about leadership
intelligence, we should note that history is likely to judge her as being wrong too
often on the big questions.
PECKING ORDERS AND ‘SIBLING’ LEADERSHIP IN

ORGANISATIONS
To anticipate the quirky and individualistic leaders in the book, it may help to
invoke the metaphor of sibling pecking orders. The reader should be warned that it
doesn’t help to approach this too literally—we are dealing here not with family life
but with the way that psychology affects organisational life. Leading from the front
is, metaphorically speaking, the province of the first-born child. Leading from
behind is the younger sibling’s speciality. The psychologist Alfred Adler described
the first-born as characteristically a ‘power-hungry conservative ‘. The newly first-
born baby is ‘powerful’, even though physically helpless. First-time parents almost
always lack confidence and tend to be ‘led’ from the start by the imperious
newcomer. Most often, the key event, a year or so into this tyranny, is the arrival of
the younger child. Suddenly the first-born has to yield the mysterious power to the
newcomer. Watch a two-year-old watching its newborn sibling—it cannot
understand its powerful feelings, which veer between a sort of ‘love’, simple
curiosity and murderousness.
The psychological life’s work for the first-born from then on (unless it is old
enough by then to understand and manage feelings of rivalry) is to get the power
back. It is no coincidence that the executive suites of public and private-sector
organisations all around the world are peopled by so many first-borns. If you need
power, you will work relentlessly to get it. The second- to nth-born child enters a
much more complex family situation than the first-born. It is more like an elaborated
authority structure than a crude power nexus. The younger sibling is generally less
conscientious, more self-possessed, more interested in things for their own sake, and
much less anxious to please adults. The cry of the younger sibling down the ages is:
‘It’s not fair!’ This presupposes that families are democracies of a sort. The best
ones are.
This is just a metaphor for illustrating the difference between anointed leadership
and emergent leadership. This book is primarily about the second of these because
emergent leadership depends on ingenuity, not position. Quite a few scientific
revolutionaries like Newton and Einstein were first-borns, but it has been argued
that the ‘emotional’ revolutions that alter our way of perceiving ourselves are
different. All the famous evolutionists, or those quickly converted to Darwin’s view,
were, like him, younger brothers. Almost all the eminent scientists who opposed the
evolutionary doctrine were first-borns. Frank Sulloway, in Born to Rebel, argues that
the Copernican and Freudian revolutions, which similarly disturb comforting notions
about ourselves, demonstrate the same birth-order effect. He argues that nearly all
the true revolutionaries, if they are not younger siblings, turn out to be first-borns
brought up to reject their fathers or first-borns whose fathers were themselves
revolutionaries.
Sulloway’s data and opinions are highly contentious (no doubt especially in the
eyes of first-borns) but, as I say, birth order is just an engaging metaphor for
examining the relationship of power to ingenuity. The capacity of managers to hang
on to power, however cunningly, is not as important as the capacity to be truly
creative—to make exciting things happen. It is crucial therefore for systems—

corporations, governments, countries—to allow ingenuity to flourish, even though
there are likely to be powerful impediments, some of them unconscious. In a sense,
all women are younger siblings when they make it into the upper ranks of male-
dominated organisational systems. They are latecomers, they tend to be excluded
from the locker room ethos and they certainly complain, ‘It’s not fair!’ You could
argue that Australia as a whole remains a kind of younger sibling, at least until the
Republic arrives.
LEADERSHIP OF THE BIG (WORLD) GAME—THE

RUGBY METAPHOR
If the family analogy is not to your taste, consider the rugby field. On the surface,
the contest is between two fairly matched teams of fifteen men. Look under the
surface and you can see a much more subtle and significant contest between the
heavy forwards of both sides (whose project is to tighten or close the game up) and
the fleetfooted backs of both sides (who aim to open things out, have a bit of fun,
and entertain the people who really matter). The analogy works pretty well for
corporate life. Remember that when the game emerged, on the playing fields of
Rugby School, it was important that all the boys should be kept occupied, or out of
mischief, on winter afternoons. This meant the big, slow, lumbering and possibly
dangerous boys as well as those who were naturally graceful athletes.
Thus was the scrum invented. Getting your head down, (male) bonding and
shoving steadily forward against the opposition describes late 20th century corporate
life pretty well, at least in the eyes of women. Studies of big corporate blunders
almost invariably involve all-male ‘groupthink’—the process by which individually
smart people sometimes lose their wits in gung-ho groups. But all the best ‘re-
engineering’ success stories involve creative collaboration across organisational
boundaries by the mentally fleet-of-foot. That means that the true leaders of the
future are likely to collaborate with the most interesting people outside their
immediate systems in formal and informal strategic alliances. Insiders often doubt
the ‘loyalty’ of such clever or unconventional people. Chapter 10 contains the story
of John Latham of IBM whose broad networks outside the company might have
been used to save the company from its only big blunder in sixty years
of operation. But he was usually regarded in the firm as a kind of spy, because too
few people understood his ‘big game’ motives. Most observers date the major
problems of the IBM Corporation from the early to mid-1980s. Latham knew
exactly what was going to happen, and when, in 1971!
I appreciate that my use of the rugby metaphor precludes many women and all
those who hew to other football codes, and is bound also to irk those whom God
meant to be heavyweight forwards. Of course, not all forwards are slow, dangerous
or lacking in individuality; some of them are amongst my best friends. The scrum
simply illustrates mindlessness and head-down doggedness better than any other
example I can think of. It also prepares us for the metaphor of the bicycle and the
frog, which is all about how the parts of a system relate to the whole. If you happen
(metaphorically speaking) to be stuck in an organisational scrum, you have to
preserve, somehow, a connection with the big game.
Intelligent leadership, I argue, is not just about who wins the narrow contest, but
about the magnificence of the whole game. Accordingly, this book is not primarily
about how to make old-fashioned corporations more flexible or ingenuity-friendly.
There are a number of very good books emerging on the concept of the ‘intelligent
organisation’—not least Gifford Pinchot’s new book, The End of Bureaucracy and
the Rise of the Intelligent Organisation. My aim is to focus more closely on the
makeup of the new kind of leader—the kinds of people who generate shared
enthusiasm rather than merely wield influence. The obvious contest is that between
corporations, fighting in marketplaces, just as in the rugby example. From a national
perspective, the real underlying struggle may be between the emergent leadership of
gifted juniors right across the corporate world and the established cadres of seniors,
networked together not just within firms but right across the upper echelons of
business, government, the professions and all the other elements of the
Establishment.
To give an example from an Australian perspective, I would be much more
interested in the international networks established by ingenious and entrepreneurial
scientists or engineers (for example, in the sixty-plus federally-funded Cooperative
Research Centres) than in executive ‘teamwork’ within corporations. Whenever
there is a gungho team, there is usually a disaffected knot of non-members
grumbling about the energetic wrong direction the team is taking. In my experience,
some of the grumblers are usually right. The best of them may have difficulty in
explaining their position, not necessarily because they lack eloquence, but because
what they have to say is complicated. It is complicated because it refers to an
external logic. This is the oldest problem for leadership. Winston Churchill was a
great leader partly because he habitually surrounded himself with brilliant, cranky,
fearless insubordinates. He loved it. Margaret Thatcher, who constantly compared
herself with Churchill, could not abide cleverness. If you said something
complicated (about a truly complicated subject), you were deemed ‘wet’. Before
long, you were out of the Cabinet, or whatever. This really was a brain drain.
It follows that this is not likely to be a useful book for anyone who thinks, ‘I
want to be the leader!—I want to be the leader!’ (as McGough’s words have it).
There certainly was a time when it was possible to maintain ascendancy by
mastering the Machiavellian tricks of political power. In the future, the only reliable
pathway to influence and satisfaction will be via ingenuity in the pursuit of
interesting and valuable ends. The leaders in these pages are all people who have
taken this route, sometimes with great difficulty. They are all good role models, in
my opinion, for future success. In the Introduction I set out the distinction between
‘binary’ and ‘ternary’ leadership. This offers a simple language for thinking about
human influence in terms of its two main manifestations—one (the ternary)
generally useful and healthy; the other (the binary) often exploitative and divisive.
THE ABB COMPANY—THE NEW CORPORATE

MODEL
Much has been written about Asea Brown Boveri, the Swiss/Swedish trams-to-
power-stations conglomerate. On the surface, it is simply a big multinational firm.
Look more closely, and you see a loose federation of over a thousand smallish units,
each of them with the coherence and shapeliness of a quick-moving rugby back line.
ABB describes itself not as ‘multinational’ but as multidomestic. The aim is not
‘globalisation’ but ‘global localisation. Because ABB doesn’t have a superstructure
of bureaucracy, it has no big, slow, lumbering forwards to dominate the game.
Instead, the company is led by the fleetfooted backs, out in the field. The dynamic is
not ‘export-push’ from the (scrum) centre but ‘import-pull’ from the forty-plus
countries in which ABB operates. The optimum size for a manufacturing plant is
regarded as no more than about 300 people. As a result, there is no executive
undergrowth from which to launch an ambush. The kind of in-fighting found in most
big corporations is notably lacking in ABB because there is no place for
skulduggery to take root; everything is in the open. If you have a successful career,
it will probably be because you are effective, not because you male-bonded with all
the other influential top dogs.
Few of the leaders described in these pages are, or were, corporate executives.
The importance of the ABB example is that it shows the possibility of fleetfooted
creatives surviving in big firms. It would be too easy for the executive reader of this
book to write off my individual examples of leadership as harebrained boffins.
Hewlett-Packard and Xerox are two other contemporary examples of big
corporations that have succeeded in keeping the ‘forwards’ at bay and opening up
space for the ‘backs’. Significantly, the late and much lamented founder of H-P,
Dave Packard, was exactly the same kind of product/purpose-driven boffin as I
describe. The famous ‘H-P way’ was always designed to open up possibilities,
encourage ingenuity and make crude careerism a dangerous activity. It is the ternary
principle made flesh because it transcends the people and the products—it is what
the company stands for. Dave Packard hated the bureaucratic careerists and made
sure that the clever scientists, on whom the company depended, had a generous
stake in all the stock schemes.
The Herman Miller corporation, a Michigan-based office furniture
maker/designer, not only limits the bureaucracy, it formally pegs the chief
executive’s salary to twenty times average earnings in the firm. It may sound
generous but it means that the wonderfully witty and approachable Kerm Campbell
earns significantly less than most of his peers in other companies. Nobody in
Herman Miller, Campbell included, would have it otherwise. The effect of this is to
give the whole firm a coherence and integrity, and to reinforce a sense of fairness. I
would guess that all my leaders could flourish in Herman Miller and that is why the
company buzzes. But Herman Miller adopted the ‘Scanlon Plan’ back in the early
1980s. This was the brainchild of Joseph Scanlon of MIT. It was based on the need
to ensure that the precious individual identity of every single member of staff should
be nurtured (against the bureaucracy), that every employee should participate
directly in the company’s decision processes, that the principle of equity should
govern all role relationships (Kerm Campbell’s salary being the most obvious
example), and that the identification and nurturing of competence should govern all
staff deployment, from top to bottom (that principle determined the company’s
employment of only the very best design skills).
In reading my selection of intelligent leadership tales, bear in mind that those I
describe would not survive for long in most big corporations. But bear in mind also
that this is not just a matter of their individual eccentricities, it is also the fault of
organisations dominated by generally well-meaning plodders. Inevitably, such
organisations become happy hunting grounds for amoral careerists. Look at the
terrible things that go on in scrums.
THE FABLE OF THE POLYPLOID HORSE

The ABB Company is a good example of a system reclaiming its natural properties.
Before the coming of the big bureaucracies (mainly in the 19th century) nearly all
organisational systems were shapely and comprehensible. This meant that they had a
human scale and you could stay in touch with the extremities. Before the 19th
century, nearly all economic activity was centred on the household. For most people,
an adequate subsistence depended on a complex of various forms of task work and
wage labour. Regular, full-time employment at a single job was highly unusual. The
viability of the household, which might involve more than one extended family, was
the crucial priority in life and the work of all its members, young and old, had to be
co-ordinated to achieve this end. Very often women were the main money-earners,
either by selling produce at market or by the manufacture of goods (e.g. textiles) at
home. In the late 20th century, we are observing the rapid decline of the sole male
breadwinner engaged in stable, long-term, full-time employment. The era of the full-
time male in bureaucratic employment lasted for less than 200 years. We seem to be
returning to an era of technological cottage work, but without the informal social
support networks that existed in the 17th century.
As a species, we were never very good at managing big bureaucracies and we
didn’t have time to improve or perfect our practice.
In fact, we created organisational monsters which suited only the careerists who
looked after themselves and who never gave a damn about useful purposes. The best
formal organisations contained no more than about 300 people (remember the ABB
optimum) because you could remember all the names and/or faces. Units of this size
were, and are, both efficient and satisfying to work in. They are the natural building
blocks of larger systems. I return to the question of how to build a coherent
organisation on this foundation in Chapter 14. The late Gregory Bateson, in Mind
and Nature, devised the perfect fable to illustrate the naturalness of this scale of
organisation and to illustrate also the perils of unrestrained growth:
They say the Nobel people are still embarrassed when anybody
mentions polyploid horses. Anyhow, Dr P. U. Posif, the great
Erewhonian geneticist, got his prize in the late 1980s for jiggling with
the DNA of the common carthorse (Equus caballus). It was said that he
made a great contribution to the then new science of transportology. At
any rate, he got his prize for creating—no other word would be good
enough for a piece of applied science so nearly usurping the role of
deity—creating, I say, a horse precisely twice the size of an ordinary
Clydesdale. It was twice as long, twice as high, and twice as thick. It
was a polyploid, with four times the usual number of chromosomes.
P. U. Posif always claimed that there was a time, when this wonderful
animal was still a colt, when it was able to stand on its four legs. A
wonderful sight it must have been! But anyhow, by the time the horse
was shown to the public and recorded with all the communicational
devices of modern civilisation, the horse was not doing any standing. In
a word, it was too heavy. It weighed, of course, eight times as much as a
normal Clydesdale.
For a public showing and for the media, Dr Posif always insisted on
turning off the hoses that were continuously necessary to keep the beast
at normal mammalian temperature. But we were always afraid that the
innermost parts would begin to cook. After all, the poor beast’s skin and
dermal fat were twice as thick as normal, and its surface area was only
four times that of a normal horse, so it didn’t cool properly.
Every morning, the horse had to be raised to its feet with the aid of a
small crane and hung in a sort of box on wheels, in which it was
suspended on springs, adjusted to take half its weight off its legs.
Dr Posif used to claim that the animal was outstandingly intelligent. It
had, of course, eight times as much brain (by weight) as any other horse,
but I could never see that it was concerned with any questions
more complex than those which interest other horses. It had very little
free time, what with one thing and another—always panting, partly to
keep cool and partly to oxygenate its eight-times body. Its windpipe,
after all, had only four times the normal area of cross section.
And then there was eating. Somehow it had to eat, every day, eight
times the amount that would satisfy a normal horse and had to push all
that food down an oesophagus only four times the calibre of the normal.
The blood vessels, too, were reduced in relative size, and this made
circulation more difficult and put extra strain on the heart.
A sad beast.
The polyploid horse is an almost perfect metaphor for the overblown

corporation—a monstrosity which just grew, without adapting, from familiar and
homely work systems. Big bureaucracies may have all the brains in the world but
they can’t bring them to bear. Peter Senge, in The Fifth discipline, makes, a similar
point in reverse: if you cut an elephant in half, you don’t get two small elephants—
downsizers please note! The best thing about the small ‘building block’ organisation
is that real talent is always visible and there is no place for the careerists to hide, or
to plot. In the coherent organisation, you can’t lead unless you are obviously
admirable. In fact that is my simplest litmus test for successful leadership: is it
possible to admire the boss? Nine times out of ten, if there is general admiration,
there is practical intelligence at work.
THE PARABLE OF IMO, THE GENIUS MONKEY

Every act of imagination is the discovery of likenesses between two
things which were thought unlike.
Jacob Bronowski
In Mexico, before the wheel was invented, gangs of slaves had to carry
giant stones through the jungle and up the mountains, while their
children pulled their toys on tiny rollers. The slaves made the toys, but
for centuries failed to make the connection.
Peter Brook
This is the first story or cameo of the book, in the form of a parable. We have dealt,
so far, with some of the variables concerning ‘leadership’. We turn here to the link
between leadership and intelligence in order to demonstrate how ingenuity can lead
to widespread social change. Imo the monkey has become famous over the years,
originally as a result of Robert Ardrey’s wonderful work of science popularisation,
The social contract, first published in 1970. Ardrey had learned of the trail-blazing
work of Japanese scientists in studying the behaviour in the wild of large, self-
contained and highly structured monkey societies. The scientists had established the
practice of ‘provisioning’—some of the monkey population’s food needs but
without distorting the natural pattern of foraging in their island habitat. This allowed
the observers to study at first hand, and continuously, the patterns of social
interaction amongst the monkeys and, above all, their learning—the way that
intelligence diffused in the social systems.
Imo excited their attention from the start. When sweet potatoes, which monkeys
love, were placed on the beach of the tiny islet of Koshima, all the monkeys
laboriously picked the grains of sand from the food in order to eat it. It was Imo, just
18 months old, who made the mental connection with the little stream that crossed
the beach not far way. Imo carried the sweet potatoes to the stream and allowed its
fresh waters quickly to wash away the sand. After a while another youngster copied
this method of food preparation and then, after a further period, Imo’s mother did so.
Very slowly the innovation diffused amongst the band, mainly amongst the young,
and within families. The normal pattern was for the young to make the
breakthrough, followed by their mothers, and then for new infants to copy their own
mothers.
Imo was not this particular monkey’s real name but the name attached to it
by the Japanese scientists studying the colony (‘Imo’ means ‘sweet potato’
in Japanese). The monkey’s real name is not known.
The point of the story, for observers of human behaviour in organisations, is that
the clever new ideas never penetrated to the powerful males at the top of the social
hierarchy. They never came into contact with the young. When caramels were
introduced to another band, the pattern was repeated—it took a year and a half for
the innovation to spread from the juniors to half the entire troop. But, in a parallel
experiment, the ‘alpha’ (boss) monkey was induced to try another new and delicious
food—wheat. The alpha female promptly copied him and the entire band of 700
monkeys took to the new food in just Four hours. Why? Because everybody
watches the leader. Nobody much attends to an Imo. By now a mature four-year-old,
Imo devised a method for ‘placer-mining’ the wheat too. Interestingly, the youngest
monkeys had figured out that it made sense to get downstream of Imo, so as to catch
any floating grains that escaped the panning process. Something similar occurs near
the smartest operators in big corporations.
There is, of course, a limit to the applicability of parables from the wild when it
comes to human organisational systems. Nonetheless, all researchers and consultants
understand the usefulness of ‘soft research’—or time spent in the local pub after
work talking informally to junior employees or suppliers. It always turns out that
juniors understand things very well because they are close to the action that
counts—at the front line. They are also invariably very sound on the deficiencies of
their immediate and middle managers. But their overall understanding is likely to be
fragmented because their picture of the system is partial. Those with the big picture,
in the executive suite, usually see things clearly from an intellectual or analytical
standpoint but they often lack the gut-feel understanding.
That is not to say that the human ‘Imos’ of this world could do the work of the
‘alphas’. Those at the top of organisational systems always have years of
accumulated learning about how to wield power. The most powerful people, almost
invariably men, exude a kind of aura. Great actors have this same ability to receive
the psychological projections of other people, and to feed off them in order to
amplify their own projection of power. In the primate kingdom, it is sometimes
referred to as ‘low peripheral movement’, as in the stately progress of the old silver-
backed alpha gorilla at the heart of his band. He is surrounded by movement, but he
demonstrates his power and his confident understanding of the total system (or, if
you prefer, his authority) by his gravitas, and by his steely gaze. All the subordinate
high-rank gorillas are in constant eye-contact with the source of power. Chief
executives and chairmen who have not developed this skill always operate at a
disadvantage and cannot transmit powerful messages quickly.
I frequently tell the story of Imo to executive audiences, in order to make a

simple point about the unpredictability of real talent and the importance of getting
clever people to the top of the system fast so that their impact is amplified. When I
ask people to speculate as to why Imo’s brilliant innovations diffused so slowly, it
generally doesn’t take long to establish that Imo’s status must have been low. From
there it is a short logical step to Imo’s youth. But, even amongst all-female
audiences, Imo goes on being referred to as ‘he’ right down to the wire.
This may tell us something useful about the way in which clever women think
about cleverness. Imo was a political nonstarter not only because she was young but
also because she lacked the ‘attention structure’ surrounding the high-status males.
Lionel Tiger, in his remarkable book, Men in Groups, wrote: ‘That females only
rarely dominate authority structures may reflect the female’s underlying inability—
at the ethological level of “pattern-releasing behaviour”—to affect the behaviour of
subordinates.’ This is a contentious argument, to which we will return in Chapter 11.
Imo’s is a useful establishing story for this book, because it underlines the
relationship between talent and structure. There is no use in having cleverness about
the place unless it is tapped efficiently, and that is primarily a matter of
organisational structure. There are many reasons other than femaleness for the
neglect of talent, but it is without doubt the most spectacular cause of the waste of
intelligence in organisations. This phenomenon is linked with another of Tiger’s
observations about the way that men’s brainpower often seems to drain away when
they get together in groups.
The paragraph in the little boxed aside a couple of pages back is a joke. It
may not be a particularly clever or funny joke, but it is a joke just the same.
The test for the reader is not whether it raises a chuckle but whether it is
perceived as a joke at all. This is an oblique way of introducing the notion
of reframing. To see the joke, you have to be able to connect two frames of
reference or levels of abstraction. ‘Intelligence’ (however you define it) is
linked with this capacity to think at two levels simultaneously. As Forster
wrote: ‘Only connect!’ The model for this particular joke is the true story of
a five-year-old girl interviewed on BBC Radio. When asked the name of

her dog, she replied: ‘I don’t know; we call him Rover!’ This is a seriously
bright kid, able to sustain a dynamic connection between the different
societies of humanity and dogdom. As humans, we can’t know for sure
whether or not dogs assign themselves ‘names’.
As we pass from reflections on ‘leadership’ to reflections on ‘intelligence’ we

can see how Imo’s story ties the two elements together. The Japanese monkey bands
had clear, ‘formal’ and easily observable structures of leadership. Every monkey
knew who the alpha was and, until eventually a new alpha supplanted him, he could
rely on their subservience to him. Not too much energy was wasted in positional
squabbling. And yet, Imo supplied another kind of ‘leadership’—the kind that alters
behaviour directly, because it offers a better way of performing operations that are
important for societal and species survival. The way that those two forms of
leadership interact probably determines the long-term success (survival) of the
system. That is as true for modern corporations as it is for primate bands. The
fundamental test of an organisation structure is whether the flow of ideas goes both
ways—the flow of ideals and purpose from the top, and the flow of practical
ingenuity from the bottom.
When Imo sat down to ponder the sweet potato problem, she did indeed look
thoughtful, just like a small child facing a just hard enough puzzle. Stanley Kubrick
famously captured that moment of primate concentration in his film 2001: A Space
Odyssey. Significantly, in the light of the examples to follow, both monkeys were
holding an object in their hands at the moment of inspiration, and turning it over and
over. Real intellectual power is never just academic or abstracted—there is always
an element of the physical or the spatial. After all, it was solving practical problems
in the real world that made us ‘intelligent’ (i.e. higher-order monkeys) in the first
place. This aspect of intelligence is taken up in the work of Howard Gardner,
discussed in Chapter 2.
Redefining intelligence
Why do we need to look at intelligence from a new angle? The answer is

straightforward—we can see easily, just by reading the newspapers, that when
‘intelligent’ (i.e. highly trained and educationally certified) people come together in
organisations they frequently make ridiculous mistakes. Even if they avoid glaring
mistakes, they often proceed so cautiously as to miss the kind of opportunities that
their juniors (like little Imo) can spot easily. When things go well continuously, over
the years, you can be sure that the organisation is being led intelligently and that
those at the top are intelligent enough to cope with the demands of their work. In
making these judgements, it is always important to keep an eye on the longer term.
A decision in the short term that seems to be intelligent (i.e. to have successful
outcomes) may turn out to have bedded-in the seeds of long-term failure.
Sometimes, intelligent people foresee such outcomes but are unable to explain their
apprehensions to ‘bright’ but narrowly focused colleagues or bosses.
Sometimes those bosses are just dumb, but it is much more likely that they have
taken their collective eyes off the ball. Binary bosses, who are concerned primarily
with personal advantage, spend far too much time eyeing the internal competition,
even though they may be quite bright when at home with the kids, or otherwise
unthreatened. They are distracted—they lose focus and concentration. Ternary
bosses, on the other hand, will be focused on the matter in hand, even though they
risk a knife in the back by ignoring their competitors. They are much more likely to
heed the ideas of a junior ‘Imo’ because they and the junior talk the same language.
Seniority means nothing in the presence of a really fascinating possibility.
There are two particular aspects of intelligence which the next section deals with
in detail, both of them crucial for successful leadership. The first is the concept of
broad-band (or multiple) intelligence. The second is the concept of systems thinking.
Both are involved in the exercise of judgement.
BROAD-BAND INTELLIGENCE
Chapter 9 contains the story of Allan Coman, until recently Director of Bradfield
College in North Sydney. That is the logical point at which to deal with the nature of
intelligence in young people just embarking on life’s work. In that chapter (flick
forward to it by all means) is to be found a fuller account of Howard Gardner’s work
on the nature of intelligence. Whilst Gardner was by no means the first to follow the
path he took, he made an important contribution in extracting from brain-damage
research some very interesting data about multiple ‘intelligences’—capabilities
located in different parts of the human brain. He reckons that there are at least seven
distinctive intellectual capabilities (see Figure 5), and that traditional educationalists
(and job selection panels) are inclined to ignore most of them. The effect of this is to
overeducate and overpromote narrow people—those who are especially practised in
(for example) the logical/mathematical and linguistic capabilities—whilst neglecting
the complementary capabilities of other potentially valuable people. Sometimes the
abilities, careers and lives of such people are blighted by this neglect.
One of the immediate applications of Gardner’s ideas arises in relation to the
‘glass ceiling’ between women and the highest office. The point is that those who
exclude women are not necessarily ‘sexist’ in the precise sense, merely ignorant
about the nature of human intelligence. They may, in good faith, confuse a facility in
Redefining Intelligence 41
• Linguistic: the sort shown in the extreme by poets

• Logical/mathematical: not only displayed in logic and mathematics but in
science generally
• Spatial: the ability to hold in your head a model of the organisation of the
world around you
• Musical
• Bodily/kinaesthetic: the sort shown by, say, dancers; the use of the whole
or parts of the body to fashion some product or performance
• Interpersonal: the awareness of how to get along with others
• Intrapersonal: self-knowledge
Figure 5 Gardner’s seven intelligences
one or two intelligences with the real broad-band McCoy. In Chapter 11, I go into
some depth on the differences between men’s and women’s characteristic areas of
intellectual strength. The suggestion is that the challenge facing all organisations is
not just a matter of being fair to women, or even of introducing a little compassion
into the boardroom, but of shoring up a seriously unbalanced intellectual capability.
One of the reasons why all-male decisions sometimes fail is that they arise from half
a collective brain. Women, for example, are often very good at spotting humbug and
stupidity in men. They are generally much better than men at this. It can be a very
useful skill indeed if you want to avoid expensive blunders.
One of the currently fashionable ideas is that of ‘emotional intelligence’, as
espoused in Daniel Goleman’s recent book of the same name. Goleman, a science
correspondent on the New York Times, draws heavily on Gardner’s work. He argues
that effectiveness has little to do with IQ scores (mostly based on logical reasoning)
and much to do with ‘self-awareness and impulse control, persistence, zeal and self-
motivation, empathy and social deftness’. The ‘intelligences’ Goleman focuses on
are the interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligences. He suggests that American
society and education have succeeded in stunting these capacities and that women
have been the principal victims of their scarcity. He also makes some sensible
suggestions as to how schools might encourage their development.
Goleman has also helped to distinguish between the ability to think clearly about
feelings and the more subtle ability to extract meaning from emotion. He quotes
Gardner as follows:
When I first wrote about personal intelligences I was talking about

emotion, especially in my notion of intrapersonal intelligence—one
component is emotionally tuning in to yourself. It’s the visceral-feeling
signals you get that are essential for interpersonal intelligence. But as it
has developed in practice the theory of multiple intelligences has
evolved to focus more on metacognition—that is, awareness of one’s
own mental processes—rather than on the full range of emotional
abilities.
In my experience, it is often women who become terrified by the mob dynamic of

male-dominated events. The point is that when you are frightened, or angry, or
whatever, it means that you are participating in some kind of emotional interaction.
If you can understand why, or how, you have a good chance of changing things for
the better, either by shifting to calm rationality or, if need be, to another emotional
state that suits you better. These questions are dealt with in more detail in Chapter
14 (Helpful Hint No. 2).
The marshmallow test
I go some way with Goleman but I think that his focus on these two particular
‘intelligences’—the interpersonal and the intrapersonal—masks the importance of
broad-band capability across the entire repertoire of multiple intelligences. However,
there is one aspect of his argument that fits beautifully with the leaders described in
this book. This is based on the well-known ‘marshmallow experiment’. In this
experiment, four-year-old children were offered a tantalising choice—a delicious
marshmallow now or, if they were prepared to wait twenty minutes or so while the
teacher ran an errand, two delicious marshmallows. Then they were left alone.
Fourteen years later, when the children were re-examined, those who had succeeded
in delaying gratification were the socially competent, academically successful
and personally effective ones. The relative failures were invariably those who
had cracked and grabbed the smaller prize sooner. My leaders, to a man and
woman, have an outstanding ability to persevere with what grabs them as
interesting and important. We can only speculate about what causes this but it must
be soldered in very early in life. I don’t believe it is entirely to do with the ‘personal’
intelligences.
The versatility of broad-banders
All the leaders described in this book are broad-banders. They are all ‘bright’ in the
sense of logical thought and clear expression, as you would expect. But they are also
physical people, in the sense that they have a feel for materials, for movement and
for the physical world. Most of them, on the evidence, might have been outstanding
exemplars of a craft, or an art, and they bring to their intellectual work a kind of
earthiness about real, as well as symbolic, things. No matter how abstracted their
work gets, they are impelled to plunge back into the nitty-gritty from time to time.
They never lose touch with the basic materials of their endeavour. Furthermore, they
all combine self-awareness with an acute empathy with other people’s states. This
means that, in Gardner’s terms, they are masters and mistresses of the whole
repertoire of ‘intelligences’.
This versatility affords them two crucial leadership advantages:
1. Versatility in work
It is relatively easy for broad-banders to make connections because their minds have
access to every possible way of thinking or doing. A good technician/boatbuilder
may know how to build and continuously improve the design of big fast catamaran
ferries. But, unless he also understands the psychology of passengers and ferry
operators, he is unlikely to move beyond technical work. If in addition he
understands that the real value to be added in a newly developing field lies in the
logistics of construction, rather than in the more obvious area of design, then he may
be able to create a niche, rather than struggle to compete in an overcrowded field.
Bob Clifford, described in detail in Chapter 7, is a successful leader because he has
made all these connections. His intelligence is broad as well as deep. As Jacob
Bronowski said: ‘Every act of imagination is the discovery of likenesses between
two things which were thought unlike.’
2. Social versatility
It is relatively easy for the broad-bander to relate to all kinds of people and to
understand what those people are trying to say. The person gifted with broad-band
intelligence can be inside the minds of others before they even open their mouths.
Such a person can then easily motivate all kinds of people, for the same reason. It
follows that such people have an advantage when it comes to leading
multidisciplinary and international teams. Howard Gardner is not talking about
national style as such, but it is clear that cultural differences simply reflect different
patterns of thinking and intelligence. Charles Hampden-Turner points out that there
is an important difference between the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ mindset (universalistic
assumptions, analytical thinking habits, individualised social relations, and
favouring achieved status—that is, rewarding people on the basis of measured,
recent performance) and the Asian ‘tiger economy’ mindset (particularistic
assumptions, integrative thinking habits, communitarian social relations, and
favouring ascribed status—rewarding people for their holistic capability and general
usefulness). He suggests that this reflects the domination of the logical/mathematical
or formal science assumption in our culture and education. In that sense, the Asian
cultures are more subtle, or more ‘feminine’.
The intelligent leader, in my terms, is a versatile person with easy access to the
entire repertoire of ‘intelligences’ (see Figure 5). It is not just that entrepreneurs like
Bob Clifford tend to be physical but that great athletes tend to be cerebral, in the
broadest sense. That great Australian, Sir Donald Bradman, was a gifted musician.
At a young age, he could listen just once to a piece played by his sister (later a
professional piano teacher) and immediately play it by ear. At school, he had an
exceptionally early command of writing and excelled in languages. In maths, the
twelve-year-old Don would ‘race the teacher in his mind’ in order to get to the
answer first. (Bob Clifford was supposed to be hopeless at maths but he too could
leap to the right answer in algebra, without knowing for sure how he got there.) My
guess is that the spatial intelligence, neglected by Goleman, is crucial to the success
of people like Clifford. Don Bradman always had what he called an ‘X-ray picture’
of all the field placements before he faced the first ball.
Later on, I will argue that broad-band development is natural for the human
infant and only misguided parenting and schooling can create the imbalance we find
in so many otherwise ‘intelligent’ people. If the parents fail, only really good
schools can take up the slack (see Chapter 9).
I C O
Input Conversion Output
Figure 6 Simple throughput model
SYSTEMS THINKING
Gardner suggests we are probably born with a broad-band mental potential. Any
perceptive primary school teacher can point you to those children who are good at
mathematics, and who also think logically and talk eloquently about quite complex
ideas, and who can draw and sculpt, and who are gifted and graceful athletes or
dancers, and who find musical expression easy and pleasurable, and who relate
easily and assume leadership effortlessly in social settings, and who also possess
composure and thoughtful self-awareness. Such children are obviously fortunate in
their choice of parents. We can safely assume that, whatever their genetic
endowment, they have been continuously stimulated throughout their young lives
and that they also feel secure.
But, however precocious such children may be, you can’t put them in charge of a
big power station. It is not just a matter of their ignorance of technical detail; their
capacity to handle complex information has to develop through many stages before
anything so complicated comes within their range. The capacity for ‘systems
thinking’, however, may be identified and encouraged quite young, and its
development accelerated. Smart parents encourage this sort of thing; most schools
don’t do it at all. Let me illustrate this by describing a personal experience, in a class
of about thirty seven- and eight-year-olds. My intention, with the nervous
permission of the teacher, was to test the hypothesis that all kids are natural systems
thinkers but most of their access to the subject is blocked by the forms and structures
of ‘education’.
I started with a very simple description of ‘open-system’ theory—how inputs get
converted into useful outputs, illustrated by reference to the human body—food,
energy, mobility, productive activity and waste products (see Figure 6). The
last made the teacher a bit more nervous but, allowing a few giggles, it was very
easy for the children to understand. We then shifted to the classroom TV set as an
input-conversion-output system. The electricity input was easy—you could see the
flex leading from the power point; the program input was trickier but somebody
remembered the aerial outside. We then went upstream to the electric power station,
via the grid, and ultimately to the mine, oil well or gas field feeding energy source
material into the power station. It got really interesting at the TV output stage,
because that was simultaneously the input to our consciousness as viewers. At one
point the actress Joan Collins appeared on the screen. One little girl said: ‘That’s
Joan Collins!’ I said (touching the screen): ‘It can’t be—this is cool and she’d be
warm!’ We then all agreed that it wasn’t really the actress but some kind of
representation of her. It turned out that one of the little boys knew all about cathode-
rays, so he gave us all a brief lecture which left me miles behind.
We also spent some time on how we could know that a pattern of lines and dots
on a flat, two-dimensional surface was actually a three-dimensional actress. They
figured out that we must have some kind of source material, on what actresses look
like generally, stored in our memories, otherwise the image wouldn’t mean anything
to us. We also drew some pictures of the human eye as a gateway subsystem linked
to the brain (where the files on what actresses look like must be kept). By this time
we were getting, effortlessly, into the territory of first-year university psychology
lectures on perception. The high point, speaking as a writer, occurred when we
tracked upstream, via studios and producers, to the real sources of programs.
Somebody has to write the material, so where do the ideas come from? Some of the
boys were quite sophisticated about ideas churning about in heads and occasionally
making creative connections. This was reminiscent of Bronowski’s notion (cited
above) of new ideas as connections between old ideas. But it was another little girl
who took us even further upstream. ‘The ideas come from God!’, she announced,
and that was regarded as good enough for our purposes. Starting with a simple,
open-system view of a TV set, we had ended up, in about half an hour (and via a bit
of physics and the psychology of perception) with theology. Not bad for seven-year-
olds.
There are two particular things to be said about this demonstration of
effortless systems thinking amongst the young. The following statements don’t
contradict; they overlap.
1. Everybody is (potentially) good at systems thinking.

All the children participated in this exploration. The teacher confessed that she could
think of no other activity in the school year that so completely engrossed the entire
class. Her conclusion was that all the children were quite good at this kind of
thinking, but that the regular curriculum (chopped up into adult-logic boxes called
subjects) left little room for this sort of thing. The point is that this capacity to
understand connections in systems is widely dispersed. Given the chance, just about
anybody can do it, preferably with friends. It is worth noting that this was an easy
one-off for an outsider; teachers have to keep the show on the road day after day. It
is also important to acknowledge that many teachers and many schools routinely do
this sort of thing, especially in the nursery and primary sectors. It tends to peter out
in the later stages of education, which is a tragedy. Einstein said: ‘It is nothing short
of a miracle that modern methods of instruction have not yet entirely extinguished
the holy spirit of curiosity!’
2. Some people are precociously good at systems thinking (right from the start).
Having acknowledged that systems thinking is natural for humans, unless it is
artificially stunted, it is also proper to point out that some of the children in this
particular class were precocious in their ability to zoom backwards and forwards
along chains of cause and effect, and to understand how some activities are
subsystems of larger systems. All the kids were good but a few were very good. This
sort of capacity, I believe, is the core of later, adult, ability to exercise judgement
and leadership. I call it intellectual firepower (for want of a better description)
because it involves handling and sorting more data, just like a computer with bigger
capacity and greater speed. It is not the only skill or capability that leaders need, but
it is the sine qua non—the bottom line, if you prefer. My assumption is that the
precocious kids, given a good following wind, will be difficult to catch up with later
in life, provided they continue to be stimulated by adults they respect, and provided
they are not psychologically damaged by life. Precocity is self-feeding.
SYSTEMS THINKING AND JUDGEMENT

This excursion to the schoolroom has a purpose. We are trying to redefine
‘intelligence’ in a practical and useful way. We are not here concerned with the
narrow forms of cleverness sometimes found in academic institutions, unless the
cleverness involves systems thinking. As Professor R. W. Revans avers, that narrow
sort of cleverness is good for solving puzzles, not for cracking problems. We are
interested in the capacity for judgement. All the well-known books about leader-ship
stress the importance of judgement, but they all have difficulty in saying what
exactly it is. I share that difficulty. On the other hand, as Chapter 14 explains, some
people are very good indeed at identifying other people with good judgement, as
their track record over many years proves.
My working definition of judgement (adapted from my colleague Gillian
Stamp’s definition) is, my friends tell me, singularly unhelpful. On the other hand,
all of the chief or very senior executives I have worked with over the years tell me
that they understand it:
JUDGEMENT IS WHAT YOU DO WHEN YOU DON’T (AND CAN’T) KNOW WHAT
TO DO
(but you sense you have to do something—fast!)
The corollary is: If it is possible to assemble all the data required to make an
absolutely cast-iron case for one particular decision, then there is obviously no need
for an executive or manager to exercise authority at that point. If the data assemble
themselves, the sooner the executive is replaced by a machine the better. A second
corollary is that if all the data can be assembled, given all the time in the world, then
there can’t be any competitors breathing down corporate necks. The essence of
sound decision-making is timeliness. If a thing is worth doing, it’s worth doing
badly (just well enough for the purpose)—but in time.
One of my acquaintances is a very clever Irish entrepreneur, a millionaire several
times over, who is famed for moving fast in turbulent markets. I tried to pin him
down once on the question of how he took so many decisions that turned out to be
right in hindsight. He took me around the houses, with much talk of market research,
staff work, strategy reviews, and all the rest of it. He confessed in the end that, after
all the staff work was done and redone, ‘I consult the leprechauns ‘. He explained
Certainty
Timely decision-point
Time
Gut-feel
Figure 7 The anatomy of timely decision-making

Effective executives, at full stretch, should be under time pressure. Good
judgement means that a sound decision can be taken fast, before the solution
is obvious. The decision works its way up from ‘gut-feel’ to an intellectual
rationalisation. It has usually reached about gullet level when the time comes
for the decisive executive to decide.
this in the following terms. As a young man he had confronted many decision-points
where his data were pointing in direction A and his instincts, or gut-feel, were
pointing in direction B. Every time he had taken the A route it turned out to be
wrong. Once he learned to run with his ‘feel’ for the situation, he began to make
serious money.
We discussed this at length in order to try to understand what it was telling us
about the exercise of judgement. The best we could do was that, at the point in time
that the decision had to be taken, the rationale for the decision was still working its
way up from the ‘gut’ to the prefrontal lobe of the brain, but it wasn’t there yet.
After the event, it was always possible to backtrack in order to unpick the logic of
the decision. At the time, there was never the time. (For the anatomy of this process
see Figure 7.) Other people saw the process as magic or ‘intuition’, or called him a
‘genius’. People with good judgement simply move faster because they can compute
more in a given time frame. In the chapter on Bob Clifford, boatbuilder
extraordinary, he reveals an insight he grasped as a young helmsman: ‘In sailing,

every decision has a time-frame—in ten minutes, it’s a different decision!’ In real
life, you can’t go back and run it again the way you might at business school.
This ability to think quickly is a function of intellectual firepower. But we are
not talking just about computing power. All the best leaders do things on the basis of
‘feel’ and by encompassing the whole picture, even though many of the necessary
bits aren’t yet in place. They are not just computing fast from one angle but making
a kind of mosaic from a broad range of different views. Bob Clifford envisions each
new ferry design long before the detailed donkey-work begins. He does it mostly
sitting in aircraft. The link with the arts is obvious. Mozart described the act of
composition as follows:
First bits and crumbs of the piece come together and gradually join
together in my mind; then, the soul getting warmed to the work, the
thing grows more and more, and I spread it out broader and clearer, and
at last it gets almost finished in my head, even when it is a long piece, so
that I can see the whole of it at a single glance in my mind, as if it were
a beautiful painting or a handsome human being; in which way I do not
hear it in my imagination at all as a succession—the way it must come
later—but all at once as it were. It is a rare feast. All the inventing and
making goes on in me as in a beautiful strong dream. But the best of all
is the hearing of it all at once.
It doesn’t help us much to say that Mozart was a ‘genius’. We do know that he
was always precocious—performing at five years of age feats that most musicians
struggle to attain in their maturity. We can argue instead that he was a person of
extraordinary mental firepower, with a strong leaning towards the ‘musical
intelligence’. He was, in short, very bright.
In Chapter 6, I describe ‘Stratified Systems Theory’, Elliott Jaques’ trailblazing
analysis of the relationship of hierarchical structure to human judgement. Once you
home in on ‘judgement’ as the core of the successful leader’s skill, then you are
forced to consider structure—the way in which people of different capacities and in
different roles relate to each other. It doesn’t matter how clever you are if you aren’t
positioned for effectiveness. Even Mozart needed positioning—in fact he was, like
all my examples, an energetic and skilful self-promoter.
The frog and the bicycle:
looking at systems
Before we move on to our first human leader, we need to pull together a few
threads—in particular the linked concepts of leadership, judgement, systems
thinking and broad-band capability. Leaders are responsible for pointing systems in
intelligent directions. It is true that in order to achieve this they have to be
persuasive, but this doesn’t really distinguish the successful leader. We all need to
be persuasive sometimes, especially when we are engaged in parenting, or in
wheedling something we want out of parents. ‘The sine qua non of leadership lies in
the capacity to change and shift systems. That means, of course, understanding
systems. The helpful thing about the metaphor of the frog and the bicycle is that it
simultaneously addresses each of the aspects outlined above, and especially the
connection between system leadership and intelligence. Bikes and frogs are different
kinds of systems and the capacity to distinguish between them is the kind of
intelligence that really matters. There is nothing new about this way of approaching
systems thinking—it is merely a whimsical way of readdressing an old issue.
However, children love it, which seems to be quite good enough a reason for airing
it in these pages. The frog/bike metaphor is, however, directly linked with Professor
Jaques’ method of assessing levels of capacity to exercise judgement (referred to in
Chapters 6 and 14).
Figure 8 The bicycle and the frog: a basic metaphor
All of the foregoing metaphors for leadership (the binary/ternary, the

physics/chemistry, the rugby scrum, the polyploid horse) lead up to the bicycle and
the frog (Figure 8). The reason for this is that, for some reason I don’t fully
understand, this particular metaphor seems to mean a great deal to Australian
audiences. I refer to it from time to time in different places around the world, but
only in Australia, and in the last three or four years, has it taken off as a powerful
explanatory tool. That is why I give it pride of place here. It may be that the
metaphor speaks directly to the sense of underdog rooted in Australian history
(clever and resourceful people transported to the colonies for fighting back against
thoughtless injustice) or to the perceived stranglehold of closely networked, but not
necessarily clever, men over corporate life. Women in particular find the frog/bike
idea enlightening, maybe because it makes systems thinking simpler and less
convoluted—less like physics.
The essential difference between the frog and the bicycle, viewed as systems, lies
in the relationship of the parts to the whole. You can take a bicycle completely to
pieces on your garage floor, clean and oil every single part, and reassemble the lot,
confident that the whole thing will work perfectly, as a bike, as before. The frog is
different. Once you remove a single part, the entire system is affected
instantaneously and unpredictably, for the worse. What’s more, if you go on
removing bits the frog will make a series of subtle, but still unpredictable,
adjustments in order to survive. This sort of system, at a level beneath
consciousness, wants to survive and will continue for an astonishing length of time
to achieve a rough equilibrium as bits are excised—until it can do so no
The Frog and the Bicycle 53
longer. At that point, again quite unpredictably, the whole system will tip over into
collapse. The frog is dead and it won’t help to sew the parts back on.
Why is this distinction important? There are a number of reasons why the
metaphor is useful. Most big organisational systems contain bikish and frogish
bits—that is, bikish parts which can be hived off and reattached in a new way
without harming the overall system, and froggish parts which really are part of the
core process. If you remove them, you damage the whole. A famous example is the
British Minister of Transport Ernest Marples’ decimation of British Rail, which
closed down all the parts of the network that didn’t (viewed as discrete systems)
make money. The problem with this was that many of the smaller branch lines fed
the big system. You couldn’t understand their contribution in isolation. In fact some
of the branch lines didn’t feed the network enough traffic and were rightly closed
down. Others really were froggish and their loss hurt not only the big railway frog
but also the even bigger community frog served by those trains. The social and
financial cost of that was enormous but, because that cost showed up elsewhere and
later (on somebody else’s balance sheet), Marples could ignore it. I apologise for the
British example—it simply demonstrates the bike/frog distinction perfectly.
The use of the frog as metaphor reinforces the point that most complex systems,
and all those containing and serving people, have ‘natural’ properties. Effective
management aligns itself with natural flows and processes, and helps them along.
Bad or dogmatic management tries to shoehorn the system into shape according to
more or less crackpot management theories, and usually distorts and confuses
things. Nowadays, many of the crackpot ideas encourage mindless competitiveness
and limit the human instinct to collaborate across boundaries. The aim is always to
‘drive out cost’ from the various, and separate, bits of a bicycle. The problem is that
separate cost-cutting exercises can weaken the integrity of the big frog. This won’t
be evident to the disembodied cost-cutters. If their minds are wired up in a bicycle
sort of way, they can see, at the COMPONENT level of operation, that they are
making an improvement. Usually it is the customers, as time passes, who begin to
sense that, at the SYSTEM level of operation, the whole frog is weakening. That is
the essence of the difference between the component and total system levels (see
Figure 9). The bike approach is concerned only with the what—the functionality of
Figure 9 Improving systems operation

Intelligent leaders understand that complex systems are more like frogs than
like bikes. You can disassemble a bicycle completely, clean and oil all the
separate parts, and reassemble it confident that it will work as before. Frogs
are different. The moment you remove any part, all the rest of the system is
affected instantly, in unpredictable ways, for the worse. Binary ‘leaders’, and
quite a few management consultants too, really do think that complex
organisational systems will respond to the bicycle treatment. They think you
can get a realistic picture of the total system by simply aggregating its
component parts. They are not wicked, just dim.
internally consistent subsystems. Frogs are determined by their environment—the

intelligent total systems question is not what or how, but why?
LIES, DAMNED LIES AND THE TYRANNY OF

MEASUREMENT
‘If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it! ‘This has become a mantra of the
bicycle approach to complex systems. It makes perfect sense if you have no feel for
the whole frog. We are surrounded by ‘performance measures’ which break up
systems into operational subsets, each of which has to be measured according to
some yardstick or other. The yardsticks are usually dreamed up by the same bicycle
thinkers who believe that when you put it all together again it will make some kind
of sense.
W. Edwards Deming, the arch apostle of statistical process control, must be
turning in his grave. He understood better than anyone that the things that really
matter, like love, generosity, trust, courage, integrity and happiness, resist
calibration. For Deming, measurement of the key variables was always a servant of
learning. In order to figure out what the key variables are you need wisdom and a
good feel for the whole frog. Unfortunately for some economics, most economists
are bicycle thinkers. The usual blunt tools like world market share, or the balance of
payments, can’t tell you if there has been a permanent improvement in growth
prospects or economic welfare. Your personal trainer can measure if your
diet/exercise regime has improved your general fitness and reduced your weight. He
can’t predict your actual performance in a competitive contest. In an economy
characterised by distrust, the purpose of measurement is not to learn but to apportion
responsibility and blame.
Spike Milligan once dreamed up a sketch which showed him sitting in a blizzard
in his bathing costume. Somebody remonstrated with him: ‘You’ll freeze!’ Spike:
‘No I won’t—look at the thermometer!’ ‘But you’ve got it in boiling water!’ Spike:
‘Of course—otherwise I’d freeze!’ That isn’t much sillier than some of the examples
of daft measurement that have come to light around the world recently. Business
schools, for example, are generally rated according to research standards. If the
research assessments are to be made shortly, there is not much you can do to get
existing staff to churn out papers fast. What you can do is hire people with enormous
research CVs on generous short-term contracts, thus transforming your rating
overnight. You may destabilise other schools’ faculties, but that is their frog, not
yours. The actual capability or usefulness of the new entrant is an irrelevance; the
statistics have been satisfied.
When British Rail became subject to strict performance targets, its managers,
who are not stupid, quietly lengthened journey times and redefined the word ‘late’ to
mean more than five or ten minutes late. When performance measures entered the
Health Service, hospitals started the waiting list clock ticking not from the first
request for an appointment but from the much later appointment booking. The more
intelligent the management the more devious will be the distortion of actual
performance to make the statistics look good. The tail wags the dog. Once the
performance measures are in place (pretending to be the same thing as actual

performance), the operatives are relieved, to some extent, of the need to exercise
judgement. Once that is achieved, you can start to hire cheap, low-capacity staff on
part-time, short-term contracts and scrimp on the training. After a while, the
passengers and the patients will find these people frustrating or infuriating,
especially if they have have been given a spell in charm school, but the statistics are
bound to ‘prove’ that there has been an ‘improvement’.
This problem crops up in an acute form in the measurement of people. One
senior government official, remarking on the drive for ‘competencies’ amongst
senior staff, said: ‘The problem is the people going for the MBAs are the no-
hopers!’ Any person possessed of good judgement will assess capability holistically,
sizing up the whole person and relating that to the complex setting in which work
has to be done. It is a good idea to have at least one of these people on selection
panels, even if everybody else is selecting or promoting according to tick-sheet
formulae. Deming saw measurement as the servant of intelligent leadership. We are
in danger of installing measurement instead of leadership.
In 1995 the Kent police, subject to new performance measures, took things to
their ‘logical’ conclusion. The ‘clear-up rate’ showed a rapid and startling
improvement in the county of Kent. (Once you introduce ‘performance pay’ to a
public service you really do motivate an improvement in the statistics.) The police
had worked out that if you stop defining a whole range of misdemeanours (like
mugging) as ‘crimes’ then the clear-up rate improves immediately. Actual
convictions can be measured accurately; so the rate is improved if the number of
crimes (versus convictions) diminishes. The real ‘productivity gain’ occurred when
the police worked out that if you could persuade a cooperative villain (in the
slammer for some crime or other and interested in remission of some of his
sentence) to own up to another couple of hundred crimes, the ratio of crimes to
‘clear-ups’ could be transformed overnight. We are back to Spike Milligan.
The most spectacular recent example of the statistical tail wagging the dog (or
the frog, if you insist) was II Sorpassa—the exciting moment in the late 1980s when
the Italian economy overtook the British, rendering Italy the fifth largest economy in
the world. This was achieved by including estimates for the famous Italian ‘black
economy’ in the official statistics. Overnight, the economy ‘grew’ by a sixth.
THE RAILWAY FROG

Railway systems, because they are complicated, always provide a good example of
the way in which component parts relate to the whole. For example, there is no
special problem in hiving off the maintenance and renewal of railway track to
competing specialist engineering firms, provided you hang on to a core of expertise
to protect yourself from exploitation. American railways did this a long time ago,
and quite right too. Maintenance and renewal are components and therefore similar
to parts of a bike. But the splitting of pathway provision (signalling) and train
running into two separate organisations (to promote ‘competition’) merely creates
the need for two sets of people to do the same job in order to ensure that neither
cheats the other. This also tends to enrich lawyers, which is never a good idea. There
are a number of quite simple ways of measuring the natural interconnections of
system parts in order to arrive at sensible decisions about how to organise things.
Train running and pathway provision can be shown to be inextricably connected,
like the organs of a frog. People who understand this are usefully intelligent. Those
who don’t, however well qualified, are not safe to leave in charge of a model train
set.
The British used to have very nearly the most efficient and cost-effective railway
system in the world, even though its performance was distorted by chronic
underinvestment from World War II onwards. Foreigners were astonished at how
much was squeezed from so little, especially in the few years immediately prior to
privatisation. By that time it had become remarkably competitive, internationally
speaking. Most people who have any experience of what used to be called ‘British
Rail’, even those with bad experience, sense that it is essentially a big frog. If you
buy a ticket from ‘the railway’ at Land’s End in the southwest corner, you expect to
be able to entrain to John O’Groats at the northern tip of Scotland. You may be
vaguely aware of passing through regional zones and you don’t imagine that the
same train or the same driver will take you all the way (he will probably have a wife
and kids located somewhere or other). You do, however, assume that somebody will
have given some thought to interconnections. But you would regard it as ludicrous,
in the confines of such a small island, to have to buy a raft of tickers from a series of
smallish monopoly railway journey suppliers up and down the country. But that is
just what the British Government has achieved, in the interests of ‘competition’.
The point is that transport in Britain is a function of scale and topography—the
natural environmental system. The United States and, especially, Australia are
another matter. If you weaken the frog by removing its parts (as if it were a bicycle),
you merely strengthen its natural predators—private cars, buses and aircraft. The
fantasy is that competition between smallish, route-based railway companies is
feasible, as between airlines. If you submit the subject to systems thinking, it quickly
becomes clear that the pathway systems are different in important ways—for
example, if a train gets into the wrong place and keeps rolling, in the end it must
bump into something. ‘Near misses’ in the air happen all the time but the truth is
that it is very difficult for aircraft to collide, because there is so much air up there
and pilots can change direction almost instantly. This is a great advantage. The
parallel disadvantage is that you can’t stop or slow down up there. From the
economic standpoint, airlines have the huge advantage over railways that they are
not obliged at great cost to maintain the air through which they travel. Once you
dissect a railway system, the predators upon railway operators immediately get the
upper hand. After that, the frog has had it. To survive, disembodied railway
operators then have to cut services and raise prices, thus hastening their own demise.
However, there is still hope for the disembodied railway operator in a country
like Britain. With luck, he may obtain the franchise to run trains in a heavily loss-
making area. This franchise will normally involve a big public subsidy, for social
reasons. This is a much more convenient arrangement than having to fight with bona
fide competitors for customers. The money thus flows directly from the taxpayer to
the operator, without the tiresome interposition of the railway traveller. The train
operator, provided by government with a (say) seven-year monopoly, has no
incentive to invest in the longer term well-being of his disembodied bit of the
system. The logical thing for him to do is sweat the assets he inherits and flog the
rolling stock to death. Probably, somebody else will inherit his clapped-out
equipment. All this is bad news for the local manufacturer of rolling stock,
who could, in the meantime, be preserving local jobs and fostering local technology
development. In truth, that train manufacturer was part of an international frog,
sustained in the battle for export business (in a real market) by home sales.
BIKES, FROGS, COCKUPS AND CONSULTANTS

These are easily scored points and it would be wrong to deny that most big,
centralised, public sector bureaucracies around the world desperately needed
reforming. But most of them were bikes too, operating within rigidly bounded
compartments and largely insulated from user experience. The frog/bike metaphor
doesn’t require us to choose between frog and bicycle—merely to recognise the
essential nature of systems. Some systems really are bikish. Railways simply
provide a near-perfect example of the frog/bike principle in action. But this is a book
about intelligent leadership and we have to ask: what is going on in the minds of
those politicians, executives and consultants who have spent the last ten years or so
dismembering organisational frogs (in the name of ‘re-engineering’ and
privatisation) in the genuine but misguided belief that they are really bicycles? If we
wish to act intelligently on the system, we need to decide early on whether we are
dealing with cockup or conspiracy. Are these people mad, or bad, or just dumb? The
fix, if there is one, has to depend on accurate diagnosis.
No systems analysis of modern leadership can neglect the impact of the
worldwide management consultancy trade. In some systems (national railway
systems may be a good example) it looks very much as though it is actually the
consultants, rather than the government ministers, who are doing the governing. It is
the consultancies that have a long-term and global perspective. Most politicians are
not around for long and most have a narrow perspective on events. They are rarely a
match for the consultancies. A conspiracy theory would suggest that the big
consultancies that make so much money from promoting re-engineering and
privatisation projects around the world know perfectly well that much of it makes
no sense at all for consumers of services—or for the communities in which they
live. It simply makes a great deal of commercial sense for the consultancies
to persuade governments that the organisms they know to be frogs are really
bicycles, and then to negotiate a contract to take them to pieces. The beauty of this is
that the bicycle treatment is bound to make any complex (froggish) system sicker,
thus ensuring even more therapeutic work for the consultants to do in the future. It
would certainly be the intelligent thing for the international consultancy firms to get
together in order to divide up the global spoils without too much messy competition.
That would add up to a global collusion conspiracy theory.
There is an alternative theory which combines conspiracy and cockup theories. It
might be that the top dog consultant/partners are old and wise enough to understand
all this, but the junior consultants, who carry through the schemes and cope with the
angst of the victims, are still naive enough to believe that the bicycle treatment will
work. If they started their professional lives in accountancy, it is possible that they
will go on believing that frogs are bikes indefinitely. Once signs of wisdom begin to
manifest themselves (in the form of doubt) the younger consultants can be kicked
upstairs into the partnership and manacled with gold. In the old days, before the big
computer hardware firms got ruinously top-heavy, this was what happened to senior
salesmen who learned, from repeated experiences, that the promised benefits of big
schemes never materialised. They got kicked upstairs just as wisdom threatened to
cut in.
SYSTEMS THINKING AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

The metaphor of the frog and the bicycle is essentially about intelligence—about
ways of thinking about systems. But it has the uncomfortable effect of drawing in
ethics. The sad truth is that, throughout history, human beings have demonstrated a
terrifying capacity to believe almost anything, provided their motivation to do so
(especially fear or greed) is strong enough. We have to remember that the broad
mass of one of the most educated (but frightened and resentful) populaces in the
world came to accept much of the Nazi gobbledegook. Robert Lifton, in The Nazi
Doctors, reminds us that nearly all the death camp doctors (professionals to a man)
came to believe that they were being victimised by the very people upon whom they
performed nauseating experimental operations.
You may say: ‘That is crazy!’ In truth, the other way madness lies. If
you couldn’t come to believe something of the kind, you really would go crazy
with guilt and remorse. The victimisation fantasy is not only convenient but
necessary. This is only an extreme example of the human being’s almost limitless
capacity for self-deception when the conditions are right. We can come to believe
almost anything, in small progressive steps, and in empathy with likeminded others,
when it suits us to do so. If we need to believe that a frog is a bike, then we are
capable of doing so. It isn’t a question of cockup or conspiracy, but a subtle blend of
both. We get the conspiracy we unconsciously desire by remaining naive enough to
participate in the cockup. True leadership is about clarity and truth. If you are brave
enough to confront people with the truth, watch out—especially if they are
collectively, but unconsciously, deluding themselves about something shameful.
They will need to dispose of you in some way and, scarier still, they will effortlessly
and quite unconsciously supply a justification for their actions. They have to.
Anybody in any doubt about this should read Gitta Sereny’s magisterial account,
Albert Speer: His Battle With Truth. This shows, with brutal clarity, how even the
most intelligent of men may park uncomfortable mental material in the
subconscious, especially when ambition is involved. Speer was clever, certainly, but
he had been emotionally damaged by an otherwise privileged childhood. He craved
attention and success to a pathological degree. Hitler supplied him with both. Speer
understood sooner than any other member of the Hitler entourage that the war was
lost but still he could not break the Faustian pact with Der Fuhrer. That meant
somehow not noticing the death camps and the genocide of the Jews. How can we
describe such a man as ‘intelligent’, no matter how clever?
At a less cataclysmic level, I faced a morally equivalent challenge not long ago. I
had the opportunity to sit in on the deliberations of some of the most senior tobacco
barons in the world. I guess that if I had exercised ‘leadership’ by stating what I took
to be the truth I might not have got out of the place alive. The worldwide tobacco
business is very much an interconnected, and malevolent, frog—a sort of cane toad.
However, in order for an individual to flourish within the system, and to live with
himself, it is necessary to chop it up into mental compartments—like a bicycle sub-
assembly. At this particular meeting, the executives’ formulation of task took the
following form: ‘The timely exploitation of an eighteen-month window of marketing
opportunity in the CIS and the Middle East.’ Put like that, it sounds almost cosy. As
I listened to the debate, I formulated the true primary task of the total
system: the timely replacement of deceased ex—consumers by young Third World

women! That is the kind of clear formulation you arrive at as a result of methodical
systems thinking—not everybody wants to face the reality.
How then do we define ‘intelligent leadership’ in the tobacco trade these days—
achieving higher and higher profits, or, in manageable steps, bringing about its
demise? You could say that the characteristic of ‘bicycle thinking’ is to deal
separately with the components of systems. The characteristic of ‘frog thinking’ is to
embrace the entire system in all its subtlety and complexity. Frog thinkers can
always handle bike thinking (about components) when they have to. Bike thinkers
generally can’t get their brains round the whole frog (system). Of course, they don’t
know that this is the case and you can’t explain it to them. Some of them are
politicians and government ministers.
PART II
A gallery of intelligent leaders
A Gallery of Intelligent Leaders 65
We move shortly to our major case studies. The story of Sir William Hudson of the
Snowy Mountains Scheme, which comes next, pulls together some of the threads
examined so far. The logic looks something like this: Successful LEADERSHIP
depends on a variety of capacities but, above all, on the exercise of sound
JUDGEMENT (getting it right most of the time). The exercise of judgement in
complex circumstances depends absolutely on the capacity for SYSTEMS
THINKING, something we can all do but at which certain people already excel at a
young age. For the purposes of this book, we are defining INTELLIGENCE as this
capacity to exercise judgement under pressure, in systems, not as the ability to pass
exams or write clever memos. Those who prove successful in this turn out, for the
most part, to be possessors of BROAD—BAND capability (remember Professor
Gardner’s taxonomy). They can not only think straight, they can do things well.
Sir William Hudson demonstrates the point beautifully, as do, in their own ways,
the others presented. These leaders are a mixed bunch. Most of them are Australian,
but I have included some magnificent non-Australians, or honorary Australians,
where deserved. What they all have in common is the capacity to illustrate what I
want to say about the connections between intelligence and leadership.
66
This does not mean that they cover the leadership waterfront, nor that they
represent any kind of balanced picture.
Here is a dramatis personae arranged in overall order of appearance. Each
character is listed under a heading that summarises his or her role in the narrative.
We have met the first of them already.
1. INGENUITY AND POWER

The parable in the story of the monkey called ‘IMO’ demonstrates how important it
is to have clever people at the top of pecking orders, and how very frustrating and
wasteful it is to neglect, through incomprehension, talent at or near the bottom of
systems. Imo stands for all those junior people who can see dangers or cockups
looming but can’t get it into the thick skulls of their superiors.
2. DIRECT LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL PRIDE

The story of SIR WILLIAM HUDSON, first Commissioner of the Snowy
Mountains Scheme, and my first proper ‘boss’, is an example of ‘direct’ leadership-
where the leader’s impact is felt mainly through his actions. The story illustrates the
ternary principle rather well, both as to Hudson’s approach to work and as to the
importance of work that is actually useful. It also suggests that maturity, and the
public service ethos have something to be said for them in these times of greedy
corporate juvenile delinquents.
3. JUDGEMENT AND THE MENTOR

Hudson’s alter ego was the postwar Federal Minister of Works and Housing,
NELSON LEMMON (introduced in the Hudson chapter). It was his capacity for
judgement, exercised against the odds, that got Hudson for the nation. As the central
theme of this book is the exercise of judgement, Lemmon is rightly included here as
an unsung hero in the Australian story. He became Hudson’s friend and mentor
throughout the life of the Snowy Mountains Scheme, long after he left public life.
4. INDIRECT LEADERSHIP AND THE THREAT OF

BRIGHT IDEAS
This is a companion story to Hudson’s, but it concerns an indirect leader–one whose
impact arises from ideas rather than from action. MARY PARKER FOLLETT, the
great American management thinker, blazed like a comet in the 1920s and 1930s,
then fell from view almost completely. Why? Her story demonstrates how difficult it
is for a solitary woman in any field to exercise effective or lasting leadership. It also
shows what happens when really penetrating insights threaten the established order.
The stories of Hudson and Follett are the main establishing stories for this book.
Between them they exemplify some of the main themes. The reader should be
warned that these first two accounts are not meant to be direct examples of the
images and metaphors employed in Chapters 1–3. Leadership is more complicated
than that. The later stories come closer to illustrating those themes.
5. THE MOST INTELLIGENT ‘DUNCE’ IN

AUSTRALIA
The contemporary story of BOB CLIFFORD, founder and head of Incat, the
Tasmanian manufacturer of big, fast aluminium ferries, shows clearly how formal
education often fails to build on native intelligence. This story introduces one of the
book’s recurrent themes–the crucial importance for any nation to get its education
system right. It is also an example of a direct leader whose indirect impact on an
entire economy and society is profound.
6. RECOGNITION OF PATTERNS IN WAR AND

BUSINESS
ROBERT KEEP is another contemporary Australian ‘leader’ whose story
demonstrates the importance of perseverance when it comes to indirect leadership
by ideas. If his enterprise, which concerns the patterns of currency market
behaviour, fulfils its promise it will transform the character of those markets. This
would be an example of transformational indirect leadership. In this case, we have a
prior ‘dry run’ story of pattern-recognition under fire in the Vietnam war to show
how broad-band intelligence is formed over time.
68
7. NURTURING LEADERSHIP AND INTELLIGENCE

ALLAN COMAN is an educator of genius–one of those rare people who not only
understand the learning process but who also know how to mould institutions to
make learning natural, useful and easy. His is the key leadership story for this book
in the sense that all the other leaders described are people not stunted by their formal
education. There would be many more such people if all the educators were like
Allan Coman.
8. FIENDISH INGENUITY
‘SPANSKY’ and ‘JAMIE’ are pseudonyms for two real-life young tearaways, one
British the other Australian, who demonstrated unusual managerial gifts. (They are
introduced in the Coman chapter.) Unfortunately, both were forced to exercise their
ingenuity against established authority. They provide an excellent illustration of
Howard Gardner’s theory of ‘multiple intelligences’. They were clever all right, but
not at the things their teachers and parents wanted. Their speciality was subversion.
9. THE ‘INTRAPRENEUR’–OR BIG COMPANY

‘IMO’
Inevitably, most of the characters in this book come across as ‘mavericks’. This says
less about the personalities involved than about the social antibodies manufactured
by big organisations. JOHN LATHAM is an example of a maverick who stuck it out
in one of the biggest corporations in the world-the once mighty IBM-and came close
to saving the company’s soul. He combines the talents of the foregoing–the derring-
do of Clifford, the spymaster guile of Keep, and the almost paternal concern for
juniors of Coman. But he was still an ‘Imo’–able to perceive patterns where his
seniors could not.
10. BUILDING VALUE OUT OF RELATIONSHIPS

LIZ O’SHAUGHNESSY is the first of two examples of ‘relationship companies’
led by women. The fact that her organisation makes (superb) airline puddings is
neither here nor there. The point is that companies like hers show the way forward
to a new kind of enterprise (characterised by balance) and a new model of

leadership.
11. ART AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP–THE

IMPORTANCE OF ‘METHOD’
NOEL WAITE helped to release the energy and creativity of Liz O’Shaughnessy
and hundreds like her. How this was achieved has as much to do with the disciplines
of art and craft as with the orthodoxies of ‘business management’. If it were the case
that the key to all this lay in the infant Noel Waite watching, absorbed, as her father
lovingly crafted men’s suits, this would represent an important lesson for all
teachers.
Sir William Hudson:
an ideal role model
William Hudson was the first Commissioner of Australia’s Snowy Mountains

Scheme, a massive hydro-electricity project set in the Great Dividing Range, in
southern New South Wales. Appointed in 1949 (at the ripe age of fifty-three), he
saw the project through to its official completion ceremony in 1974, twenty-five
years later. He had retired eight years before, in April 1967. Even that retirement,
two days before his seventy-first birthday, had been postponed twice by Acts of
Parliament. After the completion ceremony there were still five years’ construction
to go, and a further two years to the final installations. Hudson died on 12
September 1978, aged eighty-two, having very nearly seen the entire construction
process through from beginning to end. He was knighted in 1955.
Why choose William Hudson as the ideal leadership role model? Those who
worked closely with him may argue that he was not perfect, as man or technician–he
had no need to be. The requirement was that he be exactly the right
Sir William Hudson: An Ideal Role Model 71
person, at the right time, with the right capabilities, to lead an enterprise of
enormous value to Australia. For the purposes of this book, his remarkable story
contains many of the elements necessary to appreciate the leadership requirements
of today, from initial selection, through the years of endeavour, to the succession.
He also represents a good example of what Howard Gardner describes as a ‘direct’
leader—one whose impact is felt through his daily work activity. (Mary Parker
Follett, whose story comes next, is an example of ‘indirect’ leadership. In her case, it
is the ideas that do the leading, long after the protagonist has passed from the scene.)
We are living through, some observers argue, a ‘crisis of leadership’. Leading
figures in politics, publics life and business no longer command the respect accorded
to their predecessors. Leaders are perceived to wield power without due
responsibility or accountability. In countries like the United States, this cynicism has
led to a serious challenge to democracy: those who feel disenfranchised—the
Young, the poor, the ethnic minorities—no longer go to the polls. Government, the
apex of our system, is increasingly without a franchise. It the United States, some
argue, leadership now comes from the other kind of poll—the opinion poll. At a
time like this, we need inspiring leadership role models. Bill Hudson became my
‘boss’ just after my twentieth birthday. He also became, though I didn’t know it
then, one of the most important role models of my lifetime. The (autobiographical)
story of how this came about can be found later in this chapter.
The most important thing about the Snowy Mountains project, in the drab years
following World War II, is that it was big, exciting and important. It had the
additional advantage of being remarkably comprehensible. You didn’t have to be a
genius to see the advantages of diverting water from the wet side of a dry continent
to where the farmers most needed it (Figure 10). Nor did you need to be particularly
clever to see that dropping enormous quantities of water a thousand feet and more
added up to a simple, cheap and renewable way of making electricity (Figure 11).
Even within a particular power station, the logic was easy to see. There are only a
few moving parts in hydro-electric generation. They are impressively big but the list
extends only to big pipework, big valves, big turbines, big generators, big electricity
transformers, and more big pipes to flush the water out for re-use downstream. A
child could understand it; indeed I use it occasionally to explain systems theory to
children.
Dry side Wet side
Inland Great Dividing Range Pacific Ocean
Figure 10 Southeast Australia (in section)

Figures 10 and 11 depict the purpose (logic) and process of the Snowy
Mountains Scheme. Audiences all over the world love the simplicity of this
demonstration of systems operation. They understand that the task of all
leadership, wherever it is located, is to make useful purpose as
comprehensible as this. (The big oil companies have always had the
advantage that all operations are cast in ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ terms.
This makes it obvious that the organisation’s primary task is to add value
along the way.) It is easy to see the need to dam up water on the wet side of
the Great Dividing Range in order to tunnel it to the dry side for irrigation.
Running the Snowy was therefore a plum job, if you happened to have the
capacity to handle the enormous complexity. The interesting thing about Hudson
was that he never lost touch with the grassroots. I started work on the Scheme as a
‘fitter’s assistant’. This meant supporting a trained fitter (the redoubtable Robert
Owen, then halfway through his marine engineering training). I don’t think there can
have been a lowlier job) than mine, yet from the start I always understood my place
in the scheme of things. Hudson understood that if the majority of the workers didn’t
speak much English it would be a very good idea to insist that engineers-on-the-job
take the fitters and craftsmen through the construction flowcharts on a regular basis.
Flowcharts are graphical—you can see the logic of the progression. That way,
everybody was going to understand how he (hardly ever she in those days) fitted
into the big picture. It was an equally good idea to ensure that everybody was
Figure 11 Tapping a cheap and renewable resource

One can readily see how a lot of falling water can make electricity by
spinning turbines fast. The Snowy Mountains Scheme is bigger but
essentially no more complicated than the input–conversion export system
represented by a classroom TV set-which seven-year-olds can grasp easily.
William Hudson’s genius was to make all this comprehensible to the lowliest
Snowy Mountains worker, even those with shaky English.
accountable and useful. Hudson insisted that promotions should not be just a
function of longevity of service, and that pay should be linked directly with
performance. Remember that the Snowy Mountains Authority was a public service
body—such ideas were revolutionary in those days. Hudson applied ‘usefulness’ to
the scheme as a universal principle.
I never met Sir William but, as a humble Snowy employee, I benefited by the
wisdom of the policies and practices he instituted. In my ignorance, I assumed that
the sensible way things were arranged on the Snowy must be the way that all such
enterprises were run. It took me years to learn that it wasn’t so. Hudson took a
personal interest in all the employees and was always direct and
unassuming. If Your work really was essential to a particular part of the Scheme,
you were likely to be awarded all sorts of perks, such as an Authority house. Some
of the European immigrant workers couldn’t believe that the big boss could be so
approachable. When a Czech hydrographer greeted Sir William by clicking his heels
and bowing deeply, Hudson’s colleagues enjoyed their chiefs discomfiture—
’Hudson nearly died!’ On the whole, Hudson played the avuncular boss (he was,
after all, in his sixties for the key growth period) but he could play the tyrant too,
when necessary. There is the usual apocryphal story of his sacking a group of
labourers sitting idly by the side of a Snowy road, only to discover that they were
DMR (Department of Main Roads) staff and therefore not on his payroll.
Hudson also delegated wisely. True, he could be impatient with those less quick
and incisive than himself, but most people understood that this was a function of
impatience over his beloved Scheme, and nothing to do with intolerance or personal
(binary) petulance. As Lady Hudson put it; ‘ He loved work, and he was a good
chooser of men!’ The staff magazine Snowy Review contained the following biblical
parody in 1962:
In the beginning God made a man and his name was Hudson. God saith
unto Hudson: ‘Go forth and take unto yourself disciples and the Snowy
is yours. And it came to pass that Hudson recruited two who were
named Lang and Merigan and together they went forth into the
wilderness and recruited more disciples ... to them was given a hard task
with many privations ... but they won through, and seeing this, Hudson
said: ‘These are my men in whom I am well pleased. Give them many
increments.’
Together these three, Hudson and his two Associate Commissioners, were the ‘Holy
Trinity’—they spent a total of forty-three years overseeing the scheme. This is a far
cry from the short and sometimes meteoric ‘careers’ of modern-day executives.
There are a hundred aspects of the Hudson story which might be used to
illustrate ‘direct’ leadership in action. The three aspects that best demonstrate his
intelligence might be his mature wisdom at the time of his appointment, his
preparedness to seek and accept good advice from wise sources, and his ability to
juggle the contradictory demands of public sector responsibility and private sector
urgency. Here is a review of each of these aspects.
1. THE LATE RUN
William Hudson embarked on the main achievement of his life’s work at about the
age that many senior executives now retire (fifty-three). By that time he had
accumulated an enormous amount of wisdom, mainly as a result of supervising a
string of hydro-electric schemes in France, Scotland, New Zealand and Australia,
many of them on strict, fixed-price contracts. Hudson was born in Nelson, on New
Zealand’s South Island, the seventh of seven sons. His doctor father disapproved of
the choice of an engineering career, adding in frustration: ‘That’s about all you’re
bloody well good for!’ Times were not easy after his father died young. Hudson
nonetheless graduated as an engineer with first-class honours from London
University, having interrupted his studies to fight (and be wounded) in the First
World War. Everybody I know who has been away to war has a pretty sound sense
of priorities. Life continued difficult for Hudson. When the Depression interrupted
work on the Nepean Dam in New South Wales, he was forced to find work overseas,
initially in Scotland. His wife and young children followed later. By 1949 Hudson
had crammed in more variety, disappointment and achievement than most corporate
hacks in a lifetime. As a rule, a modicum of humility accompanies this kind of
experience. ‘The spoonfed graduate ‘management trainee’ often ducks the humility.
What, in its relentless search for youth, has the business community got against
wisdom? The Japanese often keep the wisest old birds on their company boards until
well into their eighties. The test, apart from wisdom, is not age but energy and
enthusiasm. Hudson was a ferociously hard worker all his life. On the Snowy, he
frequently worked until 3 a.m., seven days a week. The energy comes from caring
about the outcome. How many senior executives today really care about the
contribution their companies make to society (as opposed to caring about status and
stock options)?
A favourite party trick

One of the best-respected and most successful executives in Europe, the
late Sir Edward Choppen, previously joint chief executive of Esso Europe,
had a similar mixed sort of career behind him. Ted Choppen’s party trick
was to know the name and location of ‘every pub in Britain’. I have
seen him demonstrate this unlikely erudition. The explanation is that he

spent ten long years on the road hunting for service station sites on street
corners—and he possessed a photographic memory. This is a good party
trick to play on young featherbedded executives. Choppen was another late
runner and somewhere out there on the road, the modicum of humility, and
wisdom, took root. By the way, nobody would ever have described Ted
Choppen as tall or slim or beautiful or hirsute or youthful-looking or
otherwise godlike in appearance. Yet those who recall him do so with awe.
He is recalled, it seems, as a massive figure, because (to quote one
colleague) he was possessed of a mind like a razor’. Yet he also possessed
another excellent party trick—he never lost his humanity. The same goes
for Hudson.
2. THE MENTOR
If you accept the argument that clever people are awkward by definition, because
they always see quickly how things could be done better, or not at all, then
protecting them from envious attacks from peers becomes a necessity. ‘This is
where the (possibly) older, wiser mentor comes in. In Hudson’s case, the mentor
was the man who got him the Snowy job in the first place—Nelson Lemmon,
Federal Minister of Works and Housing in the postwar Chifley Government. In
some ways, the Snowy Mountains Scheme made Australia. Hudson, more than
anyone else, made the Snowy. Lemmon, largely unsung to this day, made Hudson
and created the conditions in which Hudson and his team could flourish. Unusually,
Lemmon got both to choose his man and to support him over the years, long after he
(Lemmon) had passed from government office.
The claim that the Snowy made Australia may seem extreme from the safe
distance of the 1990s. But, fifty years ago, Australia was a nation of just eight
million people of overwhelmingly British stock, emerging from a war in which it
had finally become clear that the country could not rely on anybody else, especially
the British mother nation. It was time to grow up and to take responsibility for
rebuilding national confidence and capability for the peace. Simultaneously, it was
time to absorb the necessary manpower for growth, at that time from all over
Europe. The Snowy, uniquely, did both. It stretched Australian capability to the
limit—the scheme was one of the biggest civil engineering projects in the world. It
also soaked up huge numbers of immigrants in the best possible way—by giving
them really important and challenging work to do, as they established themselves
financially and culturally.
Nelson Lemmon, originally a wheatgrower from Western Australia, was the
catalyst for all this, supported by other members of that government. Lemmon was
smart enough to see that the Labor Government might lose office at the forthcoming
(December 1949) federal election. His task therefore was to get the Snowy so well
established that nobody could derail it. That meant ensuring its national bona fides,
against the narrow parochialism of the State premiers. He achieved this by
persuading H. V. ‘Doc’ Evatt, then Attorney General, that the Snowy should be
secured as a Commonwealth project on defence grounds. His argument was that
most of the east coast’s power generation was located at the seaside. Memories of
Japanese submarines in Sydney Harbour in 1942 were still vivid. In theory, a sneak
naval attack could wipe out all power generation in one night. The argument was
constitutionally shaky, but it did the trick.
When the time came to choose an overall boss for the scheme, Lemmon turned
down quite a few eminent bidders, including very senior executives from the Mt Isa
and BHP mining companies, on the grounds that they envisaged running things from
Sydney as a kind of ‘gentleman’s job’ (as Lemmon put it). Nor would Lemmon
countenance an American as top man, even though the most obvious experience and
talent were located in the United States. Lemmon saw the Scheme’s symbolic
importance for the nation, and the necessity therefore of having a local at its head. In
the end, he settled for a New Zealander with a lot of Australian experience, who had
the sense to milk American experience for all it was worth.
The first Lemmon heard of Hudson was literally scribbled on the back of an
envelope, jotted down by a colleague of Hudson’s at the Water Board. Lemmon
liked the look of what he saw, especially Hudson’s record with fixed-price contracts.
His first step was to ring the ‘trade union blokes’. The following account of the
exchange is taken from Sioban McHugh’s excellent brief history of the Snowy
Mountains Scheme (my italics throughout):
Trade union official: ‘Hudson? We know him well!’

Nelson Lemmon: ‘What’s he like?’
TUO: ‘Ah, he likes his pound of flesh—bit of slavedriver.’
NL: ‘That’s good! But look, I’m thinking of him for a pretty big job, lot
of contact with the unions ...’
TUO: ‘Ah, he’ll listen to you. He won’t be like some tinpot boss; if
we’ve got any problems, he’ll hear the story, no argument—he’ll give
you a decision straight away. You’re in or you’re out—he’s good!’
This exchange needs careful study. Once we have made the assumption that the
trade union official in question was a man of good judgement (Lemmon knew this),
all we need to know is buried in the text. In the Introduction, I outlined the bare
bones of a theory of leadership capability:
• the presence of intellectual firepower

• the absence of psychological damage
In a few short sentences, Lemmon was able to ascertain that Hudson was not ‘tinpot’
(selfish or overconcerned with status) and that he was decisive. The adjunct, ‘He’s
good!’, further suggested that the decisiveness was not precipitate, just sound (right
most of the time). The ‘pound of flesh’, in other words, was a product of (ternary)
need and purpose rather than an indication of (binary) tyrannical behaviour. Hudson,
in other words, was both bright and sane. That may seem to the reader to be an
oversimplification, but if you examine the history of spectacular cockups and
blunders you generally find leaders who were not quite up to the job (in terms of its
complexity) and whose psychological unsoundness was amplified by the resulting
pressures on their intellectual resources.
It would be wrong to present Bill Hudson as a shrinking violet, however.
Lemmon eventually got Hudson on the phone and suggested a discussion about the
mooted scheme. The very next day Hudson travelled to Canberra and set out his
ideas, even down to the location of the Scheme HQ next to the railway station in
Cooma. He had worked it all out. Lemmon liked what he saw but expressed concern
about Hudson’s physical resilience at age fifty-three. Hudson responded: ‘I’ve got a
sleeping appendix and this is one of my real bad days ... but if I’d told you I was
crook, you probably wouldn’t want to see any more.’ Lemmon suggested it might
help if the appendix came out. Hudson had the operation the following day! His
widow, Lady (Eileen) Hudson, recalled the day he finally got the job: ‘He came
home that night and said, “I’ve got that job”. He had to ask Mr Chifly not to
announce it until he got it cleared with the Water Board, because he’d just asked for
the day off. He never did that—they must have wondered why he was going to
Canberra, because he never took a day off.’
In these anecdotes we can see the unusual combination of modesty and ruthless
determination that characterised Bill Hudson.
Lemmon, being a man of sound judgement, knew early on that Hudson was his
man, but there was opposition to his choice at Cabinet level, especially from Jack
Dedman, the Minister for Post-War Reconstruction. Dedman, had objected, quite
rightly, to the use of the Defence Act to smuggle the Snowy Scheme through
Parliament. When Hudson’s name came up, he reminded Cabinet that the rules
demanded three nominations. So, Lemmon submitted another list, this time with
three names on it—Hudson, Hudson and Hudson. In the end the Cabinet, prodded by
Chifley (who trusted Lemmon’s judgement), gave in and the rest is history. Having
got his man, Lemmon had to create ‘headroom’ for the Scheme’s management
cadre. That meant paying Hudson 25 per cent more than the Prime Minister. He got
that too. Chifley said to Lemmon: ‘It’s your baby, you’ve got to feed it!’
The art of judgement

In Chapter 6, we return to the question of judgement—what it is and how it
develops. In the meantime, with Nelson Lemmon in mind, it is worth
recalling Sir Geoffrey Vickers, dictum in his celebrated book The Art of
judgement:
Selection boards ... attach sometimes overriding importance to the
capacity of rival candidates for ‘good judgement; yet their estimation of
this is a matter for their own judgement and if they differ and fail to
reach agreement by discussion, there is no means by which any of their
judgements can be proved right or wrong—even, I shall suggest, after
the event. Judgement, it seems, is an ultimate category, which can only
be approved or condemned by a further exercise of the same ability.
Vickers was effectively arguing that the best and cheapest way to choose
leaders of sound judgement is to find somebody else of sound judgement
(like Nelson Lemmon, for example) and leave it to them. How do we find
such people? Well, the obvious way is to use somebody with sound
judgement to seek them out! ... and so on. If the first Commissioner of the
Snowy Mountains Scheme had been chosen by psychometric testing, or by
a panel of youngish headhunters, or by a bombastic binary type, or by a
panel of narrowly educated engineers, history might have been different.
As Vickers points out, there is no way of knowing for sure. In this writer’s
judgement, Australia has much to be grateful for in Nelson Lemmon’s
exercise of judgement and in his resolution, having made up his mind. In
any event, intelligent leadership is nine-tenths about judgement, so we will
be returning to the subject. Lemmon died in 1989, not, in this writer’s view,
sufficiently honoured for his Catalytic contribution to the making of
Australian nationhood.
Once Hudson was installed he brought great organisational skills and enthusiasm
to the task, but he was politically naive. As Lemmon commented: ‘He didn’t even
know how to write a memo to a minister.’ The Labor Government lost office in
1949, leaving Prime Minister Menzies, always lukewarm about the Snowy, to bask
in the later glory of its success. Lemmon even lost his seat in Western Australia. He
had been much too busy with his ‘baby’ to pay much attention to electioneering.
This is a common fate of those who give all their energies to the (ternary) task and
thereby neglect the (binary) political survival dimension. But he stayed in constant
contact with Bill Hudson throughout the life of the Scheme. As McHugh says: ‘They
made a formidable pair.’ It was, precisely, the relationship of a chairman (though an
informal, private one) with a chief executive. Lemmon advised on the external
positioning of the Scheme and Hudson made it happen.
As late as 1951, the Scheme came under threat of attack from Frank Packer’s
Daily Telegraph. Packer had got the idea that the Scheme was a sink for public
money and that the New South Wales economy, then in mild, short-term recession,
needed investment elsewhere. Packer induced Senator William Spooner, the new
Minister for National Development, to visit the Snowy with an eye to closing the
whole thing down. Lemmon advised Hudson to go on to the attack, getting the
Prime Minister on side, explaining to Spooner the costs of the rumours for top
management morale and, most important of all, organising a lobby of the powerful
Murray and Murrumbidgee farmers. It worked. Never was a behind-the-scenes
mentor so valuable for the longer-term, higher-order interest.
3. PUBLIC SECTOR VALUES AND PRIVATE

SECTOR ENERGY
In the 1980s and 1990s, the name of the game has been ‘privatisation’—a political
and economic doctrine based on Darwinian principles: all human life is supposed to
be driven by competition; survival is the right of the successful competitor,
extinction the fate of the loser. The high priestess of the doctrine was Margaret
Thatcher, a great battler herself, and inclined to intellectual confusion in the absence
of a good fight. Thatcher, in and out of office, loathed consensus, and regarded
public service institutions as the root of most social ills. She was, of course, a public
servant, but that is to muddy conviction with logic. In a speech on 11 January 1996
she actually said: ‘The very existence of the state, with its huge capacity for evil, is a
potential threat to all the moral, cultural, social and economic benefits of freedom!’
She wasn’t joking. In her simpleminded view all public sector enterprise was
pernicious and all private sector enterprise virtuous.
As a public/private hybrid, the Snowy Mountains Scheme is therefore an
interesting, fifty-year-old, case. To provide a contemporary context, two
developments are worth noting.
The rediscovery of trust
During the 1990s there has been a widespread, and overdue, recognition that
successful human enterprise depends as much on (ternary) collaboration as it does
on (binary) struggle. Both are important. School-level psychology studies teach us
this. It seems that one of the reasons why some kinds of Asian businesses perform
well is that the high energy levels stimulated by healthy competition are
underpinned by trust. Even Francis Fukuyama, leading luminary of the American
Right, now argues this way, calling it ‘social capital’ based on ‘density of
associations’. In the United States, if the ballooning numbers of lawyers are any
guide, you can’t trust anybody. The fun of the courtroom is only loosely connected
with higher-order (ternary) principles like justice—the (binary) point is to fight and
to win. It is very expensive, it drains away otherwise useful energy, it contributes
nothing to common wealth and, worst of all, it enriches lawyers and encourages
their proliferation. The natural concomitant of individualistic competition is distrust,
which acts as a hidden tax on all economic activity.
Paying the long-term bills
Also in the 1990s, there has been the opportunity to assess the longer term track
record of those public utilities (often natural monopolies) involved in the wave of
privatisation in the 1980s. The United Kingdom privatisation project, which others
around the world are in danger of mimicking, looked successful for a while, viewed
from a narrow and short-term accounting perspective. It takes a few years for the
wider picture (or the big frog) to become apparent to a broad range of people. Of
course, at the outset, there were a small number of expert voices anticipating and
predicting the wider costs to be absorbed, but nobody in government wanted (or was
able) to hear them. Later in this chapter there is a brief, and depressing, review of the
long-term outcomes of the privatisation of the British electricity supply industry. It
is a signal lesson to any other country contemplating short-term, sectional economic
gain at the risk of long-term degradation of the big system.
The intriguing thing about Hudson and the Snowy is that, right from the start,
they hit on a mixed public/private modus operandi which worked well. That part of
the Snowy that needed to belong to the people of Australia stayed under the aegis of
the Snowy Mountains Authority. Because the SMA inherited all the bad
bureaucratic habits of prewar public bodies, Hudson had to kick it in a binary
direction—towards high performance, high reward, high punishment modes of
work. Early in life of the Scheme, the Department of Public Works had been given
full rights to build the Eucumbene Dam. In the event, they were terribly slow; there
was never the right plant in the right place and there was strike after strike. One
senior Snowy engineer recalled: ‘This wasn’t good enough for old Bill. In 1956 he
said, “I’ve had enough! You’re going to take another seven or eight years at this
rate...and you’re going to cost a tremendous amount of money—it’s not on and I’m
going to get a contractor in.” So he went down and was extremely rude
to them—told them what he thought of them! Anyway, the contract was let to
Kaisers.’ The remainder of the dam works were completed in just twenty-two
months.
In general, those parts of the Scheme that needed to move very fast, and nearer to
acceptable risk thresholds, went to contractors. Still, most of them had to be hauled,
sometimes reluctantly and resentfully, in the opposite direction—back towards
civilised (ternary) employment practices. For example, after the death and injury toll
began to mount, Hudson worked hard to install formal procedures to improve safety.
He actually stated: ‘This Scheme is not going to kill off as many men as big schemes
usually do.’ In 1959, when I arrived on the scene and by which time forty-eight
workers had already died, the Snowy Mountains Joint Safety Council was set up and
bonuses were offered to contractors on the basis of reduced actual costs, in terms of
frequency and severity, of accidents. The chairman of the Council’s working
committee recalled that contractors’ safety bonuses were related to what it cost to
have a man off: ‘It varied from 8 per cent to 18 per cent of their contract. You could
see them all working it out—and then things really started to happen. Within two
months the accident rate was lower!’
The point about this is that Hudson and his colleagues exercised pragmatic
judgement when it came to these sorts of decisions. They were no more dogmatic in
favour of public enterprise than they were for private ownership. Balance was the
key value. Furthermore, if you could achieve worthy (ternary) outcomes, such as
enhanced safety and an improved quality of working life, by binary means (tapping
into contractor greed)—so be it. Of the 121 men who were killed in the course of
construction, nearly all were in the employment of the contractors, who carried out
the most dangerous underground work. In those days, death rates were calculated by
the mile (for tunnelling) and by the million pounds (for other construction work). By
those standards the Snowy was a ‘safe’ project—0.6 deaths per mile was pretty good
by international standards, especially in granite. Robyn Williams, the distinguished
science broadcaster, who nearly drowned on the Snowy (on a day off), recalls that
the workers had a choice between the SMA, for fairly generous rewards and
adequate safety, and the contractors (in his case the American Perini group), for
really big money and serious risk. Williams, who is not stupid, lasted ten days with
Perini and reverted to the Authority. I on the other hand
(not brave; a bit stupid; only moderately greedy) never even considered the
contractors and worked for the Authority throughout.
It was no bad thing that the first big contract went to the Norwegian firm
Ingenior F. Selmer. The idea was to get something not too complicated built fast, to
demonstrate success and progress to the public. In modern consultants’ jargon this is
called ‘garnering the low-hanging fruit’. The Guthega project resembled most
Norwegian high-head, long-tunnel installations and, more important, it offered the
locals experience in all aspects of hydro-electric construction—a dam, a tunnel, a
power station and a pipeline. The principle of the demonstrated early success is
nothing new. Hudson grasped all this without management training or expensive
management consultants. Culturally, the Norwegians were ideal, different from both
the resident Australians and the southern European immigrants but not too different.
They brought with them the typically pragmatic Scandinavian view of energetic
commercial effort, together with strictly observed safety standards, in a publicly
controlled enterprise. Students of the privatisation process could do worse than study
the success of the Snowy Mountains Scheme. It was a true hybrid of public and
private, under intelligent leadership, quite unencumbered by political or economic
dogma. Its purpose was manifestly useful. At its head was an engineer—a man who
understood three-dimensional systems, materials and process flows, and the
relationship of the spatial to the temporal. Above all, Hudson understood the
complexities of the big ‘frog’—not just the Scheme itself but the political and
environmental context as well. He could give quick and sound decisions to do with
any separate part of the ‘bicycle’ because he understood the big picture—the
context.
HOW Bill Hudson became my ‘boss’

This book isn’t an autobiography, but two of its central features are the
nature of intelligence and the process of learning. As I owe part of my
learning and intelligence to my Snowy experience, it makes sense to set out
the kind of impact that leaders like Hudson sometimes have on the young
and confused. When I set off for the Snowy I was a student at law school,
having spent the usual five or six years at secondary school and a further
two at the university proper. To understand my confusion fully,
it will be necessary to study Chapter 9, which concerns education, and in

particular the story of Spansky, the genius subversive. That comes later.
What I can say with complete conviction is that I had been puzzled
throughout my years of secondary education as to why we did the things we
did. Some of the ‘subjects’ were more interesting than others, but the point
of the whole exercise never became clear to me. So far as I could tell, I was
the only pupil in the place thus bewildered. We pupils certainly weren’t the
customers of the institution; if anything, our parents were. We were batch-
produced products of the kind described by Charles Handy in
Understanding Schools as Organisations.
Of course, I have given all this much thought since and I understand it
better now. At the time, I was merely confused and far too lacking in
confidence to query things or to mount a direct revolt. Instead, I just
behaved badly, mainly to inject some amusement into a barren existence. If
the school had a point, it was to get batches of pre-adolescent boys through
the awkward years into successful careers. That required certification
(Leaving Certificate, or similar) at around age seventeen and the passage to
another kind of institution (e.g. university) for more of the same. The
principal advantage of the university, when the time came, was the
presence there of representatives of the other half of humankind—women.
The advantage was intellectual too.
None of this required any connection with individual vocation. I know
that many of my school colleagues were already embarked on a career
trajectory that made perfect sense for their particular gifts and for their
outside connections. They were the lucky ones. What you needed at school
in those days was a good mastery of the linguistic and computational skills
and, for successful socialisation, some skills in the ‘bodily/kinaesthetic’
arena (the path was smoother if you were terrific at rugby, cricket, running,
etc.). What you didn’t get then was any systematic individual analysis or
assessment of capabilities, nor much experience in doing anything that felt
real. (See Chapter 9 for Howard Gardner’s stunning contribution to this
problem.) By the way, in case this sounds churlish, this was a terrific
school compared with most and my parents made sacrifices to pay for it all.
It still didn’t make much educational sense—that is, if you take education
to be about enhancing capability by building on natural talents. Even in the
1990s, not much formal education takes account of individual (and
idiosyncratic) ways of thinking and learning.
I can’t say for sure what prompted me and a friend (another nineteen-
year-old) to quit law school in order to hitchhike to Cooma in search of
Snowy work. As they say, it made sense at the time. We were certainly
both bored. Young men are supposed to seek danger and independence and
it was much less risky than going away to a war. It was also an early lesson
in perseverance and the importance of real capability because at that time
(late in 1958) nobody in construction really needed unskilled students,
however keen. We got signed up as a result of walking down a forbidden
tunnel and making friends with a brilliant Czech engineer in charge of that
shift. He wanted people around who were enthusiastic and quickwitted, and
he fixed it. For me it was the start of a lifelong love affair with
Czechoslovakia.
Almost overnight I went from being a medium-sized fish in a shallow
(university) pond to being a tiny cog in a huge, but comprehensible,
machine. For the next part of my life, I made a small contribution to the
construction of a large underground hydro-electric power station. I still feel
proprietorial about the power flowing from T1 (Tumut 1) station.
Everybody else I know who made a contribution to the Scheme feels the
same way—involved and proud. Robyn Williams felt, and feels, the same.
The important point was that I began to learn again, for the first time since
infancy, to exercise judgement in situations with real outcomes, and to
believe that my contribution mattered. The irony was that by pulling out of
schooling, I had engineered the resumption of my education. Anybody who
attended a good technical school, or who studied any kind of practical
engineering, would find this puzzling.
This is a very difficult thing to describe. If all your life you have been
fed educational morsels in neatly differentiated boxes (called ‘subjects’),
you are likely to be unprepared for, and surprised by, the onset of any kind
of insight about the interconnected workings of a big, complex system. To
revert to the metaphor of the bicycle and the frog, it is as if all education
had been designed to reveal to the student, one by one, the hundreds of
different parts of a big bicycle. At the end, presumably, the complete bike
would take shape, like a completed jigsaw puzzle. At that point, the process
of education would be complete and, armed with a map of the whole bike,
the student could go forth into adult life able to cope with anything. If
problems arose, you could always go back to the morsels in order to plug
any gaps or forgetfulness.
When Phil Sydney-Jones and I got to the Snowy two things
happened. Firstly, it was pretty obvious that this particular bike, in terms of
all its details, was way beyond our comprehension. Even in the 1950s the
Scheme had become very big and complicated. On the other hand, we
quickly began to get a sense of the frog—the essential interconnectedness
of the whole thing. That happened because Bill Hudson set out to make
sure that everybody who worked on the Scheme, however lowly, had a feel
for the totality. If you only understand systems as bits of bikes, you must be
limited to doing what you are told, even if it doesn’t seem to make sense. If
you understand the context of your work, you are in a position to add value
by exercising judgement—you understand the why as well as the what.
As a rule, these sorts of concepts are better expressed by creative artists
than by a journeyman hack like me. William Golding, in his Nobel Prize—
winning novel Rites of Passage, provides us with a beautiful description of
how the penny drops when we move from book-learning to real-life
experience. His 19th century hero, Edmund Talbot, is a few days into a
sailing-ship passage to Australia. He has not sailed before and this is an old
and uncomfortable tub. In his journal Talbot describes his first storm at sea,
in the Bay of Biscay. He has been heartily seasick and has ventured up on
deck just after dark and at the height of a storm:
For some reason, though the water stung my face it put me in a good
humour. Philosophy and religion—what are they when the wind blows
and the water gets up in lumps? I stood there, holding on with one hand,
and began positively to enjoy all this confusion, its as it was by the last
lees of light. Our huge old ship with her few and shortened sails from
which the rain cascaded was beating into this sea and therefore
shouldering the waves at an angle, like a bully forcing his way through a
dense crowd. And as the bully might encounter here and there a like
spirit, so she (our ship) was hindered now and then, or dropped or lifted
or, it may be, struck a blow in the face that made all her forepart, then
the waist and the afterdeck, to foam and wash with white water. I began,
as Wheeler had put it, to ride a ship. Her masts leaned a little. The
shrouds to windward were taut, those to leeward slack, or very near it.
The huge cable of her mainbrace swung out to leeward between the
masts; and now here is a point which I would wish to make.
Comprehension of this vast engine is not to be come at gradually nor by
poring over diagrams in Marine Dictionaries! It comes, when it comes,
at a bound. In that semi-darkness between one wave and the next I
found the ship and the sea comprehensible not merely in terms of her
mechanical ingenuity but as a—a what? As a steed, a conveyance, a
means working to an end. This was a pleasure I had not anticipated. It
was, I thought with perhaps a touch of complacency, quite an addition to
my understanding!
Golding captures for me the sense of awe and partial comprehension that
overwhelmed me, once I began to get the hang of the Snowy.
I won’t weary the reader with the rest of my story. I went back to law
school for a while but my enthusiasm for the lawyers, and to a lesser extent
for the law, had been fatally damaged. My head had been turned less by the
macho aspect of the Snowy experience than by the insights and the
intellectual challenges it afforded. I had got a whiff of the excitement of
big, complex, living systems. I had also gained a glimpse of real leadership
in action. I was lucky.
The reader is entitled to ask: Isn’t there some way that these natural
processes of gaining insight and copying role models could be brought into
the formal educational process, especially for those youngsters who are not
‘academic’? The answer to that question is a qualified Yes, but with
difficulty, provided you can find the educational leaders to parallel the
Hudsons! Chapter 9, about the remarkable Allan Coman, takes up this
matter.
Hudson’s story is that of a pragmatic engineer of high intellectual capacity. That

was the particular combination needed at that time, in those postwar circumstances,
to be a great leader. The Snowy Mountains Scheme itself was a pretty good example
of non-dogmatic public/private integration and local/international collaboration. The
Australian leader of today, if blessed with any intelligence at all, ought to be worried
about the long-term costs of ballooning international debt and the creeping control
of strategic national interests by unaccountable foreign corporations. Bill Hudson,
we can be sure, would have understood the complex issues involved and wouldn’t
have been frightened of fighting about them. He would have made an excellent
prime minister but, of course, he was much too busy to bother with politics.
FIFTY YEARS ON...WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

The Snowy Mountains story can now be considered from a safe historical distance.
Not everything about it worked perfectly, of course, but it remains a pretty good
example of public/private sector collaboration over the long term. It demonstrates
that if you really want to understand the workings of complex systems, particularly
those of national strategic importance, you need to do a great many sums over a
substantial period—you need to take into account the whole ‘frog’.
Let me further illustrate this with what might appear a digression. Again it is
convenient to use an overseas example, although the subject is one that bears closely
on Australian life too. It is the contemporary case of the British electricity supply
industry, which suddenly moved from the public to the private sector. Countries all
around the world, including Australian States, are imitating this example, without
necessarily waiting for all the outcomes to become clear. In Britain, the privatisation
of electricity is still hailed as a triumph by the bosses of the new private regional
electricity companies, and by their wealthy shareholders. Not everybody else is
impressed, except perhaps the foreign firms (mainly American and French) now
buying up this strategically important industry.
The story demonstrates what happens when the accountants (who are always
good at knowing the cost of everything—like the components of bicycles), rather
than the engineers (who understand the value of integrating components into
wholes), call the shots. Engineers know that complex technical systems need
‘redundancy’—capacity held in reserve for dangerous peaks. The accountant
mentality believes that you must ‘sweat the asset’—squeeze every last drop of
performance out of every element in the system. This goes for the people too—get
rid of those whose contribution can’t be measured precisely, and work the remainder
till they drop. The costs of all this will be exported elsewhere; so long as they don’t
show up on your balance sheet you are ahead of the game. This is, of course, a crude
piece of stereotyping designed to make a point. Naturally, there are saintly
accountants and diabolical engineers.
The important thing to hang on to in examining the British electricity business is
that nothing real has changed. It is still the same wires, the same overhead cables,
the same generating stations, and the same customer care mistakes. The difference is
in the money and it isn’t until you have done all the attendant sums that you begin to
understand what has happened. To take just a few aspects, the British Government
gained an instant £8 billion from the one-off sale of the electricity businesses. (At
the time of writing, the Victorian Government is getting the same kind of
windfall profit in the same way.) But Britain still had to carry on paying the large,
but unknown, interest on the stock used to buy the industry in the first place. After
privatisation, the Exchequer also lost money that the electricity industry was forced
to lend to the government in the last year before privatisation. This amounted to £1.8
billion. This ‘public dividend’ could easily have been much larger if the industry’s
capital structure had leaned towards equity and away from fixed interest capital. The
government sold the assets and the British people were left with the liabilities
forever.
There is much more to the story. Everybody now agrees that the new companies
are making far too much money from what are still natural monopolies. How so?
Firstly, the government encouraged very big price increases in the years leading up
to privatisation in order to fatten up the corporations for private investors. This was
really a covert form of taxation, displacing wealth from elsewhere in the economy.
Secondly, the industry has been ‘regulated’ by a formula which obliges it to raise
prices by less than the general rate of inflation. The firms were quick to realise that
the best way to beat the regulator was by getting rid of ever more employees. The
benefits flowed straight through to profits and the taxpayer picked up the bill for
unemployment costs—another displacement of cost.
Of course, once the government had invented the pricing formula, there was no
practical reason to privatise at all because the formula provided a continuing
pressure towards increasing efficiency—the really useful outcome the economy and
society required. Once in the private sector, the new companies set about reducing
their corporation tax bills by every means at their disposal. The poor electricity
industry regulator, with no right of access to the insider details of private firms,
hasn’t a chance. In the four years prior to privatisation, the publicly owned industry
yielded £6 billion in tax revenues. In the four years after privatisation, with
embarrassingly large profits flowing to the shareholders, the tax yield dropped to
£3.1 billion. That is a shortfall in taxation revenues in Perpetuity!
In the old days, the regional electricity suppliers were part of their local
economies, making a community contribution—part of a complex local ‘frog’.
Nowadays, as disembodied components, they suck money out of the region. Before
long, most of it will belong to foreigners, including American utility firms which
have already crossed swords with the United States regulators over fraud and
pollution. These kinds of pernicious costs, too, are incalculable but predictable. In
Britain, as in Australia, the Americans are attracted by loose and inexperienced
regulatory regimes. All this represents a loss of control over national strategic assets.
The financial proceeds, likewise, will be sucked out of Britain.
By privatising electricity, the British Government got hold of a one-off bonanza
(to finance income tax cuts) and lost a huge revenue base which might have come in
handy at a time when the pressure to rescue the public welfare and support system is
colliding with the reluctance of people and corporations to pay taxes.
Embarrassingly, the much improved public corporations initially not privatised, such
as the Railways and the Post Office, turned out to have much higher productivity
than the privatised ones! When the Conservative Government tried to privatise the
Post Office, after the electricity exercise had been absorbed, their own backbenchers
voted it down. They could see, and so could their constituents, that sweating the Post
Office asset would export unacceptable costs to the people.
The purpose of this story is not to make a political point about the ideology of
privatisation. It merely draws attention to the complicated economic and social
ramifications of major changes of this kind. There are a great many peripheral sums
to be done, over many years, before any realistic assessment of benefit or disbenefit
can be made. It has become clear in Britain that some of the supporters of
privatisation simply aren’t doing enough sums. They are neglecting the frog and
focusing serially on disembodied parts of the supposed bike, either because they are
implicated (like the newly very rich electricity bosses) or because the complexity is
just too much for their bean-counting brains. The people at large sensed that the Post
Office was a frog—not just a money-processing machine but (via local sub-offices
in rural communities) part of the fabric of society. The value of that, people sensed,
was incalculable.
The obvious question for the Australian citizen, anxious to learn from overseas
example, is: Can we be confident that our State legislatures actually understand the
complicated long-term calculations needed to evaluate the public benefits of selling
basic utilities to foreigners, even supposing we trust the motives of the buyers and/or
the sellers?
Mary Parker Follett:
a (nearly) lost leader
Sir William Hudson was a near-perfect example of what Howard Gardner calls a
direct leader—somebody whose principal impact on events occurs through his
actions and decisions from day to day. He might well require conceptual skills of a
high order but his outputs are essentially managerial. Direct leadership always
involves an element of role-modelling—demonstrating through behaviour the skills,
attitudes and values that are consonant with the primary task. Gardner writes:
I see both Churchill and Einstein as leaders—as individuals who

significantly influence the thoughts, behaviours, and/or feelings of
others. Churchill exerted his influence in a direct way, through the
stories he communicated to various audiences; hence, I term him a
direct leader. Einstein exerted his influence in an indirect way, through
the ideas he developed and the ways that those ideas were captured in
some kind of theory or treatise; hence, he qualifies as an indirect leader.
Mary Parker Follett: A (Nearly) Lost Leader 93
The Snowy Mountains Scheme was a very complex enterprise requiring no-
nonsense management. Its leader therefore had to be a down-to-earth, no-nonsense
person with the capacity to encompass great complexity.
The very intelligent indirect leader has an obvious problem. He or she is, by
definition, ahead of the game. How then can the potential follower be expected to
understand what the leader says or intends? It is not just that the content of the
leader’s utterances will be unfamiliar but also that the framing of the leader’s mind
is likely to be inaccessible. Leadership of a team at the front line is not so difficult;
the objective may be nearly in view. The leader of a commando unit has a very
simple, but dangerous, aim in view—to take out the enemy unit. The leadership is
not exercised on the spot but in the weeks and months preceding, as moves are
rehearsed and trust built up. The same goes for orchestral conductors—by the time
the performance comes round, the whole orchestra ought to be almost on autopilot,
so as to cope with the electric buzz generated by the big occasion. When Bill
Hudson instructed his engineers-on-the-job to talk the men through the construction
flowcharts, he was making sure that more distant objectives could be glimpsed in
advance.
But, away from the front line, the leadership is conceptual; followers don’t just
have to see differently, they need to think differently. Leading artists always face
this problem. Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring is now familiar to us and so is its idiom.
But it was composers like Stravinsky who created the idiom, over the years and
around a succession of pieces of music that dragged public taste along. But the first
performance of Rite of Spring in 1913 literally caused a riot in Paris. It wasn’t just
that the music was unfamiliar—it made people very angry. The feeling was that
nobody should be allowed either to compose or to perform such music. It drove
some people crazy. Creative artists often act as lightning conductors for deeper
currents in society. In the following year, 1914, Europe really did go crazy. Perhaps
it wasn’t Stravinsky’s music that introduced craziness to the scene, but that the
ambient craziness found a target, or a sluice, in the music. This example indicates
how bold leadership often involves more than blank incomprehension in potential
followers—it can give rise to fury.
This is the context for the story of an extraordinary American, Mary Parker
Follett. If the reader’s reaction is ‘Mary Parker who? ‘, I rest my case. My
preferred path for readers of this book would be that they put it down now; beg,
borrow or steal a copy of Follett’s collected lectures (delivered just a decade or so
after the Rite of Spring premiere); read them with care and wonderment; and then
resume reading this volume, suitably chastened. (Failing that, that they go and read
her works after they finish this book.)
The point is that virtually all the managerial-received wisdom (including all the
works of the big gurus), over the sixty years since her death, was anticipated in her
lectures and other writings. She was the Imo of them all. If her ideas could have
been understood and acted upon, the world of organisations and management (and
the United States economy) might have been spared much confusion, heartache and
wasted time. If we accept that this is the case (and the evidence follows), then we
ought to try to understand why. How is it possible for somebody who writes in clear
and simple English, who speaks eloquently and forcefully, who provides a wealth of
practical examples, and who reaches a wide and influential audience over a number
of years, to virtually disappear from sight?
The obvious starting point is sex. Like Imo, Mary Parker Follett was female, but
by no means of low social status. This might be connected with her impatience with
the laborious protocols of formal research popular at the time, carried through by
networks of male social science entrepreneurs. She just got on with it. ‘Although her
observations were based on a wealth of personal contracts with managers, her
thought was not supported by formally designed research’, Massie tells us in Pauline
Graham’s Mary Parker Follett: Prophet of Management. Follett was also the only
woman prominent in organisational studies at the time.
Secondly, all her ideas were inclusive and holistic—always connected to parallel
ideas—never narrow or rigidly bounded. This rendered them difficult for the
narrowminded. You could say that she was one of the great ‘frog’ thinkers,
surrounded by devotees of the ‘scientific management’ movement, most of whom
viewed business organisations as ‘bikes’ to be tinkered with, using specialised tools.
She said: ‘We have to study a whole as a whole, not only through an analysis of its
constituents.’ Massie comments: ‘Whereas most classicals [classical organisational
theorists] viewed organizational developments as a series of discrete formal
changes, Follett treated organization as a flowing and continuous process.’
Thirdly, what Follett had to say must have been threatening to the conflict-
dominated world of American business between the wars. History shows it to have
been a ‘binary’ period, dominated by institutionalised warfare between owners and
union bosses. Her arguments were pure ‘ternary’ in conception. Elton Mayo, that
highly seductive Australian, and the other proponents of the ‘human relations
school’ were much more acceptable to big business. They succeeded in repackaging
binary conflict as highly persuasive (but still binary) ‘human relations’. (Some
commentators look on the human relations school as purveyors of ‘cow
psychology’—a way of ‘tranquillising’ the workers by seducing them away from a
proper (ternary) concern with formal roles, authority and representation—all the
subjects that concerned Follett.) Her colleagues hardly acknowledged Follett’s work,
though they all drew upon it. Follett, in the nicest possible way, really was
subversive.
Her ideas are interesting in their own right but her real interest for us lies in the
shortage of followers of her lead. Ironically, she seems to have anticipated this in her
writing: ‘Let us not think that we are either leaders or . . . nothing of much
importance. As one of those led we have a part in leadership. In no aspect of our
subject do we see a greater discrepancy between theory and practice than here!’
Warren Bennis, in commenting on Follett’s work, suggested that the essence of
successful followership lies in being prepared to tell the truth. It follows that
effective leadership makes truth-telling possible. He illustrated the point as follows:
Almost 35 years ago, when Nikita Khrushchev came to America, he met

with reporters at the Washington Press Club. The first written question
he received was: ‘Today you talked about the hideous rule of your
predecessor, Stalin. You were one of his closest aides and colleagues
during those years you now denounce. What were you doing all that
time? ‘ Khrushchev’s face grew red. ‘Who asked that? ‘, he roared. No
one answered. ‘Who asked that? ‘, he insisted. Again, silence. ‘THAT’s
what I was doing! ‘, Mr Khrruschev said.
As Warren Bennis is one of the great gurus on leadership, it is well worth tuning
in to his appreciation of Mary Parker Follett’s contribution: ‘Whether the subject is
the shift in paradigms from a command-and-control, hierarchically driven
organisation to a more empowered and democratic type or the significance of a
shared vision or the importance of achieving an “integrated picture of the situation”

or the need for “expert” rather than coercive power, Follett was there first.’
I can’t do justice to her oeuvre here, but the following are a few of the themes
she wrote about:
• Constructive conflict—the idea that differences are a necessary part of life

and that difference is necessary for learning. ‘We do not want to do away
with difference, but to do away with muddle! ‘ In this, she pre-invented most
of the standard conflict-resolution methods now in use in international and
industrial relations. The problem, she knew, was that ‘integration leaves no
thrill of victory! ‘ In other words, if you are addicted to the binary
(fight/flight) mode, you can never be satisfied with a compromise.
• Management as a general function—the idea that making things run
properly is a complex process and cannot be reduced to a toolbox of
techniques. It followed from this that managerial work had to be
professionalised, so as to depersonalise the giving of orders. Once again, this
is a ternary concept—the purpose of professional standards is to render
interpersonal relations manageable.
• The leader—as someone who sees ‘the whole situation ‘, organises the
experience of the group, offers a vision of the future, and trains followers.
Follett was very clear, however, that the leader’s power had to be earned
through capability and commitment: ‘Don’t exploit your personality—learn
your job! ‘ In this she anticipated the work of Elliott Jaques, and others, on
levels of work complexity.
• Horizontal authority—a notion which prefigured today’s focus on cross-
functional collaboration in the radically flat organisation. GE’s
‘boundaryless organisation’, as espoused by Jack Welch, might have been
invented by Follett. She acknowledged the importance of the ‘departmental’
point of view but argued that department heads ought not to ‘de-
departmentalise themselves’ but instead ‘inter-departmentalise themselves’.
Unlike many American theorists of the time, she understood that you cannot
dissolve boundaries—you have to acknowledge them and make them
manageably permeable.
• Mutual problem-solving—a practical process device which anticipated

quality circles, participative management, employee involvement and other
staples of the ‘HR’ trade.
• Business as a social institution—the idea that businesses are not merely
economic units but that they interpenetrate society at every level. This
concept is in the full flow of fashion as I write. The ‘Tomorrow’s Company’
movement and the whole ‘stakeholder society’ idea are built around the
centrality of business and its social obligations.
There is much more—but I would wish the reader, especially the female reader, to
appreciate Mary Parker Follett at first hand. Her 1918 book, The New State: Group
Organisation the Solution of Popular Government, is still ahead of its time, although
the more farsighted thinktanks are now starting to catch up with her. In this book she
dealt with the problem of governmental legitimacy in local communities—one of the
hot topics of the ‘stakeholder society’ debate. Her last book, Creative Experience,
brought together the fruits of all her consultancy experience in business. It might
have been written yesterday.
If we can come to understand how Follett, of all people, came to be
todgeschwiegen (Peter Drucker’s term for her—the German for ‘non-person’—in
Pauline Graham’s Mary Parker Follett: Prophet of Management), we might learn
something about the challenge for leadership today. How can we know who today’s
Mary Parker Follett might be? Do we really expect it to be the next glib American
male with a slick marketing organisation in the wings? If we could persuade
ourselves that Follett was an impractical dreamer or (the standard male defence)
‘emotional’, we might have a part-explanation of her eclipse.
A BROAD-BAND LIFE
She came from solid Boston stock. Born in 1868, her childhood was not easy. Her
mother was a nervous invalid throughout her life and, like Bill Hudson, Follett lost
her father, whom she adored, when she was in her teens. Howard Gardner reminds
us, in Leading Minds:
Future leaders have often lost fathers at an early age . . . those who have
early been deprived of a parent are stimulated (or feel pressured) to
formulate their own precepts and practices in the social and moral
domains. Their precocious dependence on themselves may place them
in a favourable position for directing the behaviours of others . . . Jean-

Paul Sartre claimed that in the absence of a father an individual is forced
to make his own choices. However, the pain associated with the early
loss seems to endure, and many of the once-bereaved leaders have
reported never having lost a pervasive feeling of loneliness.
Mary Parker Follett had to take charge of the family, no doubt a salutary lesson
in practical management. She went to Radcliffe College at Harvard and studied also
at the other Cambridge (in England) and in Paris. She graduated summa cum laude
in economics, government, law and philosophy. Her student thesis, ‘The Speaker of
the House of Representatives’, published in 1896, became the standard source on the
workings of the Congress. By this time she was fluent in French and German and
already a considerable worldwide networker. Her circle included most of the
forward-looking writers, philosophers, lawyers and politicians, as well as the Boston
aristocracy.
Everybody assumed she would pursue a brilliant, but cloistered, academic career.
That wasn’t her way. When she came back from Paris in 1900, she immediately got
involved in the Roxbury Men’s Club, in the rougher part of downtown Boston.
Coincidentally, she took the same action as Allan Coman (see Chapter 9) by opening
up the school buildings for night-time use as recreation clubs and for study. To
provide special buildings when the school buildings were there already ‘would have
been bad management on our part ‘. Seeing the need for employment placement
bureaux, she set them up in the evening centres. Later on, they were generally
incorporated into the Boston public school system, and widely copied elsewhere.
During this time she was well known for getting her hands well and truly dirty, like
all the leaders celebrated in this book. She characteristically made a full technical
study of the most economical way to bank furnace fires before taking up the matter
with the janitors.
Mary Parker Follett knew that true understanding arises only from the fusion of
practical experience and intellectual effort. Somewhere in the middle lies
effectiveness and practical intelligence. ‘I do not think we have psychological and
ethical and economic problems. We have human problems with psychological,
ethical and economic aspects, and as many more as you like, legal even.’ She was,
in short, another broadbander, as comfortable and engrossed down in the boiler
room as on the most exalted lecture platform. The essence of ‘frog’ thinking is
to see that you don’t have to use school buildings just for teaching lessons—not if
there is a parallel need and an available timeslot.
Follett died in 1933, aged 65. Already her star was waning. Throughout the
1920s she had been a hugely visible figure as lecturer, writer and consultant to
business and government leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet Douglas
McGregor’s 1960 classic, The Human Side of Enterprise, in many respects a
paraphrase of Follett’s ideas, contains not a single reference to her work. Peter
Drucker seems to have been the first to exhume her body of work. There is no
printed reference to her throughout or after the war until Drucker’s celebrated The
Practice of Management in 1955. And even he was reminded of her existence by an
Englishman—Lyndall Urwick.
It will come as no surprise to the reader that the Japanese always understood and
appreciated her work. She was very much in tune with the consensual, thoughtful,
careful and respectful approach to management which characterises the Japanese
way. There is still a Mary Parker Follett Association in Japan, comprising business
people and scholars; not in the United States, of course. My guess would be that she
had to become a non-person precisely because she wasn’t an academic dreamer. All
her ideas arose from her experience as a no-nonsense manager at the tough end of
town. The cynical view would be that the male-dominated American business
Establishment between the wars simply wanted to go on doing what it had always
done—screwing the workers. Because most of the bosses were good churchgoing
folk, they needed an approach to human relations that made some sense but still
allowed them to get their way without any real democratic obstruction. The ‘human
relations’ school filled the bill. Follett had to go.
On the surface, Mary Parker Follett was quite different from William Hudson.
He was a ‘direct’ leader; she an ‘indirect’ leader. He was an engineer, she a
classicist. As a direct leader, Hudson left his monument behind him in the huge
physical presence of the Snowy Mountains Scheme. Follett’s legacy is buried in her
writings; to extract the value, you have to sit down, read and marvel at her
prescience. But both achieved their greatest eminence, and made their main
contribution, in their fifties—in the prime of life, in the prime of wisdom. Both were
clever, psychologically well-balanced, ternary broad-banders. In that important
respect, they are like peas in a pod.
The intelligent leader’s qualities
The ternary approach to leadership takes the line that ‘motivation’ really flows from
the ‘third corner’—the objective or common ideal—discussed in the Introduction. If
leadership succeeds, it means that the followers are attached to the objective. They
are not following the leader so much as attaching themselves to a purpose which the
leader exemplifies and embodies. This explains the awkward fact that successful
leaders come in all shapes and sizes, and commonly lack the traits that classical
leaders are supposed to have. Successful leaders are often decidedly uncharismatic.
What matters is the bonding between the leader and the good enough purpose. The
Australian leaders described in this book, if assembled in the same room (only two
know each other already), would make a motley crew. The leadership, in each case,
has flowed from the task rather than from the personality. Of course, interesting
people conceive interesting tasks. If they are good, in terms of capability, pretty
soon they will start to look like ‘leaders’.
It is, however, fair to ask: What is the bottom line? What are the minimum
requirements for successful leadership, expressed in terms that will be familiar both
to lay people and to organisational selectors and trainers? What are the necessary
The Intelligent Leader’s Qualities 101
Figure 12 Hierarchy of talents

The elements depicted are all potential disqualifiers for leadership roles, in
the sense that a serious failing in any one is sufficient to rule out an individual
for an important job. But the lower the point on the hierarchy the more
‘fixable’ the deficiency, via learning. By adulthood, the higher-order factors
like personality quirks and intellectual firepower have become intractable.
Most big blunders and cockups are caused by leaders who can’t hack the
complexity of top jobs, and can’t hack the fact that they can’t hack it.
qualities of less exotic leaders than those we are considering? Figure 12 sets out the
main variables. They are arranged on a scale of learnability: from knowledge, at the
bottom (readily learnable or recoverable), to intellectual firepower, at the top (very
nearly immutable). It is useful to look at each of them in turn. The point is, that they
are all important—a failure or shortcoming in any one of the elements may
disqualify a person for effective leadership. But when it comes to selecting for
leadership capacity it is the top two—the presence of intellectual firepower and the
absence of severe personality quirks or damage—that really count. When big
cockups and blunders do occur, this is where you look for the cause.
KNOWLEDGE
Almost all the leaders described in this book are ‘experts’. William Hudson, for
example, had to be a civil engineer in order to lead the Snowy Mountains enterprise.
Mary Parker Follett had to have involved herself deeply in front-line operations and
in the lives of front-line people in order to theorise about the wider employment
systems that affected them. To anticipate stories yet to come, Bob Clifford had to
know all about boat building and ferry operation, Robert Keep had to master model
building (though not the arcane detail of currency trading), and Allan Coman had to
understand the connection between educational process and learning. And the same
principle applies to our other leaders. These people are unlike the ‘company doctors’
who come in from the outside with a general toolbox of knowledge about how
organisations fail. Such fixers don’t have to know much, if anything, about the ailing
company’s expert business.
The point about knowledge is that it can be acquired. Sometimes new
appointments to big jobs fail due to the absence of key information, but this is
unusual. The useful booklet Taking Charge: Chief Executives Take up the Reins
(published by the search consultants Cordiner King) stresses the importance of
newcomers learning the ropes. Here are the sentiments of a newly appointed
managing director of a manufacturing company: ‘. . . I thought I’d have a break, get
my own personal affairs into order, but by the time I ended up darting here and
there, back and forth, I only got a week. In hindsight I wouldn’t have minded a few
extra weeks, even a couple of months . . . ‘ The CEO of a not-for-profit organisation
said: If I’d had my time over ... I would have refused to get hooked into this thing of
crisis management ... and in a much more deliver way gone around to all the centres
and looked and absorbed.’
These are both cases of the ultimately successful high-level transfer of an
executive to a completely new and unfamiliar business. Acquiring knowledge
quickly is not generally a problem for bright people, who know, or sense, where to
go looking for useful knowledge. However, when new high-level appointments fail,
it is sometimes attributable to a lack of understanding about the politics of the new
organisation. What is significant about the leaders in this book is that they
comfortably inhabit the spaces between fields. Their knowledge is not bounded
by conventional disciplines or orthodoxies; they are connectors of fields of

knowledge. As a result, each of them has created something quite new.
SKILL
Skills are learnable, up to a point. The infant ballet class makes the point perfectly—
all the moppets, with much drilling, can learn the steps, but only a few were really
meant by God to dance. Likewise, if God meant you to be an accountant, you are
unlikely to succeed as a nurse. You could do it, but your areas of natural strength
would be underdeployed. Sometimes miscasting can be a strength. Sir Colin
Marshall, the Chairman of British Airways, would not claim to be a natural
gladhander. Nearly everybody in BA knows he is officially an introvert (because
BA takes psychometrics seriously and everybody gets tested). His skills-base is in
cool analysis. But, coming from Avis to the airline business, he was smart enough to
understand that British Airways had to learn to deal with its customers as friends
rather than as inconvenient obstacles to flying aircraft about punctually. When BA
instituted a company-wide program called Putting People First, Sir Colin assigned
himself the obligation of appearing at every single session. If he couldn’t make it, he
would have the participants round to his office later on. Everyone could see that this
shy, stiff man was out of his element but, of course, they understood and appreciated
the reason that he so discomfited himself. Occasionally, great theatrical
performances arise from casting against type, but it is unusual and difficult.
I normally place skill below motivation in the learnability hierarchy because I
think that it is marginally more changeable by outside forces than at least the deeper
motivations. In Figure 12, they are depicted on the same level, and as mutually
reinforcing. If it turns out that you possess the gift of dance (the combination of the
bodily/kinaesthetic and musical intelligences) then you may be powerfully
motivated to spend a major part of your time dancing. The sense of growing mastery
of the skill will be exhilarating, and an amplifier of motivation. On the other
hand, if you start with the motivation, prompted for example by an older
sibling’s musical prowess, then your skills may grow out of that. Musicality is a
good case in point because it is always held to be heritable. But new research
suggests that, provided you start early enough, and you persist, almost anybody can
become musically gifted—not, perhaps, to the level of a prodigy like Noel Waite
(whose full story is in Chapter 12), but enough to fool a layperson. Even later in life
(look at Colin Marshall) significant catching-up is possible, given strong enough
motivation.
I noted above that one of the intriguing aspects of the leaders in this book is that
they all appear to possess a broad skill repertoire. In terms of Howard Gardner’s
seven multiple intelligences they cover the territory. Noel Waite, for example, might
have been a professional singer (she has perfect pitch and started playing tunes on
the piano at three), a dress designer, or any kind of public affairs executive. She was
an enormously successful commercial artist for many years, before tragic
circumstances redirected her life.
Occupational psychopathology
Most people don’t have the entire repertoire, as Gardner’s researches indicate. This
means that people who rise through the ranks to leadership positions are sometimes
unbalanced, in the sense that their particular, narrow strengths continue to dominate
their thinking. I call this occupational psychopathology or the way that natural
strengths turn into weakness, given time and opportunity. It applies to all
occupational fields but perhaps the most spectacular example is that of airline pilots.
I know of no occupation where the vocational imperative is so strong, and so
narrow. By and large, pilots-to-be know, by the age of about ten, that there is only
one calling for them. For the most part, they will not contemplate the possibility of
any other job and they will do almost anything to make sure that they get to fly. Why
this is the case is mysterious. It is true that many pilots emerge from armed services
families and quite a few grew up in sight of aeroplanes taking off and landing, but
the only other variable I have been able to identify, as a result of working with
hundreds of airline pilots, is that the boys (most pilots are male) often used to be
tree-climbers. I remember well when I was young that there was a certain kind of
nice but semi-solitary kid that you tended to forget about, until you heard the
ambulance siren. An astonishing number of pilots come from the ranks of these
children.
Of course, we are dealing here with an intermingling of special skills and strong
motivation. It is the skill aspect that dominates the safety of air travel because
more than 80 per cent of worldwide air crashes are caused by ‘human error’. We can
use this example to learn something about leadership generally. Pilots, in general,
are fantastically good at certain useful skills but, being the particular self-selected
folk they are, they carry compensating weaknesses. Probably no occupational group
has been so exhaustively put through the psychometric hoops. Pilots are tested half
to death before they are released into the cockpit. The overwhelming pattern is as
follows. They are:
• Unusually good at complex data-crunching (if you have ever seen the array
of information on a modern flight-deck, you will understand how important
this skill is).
• Unusually dominated by cold, hard logic. Pilots find it virtually impossible
to solve problems other than by the application of strict, technical logic.
Happily, most of that logic is contained in standard operating procedures.
• Unusually decisive. Having taken the problem through the logical steps, the
pilot is a courageous decision-maker. There are many occasions when that is
exactly what the situation demands.
What this means is that the stereotypical pilot (there is virtually no other kind;
we are talking about the ultimate monoculture) is ideally designed by nature to
manage 99.9 per cent of what goes on in modern airline operations. At first blush,
that is reassuring to the air traveller. The rub is that modern technology looks after
the 99.9 per cent rather better than any human being can. It is the 0.1 per cent that
presents the dangers, when something truly unpredictable crops up, often as the
result of the simultaneous failure of two parallel systems. The stereotypical pilot is
then probably the worst person in the world to take the necessary decisions under
pressure. His pattern of strengths in pure logic incapacitate him for the totally
ambiguous situation. He has had little practice, in life or in his technical training, in
coping with illogic. This means that when things get messy he may be unable to:
• Absorb new information intuitively—by making patterns. The only

exceptions to this are some female pilots and most ex-air force, fast-jet
single-seater pilots. There isn’t time for all the readouts under
combat pressure—you absorb information in shapely chunks, not in orderly

sequences.
• Share the problem with anybody else and put it to the test of opinion. If you
think you know the facts and you have a foolproof logic for sorting them,
why kick it around, even if you have an hour’s flying time before you test
your decision to destruction?
• Scan for new information ‘outside the box’. If you have some time in hand,
it makes sense to do a bit of ‘what if . . . ?’ brainstorming.
In the days when there was still a flight engineer in the cockpit, he was
frequently the one who made the effort to interrogate the data banks for more
information. He was also occasionally the person who saved the aircraft by so doing.
In the older, three-person Jumbo cockpit, the engineer could physically take control
of the aircraft, at a pinch. The engineers’ mindsets were similar to pilots’ but,
happily, not identical. The engineer has now been replaced by technology, as a cost-
saver. The two remaining pilots (as psychologically similar as peas in a pod) now
have even more sophisticated data-crunching power separating them from ‘seat of
the pants’ judgement. Happily, for the peace of mind of the air traveller, it is as
possible to shore up the natural weaknesses of pilots as it is to shore up the natural
weaknesses of their chairmen.
There are many other examples of the phenomenon of occupational
psychopathology. Many of them parallel the case of the pilots—at the operational
end what you need is routinised thinking, but at the executive end you need
intuition. If you rise within the system, what was once a strength may become a
weakness, unless the individual has a broad repertoire of skills to call on. This
applies to accountancy, because routine auditing is no preparation for the detection
of truly outstanding crookery. It applies to policing, because police operations often
get in the way of inspired sleuthing. In the infamous case of the ‘Yorkshire Ripper’
there was a middle-ranking officer (an Imo) who ‘knew ‘ the murderer was Peter
Sutcliffe some years and seven lives before he was finally apprehended. Nobody
would listen to him. Most of the police were thrown off the scent by a hoax audio
tape (supposedly from the ‘Ripper’) with the wrong regional accent. Like the pilots,
they had jumped too quickly to judgement.
Occupational psychopathology also occurs in the upper echelons of the law.

Judges are generally drawn from the ranks of barristers. What barristers are good at
is binary conflict. The best of them come to believe in their cases, however
implausible, just as the great actors do. The two fields have much in common. David
Marr’s magisterial biography of Sir Garfield Barwick contains an acute analysis of
this phenomenon.
As an advocate he had a very great skill at solving his clients’ problems,

at getting them out of a fix, but as a judge he faced a different task: to
set out the true position of all the parties, to identify and expound the
truth. Few judicial ideas and principles emerged from the mass of his
judgements. It was always easier to guess Barwick’s response to a case
than to predict what principles he would use to decide it.
Barwick was a king-sized binary who did not translate well to the necessarily
ternary demands of the bench. You might argue that the quintessential barrister’s
skills are inimical to good judgement, except insofar as the barrister-promoted-to-
judge will be able to see through the tricks deployed by counsel. Happily, most
judges have broad-band abilities and manage the shift to ternary mode quite
gracefully.
The most worrying case of all is that of the politicians. What it takes to fight
your way through the alligators in the party political swamp is not necessarily what
it takes to exercise statesmanship. You hope, in a democracy, that senior
government ministers will be able to rise above the binary two-part battlefield in
order to focus on the ternary end, the well-being of the nation. It doesn’t always
work out like that. In truth, politicians need both a strong binary instinct for survival
and the capacity for detachment and statesmanship. It is an unusual combination.
MOTIVATION
I noted above that skill and motivation are bedfellows. The one can ‘cause’ the
other. As with knowledge and skill, if you aren’t motivated by the job in hand you
are bound to fail in the end. Most of us have seen cases where enormously talented
people have failed abjectly, solely because their heart wasn’t really in it. In assessing
this aspect, it helps to draw the distinction between two types, or levels, of
motivation (see Figure 12):
• task motivation, where the individual derives satisfaction from doing work
that gives intrinsic rewards
• primary task motivation, where the satisfaction derives mainly from
identification with the organisation’s purposes or outputs, rather than from
the particular work tasks or role.
A good example might be the person who is fortunate to be working with

figures, because he is very good at that (a professional accountant, for example)—
but for an organisation whose purposes he deplores (a tobacco company, for
example). Or another person might hold the wrong job in the right organisation. Liz
O’Shaughnessy (see Chapter 12) loved her work in the speciality carpet business
and had no quarrel at all with the outputs of the firm. Her demotivation flowed from
the business practices employed. When we come to this level of the hierarchy we are
dealing with quite deepseated aspects, linked with personal values. We can work our
way through a demotivating experience but we can’t easily relearn our basic
motives.
KNOWLEDGE, SKILL AND MOTIVATION

Taken together, these three elements need to be more or less okay if an individual is
to succeed in a job. They are important potential disqualifiers but they are at the
malleable end of the occupational equation. You can do something about adapting
each of them, at least for a while, if the current role incumbent really is the only
available person. Training and development, if carefully targeted, can do something
to enhance knowledge and skill. Money is a wonderful means of tweaking
motivation in the short term, although it won’t work indefinitely. What you can’t do
anything about is the next two elements in the hierarchy—personality quirks and
what I call intellectual firepower. I focus on them now because it seems to me that
they are generally misunderstood and that they are the primary cause of most big
cockups and blunders.
PERSONALITY (TYRANNY, COWARDICE AND

DECEIT)
This is a polite way of introducing the delicate subject of psychological damage. In
the course of working for many years at high levels in big global organisations I
have encountered, sometimes to my cost, a significant number of dangerous
people. I mean, by that, people of tyrannical, cowardly and deceitful habits. These
are generally people with the strongest possible ‘binary’ orientation, of the survival
type. This means that their past experience, I suppose mainly in infancy, has
predisposed them to approach all encounters as potentially threatening. These are the
characters who aim to ‘get their retaliation in first’, on the assumption that you must
have domination on your mind. Amanda Sinclair’s descriptions (see Chapter 11) of
the typical male-dominated, big-company, Australian-executive culture capture the
essence very well.
In a fascinating three-year study of criminal psychopathy (based on interviews
with long-term offenders in Scottish prisons), Lisa Marshall of Glasgow’s
Caledonian University discovered that an alarming proportion of successful
stockbrokers and politicians turn out to have profiles very similar to those of the
criminal psychopaths. They share the selfishness, callousness, exploitativeness,
dishonesty, glib persuasiveness, shallowness, lack of remorse, instability,
irresponsibility, social deviancy and promiscuity that are characteristic of the
psychopathic personality. Both the convicted criminals and the successful
professionals turned out to have had similar (hostile, authoritarian, inconsistent)
upbringings. The ‘successfuls’ simply didn’t kill anybody and probably had other,
compensating, talents. The important point is that, in certain fields and
organisational cultures, barmyness is no barrier to career progression.
Because we are dealing here with the executive suite, it follows that we are
dealing mostly with men. Because behaviour of this kind is so prevalent, particularly
around the boardrooms of some companies, it must follow that it is no barrier to
career advancement. The probability is that the best way to get ahead in some
organisations is precisely to behave in the way that damaged personalities behave. If
there are sufficient other damaged souls around, it won’t show. To be ‘normal’ in
such a place is to seem odd. By contrast, other company cultures have ternary values
and employ and promote notably sane people. Over the last thirty years I have had a
good deal of exposure to ICI/Zeneca around the world and I have always regarded it
as a relative oasis of calm and rational decision-making. This seems to be a deeply
entrenched cultural tendency, constantly reinforced by the steady promotion of
dedicated, low-key but highly intelligent executives—people like ICI’s late and
much missed Warren Haynes. I don’t, in other words, assume that all corporate
cultures are as Amanda Sinclair describes—just a worryingly large minority of
them.
The ICI case is worth examining briefly, if only to establish that this book’s
purpose is not to be rude about all big corporations. ICI Australia has always been a
well-run organisation. There is a lively rivalry between the corporate HQ in London
and the relatively autonomous Australian operation, but always in the context of an
intelligent, ternary framework. The key is in the continuity. Sir John Harvey-Jones
is one of the most famous, and successful, of all United Kingdom company
chairmen. I have had the privilege, and the enormous fun, of spending some time
with him. ‘Larger than life’ doesn’t quite capture his personality. He makes the point
that ‘only ICI’ would have hired him, aged 32 and straight from Royal Navy torpedo
boats and Cold War espionage, without even a university degree, let alone in
chemistry. How come? Probably only ICI would have had the confidence to post at
the selection gateway the kinds of wise old birds with the intuition plus the authority
to hire oddballs like Harvey-Jones on the basis of three fairly brief chats (not
‘interviews’). As Geoffrey Vickers points out (I quoted him earlier), the capacity to
exercise judgement, particularly when it comes to people, is rare and cannot be
proved, except as a result of experience and ‘track record’. ICI HQ simply posted
smart cookies, without the benefit of psychometrics, at the gateway. The rest is
history. Those who hired Harvey-Jones knew that they had probably just hired a
future chairman of the company.
It isn’t commonly known that Dick Beckhard, the doyen of the organisational
development consultants, has acted as mentor and consultant to all the ICI HQ
chairmen for nearly thirty years. If the chairman is there to provide context and
continuity for the chief executive, who provides the context and continuity for the
chairman? Typically, ICI has the long-term view. Even as the company has grappled
with the short-term irritations of takeover bids from the likes of Hanson Industries,
that calm long-term confidence and capability has persisted. It makes the company a
tough target and a tough competitor. You could make the same argument about a
well-founded corporation like BHP seeing off short-term ‘financial engineer’
predators. Anybody with experience of ICI Australia knows that that same low-key
confidence and capability is built in. (In the conclusion to this book, I go into more
depth on the subject of mentoring and the need for longer term, Beckhard-type
relationships of trust as corporations get lean to the point of anorexia and executives
get stressed to the point of madness.)
As evidence of the essential sanity of ICI, I cite a smallish piece of work I
carried out some years ago. This was an enquiry into management development
practices right across all the United Kingdom operating divisions. After a short
period of informal research, I made a suggestion to the client which I suspected
would be much too simple to be taken seriously. I had picked up what I thought was
a gap between the rhetoric and the reality of management development. I proposed
that our task force should fan out, in pairs, to test out in all the divisions whether
there was a significant difference between the answers to these two questions:
• What do you have to do round here to get things done?

• What do you have to do round here to get ahead?
My presumption was that the bigger the difference, by company division, the
bigger the problem in both practical and ethical terms. It would have been a very
threatening exploration in many corporations, and especially in those that Amanda
Sinclair describes. ICI ran with the idea, to very good effect, because it addressed its
consistency and ethical culture. The offending divisions, where the gap was large,
received tough and uncompromising attention from the ‘Centre’ as a result. The
Australian company has the same outlook. This is the kind of corporate culture in
which it is very unlikely that seriously damaged individuals will rise to high
position. Once risen, such a person would stick out like a sore thumb in ICI.
Technology companies sometimes suffer from too little craziness when it comes
to strategic thinking. That topic crops up in the section Intellectual firepower
(below).
Damage out of adversity
Let me offer an example of the kind of psychological damage that often appears in
the corporate world. I was once asked by a chief executive to ‘counsel’ a middle-
level sales manager of an unnamed company on the eve of his planned promotion to
senior management. The promotion looked pretty ‘obvious’ to everybody
concerned, and the man himself—let us call him Keith—had been vigorously
agitating for promotion. On the surface, in terms of seniority and proven success, his
time had come. The reason why the chief executive involved me, it transpired, was
that he had a bad feeling in his waters that Keith might not be up to the job, although
he couldn’t tell why. Call it intuition. I spent some time with Keith and played the
major part in ensuring that subsequently some other kind of work was found for
him. He was not promoted to the next level. I am quite sure to this day that I did
both Keith and the company a big favour. Indeed, he passed on to other things
elsewhere, but eventually caused a spectacular, and very expensive, disaster.
Let us be clear: Keith possessed all the mental agility he needed. The problem
lay in a deeprooted binaryness. He had not had an easy life. He had been the
youngest in a pretty tough family—very much the punchbag for all his big brothers.
School was pretty rough too—a down-at-heel school in an underprivileged area.
Being small of stature, Keith had been routinely bullied throughout his early years
there. But, miraculously, on one memorable day, Keith experienced a remarkable
conversion or insight. It dawned on him that his misery did not concern whether he
would get beaten up but when! The certainty was that he would be beaten up yet
again—the unbearable aspect was the terrible uncertainty about the timing of it.
Keith wasn’t stupid. He realised with a shock of insight that he could remove that
awful anxiety by switching to the role of aggressor—by controlling the timing!
From that moment on he took control of the uncertainty that mattered to him by
hitting first. The surprise element worked well with potential aggressors.
When he grew up he became a salesman—and a very successful one. He
combined a seductive and controlling personality with great gifts in the
interpersonal intelligences—he could read the signs of weakening resolve and he
closed mercilessly on his prey. In time, he was promoted to management and he
drove his salesmen as hard as he drove himself. High-pressure selling is a tough, no-
nonsense, fight/flight world. It suits the binary mindset admirably. When successful
salespeople are promoted up the line, they don’t always translate well to the
demands of dependence. (The theory of the ‘basic assumptions’ of fight/flight and
dependence is discussed fully in Chapter 14.) Any senior manager will sometimes
need to take on important fights, but he or she also has to serve as a dependable
figure for subordinates. Keith was fine on the fighting side. What his chief
executive sensed was that Keith was not capable of accepting and amplifying the
psychological projection of dependence. There is nothing wrong with mature
dependence—it is a normal and healthy part of adult life. The problems arise with
neurotic or resourceless dependence.
It doesn’t follow that you can’t become a successful leader if you have had a
tough upbringing. Some of the very best leaders turn out to be those that have
suffered adversity and overcome it through understanding and self-awareness. Such
people really understand the underdog. Generally, these are people who have had a
modicum of healthy dependence and dependability in their early caring
relationships, no matter how adverse the material circumstances. If there has been
somebody you can trust in childhood, the chances are that you will have the capacity
to inspire trust when you achieve adulthood. Keith is one example of a naturally
gifted person who may have been doubly unlucky in life’s lottery—not only
economically deprived but psychologically deprived as well. Whatever damage we
may have suffered, there is always going to be some kind of work we can do well.
Some occupations (arguably high-pressure sales among them) actually feed off
psychological damage. But senior management is not a field for the too-damaged-
not unless the organisation itself (the Nazi hierarchy would be a good example) is
crazy.
There is a difference therefore between having access to binary combativeness
and being dominated by survival needs. Most of us, save nuns and other reclusives,
live in a naughty world. There will always be times when we need to have our wits
about us and be prepared, if necessary, to see off a predator. To always shirk the
fight is to display one form of psychological damage. People who won’t fight often
betray good causes. One of the well-known contributory factors in child abuse or
murder is the nice social worker who empathises too much with errant parents/step-
parents, who knows in her heart of hearts that disaster is possible but is unable to
challenge less acute or more complacent colleagues in a crisis meeting or committee.
But the really damaged people see everything in terms of dominance and
submission. They can’t help it and, without deep and painful therapy, they are
unlikely to change much in adulthood. The presence of substantial numbers of
people like this in high corporate position represents a long-term problem not only
for the organisations concerned but for the country also.
If Keith had been promoted, he might well have survived for some time at that
level, because the provision of support at the top tends to be generous and,
sometimes, the operations are more opaque than at lower levels in the organisation.
This is because the longer time-cycles involved can actually conceal substandard
performance. At lower levels, cockups and blunders are likely to be exposed more
quickly. As long as he lasted, he would have exported ‘noise’ into the surrounding
system and, possibly, damaged other people as well.
Damage out of privilege
Keith’s story deals with only one aspect of the damage-into-management scenario,
though a common one. There is another kind of bad-news leader whose origins, by
contrast, are generally privileged. Interestingly, the best writer on this phenomenon
is the distinguished military historian/psychologist, Norman F. Dixon. His classic
text On the Psychology of Military Incompetence points out that disastrous
commanders are always ‘careless—to say the least ‘ with the lives of their men.
Some of these commanders are basically ‘mild, courteous and peaceful ‘ men who
have joined the peacetime military for, it might be argued, the wrong reasons—to
shore up their masculine deficiencies and to satisfy an ideal of manhood. These
leaders are generally reluctant to take tough and timely decisions. General Percival
of Singapore drove his Australian colleagues to distraction by delaying crucial
decisions about defending the island from the approaching Japanese army on the
extraordinary grounds that mounting a defence might be ‘bad for the moral of troops
and civilians ‘. The thousands of Australians who ended up in Changi detention
camp did indeed encounter ‘morale’ problems—if they survived, that is.
But when it comes to wasting lives, there is another more dangerous
pshychological type which tends to rise spectacularly through the military hierarchy.
This kind of commander, Dixon tells us, is characterised by ‘overweening ambition
coupled with a terrifying insensitivity to the suffering of others. These men, like
Haig, Townshed, Walpole, Nixon and Joffre, seemed dedicated to one goal—self-
advancement. Vain, devious, scheming and dishonest, they were certainly not
inactive in the courses they pursued, nor of course were they necessarily without
military talents’. Many of my readers, I suspect, will recognise at least a few
contemporary corporate leaders in this chilling description. The awkward fact about
the last ten to fifteen years of corporate life is that for many major organisations the
period has involved attrition of people—just like the First World War.
The simplest and best way for senior executives to feed personal ambition in the
modern corporation is to construct a rewards system based on stock options and then
drive out cost through downsizing, so as to impress the stock market with the short-
term ‘improvements’. No new markets are created, no new technologies are
developed, no competitive strengths are built. C. K. Prahalad has pointed out that
something like 600 million new consumers have entered world markets in recent
years, all of them hungry for new, useful products and services. The best that many
Anglo-Saxon (American, British, Australian) firms have been able to do is to reduce
the costs of existing business operations—just as with the generals at the Battle of
the Somme, the response is more of the same. Of course, many senior executives
have felt some angst about the spillage of loyal staff and about the shellshock of the
survivors. But very few have devised a long-term way of holding the whole team
together in order to conquer new fields.
The contrast: Asian stakeholding
There is a persistent tendency on the part of Western binary thinkers to
misunderstand the example of our Asian neighbour-competitors in success and
failure. If you are a fearful binary type, you will be motivated by short-term
survival. You will have little trust and faith in a beneficent long-term well-being. If
you observe the Asian ‘tigers’ to be doing well, you will want and need to believe
that this is due to low government expenditures, less welfare, compliant workforces
and an absence of regulations. You want to believe this because it fits in with the
exploitative, short-term binary mindset. If they do badly, you probably won’t blame
the binary, money-obsessed traders and bankers. The person with access to ternary
thinking is likely to view the causation differently. He, or more likely she, will
observe that one of the reasons why Asian government does less is that corporations
do more for their people. Moral debt looms large in these cultures. If the company
lays on a free bus service, the workers are likely, on their own initiative, to repay the
favour by devising a cost-cutting scheme. The company, in gratitude, then installs a
day-care centre, and so the reciprocal cycle rolls forward.
Charles Hampden-Turner cites the example of Intel in Penang, where the

Pentium processor is made:
The managing director, a Chinese Malaysian, explained how he had

started an in-house shop. Why? ‘To save time’, he explained, ‘but also
to generate profits, which we used to start the Credit Union. Now we
have taken capital in the Credit Union and invested it in low- and
medium-tech corporations in this area...it is so that any employee who
has worked loyally for us but cannot learn the trigonometry needed for
Pentium production can be outplaced in a company that our union partly
owns. We find jobs for everyone.’ We were standing in the middle of a
flower garden, which was also the day nursery. The children were
learning English. ‘Good morning, visitor!’, they chorused. Managers’
children are educated at cost, technicians’ at half-cost, workers’ children
are educated free.
Hampden-Turner is right. If you want to build a successful economy, you can’t

do it by wilfully misunderstanding what is happening amongst our neighbours and
competitors.
This is a discussion about the psychological damage sometimes found in senior
corporate executives. There is an obvious link with our next topic-intelligence. The
binary mindset is partly caused by psychic damage and it also constrains thinking
capacity. I will return to these general themes later but it is worth noting here that
we are touching on the currently fashionable idea of the ‘stakeholder society ‘; that
is, a society in which the various stakeholders—employees, shareholders, customers,
community and government—achieve some kind of harmony. The government of
Singapore proclaims wa or harmony between interests as their not-so-secret weapon.
Things start to go wrong when one stakeholder gets into a position to dominate the
others. There is not much argument any more that, in the 1970s, the most powerful
organised workers gained advantage not by cooperating in improving the production
process but by shaking down other stakeholders. In Britain, Margaret Thatcher
orchestrated the necessary reaction against that trade union dominance.
Unfortunately, she left behind a new dominance, this time on the part of the
shareholders, the big pension funds and their stock option-motivated cohorts in the
executive suite.
There is a growing acceptance that these ‘socio-technical’ questions are crucial
to the long-term health of modern economies. Viewed in this light, Australia may
be fortunate, as compared with the United Kingdom and New Zealand, to have
enjoyed some kind of ‘accord’ with organised labour, brokered by government. The
very idea of an accord, whatever its practical limitations, is ternary. It presupposes
an agreement to limit one’s binary power in support of a higher-order collaborative
purpose. This ought to mean that, with a change in government complexion, there is
no real need for a destabilising backlash against ‘union power’ in Australia. What is
not generally accepted as part of the mix is that long-term economic decline may be
caused by the cyclical and well-intentioned promotion of psychologically damaged
people to high executive rank. If the out-turn really is a raft of damaged people at the
top, it will be no surprise if questions of ‘leadership’ come into prominence.
The causation of damage
What are the other causes of the psychological quirks that produce such fearful,
tyrannical, seductive or untrustworthy ‘leaders’? One or two such causes are worth
our attention before we consider the kind of beneficent environments that contribute
to inclusiveness and harmony in society. One obvious cause is the failure of parents
to provide a safe enough environment for the infant. Young children can ingest
insecurity from their parents. Keith’s parents, no doubt, were evidently unable to
provide a secure and dependable passage through childhood for him. If a boy, in
particular, is habitually beaten for no good reason by a father or stepfather, as
Saddam Hussein and Josef Stalin were, then he is certain to be damaged by the
experience and quite likely to grow up needing to feel overpowerful (because his
inner sense of impotence is so overwhelming). We all now know the kinds of long-
term damage that flow from the physical and sexual abuse of young girls, but in a
male-dominated world few such girls, however undamaged, are likely to emerge in
significant leadership roles. Damaged boys are another matter. Happily, these kinds
of barbarism are relatively unusual.
Much more common, in the nicest of homes, is the phenomenon of so-called
‘conditional love’. If a child grows up subject to conditional love, he or she is likely
to need excessive doses of psychological reinforcement for the rest of life. This
happens when parents, with the best will in the world, attempt to manufacture what
they take to be the right or best kind of infant. The deal is: ‘We’ll love you, provided
you behave in the approved way!’ When children like this grow up to be bosses,
they need gratitude the way addicts need drugs. It’s not enough for subordinates and
colleagues to work with them according to the dictates of formal (ternary) role
relationships; they have to be personally grateful to the boss, in order to make up for
the deeply embedded gratitude deficit in the boss’s makeup. Such bosses will do
anything to get you in their gift. It can get pretty claustrophobic.
This is not a book about child care and upbringing but, if you want your children
to be clever, secure, inventive, independent and focused—like the entrepreneurs
celebrated in these pages, then there is a right and wrong way to approach the
matter. The trick seems to lie in accepting the child as he or she is, rather than trying
to manufacture a particular kind of infant. This means waiting patiently to find out
who this new person is and then giving thoughtful support to the development of
that person. It is usually called unconditional love but you could just as well see it as
a form of empirical scientific curiosity. The wise parent assumes that the child is
good enough (i.e. perfect) and prepares to learn as well as to teach. The long-term
payoff is in the psychological health of the child (a strong sense of identity) and in
clarity of mind. Of course, like anything else, unconditional love can be overdone.
People who cause a lot of trouble, like Nick Leeson of Barings infamy, or the
occasional mass murderer, often turn out to have mums who still believe they can do
no wrong—even after the whole world can see how naughty they have been.
The authoritarian personality

By far the most complained-about behaviour on the part of bosses concerns
bullying of subordinates and kowtowing to higher authority. If effective
leadership depends on respect and admirability, the bully or sucker-up can
never assume true leadership because he or she cannot be admired by sane
or decent people. Interestingly, there is a good deal of research evidence
about the kind of parenting that produces such ‘authoritarians’.
Overwhelmingly, authoritarians emerge from households where parents are
anxious about their status in society and where the values associated with
this anxiety are imposed with a heavy hand.
First, we need to understand what is meant by the ‘authoritarian’

personality. The research that led to the concept arose directly from the
Nazi holocaust. The question concerned how so many respectable God-
fearing Germans became willing accomplices to mass murder. If the
phenomenon was not understood properly, it might recur at any time,
whenever the psychological soil was again fertile. At the end of the war, the
task was given to a group of eminent psychologists and social
anthropologists at the University of California, Berkeley, under the
leadership of Erich Fromm and T. W. Adorno. Their starting assumption
was that so remarkable was the pattern of amoral behaviour amongst
prewar and wartime Germans that it must have been the case that a
deepseated personality type was implicated. Some of these scientists had
already been driven out of Germany in the 1930s.
The Berkeley team tested the attitudes and backgrounds of over 2000
Americans from many different walks of life. They were particularly
interested in ethno-prejudice—the tendency of some people to locate all
wickedness in outgroups. Those subjects that were the most anti-Semitic,
rigid, intolerant of ambiguity and hostile to perceived outsiders were further
subjected to open-ended projective tests and clinical interviews. All the
evidence pointed to the existence of a particular and consistent
constellation of attitudes and beliefs in the most prejudiced people. That
constellation, famously, was dubbed the ‘authoritarian personality’. There
was an ‘anti-type’ too—those who were characteristically individualistic,
tolerant, democratic, unprejudiced and egalitarian...all those characteristics
to which most of us aspire.
When we consider leadership in modern organisations we are not,
thankfully, concerned with homicidal racism or political repression, but we
do see behaviour that evidently springs from similar sources. We certainly
see plenty of aggressive bullying, intolerance, anti-intellectualism, and the
projection of wickedness onto others. We see enough of this sort of thing to
ask whether it is realistic to think of the authoritarian personality as an
element in managerial and leadership failings. Most of us have encountered
bosses who were apparently indifferent to the distress of others, especially
subordinates. Stanley Milgram’s famous experiments in the 1970s showed
a direct link between managerial behaviour in institutional settings and the
presence of the authoritarian pattern. These were the experiments where the
subjects, believing themselves to be administering electric shocks to other
subjects, were induced by the authoritative ‘scientists’ in charge to
administer increasingly severe ‘shocks’ to the actors playing the ‘helpless

victims’, even when their physical struggles and screams could be seen and
heard. The non-authoritarians, as predicted, quickly refused to continue
administering the increased ‘shocks’, despite orders.
The authoritarian personality combines the following dispositions:
• a rigid adherence to conventional middle-class values

• an uncritical submission to the idealised moral authority of his or
her chosen in-group
• a wish to identify, condemn, reject and punish people who violate
conventional values
• a strong resistance to the subjective, the imaginative and the
‘tenderminded’
• a tendency to superstition about ‘fate’ and a disposition to think in
rigid categories
• a preoccupation with toughness, strength and identification with
power-figures
• a generalised cynicism about, destructiveness towards and
denigration of the human
• a belief in the dangerous forces at work ‘out there’ in the world
• an exaggerated and puritanical concern with sexual ‘goings-on’ on
the part of others
The reader will see an obvious reflection of the binary mindset—but

expressed here in psychological or psychoanalytic terms.
The followers of Pauline Hanson will certainly be people who deal with
their fears and resentments by projecting their feelings onto outgroups.
The classic authoritarian grows up in a home where socially insecure
parents teach their children to put personal success and the acquisition of
power above all else. Children are encouraged to judge people for their
usefulness, rather than for any intrinsic merit. They are taught to eschew
weakness and passivity, to respect authority, and to despise those who have
not made the socio-economic grade. Success is always equated with social
esteem and material advantage. At the same time, the children are imbued
with rigid views regarding sex and aggression. Childish transgressions are
strictly punished and dissent is never tolerated. Sex is dirty and aggression
is only permissible towards such outgroups as Jews or coloured people or
law-breakers. Boys have to be masculine, tough and strong and girls
have to be, under a frigid kind of feminine respectability, alive to the

possibility of granting favours in the service of status-seeking.
A household exactly like this is probably uncommon. Households quite
like this are not so uncommon. They may produce the kind of
psychological damage that leads on to extreme ambition, ruthlessly
manipulative behaviour, and the virtual absence of shame or guilt. In
certain kinds of highly ‘political’ organisation, this is precisely the
collection of traits that is likely to lead to career success and hence to
‘leadership’ position. When workers put together lists of the desirable
characteristics of leaders, they invariably say that the good leader is
prepared to ‘stick up for’ his or her staff when necessary. The authoritarian
always sucks up to higher authority. Funnily enough, an almost identical
behavioural type to this—the so-called ‘J type’—had been identified by the
Nazi psychologist Jaensch some ten years before Adorno and his
colleagues did their research. The difference was that the J type was
regarded by Jaensch and the Nazis as an ideal type—hard, unbending and,
above all, pure.
INTELLECTUAL FIREPOWER
I have placed this element at the top of the pile in Figure 12 because I believe it to
be the most intractable element of all, even compared with deepseated psychological
damage. It is a very difficult subject with which to engage. With some trepidation,
bearing in mind the ‘gun lobby’, I have chosen the term ‘firepower’ in order to
emphasise the sense of calibre—the possibility of delivering more thoughtfulness
and ingenuity per minute worked. I noted in the Introduction that we are all very
unsure as to what intelligence is. Schoolteachers, who have a great deal to do with
the emergent capability of children, sometimes regard intelligence as the capacity
for book-learning and regurgitation of disembodied fact. Anti-intellectuals (like the
delinquent Spansky in Chapter 9) usually look on real, useful intelligence as all
practice and no theory at all. Cognitive psychologists are increasingly looking on it
as a kind of data-processing, but they have an interesting problem with the idiot
savant who is a brilliant processor but so narrow as to be unable to cope with
ordinary life. Posh people in Britain still talk about a ‘tremendously able chap’
without specifying what exactly he is able to do, other than talk brilliantly. It is a
tricky subject, but if we are serious about better leadership we have to tackle it.
I refer now to the trailblazing work of Professor Elliott Jaques, one of the
founders of the Tavistock Institute in London. The Tavistock was set up to explore
the ways in which the insights of psychology and psychoanalysis might be
transferred to practical spheres like industrial relations and management. The idea
made sense because anyone who has worked with industrial conflict will know it
gets irrational fast and often. If you can determine the underlying pattern (if you
like, the rationality beneath the irrational), you have at least a chance of resolving
the conflict intelligently. Jaques cut his teeth on the long-running Glacier Metal
Company project, which explored these questions for over thirty years continuously.
Its principal aim was to devise and test ways of constitutionalising work relations.
The chief executive, and one of the greatest postwar business leaders, was Wilfred
(later Lord Wilfred) Brown. He had read his history. His conclusion was that the
Germans had succeeded in taking the binary fight out of industrial relations by
placing the key stakeholders in formal representational (ternary) roles. This, he
reckoned, partly explained the German ‘economic miracle’. Being a Scot, Brown
was very reluctant to admit that the Germans might be better engineers.
Brown and Jaques worked as a complementary two-man team (in very much the
same way as Hudson and Lemmon) until Brown’s death in 1985. They took their
cue from the wider system of society. The argument was that the British cracked the
problem of political legitimacy in the 19th century, by gradually bringing everybody
within the franchise—by giving them a stake in the democratic process. Prior to that
the British were probably the most lawless and corrupt nation in Europe. People tend
to forget how violent and widespread the civil unrest was in Britain in the first half
of the 19th century. Once the institutions were fixed, the people magically turned
into sober and virtuous late Victorians. The gene pool was unchanged; the
institutional structures simply made it possible for people to behave calmly and
sensibly. But, having got it right in society at large, the Brits never quite saw the
connection with industrial democracy. Once the populace becomes sophisticated
about civic rights and duties (and firms get as big as large towns), people will not
put up with an absence of democratic participation in the occupational sphere—not

willingly, at any rate. The Germans were the obverse. They went on having awful
problems with civil democracy until 1945 but they grasped the principle of
democracy in the workplace right from the start. The irony is that they thought they
were copying English industrial practice, not realising that Robert Owen and the
other pioneers of practice and thought were Scots.
As the Glacier project unfolded (it is still very much worth reading about) it
made elbow room for outstanding people—’natural leaders’—to assume authority in
the workplace, beyond their hierarchical rank. Because people were empowered by
representative as well as operative and managerial roles, they got the hang of
wearing multiple hats. It was a boon for any potential ‘Imos’. When a visiting
American tycoon visited the Glacier factory in Kilmarnock in Scotland, he found it
impossible to understand how a convenor of union shop stewards could
simultaneously be a junior manager. When the manager in question was asked about
taking a particular decision, he could reply in all honesty: ‘It depends whether I am
wearing my hat as manager or shop steward!’ The American, binary to the core,
couldn’t grasp it. By loosening up the authority structure, Brown and Jaques were
making it possible for bright people to exercise task leadership in the spaces between
formal structures.
After thirty years or so, they had become pretty good at assessing and predicting
the ability of people to handle complex tasks and roles. This is the basis for
assessment by ‘intellectual firepower’. This means, in short, the ability to mentally
process complexity, with particular reference to differing levels of abstraction.
Currently, Jaques argues that this kind of capability can be gauged quickly by
merely listening to an individual talk for a few minutes, firstly about a general
subject, and then about something he or she really cares about. Buried in the use of
language is the structure of thought—the way that superior and subordinate
categories or classes are kept in tidy relationship; the way that different, but loosely
related, subject areas are connected in order to pursue an argument. Over the years,
Jaques’ associate Gillian Stamp devised a formal protocol (sometimes called Career
Path Appreciation) to make these assessments. They have been used all over the
world and their predictive powers are startling (as measured by longitudinal studies
of subsequent promotion). This formal method is described more fully in the final
chapter. People with the gift of character and capability assessment simply do this
intuitively. The people you want on selection panels are those who never make
mistakes in this regard. They are much more reliable and cheaper than psychometric
testing.
It is important to stress that intellectual firepower is only one of the capabilities a
leader needs. I am stressing it here because years of experience have taught me that
it is the most common and underrecognised cause of leadership failure. A lack in
any of the other dimensions—knowledge, skill, motivation, or personality—may
lead to failure. Human capability is frog-like—all the separate elements have to
work well together in an integrated fashion. A lack in judgement must lead to failure
eventually. When great blunders occur, the hunt is usually on for character
weaknesses or political chicanery or conspiracy theories. More often than not the
root cause has been the inability of the top person, over a continuous period, to hack
the complexity of the situation at that particular level. He might have had the
firepower to cope at the next job level down in the system. By definition, he won’t
know that this is the problem, except in terms of a vague sense of unease. If you
can’t hack it, you can’t hack that you can’t hack it! When the leader is out of his
depth, what tends to happen is a slowing down of the corporate response to events.
Important or urgent matters go to committee or on to ‘the back burner’. When a
leader is able to handle the complexity in a timely way, we generally call it
‘judgement’. In my formulation, it is the presence of intellectual firepower that
brings about the capacity for judgement.
The step-by-step development of judgement
Elliott Jaques suggests that there is a natural hierarchy of judgement—the capacity
to cope with complexity in situations of ambiguity and pressure. This is intuitively
observable as people grow up and extend their range of ability. Every schoolteacher
knows that the average seventeen-year-old can perform mental operations way
beyond the capacity of all but the most precocious primary school kids. The great
Swiss epistemologist, Jean Piaget, demonstrated long ago how infants pass through
stages in their capacity to make sense of complexity and ambiguity. Catherine Mant
and Josef Perner provide a good example of this in their study of how children
develop their capacity to comprehend commitment. Very young children understand

commitment in terms of simple and inflexible rules. To tell a lie is always wrong,
irrespective of the surrounding circumstances. The very young child will say that if
you cannot fulfil a commitment, even though you were prevented from doing so by
an act of God, the original commitment was a ‘lie’. This looks absurd to an adult,
but we forget how we ourselves have had to work through these conceptual steps
towards a more complex and realistic understanding of when, why and how we
become obligated to others.
The American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, building on Piaget’s work,
described no less than six stages of the development of ‘moral’ reasoning from
childhood right through into adulthood. Controversially, he suggested that very few
people achieve the highest levels of moral reasoning, which involve the processing
of great complexity in the mind. When people behave badly or ‘irresponsibly’,
unless they are deceiving themselves for personal advantage, they sometimes simply
cannot comprehend how others see, and condemn, their behaviour—’ What did I do
wrong?’ Jaques argues that managers similarly have to progress through stages in
the mastery of greater and greater complexity. It is not just a matter of handling
more data but of sifting and ordering information quickly—just as superior software
squeezes more productivity out of a computer system with relatively low-level
hardware. The effective leader knows what not to think about, and when not to think
about it, so as to keep the central processing free for what is really important. The
struggling manager out of his depth loses the plot and focuses on those matters that
smart subordinates (Imos) can see, easily, are peripheral to the main plot—or he
simply overloads his brain.
Jaques makes the connection between the stages of individual capacity, as they
develop over time, and the levels of increasing complexity in organisational
hierarchies. Furthermore, he suggests that the organisational levels are immutable,
because they reflect the realities of human capacity. Organisations are made by
people, and they can’t escape the natural properties of their makers. In truth, when
they work well they become like organisms—or, if you prefer, frogs. Figure 13
summarises Jaques’ argument about the kinds of value added by each successive
level, irrespective of whether the organisation concerned is a global manufacturer or
a suburban solicitors’ practice. If Jaques is right, no organisation, however big,
needs more than seven or eight levels of hierarchy. On the other hand, a global firm
absolutely needs every one of those incremental layers of authority. If you overdo
the ‘de-layering’, it is the equivalent of cutting out a necessary linkage in a frog’s
nervous system. The system will lose the plot because part of it won’t function
properly. All this is explained in much greater depth in Chapter 14. At this stage we
are concerned just with the data-crunching aspect of judgement.
Intelligent politicians (not an oxymoron)
Countries are very big systems and require very intelligent direction but it is not
uncommon to find very smart (though sometimes narrowband) public servants
responding to intellectually-challenged politicians. Most politicians are hot stuff on
the interpersonal intelligence but they don’t always have mental staying-power.
Their crowded schedules protect them from too much sustained thought. Also, their
creativity may have been stunted since their teens by the perceived need to embrace
just one side of every political argument.
If you compare, for example, the capabilities of national leaders like Paul
Keating and John Major (both losers in landslide defeats), a stark contrast is
immediately visible. They are the same age and they come from comparable social
backgrounds. Both have been educated mainly in the university of life. If we
compare the immutable aspects of capability—the psychological and the
intellectual—the differences show up. John Major is broadly accepted as a nice
enough guy. He can be a tough politician, of course, but he lacks Keating’s waspish
bite. As Laurie Oakes put it succinctly: ‘The trouble with Paul Keating is that if you
give him a clip over the car you get a thermonuclear attack back!’ Keating clearly
finds this tendency difficult to control; there is a strong streak of binary
combativeness buried deep in his makeup. This is destructive—it was felt to be the
main cause of his unpopularity amongst Australian women (half the voters) before
the 1996 election. Many of them hated the idea of their sons growing up to behave
in a similarly cruel, punitive and larrikinish way. It would be unthinkable for John
Major to harangue a public servant for three-quarters of an hour for simply doing her
job (stewardship of public funds in relation to a now infamous teak table intended
for the Prime Minister’s official residence). At that moment, Paul Keating lost the
plot.
VII Global corporate Sustaining long-term viability; defining values, (25–50)

prescience moulding contexts
VI (Group) corporate Reading international contexts to support/alert (15–20)
citizenship level V strategic business units
V Strategic intent Overview of organisational purpose in context (→ 10)
IV Strategic Inventing/modelling new futures; positioning the → 5)
development organisation
III Good practice Constructing, connecting and fine-tuning systems (→ 2/3)
II Service Supporting/serving level 1 and customers/clients (→ 1)
I Quality Hands-on skill
Figure 13 Levels of work authority, complexity and talent

This chart summarises Elliott Jaques’ famous stratified systems theory. It
depicts the natural and ineluctable steps from simple short-term work to the
most demanding and complex work. The figures on the right refer to years—
the ‘time span of discretion’ at that level of complexity. A serious error of
judgement at (say) Level IV might take as long as five years to show through
(by which time the culprit will almost certainly have shot through). Jaques
argues that no organisation, however big or global, needs more than about
seven hierarchical levels, because these strata reflect the natural increments of
the human capacity to exercise discretion. On the other hand, ‘delayering’
beyond this minimal backbone of authority will inevitably weaken the
organisation, because necessary connections will be severed. Nobody who
works in an organisation is completely confined to his or her level of
capacity—we all have to perform mundane chores sometimes and, perhaps,
overstretch ourselves later the same day. But if we are persistently
overstretched, without watchful supervision, we will eventually make a
blunder.
Compare then the intellectual angle and there is a complete contrast. John
Major’s use of language is wooden and muddled. ‘Majorisms’ almost rival
‘Bushisms’ (George Bush’s famous convoluted engagements with the English
language) for obtuseness and meaninglessness. A favourite amongst British
journalists is Major’s statement to the Scott Inquiry into the illegal arming of Iraq:
‘Something that I was not aware had happened suddenly turned out not to have
happened!’ This merely reflects his failure to grasp higher-order principles. Major is
dull because he has no agility of mind. This means that when things get
really complicated he closes down the discourse in order to keep it in control.

Content analysis of his non-scripted utterances reveals their banality and lack of
depth—a nice, dull guy in charge of a very big, complicated system. As a result,
most of the big, important issues stay on the ‘back burner’ and the time spans of
lower-level decision-making get shorter and shorter.
Keating, for all his bad binary habits, flipflops into ternary mode and is capable
then of great depth and breadth. The ‘big picture’ may not have been the most
important issue for the Australian electorate in 1996, but few Australians doubted
Keating’s capacity to comprehend it. Even his insults were poetic. They
demonstrated a capacity to import earthy and emotional content to add impact—this
was a waspish but clever guy in charge of a system just a third as big as the United
Kingdom (in population terms)—a broad-bander. Take your pick. When it comes
time to make choices (as between a Paul Keating and a John Howard, for example)
people tend to factor in both of these aspects—the perception of psychological
damage and the perception of intellectual capability. When the opinion pollsters get
it wrong they often miss this intuitive aspect of popular perception. When people
vote ‘emotionally’ (or intuitively) they remember what it is like to be bossed, or
parented, by somebody punitive or out of his or her depth. The Australian people
probably accept John Howard at his own estimation as a ‘battler’. Whether he will
seem deep enough, in the long term, for the more complicated challenges of
leadership, we shall see.
The worldwide debate on political ‘stakeholding’ is connected with the stage
theory of moral development and of judgement. Essentially, those who argue for
explicit stakeholding for all elements in society and for the reining in of naked
capitalistic competition are saying that society is a big frog and its multiple
interconnections cannot be reduced to simple formulae. Their view is that ‘the state’
has to intervene in order to level the playing field, having taken democratic account
of the public will. Their ideological opponents insist that ‘the state’ is a sinister and
coercive enemy of individual ‘freedom’ and of the natural development of
competition between ‘free agents’ in ‘free markets’. Margaret Thatcher believes this
and so do the huge numbers of Americans who positively hate ‘big government’.
These people combine laissez-faire economics with a doctrine of unbounded liberal
individualism. The view is that market relations, regulated by contracts
and lawyers, should determine the proper working of societies. All obligations and
commitments can be traded or written down in contracts. It is not surprising that
lawyer-politicians such as Margaret Thatcher see things in this way. The argument
quickly becomes a moral argument. If we go back to Mant and Perner (above) we
see that the understanding of mutual obligation and commitment is subject to stage
development in infants. Maybe the free-marketeers have not yet developed to the
point where they can comprehend higher-order societal obligations? Maybe we are
really dealing with intelligence rather than ethics? Remember that Margaret
Thatcher famously opined: ‘There is no such thing as society!’
SUMMARY OF THE ELEMENTS

When a leader fails, the failure can be caused by any one of the five elements I’ve
outlined, or by any combination of them. Human beings are much more like frogs
than like bicycles, so all the elements are interconnected all the time; and there are
plenty of others (e.g sheer luck or variable physical energy levels) as well. My years
of observing leaders and selecting people for big jobs has forced me to conclude that
there is a symbiotic link between the two most important elements—the
psychological damage factor and the intellectual firepower factor—hence the
firepower Up and damage DOWN arrows in Figure 14. I noted earlier that Dr
Wilfred Bion (one of the Tavistock founders and the fount of much of our
understanding of group process) argued that arrogance and stupidity are virtually the
same element, because the one always causes the other. In binary/ternary language,
if an individual is strongly driven, or overwhelmed, by survival/control needs, then
he or she will need to predetermine any uncertain situations. The only social
justification for this is being right and knowing what to do. Eventually this will be
perceived as arrogance, even though its wellsprings lie in weakness and insecurity.
If you predetermine the local situation, you cannot be open to the wider ‘law of the
situation’—to use Mary Parker Follett’s pungent term. This means you will never
learn. If you never learn, you must get progressively more stupid.
The reader is entitled to wonder how anybody can rise to near the top of a large
organisation and still be counted stupid or arrogant. This is all relative, according to
the levels of work and complexity(see Figure 13). Strongly binary people are
Figure 14 Leadership elements

The two most significant (because intractable) leadership disqualifiers are
poor judgement and psychological damage, and they interact. When a leader
is overexposed or overpromoted, his or her intellectual capacity becomes
overburdened. At that point, any latent quirks are likely to emerge, under
pressure, perhaps explosively. A previously equable boss may become
tyrannical, secretive, impulsive, cowardly or deceitful. Suddenly, long-buried
psychological damage from the dim past is painfully exposed. Decisions
become erratic, or are delayed beyond reason.
very energetic, very controlling, very demanding, very seductive and, of course, very
ambitious. They can hold it all together with remarkable facility, like one of those
circus jugglers with multiple plates spinning on sticks, but there is no time or space
for serious thought. The weakness generally shows up in argument. The failing
leader, in the eyes of bright subordinates, ‘misses the point’ or cuts off the debate (in
the interests of ‘getting on’) just at the point it is getting complicated (i.e. interesting
and demanding). Stanley Baldwin, one of the dimmest of British prime ministers,
was well known for sucking blotting paper when he ‘went out of gear’ mentally
(Neville Chamberlain’s description). You can be quite sure that the failing leader’s
spouse, if any, will know the truth.
The story moves on now to the rest of my intelligent leaders. The reader can take
it as read that they earn their place here thanks to their broad-band mental
capacities and their lack of any of the crucial disqualifiers listed. Above all, they
combine practical intelligence with my definition of sanity. All of them are a bit
eccentric, but that is another matter. All Imos are eccentric by statistical definition.
Bob Clifford:
the ingenious ‘dunce’
Every organisation needs one core competence–innovation!

Peter Drucker
Bob Clifford, AO, boatbuilder extraordinary, is beginning to be a well-known figure

in Australia. In the global ferry world, he is already a very well-known figure–the
man to watch. There aren’t very many Bob Cliffords in Australia, or anywhere. Part
of the argument of this book is that there could, and should, be many more, if only
we understood ‘intelligence’ better, in order to give it the chance to flourish. To
think or write about Clifford is to question what we mean by ‘intelligence’. He is
also another example (like Sir William Hudson) of direct leadership, in the sense
that he personally commands the Incat (International Catamarans) empire. But he
also illustrates a number of the other elements dealt with above:
Bob Clifford: The Ingenious ‘Dunce’ 133
• The crucial importance of broad-band intelligence, with particular reference

to the physical, the spatial and the interpersonal. Being a broad-bander
means that Clifford can easily work with anybody, whatever his or her
pattern of intelligence. This is important in the rough world of boat-building.
Part of the delight of Bob Clifford is that he was famously ‘dumb’ at school.
• The capacity for holistic ‘frog’ thinking. Clifford has always worked things
out in the round before getting down to the bikish details. The similarity to
Mozart’s account of the creative process (in chapter 2) is striking. This
capacity to visualise the totality speeds up the cycle of design and
manufacture and promotes market leadership.
• The passage over time through the levels of complexity, from a relatively
simple fishing boat, built to solve a local commercial/technical problem, to
the creation of a global enterprise to solve large-scale marketing problems
for international shipping firms. Clifford’s story reveals the points at which
he sensed it was time to move on to bigger and better things.
• The crucial importance in leadership of the ternary principle. The real
motivator for all Clifford’s dedicated staff (despite his undoubted charisma)
is the big, beautiful craft they slip out of the Hobart shed every few weeks.
They sense that the boats are his true love, so they love them too.
At the time of writing, Incat churns out about four very big, very fast, aluminium
car-carrying ferries per annum, on a 12-week cycle, alongside the manufacture of
smaller and more conventional craft. The business is bursting at the seams of its big
yard near Hobart, and expanding fast. About 1000 Tasmanians currently work round
the clock at the yard and a network of licensing arrangements around the world
extends Incat’s range of influence. Clifford’s (current) biggest cat is a 96-metre craft
with capacity for up to 1000 passengers and about 250 cars or a lesser number of
heavy freight vehicles. Its top speed of nearly 50 knots means that it has the
capability of transforming the economics of certain kinds of ferry routes. In the
Baltic Sea or around the Far East, there are many calm-water routes where quick
turnaround is much more important to operates than huge payloads. This is the
maritime equivalent of developments in the computer world (see Chapter 10)–where

local speed and flexibility become more attractive than reliance on big, cumbersome
centralised systems.
To exploit the quickly growing fast-ferry market requires at least four particular
kinds of operational intelligence:
• The psychological capacity to get inside the minds of ferry operators from
many different cultures and to foresee for years ahead the constraints and
opportunities that confront them.
• The technical capacity to combine aluminium fabrication with constantly
developing design principles to devise better and better solutions to a
particular kind of transportation challenge.
• The intellectual curiosity to innovate; to leap ahead of conventional
assumptions in order to see what can be made to happen.
• The managerial capacity to nurture, and renew, a big workforce under
conditions of constant change.
This is called in the trade a ‘socio-technical system’–a combination of psychology

with leading edge technology. One expert puts it this way: ‘You see, Robert Clifford
understands aluminium!’ But that is not enough; you have to understand the
operational setting as well. Clifford says: ‘I’ve been a yachtsman and a ferry
operator. I know that weight is a state of mind, and I understand customers!’ The
statement, WEIGHT IS A STATE OF MIND, is pure Clifford–as much philosophy
as technology!
ASPECTS OF LIFE
The inventive dunce
We are jumping ahead. We need to recall that this remarkable entrepreneur ‘felt
inadequate’ throughout his schooldays, failed the ability test to get into high school,
was therefore sent to (the private) Hutchings School in Hobart by his ambitious
parents, and failed everything there too (in the ‘B’ class, of course). He ‘even failed
woodwork!’-apparently quite an achievement, and deeply ironic for a man
who would subsequently sculpt some of the most beautiful and efficient craft on
the seas. Clifford cheerfully copied most of his homework (and usually got
caught doing it) and failed his Schools Board Examinations. He didn’t even try to
pass.
But, significantly, his first serious reading began at around thirteen or fourteen
years of age, as a direct result of a new passion for sailing. His actual ‘homework’ at
this time (despite the teachers) was voracious reading, of a very focused kind, about
the technology and techniques of sailing. Clifford began to read when reading had a
serious purpose for him personally. Howard Gardner (Chapter 9) calls this the
‘crystallising experience’–the first moment when a child really connects with the
educational experience in such a way as to engage curiosity and stimulate further
exploration. This is when the young person senses: ‘This is me!’ If we accept that
God made Bob Clifford to make boats, then it is fortunate for the Tasmanian
economy that he had privileged access to sailing as a teenager (in his case via
school), because the sailing unlocked the intellect. That sort of access even ten years
later would have been too late to kickstart what was to follow (because crating a
major international enterprise usually takes most of a lifetime).
But this was a happy childhood. The young Clifford would actually turn up an
hour early for school, so much did he enjoy all the companionship and activity. His
main pursuits were swimming and sailing. Water, it seems, was his true medium.
Somewhere outside the curriculum, some important learning was going on inside the
‘beanhead’–Clifford’s standard nickname to this day. For example, take this insight
on market positioning and technology development: ‘In sailing, every decision has a
time-frame. In ten minutes, it’s a different decision!’ It sounds like a simple
statement, but it illustrates the importance of any executive’s capacity for
decisiveness in a turbulent environment. Clifford did not need to be taught this
principle at a business school–he learned it through the seat of his pants as a
teenager at the helm.
The reader will know by now that Bob Clifford was a ‘bright’ kid, but obviously
not bright in the way that schoolteachers generally recognise, Chapter 9, which
describes the schooldays of the young subversive, Spansky, deals in some detail
with all the facets of brightness. Spansky, who didn’t get to go to an expensive
private school, ended up in a reform school for fiendishly inventive delinquents.
Before we leave Clifford’s schooldays (and in the hope that some
of his ex-teachers may happen on this book) it is worth noting that he was usually
able to get to the correct answer in algebra, but without working through the formal,
sequential process. No doubt, the other pupils were picking their way serially
through all the formal steps of an algebraic ‘bicycle’. Clifford already had the ‘frog’
in his head, but not the mental means to unpack it. As Howard Gardner comments:
‘IQ tests would be completely different if they were designed by entrepreneurs!’
Even now, Clifford knows that if a design works ‘on the back of an envelope’ it
will work in will practice, though somebody else will have to sit down and carry
through all the detailed calculations: ‘There’s an awful lot you can’t put into the
drawings!’ When Incat made its first cat (an unsatisfactory design, as it turned out),
Clifford took enormous pride that his rough and ready speed calculation of 26 knots
was within 0.1 knots of the detailed calculation of Australia’s foremost naval
architect.
The young boatbuilder
It is an arbitrary matter to split anyone’s life into compartments, but necessary if you
want to extract some learning. Anyone who fails at school, like Bob Clifford, needs
to start feeling capable, about something, soon. To much continuous failure seems to
be corrosive (cf. Spansky). There is likely to be a big element of luck in all this.
After leaving school early, Clifford spent three years as an apprentice compositor in
a small printing works, in the days of old-fashioned mechanical printing. The saving
grace of the job, which had no long-term career prospects, was that it called for
compositional (hence spatial) skills, which are essentially creative. From this
vantage point he also got to watch a small-scale entrepreneur-the owner-build up a
business from nothing much to twenty employees. Once you have seen how
relatively easy it can be, entrepreneurship holds few terrors. Even as a teenager,
Clifford also saw the technological revolution in printing coming over the horizon.
That was really interesting.
Matter were taken out of his hands. His father, who owned and operated three
butcher’s shops, retired and decided to go into fishing. For the next ten years Bob
Clifford became a fisherman. The family bought two boats and spent five years
making no money at all with basically inferior resources. In those days there were
still plenty of fish about but you needed the right sort of all-weather boat to get at
them in order to make some money. Clifford could already ‘see’ in his mind’s eye
how you could transform the cost vs performance equation and he had a plan in
mind for the right boat. He set about building it ‘on overdraft’. It was done through
an established boat-builder but most of the donkey work, including all the materials
purchasing, was carried out by Clifford and his father. The reader can imagine the
learning to be got by a young man at the age of twenty-three in carrying through
every operation, from conceptualisation to construction, of a project like this. One of
the interesting things you learn is ‘how to keep people waiting (for payment) nicely’
but ‘always pay the bank!’
They made a good boat. ‘We launched her on the Wednesday, went to sea on the
Sunday, and twelve days later we had a full load of lobsters.’ Two years later
another boat was built and the business boomed. By the age of twenty-five, Bob
Clifford knew how to design and build for commercial operation. He also
understood, in a relatively simple form, how to juggle parallel resources over time
while a project comes slowly to fruition; a useful lesson. (In Chapter 9 I refer to the
ways in which this particular lesson might be learned by lots of youngsters in
education.) By his mid-twenties, Clifford had worked in close harness with two
older role models–one a classic enterpreneur (though on a small scale) and the other
a craftmaster in the solution of technical (fishing) problems. He soon outstripped
them both, but the experience told.
The turning point
Most successful entrepreneurs can point you to a significant moment when historical
developments coincided with personal readiness to exploit an opportunity or create
something exciting. For Bob Clifford, that defining moment probably came on
Sunday night, 7 January 1975, when he was just thirty-two years of age. On that day
a 10 000 ton freighter ploughed into the Tasman Bridge over the River Derwent. In a
few seconds, Hobart’s only fixed river crossing disappeared into the water. It was a
good time to be the Tasmanian capital’s only ferry operator.
How had this come about–the shift from fisherman to ferryman?
By his late twenties Clifford had realised that he required more than fishing as a
life’s work: ‘My mind was too active; I wanted to get into the ferryboat business.’
To the detached observer, it looks as though Clifford might really have wanted, and
needed, to build more boats. There was one false start in the ferry business, and no
financial help at all from the State Government for the young entrepreneur. The hero
of the hour and an early begetter of the Incat achievement was Tony Travers, then
manager of the ANZ Bank at Sandy Bay. Bank managers come in for a lot of stick,
so it is important to celebrate the occasional one who has both judgement and the
courage to act on it. He underwrote what was to become the Sullivan’s Cove Ferry
Company, an association of Clifford’s accountant, ex-wife, father and doctor–a
fairly typical entrepreneur’s first company.
The company was posited on the idea that there was still a ferry market in
Hobart, even though the construction of the bridge ten years before had killed off the
existing passenger ferry. Crucially, Clifford succeeded in acquiring a liquor licence,
in order to back up the passenger trade with charters and tourism. At this point,
connections became important. Ex-fishermen always know how to get hold of
terrific fresh crayfish, scallops and so on. Clifford invented the weekday lunchtime
restaurant cruise, an instant source of healthy profit. With the construction of second
boat, the company could run five lunchtime cruise every day. As things turned out,
possession of the liquor licence was more than useful.
When the bridge bash came, Clifford was ready. ‘It was the first bit of
government assistance we ever got. I knew what to do–I had fantasised about it
happening!’ Clifford was at a party that night and did not learn of the accident until
some hours later. But by the following morning all his plans were laid and his
twenty-five staff fully briefed. The history of the next few days and weeks is
fascinating for the catastrophe theorist but too detailed for our purposes here. In
hindsight, it can be seen that it took the authorities a long time to come to grips with
the problem facing the city. Clifford moved smoothly into action and not without
friction with those authorities; it was a time for assertiveness.
This is a book about intelligence–that is, the capacity to operate effectively in
complex and demanding situations. What is interesting about the Clifford response
is, once again, the mental connections. He understood straightaway that passengers
need a user-friendly frequency on the way to and from work. He could see, and
empathise with, the commuter’s state of mind. That meant a walk-on service. He
built three new small-to-medium-size, monohull, 300-passenger ferries fast, all
named after bushrangers. The government, effectively in competition with Clifford
by now, made the mistake of going for big 600/700-passenger ferries imported from
Sydney, which necessitated building a huge terminal infrastructure, which meant the
deployment of piledrivers for the construction of new jetties, and so on. Clifford
quickly achieved a five-minute-cycle timetable, utilising the existing infrastructure.
On top of that, he had the sole liquor licence.
‘For three years, I had the biggest hotel in Australia!’ It was, in fact, the
publican’s dream–the captive and thirsty customer you ‘kick out in twenty minutes
time’. Late each day, when the other ferries’ loads thinned, the Clifford boats still
set off with full loads: their customers were enjoying more than a journey–it was an
experience! By moving fast, with an eye to the consumers’ needs, Clifford had
created that most valuable asset–customer loyalty.
The big idea
It took three years to construct the new bridge over the Derwent. Long before the
ferry bonanza came to an end, Bob Clifford was engaged on the next enterprise. In
fact, International Catamarans, set up with the distinguished naval architect Philip
Hercus, was formed as early as 1977. The Sullivan’s Cove Ferry Company was
wound down, selling its ships at a profit.
The origin of the Incat business is interesting. It perfectly reflects Jacob
Bronowski’s dictum: ‘Every act of imagination is the discovery of likenesses
between two things which were thought unlike.’ In the scramble to solve the
Derwent crossing problem, Clifford had hired a hovercraft from Sydney. This craft
was number 34 from the Hovermarine boatyard in the United Kingdom. Two things
became apparent immediately:
• It was of fundamentally poor design and hardly ever worked properly. The
maintenance load was therefore huge. Like a lot of British inventions, it was
ingenious but silly. Clifford and his colleagues found it hard to credit that
well over thirty-four of these ugly ducklings had been sold around the
world.
• The travelling public loved it, to the point where it was possible to charge
double the usual ticket price. It offered a stylish and interesting way to travel
and, despite all the disadvantages, it was fast.
It was really at this point that Bob Clifford earned his spurs as an intellectual. I
use the word deliberately. When he is not globetrotting you are likely to find him in
the evening sinking a few beers with friends, at the Shipwright’s Arms on Battery
Point in Hobart, as he has always done. ‘Intellectual’ is probably the last word most
people would use to describe this amiable, bearlike figure. There is no pretension
about Clifford. But what makes him stand out is the kind of intellectual curiosity
shared by all good minds. Bright people have to know how things work, and they
have to find out what might happen if ...That Clifford is a successful entrepreneur
and leader is commonplace. That he is, at base, the possessor of formidable intellect
is much more important, and the point of this book.
Bob Clifford had to understand why the hovercraft worked at all and what
stopped it working optimally. Essentially it was merely a ‘cat with a skirt’-a device
for cutting down friction. But its shape was inefficiently high and square and its
propulsion, by high-speed diesel driving small propellors through an inefficient
‘vee’ gearbox, was wasteful. The challenge was to take the principle of the
catamaran down a different path by redirecting the forces. Catamarans have certain
fundamental advantages over monohulls–they require less power for a given speed
and the large available deck space is ideal for the carriage of passengers. If you can
make them big and stable enough, they can also transport motor vehicles over
longish distances in ocean seas.
At the outset of Incat, Clifford and Hercus were working on these technical
problems in parallel with Scandinavian designers, though they did not know it at the
time. Clifford now takes the view that this isolation was a help rather than a
hindrance: he and Hercus were forced to confront all the problems from first
principles. That meant that all the solutions would be fundamentally innovative. For
example, one of the reasons that Incat has been able to see off shipyards all round
the world is that its approach to manufacturing owes more to aircraft assembly
than to traditional shipbuilding methods. Later on we examine the work of another

Australian innovator (Robert Keep) in a different field. He takes the view that
Australians have a combined advantage: easy connection to a networked world,
together with easy disconnection, in order to think.
With catamarans, the big technical problems cut in with increased size. The
history of Incat, from the first commercial design (18 metre) in 1977, to the current
91 metre craft, is a story of problem-solving—how to make a big, fast boat with the
inherent advantages of catamaran design but none of the disadvantages. The solution
was the ‘wave-piercer’—a compromise between the simplicity of a conventional
catamaran and the SWATH (small waterplane area twin hull) type of vessel. The
characteristic of the modern wave-piercer is the central hull which rides above the
surface in calm conditions but picks up buoyancy in heavy seas, thus preventing
nosediving. Bob Clifford has an interesting scar on his forehead—the result of the
entire bar of a prototype vessel hitting him (rather than vice versa) when the craft
‘stuck its snout in’. Immediately before this happened, Clifford sensed that the boat,
which was actually surfing in high seas at the time, was near its limit of safety. ‘I’m
really a test pilot for these boats!’
Along the way, the shift from steel to aluminium construction occurred
(delivering crucial weight savings) and the move from propellor to water-jet
propulsion. The boats also require highly sophisticated ride control systems, which
are still under continuous development. Because Incat was in the vanguard of this
technology, the company had to suffer and solve the problems that always
accompany innovation. That is the downside; the upside is to be continuously some
years ahead of the competition. There is much more to come—very fast, very big,
custombuilt freight carriers, for example, may be powered by gas turbines. The Incat
kind of boat could now go much faster but the problems that then arise are different
kinds of problems—nearer to the world of aircraft than to maritime technology. Bob
Clifford is there already, constantly trying out new possibilities on the backs of
envelopes. The word around Incat is that the senior managers dread the return of the
boss from his constant visits to customers and prospects around the world, because
sitting on long-haul aircraft gives him time to think—and that means even more
ideas to be processed.
Positioning
The world is full of inventors with good ideas. Most of them remain obscure figures
and many get ripped off by smart businessmen. This means that their intelligence,
though formidable, operates across a narrow range. Many of them have been
narrowly absorbed in scientific endeavour since childhood (see the reference to
Sulloway in Chapter 1). Bob Clifford, we must remember, had been an amiable,
highly sociable, physically active and popular ‘dunce’ who wore his intelligence
lightly. Right from the start of Incat, he seems to have had a good feel for what the
marketing people call ‘positioning’. As one famous marketer puts it: ‘There is only
so much room at eye-level at the checkout—the trick is to be there!’ Clifford knew
from the start that these new kinds of boats could not be sold on paper. Incat’s third
catamaran, and its first aluminium boat, barnstormed its way from Hobart to Cairns
on its delivery voyage. Six had been sold by the time of arrival. Clifford had also
grasped that the wave-piercer catamaran technology also delivers a terrific-looking
boat—ideal for the flashy Great Barrier Reef trade.
That was only the beginning. It was also at Clifford’s suggestion that James
Sherwood, the proprietor of Sea Containers (one of Incat’s first big international
customers), should go for the Hales Trophy—the ‘Blue Riband’ for the fastest
crossing of the Atlantic by a passenger craft. Hoverspeed Great Britain, the first 74
metre catamaran, broke the record in 1990, completing the crossing at an average
36.6 knots. Bob Clifford was the captain for the record-breaking voyage but handed
the vessel over to its new owner on arrival. This was a mighty useful public relations
exercise but it also underlined one of the key sales features of these boats—their
capacity to flit quickly round the world to wherever the business is. Some of them
migrate annually between the hemispheres in order to serve seasonal markets. Even
back in 1986 the very first fast 30 metre ferry, Our Lady Pamela, took her delivery
voyage from Hobart to Portsmouth under her own power (in order to ply the fifteen-
minute crossing between Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight).
Since then, Clifford has succeeded in positioning himself and the company in
spectacular fashion. Firstly, his syndicate won line honours in the fiftieth Sydney–
Hobart yacht race in 1994. This meant acquiring the maxi New Zeland Endeavour,
renaming it Tasmania, and assembling the right crew, quickly, to carry out the job. It
was the first Tasmanian boat to win the most famous race to Tasmania. The
announcement of the challenge had taken place just three months before, on 8
October 1994, just twelve days after another canny exercise in positioning—a visit
to the Incat yard by the Prime Minister, Paul Keating, to officially open a new
construction shed and slipway.
Nine hours after the announcement Bob Clifford ran the $40 million Condor II,
at high speed, on to Black Jack Rocks near the entrance to the Derwent River,
during her sea-trials. Forty-eight people were on board at the time, many from the
purchaser’s organisation. Of course this was a catastrophe, but as an exercise in
attention-grabbing it takes some beating. The huge craft sat on the rocks for forty
days, an unavoidable topic of conversation in Hobart, as the salvage effort got under
way. Many theories about causation were canvassed, some of them salacious, all of
them engaging. The real cause was technical and quite dull, but Hobartians had a
wonderful time with the story.
It would not be quite accurate to say that Bob Clifford enjoyed the outcome of
the grounding. In some ways it reinforced his cavalier reputation. But the disaster
did present an absolutely gripping technical problem—not how to get the ferry off
the rocks but how to get the ferry off the rocks undamaged. After many unsuccessful
attempts, the problem was solved by creating ‘the biggest hovercraft in the world’—
by virtually floating it off, largely undamaged, on a cushion of air. It wasn’t a bad
advertisement for the resilience of the design, nor for the ingenuity of the Incat team.
Condor II is now at work on the Western Channel run between Guernsey and the
United Kingdom port Weymouth and is making money for an operator who must
have experienced on of the most exciting sea trials on record.
There is more to be said, later, about the development of Incat over the years.
The point here is that there is an element of theatre in all this. Listening to an
entrepreneur like Bob Clifford is not unlike talking to theatre directors. They of all
people understand the relationship between substance and illusion. Everyone
in the theatre knows that terrible things can, and will, go wrong. You could
even argue that all the most intelligent leaders are basically hams—but acting in
the cause of a worthwhile text. From a technical standpoint, the main thing to
do after the grounding was to manage the public relations outfall. From the
emotional, or theatrical, standpoint, Bob Clifford (the helmsman) knew immediately

what had to be done: go back to the yard, to the people who really matter—those
who had built the beautiful vessel—and confess. Clifford assembled the entire
workforce and, prefacing his short speech with the obvious remark, ‘We fucked
up!’, explained and apologised. That’s leadership. That’s also intelligent.
BOB CLIFFORD AS INTELLIGENT LEADER

This book posits that if we want better (smarter) leadership in all walks of life, we
are going to improve on most of the current crop of leaders. This means examining
what we mean by leadership and intelligence. Having established Hudson and
Follett as a direct and an indirect leader respectively, we’ve resumed the individual
stories with Bob Clifford because he demonstrates the difference between
conventional views of ‘leadership’ and a possibly more useful view for the future.
As I noted in the Introduction, most studies of leadership are concerned with the
capacity of ‘leaders’ to get people to do things, especially difficult or unappealing
things. The focus is usually on the process of influence that underpins the
leadership. Accordingly, many of the most compelling leadership stories concern
people who very much wanted, or even needed, to be a leader.
Bob Clifford is interesting because there is little evidence from his observed
career, or his account of it, that being a leader was ever of any importance whatsover
to him. He seems to enjoy the role immensely, but that isn’t the point. What matters
most is that he is in the process of transforming a substantial chunk of the
Tasmanian economy and society. That was never his intention; it is the by-product
of his following his vocation. As the aftermath of the Port Arthur catastrophe
demonstrates, Tasmanian society has been desperately dependent on too few sources
of economic sustenance. In the course of creating a system to build terrific boats,
Clifford has created, amongst many other things, a voracious demand for highly
trained apprentice craftworkers. This demand is reverberating upstream in the
Tasmanian educational system. If it causes a transformation there, then it is highly
likely that Tasmania will begin to look like one of those places around the world
where major inward-investors like to place their bets. A really effective technical
education infrastructure always bulks large on their wish lists.
Michael Porter, in his hugely influential book The Competitive Advantage of
Nations, explains how economic clusters gather around entrepreneurial activity,
provided that the research and educational infrastructures are in place and there is a
pragmatic approach to government subsidy. There is already a big cluster of
suppliers around Incat, and most of them are under pressure (from Incat) to raise
their game to the very best international standards. This ought to put the heat on both
State and federal governments, especially as the latter (at the time of writing) is in
the process of withdrawing the shipbuilding ‘bounty’ which has accelerated the
development of this strategically important industry. All this is the transformational
impact of one man’s ‘leadership’. Paradoxically, Clifford never set out to be a leader
but he did make something happen! If I were a new prime minister of Australia, I am
pretty sure I would make it my business to understand how this particular
entrepreneur got to be a leader, and to see whether, over the long term (long after I
passed from office), it could be made to happen again wherever in Australia the soil
seemed to be fertile.
Above all, if I had anything at all to do with the education business, I would
want to understand how the possessor of a prodigious intelligence like Bob Clifford
could have been regarded as a dunce at school. As prime minister, I would require
my education ministers to get to the bottom of this conundrum—just to make sure
that, in the future, not too much native Australian wit was junked for want of
recognition.
Robert Keep:
from spy to guru
Robert Keep is less well known than Bob Clifford, because he inhabits the arcane
world of international currency trading. Not many people know very much about
this world, and most assume that it is peopled by fiercely clever troglodytes. Robert
Keep will tell you that most of the ‘experts’ haven’t got the faintest idea what they
are doing. In most cases, you would do better to take investment decisions by
throwing dice rather than by taking advice. His breakthrough (the creation of an
algorithm for tracking market movements over time) is described in general terms
later on. It cannot be understood properly without an understanding of the person
behind it. This doesn’t mean that all creative people have to lead a life as eccentric
as Keep’s, but it does mean that big achievements require many years of gestation, a
lot of prior variety, and a healthy start in life (from the mental standpoint).
Robert Keep: From Spy To Guru 147
This is a tricky subject. The world of currency speculation is littered with

crackpot schemes and snake-oil salesmen and there are always plenty of gullible
punters avid for new ‘systems’. There are authenticated stories of punters being
prepared to back such investments as ‘Iguana Gold’ or even ‘Underwater Airlines’.
In telling Keep’s story I am not underwriting the method, merely demonstrating how
indirect leadership operates. At the time of writing, Keep’s algorithm is already
changing the practice of big currency players, especially in Australia. If the claims
made for the method turn out to have validity, the entire basis of market prediction
will be altered. This is the notion behind Howard Gardner’s indirect leadership—an
idea-driven revolution in practice. The kind of leadership referred to here is
intellectual leadership. Of course, Bob Clifford’s leadership is intellectual too, but
the visible part of it involves big, fast boats and an adoring workforce of several
hundreds. Keep has very few followers, thus far. They are rich, thoughtful and very
discreet. What the two have in common is very little interest in being a leader. This
is another story about ternary focus on the object.
It can certainly be argued that international currency, bond and commodity
trading are becoming more, not less, predictable, because so many automatic
protocols now trigger trading ‘decisions’. There is also the presence of large-scale
market-rigging activity, as in the Sumitomo case (in copper), or of ‘rogue’ trading
by unscrupulous loners, as in the Barings collapse. These influential players reduce
variety at one level whilst increasing it at another. A player as influential as George
Soros has the worldwide market clout to say (effectively): ‘The ice is brittle—let’s
put $3 billion on top to break it!’ In other words, new conditions, mostly caused by
information technology, are in place. It is a time to keep an open mind about new
ways of understanding the big international market ‘frog’.
I must declare an interest. I was at school with Bob Keep, so I know him pretty
well. The other Australian ‘geniuses’ herein I have had to study more quickly than I
would have wished. Because Keep went to very much the same kind of school as
Clifford, a word on all-male private schools may be in order. In 1995 I travelled
around Australia with my daughter, who was preparing a thesis on the policy and
practice of teaching in Australian schools. I owe to her the insight that, whilst no
more than 7–8 per cent of British schoolchildren are educated privately, more than a
quarter of Australian children go to private schools. The figures are not directly
comparable, because of the disproportionate impact of the Catholic education
system in Australia; but it is a fact worth bearing in mind when we come, later on, to
consider how both Australia and Britain can set about ‘mining’—i.e. not wasting—
all the national talent. It is hard to say whether or not the relatively large numbers of
former private school pupils in Australia (some of them described here) make it
even harder than in Britain for talent to emerge from the state school sector.
Here the Clifford and Keep stories diverge slightly because Keep was always
regarded as clever and he effortlessly excelled in almost everything. But even then
he was one of Jacob Bronowski’s ‘contrary men’. The best way that I can describe it
is that in a school almost exclusively comprising canines (big, bouncy, amiable,
mostly harmless boys) Keep stood out as a feline. Smooth of countenance, sallow of
complexion, graceful of movement, subtle of mind, he was always socially accepted
by the other boys, but he was definitely different. ‘Louche’ is the term favoured
these days for this slightly dangerous quality. The mothers of debutantes in the
United Kingdom used to call it NSIT or Not Safe In Taxis.
To illustrate this, what I remember most vividly about Robert Keep was that he
was almost unhealthily good at acting. It didn’t seem natural for a seventeen-year-
old to know how to upstage everybody else, to use silence to shattering effect, to
phrase long Shakespearian passages with perfect timing, and so on. In my naivety, I
took that kind of histrionic skill to be something emotive. With the benefit of
hindsight, I reckon now that Keep was a terrific actor because he really understood
the text; he was in the play but he was also, simultaneously, surfing the play. The
rest of us were binary actors, doing our best to please the audience. Keep was
engaged in a private communion with William Shakespeare about the play, the
ultimate ternary position. We never did a Midsummer Night’s Dream but, if you did,
you would cast Keep as Oberon and Clifford as a superb Bottom. Both men have
that theatrical capacity to be mentally in two places at once. In the leadership
literature it is called ‘presence’ and regarded as a histrionic trick. My guess is that it
is also a function of intelligence—the ability to rise mentally above a system whilst
still physically in it. The Shell Company calls it ‘helicoptering’.
I lost track of Bob Keep after school. He ought to have gone on to university,
and he did—for a few months—until boredom set in.
At least I lasted a couple of years before I repaired to the Snowy Mountains.

Keep astonished most of his friends by going into the Army as an officer cadet. He
reckoned he needed a firm surrounding discipline to stop his mind wandering about.
Just like Clifford, he knew his mind was ‘too active’. The Army knew what it was
getting; the canny psychologist who conducted the last selection interview remarked
that it might turn out disastrously, because Keep was so much cleverer than the
existing officer corps, but it would be no bad thing for the Army to find out if it
could tolerate such brightness, or even put it to use. He knew (see Norman Dixon on
military incompetence, as mentioned in Chapter 6) that the Army was dangerously
monocultural. He also sensed that the Army might be dangerous for Keep.
Wisely, after a tempestuous period of training at Duntroon, the Army posted
Keep to Military Intelligence. Here he experienced a meteoric rise through the ranks.
Effectively, he became the military version of a spy and he did well at it. After all,
espionage and acting have a good deal in common. Things were going well
generally. Not long after, Keep was appointed Aide-de-Camp to the Governor-
General, Lord Casey, and posted to Government House at Yarralumla. I will draw a
discreet veil over the next, lubricious, part of this story, to protect the innocent. The
psychologist turned out to be right: Keep was too ebullient for the peacetime army.
Clever intelligence officers really come into their own in war and there happened to
be a war on at the time. He was dispatched, not quite in disgrace, to Vietnam.
The next part of this story is now well known and has been the subject of a series
of studies and a celebrated television documentary—Long Tan: The True Story. It is
an account of ‘one of the biggest intelligence blunders of the war’ in Vietnam and it
concerns Robert Keep centrally. It is a re-run of the Imo story—that of a young but
very bright member of the band or system who sees clearly what is the case but
cannot penetrate the sensibilities of the elders. By July of 1966 Keep was
Intelligence Officer at Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy Province, the base for the Australian
Task Force.
Keep, like any good intelligence officer, made sure that he had the best possible
understanding of his environment. The Australians had proved an unexpectedly
effective irritant to the North Vietnamese Army. Keep, thinking like the enemy (the
mind in two places at once, just like a good competition analyst in business), knew
that some kind of test of Australian capability was likely. Soon he began to sense
that something wasn’t quite right about the Viet Cong movements in the area.
Various fragments of information, all an intelligence officer ever gets to process,
were coming together in his mind to make a disturbing pattern.
Keep, as a wise intelligence specialist must, stayed close to the wireless
operators. They are Imos by definition, close to the environment but lowly of rank.
Their leader was another Imo. The most experienced wireless operators had learned
to identify their individual Viet Cong counterparts by their Morse Code touch—they
even assigned them names. It is the same trick that allows a discerning music critic
to tell you whether it is Horowitz or Ashkenazy playing Chopin. The Australians
never cracked the enemy’s code, but the operators could tell where their counterparts
were—even when they changed their call signs. Using this information, Keep
realised that some of the enemy’s detachments were in the wrong place (according
to the official intelligence briefings) and in dangerously large concentrations.
Simultaneously, he was receiving from the SAS sketches of the clothing worn by the
enemy in the vicinity which suggested that some of them were not local guerrillas
but new detachments of crack troops. The pattern of enemy fire (in short controlled
bursts rather than amateurish sniping) supported this view. Keep began to formulate
a hunch.
The hunch, in brief, was that the enemy must be massing for a major attack on
the Australian position. The longer Keep sifted the information at his disposal the
more convinced he became. His problem was to persuade those above him that there
was a real danger of the Australian forces being overwhelmed. Potentially, the two
Australian battalions were outnumbered four to one. Some of his superiors had
become dependent on the Americans’ intelligence and that, in Keep’s view, leaned
to the complacent. As it turned out later, the Americans actually wanted the Viet
Cong flushed from cover by attacking the Australian position. In late July the Viet
Cong forces made a strong feint at the Australian lines, to test their defences. After
their withdrawal, the top brass convinced themselves that the enemy had quit the
immediate area. This was reassuring (for them, not for Keep).
It was said of the commanders at Pearl Harbor in World War II: ‘They were
disinclined to be attacked!’ As we have noted, people(and especially those
in high positions) can persuade themselves of anything if their motivation is strong

enough. The senior officers preferred to believe that the Australians had pacified the
entire area. Keep’s conclusion was exactly the opposite.
After the feint the enemy ‘starved’ the Australians of action, in order to persuade
them that the threat had gone away. This redoubled Keep’s suspicions. By now
convinced of the Viet Cong intentions, Keep travelled to Saigon to alert Major Peter
Young, the Assistant Australian Military Attache and an old friend. Young pulled
out all the stops to re-examine the evidence, but turned up nothing concrete to
support Keep’s theory. There was little he could achieve at long range—the real
ostriches were back in Phuoc Tuy Province. In fairness to the Army hierarchy, a
number of extra patrols were sent out specifically to gather evidence for or against
Keep’s hypothesis—there were, in other words, a number of thoughtful senior
officers who sensed that Keep might be right. Obtaining hard evidence was seen to
be the problem.
Fate then took a hand. Keep, under serious strain, fell seriously ill with
encephalitis and was evacuated back to Australia. Within a few days of his departure
the big attack came, just as predicted. The Battle of Long Tan was the most
significant Australian engagement of the entire war. In the event, the Australian
troops were very lucky. Casualties were severe but the force was not annihilated, as
it might have been. In its way it was a classic of military incompetence. As Norman
Dixon points out, the kinds of people who generally wish to go into the Army in
peacetime are precisely the kinds of people likely to blunder in this way when there
is a war on. It is another example of the psychopathology of occupational choice.
The Army found it difficult to contain Robert Keep, just as the selection panel
psychologist had predicted, but it almost made proper use him. Almost, but not
quite.
A NEW FORCE IN THE MARKET

The story moves forward twenty-five years now. The old school ran a thirty-five-
year reunion in Sydney, which I could not attend. They did, however, send me a
printout of all the members of my cohort, together with addresses and phone
numbers. By this time, after a long gap, I was revisiting Australia regularly. I
resolved, just out of curiosity, to see what had happened to the handful of school
colleagues I recalled as especially interesting. Bob Keep, for obvious reasons, was
top of the list. I was warned by one or two other former school chums that Keep was
barking mad—promoting a crackpot scheme to second-guess international currency
trading. As those warning me were essentially in the senior officer mould, and
canine, I decided to see for myself.
Right from the start I found the logic of Keep’s product—’Market Reality’—
persuasive. Essentially, it is a safety device for serious long players in international
currencies, commodities and bonds. It identifies trends and flags up more or less
strong buy/sell signals. It is in fact a simple algorithm, based on the principles of
quantum mechanics, which took Keep more than ten years to refine—he won’t say
perfect. The symbolic language is so simple that his eleven-year-old son can
understand it. The system now has a proven track record. It accurately anticipated
the 1994 bond crisis, the rally in the United States market in the first half of 1995,
and the subsequent dollar upturn. Clients of Market Reality depend absolutely on
their daily bulletins from Keep. The system, however, does not make extravagant
claims—it is merely a sophisticated way of tracking market events. It provides, for
example, the reassurance needed by big players to stay in the market (i.e. to do
nothing) when others are needlessly, and expensively, bailing out.
Its worldwide distributors say (the financially illiterate may safely skip this
quote):
The product enables the picking of individual trends and confirms that
those trends are real and not merely counterbumps . . . For example,
related trends similar to the long bond market’s relationship and
immediate impact on the stock market can be identified before they
occur. Market Reality allows a sensible judgement to be made before
the turn in a market occurs.
Dr Marc Faber, one of the world’s leading market economists, describes Keep as
‘kind of a genius’. He writes:
What I like about Robert’s work is that it is very simple to understand

and most suited to the busy executive whose reading time is limited.
Every morning I get a fax on my desk (in Hong Kong) with the . . .
symbols for a variety of financial futures, commodities and currencies
and within a few minutes I have an idea of the state of the market and
any changes which might have taken place.
These are impressive enough testimonials but there are also plenty of wise old
birds around the markets prepared to pooh-pooh any such fancy method.
Keep works mostly at night, as the data flow in from (say) the North American
futures market. By 10.30 each morning his bulletins are dispatched to his very few
very rich and very discreet clients and his work is done. He spends much of the rest
of the day wandering around the Sydney foreshore, thinking. In every way, Market
Reality is a very Australian invention. In fact, its origins lie in Australian horse
racing. When Keep was invalided home from Vietnam it took a long time for him to
get strong enough to resume normal life. After Vietnam he needed something
undemanding and, above all, Australian to take his mind off recent events. Looked
after by a medical orderly, he started his convalescence by going to the races. That
very first race meeting got his creative juices flowing again. It was a small meet; just
eight races with quite small fields and dry going. This reduced the number of
variables involved. Bob Keep, like any intelligence officer and like all bright people,
is observant—almost obsessively so. He also takes notes incessantly, as naturalists
and writers do.
He observed the pattern of the bookmakers’ odds as the day progressed, taking
notes the while. Just as in Vietnam, he was searching for the meaning behind the
public data. Back at the hospital he began to analyse the information and discovered,
with some excitement, that there was indeed a pattern which could not be explained
by chance. It looked as though what was happening was some kind of combination
of more or less predictable human behaviour (on the part of punters and bookies)
with elements of specialised insider knowledge (possibly possessed by owners).
What it all meant wasn’t clear. What was clear was that it must mean something—
the pattern was inescapable! The really interesting thing was that if you could
understand the pattern, as it developed over the course of the day, then you wouldn’t
need insider information. What the insiders knew would show up, alongside any
other important variables, incorporated in the figures—and you might be able to
devise a higher—order interpretative system.
At this point Keep was in the same openminded mental state as Bob Clifford
when he began to work out what a hovercraft was. The thing existed, but what did it
mean? It is a state not unlike that of the young child trying to figure out how
something works. In The Unschooled Mind, Howard Gardner argues that this is a
pure state that most of us grow out of. If we are lucky, we may retain this kind of
enthusiastic curiosity into our adulthood. Both Clifford and Keep were in their
thirties when these puzzles engaged their minds. You can argue that these two must
be especially ‘clever’ people. Alternatively, you can argue that all children are like
this but that, without meaning to, we train it out of them. If you desire a coherent
national education strategy, it is a very good argument to follow up.
Robert Keep’s convalescence was slow. He spent a very long time working on
the horse racing system—too long, he now admits. It was not until the mid-1980s
that a colleague pointed out to him that the way punters approach their task has
similarities to the way that speculators operate in financial markets. (Remember
Bronowski’s dictum!) Markets, like the selling of high-tech catamarans to ferry
operators, are ‘socio-technical systems’. There is a lot of technology involved (most
of which is taken for granted and the impact of which is usually forgotten) but there
is also a huge psychological element to it. Markets are based not just on perceived
‘realities’ out there but on people’s assumptions about other people’s assumptions
about reality. It is one thing to try to understand the psychology of the individual
punter or speculator. It is quite another thing to understand the collective psychology
of the whole market. In fact, Keep doesn’t pretend to be a psychologist—merely an
observer and analyst of repetitive system patterns. The fact that unconscious human
behaviour causes the patterns is neither here nor there. The important thing is that
fifteen years of dedicated, some might say obsessive, work appears to have produced
a scientific principle with some predictive power. The elegance of the thing lies in
its simplicity.
In one of Bronowski’s lectures, ‘Knowledge as Algorithm and as Metaphor’, he
cited Newton and Einstein as scientists who always imagined how the world works
in terms of simple, or childlike, images such as balls, clocks or trains. Keep will
argue that most financial analysts have lost the capacity to understand the big ‘frog’
(another simple metaphor) because they have become mired in their own
complexity. Dealers, on the other hand, only ever deal with bits of the ‘bicycle ‘
because the average time span of a trade is just a few minutes. They are close to the
frenetic action, and likely to formulate good hunches, but rarely have time to stop,
think, and see patterns. Analysts, on the other hand, are generally buried under their
computer systems and nobody can understand their arcane language. They are
disconnected from the dealers who have the ‘feel’ of the frog but not the means to
understand it fully. No one has an algorithm that draws together the day-to-day
workings of the ‘bike’ (the mechanical aspect of trading) with the ‘frog’ (the socio-
technical supersystem).
ROBERT KEEP AS INTELLIGENT LEADER

Let me repeat: on the surface Bob Keep is a different kind of leader from Bob
Clifford. Clifford is the quintessential direct leader, leading the troops from the
front. Keep’s leadership (however Market Reality and the algorithm turn out) is
indirect, from the shadows. Clifford’s direct influence is on the Tasmanian
economy, not just in the short term but in driving technology development, design
principles and education in the long term. Keep’s direct, short-term influence is
narrow but, if he turns out to be right, he will revolutionise his field—it will never
be the same again. If the algorithm fulfils its promise and goes public, it has the
potential to dampen the volatility of markets generally. That would be an
extraordinary achievement for one man who started out as a soldier. But, under the
skin, what Clifford and Keep do, and what intellectual resources they mobilise, are
remarkably similar. Both are driven by a big idea, both pursue it obsessively and
both have been prepared to devote many years to its fulfilment. Clifford, always at
full stretch, has sailed perilously close to failure along the way. It is too early to say
whether Keep is an ‘Imo’ all over again—too far ahead of the game to be
comprehended by the big boys—or certain to be wrongfooted in the end by the big
system changing.
I doubt it is a coincidence that both of them were outstanding sportsmen, and in
sports that call on highly developed spatial skills as well as the bodily kinaesthetic
intelligence. The core skill that links them together is the capacity, driven by
curiosity, to make meaningful patterns out of very complicated and messy fragments
of information. It is this ability which allows them to ascend the levels of work (see
Figure 13, earlier) so as to take on more complexity more quickly than their peers
do. There are other people around who might be able (given the motivation) to
achieve similar feats, but not so soon.
Behind the scenes

Tom Stoppard, the playwright, started to become a millionaire when his
most famous play, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, first opened in
1967. In this play, Hamlet and the court of Denmark represent the subplot,
glimpsed dimly off-stage. Stoppard is taking the audience behind the
proscenium arch to explore events just beyond the boundary of the familiar
Shakespeare play. Here the bit-part players, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern,
find themselves centre-stage. To achieve this, the playwright has first to
imagine the world beyond, then begin to explore the connections between
the two worlds. Clever people like Robert Keep are always impelled to find
out what is behind the obvious and the superficial. Playwrights and
business innovators ought to talk to each other more often than they do;
their work is fundamentally similar. In the next chapter, Allan Coman
shows how theatre and business both demand the capacity to cope with, and
positively enjoy, ambiguity and mess.
The nice thing about Stoppard’s play is that it wasn’t his idea in the first
place. His agent had always wondered about these two odd, misfit-like
characters lurking in the Hamlet subplot and put forward the idea of
building a play around them. Only Stoppard could have written it, however.
Keep’s breakthrough depended to some extent on his habit of spending
time with oddball people outside his immediate circle. His focus shifted
from horse racing to financial markets because a friend and drinking
companion from the finance world (about which he knew nothing) made
the essential connection between punters and currency speculators. From
then on the intelligence officer and obsessive observer became just the right
person to do all the donkey work. People who stick to their own narrow
profession or society rarely achieve this sort of thing because their
fundamental assumptions are rarely challenged. This is where the
interpersonal intelligence comes in; it creates curiosity about other people
and their ideas.
Allan Coman:
an educator of genius
There was so much talent there that it was all fuckin’ wasted. I mean,
‘Spansky’, he was thick as pigshit really, but if someone had took him
and tutored him . . . He’d got so much imagination!
Any examination of people who have ‘made it’, like Hudson, Follett, Clifford and
Keep, prompts curiosity about those who might have made it but didn’t. Talent is
randomly distributed in populations so it is unrealistic to expect everybody to shine.
On the other hand, it is perfectly clear that an awful lot of native talent is underused
or just wasted. The society that squeezes most from all of its populace will be the
society with the greatest energy and purpose. Any prison visitor will tell you that a
remarkable proportion of those inmates who are not just mad or otherwise
psychologically incapacitated turn out to be rather bright. In these internationally
competitive times, no society can afford this sort of waste on a big scale. What does
‘bright’ mean? Let us turn to Professor Gardner’s admirably practical definition of

intelligence: ‘The ability to solve a problem or fashion a product that is valued in at
least one culture or community ‘.
Many psychologists and educationists would quibble with this definition,
focusing as it does on output and usefulness. If our concern is with intelligent
leadership, not just with book-learning or eloquence, then it fits the bill. If we are
interested in the intelligent leadership of education, then the test of success lies in
the resourcefulness of the output—educated young people fit for general capability
and active citizenship. Because education has the power to shape a nation’s future
capability, no area of leadership is more important. If we discover educational
leaders who are consistently successful in these output terms, we need to cherish
them.
The reader will be aware that the examples of leadership described so far are not
exactly drawn from the ranks of the under-privileged. True, Bob Clifford’s father
was ‘only’ a butcher, but he did have three establishments. The point is that all of
the foregoing examples were privately educated. Both contemporary examples
(Clifford and Keep) are men of a certain age and the only woman so far was an
American; that deficiency is rectified later in Chapter 12. The purpose of the present
chapter, apart from the telling of an inspiring story, is to explore how the talents of
the young and the relatively underprivileged can be developed and exploited. This
involves three elements:
• revisiting Howard Gardner’s important work (briefly mentioned in Chapter

2) on the multiple nature of intelligence (or intelligences, as he argues)
• meeting two further ‘inventive dunces’ (here called Spansky and Jamie) who
were not quite so lucky in formal education as Robert Clifford was
• examining how Allan Coman, the hero of this chapter, has persistently
turned schools round so as to produce confident, resourceful and stylish
young Australians, fit for anything
Allan Coman was, until recently, Director of Bradfield College at Crows Nest on
Sydney’s North Shore. In the space of three years Coman transformed the College
from a ‘sink’ institution for about 150 awkward, difficult educational failures into a
thriving and much sought after centre of excellence for over 500 very successful
Allan Coman: An Educator of Genius 159
students, nearly all of whom now get into some kind of work or employment upon
graduation from the College.
In order to understand Coman’s achievement, we have to understand something
about the materials with which he works. Bob Clifford works with aluminium,
Robert Keep works with data. Coman works with, and transforms, the intellectual
effectiveness of young people aged between sixteen and twenty. The important thing
about Coman’s graduates is the word ‘effectiveness’. They may well be able to
negotiate their way around formal examinations, but the main thing is that they have
become the kinds of young adults you can safely employ, confident that they will
work resourcefully and purposively.
So, in order to appreciate what Allan Coman has achieved we are going to
‘reverse-engineer’ the process, by examining some exceptionally bright school
failures, amongst whom were ‘natural leaders’. We’ll begin in Britain and then
move back to Australia. Spansky, a fiendishly inventive subversive, was the
archetypal clever failure. Jamie was much the same. Coman’s achievement was to
create (in Australia) a college fit for ‘Spanskys’.
But first, in order to understand Spansky and his like, we will further ‘reverse-
engineer’ the argument by taking a little more of a look at Howard Gardner’s theory
of multiple intelligences.
WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?
As the reader will be aware, the concept ‘intelligence’ resists definition. We know
that IQ tests are good predictors of performance in formal education, but we also
know that formal education is a lousy predictor of adult capability, except in those
fields (like academia) built on the same assumptions. If you work as researcher or
consultant, as I do, you learn very quickly that high formal rank is no guarantee of
practical intelligence. The people I meet in corporate boardrooms are a bewildering
mix of the very bright and the amazingly dim. That’s only my opinion—another
observer might take the opposite view. I do know that when I sit, as the outsider, on
selection and promotion panels, my casting vote is often decisive. The panel is
apparently about to appoint an obvious dimwit; they turn to me and say: ‘What do
you think, Alistair?’ I reply: ‘This bloke is an obvious dimwit (and maybe a nasty
piece of work as well)!’ It then turns out that they all knew this was the case, at gut
level, but were prepared to be swept along by ‘groupthink’ towards a ghastly and
expensive mistake.
In order to make sense of Spansky and Coman, the most helpful view of
intelligence is that put forward by Professor Howard Gardner of Harvard in his 1983
book, Frames of Mind. Not all academic psychologists agree with Gardner’s
formulation, but then again, not all psychologists are very bright. Some in my
experience teeter on the fringe of sanity. The attractive thing about Gardner’s work
is that it flows from a connection (remember Bronowski’s dictum). Gardner was one
of the founding researchers on Project Zero—a major effort to address the failings of
the United States education system. Simultaneously, he was carrying out
comparative work on brain damage. He started to remap the way that human
capability (the output of intelligence) is highly localised in the brain. Severe damage
in one particular place leads to severe curtailment of particular capabilities. If
Gardner had buried himself in either of those fields—the medical or the
educational—rather than connecting them, we might not have benefited from his
important contribution to education practice.
That contribution was the theory of ‘multiple intelligences’—a theory which
involves the suggestion that IQ assessments, for example, tended to sample only a
couple of the many thinking capabilities of the human being. The other capabilities,
in certain circumstances just as useful, were generally ignored by the huge American
psychometric measurement industry. Gardner argued that people who are good at
things in the real world are in fact calling upon a very wide repertoire of intellectual
skills. He took a stab at describing that repertoire, basing his argument on the tasks
that different parts of the brain perform. He reckoned that there were at least seven
distinctive forms of intelligence. These were (elaborating on Figure 5, earlier):
• linguistic (the ability to manipulate language effectively, the archetype

being, perhaps, the poet)
• logical mathematical (the ability to manipulate symbols, typical of the
successful scientist)
• spatial (the ability to process information continuously in three dimensions,
like a sailor or a sculptor)
• musical (the ability to manipulate sound in a complex way, like a composer

or, combined with the following, a performer)
• bodily kinaesthetic (the ability for physical coordination, as found at the
highest levels in athletes and dancers)
• interpersonal (the ability to know what is happening between people and to
mobilise it, as good teachers and salespeople do)
• intrapersonal (the ability for self-understanding, without which all the others
may be distorted in use)
The multiple intelligences idea was dynamite for education theory and teaching
practice. The theory behind most schooling in the West has long been that with the
process of measuring ‘intelligence’ (usually reduced to an IQ), and grading
schoolwork, schools were rendered ‘fair’—i.e. geared to children’s natural
capacities. Gardner argued that the opposite had been achieved—we had created the
‘uniform school’. If natural capacity is not uniform, then the uniform school is by
definition unfair to those who don’t fit the mould. If you happen to be strong in the
logical mathematical and linguistic intelligences, you are bound to be defined as
‘bright’ by conventional schoolteachers, because that is how they got to pass their
exams and get into the teaching profession. Confronted by a Spansky or a young
Bob Clifford (who cheerfully fails everything), such a teacher has no way of
identifying and appreciating a different kind of intelligence.
The point about the seven intelligences (if you accept the argument) is that they
crop up in an infinite number of combinations. Gardner is hardly dogmatic about the
intelligences themselves; since the original book was published his colleagues have
noticed what seems to them to be an eighth distinctive capability—to do with the
understanding of natural phenomena, as demonstrated by the great naturalists. My
favourite illustration of the idea (and of the bodily/kinaesthetic intelligence in
particular—see Chapter 6) is the infant ballet class, which many parents enjoy or
endure. Confronted by a long line of scrubbed moppets in identical tutus, every one
of them trained to the hilt, you don’t have to be a dancer yourself to be able to see,
instantly, which one of those children God meant to be a dancer.
That child herself cannot explain her gift to you; she is barely aware of her skill,
apart from the sheer enjoyment it affords. The music seems to flow through
the young body and the body seems to ‘know’ how to move beautifully. This grace
is not, of course, located in the limbs, but in the feedback loops between limbs and
brain—it is an aspect of intelligence. Gardner could tell you exactly which part of
the brain to go for if you wished to affect this capacity. The dancer is pre-eminent in
the bodily/kinaesthetic intelligence, but will also need musical intelligence. If she
takes up choreography later on, she will also need spatial intelligence. If she
graduates to management of a ballet company, she will need most of the others
(especially the interpersonal) and enough logic and self-knowledge to delegate
wisely. Some people, irritatingly, seem to be strong in the entire repertoire. Gifted
primary school teachers can point these ‘broadband’ children out to you.
Before we move on to Spansky, a notably knockabout character, it is worth
recalling that many successful people are very physical. The psychologist Liam
Hudson (himself an ex-rugby player of note) reckons that a disproportionate number
of the really outstanding thinkers in his field are, or were, outstanding athletes of one
kind or another. Bob Clifford came alive when sailing captured his imagination but
he was also an outstanding swimmer and hockey player. I remember with absolute
clarity the way in which confronting physical problems (most of them potentially
dangerous) concentrated our minds on the Snowy Mountains Scheme. Because I
believe that the best ‘systems thinking’ is partly spatial, I have always held that civil
engineers are the intellectual aristocrats of the engineering world. You can’t help but
learn something if a bridge falls down.
The logical outcome of Gardner’s ideas is the ‘individual-centred school’—a
school which attempts to meet the incoming pupil at least halfway by adapting its
curricula and methods to reflect any particular combination of abilities. Devotees of
process re-engineering will see that Gardner’s approach is just this—a re-
examination of the throughput (pupils) in terms of the dominant transformations in
process. Gardner argues that schools need three new roles: an ‘assessment specialist
‘ (to identify, so far as possible, each student’s repertoire of intelligences, preferably
not by the use of formal tests); a ‘student-curriculum broker ‘(to find a sensible
match between what can realistically be adapted to individual need and what must
remain standard fare); and a ‘school-community broker ‘ (to carry out an analogous
matching of school resources to community needs).
SPANSKY AND THE ‘THE LADS’

Spansky was one of the subjects of an intensive study of a tough boys school in the
British Midlands, carried out by the sociologist Paul Willis in the 1970s. Willis’s
book, Learning to Labour—How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs, is a
delightful read, partly because he taped and lovingly transcribed (verbatim) the
fifteen-and sixteen-year-old boys’ language—profane, obscene, witty and always
vigorous. If I knew of an Australian study of the same pungency I would have drawn
on it. There will certainly be schools like ‘Hammertown Boys School’ (a
pseudonym) in Australia. Happily (see Jamie below) I have succeeded in finding an
Australian Spansky.
Spansky and his mate Joey were the ringleaders (the teachers’ description) or the
natural leaders of ‘the lads’—an informal group of twelve non-academic, working
class boys. This group was the primary subject of the study; it had cohered much
earlier on, in the junior years. The group as a whole acted as leader of the school’s
counterculture. There is little doubt, on Willis’s evidence, that these kids were
bright, even though they were the despair of their teachers. There is also no doubt
that, viewed from the outside, they were very destructive—violent, anarchic, racist,
sexist and shamelessly dishonest. Although most of their energies were devoted to
having a ‘laff’, there is ultimately a sad quality about their lives. Having a ‘laff’
necessarily involved fighting (usually with pupils of Pakistani or West Indian
extraction), vandalism, exhibitionistic drunkenness and smoking, affectionless sex,
thieving and endless opportunistic disruption of others’ tranquillity.
The point about the delinquent activity of ‘the lads’ was that it involved
teamwork and was endlessly inventive. All those interested in staff and managerial
development prick up their ears when those two ideas (teamwork and inventiveness)
are touched on. Willis comments:
. . . ‘the lads’ develop the ability of moving about the school at their
own will to a remarkable degree. They construct virtually their own day
from what is offered by the school. Truancy is only one relatively
unimportant and crude variant of this principle of self-direction which
ranges across vast chunks of the syllabus and covers many diverse
activities: being free out of class, being in class and doing no work,
being in the wrong class, roaming the corridors looking for excitement,
being asleep in private. The core skill which articulates these
possibilities is being able to get out of any given class: the preservation
of personal mobility . . . The common complaint about ‘the lads’ from
staff and the ‘ear-oles’ (conformist pupils) is that they ‘waste valuable
time’. Time for ‘the lads’ is not something you carefully husband and
thoughtfully spend on the achievement of desired objectives in the
future. For ‘the lads’ time is something they want to claim for
themselves now as an aspect of their immediate identity and self-
direction. Time is used for the preservation of a state—being with ‘the
lads’—not for the achievement of a goal—qualifications.
Sometimes ‘the lads’ act like directors of a theatre of the absurd:
Joey: Gates are the latest crack. Swopping gates over. Get a gate, lift it
off, put it on somebody else’s.
Bill: That’s what we done ... there was an ‘ouse there for sale. We took
the ‘For Sale’ sign out of the one, put it in next door, then we took the
milk carrier from the next one, put it in next door ... we took a sort of
window box on legs from the porch and stuck that next door. We
swapped stacks of things.
Spansky: And dustbins! [laughter] ... every night, go into one garden,
tek a dwarf out, and in the end there was a dwarf, a sundial, a bridge, a
dwarf fishing, all in this one garden, and there’s a big sundial up the
road. He got one end of it, I got the other, and carried it all the way and
put it in.
In all this, the content of schoolwork has no interest for these boys but they are
endlessly fascinated by the possibilities of the process. Once again the theatrical
metaphor springs to mind. One of the few curricular options taken up by ‘the lads’
was a film option, where they could make their own short films—invariably, in their
case, films about bank robberies, muggings and violent chases. Willis notes:
Joey gets more worked up than at any time in class during the whole
year when he is directing a fight sequence and Spansky will not
challenge his assailant realistically. ‘Call him out properly, call him out
properly—you’d say “I’ll have you, you fucking bastard” not “Right,
let’s fight”’, Later on he is disgusted when Eddie dives on top of
somebody to finish a fight. ‘You wouldn’t do that, you’d just kick him,
save you getting your clothes dirty.’
When it comes to artistic authenticity—to getting it right—Joey’s veneer of not
giving a damn falls away.
Joey, by the way, comes from a big family, known as a fighting family. His
father is a foundryman. Joey leaves school without any qualifications and is
universally identified by teachers as a troublemaker—the more so as ‘he has
something about him’. Joey has ‘presence’, like most natural leaders. Willis points
out that ‘Joey walks a very careful tightrope in English between “laffing” with “the
lads” and doing the occasional “brilliant” essay’. Spansky, the most charismatic of
all, recalls:
In the first and second years I used to be brilliant really. I was in 2A,
3A, you know, and when I used to get home, I used to lie in bed
thinking, ‘Ah, school tomorrow’, you know, I hadn’t done that
homework, you know ...’Got to do it’... But now when I go home, it’s
quiet, I ain’t got nothing to think about. I say, ‘Oh great, school
tomorrow, it’ll be a laff, you know.
I suppose that any ex-teacher reading about ‘the lads’ in these pages might
experience a shudder of painful recognition. The point is that these kids were
‘bright’, but in ways that spread eccentrically over Gardner’s seven intelligences.
The ringleaders, Spansky and Joey, were even good at the linguistic skill; they
simply didn’t bother much with it after they turned thirteen. But, above all, these
boys were skilful in the interpersonal intelligence. They knew exactly how far you
can push a teacher, just short of boiling point. Willis put it this way: ‘The soul of wit
for them is disparaging relevance: the persistent searching out of weakness. It takes
some skill and cultural know-how to mount such attacks, and more to resist them.’
All the evidence suggests that the other key intelligence of these boys was the
spatial. Their ability to conceptualise the school system, so as to dissolve its
boundaries, borders on the inspired. They evidently had a feel for the big ‘frog’; not
so the conformist ‘ear-oles’. Not only could ‘the lads’ push teachers to the limit;
they pushed the school system as a whole to the limit. They did it for a ‘laff, but you
could see it as a form of continuous, empirical, scientific experimentation.
‘The lads’ knew that they were clever, despite the teachers’ occasional insults,
and they also knew that what they did with (or to) the school was difficult to pull
off. After ‘the lads’ left school (I will pass over the drunken binge on the last day)
they read drafts of Willis’s book and met him a few months later to discuss it. Joey,
returning to the theatrical/creative theme, put it beautifully:
I thought that we were the artists of the school, because of the things we
did, I thought definitely we had our own sort of art form, the things we
used to get up to. And we were definitely the leaders of the school ... if
we were all separated and placed amongst groups of the ear-oles we
could have been leaders in our own right ... something should have been
done with us!
Joey, on top of everything else, had a pretty good grasp of the principles of group
dynamics.
If I am right that the leading ‘lads’ were pretty good at the interpersonal and the
spatial intelligences, then this ought to give us pause. The best managers are always
good at reading systems, and ‘see’ them in their mind’s eye as processes. They also
have to be hot stuff on the ‘people side’. ‘The lads’, you could argue, possessed the
core managerial skills. The problem for them, and therefore also for the teachers,
was that Hammerrtown Boys School had nothing for them to manage. The creative
urge to take charge was there but it was displaced—they managed subversion of the
entire system instead—for a ‘laff. Most of the teachers, hooked on the
logical/mathematical and linguistic intelligences, just took the boys to be dim but
infuriating. (Willis took it that confusion observed in the staff room between the
terms ‘corporal punishment’ and ‘capital punishment’ simply meant that,
subconsciously, some of the teachers itched to kill ‘the lads’.) I noted at the outset
that a surprising proportion of prison inmates turn out to be very bright (ingenious)
people who have simply got into resentful, anti-authoritarian bad habits. Teachers
please note.
JAMIE: A HOMEGROWN ‘SPANSKY’

It has always seemed a pity to me that the most carefully documented case I could
find of fiendish teenage ingenuity unregarded by adult educationists should be the
British story of Spansky. I am indebted to Sue Shegog and her colleagues at CBT
(Competency Based Trainers) in Launceston for the account of Jamie—as we’ll call
him—a boy possibly even more fiendish and ingenious than Spansky and his chums.
It’s nice to think that Australia can still outstrip the Old Country when it comes to
high-class delinquency.
By the age of fourteen, Jamie had been expelled from a ‘priorities’ high school
and had lived rough on the streets of Launceston for two years. He was the eldest
of nine children and the family just didn’t have room for a teenager in a three-
bedroom Housing Commission home. Somehow, he had learned to survive, and
even prosper, without being made a ward of the state or being placed in a youth
correction centre.
At school his first great entrepreneurial achievement was the covert takeover of
the school’s ‘certificate of merit’ system. These certificates were awarded on a
weekly basis to the ‘car-oles’ who had most closely conformed to the school’s
behavioural and disciplinary code. Jamie could see, easily, that the wrong sort of
(boring) pupils were getting these awards. His point of observation was his semi-
permanent spot between the Principal’s door and the administrative staff office.
Because Jamie was always in some kind of trouble, he became a familiar ‘piece of
office furniture’ in that strategic point at the heart of the school system. That spot
became his virtual classroom. For most of the pupils, it was a place to be avoided at
all costs; for Jamie, it was a vantage point from which he was able to study the
process by which the merit certificates were awarded and distributed.
Access to the store of certificates and mastery of the Principal’s signature were
the easy bit, once that strategic bridgehead had been achieved. From that point on,
the number of merit awards increased steadily and a great many parents were
rendered very happy indeed by the documentary evidence of their children’s
progress. Jamie was supplying a kind of unofficial social service; and he was
learning, fast, about managing dynamic systems. The key to that was the spatial
awareness of the power system—the importance, as in military tactics, of occupying
the high ground and making judicious use of strategic intelligence, covertly
obtained. Robert Keep (Chapter 8) has read this account of Jamie’s tactical nous and
looks on him as a natural intelligence officer.
But Jamie’s greatest entrepreneurial achievement concerned his first love—
motor cars. Jamie had been driving illegally since the age of ten. Scaling the security
fences of petrol depots, emptying detergent drums, cutting petrol tank hoses and
filling the drums was easy enough, provided you understood the terrain and the
security check frequencies. Once again, the core skill was spatial, reinforced by a
good grasp of human nature.
By the age of fifteen, Jamie had befriended a single mother and taken on the
responsibility for looking after her and her baby. What-ever else Jamie
was, he was a responsible person. In order to hang on to his social security benefits,
he enrolled in a six-month automotive course, part of a government program for
unemployed youths, school refusers and other young people thought to be at risk.
Let Sue Shegog take over the story at this point:
I was contracted to teach the non-vocational section of Jamie’s course,

which included a subject called ‘Enterprise Learning for Self-
Development’. I was soon to learn that the enterprise skills I wished to
nurture were well developed and thriving amongst my group of Auto
boys. Who was educating who? The challenge for me was to channel
these highly developed skills into activities which were socially
acceptable while still meeting the boys’ needs.
This statement is quite a good example of the humility needed in approaching the
‘education’ of those who are both gifted and underprivileged. Anything more
patronising is doomed to ignominious failure. Sue Shegog decided that the boys’
idea of an Easter egg raffle might be a safe sort of project for them to cut their teeth
on. The idea felt a bit ‘wossy’ to some of the boys (I am not up on Tasmanian slang
but I take it that ‘ear-oles’ are always wossy), but after a round of brainstorming,
discussion and group problem-solving they decided to give it a go. Easter was
looming at the time, so it represented an intelligent use of timing, a crucial success
factor in any business.
The first great surprise for Jamie was how easy it was to obtain goods honestly.
He was ‘blown away’ by this discovery, seeing in it a whole world of possible high-
level, and highly creative, scams. I can picture Jamie carving his way through that
den of (perfectly legal) thieves in the City of London, inventing devilishly creative
‘financial products’ designed for gullible punters. Back in Launceston, Cadburys
donated a washing basket full of Easter eggs and a range of other local firms gave
soft toys, baskets, cellophane and so on. Once Jamie was committed to the
enterprise, he was seriously ‘pissed off’ by the misuse of the takings by another
member of the team. Poacher had become gamekeeper, almost overnight.
But the Easter egg initiative was merely the dry run for the major project— the
complete restoration of an old car which the group had negotiated to purchase from
TAFE (the Technical and Further Education body) for a nominal $1. The boys spent
virtually all their time at college working on the vehicle. Jamie blossomed as a
natural leader, demonstrating by example the perseverance, dedication and technical

capability required to manage a highly complex task under time pressure. Of course,
the project had a list of desired ‘learning outcomes’ which were wildly outreached
by the reality. ‘Learning outcomes’ are for young students; the work done was, in a
word, adult.
Suddenly, well into the project, Jamie, didn’t show up for a whole week. After
an exhaustive ‘tracking’ exercise it was discovered that Jamie (the ‘irresponsible’
delinquent) had been obliged to look after one of his brothers for the two weeks of
school holiday. Omnicompetent Jamie thought he would be expelled from the course
for having to miss two weeks and lacked the confidence to ask for support during
this period of family need. Naturally, Sue Shegog, together with the course
coordinator and the rest of the teaching staff, rallied around to look after the nine-
year-old brother for the remainder of the holiday. Kids like Jamie are so ‘adult’ in
some ways that it can be difficult to recall that they are still kids, with the same
dependent needs as the rest of us. Teachers, driven to distraction by the ingenuity of
the ‘Jamies’ and the ‘Spanskys’, sometimes forget this.
The eighteen-week course ended in triumph with the group and their project
featuring in the local newspaper. As the car wasn’t quite ready, the boys organised
with their vocational trainer to return to college to complete the few remaining tasks.
After that, it was time to sell the car, finalise the P&L statement and set out the final
report on the project. (Like the Bradfield projects, this one was designed to let the
boys see the process through from conception to the final conclusion—the sale.) The
TAFE personnel chose that moment to revert to type, deciding at the last moment
that the car should remain in the college, to be disposed of at their discretion.
Furthermore, as the ‘unemployed’ had completed their course, they had no right to
remain on campus.
The alert reader will anticipate the next step in this saga. In an unanticipated
way, the TAFE officials were merely ratcheting up the scale of challenge for Jamie
and his confederates. By that time, Jamie had the local knowledge: getting the keys
from the college storeman (so as to ‘complete’ a few final touches) was easy
enough. Within the day, the car was driven out through the front gate and sold, with
just a few illegal changes for good measure. Six weeks later, all hell broke loose in
the college. Where was the car? What might happen if it was involved in an accident
(it was still, notionally, registered in the college name)? There was
a great urgency to speak with ‘these troublemakers’,

There was to be one further betrayal by the system. Sue Shegog takes up the
story:
Discussions between Jamie, the college, the course coordinator and

myself resulted in an agreement that, if the car was returned to the
college, Jamie could purchase it for $10, prior to the government auction
to be held within the week. The car was duly returned with the original
pieces restored to the appropriate places. Jamie faced the music only to
have the system let him down again. Once the car was back on college
turf, Jamie was told in no uncertain terms by senior TAFE staff to clear
off—the deal was off! The incoming group of long-term ‘unemployed
youth at risk’ trashed the car as part of their learning over the following
eighteen weeks!
When last heard of, Jamie was nineteen. He had become a father just before his
seventeenth birthday and was working part-time, in a very flexible way, to support
his young family. I like the idea of a meeting between Jamie and Spansky,
supervised by Sue Shegog and the main figure in this story, to whom we now return,
Allan Coman. That quartet of natural ‘Imos’ could reinvent useful education for all
Australian under-twenties.
ALLAN COMAN AND THE BRADFIELD COLLEGE

STORY
Allan Coman took kids into Bradfield College at about the same age as Spansky’s
Hammertown Boys school spewed them out. When Bradfield College was
established in 1993—as a joint venture between New South Wales Technical and
Further Education (TAFE) and the Department of School Education (DSE)—its
original intake included a high proportion of ‘difficult’ students who had failed
elsewhere, or dropped out, or who had a record of indiscipline. At the beginning, the
College was obliged to accept most of the students who presented themselves. Now
that the College has ‘come of age’, something that Coman dates to mid-1995, it can
afford to be more choosy, but it is still finding space for the ‘Spanskys’—quirky
characters who seem to have ‘something about them’.
The proof of the success of Bradfield lies in the demand. The College is
experiencing exponential growth and the enrolment is expected to continue to
rise. This is being achieved by expanding part-time numbers and accumulating

student numbers by running the College Monday to Friday 8.00 a.m. to 9.30 p.m. on
weekdays and 8.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. on Saturdays, and by expanding the existing
facilities.
I have to say that my experience of Bradfield College is limited so far to three
visits. Whenever I have given lectures in Australia about the Spansky phenomenon,
informed observers have instructed me to head for Crows Nest. A great many people
in the education world are now looking at Bradfield and some of them helped me
gather the information I needed. Let us begin with the College mission, a statement
to warm the heart of Howard Gardner:
To be a centre of educational excellence providing students with many

pathways and relevant experiences leading to rewarding career
opportunities through curriculum, industry training, and life skills in an
independent and innovative learning environment.
The italics are mine. This mission statement at least makes the right noises. It
suggests that book learning is important but it makes it quite clear that this is not
enough. More important, it gives the hint of a college adapting to the diversity of
students. Finally, it establishes the educational process and responsibility as
something that extends well beyond the college gates into the outside world. Now
consider the key words in the ‘Core Values’ statement:
1 Our core business is learning with a vocational focus.

2 We are client-centred and service-oriented.
3 Our emphasis is on development of the whole person.
4 Our learning occurs in an environment of change.
5 We work in teams to achieve quality learning.
6 We create connections by doing as we have agreed.
The students say that the special atmosphere of Bradfield lies in the friendly and
supportive relationships between students. That is to be expected in an institution
that sets out to encourage team working. I would suggest that this is, at base, a
function of the special relationship that has been established between staff and
students. The College is an almost pure expression of the ‘ternary’ principle (see the
Introduction) because it is firm but fair (firm on standards, explicit about rights and
duties). There is no slacking at Bradfield. If you don’t fulfil yourself you can
expect close, watchful, supportive and expert supervision, probably involving your
family as well. Yet you must take responsibility for your own work.
Allan Coman says that the strongly vocational approach accounts for about two-
thirds of the students’ enthusiasm, commitment and success after leaving. But he
insists: ‘What really captivates the students is the enterprising streak!’ Industry-
based learning is based on business planning. The process is sophisticated, involving
a broad sweep of trend data, utilising newspapers and other data sources. The
students are being encouraged to carry out the same process as Robert Keep did
when he started to scan the horse racing odds—taking a step backwards and
allowing the data to wash over you. Coman is absolutely insistent that the students
should experience the essential messiness of ‘right-brain thinking’. Then comes
Bronowski’s connecting—clustering the information gathered into meaningful
clumps, using imagination. Next comes the building of potential projects around the
clumps. These are then subjected to feasibility studies and, if need be, tested to
destruction. If the project looks as though it will run, you set it up and run it, with
just the right amount of hand-holding from College staff.
How to use a brick

The Bradfield practice of putting students together in enterprise industry
teams and encouraging them to see the whole task process through, from
conception to fruition, brings together a number of this book’s themes so
far. If the culture is one of working together in groups, then students have
to learn to appreciate different kinds of contributions—or, if you prefer,
different combinations across the Gardner repertoire. The scanning (messy)
phase of the Bradfield projects is particularly important because it permits
the ‘divergers’ to shine. The psychologist Liam Hudson used to conduct
experiments based on ‘uses of objects’ tests. These tests ask people to think
of as many possible uses as they can for everyday objects like milk bottles,
bricks, shoes, suitcases and so on. Divergent thinking seems to be an
independent variable (in relation to formal examinations, IQ tests and the
like). Very bright convergent thinkers (as tested) can usually think of just a
few different uses for a brick, then their inventiveness quickly peters out. A
diverger, on the other hand, will go on and on for hours in leaps of
imagination and fantasy, until the need for food or rest cuts in. (For the
brick, ‘tombstone for a mouse’ is my favourite amongst the suggestions.)
The diverger may not be the most useful member of the group when the
business plan is being put to bed, but he or she is crucial in the scanning
phase.
Interestingly, Liam Hudson found that when boys aged around sixteen
to twenty years were asked to do the uses of objects test under examination
conditions, but as if they were somebody else, their imaginations ran riot.
Doing the test as ‘Robert Higgins, the successful but sober computer
engineer’, the boys brought forth twice as many unusual or creative uses as
when they answered in their own right. Doing the test as ‘John McMice, the
well-known, uninhibited Bohemian artist’, brought forth an avalanche of
ideas of ‘staggering violence and obscenity’. Once again, we can see the
releasing power of the theatrical metaphor and its uncomfortable proximity
to the unacceptable. Spansky and Joey (those surreal rearrangers of other
people’s front gates) would undoubtedly be dab hands at uses of objects
tests, especially in an assumed role (and more especially as McMice). I find
myself wishing, wistfully, that Spansky and Joey could have been
transported to Australia upon leaving school, placed in Bradfield College
and engaged immediately in purposive, managerial group work demanding
creativity.
Turning things round
On the occasion of my second-last visit to Bradfield, four of the students had just
come second in the Internet category of the World Skill Olympics, competing with
university teams from Finland, the United States, France, Malaysia, Hong Kong, the
United Kingdom and other countries. The Finnish team (all graduates) beat them by
just one point. Not bad going for a group of students from the ‘recovery group’ who
had been kicked out of other schools. It looks like the revenge of the ‘Spanskys’!
The four had run a global multimedia demonstration for the Prime Minister three
weeks before; even the hardheaded media applauded their chutzpah. How can these
kids get so smart so fast? Well, Bradfield is now producing information workers—a
kind of talent feedstock for the participating firms. Allan Coman says: ‘We’re
creating a new kind of worker!’
Apart from the knowledge workers, the College is establishing a presence in
other emerging fields such as design and entertainment.
This breadth flows from Coman’s policy of selecting ‘eccentric’ staff with broad
backgrounds. One of his secret weapons during his time at Bradfield was that he
personally selected all his staff and all of them have done much more during their
careers than teach. In Germany, all academic staff in the Fachochschulen are obliged
by law to have worked outside education. Coman’s staff came from business, the
stock market, television and a wide range of other callings. The pre-eminence of
Bradfield in entertainment studies can be traced directly back to the employment of
an ex-actor (No. 96) and Sydney Theatre Company education officer. Over 100
students are now signed up for the entertainment course. Coman selects high
capacity oddballs as teachers, deliberately nurtures their interests and ‘foibles’, and
waits to see what they will come up with, nourished by the Bradfield buzz. Teachers
of this sort respect the ‘Spanskys’ of this world because they understand them and
their frustrations. They have something in common with them.
Who chose Allan Coman to direct this new enterprise? He believes that the
presence of a well-known entrepreneur/business-woman on the selection panel may
have helped because he (Coman) ought to have been—and probably was—viewed
suspiciously by conventional academics. Gregor Ramsay, the Director of TAFE,
was also an important backer. The TAFE/DSE collaboration itself owes something
to the Foundation for Education set up by the Dusseldorp family some years ago.
You might say that Bradfield College had good grandparents, long before the arrival
of Allan Coman. Still, Coman is important and we ought to try to understand how he
came to be in the right place at the right time. He understands, as Bob Clifford does,
that decisions have their special time. He says: ‘The trick is, you always say yes—
It’s better to get forgiveness at the end than to ask for permission at the start! It’s so
easy to miss an opportunity.’
My experience of education administration in the United Kingdom leads me to
think that anything so obviously successful as Bradfield must be in some kind of
danger—it raises too many awkward questions about what most of the rest are up to.
Coman says himself: ‘The straiteners and the narrowers are trying to move in!’
Bradfield compares well enough on ‘effectiveness audits’—completion rates, HSCs
gained and so on—but to really understand the process of a place like Bradfield, and
the societal benefits that may flow from it, you need to talk at length to the students
both during and after their time in the institution. Funnily enough, educational
auditors hardly ever talk to students—there is always the risk that direct contact with
the throughput might contaminate their data.
Allan Coman himself comes from a respectably modest background. He
describes himself as a ‘product of the Catholic education system’, which may
account for the very strong sense of institution with which Bradfield is imbued. His
father was originally a clerk in Tooheys Brewery; later manager of a milk factory.
Educationally, Coman was a slow starter and late reader and suffered his share of
bullying. Like many inspired teachers, he was rescued by a particular (female)
teacher (in Year 5), who spotted his peculiar talents and encouraged him. In Year 7,
he sat for and won a scholarship, ending up at the de la Salle Brothers School in
Ashfield, near Sydney.
Then he joined the Order as a trainee teaching brother and spent six years in New
Zealand. It was at this time that he collected the first of a couple of Masters degrees.
At twenty-five years of age he left the Order and went through a period of
‘isolation’. In his late twenties he was a peripatetic teacher of science, moving from
school to school and observing the practices of others. Like Robert Keep at the same
age, his isolation gave him the advantage of a certain detachment. By the age of
twenty-nine he was ready to put his ideas into practice; he became Principal of
Kingsgrove de la Salle College, ‘very determined to make the school work!’ Making
a school work means viewing the whole system as a working machine and
understanding how it ticks. You can hear an echo of Clifford’s fascination with the
original hovercraft and Keep’s absorption in the pattern of odds. Coman reckoned
the key variables were the clarity of the underpinning ideas and the quality of the
people, the whole bolted together in teams. It is a nice reformulation of the ternary
idea—purpose, people and teams.
So, by his early thirties, Coman had ‘turned Kingsgrove inside out’ and was on
the way to Bradfield. Five years at Kingsgrove turned into seven years at Ashfield
de la Salle College for boys from Years 5 to 12. On his entry, Ashfield was a failing
school with a declining roll of 550 pupils. By the time of his departure, it was a
spectacularly successful school with a roll of over 1200 pupils. By that time the
surrounding schools at Burwood and Lewisham, which had attracted most of the
government support funding in the intervening years, had almost closed. The
bureaucrats had backed the wrong horse! Ashfield was the serious dry run for
Bradfield.
Ashfield really was a challenge for a new principal with ideas. Ninety-nine per
cent of the pupils were of non-Australian stock: they came from Lebanese, Italian,
Croatian, Greek, Chinese, etc. families, and the standards of English language
expression and comprehension were generally abysmal. By this time Coman
understood something about the importance of symbolic communication with staff,
students and parents. He had read, and had been powerfully influenced by, Peters
and Waterman’s seminal In Search of Excellence. This book was not standard fare
for schoolteachers in the 1980s, but Coman has always been a voracious and eclectic
reader. (Over the years, Tom Peters, one of the great popularisers, has been an
enormous influence for good. The English are sniffy about him because he is
perceived as too garrulous. The point is, he reaches people like Allan Coman.) From
Peters, and other off-line managerial sources, Coman had picked up something
significant about the theatre of leadership—the need to reach people at a level
beneath the merely intellectual. For a modest and self-effacing man, Coman has a
near-genius for the transmission and presentation of ideas.
He foresaw three fundamental challenges for Ashfield:
• At the ‘tough but fair’ end of the spectrum, it would be necessary to address,
quickly and ruthlessly, the language problem. Without that bedrock of
capability all other aspects of education would be diminished.
• There was an urgent need to ‘soften’ the school’s profile. This meant
subverting the prevailing macho culture and replacing it with something less
mindless and more stimulating.
• Finally, there was the inevitable need to lift the boys from their relatively
stunted circumstances and to give them a glimpse of a possible better world.
The previous administration of the school had placed the first of these tasks
firmly in the ‘too hard’ basket. The latter two would simply not have occurred to the
old regime because it would not have countenanced the possibility that the riffraff in
the school contained the seeds of nobility. The reason why Allan Coman is able to
turn failing schools round, over and over again, is that he knows that every child
contains the possibility of cleverness of one kind or another. Coman simply brings
the skills of an impresario to the task of remaking the institution.
On the language front, they instituted a crash program of closely supervised

improvement for every child in the school, working in teams. Within two years, the
average Year 10 Ashfield child was up to the New South Wales State average. After
that, they were consistently above the average. That gave the kids much of the
confidence they had previously lacked. On the culture front, Coman went for a skill
area where a core of the pupils had something ready to build on. He cajoled the most
talented children into a much expanded program of drama, art and music. The first
twenty to buy in were subjected by their mates to merciless teasing—until they
eventually won the Schools’ Rock Eisteddfod, beating a raft of well-endowed
schools in State, national and international competition. Handicapped by the absence
of girls in an all-boys school, they went on stage with heavily tarted up mops as
companions! By this time, about a hundred of the kids were fighting to get into the
front line of the music program and Ashfield was famous for its public
performances. The school assemblies were now ‘legendary’ for their liveliness and
inventiveness. They were, of all things, fun, and they celebrated the special values of
the school—energy, creativity, teamwork and success.
After all this, the pupils were ready for the outdoors education program. The
entire school regularly decamped to the bush just before the Easter break for a
program of exploration, trekking and climbing, including, for some, a night in the
open at the top of a just-climbed mountain. This was an important ritual event for
innercity, often deprived, young people. It may seem extraordinary that so much
could have been achieved so relatively quickly but, as Allan Coman tells it, all you
have to do is ‘get the staff to re-envision the school then re-position the school in its
environment!’ Well, yes, but how do you get other principals to do the same thing
elsewhere. The answer is by imitation. One of Coman’s greatest sources of pride is,
as the great teacher he is, that half a dozen of the best and brightest of current
principals of New South Wales schools were involved, as junior teachers, in the
heady Ashfield experience. They saw, they learned, and they went on to conquer
new fields.
After Ashfield, Coman was ready for the challenge of Bradfield—an entirely
new kind of school with novel support from the two agencies TAFE and DSE. The
brief account given above glosses over the difficulties and frustrations at Bradfield
College—’We did stupid things at the outset!’ In hindsight, Coman is remorseful
about the embarrassment to which his entrepreneurial approach exposed genuine

supporters up the line in the New South Wales education system. All great leaders
are perfectionists and the burden of a good intellect is that you can always see what
might have been. To the outsider like myself the question is, always, what do you do
for an encore? How do people like Allan Coman find the next great challenge
commensurate with their expanding capability?
ALLAN COMAN MOVES ON ...

I discovered the answer to this important question in May 1996. When I first met
Allan Coman, in the middle of 1995, it was clear to me that he was ready for the
next challenge but almost exhausted from the relentless demands of leadership over
the past three years. Achievements like Bradfield are never easily won. Working,
initially, to two bosses (TAFE and DSE) is always nightmarish, even if the
bureaucratic spirit is willing. Coman, partly in the interests of his health, left his
beloved Bradfield to run a small Catholic private girls school (Stella Maris College)
in Manly. The reader won’t be surprised to learn that this was yet another school in
decline. Coman arrived on 1 February 1996 at a school with a nonviable roll of just
452 pupils. Just three months later the word had got around and new enrolments
were running at the rate of two or three per week. Good news travels fast amongst
anxious parents. At Stella Maris, Coman is accountable to a small company board of
directors, including five Sisters of the Order of the Good Samaritan—a far cry from
the bureaucracy of the New South Wales State education system. Stella Maris had
actually withdrawn from the formal Catholic system some years previously.
When I first heard the news of Allan Coman’s departure from Bradfield, from
his successor, I was startled. Surely Coman, of all people, should have been moving
on to bigger and wider responsibilities? I should have known better. On arrival at
Stella Maris, I learned that he had simultaneously joined the Policy Committee of
the New South Wales Catholic Education Commission, the fount of his early
experience in education. Thus he succeeded in combining hands-on experience of a
tightly knit educational community with a stake in policy direction of the big
system. Like all my leaders (look at Clifford and Keep) there is the need to stay in
touch whilst redesigning the world. (Sculpture is the metaphor—the ideas matter
but the hands must work the clay and drive the thinking.) Furthermore, and
unsurprisingly, there is a plan to create another (but privately managed) ‘Bradfield’
down the road, in association with the Manly Training Centre (another venture of
the Stella Maris board) and Manly Council. Manly—Warringah has a substantial
youth and long-term unemployment problem. Coman, it turns out, has not deserted
the ‘big picture’ at all—he has merely found a manageable way of tackling the big,
intractable problems with a minimum of bureaucratic interference and without
putting himself and his family under intolerable strain.
All great leaders leave behind them an arena that is different from what it was
before. What do we find at Bradfield today? Firstly, the succession is secure. Coman
knew that, before his departure, he would need to ‘institutionalise’ the changes he
had wrought. Andrew FitzSimons and Phil Stabback were there from the start of the
great experiment and lasted the gruelling course. They have smoothly taken the
baton.
But there is much more. Bradfield’s ripple effect is substantial and likely to
increase. The College was one of the very first to establish an Enterprise Agreement
with its staff, all of whom are better paid than the State baseline. By 1996 a third of
the staff were working four-day weeks with flexible monthly work commitments
(140 hours over four weeks). The physical assets were being sweated well into the
evenings, again with the active cooperation of the teachers. The New South Wales
Teachers Federation is not famous for flexibility, but Bradfield leadership and
determination helped them to strike an innovative and farsighted staff employment
deal, taking the Federation itself into a leadership role in Australia.
Furthermore, Bradfield is pioneering the clustering of ‘subjects’ into enterprise-
relevant combinations. In other colleges, design, drama, information technology and
entertainment industry studies are usually found in separate, carefully fenced boxes.
At Bradfield they are interlinked in exactly the way that the new
technology/entertainment/multimedia industries require. If you presume to educate
large numbers of ‘Spanskys’, you had better make your offerings relevant to the
adult world they already inhabit. You had better also attend to the entire repertoire
of human intelligences. Interestingly, Allan Coman, voracious reader that he is, was
unaware of Howard Gardner’s work when we first met. If you examine his
educational practice at each school he has directed during his career, you’ll see that
it is as if he wrote Gardner’s seminal book Frames of Mind.
One final example of the beneficent impact of Coman and Bradfield is an
apocryphal story—I hope it is true—of a meeting between Coman and the then State
Education Minister (at that time a woman) and her department head. This was at the
outset of the Bradfield experiment. The story has it that Coman was handed an
envelope containing his instructions or rules of engagement—’marching orders’—
for the task ahead. When he opened the envelope the sheet of paper inside was
blank! The Minister is reputed to have said: ‘Make it work! ‘ The rest is history.
Nothing would have been achieved without farsightedness at ministerial level and
sympathetic support (principally from Dr Susan Holland) along the line of authority.
Women in high places have been an important influence in the New South Wales
education system. At the time of writing, the head of the Education Coordination
Department is another woman—Jane Diplock—with broad-band experience of
banking as well as public service.
Even now, the New South Wales education bureaucracy is trying to create new
kinds of student pathways through the education labyrinth. The Coffs Harbour
district is the showpiece, where a Joint Board of Management has been created for
the senior high school, the TAFE Institute and the local university, in order to reduce
the tyranny of the subject guilds and to open up education to adult logic. I hope it
works well—it deserves to! If there are any problems, I would ring Allan Coman in
Manly. But then again, if I were the Prime Minister and looking for good ideas in
education, I would ring Allan Coman. He is a very senior ‘Imo’—but an ‘Imo’ just
the same!
ALLAN COMAN AS INTELLIGENT LEADER

It will be obvious that I look on Coman as a well-nigh perfect leader. It is very
nearly superfluous to list his leadership qualities, but here are just a few reminders
of earlier themes which he exemplifies.
Coman combines the direct and indirect types of leadership. None of his
achievements would have been possible without the involvement and enthusiasm of
colleagues and staff. He knows therefore how to get people attached to a worthwhile
purpose, mainly through the subtle arts of theatre and symbolism.
It appears that this motivating skill has always been idea-driven. It is the ternary
principle made flesh; Coman may be personally persuasive but the idea is really
persuasive. If the idea catches on (this book is meant to help), then he becomes an
indirect leader too.
What is the idea? It combines:
• the knowledge (some might say faith) that every child, however
disadvantaged, has the seeds of creativity and endeavour hidden away
somewhere—with . . .
• the understanding of schools as systems, charged with managing inputs,
value-adding conversion processes and valuable outputs
Forget the exams. If the output (resourceful young adults) works, then the school
works.
Coman is an exceptionally modest man, yet he has a keen critical eye for the
lunacies of educational systems. He has the great advantage, as role model for
teachers and children, that he is another ‘broad-bander’ on the Gardner intelligences.
I cannot vouch for the presence of the musical or the bodily/kinaesthetic
intelligence, but I can vouch for the rest. It doesn’t matter if he is tone-deaf and
clumsy, and I don’t want to know.
Finally, there is a transparent sense of duty. Like all the best leaders, Allan
Coman is determined to make a difference. How you interpret this depends on your
view of human nature. If you adopt a moral perspective, you can say that Coman is a
good man, impelled by a higher voice to perform good works. If, on the other hand,
you adopt a pragmatic or behaviourist perspective, you might say that he is a person
of unusually high capacity, impelled by his restless intelligence constantly to stretch
himself to new limits. The point is that it doesn’t matter whether the values drive the
intellect or vice versa. We should be grateful for the combination when we find it
and worried about the stifling of potential in similar, but younger, people.
John Latham of IBM:
the housetrained ‘Imo’
For the corporate reader, Messrs Clifford and Keep may seem a little like Martians.
It is difficult to picture either of them climbing steadily up the ranks of a
bureaucracy. Unless you count his father, Bob Clifford was never anybody’s
employee. Robert Keep did succeed spectacularly well for a while in the Australian
Army, a very substantial bureaucracy, but in the end the misfit became obvious to
both sides. Allan Coman is superficially less eccentric, although not many corporate
executives begin their careers as novitiate priests. That suggests a dedication to
ideals of a higher order than career success or corporate profit.
My assumption is that, whilst the Cliffords, Keeps and Comans can never be
fully housetrained, there are potentially more of them around than we realise and it
ought not to be impossible for big organisations to contain them and use their special
gifts intelligently.
John Latham of IBM: The Housetrained ‘IMO’ 183
Most big organisations, without meaning to, just make it very difficult for them.
Clifford, Keep and Coman have a few things in common, even though they occupy
completely different worlds. It is what they have in common that the big
corporations most need. It is that same thing which makes it likely that only a very
unusual, and smart, corporation will be able to contain them or turn them into
‘intrapreneurs’—Gifford Pinchot’s term for the entrepreneur within the corporation.
This is a necessary prelude to the story of John Latham, the only one of my
contemporary leaders to have persisted in the employ of a major bureaucracy—in
this case, the IBM Corporation. Before we examine Latham, it may be instructive to
re-examine what the preceding leaders have in common.
1. Persistence
Each of them has worried away at a particular idea or venture for year upon year.
Coman was headed for the special challenges of Bradfield as soon as he took on
Kingsgrove School, years before. Clifford was headed for the big ferries as soon as
he started to grapple with the problems of building a small fishing boat. (It is worth
recalling that all the best America’s Cup skippers were dinghy racing champions
before they graduated to Cup racing.) Keep was headed for the world of very
complex data as soon as he started jotting things down in notebooks. One of Robert
Keep’s heroes is the great 16th century Danish astronomer, Tycho Brahe. It was his
persistence, observing the heavens day after day, year after year, in a disciplined but
openminded way, that laid the foundation for his assistant, Kepler. Kepler, a
generation younger and standing on the shoulders of Brahe, devised the basic laws
of planetary motion, thus paving the way for Newton. Newton acknowledged his
debt to others’ persistence: ‘If I have seen further, it is by standing upon the
shoulders of Giants!’
Probably the only people in big corporations who share the ‘luxury’ of
persistence on this scale nowadays are a very few senior scientists in corporate labs.
One exception might be Japan, where the sprightly, octogenarian inventor/founder is
still to be found in or around the boardroom—still ingenious, and very wise. In the
take-over-obsessed Anglo-Saxon business world, anything involving a long-term
perspective has become a rarity, even for members of the board—especially for the
members of some boards. It is only in very rare cases, like some of the
‘intrapreneurs’ Pinchot describes in the 3M company, that those obsessive
employees who refuse to stop working on pet projects actually get away with it. For
the most part, the accountants and the big shareholders want quick profit because
they are always frightened of corporate predators. That fear is the enemy of
individual persistence.
Of course, product life-cycles are getting shorter and shorter, but the products
themselves are like plants that come and go. It is the quality of the soil that matters,
nurtured and cosseted over the years. Japanese corporations have been much better
than their competitors in nourishing this kind of continuity and persistence among
creative people. In the West, the Keeps and the Cliffords generally have to go it
alone.
2. Complexity and keeping if simple
This is the counterpart of persistence. Long-term projects get complicated as they
develop. They suck in elaboration. Persistent people therefore have to have high
intellectual capacity—the ability to juggle lots of mental balls simultaneously. Most
corporate executives can ring-fence their own particular patch of turf in order to
keep things reasonably simple. This is what causes departmental ‘smokestacks’ or
‘silos’ and communications blockages. Truly inventive people have to beg, borrow
and steal ideas, resources and support from wherever they can get them. In the days
of Internet, that means anywhere in the world. Their problem is to communicate in a
simple way with those they need to influence. In the corporate world, that may mean
their bosses. The problem for the entrepreneur is that he or she may be the only
person with the grand design in mind.
I worked closely for a period with the manufacturing director of a very high-tech
avionics factory. The plant had nearly three thousand employees and he knew
virtually all the names. It was a subsidiary of a major corporation. The director
engaged in, and seemed to enjoy, a kind of running guerrilla battle with head office.
He was fiercely proud of his plant, his people, and the fact that they were rated an
‘A1 Vendor’ by the Boeing Corporation. He cursed and swore his way around the
place, playing the rough-and-ready man of the people, watching events in every
corner of the operation, and getting his hands dirty. He was a great charismatic
leader who was always at pains to wear his learning, which was considerable,
lightly.
I wanted to know how he held it all together. He puzzled me at
first by referring to the ‘vehicle’. I thought he was talking about the gleaming Jaguar
in the car park, of which he was inordinately proud, and in which I had already had
occasion to offer up prayers for survival. But the ‘vehicle’, it turned out, was a
mental construct—a kind of rolling, aerial photograph of things as they currently
are, in all their complexity, right across the factory operation and its key customers
and prospects. Its special virtue was to be simple—’before the pointyheads [IT
specialists] turn it into printouts’. The contents of the ‘vehicle’ differed from day to
day, yet it was a continuous and stable construct.
I think all clever leaders have to have a ‘vehicle’ in their minds, not so much for
grappling with complexity but for keeping it simple. Only the most important things
stay inside the ‘vehicle’. Such people don’t stop working during the night—
frequently their dreams influence the contents of the ‘vehicle’ in the morning. If they
are really clever, they strive to share the vehicle with a few trusted colleagues. It
helps to know how the boss’s mind is working, alongside the formal planning and
review routines. My avionics friend, I fear, was not good at sharing his ‘vehicle’. He
was, I suppose, a kind of intrapreneur. The problem for the company, I foresaw,
would be to replace him eventually. He was much more like Robert Keep than most
senior corporate executives. Keep’s algorithm is a ‘vehicle’—a way of condensing a
mass of data into a simple formula. So are the ‘backs of the envelopes’ on which
Bob Clifford works out new ferry designs, sitting on aircraft.
If corporate mentoring or coaching is to add value, it has to help quirky people
like this to share the contents of their minds. Some of them regard knowledge as
power and board it. This is a rational response to a binary—i.e. competitive
organisational—culture. John Latham (below) had to cope with this.
3. The oscillation between thinking and doing
I sometimes call this ‘thinkering’—a clumsy amalgam of thinking and tinkering.
Clifford and Keep, in particular, are people who preserve time for thinking but they
hardly ever stop playing with their mental gadgets. They are hands-on tinkerers. It
seems they need to oscillate, on a frequent basis, between the abstract and the very
concrete. Keep does not recognise the existence of illness—he has to turn up every
single day at his computer station (during the Australian night-time) and he feels he
has to personally dispatch his bulletins. Then he goes walking and thinking. That
unbending daily cycle seems to be important. It makes perfect sense for Allan
Coman to go on running a smallish girls school whilst grappling with State-wide
policy issues. It looks very much as though each sphere (the concrete and the
abstract) is a function of the other.
Sculptors provide a good example of the same process: the idea flows into the
clay—the clay assumes a character (which is never exactly what the artist meant;
probably more interesting in a way)—the half-formed clay then feeds the thinking
process—and so on round the loop. Significantly, Henry Mintzberg seems to have
been influenced by his wife (who is a potter) in the preparation of his marvellous
book The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning. He says: ‘Because analysis is not
synthesis, strategic planning is not strategy formation!’ In other words, once you
withdraw yourself completely into the abstract domain, you lose the plot. Politicians,
especially government ministers surrounded by flunkeys, are always in danger of
losing contact with their raison d’être—the sensibilities and welfare of the people.
Theatre, our chosen metaphor so far, is similar to sculpture in this sense. The
director knows what he or she intends but also knows from experience that that is
not what will happen. A lot of other people will influence the outcome, in
completely unpredictable ways. The task of the director is not to ‘stick to plan’ but
to keep up with the creative juggernaut as it plunges forward, but still bearing the
ideal (or the writer’s intention) in mind. Bob Clifford and his colleagues are solving
enormously complex design problems as they go along. All they know for sure is the
general direction of the fast-ferry business, the niche they occupy within it, and that
they are years ahead of the competition. All of these characters seem to have always
understood that the ‘practical’ and the ‘theoretical’ must interpenetrate continuously.
Mary Parker Follett (Chapter 5) made this observation about managerial leadership
over sixty years ago.
Mintzberg goes on to say: ‘. . . strategies that are novel and compelling seem to
be the products of single creative brains, those capable of synthesizing a vision. The
key to this would seem to be integration rather than decomposition, based on holistic
images rather than linear words.’ The followers of these kinds of leaders don’t know
what is going to happen, any more than the leader does, but they sense they are in
safe hands. These leaders inspire confidence.
4. The ternary focus as the source of a good story

One thing that distinguishes these three men from their corporate employee
counterparts is their relative indifference to money and conventional career success.
They are not primarily out to succeed or to compete with their peers. Their aim is to
perfect the gadget upon which they are currently working. Joseph Schumpeter put it
pretty well in 1911 in The Theory of Economic Development: ‘There is the will to
conquer, the impulse to fight, to prove oneself . . . , to succeed for the sake, not of
the fruits of success, but of success itself. Finally, there is the joy of creating, of
getting things done or simply exercising one’s energy and ingenuity!’
Clifford, Keep and Coman range from the comfortably off to the seriously rich,
but that isn’t the point. This focus on the ‘third corner’ (the object) gives them
another advantage—the ability to see their field of operation not as the whole world
but as a stage on which they get to direct and act out their own play. This is probably
why all three are so good at ‘public relations’ or positioning. (I discovered them
because of this gift for positioning.) They are in the play but they are also
simultaneously on the outside, with a good overview of how it must look to others.
Each in his way (I mean this respectfully) is a high-class ham. This must involve an
element of Gardner’s intrapersonal intelligence. Because of this, they are much
better than the manufacturing director (above) at sharing with others—employees,
the press or anybody else—their own personal ‘vehicles’. In each case, the ‘vehicle’
is just mental work-in-progress; the trick is to shape it for public comprehension.
In Leading Minds Howard Gardner lays heavy stress on the successful leader’s
capacity to tell a gripping story, and to go on telling it consistently over time: ‘I
argue that the story is a basic human cognitive form; the artful creation and
articulation of stories constitutes a fundamental part of the leader’s vocation. Stories
speak to both parts of the human mind—its reason and emotion.’ I prefer Gardner’s
way of putting it to the grandiose idea of ‘articulating a vision’, but nonetheless that
is why some stories work. Let me repeat Allan Coman’s apparently artless
description of how you turn a failing school round: ‘Get the staff to re-envision the
school, then re-position the school in its environment!’ It sounds simple. But, by the
time Coman got to Ashfield School, he had a terrific story to tell, based on previous
success and on a developing idea (a ‘vehicle’ in his mind) about the
relationship between kids, schools and learning. He must have come across as pretty
persuasive (or inspiring) to the Ashfield staff, even though he could not have known
exactly what he would do with the school.
That, in a modest way, is why this book contains stories—the accounts of the
lives and achievements of a range of clever, influential people. Without the stories,
the conceptual material wouldn’t come alive.
JOHN LATHAM
I met John Latham for the first time around 1968. I had been appointed management
development consultant to the director of IBM United Kingdom’s Office Products
Division, the ‘downmarket’ end of the Corporation since it sold typewriters, word
processors and dictating equipment. There was a social gulf between the ‘OP’ sales
division and the data processing salesmen and systems engineers, many of whom
were Oxbridge graduates selling to their counterparts in the City of London and in
the big corporations. I had joined IBM as a young man in Australia and, newly
arrived in London, the social division was obvious enough to me. Nobody else in the
system seemed to be aware of it at a conscious level, although it affected behaviour
in mysterious ways.
Latham, a dozen years or so my senior, was in charge of the OEM (other
equipment manufacturers) Group. Their role was to operate in the grey hinterland
between the (then) dominant IBM Corporation, which didn’t need to collaborate
with anybody to maintain its almost monopolistic position in the market, and the
other suppliers who from time to time traded with IBM or fitted their equipment
(keyboards, for example) into its systems. This was good business for IBM, but it
was treated almost covertly because the mighty IBM didn’t officially consort with
the minnows. The OEM Group was located in the aforementioned Office Products
Division, because of the product overlap. This was probably a mistake because
Latham and his lads were actually stalking the no-man’s land where the really
important market intelligence for computers was to be found-where the future was
taking shape.
The obvious difference between John Latham and the three entrepreneurs above
is that he joined a major corporation in early mid-life and stayed with it
until a modestly early retirement. Latham was therefore technically an ‘intrapreneur’

not an entrepreneur, although his range of activities and interests throughout was
always pretty impressive. His importance lies in the fact that, because of the almost
unique positioning of his operational group within the Corporation, he foresaw what
must happen to IBM in another ten to fifteen years or so, unless urgent corrective
action was taken straightaway. Latham was therefore an Imo. His claim to seriously
intelligent leadership lies in the fact that he not only foresaw the future—he foresaw
how and why he would be powerless to forestall the future. He knew intuitively that,
no matter how hard he tried, he would be unable to divert the bureaucracy from its
collision course with one of the biggest corporate blunders in business history. He
did try, however.
The story of IBM’s blunder is well known, but the reader may appreciate a brief
recap. Because of IBM’s market dominance in computers, which amounted virtually
to a worldwide monopoly, it had been able to control its competition by outspending
them (especially in research) and holding new product developments back in order
to kill off upgraded competitive equipment. All this was financed by the wide
margins that IBM was able to charge for its product/service mix. The service, by
very high quality sales, systems engineering and maintenance staff, really provided
the edge. Generally, the IBM kit was nothing special but customers felt safe with the
superconfident IBM people. The inherent weakness, in all this was the flipside of the
main strength—the belief, on the part of purchasing departments, that ‘nobody ever
got the sack for buying IBM! ‘ The competition might be offering a much better
price/performance package but the safe option remained the reassuringly expensive
IBM option. Latham saw that this was a shaky foundation for continuing market
dominance because it was a Psychological advantage rather than a realistic technical
or performance advantage. How and why he was able to perceive this is the point of
the story.
It would be fair to say that John Latham stood out in the IBM culture. He had
come into the company not just from the Army but from the cloak-and-dagger ranks
of the Special Services. Tall and craggy, with a cut-glass accent, he might have
stepped out of any Hollywood-style spy/war movie of the 1940s. In fact, at the age
of seventeen, he had been in change of bits of northern Italy and Malta
in the dying days of World War II. There is a certain kind of fearless, Uncontrollable
youth for whom a war is a much more engaging pursuit than zooming around the
country on a motorbike to the despair of his mother. Latham was one of these—
precocious would be the word for it.
I have worked with many men (and fewer women) who shared the intensity of
this wartime experience. They all seem to possess a detached scale of values which
accepts that being alive at all is much more significant than getting a promotion or
pleasing a boss. It is a pity we can’t really improve on wars for teaching this sort of
wisdom.
After the war, Latham stayed on in the Army. He was rejected at first by the
Special Services on grounds of his ‘lack of interest’ (for which read: the mind
wandering to more interesting matters). He became a commissioned officer in their
ranks later on when he had proved his ingenuity in the field. An example of the
ingenuity was his invention of a kind of spyhole for use in the big NATO war games
in Germany. The north German plains are largely devoid of good cover. Latham
reckoned that the cheap, civilian ‘Anderson Shelters’ (designed to withstand Hitler’s
buzzbombs) could be converted to underground observation points strong enough to
withstand passing tanks. What’s more, Latham was able to get them built and
proven in just a few days and without permission, by enthusing his commando teams
and getting his own hands dirty. It proved simple and highly effective—Latham’s
‘army’ won the ‘war’.
There are many more Latham stories of this kind, most of which cannot be
revealed for security reasons. By the time John Latham entered the corporate world,
as a humble typewriter salesman, he had become very experienced indeed in covert
observation and in the interpretation of fragmented data. These are useful skills in
the sales world too. Selling is not unlike spying—you have to simulate particular
genuineness, while carrying out a routinised general task. Not for nothing do
psychologists see selling as a ‘promiscuous’ activity. It is also no accident that
corporations are obsessed by ‘market intelligence’. If you can understand what is (or
must be) going on by making sense of the fragments you are able to get hold of, and
building up a Pattern, then you have the drop on the competition—provided you can
get the bigwigs to understand and to act quickly on what you have discovered. It was
at this point that Latham, like Keep, ran into a brick wall of incomprehension.
As did all the best intrapreneurs, Latham had a mentor or ‘sponsor’ in IBM—
significantly, a Stateside American boffin with worldwide contacts in the new
technology world. Latham was appointed to sit, as the IBM representative, on the
British Standards Institute, because he understood the way the technology was
running. As an ex-’spy’, he understood that his role on the BSI was to say nothing
and to observe closely. Of course he was not the only person in IBM to see which
way the wind was blowing—towards highly flexible local (personal) computing, and
away from the big mainframes which still sustained IBM’s market dominance.
Because Latham was close to the designers around the world, he could see how easy
and cheap it was to bolt together even the existing technology to make a new kind of
product. C. K. Prahalad has observed that quite a few people in IBM had seen which
way things were going. The problem wasn’t the forecasting, but imagining the
possibilities and capabilities. To be fair, IBM did have special problems. Because of
its market dominance, it was under constant United States Government scrutiny
under the anti-trust laws. It was said that there were two Justice Department lawyers
whose sole function was to watch IBM nonstop. It was also said that IBM employed
sixty-three lawyers to watch those two. The Corporation was certainly distracted by
the effort to divisionalise in order to meet the objections of the smaller competitors.
What really mattered wasn’t the lawsuits but what the competitors were doing with
the technology. In the end IBM, by sticking to what it knew best, ‘gave away the
keys to the kingdom!’ Intel ran away with the manufacture of chips and Microsoft
(famously) ran away with the software. The IBM top dogs simply didn’t see that in
future it would be the software, not the machines themselves, that made the money
and secured the market stranglehold.
Like many American corporations, IBM was heavily influenced by ‘binary’ or
Darwinian notions. Product development would take place along competitive lines,
with development teams fighting it out for corporate funding. It did release
enormous energy, but it also encouraged turf wars. At that time the director of the
United Kingdom Laboratories, at Hursley, was a brilliant designer/manager, Dr John
Fairclough. One of Fairclough’s teams had already lost one of these development
battles over a mainframe computer design—reputedly with a better design—the
SCAMP system. Latham used to talk to Fairclough about technical developments
amongst the competitors.
They looked, for example, at the early Commodore machines, agreeing that it
would be easy to replicate them cheaply—a ‘typewriter with a chip inside’.
Fairclough (now Sir John) had thought about all this before and knew that the
competitors, generally scorned by IBM, were potentially dangerous. Later he went
on to become the United Kingdom Government’s Chief Scientific Officer. He was
also ready for a bigger, wider and more challenging assignment by then.
Between them Latham and Fairclough tried to bend the minds of the corporate
bigwigs. Latham talked to the European laboratory directors about the way the
market was headed. They were sympathetic but they were locked into product
development ‘missions’ handed down from above. They were a bit like rugby
forwards—already bedded-down in a scrum and pushing hard. They left powerless
to diverge, no matter how compelling the local argument. Latham was particularly
concerned about the communications side of computing—the froggish interfaces
with other types of system. This was the time when limited intelligence terminals
were beginning to find their way into airline check-in stations. This meant he was
getting involved with process control systems, message-switching, international
standards—all the spaces between systems, and a far cry from the interests of his
Office Products colleagues. He foresaw the kinds of technical collaboration and
interlocking between manufacturers that were bound to come. He was networked
with most of his counterparts around the world—an informal cabal of inventive
mavericks, taking the business forward despite their employing corporations.
Right from the start the OEM group, Latham’s team or commando, was an
oddball outfit—a motley collection of ex-garage mechanics, merchant bankers and
other riffraff, carefully chosen for ingenuity by Latham himself. The parallel with
Allan Coman’s staff at Bradfield College is inescapable (see Chapter 9). When you
entered the OEM group as a member of staff your first task, with much help and
encouragement from the others, was the establishment of your personal share
portfolio. Latham believed that everybody needed to be financially independent of
the Corporation in order to be ‘brave’ enough to take bold decisions. Not
surprisingly, every member of that oddball team has gone on to greater things. When
I discuss people like Latham with major corporations, the tendency is to marginalise
them as mavericks or eccentrics. But part of the significance of people
like this is the multiplier effect of their leadership. John Latham was truly an
innovator of great talent but he was also a fine manager, sensitive to the
development needs of his motley crew, uncompromising in his expectations of their
loyalty and effort, and expert in drawing out their own ingenuity. They certainly
admired the boss; possibly loved him in the same gruff sort of way that commandos
sometimes come to love their officers.
In the end, as history records, Latham and his like failed to redirect the
juggernaut. The Corporation survived in the end by importing a tobacco baron,
Louis Gerstner, to wield the surgeon’s knife. The treatment was essentially financial
by then and desperately necessary. The opportunity to change the Corporation by
way of technological innovation had vanished by that time.
Latham’s last few years with the IBM Corporation were instructive. By that
stage he was engaged, on a semi-formal basis, with a wide range of leading-edge
projects, working with sponsors from all over the worldwide IBM Corporation. But
his employment was still officially with the original Office Products management
bureaucracy in the United Kingdom. They had never really understood Latham. His
final months bore an uncanny resemblance to the exit of Michael Phillips from the
Bank of California (see below). Once Phillips lost the protection of his boss, Bob
Person, his corporate enemies nailed him. First he lost his sponsor, then he lost his
job. He said: ‘Bob Person understood and could explain what I was trying to do in
terms other bankers could comprehend.’
Michael Phillips and the widows

Gifford Pinchot, the inventor of the ‘intrapreneur’ (internal entrepreneur)
concept, tells the story of Michael Phillips, then Director of Market
Research for the Bank of California. Phillips was an ‘Imo’, encouraged and
protected by Bob Person, one of the bank’s top team. Phillips subjected all
the bank’s personal investment products to an exhaustive market analysis
and discovered that one particular customer group not only produced a
disproportionate profit for the bank but did so for minimal marketing or
account management effort. This group was the widows—some of them
very wealthy indeed; all of them bereft or grieving; most of them unused to
managing money. Phillips concluded that not only were the Bank of
California’s widows getting a raw deal—all the widows in America were.

Phillips set his sights on that wider market. His idea was to offer them an
easy-to-understand personal account in the form of a special Certificate of
Deposit, which would help them to take responsibility for their own affairs
and, more important, to earn substantially more from their investments.
Like all the leaders celebrated in these pages, Michael Phillips began by
immersing himself in the data. Gifford Pinchot continues the story:
He was motivated by a personal ideal: to provide a better savings

vehicle for older people. As the head of marketing research, he had
assembled groups of older bank customers with substantial savings and
asked them to discuss their investment needs. Many of them said they
had heard of Certificates of Deposit, but they knew very little about CDs
except that they were a desirable form of investment but suitable only
for investors more sophisticated than themselves.
Beginning with the typical tasks of his job, Michael had to determine
why these customers were putting their money in 4% savings accounts
instead of 5.25% CDs. He discovered from his market research groups
that customers were puzzled by the term ‘certificate’, since in most
cases the actual certificate or bankbook-type of record had been
replaced by a ledger entry held somewhere in the bowels of the bank.
Furthermore, the fact that CDs were only sold in large denominations
such as $10,000 intimidated many potential customers, including many
who had savings accounts far larger than that.
But Michael did not stop with discovering these facts, as his job
description warranted. He went much further in his research. There was,
he found out, no legal or operational reason why Certificates of Deposit
could not be offered in small denominations; rather, the intimidating
Certificates were based on a longstanding tradition in commercial
banking that Michael abhorred—that dealing with individual customers
was unprofitable and somehow beneath the dignity of a proper banker.
Michael, on the other hand, saw consumer Certificates of Deposit as an
opportunity to better serve customers and attract substantial deposits by
offering them a higher return. His idea was simple: to create and
advertise a Certificate of Deposit in small denominations ($500).
At this point he came into collision with the bank’s senior management
cadre. They patiently explained that the primary task of a business is to
widen, not to narrow, the profit margin. If the widows were complaisant
and ignorant, that represented a marketing opportunity—the task was to
extract more from them. This is the binary model in pure form: if I gain,
you lose! Phillips argued that the bank’s focus was too narrow and too
short-term (Imos always argue like this), and that it was locked into the
existing customer base. Phillips had his eye on the Widows of America—
no less. The task, as he saw it, was to create an entirely new product which
broke all the rules by bringing very substantial benefit to an exploited
group.
The story has a sort of happy ending. In the end Phillips won the
argument, the new product was created and marketed, and the Bank of
California went on to manage a chunk of the investment income of widows
right across the United States. This ternary (wide-view, long-term) vision
transformed the fortunes of the bank in just a few years (by transforming
the fortunes of widows). By really looking after the customers the bank
looked after its own interests, as a by-product. But defeat at the hand of the
upstart Phillips rankled with some of the binary heavyweights. Three
months after Bob Person (Phillips’ sponsor and protector) left the company,
they sacked Michael Phillips.
In order to survive in IBM, Latham also needed such a sponsor. In fact Gifford
Pinchot argues that the corporate survival of the ‘Imo’ depends on an array of
talents, probably located in different people:
• The inventor: the person who really understands the new product or service
but not how to make a business of it.
• The ‘intrapreneur’: the person who focuses on the business realities but who
may, in enthusiasm, neglect the realities of organisational politics.
• The sponsor: the person who gives tactical advice to the intrapreneur and
removes organisational barriers.
• The protector: the very high-level sponsor who approves and protects but
who rarely meets the intrapreneur.
Latham’s problem, as a quintessential Englishman of higher social status than his

immediate bosses, was that he needed protection from another culture, IBM being in
essence as American as blueberry pie. When he ran out of protection, he was sunk.
With the decline of IBM’s fortunes, the United Kingdom Office Products
management needed to ‘lose’ seven managers. As they didn’t really understand what
Latham was up to, they didn’t really value his eccentric gifts. Latham went on a
skiing holiday and broke a leg. In recuperation he received a message that on his
return he was to report to one of the branch offices as a common or garden
salesman: the role in which he had entered the Corporation twenty years before. He
was then fifty-five years of age. He never went back; all that remained was to brief
his lawyers.
Most of the corporations I deal with would prefer to believe that this kind of
thing could not happen today, at least in their corporations. In Chapter 1, I drew
attention to firms like Hewlett-Packard, Herman Miller and ABB, where neglect of
cleverness is less likely. But the problem remains with the broad-band capability, or
lack of it, up the managerial line. Even if you institute policies and programs
designed to root out creativity and protect the creative, you must still be limited by
executives who cannot grasp what they are being told by junior ‘Imos’. In the end,
the core task for intelligent leaders is to ensure that the higher you go in the
hierarchy the smarter the people—right across the Gardner repertoire of
intelligences. How this is achieved is addressed in Chapter 14.
Boys, girls, role models
and parenting
The alert reader will have noticed that the heroes celebrated thus far (with the
exception of Imo and Mary Parker Follett) have all been men. That is partly a
function of my narrow exposure to intelligent leadership in Australia in the last few
years. In the course of researching this book, I have now started to penetrate a much
wider society of interesting leaders, especially in science and technology, politics,
and also amongst women. Any new edition should be enriched by a wider and
deeper dramatis personae. At any rate, it is vitally important to expose the subtle
differences between the characteristic leadership styles of women and men. The
overlap is huge, but the differences are still important. Howard Gardner, whose
theory of multiple intelligences underpins much of my argument about the nature of
intelligence, suggests that there are few sex differences amongst the ‘intelligences’
except for the spatial intelligence and, notably, the interpersonal intelligence. This is
captured nicely by the title of a conference session late in 1996: Why Men Never
Listen and Women Can’t Read Maps!
The suggestion that sex-based behavioural differences are inbuilt has to be
considered in the context of special environmental factors.
Lyn Carlsmith, a research student at Harvard in the 1960s, came up with one of
those hunches that precede really interesting research. Thinking in much the same
inductive way as Robert Keep, she got a feeling about the cohort of young men
passing through the university at that time. She thought there was something odd,
and unusually nice, about them; but why? She then carried out an exceedingly
elegant piece of research which required no research protocols, or interviews, or
surveys, or complicated analysis.
Her main achievement was to grasp that World War II represented a kind of
research goldmine. These young men had spent their infancy in the first years of the
war. Some of them had had a ‘normal’ upbringing in the sense that their fathers (for
one reason or another) did not go away to war. Others had lost their fathers for the
duration, and some of them permanently. This was an abnormal kind of upbringing.
Carlsmith’s research approach was simplicity itself: she went back to the records
of the Scholastic Aptitude Test that all the students had completed in order to get
into Harvard in the first place. She extracted their verbal and mathematical scores (in
those days, the pattern almost invariably was that men excelled in the mathematical
and women in the verbal). She divided the students, all of whom were male, into two
groups: those whose fathers had been away for at least two years during the
subjects’ infancy and had then permanently returned; and those, from matched social
backgrounds, whose fathers had remained at home.
The outcome was striking, and pretty much as Carlsmith expected. In the ‘father-
present’ group, eighteen out of twenty students had the typical male bias towards the
mathematical part of the SAT but only seven out of twenty in the ‘father-absent’
group did so (see Figure 15). These young men were (so far as their test profiles
suggested) very like the bold, confident, slightly androgynous young women you
find in the top American women’s colleges—the kind of young women who tend to
have been regarded throughout their lives as omnicompetent by their fathers and/or
to have grown up in tomboyish friendship and rivalry with a raft of brothers. They
are intelligent young women with the same cocky self-assurance as young men and
they tend to do very well in their careers.
What this suggests is that, without too much social engineering, it ought to be
possible to produce young men with much of the
Boys, Girls, Role Models and Parenting 199
'Male' (mathematical) bias 'Female' (verbal) bias
'Normal' infancy –
father present
'Abnormal' infancy –
father absent
Figure 15 Lyn Carlsmith’s Harvard Class of ‘64: Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores
Lyn Carlsmith’s wonderfully simple and elegant study of Harvard
undergraduates suggests that if infant boys are brought up without male role
models (either the parental or the peer-group kind), but with very positive
female role models, some thirteen out of every twenty of them will end up
thinking very like the best and most resourceful women.
subtlety, sensitivity and guile of ‘typical’ young women and, at the same time, to
produce young women with the same assertiveness and risk-taking capabilities as
‘typical’ young men. Such young men and women are already very similar to each
other and generally work and get on well together. The genetic differences remain in
the behaviour patterns, but they don’t get in the way of effectiveness. Viewed in this
light, the single-sex school may be a mixed blessing. Of course, mixed schools need
to keep an eye out for the special needs of both girls and boys. Elements of
quarantine will always be required but, overall, the output today of the very best
mixed schools is impressively ahead of that part of its parental generation educated
in purdah. They will be much better managers and many more of them will be
women who really know how to relate to the best kinds of men.
By the way, the Carlsmith generation was my cohort and her findings ring true
for me and, I think, for most of my male and female contemporaries. It was and is an
unusual generation, containing sensitive men like Clive James (whose father was
killed on the way home from the war) and tough and resourceful women like
Germaine Greer. It is a great pity that nobody, so far as I am aware, has
conducted a similar study of the young women of that generation. If you read
Greer’s poignant book, Daddy, We Hardly Knew You, you get an intimation of what
it must have been like to be brought up during a war by an omnicompetent mother
and to see that mother reduced to relative impotence by the return of a less than
perfect man. It was mostly that generation that produced the great feminist tracts.
THE TROUBLE WITH BOYS

In the next section I touch on the trouble with girls (or female executives)—the
natural reaction against dominance by male gangs. Sometimes female dogmatism
may seem to be the only defence against collective male strength. If it is true that
boys brought up solely by women have a wider repertoire of ‘intelligences’ than the
average, does this tell us anything useful? What about all those little boys officially
in the ‘father-present’ state who hardly ever see their fathers? Since I came upon the
work of Howard Gardner, I have discovered that one of the best ways of getting
through to the real concerns of chief executives and other very senior male managers
is to take them through the theory of ‘multiple intelligences’. A good many of them
are gripped because they themselves have had to overcome poor academic
performance in order to demonstrate their prowess in making things happen. Others
are gripped because they are worried sick about the behaviour and capabilities of
their own children—especially their sons (whom they hardly ever see).
There is not much doubt that criminality in society is directly associated with the
Y-chromosome. Most of the inhabitants of jails are men. About 90 per cent of
indictable offences are the responsibility of men. Around sixty young men are
incarcerated for every one young woman. Are we dealing with genetics here, or with
social conditioning? What are the implications of all this for developing effective
(i.e. useful) leadership? In their fascinating book Demonic Males Wrangham and
Peterson point out that, whilst many animals routinely kill, in the interests of
survival, only humans and chimps (our nearest cousins) actively seek the death of
prey, apparently for its own sake. If so, it must have been usefully adaptive in the
past. They describe how apes will gang up on individuals with positional power in
order, not merely to depose them, but to tear them limb from limb
in a form of extended torture. Once the new order is installed and, in due course,
another realignment of power, another episode of torture will ensue. It is horribly
reminiscent of boardroom power struggles—just bloodier. Out on the street,
amongst the gangs of young men, you get the blood too! We should bear in mind
that it is only about 130 000 years ago that we achieved ‘full’ humanity as Homo
sapiens sapiens, a mere moment in evolutionary time.
If we consider the social conditioning of the typical young modern male, it
amounts to a predicament. Very few men are closely associated with the boy. He
may catch glimpses of men at work, doing whatever it is that men do, and his father
(if any) may swoop down and throw him excitingly in the air, but that is usually a
fleeting thrill. His sister, on the other hand, is much more likely to get to observe
adult women at useful work, at first hand and continuously. For her, the future is not
so far away. By the age of around three, little girls know that they will probably
grow up to be (inter alia) mothers and homemakers, and they know roughly what
that entails. To a ‘liberated’ female adult, homemaking may seem limiting but, to a
three-year-old, it must be reassuringly comprehensible. By three, girls are behaving
like women; practising being grown up. The outstanding entrepreneurs in this book,
men and women, mostly got to watch a parent making something happen at first
hand. The experience gives a good sense of process—how the world can be
improved or transformed by concentrated human effort.
If boys try out copying their mothers, they will be told that boys don’t do that. If
they cry and ask to go home, that isn’t on either. Angela Phillips (in The Trouble
with Boys) comments:
Perhaps the reason why so many boys run around and shout a lot is
because they don’t know what else to do. They don’t have a complex
role to inhabit, or a joint understanding of an imaginary world in which
to play together. The only thing they know about what it is to be male is
that it isn’t like being a girl. They start to define their whole sense of
themselves, not in a positive sense as ‘like’ someone but in a negative
sense, as unlike the people who surround them.
Phillips points out that boys therefore confront a vacuum; they have to find out,
somehow, what it is to be male (as opposed to non-female). In the absence of
satisfactory adult role models, they pick it up from male peers, mainly in groups:
By the time they are seven, the coercive process of masculinisation is

well under way. Boys mercilessly tease those who do not conform to the
group idea of masculinity. Those who don’t fit will be edged out in
order to create a clearer idea of what it is to be a proper boy.
Pretty soon, in the early teens, the prospect of violence looms. If you don’t fit in,
you have to find a way of avoiding trouble. A substantial majority of the great
comedians (Clive James was no exception) are clever and sensitive people who grew
up surrounded by toughness and who coped by taking on the role of class clown.
The most dangerous kids are those who have been excluded by peer pressure and
who are desperate for reinclusion in the group. They will do just about anything,
however criminal and violent, to earn approval. Once ‘toughness’ and the art of
male-bonding is learned, those at the top of the tree can go on to bully other people
in the business world. Those at the bottom, like Spansky and his chums, will very
likely swell the ranks of the jailbirds.
Of course there is more to this than social conditioning and the absence of male
role models. We have only to look at the completely natural patterns of young male
behaviour amongst our primate cousins. Lionel Tiger pointed out a long time ago (in
Men in Groups) that the all-male hunting band far preceded the evolution of our big
brains a couple of million years ago. The hunting band had the capacity to act as a
brain, even if its individual members were still relatively primitive. The hostile
takeover clearly offers more than financial excitement and satisfaction to human
predators. All the evidence suggests that hostile takeovers usually benefit the few at
the expense of the many. The evidence suggests that both firms involved frequently
underperform afterwards. The business community as a whole, and hence the nation,
may be weakened as a result. But the predators’ leaders never had higher-order aims
in mind, just short-term aggrandisement, like hunters slavering for red meat. If
business leaders were less primitive (better brought up?) maybe business as a whole
might flourish. The best leaders for today need their primitive instincts, because it
can get nasty at times, but they also need a longer and wider view of the future.
Starting off as a boy may not be the ideal preparation for that.
In the meantime, the new consensus is that successful nations have business
communities in which trust coexists with competitiveness.
With trust, you can set about building and sustaining long-term businesses with
valuable purposes and outputs. If the price of success is the hostile takeover, why
bother with building anything—become a raider! When I first adopted the terms
‘binary’ and ‘ternary’, an American colleague, conscious of the primitive
psychology of the takeover, commented: ‘You might as well talk about raiding and
building.’ It comes to much the same thing. Raiding is binary, because all that really
matters is winning. Building is ternary, because the relationships are much less
important than the objective or ideal.
‘THE TROUBLE WITH WOMEN IS THEY DON’T GIVE

PUTTS!’
I am indebted to Robert Joss (Chief Executive, Westpac) for this quote from one of
his senior managers. The statement could mean a number of things, from ‘women
are inflexible’ to ‘women have high standards’. The point is that it was a man, and a
senior one, who said it.
For the reader unfamiliar with golf, an explanation is in order. There is a
convention in friendly golf of ‘giving’ a short (say half-metre) putt on the green, the
last half-metre the ball has to travel in order to fall in the hole. These short putts can
be ‘knee-tremblers’—they should be easy but if much hangs on them (like a
substantial wager) the distance can seem much greater. When you are given a putt,
you simply pick up your ball and treat it as if it had been holed-out. In an informal
way, you are now in debt to your opponent. Your opponent is entitled to expect you
to give him an equally tricky putt later on. The emphasis is on him—this is generally
a male-bonding kind of ritual.
When Robert Joss passed on this excellent quote (in the course of an interview
for Amanda Sinclair’s major study, published as Trials at the Top, about women’s
difficulty with the ‘glass ceiling’) my immediate reaction was: ‘They don’t give
putts in the US Open either!’ In other words, if you are engaged in a serious,
international competition for big stakes (like the modern business world), there is
absolutely no room for sloppiness. It may well be that the female executive’s
uncompromising approach irks her male colleagues, but it might be just the ticket
for the serious business of satisfying foreign customer requirements. My guess is
that when senior businesswomen methodically cross the t’s and dot the i’s, they
remind men of their own mothers, or bossy sisters, or strict school teachers or
(worse) their wives.
The best thing about the putt-giving statement is that it underlines the reality that
both sexes have characteristic strengths and weaknesses. That is not to argue that no
men share the feminine weaknesses or that no women share the masculine
weaknesses; simply that each sex has its special and distinctive pattern of behaviour.
Whether that behaviour represents a strength or a weakness depends entirely on the
context. I believe that the male reaction: ‘women don’t give putts!’ tells us
something important about both the strengths and weaknesses of women in big and
responsible jobs. If women are serious about breaking through the ‘glass ceiling’ it
will be useful to learn from this.
Let us go back those 130 000 years—to the point of pre-history where we have
become recognisably homo sapiens sapiens—upright posture, big brain and all. The
men are bigger and stronger than the women and there is a clear role specialisation
which has proved valuable for adaptive natural selection. Those with the capacity to
flick the wrist will be launching lethal projectiles at animal prey. No woman can do
to a 160 gram cricket ball what a professional male cricketer can—send it seventy
metres on an almost flat trajectory at bullet-like speed. Genetically-speaking, the
trick is located in the mechanism of wrist, elbow and shoulder. Women can throw,
but they can’t throw like that.
Because hunting is necessarily a group effort, especially if you are slower or
weaker than some of your prey, then the task has to be performed according to the
implicit understandings within groups of stalking men. In the heat of the hunt, there
is no time for elaboration. Anybody puzzled by the atavistic glee of corporate raiders
mounting an ambush on other unsuspecting businessmen, need look no further than
the hunting band. That is the genetic endowment of the human male. Any sympathy
for the prey would be counter-productive. The activity hardly requires thought—
mainly high adrenalin levels and a very deep-seated capacity to work together on a
limited, dangerous task. You could predict, however, that the hunting males would
acquire highly developed spatial skills; the capacity to ‘see’ the terrain as if from
above.
Meanwhile, back in the cave, there is a lot of elaboration. There is actually a
form of society which involves a certain amount of diversity. After all, there are the
relatively elderly and the young, and the possibility for communicating in a different
and more complicated way. As language develops, the talking is bound to be about
the system and its survival requirements. The presence of a relatively settled society
or community means the development of empathy between people. This doesn’t
mean that the hunters will lack empathy, simply that their relationships are likely to
be of a different, and less sentimental kind. The physical requirement for
specialisation by sex (reinforced by genetic coding over hundreds of thousands of
years) means that men and women are characteristically good at different things.
The skill overlap is substantial but the differences remain.
The shift to organised farming, our species’ first chance to share labour between
the sexes, occurred a mere 300 generations ago—a fleabite in evolutionary terms
and far too short a time for men to adapt to the new circumstance. The modern
bureaucracy is the product of the last couple of hundred years. We haven’t got the
hang of it yet. We may be in the process of disinventing it.
There is a point to this speculative tour around our pre-history. It is that the
evolutionary process is unimaginably gradual. Our ideas may be modern but our
instinctive behaviours, as men and women, are programmed and very slow to
change. Our problem is that, as a species, we have got control of too many of the
environmental forces which used to control us. We are changing our circumstances
more quickly than we can evolve. The characteristic behaviours of the stronger sex
used to be functional for species survival, supported by the women. It now looks
very much as though the characteristic behaviours of men might be our undoing.
Once it becomes possible to apply technology to the social control of big
populations, then Saddam Hussein’s big brain becomes a liability. Because his
father treated him like a dog, his behaviour is no more ‘advanced’ than that of his
prehistoric ancestors.
The most important problems which beset us now are relationship problems. It
doesn’t really matter all that much whether or not the Hubble space telescope sends
back terrific pictures of deep space, if our own world falls apart in the meantime.
Most of the men celebrated in these pages are fiddlers and tinkerers. They happen
also to be charming and persuasive, but their special strength lies in the ability to
fool around with materials (aluminium, currency movements, student throughput
systems, computer peripheral devices, etc.) in such a way as to produce wonderful

outcomes. As Chapter 2 suggests, they have a spatial way of overviewing complex
phenomena. It is no great surprise that the seminal work of Mary Parker Follett died
the death, because the core of her understanding lay in human relationships. The
powerful men surrounding her clearly had difficulty in grasping her meaning fully.
In the sixty years since her death, a succession of famous male thinkers and writers
has been slowly struggling to catch up with her. My own ‘ternary’ notion is merely a
warmed-up (masculine/spatial) variant on her ‘law of the situation’.
This is a well-known psychological experiment which demonstrated the truth of
all this charmingly. The setup was an ante-room, scattered with various toys and
devices. Young children of both sexes were asked to wait in this room for the
experiment to begin. They didn’t know it, but the experiment had begun already.
The boys fell on the toys and proceeded to manipulate or disassemble them,
demonstrating fierce concentration. Communication was limited to the odd
monosyllabic grunt, always to another boy and always about the device in hand. The
girls completely ignored the toys, and the boys, and created an instant society.
Within five minutes of arrival, all the girls knew an astonishing amount about all the
other girls. The speed and richness of the exchanges was stunning.
Now of course there may be women as captivated by tinkering as these boys, and
men as sociable as these girls, but it isn’t the norm. The leaders celebrated in these
pages seem to me to be people with a very wide repertoire of behaviours and skills.
Clifford, Keep, Coman and Latham all come across as pretty butch, but with their
‘feminine’ skills intact. Mary Parker Follett, Noel Waite and Liz O’Shaughnessy
(the stories of these latter two are still to come) are entirely feminine but their useful
‘masculine’ skills have helped them to exercise leadership. All of these people
appear to spread right across the Gardner ‘multiple intelligences’. If we could
determine what caused that, we might be able to replicate the process in families and
schools.
I said above that the characteristic behaviours of men and women are neither
good nor bad; it depends entirely on the situation. I hinted also that women might
have something to learn from the ‘women don’t give putts’ anecdote. There is a clue
here, I believe, as to the avoidable mistakes that female executives make. I am
Figure 16 Executive mentoring: male/female synergy

As the fashion for one-to-one executive mentoring and coaching develops, it
turns out that some of the most effective mentors to very senior men are
resourceful women of a certain age. And vice versa. It may be that, within
the security of the mentoring relationship, the yin and the yang come together
harmoniously.
thinking now of women who want to succeed in conventional, large organisations. I

am not preaching to the increasing number of outstanding women who are turning
their backs on such organisations because they are bored by the childishness of their
male colleagues’ behaviour. Trials at the Top, which both male and female big
company executives should read, charts this development admirably.
However, the big corporations are going to have to find some way of retaining
the most talented women (the ones most likely to lose patience with the executive
‘boys’). Otherwise the monoculture at the top will lose creativity, along with its
diversity. Altering the group behaviour of the boys is the obvious place to start, but
isolated female executives probably also need a modicum of mentoring. Noel Waite
has specialised in providing this service for female executives over many years, but
there is also an argument for the kind of mentoring provided by an older wiser man.
Sometimes the male mentor can adopt a more uncompromising stance than another
female. The same thing works in reverse; a remarkable number of the most trusted
and successful mentors of male European chief executives are women. It works for
the same reason—the female mentor can be more uncompromising (tougher, if you
like) than another man would dare.
The fatal flaw

Now, with trepidation, we come to the characteristic female executive ‘failing’. It is
less serious than the characteristic male executive failings about which senior
women often complain. These male failings generally include crude
competitiveness, rampant careerism, unmanaged aggression and a loss of identity in
the rugby—scrum mentality of the group. If the typical male executive failure is the
loss of identity and integrity, the typical female executive failure is dogmatism. I
have seen a number of promising female executive careers self-destruct on this
particular rock. It is one of the most common and important presenting symptoms in
role consultations with senior women. It is the main blind—spot amongst powerful
women and it automatically causes a failure to learn. It follows, if you know you are
right, there cannot be anything to learn.
This is entirely understandable, if not entirely excusable. If you are a lone, or
nearly lone woman surrounded by slapdash men, it will be necessary to cross the t’s
and dot the i’s. If the men are locked in ‘groupthink’, the woman may be excluded
and disempowered. As she cannot sup at the well of male group power, she must
derive her strength from somewhere else. It is as if she is forced to say: ‘All right, if
I can’t be strong with the group (and I can’t) I’m going to be right!’ I would guess
that the executive quoted by Robert Joss of Westpac might have been reacting
against this form of dogmatism. Women who have been forced into this position
throughout their lives can find it very difficult to start ‘giving putts’ at work, after so
much struggle. That is why the off—line mentoring approach is more likely to be
helpful. In that setting, it is possible to consider the possibility of being wrong and it
is possible to ‘unpack’ situations which have cropped up at work and which have put
the woman under pressure.
In Britain, Margaret Thatcher is regarded by many people as the archetype of the
bossyboots woman who never acknowledges, because she never registers, that she
may be wrong. John Major, her successor, got into trouble in her eyes because he (in
her words) ‘lacks an unswerving belief that you have to be right!’ As a matter of
fact, John Major is wrong rather much of the time, in the view of most Brits, but at
least he appears to be aware that such things are possible. Thatcher was in the habit
of tapping her forehead and saying: ‘I have a filing system here—I always
• Boorishness • Neurotic timidity

• Stupidity – arrogance • Envy/resentment
• Emotional frigidity The • Unconscious collusion
• Unconscious collusion best • Self-defeating dogmatism
• Mindless competitiveness PEOPLE
(‘I'm strong, so I'm (‘If I can't be strong,

going to win!’) I'm going to be right!’)
Extremes of ‘male’ behaviour Extremes of ‘female’ behaviour
Figure 17 The best people

The worst (most boorish and untrustworthy) men and the worst (most
neurotic and dogmatic) women have a kind of modus vivendi. It is called the
war of the sexes and everybody understands the rules. The best of both sexes
are very similar to one another, as the illustration shows, and don’t need to
fight at all. They ought to marry each other more frequently than they seem
to.
remember things correctly!’ Female executives in Britain tend to disown Margaret

Thatcher, on the ground that she is really a man (because of her competitiveness and
aggression). In truth, she was the quintessential dogmatic woman. Her failure ever to
give a putt weakened Britain’s position in the world, especially in Europe.
Obviously the giving, or not, of putts is a behavioural variable, partly
independent of the presence, or not, of intellectual firepower. There are a few
dogmatic bright people and there are many dogmatic stupid people. There are more
of the latter, for obvious reasons. I remarked earlier on that arrogance and stupidity
are different sides of the same coin because the one causes the other, and vice versa.
The need is for female leaders who combine the best of male and female—tough
cookies with hearts of gold, and never prey to self-destructive dogmatism. As we
move forward to Waite and O’Shaughnessy, Figure 17 sums up the overlap between
the sexes.
Liz O’Shaughnessy
and Noel Waite:
relationship businesses
and the 21st century
This chapter is built around two further mini—biographies. Both of the subjects are
contemporary Australian women. Their achievements are separately interesting but
it is the connections between them that concern us most. Their businesses create
value through relationships and, characteristically, one helped to launch the
entrepreneurial career of the other. Helping is the very essence of human
relationships. Their stories provide the perfect opportunity to introduce two
interlinked themes.
1. Tomorrow’s Company
The relationship company is healthy, in the sense that its network of relationships
within and without the organisation create a climate of trust. This, in turn, acts as a
kind of antibody against environmental turbulence. The ‘Tomorrow’s Company’
initiative, described here, works on the proposition that business analysts always get
it wrong because they use too narrow a scoresheet for assessing organisational
health. They usually let down the farsighted shareholder by dealing only with
relatively short—term financial elements, leaving out the elements that women tend
to understand intuitively, and which bring about durable, long—term success.
Relationship Businesses and The 21st Century 211
2. Art and the entrepreneur

One of the Characteristics of newly-founded organisations is that they are still
attached to their original purposes—they have not yet become merely self-serving
devices for looking after the well-being and careers of their members or
shareholders. They have this in common with artistic enterprise which, at its best, is
always concerned with the object, never with peripheral aims like money or success.
In one sense these two female entrepreneurs are artists and the intriguing thing
about them is their respective methods. This offers a chance to reflect on the way
that outstanding artists, sportspeople and business leaders develop their unique
methods of operation, and how this is the real source of the respect and admiration
they attract as ‘leaders’.
In Chapter 1, Imo the little monkey symbolised the difficulty that ingenious women
have in making their presence felt in a patriarchy. In Mary Parker Follett, we have a
near-perfect example of an (American) intellectual leader who achieved prominence
for a time but who dropped from sight for want of a cohort of other reinforcing and
supporting women. In order to illustrate the above themes, I wanted to highlight
ingenious female ‘Imos’ who had confronted the usual difficulties and surmounted
them through intelligent and timely mutual support. There are a great many
outstanding Australian women from whom I could have chosen—in business,
education, the sciences and the arts. My own great-great-grandmother, Georgiaria
McCrae, one of the first women in Melbourne (she arrived, accompanied by her four
infant sons, in February 1841) and certainly amongst the most capable, is an
excellent example of great talent underused. Brenda Niall’s brilliant biography of
Georgiana is required reading for anybody interested in Gardner’s theory of multiple
intelligences. Georgiana combined the gifts of an artist and musician with the
fluency of a linguist, with the skills of a society networker/hostess, with the
practicality of a navvy.
I leave the reader to pursue Georgiana. The two women I have chosen are linked
by the fact that the older provided transformational mentoring for the younger at a
crucial time. The separate achievements of each of them are remarkable but it is
relevant that the contact was a generous, helping contact. When Liz O’Shaughnessy
needed to break away from a (financially successful) career that was destroying her
personal morale, Noel Waite was on hand to provide the kind of acute
observation and advice that she has supplied to hundreds of Australian women. Liz
O’Shaughnessy’s business (Puddings On The Ritz) really dates from that
transformational moment. It is a new business, so its inclusion here represents a
calculated risk—the same risk Tom Peters ran when he created In Search of
Excellence around real business cases. Some of his companies, my old alma mater
IBM amongst them, slid into decline soon afterwards. By including these two
women in the text I can make a double point about the distinctive kinds of
businesses that women generally run, and about the ways that women can provide
support and advice to each other.
Just as Bob Clifford’s defining moment was the destruction of a bridge, you
could say that Liz O’Shaughnessy’s moment was the reinvention of the Goolgowi
campfire pudding, which first saw the light of day in the 1830s. It is a succulent
confection of breadcrumbs, vinefruit and bananas. Making it just right for airline and
other bulk catering meals is the tricky part. By the end of 1996 something
approaching a million Goolgowi puddings had been consumed on (mainly) Qantas
and Ansett flights. Every single pudding was essentially handmade with tender
loving care. At the time of writing, United Airlines, Air Vietnam and Air Caledonie
have joined the select Goolgowi club. The Goolgowi has now been joined by a
range of other puddings, all made to the same exacting standards and using similar
high-quality, natural ingredients. Hospitals, hamper companies and gourmet
restaurateurs are now in the Puddings On The Ritz loop, plus the Diabetes
Foundation of Australia. The hospitals, such as the Royal Melbourne and the Royal
Womens, get a special pricing deal because Liz O’Shaughnessy believes that really
good food is spiritually nurturative for the convalescent.
The big stores—Coles-Myer/Grace Brothers, Daimaru and David Jones—have
now joined the club and the corporate gift market, based on personalised packaging,
is expanding exponentially. The export market beckons, based on the logic that
Australia has a huge advantage in the quality and range of its natural foodstuffs.
Puddings On The Ritz simply adds value by deriving classy niche products from the
very best natural ingredients and packaging them with stylish, theatrical flair. All
this has been achieved by a workforce of talented and dedicated youngsters (‘CES
kids’) selected by Liz O’Shaughnessy from the ranks of the disadvantaged or
unemployed. Why? Because she knows what it means to have a tough time of it
as a kid and she likes to help. The Puddings On The Ritz philosophy is to ‘employ
long-term jobless young people and those from disadvantaged circumstances, and to
provide support, encouragement, friendship and training in every aspect of our
business in a nurturing work environment’. The company is ‘committed to the youth
of Australia’.
Waite Consulting, Noel Waite’s organisation, is obviously a ‘relationship
business’. Its core business is in executive search, advertised recruitment, vocational
and career counselling, outplacement and training. Even here, a major part of this
highly successful business arose out of informal and unpaid counselling. As Noel
Waite puts it: ‘Women gravitated to me for career advice . . . I had no intention ever
of getting involved in “women’s affairs”.’ In those early days, around 1980, the only
money charge was for the psychologist for vocational appraisals. The relationships
preceded the business. It is the ternary principle made flesh: the valued object causes
the moneymaking—virtually as a by-product of that object. The business is
financially more valuable because its underpinning values are human values. It is
valuable because it is valued. By contrast, Puddings On The Ritz ought by rights to
be a straightforward manufacturing and service business. After all, the output is
steamed puddings, not advice or support. Yet, probably because it is run by a
woman, the company feels like a relationship business. It is hard to say whether the
human satisfactions or the puddings are the by-products. At risk of corniness, maybe
a pudding made with love always tastes lovely.
TOMORROW’S COMPANY
Before we look in detail at the biographies of these two women, it will be useful to
examine the context of their enterprises. All over the world there is a mounting
critique of the kinds of organisations in both the public and private sectors (but
especially the latter) that have served to dehumanise workers whilst, so far as
possible, exploiting consumers. The feminist part of the critique avers that such
organisations are natural outgrowths of masculine competitiveness, selfishness and
aggression. What matters to the male power blocs at the top, according to the
critique, is success, however achieved. Intelligent collaboration with other
organisations, in order to better serve customers, is less exciting than the well-timed
and stealthy corporate ambush. What the organisation actually does for a living, and
how it may despoil its environment, is of no real concern, provided that the short-
term economic indices hold up. If there is a choice between keeping the team
together in order to serve new markets, or driving out cost (via attrition) to flatter the
bottom line, the latter option nearly always wins.
Charles Hampden-Turner makes the important point that all this is short-sighted
from the national perspective, even though it makes a kind of sense for the most
powerful individuals in the firm in the short term. He points out that the smart
countries are getting out of the pernicious trades. The Japanese are majoring in
pollution prevention and control, because the world has to change its polluting ways.
The Americans and the British, driven by the ‘masculine’ leaning to technology and
short-term gain, have been slower to grasp this logic. British industry is
disproportionately represented in slow-growing or declining sectors like drink,
tobacco and armaments and underrepresented in fast-growing export sectors like
information technology. As we come to terms with needs (as opposed to wants), the
future will inevitably belong to the useful. You could argue, I suppose, that eating
nothing but Goolgowi campfire pudding (or Boambee date and walnut pudding, or
classic chocolate and macadamia pudding, or pear and ginger, or orange and
zucchini, or chestnut and tokay, etc.) would mean an unbalanced diet, but we are not
talking about serious side-effects here.
Before the move to puddings, Liz O’Shaughnessy was a senior executive and
part-owner in the custom carpet manufacturing business. She was alienated not from
the basic business but from the way it was run. Women often can’t stomach the sort
of practices that men embrace or turn a blind eye to. In the future that will be a plus,
not a minus. If the purpose and outputs of a business are pernicious or merely
frivolous, the presence of women in senior management may well be
counterproductive. If they can’t put aside their conscience, they will simply slow
things up. But once you get into the virtuous businesses, where the rights of all the
stakeholders are meticulously preserved, then the women start to look more
attractive.
One of the most valuable initiatives in Europe in the last three years has been the
‘Tomorrow’s Company’ project, based on the Royal Society of Arts. This project
has been driven by a group of about thirty of the most forward-looking blue-chip
firms, including IBM, Guinness, Rothschilds, Coopers & Lybrand, Cadbury

Schweppes and Natwest Bank Group. All of the firms were worried about their
international competitiveness. They were worried also that they might have been
measuring the wrong variables in their attempt to compete, or to catch up.
Their research makes interesting reading for anybody concerned about the waste
of female talent in large corporations.
The four principal obstacles to effective competition were:
1. The adversarial approach

Coopers & Lybrand’s 1994 Middle Market Survey indicated that 73 per cent of
companies still believe they are doing the intelligent thing by screwing their
suppliers to the floor. The idea of managing a relationship business (an idea first
trawled by Mary Parker Follett back in the 1920s) has penetrated into the rhetoric of
top management but not into the the practices of buyers. In the carpet business, Liz
O’Shaughnessy was in charge of production and buying all the yarn. It is a very
good place to learn about the continuities of trust upon which long-term success has
to be built. The Puddings On The Ritz policy statement says: ‘Our aim is to provide
first-rate products, backed by superior service and expertise, and to create solid
relationships with all customers, large and small. Each customer is important to us.
Our commitment to excellence is reflected in our dedication to creating and
maintaining personal relationships with our clients by means of active
communication.’ But in her final years in the carpet business she was under constant
pressure to scrimp on the degree of yarn going into the product. She was deeply
offended by the sloppiness but she also understood that, in the long run, it was
inefficient and costly when they came up short on jobs. One of Bob Clifford’s
founding experiences was managing the buying process for the very first (fishing)
boat. The Coopers study makes it pretty clear that the binary approach (I win, you
lose) is alive and kicking, and the ternary (let’s build a relationship that works for
both of us long term—let’s get it right!) is still pretty precarious, despite all the
rhetoric.
2 Complacency and ignorance of world standards

The IBM/London Business School study showed that, whilst 2.3 per cent of the
companies studied met the criteria for world-class operating standards, 73 per cent
of those companies believed that they were world-class. We are back again to the
giving of putts in male monocultures. When it comes to the standards required in the
global marketplace, there is no room at all for sloppiness. It is where women’s most
irritating pernicketiness becomes a potential corporate strength, handled properly.
Barings Bank, funnily enough, was always ternary at the top—a family company
wedded to good works and public spirit. The rot was in the sloppy, overoptimistic,
shortsighted, greedy men in the middle, giving putts all over the place. After the
collapse the new corporate director of human resources, Frank-Jan de Leeuw (a
methodical Dutchman from the new owners), issued all 5000 employees with their
very first job descriptions! And after the tragic sinking of the ferry Herald of Free
Enterprise, with the loss of more than 100 lives, the independent Sheen Report on
P&O European Ferries said: ‘From top to bottom the body corporate was infected
with the disease of sloppiness.’ The inquest returned a verdict of unlawful killing but
the judge declined to prosecute the directors for corporate manslaughter. More
putts?
3. Over-reliance on financial measures

The Tomorrow’s Company team observed tartly that of the eleven companies that
topped Management Today’s profitability league table between 1979 and 1989 four
subsequently collapsed and another two fell to hostile takeovers. Their conclusion
was that companies that rely solely on financial measures of success are exposing all
the stakeholders to unwarranted risk. As yet, very few shareholders are putting the
squeeze on the institutional investors and pension fund trustees to evaluate the whole
‘frog’—not just the disembodied financial bits of the corporate ‘bicycle’. In the end
they will have to devise a ‘balanced business scorecard’ which will reflect All the
variables that go to make up a healthy organisation. That will include, of course, the
core values and purposes, the long-term reputation, and the hedging against the sort
of risks that Barings and P&O fell prey to. We are talking about the ‘relationship
company’—a concept that Liz O’Shaughnessy and Noel Waite never needed to be
taught. Of course, this kind of shortsightedness on the part of institutional investors
is both stupid and a gross failure of leadership.
4. Misunderstanding of directors’ duties

This is partly a question of the interpretation of company law. The issue is whether
you regard directors as responsible solely to the existing register of shareholder, or
whether they ought to be held accountable to any shareholders
at any time in the future. If, as director, you acquiesce in going for the short-term
buck, you are probably shortchanging tomorrow’s investors and employees. You are
almost certainly helping to weaken the long-term viability of the corporation as a
national asset. Bob Garratt’s wonderful new book The Fish Rots from the Head is
required reading on the role and function of the company board and, in particular,
the key role of the tough, nosy and independent non-executive director.
I have included the Tomorrow’s Company material here because it connects
directly with the findings of a report on the operation of ‘glass ceilings’ in
Australian companies, Trials at the Top. Section 2.3 of that publication, on ‘The
Australian Executive Culture’, reads like a paraphrase of the obstacles noted above:
• I’ve lived and worked in the United States in several cities ... This
[Australia] is by far the most ‘clubby’, closed senior executive environment
that I’ve seen. I guess all seems very comfy and very cosy ...
• They were fed up with the sloppiness, the lack of a sense of opportunity, the
lack of fairness, that maybe some sort of old boy values will get you ahead
...
• It really is a club. It’s a boys’ club and they act like it’s a boys’ club so that
manifests itself in the shady jokes, the whisperings, the jokes off to the side
...
Finally, on the matter of the adversarial culture of the big corporation (the reason
why bright women want out), Amanda Sinclair writes:
The language and metaphor . . . are of physical combat. Being in

meetings is described as ‘taking body blows’. A new appointee to a
Board is, with relish, expected to ‘give the Board a bit of stick’.
Potential entrants need to demonstrate their eligibility by ‘pounding at
the door . . . clawing at the door to get the visibility . . .’ The
environment is described as a ‘rat race’, populated by ‘some men of
limited ambition, some big rats’. An ‘adversarial culture’, the executive
environment is widely portrayed as combative, Where pain is publicly
inflicted. In its best example, this was cast as ‘well-directed aggression’;
something close to thuggery and bully-boy tactics, at its worst.
PUDDINGS ON THE RITZ: LIZ O’SHAUGHNESSY’S

RELATIONSHIP COMPANY
Happily, the Australian Institute of Management has already picked up on the

Tomorrow’s Company work. Under the leadership of Brian Hirsch, the AIM is
taking a different and more independent tack—keeping the big firms at arm’s length.
Big Australian firms have come a long way in recent years but the Trials at the Top
report suggests that most of them are still uncongenial for very clever women like
Liz O’Shaughnessy—and for plenty of men as well. In fact, it is exactly this kind of
male mindlessness that led, indirectly, to the creation of Liz O’Shaughnessy’s
business. She had started out at fifteen years of age as an insurance clerk with the
T&G in Melbourne. That was in 1966. In those days the men were paid more for the
same work and the women weren’t even allowed to smoke at their desks. You may
wonder whether the smoking at fifteen was a sign of rebelliousness—it was.
O’Shaughnessy fought for, and won, the right for the women to smoke wherever
they wished. It didn’t do much for her popularity with the bosses. She moved on to a
stuffy, Lloyds-associated insurer where it was even worse—deferential and grossly
inefficient: ‘I got sick and tired of doing the work of a broker, and covering for him
whilst he was at lunch or the pub!’ The O’Shaughnessy career proceeded
along these lines for the next few years, always shouldering an enormous burden of
demanding work; never getting the full credit or reward for it. By the time she was
twenty-one, and just married, she was working in PVC piping with a company that
eventually became part of James Hardie Industries. It was, she confesses, ‘an
incredible learning experience—I was the GDB [general dogsbody]. I performed the
task of office manager, receptionist/telephonist/secretary, accountant, purchasing
officer, salesperson, order clerk, pay officer, packer and loader. But, more
importantly, I was a dedicated and loyal assistant to my boss—I shared his vision!’
Furthermore, she and her boss had created the business from scratch; she had
seen at first hand how a new business with a new kind of product grows and
develops. I believe this is a crucial factor in the development of entrepreneurs. Bob
Clifford had a similar experience (in the printing trade) at about the same age. Allan
Coman created a realistic simulation of the same experience in his real-life projects
at Bradfield College. When his students actually go to market it stops being a
simulation, of course.
Predictably, Liz O’Shaughnessy became too useful to promote. She was
performing an enormously complex task but she was never afforded a proper title.
Furthermore, she was clearly dangerous—a ‘power behind the throne’. Her
condition for helping to set up a new operation (as an outcome of the James Hardie
takeover) was to move to a consultancy contract. When her boss went overseas for a
few weeks his replacement, jealous of Liz’s power, ‘relieved’ her of her consultancy
duties. She finally saw red. A friend mentioned that Noel Waite, head of a career
development consultancy, had helped hundreds of men and women to convert bad
experiences like this to good. Within a few weeks O’Shaughnessy was on her way to
the carpet trade, courtesy of a transforming meeting with Noel Waite.
It will be obvious from all this that Liz O’Shaughnessy is ‘bright’. Yet the
narrative records her going out to work at fifteen years of age. There has to be a
story, and there is. One defining moment was the sudden death of her mother (aged
forty-two) when Liz was about to turn twelve. This precipitated a long separation
from her father, who remarried shortly afterwards and ‘chose’ his new wife over his
children. But even by then there were signs of an iron will. Her mother was
desperate for her to go to MLC (Methodist Ladies College) as she had done
herself. Liz won the scholarship but refused to go to MLC, preferring the
downmarket high school in Heidelberg where her friends and brother were. She was
grossly understretched there, but happy, and excelled in everything, including an
astonishing array of sports. Even in primary school she had been a boisterous and
disruptive class clown. The headmaster, ahead of his time, understood that her
problem was boredom and secretly rewarded her with jelly beans (having officially
admonished her on behalf of the teachers). He can take some of the credit for
buoying up her morale at a time when her family placed all its gratitude with God.
Home life had always been an odd mixture. She was brought up in a stiflingly
religious extended family of Methodist ministers and laypersons. Both her parents
were trustees of local churches and her mother was the organist. Her father was
originally a carpenter/builder from the Victorian country and her mother an English
emigrant from the coalmining county of Durham. Her childhood memories are of
spending all Sunday at church, of camp pie sandwiches for the ‘alcos’, of spraying
Airwick over the back pews of the mission, of mattresses laid out for sleeping in the
back of the station wagon on long-distance missionary work. Anyone who has read
Jeanette Winterson’s novel Orange Are Not the Only Fruit will recognise the
atmosphere. Liz O’Shaughnessy’s mother had high expectations of her daughter and
was an excellent soundingboard, but it was not a warm or nurturing relationship. Her
mother’s death virtually destroyed her faith in deities but not in the goodness of
human nature.
Forced by her father to leave her beloved high school in order to decamp to
another school which she hated from the start, she rebelled again. She had already
won a Commonwealth Scholarship to support her studies for the
Leaving/Matriculation years. Instead, desperately unhappy and unloved at home, she
quit school halfway through her Leaving year, got a job, and also left home. Some of
her experiences in the next year or so were of being ‘exposed to moral danger’, as
the courts used to put it. Many of her similarly rootless friends and associates
succumbed to ‘drugs, booze, nightclubs, sex’. She was lucky to be more or less
adopted by a loving couple in South Melbourne, both recovered alcoholics. For the
first time in years, she felt safe and loved. Even in the dark days she felt ‘totally
conscious that some higher power was protecting and guiding me. I had absolute
awareness that I was meant for better things and that what I was
experiencing was just preparing me.’ You can take those words to have a religious
significance or—if the uses of theatre are central to the book you happen to be
writing—you can take them as powerful evidence of the protection and inspiration
that flow from imaginative fantasy. The main thing is that now Liz O’Shaughnessy
is in a position to provide challenging employment for kids like herself thirty years
ago—talented but probably unemployed or understretched or otherwise at risk.
Perhaps the best way to describe this caring process is to spell out what
happened when Puddings On The Ritz went, overnight, from making 4000 puddings
every four weeks for Qantas to making 3000 puddings per day for Ansett. Prior to
that the business had been run as a weekend venture, parallel to the carpet business,
until O’Shaughnessy walked out of that job. Like Bob Clifford, Liz O’Shaughnessy
has a good feel for showbiz. Clifford says: ‘My boats sell my boats!’ Liz knows her
puddings sell her puddings. Her very first order for 2000 puddings came, on the
spot, as a result of setting up a display on the occasion of David Jones’s establishing
its Melbourne Food Hall. The display involved a theatrical combination of calico
trimmings, parchment, silver platters and great dollops of King Island cream. On
that occasion she had to pull out of the proffered contract because her company
wasn’t ready to produce in bulk. Shortly after, she invested in a brace of ex-hospital
steamers. The Ansett order sprang from the Melbourne International Food Fair in
September 1994, where ‘Puddings’ had laid on another jazzy, olde worlde display,
in partnership with an antiques dealer. They won the best stand award.
This time they had just three weeks warning: ‘The [name withheld to protect a
household-name food] product has failed—you’re on!’ Liz took on the job with no
equipment, no staff, no money. In three weeks she had to find and buy the right
equipment for the contract, including the fundamentals like commercial dishwasher,
vacuum sealing machine, electronic scales and, crucially, the banana processor for
750 kilos of bananas per week. She also had to work out appropriate packaging to
preserve freshness, design and contract out the packaging work, source all the raw
materials and, above all, find, hire and train the staff. She went straight to the
commonwealth Employment Service for three long-term unemployed young people.
In the end, the interviews were conducted four days before the first puddings had to
be dispatched.
They did it. The first delivery of seventy-five cartons (7500 puddings) went out
on time on 21 October 1994, the second seventy-five cartons three days later. The
kids were working about twelve hours every day and Liz and her production
supervisor (an ex-school-teacher) around twenty hours per day. Production went on
twenty-four hours per day, including several minor contracts for different puddings
in the runup to Christmas. There was a campbed in the office for those ‘babysitting’
the puddings. For those young people, this was best form of caring—an assumption
that they could and would perform to a high standard, that they would care about the
quality of the output, that they would work together responsibly and in harmony.
(Naturally, this was Allan Coman’s assumption about the youngsters who passed
through Bradfield.) Of course, the big boss was there too, working harder than
anybody. The entire Ansett contract was completed to specification, without a hitch.
Liz O’Shaughnessy says, and she means it: ‘I really wanted to give these young
people a chance. I felt that if someone were to believe in them, support them, not
punish them, but encourage them to learn from their mistakes, that it would bring
out the best in them. In a sense, the business is more about the social aspects than
about making puddings. Puddings just happen to be the vehicle for the project!’
The debt of these young people is, indirectly, to Noel Waite. She was the person
who originally hauled Liz O’Shaughnessy out of a dead-end situation into a new
conception of enterprise. It is an example of one relationship business (a career
development consultancy) instigating another. When any human being is
empowered like this, the ripple effect is always palpable—the power multiplies
itself. That is why schoolteaching is a noble profession.
ROBERT CLIFFORD AND LIZ O’SHAUGHNESSY—

THE PARALLELS
It may seem far-fetched to connect the manufacture of big fast ferries with the
making of puddings. But look more closely and you can see that the only important
difference between these two (sex aside) is the old male/female split of tinkering and
socialising. For Clifford, it is really the technical challenge that matters most, though
he is an inspired ‘man-manager’. For O’Shaughnessy, it is the people and the

relationships that matter, though she is an inspired cook. The point is that similar
conditions need to be in place in order to produce people like this who make things
happen. The same is true for my other leaders but the parallels are more striking
with these two:
• The broad repertoire of ‘intelligences’
We should not be fooled by Clifford’s dismal academic performance at school.
When he had something important to read about, he got reading. Anyway, he could
always do the mathematics, he just didn’t know how he did it. Both were
outstanding sportspersons (bodily-kinaesthetic and spatial intelligences) as well.
• Observing the enterpreneur
Clifford and O’Shaughnessy both got to watch an entrepreneur build a business (in
printing and plumbing respectively) when they were young enough not to be too
frightened of risk. This is a bit like toddlers skiing fearlessly fast—they never really
learn fear properly. Allan Coman recreates these conditions at Bradfield College. It
doesn’t matter what the business is; it is the process of formation that matters. If you
have lived through it once, it isn’t frightening any more.
• The content role model
This seems to be a different kind of role model—the adult who engrosses you in a
particular field or medium. Robert Clifford’s father was originally a butcher, but
when the family turned to fishing, father and son worked closely together in what
was already established as the boy’s medium—water. Liz O’Shaughnessy’s maiden
Aunt Adelaide (whom she adored) was an Army cook and ‘keeper of the foods
secrets’. Liz got to watch an expert making things happen, transforming materials
into delicious finished products, displaying effortless Mastery. It left a mark.
• The ham
Both of these creatives are essentially hams—using whatever razzamatazz it takes to
promote their causes. I am not sure where theatricality falls amongst the Gardner
‘intelligences’ but I suggested, in writing about Robert Keep, that it must have
something to do with ‘spatial’ and the ‘intrapersonal’ intelligences. Both of them are
engrossed in their businesses (as actors) yet they both know when
and how to take up a position on the outside in order to present the business in the
best possible light (as impresarios).
• A plug for the ANZ Bank
Perhaps this is a frivolous connection. I have already recounted how Tony Travers
(manager of the Sandy Bay branch of ANZ in Tasmania) bankrolled Clifford’s entry
into the ferry business when all other bankers fought shy. When Liz O’Shaughnessy
got the enormous (verbal) Ansett contract, nobody in banking and venture capital
wanted to know, despite her track record, because she had not run her own business
before. In the end, Andrew Wise of the St Kilda Road ANZ came through. I hope
the ANZ and the other banks still have local managers authorised to exercise
judgement in this way.
• Moving on personally
Significantly, very intelligent entrepreneurs usually have to leave somebody behind
if they are to maintain momentum. Robert Clifford and Liz O’Shaughnessy parted
with both a spouse and a business partner at the same key point in the course of their
odysseys. Liam Hudson suggests that this is almost inevitable and that evidence
suggests a strong correlation between the most revolutionary scientists, in terms of
their breakthroughs, and the frequency of divorce. He says: ‘An ability to breach the
walls of convention in the intellectual sphere is associated ... with the propensity to
breach them in the personal sphere as well.’ For the true entrepreneur, the enterprise
is the first love. It takes a special kind of spouse to cope with this.
• Moving on corporately
At the time of writing, both Incat and Puddings On The Ritz are at growth
thresholds. One is a medium-sized firm of less than a thousand people and the other
is a small firm of less than ten. Nonetheless, the problem is the same—how to
become a different kind of company and how, in particular, the leader can let go
some of the direct control of everything. Of all the services available to SMEs (small
to medium enterprises) there is usually insufficient attention paid to the nature of
these threshold points of growth. At these points, the leader needs a particular kind
of mentor. There are very few around who understand what kind of support is
required; which brings us back to Noel Waite. I return to this important issue of
mentoring in Chapter 14.
WAITE CONSULTING: NOEL WAITE’S

RELATIONSHIP COMPANY
Liz O’Shaughnessy’s story is typical of the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people

who have been influenced in a similar way by Noel Waite, AO. Waite Consulting is
the ultimate relationship business. How the company evolved is worthy of study.
The turning point of Noel Waite’s career was a tragedy—the death of her husband,
John Waite, and her own facial disfigurement—in a car crash in the United
Kingdom. At that time she had four children back in Australia, aged from twelve to
four. She spent months in hospital having her face brilliantly reconstructed by a
team of surgeons who had worked under the great New Zealand plastic surgeon
Archibald McIndoe. After those months she caught the ship home (flying was out
because of her damaged sinuses), first buying a couple of wigs and a special makeup
kit. On her arrival home all the kids recognised their mother: the surgeons had done
a superb job. So good was the reconstruction that I had to be told about it after my
first meeting with her, but that was much later.
The business, originally a personnel and vocational consultancy, nearly
disintegrated without its founder, John Waite. Attempts were made to replace him
but no one could quite pick up the reins. It became obvious that only
Noel could do it, so she did; but the business fluctuated for six years because, as a
single parent, she was determined that her children should come first. Then she
married her present husband, Bruce Gandy, and seriously turned her mind back to
the business. She kept her first married name, however, an unusual decision in those
days. It made sense—the Waite name was a valuable asset. In the early, nerve-
racking days, it was also reassuring to hide behind her androgynous given name,
Noel. Like all the leaders celebrated here, she always understood that the product all
it stands for must be center stage. The rest, as they say, is history. Waite Consulting
steadily enhanced its reputation as a national (and increasingly international) leader
in career development. The firm is now established in every Australian State and
represented in four Asian countries. Canada, South Africa and possibly the United
Kingdom are next.
In 1989–90, in the depths of the business downturn, Noel Waite took the bold
step of shifting to central Melbourne and setting up the Waite Career Development
Centre alongside the core search and management services practice. She became the
first female president of the Australian Institute of Management in 1990 (and was
reappointed in 1993). Also in 1993, in the Queen’s Birthday Honours List, she was
appointed Officer of the Order of Australia (AO) for ‘service to business and
management, particularly through the development of women in management’.
Waite Consulting is doing something practical about the ‘glass ceiling’. Its ‘Top
Steps’ and ‘Ultimate Steps’ programs are probably Australia’s best hope of
enriching the capacity of top management by bringing in well-prepared women of
the very highest calibre. If you look at Noel Waite merely as a successful
businesswoman, then you could adopt the binary (competitive) view of her
success—after all, she has prevailed over most of the competition, winning the race
to new market niches. If you look at her as an intelligent leader, then the view is
ternary, because the effect of her success is to strengthen the cadres at the top of
Australian management in the medium and long term. Waite Consulting gains too,
of course, but that is a by-product.
Where did this remarkable woman come from and what were the shaping forces?
At this stage the reader might expect me to refer back to Howard Gardner and the
seven intelligences. Very well, then: Noel Waite is another broad-bander. Like Liz
O’Shaughnessy, she was always ‘bright’ at school and loved it. As I noted earlier,
she has perfect pitch and played piano from the age of three, and sang well enough
to consider it as a career. Apart from schoolwork, her other passions were art and
acting. This accounts for at least the verbal, musical, spatial and bodily/kinaesthetic
‘intelligences’. Mostly, the family’s aspirations for Noel centred on the music. In the
end she became a very successful commercial artist, until fate took a hand. Like Liz
O’Shaughnessy, she was visited by family tragedy at around twelve to thirteen years
of age. Her mother nearly died from meningitis and lost her eyesight and her hearing
for a substantial period (a tragedy for such a music lover). Noel took over
management of the household—cooking, shopping and washing in the copper.
Like the other entrepreneurs, Noel Waite had an early exposure to mastery of a
craft. Her father was a master tailor and her volatile
and temperamental grandmother (with whom she
lived through most of her Melbourne schooldays)
was a gifted dress designer. The more you look at
successful entrepreneurs, the more important the
early exposure to dedicated craft working seems to
be. During the war her father moved from
Deniliquin to a £4/10/- per week Public Service job
in Melbourne and made suits at night, sending two
of his children to grammar school. Noel helped her
father sometimes and also made all the dresses for
her mother, her sister and herself. After school, the move to Swinburne Art School
and a four-year Commercial Art course was a natural progression. The year 1946
was an interesting time to be going to art school. There was an atmosphere of
expectancy and a motley collection of ‘rehab’ students from the armed forces. It
must have been an eye-opener for a young lady from a ‘school for little ladies’.
Nobody got a formal qualification, which seems a pity because it was a
distinguished cohort, containing soon-to-be internationally distinguished artists like
Norma Redpath, Ray Crooke and Kath Ballart. Noel Waite had to go to
Victoria/Deakin in 1980 for a fifth year in order to get a diploma.
In 1950, at the age of twenty-one, Noel joined an exclusive accessory house as a

window dresser but quickly moved on to illustrating all the advertisements. Myers
poached her shortly afterwards; she worked there full-time for the next six years,
infuriating her six-years-older civil engineer brother-in-law by earning much more
money than he did. By this time she was married to John Waite, previously head
chorister at her church. As he set up the Waite business, she persuaded Myers (ahead
of their time) to retain her on a fee basis to carry on her art/fashion work from home,
whilst she brought up the children. The late Wally O’Donohue, the advertising
manager and a notable Myers ‘Imo’ with a good eye for talent, fixed it. There is an
echo of Liz O’Shaughnessy in Noel’s reflections on those next nine years: ‘Business
was not for me; as an artist I worked for love! Money came in as a result of a job
well done and it honestly never occurred to me that I would be running my own little
advertising art business in my own studio with a nucleus of regular clients—very
lucrative, I might add!’
Once again, we see the ternary approach paying off—look after your vocation,
and the valued product or output, and in the long run life will look after you. The
accident destroyed all that, so far as art is concerned, although Noel did her best to
keep the art business running in parallel with the consultancy. In the end, her ‘art’
moved onto a bigger and more complex ‘product’ If we take the Jaques levels of
capability seriously, it might be that somebody as intelligent as Noel Waite needs at
a certain point to move on to the next level of challenge. Technically, Noel ‘ought’
to be considering retirement now. In practice, she is probably just about ready, and
gearing up, to make her real contribution to her country. Waite Consulting-
Executive Search and Selection is already in the safe hands of her son, Peter Waite.
Really, the point about many female entrepreneurs, like Waite and O’Shaughnessy,
is that they are impelled to do something useful. They make money all right, but it is
not always the primary driver that it is with so many male entrepreneurs.
ART AND THE ENTREPRENEUR—THE

IMPORTANCE OF METHOD
Noel Waite and Liz O’Shaughnessy are near-perfect illustrations of Howard
Gardner’s central thesis that the ‘multiple intelligences’ interact and reinforce each
other in powerful ways. Noel Waite used to be embarrassed about being just ‘an
artist in business’. No longer. Now she believes more than ever that intelligent
business leadership is always about visualisation and conceptualisation as well as
detail. This is not just a matter of having a good overview of the scene but of
shaping something completely new out of the available fragments. The true
entrepreneur, in other words, has a cluster of intelligences very similar to that of the
artist.
All outstanding people seem to have a more or less conscious method, whether
they work in business or the arts. To take the business world first, in Chapter 10 I
described an outstanding technical executive with what he conceived of as a ‘vehicle
‘ in his head—a kind of rolling, constantly fluctuating map of the territory. He found
the ‘vehicle’ difficult to describe to others but he knew it was his secret weapon.
Robert Keep’s algorithm is sufficiently robust that he has no need to be clever, on a
day-to-day basis, about currency movements—once his clients understand what the
algorithm does, all he has to do is log the daily changes in the markets and pass on
the details for the clients to act upon. He deals with his clients via the algorithm. An
intelligent strategic plan serves the same purpose, provided it is infinitely flexible,
serving as an organising principle for day-to-day action.
This is only speculation, but it is easy to see how a young child with a
craftsperson parent (or similar role model) would learn early in life how method
gives rise to mastery. The craftsperson probably can’t explain in words how it is
done but watching it all happen is bound to be instructive. Liz O’Shaghnessy’s Aunt
Adelaide made wonderful-tasting food. How she achieved this was initially
mysterious for the watching child. That same trick now benefits thousands of airline
passengers otherwise doomed to bland and unimaginative in-flight eating. The trick
is to reframe airline food as some other kind of meal—more classy, stylish and
relaxed—as if you were not crammed into an aluminium tube five miles up in the
sky. Having the vision is crucial, but it comes to nothing without the practical
method.
Something very similar occurs in the arts, as young practitioners are apprenticed
in formal and informal ways to great masters. You can teach the arts, up to a point.
At that point, each tyro artist has to begin to fashion his or her special and
idiosyncratic method. Nearly all the great actors have a routine or ritual, sometimes
childishly simple, to which they resort under pressure or as a gateway to deeper
levels of work. Sir Alec Guinness can’t get the character until he has got the
character’s walk. The great mezzo-soprano Dame Janet Baker never talks about her
voice: she always refers to ‘the instrument’-a God-given object of which she has
stewardship. This kind of ternary thinking is characteristic of great artists. The
words don’t matter—vehicle, method, algorithm, routine, instrument—the idea is
the same; the outcome is achieved through some valued object or principle which
has been devised by the individual concerned, generally as an outcome of years of
endeavour. It is always a personal thing; not the gift of a teacher, or guru, or flashy
consultant.
Over the years I have been more or less obsessed by the self-portraits painted by
Rembrandt throughout his long life. Never a great beauty, he got less and less pretty
as the years passed but he always painted himself with a cool, almost brutal
detachment. The last paintings in the series reveal a wonderful humanity and
nobility, yet the effect is achieved with progressively less brushwork; he achieved
more and more impact with less and less obvious effort—true economy. The self-
portrait, it seems, was his personal ‘vehicle’. The wonder of it is that the whole
development of his method can be traced through these marvellous paintings. The
same is true of the great actors—the achievement of more with less, as time passes.
There is a curious parallel between the worlds of art and sport—both fields that
call on the bodily/kinaesthetic intelligence. Because these worlds rarely mix, it is not
commonly known that Julian Bream, possibly the world’s leading lutenist and one
of the greatest guitarists, shares a technical or craft experience with Nick Faldo, one
of the greatest golfers of all time. Both of them were faced with the need to break
their basic methods in mid-life in order to sustain their success. Bream was largely
self-taught. His method had made him an internationally known virtuoso but, as time
passed, it became evident that it, aided by a serious car accident, would eventually
doom him to muscular difficulties and possible arthritic complications. There was no
alternative but to go back to square one and relearn his method, like a child or tyro.
It took him years, but his art demanded it of him. The method will make it possible
for him to continue his life’s work for almost as long as life persists.
Faldo faced the same problem. He was already a leading golfer, but he was
determined to be the best in the world. That meant the creation of a method which
was so simple and so fundamentally sound that it would never crack under pressure.
The aim was a swing—the basic tool of the professional golfer—that would deliver
good results even when it was operating suboptimally. The solution was the same as
for Bream—to go back to school in order to rebuild the method from scratch. It took
some years, under the eye of one of golf’s great technical gurus, during which time
Faldo made virtually no money at all from the game. But he was patient and he
emerged with a method that will see him through to the end. His great rival, Greg
Norman, now also in his forties, still has a ‘young man’s swing’—endlessly exciting
to watch but always fragile under pressure. (As we go to press, Norman too is finally
seeking advice from David Leadbetter, the great guru of the swing.)
By the way, Faldo has done another clever thing. He has dispensed with the
series of male caddies (club carriers and advisers) and formed a long-term
professional association with the wonderfully equable Fanny Sunesson, previously
one of better female golfers in Sweden. When the going gets tough, as it always
does in professional golf, Fanny is there to exude calm professionalism and to bark
polite Scandinavian instructions at spectators and officials. Meanwhile, the almost
invariably male caddies of other golfers share in any binary panic going. The calm
and ultra-professional female caddy is part of the Faldo method and mystique, along
with the rebuilt swing. It is a potent combination. The only technical difficulty is
that American caddies are obliged by the big golf clubs to wear trousers. Fanny has
invented the skort—a sort of comfortable and practical pair of baggy shorts or
culottes with a kilt-like front—a typically inventive way of pleasing everybody.
Artists and sportspeople offer a good example of the ternary principle in
practical use. If you have a personal method that has been shaped over the years by
your own struggle, you have a binary advantage over any competition.
Take the example of the great hurdler David Hemery. It was Hemery who sliced
a whole second off the world 400 metre hurdles record in the Mexico Olympics.
Very few athletes have destroyed a world record so comprehensively, and few ever
will again. Few people know how this was achieved.
Four years previously, at the close of the Tokyo Olympic Games, Hemery and his
coach sat down and calculated what speed would be required to certainly win the
Mexico hurdles, taking into account the general improvement in performance
standards and coaching methods. They concluded that 48.4 seconds should do it—
nearly a full second (or about eight metres) faster than the existing world record.
From that point on, their joint endeavours were focused on sustaining that particular
(48.4) pace for the full 400 metres of hurdling. The pace became the method. At
first, this was only achievable for about 200 metres or so but, as time passed, they
continuously extended the range at the same, almost metronomic, pace. By Mexico,
they were almost there, but not quite. The hope was that, under pressure of
competition, Hemery could find the extra few metres at that same gruelling speed.
As it turned out, by the time of the Olympic final most of the best American
opposition was already in awe of Hemery, who wasn’t talking to anybody much (so
focused was he on the method) but who everybody knew was going incredibly fast
over the hurdles. The other athletes probably realised by then that Hemery was not
engaged in a binary contest with them, but in a personal odyssey with the gods of
athleticism. He and his coach had defined the race four years previously; all that was
required on the day was the execution. When the time came, Hemery was a bit
worried about one other competitor and consciously went out at what felt like about
48.3 seconds pace. After the race, which Hemery won by a mile, he could not
believe that he had actually sustained a 48 seconds flat pace, even in the thin air of
Mexico City. By cutting adrift from ordinary competition with ordinary athletes,
they had reframed the race. The nice thing about athletics, as golf, is that there is not
much room for referees or judges—the outcome is obvious to all. Now, David
Hemery teaches the mysterious secrets of method to others, and notably to senior
business people.
It doesn’t much matter whether the field is sport, art, craft or business: the player
with a method usually has the edge. That competitive edge comes, oddly enough,
from eschewing direct competition with all the other people. The truly creative
entrepreneur is engaged in a higher-order contest for perfection against the
‘elements’. The point about people like Noel Waite, whose story prompted these
musings, is that they built their method laboriously and patiently over the
years, just as craftspeople must. All of the heroes celebrated in this book, from Bob
Clifford to Bill Hudson, did the same thing. This is probably the main reason why
they became admirable people—they manifestly built something of value and the
process of building improved them. That is one reason why sporting heroes become
heroes—people can see how the natural talent has been developed and sharpened by
effort and dedication. It is impossible to follow a leader you don’t admire.
Leadership is like love—it dies when admiration cannot be sustained.
This means that it is much easier for the SME (small to medium enterprise)
leader to appear admirable in the eyes of his or her people. They can see at first hand
the match between the person and the corporate object and values. In the big firm,
those values need to be very clear, very admirable and very consistently reinforced
in order to compensate for the isolation of the leader. In companies where such
strong values exist (Hewlett-Packard and ICI, for example) there have generally
been outstanding broad-banders in charge over a long period—the kind of people
who really do value their people, who really do care about fashioning valuable
outputs, and who also have the theatrical knack of embodying those values in their
behaviour and in their symbolic communication. Where the narrow-banders get the
upper hand (those who can only see the money and the short-term gain), life gets
increasingly difficult for young ‘Imos’ in the engine room. They need intelligent
inspiration.
If you believe, as I now do, that the outstanding people I have described are
merely normal—apart from being lucky enough to have had an upbringing that
allowed natural development of all the intelligences (through guidance,
encouragement and role-modelling)—then the clever country would be the one to
remove all the obstacles to such natural development, or at least to seek ways to
ameliorate the effects of stupidity in parenting and schooling. You have to believe,
to start with, that all the talent is there in the first place. Allan Coman can always
turn schools round because he knows this is the case. I am sorry to say that most of
the business schools with which I am familiar have a narrow view of the talents that
leaders need. All this talk of relationships and art merely puzzles the more macho
management academic. But then, business schools are generally uncongenial places
for the best women.
COACHING, MENTORING, COUNSELLING AND SO

ON ...
In Chapter 14 there is a full description of certain methods for helping people to
come to terms with their own best ways of working and achieving. These go under
such titles as Executive Role Consultation, Career Path Appreciation and so on. In
essence, they are no more than elaborations of the process that goes on between a
master and an apprentice. In order to achieve the remarkable results that Noel Waite
has had with her clients over the years, more is required than the application of
mechanical formulae. When Waite took Liz O’Shaughnessy in hand, her first task
was to determine what kind of resource this person represented. She was charged
with moulding the material to hand, not with manufacturing a particular or
routinised sort of manager. The good golf pro does the same thing—observes the
trainee’s natural swing before beginning to shape and control it. You go against the
grain at your peril, and your pupil’s.
This may sound simple, but it seems to be the hardest thing of all for managers,
parents and teachers of all kinds to understand and practise. All those callings
demand leadership. The easier part of leadership is the creation and sustaining of the
vision. The artist or sculptor usually knows in advance what is intended. Most
parents know exactly what kind of offspring they want to have. The harder part is
the moulding and shaping required, because this is always perplexing and frustrating
and there is no certainty at all that it will work out ‘right’ in the end. I suspect that
the great coaches and mentors are those who understand in their bones about craft
and method. Of course, that goes for the great leaders too. Noel Waite has had an
extraordinary long-term impact on the quality of Australian management, mainly, I
think, because she understood these things from a very young age. Not only was she
‘bright’, she saw at first hand how each of the suits her father lovingly crafted turned
gradually from an undifferentiated jigsaw of bits and pieces into a beautiful,
practical three-dimensional object.
Weaving the threads
I warned the reader at the outset that this book deals with a quirky selection of
leaders—from monkeys to major business entrepreneurs. I don’t pretend that they
cover the entire territory, either as to leadership capacity or as to intelligence. They
are in the book because they are interesting cases and because they are, to my eyes
at least, admirable. What I want to do in this brief summarising section of the book
(before we pass on to the ‘helpful hints’) is to weave together as many of the threads
from the earlier chapters as possible. This ought to be when the different yards (no
pun intended) begin to make up a recognisable pattern in the cloth. This means that
this section, as you would expect, contains a great many cross-references. I also
want to say a little about the kinds of intelligent and well-known leaders for whom
there is no space in the book. I touch on just four eminent Australians—a
businesswoman, a jurist/diplomat, an economist/banker and a scientist.
THE ADMIRABLE LEADER

One problem with too many modern ‘leaders’, especially in politics and business, is
that they are difficult for decent people to admire. There is a view amongst many
young people that top dogs are tainted by definition—if you have succeeded in
grabbing or inheriting power, there must be something dubious about you. I noted
above that leadership has something in common with love—once admiration is lost,
so is everything else. You can’t love, or follow, a person you no longer admire. The
continuous enrichment of mediocre ‘fat cats’ at the top of big organisations, and the
simultaneous impoverishment of those at the bottom, or at the margins of systems,
simply means that top people, unless they are obviously very, very good, are
collectively relinquishing their claim to admiration. Once it becomes clear that they
are in pursuit only of binary goals such as wealth or power, rather than useful
ternary end products, then they can forget the admiration of decent, sane people
(including their own children, if any) and the claim to ‘leadership’. As Sumantra
Ghoshal points out, Western business leadership has become ‘extraordinarily timid’,
downsizing to restore profit rather than transforming: ‘.....it doesn’t really take a
great deal of managerial imagination or guts ....and the thing is we have made a
macho-ness out of the timidity’. The characters in this book have all done pretty
well and those still with us are pretty happy too, but their claim to fame lies in their
outputs and innovations—in their contributions.
As I said at the beginning of this book, I have access (directly or indirectly) to
the heroes described here and this means I can tell their stories in slightly more
depth than most treatises of leadership are able to attempt. Tom Peters and Charles
Handy are the masters of these kinds of parables in the business world. For my
money, John Pilger’s wonderful book Heroes is the model for transmitting important
messages via stories about admirable people. (He is another admirable Australian
‘leader’—a hero, if you like—who has stuck to his ethical guns through thirty
distinguished years in the journalistic swamp.) More important, the heroes described
here share a number of characteristics and talents. These characteristics underpin the
book’s argument about the nature of intelligent leadership. Once we are clear about
the elements, we can begin to think clearly about getting ourselves more intelligent
leadership. Once we are clear about the elements, we can begin to think clearly
about getting ourselves more intelligent leadership in every walk of life, but
especially in the nation’s schools.
THE INTELLECT/DAMAGE SYNERGY—THE SMART

AND SANE LEADER
Although there are always many variables involved when leadership is influential,
this book sets out to reduce the variables to the most important two: the capacity
Weaving the Threads 237
to think clearly and the relative absence of psychological damage (see Figure 14,
earlier). Smart and sane should be the watchwords. The difficulty with this simple
formulation is that both aspects require a deal of ‘unpacking’. What do I mean by
‘intelligent’, and what sort of ‘damage’ always undermines leadership?
On the intelligence front, the reason I have enlisted Howard Gardner and the
theory of ‘multiple intelligences’ is that there is little agreement, even amongst
psychologists, about the nature of practical or operational intelligence. The highly
‘educated’ tend to be dismissive of those from the university of life. The relatively
uneducated often assume that the educated are ‘all theory’. People who think in a
holistic way (seeing systems as densely interconnected ‘frogs’) have difficulty with
serial or compartment thinkers (who have to work their way methodologically
around the ‘bicycle’)—and vice versa.
Connections and patterns
We began our trawl of clever leaders with Imo, the inventive monkey on the island
of Koshima. Her special ability was to connect one phenomenon (a creek) with a
process (the removal of sand from sweet potatoes). Her discovery could not have
arisen by chance—she had to conceptualise the possibility before carrying out the
first crucial physical experiment. What she did looks simply enough after the event.
It looks like an amalgam of Gardner’s logical and spatial intelligences. Bob Clifford
did much the same thing when he connected commercial ferry operation with
catamaran design. The first of these necessarily involved an understanding of the
psychology of marketing and hence of the interpersonal intelligence. The second
required spatial awareness, learned through bodily/kinaesthetic experience.
In a similar way to Imo and Clifford, Robert Keep was able to visualise
battlefield situations in advance by making patterns out of previously inchoate
material. He ‘knew’ the Viet Cong attack was imminent because he could ‘see’ in
his mind’s eye the meaning of a pattern. Later on, his eminence in the world of
finance flowed from seeing the psychological connection between horse racing odds
and the operation of currency markets. Mary Parker Follett was one of the first
people to see clearly how the operational aspects of organisations
are connected to human nature. Her view was therefore holistic, as opposed to the
mostly mechanical models popular at the time. She was really the precursor of the
‘socio-technical systems’ idea.
These are all ‘intelligent’ people but the aspect of intelligence that distinguishes
them is this ability to connect in order to make patterns. All of them are more or less
gifted in all the Gardner ‘intelligences’ but this is their notable strength. I have had
the privilege of talking at length with most of these heroes and it is clear to me that
making patterns has motivated them and largely caused their creative breakthroughs.
The obvious link is with my account in Chapter 2 of the seven- and eight-year-olds
engaged in highly sophisticated systems thinking. I argue that this kind of pattern-
recognition and pattern-making is a natural gift which we often neglect in parenting
and schooling. Only when education is alive to this capability do you get the
extraordinary results (in terms of creative, practical outcomes) achieved by Allan
Coman at Bradfield College. As a form of work, pattern-making is simultaneously
very disciplined but also essentially playful.
Seeing or envisioning are usually regarded as creative or artistic skills, and why
not? My guess is that what these gifted people do (when they envision something) is
to employ an enormous amount of the neural circuitry, just as the most complex
software eats up capacity on a computer. The outcome may be simple and elegant
but the processing usually involves lengthy, complicated and more or less
continuous processing. This probably explains the pre-eminence of the chess
grandmasters—it is hard to discern what exactly distinguishes them from other
front-rank players, apart from the fact that they generally win! When the
grandmaster beats the biggest computer in the world, the trick goes beyond the
logical/mathematical skills—there is evidently some kind of complex spatial
pattern-making going on, with a time dimension built in. The best players are
usually obsessional, thinking about chess more or less nonstop, but some of them are
notably uncrazy. Bob Clifford is as sane as they come, but he hardly ever stops
thinking about his beloved boats.
All the great artistic endeavours are accompanied by this sort of night and day
perseverance. A well-known example is Wagner’s ‘discovery’ of the great E flat
major Rheingold theme (after a nightmarish half-sleep on an uncomfortable couch in
La Spezia): [When] I awoke from my half-sleep in terror ... I at once recognised
[that] the orchestral prelude ... which for a long time I must have carried about with
me, yet had never been able to fix definitely, had at last come to being within me!’ It
is by no means frivolous to compare with this Paul McCartney’s ‘discovery’ of the
‘Yesterday’ melody. He woke up with the tune in his head, wrote it down, and spent
the next few weeks asking everybody in the business where he had heard it before.
The shape of the song looked so obvious to him that it was inconceivable that he had
invented, rather than rediscovered it. ‘Yesterday’ was sui generis—completely
unlike all the other Lennon and McCartney songs but, crucially, it emerged out of
their most concentrated period of joint creative productivity, but from just the one
overheated brain.
The obvious link with Howard Gardner in these two cases lies in the
simultaneous mobilisation of the musical and spatial intelligences (because
composers usually ‘see’ the shapeliness of their output—see Mozart’s reflections on
this subject in Chapter 2). But, at another level, both of these composers reveal an
insight about intrapersonal self-awareness. They are fully engaged in their creative
work, but simultaneously aware of themselves as instruments or conduits for the
output. Throughout the book I have referred to the theatrical metaphor and to the
crucial ability of effective leaders to occupy the stage whilst holding in mind the
shape of the whole play. If you adopt Gardner’s logic, there is no essential
difference between the business entrepreneur and the creative artist—both need
perseverance and a vision. The point is that this demands brainpower, not just ‘flair’.
In the concluding part of the book I outline a few methods for enhancing the
mobilisation of broad-band mental activity. The Career Path Appreciation method
actually sets out to test, amongst other skills, the capacity of an individual to reframe
visual patterns, on the assumption that this ability underpins some aspects of
managerial effectiveness. In order to do this, subjects are obliged to hold a greater
quantity of information in mind for a sustained period of intensive work, and to sift
and order it under time pressure. The Executive Role Consultation method helps
individuals to a more self-aware state in their working and life environments, on the
assumption that this will amplify their impact on events generally. A number of
organisations, notably Body Shop, now involve their staff in big, theatrical
collaborations, on the assumption that this is good not only for ‘creativity’
and teamwork but excellent also for developing thinking capacity. It forces people to
think at two levels simultaneously, it forces them to hang on to a visualisation whilst
coping with running emergencies, and it absolutely demands the fusion of rational
discipline with emotional messiness. Art, as we know, mirrors life.
The point is that intelligence counts when it comes to effective and admirable
leadership, but you have to define intelligence in a broad, interconnected way. It all
comes down to brainpower in the end but business schools generally neglect any
outcomes that seem to be passionate, or heartfelt, or unsupported by the ‘facts’ and
by ‘logic’. Howard Gardner agrees, of course, on the importance of
logical/mathematical intelligence; but it is not enough. Daniel Goleman, the author
of Emotional Intelligence, is right to stress the importance of social deftness in
leadership but a sense of space, shapeliness and interconnection also seems to be
important. In fact, all Gardner’s intelligences matter when we set out to bring up or
educate children, or to develop managers.
Readers of this book are free to make connections which have not occurred to
the author. This happens all the time, as I know from readers’ letters past. One such
is the connection between bogus statistics (described in Chapter 3) and the
phenomenon of under management in the downsized organisation (described in
Chapter 14). Today’s most spectacular blunders and cockups often involve this
combination. The extraordinary cases of Nick Leeson (who brake Barings Bank)
and Peter Young (who cost Morgan Grenfell half a billion pounds—and rising—by
doing more or less the same thing as Leeson a year later) demonstrate how greedy,
low-capacity bosses will always trust statistics that please them, especially when
they hardly ever see the rogue subordinates they are supposed to be supervising. In
order for Morgan Grenfell to learn from the Barings fiasco, it was necessary for
somebody to make the essential connection between so-called ‘performance
measures’ and the absence of proper supervision up and down the anorexic
organisational hierarchy. Nobody made the connection. The intelligent, systemic
question to ask is: do the designers of ‘performance management’ systems and the
separate groups who carry out downsizing understand the connection with
subsequent cockups? Does anybody in senior management factor in the huge cost of
big cockups when they think about how to manage the system in future? If such
things only happen every few years (even if they can destroy institutions and lives) it
probably won’t happen on your watch and, in the meantime, look at all the lovely
money.
Psychological damage
My argument, as the reader will by now be aware, is that such intellectual
deficiencies or bad habits are bound to interact with latent psychopathology. If a
manager brings too much of his psychic damage to work, that will always cloud his
thinking and lead eventually to mental muddle. Even slightly crazy people have to
get reality to fit the mad internal map. On the other hand, if a manger lacks the
agility of thought to keep up with events, he or she will come under increasing
pressure and, sooner or later, behave badly. In Chapter 6, I set out the probable
causes, early in life of the kinds of psychopathology that cause bullying,
deceitfulness or cowardice in the workplace. Most of the organisations in which I
work are very slow to discipline—or to help—the many managers who cause
workplace fear and irrationality. There is so much of it about that it hardly seems
worthy of comment, even assuming you are aware of it.
All bullies and totally selfish people are damaged, rather than ‘bad’. Very
dangerous people, like Slobodan Milosevice, the Serbian tyrant (just clinging to
power at the time of writing), are usually very damaged. Hitler, Stalin, Saddam
Hussein and most of the great tyrants of history were themselves tyrannised in
childhood. Milosevic’s background is about par for the course. When he was seven,
his favourite uncle blew his brains out. His father, a Serb Orthodox priest, followed
suit when young Slobo was twenty-one. Twelve years later, his mother hanged
herself from a light fitting in the Milosevic living room. Like his fellow Balkan
dictator Nicolae Ceaucescu, he married a fiercely ambitious and ruthless woman—
the redoubtable Mira. Together, they were more dangerous than apart, feeding each
other’s fantasies and ambitions in the grip of a folie a deux. Her father got him his
first crucial political appointment. Egged on by Mira, he ambushed his principal
mentor, Ivan Stambolic, the man who had helped him most in his meteoric rise
through the Communist Party ranks. Stambolic, one of the more principled of the
old party apparatchiks, was appalled at the way Milosevic was prepared to stir up all
the old Balkan ethnic demons in order to get binary power for himself. Therefore,
Stambolic had to go.
The point to bear in mind about damaged souls like Milosevic is that they can be
extremely skilful in their political machinations. Part of their psychopathology is an
almost superhuman understanding of the uses of fear and suspicion in human
relations. Higher-order ternary logic always catches up with them in the end, but by
that time the entire system (region) is likely to have been poisoned—old wounds
reopened, new atrocities committed, and a whole generation infected with hate—all
to serve the ambition of a crazy couple. Political tyrants provide the best possible
illustration of the way in which intelligence and psychopathology relate to one
another. They are essentially independent variables, but when they interact—in the
form of the clever madman—watch out!
I cite the case of Milosevic to highlight the issues. I don’t suggest that the petty
tyrants in organisations are as ‘wicked’ as this, but they are pale imitations of the
same phenomenon. When ordinary, decent people are hurt in organisational life, it is
often at the hands of a relatively damaged individual who has aggrandised himself
(or herself) in the pursuit of personal ambition. The binary ambition has supplanted
the ordinary human interest in doing something useful. Of course, none of us can
claim to have escaped all psychological damage. The outstanding Australians
described in this book are not exactly perfect but, I contend, they are notably
uncrippled by psychopathological baggage. If they have a failing, it lies in a kind of
obsessiveness. In this respect they resemble the great artists rather than the greediest
businessmen. This means that they are, so to speak, married to their creative
endeavour. In most cases, this seems to create some difficulties for life partners.
With a couple of notable exceptions, my heroes have had stormy or discontinuous
relationships with partners. As the psychologist Liam Hudson points out (see
Chapter 9), major discontinuities in creative work often spill over into social life.
The difficulty for the creativity-driven person may lie in finding a suitable (that
is, similar) partner. When it comes to obsessives, it takes one to live with one.
Figure 17 suggests that the ‘best’ (most creative and productive) people don’t
always get hitched to one another. Sometimes, highly binary women ambush
gormless but potentially ternary men—what might be described as the Macbeth
The new company Effects/outcomes
Emphasis on value of work outputs, as

Flat pyramids
opposed to positional power games
Reduced tyranny of set workplaces

New technology
and hours
Predominance of empathetic social

Customer focus
skills
Exposure of amoral enterprise Decline of the amoral careerist
Figure 18 The ‘glass ceiling’ good news
syndrome. This was apparently the case with Mesdames Milosevic and Ceaucescu—
strong but crazy women using weak and malleable men as a front for their own
ambition. Something not dissimilar occurs in the senior ranks of the big
corporations, although this has not been much studied. Over the years, I have
worked with numerous very senior men, many of them deeply frustrated and
unhappy, who were driven, in the main, by the expectations and desires of their
wives and/or demanding offspring. Until we get many more women in top jobs, we
won’t know whether the reverse is likely to occur. I have seen overstretched male
executives, grey with exhaustion at the end of the long working day, restored
overnight to fighting-fitness by a backstage impresario.
The ‘Tomorrow’s Company’ initiative (discussed in the previous chapter)
suggests that in future there may be a shortage of the kinds of admirable people I
have described in these pages. In a relationship organisation, where trust and
reputation are the building blocks of success, there is not much room for the old-
style machine politicians. As most of them were men (possibly propped up by
ambitious partners) life is arguably going to get better for women. The emerging
fields of networked home-working, media, theatre, health and public relations are
all, if not dominated by women, at least female-friendly. As Figure 18 depicts, in the
longer run things are moving towards women’s advantage—flat organisational
structures extrude unnecessary timeservers, new technology loosens up the working
day, customer focus helps those with natural empathetic skills who really
care, and the Tomorrow’s Company focus on ethics will, in the long run, tend to
root out the crooks. All these developments favour women. Noel Waite and Liz
O’Shaughnessy are very good examples of women who have not had to trim or
distort their essential natures in order to succeed. We don’t yet have enough skilled
mentors and coaches to support their successors.
All these intelligent leaders seem to be broad-banders (using Gardner’s notion of
multiple intelligences). This appears to enhance their systems thinking capacity, or
their ability to see problems from different angles and to envisage novel futures.
This translates into timely judgement—the ability to size things up quickly and act
decisively. This is how we are defining leadership in tomorrow’s company. As a
matter of fact, it is not much different from the array of characteristics usually
associated with famous ‘leaders’ like Winston Churchill, even though such leaders
have generally been viewed mostly in the light of character rather than intelligence.
Churchill, of course, was a first-rate journalist and writer. Like the leaders in the
book, he was also something of an obsessional, but his psychopathology never
completely disabled him. Arguably, it was exactly what his life’s task demanded. He
was pretty badly parented, by today’s standards, but he did have a wonderful,
kindly, caring nanny. Without her, possibly none of his talent would have been
realised, because the damage might have swamped the intellect. Nanny Everest, you
could argue, exercised a remarkably important leadership act in the context of 20th
century history.
WHO’S NOT IN THE BOOK?

This roundup of the book’s characters, and their connection with leadership and
intelligence, points up the absence of many outstanding Australians from these
pages. As I discussed the emerging book with colleagues the constant refrain was:
‘Why didn’t you put in Janet Holmes á Court, or Ninian Stephen, or James
Wolfensohn, or Allan Synder, or . . . ?’ The short answer is that I wanted to pick out
just a few people, not all of them grandees, who exemplified the core intelligences
and aspects of leadership that are the book’s subject. I also wanted people with
whom I could spend quite a lot of time, in the endeavour to get behind the public
entrepreneur to the intellectual and ethical reality beneath. This means I needed their
permission so to explore. I also wanted to expose the less famous (like Liz
O’Shaughnessy and Robert Keep), the underappreciated (like Bill Hudson) and the
neglected or forgotten (like Mary Parker Follett) on the grounds that we should all
worry about the prominence of flashy but shallow charismatics when so many
substantial leaders are unknown. Once I step beyond the core characters, it is
invidious to leave out anybody of merit, and just as invidious to deal with only the
four ‘absentees’ noted above.
But I want to give a sense of the kinds of establishment figures who are the
spiritual brothers and sisters of the book’s heroes. You don’t have to be obscure in
order to be virtuous. These four are all extraordinary Australians (maybe we can
include them in a subsequent edition of this book, after it has been improved by
first-tranche readers). Janet Holmes à Court, for example, is another woman (such as
Noel Waite) who came to prominence through a tragedy—the untimely death of her
husband Robert. She was already a very significant upholder of communitarian
values in Australia and a lifelong non-conservative. To start with, that made her
unusual amongst business leaders, most of whom lean, without much forethought, to
the political right. What has happened since to Heytesbury Holdings (the grazing to
theatre empire pieced together by Robert) is that it has become a more stable
organisation, partly as a result of overdue business reshaping but partly also as the
result of female levelheadededness.
All of the collapsed business empires of the 1980s, put together by male
financial engineers, were essentially virtual corporations. Of course, there were
tangible assets but the ascribed value depended mainly on the opinions and
expectations of the traders and dealers that Robert Keep so expertly scrutinises.
Knowledgeable women tend to be as sceptical about financial-engineers’ figures as
they are about flashy men. They generally need to understand the substance of the
business. The main problem for female inheritors of business empires is usually a
control problem—how to ensure that all the men surrounding you really share your
value set. If they don’t they are bound occasionally to perpetrate cockups with the
best will in the world—by simply trying to do their binary best (see the reference to
The Adversarial Approach in Chapter 12). This is not meant to be an apologia for
the Heytesbury group of companies, just an observation that the stable
organisation is not necessarily the stodgy organisation and that women, by and large,
value stability.
Systems thinking tells you quickly enough that if women need to spend at least
twice as long in the lavatory as men (and if theatre audiences split roughly fifty-
fifty), then in order to operate efficiently your theatres are going to need toilet
capacity in the ratio 2:1. It’s only a small thing but, all over London, the female
clientele of the Stoll Moss theatre chain owe an unconscious debt of gratitude to the
sort of leader who connects systems thinking with ordinary human needs (the
substance) whilst driving ‘strategy’. Most of these theatres have been around for a
long time; it took till the 1990s for this aspect of throughput process to be addressed
intelligently.
It ought to be reassuring to Australians that that kind of levelheadedness is to be
found, for example, on the Reserve Bank Board. The story goes that, when Janet
Holmes á Court joined the Reserve Bank, she was the only external director game
enough to say ‘what does that mean?’ when the experts tried to baffle the non-
executives with science, even though most of the others were baffled too. That is
one of the most difficult, useful and underrated leadership acts of all. In Chapter 10,
I refer to the practice of ‘thinkering’ or amalgamating high thought with hands-on
tinkering. This is the combination of subtle thinking, ethical value and no-nonsense
straightforwardness that outstanding women can bring to high office. It is tragic that
it so often requires a tragedy to make it happen. It is no surprise, therefore, that Janet
Holmes á Court is the prime mover behind the Australian Children’s Television
Foundation (ACTF) and that Gardner’s ideas about ‘thinkering’ provide the basis for
the ACTF’s early childhood program.
Most of the beleaguered inhabitants of Ireland, both north and south, are
unaware of the crucial role of Sir Ninian Stephen in drawing the warring factions
together to talk as intelligently as possible to each other. Wisely, the British
Government recognised that the midwife for the ‘peace process’ had to be somebody
of enormous wisdom, patience and detachment. That doesn’t mean that Sir Ninian
lacks passion for the task at hand, merely that, as an Australian, he can combine a
lawyer’s clarity of mind with a cultural affinity that is just about right—not too close
(an English person wouldn’t do), nor too distant. Above all, he reinforces the point
that wisdom goes on accreting in the minds of those who remain ablebodied. A
much younger mediator than Sir Ninian is difficult to imagine. It is surprising, in a

way, that more distinguished Australians are not called upon to act the referee in
world affairs. The Irish work, of course, calls for the very opposite of flamboyant
leadership. Theatrically, the need is for the subtlest and most sensitive direction of
the negotiation system—the lightest touch, backed up by the big brain.
Observers of the World Bank say that that institution is undergoing a revolution,
and not before time. The more thoughtful economists have argued for years that the
bank had become part of the problem, rather than part of the solution to the world’s
economic and political stability problems. Previously, crude economic intervention,
based on oversimple ‘bicycle’ assumptions, were applied to immensely complex
socio-economic ‘frogs’, especially in those underprivileged parts of the world that
were most difficult for Americans to understand. James Wolfensohn, the newish
chief, has effectively asked two questions: What exactly is the World Bank for?
What, in reality, have been the long-term effects of previous World Bank
interventions in other people’s economies? This particular Australian is merely
applying highlevel systems thinking to an urgent world problem. In order to effect
change, he needs most of the repertoire of the Gardner intelligences, from social
deftness (interpersonal) through self-deprecating unpompous humour
(intrapersonal) to the big brain (logical/mathematical and spatial). There is no
obvious application for his musical virtuosity (he plays the cello) but Gardner would
argue that it probably helps the big ‘frog’ (Wolfensohn’s brain) to work well. No
reader of this book will be surprised to learn that he was previously a world-class
fencer (the bodily/kinaesthetic intelligence).
There is a curious parallel to Wolfensohn’s top teamwork at the World Bank in
the Nick Faldo/Fanny Sunesson story in Chapter 12. Wolfensohn brought in the
redoubtable Rachel Lomax as his deputy. She was previously one of the most senior
Treasury mandarins in the British Civil Service, famous for being about the only
person who could handle Margaret Thatcher. There is a famous account of the return
of Lord Carrington and Sir Ian Gilmour from Brussels, after a notably successful
renegotiation of Britain’s contribution to EEC funding. On their return they
presented the outcome, with some pride, to the Prime Minister. She, for reasons
nobody could fathom, found fault with everything, complaining, amongst other
things, about the impact of the renegotiated settlement on foreign aid. As it had
absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with foreign aid, this was perplexing to

Carrington, Gilmour and all the aides present. As Gilmour put it, was a bit like being
a soccer goalie in some arcane version of the game where the object was to kick the
ball into the crowd—the best you could manage would be the odd despairing lunges
as the ball sailed out.
But, Gilmour noted, Rachel Lomax had the Prime Minister’s measure. Whenever
Thatcher was plain wrong, Lomax would calmly but firmly point out: ‘I believe,
Prime Minister, if you refer to section X, subsection Y, on page Z, you will see
that...!’ The PM, sensing she was outgunned, went quietly. In the end, Gilmour
concluded that there was no logic in Thatcher’s disagreements; it was simply more
important for her emotionally to have the binary fight with Brussels than to achieve
an intelligent, realistic, ternary outcome. That realisation filled him with dread.
Anyway, James Wolfensohn, our Australian hero, has done what smart leaders do—
post really smart lieutenants at key strategic points. It is a nice touch that the key
lieutenant should be a woman.
The fourth ‘absentee’ is Professor Allan Snyder, head of optical research at the
Australian National University in Canberra and recent winner of the Australia Prize
for science. I would dearly like to have explained his work (so far as I could
understand it) and its origination in these pages. Given time and space, I would have
recruited Robyn Williams—a unique science broadcaster/populariser in all the world
to assist with this task. Snyder, like Williams, is Australian by adoption, a nice
compliment from one of the world’s leading photonics researchers and the
impresario behind a number of leading-edge Cooperative Research Centres. Here is
another broad-bander, drawn from primarily musical stock in New York but steeped
also in high finance and psychology. One of his obsessions, parallel with his
groundbreaking hard science, is the nature of perception and the workings of the
human mind. (In this respect, he resembles Howard Gardner, whose main
contribution to this book arose from the connection between hard science and the
practical problems of education—see Chapter 9.) Snyder, like Robert Keep (a
friend), has persevered for years with scientific ideas and experiments which, if
ultimately successful, will completely transform the relevant field, worldwide. Bob
Clifford would agree with both of them that Australia, partly because of its physical
isolation, is a fertile source of scientific innovation and creativity, provided
the worldwide connections are in place. It helps to be distinctive, but networked.

With the possible exception of Janet Holmes) a Court, all of these notables are
probably better known outside Australia than at home. That is perhaps as it should
be but, if inspiring role models are needed by young Australians (and they are), what
is the best way to expose these kinds of people and achievements, in schools, for
example? How many Australians really understand what the jurist/diplomat, the
economist/banker and (perhaps most important) the scientist represent, and what
their likely impact on the world well into the next century will be? We can anticipate
that the eyes of the sporting world will turn to Australia and New Zealand at the
millennium, as the Olympics and the America’s Cup come south in the same year. It
would be a crying shame if this merely reinforced the world’s view of a region
entirely peopled by amiable athletes. Intelligence, in the practical and broad-band
form I have described in these pages, has always been an Australasian speciality.
The trick is to celebrate the fact and to ensure that it is nurtured and reinforced over
the very long term.
It would be no bad thing, by the way, to institute a major Down Under
celebration of the mind (especially the active, applied, problem-solving mind) to
coincide with all this physical activity. As we enter the new millennium, why not
bring the world to the South Pacific to look afresh at the big issues? If the great
economic shift is, as the pundits say, to the Asia-Pacific region, maybe Australasia
can play a leading role in integrating and mobilising practical—and multiple—
intelligence in the region. Mounting something like that would require the support of
clever politicians with a long-term perspective and, dare I say it, a view of the big
picture.
PART III
Nurturing intelligent leadership
Nurturing Intelligent Leadership 253
In this final part of the book I outline a number of useful hints and ideas for anybody
interested in helping the kinds of mavericks celebrated in these pages, or in
supporting maverickdom in big organisations. On the whole, the former task
(helping the entrepreneur to grow his or her enterprise) falls to government—in the
Australian setting, to State government. On the whole, the latter task (loosening up
the buried cleverness of all the ‘Imos’ in big systems) falls to management
educators, consultants and researchers. These were matters confronted by David
Karpin’s Federal Government Task Force on Management and Leadership Skills in
Australia, which produced its valuable final report, Enterprising Nation, in 1995. I
had the honour of helping the overseas touring arm of the Task Force as it examined
the thinking and practices of foreign corporations and education systems.
Be warned: the ‘helpful hints’ set out below in Chapter 14 are not tools, not step-
by-step procedures, to be taken away and used in work systems by readers. I have
included them in the book as a source of optimism. There are practical and user-
friendly ways of intervening in systems but they require mastery, and hence
understanding. I include therefore some suggestions for further reading
around the main themes of the book. And I am always happy to talk to anybody
about how to attach good ideas to messy realities.
Much of what I want to say concerns the sizes of systems and of their
subsystems. That is why Gregory Bateson’s ‘polyploid horse’ serves as the text for
Chapter 1. To shift the organic metaphor, Australia is just a big frog. Any attempt to
get it to function as a highly efficient frog must depend on our capacity to
understand how all the parts relate to the whole. No consultant, however
Machiavellian, can make it into a bicycle (see Chapter 3). We have to understand it
as a complex system in order to help it to grow and develop naturally. In the United
States and the United Kingdom, there are too many examples of dogmatic force-
feeding or starvation of systems in evidence. As I remarked earlier, if you have more
of your citizens in jail or on remand than you have in college (as in the United
States) then the big system cannot be functioning well.
Viewed from the outside, the relationship of an organisation like Bob Clifford’s
Incat to Tasmania, and to Australia, and to the specialised world of fast ferry
transportation, is downright fascinating. But so is the relationship of a system like
Tasmania itself to its environment. From the outside, it is difficult to comprehend
that a system of just three industrial clusters, with a population about the same as a
big metropolitan county in Britain, should be a fully fledged State with all the
trimmings (including a bloke in a silly hat to open Parliament). Yet there is the
reality of Bass Strait to reinforce the psychology of separateness. Potentially,
Tasmania, given a few more Bob Cliffords, could teach the mainland about creating
and sustaining coherent systems—systems that feel right and function smoothly. Half
a million people is a terrific starting point, provided you can bring them all together
into a realistic sense of community.
The tragedy of Port Arthur makes it clear that the presence of sound political
institutions (the structure of the bike, if you like) is no guarantee of social coherence.
As with any disaster, there was a prescient ‘Imo’ sounding a warning. In 1991 Barrie
Unsworth, then Premier of New South Wales, prophesied: ‘It will take a massacre in
Tasmania before we get proper gun control in this country! ‘ He had tried harder
than any politician to anticipate impending danger by responding intelligently to the
Hoddle Street, Queen Street and Strathfield massacres. No one could argue that
there wasn’t a pattern building up. After Port Arthur, he tended to blame himself:
‘The events at Port Arthur made me very sad and depressed, with the sense I failed
in 1987 to effectively start the process which would remove the weapons of war
from our society and achieve a real reduction in guns. Therefore, I felt I had
contributed to the tragic circumstances’ (Herald Sun, 6 May 1996).
Barrie Unsworth is the last person in Australia who should blame himself for the
failure of the country to come to its senses. But his anguish shows the burden of the
intelligent leader when the system cannot respond to intelligence. Such people are
always uncompromising with themselves. They are able to comprehend the
complexities of the big system (the frog, the country as a whole) but sometimes they
lack the political clout, or the time needed, to act upon that understanding. They are
often surrounded by intellectual pygmies with narrow-span, short-term perspectives.
Those pygmies rarely share the sense of anguish or guilt because they were helpless
to begin with. Understanding is a terrible burden because, in the relatively
undamaged personality, it imposes duty. This is the stuff of tragedy.
If we take Tasmania as a case study, we can see that understanding the nature of
the beast, and beginning to bring it to blooming health, must be a long-term process,
very carefully undertaken. Michael Porter’s important book The Competitive
Advantage of Nations has much to say about the natural economic clusters that
sometimes grow, like algae, around networks of entrepreneurs. Those clusters are in
the nature of mini-frogs. One of the best known, described by Porter, is the cluster of
ceramic tile manufacturers in the north of Italy. Beginning with a few natural
(geological) advantages, the tilemakers combined fierce commercial competition
with intelligent technical collaboration, supported by a network of publicly funded
training establishments and research and development centres. Porter argues that
that trick lay not in the dominance of free enterprise OR state control, nor in the
dominance of competitiveness OVER collaboration, but in a subtle admixture of all
the elements-binary AND ternary. If you really understand the natural properties of
the system, there is no place for political dogma.
Tasmania could be the ultimate example of a big socio-technical system
repairing itself. But it will require very intelligent and persistent leadership. The
economic fixes, though difficult, will be the relatively easy bit. The integration of
natural economic activity with long-term social healing will be the complicated, and
therefore hard, part. The ‘collective unconscious’, an idea first mooted by Jung, will
dog the rational process of economic rebuilding. Without integration of the rational
task aspect and the underlying demons, the project of rebuilding may fail
completely—or make things worse. The helpful hints given below will make more
sense if the sense of system (or frog) is held in mind. To make it easier I reproduce a
shortened version of Bateson’s ‘polyploid horse’ as a reminder of what happens
when a system is constructed according to the logic of a completely different kind of
system:
. . . a horse precisely twice the size of an ordinary Clydesdale. It was

twice as long, twice as high, and twice as thick. By the time the horse
was shown to the public it was not doing any standing. In a word, it was
too heavy. It weighed eight times as much as a normal Clydesdale.
For a public showing, Dr Posif always insisted on turning off the hoses
that were continuously necessary to keep the beast at normal
mammalian temperature. After all, its skin and dermal fat were twice as
thick as normal, and its surface area was only four times that of a normal
horse, so it didn’t cool properly.
Every morning, the horse had to be raised to its feet with the aid of a
small crane and hung in a sort of box on wheels, in which it was
suspended on springs, adjusted to take half its weight off its legs. Dr
Posif used to claim that the animal was outstandingly intelligent because
it had eight times as much brain (by weight) as any other horse, but it
had very little free time for thinking, what with one thing and another—
always panting, partly to keep cool and partly to oxygenate its eight-
times body. Its windpipe, after all, had only four times the normal area
of cross section.
And then there was eating. Somehow it had to eat, every day, eight
times the amount that would satisfy a normal horse and had to push all
that food down an oesophagus only four times the calibre of the normal.
The blood vessels, too, were reduced in relative size, and this made
circulation more difficult and put extra strain on the heart.
My recommendation to senior executives is usually to read this passage once,

just to get the physics and the biology clearly in mind, then to read it carefully again,
with the big corporation in mind. The fable demonstrates what inevitably happens
when two or more variables, whose curves are discrepant, interact. This is what
produces the interaction between change and tolerance. As a species we have
been pretty good, over a few million years, at coping with bands, gangs and smallish
societies. The modern corporation is a very new and unfamiliar system, connected
by entirely novel electronic linkages. It is hardly surprising that primitive behaviour
sometimes bubbles up from the depths.
I illustrated the change/tolerance phenomenon earlier by describing how a frog
will absorb gradual change (removal of bits, for example) for a surprisingly long
time, until suddenly the threshold of tolerance is passed and the entire system
collapses. The ‘polyploid horse’ illustrates how big, cumbersome corporations
usually get out of kilter with their component parts (living, breathing, thinking,
feeling, hurting, inventive human beings). The fable doesn’t help us to decide what
to do about it. ‘Downsizing’ clearly exposes the system to the same problem in
reverse—the changing of any variable always exposes a critical value of another
variable.
THE ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENT LEADERS

The reader is entitled to take the view that the people I have described in this book
are really oddballs or mavericks. They are mostly people who don’t fit very well
into conventional social or employment systems. They are also people who present
as exceptionally ‘bright’. The purpose of this book is to suggest that people like this
are the only ‘normal’ ones among us. It is the big employment bureaucracy that is
odd, historically speaking. If we were all better at parenting, educating, supporting,
encouraging and stimulating, then everybody would be as bright and focused as
these heroes. They are people who escaped most of the damage attendant on normal
upbringing. I accepted in Chapter 6 that ‘intellectual firepower’ may be the most
intractable of the successful leader’s qualities. That is halfway to admitting that
intelligence may be partly heritable.
On the other hand, I have had the opportunity to observe, close to, the work of
obstetrics pathfinders like Dr Frederic Leboyer. His babies always emerge into a
peaceful, unhurried world without stress, panic or noise, save for J. S. Bach, softly.
Such babies are not upended by the rugger-bugger type of gynaecologist and slapped
on the bottom in order to elicit evidence of lungpower. They are allowed to crawl at
their own pace around mummy, exploring this new environment. They appear
completely focused, as though checking out a place overheard and imagined, now
available for inspection. They do not cry; they are just interested. The point of this is
that Leboyer claims that his babies always end up clever, because they have
curiosity and calmness soldered in. This is quite impossible to prove because the
kinds of parents who opt for a Leboyer birth are already, by definition, highly
selected. Still, it makes you think. I often watch other people’s babies on public
transport. There is an extraordinary difference between the blank, enclosed and
disgruntled visages of some babies and the probing and inquisitive scanning of
others. It matches the behaviour of the mothers. The recent discovery of the
correlation between sucking dummies in infancy and subsequent low IQ fits neatly
with this prejudice.
SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS THEORY

At any rate, the idea to hold in mind is that almost anybody can operate in a similar
way to the heroes in this book. If that is to happen inside large organisations, we
have to pay some attention to the structure and processes of such organisations,
bearing in mind that human nature changes very slowly—more slowly than we can
observe in a 70-year span. We are dealing here with the theory of ‘socio-technical
systems’, a phrase coined in the 1950s by some of the Tavistock Institute pioneers.
The classic study took place in British coal mines. An efficient new technology had
appeared on the scene—the so-called ‘long wall’ method of coal-getting. You could
prove easily, on paper, that the new technology would produce much more coal per
hour because it was technically much more ‘efficient’.
It didn’t work out like that. It turned out that if you permitted the technology to
dominate the process, the inevitable effect was to destroy the social ‘glue’ that held
together the work system. One effect of the new technology was to break up the
logic of the work sequence, leaving the miners to carry out only a fragment of the
task, rather than seeing the whole cycle through. This removed meaning from their
work. Furthermore, the new technology broke up the work groups that underpinned
trust and respect across the whole system. Those groups, like the subassemblies of
frogs, were part of the total system. If you messed them around, the whole system
suffered. In a closely knit mining community, the families and the local community
were part of that big system too. The damage to the big ‘frog’ was
widespread and insidious. From the management standpoint, production rates

following introduction of the new technology actually suffered.
The ‘solution’, famously, was to satisfice. If you designed a system around the
technology alone, you ran the risk of distorting or destroying the social glue. If you
designed a system around the social needs, you simply wasted the benefits of new
methods and exposed yourself to smarter competition. The trick was to integrate
technical and social requirements into a sub-maximal but workable alternative,
drawing upon the knowhow of all the ‘Imos’ in the system. It was an early example
of what we might now call ‘team working’ or ‘multiskilling’ or ‘empowerment’.
The new multiskilled groups accepted responsibility for each activity in the
extraction cycle, from initial shot-firing of the coal and its removal to conveyor
belts, through the moving forward of roof supports as the face advanced, to the final
packing of the worked face and the management of a controlled roof-fall. When
something works well, because it makes sense, it motivates and stimulates. The
outfall is more interest and creativity. The people who work the system always
understand it better than their bosses but, even now, as we approach the millennium,
their wisdom is rarely tapped. Their ‘resistance to change’ varies inversely with
intelligent involvement in decision-making.
The interesting thing about the socio-technical systems work of the 1950s in the
British Coal Board is that it predates ‘business process re-engineering’ (BPR) by
nearly fifty years. The basic idea was the same—isolate the fundamental throughput
processes and encourage those people with the operational responsibility to improve
the processes for themselves, using statistical data. The basics flowed directly from
the ‘operations research’ approaches which coped with the logistics of the
Normandy landings in 1944. I have long argued that BPR is merely operations
research rebadged. It is what intelligent people do naturally. There is, however, a
big difference in the starting points of the 1980s re-engineers and the socio-technical
pioneers:
• BPR was a godsend (a sort of intellectual figleaf) for the 1980s asset-
strippers driven by stock market demand for short-term profit in the United
States and the United Kingdom. The simplest way to improve the bottom
line fast is to strip out cost. The quickest way to achieve that is to
‘downsize’, or ‘rightsize’ as it soon came to be known. The moment to get

into ‘outplacement counselling’ was the early 1980s. The human asset-
strippers sensed that they were taking the easy, short-term route, so the
outplacement package eased a few consciences. Most of them believed that
they had no alternative—that BPR was holy writ. Read Professor Enid
Mumford’s book Systems Design: Ethical Tools for Ethical Change for the
evidence that the longer term effects of this sort of restructuring have
usually been deleterious. She says ‘United States companies that have
drastically reduced the size of their labour forces have proved to be less
financially successful than those in the same industry that did not do so.’ By
1996 the arch-apostles of BPR, James Champy, Michael Hammer and Tom
Davenport, had all recanted. Davenport has gone as far as calling BPR,
when it is distorted and misused just for downsizing, the ‘last gasp of
Taylorism’.
• By contrast, the Tavistock Institute pioneers set out to improve the health
and well-being of the whole ‘frog’. That meant the long-term viability of the
total system—its technical capability and its resourcefulness and ingenuity.
Originally, the enormous improvements in productivity that flowed from
socio-technical systems design surprised the Tavistock and Coal Board
initiators. They had not yet fully grasped the link between ‘soul-destroying’
work and system productivity.
CHANGE AND THE CHANGE-MERCHANT

A comment on change and so-called resistance to change is in order here. It is true
that we live in a world of constant change, and we have to be able to adapt as
quickly as our environment changes. That really is the iron law of natural selection.
But, and it is a big but, we also have to deal these days with an army of ‘change-
merchants’ who feed off instability and chaos. Some of these merchants are
academics but most are management consultants. Their unconscious project is to
destabilise systems, because destabilisation is the source of their power and wealth.
Note the use of the word ‘unconscious’. A few of the change-merchants appear to be
tightly controlled Machiavellians, deliberately and consciously sowing the seeds of
anxiety, much as secret agents do in wartime. But the great majority are persuasive
because they really are attuned to chaos and deeply believe in the need for incessant
change. In my experience, top management is frequently taken in by such people;
the rank and file (the ‘Imos’) never.
A change—merchant, in the sense in which I am using the term, may be defined
as ‘an individual with a pathological need to create external chaos commensurate
with his or her internal state ‘.
In offering this definition, I am not denying the existence of chaos or the need
for systems to change and adapt. All I am doing is pointing out the presence of
dangerous destabilising forces in the ‘machine’. A good mechanic senses when a
machine or system is close to the edge. Bob Clifford knew, just before the event,
that part of one of his catamarans was about to bang him on the head. I am
suggesting that the change industry is sometimes part of the problem rather than part
of the solution. On the whole, the ‘Imos’ in the system know this but they can’t get
through to their bosses. They can generally see through consultants. Because they
understand the basic processes, they can see the inbuilt stabilities and continuities.
They can usually see the possibility for cheap and simple evolution, as opposed to
heavyhanded revolution. Some of the change—merchants I have encountered appear
to be threatened by stability and continuity because it is so much out of kilter with
their own psychological condition. The effect of the all—singing, all—dancing
‘change program’ is frequently to belittle the scope and value of the changes that
operatives and front—line staff are coping with day in and day out.
Some of the executives and consultants I have encountered, especially in the last
ten years of BPR and ‘change programs’, seem to me to be somewhat damaged
characters with a pathological need to get their immediate environment into the
same chaotic condition as their own insides. It is as if they require that equilibrium
in order to cling to sanity. If the environment contains too much stability, this is
threatening for them. Such people export their fearful inner states—they are usually
perceived as bullies. Generally, they are binary in character—fearing submission
and getting their retaliation in first. It helps, sitting in a meeting dominated by one of
these characters, to remember that inside they are very frightened and confused
people. This doesn’t alter the fact that they do much damage and export noise into a
work system that always needs clearheadedness. How do they get promoted to these
positions? We come to that shortly.
Helpful hints on organisational leadership
My ‘helpful hints’, are all based on certain fundamental assumptions about the
operation of systems, both big and small. If the reader is unconvinced about the
assumptions, the hints won’t look so helpful. We are dealing here with what is
commonly described as ‘systems thinking’. There are three basic assumptions:
1. The group is the building block

I don’t like using a static, construction metaphor to describe a fluid process but the
point is that there are some aspects of systems that really are as stable as a stone
building. Our prehistory has soldered in our dependence on groups and our
helplessness without them. Any big organisation that works well must have a stable
foundation of coherent groups ‘at the coalface’ where the crucial customer/client—
facing work is done. The way to build a resilient organisation is from the ground up.
2. People need purpose and to be at work

Whenever you see a human being ‘on song’ you can be sure that that person is bent
on achieving something that makes sense (to him or her). Human beings are at their
Helpful Hints on Organisational Leadership 263
best when they work (individually and collectively) to solve problems that matter to
them and to their kin. That is what we did well, as a species, in order to ‘rise above’
the other apes. There is a limit, therefore, in the extent to which you can persuade
people (e.g. employees) that ‘Mickey Mouse’ purposes are real. ‘Motivation’ is a
word much misused, mainly by Americans. It is a noun that describes an inner
human state. When it is misused as a verb (I am going to motivate you!) intelligent
people (subordinates, ‘Imos’) can see through it easily. The verb to motivate is
binary because it depends on personal persuasiveness. The noun motivation is
ternary because it depends on identification with a ‘good enough’ Purpose.
3. Organisations have a depth structure (a hierarchy)

This is a fancy way of saying that if you find yourself accountable to a relative
airhead, it won’t work. Whatever the ‘delayers’ or leaderless workgroupers say, the
only way that big purposive task systems can operate well is when some people are
held accountable for the work outputs of others. That means hierarchy. The person
in charge has to be superior in capability as well as authority because, by definition,
his or her work is more complex.
Taking these three simple assumptions or propositions together, you can set
about creating an organisation which is focused, which feels right to people, and
which has the capacity to learn continuously because all the ‘Imos’ are in play. I
begin with the trailblazing work of Christian Schumacher.
HELPFUL HINT NO. 1: SCHUMACHER’S SEVEN

PRINCIPLES
As it happens, Christian Schumacher is the son of the late E. F. Schumacher, author
of the seminal book small is Beautiful. Not surprisingly, the seven principles are
entirely consistent with the message of that extraordinary and prophetic book.
Christian Schumacher calls his approach simply ‘work structuring’, on the
assumption that the most important thing an organisation does is to ‘export’ useful
products (not necessarily overseas). The way you structure the organisation must be
governed by the way you structure the work. The work-structuring approach is
similar to ‘business process re-engineering’ (BPR), in that it examines the way in

which ‘imports’ are converted (via value-adding) into ‘exports’. The big difference
is that the human dimension (or socio-technical dimension; see above) is built in
from the start. In his latest book on BPR, even James Champy has acknowledged
that ‘re-engineering is in trouble’— because ‘management culture’ gets in the way
of intelligence. The big difference these days is the power of computing technology,
which is tending to dissolve traditional organisational boundaries. This is just
another reason why women, who are much better networkers than men, will soon
take over the world.
The work-structuring principles are as follows:
1. Work should be organised around BASIC TRANSFORMATIONS in order to

form ‘whole tasks’.
As throughputs flow through work systems they undergo various transformations,
some of them minor (like storage or transportation) and others basic, like the
chemical transformation of materials in manufacturing. Any work system can be
analysed so as to clarify these fundamental transformations. They are the nucleus of
the perceived ‘whole task’. Intelligent people know about this intuitively. If the
structure of work flows fits the intuition of the people, it will obviously ‘feel right’.
2. The basic organisational unit should be the PRIMARY WORK GROUP.

This principle simply builds on the evidence above, that people work best in groups
and that if the group formation makes sense (because it is built around a basic
transformation) the whole is always greater than the sum of the parts. In practice,
work groups ought to range from about four to twenty people. The very small
organisation has the advantage that the entire system feeds off this intellectual and
emotional nourishment.
3. Each work group should include a DESIGNATED LEADER.

Schumacher takes the view that the so-called ‘leaderless work group’ is a nonsense.
The leader is part of the group but he or she has also to accept responsibility for
high-level coordination, for efficient operation and improvement, and for the
personal development of the group’s members. For this, he or she requires the
capability to work at a higher level of complexity and accountability. The ‘leaderless
work group’ will always stay within its comfort zone. The more successful a group
is the more it requires a single, designated leader to fight its corner and to drag it, if
need be, out of its comfort zone.
4. Each work group and its leader should, so far as possible, PLAN AND
ORGANISE the group’s work.
If this responsibility is detached, there will be a loss of meaning (see above) and
collective satisfaction. With this responsibility, groups are more committed and
learn faster.
5. Each work group should have the responsibility of EVALUATING its own
performance against agreed standards of excellence.
This means that all work groups get to complete the ‘plan-do-review’ cycle,
ensuring coherence (a good collective understanding of the group’s connection with
and contribution to the wider system). Group members always have to remember
that they exist to add value. If the conditions are right, the self-evaluation of groups
will always be more uncompromising than external evaluation will. (See Figure 19
for a depiction of this and the next two principles.)
6. Jobs within groups should be structured so that each individual can plan, do
and evaluate at least one significant TRANSFORMATION in the work process.
Using a technique known as ‘transformation analysis’, core jobs are identified. A
core job is the cluster of activities around at least one value-adding activity. A core
job may require the full-time effort of two or three people, depending on the
workload. To it is added the responsibility for planning, doing and evaluating those
secondary activities that tie more closely to it than to other core jobs. These
secondary activities are described as ‘enhancements’. A core job plus its
enhancements comprises a ‘whole job’. This is the basis for real empowerment—
through this process, individuals get real ownership and responsibility for something
they really can control.
7. Personal and structural conditions that encourage TEAMWORKING AND

PARTICIPATION through the whole organisation should be established.
The essence here is to ensure that every group and every individual gets connected
to the overall primary task. (Sir William Hudson’s dictate that all staff should be
exposed to the Snowy Mountains Scheme’s progress flowcharts on a weekly basis is
a good example.) The main structural conditions for organisation-wide teamworking
Designated
work group
leader
Basic work group Each work group completes

the plan-do-review cycle
Basic
transformation Each individual personally
controls at least one
transformation
s
flow Each individual and group
or k
ra l w has the opportunity to
N atu
participate in the
organisation's common
task
Figure 19 Work-structuring principles
include flexible working arrangements, common conditions of employment, regular

work group meetings and a reward system compatible with teamworking.
Work Structuring Ltd has been installing processes like these all over the world
for many years with consistent success, notably in manufacturing and service
organisations, health services, government departments and agencies, finance houses
and banks. Unlike some of the crasser BPR merchants, Work Structuring Ltd works
in a admirably low-key way, striving always to enhance client capability. It will be
obvious to the reader that the general approach meets my three assumptions head on:
the need for work groups as organisational building blocks, the need for meaning in
work, and the need for enhanced capability in higher-order jobs. It will also be clear
that the work-structuring approach, because it involves real participation and
empowerment, makes it much more likely that the ‘Imos’ will be listened to and
understood. After all, they are the clever ones when it comes to really understanding
transformational processes. There is a chance, therefore, that they may stay inside
the organisation and become one of Pinchot’s intrapreneurs. The alternative for
them is to leave, taking the cleverness away, or to stay and create mischief.
Space
VI
The natural V
hierarchy of:
Value-
• Complexity (context) IV added
• Authority (accountability) Inputs outputs
• Talent (judgement) Process
II
I IV
‘Imo’
BPR's time (to market)
Figure 20 The space-time continuum

This diagram demonstrates that the natural spatial hierarchy of an
organisation (the way that complexity, authority and talent have to increase
the higher you go) is just as important as ‘time to market’. The fashion for
‘business process re-engineering’ (BPR), which simplifies processes to save
time, has (important though time is) obscured the significance of the ‘spatial’
dimension. If leadership flaws exist in this dimension the risk is that a lowly
(Level I) employee with high (Level IV) intelligence can’t get a hearing.
Space and time both matter.
The space-time continuum

The work-structuring principles share with business process re-engineering a
concern with time. The whole point about the simplification of work processes is to
shrink time to market at least as quickly as the competition does. It is no
exaggeration to say that compressing time has been the dominant focus of business
improvement over the past ten years, and quite rightly so. This has led to a partial
neglect of the space dimension. I glorify this linkage as the space-time continuum
(see Figure 20). It is a grandiose way of saying that all systems have to exist in space
and time, and the neglect of either dimension is dangerous. The proof of this, despite
all the BPR initiatives and the speeding up of processes, is the apparent proliferation
of large-scale cockups and blunders—from the Barings Bank fiasco to the
Challenger Space Shuttle catastrophe. ‘These kinds of blunders are always foreseen
by bright ‘Imos’ lower down the organisational hierarchy. They are mainly caused
by two factors:
• the ‘dumbing’ of all-male groups (see Bay of Pigs-below)

• the presence of ‘dumb’ people in high places
HELPFUL HINT NO. 2: ACHIEVING EMOTIONAL

LEADERSHIP
The ‘space’ dimension, technically speaking, deals with the second of the two
factors listed—the ascent of low-grade intellects to highlevel jobs. This is discussed
below in Helpful Hint No. 3. The first, the dumbing’ of senior decision-makers, is a
common outcome of the preponderance of male monocultures at the top of big
organisations. Any group is a potentially powerful medium—for good or ill. The
commando group in wartime is capable of quite extraordinary achievements, buoyed
up by adrenalin and absolute mutual trust. The scientific team, driven by curiosity,
can achieve leaps of logic that defy subsequent analysis. These are commonly all-
male groups. John Latham’s ‘OEM’ group in the IBM Corporation (Chapter 10)
brought a remarkable, SAS-like esprit de corps to the selling of humble typewriters
and word processors. But because any group has its primal origins in the unspoken
understandings of the hunting band, it can degenerate into a primitive and mindless
state. Youths in street gangs are usually astonished to discover that they have
murdered somebody else. They didn’t mean it—they simply lost their identity (and
therefore their adult responsibility) in the mass.
One thing is certain: when tricky or dangerous situations are encountered, the
leadership has to ‘carry’ the group, whether it is a commando or, in the case of
General Bernard Montgomery on 13 August 1942, the entire staff of Eighth Army
Headquarters. Montgomery’s first address to the assembled top brass, on the very
day of his arrival to take command, has gone down in legend. He faced a highly
skeptical audience that evening. He was their fourth new commander in a year and
their record was of almost continuous reverses and failures. In hindsight, his address
was almost a parody of the British stiff upper lip style of exhortation:
I want first to introduce myself to you. You do not know me; I do not
know you. But we have to work together; therefore we must understand
each other and we must have confidence in each other. I have only been
here a few hours. But from what I have seen and heard since I arrived I
am prepared to say, here and now, that I have confidence in you. We
will then work together as a team; and together we will gain the
confidence of this great army and go forward to final victory in Africa. I
believe that one of the first duties of a commander is to create what I
call ‘atmosphere’; and in that atmosphere, his staff, subordinate
commanders and troops will live and work and fight. I do not like the
general atmosphere I find here. It is an atmosphere of doubt, of looking
back to select the next place to which to withdraw, of loss of confidence
in our ability to defeat Rommel, of desperate defence measures by
reserves in preparing positions in Cairo and the Delta. All that must
cease!
There was much more in the same vein. We know this because one of the
audience, presciently, took down the whole speech in shorthand. The contents do not
bear close analysis. The point is that this was one of the great galvanic pre-
engagement addresses, reminiscent of Agincourt, because it connected with the
collective unconscious of all those present. Montgomery ‘found’ the emotional pulse
of those present. This was two months before Alamein and it played a crucial and
necessary part in shifting perceptions quickly amongst the top seventy officers. On
this occasion, Montgomery attuned himself emotionally to his audience just as Hitler
did in addressing a mass rally. The purpose was different but it was the same
underlying phenomenon. The notable variable is consciousness on the part of the
speaker—is the skill mobilised consciously (that is, under control) or does it, as it
were, take over the speaker? Joachim Fest describes the mutual attunement of Hitler
and his audiences:
For a few moments he would linger before the platform, mechanically

shaking hands, mute, absent-minded, eyes flickering restively, but ready
like a medium to be imbued and carried aloft by the strength that was
already there, latent, in the shouting of the masses. The first words were
dropped mutely, gropingly, into the breathless silence; they were often
preceded by a pause that seemed to become utterly unbearable, while
the speaker collected himself. The beginning was monotonous, trivial,
usually lingering on the legend of his rise: ‘When in 1918 as a nameless
soldier at the front I ...’ This formal beginning prolonged the suspense
once more, into the very speech itself. But it also allowed him to sense
the mood and to adjust to it. A catcall might abruptly inspire him to take
a fighting tone until the first eagerly awaited applause surged up. For
that was what gave him contact, what intoxicated him, and ‘after about
fifteen minutes’, a contemporary observer commented, ‘there takes
place what can only be described in the Primitive old figure of speech:
The spirit enters into him’. With wild, explosive movements, driving his
metallically transformed voice mercilessly to its highest pitch, he would
hurl out the words. Quite often, in the furore of his conjuring, he would
cover his grimacing face with his clenched fists and close his eyes,
surrendering to the spasms of his transposed sexuality.
We have a come a fair way from the clipped homilies of Montgomery but, as
they say, different folks require different strokes. An analysis of Churchill’s great
radio broadcasts reveals that he touched the hearts of the British people through
poetry, not by quotation but by expressing himself with the elegance and grace of
poetic language. If your audience can’t see you, the language itself carries a greater
weight. This confers advantages and disadvantages. Poetry easily evokes the
‘motherland’—the beloved object to be defended against barbaric hordes. World
War II was a ternary war for the British—on matter how fierce the fighting, the
good object always provided the justification. As aggressors, the Germans’ war was
all binary —conquest was the aim, fuelled by paranoid fantasy; the classic
‘fight/flight’ position. But, effective as it is for celebrating the good object, poetic
language can so easily go over the top. Apparently a great many down-to-earth
Britons assumed, without offence, that Churchill must have been drunk during some
of these broadcasts: ‘Advance Britannia!— Long live the king!’ It didn’t matter.
Robert Menzies, no mean orator himself and always prone to the OTT speech, put it
well in referring to Churchill: ‘His real tyrant is the glittering phrase—so attractive
to his mind, but awkward facts have to give away!’
The point is that these three quite different orators—clipped and critical, insane
and transported, sentimental and poetic—found a pathway to the collective
emotional state of their audience. The ability to do that, even in the humblest
circumstances, is the best trick in the aspiring leader’s armoury. How is it done?
Bion’s ‘basic assumptions’
The great psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion (also a senior Army officer and main inventor
of the War Officer Selection Board group selection method) made use
Figure 21 ‘Basic assumptions’ in group life
of his wartime experiences with groups to unpick the primitive and unconscious
‘basic assumptions’ that take hold of groups. He argued that these basic assumptions
were ‘instantaneous, instinctive and inevitable’. Whatever rational work the group
was engaged in, there was always a parallel, emotional group life, just beneath the
surface (see Figure 21). He dubbed the principal basic assumptions Dependence,
Fight/Flight and Pairing. His observation was that leadership of the group always
hinged on the unconscious belief that it could depend on somebody or something, or
that it had to flee from or attack some enemy or threat, or that it would be delivered
from doubt by the union of two of its members, usually the ‘leader’ and somebody
else. Effective leadership therefore entailed mobilising the primitive basic
assumptions in the interests of the task. The basic assumptions are always present so
you can’t ignore them. If the leader needs emotional commitment to a course of
action (as well as intellectual understanding) then he or she must either align the task
work with the prevailing assumption, or tweak the assumption. If all this sounds
excessively psychological, think back to the last time a business meeting turned
really nasty. Amanda Sinclair’s descriptions (Chapter 12) of ritual public
humiliations captures the essence of basic assumptions bubbling up to the surface

uncontrollably, and in opposition to a calm task performance.
All other things being equal, the effective leader is the person with easy access to
this subterranean level of group process. The access is not necessarily conscious. In
many years of leader watching, I have seen some people intuitively play the basic
assumptions in order to get things done. My guess is that these ‘natural leaders’ are
always people with Gardner’s entire repertoire of ‘intelligences’ to call on. This
gives them the theatrical capacity to participate in the emotional life of the group,
whilst maintaining enough intellectual detachment to keep the work on track. For
those who lack this natural ability, all is not lost. In the discussion on Executive
Role Consultation (below) I describe how it can be developed.
Perhaps the most spectacular, and well-documented, example of male
‘groupthink’ was described by Irving Janis in relation to the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Here
was a situation where a highly intelligent group of men around President Kennedy,
every single one of them (as it turned out later) with deep misgivings about the
enterprise, blindly pressed forward to one of the most predictable and preventable
blunders of all time. No one could speak out; everybody else seemed to be
comfortable with the decision. Probably, the group seesawed between basic
assumption Fight (against the threatening Cubans), basic assumption Flight (in
relation to the fantasised Russian threat) and basic assumption Dependence (on the
credibility of the generals, or on the charisma of the President). All we can be
certain of is that rational task performance went out the window. This sort of thing is
not so uncommon; we have all failed to speak out at meetings out of fear or
confusion. The leader (male or female) who is comfortable with emotional process
has an enormous advantage here.
The emotional life of business schools
This leads to an awkward question about business schools and MBA type programs.
If it is true that effective leadership depends partly on the ability to tune into
emotional states, how do traditional programs tap into, or enhance, this ability. I
refer the reader to my book The Dynamics of Management Education. This
describes an attempt to understand how the psychological underpinnings of business

school programs can get in the way of useful learning outcomes. I carried out an in-
depth study of a long (twelve-week) executive program at the London Business
School—an institution sufficiently confident to open up its underlying processes to
scrutiny.
It quickly became evident that the input-conversion-output process was the
opposite of that which obtains in a hospital—another type of ‘people-processing’
institution. As a general rule, the hospital obliges you to bring in your guts (for
processing) but to hang up your brains at the entrance, like cowboys’ firearms at the
saloon door. Most patients are treated as if they had no brains at all. In the business
school the deal is: bring in your brains but hang up your guts at the front entrance.
The idea that management is also about emotional life is hardly recognised at all or,
worse still, is treated as a technique for manipulating behaviour.
The institutional processing of people (in business schools, hospitals, etc.) is
always tricky because the customers are made relatively helpless and anxious by the
risks entailed and by the processing itself. The suppliers (professors, surgeons, etc.)
can unconsciously ease their own anxieties by partialising the customers—that is,
by trying to deal only with the part that concerns them, and not with the whole
person. This is the human throughput equivalent of the bicycle-repair shop.
Hospitals, for example, have ways of making you feel neurotic if you take too keen
an interest in your own case. Business schools are sometimes made very nervous by
the outbreak of actual behaviour amongst their students, particularly if it involves
passion, skepticism or anger. They are much more comfortable with ‘behavioural
studies’.
I don’t need to remind the reader that none of the outstanding people described
in this book owe their success to formal business education. They are all ‘broad-
banders’ attached to useful, concrete outcomes and all of them convey their passion.
They never unlearned their natural, multiple intelligences and, had they ever gone to
business school, they might well have been made ill by the experience. I have tried
to imagine Sir William Hudson as a 35-year-old member of a long executive-
development program—and have failed. It follows that if I have a criticism of the
Karpin inquiry it lies in the task force’s touching faith in formal, academic subject-
based business school programs.
HELPFUL HINT NO. 3:

JAQUES’ CONTRIBUTIONS
Sometimes when the ‘Imos’ fail to break through with their good ideas it is a
function of conscious jealousy and deliberate political sabotage. John Latham
suffered from this, at the hands of people with no shame at all. More frequently, the
plight of the ‘Imo’ is the result of dumb incomprehension in high places, especially
when broad-band ‘Imos’ come up against narrow-band seniors (those with power,
position and very advanced technical skills in one field of another). In Chapter 6, on
the qualities of successful leaders, I drew a distinction between knowledge, skill,
motivation and personality quirks as disqualifiers for high rank. I suggested that the
most common cause of blunders was the shortage of ‘intellectual firepower’ in top
jobs. This means, simply, the capacity to cope with complexity.
In Figure 22 I present once again Elliott Jaques’ famous ‘strata’ of work
complexity. Those who have worked with this theory, including major Australian
organisations like CRA, Westpac Bank and the Electricity Trust of South Australia,
know that it accords closely with reality. Jaques (another of the Tavistock
luminaries) is asserting that there can be no more than around seven levels of
hierarchy, no matter how big the organisation. A substantial non-international
organisation of up to, say, a thousand employees ought to have no more than five
hierarchical levels from CEO to operative. This means that many big organisations
have been top-heavy in the past. If there are more levels than this, some of them
must be ‘pseudo-levels’ and the pseudo-role incumbents will be effectively bypassed
by other people, especially subordinates. The smart subordinate can always identify
the ‘real boss’.
The spate of ‘delayering’ we have seen in recent years is therefore justified,
provided that it has been carried out according to a consistent theory of
organisation—provided that it is the ‘pseudo-levels’ that disappear, and not real
flesh-and-blood connections which help to sustain the whole organisational ‘frog’.
Jaques doubts that this is always what has happened. Much of the downsizing has
been driven merely by cost-hunting. This has led to the illogical excision of
functions and roles. We are back to the concept of the frog again. If you propose to
remove anything from the body corporate, you need to know in advance the likely
impact on the totality. That means understanding how the bits connect and how they
are ordered.
VII Global corporate Sustaining long-term viability; defining values, (25–50)

prescience moulding contexts
VI (Group) corporate Reading international contexts to support/alert (15–20)
citizenship level V strategic business units
V Strategic intent Overview of organisational purpose in context (→ 10)
IV Strategic Inventing/modelling new futures; → 5)
development positioning the organisation
III Good practice Constructing, connecting and fine-tuning systems (→ 2/3)
II Service Supporting/serving level 1 and customers/clients (→ 1)
I Quality Hands-on skill
Figure 22 Levels of work authority, complexity and talent
The point about the strata is that they are linked in a stepwise fashion. The ‘good boss’ (all
other things being equal) is the one who can ‘context’ your work. This means that he or she
has the capacity to encompass a system bigger, wider and higher up than yours. If the boss
lacks that capacity, decisions will be slowed up and subordinates will be frustrated—or
maddened. There are few things more infuriating than being obliged to report to somebody
who cannot cope with the demands of the boss’s role. This is mainly what the ‘Imos’ moan
about in the pub after work. Jaques’ theory asserts that you can easily render an organisation
anorexic by taking out too many layers, thus leaving a vacuum in the chain of authority. This
happened to a number of organisations around the world in the financial services business.
Very significant Level II, III and IV lending decisions were being taken without the
coordination and supervision of Level V, which had been taken out to save cost. The global
Level VI work was usually still in place but unconnected. The result was very expensive, as a
raft of ill-conceived lending initiatives (taken by people not quite up to the job) came home to
roost. The diagram shows how the relationships between bosses and subordinates (the line of
accountability) are the atoms that make
up a successful, energetic organisation. A lot of the current management literature
is anti-hierarchy. Anybody who has ever felt powerless or crushed by bad parents, teachers or
bosses is likely to harbour an irrational hatred of hierarchy,
Tasking Judgement Trusting
Work
n ce
Re
e re
vie
oh
w
C
Tending
(a) The optimal tripod of work
Enforcing Frustration Distrust
Work
n
Pa
tio
ra
na
lys
ie
Al
is
Policing
(b) The rigid tripod of work
Handing over Guesswork Mistrust
Work
Ig
ie
no
om
ra
nc
An
e
Neglect
(c) The diffuse tripod of work
Figure 23 These three diagrams show how it feels when the hierarchical strata of
organisations shift from the optimum and get out of kilter. This can be caused either by poor
organisational design or by inadequacy in bosses—or both. In the OPTIMAL state, the boss
TASKS a subordinate clearly (not specifying what will be done but specifying outputs
required from that subsystem, along with time frames). He or she then TRUSTS the
subordinate to get on with it (this doesn’t work if the subordinate has been wished on the boss
without the latter’s, consent). But trusting is not enough-subordinates also need bosses to be
minimally watchful. TENDING means that the good boss appears at your shoulder just at the
moment you were beginning to wish he or she would. Effective and sensitive tending loops
back to intelligent retasking, and so it goes on. Balanced tasking, trusting and tending form
the kind of bossing that people pray for, It is partly a function of the layers in the structure. If
there are too many layers and/or the boss lacks confidence (capacity), the system goes RIGID.
If the company has overdone the ‘delayering’, it goes DIFFUSE. This handing over of
responsibility is often dressed up as ‘empowerment’. Really it is a form of casting
subordinates adrift.
as if human pecking orders were the source of all disharmony.

It is a bold theory, which irritates some people, because it asserts that the levels
are immutable–it makes no difference if the organisation in question is a
manufacturing firm, a solicitors’ practice, a government or a diocese. If you have
ascended to Level IV capacity, you will be able to take on strategic development
work of that complexity in any field for which your knowledge, skills and
motivation suit you. If I deal with my architect, or my accountant, I do not receive
the product or service directly from a Level I worker, as I do when I buy an object
made by factory workers, and sold to me by a shop assistant. I will deal with the
professional direct, and I would expect to notice quite quickly if he or she seems not
to be up to the job (i.e. unable to hack the complexity required). The professional
person will however be served by Level I/II/III staff within the practice. Why do the
levels of human capacity match the levels of organisational work complexity so
neatly? The answer, according to Jaques, is that organisations are merely and
necessarily reflections of human nature and human ability as it develops over time.
The one is a natural function of the other.
Talent vs age
Before I actually put forward Helpful Hint No. 3–be patient!–there is one more
important angle to the theory of work system stratification. The levels of work
complexity are stable. The capacities of people clearly are not. While it is true that
all people can be developed quickly to some extent with intensive instruction and
support, it is also true that some people develop preciously when it comes to
intellectual firepower. Even as I write, one of my clients (this is in the United
Kingdom) is ascending fast from Level IV to Level V capability. He is very young;
much too young in the eyes of his employers for any sort of conventional promotion
through the system. He has also put a few backs up because he habitually pokes his
nose into all sorts of organisational crannies (always important ones; that is why
they attract him). He is able to do this because his formal obligations (at Level III)
are met in about a third of the working week. He represents therefore a ‘problem’,
both for his immediate superiors (who can’t keep up with him and who think he is
‘arrogant’–he is not!) and for the human resources director. People like this are very
difficult to deploy in their twenties. They come into their own in their thirties and
they usually turn out not to have been arrogant at all–merely impatient.
Figure 24 shows the differential rate of the increase in capacity to exercise
judgement in complex or ambiguous situations. This is the normal pattern, all other
things being equal–but of course life does not always run so smoothly. Thousands of
managers from the former Soviet Union are now being exposed for the first time to
modern management development and ideas. Most of their growth curves have been
distorted by overmanagement and understimulation in the past. Those of lower
capacity merely resume the flat trajectory (see Figure 24). Those of high capacity
jump, almost overnight (given the chance to stretch themselves), to the high
trajectory they would probably have pursued had they worked in the West. Clearly,
some people ascend more quickly than others. These are the people who (none of
the other disqualifiers being present) need to be ‘fasttracked’ to the most senior
echelons of organisations. The array of growth curves looks pretty forbidding and
deterministic to most people. It should be said that it pertains to quite a narrow area
of capability. There is no suggestion that the work of high-flyers in this sense is
more important than the work of anybody else. We all have our special contribution
to make.
Figure 24 also reveals that the accumulation of wisdom does not cease at the
‘normal’ age of retirement. The kinds of people celebrated in these pages go on
getting smarter, and encompassing more, as they age, provided that their
physical/mental equipment holds out. If any country is serious about mining its
talent, this raises an interesting question. I am conscious of this because my own
father produced five new books after he passed the age of ninety. He was lucky that
writing is one of those trades unconstrained by physical barriers; you can do it from
anywhere. But there are substantial numbers of smart fifty-plus year-olds being
‘spilled’ from large organisations these days, with no obvious sluice for their energy
and ingenuity. This is where the not-for-profit sector comes in. In the United States
there are now more than 1.4 million not-for-profit organisations with total combined
assets of over $500 billion. This sector already contributes more than 6 per cent of
GNP, and growing, and is responsible for 10.5 per cent of total national
employment.
Any intelligently led (i.e. farsighted) government these days would be making a
direct investment in expanded job creation in the not-for-profit sector, as an
alternative to welfare for the increasing numbers of people who find themselves
locked out of the streamlined, downsized, high-tech global marketplace. The British
thinktank ‘Demos’ puts it succinctly:
Powerful vested interests are likely to resist the idea of providing a

social wage in return for community service. Yet, the alternative of
leaving the problem of long-term unemployment unattended could lead
to widespread social unrest, increased violence, and further
disintegration of society!
It is an attractive idea that high-capacity executives can be spilled into the not-
for-profit sector, in order to stay useful, when they get to be fifty or so-but what
about the relative youngsters back in the corporations? It is probably no coincidence
that we are seeing an explosion of concern about ‘stress’ in the workplace,
especially amongst senior executives. Some executive boards are nowadays dogged
by the ill-health of their members. They are working much too hard because they are
at full intellectual stretch–just coping with the complexity, if they are lucky. The
thing to remember is that these groups of (mostly) men are usually a good ten years
younger on average than their equivalents ten to fifteen years ago. An examination
VIII
Levels of work and capabilities

VI
IV
III
II
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Age
Figure 24 Array of growth curves

This chart refers to the development, overtime, of the mental aspect of
managing–the capacity to process complexity under situations of uncertainty
or ambiguity. Obviously there are other important factors. Given a good
following wind (unusual), the development of this capacity in individuals is
remarkably steady and predictable. It can be seen that some people are
relatively precocious in this respect. Smart primary school teachers can spot
exceptionally bright youngsters easily. Big organisations need to get these
people to the top (if they can keep them) relatively quickly–provided that
none of the main disqualifiers is present. But just as valuable, in a different
way, are those people in technical organisations who ascend slowly to Level
II supervisory work, carrying with them a huge wealth of knowhow, nous,
gut-feel, insight and so on. Such people are ‘natural leaders’ (at a key,
supervisory, level in the system) for those people who do the real work–at the
front line. These days, many older and wiser supervisors are stripped out to
save money, or to create ‘leaderless work groups’. This is usually a false
economy because they represent the last line of defence against the big
technical blunders which are always very expensive.
of Figure 24 reveals that some of these struggling executives might have been able
to cope, as their capacities expanded, a few years later–particularly their capacity for
‘judgement’. Unfortunately, they jumped at the chance to fill the shoes of some wise
old bird now (happily or not) understretched in the voluntary sector or on the golf
course.
Once you accept the notion that the nucleus at the core of any effective
organisation is sound judgement, then it follows that the way to design organisations
is to ensure that there is both space for judgement and active encouragement and
stimulation of individual decision-making. The organisation will work well if every
individual within it is at full stretch and is given exactly the right amount of elbow
room for exercising discretion that he or she can cope with (see Figure 25). That
means there must be a boss capable of gauging how much discretion is appropriate
for the job and for the person.
Career Path Appreciation
Career Path Appreciation (CPA) is the essence of Helpful Hint No. 3. It is a method,
originally designed by Gillian Stamp, based on Jaques’ theories about levels of work
complexity, for assessing/predicting individual capacity for the exercise of
discretion and judgement in situations of complexity and ambiguity. If you accept
that it is the intelligence of the leader that is most important of all, then you need a
way of judging judgement. If you are very lucky, you may have available one of
those gifted people who know about these things, and who never make mistakes in
the assessment of capacity and character. If not, you need a method.
In one of the CPA procedures, a fiendishly difficult symbol card exercise, the
individual is faced with an obscure logic in the form of an array of symbols of
different shapes and colours. The task is to try out, in a step-by-step sequence, the
different possibilities for determining the pattern or logic of the symbol cards,
explaining each successive strategy to the assessor. This part of the CPA is
essentially an exercise in continuous reframing (see Executive Role Consultation,
below).
Stamp has conducted twenty-year studies of correlations between these
assessments and the subsequent career trajectories of the individuals concerned. The
results are impressive, People who are outstandingly good at this sort of reframing
are always outstanding at the intellectual side of managing—sorting and crunching
the data and making serendipitous connections.
I have spent some time leading up to the CPA method (there are numerous
others of the same kind) because I want to stress, by so doing, the point that
business
A
SYSTEMATIC set of
RELATIONSHIPS between
INDIVIDUALS (and groups) which allows just the right amount of space for
the exercise of
DISCRETION in making
JUDGEMENTS
Figure 25 Sound organisation structure
failures are caused—mainly—by failures of judgement. The hot issue in ‘leadership

studies’ ought not to be personality, or charisma, or even ‘vision’—it ought to be
brainpower, or the ability to handle complexity under fire. This is so obvious to me,
as a student of worldwide cockups and blunders, that I have difficulty in seeing how
anybody could see things differently.
Remember that methods like CPA deal mainly with the cognitive aspect of
leadership. All the other potential disqualifiers (knowledge, skills, motivation and
quirks) still have to judged by intelligent people with good, proven, judgement. You
use CPA if you want to be sure that an individual can handle complexity, and to
check on the precocity—how quickly that ability will increase over the years. The
human resources director needs this kind of information for medium-term
succession planning and for protecting the best ‘Imos’ from envious attacks by their
peers. One Australian mining company chair man put it like this: ‘have to identify
and protect the radical!’
The space-time continuum revisited
In the preceding section, I have offered a seal of approval to two methods of
intervening in organisations, both of them based on the broad ‘socio-technical
systems’ idea. The first is the ‘work structuring’ method devised by Christian
Schumacher and the second is the ‘career path appreciation’ method, which grew out
of Elliott Jaques’ ‘stratified systems theory’. I suggested that the former superficially
resembles ‘BPR’ (business process re-engineering) because it is concerned
principally with time—getting work done in a quicker and more efficacious way by
structuring the work flow vs people relationship in a logical fashion. I also suggested
that stratified systems theory was mainly concerned with space—the spatial distance
between organisational roles, particularly up and down the hierarchy.
This makes a kind of sense but you could as well put it the other way round.
Work Structuring achieves its efficiencies by locating work groups at exactly the
right distance from each other and by clarifying the location of the boundaries
between them. To that extent, work structuring is as concerned with the spatial as
the temporal. Similarly, the assessments of capability which flow from career path
appreciations, and which get the spatial roles right, are based ultimately on Jacques’
famous theory of the ‘time-span of discretion’—a theory about the temporal
implications of the decision-making involved in managerial work. The chief
executive needs to be able to envision much longer time-frames than the front-line
team leader. The CPA gets at that crucial capacity.
The fact is that time and space interact at every point. Any intervention in an
organisation which fails to factor in both dimensions is likely to fail, because it will
distort reality. Most BPR exercises fail in the end because their focus is too short-
term—on immediate cost savings. Treating a complex system as if it were a bicycle
disabled by a minor short-term mechanical problem is liable to damage the ‘frog’—
but the damage probably won’t show for years. Or, the consultants sometimes ‘fix’
one part of the organisation, by ‘downsizing’ or even selling it, only to discover that
there were subterranean connections with the rest of the organisation, a bit too deep
for bright (but narrow) young consultants to discern. The result, once again, is a
weakening of the big ‘frog’. When the financial costs come home to roost, much
time will have passed. By that time a new generation of optimistic youngsters may
well be in charge, entirely without organisational memory. If they do not understand
the meaning of the past for the present, they are doomed, as the saying goes, to
repeat history. They will deal with ‘new’ financial difficulties as if they were novel,
rather than the detritus left over from the innocence of their predecessors.
Experienced, high-capacity executives find it relatively easy to understand how
the temporal and the spatial interact. Some major corporations, like Exxon, use
Work Structuring on a more or less continuous basis—worldwide. Others, like ICI,
use Career Path Appreciations worldwide. It is a virtuous circle. Corporations which
grow their people organically and systematically, like a good farmer nurtures his
crops, tend to end up with thoughtful, wise leaders at the top. They, in turn, buy in
intelligent modes of intervention which are likely to sustain the natural cycles of
renewal—in structures as well as people. It is a difficult matter to get the less canny
leaders of less canny organisations actually to understand the preceding three
paragraphs. It amounts to saying: If you get good (i.e. smart and sane) people and
you slot them into coherent structures and roles, things will go pretty well. As the
Americans say, it’s not exactly rocket science.
HELPFUL HINT NO. 4: REFRAMING THE EXECUTIVE

MIND
The Career Path Appreciation method flows from the theory of stratified system
levels. Its useful output for the human resources director is an assessment of the
current level of capability of the executive concerned and a prediction of the
probable rate of ascent through the higher levels in years to come. I want to
highlight now another method, called Executive Role Consultation, which is similar
in some ways but has a different purpose. The purpose is to help the CEO to be actor
and impresario at the same time—to manage with passion but to remain cool and
clear as well. The combination of passion and detachment is the ballmark of the
intelligent leader.
The Executive Role Consultation method is merely a formalisation of the natural
process that takes place when one person (armed with a good system overview)
helps another to ‘reframe’ his or her relationship with reality. Something of the kind
goes on whenever anybody helps a friend, a colleague, a subordinate, a patient or a
client to ‘see’ things differently. It is what ‘natural leaders’ do without knowing it. It
is what Noel Waite does for people stuck in an unhappy or unproductive place, in
order to help them to think their way out intelligently. Your best friend, after all, is
someone who can be cruel to be kind, because he or she knows your habitual
weaknesses. An important task for a role consultation is to explain the difference
between:
• the normative or formal role (the job description, for example)

• the experiential role (what the executive thinks he or she is up to)
• the phenomenal role (how everybody else sees it)
These three roles are always different, sometimes grossly so. This is important and
needs to be understood by the executive concerned.
Figure 26 Three versions of an executive’s role

This sets out the logic for the Executive Role Consultation method. It is
nearly always the case that the formal (or normative) role of an executive—
the job description, for example—differs from his or her view of reality (the
experiential role). This differential doesn’t usually concern Anglo-Saxon
executives-who tend to be keen on ‘freedom’—but it does worry German
managers, who think that if the reality has drifted away from the intention it
might be a good idea to update the job description. This makes sense. The
extraordinary truth is that the phenomenal role (the activity pattern that
everybody else observes) is nearly always wildly different from both the
normative and the experiential roles. If the executive concerned can get to
understand the meaning of his or her actual activity pattern, then there is a
good chance of exercising effective (because realistic) leadership. The so-
called ‘natural leaders’ are always naturally realistic—they don’t delude
themselves about the situation or about their own impact on the situation.
This is fairly rare—which is why role consultation needs to exist.
A failure to understand this simply exports confusion into the system because
everybody else has to cope with three different versions of the executive’s ‘role’ (see
Figure 26). An inexperienced or unsophisticated personal assistant, for example, can
confuse others by taking the executive’s formal role at face value. An adoring PA
can infuriate others by assuming that he or she is always right. The smart PA acts as
a kind of automatic transmission, meshing the external system to the executive’s
peculiarities and fantasies.
When I conduct a role consultation, for example with a CEO, it is generally
described as ‘mentoring’. I am not certain that that is technically the correct
Figure 27 Executive role consultation: coping with change and initiating change
term because the method is essentially cognitive. My client and I may have a
stimulating time in the course of eight to ten meetings of up to three hours each—
sometimes frustrating, sometimes hilarious—but the main focus is always on the
executive’s mindset: the way he or she ‘constructs’ the world. If a chief executive
has a limited mental ‘map’ of the relevant territory—or a distorted one—then the
entire organisation is certain to end up limited or distorted. Nothing is more
important than the contents of the chief executive’s head. An increasing number of
chief (and other) executives are now calling on this sort of assistance. The previous
generation of top managers might have seen the need for it as a weakness; the
younger generation was brought up understanding much more about psychology,
psychopathology, cybernetics and perception.
Figure 27 describes the process in cybernetic terms. I find that this form of
explanation sometimes helps engineers to understand what a role consultation might
be like, before the event. Otherwise, it sounds to them like therapy. The underlying
theory is that the human mind runs on ‘autopilot’ most of the time. Just as an
autonomic control system uses feedback loops to manage its task without constant
supervision, so the executive’s daily routine is generally programmed by
surrounding routines and events. In the donkey-engine example on the left of the
diagram, the source of energy enters the system as fuel. Combustion of the fuel
drives the cylinder which, in turn, exports the ‘work’ or the added value. The
flywheel senses the load, altering its aspect in line with demand on the system, and
sends messages to the governor accordingly. If the message ‘says’, ‘We’re
struggling here!’, the governor is programmed to inject more fuel, thus maintaining
the system in equilibrium. All control systems operate roughly like this—using
feedback in order to adjust operations, within prespecified tolerances.
Using this metaphor, we can see that executive energy enters the system via the
executive. ‘High octane’ executives simply bring in more physical energy. The
‘work’ of the executive is the actions taken, from which added value flows. The
individual takes cognisance of the effects of the action taken, via normal perception
(watching, evaluating, surmising)—this is the mental ‘flywheel’. The really
important element in the executive feedback loop is the governor—the
preprogrammed set of assumptions which save the individual from laboriously
delving into every detail. I call this the ‘role-idea’—a completely individual
assumption, belief, hunch, prejudice or ‘map’ about how the world is and what the
impact of actions taken is. We can infer the existence of a role-idea from the way we
behave but, other than that, we are mostly unaware of its existence.
The role-idea collects data from perception, according to habit. If it is inclined to
collect only good news, it will collect only good news. The result will be
complacency and increasing isolation. The role-idea also contains all the possible
excuses for inaction or failure because it tells you what can’t possibly be done. That
news may relieve you of the responsibility for going outside your designated turf or
for taking on a seriously frightening and risk-laden duty. If you enjoy certain kinds
of work—hey presto!—the role-idea will record lots of need for that work to be
done. If you dread certain work, the need for it may miss the role-idea completely.
All this is important for two main reasons:
• Chief executives are separated from reality by a raft of systems, routines and
flunkeys. They infrequently meet the ‘Imos’ lower down the organisation
who actually see at first hand the impact of top management decisions. They
are forced to rely, therefore, on a working assumption about their own role
in the system: where they might or should go to test reality; who they can
trust inside and outside the organisation; what the Board wants; and so on.
• The role-idea actually governs behaviour. It is ‘the governor’. The reason

why people do what they do (even if it makes no sense at all to others) is
that it makes sense to them—it is internally consistent with their mental map
of the territory (which includes the individual himself or herself—in role).
If it is the case that behaviour is governed by the role-idea, then it follows that
you cannot and will not alter behaviour unless you get at the role-idea, no matter
how many management training courses you may attend. Altering behaviour in an
intelligent direction is essentially the purpose of a role consultation. It will be clear
that we are not talking about formal role, as specified in a job description. We are
dealing with role in the theatrical sense as something that emerges from
circumstances in a distinctive and individual way. If the surrounding system
perceives you to be playing Iago, and deals with you accordingly, there is no point
in your protesting that you are really Othello. Your real ‘role’ is determined by the
perceptions of those surrounding you. This is why role consultation can be useful for
leadership development; it helps the executive client to adopt a dynamic role that
‘feels right’ to all the followers.
Most of the important work in a role consultation takes place between the
consultations, which are usually at two-week to four-week intervals. The first two or
three consultations lay out the map of the territory, as it is constructed in the
executive’s head. That map represents a mixture of solid data and the ‘spin’ that the
executive’s mindset imparts to data. As the meetings progress, the consultant is
formulating a series of hypotheses about what might be going on between the
system and the client. All these hypotheses are testable. If you arrive at a hunch, you
can always construct an experiment to test it. The testing is the job of the client
executive in the spaces between meetings. In a recent consultation my client and I
jointly devised a picture of the system which suggested that a much needed reform
of work practices (long resisted by everybody and attempted unsuccessfully in the
past) might be easily achieved in the present, unusual, circumstances of the system.
Although it seemed to me that the supporting evidence for this was laid out in front
of us (on a big piece of flip chart paper full of hieroglyphics, system models,
hunches and other creative/artistic effusions), my client ‘know’ that it was
impossible.
Testing the hypothesis was easy. He walked into two key offices and announced
the changes, the timetable for their completion, and the delegation of authority to
carry them out. To his astonishment, it happened—the system was ready! At our
next meeting, we went back to the hieroglyphics to revisit the system analysis. We
satisfied ourselves that, while he had much reinforced his reputation for bold and
incisive leadership, the truth was that it was easy to achieve because you could see
the system was ready to tip in that direction. In a sense, I had been consulting
directly to the system by way of the chief executive’s perceptions. He learned two
important lessons from this:
• at the basic level, he improved his ‘map’ of that particular territory at that
time
• at the ‘double-loop’ level, he acknowledged that he had the mental habit of
constructing particular kinds of unreliable maps, or fantasies
There is nothing like a good fantasy for distorting reality and turning followers
off. He learned that it would be wise in the future to guard against the arousal of the
same class of fantasy. In effect, what he had learned was that the ‘role-idea’ is
mostly unconscious. It is there, inside our heads and shaping our actions. We think
our actions are determined by ‘reality’ as we see it. The problem is that reality gets
filtered through the role-idea and, sometimes, distorted. Role Consultation drags the
role-idea, kicking and screaming, into consciousness.
No doubt I have failed to describe this process adequately. All of my past clients
say that the experience is indescribable. However, when it works, it works
spectacularly. To the outside world the outcome can look like a four to six month
personality transformation from tentative and cautious technocrat to bold, confident
and inspiring leader. The truth is that the executive client now simply has a better
cognitive map—this effectively renders him or her more intelligent, thus creating the
impression of bravery! If double-loop learning takes place, there should be no need
to repeat the process. In fact, role consultation clients frequently return for a ‘10 000
kilometre service’, as one put it, either to check that no cognitive bad habits have
crept back or to seek assistance in unpacking a particularly messy situation.
In describing the role consultation process I have used the technical language of
cognition, role and so on. The commonsense way of viewing this is in terms
of self-awareness. Role consultation may simply be more helpful than instructing:

‘Know thyself!’ Robert Keep (see earlier), was a riveting amateur actor because he
really understood the play. All the characters in this book have a heroic quality for
the same reason—self-awareness. Role consultation evidently improves awareness
of self and system, in action, in the situation.
The new fashion for one-to-one mentoring, counselling and so on
...
As faith in formal management education has dwindled, the use of one-to-one forms
of executive support has grown, and continues to grow. The explanation for this is
not difficult to determine.
1. At long last, it has dawned on corporate trainers and management developers
that external management or business school programs are often wasteful, in the
sense that their target is too broad for most of the students most of the time. Even the
best external programs provide space for academics to tyrannise students, at great
expense. This has been known for a long time but, lately, the money has got tighter.
2. More significantly, the ‘downsized’ organisation has created managerial
vacuums. A glance at Figure 22 above will show how the removal of a necessary
level may lead to a dangerous loss of control. In the modern ‘lean’ organisation a lot
of people are undermanaged. Their bosses are often away, usually on an aircraft,
and they themselves have been promoted to a particular level of seniority,
complexity and stress at a much younger age than would have been the case in years
past. They have more subordinates to manage (because the spans of control have
widened) and the subordinates themselves are younger and less experienced. Such a
boss is going to want and need a helping hand—if not from another boss, then from
a mentor or coach.
This is an interesting development. It is a necessary outcome of the super-lean
organisation but it means that loyalties have been altered irrevocably. The social
glue that held together organisations in the past had the parent-like relationship
between boss and subordinate as a reinforcing structure which tied together all the
peer groups. Now the trust that flows from personal understanding and continuity
lies with an outsider—a professional mentor, coach or counsellor. Some
organisations, recognising the limitations of the new managerial class, have opted
for internal greybeards (sometimes recent retirees) to provide that social glue, in
parallel with the managerial ‘line’. It is difficult to make it work because even the
detached greybeards tend to get drawn back into the organisational politics,
particularly when they wish to promote the career cause of their proteges. Never
forget that the lean organisation is usually a highly political organisation.
For these reasons, the one-to-one mentor/coach/counsellor is here to stay. The
form varies. In California, as you might expect, much of the one-to-one work comes
under the banner of ‘creativity’. In the severely downsized organisation, the one-to-
one supporter is often a ‘stress counsellor’ or, if not labelled as such, much the same
thing. In the trendiest organisations, the executive mentor is modelled on the great
sports coaches (like the golf guru David Leadbetter) and brandished about as a status
symbol. My own approach to ‘executive consultation’ (see above) is essentially
cognitive and attempts to enhance self-knowledge. It has much in common therefore
with the sports coach model, because most sports success is ‘in the mind’. Graham
Alexander, one of the leaders in the field, proposes that: PERFORMANCE=
POTENTIAL minus INTERFERENCE. I like that formulation. In the successful
role consultation, the consultant and client jointly identify the sources of
interference. Once identified, they can be managed or even eradicated.
What we have to face is that the emergence of all these one-to-one roles
indicates the presence of an organisational vacuum created by weak leadership and
dysfunctional structure. If the main ‘demotivators’ of managers in modern
organisations (according to Institute of Management research) are perceived
incompetence of higher management and organisational politics, then the calm,
experienced, detached, sympathetic and frankly uncompromising mentor is bound to
seem like an island of sanity in a sea of nonsense.
HELPFUL HINT NO. 5: THE

ASSESSMENT/DEVELOPMENT CENTRE MODEL
I suggested above that the capacity for judgement is at the heart of our endeavours to
fix problems and to plan for the future. Judgement is the key, whether you are
engaged in assessment or in development of people. Why not combine assessment
and development? If you put management trainees in classrooms and ‘teach’ them
curricula, you run the obvious risk of turning off those who combine the spatial and
interpersonal intelligences. As we have mooted, these may be the most capable
people of all. If you select by psychometrics, you run the risk of excluding those
with eccentric profiles. Again, if the examples in this book bear any weight, these
may be the most valuable ‘Imos’. We need a way, it seems, of putting people to
relevant tests of their capability—and that means, if you accept the argument, tests
of their capacity in real time to exercise judgement under conditions of uncertainty.
‘Action Learning’, the invention of Professor R. W. Revans, is the best known
method of achieving this objective.
It was with these issues in mind that my colleagues and I in the IBM Corporation
set about revamping our procedures for assessment, selection and promotion of all
kinds of staff. This was in the United Kingdom company. The model we devised
then has stood the test of time. It has been much copied, but not copied enough in
my humble opinion. When we began this exercise, we had already inherited an
‘assessment centre’ model from our American parent. Like most American products,
it was practical and sturdy, but without subtlety or style. It was, however, based on
fairly exhaustive research into the observed traits of already successful IBM
executives. The assessment centre design sought to replicate these success traits
throughout the corporation. The difficulty with this is obvious—what you were good
at formerly may not be what is required in a different future. This was at about the
point in history when John Latham was beginning to expose the fixity of the IBM
mindset.
In the United Kingdom company we had one or two advantages. One was that
some of us had first-hand knowledge of the selection boards used by British
organisations (including Unilever and the Civil Service), which were in direct line of
descent from the original WOSBs (War Office Selection Boards) set up to identify
leadership capacity in wartime. As a result of the WOSBs, the British Army had
gone from almost invariably getting it wrong in officer selection to hardly ever
making a mistake. The principal creator of the WOSBs was Wilfred Bion, who
poured his insights about group dynamics and emotional leadership into the design.
The American assessment centre movement grew from the same origins, but in
different intellectual soil. ‘Group dynamics’ in the United States became an
exploration of ‘interpersonal authenticity’ and power. The European descendant was

mainly about the exercise of leadership judgement and authority.
IBM United Kingdom had another advantage—the presence of two Australian
‘Imos’, near enough culturally to the Brits to merge into the surroundings but
different enough to see things in a tangential way, as from the proverbial
‘helicopter’. I, of course, was one of them. The other was my then assistant, Julia
Wansey. I wasn’t all that clever in those days but I was smart enough to know how
clever Wansey was. When she got a hunch, you gave her her head. Her great insight
was that there was some kind of pattern to be found in the voluminous IBM records
of all the selection and promotion exercises in the past. She also had the
perseverance to plough through the archives, piecing together the pattern. No one
had ever bothered before. The reader will see the parallel with Bob Clifford and
Robert Keep, worrying away incessantly at a hunch. Her great discovery, amongst
others, was that there were two branch sales managers in the system who had never,
apparently, made a mistake in appointments and promotions.
Furthermore, they had not achieved this remarkable record by caution—these
were the men who habitually pressed oddball salesperson candidates on to their
colleagues with assurances that they would garner ‘300 per cent of quota’, not just
the target 100 per cent. Their advice was always taken because they were always
right—they knew about these things. They were also very good at representing the
IBM Corporation to the aspirants, so that the newcomers always understood what
they were letting themselves in for, and settled in painlessly. These two branch
managers were otherwise nondescript characters—competently carrying out an
operational (but not strategic) job at Level III (see Figure 22). They were both
somewhat older than the average branch manager and had been in the post for some
years. They were settled and they clearly had a good contextual understanding of
their branch’s place in the wider scheme of things. This kind of stability probably
wouldn’t be allowed today.
Characteristically, I wasted a lot of time trying to find out why these two
managers were thus gifted, and what it was they were doing right. They certainly
didn’t know how they did it, although they did know that they were much better than
their colleagues in this respect. They were very grateful to us for making them
famous for it. Julia Wansey was the one who instructed me to stop wasting time with
research and to put the two of them to practical use. When we got our
assessment/development program (called PDP—Personal Development Program) up
and running, those two managers were routinely seeded into the six-person assessing
group. We spread their insight around by a sort of osmosis. Over the years, they
subtly acted upon the prejudices and confusions of their colleagues. The design that
we came up with I now put forward as a simple and practical way of grappling with
many of these important questions.
In designing an assessment centre model, we had to overcome certain
characteristic weaknesses of the traditional approach:
• We were determined to overcome the ‘cattle market’ dynamic which arises

when individual is pitted against individual in harsh competitive conditions.
Some of the American assessment centres actually declare a ‘winner’ at the
end of the week, which seemed to us counterproductive for eleven out of the
twelve candidates. Acknowledging that there has to be a realistic
competitive edge, we aimed to restore participants to a colleague
relationship before the end of the program, because much of their everyday
work demanded teamwork.
• However, we wanted each individual to have the benefit of confidential
individual feedback on their performance during the week, parallel to the
formal assessments.
• We were also determined that the group exercises, against which
assessments are made, should be ‘divergent’ as well as ‘convergent’, in
order to test ability to cope with ambiguity. Most of the American exercises
we inherited were zero-sum games with more or less ‘right’ answers. Life is
rarely like that. Our hunch was that IBM, as a world monopoly supplier of
data processing hardware, had become much too convergent in its thinking.
We had no business promoting more of the same.
• We also wanted everybody involved to use the opportunity to learn about
the current situation of the overall system and to submit it to an exercise in
collective ‘systems thinking’.
• We deliberately set out to make the assessment process and criteria as
transparent as possible. We saw this as part of the collective learning about
‘how we do things around here’ or, if you insist, the ‘organisation culture’.
After all, the main argument for assessment centres is that they make it
possible to compare like with like in a fair and neutral setting. The
unregarded ‘Imo’, tucked away in an obscure branch office, gets a chance.
The design that emerged spread over five days. The first three days were devoted
to the assessments, some individual, most groupbased, and all relatively open-ended.
The Thursday was then given over to a combination of individual feedback and day-
long group preparation for a ‘management interaction’ session on Friday morning.
Friday contained the ‘interaction’ and the rest of the feedback. The first three days
were for ‘binary’ competitiveness, but within suitably transparent ‘ternary’ game
rules. The concluding two days were all ‘ternary’, concerning the system as a whole.
The two most distinctive features of this design were:
• The long and detailed process of system research preceding each program.
The outcome of this work became the input to the group exercises. The
participants worked on real, current problems rather than on warmed-up
simulations of reality. The upside was the urgency and relevance of the
work done, some of which had valuable outcomes in the real world. In
effect, this was an Action Learning exercise. The obvious ‘downside’ was
the enormous amount of prework required by management development
staff to shape the materials for the exercises—though what else should
management developers do? It was here that our analytic and design skills
were stretched to the limit.
• The presence, throughout the Friday morning, of an openended group
dynamics event involving the entire top management group of the relevant
division of the company. This was modelled loosely on the Tavistock
Institute ‘Working Conference’ design.
On each program, the participants were presented with their top management, to
do with as they wished on the Friday morning. At the beginning, this was no less
terrifying for the top management than for the participants. As the series rolled
forward, both sides got the hang of it, building on the experience and reputations of
previous groups. The participants could make presentations, ask questions, or
do nothing if they chose. They could work collectively, or in subgroups, or as

individuals. They could create leadership and authority structures, or have a free-for-
all. They could all try to speak, or they could delegate responsibility. The content of
the event was up to them, at least until the top management team got going. All that
was fixed was that they were collectively responsible for the management of the
Friday morning event; the executive group, within reason, would do as it was told.
We had turned the tables.
As noted, the preparation for the event took place on the Thursday. We left them
to it but we offered them a consultancy service, on request. As they were
confronting a pretty difficult management assignment, they usually availed
themselves of that service. Although it wasn’t part of the formal assessment, the
real-time challenge of the looming top management interaction really sorted out
sheep from goats. Those who rose to the intellectual challenge, whilst maintaining a
good relationship with peers, were the natural leaders. Because, on the whole, we
got the assessment exercises right (challenging, relevant, teamwork-based) the
participants were just about ready to take on the Friday with a prospect of collective
‘success’—a well-managed meeting which achieved the participants’ stated
objectives for it. Figure 28 shows the differential roles of participants and program
staff.
This is a specific example of a particular program in a particular company, aimed
at bringing together the twin aims of development and differentiation in a seamless
whole. The details aren’t important. Plainly, there are elements of Action Learning
and action research, Schumacher’s work restructuring, Tavistock group dynamics,
Gardner’s multiple intelligences and so on buried in this complex design. The
principles and assumptions underpinning this initiative are still, in my opinion,
interesting. Those principles have been applied repeatedly in my work over the
years. One repeating theme is that it is always better to create a framework within
which people can learn about their systems (by systems thinking) than to try to
‘teach’ them things, especially ‘management techniques’. Whenever development is
approached in this way, there is always a massive assessment outfall—you find out,
quickly, who the natural ‘Imos’ are. They grasp the wider system properties quickly
and then oscillate freely between the foreground and background. If all development
were done this way, there wouldn’t need to be any formal assessment
Ongoing
operations
research
Ongoing
Participants as individual Open-ended complex careers
guinea pigs exercises promotion
research
Participants as team Consultancy

learners resources
Participants as Top management

managers as guinea pigs
Participants as ‘Mentoring’
individual counsellees resource
Progress Holistic
2nd-loop
on tricky assessment
participant
business for long-term
learning
problems capability
Figure 28 Assessment Centre model: respective roles of staff and participants
at all beyond the boss-subordinate process, with possibly a bit of 360 degree
feedback thrown in.
HELPFUL HINT NO. 6: MENTORING THE SME CHIEF

EXECUTIVE
All these helpful hints and ideas are aimed at bringing the advantages of natural
development, as experienced by the ‘natural leaders’ in this book, to the large
corporation. I direct the reader to Gifford Pinchot’s 1985 bestseller, Intrapreneuring,
and his 1993 book, The End of Bureaucracy and the Rise of the Intelligent
Organisation, for further enlightenment on this subject. There is a groundswell of
agreement that responsive organisations like Incat, Waite Consulting, Market
Reality and Puddings On The Ritz show the way forward—as the
big corporate behemoths shrink. It is a matter of importance, therefore, that new and
developing SMEs (small to medium enterprises) should be kept in play so far as
possible. They are the tender shoots of future growth. I believe that the Karpin Task
Force has it about right here, by focusing mainly on one-to-one mentoring for
owner/managers and on the creation of networks of mentors and entrepreneurs.
In 1992 I carried out a study of the entrepreneur-mentor relationship amongst
SMEs for the Department of Employment in the United Kingdom. This piece of
work parallels the observation (above) about people who always get it right.
It turned out that there was a smallish number of specialist consultants to SMEs
who had a disproportionate impact on the firms involved with them. The multiplier
effect of these interventions was remarkable. I studied one manufacturer of
laboratory automation equipment whose business had been transformed by a fairly
straightforward refocusing of objectives (involving all seventy employees) together
with a statistically based quality improvement program. The owner/proprietor was
basically an inventor, in partnership with an eminent surgeon. Between them they
covered the technology/ applications territory. Not only had this firm been
transformed but a cluster of upstream supplier firms, in metal bashing, wiring loom
supply, electronics and so on, had also been sharpened up by the impact of this
work. In this case alone I calculated that an expense of £35 000, half of it public
money, had resulted in millions of pounds worth of economic benefit to the local
microeconomy.
In this case, as in many of the success story cases, the mentor was a woman of a
certain age, consulting to a male owner about fifteen to twenty years her junior. This
was a common pattern. Even more striking was the acknowledged success of this
program in Scotland. I have remarked earlier how the Scots are superior to the
English in most respects, and this should be factored into the equation. But the
unusual feature here was that the government program was, by chance I think,
administered by women in Scotland. The effect seems to have been that the
matching of consultant/mentors to owner/managers was carried out with the same
elan as displayed by the best society hostesses. Elsewhere, where the matchmaking
was clumsier, the results were less impressive or, in quite a few cases,
embarrassingly negative. In the course of the study my colleagues and I brought
together a number of groups (six pairs at a time) of successful CEO/mentor pairs for
two or three days in order to study the psychodynamics of the relationship at close
hand. Not surprisingly, the psychometric patterns for CEOs and mentors were
different (for readers familiar with the Myers-Briggs Type Inventory: CEO = STJ;
Consultant = NFP). All the successful mentors were intuitively doing a form of ‘role
consultation’ (see earlier)—helping the chief executives to view themselves from
‘above’.
It seems to me that an outstanding woman of a certain age may well be better
equipped to lean on a male owner/manager in an uncompromising (‘tough but fair’)
way than another man is. For one thing, the female consultant usually seems to
strike up a friendly relationship with everybody in the firm, cutting through any
rigidities of hierarchy or turf wars. One female consultant had a confidential helpline
established (via a letterbox in the entry vestibule) for all the predominantly female
staff, without any sign of intrusion into the core CEO-mentoring role. People in the
client firm say things like: ‘She really cares! ‘; ‘She’s one of the family!’; It’s as if
she’s an employee! ‘
It may not be fanciful to suggest that there is a family dynamic, or a potential
one, in the small firm and that the absence of a strong female role model (or vice
versa) is disturbing for the socio-technical system. In other words, in the SME,
leadership has a special meaning, nearer to parenthood than to technocracy. If this
all sounds mushy, it was this particular female mentor who virtually forced the CEO
of the aforementioned firm to take the long overdue step of importing a hardedged
chairman to the firm. The female mentor seems to embody the ‘tough but fair’
ternary model of leadership, in partnership with the boss.
Of course, the mentor need not be a woman. I simply pass on this intelligence for
its possible relevance to the Australian case, where male owner/managers are also
the norm.
On the basis of the above study, I would summarise the requirements for the
SME consultant role as follows.
1. Conceptual (systemic) thinking capability The mentor/consultant must be at

least the equal of the CEO in capacity level (using the Jaques stratified system
scale). If the SME owner/manager is to manage strategic development effectively,
he must be possessed of at least Level IV capability. If he is stuck at Level III, his
consultant must be at least Level IV in order to lead him into the strategic
positioning arena. In that case, the consultant must be very sensitive, because the
owner is somewhat exposed as his staff will certainly know, or sense, his limitations.
The capability aspect, remember, has nothing to do with interpersonal skills or
specialised knowledge; just the ability to exercise judgement and to process
complexity.
2. A bias to attachment. The best of the SME consultants, in my experience, are
people who positively dislike big companies, mostly as a result of spending too
many years within them. Their enthusiasm for the SME sector is genuine and
unfeigned. They are prepared to work very long hours for often inadequate reward,
because of their close psychological attachment to the SME and its people. You
could say that these consultants need the attachment. It is this factor, in my opinion,
that leads to the admired and effective consultants always being described as having
‘integrity’.
I hope the Karpin Task Force recommendations lead to good outcomes amongst
Australian SMEs. Our evidence suggests that mentoring doesn’t work when the
capability/attachment equation is wrong, and when the mentor/CEO matching is
insensitive. By the way, we proved to our own and our sponsors’ satisfaction that the
United Kingdom Government program to support SMEs financially via consultants
was a great success. You needed only one in every ten projects to really take off to
show a ‘profit’ on the scheme. Once we proved it, the government dropped it. I
forget why, now; but I remember being unable to comprehend the muddled and
illiterate justification for the decision. Nothing like that could happen in Australia!
POSTSCRIPT
In the year or so since Intelligent Leadership was first published, the bike/frog and
binary/ternary metaphors seem to have had a particular impact among Australian
leaders in both the private and public sectors. The ideas behind them are not exactly
new or mindstretching, but it seems the time was ripe for simple metaphors to
explain some of the institutionalised craziness of modern management practice.
The impact of the metaphors went some way beyond the world of management
and administration. The 1998 Federal Election presented the voters of Australia with
a binary choice between two utterly binary political manifestos. The Government
offered the people a new tax and not much else. Taxation, because it always affects
relative advantage and disadvantage, is always a binary matter, unless new taxes are
clearly directed to ternary outcomes. We are good at money was the subliminal
message (and they are not).
The Labor opposition reverted to an historical binary position based implicitly on
class warfare. We are good at money too was the supertext but the real effort went
into winning back the blue-collar voters lost to the Coalition in 1996. It was not until
very late in the campaign did the opposition realise that the election was winnable at
all.
It was as if neither party had learned anything from the extraordinary dominance
of Tony Blair’s administration in Britain. Blair realised a long time ago that the
previous Government was bereft of a true political project—what, in other words,
were the Conservatives for in a harsh binary world in which the rich were getting
ludicrously richer and the poor dangerously poorer? It helped that the Government
had become progressively incept and corrupt, but Blair really captured the middle
ground by devising a project of ternary hope and inclusiveness.
It is a matter of interest that his day-to-day spiritual guru should be an Australian
Christian Socialist clergyman, Rev. Peter Thomson, who was in turn heavily
influenced by the Scots philospher John Macmurray. It was Macmurray who stated:
‘All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action and all meaningful action is for
the sake of friendship!’ You could hardly ask for a more Australian sentiment, or a
more ternary one, at the dawn of a new millennium.
What Blair and his colleagues succeeded in doing was to transform the 1997
British General Election from the usual binary standoff into an opportunity for
ternary optimism and decency. Historically speaking, not every election can be
ternary in nature. The 1998 Australian election wanted to be a ternary one (because
that’s what most of the people yearned for) but neither of the main Parties
understood this. This meant that whichever Party got to win would do so luckily,
rather than as a result of intelligent leadership.
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Index
ABB, 30–2, 33, 196 selection & promotion, 80; tyranny,
abstraction, 43, 123, 185–6 78, 241–3; US business, 95, 185,
academic success, 42, 48, 88, 273 191; see also ternary mindset
accountability, 71, 263–4, 267, 275 Bion, Wilfred, 2, 129, 270–2, 292
accountancy, 60, 82, 89, 106, 108 birth order, 26–8
acting, 107, 148, 187, 223, 227, 230, 284, blunders, see cockups & blunders
288, 290, 302 bodily/kinaesthetic intelligence: 41, 43–4,
action learning, 292, 295–6 85, 103, 161–2, 230; case studies,
admirable people, 235–6 44, 133, 155, 162, 181, 223, 227,
Adorno, T.W., 119, 121 237, 247
adversarial approach, 215 boundaryless organisation, 96
age, 29, 66, 74–5, 207, 277, 278–81, 291, boys: authoritarian personality, 120–1;
298; see also juniors physics assumptions, 23–4; see also
aggression, 200–3, 208–9, 213, 217, 301 parenting
airline pilots, 104–6 Bradfield College, 170–5, 177–81
Alexander, Graham, 291 Bradman, Sir Donald, 44
ambition, 114–15, 121, 130, 217, 241–3 brain, 40, 160, 162, 172, 202, 248
Anglo-Saxon mindset, 44, 115, 183, 285 brainpower, see intellectual firepower
ANZ Bank, 138, 224 British Airways, 103
Ardrey, Robert, 23, 35 British Rail, 53, 55–8
arrogance, 2, 129, 209, 278 broad-band capability, see multiple
arts: 43, 45, 87, 93, 166, 177, 301; intelligences
entrepreneurs and, 50, 68–9, 211, Bronowski, Jacob, 34, 43, 46, 139, 148,
227, 228–34, 238–9, 242 154, 160, 172
Asian business, 10, 44, 81, 115–17; see Brown, Lord Wilfred, 122–3
also Japan; Singapore bureaucracy, 30–4, 59, 82, 182–3, 189,
assessment centre model, 291–7 193, 205, 257
assessment of leadership ability, see Burns, James McGregor, 24
selection & promotion business practices, see methods of
athletes, 44–5, 161–2, 211, 220, 223, operation
230–3, 249, 291 business process re-engineering (BPR),
Australian Institute of Management, 218, 28, 59, 162, 259–61, 263–4, 266–7,
226 282–3
authoritarian personality, 109, 118–21 business schools: 14, 50, 55–6, 75, 240,
authority: 4–12; families, 27; horizontal, 290; emotional life, 272–3
96; judgement, 48, 110; kowtowing career development consultants, 219, 222,
to, 118, 121; structures, 123, 126–7, 225–6, 228
267, 275; subversion, 68; trust, 14, Career Path Appreciation (CPA), 123,
16, 113, 276–7 234, 239, 281–2, 283–4
balance, 41, 69, 83, 277 careerism, 31–4, 74, 85, 109, 182, 187,
Baldwin, Stanley, 130 208, 243
bank managers, 138, 224 Carlsmith, Lyn, 198–9
Bank of California, 193–5 Catholic education system (Australia),
Barings Bank, 4, 118, 147, 216, 240, 267 175–9
Barwick, Sir Garfield, 107 Ceaucescu, Nicolae, 241, 243
Bateson, Gregory, 5, 10, 33–4, 254, 256 chairmen, 3, 36, 80, 103, 106, 110, 299
Bay of Pigs fiasco, 268, 272 Challenger Space Shuttle catastrophe,
Beckhard, Dick, 110–11 267–8
Bennis, Warren, 95 Chamberlain, Neville, 130
BHP, 77, 110 Champy, James, 260, 264
bicycles, see frog & bicycle metaphor change, 35, 247, 256–9, 260–1, 286
‘big game’ motives, see whole picture character weaknesses, see damaged
binary mindset: 4–13, 24, 30, 52, 54, personality
129–30; actors, 148; adversarial charisma, 15, 25, 36, 100, 133, 165, 184,
approach; 215; collaboration with 245, 282
ternary, 81, 83, 255, 295; damaged chemistry, 23–4, 52
personalities, 109, 112–13, 115–16, chess, 238
120, 261; distrust, 82, 194–5; chief executives (CEOs): role
fight/flight; 6, 112, 270–2; goals, consultation, 284–91; small
236; hostile takeovers, 203; business, 297–300
industrial relations, 122–3; internal children, see young people
competition, 39, 185; lawyers, 82, Choppen, Sir Edward, 75–6
107; male upbringing, 202; mentors, Churchill, Winston, 30, 92, 244, 270
231; method, 232; motivation, 263; Clifford, Bob: 67, 132–45, 157; direct
politicians, 25–6, 30, 126, 128, 248; leadership, 68, 147, 155, 178, 215;
methods, 43, 153–4, 175, 182–6, cost-cutting, 53, 274, 283

237–8, 293; parallels with craft, 43, 69, 137, 144–5, 223, 227, 229–
O’Shaughnessy, 222–4 30, 232–4
Clinton, Bill, ix, 12–13 creativity: Australia, 248, 300–2; case
clowns, 202, 220 studies, 168, 173–4, 177, 179, 181,
coaching, see mentors 238; counselling, 291; male/female
coal mining, 258–60 synergy, 207; partners, 242; process,
cockups & blunders: bikes & frogs, 59– 50, 133, 136, 165–6
60; downsized organisations, 240; criminal psychopathology, 109, 200
female executives, 26, 206; IBM, 29, crisis of leadership, 1–2, 71, 186
189, 191–2; Imos foresee, 29, 66, crystallising experiences, 135, 137–8,
149–51, 268; intellectual firepower, 143, 212
ix, 2, 78, 101, 108, 124, 267–8, 281– cultural differences, see corporate culture;
2; performance measures, 240; national character
psychological damage, 112, 114, curiosity, 47, 134, 140, 153–4, 156, 268
118, 124; selection & promotion, currency market behaviour, 151–6
160; systemic stupidity & male customers, 53, 59, 85, 115, 139–40, 193–
groupthink, 28, 39, 41, 216, 267–8, 5, 213, 243, 262
272; see also stupidity damaged personality: 60–1, 101, 108–21,
collaboration: 10, 28, 53, 81, 88, 96, 117, 124, 128–30, 241–4, 261; see also
213, 239; public/private sector, 73– authoritarian personality; sanity;
4, 81–4, 88, 255 tyrants
Coman, Allan: 68, 170–81; broad-band Darwinian survival, 4, 11, 81, 109, 191,
intelligence, 40, 160, 206; 260
eccentricity, 182–3; educational data analysis, 48–50, 105–6, 121, 172,
leadership, 88, 98, 102, 158–9, 219, 190, 194, 281
222–3, 233, 238, 302; staff, 192; de Bono, Edward, ix
ternary focus, 187–8; theatricality, decision-making, 48–50, 78, 105, 114,
56; ‘thinkering’, 185 259, 281; see also timeliness of
commando groups, 93, 193, 268 decision-making
commitment, 125, 129, 265 defining moments, 135, 137–8, 143, 212
communication, 206, 215 de-layering, 126–7, 263, 274–7, 290
competition: 3, 10, 48, 57–8, 81–2, 128, delegation, 74, 162
139, 255; IBM, 189, 191–2; internal, delivery process, see methods of
39–40, 185, 187, 191 operation
competitiveness, 10, 53, 57, 202, 208–9, Deming, W. Edwards, 55–6
213, 226, 232; international, 215–16 democracy, viii-ix, 1, 5–7, 12–13, 26–7,
complexity: 15, 17, 26, 30, 60, 130, 267; 71, 99, 122–3, 126, 128; see also
keeping it simple, 184–5; Snowy participation
Mountains Scheme, 72, 86, 88–9, departments, 96, 184
93; see also judgement; work dependence, 112–13, 271
complexity levels design, see creativity
component level of operation, 53–4, 57, destinations, 7, 21–4
62 diffusion of innovation, 35–8
composition (music), 50, 161, 238–9 direct leadership, 25, 66–7, 71, 74, 92–3,
computer industry, 60, 133–4; see also 99, 132, 144, 180
IBM Corporation directors’ duties, 216–17
conceptual skills, 92–3, 237, 299–300; disadvantaged, see underprivileged
see also systems thinking disaffected groups, 29–30, 71
confidence in leaders, 1–2, 71, 186 disciplines, 47, 85–6, 103, 179–80
connections: making, 237–41; case discretion, time-span of, 48–50
studies, 34, 37, 43, 139, 146, 172, disqualifiers for leadership roles, 101,
237–8; see also creativity; 108, 114, 130–1, 274, 282; see also
imagination damaged personality; intellectual
connections in systems, 57–8, 61, 87, 283 firepower
consensual approach, 6, 99 divergent thinking, 172–3, 294
conspiracy theories, 57–61, 124 divisions, 96, 184
constitutional framework, 6, 10, 122 divorce, 224
consultants, see management consultants Dixon, Norman T., 114, 149, 151
consumers, see customers dogmatism, 200, 203–4, 206, 208–9, 254
content, 93, 164, 223 downsizing, 34, 56, 115, 236, 240, 257,
context, 22–4 259–60, 274, 283, 290
contingency theory, 24 Druker, Peter, 97, 99, 132
contracts, 56, 59, 75, 77, 82–4, 221–2 dunces, 67, 133–5, 142, 145, 158–9, 161,
control systems, 245, 286–7 170, 223
convergent thinkers, 172, 294 eccentricity, see maverick intelligence
Cooperative Research Centres (CRCs), economic activity, 10, 55, 145, 255–6
29, 248 economic theory, 26, 116–17, 128, 247
corporate culture, 109–11, 182–7, 264, education: art, 227; Australia, ix, 67–8,
294 85–8, 144–5, 147–8, 163, 187–8;
Index 309
boys, 24; female entrepreneurs, 219– Faldo, Nick, 230–1, 247

20, 226–7; formal, 159; gender families, see parenting; sibling leadership
differences, 199, 206; intelligence fat cats, see salaries & rewards
and, vii, 15, 40–2, 44–7, 137, 154, fathers, see parenting
161–2, 233, 238, 240, 248, 257; feelings, see emotional intelligence;
leadership of, 158, 236; UK, 147–8, intuition
163–6, 174; US, 3, 98–9, 160, 254; feminism, 200, 213
see also Coman, Allan fight/flight, 6, 112, 270–2
effectiveness, 41–2, 50, 159, 174 financial measures, 110, 154–5, 193, 210,
efficiency, 3, 11, 258–9 216, 245
Einstein, Albert, 27, 47, 92, 154 financial scams, 4, 168
electricity supply, 71–3, 75, 77, 82, 86, firm but fair, see under fairness
89–91, 274 Follett, Mary Parker: 67, 92–9, 102, 129,
emotional intelligence, 41–2, 97, 240, 157, 186, 197, 206, 215, 237;
302 indirect leadership, 67, 71, 92–3, 99,
emotional leadership: 22, 268–73, 292; 144; neglect of, 67, 93–4, 99, 206,
business schools, 272–3 211, 245
emotional revolutions, 27 followers, 1, 16, 21–3, 25, 95, 100, 147,
empathy, see interpersonal awareness 211
employees: Asian business, 115; Frank, Robert, 3
corporate culture, 4–6, 99, 184, 187, freedom, 128, 285
213, 217; Herman Miller, 31–2; frog & bicycle metaphor: 29, 51–62, 124–
Incat, 133–4; involvement, 97; 6, 216, 256, 260; Australia, 254–5;
privatised utilities, 90; rights, 5; case studies, 84, 86–7, 94, 98, 133,
Snowy Mountains Scheme, 73–4, 136, 147, 165; change, 257–8;
83–4, 86–7; supervision, 240; views computing, 192; economics, 247;
of leaders, 130; see also downsizing; financial analysts, 82, 89–91, 154–5;
juniors; salaries & rewards; training modes of thought, 237; politicians,
& development 128–9; see also systems thinking;
employment systems, 98, 102, 115, 179, whole picture
212, 216, 221–2, 265–6, 277 Fukuyama, Francis, 81
empowerment, 259, 265–6, 277 Gardner, Howard: definition of
energy, 74–5, 81–2, 130, 157, 177 intelligence, 158, 160; on
engineers: 29, 106, 228; Scots, 5–6, 122; crystallising experience, 85, 135–6;
Snowy Mountains Scheme, 75, 77, on direct/indirect leadership, 25, 71,
80, 84, 86, 88–9, 99, 102 92; 147; on storytelling, 187; on
entertainment industry, 173–4 upbringing, 97, 154; scientific
enthusiasm, 29, 75, 80, 154 research, 40, 248; see also multiple
entrepreneurs: arts and, 50, 68–9, 211, intelligences
227, 228–34, 238–9, 242; assistance Garratt, Bob, 217
to, 253, 255, 297–300; case studies, genetic inheritance, 101, 200, 204–5,
44, 49–50, 67–9, 136–45, 178, 210– 257–8
13, 219, 222–8; networks of, 29, 94, genius, 49–50, 68, 85, 152
255, 298; systems thinking & Germany, 5–6, 10–11, 122–3, 174, 190,
Judgement, 48–9, 184, 244; 285; see also Nazism
upbringing & observation, 201, 223, Gerstner, Louis, 193
227; see also intrapreneurs Ghoshal, Sumantra, 236
environment (context), 22–4 Gilmour, Sir Ian, 247–8
Establishment, 29, 99, 245 girls: authoritarian personality, 121;
ethics, 2–3, 60–2, 111, 125, 128–9, 236, chemistry assumptions, 23–4; see
243–4 also parenting
Europe, 10–11, 30–1, 93, 207, 209, 214, Glacier Metal Co, 122–3
247–8, 293; see also Germany; glass ceiling, 40, 203–4, 217, 226, 243
Italian economy Golding, William, 87–8
Executive Role Consultation, 234, 239, Goleman, Daniel, 41–2, 44, 240
272, 281, 284–91, 299 golf, 203–4, 206, 208–9, 215, 230–2, 291
executive support, see mentors government ministers, 59, 62, 76–7, 79–
executives, 31, 37, 48, 59, 74, 109, 111, 80, 107, 130, 180, 186; see also
182–96 Lemmon, Nelson
expectancy (pairing), 271 government relations with business, 10,
experts, see knowledge 138–9, 143, 145, 253, 279, 298–301;
external logic, see whole picture collaboration with private sector,
Faber, Marc, 152 73–4, 81–4, 88, 255
failure of leadership: 107, 129, 216, 281– Greer, Germaine, 199–200
2; see also cockups & blunders; groups: as building blocks, 262; basic
damaged personality assumptions, 270–2;
Fairclough, Sir John, 191–2 psychodynamics, viii, 129, 166,
Fairness: 27–8, 31, 41, 161, 217; tough 201–8, 272, 292–3, 295–6, 299; see
but fair, 7, 10–11, 78, 171, 176, 275, also peer-groups; work groups
299 groupthink, 28, 160, 208, 272
growth: 56–7; organisational, 32–4, 110, studies, 67, 71, 92–3, 99, 144, 147,
214, 224 155, 180–1, 211
gun reduction, 254–5 inductive reasoning, 198
gut-feelings, see intuition industrial relations, 5, 26, 122–3
Hampden-Turner, Charles, 44, 116, 214 information technology, 173, 214
Handy, Charles, x, 17, 85, 236 ingenuity: 27–30, 139; case studies, 35,
Hanson, Pauline, 120 38, 66, 68, 158–9, 163, 166, 169,
harmony, 116 193, 195, 211, 300
Harvey-Jones, Sir John, 110 innovation: 132, 134, 140–2, 156, 193,
Haynes, Warren, 109 236, 248; diffusion, 35–8
health service management, 7–8, 55, 266, instincts, see intuition
273 integration, 96, 124, 255, 259, 302
healthy companies, 210, 216 integrity, 31, 208
helping, see mentors Intel, 116, 191
Hemery, David, 231–2 intellectual capabilities, see multiple
Herman Miller, 4, 31–2, 196 intelligences
heroes, 25, 233, 236, 238, 242, 290 intellectual firepower: 2, 47, 50, 78, 100,
Hewlett-Packard, 31, 196, 233 108, 121–9, 130, 209, 274, 278;
hierarchical structures, 35–8; see also sanity and, 236–44; see also
work complexity levels curiosity; work complexity levels
higher-order ideas, see ternary mindset intellectual leadership, see indirect
Hitler, Adolf, 22–3, 61, 190, 241, 269–70 leadership
holistic thinking, see whole picture intelligence: definitions, 39–50, 159–62;
Holmes á Court, Janet, 244–6, 249 see also emotional intelligence; IQ
horizontal authority, 96 tests; maverick intelligence; multiple
hospitals, 7–8, 55, 266, 273 intelligences; narrow intelligence;
hostile takeovers, 12, 110, 183–4, 202–4, practical intelligence
213–14, 216, 219 interconnections of systems, 57–8, 61,
Howard, John, 128 86–7, 283
Hudson, Liam, 162, 172–3, 224 internal competition, 39–40, 185, 187,
Hudson, Sir William: viii, 65–6, 70–88, 191
157, 245, 265; direct leadership, 66– international enterprises, 30, 133, 135,
7, 71, 74, 92–3, 99, 132, 144; 141–3, 215–16, 226
Lemmon as mentor, 66, 74, 76–81, international networks, 29, 133, 192
122; role model, 70–1, 88, 92; interpersonal awareness: 41, 43, 161, 240;
upbringing & experience, 97, 102, binary mindset, 4, 12, 25, 112, 242;
233, 273 case studies, 133–4, 156, 165–6,
Hughes, Robert, 3 206, 237, 247; developing people,
human error, 105 292–3, 300; gender differences, 197,
human relations school, 95, 97, 99 205, 211, 222, 243–4; politicians,
human relationships, see interpersonal 126; see also emotional intelligence;
awareness persuasiveness
human resources directors, 278, 282, 284 intrapersonal self-knowledge, 41–3, 45,
hunches, see intuition 161–2, 187, 223, 239, 247, 290–1;
hydro-electric generation, 71–3, 75, 84, see also emotional intelligence
86 intrapreneurs, 68, 183, 185, 189, 191,
IBM Corporation: blunders, 28–9, 68, 193, 195, 266
189–93, 212; Latham’s career, 183, intuition: 36, 48–50, 105–6, 110, 112,
188–93, 195–6, 268; staff 128, 136, 293; assessing people,
development, 292–7; Tomorrow’s 124, 160; in research, 198;
Company project, 214–15 instinctive behaviour, 205; pattern
ICI, 109–11, 233, 283 recognition, 150, 154–5
ideal, see purpose inventiveness, see innovation
ideas, 40, 46, 67, 71, 92, 94, 142, 147, IQ tests, vii, 41, 136, 159–61, 172, 258
175–6, 181 Irish people, 4, 48–9, 247
identity, 31, 164, 208 isolation, 175, 248
imagination, 139, 156–7, 172–3, 191 Italian economy, 10, 56–7, 255
immigration, 4, 74, 76–7, 84, 86, 176, jail, see prisoners
220, 248 James, Clive, 197, 202
Imo, 34–8 Jamie, 68, 158–9, 163, 166–70
Imos in organisations: awareness of Janis, Irving, 272
opportunities & dangers, 39–40, 66, Japan, 4, 35, 75, 77, 99, 114, 183–4, 214
125, 194, 261, 268; case studies, 68, Jaques, Elliott, viii, 50–1, 96, 122–5, 127,
94, 123, 149–50, 155, 170, 180, 189, 228, 274–7, 281–3, 299
195–7, 211, 237, 274; identifying & Joey, 163–6, 173
developing, 195–6, 228, 253, 259, Johnson, Lyndon B., 24–5
282, 292–3, 295–6; in politics, 254; Joss, Robert, 203, 208
motivation, 263; neglect of, 106, judgement: assessing people, 56, 79–80,
211, 233, 274–5, 287 110, 291; broad-band intelligence,
indirect leadership, 25, 92–3; case 40, 130; definition, 15, 48;
Index 311
development, 280–2, 293; Hudson, Machiavellian attitudes, 30, 254, 260

65, 78–80, 83, 86–7; lawyers, 107; McHugh, Siobhan, 77–8, 80
mentors, 66, 300; short & long-term, madness, see damaged personality
39, 124, 267; systems thinking and, Major, John, 7, 126–8, 208
48–50; see also timeliness of male-dominated systems: Australian
decision-making; work complexity culture, 109–11, 203, 207, 213–19,
levels 245; ‘dumbing’, 268; resistance to
judges, 107 female ideas, 35–7, 41–2, 52, 94, 97,
juniors, 29, 35–7, 39–40, 68; see also 99, 200, 206–7, 211; see also
Imos in organisations groupthink
Karpin Task Force, 253, 273, 298, 300 management consultants: 3, 36, 102;
Keating, Paul, 7, 126, 128, 143 bicycle treatment, 54, 59–60, 254,
Keep, Robert: 67, 146–56, 157–8; broad- 283; change-merchants, 260–1;
band intelligence, 68, 167, 206, 223, former staff, 219; mentoring &
290; isolation & connection, 141, management development, 24, 110–
175, 178, 182–5, 245; knowledge, 11, 253, 296–300; see also career
102; method, 159, 172, 185, 229; development consultants; mentors
pattern recognition, 67, 190, 198, management culture, 109–11, 182–7, 264,
237; perseverance, 187, 248, 293 294
Keith, 111–14, 117 management development, see training &
Kennedy, John F., 272 development
Khrushchev, Nikita, 95 management schools, see business
kinaesthetic intelligence, see schools
bodily/kinaesthetic intelligence management theories, 5, 17, 24, 53, 69,
knowledge: 101, 102–3, 108, 124, 130, 94, 176, 275, 296
181, 185, 300; see also learnability Mant, Alistair: books, 4–5, 8–9, 272–3;
Kohlberg, Lawrence, 125 experience, 84–8, 149, 293
language, see linguistic capabilities Mant, Catherine, 124–5, 129
Latham, John, 28–9, 68, 183, 185, 188– manufacturing, 5, 26, 30–2, 58–9, 67,
93, 195–6, 206, 268, 274, 292 140–1, 184–5, 213, 222, 266, 298
lawyers, 57, 81–2, 88, 107, 129, 191 market intelligence, 188, 190–2
Leadbetter, David, 231 marketing: 115, 212, 226, 237;
leaderless workgroups, 263–5 positioning, 50, 135, 142–4, 187
leadership: definition, 16, 21, 22–8, 144, markets: 3, 10–11, 29, 48, 128–9;
244; elements of, 129–31; see also behaviour, 151–6
confidence in leaders; disqualifiers Marshall, Colin, 103–4
for leadership roles Marshall, Lisa, 109
Leadership Consortium, 14 marshmallow test, 42–3
learnability, 101–3 mass psychology, 23, 42, 268–70; see
learning: binary mindset, 129; female also groupthink
executives, 208, 219; Imo, 35; new mathematical capabilities, see
appointees, 102; outcomes, 169, logical/mathematical capabilities
273; process, 68, 84, 86, 102, 188, maturity, see age
265 maverick intelligence: 14, 26, 28, 31,
Leboyer births, 257–8 110, 253, 257, 292–3; case studies,
Leeson, Nick, see Barings Bank 28, 68, 131, 146–52, 156, 174, 182,
Lemmon, Nelson, 66, 76–81, 122 192–3, 195
leprechauns, 48–9 Mayo, Elton, 95
levels of work complexity, see work meaning, 258, 265–6
complexity levels measurement, 54–7, 215, 240, 265; see
likenesses, see connections also financial measurement
linguistic capabilities: 40–1, 43, 45, 85, meetings, see groups
160–1, 300; case studies, 163, 165– men: characteristic intellectual strengths,
6, 176–7, 211, 227; politicians, 127– 41, 198–9; characteristic leadership
8, 270; upbringing, 198, 205 style, 197, 199, 200–2, 208; see also
logical/mathematical capabilities: 40–1, boys; glass ceiling; male-dominated
43–5, 85, 160–2, 238, 240; case systems
studies, 49, 136, 166, 223, 227, 237, mentors: case studies: 66, 74, 76–81, 122,
247; occupational psychopathology, 185, 191, 193, 195, 207, 210–13,
105–6; parenting, 198–9; see also 219, 222, 224, 284; current fashion,
science 234, 285–6, 290–1; females, 207–8,
Lomax, Rachel, 247–8 244; ICI, 110–11; small & medium
London Business School, 215, 273 enterprise, 297–300; sportspeople,
long-term view, see whole picture 231–2; see also Executive Role
loyalty, 28 Consultation; training &
Macbeth syndrome, 242–3 development
McCartney, Paul, 239 Menzies, R. G., 80, 270
McCrae, Georgiana, 211 metacognition, see intrapersonal self-
McGough, Roger, 1, 30 knowledge
McGregor, Douglas, 99 metaphors, 16, 52, 154, 217
methods of operation, 228–34 occupational psychopathology, 104–7

Microsoft, 191 O’Donohue, Wally, 228
Milgram, Stanley, 119–20 open-system theory, 45
military officers, 149–51, 189–90; see operational intelligence, see practical
also spies; war intelligence
Milligan, Spike, 55–6 operations research, 259, 297
Milosevic, Slobodan & Mira, 241–3 Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 25
mindsets, see Anglo-Saxon mindset; opportunities missed, 39–40, 125, 217
binary mindset; Executive Role oratory, 268–70
Consultation; modes of thought organisational culture, 109–11, 182–7,
ministers, see government ministers 264, 294
Mintzberg, Henry, 186 organisational size, 30–4
mistakes, see cockups & blunders organisational structure, see structures
mob psychology, see mass psychology organisational studies, 94, 237–8
model building, see pattern recognition organisms, see frog & bicycle metaphor
modes of operation, see methods of O’Shaughnessy, Liz: 68–9, 108, 206, 209,
operation 211–16, 218–22, 244–5; Clifford’s
modes of thought: 4–12, 44, 93, 123, 237; parallels, 212, 221, 222–4; Waite’s
‘thinkering’, 185–6, 246 relationship, 19, 211, 222, 225, 227–
money, 5, 89–90, 108, 187, 211, 228, 9, 234
233, 236, 241 outcomes: 75, 83, 86, 206, 238, 243, 273;
monopolies, 58, 82, 90, 188–9, 191 learning, 169, 273
Montgomery, Bernard, 268–70 outputs: 5, 45–6, 92, 108, 236, 243, 277;
morality, see ethics value, 8–9, 12, 158, 203, 214, 228,
Morgan Grenfell, 240 267
Morris, Dick, 12–13 P&O, 216
motivation: binary/ternary, 263; broad- pairing (expectancy), 271
band intelligence, 44; case studies, parenting: authoritarian, 109, 112–13,
133, 181, 194; leadership elements, 117–18, 120–1, 241; intelligence
107–8; performance pay, 56; self- and, 44, 198–201, 233–4, 238, 240,
deception, 60, 150–1 257–8; social conditioning, 26, 97–
motor industry, 5–6 8, 165, 201, 205–6, 220, 244, 299
Mozart, W. A., 50, 133, 239 participation, viii, 32, 97, 123, 265–6
multiple intelligences (Gardner): 40–4, partners (spouses), 224, 241–3
158–62; Australasia, viii, 128, 211, patriarchy, see male-dominated systems
249; case studies, 15, 67–8, 97–9, pattern recognition, 237–41; see also
104, 133, 159–62, 165, 171–2, 179– modes of thought
81, 200, 206, 223, 226–9, 238, 244, pecking orders, 26–8, 66, 277
247–8, 273; corporate leaders, 51, peer-groups, 199, 201–4
65, 130–1, 196, 233, 237–40, 272, Percival, General, 114
296; parenting & sex differences, performance measures, 54–7, 240, 265
196–8, 200; versatility, 43–6 performance pay, 56, 73
multiskilling, 259 pernicious trades, 8, 59–62, 108, 214
Mumford, Enid, 260 perseverance, 183–4
musical intelligence: 41, 44–5, 50, 93, Person, Bob, 193, 195
103, 161–2, 211, 230, 238–9; case personal advantage, 39, 213, 241
studies, 104, 177, 181, 227, 247–8 Personal Development Program, 294–7
Myers-Briggs Type Inventory, 299 personal intelligence: see emotional
narrow intelligence, 40, 142, 274 intelligence; interpersonal
national character: 10, 44, 134; see also awareness; intrapersonal self-
Anglo-Saxon mindset; Asian knowledge
business; Europe personal relationships, see interpersonal
national interests, 88–91, 107, 214, 217 awareness
natural leaders, 16, 25, 123, 159, 163, personality: 108–21; see also
168, 272, 280, 284–5, 297 authoritarian personality; damaged
natural selection, 4, 11, 81, 109, 191, 260 personality
Nazism, 22–3, 60–1, 113, 119, 121, 269– persuasiveness: 5, 8, 24–5, 51, 112, 130,
70 181, 188, 260, 263
networks, 29, 52, 133, 192, 264, 298; see Peters, Tom, 17, 176, 212, 236
also Establishment Phillips, Angela, 201
New Zealand, 117, 175, 249 Phillips, Michael, 193–5
Newton, Isaac, 27, 154, 183 physics, 23–4, 52
Norman, Greg, 231 Piaget, Jean, 124–5
not-for-profit sector, 279–80 Pilger, John 236
nurturing intelligent leadership: 262–300; Pinchot, Gifford, 29, 183, 193–5, 266,
case studies, 68, 134 297
object, see purpose Police, 56, 106
objects, see practical intelligence political skills, 80, 84, 88, 102, 121, 126,
obsessiveness, 154–6, 184, 238, 242, 244, 242
248 politicians: 1, 59, 62, 107, 109, 186, 197,
Index 313
249; intelligence, 126–9; 155; scientific, 27, 154–5, 183, 224,

psychological damage, 241–3; see 248–9
also government ministers reward systems, see salaries & rewards
polyploid horse, 32–4, 52, 254, 256–7 rich and poor, gulf between, 3–4, 236
Porter, Michael, 10, 145, 255 role, 25, 101; see also Executive Role
positioning, 50, 135, 142–4, 187 Consultation
power: 4–12; abuse of, 4–5, 71, 241–3; role models: case studies, 70–1, 88, 92,
male, 35–6, 66, 206; sibling pecking 137, 223, 229; upbringing &
order, 26–8; struggles, 200–3 education, 199–202, 229, 233, 249,
practical intelligence: vii, 2, 34, 131, 159, 299; see also craft
205, 211, 237; case studies, 38, 98, rugby metaphor, 28–30
134, 136, 138, 169, 185–6, 222, 238
Prahalad, C.K., 115, 191 Saddam Hussein, 117, 241
precocity, 47, 50, 97, 104, 190, 278, 282 salaries & rewards: 3–4, 31–2, 56, 73, 79,
predicting leadership success: see 115–16, 236, 266
selection & promotion salespeople, 5, 60, 111–13, 161, 190, 196,
prisoners 3, 16, 109, 157, 166, 200, 202, 293
254 sanity: 15, 78, 111, 131, 236–44, 291; see
private sector collaboration with public also damaged personality
sector: 73–4, 81–4, 88, 255 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 98
privatisation, 3, 57, 59, 81–2, 84, 89–91 Scanlon Plan, 31
privileged background, 114–15 schools, see education
problem-solving, 48, 97, 105–6, 158, 249 Schumacher, Christian, 263–8, 282, 296
process: 22–3, 94, 96, 164, 166–7, 174, science: 41, 44, 302; see also
201, 238, 267; see also business logical/mathematical capabilities
process re-engineering scientific management, 94
product development, 189, 191–5 scientists: 197; in corporations, 31;
productivity, 56, 91, 258–60 international networks, 29; narrow
profits, 62, 90, 182, 216, 236, 259 intelligence, 142; revolutionaries,
promotion, see selection & promotion 27, 154–5, 183, 224, 248–9; teams,
protectors, see mentors 268
psychodynamics, see under groups Scots, 4–6, 9, 75, 122–3, 298
psychological damage, see damaged selection & promotion: 15, 23, 40, 56, 60,
personality 100–2, 110, 123–4, 159–60;
psychometric testing: 80, 103, 105, 110, assessment centre model, 291–71;
124, 160, 198–9, 292, 299; see also case studies, 71, 73–80, 174, 212–
IQ tests 13, 219, 221–2; damaged
public relations, 142–4, 187 personalities, 111–14, 117, 129, 261;
public sector: collaboration with private IBM, 292–7; intellectual firepower,
sector, 73–4, 81–4, 88, 255; 129, 268, 278; military, 149, 151,
educational administration, 174–5, 270–1, 292; see also Career Path
180; performance measures, 56; Appreciation
reform, 59, 266; relations with self-knowledge, see intrapersonal self-
politicians, 126, 247–8; selection knowledge
boards, 292; values, 66, 74; see also selfishness, 39, 213, 241
privatisation Senge, Peter, 34
public utilities, 4, 58, 82, 89–91 seniors, see age
Purpose: attachment to, 262–3; pernicious sex differences, 197, 199–201, 203–9,
or frivolous, 8, 59–62, 108, 214; 246
useful, 14–15 shareholders, 116, 211, 216–17
Shegog, Sue, 166, 168–70
qualities of intelligent leaders, 100–31 sibling leadership, 26–8
quality, 6, 11, 97, 215–16, 265 simplicity, 184–5, 230–1, 267
Sinclair, Amanda, 109–11, 203, 207,
raiders, see hostile takeovers 217–18, 271–2
railway systems, 53, 55–6, 57–9 Singapore, 114, 116
Ramsay, Gregor, 174 size, 30–4
re-engineering, see business process re- skills, 101–2, 103–7, 108, 124, 130, 166
engineering sloppiness, 215–17
reframing, 284–91 small to medium enterprises (SMEs):
relationship businesses: 68–9, 210, 212– 224, 233; mentoring, 297–300
16, 243; case studies, 221–3, 225, smartness, see intellectual firepower
227, 233–4 Snowy Mountains Scheme: viii, 66, 70–
research: 36, 55, 94, 145, 189, 198, 215– 84, 86–9, 93, 99, 149, 162, 265
16, 248, 253, 255, 294; see also Snyder, Allan, 244, 248, 302
Cooperative Research Centres social capital, 81
respect and admiration, 235–6 social competence, see interpersonal
responsibility, 168–9, 172, 265, 277 awareness
Revans, R. W., 48, 292 social conditioning, 200–3
revolutionaries: indirect leaders: 147, socio-technical systems, 258–60
Soviet Union, 95, 117, 241, 272, 278 Tavistock Institute, London, viii, 122,
space-time continuum, 267–8, 282–4 129, 258, 260, 274, 295–6
Spansky: 68, 85, 121, 135–6, 157–62, Taylorism, 260
163–6, 169–71, 173–4, 179, 202, teachers: 161–2, 174–5, 179–81, 187–8,
238, 292 192, 220, 222
spatial intelligence: 24, 41, 160, 162, teamwork: 29, 163, 171–2, 177, 259,
238–9, 292; case studies, 44, 133, 265–6, 294
136, 155, 165–6, 223, 227, 237, 247; technology, see socio-technical systems
gender differences, 197, 204, 206 ternary mindset: 5–17, 24–6, 30–1, 40,
spies, 29, 67–8, 149–51, 153, 156, 167, 52, 115, 117, 129, 202–3, 215; case
188–92 studies, 66, 80, 83, 95–7, 99, 109–
sponsors, see mentors 10, 147–8, 171, 175, 181, 187, 195,
sportspeople, see athletes 206, 213, 226, 228; collaboration
spouses, 224, 241–3 with binary, 81, 83, 255, 295;
stability, 246, 260–2, 293 contests, 231–3; end products, 236;
staff, see employees industrial relations, 122; lawyers,
stakeholders, 97, 116, 122, 128, 214, 216 107; mentors, 299; motivation, 100,
Stalin, Josef, 95, 117, 241 133, 147; politicians, 128–9, 242,
Stambolic, Ivan, 241–2 248; stories, 187–8; trust, 81; war,
Stamp, Gillian, 48, 123, 281 270
standards, 6, 11, 97, 215–16, 265 Thatcher, Margaret, 2, 25–6, 30, 81, 116,
statistics, see measurement 128–9, 208–9, 247–8
status, 37, 44, 78, 94, 195 theatrical talents & metaphors: 23, 25,
Stephen, Sir Ninian, 244, 246–7 176, 180, 186, 233, 239, 246–7, 272;
Stoppard, Tom, 156 actor, 107, 148, 187, 223, 227, 230,
strategic planning, 186, 229, 277, 299– 284, 288, 290, 302; impresario, 143–
300 4, 224, 284; playwright, 156, 164–6;
stratified systems theory, see work see also entertainment industry;
complexity levels heroes
Stravinsky, Igor, 93–4 theory, 43, 123, 185–6
stress, 279, 291 thinkering, 185–6, 246
strong leadership, 25–6 third corner, see ternary mindset
structures: 50, 123, 258, 260, 282, 290–1; thought, see intellectual firepower; modes
hierarchical, 35–8 of thought
stupidity: vii, 2, 39, 129, 209, 216, 268; 3M company, 184
see also cockups & blunders throughput model, 45–6, 162, 267, 273;
subjects (disciplines), 47, 85–6, 103, see also outputs
179–80, 302 Tiger, Lionel, 37, 202
subversives, 68, 85, 95, 135, 159, 163, tiger economies, see Asian business
166 timeliness of decision-making, 48–50; see
Sulloway, Frank, 27, 142 also judgement; space-time
Sunesson, Fanny, 231, 247 continuum
Swinburne University, 227, 301–2 tinkering, see practical intelligence
systems thinking: 45–7, 51; basic tobacco industry, 8, 61–2, 108, 193, 214
assumptions, 262–3; definition, 16; Tomorrow’s Company, 213–17
education, 181, 238, 294, 296; tough but fair, see under fairness
engineers, 162; fairness, 11; human toys, 205–6
needs, 246–7; hydro-electricity as trade unions, see unions
example, 71–2; improving training & development, 56, 100, 108,
operations, 53–9; intelligence and, 111, 149, 213, 221, 240, 253, 283–4,
244; judgement and, 15, 40, 48–50, 288, 290–7; see also mentors
65; mentors, 299–300; transport, 58; transactional leadership, 24
unconscious, 60–2; see also transformational leadership, 24, 67, 144,
conceptual skills; connections 236, 248
making; frog & bicycle metaphor; transformational mentoring, 211
open-system theory; socio-technical transformational moments, 135, 137–8,
systems; throughput model; work 143, 212
complexity levels transformations, 264–6
transport, 57–9
takeovers, hostile, see hostile takeovers triangulation, 12–13
talent: development, 34, 37, 267.; 277– Truman, Harry S., 25
81; neglect & waste of, 66, 157–8, trust: authority and 14, 16, 113, 276–7;
196, 211, 215; see also failure of mentoring, 111, 287, 290;
leadership; work complexity levels rediscovery of, 81–2, 202–3, 210,
task: leadership, 100, 123, 271–2, 276–7; 215, 243; work groups, 258, 268
motivation, 108, 130; ternary TV set, as throughput model, 45, 73
attachment, 25, 96, 195; work tyrants, 21, 78, 241–3
structuring, 264–6 unconscious: 154, 256, 260, 269, 289,
Tasmania: 254–6; see also Clifford, Bob; 302; groups, 270–2; systems
‘Jamie’ thinking, 60–2; see also emotional
Index 315
leadership hierarchy of talents, 101; Jaques’

underprivileged, 158, 168, 176–7, 181, stratified systems theory, viii, 50–1,
212, 220–1 96, 123, 264, 267, 274–81, 284, 299;
unions, 26, 77–8, 95, 116–17, 123, 179 politicians, 126–30; see also
universities, 85–6, 148, 175, 180, 248; hierarchical structures; judgement
see also business schools work groups: 258, 264–6, 283; leaderless,
Unsworth, Barrie, 254–5 263–5
upbringing, see parenting Work Structuring, 263–8, 282–3, 296
usefulness, 9, 66, 73, 84, 158, 170, 214 work system stratification, see work
utilities, 4, 58, 82, 89–91 complexity levels
value-added outputs, 8–9, 12, 158, 203, workers, see employees
214, 228, 267 World Bank, 247–8
values agenda, 12–13 Wrangham, Richard, 200
vehicle, see methods of operation Xerox, 31
verbal skills, see linguistic capabilities Yorkshire Ripper, 106
versatility, 43–6 young people: commitment, 124–5;
Vickers, Sir Geoffrey, 79–80, 110 intelligence, 15, 40, 45–7, 121;
violence, see aggression relationship businesses, 212–13,
vision, 186–7, 195, 239, 282; see also 216, 221–2; systems thinking, 45–7,
whole picture 238; see also education; juniors
vocational education & counselling, 172,
213
voting, 1, 6–7, 12–13, 71, 122, 126, 128
Wagner, Richard, 238–9
Waite, Noel: 69, 225–8, 245; art &
method, 229, 232–4 broad-band
intelligence, 104, 206, 209, 244;
mentoring, 207, 210–13, 219, 222,
224, 234, 284; relationship business,
213, 216, 222, 297
Wansey, Julia, 293
war: leadership in, 21, 26, 67, 93, 114–
15, 149–51, 237, 268–70, 292;
operations research, 259; sense of
priorities, 75; see also commando
groups; spies
Westpac, 203, 208, 274
whole picture: 28–30, 36, 52, 57, 110,
183, 237, 260; case studies, 28–9,
50, 54–6, 72, 84, 88, 94, 96, 133,
155, 165, 179, 238; 155; long-term
success, 210, 215, 217; politicians,
128, 249; privatisation, 82–4; see
also vision
widows, 193–5
Williams, Robyn, 83, 86, 248
Willis, Paul, 163–6
win/lose, see binary mindset
Winterson, Jeanette, 220
wisdom, 60, 74–5, 110, 279
Wolfenshon, James, 244, 247–8
women: characteristic intellectual
strengths, 37, 40–2, 198–200;
characteristic kinds of business,
212–14, 243–4; characteristic
leadership style, 197, 199–201, 203–
4, 216; education, 85, 180, 233;
entrepreneurs, 211, 233 (see also
O’Shaughnessy; Waite); households,
32; mentors, 231, 298–9;
networking, 264; pilots, 105; role
models, 201; rugby metaphor, 29;
scientists, 301; sibling leadership,
28; stability, 246; systems thinking,
52; ternary/binary orientation, 9, 16,
126, 241–3, 248; see also feminism;
girls; glass ceiling; male-dominated
systems; spouses
work complexity levels: development of
judgement, 124–6, 133, 155, 228;

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Alistair Mant was born and raised in Sydney.

He attended Sydney Grammar School

ALLEN & UNWIN

Copyright © Alistair Mant 1997

First published in 1997

National Library of Australia

1. Leadership. 2. Leadership—Case studies. 3. Organizational change. I. Title.

Digital processing by The Electric Book Company, London, UK, www.elecbook.com

This book is primarily about intelligence—not the sort of ‘intelligence’ measured by

I want to be the leader!

Roger McGough, b. 1937

French revolutionary leader (in cafe), circa 1848

As the millennium approaches, there is evidently some kind of problem about

all legitimacy. It doesn’t stop there. Confidence in public administrators, trade

tooth-and-claw, materialistic fractiousness, rather than the wonderful folksy

POWER, AUTHORITY AND MODES OF THOUGHT

Figure 1 Modes of operation

of three-cornered relationships, where absolute power is softened or governed by the

Figure 3 Possible output value/delivery process combinations

‘tigers’ and, more relevantly, the exemplars of so-called ‘Rhineland’ or ‘Rhenish’

There is a very profound contrast between such (symmetrical)

Figure 4 The good boss

Dick Morris, ‘triangulation’ and the ternary election

alongside the already securely established ‘values agenda’. According to

ABOUT THIS BOOK

A mob transcends its leaders, becomes a single wild happy thing

It is a good description of the primitive behaviours sometimes observable in

THE LEADERSHIP PHENOMENON AS PHYSICS OR

a relationship—you have to discover it! Boys should be taught these things in

McGregor Burns’ transactional/transformational leadership paralleled my own

LEADING FROM BEHIND

PECKING ORDERS AND ‘SIBLING’ LEADERSHIP IN

creative—to make exciting things happen. It is crucial therefore for systems—

LEADERSHIP OF THE BIG (WORLD) GAME—THE

THE ABB COMPANY—THE NEW CORPORATE

THE FABLE OF THE POLYPLOID HORSE

The polyploid horse is an almost perfect metaphor for the overblown

THE PARABLE OF IMO, THE GENIUS MONKEY

I frequently tell the story of Imo to executive audiences, in order to make a

a five-year-old girl interviewed on BBC Radio. When asked the name of

As we pass from reflections on ‘leadership’ to reflections on ‘intelligence’ we

Why do we need to look at intelligence from a new angle? The answer is

• Linguistic: the sort shown in the extreme by poets

Figure 5 Gardner’s seven intelligences

When I first wrote about personal intelligences I was talking about

In my experience, it is often women who become terrified by the mob dynamic of

Figure 6 Simple throughput model

1. Everybody is (potentially) good at systems thinking.

SYSTEMS THINKING AND JUDGEMENT

(but you sense you have to do something—fast!)

Figure 7 The anatomy of timely decision-making

extraordinary, he reveals an insight he grasped as a young helmsman: ‘In sailing,

Figure 8 The bicycle and the frog: a basic metaphor

All of the foregoing metaphors for leadership (the binary/ternary, the

Figure 9 Improving systems operation

internally consistent subsystems. Frogs are determined by their environment—the

LIES, DAMNED LIES AND THE TYRANNY OF

performance measures are in place (pretending to be the same thing as actual

economy’ in the official statistics. Overnight, the economy ‘grew’ by a sixth.

THE RAILWAY FROG